This essay explores Plato’s rudimentary epistemology of non-discursive thought. I will proceed in three steps, beginning with a general view of Plato’s philosophy, subsequently focusing on the Meno, and ending with a close reading of the passages on music in Republic. In the first section, I will outline a general framework to examine the relation between truth (alētheia) and discourse (logos) in Plato’s philosophy. My central argument is that, for Plato, discourse is a necessary yet not sufficient condition for truth. Accordingly, I identify two sides of Plato’s philosophy: his “logocentric” project, which aims to demonstrate the necessity of discourse in truth-finding, and his “logoskeptic” project, which underscores the insufficiency of discourse in truth-finding. This double philosophical undertaking, then, raises the question of how both aspects—discourse’s necessity and its insufficiency—relate to each other in a combined extra-discursive pursuit of truth. In the subsequent two sections, I will focus on two Platonic dialogues to characterize the relation between logoskepticism and logocentrism as a dialectical circle. First, I will analyze this relation through a reading of the Meno, in particular the aporia of the ‘‘paradox of inquiry”. This interpretation aims both to solidify the general framework presented in the previous section and to introduce the notion of “dialectics” to conceptualize the relation between one’s discourse and that which transcends one’s discursive abilities. In the Meno, I argue, this dialectic unfolds as a circular mode of thinking in which a form of passivity ultimately proves decisive. However, in the Meno, the dialectical mode of thought remains largely confined to the realm of discursivity, leaving unresolved the question of how discourse and the non-discursive might collaborate in a similarly dialectical yet extra-discursive mode of reason. Finally, in the third section, I argue that a close reading of the passages on music in Book III of the Republic (398b–403c) reveals an insight into the dialectical relation between discursive and non-discursive reason. Throughout these passages, Plato launches a paradoxical theory of musical pedagogy. In short, Plato makes a case for the cognitive value of music’s non-discursive nature, while simultaneously explaining this non-discursive quality in a thoroughly logocentric manner. Much of the scholarship on Plato’s philosophy of music tends to emphasize only one side of this paradox. However, I contend that by recognizing both contrasting aspects of Plato’s musical pedagogy, by preserving rather than resolving their circular relation to each other, we can see how discourse and non-discursive material interact dialectically in music. In doing so, I aim to show how Plato’s paradoxical theory of music bridges two key aspects of his overall philosophy, namely discourse’s necessity and its insufficiency in the pursuit of truth.
