dc.contributor.author
Dittrich, Marcus
dc.contributor.author
Knabe, Andreas
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:13:55Z
dc.date.available
2010-08-31T09:24:00.091Z
dc.identifier.isbn
978-3-941240-27-8
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19613
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/FUDOCS_document_000000006425
dc.description.abstract
Common wisdom holds that the introduction of a non-binding minimum wage is
irrelevant for actual wages and employment. Empirical and experimental
research, however, has shown that the introduction of a minimum wage can raise
even those wages that were already above the new minimum wage. In this paper,
we analyze how these findings can be explained by theoretical wage bargaining
models between unions and firms. While the Nash bargaining solution is
unaffected by minimum wages below initially bargained wages, we show that such
minimum wages can drive up wages – and be harmful to employment – when
bargaining follows the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000314-2
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000006-7
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::331 Arbeitsökonomie
dc.title
Wage and employment effects of non-binding minimum wages
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Volkswirtschaftslehre
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refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000006425
refubium.series.issueNumber
2010,15 : Economics
refubium.series.name
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000001126
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access