dc.contributor.author
Scharpf, Fritz W.
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:06:09Z
dc.date.available
2013-10-21
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19363
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-23019
dc.description
1\. Introduction 5 2\. Performance of the Original Euro Regime 6 2.1
Centralized Monetary Policy in a Non-optimal Currency Area 7 2.2 Euro Crisis
and Euro-rescue Policies 10 3\. The New Regime of Euro Governance 12 3.1
Revised Problem Perceptions and their Implications 13 3.2 From Soft
Recommendations to Hardened Requirements 13 3.3 What if the New Regime Had
Been in Place? 15 4\. The Euro Regime: What is Gained and What Was Lost? 17
4.1 Limited Gains 18 4.2 Instead of Nominal Devaluation, Competitive Real
Devaluation 18 4.3 Obstacles to the Management of Aggregate Demand 19 4.4
Global Capitalism and Self-inflicted Helplessness 20 4.5 But Could the Regime
be Patched? 20 5\. Input Legitimacy of the Present Euro Regime? 24 6\. Could
Political Union Provide the Solution? 26 6.1 The Risk of Politicization 26 6.2
Legitimate Majority Rule? 28 References 30
dc.description.abstract
On the basis of a brief reconstruction of the causes and impacts of the Euro
crisis, this paper explores, counterfactually and hypothetically, whether the
new Euro regime, insisting on fiscal austerity and supply-side reforms, could
have prevented the rise of the crisis or is able to deal with its disastrous
economic and social impact. A comparison with the likely impact of transfer-
based Keynesian reflation suggests that, in both cases, economic success is
uncertain, while both approaches are likely to produce severely negative
sideeffects. In light of such dismal policy choices, attempts to politicize
European election campaigns are more likely to provoke unmanageable policy
conflict than to overcome the input-oriented, democratic deficit of European
economic governance.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000055-9
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.title
Political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_52_Scharpf.pdf?1382011977
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe"
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000019087
refubium.series.issueNumber
52
refubium.series.name
KFG working paper
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000002818
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access