The EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) was launched in the 1990s as a quest for “autonomy.” Fifteen years of efforts failed to deliver that objective. The coherence of the EU member states in their security dealings with the US was always vulnerable to the potentially incompatible objectives of the UK and France. But as EU leaders post-Brexit re-launch the CSDP, as the 2016 European Global Strategy rediscovers the virtues of “strategic autonomy,” and as the world juggles with a US president who appears to question the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, it is time to radically re-think the relations between the EU and NATO. This paper argues that, in the longer term, it is through the strengthening of the EU-NATO relationship that EU strategic autonomy will become possible, and that a consolidation of the transatlantic bond will emerge.

Integrating theories about discourse (Discourse Studies; DS) with social science theories allows to grasp the dynamic and fluid co-construction of European identities, both top-down and bottom-up. Such interdisciplinary approaches systematically deconstruct the everyday workings of European institutions and support our understanding of the impact of traditional and social media in their production and reproduction of pro-European or Eurosceptic sentiments and attitudes. In this chapter, I first present some important characteristics of Discourse Studies and Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), specifically of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA). I then, secondly, summarize the most relevant discursive research based on a range of theories and methodological approaches on European integration. Thirdly, I illustrate the interdisciplinary nexus of discourse-oriented European studies with a case study on the mediatization and politicization of the refugee crisis in Austria, from 2015-2016. I specifically focus on legitimation strategies and argumentation schemes which accompany the implementation of ever more restrictive policy decisions.

This paper deals with two litmus tests for theories of European integration. The first part asks, how and to what extent various approaches can explain the contemporary crises of European integration. It thereby tackles the question whether European integration theories might have biased EU scholars towards ignoring evidence for (dis-)integration. While being more optimistic about the state of the Union than many EU scholars are, the paper argues for a more differentiated conceptualization of integration as a continuous variable that takes disintegration rather than stagnation or no integration as the opposite value of integration. The second part of the paper asks to what extent European integration theories are able to shed light on experiences with regionalism across the globe. It argues that they do provide plausible accounts for the emergence of regionalism around the world. Comparing regions points to important scope conditions under which European integration theories operate. When it comes to outcomes, however, they need to be complemented by explanations emphasizing diffusion to explain why and when states are more inclined to pool and delegate sovereignty in some regions than in others.

After twenty years of continuous deepening and widening, European integration has entered an era of recurrent crises. Most students of the European Union (EU) seem to agree that the constitutional equilibrium between intergovernmental and supranational institutions has changed. Some see “new intergovernmentalism” and “integration without supranationalisation” prevail. Others contend that we witness a series of functional and institutional spillovers empowering supranational institutions. This paper argues that governance approaches are particularly useful to address the puzzling counter-positions represented in the current debate about the ‘nature of the beast. They are better equipped to explore how and to what end institutional structures and processes have responded to the crises than mainstream integration theories. The paper starts with introducing the “governance turn” in EU studies as the attempt of EU scholars in the early 1990s to capture the nature of the EU. It then presents a typology that is based on a broad concept of governance as institutionalized forms of political coordination. The empirical part uses this typology to give an overview of the structures and processes of EU governance before applying it to the financial and the migration crises. The paper concludes with a discussion of the major challenges for European integration (theories) from a governance perspective, particularly with regard to managing current and preventing future crises.

In this paper we seek to explain why bank performance has varied so dramatically during and after the financial crisis on Europe’s periphery, both across states and within them. Our dependent variable is bank performance defined in terms of credit provision and banks’ contribution to financial stability. Our independent variable is the particular mix at play between political/social purpose and what we call ‘market authority’ - the importance of market incentives, signals and pricing within a particular financial ‘ecosystem’. “Economic nationalism” or the politicization of local and regional banks has often imbued banks with social and political goals, serving the economy at different levels, and is one major source of political/social purpose. But the latter must be constrained by market authority. We argue that for optimal bank performance, economic nationalism or political/social purpose must be constrained by market authority, otherwise a political logic (e.g. cronyism, a lack of professionalism, and deficits in banking expertise) can easily subvert or distort credit provision and undermine financial stability.

This concluding chapter of the third edition of European Integration Theory (OUP 2018) takes stock of the updated mosaic of integration theory. The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section offers a comparative perspective on the book’s chapters. To that end, it presents the preferences of each approach from a comparative perspective, against the backdrop of three leading metaphorical perceptions of the EU. The second section addresses the absence of security crises in the book’s contributions. To explore, how security crises may be brought into focus in integration theory, it distinguishes the impact of integration along two dimensions. These include first, the horizontal regional comparative perspective and the ‘litmus test’ of the applicability of integration theory to other regions; and second, the vertical dimension which connects normative crises in EU sub-units with global conflicts. And the concluding third section asks how integration theory fares sixty years on from the Treaty of Rome, and points out potential issues and themes for the future of European integration theory.

This introductory chapter of the third edition of European Integration Theory (OUP 2018) addresses the rationale for a book on European integration theory and introduces the contributions to the book. It begins by addressing the question of Why Study Integration Theory; it then defines the terms ‘integration’ and ‘theory’ and introduces the ‘mosaic of European integration theory’ as the book’s central concept. The chapter also offers an overview of European integration as a process which has been studied for several decades now. To that end, the chapter recalls distinct phases of integration and the respective parts of the mosaic which have been developed to understand and explain them based on descriptive, analytical and constructive theorising. Each phase is distinguished by historical context, leading questions and relevant theoretical reference points. The book’s extensive section on Studying European Integration by taking account of ‘contexts of theoretical development’ and addressing the question of ‘competing or complementary theoretical approaches’ which also identifies the functions and areas of theory. In concluding, the chapter details the concept of the ‘Mosaic of Integration Theory’ and introduces the chapter structure of the book’s contributions.

European integration is a fundamentally open-ended and contested process. Within the ‘mosaic of European integration theories’, critical political economy perspectives highlight the imbalances and structural power asymmetries of the European project, and how they have become manifest in the multiple crises in Europe. How to account for both the origins and consequences of this crisis has become a key question for scholars and students of European integration. We argue that critical political economy (CPE) has an important and unique contribution to make here. Unlike other approaches, CPE seeks to uncover the deep connections between the (internal) dynamics of the European integration process and the dynamics of global capitalism, arguing that European integration, or disintegration for that matter, takes place in a global, structural context that shapes and conditions both form and content of the integration process. In this paper, we provide an overview of the key concepts, methodology and arguments of a critical political economy perspective on European integration. Following a discussion of the core conceptual framework, the paper then proceeds with an integrated analysis of EMU as a political project, with a particular focus on continuity and changes within the political economy of neoliberalism. The Euro crisis here serves as a contemporary reference point to illustrate the strengths and contributions of critical political economy perspectives to the overall mosaic of European integration theories.

In the last three decades Regional Parliamentary Institutions (RPIs) have experienced a rapid increase and spread across all regions around the globe. They represent a unique parliamentary phenomenon of international affairs that first and foremost exhibits a genuine legitimacy nexus between local constituencies and the international area. This paper builds on this characteristic and elaborates a legitimacy approach that identifies three legitimacy mechanisms that may help to conceptualize the establishment of specific design features of RPIs. To this end, a concise typology of RPIs with two disjunctive criteria – election mode and connection to a parent regional organization – provides the grounds for a systematic analysis of their organizational design. Building on a newly created dataset of 68 globally spread RPIs, the empirical analysis generates two main findings: (1) the rapid increase of RPIs after 1989 is empirically corroborated for all regions and most types of these institutions; (2) two standard applications of the developed legitimacy mechanisms – functional and normative legitimacy arguments – are not significant in explaining the choice of specific design features of RPIs. Therefore, the observed rapid increase and global spread of these institutions provide tentative evidence to support a diffusion analysis of their emergence and design, making the paper call for a more thorough conceptualization of RPIs’ organizational design and processes of inter- dependent decision-making.

The global financial safety net provides backstop during times of financial crises. Its elements underwent fundamental changes since the global financial crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) introduced new facilities on the global level, new regional financial arrangements (RFAs) were created, and bilateral swap agreements emerged as a new element. In this paper, we ask how these changes influence the use of the different safety net options, and what role RFAs have in the safety net today. We created a database with all the cases in which a RFA member drew on one of the elements of the global safety net. This allows us to analyze which other options the country had at hand, and to examine their use along the institutional design in terms of timeliness, volume, and policy conditionality. We find today’s global financial safety net to be not a global, but a geographically and structurally scattered net. RFAs make the safety net safer only for small member countries. Just few countries can count on a bilateral swap line, their selection being subject to the discretion of the swap partner. Thus, a large number of countries fall through important knots of the safety net and have the IMF as their only option.

The global climate change agreement completed on December 12, 2015 in Paris set a collective target to cap greenhouse gas emissions in order to limit the temperature increase to 2 degrees Celsius with a goal to get as close as possible to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels. These goals were to be accomplished through a “bottom up” mechanism for national policy approaches in which states made their own choices about how they would meet climate targets. This paper examines why and how an agreement was possible in 2015 when it had not been before. What was different in Paris, or leading up to Paris, so that the parties involved successfully came to an agreement when it was not possible in Copenhagen? This paper presents a problem definition and issue framing perspective to examine the shift in the discussion in Paris from the burdens of climate action to opportunities climate action offered for economic and development models. It provides a road map to understand the role of key stakeholders, including governments, the business community, civil society, and subnational actors in the making of the climate agreement.

The idea that states can hold common values and standards of conduct as well as some capacity to act in the international arena in collective manners for collective goals is epitomized in the concept of international community. Although the term is widely used by scholars, practitioners, and international political leaders and is an integral part of the common international vocabulary, only few have sought to define it, identify its members, and characterize its ways of actions and sources of legitimacy. This paper asks: Who is the international community? Taking a socio-discursive approach, I argue that the international community is essentially a construct that does not exist beyond the discursive level, namely that it materializes only when political agents talk about it, refer to it, and attribute to it certain values, rules, and virtues. I present here the findings of an automated text analysis of 4264 states’ speeches at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that point to the prevalence of the international community in the international discourse and reveal the main topics that are associated with it. These findings illuminate salience patterns in the discursive construction of the international community and shed light on its function as a legitimacy framework for international action

Why do regional powers such as Brazil, South Africa, or Russia undertake different collective strategies to supply public goods in their regions of influence? When do those states prefer to delegate competences to existent multilateral financial institutions, such as regional development banks (RDBs), and when do they prefer to make use of their own national financial instruments? Why do those states create new RDBs that challenge the existing ones? The article builds and tests a set of hypotheses based on the interplay between capabilities and legitimacy to help answer these questions using contemporary South America as a case study. Through a process tracing analysis carried out for the period 2000–15, the article explains the different strategies undertaken by two states, Brazil and Venezuela, to supply infrastructure in the region, ranging from the use of the Brazilian National Development Bank to the creation of a new Bank of the South. It is suggested that the low capabilities and legitimacy expectations of both states explain the rising importance of external actors in the supply of regional public goods that we are currently witnessing in South America.

Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional institutions. While powerful states – particularly the “new” rising powers – may have a vested interest in regionalism as a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers.

Corresponding to the global proliferation of inter-state activities at the regional level since the end of the Cold War, Eurasia has experienced a surge of regional agreements and organizations. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, more than 29 regional organizations (ROs) with significant membership and agenda overlap have emerged. These organizations differ significantly in terms of institutional design. Organizations that were created in the 1990s and early 2000s display very limited or no pooling of authority and low to moderate delegation. Regional organizations that were established during the past decade show pronounced delegation and median pooling. A mapping based on formal treaty analysis shows a general deepening of regional integration over time. It also reveals three phases of Eurasian regionalism with distinct integration dynamics and goals. Especially the third phase is surprising, as we do not only witness the increase of political authority of ROs, but also a more consequent implementation of agreements and the introduction of supranational elements. This deepening of regionalism is puzzling in light of 1) the rather recent independence of the Eurasian states and their colonial past under Russian domination, 2) the level of autocracy in the region, and 3) the presence of a regional hegemon, which has moreover recently experienced an authoritarian backlash. Relying on the concept of political authority, the first part of this paper gives an overview of the development of formal regional integration in Eurasia during the past 25 years. The second part of the paper asks why Russia and the smaller Eurasian states go along with increasing authority transfers to ROs. Based on a series of elite interviews conducted in Russian in February and March 2017, potential drivers of Eurasian regionalism are explained, with particular attention to Russian motives. The paper concludes with an outlook on avenues for future research.

One distinguishing feature of the “new” regionalism is its outward orientation – the increased importance of the external dimension of regional cooperation. It makes sense, then, that efforts to manage external perceptions of a region, on the part of policy-relevant actors in that region, might contribute to important changes to regional norms and institutions. By and large, though, existing accounts of normative and institutional change at the regional level do not explicitly conceptualize and theorize collective image consciousness and management. This paper offers an initial attempt to address this conceptual gap, making use of two cases of regional image crisis (post-Cold War Africa and post-1997 Southeast Asia) in order to draw out logics of regional image consciousness and to distinguish among types of regional image management efforts. As regional communities of states, Africa and Southeast Asia promoted and adhered to a relatively strict interpretation of the principle of non-interference during the Cold War period. In the post-Cold War era, the non-interference norm has eroded in both regions. In each, these developments constituted – in part – a collective image management strategy, aimed at external audiences. Reforms to regional institutions were promoted in part as efforts to ameliorate negative international perceptions.

This research paper attempts to assess European responses to the Arab uprisings and, in particular, the introduced change in the EU policy towards its Southern Neighborhood. In specific terms, to what extent do security and strategic considerations still constitute the basis in the EU’s “fundamental revision” of its policy in the Southern Neighborhood? And to what extent is the need to safeguard security and strategic interests undermining an authentic EU role in building deep democracy in the region? The presented analyses provide a profound scrutiny and assessment of the new version of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), an empirical evidence of persisting security considerations post-2011 in Euro-Arab relations, and a more elaborated vision of future Euro-Arab relations, attempting to balance between three considerations: security, democracy, and governance. The paper argues that the EU response to revolutionary events in the Arab region has been weak and that the new version of the ENP results hollow. Wide disagreements among European capitals on how to react to Arab uprisings, the sudden influx of illegal migrants and refugees, increased energy concerns, and the rise of political Islam, especially in radical forms, appears to be the key reasons behind this weak response. The study advocates that a proactive and agile EU role in the Arab region post-2011 should not be considered as derived from a moral stance. Rather, it is urgently required as it is in Europe’s own interest. The historic events in the Arab region suggest that the EU should not merely revise its own ENP with the Southern Mediterranean. However, it should develop a comprehensive vision and an all-encompassing approach to the entire Arab region, from the West Mediterranean to the Gulf. Finally, this paper provides a number of policy recommendations, attempting to offer a frame for such a vision.

The political game in the European Union has changed. Nowadays, EU issues are politicized in the public mass arena and demand from the European leadership more than the traditional, thin top-down communication. Concerns about the European democratic deficit and the legitimacy of the EU have made it important to engage citizens in EU issues and actively win their support. Since citizens almost never have firsthand experience with EU issues, they are most likely to pick up political cues from media discourse. Several events have shown that many citizens have only recently discovered the implications of European integration. Apparently, much of the media discourse on EU issues emanating from unpoliticized consensual decision-making in interest-based arenas does not reach the citizens. By comparing the media discourse on the few EU issues in which citizens have become activated and engaged – either to challenge or to support European decision-making – with media discourse that has not engaged citizens, the mechanism can be unraveled that explains the conditions under which citizens most effectively become politically active regarding EU issues. It is expected that a discourse that is highly loaded with emotions is more likely to reach citizens’ hearts and minds, and thus lead to political action, than the usual technical and consensual manner of presenting European decision-making. Insights from collective action research and on media effect research are used to operationalize the key-concept “emotions”. Media discourse that generates sufficient arousal to attract the citizens’ attention and interest and that invokes the identity of an imagined community in relation to a sense of agency and injustice is most likely to mobilize European citizens, even on an EU issue.

Of all the countries identified as rising powers on the world stage, Brazil appears to have drawn considerable economic and political strength from its engagement with various forms of regionalism during the expansionist years when Lula was president. Whether by helping create a local, intra-regional entity (Mercosul) or, later, proposing a continental one (UNASUL), Brasilia appeared to have the capacity to further its own economic and political interests by generating cooperative interactions with its smaller neighbors. Subsequently it took a leading role in inter-regional negotiations between Mercosul and the European Union in the global North and between Mercosul and ASEAN in the global South. More recently still, it spread its wings by associating trans-regionally with powers that are similarly dominant within their own regions – IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) and BRICS (Russia, India, China, and South Africa) which shared with it a desire to play greater roles in the major institutions of global governance. While these new associations have their inner raisons d’être, belonging to them also bolsters Brazil’s weight in such traditional multilateral organizations as the United Nations and the WTO which were previously dominated by the US-Europe-Japan triad. This working paper assesses the relative importance of these different regionalisms in Brazil’s emergence on the global stage by counterposing them with such standard explanations of a state’s global significance as its military might, economic strength, and its soft-power influence overseas. We identify how various regionalisms interact with traditional bilateral and multilateral relations in helping or hindering Brazil in its global ascent. We conclude to our surprise that regionalism has only played a minimally positive role economically. Even politically, it has on occasion become more hindrance than help in boosting Brazil into its current orbit – as its announced intention to negotiate separately with the EU suggests.

The EU has for a long time claimed the title of “leader” in the international politics of climate change. However, existing research has generally failed to specify whether the EU’s purported leadership has induced the “followership” of other states. This working paper seeks to shed light on this somewhat neglected topic by examining the attempted diffusion of climate change norms, policies, and institutions by the EU to China and India. The paper makes two principal arguments. First, the development of Chinese and Indian climate change policy should be understood as primarily domestic developments. Nonetheless, there was limited evidence of diffusion from the EU, but there was significant variation between the Chinese and Indian responses to the EU’s diffusion attempts. The Chinese response was one increasing accommodation; the Indian response was a more straightforward case of resistance. Second, domestic factors help to explain the variation in the Chinese and Indian responses to EU attempts at diffusion and, related, the observed pattern of diffusion from the EU to China and India. Particularly important is the degree to which new external ideas and concepts resonate with pre-existing domestic ideas and concepts. The paper thus paints a picture of limited EU leadership, but also suggests that the EU attempts to secure “followership” could be enhanced by paying greater attention to the domestic politics and preferences of third countries.