dc.contributor.author
Saatçioğlu, Beken
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T07:57:46Z
dc.date.available
2010-07-15
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19078
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-22749
dc.description
1\. Introduction 5 2\. Overview of the Literature 7 2.1 Credible EU
Conditionality 7 2.2 Liberal Ruling Parties (or Low Political Compliance
Costs) 10 3\. Data and Argument 11 3.1 Measurement of Conditionality 11 3.2
Measurement of Compliance 14 3.3 AKP’s Political Identity Reconsidered 15 3.4
Argument on AKP’s Compliance Trends 21 4\. Conclusion 26 Literature 27
Appendix 30
dc.description.abstract
What explains the EU compliance of Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP)? Since it came to power in 2002, AKP has launched legislative
reforms in order to meet the European Union’s political membership criteria
(i.e., democracy, rule of law, human rights and minority rights). These
reforms are puzzling since they happened in the absence of the two conditions
of compliance argued in the literature: (1) credible EU political
conditionality, (2) liberal ruling parties in EU candidate states. I argue
that AKP’s pro-EU reform agenda is explained by neither a belief in the
possibility of membership via democratization (credible conditionality) nor
liberal political identity. Rather, democratic measures under AKP are
instrumentally induced. Two broad political motivations have guided AKP’s
reform commitment: (1) the electoral incentive to please Turkey’s pro-EU
membership electorate as well as AKP’s conservative/religious constituency
eager to see freedom of religion expanded under EU conditionality, (2) the
motive to use reforms to weaken domestic secular forces (i.e. the military and
high courts) and “survive” as a party with Islamist roots in Turkey’s secular
political system. The paper supports the argument with evidence gathered from
original coding data for both conditionality and compliance as well as
process-tracing.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000055-9
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.title
Unpacking the compliance puzzle
dc.title.subtitle
the case of Turkey‘s AKP under EU conditionality
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe"
![Dieser Wert wurde niemals validiert.](/cache_202e45ad85b55efaeb29160f63cd3f3b/themes/FuCD/images/authority_control/invisible.gif)
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000006031
refubium.series.issueNumber
14
refubium.series.name
KFG working paper
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000001021
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access