dc.contributor.author
Eibauer, Josef
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T07:46:52Z
dc.date.available
2012-12-21
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/18690
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-22377
dc.description.abstract
The present study tries to investigate on the dynamics between the level of
transparency of international treaty negotiations and the success of European
Commission negotiators in achieving their particular political interests.
Drawing upon an alternated version of Robert Putnam's two-level game approach,
two distinct hypotheses are established. First, a low level of transparency of
international treaty negotiations increases the amount of gains available to
European Commission negotiators at the international level. Second, a low
level of transparency of international treaty negotiations decreases the
likelihood of ratification at the non-international level. These hypothesis
are tested against the case of the international Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) negotiations and the subsequent ratification procedure that
took place between the years 2005 and 2012. Empirically, it can be confirmed
that the ACTA talks' low level of transparency detached the usually
intertwined international, supranational, and domestic negotiation levels and
thus increased the political leeway available to the Commission, leading to a
treaty text that reflected its tough stance on intellectual property rights
regulation. However, the low level of transparency also resulted in the
Commission's lack of information about the true nature of negotiation outcomes
that were acceptable to both the public and parliamentary majorities. Indeed,
following a lively campaign against the treaty that was predominantly
coordinated via the internet and social networks, ACTA ultimately failed
ratification both on Member State and Community levels. In a nutshell: When
the debated issues are controversial and salient to the public, the European
Commission is likely to fail reaping the benefits of international negotiation
secrecy.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000069-0
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::323 Grundrechte und politische Rechte
dc.title
Blessing or curse? The effects of transparency on the European Commission's
success at the international ACTA negotiations
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/oekonomie/ipoe/pipe_working_papers/papers/PIPE_Working_Paper_14-12_Eibauer_-_Blessing_or_Curse__Effects_of_Transparency.pdf
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft / Schwerpunkt Internationale Politische Ökonomie
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refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000015814
refubium.series.issueNumber
14
refubium.series.name
PIPE - papers on international political economy
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000002277
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access