dc.contributor.author
Armas, Jay
dc.contributor.author
Merbis, Wout
dc.contributor.author
Meylahn, Janusz M.
dc.contributor.author
Rafiee Rad, Soroush
dc.contributor.author
Razo, Mauricio J. del
dc.date.accessioned
2025-03-20T12:28:39Z
dc.date.available
2025-03-20T12:28:39Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/46930
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-46645
dc.description.abstract
Cooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma games with an arbitrary number of players by combining reaction networks, methods from quantum mechanics applied to stochastic complex systems, game theory and stochastic simulations of molecular reactions. Using this framework, we propose a novel and robust mechanism for cooperation based on risk aversion that leads to cooperative behaviour in population games. Rather than individuals seeking to maximise payouts in the long run, individuals seek to obtain a minimum set of resources with a given level of confidence and in a limited time span. We show that this mechanism can lead to the emergence of new equilibria in a range of social dilemma games.
en
dc.format.extent
28 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
risk aversion
en
dc.subject
population games
en
dc.subject
reaction networks
en
dc.subject
stochastic petri net
en
dc.subject.ddc
500 Naturwissenschaften und Mathematik::510 Mathematik::510 Mathematik
dc.title
Risk aversion can promote cooperation
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.articlenumber
015010
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1088/2632-072X/adb234
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Journal of Physics: Complexity
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
1
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
6
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1088/2632-072X/adb234
refubium.affiliation
Mathematik und Informatik
refubium.affiliation.other
Institut für Mathematik

refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
2632-072X
refubium.resourceType.provider
WoS-Alert