dc.contributor.author
Schneider, Julia
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-07T14:44:53Z
dc.date.available
2010-08-24T13:06:04.388Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/358
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-4562
dc.description
INTRODUCTION
.......................................................................................................
1 CHAPTER 1: GERMANY’S SHIFT TOWARDS ACTIVATION
.............................................. 7 1 Activation in Labor Market
Policy
..............................................................................
7 2 The Hartz-Reforms
................................................................................................
10 3 The Shift towards Activation through Hartz IV
.......................................................... 13 CHAPTER 2: THE
DATA
.............................................................................................
16 CHAPTER 3: EFFECTS OF BENEFIT SANCTIONS ON RESERVATION WAGES, SEARCH
EFFORT,AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
....................................................................................19
1 Introduction
..........................................................................................................
19 2 Welfare Sanctions in Germany
...............................................................................
23 3 Data
....................................................................................................................
24 3.1 Sample Description
...........................................................................................
24 3.2 Descriptive Statistics
.........................................................................................
25 4 Empirical Approach and Results
.............................................................................
27 4.1 Identification and Estimation
...............................................................................
27 4.2 Estimation Results
.............................................................................................
31 4.3 Common Support and Matching Quality
............................................................... 33 4.4
Matching Estimates by Outcome
.......................................................................... 34
4.4.1 Reservation Wages
.........................................................................................
35 4.4.2 Search Effort
..................................................................................................
36 4.4.3 Re-employment
..............................................................................................
36 4.5 Further Sensitivity Checks
..................................................................................
38 5 Conclusion
............................................................................................................39
Appendix
.................................................................................................................41
CHAPTER 4: IMPACTS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTION PLANS ON RESERVATION WAGES, SEARCH
EFFORT AND RE-EMPLOYMENT
....................................................................................50
1 Introduction
..........................................................................................................
50 2 Individual Action Plans for Welfare Recipients in Germany
........................................ 52 3 Individual Action Plans in a Job
Search Model .......................................................... 54 4
Data
....................................................................................................................
58 4.1 Sample Selection
...............................................................................................
59 4.2 Descriptive Statistics
..........................................................................................
59 5 Empirical Approach and Results
.............................................................................
62 5.1 Identification and Estimation
..............................................................................
62 5.2 Conditional Independence
..................................................................................
62 5.3 Estimation
.........................................................................................................
65 5.4 Estimation Results
..............................................................................................
67 5.5 Effects of IAP as Single Treatment
....................................................................... 68 5.6
Effects of IAP as Multiple Treatments
.................................................................... 70 5.7
Sensitivity Analysis
............................................................................................
72 6 Conclusion
...........................................................................................................
72 Appendix
................................................................................................................
75 CHAPTER 5: JOB SEARCH MONITORING AND RESERVATION WAGES OF ELDERLY
UNEMPLOYED
...........................................................................................................85
1 Introduction
..........................................................................................................
85 2 Institutional Framework
........................................................................................
89 3 Data
....................................................................................................................
91 3.1 Sample Selection and Descriptive Analysis
.......................................................... 91 4 Empirical
Approach and Results
.............................................................................
92 4.1 Results
.............................................................................................................
95 4.2 Robustness Check
............................................................................................
98 5 Conclusion
...........................................................................................................
99 Appendix
...............................................................................................................
101 CHAPTER 6: JOB SEARCH MONITORING AND MENTAL HEALTH OF ELDERLY UNEMPLOYED
106 1 Introduction
........................................................................................................
106 2 Data
..................................................................................................................
109 2.1 Sample Selection
.............................................................................................
109 2.2 Descriptive Statistics
........................................................................................
110 3 Empirical Approach and Results
...........................................................................
112 4 Robustness Checks and Extensions
...................................................................... 116 4.1
Falsification Tests
.............................................................................................
117 4.2 Testing for the Absence of Other Discontinuities
.................................................. 117 4.3 Different
Specification of the Outcome Variable
.................................................. 118 5 Conclusion
.........................................................................................................
119 Appendix
..............................................................................................................
121 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
..............................................................126 1 Conclusion
........................................................................................................
126 2 Policy Implications
..............................................................................................
131 3 Future Research
..................................................................................................
132 BIBLIOGRAPHY
.....................................................................................................
135 LIST OF TABLES
...................................................................................................
142 LIST OF FIGURES
..................................................................................................
144 GERMAN SUMMARY
...............................................................................................
145
dc.description.abstract
This dissertation analyzes the impact of activation on job search strategies
and the situation of welfare recipients in Germany. It consists of four
microeconometric ex-post evaluation studies, using cross-sectional data from
winter 2005/06 with rich information on more than 15,000 unemployed welfare
recipients from January 2005. Methodologies used are statistical matching and
regression discontinuity models. Results on benefit sanctions show that
sanctions increase the probability to find regular employment. There are no
effects, however, on job search intensity or reservation wages. Results on
individual action plans (IAP) show that IAP mainly exert compulsion on the
unemployed and less support. IAP increase search intensity and slightly reduce
reservation wages but do not lead to increased re-employment probabilities,
rather to lock-in effects due to obligatory work measures. Results on the
effect of activation without compulsory elements (monitoring and sanctions) on
reservation wages show that reservation wages of older unemployed strongly
increase. Results on mental health show that compulsory elements of activation
are not generally detrimental for mental health. We find, however, that older
unemployed in East Germany are in better mental health as soon as they have
the option to receive welfare without monitoring and sanctions. In sum, the
dissertation shows that activation can change the job search strategy of
unemployed welfare recipients, especially job search intensity, since
reservation wages lie at the bottom of the wage distribution. The results on
sanctions imply that activation can also reduce the non-monetary expectations
of unemployed towards a new job, or lead to intensified counseling. As a
consequence, activation can lead to an increase in the frequency of job offers
and/or job search efficiency, and, ultimately, re-employment rates. Changes in
job search strategies do not translate into job search success in all cases.
Then, activation might negatively affect mental health and thereby raise exits
into health and disability benefit receipt.
de
dc.description.abstract
Die Dissertation untersucht die Wirkung von Aktivierung auf die
Arbeitssuchstrategie und Situation von Arbeitslosen im SGB II Bezug durch vier
mikroökonometrische Ex-Post-Evaluationsstudien. Datengrundlage ist die
Querschnittsbefragung „Lebenssituation und soziale Sicherung 2005“ von Winter
2005/2006 mit reichhaltigen Informationen zu über 15.000 Personen, die im
Januar 2005 im SGB II Bezug waren. Die Effekte der betrachteten
Aktivierungskomponenten wurden mittels statistischer ‚Matching’ Modelle und
‚Regression Discontinuity’ Modelle geschätzt. Die Analyse leistungskürzender
Sanktionen ergab, dass Sanktionen die Wahrscheinlichkeit, reguläre
Beschäftigung zu finden, erhöhen. Es zeigten sich jedoch keine Wirkungen auf
Reservationslöhne oder Suchanstrengungen. Die Analyse von
Eingliederungsvereinbarungen (EGV) ergab, dass EGV vor allem fordernd wirken,
die Suchintensität erhöhen und den Reservationslohn leicht senken, aber nicht
die Beschäftigungswahrscheinlichkeit steigern sondern zu Lock-In-Effekten
führen. Die Analyse der Reaktion der Reservationslöhne älterer Arbeitsloser
auf ein ganzes Aktivierungspaket, nämlich das Wegfallen des ‚Forderns‘
(sanktionsbewehrte Kontrolle von Suchanstrengungen), ergab, dass die
Reservationslöhne ohne ‚Fordern‘ deutlich steigen. Die Analyse des Wegfallens
von ‚Fordern‘ auf die mentale Gesundheit ergab, dass ‚Fordern‘ nicht generell
schädlich für die mentale Gesundheit ist. Allerdings sind ältere ostdeutsche
Arbeitslose in besserer mentaler Verfassung, sobald sie die Option haben, aus
dem „Fordern“ auszuscheren und damit geringeren Kontroll- und
Sanktionswahrscheinlichkeiten ausgesetzt sind. Insgesamt zeigt die
Dissertation, dass Aktivierung die Arbeitssuchstrategie von Arbeitslosen im
SGB II Bezug verändern kann, vor allem die Suchaktivität, da die
Reservationslöhne am unteren Ende der Lohnverteilung liegen. Die
Sanktionsergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Aktivierung auch zu einer
Absenkung der nicht-monetären Erwartungen an einen Job führen kann, oder eine
intensivere Betreuung nach sich zieht, so dass die Arbeitsangebotsfrequenz
und/oder Sucheffektivität steigt. Veränderte Arbeitssuchstrategien führen
allerdings nicht automatisch zum Erfolg der Arbeitssuche. Ist dies der Fall,
kann Aktivierung die mentale Gesundheit beeinträchtigen und damit Übergänge in
Kranken- und Berufsunfähigkeitsversicherungsbezug erhöhen.
de
dc.format.extent
VI, 158 S.
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
individual action plan
dc.subject
microeconometric
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::331 Arbeitsökonomie
dc.title
Activation of welfare recipients
dc.contributor.contact
Julia.Schneider@stifterverband.de
dc.contributor.inspector
Prof. Dr. Ronnie Schöb
dc.contributor.inspector
Prof. Dr. Andreas Knabe
dc.contributor.firstReferee
Prof. Dr. Viktor Steiner
dc.contributor.furtherReferee
PD Dr. Joachim Wolff
dc.date.accepted
2010-06-25
dc.identifier.urn
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudissthesis000000018714-2
dc.title.subtitle
Impacts of selected policies on reservation wages, search effort, re-
employment and health
dc.title.translated
Die Wirkung von Aktivierung auf die Arbeitssuchstrategie und Situation von
Arbeitslosen im SGB II Bezug
de
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDISS_thesis_000000018714
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDISS_derivate_000000008136
dcterms.accessRights.dnb
free
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access