In the aftermath of the First World War, the Weimar Republic found itself in financial disarray. Originally put forward by the antirepublican right, the idea of a forced loan emerged. The idea triggered harsh controversies regarding the shortfalls in the new state’s sovereignty and its lack of fiscal power within the framework of an international order. The conflicting images of the Weimar state effected the decisions finally taken. This article argues that a rhetoric of emergency was combined with notions of the expert as an apolitical figure in order to legitimize compulsory lending. Yet, contrary to contemporary perceptions, the Weimar forced loan was not a result of governmental impotence or an exceptional incident within the history of public finance. As a political tool, it helped to solve conflicts on the national as well as the international level, if only for a short period of time. As an instrument of state finance, it was not an act of failure to still fiscal needs the ‚normal way‘ but a conscious claim for the autonomy of the Weimar state. But the conviction that compulsory loans might be a legitimate element of fiscal politics under the auspices of a strong and well-informed state emerged only with the Second World War – in Germany as well as on an international level.
