The paper analyses the peculiarities of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy towards the so-called post-soviet countries. It focuses on Russia’s policies towards Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and the South Caucasus, with specific attention onhow a complexityof foreign policy players, diverse available tools, and geopolitical as well asideational, economic, and cultural interestsare combined into a coherent strategy. The paper argues that despite common strategic goals –geopolitical security and Great Power identity –the interests of powerful domestic players hinder the creation of a consistent and long-term plan forhow to achieve strategic goals. The domestic institutional logic of Russia as a Limited Access Order (LAO) creates significant obstacles for long-term planning and makes Russian policy in the post-soviet space tactical rather than strategic. The existing patterns of asymmetricaleconomic, political, and cultural interdependence of neighbouringcountries with Russia allows Moscow to achieve short-term victories. These victoriesare, however,mainly determined by the rigid use of hard power tools, which in the long run reduces Russia’s attractivenessand forces neighbouringcountries to look for alternatives
