dc.contributor.author
Konyukhovskiy, Pavel V.
dc.contributor.author
Grigoriadis, Theocharis
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T11:46:09Z
dc.date.available
2018-03-16T10:51:38.936Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/22080
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-25284
dc.description.abstract
Proxy wars are a key pattern of political conflict and interstate competition.
Rather than resorting to direct conflicts, which are costly and entail a
higher level of uncertainty, governments may opt for proxy wars, which may
last longer, but are less costly and render them more immune to exogenous
shocks. We start with the modeling of a direct war with two players where a
static equilibrium may be neither realizable nor sustainable in the long run.
Then, we offer a model of proxy war where the proposed equilibria are
realizable, but not always sustainable in the long run. The consolidation
level of the double principal-agent relationship predicts the continuation of
conflict and thus the emergence of peace.
en
dc.format.extent
25 Seiten
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000945-5
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000006-7
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
non-cooperative games
dc.subject
principal-agent models
dc.subject
proxy conflicts
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft
dc.identifier.urn
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsdocument000000029341-7
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000029341
refubium.series.issueNumber
2018,4 : Economics
refubium.series.name
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000009544
dcterms.accessRights.dnb
free
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
