dc.contributor.author
Blaufus, Kay
dc.contributor.author
Braune, Matthias
dc.contributor.author
Hundsdoerfer, Jochen
dc.contributor.author
Jacob, Martin
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:26:44Z
dc.date.available
2014-09-04T18:03:36.781Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20121
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/FUDOCS_document_000000020896
dc.description.abstract
In a real-effort laboratory experiment to manipulate evasion opportunities, we
study whether the moral evaluation of tax evasion is subject to a self-serving
bias. We find that tax morale is egoistically biased: Subjects with the
opportunity to evade taxes judge tax evasion as less unethical as opposed to
those who cannot evade. The detection probability does not affect this result.
Further, we do not find moral spillover effects, for example, on legal
activities.
en
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000318-5
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000006-7
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
Tax Compliance
dc.subject
Self-Serving Bias
dc.subject
Moral Spillover
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::336 Öffentliche Finanzen
dc.title
Self-Serving Bias and Tax Morale
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000020896
refubium.series.issueNumber
2014,18 : FACTS
refubium.series.name
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000003869
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access