dc.contributor.author
Bester, Helmut
dc.contributor.author
Krähmer, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:26:36Z
dc.date.available
2008-06-10T08:03:36.037Z
dc.identifier.isbn
3-938369-49-3
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20112
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/FUDOCS_document_000000000147
dc.description.abstract
This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends
the standard principal-agent model by a project selection stage in which the
prin- cipal can either delegate the choice of project to the agent or keep the
authority. The agent's subsequent choice of effort depends both on monetary
incentives and the selected project. We find that the consideration of effort
incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over
projects to the agent. In fact, if the agent is protected by limited
liability, delegation is never optimal.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000309-6
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000006-7
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
principal-agent problem
dc.subject
limited liability
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::332 Finanzwirtschaft
dc.title
Delegation and incentives
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/verwaltung-service/bibliothek/diskussionsbeitraege/diskussionsbeitraege-wiwiss/files-diskussionsbeitraege-wiwiss/discpaper01_07.pdf
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000000147
refubium.series.issueNumber
2007,1 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
refubium.series.name
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000000057
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
