dc.contributor.author
Konrad, Kai A.
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:26:35Z
dc.date.available
2008-06-20T08:09:13.799Z
dc.identifier.isbn
3-938369-07-8
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20109
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/FUDOCS_document_000000000352
dc.description.abstract
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent
shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the allpay auction
framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest
firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a consequence,
equilibrium profits of both firms may increase, but the prize may be allocated
less efficiently. The reverse ownership structure is also likely to increase
the profits of the firms involved in the ownership relationship but without
these negative efficiency effects.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000306-0
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000006-7
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
all-pay auctions
dc.subject
silent minority
dc.subject
ownership structure
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft
dc.title
Silent interests and all-pay auctions
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.wiwiss.fu-berlin.de/verwaltung-service/bibliothek/diskussionsbeitraege/diskussionsbeitraege-wiwiss/files-diskussionsbeitraege-wiwiss/discpaper08_05.pdf
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000000352
refubium.series.issueNumber
2005,8 : Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe
refubium.series.name
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000000109
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
