dc.contributor.author
Betzold, Carola
dc.contributor.author
Weiler, Florian
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T07:42:56Z
dc.date.available
2016-06-09T11:16:35.915Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/18560
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-22255
dc.description.abstract
In the run-up to Paris, individual countries and multilateral banks made new
promises to provide millions of dollars for adaptation (and mitigation) action
in developing countries, with a view to reaching the usd 100 billion target
announced in Copenhagen and confirmed in Paris. But where are all these funds
going to? To what extent do they reach the poorest and most vulnerable, those
most in need of support? The focus of this paper is on bilateral aid for
adaptation to climate change. Using oecd data on adaptation aid, we examine
how donors allocate this aid|and to what extent they indeed prioritise those
`particularly' vulnerable to climate change. To understand donor behaviour, we
build on the large literature on aid allocation in general, and on adaptation
aid in particular. Yet, as opposed to traditional dyadic analyses, we
conceptualise aid allocation as a network, in which the provision of
adaptation aid is a network tie. This network approach, we argue, is better
able to capture interactions between donors, for the allocation decisions of
others likely in uence a donor's allocation decision. Donors on the one hand
coordinate their allocation, but on the other hand also compete for political
and economic influence through the provision of aid, including aid for
adaptation. In order to capture these coordination dynamics in addition to the
dyadic relationships between donors and recipients we employ Temporal
Exponential Random Graph Models. Our analysis indicates that donors consider
recipient need and recipient merit when deciding on how to allocate adaptation
aid: more vulnerable and more democratic countries are more likely to receive
adapation aid. More importantly, however, donors consider their own economic
and political interests: trading partners and former colonies are much more
likely to receive adaptation aid. Finally, we also found evidence for donor
coordination: countries that already receive adaptation aid from other
countries are less likely to form additional ties, that is, they are less
likely to also receive adaptation aid from additional donors.
en
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::333 Boden- und Energiewirtschaft
dc.title
Allocation of Adaptation Aid
dc.type
Konferenzveröffentlichung
dcterms.bibliographicCitation
2016 Berlin conference on global environmental change: transformative global
climate governance "aprés Paris", Berlin 23-24 May 2016
dc.title.subtitle
A Network Analysis
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.berlinconference.org/2016/
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft / Forschungszentrum für Umweltpolitik (FFU)
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000024731
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
refubium.series.name
Berlin conference on global environmental change
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000006546
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access