Since the two narratives of strategic autonomy and European sovereignty first appeared in the EU in 2016 and 2017, they have been omnipresent. At the same time, Donald Trump was elected as U.S. president and a series of difficulties in transatlantic relations began. Although transatlantic relations have been tumultuous in the past, statements by experts and leaders prompt speculation that the Transatlantic Security Community (TSC) has undergone deeper changes this time around. Therefore, this paper analyzes the extent to which the EU’s Common Security and Defense policies (CSDPs) have been justified from 2016 to 2020 given the evolving TSC. In doing so, it becomes clear that the TSC is not the only explanation for the EU’s recent CSDPs but is merely one of many.

This paper analyzes the extent to which neo-cleavage theory can explain democratic backsliding in the European Union, focusing on the role of the GAL/TAN cleavage and an alternative explanation, populism. It brings together different factors into a causal model based on the willingness-opportunity metatheoretical framework, which is then evaluated empirically using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The results indicate that both TAN ideological stance and populism provide two alternative motivations for democratic backsliding, but do not produce backsliding in the absence of certain opportunities.

Diese Abschlussarbeit befasst sich mit der deutsch-französischen Initiative zur wirtschaftlichen Erholung Europas nach der Coronakrise. Sie möchte erklären, warum Deutschland Gemeinschaftsanleihen zur Finanzierung des EU-Wiederaufbaufonds billigte, aber die fiskalpolitische Integration einschränkte, indem diese Maßnahmen befristet wurden. Dafür verwendet diese Arbeit die Theorie des Liberalen Intergouvernementalismus (LI) und vertritt die These, dass Deutschland die Finanzhilfen aus rationalistischem Eigeninteresse wegen der Binnenmarktexporte akzeptiert hat und durch seine Verhandlungsstärke eine institutionelle Konstruktion durchsetzen konnte, mit der innenpolitische Skepsis gegenüber fiskalpolitischer Integration minimiert wurde. Diese Arbeit zieht allerdings den Schluss, dass der LI ein paar wichtige Erklärungsfaktoren übersieht, etwa die Dynamik innerhalb der deutschen Regierungskoalition, den makroökonomischen Anpassungsdruck aufgrund institutioneller Schwächen der EU und die europäische Solidarität als Beweggrund politischen Handelns. Dies schränkt die Erklärungskraft des LI ein. Durch die Beurteilung der relativen Stellung des LI leistet diese Arbeit einen wichtigen Beitrag zur akademischen Bearbeitung der jüngsten Entwicklungen in der Europapolitik. Darüber hinaus befasst sie sich mit der übergreifenden Debatte der europäischen Integration.

Die Europäische Union (EU) dient Teilen der Regionalismus- und Integrationsfor-schung immer noch als wichtiges Idealbild. Die zunehmende Integration ihrer Mit-gliedsstaaten und die demokratische Agenda der Europäischen Union haben den Blick auch auf andere Regionalorganisationen geprägt. Dieser Beitrag untersucht die zent-ralasiatische Regionalorganisation Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit (SCO). Einerseits gibt es bisher nur wenige empirische Untersuchungen zu dieser Re-gion und dieser Organisation. Andererseits ist die SCO ein intergouvernementaler Zu- sammenschluss autoritärer Regime und entspricht damit nicht dem oben genannten Idealbild. Der Beitrag zeigt, wie die Mitgliedsstaaten der SCO diese Regionalorganisa-tion nutzen, um ihr Handeln und ihre Regime nach innen und nach außen zu legitimie-ren. Durch dieses Vorgehen schaffen es die Mitglieder der SCO, eine Gegenöffentlich-keit zur westlich geprägten Internationalen Gemeinschaft aufzubauen und ihre eigenen Regime zu stabilisieren.

Eight years ago, the Open Method of Coordination was codified as a mode of governance to implement the Lisbon strategy of the European Union which aims to turn the European economy into the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. Since then, the OMC has often been highlighted as a “third way” in European governance – an alternative to intergovernmental negotiations and the Classical Community Method. Hopes that the OMC could develop into a “third way” would be destroyed if the OMC had considerable potential to promote institutional- spillover and this way to encourage the European Commission's competence creep. In that case, the OMC could be seen as having a bridging function between the two traditional methods used to govern the EU. Based on the supranationalism as put forward by Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998), this paper analyses the OMC's potential to promote institutional-spillover in European education policy. With institutional-spillover I mean an increase of the decisional autonomy or capacity of the European Commission. The analysis reveals that the OMC's potential to promote institutional-spillover in education is very small as it neither increases participation of transnational society in the policy-making process nor sufficiently increases the autonomy of joint organisations such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.

This paper focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN) that tries to promote civil society co-operation and human rights within the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). To this end, it explores the EMHRN’s ‘actorness’ and role in Euro-Mediterranean transnational relations in three respects: its linkage to the intergovernmental politics of the EMP, its participation in transnational civil society activities, and its part in the local human rights activism of its members. Methodologically, the empirical analysis relies primarily on document analysis and interviews and narrows its focus down to Morocco for the last aspect. The network’s identity and activities as an umbrella organisation for human rights are closely linked to the EMP. It pursues a mix of strategies, including the lobbying and consultancy, awareness-raising campaigns, service-provision to its members, and international networking in the context of Euro-Mediterranean relations. It assumes various functions vis-à-vis European institutions, national governments, its members, and other transnational actors, leaving its nature ambiguous and potentially compromising the effectiveness of its different strategies. Despite all these limitations, the EMHRN definitely contributes to ‘transnationalising’ Euro-Mediterranean (human rights) politics, bringing parts of civil society closer to the EMP – and vice versa.

At first sight, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) seems to be a least likely candidate for a regional organization (RO) prescribing and promoting (good) governance in its member states: It consists of authoritarian monarchies and is a strong proponent of the principles of national sovereignty and non- interference. This paper, however, shows that the GCC does engage in governance transfer. Reacting to a crisis of legitimacy, the rulers of the GCC states have resorted to governance transfer as a strategy of legit-imation. In certain policy fields they prescribe and promote good governance standards to suggest to their respective citizenry as well as to external investors that they are actively trying to tackle their governance problems in these fields. Governance transfer by the GCC can be conceptualized as an institutional choice by the rulers of the GCC states which is supposed to ensure their regimes’ survival in times of a crisis of legiti-macy.

The promotion of good governance in its neighborhood has become one of the main pillars of the European Union’s foreign policy during the last decade. The European Security Strategy adopted in December 2003 explicitly mentions the need for the EU to support the development of good governance in its Eastern and Mediterranean neigh-bourhood (European Council 2003). This objective was reiterated by the Strategy Pa-per for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which points out that good gover-nance constitutes one of the areas of “mutual commitment” for the new partnership between Brussels and the countries in its Eastern and Southern vicinity (European Commission 2004a: 3). Consequently, the European Commission (EC) underlined this aspect in its proposal for the establishment of a new financing instrument - the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - for projects in states included in the ENP (European Commission 2004b: 12).

This paper qualitatively explores the prospects to restore compliance with EU law against the rigid and eminently strong resistance of the affected member states. An empirical study of Court cases on incorrect legal transposition of EC directives in Germany and the UK reveals that states give in to the European prosecutors early in some cases, but maintain non-compliance for a longer period in others. This paper demonstrates that policy variables such as the interpretational scope of the disputed element, domestic norms, the organizational degree of organized interests, and the strength of domestic non-compliance constituencies influence the settlement dynamics of hard cases.