dc.contributor.author
Bachmann, Jana
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T00:28:10Z
dc.date.available
2017-03-10T10:04:01.086Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/11987
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-16185
dc.description
Table of Contents I. Introduction 11 II. Literature Review 21 II.1 Liberal
Democracy and the Rule of Law 21 II.1.1 Defining Liberal Democracy and
Democratization 21 II.1.2 Defining the Rule of Law 22 II.1.3 Relationship
between Liberal Democracy and the Rule of Law 31 II.1.4 The Role of the Rule
of Law in External Democracy Promotion 35 II.1.5 The Role of the Rule of Law
in Croatia and Turkey’s Democratization Process 38 II.2 External Democracy and
Rule of Law Promotion 44 II.2.1 History and Actors 44 II.2.2 Motives 46 II.2.3
Types and Methods 47 II.2.4 The EU as an external Democracy and Rule of Law
Promoter 48 II.2.5 EU Monitoring and Progress Reports 56 II.2.6 The EU’s RoL
concept within the accession process 57 II.3 Measuring the Rule of Law 73
II.3.1 Actors and Motives behind Democracy and Rule of Law Evaluation 73
II.3.2 Quality Criteria for Adequate Measuring 75 II.3.3 Research Gaps:
Indices 79 III. Democracy and Rule of Law Index Comparison 80 III.1 Index
Selection 80 III.2 Index Backgrounds 81 III.3 Adequacy of Indices’ Methods and
Implications for Across-Index Comparison 86 III.3.1 The European Commission’s
Progress Reports 86 III.3.2 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Reports 99
III.3.3 Bertelsmann Transformation Index 104 III.4 Implications of Indices’
Methodological Set-up for Empirical Analysis 110 IV. Political Bias Claims 112
IV.1 Academia 113 IV.1.1 Category 1 – Accession as a Political Decision 113
IV.1.2 Category 2 – Lack of Aptitude and Usability of Criteria 114 IV.1.3
Category 3 – Inconsistent and Wrongful Application 115 IV.1.4 Category 4 –
Double Standards between EU Member States and Non-members 116 IV.1.5 Category
5 – Double Standards among Candidate Countries 117 IV.2 Member States’
Positions towards Accession 119 IV.2.1 Croatia’s Membership 119 IV.2.2
Turkey’s Membership 120 IV.3 Media Coverage of Political Bias expressed by
Political Actors and NGOs 121 IV.4 Negative Consequences of Political Bias
Claim: Inner and Outer Credibility of the EU 123 IV.4.1 Inner Credibility of
the Union 123 IV.4.2 Outer Credibility of the Union 124 IV.5 Repercussions of
Political Bias on Member States and (potentially new) Candidate Countries 126
IV.6 Importance of reliability and Validity of the Progress Reports 127 IV.7
Eradicating Suspicion of Political Bias 128 V. Conceptual Framework 130 V.1
Dependent Variable I – Political Bias 130 V.2 Independent Variables for
Political Bias 132 V.2.1 Reputation 132 V.2.2 Incentivization 135 V.3
Dependent Variable II – Consistency of the Indices’ Reports 136 V.4
Independent Variables for Consistency among the Reports 136 V.4.1 Sources 136
V.4.2 Path Dependence 138 V.5 Hypotheses 143 VI. Methodology 144 VI.I
Qualitative Content Analysis 144 VI.II Expert Interviews 157 VI.III Review of
Internal COM Documents 159 VII. Results 160 VII.1 Qualitative Content Analysis
Results 160 VII.1.1 Inductive Qualitative Content Analysis Results 160 VII.1.2
Scaled, Structuring Qualitative Content Analysis Results 162 VII.2 Interview
and Internal COM Document Revision Results 184 VII.2.1 Progress Report
Creation Process 185 VII.2.2 Experts’ Opinions on the Political Bias
Accusation vis-à-vis the COM 185 VII.2.3 Experts’ Explanations for
(Dis-)Similarities between their Institution’s Results 188 VII.2.4 Reflections
on the Independent Variables explaining the (In-)Consistency of Results 192
VIII. Discussion 194 VIII.1 Research Question, Hypotheses and Key Findings 194
VIII.1.1 Research Question and Relevance 194 VIII.1.2 Contribution to Research
195 VIII.1.3 Key Findings 195 VIII.2 Impact of Independent Variables 201
VIII.2.1 Independent Variables for Political Bias 201 VIII.2.2 Independent
Variables for Consistency of the Indices’ Results 202 VIII.2.3 Explanations
introduced by Interviewees 204 VIII.3 Validity of Academia’s Critique of
Progress Reports 208 VIII.3.1 Political Motives of COM’s Reports 209 VIII.3.2
Aptitude and Usability of Copenhagen Criteria 209 VIII.3.3 Application of
Copenhagen Criteria 210 VIII.3.4 Double Standards between Member States and
Candidate Countries 210 VIII.3.5 Double Standards between Candidate Countries
210 VIII.4 Embedding and Critical Reflection of Thesis within Academic Debate
211 VIII.4.1 Relation to Similar Studies 211 VIII.4.2 Alternative Explanations
of the Findings 212 VIII.4.3 The Study’s Limitations 213 VIII.4.4 Finding’s
Implications 214 IX. Summary 216 Bibliography 228 List of Figures Tables Table
1 - Thin vs. Thick Rule of Law Definition assembled from the concepts of
Magen/Morlino (2009:9), Kleinfeld (2006: 47), Wennerström (2007: 78) and
Tamanaha (2004/2006) 27 Table 2 - RoL Versions according to Tamanaha (2004:
91) 29 Table 3 - Comparison of Carother’s (2006) and Wennerström’s (2007) RoL
Concepts 31 Table 4 – Six types of external democracy promotion (cf.
Giesendorf, 2008: 124) 47 Table 5 - cf. Kochenov (2008: 58/59) 49 Table 6 -
Rule of Law elements included in Guidance Note 2005, Enlargement package to DG
Enlargement 59 Table 7 - Summary of EU RoL accession requirements for
candidate countries 72 Table 8 – Quality Criteria for measuring index
(Munck/Verkuilen, 2002: 8) 78 Table 9 - Overview of background information on
democracy indices 85 Table 10 - Goals of Judiciary Reform (Guide to the Main
Administrative Structures required for implementing the Acquis, 2005) 91 Table
11 - European Commission (Enlargement package 2005, Guidance Note, Annex) 92
Table 12 - Selection of Justice Reform Reporting Guideline Questions (Internal
COM Document, 2015) 96 Table 13 – FH’s ‘Freedom in the World’ Rule of Law
Questions 102 Table 14 – The BTI's Rule of Law questions 107 Table 15 -
Fulfillment of Munck/Verkuilen's index quality test 110 Table 16 - Areas of
Critique regarding Copenhagen Criteria from Academia 118 Table 17 - Overview
of SSQCA Approach 148 Table 18 - Specific elements of RoL sub-components,
gathered through initial qualitative content analysis of COM, FH and BTI
Reports (2005-2012) 152 Table 19 - Coding Manual 156 Table 20 - appearance of
RoL categories in all three indices 161 Table 21 - Table of Croatia’s
aggregated, overall RoL scores 163 Table 22 - Table of Turkey’s aggregated,
overall RoL scores 171 Table 23 – Croatia and Turkey’s assembled RoL scores
(2005-2012) 179 Table 24 - Croatia and Turkey's RoL scores by sector
(2005-2012) 180 Table 25 - Consistency of results for Croatia and Turkey 181
Table 26 - Turkey's score consistence between the COM and BTI 183 Table 27 -
Croatia's score consistence between the COM and BTI 183 Table 28 - Croatia's
score consistence between the COM and FH (FiW) 184 Table 29 - Impact level of
Independent Variables 208 Illustrations Illustration 1 - Decision tree
research routes Fehler! Textmarke nicht definiert. Illustration 2 – The EU’s
RoL requirements in external democratization (Arnull: 2002) 36 Illustration 3
- Elements of the Copenhagen Criteria (Europa.eu) 52 Illustration 4 - Elements
of the Political Criteria: Democracy and the Rule of Law ( Ludwig, 2011: 117)
53 Illustration 5 - Five Elements of the EU accession RoL concept 61
Illustration 6 - EU rule of law requirements gathered from Chapter 23
Judiciary and Fundamental Rights 62 Illustration 7 - measuring tree according
to Munck/Verkuilen (2002) 76 Illustration 9 - BTI RoL Question specification
108 Illustration 9 - Diagram of independent Variables potentially explaining
comparison’s results 142 Illustration 10 - Mayring's Qualitative Content
Analysis (2000) 149 Diagrams Diagram 1 - Croatia's RoL Evaluations (COM, FH,
BTI) 163 Diagram 2 - Croatia's Judicial Independence Evaluations (COM, FH,
BTI) 164 Diagram 3 - Croatia's Efficiency Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 165
Diagram 4 - Croatia's Crime Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 166 Diagram 5 -
Croatia's Rights and Liberties Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 167 Diagram 6-
Croatia's RoL Evaluation (COM, all four sectors) 168 Diagram 7 - Croatia's RoL
Evaluation (BTI, all four sectors) 169 Diagram 8 - Croatia's RoL Evaluation
(FH, all four sectors) 170 Diagram 9 - Turkey's RoL Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI)
171 Diagram 10 - Turkey's Judicial Independence Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 172
Diagram 11 - Turkey's Efficiency Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 173 Diagram 12 -
Turkey's Crime Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 174 Diagram 13 - Turkey's Rights and
Liberties Evaluations (COM, FH, BTI) 175 Diagram 14 - Turkey's RoL Evaluation
(COM, all four sectors) 176 Diagram 15 - RoL Evaluation (BTI, all four
sectors) 177 Diagram 16 - RoL Evaluation (FH, all four sectors) 178
dc.description.abstract
The European Commission has been accused of producing politically biased
Progress Reports on its candidate countries by Member States, candidate
countries and academia. This claim is tested by comparing the Commission’s
reporting results to those of two other, independent democracy evaluation
indices after transposing them onto one, common scale. The predominant
consistence of their results speaks against the political bias claim and to
the high quality of the European Commission in gathering factual information
on the candidate countries. However, the indices’ level of independence proves
to be lower than expected since they are basically using the same sources,
including one another. Thus, more resourceful indices have a bigger impact on
the general evaluation tone when less equipped indices draw from their
Reports. Also, institutional choices that lead to and reinforce the political
bias perception must be addressed by the Commission. These aim at increased
transparency of the reporting process by a) publishing the reporting
methodology as well including specific checklists for the respective criteria,
b) reducing unofficial input opportunities for member and candidate countries
and c) dissolving the double role of the Commission as both assessor and
distributor of financial support to the candidate countries.
de
dc.description.abstract
Die Europäische Kommission wird von Seiten der Mitgliedsstaaten, der
Beitrittskandidaten sowie von Vertretern der Politikwissenschaften der
politischen Färbung ihrer Fortschrittsberichte für Kandidatenländer
beschuldigt. Diese Behauptung wurde getestet, indem die Ergebnisse der
Fortschrittsberichte der Europäischen Kommission mit denen von zwei
unabhängigen Demokratiemessungsindizes verglichen wurden. Dies geschah,
nachdem alle drei Indizes mithilfe einer einheitliche Messskala vergleichbar
gemacht wurden. Der hohe Grad an Konsistenz der Indexergebnisse schwächt das
Argument der politischen Färbung und unterstützt die Wahrnehmung, dass die
Europäische Kommission qualitativ hochwertige, faktische Informationen über
die Kandidatenländer erhebt. Allerdings ist der Grad der Unabhängigkeit
zwischen den Indizes niedriger als erwartet, da alle drei im Wesentlichen
dieselben Quellen nutzen, inklusive einander, was wiederum zu zirkulären
Zitationen führt. Dadurch haben Indizes mit höheren Ressourcenkapazitäten
einen größeren Einfluss auf den allgemeinen Bewertungston, insbesondere, wenn
ressourcenärmere Indizes sich ihrer als Quellen bedienen. Darüber hinaus
führen institutionelle Entscheidungen seitens der Europäischen Kommission zu
einer verstärkten Bias-Perzeption, welche wiederum adressiert werden sollte.
Konkrete Politikempfehlungen beziehen sich in erster Linie auf die
transparentere Gestaltung des Bewertungsprozesses inklusive der a)
Veröffentlichung der Evaluierungsmethoden mit dezidierten Kriterien-
Checklisten, b) der Reduzierung von inoffiziellen Einflussmöglichkeiten
seitens der Mitglieds- und Kandidatenländer und c) der Auflösung der
Doppelrolle der Kommission als Evaluierender und gleichzeitiger Distributor
von finanziellen Zuwendungen an die Kandidatenländer.
en
dc.format.extent
241 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
external democratization
dc.subject
progress reports
dc.subject
European Commissionon
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::327 Internationale Beziehungen
dc.title
Political Bias or Fair Play? How consistent are the European Commission’s
Progress Reports with view to the Rule of Law?
dc.contributor.contact
ja.bachmann@web.de
dc.contributor.firstReferee
Prof. Dr. Carina Sprungk
dc.contributor.furtherReferee
Prof. Dr. Eva Heidbreder
dc.date.accepted
2017-03-01
dc.identifier.urn
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudissthesis000000104320-5
dc.title.subtitle
A comparative analysis using the examples of Croatia and Turkey
dc.title.translated
Politische Färbung oder nicht? Wie konsistent sind die Fortschrittsberichte
der Europäischen Kommission mit Hinblick auf Rechtsstaatlichkeit?
en
dc.title.translatedsubtitle
Eine vergleichende Analyse an den Beispielen von der Türkei und Kroatien
en
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
de
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDISS_thesis_000000104320
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDISS_derivate_000000021143
dcterms.accessRights.dnb
free
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
