dc.contributor.author
Mayr, Erasmus
dc.contributor.author
Vetter, Barbara
dc.date.accessioned
2023-11-02T10:10:44Z
dc.date.available
2023-11-02T10:10:44Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/41073
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-40794
dc.description.abstract
Abilities, in contrast to mere dispositions, propensities, or tendencies, abilities seem to be features of agents that put the agent herself in control. But what is the distinguishing feature of abilities vis-à-vis other kinds of powers? Our aim in this paper is to point, in answer to this question, to a crucial feature of abilities that existing accounts have tended to neglect: their adaptivity. Adaptivity is a feature of how abilities are exercised. The main reason for its relative neglect has been that most extant accounts have focused solely on whether abilities are exercised successfully in certain possible situations and have mostly understood the exercise of an ability in terms of complete successful performance. We begin by pointing out two aspects of abilities with regard to which current accounts seem (at best) incomplete: control and exercise. We then introduce adaptivity as we understand it, and end by putting it to work in developing a fuller understanding of abilities that does better than current accounts.
en
dc.format.extent
15 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject
understanding
en
dc.subject.ddc
100 Philosophie und Psychologie::100 Philosophie::102 Verschiedenes
dc.title
Adaptive abilities
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1111/phis.12249
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Philosophical Issues
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
1
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
140
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
154
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
33
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12249
refubium.affiliation
Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften
refubium.affiliation.other
Institut für Philosophie

refubium.funding
DEAL Wiley
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1758-2237