dc.contributor.author
Kofanov, Dmitrii
dc.contributor.author
Kozlov, Vladimir
dc.contributor.author
Libman, Alexander
dc.contributor.author
Zakharov, Nikita
dc.date.accessioned
2023-07-03T06:37:01Z
dc.date.available
2023-07-03T06:37:01Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/37403
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-37116
dc.description.abstract
This article investigates the determinants and consequences of manipulating COVID-19 statistics in an authoritarian federation using the Russian case. It abandons the interpretation of the authoritarian regime as a unitary actor and acknowledges the need to account for a complex interaction of various bureaucratic and political players to understand the spread and the logic of manipulation. Our estimation strategy takes advantage of a natural experiment where the onset of the pandemic adjourned the national referendum enabling new presidential terms for Putin. To implement the rescheduled referendum, Putin needed sub-national elites to manufacture favourable COVID-19 statistics to convince the public that the pandemic was under control. While virtually all regions engaged in data manipulation, there was a substantial variation in the degree of misreporting. A third of this variation can be explained by an asynchronous schedule of regional governors’ elections, winning which depends almost exclusively on support from the federal authorities.
en
dc.format.extent
26 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
data manipulation
en
dc.subject
authoritarian regimes
en
dc.subject
incentives in federations
en
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.title
Encouraged to Cheat? Federal Incentives and Career Concerns at the Sub-national Level as Determinants of Under-Reporting of COVID-19 Mortality in Russia
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1017/S0007123422000527
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
British Journal of Political Science
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
3
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
835
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
860
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
53
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123422000527
refubium.affiliation
Osteuropa-Institut
refubium.funding
Open Access in Konsortiallizenz - Cambridge
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1469-2112