dc.contributor.author
El Kassar, Nadja
dc.date.accessioned
2023-01-02T11:02:04Z
dc.date.available
2023-01-02T11:02:04Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/36922
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-36635
dc.description.abstract
Recent years have seen a shift in epistemological studies of intellectual self-trust or epistemic self-trust: intellectual self-trust is not merely epistemologists’ tool for silencing epistemic skepticism or doubt, it is recognized as a disposition of individuals and collectives interesting in its own rights. In this exploratory article I focus on a particular type of intellectual self-trust—collective intellectual self-trust—and I examine which features make for valuable or pernicious collective intellectual self-trust. From accounts of the value of individual intellectual self-trust I take three frameworks for evaluating collective intellectual self-trust: an epistemically consequentialist, a virtue-theoretic and a prudential/pragmatic framework (§2). Then I introduce collective intellectual self-trust (§3). Against this background I explain what is distinctive of valuable collective intellectual self-trust (§4) and pernicious collective intellectual self-trust (§5) within the three frameworks. I close by discussing the relation between the three frameworks and argue that evaluating intellectual self-trust requires a multi-perspectival approach constituted by the three frameworks.
en
dc.format.extent
18 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject
intellectual self-trust
en
dc.subject
epistemic self-trust
en
dc.subject
epistemological studies
en
dc.subject.ddc
100 Philosophie und Psychologie::100 Philosophie::102 Verschiedenes
dc.title
Valuable and pernicious collective intellectual self-trust1
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1111/phis.12228
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Philosophical Issues
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
1
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
286
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
303
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
32
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1111/phis.12228
refubium.affiliation
Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften
refubium.affiliation.other
Institut für Philosophie
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refubium.funding
DEAL Wiley
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1758-2237