dc.contributor.author
Jo, Wendy K.
dc.contributor.author
Oliveira‐Filho, Edmilson Ferreira de
dc.contributor.author
Rasche, Andrea
dc.contributor.author
Greenwood, Alex D.
dc.contributor.author
Osterrieder, Klaus
dc.contributor.author
Drexler, Jan Felix
dc.date.accessioned
2022-03-17T13:41:39Z
dc.date.available
2022-03-17T13:41:39Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/34437
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-34155
dc.description.abstract
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) causing coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) likely has evolutionary origins in other animals than humans based on genetically related viruses existing in rhinolophid bats and pangolins. Similar to other animal coronaviruses, SARS-CoV-2 contains a functional furin cleavage site in its spike protein, which may broaden the SARS-CoV-2 host range and affect pathogenesis. Whether ongoing zoonotic infections are possible in addition to efficient human-to-human transmission remains unclear. In contrast, human-to-animal transmission can occur based on evidence provided from natural and experimental settings. Carnivores, including domestic cats, ferrets and minks, appear to be particularly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 in contrast to poultry and other animals reared as livestock such as cattle and swine. Epidemiologic evidence supported by genomic sequencing corroborated mink-to-human transmission events in farm settings. Airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2 between experimentally infected cats additionally substantiates the possibility of cat-to-human transmission. To evaluate the COVID-19 risk represented by domestic and farmed carnivores, experimental assessments should include surveillance and health assessment of domestic and farmed carnivores, characterization of the immune interplay between SARS-CoV-2 and carnivore coronaviruses, determination of the SARS-CoV-2 host range beyond carnivores and identification of human risk groups such as veterinarians and farm workers. Strategies to mitigate the risk of zoonotic SARS-CoV-2 infections may have to be developed in a One Health framework and non-pharmaceutical interventions may have to consider free-roaming animals and the animal farming industry.
en
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
domestic animal
en
dc.subject
farmed animal
en
dc.subject.ddc
600 Technik, Medizin, angewandte Wissenschaften::610 Medizin und Gesundheit::610 Medizin und Gesundheit
dc.title
Potential zoonotic sources of SARS‐CoV‐2 infections
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1111/tbed.13872
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Transboundary and Emerging Diseases
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
4
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishername
Wiley
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
1824
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
1834
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
68
refubium.affiliation
Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin
refubium.funding
DEAL Wiley
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pmid
33034151
dcterms.isPartOf.issn
1865-1674
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1865-1682