dc.contributor.author
Koch, Karen
dc.date.accessioned
2022-01-18T10:35:01Z
dc.date.available
2022-01-18T10:35:01Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/33615
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-33335
dc.description.abstract
Hegel's integration of the concept of Life in the Logic has long been disputed and rejected by many scholars. The most common objection was that it seemed counterintuitive to integrate an empirical phenomenon such as Life into a Logic that, in fact, ought to present an immanent development of pure concepts. Hegel was often accused of bringing empirical considerations into his Logic in order to develop his logical account of Life. Consequently, there has been a great discussion about the question as to whether a Logic is an appropriate place for this concept—a discussion that did not occur with respect to other categories in Hegel's Logic. Now, in contemporary literature on Hegel, there is a surge of genuine interest in Hegel's logical account of Life, accompanied by the insight that the concept of Life plays an important and indispensable role in Hegel's philosophy. However, what this role is precisely is a controversial issue.
en
dc.format.extent
14 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
purposiveness
en
dc.subject
intelligibility
en
dc.subject
Kant's scepticism
en
dc.subject.ddc
100 Philosophie und Psychologie::100 Philosophie::102 Verschiedenes
dc.title
Purposiveness, Intelligibility and Kant's Scepticism: Reconsidering Ng's Account of Hegel's Response to Kant
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1017/hgl.2021.20
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Hegel Bulletin
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
3
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
416
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
429
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
42
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1017/hgl.2021.20
refubium.affiliation
Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften
refubium.affiliation.other
Institut für Philosophie
refubium.funding
Open Access in Konsortiallizenz - Cambridge
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
2051-5375