dc.contributor.author
Mueller, Elisabeth F.
dc.contributor.author
Flickinger, Miriam
dc.date.accessioned
2021-09-07T07:18:21Z
dc.date.available
2021-09-07T07:18:21Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/30908
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-30647
dc.description.abstract
Research Question/Issue
This study analyzes the heterogeneity of CEO compensation in family firms. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between a family CEO's social identification with the family firm and the level of her or his compensation.
Research Findings/Insights
Using a sample of S&P 500 family firms between 2006 and 2014, we find that levels of social identification among family CEOs explain the heterogeneous patterns of CEO compensation among family firms. Our results show that the level of social identification varies among family CEOs.
Theoretical/Academic Implications
Our findings indicate that differences in social identification among individual family executives are an important factor in CEO compensation in family firms. This factor has been overlooked in the literature, which has instead focused on the explanatory power of faultlines between family versus non-family firms or family versus non-family executives in family firms.
Practitioner/Policy Implications
Practitioners may value our finding that socio-psychological dynamics influence strategic decision-making in family firms, such as setting the compensation of the family CEO. In particular, practitioners should be aware of each family CEO's level of identification and should not assume that all family members equally socially identify with the family firm.
en
dc.format.extent
18 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject
corporate governance
en
dc.subject
CEO compensation
en
dc.subject
family firms
en
dc.subject
social identification
en
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::330 Wirtschaft
dc.title
It's a family affair: How social identification influences family CEO compensation
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1111/corg.12375
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Corporate Governance: An International Review
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
5
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
461
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
478
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
29
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12375
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
refubium.affiliation.other
Betriebswirtschaftslehre / Management-Department
refubium.funding
DEAL Wiley
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1467-8683
refubium.resourceType.provider
WoS-Alert