dc.contributor.author
Souris, Antonios
dc.contributor.author
Stecker, Christian
dc.contributor.author
Jungjohann, Arne
dc.date.accessioned
2023-07-03T12:55:37Z
dc.date.available
2023-07-03T12:55:37Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/39950
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-39672
dc.description.abstract
Background
Transport policy has regained political relevance in Germany. The successful realization of the Verkehrswende,—the extensive transition toward sustainable transport and mobility—is central to reaching climate neutrality. In 2020, the Federal Government proposed the reform of two key ordinances that have regulated road traffic so far. The amendment was aimed at implementing several provisions at the expense of car drivers and, at the same time, in favor of cyclists and pedestrians. Due to cooperative federalism, the governments of the 16 constituent units (Länder) had to adopt the amendment in the Bundesrat, Germany’s second chamber. In the legislative process, however, the reform ultimately failed in its original scope. Using it as a particularly instructive case study, we show how and why party competition and cooperative federalism hamper comprehensive transport policy reforms in Germany.
Results
In the German political system, political interests interact within a complex web of cooperative federalism. To understand partisan encroachment on the federal decision-making processes, this paper uses a process-tracing approach. To investigate decision-making in the Bundesrat and its outcomes, the empirical analysis combines qualitative analyses of several publicly available sources. We can empirically demonstrate that political parties influenced legislative procedures. The reform failed in its original scope because the three political parties with veto power in the Bundesrat insisted on their positions and were not willing to agree on a compromise.
Conclusions
For the implementation of the Verkehrswende, the German federal system proves to be both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, the institutional design of the Bundesrat constrains extreme positions and helps promote decisions most citizens may agree with. The Länder governments and administrations can also contribute their expertise and local experience to federal legislation via the Bundesrat. On the other hand, veto powers are ubiquitous in the German system of cooperative federalism. Therefore, it is prone to blockades. The actions of the political parties in the Bundesrat have hampered the comprehensive reform of road traffic regulations that was originally envisaged. Policymaking took two steps forward toward implementing the Verkehrswende, only to immediately take one step back again.
en
dc.format.extent
11 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
Mobility policy
en
dc.subject
Transport policy
en
dc.subject
Verkehrswende
de
dc.subject
Political parties
en
dc.subject
Cooperative federalism
en
dc.subject
Process-tracing
en
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.title
Two steps forward, one step back? Party competition, cooperative federalism, and transport policy reforms in Germany
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.articlenumber
20
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1186/s13705-023-00399-z
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Energy, Sustainability and Society
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
13
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13705-023-00399-z
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
refubium.affiliation.other
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft
refubium.funding
Springer Nature DEAL
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
2192-0567