dc.contributor.author
Vogt, Lisa
dc.date.accessioned
2022-05-20T08:16:57Z
dc.date.available
2022-05-20T08:16:57Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/35090
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-34807
dc.description.abstract
Dispositional Essentialism, as commonly conceived, consists in the claims that at least some of the fundamental properties essentially confer certain causal-nomological roles on their bearers, and that these properties give rise to the natural modalities. As such, the view is generally taken to be committed to a realist conception of properties as either universals or tropes, and to be thus incompatible with nominalism as understood in the strict sense. Pace this common assumption of the ontological import of Dispositional Essentialism, the aim of this paper is to explore a nominalist version of the view, Austere Nominalist Dispositional Essentialism. The core features of the proposed account are that it eschews all kinds of properties (be they universals, tropes, or sets of particulars), takes certain predicative truths as fundamental, and employs the so-called generic notion of essence. As I will argue, the account is significantly closer to the core idea behind Dispositional Essentialism than the only nominalist account in the vicinity of Dispositional Essentialism that has been offered so far—Ann Whittle’s (2009) Causal Nominalism—and is immune to crucial problems that affect this view.
en
dc.format.extent
29 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
Dispositional Essentialism
en
dc.subject
Generic essence
en
dc.subject
Laws of nature
en
dc.subject
Causal Nominalism
en
dc.subject.ddc
100 Philosophie und Psychologie::100 Philosophie::102 Verschiedenes
dc.title
Nominalist dispositional essentialism
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.articlenumber
156
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1007/s11229-022-03588-z
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Synthese
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
2
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
200
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03588-z
refubium.affiliation
Philosophie und Geisteswissenschaften
refubium.affiliation.other
Institut für Philosophie
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refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1573-0964
refubium.resourceType.provider
WoS-Alert