dc.contributor.author
Hofmann, Andreas
dc.contributor.author
Naurin, Daniel
dc.date.accessioned
2021-09-27T11:22:51Z
dc.date.available
2021-09-27T11:22:51Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/32065
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-31793
dc.description.abstract
Litigation has long been a part of interest groups' lobbying tactics in the U.S. In Europe, by contrast, taking political conflicts to court has traditionally been viewed with skepticism. However, in the wake of an increasing judicialization of politics in Europe, litigation has also become part of the toolbox of European interest groups. Using original survey data from five European countries, we study how they use that tool. We show that European interest groups go to court somewhat less often than their American counterparts, but that the groups that do end up in court have similar characteristics. Overall, we find that the more politically active and resourceful a group is, the more likely it is to turn to the courts. However, a subset of politically active groups, one that deploys distinct outsider tactics, is more likely to use litigation than the rest. Government funding, however, reduces groups' propensity to litigate.
en
dc.format.extent
19 Seiten
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subject
interest groups
en
dc.subject
lobbying tactics
en
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::320 Politikwissenschaft::320 Politikwissenschaft
dc.title
Explaining interest group litigation in Europe: Evidence from the comparative interest group survey
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.1111/gove.12556
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Governance
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.number
4
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pagestart
1235
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pageend
1253
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
34
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12556
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
refubium.affiliation.other
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft
refubium.funding
DEAL Wiley
refubium.note.author
Die Publikation wurde aus Open Access Publikationsgeldern der Freien Universität Berlin gefördert.
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1468-0491