dc.contributor.author
Vierkant, Tillmann
dc.contributor.author
Deutschländer, Robert
dc.contributor.author
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter
dc.contributor.author
Haynes, John-Dylan
dc.date.accessioned
2019-06-12T08:54:26Z
dc.date.available
2019-06-12T08:54:26Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/24738
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-2498
dc.description.abstract
A long-standing position in philosophy, law, and theology is that a person can be held
morally responsible for an action only if they had the freedom to choose and to act
otherwise. Thus, many philosophers consider freedom to be a necessary condition for
moral responsibility. However, empirical findings suggest that this assumption might not
be in line with common sense thinking. For example, in a recent study we used surveys
to show that – counter to positions held by many philosophers – lay people consider
actions to be free when they are spontaneous rather than being based on reasons. In
contrast, responsibility is often considered to require that someone has thought about
the alternative options. In this study we used an online survey to directly test the degree
to which lay judgements of freedom and responsibility match. Specifically, we tested
whether manipulations of deliberation affect freedom and responsibility judgements in
the same way. Furthermore, we also tested the dependency of these judgements on a
person’s belief that their decision had consequences for their personal life. We found
that deliberation had an opposite effect on freedom and responsibility judgements.
People were considered more free when they acted spontaneously, whereas they were
considered more responsible when they deliberated about their actions. These results
seem to suggest that deliberating about reasons is crucially important for the lay concept
of responsibility, while for the lay notion of freedom it is perceived to be detrimental.
One way of interpreting our findings for the interdisciplinary debate on free will and
responsibility could be to suggest that lay beliefs match the philosophical position of
semi-compatibilism. Semi-compatibilists insist that the metaphysical debate on the
nature of free will can be separated from the debate on conditions of responsible
agency. According to our findings the beliefs of lay people are in line with views
held by semi-compatibilists, even though we did not test whether they endorse that
position explicitly.
en
dc.rights.uri
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subject
responsibility
en
dc.subject
deliberation
en
dc.subject
experimental philosophy
en
dc.subject.ddc
600 Technik, Medizin, angewandte Wissenschaften::610 Medizin und Gesundheit::610 Medizin und Gesundheit
dc.title
Responsibility without freedom? Folk judgements about deliberate actions
dc.type
Wissenschaftlicher Artikel
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.articlenumber
1133
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.doi
10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01133
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.journaltitle
Frontiers in Psychology
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.originalpublishername
Frontiers Media S.A.
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.volume
10
refubium.affiliation
Charité - Universitätsmedizin Berlin
refubium.resourceType.isindependentpub
no
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.pmid
31164854
dcterms.isPartOf.eissn
1664-1078