Seven years after the annexation of Crimea and amid an ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia has tried to move towards military escalation in the Donbass region making clear that the status quo emerged in 2014 as a “new normal” cannot last. The Minsk II Agreement negotiated between Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany in the framework of the Normandy Format in February 2015 remains unimplemented despite numerous rounds of mediation. Western economic sanctions against Moscow succeeded in limiting the Kremlin’s military advance beyond Donbass and deterred it from making further territorial gains. However, these measures failed to impact on Russian decision-making regarding resolution of the conflict. Influencing Russia’s foreign policy is not an easy task, as the country’s conduct of international relations is shaped by domestic factors and the authoritarian nature of its governance. Still, the West needs a strategy in response to the international and domestic wrongdoings already committed by the Kremlin and as a preventative measure to deter Moscow’s future aggression. In order to face the Russian challenge, the West should first design clear rules for its own foreign-policy behaviour based on the primacy of human rights and democracy and then define how to defend universal values abroad, including in Russia. Only after, it could structure a transatlantic strategy along the following lines: active United States–European Union involvement in the Normandy Format aimed at the fulfilment of the Minsk II Agreement, strengthening Ukraine’s resilience in developing democracy and its military and energy sectors and finally improving sanctions mechanisms against the Kremlin.

The European Union (EU) has come out with a new agenda for the southern neighbourhood, reflecting a changing environment in which the Covid-19 pandemic and the need for a shared economic and social recovery are put to the forefront. Does this new agenda respond to the demands and practices of the Arab uprisings or does it revert to the stability paradigm? We argue that the EU could regain relevance in a multipolar region by putting itself more firmly behind citizens and their demands in the region. Rather than seeing citizens as “norm-takers” of the EU, it needs to begin to see them as “norm-makers”, including for the EU. Covid-19 has so far seemed to delay the EU’s entry into a new era, but it could yet act as a catalyst for the bloc to rethink its policies in the longer term. In this respect, the Green Deal may offer most potential for the EU to move forward towards a more sustainable and equitable approach that puts participatory democracy, the whole range of human rights and social–ecological justice upfront.

Despite the popular protests that took place in 2011, the political economy of Tunisia remains largely characterized by processes of state capture and cronyism. While benefiting the ruling class, the social and economic costs of these mechanisms are detrimental to most of the population. There is a tendency in policy and academic circles to characterize state capture as the result of a late-development syndrome and unfair competition. This policy paper, however, proposes to adopt an alternative outlook. It argues for the need to critically reflect on the key role of the current neoliberal economic model in sustaining these dynamics. Based on the pursuit of the profit rate, the push for neoliberal reforms in Tunisia have sustained predation and rentierism since the late 1980s. In such a context, the European Union (EU) should rethink its terms of economic engagement based on neoliberal premises, and instead sustain an economic agenda aiming to regulate the rights and responsibilities of local and international capital in the interest of all.

There is a growing scepticism regarding the implementation of the European Union Global Strategy (2016), which builds on the idea of fostering resilience to the east and south, in a neighbourhood increasingly threatened by governance breakdown and violent conflict. Scholars highlight the vagueness of resilience, as well as the existing contradictions between policy sectors and member states’ preferences, as key elements constraining EU foreign policy. In response to these shortcomings, the idea of ‘strategic autonomy’ is currently being deployed to entertain a geopolitical EU and implement the Global Strategy more efficiently. This paper discusses how the idea of strategic autonomy is used, contrasts it with that of resilience as envisioned in the Global Strategy, and highlights some unforeseen risks for the EU external action: 1) strategic autonomy might be unrealistic in the short term and thus widen the gap between capabilities and expectations; (2) intervening geopolitically can also imply a move away from aspirations to foster resilience in a constructive and cooperative way with other partners.

The rise of populism in the European Union represents a key internal political development that is likely to have repercussions on its foreign policy. It is traditionally assumed that, when in the opposition, populist parties affect foreign policy debates though not foreign policy outcomes. But when they are elected into office, as happened in several EU member states, how do they shape policy decisions and processes in EU foreign policy? This policy paper argues that although populist actors can be vocal and conspicuous in aligning with external actors contesting the international liberal order, they rarely go as far as swaying or blocking EU foreign policy decisions and outputs. At the same time, however, populist governments’ domestic illiberal policies have the potential to undermine the EU’s legitimacy, structural power, and resilience-building endeavours.

Confronted in its southern neighborhood with the choice between continued promotion of democratic transitions and the need for stability in the post Arab-Spring environment, the EU is tilting to the latter. Past EU efforts reflected the conviction that peace, stability, and prosperity were the outcomes of democracy. But threats of regional conflict, civil wars, waves of immigrants, and rise in terror is forcing a rethinking. While searching for stability is understandable, supporting a return of authoritarianism is counterproductive. Indeed, a return to tyranny in the Arab world has already created significant public discontent that has led to a second wave of Arab uprisings. The EU should seek to strengthen societal resilience by supporting democratic reforms, for example, by supporting local Arab civil society initiatives. Such support should be guided by local priorities, those that address the economic and well as the political, educational, and health needs of the Arab public.

This policy paper focuses on impacts of global and diffuse risks on the EU and its neighbourhood regions. It provides a brief overview of six major risk categories that cover majority of global and diffuse risks and suggests their prioritization based on temporality, probability of occurrence and multiplication effect. The empirical evidence dictates that, in order to better cope with the impacts of global and diffuse risks and strengthen the resilience of its neighbourhood countries and with extension - of itself, the EU needs to prioritize the global risks which not only endanger the EU and its surroundings in the long term (climate change) but can also act as major spoilers in the short term (irregular migration & geopolitical rivalries). Finally, the EU should also pay attention to multiple effects of global risks and devise strategies based on regional and country-specific differentiation.

Protracted conflicts, which negatively affect the security environment and foster the emergence of Areas of Limited Statehood (ALS) and Contested Orders (CO), are present both in the eastern and southern neighbourhoods of the European Union (EU). The aim of this policy paper is to examine the EU’s conflict management approach to protracted conflicts in its neighbourhood and analyse how the resilience paradigm can mitigate the effects of ALS/CO in the European neighbourhood. The revision of EU foreign policy in the past decade has resulted in a major turn in the narrative towards resilience. Its Global Strategy refers to building state and societal resilience in its neighbourhood as one of the EU’s key strategic priorities. Can resilience policies address the protracted conflicts in the EU’s surrounding? Obstacles include the policies of other external actors, mainly Russia in the East but also Turkey in the South.

In Egypt and Tunisia, where violent radicalization has increased in recent years, official religious institutions have been tasked by the governments with the mission of countering ‘deviant’ ideas by preaching ‘moderate’ Islam. In order for religious institutions to play a positive role in preventing violent radicalization, they should start by consolidating their status as legitimate religious actors independent of political authorities, and then compete with their ideas in a plural religious sphere, rather than impose them on Muslims as ‘the true Islam’. While the EU could encourage the political regimes in both countries to ensure the independence of these religious institutions, it should engage cautiously with state religious institutions so as to not unintentionally damage their legitimacy in the religious sphere.

As part of their efforts to professionalize crisis and conflict prevention, foreign policy-makers are investing more in foresight, early warning or prediction. Different approaches and their products are suited for different purposes, based on distinct strengths and weaknesses. This policy paper provides an overview of the most common methods used in the context of preventing violent conflict and governance breakdown, and offers guidance on what to look out for when thinking about and planning for the future of crisis prevention.

Once upon a time, academia and practice were joined at the hip, but as years went by, a yawning gap began dividing the two worlds. Today, while occasions of contact between academia and practice exist, they remain mainly ad hoc and superficial. To bridge the gap between academia and practice, many have called for policy relevant scholarship. But this misses the point: academics are and should continue to be academics, much like practitioners are and should continue to be practitioners. It is not up to the academic to come up with detailed policy proposals. They often lack the technical expertise, the bureaucratic experience or political instinct to know the specific what, when and how needed. Yet the academics’ contribution to policy-making can be immense if they continue to be academics: using their unique skill set but with an eye for the concepts, the framing and the story-telling that are so essential to good policy-making.

This policy paper contributes to the debate on the implementation of the new resilience paradigm central to the EU‘s Global Strategy. It argues that the EU should clearly distinguish between regime stability as the capacity to persist or ‘bounce back’, and resilience as societal capacities to undergo processes of adaptation and transformation. Moreover, the EU should focus on legitimate institutions, appropriate institutional design, and social trust when strengthening resilience in its neighbourhood. In order to help build resilience the EU needs to know its neighbours, find the right partners in its neighbourhood, and provide the policy space for new resilience partnerships to develop.