dc.contributor.author
Schöb, Ronnie
dc.contributor.author
Thum, Marcel
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:27:36Z
dc.date.available
2011-09-21T07:13:37.086Z
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/20162
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/FUDOCS_document_000000011804
dc.description.abstract
Individual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring
new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information
about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in
the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than
predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and
full information.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000315-0
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000006-7
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject
hidden information
dc.subject
labour market regulation
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::331 Arbeitsökonomie
dc.title
Job protection renders minimum wages less harmful
refubium.affiliation
Wirtschaftswissenschaft
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Volkswirtschaftslehre
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000011804
refubium.series.issueNumber
2011,14 : Economics
refubium.series.name
Diskussionsbeiträge des Fachbereichs Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Freien Universität Berlin
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000001756
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
