dc.contributor.author
Rousselin, Mathieu
dc.date.accessioned
2018-06-08T08:02:09Z
dc.date.available
2012-12-02
dc.identifier.uri
https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/19230
dc.identifier.uri
http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-22892
dc.description
1\. Introduction 5 2\. The EU as a Bilateral Rule Exporter: What Do We Know? 6
2.1 How Does the EU Export Its Rules Bilaterally? Power Asymmetries,
Functional Dynamics and Domestic Politics 6 2.2 When Is the Bilateral Transfer
of EU Rules Successful? Domestic Preferences and Power Asymmetries 7 3\.
Bridging Europeanization and Globalization Studies: Identifying Commonalities
in the Explanatory Mechanisms 9 4\. Theoretical Implications of the Shift from
Bilateral to Multilateral Rule Transfer 11 4.1 How Do Bilateral Transfer
Processes Differ from Multilateral Ones? 11 4.2 Determining the Collective
Preference of Rule Importers 12 4.3 Imposing Constraint at the Multilateral
Level 14 4.4 Seeking Consent at the Multilateral Level 14 5\. Hypotheses,
Methodology and Case Selection 15 6\. The IMO Ban on Single-Hull Oil Tankers
17 7\. The UNECE-Sponsored Spread of the European Emission Control System 19
8\. The Spread of GSM Standards for Mobile Telephony Despite the ITU
Neutrality 21 9\. The Failure to Integrate the Singapore Issues into WTO
Negotiations 23 10\. Conclusion: Constraint and Consent in the Transfer of EU
Rules 24 Literature 26
dc.description.abstract
This working paper investigates the conditions which prompt a variety of non-
EU states grouped within an international organization to adopt European rules
or standards rather than any alternative rule or standard available for
selection. The paper reviews the main conceptual frameworks from research on
the bilateral transfer of European rules and highlights similarities between
these and alternative explanatory models of rule transfer, diffusion or
convergence found in the broader IR literature. After identifying the main
differences between bilateral and multilateral rule transfer processes, the
paper proposes theoretical amendments to capture the original forms and new
channels via which the EU can either impose constraint or seek consent at the
multilateral level. On this basis, two hypotheses are formulated whose
plausibility is subsequently probed by means of four comparative case studies
dedicated to the worldwide transfer or non-transfer of European rules via
international organizations.
de
dc.relation.ispartofseries
urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-fudocsseries000000000055-9
dc.rights.uri
http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen
dc.subject.ddc
300 Sozialwissenschaften::330 Wirtschaft::337 Weltwirtschaft
dc.title
The EU as a Multilateral Rule Exporter
dc.title.subtitle
The Global Transfer of European Rules via International Organizations
dcterms.bibliographicCitation.url
http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/transformeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_48_Rousselin.pdf
refubium.affiliation
Politik- und Sozialwissenschaften
de
refubium.affiliation.other
Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of Europe"
refubium.mycore.fudocsId
FUDOCS_document_000000015393
refubium.mycore.reportnumber
48
refubium.series.issueNumber
48
refubium.series.name
KFG working paper
refubium.mycore.derivateId
FUDOCS_derivate_000000002203
dcterms.accessRights.openaire
open access
dcterms.isPartOf.issn
1868-7601