The likely extension of the euro area has triggered a debate on the organization of the ECB, in particular on the apparent mismatch between relative economic size and voting rights in the Council. We present a simple model of optimal representation in a federal central bank addressing this question. Optimal voting weights re ect two opposing forces: the wish to insulate common monetary policy from changing preferences at the national level, and the attempt to avoid an overly active or passive reaction to idiosyncratic national economic shocks. A perfect match between economic size and voting rights is rarely optimal, and neither is the one country, one vote princi- ple . Empirically, there are indications that the pattern of over- and under-representation of member countries in the ECB Council might be extreme by the standards of the US Fed and German Bundesbank and not always optimal.

In a monopoly setting where consumers cannot observe the quality of the product we show that free samples which are of a lower quality than the marketed digital goods are used together with high prices as signals for a superior quality if the number of informed consumers is small and if the di®erence between the high and the low quality is not too small. Social welfare is higher, if the monopolist uses also free samples as signals, compared to a situation where he is restricted to pure price signalling. Both, the monopolist and consumers bene¯t from the additional signal.

The pending enlargement of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has brought to the fore the discussion of the voting right distribution in the European Central Bank (ECB) council. We show that, in a model where labor unions internalize the inflationary consequences of wage setting, deviating from a voting scheme based purely on economic size can be beneficial. Preliminary evidence on unemployment and voting rights in the ECB council seems broadly in line with this idea. We also point to possible policy implications for EMU enlargement and ECB restructuring.

The multi-period multinomial Probit model (MMPM) is seen as a flexible tool to explain individual choices among several alternatives over time. There are two versions of this model: a) for each individual the covariates for all alternatives are known and b) for each individual only the parameters of the alternative which was chosen is known. The main difficulty with the MMPM was the calculation of the probability for the individual sequence of chosen alternatives, which requires the computation of the integral over a high dimensional multivariate Normal density. This remedy was removed by the Smooth Recursive Conditional (SRC) simulator. Several simulation studies have investigated the stability of the MMPM estimates with special emphasis to the number of replications of the SRC routine. In contrast to these studies, which use the case of alternative specific covariates, we use the case of the individual specific covariates. We conclude that the MMPM with individual specific covariates is only weakly identified, generalizing Keane’s (1992) result for the one period case. As a consequence the maximization of the simulated likelihood often converges to a singular covariance structure so that the SRC-routine stops iterating. This feature cannot be avoided by increasing the number of replications in the SRC-routine. The percentage of these failures rapidly increases with the number of alternatives.

In this paper, I provide a quantitative review of the empirical literature on Zipf’s law for cities; the meta-analysis combines 515 estimates from 29 studies. I find that the combined estimate of the Zipf coefficient is significantly larger than 1.0. This finding implies that cities are on average more evenly distributed than suggested by (a strict interpretation of) Zipf’s law. I also identify several features that account for differences across the individual point estimates.

Wird die Unabhängigkeit von Zentralbanken schon lange in der Literatur diskutiert, hat die Thematisierung von Transparenz erst durch neue Praktiken der Zentralbanken größere Aufmerksamkeit erlangen können. In dieser Arbeit wird eine Klassifikation ders Aspekte von Transparenz erarbeitet, anhand derer die unterschiedlichen Forschungsarbeiten systematisiert und in ihrer Relevanz analysiert werden können. Diese Analyse erfolgt am Beispiel der Politik der Europäischen Zentralbank, da diese sich einerseits permanenter Kritik bezüglich ihrer Intranparenz ausgesetzt findet und anderseits ihre neuen Praktiken die Grenzen der bsiherigen Forschung aufzeigen können.

This paper compares the trading patterns of amateurs to that of professional investors during the days following the weekend. The comparison is based on all the daily transactions of a sample of both amateurs and professionally managed investors in a major brokerage house in Israel between 1994-1998. We find that weekends influence both amateurs and professional investors, however they affect professionals and amateurs in opposite directions. The results are consistent with previous hypotheses about the effects of the weekend on individuals and institutions in the US and with the way these differences may explain the weekend effect in returns in the US and in other markets. The results are also consistent with the absence of a weekend effect in returns in Israel during the period examined, since the conflicting effects of the weekend on individuals and professionally managed investors may have canceled each other.

In this paper we present a new method for estimating market integration under a commodity money system such as that which existed in Europe until the demise of the gold standard. The approach is based on the analysis of deviations between exchange rates and parity, which under conditions of a perfectly functioning and fully integrated market should not exceed the bullion points. Consequently the time needed for adjustment, following a violation of the bullion points, can be used as an indicator of market imperfections and as a measure of integration. We apply this approach to trade between late medieval Flanders, Lübeck and Prussia, our results showing that Flanders- Lübeck constituted a much better-integrated market than Flanders-Prussia. Moreover, the results indicate that the degree of market integration increased between the early fourteenth and the middle of the fifteenth century.

This papers sheds light on the puzzling evidence that even though open source software (OSS) is a public good, it is developed for free by highly qualified, young and motivated individuals, and evolves at a rapid pace. We show that once OSS development is understood as the private provision of a public good, these features emerge quite naturally. We adapt a dynamic private-provision- of-public-goods model to reflect key aspects of the OSS phenomenon. In particular, instead of relying on extrinsic motives for programmers (e.g. signaling) the present model is driven by intrinsic motives of OSS programmers, such as user-programmers, play value or homo ludens payoff, and gift culture benefits. Such intrinsic motives feature extensively in the wider OSS literature and contribute new insights to the economic analysis.