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EUROPEAN CONVENTION
THURSDAY, 15 MAY 2003

Debate on draft articles on Institutions

0026 4-023
Fini (Ch.E/G.-IT). - Merci Monsieur le Président. Avec trois minutes, je suis riche aujourd'hui.

A_approve, admit as correct-

L'orateur poursuit en italien

0027 Signor Presidente, giunti quasi al termine dei nostri lavori, credo che sia
0028 innanzitutto necessaria, da parte di tutti noi, la consapevolezza del
grande e, ad avviso del governo italiano, positivo lavoro svolto fin qui
dalla Convenzione; al tempo stesso credo che serva alla Convenzione,
0029 soprattutto adesso, un forte slancio per superare le polarizzazioni tra
metodo comunitario e metodo intergovernativo, tra paesi vecchi e nuovi,
tra Stati piccoli e grandi. E' la ragione per la quale desidero, innanzitutto,
esprimere il mio ringraziamento al *Praesidium* e al Presidente Giscard
perché il documento sulle Istituzioni dell'Unione, che ci è stato
presentato e che era giustamente tanto atteso, ci stimola a compiere un
lavoro di alto profilo politico in sintonia con la portata storica delle
riforme necessarie nell'Europa riunificata.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
A_approve, admit as correct-

Ad avviso del governo italiano, l'impianto complessivo della proposta del *Praesidium* è positivo, certamente migliorabile, contiene significative innovazioni e, soprattutto, corrisponde all'esigenza di rafforzare tutte le Istituzioni, mantenendo l'equilibrio tra di esse. Tra le innovazioni, positive e di rilievo, mi limito a ricordare: in primo luogo, l'istituzione del Ministro degli esteri dell'Unione - articolo 19 - che avrà un ruolo propulsivo nella politica estera e di sicurezza comune dell'Unione medesima; in secondo luogo, la razionalizzazione della funzione legislativa, con la creazione del Consiglio per gli affari legislativi, vera e propria Camera degli Stati che costituirà l'interlocutore unico di un rafforzato Parlamento europeo: è l'avvio di un sistema in qualche modo simile ai sistemi bicamerali.

Nell'ottica del rafforzamento, che non altera l'equilibrio istituzionale, voglio sottolineare che ci sembra molto importante che la Commissione mantenga il suo ruolo centrale di guardiana dell'interesse europeo, conservando il monopolio dell'iniziativa legislativa.

Ma se la Commissione resta il motore dell'Europa, altrettanto insostituibile si rivela l'esigenza di garantire il funzionamento efficace all'organismo che deve esprimere le visioni politiche e strategiche dell'Unione, specie in un'Europa riunificata. Questo organismo dev'essere il Consiglio.

Secondo il governo italiano la Presidenza del Consiglio, lunga e *full time*, proposta dal *Praesidium*, garantisce continuità e coerenza di azione. La descrizione dei compiti e delle funzioni del Presidente del Consiglio ci appare equilibrata e in grado di fugare le apprensioni di quanti temevano un eccesso di potere.

0030 L'Italia guarda comunque con favore alle proposte che meglio
 0031 definiscono il ruolo di *chairman* del Presidente del Consiglio e che
 prevedono l'istituzione di una Vicepresidenza a rotazione, con almeno
 una seduta all'anno del Consiglio nella capitale del paese cui spetta la
 Vicepresidenza di turno.

0032 Allo stesso modo, pur comprendendo l'utilità e l'efficacia di una
 riduzione del numero dei Commissari che - ricordo - non devono tutelare
 gli interessi nazionali, comprendo bene le ragioni politiche e simboliche
 che spingono molti Stati candidati a chiedere di essere rappresentati in
 Commissione sul piano di assoluta parità. Per il governo italiano la
 soluzione più opportuna potrebbe essere quella di prevedere un
 Commissario per Stato membro per un primo, breve periodo transitorio;
 0033 successivamente si dovrebbe però arrivare ad una Commissione a
 0034 composizione predeterminata e limitata, con l'obbligo di rotazione
 0035 paritaria tra tutti gli Stati dell'Unione.

0036 Signor Presidente, l'Italia non ha presentato emendamenti all'articolato
 del *Praesidium* nel senso sopra descritto perché, come dicevo in
 precedenza, ne condivide in sostanza la stesura. Intendiamo comunque
 muoverci su questa linea, alla ricerca di tutti quegli elementi utili e
 0038 necessari per ampliare la condivisione del progetto istituzionale in seno
 0039 alla Convenzione; del resto, i nostri lavori sono regolati da una logica di
 consenso e non da una logica di voto, proprio per privilegiare il
 momento di unione su quello di divisione. Crediamo, anche nel ruolo di
 futuri presidenti di turno del Consiglio, che questo sia davvero lo spirito
 giusto per il buon esito, ora, dei lavori della Convenzione e, domani,
 della Conferenza intergovernativa.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

B_threaten-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_demand, call for, desire-

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

4-024

Lamassoure (PE). - **Oui au compromis créateur, non au compromis**
démagogique. Nous approchons du compromis final. Nous représentons
des institutions différentes. La tentation va être très très très forte de
rechercher le compromis par addition - les revendications du Conseil
plus celles du Parlement plus celles de la Commission plus celles des
parlements nationaux. Si c'est le cas, chacun de nous sortira enchanté et
l'Europe aura perdu. C'est exactement ce qui a fait échouer le Conseil
européen de Nice. Chaque gouvernement est revenu de Nice très satisfait
et le lendemain, on s'est rendu compte que le travail était à refaire et on a
créé la Convention.

Vers quoi risquons-nous de déboucher? Sur un Conseil de 25 membres
dont chaque pays sera fier d'exercer la présidence glorieuse pour deux
réunions tous les quinze ans. Sur une Commission censée représenter
l'intérêt commun mais composée exclusivement sur des bases nationales
avec un Commissaire par nationalité. Laeken nous demande de renforcer
l'indépendance du Collège et on le transforme en Coreper. Sur un
Président de la Commission qui serait à la fois nommé et élu par tout le
monde, par le Parlement et par le Conseil, par la majorité du Parlement
et par la minorité du Parlement. Bref, ce serait là la méthode la plus sûre
pour choisir une personnalité qui ne fera d'ombre à personne. Ce serait le
compromis par addition des lâchetés.

Pour parvenir au compromis créateur, il faut partir des fonctions
attendues de chacune des institutions et renforcer toutes les institutions.
La fonction du Conseil est de représenter fidèlement les Etats. C'est au
sein du Conseil que doit s'exprimer l'égalité des Etats par l'égalité des
droits de vote. Le praesidium a fait là une proposition révolutionnaire et
bienvenue dont il nous faut mesurer la portée. La fonction du Parlement
est de bien représenter les citoyens. Avec 600 ou 650 députés, c'est une
assemblée qui légifère. A 750 ou plus, ce serait un forum qui bavarde.
La fonction de la Commission est de bien définir l'intérêt commun de
l'Union. Son président doit donc recevoir une légitimité démocratique

propre, indépendante des Etats: celle du vote populaire par l'intermédiaire du Parlement européen, se prononçant à la majorité simple. Si on exige une majorité qualifiée, on confisque le vote populaire au profit de combinaisons de couloir. Enfin, la composition de la Commission doit être, si je puis dire, dénationalisée, soit en fixant un nombre de Commissaires très bas, soit au contraire, en supprimant tout chiffre plafond au nombre des Commissaires et en laissant le président de la Commission composer son équipe. On aurait ainsi garanti l'égalité des Etats, l'égalité des citoyens et le renforcement de toutes les institutions de l'Union. C'était le mandat de Laeken

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(Applaudissements)

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4-025

Costa (Parl.-PT). - Senhor Presidente, entre a proposta do *Praesidium* para as instituições e uma solução de coesão e de futuro há uma distância ainda grande a percorrer. O projecto de um cargo presidencial europeu a tempo inteiro nasceu mal justificado e revelou-se um factor de divisão. Nas presentes condições tornou-se um propósito institucional que promove a fractura e não a coesão. Se queremos edificar instituições sobre um chão comum e não sobre um campo de batalha repartido entre muitos países vencidos e poucos países vencedores, então a viatura presidencial terá de inverter a marcha e regressar à garagem. Exige-o a nossa própria coesão.

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O formato e o conceito da Comissão não podem ser reduzidos e deturpados sob a falsa alegação, totalmente falsa alegação, de que não há executivos eficazes com mais de quinze iguais. Na Europa actual, assegurar a igualdade na relação com os Estados-Membros continua a ser fundamental sob pena de graves efeitos sobre a nossa coesão. O novo cargo proposto sob a designação de ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ou sob outra mais adequada é uma boa inovação desde que se introduzam alterações, que propusemos, que evitem que esse novo cargo venha a ser construído em prejuízo das Presidências da Comissão e do Conselho. Para isso, é importante que seja escolhido de entre os comissários e não seja ele a presidir ao Conselho de ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros.

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***A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

O Conselho Legislativo, como câmara representativa dos Estados no processo legislativo, não pode ser tratado como mais uma formação do Conselho entre várias outras formações executivas. Deve ser posto ao lado do Parlamento Europeu no quadro de uma reforma do poder legislativo da União que dê um novo impulso de legitimidade democrática à lei europeia.

A ideia de um Congresso dos Povos da Europa também se revelou um projecto fracturante, pelo menos nos termos que foram propostos. Deve evoluir para uma Conferência Interparlamentar, uma instância sem papel legislativo mas com missões de acompanhamento e controlo que são de grande relevo em áreas europeias não submetidas a qualquer controlo parlamentar digno desse nome.

Em conclusão, o cargo presidencial a tempo inteiro deverá ser retirado. A Comissão não deve perder o mais valioso que foi atingido em Nice. O ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros deve ser aperfeiçoado para ter sucesso. O Conselho Legislativo deve ser valorizado e dignificado. Em vez do Congresso dos Povos da Europa, devemos antes admitir uma Conferência Interparlamentar europeia.

4-025 Translation

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Herr pr, zwischen dem Vorschlag des Präsidiums für die Institutionen und einer zusammenführenden und zukunftstüchtigen Lösung liegt noch ein langer Weg. Das Projekt eines europäischen Vollzeitpräsidenten wurde mit einer schlechten Begründung geboren und hat sich als ein Trennfaktor erwiesen. Unter den heutigen Umständen hat es sich in einen institutionellen Zweck verwandelt, der Frakturen und nicht die Kohäsion fördert. Wenn wir die Institutionen auf einem gemeinsamen Boden bauen möchten und nicht auf einen Schlachtfeld, geteilt zwischen viele besiegte und wenige Siegerländer, dann muss das präsidentielle Fahrzeug den Rückwärtsgang einlegen und wieder in die Garage. Unsere Kohäsion selbst verlangt es.


O formato e o conceito da Comissão não podem ser reduzidos e deturpados sob a falsa alegação, totalmente falsa alegação, de que não há executivos eficazes com mais de quinze iguais. Na Europa actual, assegurar a igualdade na relação com os Estados-Membros continua a ser fundamental sob pena de graves efeitos sobre a nossa coesão. O novo cargo proposto sob a designação de ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros ou sob outra mais adequada é uma boa inovação desde que se introduzam alterações, que propusemos, que evitem que esse novo cargo venha a ser construído em prejuízo das Präsidências da Comissão e do Conselho. Para isso, é importante que seja escolhido de entre os comissários e não seja ele a Präsidir ao Conselho de ministros dos Negócios Estrangeiros.


Das Format und das Konzept der Kommission können nicht durch die falsche Behauptung - die völlig falsche Behauptung - dass es keine wirksame Exekutive mit mehr als 15 Gleichwertigen geben kann, reduziert und verfälscht werden. Im aktuellen Europa ist es immer noch grundlegend, die Gleichheit der Mitgliedsstaaten zu versichern - bei Strafe gefährlicher Auswirkungen auf unsere Kohäsion. Der vorgeschlagene neue Amt, mit der Bezeichnung Außenminister oder mit einer anderen, besser passenden, Bezeichnung, ist eine gute Neuerung, solange Veränderungen/Änderungen, die wir vorgeschlagen haben, eingeführt werden. Änderungen die vermeiden werden, dass dieses neue Amt zu Schaden der Kommission- und Ratspräsidentschaften eingerichtet wird. Deswegen, ist es wichtig, dass aus den Kommissaren gewählt wird, und dass er nicht dem Rat der Außenminister vorsitzt.

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 B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

 B_demand, call for, desire-

0068 Conferência Interparlamentar europeia.
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4-026

Rupel (Gouv.-SI). - Mr President, in Slovenia we consider it crucial that the enlarged European Union be based on Community spirit, which should be further strengthened by institutional solutions. This has been the foundation for the development of the European integration process, which a number of new countries wish to join. History has shown that the Community method enables a creative life in a community since it is based on the impartial seeking and implementation of common interests, without the need for anybody to give up their identity and without reintroducing the patterns of the former organisation of the continent which was based on a search for balance between interests supposedly aimed at alleviating the tensions of the largest European countries striving to establish dominance.

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Slovenia is one of the smaller future EU Member States. It is essential that the enlarged European Union respects the principle of equality between its Member States, small and large, old and new. This balance is a necessary element of the legitimacy of the European integration process.

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As to equality between Member States, we have to distinguish between equality in terms of equality before the law, which means rules applicable to all Member States, and in terms of equal representation in the institutions. This representation should be based on the balance of the dual nature of the EU: a union of citizens and a union of sovereign nation states.

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The question of suitable representation of the countries within the individual institutions relates to the balance between small and large Member States. This balance has not been duly taken into account in the Presidency proposals.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
B_threaten-
B_uphold (an offer, promise)-

I am therefore in favour of preserving the rotating Presidency system, at least at the levels of the European Council, General Affairs Council and Coreper, thereby guaranteeing a suitable representation and equality of all Member States and allowing the citizens of each Member State to identify with the EU. Perhaps we need to adjust the present system of management; it should be a system appropriate for multinational organisations. Simple majoritarian democracy would be a recipe for radical democratic deficit

A_approve, admit as correct-
**A_justify-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]- A_conclude, (logically) infer-

As to the questions of equal representation, the institutions and the weighting of votes of individual Member States, an acceptable compromise solution was found at the Intergovernmental Conference in Nice. Changing any of the three elements of this compromise solution would open the debate concerning the other two.

I therefore propose that the solution achieved in Nice be applied to the weighting of votes in the Council, the distribution of seats in the European Parliament and the composition of the Commission. The composition of the Commission will be of utmost importance to new Member States. Any other composition that is not based on the principle of "one state, one commissioner" would be acceptable only if founded on the principle of equality of Member States.

I voice my support for the solutions proposed by the Presidency concerning the institutions' arrangement governing EU external action. The European Union will be stronger in its external action if it is able to speak with one voice. We therefore consider that the merging of the functions of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and

0086 Security Policy and the Commissioner for External Relations to create an
0088 EU Foreign Minister is a suitable solution.

4-027

0089 **Brok (PE).** – Herr Präsident, Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich glaube,
0090 dass die Vorlage des Präsidiums eine gute Vorlage ist, die Beratungen
und schließlich auch einen Kompromiss möglich macht. Ich stimme mit
meinem Vorredner, Herrn Rupel, darin überein, dass die historische
Erfahrung zeigt, dass die Gemeinschaftsmethode die richtige ist, und
daran müssen wir uns orientieren. Wir müssen einen Ausgleich zwischen
Groß und Klein finden, der bisher nicht besteht, weil in der bisherigen
Vorlage die kleinen Länder mit ihren Vorstellungen zu sehr
vernachlässigt wurden. Der Entwurf kann bisher zu sehr zugunsten der
0091 großen Länder ausgelegt werden.
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Gleichzeitig müssen wir eine Balance zwischen Legitimation, Effizienz
und Transparenz finden. Meines Erachtens ist der hauptamtliche
Ratspräsident wirklich der einzige Aspekt des Vorschlags, der a) den
0093 Ansatz zum Intergouvernementalen hat und b) die Balance zwischen den
0094 Institutionen erheblich stört. Dieser Ratspräsident unterliegt keiner
parlamentarischen Kontrolle, obwohl er beispielsweise in der
Außenvertretung exekutive Aufgaben haben soll. Damit wird die
0095 Außenvertretung auch nur noch komplizierter, weil wir dann einen
0096 Kommissionspräsidenten, den neuen Außenminister - was ich für einen
guten Vorschlag halte - und diesen Ratspräsidenten haben. Wir erweitern
die Zahl der Telefonnummern, anstatt sie einzuschränken, und deswegen
0097 sollten wir nicht auch noch einen Ratspräsidenten haben.
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Kontinuität kann notwendig sein, sie kann jedoch auch auf andere Weise
hergestellt werden, nämlich durch die Verlängerung der Amtszeit, durch
Ratsentscheidungen in den Händen der Staats- und Regierungschefs und
der einzelnen Räte. Der Außenministerrat beispielsweise soll - das ist in
diesem Zusammenhang der wichtigste Punkt - von dem zukünftigen
Außenminister geleitet werden.

Der Kommissionspräsident und damit die Kommission müssen dadurch
gestärkt werden, dass er auch bei der Verteilung von Ämtern und
reshuffling und Zuordnungen und Reihenfolgen komplette
Richtlinienkompetenz hat. Ich glaube, dass das der Weg ist, um effizient
zu gestalten und damit auch politische Verantwortung in die Hände des
Kommissionspräsidenten zu legen. Gleichzeitig müssen wir
berücksichtigen, in welcher Weise jedes Land Zugang zu allen
Informationen hat, und eine ausgewogene Lösung zwischen Groß und
Klein finden.

Herr Präsident, ich danke Ihnen sehr für den Vorschlag, demzufolge eine
Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetzgebungsrat und Exekutivrat gemacht
wird, wobei der Gesetzgebungsrat öffentlich tagen soll. Ich glaube, wir
müssen in Teil B oder in Teil III, wie wir das jetzt nennen, noch sehr
deutlich präzisieren, wie dies gestaltet werden soll.

Lassen Sie mich eine letzte Bemerkung machen. Der Außenminister, der
Mitglied der Kommission ist und ein besonderes Mandat des Rates und
ein Vertrauensvotum des Rates hat, braucht eine Institution, mit der er
arbeiten kann. Dieser Auswärtige Dienst darf aber keine neue Bürokratie
schaffen - möglicherweise eine Bürokratie zwischen Kommission und
Rat -, sondern er muss ein Bestandteil der Kommission sein, weil sonst
auch heutige Gemeinschaftsaufgaben aus der Kommission verlagert
würden. Wir sollten dafür Sorge tragen, dass wir keine doppelte
Administration schaffen. Aber man muss hinzufügen - das haben wir in
einem Antrag auch gemacht -, dass in den Bereichen, in denen der Rat
die Zuständigkeit der Beschlussfassung hat, diese Behörde im Rahmen

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

**A_justify~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_reject, decline, refuse-

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

der Kommission rechtlich verpflichtet ist, die Beschlüsse des Rates auszuführen. Ich glaube, wenn wir dies so gestalten, können die Sorgen des Rates, also der Mitgliedsländer, entsprechend berücksichtigt werden, während die Struktur einheitlich bleibt. Wir sollten darauf achten, dass wir die Abläufe nicht komplizieren, sondern im Interesse unserer Bürger die Leistungsfähigkeit in den Vordergrund stellen.

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(Beifall)

4-028

Einem (Parl.-AT). – Herr Präsident! Ich kann mich weitgehend dem, was Kollege Brok soeben gesagt hat, anschließen. Vielleicht ein paar Ergänzungen: Erstens glaube ich, dass das entscheidende Fundament für die Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Union die Gemeinschaftsmethode ist, und dass wir überall dort, wo wir in Gefahr geraten, die Gemeinschaftsmethode aus dem Gleichgewicht zu bringen, auch mit unseren Verfassungsideen in Gefahr geraten.


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Zweiter Punkt: die Kommission. Ich denke, es ist von entscheidender Bedeutung - das werden die Wortmeldungen am heutigen Tag noch zeigen -, dass wir gewährleisten und absolutes Vertrauen in die Perspektive schaffen, dass jeder Mitgliedstaat, insbesondere auch jene, die jetzt erst beitreten werden, in nächster Zeit damit rechnen können, auf jeden Fall einen eigenen Kommissar nominieren und stellen zu können.

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Da wir aber eine Verfassung machen wollen, die nicht nach jeder Erweiterungsrunde verändert werden muss, sollten wir vielleicht eine Lösung finden, die sicherstellt, dass jetzt und später alle Mitgliedstaaten in gleichmäßiger Rotation einen Kommissar stellen. Dafür brauchen wir eine Lösung, die heute im Vorschlag des Präsidiums noch nicht enthalten ist, die vielleicht darin bestehen könnte, dass der Kommissionspräsident die Frage entscheidet, wer Kommissar ist, und dass eine Rückkopplung nicht nur mit dem Parlament, sondern allenfalls auch mit den Mitgliedstaaten erfolgt, die sicherstellt, dass diese Lösung trägt.

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Lassen Sie mich zur Kommission in Ergänzung zu dem, was Herr Brok schon gesagt hat, noch eines sagen. Ein zentrales Detail für die höhere Effizienz der Kommission wird sein, dass wir auch den Kommissaren ein Weisungsrecht gegenüber den Generaldirektionen geben. Die Bürokratie und die Kommissare dürfen nicht länger nebeneinander leben, ohne dass die Kommissare im Fall des Falles die Möglichkeit haben, ihren Willen, für den sie sich auch vor dem Parlament zu verantworten haben, umzusetzen.

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Drittens, der Europäische Rat. Ich erkenne die Notwendigkeit an, den Europäischen Rat besser zu koordinieren und sicherzustellen, dass er auch bei 27 oder mehr Mitgliedern arbeitsfähig bleibt. Ich spreche mich allerdings deutlich gegen jede Form eines dauerhaften Vorsitzenden oder Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates aus, weil das zu einer vollständigen Veränderung der europäischen Architektur führen würde, die ich ablehne. Herr Brok hat im Wesentlichen schon gesagt: Das ist eine Tendenz zum Intergouvernementalismus, und es führt zu einer dauerhaften Kohabitation auf europäischer Ebene, die wir nicht wollen, um es deutlich zu sagen.

Ich denke allerdings, dass trotzdem Änderungen notwendig sind, ohne hier meine Änderungsvorschläge zu referieren. Wir brauchen jedenfalls einen Stab von Kommissions- und Ratssekretariatsbeamten, die den von mir vorgeschlagenen Generalsekretär unterstützen und für jene Kontinuität sorgen, die erst die Qualität der Arbeit ausmacht. Dabei

0114 reicht aber ein Präsidium wie ich es vorgeschlagen habe, und nicht ein
0116 Präsident. Der Außenminister, den wir einsetzen wollen, wird nur stark
sein können, wenn er als Hintergrund einen Europäischen Rat hat, der
funktioniert.

4-029
0117 **Le Président.** - Monsieur Santer, je crois que les pays du Bénélux se
0119 sont plus ou moins regroupés et vous ont confié le soin de parler au nom
de plusieurs d'entre eux. Néanmoins, la base reste de trois minutes mais,
si vous allez au-delà, on comprendra que c'est au nom des autres
0120 orateurs.
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4-030
0122 **Santer (Ch.E/G.-LU)**- Merci Monsieur le Président. Effectivement, j'ai
0123 l'honneur de parler au nom des trois représentants du gouvernement du
Bénélux car les amendements que les pays du Bénélux ont
conjointement introduits s'inscrivent dans la logique du mémorandum
0124 que nous avons diffusé au mois de décembre dernier. L'élément principal
0125 est la défense et le renforcement de la méthode communautaire et nos
propositions prennent en compte les principales critiques que l'on peut
adresser aujourd'hui à l'action de l'Union.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-
**A_explain-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

0126 A l'intérieur, le changement semestriel de programme affaiblit la
0127 continuité de son action et, à l'extérieur, l'Union européenne n'a pas
atteint le niveau de crédibilité, d'efficacité et également de visibilité qui
lui permettrait de jouer pleinement son rôle international.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

0128 Nos propositions visent donc à remédier à ces faiblesses sans toutefois
0129 créer de nouvelles institutions ni bouleverser l'équilibre entre les
institutions. L'organisation institutionnelle future de l'Union doit
également respecter le principe d'égalité des Etats membres auxquels
tant de conventionnels sont attachés. L'égalité des Etats membres, d'un
côté, et l'égalité des citoyens européens sont étroitement liées.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

L'axe central de nos propositions se situe dès lors, dans un renforcement
du rôle de coordination d'une formation du Conseil, à savoir le conseil
des affaires générales. Celui-ci devient l'instance chargée de préparer et
d'assurer le suivi des réunions du Conseil européen. Nous voulons que
le Conseil européen joue pleinement son rôle d'impulsion politique qui
est fondamental dans une Union de 25 membres ou plus. Et une bonne
préparation de ses travaux est de ce fait indispensable. Nous ne
souhaitons cependant pas faire du Conseil européen une institution à
part. Nous proposons de confier la présidence du conseil des affaires
générales au président de la Commission. Ainsi le besoin de continuité et
de cohérence dans l'action de l'Union sera le mieux assuré.

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

Par contre, la présidence du conseil des affaires étrangères sera confiée
au nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères afin d'assurer la même
continuité et une visibilité accrue. Nous sommes convaincus de pouvoir
en retirer un plus haut degré d'efficacité dans l'action extérieure de
l'Union. Et nous souhaitons que le ministre des affaires étrangères soit
intégré dans la Commission dont il deviendrait un des vice-présidents
tout en préservant la spécificité de la PESC et de la PESD. Par ailleurs, il
faudra réunir les ressources administratives notamment en matière de
gestion des relations extérieures comme cela vient d'être dit.

Ainsi, les deux principaux problèmes connaîtraient une solution
cohérente et efficace. Cohérente parce qu'elle correspond aux fonctions
d'organe exécutif de la Commission et efficace parce qu'aucune nouvelle
institution ni même aucune nouvelle structure n'est créée. Cette solution
nous permettra de maintenir le système actuel de la rotation semestrielle
pour les autres formations du Conseil dont la liste devrait correspondre à

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celle décidée par le Conseil européen de Séville. Cela ne devrait toutefois pas empêcher des arrangements ad hoc pour l'une ou l'autre formation du Conseil si le besoin s'en faisait sentir.

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Cette solution s'inscrit également dans le souci de simplification qui est une des lignes directrices du mandat de cette Convention. Et c'est précisément dans ce souci de simplification que le Bénélux peut accepter la proposition de remplacer par une double majorité le système de pondération des votes, particulièrement complexe depuis Nice. Il nous a cependant semblé nécessaire de prévoir une double majorité spéciale pour les cas où il n'y a pas de proposition de la Commission. Le traité actuel connaît une telle disposition qu'il nous semble préserver.

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Pour ce qui est des arrangements institutionnels proprement dits, le Bénélux a cherché à répondre au besoin d'efficacité tout en intégrant la demande légitime du respect de l'égalité des Etats membres. C'est dans ce sens qu'il convient tout particulièrement de comprendre nos propositions relatives à la composition de la Commission. La proposition du praesidium comporte des risques évidents pour l'égalité des Etats membres et de ce fait, pour la légitimité de la Commission. Le maintien d'une Commission composée d'un national par Etat membre pourrait à terme mener à une perte d'efficacité, encore que, à titre personnel, je n'en sois pas tout à fait convaincu. Nous pouvons accepter une Commission réduite pour assurer l'efficacité de cette institution dans une Union élargie à condition que le principe d'une rotation égalitaire soit préservé. Voilà le sens de notre proposition qui distingue le collège des Commissaires qui prennent les décisions, et les Commissaires délégués qui participent aux travaux de la Commission. Au besoin, les sensibilités de chaque pays pourraient être répercutées au sein de la Commission, dont l'indépendance doit évidemment être renforcée.

Il va de soi que de tels arrangements ne s'appliqueraient qu'à partir de l'entrée en fonction de la Commission qui suit l'entrée en vigueur de la Constitution.

Les pays du Bénélux proposent ensuite de renforcer le Parlement européen en lui donnant le pouvoir d'élire le président de la Commission. Nous n'avons pas prévu de détails quant à la procédure de sélection des candidats à une telle élection car il me semble qu'il faille maintenir une certaine flexibilité. Faut-il pour autant prévoir cela expressément dans la Constitution? Nous pensons que non, d'autant plus nous ne connaissons pas de Constitution qui prévoit ces détails.

Le Président élu serait confirmé par le Conseil européen et il lui appartiendrait alors de composer sa Commission dans le respect de la rotation égalitaire entre Commissaires et Commissaires délégués. Comme c'est déjà le cas actuellement, cette Commission serait soumise à un vote d'approbation par le Parlement européen devant lequel la Commission serait responsable. Je tiens encore à préciser à cet égard que le Bénélux propose qu'une motion de censure adoptée par le Parlement européen entraînera en principe une dissolution de celle-ci, sauf si le Conseil européen en dispose autrement.

Le ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Union, en tant que vice-président de la Commission, fait bien évidemment partie du Collège des Commissaires mais la procédure conduisant à sa nomination répond à la nature particulière de sa fonction et de sa place dans le schéma institutionnel.

Enfin, Monsieur le Président, nous ne voyons pas de place dans le jeu interinstitutionnel et interactionnel de l'Union pour un Congrès des

B_demand, call for, desire~

peuples. Nous sommes convaincus que la légitimité démocratique au niveau européen doit continuer à être représentée par le Parlement européen. Certes des rencontres entre parlementaires nationaux et parlementaires européens doivent continuer, mais plutôt dans un cadre informel privilégiant d'ailleurs l'échange de bonnes pratiques et le dialogue interparlementaire. Le renforcement du rôle des parlements nationaux, notamment en matière de contrôle du principe de subsidiarité, nous paraît être convenablement pris en compte par les travaux de la Convention.

En guise de conclusion, je me permettrai simplement de souligner la disponibilité des pays du Bénélux pour trouver un véritable compromis permettant de conclure avec succès cette Convention. Un tel compromis ne pourra cependant voir le jour que si nous nous livrons à une écoute attentive de chacun des membres de cette Convention. Un consensus au sein de cette Convention est sûrement à notre portée. Il sera le fruit de propositions constructives et d'une disponibilité à trouver des solutions équilibrées. Tel est le but des propositions que nous vous soumettons.

(Applaudissements)






4-031

Haenel (Parl.-FR). - Monsieur le Président, mes chers collègues, nous n'arriverons pas à un résultat si chacun défend seulement les intérêts de son institution ou la position de son pays. Il faut retrouver l'esprit qui a animé les pères fondateurs, c'est-à-dire nous nous élevons au-dessus des enjeux de pouvoir et des intérêts particuliers. Notre but doit être que les institutions de l'Union puissent remplir leur tâches et être plus légitimes, plus efficaces, plus contrôlables et plus responsables. Et il me semble que les propositions du praesidium répondent à ces légitimes attentes de nos concitoyens.

Premier point. On ne peut pas conserver la présidence tournante du Conseil européen. Elle ne permet ni la visibilité, ni la responsabilité. Une présidence plus longue par Etat membre n'est pas non plus la solution. Elle serait une charge trop lourde et donnerait à la présidence une coloration trop nationale. La solution retenue par le praesidium est donc la bonne. Avec un président stable du Conseil européen et avec un ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Union, l'Europe pourra commencer à exister davantage sur la scène internationale. La restructuration du Conseil, avec une formation uniquement dédiée à la PESC, achève de rendre opérationnel ce dispositif. Ces propositions forment un ensemble cohérent et répondent aux besoins de l'Europe. Souvenons-nous qu'au début de nos travaux, nous avons été unanimes pour demander que l'Europe s'affiche davantage sur la scène internationale. Nous ne serons ni cohérents ni crédibles aujourd'hui en refusant d'adapter profondément les institutions à cet objectif, moyennant bien sûr quelques aménagements qui viennent d'être suggérés.

Deuxième point. Il s'agit du problème de la Commission mais il est d'une toute autre nature. Ma préférence, pour des raisons d'efficacité, va à une Commission réduite, comme le propose le praesidium. Toutefois, je comprends la préoccupation des pays qui adhèrent aujourd'hui à l'Union. Je crois que pour les nouveaux peuples qui nous rejoignent, afin qu'ils le fassent dans les meilleures conditions et qu'ils se retrouvent dans l'Union européenne, il faut accepter, au moins dans un premier temps, un Commissaire par Etat membre. Et je crois aussi qu'une structuration interne de la Commission peut permettre de conserver alors son efficacité.

Troisième point. Pour le Parlement européen, je ne comprends pas que le praesidium n'ait pas prévu la possibilité d'une dissolution. Il y a un

-  **A_argue~
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
-  B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-
-  **A_argue~
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

επικεντρωθώ σε ένα μόνο θέμα των θεσμών, το θέμα του Προέδρου του Συμβουλίου. Υπάρχει από τη μια μεριά η πρόταση για τη μακρόχρονη θητεία του Προέδρου του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου. Οι υποστηρικτές πιστεύουν ότι υπάρχουν δυσκολίες για την εξάμηνη εναλλαγή σε μια Ένωση των 25. Η Ελλάδα είχε τοποθετηθεί υπέρ της εναλλαγής. Αυτοί που αντιτίθενται στη μονιμότητα του Προέδρου του Συμβουλίου, τονίζουν τον υπαρκτό πράγματι κίνδυνο ο Πρόεδρος αυτός να λειτουργεί στην πράξη έντονα διακυβερνητικά εκπροσωπώντας περισσότερο το διευθυντήριο των μεγάλων και υποβαθμίζοντας το ρόλο της Επιτροπής. Δεν προωθείται η διαφάνεια μέσα από αυτή την επιλογή. Αν όμως πάρουμε τη λογική εκείνων που υποστηρίζουν τη μονιμότητα του Προέδρου, θα δούμε ότι υποστηρίζουν πως διασφαλίζει τη συνέχεια, τη συνοχή, την ισχυρή εκπροσώπηση σε επίπεδο κορυφής και ότι θα πρέπει να αναζητήσουμε μια τέτοια νέα λογική. Αν όμως είναι έτσι, εγώ θα ήθελα να τονίσω ότι υπάρχει μια ιδιαίτερη πρόκληση. Είναι η δημοκρατική πρόκληση και πιστεύω ότι για τους πολίτες μας σήμερα στην Ευρώπη υπάρχει ένα κύριο ερώτημα της δημοκρατικής νομιμοποίησης των νέων μας θεσμών. Και πιστεύω ότι αυτό που θα μπορούσε να προταθεί ως συμβιβασμός, που θα εξασφαλίζει διαφάνεια και νομιμοποίηση, θα συμβάλει στη θεσμική ισορροπία της Ένωσης, θα ήταν η άμεση εκλογή του Προέδρου του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου από τους Ευρωπαίους πολίτες, άμεση εκλογή ταυτόχρονα με τις ευρωεκλογές, με ανάδειξη των υποψηφίων από τα κόμματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου.

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Επιτρέψτε μου να πω δυο λόγια ως προς το γιατί πιστεύω ότι έχει σημασία να συζητηθεί αυτό το θέμα. Ξέρω ότι είναι κάτι που πολλοί το θεωρούν πολύ μελλοντικό αλλά νομίζω ότι πρέπει να τεθεί. Πρώτα απ' όλα ο Πρόεδρος του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου, άμεσα εκλεγόμενος, στον οποίον θα ανατεθεί η προετοιμασία, η διεύθυνση των εργασιών και η παρακολούθηση της υλοποίησης των αποφάσεων του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου, θα έχει με την εκλογή του πράγματι δημοκρατική νομιμοποίηση. Σήμερα με την εξάμηνη εναλλαγή έχουμε έναν άμεσα νομιμοποιημένο αρχηγό κράτους ή κυβέρνησης στην Προεδρία του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου. Γιατί λοιπόν να τον αντικαταστήσουμε με έναν Πρόεδρο έμμεσης, άρα και ασθενέστερης δημοκρατικής νομιμοποίησης, όπως προτείνεται;

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Δεύτερον, ένας άμεσα εκλεγμένος Πρόεδρος θα διασκέδαζε τις ανησυχίες όσων επικαλούνται τον κίνδυνο ενός διευθυντηρίου, αφού εκφράζοντας το σύνολο των Ευρωπαίων πολιτών θα συντόνιζε αξιόπιστα όλους, μικρά, μεσαία και μεγάλα κράτη. Θα είχε δε το κύρος να βοηθά στη δημιουργία συναίνεσης, ένα θέμα που τόσο συζητήθηκε με την κρίση στο Ιράκ. Θα εξασφάλιζε έτσι στο κατ' εξοχήν διακυβερνητικό όργανο και μια υπερεθνική εξισορρόπηση στη λογική της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, ως μίας Ένωσης και κρατών και πολιτών.

Τρίτον, στο διεθνές επίπεδο θα εκπροσωπούσε την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση σε επίπεδο κορυφής με την αξιοπιστία που προσδίδει μόνο η δημοκρατική νομιμοποίηση. Θα είχε κύρος ως συνομιλητής με κάθε Πρόεδρο οποιασδήποτε άλλης χώρας.

Τέταρτον, υπάρχει η ανησυχία ότι αυτός ο εκλεγμένος Πρόεδρος θα υπέσκαπτε τον Πρόεδρο της Επιτροπής. Θα ενίσχυε το διακυβερνητικό έναντι του υπερεθνικού της Επιτροπής. Διαφωνώ. Πρώτον θα είναι περιορισμένες οι αρμοδιότητές του, όπως υπάρχουν Πρόεδροι άμεσα εκλεγμένοι στα κράτη μέλη της Αυστρίας, Πορτογαλίας, Ιρλανδίας, αλλά θα υπήρχε και μια υπερεθνική νομιμοποιητική συνιστώσα, θα ήταν φυσικός σύμμαχος της Επιτροπής στο Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο και ίσως στο μέλλον *double hating* για έναν Πρόεδρο της Επιτροπής του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου.

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Τέλος, θα ενίσχυε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, διότι θα ήταν υπονήφιος από τις πολιτικές ομάδες και πιστεύω θα έβαζε τον πολίτη στην κορυφή των εξελίξεων της Ευρώπης. Κάτι ιδιαίτερα δημοκρατικό.

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Κλείνω, κύριε Πρόεδρε για να μην πάρω χρόνο με μία απλώς παρατήρηση ιστορική για ένα άλλο θέμα. Η ιδέα ενός συντάγματος υπερεθνικού μάς συγκινεί ιδιαίτερα εμάς τους Έλληνες, διότι έχουμε έναν πατέρα του ελληνικού συνταγματισμού το Ρήγα Φεραίο, ο οποίος σχεδίασε ήδη το 1797 ένα σύνταγμα για μια πολυεθνική δημοκρατία των βαλκανικών λαών. Μιλούσε για μια πολυεθνική δημοκρατία από τη Βοσνία μέχρι την Αραβία, που θα διασφάλιζε την ισότητα μεταξύ Χριστιανών, Μουσουλμάνων και Εβραίων, Βουλγάρων, Ρουμάνων, Τούρκων, Ελλήνων, Σέρβων, Αλβανών, και νομίζω ότι πάνω σ' αυτό εμείς κτίσαμε το δικό μας πατριωτισμό, γι' αυτό έχουμε ενθουσιασμό, διότι οι ιδέες αυτού του συντάγματος που συζητούμε, οι ιδέες της δημοκρατίας, της ελευθερίας και της ισότητας, μπορεί να επιτρέψουν να κτίσουμε πράγματι μια Ευρώπη μόνιμης ειρήνης.

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Translation (Χειροκροτήματα) 4-033

Papandreou:

Mr. President, dear colleagues, what is needed right now in Europe is to manage to ensure the vitality of two distinct components. These are on the one hand the member states and on the other hand our citizens - and to manage to express these components in a new institutional balance in this novel Constitution, so that the total architecture will ensure cohesion, reciprocal control and balance.

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We have already mentioned our positions as Greece, but I would like to focus on one institutional issue, that of the President of the Council. There exists, on the one hand the proposal for a long-lasting service for the President of European Council. Its supporters believe that realistic difficulties exist for the six-month rotation of the Presidency to continue in a Union of 25. Greece has been in favour the alternation. Those who object to a permanent President of the Council, stress the true danger that this President may end up functioning in a purely intergovernmental function, by mostly representing the directorate of the big countries and downgrading the role of Commission. Transparency is not promoted through this choice. If we however follow the rationale of those who support a permanent President of the council, we will see that they believe that it ensures continuity, cohesion and a powerful representation at a high level. We should indeed support such notions. If it is such, I would like to stress that we are faced with a significant challenge. It is the democratic challenge and it is my belief that the question of democratic legalisation of our new institutions is today posed by European citizens. It is my belief that the direct election of the President of European Council from European citizens, a direct election which would simultaneously take place with the European elections, with the appointment of candidates from the parties of the European Parliament, could be proposed as compromise that would ensure transparency and legalisation and would also contribute to the institutional balance of Union.

Allow me to state a couple of reasons concerning why I believe that it is important for this subject to be discussed. I am aware that it is a subject that many consider as something of the distant future; however I believe that it should be discussed. First of all, the President of the European Council, directly elected, to whom the preparation, the administrative direction and the monitoring of the formation of the decisions of the European Council will be attributed, will enjoy a high level of democratic legalisation. Today with the six-monthly rotation we have a

B_demand, call for, desire~

**A_argue~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_suggest a compromise~

**A_argue~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_reject, decline, refuse~

0193 directly mandated head of state or government in the Presidency of the
0194 European Council. Why should we then replace him with an indirectly
elected President, with a weaker mandate, as proposed?

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

0195 Secondly, a directly elected President would entertain the fears of those
0196 who invoke the danger of having a directorate, since by expressing the
totality of European citizens the President would reliably coordinate all
0197 member-states regardless of size. He would have the prestige to help
towards the creation of consent, a subject that was so much discussed
during the crisis in Iraq. He would thus ensure a supranational balance
inside a predominantly intergovernmental institution in the spirit of the
European Union, as a Union of both states and citizens.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

0198 Thirdly, in the international level, the President would represent the
0199 European Union at a high level with a degree of reliability that can only
be provided through direct election. He would have the prestige of an
equal with every President of any other country.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
**A_explain-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

0200 Fourthly, there exists the concern that this elected President would
0201 undermine the President of the Commission; that his election would
strengthen the intergovernmental aspects of the union against the
supranational Committee. I disagree. First of all, his responsibilities will
be limited, in the same way that Presidents in member states like Austria,
0202 Portugal and Ireland are directly elected, but there would also exist a
0204 supranational legitimizing component, he would be the natural ally of
0205 the Commission in the European Council and perhaps in a future
"double hating" for a President of the Commission of the European
Council.

0207 Finally, such a thing would strengthen the European Parliament, because
the President would be a candidate from the political party groups and
such a thing would place the citizen on the top of the developments in
Europe. Such a thing would be particularly democratic.

I conclude, Mr. President, with a simple historical observation about
another subject. The idea of a supranational constitution moves us the
Greeks particularly, because of the fact that father of Greek
constitutionalism was Rigas Fereos, who in 1797 shaped a constitution
for a multinational democracy of the Balkan populations. He spoke
about a multinational democracy from Bosnia up to Arabia, that would
ensure the equality between Christian, Muslim and Jewish, Bulgarian,
Romanian, Turkish, Greek, Serb, Albanian. We built our own patriotism
upon that belief and that is why we have such enthusiasm, because the
ideas of this constitution that we discuss, the ideas of democracy, of
freedom and equality, can indeed help us build a Europe of permanent
peace.

4-034
Spini (Parl.-IT). - Giustamente, lei, Presidente, ci ha richiamato alle
domande di Laeken: come rafforzare la legittimità democratica della
Commissione. Io trovo che l'articolo 15 dice, giustamente, "il Presidente
della Commissione viene eletto dal Parlamento", ma il successivo
articolo 18 bis sancisce che il Parlamento può solo rifiutare o confermare
tale designazione. Nel caso della conferma il Parlamento non ha nessun
ruolo; il caso del rifiuto rappresenta una crisi drammatica del rapporto
fra Consiglio e Parlamento.
Credo, quindi, che si debba cambiare quest'aspetto, dando la possibilità
al Parlamento europeo, eventualmente, di votare fra più candidature se
una non è gradita, e quindi anche di esprimere nel suo seno, con un
congruo numero di firme, una candidatura da affiancare a quella del
Consiglio e votare. Ci sarà più equilibrio anche fra la rappresentatività
del Presidente della Commissione e quella del Presidente del Consiglio

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4-035

Voggenhuber (PE). – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Herr Kollege Lamassoure hat uns heute vor der Methode des Scheiterns der Regierungskonferenz gewarnt, und er hat diese Methode eine Addition der Wünsche genannt, die letztlich zu einer Addition der Feigheiten wird. Ich denke, er hat darin Recht, und was wir dem entgegen zu halten haben, ist nicht nur der Mut, sondern auch das Bestehen auf einer konstitutionellen Logik. Nun, das findet sich in diesem Konvent eigentlich auch, nicht aber im Vorschlag des Präsidiums.

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Ich darf Ihnen einmal die Analyse der Abänderungsanträge vorlegen. Bisher haben 101 Mitglieder einen Antrag gegen eine dauernde Ratspräsidentenschaft gestellt, 15 Regierungen. Reicht das, oder müssen wir uns noch Wochen mit diesem Plan, der hier keine Mehrheit hat, niemals einen Konsens haben wird, abquälen? Können wir endlich zu den wesentlichen Fragen der Konstitution übergehen? Wir sind hier kein italienischer Marktplatz. Deshalb haben wir nicht das Vergnügen, das Duell unseres Präsidenten mit dem Kommissionspräsidenten zu erleben. Das ist schade, aber wir können uns natürlich bemühen, und vielleicht bekommen wir von unserem Präsidenten die Antwort darauf, was denn an der Wahl von pensionierten und emeritierten Ministerpräsidenten in ein höchstes Amt der Union demokratisch ist, was denn die parlamentarische Kontrolle dieses Ratspräsidenten sein soll, wie es denn mit dem Gleichgewicht der Institutionen aussieht, mit einer völlig neuen, über den bestehenden Vertrag hinausgehenden Machtposition in der Union, mit der Störung des institutionellen Gleichgewichts, mit einer angelegten Rivalität zwischen dem Ratspräsidenten und dem Kommissionspräsidenten, mit einer entstehenden Parallelbürokratie.

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Ich denke, der Präsident dieses Konvents kann gern auf allen italienischen Marktplätzen diskutieren, aber er - und mit ihm das Präsidium - sollte langsam zur Kenntnis nehmen, dass es in diesem Konvent eine überwältigende Mehrheit, einen Konsens gegen diese Vorstellung eines dauernden Ratspräsidenten gibt.

(Beifall)

4-036

Le Président. - Simplement, l'expression de marché italien n'est pas très heureuse. L'Italie est un des pays fondateurs, un des plus civilisés et des plus agréables à vivre. Si la Convention était un marché italien, nous y passerions l'été.

(Rires)

La parole est à Monsieur Dini précisément.

4-037

Dini (Parl.-IT). - Mr President, I do not react to the last intervention. I think that it was improper and I believe he did not mean it. I do not know what he meant.

I understand the reaction to the proposal made by Mr Borrell Fontelles on the changes in the status of the European Central Bank. I believe it will be a mistake to make such a change. The status should remain as is, as a pillar of the common currency, the other being the Stability Pact. Changes in this area would give a wrong signal to the markets, especially at a time when public finances are not in order in many of our Member countries.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~ EP_Voggenhuber

A_inform, report~

A_ask, want to know~

**A_argue~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_ascertain non-agreement~

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4-038

Hololei (Gouv.-EE). - Mr President, I will make two brief comments on what has been said about the Commission and its composition. When I last looked, the European Union was a union of values in which democracy and respect for the equality of Member States were far more important than efficiency. You cannot refer solely to the efficiency of the European Commission. Reducing the Commission's size, thinking that you can solve all the problems of the world without even looking into the possibilities of improving the internal working procedures, giving greater emphasis to the efficiency of the Commission and at the same time losing much more as regards respect for the principle of equality between Member States is not the right way to look at the issue.

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Secondly, it has been said that the future Member States in particular have been advocating the retention of commissioners. I do not think that the value of guaranteed equality between the Member States is an issue that concerns the future Member States alone. As far as I understand the comments made by the various Members of the Convention who come from the current Member States, this is something which is worrying them too. It is not about the future of the old Member States, it is about principles.

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4-039

Lequiller (Parl.-FR). - Monsieur le Président, je voudrais réagir aux propos de certains orateurs qui, en parlant de la Commission, ont dit qu'il faudrait une phase transitoire pendant laquelle la Commission serait représentée par tous les Etats membres. Sauf si je me trompe - et je parle sous votre contrôle -, c'est ce qui va se passer. La prochaine Commission, qui sera régie par le Traité de Nice, sera composée de vingt-cinq Commissaires représentant les Etats membres. Donc, cette phase transitoire existe déjà. Je suis favorable à la réduction de la Commission mais je voudrais rappeler à ceux qui ont émis des objections que cette phase transitoire existera.

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B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-040

Le Président. - La sémantique n'est pas indifférente. Les Commissaires ne représentent pas les Etats membres. La Commission représente l'intérêt commun européen. Ses membres sont désignés à l'heure actuelle par les Etats membres mais ce ne sont pas des représentants. La parole est à Monsieur Bruton.

4-041

Bruton (Parl.-IE). - Mr President, I just want to intervene in support of Mr Papandreu. He suggested that the people of Europe should have the opportunity to select, in an election, the President of Europe.

Here, we are having a debate between institutions, and if you asked most Europeans to identify what the Commission does, to identify what the Council does, to identify what the Parliament does, they would not know. They do not know because they are not consulted in a real way. The most that any person can do in a European election is to change one MEP out of seven hundred, by virtue of their vote. They are never asked, in any election, to pronounce on a single, simple European question, where that question is being asked of all Europeans at the same time, on the same day, throughout the continent.

If Mr Papandreu's proposal was accepted and we allowed the people to elect the President of Europe, then we would create a European demos. Many people say that we cannot have such a thing until we have a European demos. We will never have a European demos until we have a European election because a European election to select a president will create such a demos. It will create such a political space, it will create

0248 such a European debate. We will never have it with the present system,
0249 and that is why I support what George Papandreou has proposed.

B_judge~

4-042

0251 **Zieleniec (Parl.-CZ).** - Mr President, when I listen to those who favour
0252 a long-term President of the European Council I note two main
arguments, both of which are highly irrelevant: firstly to bring more
continuity to the work of the Council, and secondly to make the
Presidency of the European Council more visible and available, both to
our foreign partners and, even more, to European citizens. On the other
hand, those who oppose a full-time Presidency of the Council fear two
dangers. These dangers are very serious: the loss of influence of smaller
countries, the loss of equality between countries and a rivalry between
the new President of the Council and the President of the Commission
resulting in the disturbance of the balance between the main EU
institutions. These dangers are real. This is the reason why a full-time
0253 President of the Council should be rejected.
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B_judge~

B_reject, decline, refuse~

B_suggest a compromise~

A_establish, mention~

**A_argue~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

0255 However, I am convinced that a stalemate has not been reached as
0256 regards these two positions. There is a possible solution: the creation of
the function, not of Chairman of the Council, but of President of the
European Union. He or she would not be part of the Commission or the
Council. This would not, therefore, threaten the balance between the two
institutions. He or she would have the highest protocol standing but no
0258 real executive power, no direct influence on the Union's decision-
0259 making process. However, his or her role as consensus-maker, the longer
mandate and his or her experience would bring more continuity to the
work of the Council but would not dominate the work of the Council on
account of the President's coexistence with the rotating term Presidency.

A_assume, conjecture, believe~

**A_explain~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

A_concede, grant, acknowledge, accept, admit~

0260 Finally, the President would be available and visible. He or she should
0261 travel across the Union, contributing to the awareness of the European
identity and common destiny and promoting cohesion of the Union.
Such a solution would not only solve the current deep conflict within the
Convention but would also provide a new symbol of European political
unity and provide an important impetus to the integration process.

B_suggest a compromise~

4-043

Barnier (CE). - Un jour, je suis certain que les pays européens auront
non seulement envie mais besoin de placer à la tête de l'Union
européenne un seul président. Je suis certain de cela. C'est une
perspective que j'ai indiquée à titre personnel tout comme d'autres
conventionnels. Elle consiste en ce que l'Union européenne dispose d'un
exécutif unifié dont le chef serait désigné soit indirectement, soit
directement par les citoyens pour faire écho à la proposition de Monsieur
Papandreou et un président qui puisse les représenter aussi bien à
l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de l'Union.

Je reconnais cependant que le moment de mettre en œuvre cette
perspective est sans doute prématuré, même si rien ne nous interdit de le
prévoir ou de l'indiquer aujourd'hui comme une perspective et peut-être
même de le prévoir dans le Traité à travers une clause évolutive. Je
rappelle d'ailleurs qu'en 1957, dans le Traité de Rome lui-même, il y
avait pour le Parlement européen et ses modalités d'élection une telle
clause évolutive qui a été réalisée 17 ans après.

Par conséquent, pour un certain temps, nous devons travailler dans le
cadre des institutions actuelles qui sont caractérisées depuis quelques
années non pas par la séparation des pouvoirs, non pas par la confusion
des pouvoirs mais par le partage des pouvoirs. Et, dans ce système, nous
devons, dans les trois petites semaines qu'il nous reste, pour reprendre le
mot de Alain Lamassoure et de Jacques Santer, bâtir un compromis, mais

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un compromis dynamique qui mette de l'efficacité, de la légitimité dans chacune des institutions et qui mette de la confiance et de la synergie entre les institutions.

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Confiance et efficacité au Conseil parce que son fonctionnement est un problème. Un certain nombre a voulu dire qu'en créant une présidence plus stable du Conseil, il fallait veiller à ne pas créer des conflits entre les institutions et une rivalité administrative structurelle avec la Commission.

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Efficacité, coopération et confiance. Je soutiens à ce titre l'idée du ministre des affaires étrangères placé dans la Commission, travaillant en bonne intelligence avec les autres commissaires mais, pour la PESC, travaillant sous l'autorité, le mandat du Conseil. Ce sera le lieu et l'homme ou la femme d'une culture diplomatique commune dont on a vu qu'elle nous manquait.

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Enfin, responsabilité, efficacité au niveau de la Commission elle-même. Permettez-moi de le dire en qualité de membre du Collège. Quelle que soit la solution que nous allons trouver, que ce soit celle du praesidium, que ce soit celle d'un collège élargi où il y aura un Commissaire par Etat membre mais forcément structuré, que ce soit celle du praesidium modifiée par une rotation égalitaire, prenons garde à préserver ce qui est une des clés du modèle communautaire, qui ne se résume pas à la Commission. Il faudra mettre la majorité qualifiée et supprimer ou réduire le droit de veto. Il faudra veiller à garder ce lieu vital de cohérence de l'intérêt commun, comme vous l'avez dit Monsieur le Président, en veillant, quelle que soit la modalité de fonctionnement de la Commission, à préserver sa collégialité, son indépendance et son pluralisme. Et je suis sûr que nous pouvons trouver sur ces trois mots une solution intelligente.

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4-044

Van Lancker (PE). - Voorzitter, ik zou om te beginnen enkele opmerkingen willen maken over het voorstel van het presidium met betrekking tot het voorzitterschap van de Europese Raad. De voorstanders van een dergelijke functie verdedigen dit, omdat het om de zes maanden roterende voorzitterschap inefficiënt is en onvoldoende continuïteit garandeert, iets wat het Europees Parlement trouwens herhaaldelijk heeft gesteld. Bovendien wordt gesteld dat de Unie een duidelijker vertegenwoordiger naar de rest van de wereld nodig heeft. Ik denk, collega's, dat die argumenten terecht zijn maar ik denk ook dat een *fulltime* voorzitter met de taakomschrijving die het presidium hem gegeven heeft niet het juiste antwoord is op die vragen en bovendien het evenwicht tussen de instellingen in gevaar dreigt te brengen, hoofdzakelijk om twee redenen.

Ten eerste, in de formule van het presidium is het een voorzitter die de Unie vertegenwoordigt inzake buitenlands beleid. Daar zou ik willen aansluiten bij wat de collega's Brok en Einem al gezegd hebben, nl. dat de voorzitter zo een soort concurrent wordt van de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, uitgaande op een moment dat de Conventie wil dat de functies van Solana en Patton samengevoegd worden. De minister van Buitenlandse Zaken moet het gezicht zijn van de Unie in verband met het buitenlands beleid, en hij zou, als vice-voorzitter van de Europese Commissie, benoemd door de Europese Raad, een grotere legitimering hebben indien ook het Europees Parlement met zijn aanstelling zou kunnen instemmen en de minister van Buitenlandse Zaken bovendien ook aan het Parlement zou rapporteren.

Ten tweede, in de formule van het presidium is het de voorzitter die de continuïteit van de beslissingen van de Europese Raad verzekert. Dat

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lijkt mij uitgerekend de rol van de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie en van de Europese Commissie zelf. Ik vrees dat we met een dergelijke taakomschrijving met een voorzitter van de Europese Raad eerder meer verwarring en meer conflicten tussen de instellingen creëren dan oplossen.

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De vraag is dus of het mogelijk is om die functies te schrappen uit de taakomschrijving van de voorzitter. Maar heeft een voorzitter van de Europese Raad die alleen de Raad voorziet en animeert en die de consensus bevordert dan nog wel een *fulltime* functie? Moeten we niet eerder gaan naar een formule waarbij een zetelend premier voor een langere duur het voorzitterschap van de Europese Raad waarneemt? In het algemeen zou het probleem van efficiëntie en continuïteit zowel in de Europese Raad als in de Raadsformaties beter opgelost worden door voorzitterschappen van iets langere duur in teamverband.



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Een ander belangrijk punt is de toekomst van de Raad Algemene Zaken. Die moet zorgen voor de coherentie tussen de Raad en de voorbereiding van de Europese Raad. Daarom lijkt het mij een goed idee - wat de Benelux trouwens ook voorstelt - dat de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie ook de Raad Algemene Zaken voorziet.

 A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

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Nog een paar kleine opmerkingen, collega's. Ten eerste, voor sociaal-democraten is het onaanvaardbaar om ECOFIN expliciet in de grondwet op te nemen en de Raad Sociale Zaken geen plaats meer te geven. Ten tweede, de Conventie mag de kans niet missen om aan het Europees Parlement de bevoegdheid te geven om zijn eigen zetel eens en voor altijd vast te leggen. Ten derde, het is belangrijk dat de Europese instellingen niet alleen het evenwicht tussen grote en kleine, nieuwe en oude lidstaten respecteren, maar ook het evenwicht tussen mannen en vrouwen weerspiegelen. Ten vierde, ik zou me willen aansluiten bij het pleidooi van José Borrell Fontenelles om het mandaat van de Europese Centrale Bank niet alleen vast te leggen op prijsstabiliteit, maar ook op economische groei en werkgelegenheid. De *Federal Reserve* heeft dit trouwens ook in haar opdrachten staan.

 **A_give reasons-
 A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-044 Translation

Van Lancker (PE). - Sir, the chairman, I would like to start with some observations on the proposal of the presidium concerning the presidency of the European Council. The proponents of such a function defend this, because the rotation of the chairmanship every six months is inefficient and guarantees insufficient continuity, something that the European Parliament as a matter of fact has declared repeatedly. Moreover it's being declared that the Union needs a clearer representative towards the rest of the world. I believe, colleagues, that those arguments are correct but I also believe that a *fulltime* President, with the task description given by the presidium, is not the right answer to those questions and moreover it might endanger the balance between the institutions, mainly for two reasons.

Firstly, in the formula of the presidium it is a President who represents the Union concerning foreign policy. There I want to adopt what colleagues Brok and Einem already said, namely that in this way the President becomes a kind of a competitor of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, just at a

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moment when the Convention wants to merge the functions of Solana and Patton. The Minister of Foreign Affairs should be the face of the Union concerning foreign policy, and as Vice-President of the European Commission, appointed by the European Council, he would appear to be more legitimate if the European Parliament could also agree with his appointment and if the Minister of Foreign Affairs would report back to the parliament.

***A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Secondly, in the formula of the presidium it is the President who assures the continuity of the decisions of the European Council. This seems to me to be exactly the role of the President of the European Commission and of the European Commission itself. With such a task description for a President of the European Council, I fear that we will create more misunderstandings and more conflicts between the institutions rather than solving them.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

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The question is thus whether it is possible to cancel those functions from the task description of the President. But does a President of the European Council who chairs and animates only in the Council and who promotes the consensus, still have a fulltime function? Shouldn't we rather go for a formula whereby a Prime Minister observes presidency of the European Council for a longer duration? In general, the problem of efficiency and continuity both in the European Council as in the Council formations could be solved better by presidencies and teamwork of a somewhat longer duration.

Another important issue is the future of the Council of General Affairs. This council must ensure the coherence between the Council and the preparation of the European Council. Therefore I believe it is a good idea that the President of the European Commission also chairs the Council of General Affairs, a point which as a matter of fact is also being proposed by the Benelux countries

Just a few more small remarks, colleagues. First, for social democrats it is unacceptable to include ECOFIN explicitly in the constitution and to exclude the Council of Social Matters. Secondly, the convention shouldn't miss the opportunity to give the European Parliament the competence to fix its own seat for once and for always. Thirdly, it is important that the European institutions not only respect the balance between large and small, new and old Member States, but also reflect the balance between men and women. Fourth, I agree with the pleading of José Borrell Fontanelles to fix the mandate of the European Central Bank not only on price stability, but also on economic growth and employment. The *Federal Reserve* also has this in its

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**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB). - Mr President, last year in Cardiff Tony Blair emphasised the importance we attach to the principles of equality between Member States and of maintaining the institutional balance. The European Union has outgrown its structures, we need reform to modernise and strengthen institutions that were designed for six Member States to reflect our new membership of twenty-five and more. The Praesidium has done a good job in trying to find the consensus and the compromise that we need in this Convention.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
B_demand, call for, desire~
E_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

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A_insist, persist, stick to a belief-

The old system of the Presidency, rotating every six months, will not withstand the rigours of an enlarged European Union. This is not about big versus small, it is about turning the Council into an institution fit to fulfil its role: a real partner for the Commission, able to speak for and deliver governance. We need to replace the six-monthly rotation with a mechanism that provides coherence and continuity. As Sweden, Spain and Poland among others have said, that means a team presidency, and we have suggested a model designed to give each Member State the chance to chair every Council formation and to showcase their role in Europe by hosting a Council.

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That team will need to be coordinated. Do any of our prime ministers have the time needed to do this task, the time needed to visit twenty-four and more countries twice every six months and find where the compromises might lie and help to deliver the European Council's strategic agenda? Do they have the time to represent the Union in its foreign policy dealings with other countries, the time to get the most from a summit with China and to develop relations with Latin America? I would like to stress here that I am talking about the existing duties of the Council Presidency; there is no question of reducing the Commission's existing role in this area. I have yet to hear an alternative to a full-time chairman of the European Council that meets our vision of a Union capable of delivering on the issues that really matter.

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As for Council formations, I cannot accept a single legislative Council. I sympathise with the aims of coherence and transparency that the EU does not work like a national government. There is no neat distinction between legislation and policy. Often policy is agreed by debates over legislation. A false distinction will obscure rather than open up our procedures. It will give the dangerous impression that the Council is some sort of second chamber. I notice that ECOFIN and all the foreign ministers on it have rejected the idea of a single legislative Council.

We have yet to find a consensus on the structure of the Commission and how it chooses its president, but we are agreed on its importance as the guarantor of the Treaty. We must base any settlement on equality and rotation of countries, big and small, and on securing the independence of the Commission and, especially, the independence of its president.

Europe needs a strong, independent and impartial Commission, accountable to the Parliament and to the Council.

Regarding the so-called Foreign Minister, the draft articles serve to show that such an appointment can only be made if responsibility for policy remains with the Council and if we are prepared to create a new category of commissioner, who is not bound by the normal collegiate procedures.

This Convention must not be paralysed by institutional, vested interests

because that would demonstrate to the world that the European Union is not serious about being strong and effective. We must be ambitious, equipping the European Union to be a strong and progressive force for good in the world, promoting our values of democracy, human rights and social justice.

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**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-046

Wittbrodt (Parl.-PL). - Mr President, today we are discussing one of the most important questions: the institutional shape of the Community and its external representation. In discussing institutional reform, we have to remember the main principles - solidarity and subsidiarity - and at the same time take into account demands of efficiency in order to respond to the challenge of competing in a globalised world. The most important discussion touches upon the question of the European Union having a president. As we can see, it divides countries into small and large ones. I support the PPE-DE amendments described in part in Mr Brok's intervention.

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B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to~
B_reject, decline, refuse~
**A_give reasons~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]- B_suggest a compromise~

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The proposal concerning a president brings unsatisfactory compromise. It does not solve anything in terms of the efficiency of the decision-making process. It simply changes the name of the European Union's external representation; it does not change the balance. It decries the role of a future Foreign Minister of the European Union, even if he or she is double-hatted. Its external image will definitely lose its importance in the triple external representation. Moreover, the President of the Council and the President of the Commission will be unable to act together without competition. The European Union does not need a kind of cohabitation.

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B_demand, call for, desire~
**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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I am in favour of election of the President of the European Commission by the Parliament. I am in favour of a reformed Presidency, which should reflect the rules of efficiency and continuity. Therefore we should make it longer, extended to two-and-a-half years for example. It could be held by three or four countries combined, on the basis of their size.

A_assume, conjecture, believe~

From the point of view of efficiency and quality, the number of commissioners should not depend on the number of countries. Member States can be represented by commissioners and their deputies. We do not need to set up a new institution. Also, the project of setting the Convention and then having IGCs is a way to make the decision-making process longer. In order to respond to the institutional challenge of the biggest enlargement yet, we do not need any strange compromises. We need to have a very clear and brave vision of how a Union of nearly 30 countries is to be managed as well as an efficient decision-making process.

B_judge~

Finally, the Nice compromise voting system should be fully respected.

4-047

Bonde (PE). - Mr President, the central issue is the wholesale movement of powers from the national parliaments and electorates to Brussels through the general rule on voting by qualified majority. In Brussels the Commission is also strengthened by a right to legislate on its own, unless there is a qualified majority against it. In the Commission, most laws will be decided by the cabinets - over 90% today - influenced by lobbyists, behind closed doors, with no say for the elected Members of Parliament.

The European Council will elect a president from among themselves to represent the EU abroad, a Commission president to govern internally, and a foreign minister to act as a go-between. With an EU president and an EU prime minister to pick his own ministers, the EU will have the

same power structure as France, but we are not one single people like the French. We are different European peoples, all living in parliamentary democracies. Now they will gradually be emptied. The EU Constitution will be above our national constitutions. Our national citizenship will be suppressed by EU citizenship. Our fundamental rights will become EU State rights and duties. Our own high courts will be subsidiaries of a common EU State legal system. We will move from cooperation between states to the forming of a new state with legal personality and a common foreign office and a common defence. We can vote in national elections but we can never maintain the accountability of the Council or change its laws or composition. We can also vote in European elections but we cannot hold the Commission accountable. There is no direct link between our votes and laws. Most laws can be adopted against the wish of the majority of voters. With prime ministers empowered to appoint former colleagues as the leaders of a "Europe of Presidents", our institutions will be run by presidents who can no longer be elected in their own countries. The voters of all Member States will lose out by having their say reduced. The demand that 60% of the population must be attained in QMV means that the three biggest countries can block a decision sought by 22 Member States.

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A_establish, mention~

A_assume, conjecture, believe~
B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~

In the Council the 'ayes' will always be with the bigger states and their adopted positions. Twelve Member States can always be sidelined. Why not demand that 75% of Member States and 50% of the population must be required for the adoption of all laws?

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B_demand, call for, desire~

B_threaten~

In the Commission the Member States will have no guarantee of representation. We can have laws where nations do not have even the slightest possibility of proposing a law. In the European Parliament, degressive proportionality means fewer seats for all smaller nations. The overall president will not serve the interests of the 19 smaller Member States. Small states will lose on all four axes to the bigger states. If our say is to be reduced, we should at least be asked in a referendum. If we sideline democracy it should at least be decided in a democratic way, by referendum. So, voters in all countries, wake up and demand your say against the draft presented by the Praesidium!

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B_demand, call for, desire~

B_uphold (an offer, promise)~

4-048

Dastis, Alfonso (Ch.E/G.-ES). – Sr. Presidente, yo creo que todos aquí deseamos que la Convención sea un éxito y yo quiero darle mi opinión sobre lo que la Convención no debe hacer y lo que debe hacer para lograr ese éxito en materia institucional.

¿Qué es lo que la Convención no debe hacer? La Convención no debe alterar el compromiso de Niza en lo relativo a la composición y el peso relativo de los Estados miembros en las instituciones, ni en cuanto al número de comisarios, ni en cuanto al número de escaños y su reparto en el Parlamento, ni en cuanto al número de votos y su reparto en el Consejo. Si lo hace, no habrá acuerdo en la Convención y habrá una Conferencia Intergubernamental, larga y difícil, que llegará a un resultado no diferente al de Niza, resultado que acaba de ser ratificado en Atenas también por los nuevos Estados miembros.

¿Qué es lo que, por el contrario, sí debe hacer la Convención? Lo que la Convención debe hacer es encontrar una fórmula de consenso que garantice el funcionamiento eficaz de las instituciones, manteniendo el equilibrio entre ellas. Eso significa fortalecer el método comunitario, que es el resultado del trabajo, de la articulación de las tres instituciones. Debe fortalecer el papel del Parlamento Europeo convirtiéndolo en un colegislador general, mediante la ampliación de la mayoría cualificada - naturalmente, la mayoría cualificada, tal y como se entiende en Niza-, debe fortalecer a la Comisión, también mediante el fortalecimiento de la

mayoría cualificada que le da, evidentemente, un mayor poder, aumentando su papel en la planificación estratégica de los trabajos de la Unión y fortaleciendo la legitimidad de su Presidente mediante su elección por el Parlamento Europeo. La Convención no debe, por cierto,

hacer lo que apuntan algunas propuestas, que se llaman de compromiso, a saber, permitir que la Comisión se apodere, por así decir, del Consejo presidiendo sus trabajos.

Y ¿qué debe hacer la Convención, por fin, en cuanto al Consejo? Debe encontrar una solución a su Presidencia que combine estabilidad y rotación. Una Presidencia estable que haga lo que hace ahora la Presidencia rotatoria, pero por más tiempo, y un sistema de Presidencias por equipo que permitan que los Estados se involucren en las labores de dirección de la Unión de manera más frecuente que cada doce años y medio.

Yo creo que para asegurar este compromiso sobre el funcionamiento de las instituciones, la propuesta del Praesidium es una baza aceptable para tratar de encontrar ese consenso.

4-049
Le Président. - Je vous remercie, Monsieur Dastis. Simplement, quelle définition donnez-vous de la majorité qualifiée?

4-050
Dastis, Alfonso (Ch.E/G.-ES). - Yo doy la definición que se encuentra en el Protocolo adjunto al Tratado de Niza.

4-051
Duff (PE). - Mr President, it is important to remember that we are in this debate so that we can improve the institutional expression for what was our first agreement inside the Convention: to provide the Union with a stronger capacity and legitimacy to act effectively. That means a stronger executive authority than we have at present, which is more solidly grounded inside parliamentary democracy. It surely cannot mean preserving the status quo that was provided so clumsily at Nice. It is because we reject the spirit of Nice that the Convention exists in the first place.

I certainly share the criticism that many Members are expressing at the idea of a full-time presidency of the European Council. We fear that such a proposal would institutionalise the rivalry between the Commission and the Council, and between the Presidency and the Foreign Minister. We want to follow the logic of the merger of the roles of Commissioners Solana and Patten and to move towards the integration of all the executive functions and resources of the Union beneath a single presidency. We also need to bring in a multi-annual strategic work programme, proposed jointly by the Commission and the Parliament but decided by the European Council. This would permit us to suppress the six-monthly presidency programmes which are at present such a distraction from stability and coherence.

As a first step towards an integrated presidency, I and a growing number of others support the proposal that the President of the Commission should chair the General Affairs Council.

4-052
Teufel (Parl.-DE). - Herr Präsident, meine sehr verehrten Damen und Herren! Ich möchte in der gebotenen Kürze meine Position in elf Punkten darstellen:

Erstens: Die Präsidiumsvorschläge sind eine gute Grundlage für unsere

B_demand, call for, desire-

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

A_ask, want to know-

A_claim (facts and values)-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_concede, grant, acknowledge, accept, admit-

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Diskussion.

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Zweitens: Dem Präsidiumsentswurf für einen Europäischen Ratspräsidenten kann ich grundsätzlich zustimmen, weil er für mehr Kontinuität sorgt, eine stärkere Abstimmung unter den Mitgliedsländern gewährleistet, aber gleichwohl in seinen Aufgaben begrenzt ist. Die Aufgabenabgrenzung zum Kommissionspräsidenten und zum Außenminister ist jedoch noch nicht deutlich genug. Das vorgeschlagenen Präsidium halte ich nicht für gut, da es zu einer Aufblähung des Amtes führen wird. Wir sollten uns alle gemeinsam um eine Lösung bemühen, die auch für die kleineren Mitgliedstaaten akzeptabel ist.

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Drittens: Beim Ministerrat ist die Verringerung der Ratsformationen im Sinne einer ganzheitlichen Betrachtung der Arbeitsfähigkeit und Transparenz richtig, ja, sogar dringend geboten.

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Viertens: Es muss sichergestellt werden, dass auch künftig regionale Minister nach nationalen Rechtsordnungen einen Mitgliedstaat vertreten können.

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Fünftens: Die qualifizierte Mehrheit im Rat als doppelte Mehrheit sollte Regelprinzip werden. Dies bedeutet im Vergleich zu Nizza eine deutliche Vereinfachung des Verfahrens. Insoweit stimme ich dem Präsidiumsentswurf zu. Das Quorum für die Bevölkerungsmehrheit sollte aber mindestens zwei Drittel betragen.

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Sechstens: Der Kommissionspräsident sollte - anders als im Präsidiumsentswurf vorgesehen - vom Europäischen Parlament mit einfacher Mehrheit gewählt werden, mit anschließender Zustimmung durch den Europäischen Rat.

Siebtens: Zur Größe der Kommission unterstütze ich den Präsidiumsentswurf. Die Bestellung von delegierten Kommissaren ist notwendig, damit alle Mitgliedstaaten in der Kommission vertreten sind.

Achtens: Auch beim Rechnungshof muss eine Verringerung der Zahl der hauptamtlichen Mitglieder in Verbindung mit einer Rotation erreicht werden. Ich unterstütze den überzeugenden Vorschlag von Peter Hain.

Neuntens: Der Ausschuss der Regionen sollte Organstatus und ein eigenes Klagerecht erhalten.

Zehntens: Die Regionen mit Gesetzgebungsbefugnis sowie alle Kammern der nationalen Parlamente müssen als Klagebefugte beim Europäischen Gerichtshof genannt werden, wenn ihre Rechte verletzt sind.

Elftens: Die Verfassung muss eine Stärkung der Rechte des Europäischen Parlaments und eine Stärkung der Rechte der Kommission bringen. Das ist aber auch der Fall, wenn die Vorschläge des Präsidiums und meine ergänzenden Vorschläge berücksichtigt werden.

4-053

Hübner (Gouv.-PL). - Mr President, if we are to have a single draft treaty by this time next month, we all have to show the necessary flexibility, be constructive and meet each other half-way. We certainly must be creative in formulating compromises, but we should not lose sight of the principles that our people care so much for. We should remain faithful to the underlying principle of the Union - that of equality of the Member States. We have to focus equally strong attention on the demands of efficiency. It is on the basis of these assumptions that we,

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-
B_demand, call for, desire-

A_approve, admit as correct-
B_demand, call for, desire-

B_suggest a compromise-

0392 earlier in the year, proposed the creation of a group presidency, where
 0393 Council formations would be assigned to countries holding the group
 presidency. Such a presidency would enable participating Member States
 to take advantage of the benefits of rotation while at the same time
 0394 ensuring greater continuity and efficiency in policy-making within the
 0395 Union which is of great importance. I continue to believe that it is a
 workable solution. In my view it also offers a way of resolving the
 biggest controversy with regard to the presidency of the European
 Council.

As to the institution proposals made at Nice, I believe we should not risk
 readdressing them. Nice introduced a well-balanced compromise on
 these issues. However, we should leave to the European Council the
 possibility of deciding unanimously on some of these issues in the
 future.

0396 Regarding the Commission, I do not see the inevitability of the direct
 0397 negative link between size and efficiency. My view is that if people feel
 they are represented among those who are responsible for common
 0398 European interests, the Commission could be even more efficient in
 0399 safeguarding this common European interest. It would work towards
 strengthening Community methods which will, no doubt, be even more
 0401 essential for the enlarged EU. Efficiency, in my view, depends more on
 0402 organisation and management than on the mere size of the Commission.
 0404 The President of the Commission should have much more power and
 0405 freedom to organise the work of the college, to distribute the portfolios
 and also possibly to create some groups or clusters of commissioners
 dealing with sets of issues and working under vice-presidents that would
 0407 manage those clusters. I also support the provision in the Constitution,
 0408 according to which every commissioner should give up his or her
 mandate if the President of the Commission so demands in a motivated
 request to the European Council and European Parliament.

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

**A_explain-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

With regard to the proposed method of electing the President of the
 Commission, the European Parliament should play a more important role
 than simply putting a seal on the decision made by the European
 Council. I would suggest that the European Council should at least
 propose two candidates for Parliament to choose from.

4-054
Duhamel (PE). - Quand je vous rencontre entre deux séances, vous me
 dites que je n'interviens pas assez. Là, j'avais un carton bleu pour
 expliciter rapidement un désaccord avec Elmar Brok et pour une fois,
 avec M.Duff. Et par ailleurs, je suis sur la liste des orateurs. Je n'y peux
 rien.

4-055
Le Président. - Vous allez parler au nom du carton bleu et dans trois ou
 quatre orateurs, vous reprendrez la parole comme orateur.

4-056
Duhamel (PE). - Si vous voulez. Cela me permettra de fumer une
 cigarette entre les deux. Je voudrais attirer l'attention de Monsieur
 Wittbrodt qui n'est plus là et de Monsieur Duff qui l'est encore, pour une
 fois que je ne suis pas d'accord avec lui, à propos des objections qu'il
 formule au sujet d'une présidence du Conseil européen qui serait un
 obstacle pour le ministre des affaires étrangères européennes, sur le fait
 qu'il ne faut pas exagérer l'importance des prescriptions
 constitutionnelles.

Il ne faut exagérer ni leur précision, ni leur effet. Essayez de raisonner
 sur le cas allemand, par exemple. Qui, aujourd'hui, - je fais exprès de ne
 pas prendre la France -, qui représente aujourd'hui la *Bundesrepublik* sur

la scène internationale? Spontanément, la réponse ne vous vient pas à l'esprit. Je crois qu'elle n'est pas écrite dans la Constitution. Vous avez trois personnages - Johannes Rau, Gehrard Schröder et Joschka Fischer - et trois fonctions - Président de la République, *Bundeskanzler* et ministre des affaires étrangères. Le Président de la République exerce une fonction de représentation, fonction honorifique et parfois un petit peu plus. Le *Bundeskanzler* est celui qui dirige la politique étrangère, qui prend les grandes décisions fondamentales de politique étrangère allemande. Joschka Fischer, le ministre des affaires étrangères codirige et met en œuvre. Personne ne dit que le système est déliant.

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**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Cherchez quel serait l'équivalent par rapport à ce qui est proposé là. L'équivalent du Président de la République allemand serait le président du Conseil permanent. L'équivalent de M.Schröder serait le Conseil européen et l'équivalent de M.Fischer serait Fischer. Je veux dire que ce serait le nouveau ministre européen des affaires étrangères.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

B_demand, call for, desire-

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4-057
Le Président. - Je vous remercie. Malheureusement, Monsieur Fischer s'est juste absenté. Mais il prendra la parole cet après-midi. La parole est à Monsieur Dini.

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4-058
Dini (Parl.-IT). - Mr President, with regard to the President of the European Council, I confirm that, in my view and that of others, the most innovative and coherent proposal for superseding the precarious situation created by the six-monthly rotation is to vest the two functions of President of the Council and President of the Commission in the same person - at least in the future, at a time to be foreseen by the Constitution. Mr Barnier and others have made this point.

B_demand, call for, desire-

In the case of the multi-presidency, as formulated in the Praesidium's proposal, it would be necessary in our view, as Mr Papandreou said today, to limit its task even more specifically to the exercise of powers of general guidance and the preparation of the European Council meetings. The President should have a function of persuasion in order to force a convergence. It is also important to insist on the impulse-giving role of the President, rather than on the operational one.

As some others have underlined, the relationship between President and Foreign Minister also needs to be defined carefully in order to prevent the President, who also has powers of external representation, from obscuring the Foreign Minister.

It is of fundamental importance that the Convention establishes the constitutional principle whereby the Council decides by majority vote by introducing the double majority principle, as suggested. Exceptions need to be identified and included in the individual policies.

However, such exceptions as own resources, new members, revision of the Constitution, defence policy, electoral procedure and Article 18 for example should be kept to a minimum. I believe that the clear division of competence in the Constitution offers sufficient safeguard against Member States being outvoted on unforeseen issues.

It is right to reduce the number of Councils and to provide for a Council with exclusively legislative functions as the counterpart of the European Parliament, as proposed by the Praesidium. This would create, as in many federal constitutions, a chamber of representatives and a chamber of states and would reflect a double legitimacy. The legislative council could then be given a name that indicates its nature as the second chamber of a single legislative body.

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As to the Commission, we must overcome the division that exists today in the Convention as regards its size and composition. In this regard, it is worth asking whether the distinction between full commissioners with a right to vote and others assigned to tasks but lacking the right to vote will prejudice the transparency and clarity that the reform is intended to achieve.

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I am convinced that in order to reach consensus, a better solution would be that envisaged in the Treaty of Nice, with one commissioner per country until the Community is enlarged to twenty-seven countries. Then the number of commissioners would be reduced to fifteen or a similar number. Provision would be made for rotation on an equal basis and each new Member State would be represented in the College by its own commissioner for the time of its accession. Mr Haenel has made a similar proposal.

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Hjelm-Wallén (Ch.E/G.-SE). - Herr ordförande! Liksom så många andra anser jag att var och en av institutionerna bör förstärkas utan att den grundläggande balansen mellan dem rubbas. Samtidigt bör vi åtgärda effektivitetsbrister och bristande öppenhet i institutionernas arbete. Detta är inte minst viktigt i ljuset av en union med 25-30 medlemsstater.

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För det första innebär det att Europaparlamentet behöver stärkas genom att medbeslutandeförfarandet tillämpas på flera områden. Jag stöder exempelvis medbeslutanderätt för parlamentet på det rättsliga området samt att parlamentet fattar beslut om den övergripande inriktningen av den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken.

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Rådet behöver en väsentligt förbättrad kontinuitet i sitt arbete. Jag vill därför se en vald ordförande i Europeiska rådet som skulle utföra samma uppgifter som dagens rådsordförande har. Jag vill också ha ett gruppordförandeskap som delar på ansvaret för att leda de övriga rådskonstellationerna. Jag anser att det är en viktig princip att medlemsländerna är ordförande i rådskonstellationerna. Därmed garanteras också en sorts roterande ordförandeskap, vilket jag tror är mycket viktigt för alla länder. För att rådet skall ha beslutskraft också i en utvidgad union krävs en generell övergång till beslut med kvalificerad majoritet med vissa bestämda undantag, t.ex. skatter, försvarsfrågor samt kärnan i utrikespolitiken.

Kommissionens roll och oberoende måste stärkas. Kommissionen måste framför allt bli bättre på att övervaka att medlemsländerna genomför den gemensamt beslutade lagstiftningen. Jag har lagt fram ett ändringsförslag till artikel 18.1 som förtydligar detta.

För det andra anser jag att vi här i konventet inte bör riva upp Niceöverenskommelsen och inte heller anslutningsfördragen vad gäller röstviktning i rådet, sammansättning av kommissionen eller platser i parlamentet. Det innebär inte att jag anser att denna överenskommelse i alla detaljer är perfekt, men det är en mycket välbalanserad kompromiss mellan olika intressen. Nicekompromissen bör alltså bestå. Varje försök att omförhandla denna kompromiss riskerar bara att leda till en låsning här i konventet, vilket jag tror skulle omöjliggöra att vi får ett positivt resultat av konventets arbete. Jag vädjar därför till presidiet: Släpp förslaget att ändra i Niceöverenskommelsen!

För det tredje behöver vi förbättra unionens öppenhet och demokratiska förankring. Jag har därför föreslagit att allmänna principer om öppenhet och god förvaltning inom institutionerna skall skrivas in i fördraget, och

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att dessa principer därtill konkretiseras på en hel del ställen i konstitutionen. Det är självklart att ministerrådets lagstiftningsarbete skall ske i full öppenhet, men det innebär, enligt min åsikt, inte att man måste ha ett lagstiftningsråd. Det är jag emot av en mängd skäl.

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Jag tror vidare att valet av kommissionsordförande kan bli betydligt öppnare och ske närmare medborgarna. Det grundläggande måste dock vara att kommissionsordföranden har en förankring i rådet, eftersom en kommission utan förtroende i rådet har svårt att utföra sitt arbete. Europeiska rådet bör därför både nominera och tillsammans med parlamentet ha möjlighet att rikta misstroendevotum mot kommissionsordföranden. Jag menar att mycket talar för att de nationella parlamenten borde involveras i valet av kommissionsordförande. Ge dem exempelvis lika många röster som Europaparlamentet och låt den nominerade kandidaten resa runt och träffa de nationella parlamenten och bli utfrågad före en omröstning. Jag tror att detta skulle dra till sig stor uppmärksamhet. Det skulle innebära att kommissionsordföranden blev bättre förankrad i hela EU-området och skulle få ett brett mandat. Förhoppningsvis skulle intresset för EU-frågor därmed öka både hos parlamenten och allmänheten.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
B_demand, call for, desire~

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4-059 **Hjelm-Wallén (Ch.E/G.-SE)**. - Herr Vorsitzender! Wie so viele andere meine ich, dass jede einzelne der Institutionen gestärkt werden sollte, ohne die zugrundeliegende Balance zwischen ihnen zu verschieben. Gleichzeitig sollten wir etwas gegen Effektivitätsdefizite und Mangel an Öffentlichkeit in der Arbeit der Institutionen tun. Dies ist wichtig, nicht nur im Lichte einer Union mit 25-30 Mitgliedsstaaten. Zum Ersten beinhaltet dies, dass das Europaparlament gestärkt werden muss, in dem das Mitentscheidungsverfahren auf weitere Bereiche angewendet wird. Ich unterstütze beispielsweise das Mitentscheidungsrecht für das Parlament im Justizbereich genauso, wie eine Entschließung des Parlamentes zur übergeordneten Ausrichtung der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik.

B_demand, call for, desire~

B_threaten~

Der Rat braucht eine wesentlich verbesserte Kontinuität in seiner Arbeit. Daher möchte ich einen gewählten Vorsitzenden im Europäischen Rat sehen, der dieselben Aufgaben wie der jetzige Ratsvorsitzende ausführen sollte. Ich möchte ebenso einen Gruppenvorsitzenden haben, der die Verantwortung trägt, die übrigen Ratskonstellationen zu führen. Ich halte das für ein wichtiges Prinzip, dass die Mitgliedsländer den Vorsitz in den Ratskonstellationen halten. Damit wird gleichzeitig eine Art rotierender Vorsitz garantiert, welcher, denke ich, sehr wichtig ist für alle Länder. Damit der Rat Beschlusskraft auch in einer erweiterten Union hat, wird ein genereller Übergang zu Beschlüssen mit qualifizierter Mehrheit benötigt, mit einigen bestimmten Ausnahmen, zum Beispiel Steuern, Verteidigungsfragen inklusive des Kerns der Außenpolitik.

Die Rolle und die Unabhängigkeit der Kommission müssen gestärkt werden. Die Kommission muss vor allem besser in der Überwachung der Umsetzung der gemeinsam beschlossenen Gesetze in den Mitgliedsländern werden. Ich habe dazu einen Änderungsvorschlag zu Artikel 18.1 vorgelegt, der dies verdeutlicht.

Zum Zweiten finde ich, dass wir hier im Konvent nicht die Vereinbarung von Nizza und auch nicht die Anschlussverträge rückgängig machen sollten, was die Stimmenverteilung im Rat, die Zusammensetzung der Kommission oder die Sitze im Parlament betrifft. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass ich denke, dass diese Übereinkünfte in allen Details perfekt sind, aber sie sind ein sehr wohlbalancierter Kompromiss zwischen verschiedenen Interessen. Der Kompromiss von Nizza sollte also bestehen bleiben. Jeder Versuch diesen Kompromiss um zu verhandeln,

0455 riskiert nur, zu einer Blockade hier im Konvent zu führen, was, denke ich, die Möglichkeit verhindert, zu einem positiven Ergebnis der Arbeit des Konvents zu kommen. Ich appelliere deswegen an das Präsidium: Lassen Sie den Vorschlag fallen, das Übereinkommen von Nizza zu ändern.

0456 Zum Dritten ist es nötig, die Offenheit der Union und ihre demokratische Verankerung zu verbessern. Ich habe deswegen vorgeschlagen, dass allgemeine Prinzipien über Offenheit und gute Verwaltung in den Institutionen mit in den Vertrag geschrieben werden, und dass dazu diese Prinzipien an einer ganzen Reihe von Stellen in der Verfassung konkretisiert werden. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass die Gesetzgebungsarbeit des Ministerrats in voller Offenheit geschieht, was meiner Meinung nach aber nicht beinhaltet, dass man einen Gesetzgebungsrat haben muss. Ich bin aus einer Menge Gründen dagegen.

0458 Ich glaube weiter, dass die Wahl des Kommissionsvorsitzenden deutlich
0459 offener sein und näher an den Mitbürgern geschehen kann. Das
0460 Grundlegende muss dennoch sein, dass der Kommissionsvorsitzende eine Verankerung im Rat hat, weil es eine Kommission ohne das
0462 Vertrauen im Rat schwer hat, ihre Arbeit durchzuführen. Der
0463 Europäische Rat sollte daher die Möglichkeit haben sowohl den Kommissionsvorsitzenden zu nominieren, als auch mit dem Parlament zusammen ein Misstrauensvotum gegen ihn zu richten. Ich finde vieles spricht dafür, dass die nationalen Parlamente in die Wahl des Kommissionsvorsitzenden eingebunden werden sollten. Geben Sie ihnen beispielsweise gleich viele Stimmen wie dem Europaparlament und lassen Sie den nominierten Kandidaten herumreisen, die nationalen Parlamente treffen und vor der Abstimmung befragt werden. Ich glaube, dass dies große Aufmerksamkeit nach sich ziehen wird. Das würde bedeuten, dass der Kommissionsvorsitzende besser im gesamten Gebiet der EU verankert wäre und ein breites Mandat bekommen würde.
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0465 Hoffentlich würde dadurch das Interesse für Fragen der EU sowohl bei den Parlamenten als auch in der Öffentlichkeit steigen.

4-060

Duhamel (PE). - Nous commençons à bouger pour nous accorder et je voudrais aller dans le même sens avec des propositions dont je sais que certaines sont consensuelles et dont d'autres pourraient le devenir.

Nous sommes d'accord sur le fait qu'il est indispensable de s'accorder. On a fait les trois quarts du travail. Notre projet à mes yeux et à mon goût, sur trop de points, reste en statu quo mais sur d'autres, il marque des avancées très importantes. Ce que nous proposons est déjà beaucoup beaucoup mieux qu'Amsterdam et Nice. C'était bien le moindre.

Il est temps de converger. Ce n'est plus le moment d'exprimer pour nous nos préférences. C'est le moment de rechercher quelles peuvent être les convergences. Et c'est possible à plusieurs conditions. Chacun doit bouger. Les anti-Conseil européen doivent accepter qu'il y ait une vraie présidence. Les pro-Président doivent accepter qu'elle soit limitée. Les euronationalistes qui exigent un national dans la Commission doivent tolérer une solution pour qu'elle soit viable, et les autres, une solution pour faire une place à tous. Il faut prendre en compte le point de vue de l'autre. Messieurs Aznar, Blair, Chirac veulent leur président du Conseil européen. Messieurs Giscard d'Estaing, Hain, Fini, Méndez de Vigo, de Villepin veulent le leur donner pour les aider à avaler le reste. La Convention doit avoir l'intelligence politique d'en tenir compte. La plupart des autres Etats ne veulent pas d'un directoire. La Convention doit construire une solution qui les en préserve.

Ne surestimons pas nos choix, donc nos désaccords. Personne ne connaît

0468 exactement les conséquences de l'élection du président de la
 0469 Commission par le Parlement ou les conséquences d'une présidence
 durable du Conseil européen. Tout dépendra des personnalités, des
 circonstances, des évolutions des partis et de la vie politique européenne.
 Tant mieux si un jour le Conseil et son Président donnent des impulsions
 fortes parce que le président de la Commission en est incapable. Ne nous
 prenons pas pour des dieux constitutionnels. Soyons d'autant plus
 conciliants que nous connaissons les limites des prescriptions
 constitutionnelles quant à la réalité du pouvoir.

B_demand, call for, desire-

0470 Trouvons un consensus global sur les deux points durs qui nous divisent.
 0471 Choisissons pour le Conseil européen soit un Président accepté mais
 encadré, soit une présidence collective mais effective. Choisissons pour
 la Commission: idéalement, je maintiens qu'il faudrait avoir la sagesse de
 ne pas trancher dans la Constitution et de laisser sa composition à la
 0472 décision de son président. Presque aucune Constitution au monde ne met
 0473 le nombre de ministres. En outre, cela renforce le président de la
 0474 Commission et cela permet de varier selon les circonstances. Mais si la
 0475 Convention récuse cette modestie, acceptons soit une Commission
 0477 restreinte en garantissant qu'aucun pays n'en sera durablement exclu, soit
 0478 une Commission large mais hiérarchisée.

**A_Justify-
 A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

0480 Les grands Etats veulent tout: un président du Conseil européen et une
 0481 Commission étroite. Les petits Etats ou les moins peuplés veulent tout: la
 présidence tournante et un Commissaire chacun. Que personne n'ait tout,
 que chacun ait quelque chose: Président limité ou présidence effective et
 Commission resserrée ou Commission hiérarchisée. Qu'importe le choix
 ultime! Aucun n'est catastrophique pour personne. Chacun a ses
 avantages et ses inconvénients, pour la plupart imprévisibles. La seule
 chose qui serait catastrophique serait de gâcher tout ce que nous avons
 fait en laissant nos institutions dans leur triste état. Par conséquent,
 renonçons aux illusions de nos certitudes et passons au courage du
 consensus.

(Applaudissements)

4-061

Le Président. - Tout le monde devrait vous applaudir mais on le fait *in petto*. La parole est à Monsieur Avgerinos.

4-062

Αυγερινός (Parl.-GR). - Κύριε Πρόεδρε, εισερχόμαστε στο ουσιαστικότερο και ταυτόχρονα κρισιμότερο σημείο των εργασιών μας για τη σύνθεση και λειτουργία των θεσμικών οργάνων και είναι επόμενο να εκφράζονται πολλές και αποκλίνουσες απόψεις. Είναι επιθυμητό να υπάρξει συναίνεση και συμφωνία. Είναι αναγκαίο να εκφραστεί η Συνέλευση και να γίνει σεβαστή η άποψη της πλειοψηφίας της. Πολλά τα θέματα, λίγος ο χρόνος παρέμβασης. Έχω υποβάλει τις απόψεις μου με αιτιολογημένες τροπολογίες για όλα τα άρθρα σχετικά με τα θεσμικά όργανα. Γι' αυτό θα αναφερθώ μονάχα στα θέματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου και της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής.

Κύριε Πρόεδρε, σ' αυτήν ιδιαίτερα τη μεταβατική περίοδο, που είναι σε εξέλιξη η ενοποιητική διαδικασία και αναπτύσσεται η ευρωπαϊκή συνείδηση, αυτή την περίοδο προσαρμογής των νέων χωρών στις κοινοτικές αξίες και λειτουργίες, είναι ανάγκη σε ό,τι αφορά το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο να διατηρηθεί το ισχύον καθεστώς ή μια μορφή ομαδικής Προεδρίας ετήσιας διάρκειας από τρεις ή τέσσερις χώρες οι οποίες θα προεδρεύουν στα διάφορα Συμβούλια. Επ' αυτού, η πρόταση του κ. Παπανδρέου είναι πολύ λογική και αποκαθιστά δημοκρατικά την Ένωση. Δεν ξέρω όμως αν σήμερα μπορεί να εφαρμοστεί. Αναφέρθηκε σ' αυτό και ο κ. Barnier. Μήπως δηλαδή είναι αρκετά πρόωρο. Σίγουρα

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όμως θα είναι αυτό που θα ισχύσει στο μέλλον και που θα πρέπει να συνδυάζεται ταυτόχρονα με τις εκλογές των ευρωβουλευτών των ευρωπαϊκών κομμάτων.

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Σε ό,τι αφορά τώρα την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, θεωρώ ότι πρέπει κάθε χώρα να έχει έναν Επίτροπο. Ο Επίτροπος εκφράζει την παρουσία της χώρας του και δεν καταλαβαίνω γιατί αυτό συναρτάται με την αποτελεσματικότητα μιας Επιτροπής των 15 ή των 25. Δεν είναι επιχείρημα που πείθει αυτό. Θα χρειασθεί πολύς χρόνος, κύριε Πρόεδρε, για να φθάσουμε στην ευρωπαϊκή ολοκλήρωση και αυτή η πορεία δεν μπορεί να εκβιάζεται αν δεν την έχουν κατανοήσει και αποδεχθεί οι λαοί της Ευρώπης. Τέτοιες αναγκαίες ίσως αλλαγές μπορούν να καθυστερήσουν για αργότερα.

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Γι' αυτό ακριβώς πρέπει να υπάρχει η μεγαλύτερη δυνατή αποδοχή και δεν διαφαίνεται κάτι τέτοιο. Δεν ευνοεί την πορεία ενοποίησης ο συγκρουσιακός χαρακτήρας. Σήμερα το θέμα της σύνθεσης της Επιτροπής συντηρεί και οξύνει την αντιπαράθεση μικρών και μεγάλων χωρών. Στην εξέλιξη ενοποίησης της Ευρώπης, η οποία θα είναι συνεχής, δεν μπορεί να διαιωνίζεται αυτή η αντιπαράθεση. Η Νίκαια, κύριε Πρόεδρε, μέσα από ένα δύσκολο τοκετό, γέννησε μια λογική λύση στο θέμα της σύνθεσης της Επιτροπής για της περιοδικότητας της Προεδρίας, γι' αυτή τουλάχιστον τη μεταβατική περίοδο. Σε ό,τι αφορά τέλος την υπόδειξη τριών υποψηφίων επιτρόπων από κάθε χώρα, δεν τη συζητώ. Δεν είναι σοβαρή πρόταση και δεν καταλαβαίνω γιατί ήρθε αυτή η πρόταση. 4-062

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Avgerinos:

B_demand, call for, desire~

**A_argue~

A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

Mr. President, we are entering to the most essential and simultaneously the most critical point of our work concerning the composition and the operation of institutional bodies and it is quite logical that numerous deviating opinions will be expressed. Consent and agreement are desirable. It is essential for the Assembly to express itself and for the majority opinion to be respected. The issues are numerous, and the time in our hands is limited. I have already submitted my views with justified amendments on all the articles concerning to the institutional bodies. Because of this, I will only refer to issues concerning the European Council and the European Commission.

Mr. President, in this highly transitory period, in which the unificating process is under development and a new European conscience is being forged, this period of adaptation of all new countries to Community values and operations, it is necessary to maintain the current status in what concern the European Council, or make an arrangement in the form of a common Presidency of annual duration from three or four countries which will chair in the various Councils. In what concerns this, Mr Papandreou's proposal very logical and democratically restores the Union. I do not know however if it could be applied today. Mr Barnier also referred to this. That is to say this is premature or not. It is certain, however, that this will be in effect in the future and it will be simultaneously combined with the election of the members of the Parliament of the European parties.

In what concerns the European Commission, I believe that each country should have the right of appointing a Commissioner. The Commissioner expresses the presence of his country and I do not understand why this is associated with the effectiveness of a Commission of 15 or 25. This is not a really convincing argument. Lots of time will be needed, Mr. President, in order to reach the level of European integration and such a course should not be blackmailed if it is not perfectly comprehended and accepted by the peoples of Europe. Such - necessary perhaps- changes

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This is precisely why the most extensive acceptance possible should exist and such a thing is not obvious right now. Today, the subject of the composition of Commission maintains and accentuates the conflict between small and big countries. This conflict cannot be perpetuated in the development towards the unification of Europe, which will be continuous. Nice, Mr. President, through a difficult labour, gave birth to a reasonable solution in the subject of the composition of the Commission, the rotation of the Presidency, for this transient period at least. Finally, with regard to the proposal of having three candidate Commissioners from each country, I will not even get in the process of discussing it. It is not a serious proposal and I do not understand why this proposal was even submitted.

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A_approve, admit as correct-

4-063

Timmermans (Parl.-NL). - Tout d'abord, Monsieur le président, je tiens à exprimer mon admiration pour la qualité des textes qui nous sont proposés par le praesidium. Je crois que le travail qui a été fait par le secrétariat et tous ceux qui le soutiennent est vraiment d'une qualité excellente et je vous en félicite.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

Je soutiens pleinement les propos exprimés au nom du Bénélux par Monsieur Santer. Je crois que là, il y a des éléments qui peuvent mener à un compromis, à un consensus tel qu'exprimé aussi par Olivier Duhamel

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Je crois qu'il y a des éléments, surtout pour ce qui est de la Commission, qui peuvent nous aider à trouver un consensus. Moi aussi, je crois beaucoup en la position forte, efficace de la Commission. Comment crée-t-on une Commission forte ? En parlant principalement de ses compétences plutôt que de sa composition, plutôt que de cette règle d'avoir un Commissaire égalitaire venant de tous les Etats membres. Je regarderais plutôt de ce côté là la position de la Commission. Je veux une Commission forte capable d'être le pouvoir exécutif principal de l'Union, capable de faire des propositions, ayant le monopole des propositions à l'Union et qui, dans cette relation avec d'autres institutions, crée une position forte. Et je ne crois pas qu'il est essentiel pour ça d'avoir un Commissaire par Etat membre. Par contre, je crois que vingt-cinq ou vingt-sept commissaires à un niveau égalitaire n'aide pas nécessairement l'efficacité de l'institution. Comme l'a dit Monsieur Santer, l'équilibre entre les institutions est le point principal de nos discussions. Il s'agit d'un équilibre à cause ou grâce à un Conseil efficace, un Conseil qui crée un visage qu'on peut reconnaître dans les Etats membres. Je ne suis pas, en principe, contre un Président plus permanent du Conseil européen. Et je suis le raisonnement d'Olivier Duhamel qui dit qu'il faut regarder la situation allemande. Oui, d'accord. Mais les propositions du praesidium sont un peu trop cinquième République et un peu trop peu situation allemande. Je vois là encore des possibilités d'améliorer la situation en ligne avec ce qui a été proposé par le Bénélux. Mais le compromis ou le consensus doit se rallier autour de l'idée qu'on doit trouver un nouvel équilibre qui renforce l'Union et son action pour les citoyens et aussi, pour le monde extérieur.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-064

Peterle (Parl.-SI). - Mr President, it is more than obvious that the success of the Convention will largely depend on how capable we are of reaching a consensus on institutional issues. We have achieved much so far. I am still positive that the Convention can conclude its business successfully and on time, provided that we take into account all the criteria and the mandate that were set in Laeken. It would be far from sensible to agree to divide Member States into new and old ones, large and small ones or rich and poor ones. So far, this has not been the

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practice. We need continuity - continuity of fundamental principles and a stability when enforcing these principles in an enlarged EU.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Allow me to share a few words with you on the issue of the presidency. I am fully convinced that the quality of presidency does not depend on the number of Member States, nor on the size of the presiding State, as was clearly shown by the practice adopted thus far in the EU. I am also convinced that we can achieve a successful presidency without doing away with any of the principles that have been applicable so far.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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The rotation principle has kept the Union alive, made it closer to the citizens and to the Member States. Regional stresses of the presiding Member State can be very beneficial for the EU as such.

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Regarding Nice, as a representative of one of the candidate countries I agree with those who have already spoken about this today. New Member States need the experience that accountable membership in the EU will bring. Accountable membership can only be achieved by means of a commissioner. So far, nobody has said that commissioners represents national interests of Member States. I do not believe that it is opportune to talk about this right now, when we have new countries coming along.

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A_establish, mention-

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The Minister for Foreign Affairs should wear two hats in this respect. I would be more than glad if we were to apply the same principle to the President of the Commission. This would highly increase efficiency and effectiveness. It would do away with the rivalry and ensure a balance to which a chair of the European Council could contribute. A balanced principle of rotation can also be put into place at lower levels, not just at the highest level.

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In conclusion, I am convinced that in order to have an efficient functioning of an enlarged Union, we have to increase the democratic validity of its institutions. That is also why I support all proposals that will increase and strengthen the role of the European Commission, the President of the European Commission and the European Parliament.

(Applause)

4-065

Tiilikainen (Ch.E/G.-FI). - Mr President, European integration is unique as a political project. The contribution of Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann to European history is invaluable. Jean Monnet was the founding father of the European institutions; the Community method is his intellectual product. In his memoirs Jean Monnet writes that the life of institutions is longer than that of men; if they are well built they can accumulate and hand on the wisdom to succeeding generations.

What was a well-built European institution according to Jean Monnet? The core idea of Monnet in his historical work was that Franco-German reconciliation should not be achieved at the expense of smaller nations. Monnet wrote in his memoirs that Europe shall be built by the same process as each of our nation states, by establishing among European nations a new relationship comparable to that which exists among the citizens of any democratic country: equality organised by common institutions.

Equality among European nations was a leading principle in the foundation of the European Communities. A European constitution should not extinguish this valuable principle. In the Praesidium's proposal, this principle no longer plays any role in the European institutions. A number of common proposals and amendments have been

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fabled here in the Convention, demanding respect for the key principles of equality and the Community method.

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The Nice Treaty included a solution for the Commission that would guarantee both its efficiency and legitimacy in an enlarged Union. When the size of the Commission is reduced, its composition should still be based on an equal rotation between Member States. The Council that forms the main link between the Member States and their parliamentary machinery and the Union's decision-making should treat the Member States equally. A rotating presidency in the European Council, in key formations of the Council and in the COREPER guarantees this equality and forms an important link between the Union and the entire political system, and even citizens of the Member States. An elected presidency would deprive the EU of one of its cornerstones of equality.

B_demand, call for, desire~
**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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The European Parliament remains the only directly elected European institution, even for the smallest European nation. Therefore, appropriate representation of all the peoples of Europe must be ensured. The Nice Treaty created a proper basis for the division of the Parliament's seats. Another cornerstone in Jean Monnet's thinking was the role of the High Authority, now called the Commission, with its independence from national interests. Monnet wrote that a Europe of sovereign states was incapable, despite its leaders' goodwill, of reaching the sensible decisions that were needed for the common good.

B_reject, decline, refuse~
**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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It would be quite another matter however, if the power of decision was entrusted to institutions serving the general interest of all.

B_demand, call for, desire~
**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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I am not willing to disturb the original communitarian order among European institutions. The European Council, if it was elevated to the role of a Union institution and equipped with a permanent presidency, as the Praesidium proposes, would, without doubt, do this. The European Council should maintain its current role as the driving force of integration without becoming an institution or having a bureaucracy of its own. It should not adopt functions originally designated to the Council. We do not need new institutions nor new principles, but we should safeguard the original heritage of Jean Monnet in European institutions.

(Applause)

4-066

Figel, Jan (Parl.-SK). -Mr President, I should like to emphasise that one of the key underlying goals guiding our reform must be the reinforcement of the Community method in the European Union. We must ensure the principle of equal treatment among EU countries and include existing institutional balance in the Union, especially within the triangle of Council, Parliament and Commission.

The European Union does not need any additional institutions. It must make the existing structures work better, as Mrs Tiilikainen has said. The European Commission must remain the guardian of the Treaties. It has to keep its crucial role at the centre of policy-making in the Union by preserving its sole right of legislative initiative and by reinforcing its executive tasks. Each Member State should keep the right to nominate one commissioner, thus ensuring the principle of equal treatment for the future. At the same time, the Commission's role of legitimacy and independence should be strengthened through election of the President of the Commission by the European Parliament by a three-fifths majority of its Members.

The Council and the European Parliament must become equal co-

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legislators, whereby all decisions taken by the Council on the basis of qualified majority voting are, in future, co-decided by Parliament.

- B_demand, call for, desire~
- **A_justify~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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In the interests of equality among Member States and of preserving the interinstitutional balance, the European Council should be run on the basis of a rotating presidency. That represents an important tool for Member States to identify with the Union. The presidency of the European Council shall be held in turn by each Member State for a term of six months. Member States holding the presidency of the European Council shall simultaneously be a member of the team presidency of the European Council. A rotating presidency is not an essential problem that undermines continuity of the Union's policies. Rather, to ensure better coherence and continuity, we have to improve our strategic thinking and strategic planning. At the same time, the election of a personified head of the European Council raises a number of potential risks, including the creation of a new power centre in the institutional architecture of the Union.

- B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~

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A presidency of individual Council formations shall be chaired by a team presidency of four Member States for a period of two years. The agenda of the Council Presidency shall be organised in accordance with the common agreement of the four countries holding the presidency. Overall reform of the EU institutions must be underpinned by enhanced democratic and transparent practice. In reality, all legislative meetings of the Council and Parliament must not take place behind closed doors.

- B_reject, decline, refuse~
- **A_justify~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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(Applause)

- A_insist, persist, stick to a belief~
- A_concede, grant, acknowledge, accept, admit~

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4-067

Le Président. - Je vous remercie. Par rapport aux deux remarques précédentes, je voudrais dire un mot. N'oubliez pas les citoyens. On entend parler de l'égalité des Etats. C'est une chose. Mais l'Europe, c'est l'égalité des citoyens, ne l'oubliez pas. Vous ne pouvez pas demander aux citoyens de soutenir le projet européen si vous ne reconnaissez pas l'égalité des citoyens. C'est un système qui ne peut pas fonctionner. Par conséquent, c'est un système qui est basé sur l'égalité des citoyens et qui reconnaît l'égalité de droit des Etats. Mais je suis quand même frappé de voir que cette égalité des citoyens, on en parle peu. La parole est à Monsieur Paks.

- B_reject, decline, refuse~

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4-068

Paks (Parl.-LV). - Mr President, I strongly believe that for the equality of the States, the principle of the rotating presidency of the Council has to be maintained. For the same reason, the proposed permanent chair of the Council should be abolished. The system of the rotating presidency embodies a role that every nation state in the EU can undertake. It has also represented a safeguard of the equality of each Member State within the EU. Responsibility for and visibility of the rotating presidency enables each Member State to strengthen the vision of the European Union as a Union of nation states with common aims and values.

The arguments which have been put forward do not convince me that the current rotating presidency system is not an appropriate model for a European Union of twenty-five Member States. However, I cannot exclude the fact that one day, as Mr Barnier said, we will come to the conclusion that substantive changes in the system are needed.

Secondly, for the sake of retaining institutional balance, the proposal to grant the European Council the status of an EU institution is not an acceptable solution.

4-069

Kristensen (Parl.-DK). - Hr. formand, det er vigtigt, at vi hele tiden

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holder os for øje, at ideen med det europæiske samarbejde er, at der er ligevægt imellem store og små lande og deres indflydelse. Det gælder stemmewægt, sprog, antallet af kommissærer og repræsentation i Europa-Parlamentet. Det har faktisk været en afgørende forudsætning for samarbejdets stabilitet.

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Jeg vil gerne starte med at se på antallet af kommissærer. Der foreslås, at man reducerer fra Nice-traktatens 25 kommissærer til højst 15. Kommissionen skal i fremtiden bestå af en formand, en EU-udenrigsminister samt op til 13 kommissærer. Jeg er klar over, at Nice-traktaten rejste en række spørgsmål omkring antallet af kommissærer, når vi bliver 27 lande, men før vi tager hul på den debat, bør vi starte med at se på problemerne med balancen mellem små og store lande. Det, synes jeg, er fraværende i Præsidiets udspil. Der er intet princip om ligestilling eller rotation mellem landene, når det gælder spørgsmålet om, hvem der skal have en kommissær, og hvem der skal stå uden for døren, når Kommissionen træffer beslutninger. Derfor opfordrer jeg til, at vi holder os på Nice-traktatens spor.

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Jeg vil samtidig gerne understrege, at jeg stadig støtter, at vi lader et valgkollegium med repræsentanter for både nationale parlamenter og også fra Europa-Parlamentet vælge formanden for Kommissionen. Når vi ser på stemmewægten i Rådet, mener jeg også, at der er tale om en ubalance i forholdet mellem store og små lande. Forslaget fra Præsidiets vil først og fremmest gavne de fire største EU-lande. De små lande er, og det erkender jeg, samtidig beskyttet imod at blive majoriseret af et mindretal af store lande med kravet om, at der skal være et flertal af lande bagved en vedtagelse. Men jeg synes, at det er et dårligt forslag, som kan være med til at skabe splid og sætte spørgsmålstejn ved det svære kompromis, som der blev opnået på Nice-topmødet netop omkring balancerne. Jeg mener, vi skal fortsætte i Nice-sporet, og Konventet skal i sit slutdokument kunne genoprette den balance, som har været så vital for hele det europæiske samarbejde igennem alle årene.

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4-069 Translation

Kristensen (Parl.-DK). Mr. President, it is important that we all the time keep in mind that the idea of the European cooperation is that it is equality between big and small countries and their influence. That includes vote power, language, number of commissaries and representatives in the European Parliament. This has actually been a crucial prerequisite for the stability of the cooperation.

I will start by looking at the number of commissaries. It is suggested to reduce the number from the 25 commissaries of the Nice Treaty to maximum 15. The Commission will in the future consist of a chairman, an EU foreign minister and up to 13 commissaries. I am aware of that the Nice Treaty raised several questions concerning the number of commissaries when we become 27 countries, but before we start that debate, we should start by looking at the problems with the balance between small and large countries. That is, I feel, lacking in the Chairmanship proposal. There is no principle about equality or rotation between the countries concerning the question whether who will have a commissar and who will stand outside the door, when the Commission makes decisions. Therefore I encourage that we stay in the track of the Nice Treaty.

I will at the same time like to underline that I still support to let an election college with representatives from both national parliaments and also from the Europe Parliament elect the Chairman for the Commission. When we look at the vote power in the Board, I also think that there is an unbalance in the relation between large and small countries. The suggestion from the Chairmanship will first and foremost benefit the

four largest EU countries. The small countries are, and I realise that, at the same time protected against becoming under majority from a minority of large countries with the demand that it has to be a majority of the countries behind a decision. But I think that it is a bad suggestion that can contribute to making disagreements and question the large compromise that was achieved at the Nice top meeting exactly around the balances. I think we should continue in the track from Nice, and that the Convention should rebuild the balance that has been so vital to the whole European cooperation through all the years in their end document.

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B Uphold (an offer, promise)~
B demand, call for, desire~

4-070

Kuneva (Gouv.-BG). - Mr President, I would like to stress that we continue to support the essential principles set out in the joint paper reforming the institution's principles and premises presented by 16 governmental representatives at the end of March.

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A approve, admit as correct~
A argue~
A justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
B demand, call for, desire~
A justify~
A justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
A contradict, reject, dispute, object~
A explain~
A justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

The new constitutional provisions for the institutions should preserve the existing institutional balance, respect the equality of Member States and reinforce the Community method. Having this in mind, allow me to mention very briefly our main considerations on the institutional provisions.

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A very positive step forward is the creation of the position of European Foreign Minister, a role also comprising the position of Vice-President of the Commission and assuming overall responsibility for the Union's external action. There is no doubt that this will help the European Union speak with a stronger and more coherent voice in the world.

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B demand, call for, desire~

We also consider that the Presidency of the European Council should be exercised on a rotational basis. This would guarantee respect for the principle of equality among Member States. In order to ensure continuity the European Council should adopt a multi-annual strategic programme. We have some doubts about the creation of a permanent President of the European Council. There could be the risk of his competing with the President of the Commission and undermining the role of the latter. Furthermore a permanent president would be accountable neither to the European Parliament nor to the national parliaments. The Council, in its general affairs formation, should be presided over by the President of the Commission and, in its foreign affairs formation, by the European Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Election of the President of the European Commission by the European Parliament would reinforce the Community method and would increase the democratic accountability of this institution. The European Council should confirm the election by qualified majority. The Commission should comprise a national of each Member State. We are of the opinion that the idea to introduce associate commissioners is not consistent with the principles of equality.

As far as the qualified majority vote in the Council is concerned, we are of the opinion that the Constitution should include the figures agreed in Nice for an EU of 27 Member States.

Last but not least, the European Parliament should have a stronger role by sharing with the Council the power to enact legislation and to adopt the Union's budget. The number of seats per Member State should again follow the agreement reached in Nice. It is difficult for us to subscribe to the idea of creating a congress. It would make the institutional structure more complicated and the decision-making process even more cumbersome.

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4-071

(La séance, suspendue à 12h40, est reprise à 15h00)

4-072

PRÉSIDENCE DE M. GISCARD D'ESTAING

Président

4-073

Debate on draft articles on Institutions (continuation)

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4-074

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Duff (PE). - Mr President, I was anxious to pick up the point that Peter Hain was making concerning the necessity of avoiding the rivalries between the vested interests. It struck me that the reason it is proving such a problem for us clearly to separate the legislative from the executive formations of the Council is precisely because of the vested interests that are found in the sectoral ministerial formations. While it is easy for me to agree with his analysis of the problem, I am completely confounded and perplexed at the solution that he prescribes.

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Maij-Weggen (PE). - Mr President, I would like to give my point of principle on institutional relations. For a very long time, great importance has been attached to the need for a clear balance in the European Union between the institutions, between the big countries and the smaller countries and between the political families.

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Voorzitter, bij die constructie is de functie van de Europese Commissie de belangrijkste. De Europese Commissie heeft twee organen naast zich nodig, namelijk de Raad en het Europees Parlement. Beide moeten een stimulerende, een controlerende en een besluitvormende rol spelen, de Raad namens de lidstaten en het Parlement namens de burgers. Nogmaals, met een centrale functie van de Europese Commissie. In dat model waarin de Europese Commissie de centrale instelling is, hebben we mijns inziens niet zozeer een president nodig die gesitueerd is bij de Europese Raad: eerder zouden we de positie van de voorzitter van de Europese Commissie moeten opwaarderen tot iets wat te vergelijken is met die van een president. Dat voorstel is al door verschillenden gedaan en ik denk dat dat uiteindelijk de beste oplossing is. Een dergelijke president van de Europese Commissie zou moeten worden voorgedragen door de Raad en gekozen door het Europees Parlement. Ik wil zelfs, net als de heer Papandreou, nog een stapje verder gaan en verklaren dat ik in de toekomst ook wel een gekozen president van de Europese Commissie zie. Die verkiezing zou gelijktijdig met de verkiezingen voor het Europees Parlement kunnen plaatsvinden, dan zouden die laatste misschien ook een beetje meer aandacht krijgen.

Ik ben dus geen voorstander van een president bij de Raad. Dat zorgt voor een onbalans en voor een ongemakkelijke concurrentie tussen Commissie en Raad. Het kan bovendien nog zorgen voor extra bureaucratie, en wij zijn als Conventie natuurlijk niet ingehuurd om voor nog meer complicaties en bureaucratie te zorgen.

Ten aanzien van de minister van buitenlandse zaken vind ik dat het presidium een uitstekend voorstel heeft gedaan, nl. om de betrokken persoon een zetel te geven bij de Commissie en hem tegelijk ook een rol te laten spelen bij de Raad externe betrekkingen. We hebben de afgelopen jaren gezien hoe het gegaan is met de heren Solana en Patten. Iedereen die daar dichtbij heeft gezeten - en dat geldt zeker voor de

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leden van het Europees Parlement - weet dat dat een ongelukkige constructie was, die tot een ongemakkelijke concurrentie heeft geleid en ook tot verwarring in het buitenland. Ik vind het voorstel van het presidium dus uitstekend.

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Dan de Europese Commissie zelf. Over de voorzitter daarvan heb ik al iets gezegd. Met betrekking tot de leden ben ik van mening dat er in de eerste periode na de uitbreiding één commissaris per lidstaat moet zijn. Dat vind ik belangrijk voor de binding van de nieuwe landen met Brussel. Wel zou je de mogelijkheid kunnen opnemen om in een later stadium wel met een roulatiesysteem te komen, maar zeker de eerste twee periodes niet.

A_claim (facts and values)-

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Ten slotte, Voorzitter, ik hoor niemand meer spreken over het volkscongres. Ik hoop dat dat zo blijft.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

4-075 Translation

Maij-Weggen (PE). - Mr Chairman, I would like to give my point of view on institutional relations. For a very long time, great importance has been attached to the need for a clear balance in the European Union between the institutions, between the big countries and the smaller countries and between the political families.

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Mr Chairman, within this construction, the function of the European Commission is the most important one. The European Commission needs two committees by her side, namely the Council and the European Parliament. Both must play a stimulating, monitoring and decision-making role; the Council on behalf of the Member States and the Parliament on behalf of the citizens, once again, with a central function of the European Commission. In this model where the European Commission is the central institution, we don't particularly need to, in my opinion, a president for the European Council: we should rather revalue the position of the President of the European Commission to a statute comparable with that of a president. This proposal has already been made by several people and I think that it is eventually the best solution. Such a president of the European Commission should be proposed by the Council and chosen by the European Parliament. I even want, like Mr Papandreou, to go a step further and declare that I believe as well that there will be a president of the European Commission in the future. The election for could take place simultaneously with the elections for the European Parliament. By doing this the elections for the European Parliament might also get a bit more attention.

B_reject, decline, refuse-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

Therefore I am no proponent of a president at the Council. This creates imbalance and an uncomfortable competition between the Commission and the Council. Moreover it can entail extra bureaucracy, and we as a Convention are of course not engaged to create more complications and

0629 **bureaucracy.**

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0631 With regard to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I find that the
0632 presidium has made an excellent proposal, namely to give
the person involved a seat at the Commission and at the
same time to let him play a part at the Council for external
relations. We have seen in previous years how it has ended
with Mr Solana and Mr Patten. Everyone who has been near
to that - and this certainly applies to the members of the
European Parliament - knows that it was a miserable
0633 construction, which conducted to an uncomfortable
0634 competition and also to misunderstanding abroad. So, I
0636 believe the proposal of the presidium to be excellent.

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Then the European Commission itself. I've already said
something concerning the president. Concerning the
members, I find that there should be one commissioner per
Member State during the first period after the extension. I
consider this as important for the relationships of the new
countries with Brussels. However, the possibility to come to
a rotation system at a later phase could be incorporated, but
certainly not in the first two periods.

Finally, Mr Chairman, I hear no one speaking anymore
about the people's congress. I hope it remains like that.

4-076
Kiljunen (Parl.-FI). - Mr President, I appreciate that Mr Duhamel did
not actually use his blue card. I would like to respond to his presentation.

I enjoyed the clear and well-argued presentation by Mr Duhamel and the
way in which he sought a compromise. He stated that there are two
things in our processes: what we are trying to write and what will
become the reality. He stated that if the Commission is broad, the reality
is that, inherently, it will be hierarchical. If the Commission is small and
narrow, the reality is that the equality among Member States could be
better guaranteed. Moving on to the Council, he stated that if the
European Council has one president it could be weak, and that if we
used the formula of a group presidency, it could be strong

I might agree with his analysis as regards the Commission but I disagree
with his analysis regarding the Council. There is clearly a tendency to
believe that if one creates one leader, it will be a strong leadership, but if
one creates a group leadership, by essence it is weak

I should like to ask Mr Duhamel for his opinion

4-077
Thorning-Schmidt (PE). - Mr President, the questions concerning the
Commission and the President of the European Council are extremely
important and we must appreciate that such discussions are essential but,
unfortunately, it takes up time allocated today for the discussion of other
matters. I have listened very carefully to the Benelux delegation, to the
Swedish delegation, to the Austrian and other government
representatives. I must say, I am a little disappointed that none of those
governments have chosen to touch upon the issue of the seat of the
European Parliament.

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

B_Judge-

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

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I would like to ask a very direct question, because that is the purpose of the blue cards: I have put in an amendment suggesting that the European Parliament should choose its own seat. Would you not agree with me that this is a suitable time in the Convention, now that we are discussing the institutions, for putting this on the agenda? Would you also not agree with me that if we do not put it on the agenda right now, we will all be responsible for missing out on this opportunity to do so?

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I would very much like to have an answer. Not all of the government representatives concerned are in the room right now, but I would be happy if you could answer me and also discuss within your own governments whether this is the time to put this issue on the agenda in a very forceful way. Otherwise it will never, ever happen. I am not asking that we open all discussions, I am only requesting that the European Parliament gets a chance to decide on its own seat.

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(Applause)

4-078

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Kirkhopte (PE). - Mr President, just before I use my time up, may I comment that those of us that play by the rules in terms of the amount of time you allow us to speak sometimes find it very difficult when blue cards and others extend the time they speak, longer even than the speeches we ourselves make when we have waited all day to make just one speech. I am now going to make my speech and I shall keep it to the time as usual. I want to make that observation because a lot of people are talking for long periods of time, inappropriately.

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First of all I want to support the view that each Member State, regardless of its size or its date of entry, should be represented in Brussels by a commissioner. This is only fair, and it is in the spirit of a genuine and equal community of nation states, both old and new, and of their citizens. Consequently, I am urging Members of the Convention to support my suggested amendment to Article 18a(2) that 'each Member State shall nominate one person whom it considers qualified to be a European Commissioner. The President-elect shall allocate portfolios for each of those Commissioners.' Those who say it cannot be done because it is not practical to split portfolios or deal with it that way should look at the relative strengths and sizes of governments around Europe. It is, of course, perfectly proper and perfectly possible, and it can be very efficient. The idea, as somebody has suggested, of starting with one commissioner per state and then gradually reducing it, would seem to me to be a total nonsense, apart from being impractical. We should take a commissioner for each state and retain that position. It would be very acceptable all round.

The Commission should be more non-political than it is currently. I would personally prefer that each Commissioner appointed should be either a current or former civil servant from the Member State concerned. I appreciate the view may not be generally shared, and it obviously is not, but being a commissioner quite often requires more specialist skill than is sometimes available from that large number of retired or preferred politicians that seem to be all over the place. I know that I have at least one supporter on the platform today.

My second proposal is this. Each commissioner should 'be submitted individually to a vote of approval by the European Parliament'. A censure motion must be able to apply to the Commission, not just as a whole but to individual commissioners. Why should the whole Commission be rejected if one commissioner is thought to be unfit for office? That produces, as it did not long ago, a chaotic and farcical

0664 situation and it should not be allowed to continue.
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0666 In Britain, cabinet ministers regularly seem to resign if they behave
0668 improperly, but it does not bring the government down, sadly. In
0669 conclusion, I urge Members to accept those two amendments; it would
0670 support our chief objective which is the promotion of democracy and
accountability in our Union.

4-079
0672 **Le Président.** - Vous aviez fait quelques remarques à vos collègues et
0673 vous avez dépassé votre temps de parole de quarante secondes.

4-080
0674 **Meyer (Parl.-DE).** — Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen!
0675 Diese Debatte bringt uns weiter, wenn sie dazu genutzt wird,
unterschiedliche Positionen nicht ständig zu wiederholen, sondern
einander anzunähern und durch Kompromisse zusammenzuführen.
Olivier Duhamel hat ganz Recht. Der Weg zum Konsens führt über
Kompromisse. Ich will das bei einem Thema versuchen, dem
umstrittenen Vollzeitpräsidenten des Europäischen Rates

0676 Einige von uns sind für diesen Vollzeitpräsidenten, weil er Kontinuität
0677 gewährleistet. Andere wollen das alte Rotationssystem beibehalten, weil
man damit gute Erfahrungen gemacht hat und weil dieses System die
Mitwirkung aller Regierungen für jeweils sechs Monate in gewissen
Abständen gewährleistet. Aber gilt das auch noch nach der Erweiterung
der Europäischen Union, wenn jede Regierung nur alle zwölf einhalb
oder fünfzehn Jahre für sechs Monate den Vorsitz inne hat? Ist das dann
0678 wirklich so attraktiv? Ich meine, dass der Vorschlag des Präsidiums in
0679 die richtige Richtung weist und dass er durch bestimmte Ergänzungen so
verbessert werden kann, dass er die Grundlage für einen möglichen
Kompromiss werden kann. Entscheidend ist, dass der künftige
Vollzeitratsvorsitzende sich nicht zum Gegenspieler des
Kommissionspräsidenten entwickeln oder gar ein Superpräsident werden
kann. Wir sollten ihn also zunächst einmal schlicht Vorsitzenden nennen
und nicht Präsidenten, und das sollte dreifache praktische Bedeutung
haben.

Drei Instrumente gibt es, um die Macht des Vorsitzenden einzugrenzen.
Das erste Instrument ist eine genaue Aufgabenbeschreibung, die das
Präsidium zu erstellen versucht. Ich bin allerdings mit dem Deutschen
Bundestag der Auffassung, dass der künftige Ratsvorsitzende nicht die
Außenvertretung der Europäischen Union wahrnehmen sollte, sondern
dass dies vor allem und in erster Linie Sache des künftigen europäischen
Außenministers sein sollte.

Das zweite Instrument ist die Beibehaltung der Rotation an der Spitze,
und in diese Richtung geht ja der Vorschlag des Präsidiums, wonach
man zum Beispiel um diesen Ratsvorsitzenden herum eine Troika mit
drei Regierungs- oder Staatschefs bilden könnte, die dann rotierend für
jeweils ein Jahr den Vorsitzenden nicht nur beraten, sondern auch
kontrollieren. Aber ich hätte dieses Kollegium, das ich nicht Präsidium
nennen möchte, gerne obligatorisch gemacht, sonst könnte doch die
Regierung des Landes, aus dem der Ratsvorsitzende kommt, sagen: Wir
brauchen ein solches Kontrollgremium nicht. Unser Mann sollte nicht in
dieser Art eingeschränkt werden. Deshalb möchte ich dieses Kollegium
obligatorisch haben.

Das dritte Instrument, um die Bäume des Ratsvorsitzenden nicht in den
Himmel wachsen zu lassen, ist, dass er vom Generalsekretariat des Rates
unterstützt wird, das es schon gibt, dass er also keine administrative
Gegenmacht erhält.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to~

B_suggest a compromise~

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Wenn das Präsidium mit diesen Ergänzungen einen Vorsitzenden des Rates vorschlägt, der für Kontinuität sorgt, ohne zum Superpräsidenten werden zu können, müsste das ein Kompromiss sein, auf den wir uns verständigen können.

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4-081

Le Président. - Je vous remercie Monsieur Meyer. Je vous rappelle que dans notre article, il y a bien la possibilité d'une vice-présidence rotative comme vous y faisiez allusion. La parole est à Monsieur Roche.

A_claim (facts and values)-

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4-082

Roche (Ch.E./G.-IE). - Mr President, by submitting a paper to the Convention 16 Member States have sought to indicate our concerns over the issues that face us on the institutional side. In that paper we sought to outline the principles and premises that should underpin the institutional arrangements. These were very simple: to maintain and reinforce the Community method, to preserve the institutional balance, to respect the equality of Member States, to create new institutions and to enable the institutions to operate as openly, transparently and democratically as possible.

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On the issues that have come before us from the Praesidium, first and foremost, with regard to Parliament, I do not see any enthusiasm whatsoever for the idea that we should depart from the formula that was agreed with regard to representation and the distribution of seats. Indeed, many of the amendments reinforce that.

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A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

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As to the Commission specifically, the smaller Member States paid for equality at Nice. Part of the Nice arrangement was to give us equality within the Commission. It is not right or reasonable to reopen that issue now.

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_insist, persist, stick to a belief-

B_reject, decline, refuse-

The issue relating to demography, which you return to from time to time, is addressed both in the Council and in the distribution of seats within Parliament. There is no *bona fide* reason for reopening that issue at this time.

With regard to the President of the Commission, this strikes me as an opportunity that the Convention should rise to. I have made the suggestion that on one single day the Member State parliaments of every one of the new States of Europe and the European Parliament should join together to do one single thing: to elect democratically a president of the Commission. I have also suggested an open and transparent means of nominating those who would stand as candidates for that election. This would give the Convention the opportunity to create a sense of excitement, a new dynamism in Europe. I cannot understand why we do not look in that direction. I do not find attractive the Baghdad formula of offering only one name for election.

With regard to the President of the Council, I have listened very carefully to the debate. If smaller States have to be listened to, we must also be prepared to hear the arguments. I have not heard coherent arguments on this issue in support of creating a full-time presidency. I am concerned that to do so would create an imbalance and the difficulties that we have discussed.

With regard to the Council, I make the point again that the voting weights in the Council were decided at Nice. There is no *bona fide* reason to reopen that issue now. I am allergic to the proposition that we should try to set out in a constitutional treaty the issues of Council formations. I proposed that this should not be done because it is overly

0700 inflexible and will cause us problems.
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0702 I am critical of a number of issues, but this Convention can be upbeat
0703 about the opportunities available in meeting our timetable because we
0704 have achieved a huge amount. It is a different way of doing business; it
0705 is more challenging. I would not agree, however, that it is a basis for
shoving the final dates back beyond 21 June.

(Applause)

0707 4-083
0708 **Lenmarker (Parl.-SE).** - Mr President, I would like to reiterate that I
find it difficult to understand why we should abolish the three pillars, in
order to have a more coherent Union, not only with different policies but
even within external action, when the current Common Foreign and
0709 Security Policy is too far removed from the other parts of external
0710 action. This is the gist of Mr Dehaene's working group. There should be
only one president, and that should be the President of the Commission.
The Foreign Minister should report to that President. I am very glad that
0711 there is a very broad majority within the PPE-DE group, and hopefully
0712 also in the Convention, which supports that principle.

0713 When it comes to the Council of Ministers, the formations and all the
0714 chairmanships could be decided internally. Let us remember that last
summer the Council went from 18 to 9 formations without any decision
outside the Council itself. As long as there is equality of Member States,
0715 the Council of Ministers should decide these matters within itself. This is
0716 a practical matter.

- ⚡ **A_argue~
- ⚡ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
- ⚡ B_demand, call for, desire~
- ⚡ B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~
- ⚡ B_threaten~


When it comes to the Commission, there are two contradicting points:
one is efficiency - to have a Commission that works – and the other is
representativeness. It is proper that each and every Member State should
be represented in the Commission, but there should be greater freedom
for the Commission President to organise work in the Commission in
order to make it work efficiently. It is particularly important for new and
small Member States to be in the Commission, not least because the
cabinet carries out a big function when it comes to representing either
the country or the Commission in the country.

When it comes to voting rights in the Council and the number of seats in
the European Parliament, we have the Nice principles until there are 27
Members, but then we must go further than the 27 Members. It is very
difficult for representatives of a country to give up the principles of
Nice. There must be a very clear-cut principle, one that could defend a
new balance within the Council of Ministers or within the European
Parliament. It would therefore be worthwhile to have reflection groups
to find those principles. Otherwise it will be more or less impossible for
any country to give up seats in relation to Nice.

Let me underline the two principles of openness and good government
that were previously mentioned by my Swedish colleague.

4-084
Liepina (MPC-LV). – Herr Präsident! Ich habe mir über diese Artikel
in ihrer Gesamtheit Gedanken gemacht. Ich bin nicht oft zu Hause, aber
wenn ich da bin, muss ich mit den Menschen über die Europäische
Union reden, weil uns ja das Referendum noch bevorsteht und sie wissen
möchten, wofür oder wogegen sie denn stimmen sollen. Über diesen
Entwurf, über die Organe der Union müsste ich Folgendes sagen: In der
Europäischen Union werden wir ein Parlament haben, in dem wir etwas
weniger als acht von den insgesamt 700 Vertretern stellen werden.
Dieses Parlament wird mit dem Rat als Gesetzgeber tätig werden und

Aufgaben der politischen Kontrolle und Beratungsaufgaben wahrnehmen. Der Rat ist ein Organ, bei dem unser Regierungschef viermal im Jahr mit anderen Staats- und Regierungschefs bei dem Präsidenten von Europa zusammentreten wird. In diesem Rat wird eine Mehrheit der Regierungschefs, die drei Fünftel der Bevölkerung repräsentieren, Beschlüsse fassen. Es gibt auch eine Kommission, die für das Wohl von Europa als Ganzes arbeitet. Das wissen wir, denn von der Kommission kommt die Initiative der Richtlinien. Wir werden zwar kein Mitglied stellen, aber die Kommission übt ihre Tätigkeit ohnehin in voller Unabhängigkeit aus. Unsere Minister werden gemeinsam mit dem Parlament als Gesetzgeber tätig werden und die Aufgaben der Politikfestlegung sowie Koordinierungsaufgaben wahrnehmen. Auch hier wird die Mehrheit der Minister, die drei Fünftel, das sind 60% der Bevölkerung, repräsentieren, Beschlüsse fassen. Es ist allerdings nicht ganz ausgeschlossen, dass unser Minister für ein Jahr den Vorsitz einer gewissen Zusammensetzung des Ministerrates übernimmt. Die Mehrheit der Staats- und Regierungschefs, die 60% der Bevölkerung repräsentieren, werden einen Minister benennen, der die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik leitet. Wir werden einen Richter in einem unabhängigen Gerichtshof haben, der über Klagen eines Mitgliedstaates, eines Organs oder juristischer oder natürlicher Personen sowie über die Auslegung des Unionsrechts entscheidet. Es wird eine Zentralbank geben, die unserer Zentralbank vorsteht. Wir könnten einen Vertreter in den Ausschuss der Regionen sowie im Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss entsenden. Ein paar unserer Vertreter könnten auch noch einmal im Jahr einem Bericht über die Lage der Union zuhören.

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 B_suggest a compromise-

Wenn ich so eine Botschaft nach Hause bringe und auch noch für den Beitritt zur Europäischen Union plädieren würde, dann würden sich die Leute fragen, welches Land ich eigentlich vertrete. Nicht nur ich, sondern auch die Europäische Union, die heute den Ruf der Staatengleichheit genießt, würden unglaubwürdig werden!

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4-085

Fischer (Ch.E/G.-DE). – Herr Präsident! Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union auf 25 Mitgliedstaaten wird Realität werden. Wir stehen unmittelbar vor der Vollendung, und das heißt, dass wir jetzt auch das Ziel, eine handlungsfähige und demokratische erweiterte Union zu schaffen - die Aufgabe, die diesem Konvent gestellt wurde -, gemeinsam erreichen müssen. Wir sind uns einig, dass dies nur durch die Stärkung der Gemeinschaftsmethode - Grundlage der Erfolgsgeschichte dieser Europäischen Union - gewährleistet werden kann. Zahlreiche, sich teilweise gegenseitig ausschließende Änderungsvorschläge liegen vor. Uns, dem Konvent verbleibt nicht mehr viel Zeit. Das muss allen Beteiligten klar sein, und deshalb müssen wir uns auf einen zukunftsorientierten Gesamtentwurf für die institutionelle Architektur verständigen. Das kann nach Lage der Dinge nur ein ausgewogener, guter Kompromiss sein. Der Entwurf des Konventspräsidiums bildet dafür eine gute Arbeitsgrundlage. Insbesondere der Benelux-Vorschlag enthält aber auch wichtige Ansätze, um die sich ein Konsens kristallisieren könnte. Diesen Konsens muss der Konvent innerhalb des vorgenommenen Zeitplans erreichen. Ich glaube, wenn wir nicht im Zeitplan bleiben, dann schaffen wir ein Problem, das sehr schwierig zu lösen sein wird.

Die erweiterte Union wird aufgrund ihrer schieren Größe stärkeren zentrifugalen Kräften ausgesetzt sein. Aus diesem Grund muss die Kommission in ihrer Funktion als Hüterin des Gemeinschaftsinteresses gestärkt werden. Die Idee der perspektivischen Anpassung der Größe des Kollegiums könnte dabei ein wichtiges Element sein. Hier sind wir meines Erachtens, wenn man die Vorschläge Revue passieren lässt, von einer Einigung nicht weit entfernt.

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Zweitens: Ich begrüße die Zustimmung im Konvent zur Wahl des Kommissionspräsidenten im Lichte der Europawahlen. Sie stärkt das Europäische Parlament, die Kommission und die europäische Demokratie insgesamt. Um den direkten Zusammenhang zwischen den Europawahlen und der Person des Kommissionspräsidenten sicherzustellen, sollte das Europäische Parlament mit der Mehrheit seiner Mitglieder wählen, alles andere wäre meines Erachtens ein integrationspolitischer Rückschritt.

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Die Stärkung der Gemeinschaftsmethode bedarf auch einer Reform der Ratsarbeit. Der Rat kann mit 25 und mehr Mitgliedern nicht mehr funktionieren wie ein Rat mit sechs Mitgliedern. Für prüfenswert halte ich den Benelux-Vorschlag, neben einer stabilen Vorsitzregelung im Außenrat einen dauerhaften Vorsitz im allgemeinen Rat zu schaffen. In anderen Ratsformationen könnte die Rotation zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten beibehalten werden.

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**A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Wenn es gelingt, die Gemeinschaftsinstitutionen und das institutionelle Dreieck insgesamt zu stärken, könnten wir - dessen bin ich mir sicher - auch die kontroverse Vorsitzfrage des Europäischen Rats lösen. Der Europäische Rat wird auch künftig seine im Vertrag vorgesehene Rolle wahrnehmen und nicht etwa in Konkurrenz zur Kommission treten. Um Kontinuität und Kohärenz zu gewährleisten, ist unbeschadet der Aufgaben der Unionsorgane die Wahl eines Vorsitzenden sinnvoll

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

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**A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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(Beifall)

4-086

Follini (Parl.-IT). - Signor Presidente, gli articoli dedicati alle Istituzioni sono il classico bicchiere riempito per metà: mezzo pieno per gli ottimisti e mezzo vuoto per i critici. Io sono tra quanti avrebbero preferito un bicchiere pieno per intero: mi sembrava che fosse arrivato il momento di dare all'Europa un solo Presidente con un doppio cappello, che fosse insieme capo del Consiglio e della Commissione. Prendo atto che le nostre realistiche possibilità politiche si fermano prima di arrivare a tanto, ma resto dell'idea che quel traguardo, in prospettiva, non vada abbandonato. Per rendere quel traguardo meno lontano e meno difficile noi oggi dobbiamo trovare un equilibrio tra le Istituzioni dell'Unione, che renda più forte il Consiglio, più forte la Commissione e più forte anche il rapporto tra Consiglio e Commissione. Mi pare che alcune delle soluzioni che ci vengono proposte - dal Ministro degli esteri al Consiglio per gli affari legislativi - vadano in quella direzione e, da parte mia, approvo queste soluzioni. Vengo ora ai due punti più controversi: primo, un Presidente del Consiglio europeo di lunga durata, con poteri limitati, sottratto alla rotazione semestrale e dedicato al suo compito a tempo pieno può servire a rendere più stabile il rapporto tra l'Unione e gli Stati. Sono favorevole più per realismo che per entusiasmo. So bene che per molti il rafforzamento del Presidente comporta il rischio di un eccessivo rafforzamento del braccio intergovernativo a spese del cuore federalista, ma non credo affatto che un Presidente più debole e più provvisorio sarebbe utile all'Unione.

Secondo punto: il numero dei Commissari ha raggiunto, con il Trattato di Nizza, il punto più estremo. Ho molti dubbi che la vecchia logica, che assegna almeno un Commissario per ogni paese sia così utile, come si dice e come forse era una volta, al processo di integrazione. Mi sembra che questa logica sia un cuneo intergovernativo conficcato nel mezzo di un'istituzione comunitaria; non so quanto convenga aprire una controversia sul numero dei Commissari: forse è più utile lasciare al Presidente della Commissione e al Parlamento la scelta di quali e quanti Commissari debbono essere designati, conservando un minimo di

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flessibilità.

Noi ci troviamo nel tornante forse decisivo del nostro lavoro, e tutto questo avviene in uno dei momenti più tribolati della vita dell'Unione. A molti di noi piacerebbe che queste scelte venissero fatte, non dico con spirito profetico ma almeno con una visione generosa del rapporto tra l'Unione e gli Stati. Dove la generosità non arriva, s'impone un compromesso; speriamo almeno che ci soccorra una ragionevole astuzia, come mi pare di leggere nelle proposte che ci vengono presentate

**A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Gül (Gouv.-TR). - Mr President, there is no doubt that the function of the Union's traditional system should be improved further. It is now even more necessary in view of the fact that the institutions' architecture has not been reformed following the previous enlargements. However, the improvements should take into account the significance of preserving the institutional balance of the Union. In that respect the Laeken Declaration has asked for more clarity, simplicity, efficiency, democracy and responsibility in the institutional system. These being our objectives, I would like to express a few remarks concerning the draft articles on the institutions.

**A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

B_demand, call for, desire-

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The institutional architecture that has been emphasised by the draft articles do not seem to me, at this stage of our discussions, sufficiently clear, particularly with regard to the organisation of the executive power. I acknowledge the need to enhance the presidency, but I am not sure whether the proposal to elect a European Council president for a term of two-and-a-half years is a satisfactory solution for attaining the objective of the Laeken Declaration. The creation of a full-time presidency post for the European Council, as an additional figure to the current institutional architecture, could further complicate the already complex decision-making system. Strengthening the presidency should not be at the expense of the Community method.

A_claim (facts and values)-

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The second remark I would like to make is also related to the need for simplicity in the institutional system. The establishment of a congress composed of representatives of the national parliaments and Members of the European Parliament would only add one more element to this already complicated architecture. I consider it more convenient to improve the functioning of the COSAC and to assign to each the tasks envisaged for the congress.

My third remark is about the Commission. The Commission is the guardian of the European common interest. The role of the Commission in an enlarged Europe should be reinforced. The draft articles presented by the Praesidium should be broadly in line with this guiding principle. Moreover, the Commission in an enlarged Union should be able to operate as a college and effect the principle of equality of all Member States. This is the way to show the citizens that their views and concerns are being heard by the European Union and that the Commission belongs to them.

We welcome and support the remaining draft articles on the institutions presented by the Praesidium. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the President for the valuable work they have carried out.

4-088

Vitorino (CE). - Mr President, I believe that the paradox of today's debate is that among us there is a large consensus on some basic principles concerning the Union's institutional framework – keeping that institutional balance, respecting equality between Member States, strengthening the capacity of the Union to steer and improve its capacity to deliver – but it is quite clear that there is significant dissent over the

0755 means of translating these principles into concrete solutions.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

0757 Starting with the role of presidencies, we need to make sure that the new
0758 institutional setting assures two objectives: continuity of the work and
stability in the leadership. For me it is quite clear that annual strategic
programming is a key tool for that purpose. It will remove the temptation
of following national agendas and the risk of adopting stop-start
strategies. Executive tasks, as a rule, and accountability for their results
should fall more clearly within the Commission's responsibility. For the
rest, it is above all necessary that the General Affairs Council play its
role of coordinating council.

A_ascertain agreement-

0759 We in the Convention also have consensus in favour of a double-hatted
0760 foreign minister, acting as External Representative for Common Foreign
and Security Policy at the same time as serving as a member of the
Commission. I also trust that we can agree that coherence requires the
Commission to take on this role in other policy areas. Both Foreign
Minister and Commission will ensure continuity and leadership in all
relevant areas of external relations. Therefore I recognise that the
concept and the institutional profile of the chairman of the European
0761 Council in foreign policy will not add clarity to this system and can even
0762 be a force of potential confusion. This means that chairing the different
Council formations and moving the strategic programme ahead will be
the main tasks of the presidencies of the Council.

**A_argue~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1] -

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

0763 If we are sincere in saying that nobody wants to have a parallel executive
0764 or a rival bureaucracy to the Commission, based on the Council, then all
0765 the different modalities proposed for the presidency of the Councils
0766 present strong arguments in favour of that approach: maintaining a six-
month rotation system, organising presidency teams, election by each
formation for a longer period. I can also see the logic behind the
proposal to have commissioners sharing Council formations, but I have
misgivings about that. It seems to me that the role of the Presidency of
the Council, doing deals and finding agreement, is incompatible with the
Commission's role of making proposals and executing the results.
Therefore, our preference is for allowing each formation of the Council
to elect its own president. This would leave maximum flexibility and, in
the end, would correspond to an informal rotation with wide political
backing.

Finally, as far as the composition of the Commission is concerned, we
need to build a solution on the basis of the Nice Treaty. The next
Commission will have 25 commissioners. But an executive with 25
members, plural in its composition and bound by very strict rules of
collegiality, will have to be streamlined. The option here is between a
large – but internally structured – Commission or a reduced Commission
based on strict equal rotation by Member State. In both cases, the
president will have his powers reinforced. I hope that, at the end of this
debate, on the basis of the text of the Praesidium and on the text of the
amendments, we will be able to find a compromise solution. Indeed, at
the end to the day everyone will concede that our text is like Wagner's
music: it sounds worse than it is.

(Laughter)

4-089

Kiljunen (Parl.-FI). - Mr President, this morning some Members of the
Convention requested that amendments in future be made by groups.
Two months ago, 68 Convention Members, 39 of whom are full
Members, made a joint contribution on institutional reform in the Union.
The aim was to find a minimum common position, which would enjoy
broad support among the Convention Members, including government

representatives and, in particular, parliamentarians from both national parliaments and the European Parliament, who in fact form the majority in the Convention.

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B_demand, call for, desire-
B_demand, call for, desire-

The basic proposals in the contribution were: first, the Presidency of the European Council rotates between the Member States, secondly, in the Council, simple double majority should be used when Council uses qualified majority voting; thirdly, the codecision procedure should be used in all legislative matters decided by qualified majority in the Council; fourthly, equal representation should be guaranteed in the composition of the Commission, and commissioners should have equal rights in decision-making.

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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B_reject, decline, refuse-

We also proposed that the European Parliament should have its seat in one location. Although a total of 68 Members of the Convention are supporting this contribution, the Praesidium proposal has ignored our position somewhat. That is a bit strange. Our aim is to create a more transparent and democratic decision-making system for the Union. Obviously, those principles should also apply to the Convention itself. You, Mr President, have said that you listen carefully to what Convention Members say. But now I feel that the Praesidium has bypassed a significant broad-front opinion within the Convention.

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B_demand, call for, desire-

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In conclusion, we must maintain the institutional balance and the equality of Member States. We should not create new institutions. A full-time president for the European Council would become a powerful new institution, which would certainly disrupt the institutional balance. Similarly a foreign minister of the Union chairing the External Affairs Council would create confusion in terms of his role. The foreign minister must be the one making proposals and implementing decisions, not the one taking decisions on the same proposals as the Council chairman.

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B_suggest a compromise-

The presidency rotation must be maintained, at least within the European Council, General Affairs Council and COREPER. The Commission must remain a collegiate body in which all commissioners are equal. With regard to this composition, the Nice Treaty is a good compromise.

Mr President, you asked: have we forgotten the equality of citizens when we speak of the equality of States? No, we have not. The Convention has made good progress with regard to the role of the European Parliament, representing directly the interests of citizens. The European Parliament must be both a Union legislator and a budgetary authority alongside the Council.

Finally, I support the fact that legislative and coordinative functions within the Council will be separated. That is why I support the proposal of having a separate Council for legislative affairs.

(Applause)

4-090

MacLennan of Rogart (Parl.-GB). - Mr President, on the role of the presidency of the Council two positions, supported by two rationales, have now been advanced. The first would retain the rotating presidency to sustain the equality and input of all the Member States. The second would appoint a long-term chairman to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of Council decision-making. These two positions must be reconciled. One solution would have the president of the Commission chair the General Affairs Council - as proposed by the Benelux countries, Mr Duff and a number of others. I hope that flies. If not, an alternative solution would be to share the different functions between the rotating chair - to chair the Legislative Council, host European Council

meetings and communicate their decisions - and a longer-serving, politically-eminent secretary-general to chair the General Affairs Council, other formations and to drive forward the European Council's agenda.

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Like the proposed foreign minister, a secretary-general appointed by the Commission could sit in the Commission, with particular personnel responsibilities preventing the emergence of rival bureaucracies.

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Rack (PE). – Herr Präsident! Meine Wortmeldung hat sich auf das bezogen, was Timothy Kirkhope angesprochen hat, und ich wollte ihm in der ersten Hälfte dazu gratulieren, dass er dem Prinzip "ein Kommissar pro Mitgliedsland" mit sehr klaren und deutlichen Worten Unterstützung zugesagt hat. Der zweite Teil hat sich ebenfalls auf die Wortmeldung von Timothy Kirkhope bezogen: Ich wollte ihm in aller Deutlichkeit sagen, dass es ein Verbrechen an der Idee Europa wäre, die Kommission nur als einen Haufen von Bürokraten darzustellen, von älteren Beamten, die offenbar dann in Europa eine unpolitische Spielwiese bekommen sollen. Das ist genau das, was wir nicht brauchen. Wir brauchen ein politisch legitimes Gremium, das für Europa spricht, und diese politische Legitimation gibt es nur dann, wenn jeder der Kommissare auch tatsächlich eines der Mitgliedsländer hinter sich weiß. Es geht nicht darum, dass er die Interessen seines Landes vertritt, sondern es geht darum, dass sich Europa insgesamt in der Kommission wiederfinden kann.

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_reject, decline, refuse-

A_concede, grant, acknowledge, accept, admit-

B_judge-

4-092

Duhamel (PE). – C'est pour répondre à Monsieur Kiljunen et aussi à Monsieur Roche ou à quelques autres. Moi je veux bien, encore une fois, que l'on se dispute sur les choses sur lesquelles il y a de la consistance et de la vérité, pas qu'on se dispute sur des fantasmes. On peut très bien ne pas retenir un Président permanent du Conseil européen. Moi, je n'en ferais pas une maladie sauf si politiquement ça avait des conséquences fâcheuses dans la suite du processus. Mais il y a un certain nombre de choses qui sont fausses.

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C'est faux de penser que s'il y a un président du Conseil européen, il appartiendra toujours à un grand Etat. C'est faux et c'est impossible. C'est faux d'assimiler un Président permanent seul à un directoire. C'est faux parce que le Président ne représentera pas l'ensemble des grands Etats contre les petits. C'est faux de penser que c'est une intergouvernementalisation parce que c'est, au contraire, un début d'eupéanisation du Conseil européen. Le Président du Conseil européen n'a que cela à faire, il est pris par l'institution et il devient européen. Ce fut le cas en France. Quand on a nommé un super flic ministre de l'intérieur répressif président du Conseil constitutionnel, celui-ci est devenu défenseur des libertés. Il y a des effets d'institution. Tout le monde sait ça. Et c'est faux d'imaginer que ce sera un pouvoir fort et encore plus fou d'imaginer que ce sera un pouvoir dominant parce qu'il n'aura pas de légitimité.

C'est pour ça que je ne suis pas d'accord avec Valéry Giscard d'Estaing pour qu'il soit élu par le congrès des députés, des peuples et, à terme, au suffrage universel. Là, pour le coup, ça deviendrait trop de légitimité. Mais la version du praesidium convient très bien : il a peu de légitimité et il a peu de pouvoir. Donc, il peut donner un peu de continuité, un peu de stabilité, mais pas tout le reste. Donc, arrêtons avec les mythes.

Et s'il vous plaît, ne dites pas et ne répétez pas que Nice est un bon compromis sur la manière de voter au Conseil alors qu'il est incompréhensible par quiconque, même les experts, sauf à le relire trois

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fois et qu'il est provisoire. Ne dites pas que c'est un bon compromis sur la Commission alors qu'il ne règle pas le problème pour l'avenir. Ne dites pas que c'est un bon compromis parce que c'est un compromis si mauvais que c'est grâce à lui que nous sommes là.

(Rires)

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Van Lancker (PE). - Mr President, I should like to respond to the intervention by Mr Roche. He said that in Nice it was the small countries that paid for equality. I am very sensitive to the whole issue of equal treatment between big and small Member States. We have to acknowledge that in all our European institutions there is a mixture of equal treatment amongst Member States and equal treatment of citizens. But in my view, in Nice, it was the big Member States that paid for equality, at least as far as the European Commission is concerned. They have given up one commissioner. He is right to say that it is the small Member States who paid in terms of qualified majority voting because we now have this dreadful compromise in that regard. That is why I do not understand the position of Mr Dastis He said that we should not touch upon the solutions brought by Nice. I am wondering what kinds of solution Nice brought. Nice left the whole Commission question open. We know that the next Commission is going to have 27, rather than 25, commissioners. What happens next? Nobody knows. It is up to the Convention to correct Nice.

B_Judge~
**A_argue~
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

**A_argue~
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_reject, decline, refuse~

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Farnleitner (Ch.E/G.-AT). -Mr President, first of all let me clarify a couple of points. I will follow the arguments of Mrs Tiilikainen and Mr De Gucht. We are the ones who signed this letter of 16 and 9, and I think that we are also entitled to have our proposals and arguments discussed so we will not always be said to be the conservative side, because whoever said that did not reach the papers.

My second point. There seems to be a new recipe for the future of Europe. We will have very strong presidents in strong Member States and very weak presidents at the European level. I would prefer a solution whereby a strong president like Mr Chirac or a strong prime minister like Mr Blair should also be, at least for a few months, a strong European president in the Council. I cannot agree to a solution of having a strong president in the Member States and a nice president at EU level.

Another point to consider is the time procedure. For the next two years we have to act according to Nice, we will probably have a Commission of twenty-five from 2004 onwards. We have decided already that this will not work; history will give us the chance, if this new Constitution comes into force, in 2006 at the earliest. By then, we will have had two years of a Commission of twenty-five with rotation. Do you imagine that this system will have worked and those pretending that it would never work become convinced by then? That is why the paper of the sixteen has a clause saying we should at least critically evaluate the results of two years of using the Nice contract. I can no longer go along with such a paper since we know already that the next two years will fail.

Let me give you another example. If the Commission, which is under tremendous pressure to perform with twenty-five Members under a new structure, is to do a good job, it will be terribly hard to reduce the number by half. I would prefer a solution by which we have a critical evaluation after this time of experience.

My last proposal is that we in the group of the small and medium sized countries take the proposals of the big ones very seriously, but we would

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be glad if some or most of you, at least in smaller circles, could take our proposals seriously enough that you would be able to discuss them.

(Applause)

4-095

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Azevedo (Parl.-PT). - Senhor Presidente, agora que a Convenção debate o sensível *dossier* da reforma das instituições, aquilo que a Europa menos precisa é de propostas provocatórias, divisionistas, que não preservem o equilíbrio entre as instituições e enfraqueçam o método comunitário, tão vital para a União saída do presente alargamento. Em si a provocação não é um mal, pode até ser um saudável estímulo intelectual e político se orientada para o despertar do profundo e genuíno interesse comum dos povos europeus. Mas, então, há que resistir à tentação de provocar apenas para tentar impor modelos que não congregam o sentir da maioria. Importa também evitar propostas divisionistas assentes não no respeito da igualdade dos Estados, mas antes numa pseudoglorificação da estrutura assimétrica dos países membros e que podem contribuir para alicerçar perversamente a estratificação da União Europeia.

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Por fim, qualquer solução construtiva há-de ter na densificação (entenda-se respeito e reforço) do método comunitário um propósito decisivo e determinado. Nesta perspectiva subscrevi uma proposta que, do lado da Comissão composta por um comissário com igual estatuto por Estado-Membro, reserva o carácter colegial, a independência e a posição de garante do interesse comunitário. E que, no tocante ao respectivo presidente, apoia a eleição pelo Parlamento Europeu afirmando a sua legitimidade democrática.

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No tocante ao Conselho defendi as presidências rotativas como consequência do princípio da igualdade entre os Estados-Membros na certeza que o seu fim empobrece a manifestação das diferentes sensibilidades europeias em política internacional e não torna o projecto europeu mais próximo e compreensível junto dos cidadãos. E não se invoque o argumento de que as presidências semestrais provocam a quebra da continuidade das estratégias comunitárias para fazer vingar a tese de uma presidência com carácter permanente. É um argumento falacioso que mascara tendências mais ou menos expressas de directório. É, além disso, apresentar um cartão amarelo ao potencial dos programas estratégicos plurianuais e anuais e bem assim à acção das *tróicas*.

***A_argue~
**A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

Para o aumento da coerência e credibilidade das várias vertentes da acção externa e da União, defendi igualmente a atribuição a uma mesma entidade, em duplo chapéu, das funções de alto representante para a PESC e de comissário para as relações externas. Mas que este novo cargo de ministro Europeu dos Negócios Estrangeiros, uma boa inovação, seja integrado na Comissão.

Senhor Presidente, respeitem-se os equilíbrios institucionais tão laboriosamente construídos. Promova-se a actuação mais transparente, mais eficaz e mais democrática das instituições europeias e assumamos que a União não carece de novas instituições do tipo Congresso dos Povos. No final, o figurino futuro das actuais instituições europeias e do processo decisório comunitário tem de ser a todos os títulos absolutamente credível.

4-095 Translation

Azevedo (Parl.-PT). - Senhor Präsident, agora que a Convenção debate o sensível *dossier* da reforma das instituições, aquilo que a Europa menos precisa é de propostas provocatórias, divisionistas, que não preservem o equilíbrio entre as instituições e enfraqueçam o método

comunitário, tão vital para a União saída do presente alargamento. Em si a provocação não é um mal, pode até ser um saudável estímulo intelectual e político se orientada para o despertar do profundo e genuíno interesse comum dos povos europeus. Mas, então, há que resistir à tentação de provocar apenas para tentar impor modelos que não congregam o sentir da maioria. Importa também evitar propostas divisionistas assentes não no respeito da igualdade dos Estados, mas antes numa pseudoglorificação da estrutura assimétrica dos países membros e que podem contribuir para alicerçar perversamente a estratificação da União Europeia.

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Herr pr, jetzt da die Konvention das heikle dossier der Institutionelle Reform bespricht, sind provokative und trennende Vorschläge das, was Europa am wenigsten braucht. Vorschläge, die das Gleichgewicht zwischen den Institutionen nicht bewahren und die kommunitäre Methode schwächen, die so vital für die aus der letzten Erweiterung entstandene Union ist. An sich ist Provokation nichts schlimmes und kann sogar eine gesunde intellektuelle und politische Anregung sein, falls sie auf das Wecken des tiefen und echten gemeinsamen Interesses der europäischen Völker gerichtet ist. Jedoch, muss man dann der Versuchung widerstehen, zu provozieren, nur um Modelle aufzuzwingen, die dem Gefühl der Mehrheit nicht entsprechen. Wichtig ist es auch, trennende Vorschläge zu vermeiden, die nicht auf Respekt für die Gleichwertigkeit der Staaten beruhen, sondern eher auf einer Pseudoglorifizierung der asymmetrischen Struktur der Mitgliedsstaaten, und die können zur Gründung einer perversen Stratifizierung der Europäische Union beitragen.

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A_insisit, persist, stick to a belief-

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

Por fim, qualquer solução construtiva há-de ter na densificação (entenda-se respeito e reforço) do método comunitário um propósito decisivo e determinado. Nesta perspectiva subscrevi uma proposta que, do lado da Comissão composta por um comissário com igual estatuto por Estado-Membro, reserva o carácter colegial, a independência e a posição de garante do interesse comunitário. E que, no tocante ao respectivo Präsidente, apoia a eleição pelo Parlamento Europeu afirmando a sua legitimidade democrática.

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B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

No tocante ao Conselho defendi as Präsidiências rotativas como consequência do princípio da igualdade entre os Estados-Membros na certeza que o seu fim empobrece a manifestação das diferentes sensibilidades europeias em política internacional e não torna o projecto europeu mais próximo e compreensível junto dos cidadãos. E não se invoque o argumento de que as Präsidiências semestrais provocam a quebra da continuidade das estratégias comunitárias para fazer vingar a tese de uma Präsidiência com carácter permanente. É um argumento falacioso que mascara tendências mais ou menos expressas de directório. É, além disso, apresentar um cartão amarelo ao potencial dos programas estratégicos plurianuais e anuais e bem assim à acção das tróicas.

Was den Rat betrifft, so habe ich die rotativen Präsidentschaften verteidigt, als Konsequenz des Prinzips der Gleichheit der Mitgliedsstaaten, weil ich mir sicher bin, dass ihr Ende den Ausdruck der unterschiedlichen europäischen Empfindlichkeiten in der internationalen Politik verarmen wird und das europäische Projekt den Bürgern nicht näher bringt oder es ihnen verständlicher macht. Und es soll hier nicht argumentiert werden, dass die semestralen Präsidentschaften einen Bruch in der Kontinuität der europäischen Strategien verursacht, um der These einer permanenten Präsidentschaft zum Sieg zu verhelfen. Es ist ein geschwätziges Argument, das mehr oder weniger explizite Tendenzen in Richtung eines Direktoriums verbirgt. Es bedeutet ausserdem, eine gelbe Karte den plurianualen strategischen Programmen sowie der Handlung der Troikas zu zeigen.

Para o aumento da coerência e credibilidade das várias vertentes da acção externa e da União, defendi igualmente a atribuição a uma mesma

entidade, em duplo chapéu, das funções de alto representante para a PESC e de comissário para as relações externas. Mas que este novo cargo de ministro Europeu dos Negócios Estrangeiros, uma boa inovação, seja integrado na Comissão.

Zum Zwecke der Steigerung der Kohärenz und Glaubwürdigkeit der mehreren Aspekte der external action und der Union habe ich mich auch für die Ermächtigung einer einzigen Persönlichkeit/Behörde (=entity) - in double-hatting - für den Posten des Hohen Repräsentanten für GASP und des Kommissars für Außenbeziehungen eingesetzt. Aber derart, dass dieser neue Posten des Europäischen Außenminister - eine gute Innovation - in die Kommission eingegliedert wird.

Senhor Presidente, respeitem-se os equilíbrios institucionais tão laboriosamente construídos. Promova-se a actuação mais transparente, mais eficaz e mais democrática das instituições europeias e assumamos que a União não carece de novas instituições do tipo Congresso dos Povos. No final, o figurino futuro das actuais instituições europeias e do processo decisório comunitário tem de ser a todos os títulos absolutamente credível.

***A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-096

Fayot (Parl.-LU). - Monsieur le Président, nous sommes au tout début de la discussion institutionnelle. Je rappelle que nous n'avons pas eu de groupe de travail sur ces questions et que nous sommes donc en train de commencer ces discussions.

La première chose que je voudrais dire concerne l'égalité. Les Etats membres sont entrés et entrent dans l'Union européenne parce que c'est une union d'Etats partenaires égaux. Cette égalité est évidemment difficile à inscrire dans les faits et surtout, difficile à concilier avec l'efficacité et la visibilité. Mais elle est un principe essentiel, particulièrement important, pour les nouveaux Etats membres qui ont connu une autre union où l'égalité n'existait pas. L'égalité s'exprime de multiples façons. La plus visible est la représentation des Etats membres dans les institutions essentielles.

Je suis d'accord avec ceux qui veulent détacher l'appartenance à la Commission de la nationalité. Mais, en même temps, la Commission doit assurer la cohésion de tous les Etats membres dans l'Union. Elle doit expliquer et défendre la politique européenne devant tous les citoyens et pas seulement dans son château de Bruxelles. Je pense donc qu'il faut inscrire dans la Constitution une dynamique: partir d'une Commission où, dans les prochaines années, chaque Etat membre est représenté, pour aboutir à une Commission restreinte, formée sur la base d'une rotation égalitaire permettant l'équilibre entre grands et petits Etats membres. D'aucuns demandent de laisser au président de la Commission le soin de composer sa Commission comme il l'entend. Mais, pensez-vous que ce Président ne comprenne rien à la politique politicienne? Que le président ne sait pas où sont les gros bataillons de députés alors que les petits bataillons ne seront jamais assez forts pour assurer sa majorité au Parlement européen? Que la Commission risquera donc à jamais d'être déséquilibrée en défaveur des petits Etats membres si nous voulons faire élire le président de la Commission par le Parlement européen?

Un autre aspect de l'égalité est la représentation des petits Etats membres au Parlement européen. Si la Convention fixe arbitrairement un nombre total de députés à 700 au lieu de 732, il va réduire d'autant le nombre de députés des petits Etats membres. Là encore, je suis d'accord avec ceux qui disent qu'un député européen doit essentiellement être au service de l'Europe. Mais l'Europe, ce sont les Etats membres et un député européen a un pied en Europe et un pied dans son Etat membre. Moins un Etat

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membre a de députés, moins ses sensibilités politiques sont représentées et moins le débat européen est effectif dans ce pays.

A_approve, admit as correct-

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Toujours à propos de l'égalité, la proposition du praesidium d'introduire la double majorité pour le Conseil est une bonne proposition que je soutiens entièrement.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Monsieur le Président, le Conseil est évidemment une autre institution essentielle. Franchement, je dois avouer que la discussion sur cette institution ne me satisfait pas à ce stade. Je comprends pourquoi on veut un Président permanent pour le Conseil européen. Je crois comprendre que l'intention derrière cette proposition est d'assurer la continuité du travail du Conseil européen, donc l'efficacité. Et, en même temps, il faut regretter qu'aucune réflexion n'ait été faite sur l'étendue des compétences de ce Conseil européen et sur l'importance du conseil des affaires générales justement mis en avant dans le texte du Bénélux. On reprend vaguement l'ancien article 4 du Traité de l'Union européenne alors qu'en réalité, le Conseil européen est dès aujourd'hui un organe protéiforme qui se veut l'arbitre suprême et intervient dans tous les domaines.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]- A_ask, want to know-

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Ce qui pose problème, ce n'est pas tellement la question de la présidence mais le Conseil européen lui-même. On essaye maintenant d'amadouer ceux qui sont contre ce Président du Conseil européen en le ravalant au rôle de Président de séance ou de *Chairman* sans véritable pouvoir. Or, soit ce Président a un pouvoir véritable avec sa bureaucratie pour assurer

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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la continuité et l'efficacité du Conseil européen, soit il n'est qu'un président de séance sans pouvoir et il n'assure ni efficacité ni continuité, les vrais chefs restant les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement. Pourquoi donc faut-il un tel président de séance au lieu d'un Premier ministre président du Conseil européen par rotation? Monsieur le Président, mon interrogation reste entière au stade actuel mais je reste évidemment ouvert à tous les arguments.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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4-097

Le Président. - Je souhaiterais faire une remarque par rapport à ce que vous avez dit sur un point. Concernant le Parlement européen, la proposition du praesidium a repris intégralement le texte qui avait été voté par deux fois par le Parlement européen lui-même. Donc, c'est un texte d'origine du Parlement européen. Et d'ailleurs, dans les amendements présentés par la Commission, la Commission présente le même texte que nous. Ce n'est donc pas une improvisation. C'est un texte voté de façon démocratique par le Parlement européen, et d'ailleurs, à une assez large majorité. La parole est à Monsieur Oleksy.

4-098

Oleksy (Parl.-PL). - Mr President, the creation of a permanent chairman of the European Council will serve the internal efficiency of the Union and clarify its external representation, provided that the chairman successfully cooperates with the EU Foreign Minister. Many of us had exactly this in mind when supporting the idea at an early stage of the debate.

We should not perceive the creation of a permanent chairman of the Council as an attempt to establish a chief of the whole Union. We are talking about the chairman of only one institution. This should in no way weaken the Community factor. A permanent chairman, yes, but not in the form of a new institution that would compete with the supranational bodies, especially the European Commission. That is why I am not sure whether the creation of an additional part in paragraph 3 of Article 16a would adversely influence the existing delicate institutional balance within the European Union.

0865 In order to guarantee a coherent system it is crucial to preserve some
 0866 elements of rotation in the formations of the Council of Ministers,
 0867 together with the permanent chairman of the European Council. That is
 0868 why I propose replacing the current wording of Article 17a and creating
 0869 a team presidency composed of three or four Member States holding the
 presidency of a Council formation for two years.

- **A_argue-
 - A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
 - B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-
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- **A_justify-
 - A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
-
- **A_argue-
 - A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
 - B_threaten-

0870 The allocation of responsibilities within the team presidency should be
 0871 agreed within the team. A team presidency based on a system of equal
 rotation ensures equal treatment of all Member States.

0872 On qualified majority voting, I would like to stress that the Nice formula
 0873 constitutes the fruit of a difficult compromise between the Member
 States and should not be changed. An attempt at changing it with
 0874 provisions which guarantee the right balance between the bigger and
 0875 smaller Member States could become a source of great controversy,
 hampering the agreements on issues of great constitutional importance.

0877 As far as the Commission is concerned, I suggest keeping its role
 0878 whereby one country has the right to one commissioner. This is of
 special importance on account of legitimacy concerns in the new
 Member States. Moreover the effectiveness of the Commission depends
 more on its structure than on the number of commissioners. We could
 consider the formula proposed by the Praesidium after a transitional
 period, which would be the Commission's first term after enlargement.

0879 Finally, I support the role given to the European Parliament in electing
 0880 the President of the European Commission. As far as the positive
 discrimination clause referred to in Article 18a is concerned, it could, in
 my view, become part of the Union's informal custom but should not be
 inscribed in the Constitutional Treaty.

4-099

Lopes (Ch.E/G.-PT). - Senhor Presidente, num documento intitulado
 "Reforma das Instituições, princípios e argumentos" representantes de 16
 governos nesta Convenção, entre os quais eu próprio, afirmam que a
 reforma das Instituições da União deve obedecer aos seguintes
 princípios: preservar a igualdade dos Estados-Membros; preservar o
 equilíbrio institucional; manter o sistema de rotação das presidências;
 manter e reforçar o método comunitário.

Estes princípios foram reafirmados pelos Chefes de Estado e de Governo
 dos mesmos 16 países, incluindo o primeiro-ministro português, no
 Conselho Europeu informal de Atenas. O Presidente da Convenção
 esteve presente nesse Conselho informal. Nestas circunstâncias, a
 proposta do *Praesidium* causou-nos perplexidade. O princípio da
 igualdade entre os Estados-Membros é desrespeitado. O equilíbrio entre
 as Instituições é desvirtuado. O sistema de rotação das presidências é
 eliminado. O reforço do método comunitário é insuficientemente
 expresso. Em suma, a proposta do *Praesidium* afecta directamente os
 alicerces da construção europeia.

Já o tenho dito várias vezes e considero oportuno repeti-lo aqui: é minha
 profunda convicção que aceitar um presidente eleito para o Conselho
 Europeu e o fim generalizado das presidências rotativas seria um erro
 que se poderia revelar fatal para o futuro da União. Por três motivos
 muito simples: estaríamos a atentar contra a História, a natureza e os
 objectivos da União; por outro lado, o projecto de articulado sobre a
 "Futura composição da Comissão" não me oferece qualquer garantia de
 que será respeitada a igualdade entre os Estados-Membros; finalmente,
 as propostas sobre a composição do Parlamento Europeu e a regra da
 maioria qualificada no Conselho são um retrocesso relativamente ao

0881 Tratado de Nice.

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0883 Senhor Presidente, verifico que nesta área as posições permanecem
0884 ainda bastante afastadas. Temos confiança de que até ao final dos nossos
0885 trabalhos será possível fundi-las. Daremos todo o nosso esforço a esse
0886 objectivo. Mas a declaração de Laeken é muito clara: o documento final
0887 da Convenção deverá indicar opções naqueles casos em que não se
0888 obtiver consenso. Desejamos esse consenso mas também não lhe
sacrificaremos princípios que consideramos essenciais.

0889 (Aplausos)

4-099 Translation

0890 **Lopes (Ch.E/G.-PT).** - Senhor Präsidente, num documento intitulado
"Reforma das Instituições, princípios e argumentos" representantes de 16
governos nesta Convenção, entre os quais eu próprio, afirmam que a
reforma das Instituições da União deve obedecer aos seguintes
princípios: preservar a igualdade dos Estados-Membros; preservar o
equilíbrio institucional; manter o sistema de rotação das Präsidências;
manter e reforçar o método comunitário.

0891 Estes princípios foram reafirmados pelos Chefes de Estado e de Governo
dos mesmos 16 países, incluindo o primeiro-ministro português, no
Conselho Europeu informal de Atenas. O Präsidente da Convenção
esteve presente nesse Conselho informal. Nestas circunstâncias, a
0892 proposta do Praesidium causou-nos perplexidade. O princípio da
igualdade entre os Estados-Membros é desrespeitado. O equilíbrio entre
as Instituições é desvirtuado. O sistema de rotação das Präsidências é
eliminado. O reforço do método comunitário é insuficientemente
expresso. Em suma, a proposta do Praesidium afecta directamente os
alicerces da construção europeia.

0893 *Unter diesen Umständen, hat uns der Vorschlag des Praesidiums
bestürzt. Das Prinzip der Gleichheit der Mitgliedsstaaten wird
missachtet. Das Gleichgewicht der Intitutionen wird verfälscht. Der
rotative System der Präsidentschaften wird eliminiert. Die Verstärkung
der Komunitären Methode ungenugend ausgedrückt. Kurz gesagt, der
Vorschlag des Praesidiums greift direkt die Fundamente des
Europäisches Baus an.*

Já o tenho dito várias vezes e considero oportuno repeti-lo aqui: é minha
profunda convicção que aceitar um Präsidente eleito para o Conselho
Europeu e o fim generalizado das Präsidências rotativas seria um erro
que se poderia revelar fatal para o futuro da União. Por três motivos
muito simples: estariamos a atentar contra a História, a natureza e os
objectivos da União; por outro lado, o projecto de articulado sobre a
"Futura composição da Comissão" não me oferece qualquer garantia de
que será respeitada a igualdade entre os Estados-Membros; finalmente,
as propostas sobre a composição do Parlamento Europeu e a regra da
maioria qualificada no Conselho são um retrocesso relativamente ao
Tratado de Nizza.

*Ich habe es mehrmals gesagt und ich halte es für angemessen, es hier zu
wiederholen: es ist meine tiefe Überzeugung, einen gewählten
Präsidenten des Europeichen Rats zu akzeptieren und das
verallgemeinerte Ende der rotativen Präsidentschaften Fehler wären,
die sich als tödlich für die Zukunft der Union erweisen könnten. Aus
drei einfachen Gründen: wir würden gegen die Geschichte, die Natur
und die Ziele der Union verstoßen; auf der anderen Seite, bietet mir
das gegliederte Projekt über die "Zukünftige Zusammensetzung der
Kommission" keine Garantie, dass die Gleichheit der Mitgliedsstaaten
respektiert wird; letztendlich, sind die Vorschläge für die
Zusammensetzung des EP und das qualifizierte Mehrheitsverfahren in
dem Rat ein Ruckschritt im Bezug auf den Vertrag von Nizza.*

Senhor Präsidente, verifico que nesta área as posições permanecem

B_reject, decline, refuse-

A_insist, persist, stick to a belief-

A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_ascertain non-agreement-
A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

0894 ainda bastante afastadas. Temos confiança de que até ao final dos nossos
trabalhos será possível fundi-las. Daremos todo o nosso esforço a esse
objectivo. Mas a declaração de Laeken é muito clara: o documento final
da Convenção deverá indicar opções naqueles casos em que não se
obtiver consenso. Desejamos esse consenso mas também não lhe
sacrificaremos princípios que consideramos essenciais. (Aplausos) Herr
0896 Pr, ich stelle fest, dass in diesem Bereich die Positionen immer noch
0897 sehr weit von einander entfernt sind. Wir vertrauen darauf, dass es bis
0899 zum Schluss unserer Arbeit möglich sein wird, sie zu verschmelzen.
Wir werden uns ganz bemühen, dieses Ziel zu erreichen. Aber die
Laekener Erklärung ist sehr eindeutig: das endgültige Dokument der
Konvention soll Optionen angeben, für Fälle, in welchen kein Konsens
erreicht werden könnte. Wir wünschen uns diesen Konsens, aber wir
0900 werden ihm die Prinzipien, die wir für wesentlich halten, nicht zu Opfer
0901 bringen.

4-100

0902 **Δημητρίου (Parl.-CY).** - Κύριε Πρόεδρε, οι προτάσεις που έχει
0903 καταθέσει το Προεδρείο οπωσδήποτε δεν είναι το τελικό κείμενο. Και
δεν είναι το τελικό κείμενο, διότι δεν φαίνεται να συγκεντρώνουν το
τεκμήριο της συναίνεσης τουλάχιστον επί 3-4 θεμάτων. Εκείνο όμως
που πρέπει να μας απασχολήσει είναι το πώς θα καταλήξουμε να έχουμε
0904 στο τέλος συναίνεση. Σίγουρα δεν μπορούμε να προσεγγίσουμε κανένα
0905 θέμα με τον κομματισμό, ούτε με την πρόθεση να επιβάλει ο ένας την
άποψή του στον άλλο. Πρέπει να βασιστούμε στη λογική και σε κάποια
κριτήρια.

0908 Οπωσδήποτε, τα κριτήρια αυτά πρέπει να είναι οι κοινές συνιστάμενες
που έχει φανεί ότι σ' αυτή τη Συνέλευση τυγχάνουν καθολικής
αποδοχής. Έχουν αναφερθεί αυτά. Έχει αναφερθεί ότι το κοινοτικό
σύστημα πρέπει να ενισχυθεί. Έχει αναφερθεί ότι η αρχή της ισότητας
πρέπει να γίνει σεβαστή. Έχει αναφερθεί ότι πρέπει να υπάρξει ενίσχυση
των θεσμικών οργάνων. Έχει επίσης τονισθεί ότι το καθετί πρέπει να
αντιμετωπισθεί με μια προσέγγιση που να εξαρτάται από την
αποτελεσματικότητα της λειτουργίας των θεσμικών οργάνων. Με βάση
αυτά τα κριτήρια, έχω τη γνώμη ότι η πρόταση που αφορά την
Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή δεν μπορεί να ανταποκρίνεται στις προσδοκίες
όλων ή και να τυγχάνει καθολικής συναίνεσης. Δεν μπορεί παρά το κάθε
κράτος να έχει τον Επίτροπό του. Και σ' αυτό φαίνεται να υπάρχει
γενική επιμονή.

Όσον αφορά τώρα την οργάνωση και τη λειτουργία της Ευρωπαϊκής
Επιτροπής, εκεί υπάρχουν πολλές απόψεις, και λειτουργικές και
πρακτικές, και μπορεί να υπάρχει τρόπος να αντιμετωπισθεί
αποτελεσματικά το ερώτημα του πώς θα λειτουργήσει καλύτερα.

Τάσσομαι ανεπιφύλακτα υπέρ της ενίσχυσης της Επιτροπής και
ταυτόχρονα του Κοινοβουλίου, και φαίνεται μέσα από τις προτάσεις του
Προεδρείου ότι τούτο επιτυγχάνεται σε μεγάλο βαθμό. Αλλά, όσον
αφορά την εισαγωγή του θεσμού του Προέδρου του Συμβουλίου, θα
ήθελα να πω ότι, αν δεν υπήρχαν τα μειονεκτήματα τα οποία έχουν
επισημανθεί, σίγουρα αυτός ο θεσμός αυτή την ώρα θα μπορούσε να
ήταν ωφέλιμος. Φαίνεται όμως ότι δημιουργούνται προβλήματα στην
πράξη. Φαίνεται επίσης ότι αυτή η εισήγηση δεν τυγχάνει της καθολικής
υποστήριξης ή τουλάχιστον της συναίνεσης όλων. Και μπορεί να είναι
κάτι που θα γίνει αποδεκτό απόλυτα στο μέλλον. Εκείνο το οποίο
χρειάζεται τώρα να κάνουμε είναι να βρούμε τρόπους να καταλήξουμε
σε συναινετικές λύσεις και όχι σε συγκρούσεις. Ελπίζουμε ότι, μέχρι την
ημέρα που έχει ορισθεί ως ημερομηνία κατάθεσης του συντάγματος, θα
μπορέσουμε να έχουμε αυτή τη συναίνεση.

0908 4-100 Translation
0909 Dimitriou:
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0912 Mr. President, the proposals of the Presiding board do not constitute the
0913 final text. They should not be the final text because they do not appear to
gather consent on at least 3-4 issues. What we should work on is how we
will be able to eventually reach to a point of consent. It is certain that no
subject can be either approached with partisanship, or with the intention
of imposing our opinion to one another. Our decisions should be based
on logic and on certain other criteria.


0914 Under any circumstances, these criteria should reflect the common
0915 grounds on which all the members of this assembly have agreed upon.
0916 These have been mentioned. It has been mentioned that the Community
0917 system should be reinforced. It has been mentioned that the principle of
equality should be respected under any conditions. It has been clearly
stated that the institutional bodies should be invigorated. It also been
stressed that all decisions should be made under the approach of
enhancing the effectiveness of the institutional bodies. Under these
criteria, it is my opinion that the proposal that concerns the European
Commission cannot correspond to the expectations of everyone. Every
state should be able to appoint a Commissioner. And on this, most seem
to agree.

0918 In what concerns the organisation and the function of the European
0920 Commission, there exist many different opinions, and there might be a
0922 way to effectively address the issue of how it will better operate.

0923 I unconditionally come out in favour of reinforcing the Committee and
0924 the Parliament, and it appears through the proposals of the Presiding
board that this has already been achieved to a large extent. Nevertheless,
in what concerns the institution of the President of Council, I would like
to say that, if the disadvantages which have been pointed out did not
exist, I am certain that this institution could be beneficial. It appears,
however, that problems are created in practice. It also appears that this
proposal does not enjoy catholic support or at least of everybody's
consent. This can absolutely be something that will become acceptable
in the future. What we now need to do is to explore ways which will
help us lead to solutions of consensus and not towards conflict. Let's
hope that, up to the day which it has been fixed as the date of finalising
the new constitution, we will be able to have reached this consent.

4-101
Le Président. - Je vous remercie pour cet esprit de conciliation.
Monsieur Heathcoat-Amory n'est pas là. Nous prenons les cartons bleus.
Les orateurs sont Monsieur Hain à nouveau, Monsieur Roche et
Monsieur Dastis.

4-102
Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB). - Mr President, I would just like to make some
brief points on the idea that we need more compromise. I believe we do.
However, I believe that your proposals, Mr President, were a
compromise. The elected Chairman of the Council and the proposals for
the election of the President of the Commission were a compromise
between the two different strands in this Convention. That is what we
have to build on and we must get the detail right. I very much
sympathise with the arguments of Spain and Ireland, amongst others,
that it is going to be virtually impossible to reopen the Nice Treaty in
respect of voting and one commissioner per country. That is part of the
compromise as well



0927 Regarding the Chairman of the Council, what we are talking about is existing duties of the existing presidency being carried out by a full-time member, much more efficiently and better. We are not talking about a super-president who is going to be either a rival of, competing with, or dominating the President of the Commission. That is not what we want. We just want an effective Chairman of the Council to carry out the existing functions, remit or duties far more effectively in helping to lead the governments more effectively. That is part of the compromise as well. I say to people that if they want an outcome to this Convention, as I do, with a single text all agreed, compromising and forming a consensus, an elected president/chairman of the Council is an indispensable part of that, as is strengthening the position of the Commission President and some of the ideas I have suggested, particularly on equality of commissioners and rotation for each Member State and the new Member States who also have to win referenda.

B_suggest a compromise~
 B_threaten~
 **A_explain~
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
 B_reject, decline, refuse~

0931 4-103
 0932 **Dastis, Alfonso (Ch.E./G.-ES).** – Señor Presidente, intervengo por
 0933 alusiones personales de la Sra. Van Lancker y del Sr. Duhamel -sobre
 0938 todo de la Sra. Van Lancker-, en relación con Niza. Yo únicamente
 0936 quisiera explicar por qué defiendo Niza y qué significa Niza, porque al
 0938 parecer hay quien lo considera incomprensible. Niza, en cuanto a los
 votos, es un sistema de doble mayoría en el que la mayoría de la población es una mayoría basada en una proporcionalidad degresiva, que es justamente lo que decimos que hay en el Parlamento y lo que queremos en el Parlamento. Si lo que se quiere es aplicar la proporcionalidad pura en el Consejo, primero hay que saber lo que eso significa respecto al peso de cada Estado miembro; no sé si lo saben todos los que la defienden. Y en segundo lugar, habría que aplicar también la proporcionalidad pura a las otras instituciones, incluido el Parlamento Europeo, y con ello se llegaría, me temo, a que algún Estado miembro tuviera un solo parlamentario, y eso porque humanamente no es posible dividirlo.

**A_clarify
 B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to~
 **A_argue~
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
 B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to~
 A_contradict, reject, dispute, object~
 **A_explain~
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

4-104
Le Président. - Monsieur Dastis, je vous signale que nous avons prévu qu'il y avait en tout cas un minimum de quatre députés par Etat membre. Il n'est pas question de les couper en huit. La parole est à Monsieur Roche.

4-105
Roche (Ch.E./G.-IE). - Mr President, first and foremost I would like to support Mr Dastis in the points he has been making. It seems to me that it is a little early to be abandoning the Nice formulation when it has not even been tried. Secondly, I would like to refer to three of the previous speakers. Mr Vitorino made a very important and telling point, that if we want to have coherence, particularly in terms of the Council and particularly if rotation is to remain a part of it, he is absolutely correct that there must be a multi-annual programme in place, so that this great ship of Europe will know the direction it is heading in. That is part and parcel of the alternative proposals that we have put forward, suggesting that we could make adjustments that would support a rotating presidency.

I would like particularly to come to Mr Duhamel and Ms Van Lancker, both of whom seem to think, particularly the former, that the smaller states are somehow or other allergic to the idea of a full-time president because the full-time president will automatically come from a large state. I certainly do not share that delusion; it is unlikely to happen if we go in that direction. In fact, it is very unlikely to happen. That is not the basis of our argument at all. The basis of our argument is that it will undermine well-trying, well-tested balances that currently exist between

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the institutions. It is a revolutionary step, in terms of the arrangements between the institutions, that is untried and untested when there is an alternative, less revolutionary and more likely to be supported, available in terms of creating a rotation that might just work.

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I have just made the point and, going back to Mr Dastis and Ms Van Lancker, and to Mr Farnleitner who picked up the point, the Nice formula has not been tested, the Nice formula was very hard won. The Nice formula meant that small states had to make realistic concessions towards the larger states. We now have a situation where at least some people perceive – if you read the eurosceptic press, particularly in Britain but not just in Britain – that larger states are now making a grab for power, having put those concessions into their pockets, and that they are now effectively wanting to renege. I know that is not the basis on which we are debating things here, but it seems to me that, with regard to the Commission in particular, the issue of equality is of such fundamental importance, particularly to small and medium states, that we should be very protective of it.

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(Applause)

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MacCormick (PE). - Mr President, immediately following what Mr Roche just said, it seems a pity to me that too often speakers have spoken of states being represented on the Commission, which is not the point. It is really the other way round, that Europe must be represented in the states. That is the precise point for the smaller countries, that people need to be sure that when the Commission is speaking for Europe and upholding the Constitution of Europe, it is doing so with sympathy and understanding of all the national traditions of Europe. That is the argument, not some particular point about representativity in the other sense! That argument is absolutely critical. It seems to me that those who argue in favour of upholding the Nice compromise are arguing a sound point. I support them.


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4-107

Abitbol (PE). - Même s'il s'est passé un peu de temps, je voulais répondre à l'intervention de Joschka Fischer. J'ai du mal à saisir en quoi l'élection du président de la Commission par le Parlement serait un progrès démocratique. Je rappelle qu'en 1999 par exemple, la majorité du Conseil était plutôt à gauche et la majorité du Parlement plutôt à droite. Il y aurait donc eu un conflit politique entre le Conseil et le Parlement, le Parlement sans doute n'acceptant pas le Président présenté par le Conseil qui était de gauche alors que le Parlement était passé à droite.

Cette politisation à droite ou à gauche, à mon sens, fera que le président de la Commission sera perçu par les Européens comme étant de droite ou de gauche, c'est-à-dire qu'il se coupera de la moitié de l'électorat européen. J'ai vraiment du mal à saisir en quoi on met de la démocratie. On coupe, au contraire, la Commission et son président de la moitié des électeurs qui verront le camp adverse emporter le siège.

On parle beaucoup de la répartition des sièges. Cette Convention se transforme un peu en tombola au profit des organisateurs de tombola, comme disait le regretté Coluche. Quitte à changer les sièges, notamment au Parlement européen, ce n'est pas sur les petits pays qu'il faut prendre les sièges à redistribuer. Il faut revenir, à mon sens, sur l'avantage inconsidéré qui a été accordé à l'Allemagne, à Nice, où on lui a donné 40 % de députés en plus que les pays immédiatement suivants - France, Angleterre, Italie, Espagne. Avec ces 40 % de députés en plus, à mon sens, il y a là de quoi faire pour tous les petits candidats.

 B_concede, make a concession, give way-

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4-108
Heathcoat-Amory (Parl.-GB). - Mr President, I should like to make two points.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Frankly, these institutional proposals are something of a mess. The reason is that they are the result of institutional ambition and a series of unsatisfactory compromises. Therefore I doubt that we will fulfil the simplification mandate from the Laeken Declaration. If one takes the example of the foreign minister, he or she will be a member of the Commission and therefore he or she will be bound by the collegiate rule specified in draft Article 18a(4). This person will also chair the Foreign Affairs Council. So there is an immediate conflict of interest there. It is very difficult to serve two masters in this way. It may be possible in quiet times, but if there is a crisis or a challenge such as the Iraq war, then these internal contradictions will lead to weakness, not strength, in Europe's foreign policy-making.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
A_assume, conjecture, believe~

B_threaten~

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Secondly, on the question that we have been debating about a permanent president of the Council, I believe that this is becoming - certainly in the eyes of the public - a kind of sharing-out of jobs between politicians. We are going to have a president, an appointed foreign minister, a president of the Commission, elected or appointed according to a novel new procedure, and then we are going to have a great raft of vice-presidents. These posts will be semi-permanent and will constitute a kind of European government, but without the accountability and control that we demand from government. More important, this "Europe of presidents" will do nothing to move Europe closer to its citizens. Again, that is not an option, but a requirement. If this whole Constitution is rejected by Member States it will be because we have not fulfilled the Laeken Declaration, which they told us to right at the start.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_demand, call for, desire~

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This issue of presidents and permanent presidents is not just about small states. I sympathise with their view that these proposals will alienate their people. It is more important than that. It is about whether people, even in big states, will feel excluded from the eventual organisation. Therefore we must return to the principle on which we are founded, which is the principle and practice of the equality of Member States and between Member States. These are the essential building blocks of Europe from which we can build upwards. Therefore I have tabled my amendments and signed others to give practical effect to this founding principle, one of the central rules of the game for a more successful, more enduring and, above all, a more democratic Europe.

4-109
Le Président. - Je vous remercie. Nous avons des demandes de parole qui viennent aussi des observateurs. Si vous le permettez, comme je sais que certains d'entre eux ont d'autres réunions, je donnerai la parole à deux d'entre eux: Monsieur Jacobs et Monsieur Gabaglio. Ensuite, les autres observateurs viendront dans la discussion.

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Jacobs (Partenaires sociaux). - Le bon fonctionnement des institutions dans une Europe à vingt-cinq sera la clé de son succès. L'Europe a besoin de pouvoir agir rapidement et efficacement. Dans ce contexte, l'UNICE s'est toujours fermement prononcée en faveur de la défense de la méthode communautaire, centrée autour d'une Commission pleinement indépendante, forte et possédant d'un droit d'initiative exclusif en matière législative, complété par la procédure de codécision. Ceci est indispensable pour garantir la cohésion et l'efficacité des actions communautaires. A ce sujet, l'UNICE estime que la formulation de l'article 18, relative à la Commission européenne, ne reflète pas suffisamment la dimension qui doit être celle de la Commission et que la

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rédaction de son paragraphe 2 notamment doit être revue. Nous avons proposé un amendement, à cet effet, afin que la formulation actuelle soit remplacée par la suivante : "la Commission dispose d'un droit exclusif d'initiative en matière législative, sauf exception expressément prévue par le Traité".

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L'UNICE estime aussi que référence devrait être faite, dans l'article 18, au fait que la Commission propose le programme annuel et multiannuel de travail de l'Union. Ces amendements nous semblent nécessaires pour assurer le rôle pivot de la Commission au sein du triangle institutionnel.

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Il est important que le portefeuille mixte du ministre des affaires étrangères -politique étrangère, relations extérieures, coordination de l'action externe de l'Union- ne conduise pas, en pratique, à un affaiblissement de la capacité de l'Union à agir et à défendre avec vigueur les intérêts de l'Union en matière de politique commerciale commune et d'investissement.


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Gabaglio (Parti sociali). - Signor Presidente, condivido le opinioni espresse or ora dal signor Jacobs sulla necessità di preservare, sia pure con gli adattamenti necessari, l'attuale equilibrio istituzionale, un ruolo centrale della Commissione e del Parlamento così come il metodo comunitario.

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Vorrei tuttavia aggiungere due osservazioni di altra natura: la prima riguarda le formazioni del Consiglio che, nelle proposte del *Praesidium*, vengono drasticamente ridotte: affari esteri, politica economica e finanziaria, giustizia. Si tratta di dimensioni importanti, non c'è dubbio, ma l'Unione europea è anche altro, in particolare è anche dimensione sociale. E' vero che il Consiglio "affari generali" può creare altre formazioni del Consiglio, ma le proposte sul tappeto creano una gerarchia che non è, secondo me, auspicabile. Non è solo questione di visibilità ma anche, soprattutto, di operatività e di efficacia nella condotta delle politiche dell'Unione. Credo, in ogni caso, che il Consiglio "affari sociali e del lavoro" debba essere mantenuto.

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 B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

La seconda osservazione riguarda gli obiettivi della politica monetaria, tema ripreso da altri oratori questa mattina e che io non considero un tabù. Non c'è dubbio che l'obiettivo prioritario della politica monetaria è la stabilità dei prezzi, ma non vedo perché la Banca centrale europea perderebbe credibilità nel rendere più esplicita la sua attenzione anche alle esigenze della crescita economica e dell'occupazione. Personalmente, penso che ne guadagnerebbe, agli occhi dei cittadini non c'è dubbio e forse anche dei mercati, anch'essi interessati, almeno a lungo termine, a un'economia forte e dinamica. Ritengo quindi opportuno rendere più chiaro il contributo che la Banca è chiamata a dare, pur col suo compito fondamentale, agli obiettivi più generali dell'Unione.

Da ultimo, un'osservazione sul Comitato economico e sociale: vorrei sottolinearne il significato e l'importanza; se adattamenti sono necessari - resta da verificare - dovrebbero essere fatti senza precipitazione e con opportuna consultazione.

4-112

Balázs (Gouv.-HU). - Dans la dernière phase de nos travaux, la pression de temps augmente. Sous cette pression, de bons et de mauvais compromis mûrissent plus rapidement. Les bons compromis sont ceux qui se basent sur des principes. De tels principes sont proposés dans la lettre conjointe qui vous a été adressée, Monsieur le Président, et que la

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majorité des pays participant à la Convention ont signée.

A_claim (facts and values) -
B_demand, call for, desire -

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La méthode communautaire, la balance des institutions, l'égalité des Etats membres etc. sont des principes qui assurent un soutien politique très large, y compris de la part des nouveaux Etats membres. N'oublions pas que des référendums sont en cours et des millions de citoyens votent pour une Union qu'ils connaissent et dont la prochaine structure est esquissée dans le Traité de Nice. Nice devait être notre point de départ, pas forcément en ce qui concerne les détails juridiques ou techniques, mais en ce qui concerne les principes. Ce devrait être une tentative de définir l'égalité dans l'inégalité avec un accès égal au poste de Commissaire et à la chaise de la présidence du Conseil sous une forme ou sous une autre.

**A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

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Accepter les principes est le premier pas. Le diagnostic des faiblesses en serait le deuxième, suivi par l'action. Changer trop est aussi dangereux que de ne rien faire car l'Union à 25 devrait s'adapter rapidement à cette nouvelle réalité. Pourtant, l'accroissement du nombre des Etats membres sera moins pesant dans la Commission. Un passage de 20 à 25 constitue un changement moins problématique dans une structure collégiale que le saut qualitatif au Conseil de quinze à vingt-cinq, où chacun est un joueur individuel. Au Conseil, les remèdes seraient multiples : présidence de groupe, une certaine réduction du rôle du Président vers un rôle de président de la session et peut-être, limitation dans le temps via notamment la présidence de groupe. Il faut aussi mieux profiter des positions permanentes d'un président renforcé de la Commission avec plus de légitimité, d'un nouveau ministre des affaires étrangères et,

A_approve, admit as correct-

**A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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n'oublions pas, d'un secrétaire général du Conseil libéré des tâches de la représentation extérieure. Ces personnes pourront assister la chaise d'une présidence rotative au conseil des affaires générales, des relations extérieures et même au Conseil européen. Il faudrait pleinement utiliser les compétences et les capacités individuelles de ces trois positions renforcées avant de proposer de nouveaux postes permanents avec un soutien boiteux. Notre objectif est d'assurer l'efficacité et l'égalité des Etats membres.

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4-113

Le Président. - Je vous remercie Monsieur Balázs et d'ailleurs, votre Premier ministre me parlait en ce sens à Athènes.

4-114

Hasotti (Parl.-RO). - Mr President, a stronger Europe needs a stronger Commission as the driving force of European integration. The Commission's powers therefore need to be increased, as well as its political legitimacy. Most references to the powers of the Commission are to be provided in Part III. I will stress only a key prerogative of the Commission, the annual legislative programme that should be included in Article 18. The president of the Commission should be chosen by the European Parliament following its election, and then the candidate should be elected by the European Council, deciding by qualified majority.

In order to uphold the institutional balance and to reach the necessary consensus amongst governments, a stronger Commission will have to be paralleled with reform of the EU's intergovernmental structures. It is logical to have a full-time president of the European Council, it makes sense. His or her main role would be to create the broadest possible consensus amongst the Heads of State and Government. A clear separation of the legislative and executive functions represents the key part of the Council reform. In this respect, the legislative council should be better identified as the distant European institution.

1001 A sensitive issue is the number of commissioners; on the one hand,
 psychological reasons and the need for European ownership for the new
 Member States would recommend the solution, "one country, one
 commissioner". On the other hand, a stronger Commission means an
 1002 efficient one. In this case, the proper functioning of the Commission
 1003 should be the main criterion to be used where the right number of
 commissioners is decided. Critics of a full-time president argue that this
 1004 solution would lead to parallel unions and that the move would widen
 1005 the gap between intergovernmental and communitarian methods.

A_claim (facts and values)-

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

1007 In order to avoid such a risk, I suggest that the Vice-Presidents of the
 1009 Commission should chair the executive council formations and the
 President of the Commission should chair the General Affairs Council.
 The legislative council would be chaired on a rotation basis respecting
 1010 the principle of the equality of states.
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**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-115
 1012 **Le Président.** - Je vous remercie. Je salue Monsieur Vilén parce que
 1013 c'est un nouveau conventionnel désigné par le parlement finlandais après
 les élections dans ce pays. Vous avez la parole et nous vous souhaitons
 la bienvenue.

B_reject, decline, refuse-

**A_explain-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-116
 1014 **Vilén (Parl.-FI).** - Mr President, it seems that elections are strange
 1015 things. They keep putting new people in different positions. It is an
 honour and a privilege to be able to participate in the work of the
 Convention, especially now that the work is reaching its late and very
 crucial stages. As a convinced European and former Minister for
 1016 European Affairs in the previous Finnish Government, I am particularly
 1017 aware of the important task faced by this Convention.

B_threaten-

B_demand, call for, desire-

The Convention has a very formidable task ahead in the four remaining
 weeks of our mandate. Our aim must be to find a balanced consensus in
 as many matters as possible and in a way that truly respects the basic
 principles of the Union: the equality of Member States and of people as
 well as the balance of the ingenious institutional system that has been
 created for the Union.

I, together with a clear majority of Member States – and I assume a clear
 majority within this Convention – believe that the proposed full-time
 President of the European Council does not respect these principles. The
 proposal does not add any value to the institutional system; on the
 contrary, it creates a new power base that would most likely shake the
 institution of the Union out of balance. It is also difficult for me to see
 how the new proposal by the Greek and Irish representatives, concerning
 the direct election of the President of the European Council, would
 respect the principle of equality between Member States, for example
 between Malta and Germany.

Nor can I see how Finland and many other Member States could accept
 such a President of the European Council in the IGC. It is worrying that
 the President has not truly listened to the majority opinion of the
 Member States in this matter, most recently expressed at the Athens
 Summit. Also, turning the European Council clearly into a separate
 institution, as proposed, would not comply with the Laeken mandate and
 would not make the Union more democratic or transparent.

With regard to the Commission, we need to find a compromise that
 respects the role of the Commission as a collegiate body as well as the
 equality of commissioners. The best result we can achieve is the Nice
 compromise in this matter. I believe that we are now approaching the
 closing stages, when true compromises must be found. Compromise is

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the genuine will of all Members here. So, I listened very carefully to the German Foreign Minister's speech today. He took a very positive step forward in trying to find true compromises. I look forward to continuing the discussion on these matters.

(Applause)

4-117

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De Gucht (Parl.-BE). - De Commissie zorgt ervoor dat de Europese Unie een Europese agenda heeft en dat allen gelijk behandeld worden, ongeacht hun nationaliteit, ongeacht de demografie. Zij zorgt ervoor dat de staten en volkeren daadwerkelijk en niet enkel in de verklaringen die staatsleiders van tijd tot tijd zo formeel opstellen, integreren. Bijna elke dag formuleert zij voorstellen die Europa een stapje vooruit helpen. Door al die stapjes is Europa zo succesvol geworden dat het nu op een kruispunt gekomen is. De Unie kan niet meer in stilte aan haar verdere integratie werken. Zij moet zichzelf duidelijk legitimeren bij haar burgers als zij op voor de burger meer zichtbare en politiek gevoelige beleidsdomeinen zoals buitenlands en economisch beleid wil doorbreken.

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Zijn wij werkelijk bereid om op dit cruciale ogenblik de Commissie en het supranationale Europa te laten vallen voor een Europa van regeringen die elkaar veelal het licht in de ogen niet gunnen? Gaan wij de mogelijkheden op deze Conventie gebruiken om een stap terug te zetten, een stap naar de tijden van vóór de Unie? De voorstellen van het presidium lijken in die richting te gaan. Zij verdringen immers de Commissie en het supranationale Europa voor versterkte intergouvernementele structuren.

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In de voorstellen wordt gepleit voor een permanente voorzitter van de Europese Raad. Deze voorzitter zal de agenda van de Europese Unie gaan bepalen en het gezicht van de Unie worden op die terreinen die voor onze burgers en de buitenlandse machtscentra van belang zijn. De voorstellen leiden ertoe dat de Commissievoorzitter die functie niet kan uitoefenen. De Commissie zal onder de duim worden gehouden door een rivaliserend nieuw machtscentrum dat zal verhinderen dat de Commissie in al haar beleidsvoerende macht ooit kan doorgroeien en bij onze burgers en bij onze internationale partners echte legitimiteit kan verwerven.

Voor het Europa zoals wij het kennen is dit voorstel een enorme achteruitgang en voor de burgers wordt Europa niet transparanter, democratischer of efficiënter. Integendeel. De voorzitter wordt immers niet gekozen, niet door enig parlement gecontroleerd en ontsnapt volledig aan de invloed van de burger, hoewel hij enorme macht geniet en de Unie op het internationale vlak vertegenwoordigt.

Daarom stel ik u voor om te kiezen voor de benadering van de Beneluxlanden. De Commissie wordt daarin democratisch versterkt, krijgt meer uitvoerende bevoegdheden en wordt niet bedreigd met een rivaliserende macht. Enkel op die manier zal Europa ook in de toekomst al zijn burgers en lidstaten op gelijke manier kunnen dienen, met een Europese agenda in plaats van een nationale.

Ik stel ook voor om even na te denken over het voorstel van de ELDR om de commissievoorzitter de Europese Raad te laten voorzitten.

4-117 Translation

De Gucht (Parl.-BE). - The Commission ensures that the European Union has a European agenda and that everyone is

being treated equally, irrespective of their nationality and their demography. It ensures that states and peoples integrate effectively in practice and not only in the declarations which member state leaders establish so formally from time to time. Almost every day it formulates proposals that help to move Europe forward. Thanks to all those small progresses Europe has become so successful that it has now arrived at a cross point. The Union can no longer work in silence on its further integration. She has to be seen clearly as legitimate in the eyes of her citizens if she wants to break through in domains which are more visible to the citizens and which are more politically sensitive such as foreign and economic policy.

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B_reject, decline, refuse-

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

Are we really prepared to drop the Commission and a supranational Europe at this vital moment for a Europe of governments that often grudge each other in the back of their eyes? Will we use the possibilities at this Convention to take a step back, a step to the times before the Union? The proposals of the presidium seem to go in that direction. After all, they repress the Commission and supranational Europe for reinforced intergovernmental structures.

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B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

In the proposals a permanent President of the European Council is pleaded for. This president will stipulate the agenda of the European Union and will become the face of the Union in those domains which are so important for our citizens and for the foreign power centres. The proposals lead to the fact that the president of the Commission cannot exercise that function. The Commission will be monitored by a competing new power centre which will prevent the Commission of all her policy-making power, from moving the Union forward and will prevent her from acquiring legitimacy from our citizens and our international partners.

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For Europe, such as we know it, this proposal is an enormous reversal, and for the citizens Europe won't become more transparent, more democratic or more efficient. On the contrary. After all, the President is not elected, not monitored by any parliament and would escape entirely from the influence of the citizen, although he would enjoy enormous power and represents the Union on the international scene.

Therefore I propose to you to support the approach of the Benelux countries. With this approach the Commission is being democratically reinforced, obtains more executive competences and is not threatened by a competing power. Only in this way, will Europe be able to serve its citizens and member states in an equal manner in the future, with a European agenda instead of national agenda.

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I propose as well to think about the proposal of the ELDR, to let the president of the Commission chair the European Council.

B_demand, call for, desire~

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4-118

Christophersen (Ch.E/G.-DK). - Mr President, the Praesidium has presented the first draft of the future institutional architecture of the European Union. The numerous amendment proposals received by the Secretariat indicate the importance of these issues. At the same time they highlight the fact that the opinions of the Members of the Convention are divided. The next step must be to look for a highly ambitious compromise that can bridge these different opinions. Our common point of departure is the objective of making the EU more effective and democratic. In pursuit of this objective we must respect the principle of equality and the balance between small and large Member States, and maintain the institutional balance.

B_demand, call for, desire~

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**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~

An artistic impression of a compromise over this can be discussed. However, it should clearly respect these important principles. We should not forget our recommendation to make the new legislative procedure the general rule of decision-making. Furthermore we have yet to see this work in practice and I therefore see no need to reopen this. Instead, the Convention should focus on solving the other institutional issues on the agenda.

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B_demand, call for, desire~

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B_suggest a compromise~

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One of the divisive issues in the Convention so far has been over the chairman of the European Council. This is quite understandable. An elected chairman represents a new way of thinking in the European Union, but it is an idea which deserves proper examination. Even though there are strong differences of opinion, I believe it is possible to bridge our views. If we decide to make this idea part of a larger and more ambitious package of changes, then the way forward should be to establish a clear job description for the elected chairman that will work in practice. It must be made clear that the elected chairman is the servant, not the master, of the European Council, a person who performs the practical function of preparing and chairing meetings in the Council. His or her powers must also be clearly defined to avoid conflicts with the EU Foreign Minister or the President of the Commission. Our aim is to clarify the issue of who does what, not make it more complicated.

Furthermore, the principles of equality and balance between large and small Member States must be respected when electing the chairman. Candidates from every Member State should have an equal opportunity to be elected. Member States should each have one vote.

Finally, a satisfactory solution must be found with regard to the rotating presidencies. That issue has to be settled before we finalise the job description of the permanent chairman of the European Council. I have suggested maintaining rotating presidencies with regard to the individual Council formations. Others have proposed the introduction of team presidencies. An elected chairman with a clearly defined mandate, in combination with a modernised version of the rotating presidencies will, in my opinion, increase efficiency and democracy.

Another important institutional issue is how, at the same time, to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the presidency and the Commission. That is very important. I have proposed that the president be elected by a joint electoral college with members appointed by the national parliaments and the European Parliament, with a right for

governments, and perhaps the European Parliament and national parliaments, to nominate the candidates.

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4-119

Ατταλίδης (Gouv.-CY). - Κύριε Πρόεδρε, οι προτάσεις που έχω υποβάλει για τροποποιήσεις στο κείμενο του Προεδρείου είναι παρόμοιες με εισηγήσεις που έχουν υποβάλει άλλα μέλη της Συνέλευσης που εκπροσωπούν κυβερνήσεις. Δεν διαπνέονται από επιθυμία να παραμείνει η κατάσταση ως έχει, αλλά από προσπάθεια να καταστούν οι θεσμοί πιο δημοκρατικοί και αποτελεσματικοί, όπως μας ζήτησε η διακήρυξη του Λάκεν, ενώ όμως συνεχίζει να διέπεται η δομή και η λειτουργία τους από κάποιες βασικές αρχές, τις αρχές της διατήρησης και ενίσχυσης της κοινοτικής μεθόδου, του ισοζυγίου μεταξύ των θεσμών και της ισοτιμίας των κρατών μελών.

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Όσον αφορά το Συμβούλιο, ένας μακροχρόνιος Πρόεδρος εκλεγμένος από τα μέλη του Συμβουλίου μπορεί να υποστηριχθεί ότι ενισχύει τη συνοχή και συνέχεια, αλλά δεν εξυπηρετεί τον εκδημοκρατισμό και επηρεάζει αρνητικά το ισοζύγιο των θεσμών, τη λειτουργία της κοινοτικής μεθόδου και την ισοτιμία των κρατών μελών. Υπάρχουν άλλοι τρόποι να εξασφαλισθεί η συνοχή και η αποτελεσματικότητα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου και του Συμβουλίου Υπουργών. Το πολυετές στρατηγικό πρόγραμμα που θα υιοθετεί το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, το πρόγραμμα που θα υποβάλλουν από κοινού διαδοχικές προεδρίες, η ενίσχυση του ρόλου του Γενικού Γραμματέα του Συμβουλίου και, τέλος, η επέκταση της απόφασης με σταθμισμένη πλειοψηφία.

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Στα θέματα της εξωτερικής δράσης και ασφάλειας, η συνοχή, η αποτελεσματικότητα και η ορατότητα είναι κρίσιμης σημασίας. Ο θεσμός του Υπουργού Εξωτερικών που προτείνεται και στις εισηγήσεις του Προεδρείου, μας δίνει την απάντηση στους τομείς αυτούς. Συγχρόνως όμως, η συνέχιση της εναλλασσόμενης προεδρίας φέρνει την Ένωση περιοδικά κοντά στους πολίτες και τον πολιτισμό της κάθε χώρας και σηματοδοτεί την ισοτιμία των κρατών μελών.

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***A_argue--
**A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

Όσον αφορά την Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή, μια σημαντική μεταρρύθμιση που προσδίδει αυξημένη δημοκρατική νομιμότητα είναι η εκλογή του Προέδρου από τα μέλη του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου μεταξύ περισσότερων υποψηφίων και όχι απλώς με επικύρωση ή απόρριψη. Οι εξουσίες του Προέδρου της μεγαλύτερης Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής διευρύνονται ώστε να οργανώνει αποτελεσματικά τη λειτουργία της. Τουλάχιστον πρέπει να δούμε πώς θα λειτουργήσει η εφαρμογή της Συνθήκης της Νίκαιας με ένα μέλος της Επιτροπής από κάθε κράτος μέλος και, εάν χρειασθεί, να εξετάσουμε, όπως προβλέπει η Συνθήκη, στο μέλλον ένα νέο σύστημα με ισότιμη εναλλαγή. Εξάλλου, όπως πολλοί προηγούμενοι ομιλητές έχουν αναφέρει, θα ήταν αντιπαραγωγικό να ανοίξουμε τώρα τα ζητήματα που με τόση δυσκολία συμφωνήθηκαν στη Νίκαια.

4-119 Translation

Attalidis:

Mr. President, the proposals that I have submitted for modifications in the text of the presiding board are similar with proposals submitted by other members of the Assembly. They are not inspired by the wish the situation remains as such, but from the effort to render the European institutions even most democratic and effective, in the spirit of the Laaken Treaty, while their structure and operation continues to be characterized by the principles of the Community method, and by the principles of balance between institutions and of the equality among member states.

1080 In what concerns the Council, one could state that a long-lasting President elected by the members of the Council could strengthen cohesion and continuity, but would not serve towards further democratisation and it would negatively influence the balance between institutions, the function of the Community method and the equality among member states. There exist other ways through which to ensure the cohesion and the effectiveness of the European Council and of the Council of Ministers: the strategic program that the European Council will adopt, the program that successive presidencies will submit jointly, the enhancement of the role of the General Secretary of the Council and, finally, the extension of special-majority decision making process.

1081 In the subjects of foreign policy and security, further cohesion, effectiveness and visibility are of critical importance. The institution of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union which is among the proposals of the Presiding board provides us with an answer in these critical topics. At the same moment, however, the continuation of the rotating presidency brings the Union closer to its citizens and further signals the equality of member states.

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***A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~

***A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

1089 With regard to the European Commission, a potentially important reform that would lend increased democratic legality to the institution would be the election of the President of the Commission from all the members of European Parliament among more candidates and not simply with ratification or reject. The powers of the President of a greater European Commission are extended so that its function and operation will be administered more effectively. We should at least witness the way in which the application of the Treaty of Nice will work, with each individual member of the commission originating from a different member state (and with all different states represented on the Commission) and, if needed, to re-examine all different possibilities in the future. After all, as many of the previous speakers have mentioned, it would be counterproductive to now reopen the issues on which were agreed in Nice with such difficulties.

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***A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_reject, decline, refuse~

B_demand, call for, desire~

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~

4-120

Bösch (Parl.-AT). – [Herr Präsident! In dem Papier zu den Organen der Union, das das Präsidium vorgeschlagen hat, ist in wesentlichen Bereichen ein guter Ausgleich gelungen, und die Austarierung zwischen den Aufgaben der einzelnen Organe der Union ist treffend wiedergegeben.]

Allerdings kann ich nicht zustimmen, wenn es darum gehen sollte, neue Organe zu schaffen, wie es auch in diesem Papier, das von Ihnen vorgelegt wurde, vorgeschlagen wurde. Im Besonderen geht es mir dabei um die Wahl eines Präsidenten des Europäischen Rates für einen längeren Zeitraum. Ich bin der Ansicht, dass die Rotation innerhalb des Europäischen Rates, wie sie innerhalb der Union jetzt praktiziert wird, beibehalten werden sollte, nicht nur damit jedem Mitgliedsland die Möglichkeit gegeben wird, den Vorsitz auszurichten, sondern damit auch jedes Mitgliedsland der Union die Verpflichtung hat, den Vorsitz innerhalb der Union zu übernehmen. Der Europäische Rat muss sich Arbeitsprogramme geben, die über mehrere Jahre hinweg wirken, so dass der Wechsel in der Präsidentschaft des Europäischen Rates eigentlich kein inhaltlicher, sondern nur ein formeller ist, und deshalb im Bezug auf die Inhalte der Politik der gesamten Union nicht entscheidend ist.]

Das Präsidium der Union sollte nach meinem Dafürhalten aus der Troika, wie wir sie jetzt schon haben, aus dem Präsidenten der Kommission und dem Präsidenten des Parlaments bestehen. Deshalb glaube ich, dass der Vorschlag einer mehrjährigen Präsidentschaft des

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Europäischen Rates nicht zielführend ist.

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Dasselbe gilt auch im Bezug auf die Kommissare. Ich glaube, dass auch weiterhin jedem Land die Möglichkeit gegeben werden sollte, einen Kommissar zu stellen. Im Vorschlag des Präsidiums sprechen Sie von 15 Kommissaren, die künftig neben dem Außenminister der Union die Kommission bilden sollen. Sie sprechen auch davon, dass jedem Kommissar ein delegiertes Mitglied beige stellt werden könnte. Das gibt immerhin eine Zahl von 30 Personen, die zukünftig die Kommission bilden werden, und diese Zahl ist meines Erachtens nicht überzogen. Ich glaube nicht, dass die Kommission zu groß wäre, wenn auch nach dem Beitritt der neuen Mitglieder jeder Mitgliedstaat je einen Kommissar stellt.

B_demand, call for, desire~

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Zukünftig sollte also die Gleichheit zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten ein Prinzip sein, und wenn wir dieses Prinzip im Entwurf über die Organe verankern, dann können wir mit unserer Arbeit zufrieden sein.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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B_uphold (an offer, promise)~

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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Serracino-Inglott (Gouv.-MT). - Mr President, I should like to make two main points in relation to the amendments submitted by Malta.

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to~

**A_justify~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

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First, a remark concerning our amendments on minimum thresholds with regard to European Parliament representation and the weighting of votes in the Council. Our amendments, which incidentally coincide with those submitted by Mr Brok of the PPE-DE group, are not intended to be a departure point for proposing the re-opening of Nice. We only think that if blatant errors and anomalies are discovered, they can and should be corrected, as has already been done in one or two cases. Basically, we agree with the Benelux proposals on this topic. Principles underlying the Nice Treaty should not be put into question. The same, however, does not apply to matters that do not significantly affect those principles. The principle in question here is that of the equality of states. You, Mr President, have rightly remarked that this principle has to maintain a balance with that of the equality of citizens. I am not surprised that many speakers in this discussion have spoken of the equality of states and hardly anyone has mentioned the equality of citizens, because it is the equality of states that is being threatened, not the equality of citizens.

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I also want to indicate much stronger support for the amendment proposed by Lord MacLennan of Rogart. In particular, it highlights and gives a stronger profile to the role of Secretary-General of the Council. It seems to me that this proposal is the most promising of the really constructive compromise proposals that have emerged because it has all the advantages that are attributed to the proposal of a permanent president, without losing those of rotation.

Speaking on behalf of the small countries, we still hope that the Convention will overcome what the media at the time of Nice called 'the Lilliput complex', that is, the strange fear that seems to have struck or afflicted the large states, the fear that they might be overwhelmed by the influx, nine-strong, of small countries. Once it has been agreed not to extend the powers of the Commission into the field of external affairs, it really is not necessary for us - the small states - to be rendered completely toothless for the good of Europe. We therefore subscribe wholeheartedly to the letter sent to you, signed by the representatives of a clear majority of the governments represented at the Convention.

4-122

Bruton (Parl.-IE). - Mr President, in this debate we should look back at the reasons for the success of the European Union in terms of its constitutional philosophy. An essential element in the constitutional

philosophy of the European Union has been the separation of powers between the three elements of the triangle, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, and it is very important that we do not do anything to upset that. I would therefore be a bit hesitant to go any further than the Praesidium has gone, in giving the European Parliament more control over the Commission, because if the European Parliament has too much control over the Commission, it will upset the separation of powers, particularly since, as Mr Haenel has reminded us, if the Parliament sacks the Commission, there is no corresponding power vested in the Commission to call a parliamentary election to put the issue before the people.

Furthermore, we must recognise that if there is to be a genuine separation of powers, then there is a considerable amount of merit in what Mrs Thorning-Schmidt has been saying about each separate institution being able to decide separately where it shall meet and where it shall not meet. That is a natural development of the separation of powers. Similarly, if there is to be a separation of powers, we should be hesitant about having people from one institution chairing other institutions and their meetings. That would tear them apart psychologically, and they would either do too much or too little in defence of one or other of the institutions they are trying to represent.

Finally, in this context we should look at a possible tension between the wording of Article 18 of Part I, which says that the 'European Commission shall safeguard the general European interest', and Article 29 of the European Council's mandate, which says that in foreign policy the European Council shall identify the Union's strategic interests. There is a very subtle difference. The Council is to 'identify' the interests and the Commission is to defend them. Is it possible that you would have two separate institutions doing that separate job? It seems to me that the Commission should be intimately involved in any identification of the Union's collective interests, whether in foreign policy or domestic policy. These interests cannot be defined as either domestic or foreign policy, they are common interests, whether at home or abroad.

I would hate to think that under the wording of Article 29, which gives the Council the power to identify the Union's strategic interest, we might develop a big bureaucracy in the Council, which would be designed to identify the interest, separate from the bureaucracy in the Commission, whose job it would be to defend that interest. Identification and defence should be merged into one institution and I would hope that institution would be the Commission.

4-123

Puwak (Gouv.-RO). - Mr President, I would like to make a few comments on the institutions of the Union of 27 Member States.

First, concerning the European Commission, we all agree that the Commission has to be stronger and more independent from the Member States. If there are 27 commissioners or less, the requirements of good government are the same. They should be assured. Therefore competence and quality should prevail. In our discussion we focus only on the number of commissioners.

Strengthening the Community method is compulsory to ensure deeper integration – the second objective after enlargement with 10+2 countries. Certainly the best solution would be to have one commissioner per state. Trying to find a reasonable compromise, we can support the idea of a smaller sized Commission only on the condition that the European Constitution lays down clear provisions on the criteria that define an equitable rotation system.

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The same will be needed if the Convention is to accept the idea of giving to the President of the Commission the responsibility of deciding the size of the Commission. We need to be more prudent in dealing with the idea that each Member State should put forward three nominees for the job of commissioner, for at least two reasons: the difficulty faced by the President of the Commission in choosing one person out of the three nominees put forward, and perhaps the lack of interest shown by the nominees who are second or third option on a list and have little chance of becoming commissioners.

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As to the Sectorial Council, in the light of our discussion in the working group and in the plenary session dedicated to the subject of social Europe, in order to accomplish a balance between the economic and social dimensions of the Union we support the idea of having a special Council formation, the Council for Economic and Social Affairs. I kindly ask the Praesidium to consider the recommendation of our working group.

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With regard to the system of the Presidency of the Council of European Union, is there a way to ensure an equal term for participation by all Member States, fair rotation and reasonable frequency for the terms of office of the Presidency, and visibility for all Member States? The solution could be to combine the permanent presidency of the European Council with a rotating presidency of the Sectorial Council, holding office for variable intervals.

Finally, as a future Member State of the Union in 2007, we want to bring this Europe into our homes, not only by means of common policy and legislation but also by means of the meetings of the Council attended by the leaders of the Union in our countries, Romania included

4-124

Szajer (Parl.-HU). - Mr President, my country Hungary, a newcomer to the Union, considers it very important that the equality of the Member States should be maintained. If we were to give up the idea of a Presidency of the Council or the rule that each Member State has the right to nominate a commissioner, we might lose a highly important keystone of this equality.

The public discussions that took place before the referenda in the candidate countries clearly demonstrate that the citizens are particularly sensitive to their respective countries' future rights and status in an enlarged European Union. Given our recent history of Soviet occupation and Communist oppression, this sensitivity is completely legitimate.

Preserving the rules governing the rotating presidency and the principle of one commissioner for each country is also important for the public of the Member States to identify more strongly with the institutions of the Union. If we were to give up these arrangements, we might run the risk of weakening the – already problematic – popular acceptance of the EU institutions in our own countries, which is completely against our mandate as agreed in Laeken.

Nations, regardless of their size, which see their political leaders acting for a certain period of time on behalf of the Union, feel that the Union is theirs and that they have a voice in the European political process. The same applies to the nomination of commissioners. By contrast, some Member countries could feel marginalised or left out of the common business of Europe. Therefore I support the amendments of my EPP colleagues, Members of the Convention from whose amendments my name is missing for technical reasons, as they flexibly preserve these

- B_demand, call for, desire~
- B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~
- A_claim (facts and values)~
- B_demand, call for, desire~
- **A_explain~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
- B_threaten~

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rules for the benefit of a more democratic and transparent European Union.

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I would like to remind the Members of the Convention of another important issue: the lack of national minority representation in the Union's currently overly majoritarian institutional system. I tabled an amendment based on my previous contributions and interventions concerning the establishment of a representative body of national minorities according to the existing model of the Social and Economic Committee or of the Committee of the Regions. This institution would be capable of establishing the minority dimension for the European Union, which is currently missing, and could soften the present exclusive, majoritarian institutional system. I would like to ask my fellow Convention Members to support this idea.

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Γιαννάκου-Κουτσίκου (Parl.-GR). - Κύριε Πρόεδρε, η σημερινή συζήτηση είναι εξαιρετικής σημασίας, αν ληφθεί υπόψη ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση υπάρχει και λειτουργεί κατά βάση χάρη στην ύπαρξη των υπερεθνικών θεσμών που δημιουργήθηκαν με την πολιτική βούληση των εθνικών αρχών των κρατών μελών. Στο βαθμό που τα θεσμικά όργανα της Ένωσης εξασφαλίζουν ισοτιμία των κρατών μελών και πραγματικά δικαιώματα των ευρωπαίων πολιτών, η Ένωση μπορεί να προχωρεί ικανοποιητικά. Αυτό συνδέεται και με τις αντιλήψεις που έχουν οι λαοί σχετικά με την εθνική τους ταυτότητα. Όταν διασφαλίζονται τα παραπάνω, αποφεύγεται και η αμφισβήτηση του συνολικού εγχειρήματος που μέχρι σήμερα προσέφερε τα μέγιστα, δημιουργώντας ένα πολυεθνικό χώρο ασφάλειας και ευημερίας.

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Σχετικά με τους ευρωπαϊκούς θεσμούς, από τη μέχρι σήμερα εμπειρία γνωρίζουμε καλά πότε οι θεσμοί λειτούργησαν ικανοποιητικά, ποιά ελλείμματα υπάρχουν, πώς πρέπει να καλυφθούν και ποιές νέες θεσμικές μεταβολές μπορούν να εξασφαλίσουν τη λειτουργία μια Ευρώπης των 25. Εξειδικεύοντας την τοποθέτησή μου, έχω υποβάλει πλήρως αιτιολογημένες τροπολογίες που μπορούν να συνοψισθούν στα εξής:

Όσον αφορά στο Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, άρθρα 14, 16 και 16α. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο δεν μπορεί να χαρακτηριστεί ως θεσμικό όργανο της Ένωσης, όπως αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 14. Αποτελεί φυσικά δομικό στοιχείο του όλου συστήματος. Η Προεδρία του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου, όπως αναφέρεται στο άρθρο 16α, δεν είναι η καλύτερη μέθοδος για να προωθηθούν η ευρωπαϊκή ολοκλήρωση και τα ευρωπαϊκά συμφέροντα. Γι' αυτό και ζητώ τη διαγραφή του άρθρου αυτού. Θεωρώ ότι το σύστημα της εναλλασσόμενης προεδρίας πρέπει να παραμείνει. Με την επέκταση του χρόνου άσκησης της, αλλά και μια συλλογική προεδρία ασκούμενη από διαφορετικές χώρες ταυτόχρονα μπορεί να λειτουργήσει ικανοποιητικά, χωρίς να πλήξει την περί ισοτιμίας αντίληψη των κρατών μελών. Με ποιο απλά λόγια, ένας προεδρεύων του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου που δεν θα είναι εν ενεργεία αρχηγός κράτους ή πρωθυπουργός δεν είναι η σωστή λύση στη παρούσα φάση.

Δεύτερον, όσον αφορά στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, το άρθρο 15. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο πρέπει να αναδειχθεί ως μέρος της νομοθετικής αρχής και της αρχής του προϋπολογισμού και να ενισχυθεί ως όργανο άμεσης έκφρασης της βούλησης των λαών. Ο αριθμός των μελών του πρέπει να παραμείνει στους 732, όπως ακριβώς ορίζει η Συνθήκη της Νίκαιας.

Τρίτον, όσον αφορά στην Επιτροπή, άρθρα 18 και 18α. Η Επιτροπή είναι ο εκτελεστικός βραχίονας του ενωσιακού συστήματος και έχει το δικαίωμα πρωτοβουλίας. Ο Πρόεδρος της Επιτροπής πρέπει να

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εκλέγεται και να εγκρίνεται η τοποθέτηση της Επιτροπής ως Σώματος από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο. Ομοίως, η έγκριση αυτή πρέπει να αφορά και στον Υπουργό Εξωτερικών της Ένωσης.

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Πολλή συζήτηση έχει γίνει, κύριε Πρόεδρε, για τον αριθμό των επιτρόπων. Και η πρόταση του Προεδρείου εισάγει διαφορετικά status για τους διαφόρους επιτρόπους. Όταν όμως και το μικρότερο κράτος μέλος περιλαμβάνει 30 και περισσότερους υπουργούς, πώς είναι δυνατόν να θεωρείται ότι για 25 κράτη μέλη είναι μεγάλος ένας αντίστοιχος αριθμός επιτρόπων; Στη χώρα μου υπάρχουν περίπου 60 υπουργοί και υφυπουργοί. Και είναι μόνο 10 εκατομμύρια. Βεβαίως, οι επιτροπείς δεν εκπροσωπούν τα κράτη μέλη, αλλά το δικαίωμα να προτείνουν αυτά έναν επίτροπο της εθνικότητάς τους, σε ισότιμη βάση, θα είναι ολέθριο να ανατραπεί. Δεν χρειάζεται πρόταση για τρεις, κύριε Πρόεδρε. Θα εισαγάγουμε μέσα στα κράτη μέλη διαδικασίες συγκρούσεων που μέχρι σήμερα υπήρξαν ανύπαρκτες. Η δυνατότητα κάθε κράτους μέλους να ορίζει έναν επίτροπο είναι ζήτημα ιδεολογικό και δικαίωμα που πρέπει να διατηρηθεί. Διαφορετικά, θα υπάρξουν αρνητικές αντιδράσεις εντός των ευρωπαϊκών χωρών, που θα έχουν και νομιμοποιητική βάση, αφού θα δημιουργούνται υποψίες ότι η ισοτιμία ως αρχή παραβιάζεται εις βάρος των μικροτέρων χωρών.

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Κύριε Πρόεδρε, εν κατακλείδι, στο ζήτημα της αποτελεσματικότητας της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης μπορεί να δοθεί απάντηση χωρίς να πληγούν ορισμένες σταθερές που για τους λαούς της Ευρώπης διασφαλίζουν μια λογική ισοτιμίας των χωρών, ανεξάρτητα από το μέγεθός τους και ανεξάρτητα από τη διεθνή τους δύναμη.


4-125 Translation
Giannakou-Koutsikou:

Mr. President, today's discussion is of exceptional importance, if one takes into consideration that the European Union exists and functions because of the presence of supranational institutions that came to existence because of the political will of national authorities of the member states. To the extent that the institutional bodies of the union will be able to ensure equality among member states and the actual rights of the European citizens, the Union will be capable of further advancing. This is also connected with the perceptions of the European populations with respect to their national identities.

With regard to European institutions, from today's experience we have reached a point of knowing very well when institutions functioned satisfactorily, what kind of weaknesses exist, the ways in which we can overcome those weaknesses, but also, what kinds of institutional changes can ensure the operation of a new Europe of 25.

I have already submitted specific amendments, which can be summarized in the following:

In what concerns the European Council, articles 14,16 and 16a. The European Council cannot be characterized as the institutional body of the Union, as reported in article 14. The European Council constitutes, of course, a structural element of the whole system. The Presidency of the European Council, as mentioned in article 16a, is not the best possible method through which to promote European integration and European interests. This is why I am demanding the removal of this article. I consider that the system of rotating presidency should remain. With the extension its term, but also through a collective presidency exercised by different countries simultaneously, the executive system can function satisfactorily, without affecting the sensitivities of the member states in aspects of intergovernmental equality. In simple words,



a President of European Council who will not be an active Head of State or Prime Minister is not the right solution in the present phase.

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Secondly, in what concerns the European Parliament, and specifically article 15. The European Parliament should be part of the legislative branch and the pre-eminent authority responsible for shaping the community budget and be strengthened as the body of direct expression of the will of the people. Its number of members should remain 732, as specified by the Treaty of Nice.

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Thirdly, in what concerns the Committee, articles 18 and 18th. The Committee is the executive arm of our unified system and has the right to take initiatives. The President of the Committee should be elected and, along with the whole composition of the Committee, approved by the European Parliament. Similarly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Union should also be confirmed in such a way.

A lot of discussion has been taking place, Mr. President, in what concerns the number of delegates. And the proposal of the Presiding board introduces a different status for the various commissioners. At the moment when even the smallest member state has more than 30 cabinet members, how it is possible to say that for 25 member states a corresponding number of commissioners will be excessive? My country's administration consists of around 60 ministers and deputy-ministers. And we are only 10 million people. Of course, the commissioners do not represent the member states, but it will be disastrous to reverse the right of each member state to appoint a commissioner on the basis of his or her nationality. It does not require a proposal for three, Mr. President. We will introduce processes of conflicts within member states that up until today have been non-existent. The right of each member state to appoint a commissioner is - in the end - an ideological question and a right that should be maintained. If not, we will face potential negative reactions within member states, that will now also have legitimizing base, since suspicions that the value of equality among member states is not guaranteed, will be fostered.

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***A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
B_demand, call for, desire~
A_approve, admit as correct~

In conclusion, Mr. President, in the question of the effectiveness of the European Union, an answer could be provided without affecting certain variables which ensure the equality of member-states regardless of their size and of their international force.

4-126

Martikonis (Gouv.-LT). - Mr President, in Lithuania we are well aware of our responsibility to make the European Union functional. We are about to accede to the Union and we are fundamentally interested in its viability.

The discussion on institutions might be a discussion about big and small, it might be about old and new, but first of all it is about achieving our common objectives. It is about understanding better our mutual interests and our expectations. The referendum which took place just a few days ago was a powerful signal that Lithuanian citizens endorse the Accession Treaty and, at the same time, endorse the present institutional architecture of the Union. A political mandate from them means respect for the institutional arrangement achieved at Nice. Being a signatory to the Nice Treaty, I would say that although we might get signals to the contrary from Vilnius, we should not rush in dealing with constitutional matters.

For me the principles are clear: the Community method, equality of

Member States, institutional balance in the Union. These principles are equally important for a large number of Members States, present and future, of the Union. The Lithuanian position was once again affirmed by joint amendments to the institutional articles presented by the representatives of nine governments. It is not surprising, therefore, that comments made by our Finnish, Portuguese, Estonian, Irish or Austrian friends are similar. It is, to my mind, an important opinion. It is a coherent and complete set of proposals.

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***A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_demand, call for, desire~

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A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_demand, call for, desire~

I consider the European Council to be an important part of the institutional framework that provides the Union with the necessary impetus for its development. It gives political guidance. But it is not a separate institution and should not be part of the legislative procedures of the Union.

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The rotation of Member States in the Council must be retained. The Council is the institution in which equality of Member States must be fixed and expressed. The shortcomings of a rotating presidency are clearly outweighed by its advantages. Some methods of management to address those shortcomings have been suggested here on several occasions. A rotating presidency also proved to be a crucial tool for maintaining links between the Union and the citizens of its Member States.

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In conclusion, I note that the draft articles from the Praesidium do not for the moment reflect the common position of a large group of Members of the Convention on some key issues. Aiming to achieve a successful outcome to the Convention, we still have a lot of work to do in bridging important opinions in this Chamber.

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(Applause)

4-127

Dybkjær (PE). - Mr President, in relation to the remarks by Mrs Puwak on appointing commissioners, I should like to stress the importance of equality, not only between Member States, small and big, but also equality between men and women. I thank the Praesidium for at least having said that women should be appointed to the Commission from the Member States. This is not always the case. I have made an amendment that says we should, perhaps, only appoint two members, one male and one female. That would also mean there would not be a competition. I suggest that the Commission chair, who will really have the power, has to choose between the male and female and ensure that we have at least 40% of one of the sexes. Then you can choose whether you want men or women.

4-128

Le Président. - Effectivement, nous avons introduit dans notre projet le fait qu'il y ait au moins une femme. Mais enfin, vous avez vous-même d'autres propositions que nous notons.

4-129

De Rossa (Parl.-IE). - Mr President, Mr Bruton made the point that there was no provision for the dissolution of the European Parliament. If the price for the election of the Commission by the European Parliament is the power to dissolve the European Parliament, then I am prepared to pay that price. It is important to have a connection between the legitimacy of the vote of the elector and the selection of the President of the Parliament. Let us have a proposal on the means by which the Parliament might be dissolved at some point.

Secondly, I want to support the proposal submitted by Mr Gabaglio and others in favour of securing a social policy personality for the Union and

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providing explicitly for a Council for social policy. I also want to support Mr Borrell's proposal that the European Central Bank should have regard to employment matters.

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A final point in relation to the timetable, which was mentioned this morning. I welcome the possibility that we may have extra time, but I would only accept it on the basis that we present the full constitutional draft, not a constitution by insolvency, to the Council on the final date.

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4-130
Muscardini (PE). - Intervengo, Presidente, con due brevi osservazioni. Concordo con il collega: se è necessario mettere una norma per cui il Parlamento europeo può anch'esso decadere, mettiamola pure, purché il Parlamento abbia la possibilità di mettere sotto inchiesta quei Commissari che non rispondono ai requisiti, alle norme, alle regole che il loro mandato deve ricoprire. Comunque, i parlamentari europei singolarmente possono già decadere dal Parlamento europeo nel momento in cui non rispondono alle regole per le quali sono stati votati.

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Vorrei poi fare un'osservazione brevissima sul numero dei parlamentari europei. E' vero che il Parlamento europeo ha, in due occasioni, identificato un numero limite, ma è vero anche che partecipavano a quell'assemblea soltanto i parlamentari dei quindici paesi membri, mentre a questa Convenzione partecipano anche i paesi in via di adesione. Credo perciò che si possa tranquillamente discutere tra di noi se questo limite va mantenuto o si può eventualmente dilatarlo per una maggiore rappresentanza di tutti i paesi, grandi e piccoli.

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_demand, call for, desire-

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4-131
(La séance, suspendue à 17h30, est reprise à 1810)

4-132
PRESIDENZA DI GIULIANO AMATO
(Vicepresidente)

4-133

Debate on draft articles on Institutions (continuation)

4-134

Tajani (PE). - Signor Presidente, due elementi inseparabili sono, a mio giudizio, destinati a garantire all'Europa di domani un ruolo da protagonista sul palcoscenico internazionale: la volontà politica e le nuove Istituzioni. Senza la determinazione forte degli Stati europei di avere un'unica politica estera e di difesa sarà impossibile per l'Unione assumere nuove e crescenti responsabilità in uno scacchiere geopolitico in continua evoluzione. Senza un profondo cambiamento delle Istituzioni sarà però impossibile prendere decisioni comuni in tempi rapidi e realizzare programmi e progetti a medio e a lungo termine. A questo fine la scelta di un Presidente del Consiglio europeo, eletto per almeno due anni, è inevitabile.

Nella nuova Unione a 25 il Consiglio avrà infatti un ruolo di direzione troppo importante per potersi permettere di funzionare a singhiozzo, ma l'elezione di un Presidente dovrà essere accompagnata dalla previsione di meccanismi che garantiscano gli Stati più piccoli. Possiamo per questo ragionevolmente pensare a rotazioni più frequenti in un eventuale Ufficio di presidenza e magari anche nei Consigli di settore, che sono destinati a vedere accresciuta la loro importanza.

Per quanto riguarda la Commissione, l'elezione del Presidente da parte del Parlamento, su proposta del Consiglio, il superamento della regola di

1232 un Commissario per Stato membro ed il principio di responsabilità
politica davanti al Parlamento rafforzano, in prospettiva, il ruolo
esecutivo della Commissione e non pregiudicano quello, fin qui svolto,
di guardiano dei Trattati. C'è però un tema che credo debba essere
1233 affrontato in maniera seria, cioè quello che riguarda il Parlamento
europeo, che è divenuto per la prima volta sede di un rapporto di fiducia
con la Commissione, nella proposta del *Praesidium*, e che quindi vede
rafforzato il proprio ruolo. Occorre però rilevare che questo importante
organo merita maggiore attenzione nel Trattato costituzionale.

1234 Ho proposto alcuni emendamenti che hanno per oggetto il
riconoscimento delle autonomie e del diritto di autorganizzazione del
Parlamento europeo, nonché la previsione, nel Trattato, dello statuto dei
deputati europei con speciale riferimento alle norme che ne garantiscono
1235 l'immunità. Ho notato con piacere che gli onorevoli Duff, Dini e altri
sono intervenuti sulla questione dell'immunità con uno specifico
emendamento.

1236 Il testo del *Praesidium* ha poi il merito di istituire il tanto auspicato
1237 Ministro degli esteri dell'Unione, quale Vicepresidente della
1239 Commissione. Si tratta di un importante passo in avanti che permetterà
all'Europa di avere una voce unica soprattutto in occasione delle crisi
internazionali. Una figura che contribuirà così ad evitare, o quantomeno
1240 ad attenuare, le divisioni emerse in occasione dei più recenti
1241 avvenimenti.

Resta comunque valida, in una prospettiva più lontana, la proposta di un
Presidente unico per l'Europa. E' una meta che potremo conquistare nei
prossimi dieci o quindici anni e che potrebbe trovare un esplicito
riferimento nel testo del Trattato.


1242 In conclusione, la proposta di riforma presentata dal *Praesidium*
1243 risponde, nel suo insieme, all'esigenza di un'Europa delle istituzioni più
stabili, più efficienti e più credibili, ma sarà soltanto la forte volontà
politica a dare vita alla nostra opera di ingegneria costituzionale. Se i
1244 Quindici di oggi e i Venticinque di domani non decideranno di costruire
un progetto comune, non si riuscirà a vincere la grande sfida del
cambiamento a cui ci chiamano 500 milioni di cittadini europei.



4-135

Dervis (Parl.-TR). - Mr President, two quick points. Regarding Article
18, I have the feeling that most Members of the Convention would like
to see the European Parliament directly elect the President of the
Commission with the Council ratifying that choice, rather than the other
way around. In terms of achieving the right balance between the
institutions and moving forward with Europe, also at the level of
political perceptions, this is indeed important and this is the way it
should be.

However, even if this were to come to pass, there is still the problem of
the nominating procedure for the President of the Commission. To
reinforce the pan-European dimension of that position, I believe it could
be appropriate to require that the nominee obtain seventy signatures in
the European Parliament (one tenth of all Members) coming from at
least one-half of the Member countries. Even if, in the end, it was the
Council that proposed the final candidate to the Parliament, a formula of
this sort might in fact be a basis for compromise between the two
positions whereby it is either elected by the Parliament or the Council
takes the lead.

There is a need for some excitement between the peoples of Europe, the
President and the European Parliament from a trans-border point of
view; in other words, if the candidate was clearly a pan-European one, it
would greatly contribute to that sense of excitement of which we are
somewhat lacking in Europe.

 B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

 **A_argue~
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

1245 Regarding the number of commissioners, it is time to face reality and
 1246 agree that Europe will more than ever need an effective and efficient
 1248 Commission, able to cope with the post-enlargement challenges. In the
 1249 medium term this means that the number of commissioners must be
 1250 dissociated from the number of Member countries. The best solution
 would give the President of the Commission some leeway in determining
 the number of Commissioners. This could be achieved by stipulating in
 the Constitution that the number of Commissioners is subject to a lower
 limit of, say, fourteen, and an upper limit of, say, eighteen. The pool of
 nominees could be put forward by Member States with each State
 nominating three individuals, at least one of which would be a woman,
 as proposed by the Praesidium.

**A_argue--
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-136
Kohout (Gouv.-CZ). - Mr Vice-Chairman, European integration has
 been developed through what is called the 'culture of institution' or the
 'Community method'. Having been cultivated thus far, it should be
 preserved and kept alive in the present institutional balance. The crucial
 institutional structures are the Council, the European Council, the
 Commission and the European Parliament. No more structures of that
 kind are needed, no congress and no president of the Council and of the
 European Council. I will focus on three issues: the election of the
 Commission President, the dissolution of the European Parliament and
 Council presidencies.

1255 First, with regard to electing the Commission President, the European
 1256 Council, acting by qualified majority, should compile a list of up to three
 candidates and send it to the European Parliament. The European
 Parliament would then elect a candidate. If need be, the election process
 could comprise three rounds at most, the reason being that both sources
 of legitimacy would have to be involved in the process, that is to say, the
 Member States and the peoples of Europe. I steadfastly stick to the
 principle of one fully-fledged commissioner per Member State when I
 speak about the composition of the Commission.

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

Secondly, the European Parliament could pass censure by the European
 Commission if the motion had the support of two-thirds of all MEPs. In
 that case, the resulting no-confidence vote would become a relevant
 proposal to be confirmed by the European Council. If the tabled motion
 had less support, it would become a relevant recommendation for the
 European Council. It would then decide whether or not to comply with
 the recommendation. If not, the European Council could dissolve the
 European Parliament.

The procedure just described concerning dissolution should also apply
 when the adoption of an annual budget was at stake in the European
 Parliament and/or whenever the European Commission decided to link
 the adoption of a basic legislative act with the confidence motion.

With regard to the Council presidency, we suggest it be organised in
 team arrangements and combined along two lines. The first should be a
 coordination line, institutionally represented by COREPER, the
 Coordination Council and the European Council. The second line should
 consist of Sectoral Councils. The team presidency of the Council should
 encompass between three and five Member States and reflect the
 categories of large, medium-sized and small countries as defined in a
 Council act adopted by unanimity.

The coordination-line presidency should be held on an alternating basis
 by one of the three presiding Member States and comprise teams set up
 for a period of six months. The presidency and sectoral Councils could
 be divided within the presidency team by its mutual accord. An

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aggregate presidency period of one team could last up to 24 months. To increase efficiency and to streamline internal coordination, the team presidency of the Council could, if it so wished, select a leader to exercise this function for the period of the team presidency.

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As you have probably noticed, my contribution is wholly in line with the common ground achieved by the government representatives of nine like-minded countries and is also, to a large extent, based on the contribution of principles and premises signed by 16 governments, colleagues of mine.

(Applause)

4-137

President. – It was quite clear. That is why you received applause. You are now a sort of faction here

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Muscardini (PE). - Signor Presidente, la composizione delle Istituzioni e la definizione dei loro compiti è il nodo cruciale dei nostri lavori; senza equilibrio tra i poteri non vi è effettiva capacità di incidere all'interno e all'esterno dell'Unione. Riaffermiamo per il Parlamento europeo la necessità di una proposta legislativa e l'ampliamento della codecisione per quegli interventi che implicano il coinvolgimento delle popolazioni per le conseguenze economiche e politiche. La riunificazione dell'Europa, prima a venticinque e poi a ventisette, deve garantire i principi democratici e di rappresentanza, con una Commissione composta da un Commissario per ogni Stato membro. L'attuale Unione a quindici ha una Commissione con venti Commissari: non riteniamo né utile né politicamente corretto, in questa fase delicata per il futuro dell'Unione, che l'Europa a venticinque, e poi a ventisette, abbia una Commissione ridotta. Per il gruppo "Unione per l'Europa delle nazioni" la soluzione più corretta e funzionale è quella di una Commissione di tanti membri quanti sono i paesi aderenti lasciando alla Commissione stessa e al suo Presidente l'organizzazione interna e l'assegnazione dei ruoli funzionali.

Riteniamo utile valutare la richiesta, presentata dal Mediatore, della parificazione del suo istituto ad una Istituzione comunitaria, purché sia prevista per ogni Stato la designazione di un Vicemediatore europeo, presupposto indispensabile ad evitare che il Mediatore si tramuti in organismo di sola facciata e non in grado di garantire l'interesse dei cittadini attraverso l'esame delle migliaia di richieste che questi gli rivolgono. Ricordiamo che, solo nell'ultimo periodo e nell'Europa a quindici, sono stati presentati al Mediatore più di diecimila ricorsi. Per quanto riguarda il Consiglio e il nuovo Consiglio dei ministri, è prioritario che si coniughi una capacità funzionale con il rispetto della rappresentanza democratica, affinché nessuno possa sostenere che l'Europa non rappresenta con uguale attenzione tutti gli Stati membri. Abbiamo più volte affermato la necessità che l'Unione parli con una sola voce in politica estera e per la sicurezza interna. Siamo lieti di vedere largo consenso su questa necessità. Segnaliamo comunque il rischio di conflitto di competenze tra Commissione e Consiglio qualora il rappresentante della politica estera, della sicurezza e delle relazioni esterne si trovasse a partecipare alle riunioni del Consiglio senza essere investito da un mandato della Commissione. Questa nuova figura, infatti, per la politica estera risponderebbe soltanto al Consiglio, pur essendo membro della Commissione, e per le relazioni esterne, invece, risponderebbe soltanto alla Commissione, creando così un personaggio investito di due funzioni distinte e dipendente da due diverse Istituzioni. Riteniamo perciò auspicabile, per evitare confusioni e conflitti di competenze, che questa parte dell'articolato sia trattata definendo meglio il ruolo di rappresentanza e il modo con il quale egli debba rispondere al

1271 Consiglio e alla Commissione.

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PRÉSIDENCE DE M. GISCARD D'ESTAING

Président

4-140

1279 **Lekberg (Parl.-SE).** - Herr ordförande! I likhet med många andra här
1280 anser även jag att Niceöverenskommelsen inte får rivas upp. Den handlar
ju om röstviktningen i rådet, sammansättningen i kommissionen och
antalet platser i parlamentet. Vi skall vara medvetna om att
Niceöverenskommelsen är en noga framförhandlad kompromiss. Jag tror
inte att slutresultatet av en ny förhandling skulle se så annorlunda ut.
1281 Däremot är jag säker på att en sådan förhandling skulle blockera arbetet
1282 både i konventet och i den kommande regeringskonferensen. Släpp
därför förslaget om att ändra i Niceöverenskommelsen!

1283 Däremot stöder jag presidietts förslag om en vald ordförande i
1284 Europeiska rådet, *men* det måste kombineras med ett
gruppordförandeskap som delar på ansvaret för att leda alla övriga
rådskonstellationer. Det är en viktig princip att det är medlemsstaterna
1285 som är ordförande i rådet och att det finns en jämlik rotation. Jag anser
1286 dock inte att vi behöver fördragsfästa de olika rådskonstellationerna. Jag
vill i detta sammanhang särskilt invända mot idén om ett särskilt
1287 lagstiftningsråd. Konsekvensen av det förslaget kommer att bli att vi får
1288 särskilda, fast stationerade företrädare i Bryssel. Vi skulle få någonting
som liknar ett Coreper 3, vilket jag inte tror att vi är betjänta av.

1289 Jag stöder däremot förslaget om att öppenheten skall gälla i rådets
1291 arbete. Överhuvudtaget måste vi förbättra öppenheten i institutionernas
1292 arbete på alla plan. Jag och flera andra har därför föreslagit att allmänna
principer om god förvaltning och öppenhet inom alla institutioner skrivs
in artikel 14.4 och att dessa principer konkretiseras på andra ställen i
konstitutionen.

B_demand, call for, desire~

**A_argue~

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

Jag delar vidare uppfattningen att vi måste ha en obereoende och stark
kommission. För att få en väl förankrad kommissionsordförande har jag
föreslagit att hon eller han skall väljas av de nationella parlamenten efter
en indikativ omröstning i Europaparlamentet. Låt därför Europeiska
rådet nominera ett antal kandidater, låt dessa kandidater sedan åka runt i
medlemsstaterna och bli utfrågade före omröstningen. Det skulle både
stärka kommissionen och föra kommissionen närmare medborgarna.

Jag tror fortfarande inte på en kongress. Unionen behöver inga nya
organ, utan reformera i stället COSAC. Jag tror att det är ett bra nätverk
för interparlamentariska kontakter.

Slutligen gläder det mig att flera ledamöter har tagit upp revisionsrätten.
Jag har lagt fram ett konkret förslag om att reformera revisionsrätten.
Den är mycket viktig för att värna om att unionens medel hanteras på ett
effektivt och korrekt sätt. Därför måste den också bli effektiv i sitt arbete
i en union med 25 medlemsstater. Jag har därför föreslagit att en
direktion med nio ledamöter utses för sex år i taget på roterande basis
och att dessa skulle överta den aktiva revisionen. Medlemsstaterna bör
dock ha företrädare i en styorkommitté som antar årliga arbetsprogram.

4-140 **Lekberg (Parl.-SE).** - Herr Vorsitzender! Genau wie viele
andere hier bin ich der Meinung, dass das Übereinkommen von Nizza
nicht rückgängig gemacht werden darf. Es handelt ja gerade von
Stimmengewichtung, die Zusammensetzung der Kommission und die

1294 Anzahl der Sitze im Parlament. Wir sollten uns bewusst sein, dass der Nizzavertrag ein sorgfältig ausgehandelter Kompromiss ist. Ich glaube nicht, dass das Endergebnis einer Neuverhandlung so anders aussehen würde. Dagegen bin ich sicher, dass eine solche Verhandlung die Arbeit sowohl im Konvent, als auch bei der kommenden Regierungskonferenz blockieren würde. Lassen Sie deswegen den Vorschlag zur Änderung des Nizza-Übereinkommens fallen!

B_threaten--

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to--
B_demand, call for, desire--

1295 Ich unterstütze dagegen den Vorschlag des Präsidiums für einen gewählten Vorsitzenden im Europäischen Rat, dies muss *aber* mit einem Gruppenvorsitz kombiniert werden, der mit die Verantwortung teilt, die übrigen Ratskonstellationen zu führen. Es ist ein wichtiges Prinzip, dass die Mitgliedsstaaten den Vorsitz im Rat haben und dass es eine gleichwertige Rotation gibt.

1296 Ich meine dennoch nicht, dass wir die verschiedenen Ratskonstellationen vertraglich festlegen brauchen. Ich will in diesem Zusammenhang besonders Einwände gegen die Idee eines speziellen Gesetzgebungsrates erheben. Die Konsequenzen dieses Vorschlages wären, dass wir spezielle, ständige Vertretungen in Brüssel bekommen. Wir würden etwas bekommen, was Coreper 3 ähnelt und ich glaube nicht, dass uns damit gedient ist.

1297 Ich unterstütze hingegen den Vorschlag, dass Öffentlichkeit für die Arbeit des Rates gilt. Generell müssen wir die Offenheit der Arbeit in den Institutionen auf allen Ebenen verbessern. Ich und einige andere haben deswegen vorgeschlagen, dass allgemeine Prinzipien einer guten Verwaltung und Offenheit in allen Institutionen in Artikel 14.4 niedergeschrieben werden, und dass diese Prinzipien an anderen Stellen in der Verfassung konkretisiert werden.

1300 Ich teile darüber hinaus die Auffassung, dass wir eine unabhängige und starke Kommission haben müssen. Um einen gut verankerten Kommissionsvorsitzenden zu haben, schlug ich vor, dass sie oder er von den nationalen Parlamenten, nach einer ersten Wahl im Europaparlament, gewählt wird. Lassen Sie daher eine Anzahl Kandidaten vom Europäischen Rat nominieren, lassen Sie diese Kandidaten daraufhin durch die Mitgliedsländer reisen und vor der Wahl befragen. Dies sollte sowohl die Kommission stärken, als auch die Kommission näher an die Mitbürger bringen.

1304 Ich glaube noch immer nicht an einen Kongress. Die Union braucht keine neuen Organe. Stattdessen sollte COSAC reformiert werden. Ich denke, dass dies ein gutes Netzwerk für interparlamentarische Kontakte darstellt.

Schließlich erfreut es mich, dass einige Mitglieder das Revisionsrecht aufgenommen haben. Ich habe einen konkreten Vorschlag für eine Reform des Revisionsrechts vorgelegt. Es ist sehr wichtig, um sicherzustellen, dass mit den Mitgliedsländern der Union in effektiver und korrekter Weise umgegangen wird. Daher muss es ebenso effektiv in seiner Arbeit in einer Union mit 25 Mitgliedern sein. Ich habe deswegen eine Direktion mit neun Mitgliedern vorgeschlagen, die für sechs Jahre jeweils auf rotierender Basis gewählt werden. Diese sollen die aktuellen Revisionen übernehmen. Die Mitgliedsstaaten sollten trotzdem Vertreter in einem Führungskommitté haben, das jährliche Arbeitsprogramme annimmt.

4-141

McAvan (PE). - Mr President, I am essentially happy with the compromises put before us by the Praesidium. They strike a good balance; they give something to each of the institutions and if we have that kind of approach it will make the European Union stronger in the future, which has to be our principal aim.

There are one or two areas in which I would like to see some changes. To have thirteen commissioners and thirteen sub-commissioners is not the best solution. We ought to have a small Commission, irrespective of

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whether that will be of thirteen or twenty members as Nice suggests. If there are twenty-seven, there will ultimately be an argument about whether there will be junior and senior commissioners. Somewhere or other there will have to be rotation whichever proposal comes up.

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With regard to the Court of Justice, there should be a maximum nine-year term of office, which is non-renewable. It is extremely important that our judges are totally independent and cannot have pressure put upon them. I hope the Praesidium will consider that. Regarding the Court of Auditors, I, along with other MEP colleagues, say that this should be cut down to nine members. We do not need a representative Court of Auditors; we need a professional Court of Auditors which does a good job. If that is by rotation, so be it. The main thing is that it should be a professional body.

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I also like the idea of a multi-annual EU work programme, which would be approved by the European Council and then looked at by the Parliament and the Commission.

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On the European Parliament, I could accept the limit of 700 Members which, as you rightly say, comes from the European Parliament's own conclusions. But given that all the planning now is working towards 732 and the Nice solution, let us live with the Nice solution, although I know that some of the applicant States were not entirely happy with it. There were one or two injustices on the margins of the Nice solution which we should address in this Convention and make sure that all States are treated equally.

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There is one clear mission in the proposals on the European Parliament, which my colleague Mrs Thorning-Schmidt referred to this morning, and that is the Parliament's seat. I used to have a colleague who had three trays on his desk: an in-tray, an out-tray and a 'too hard' tray, and I understand the Praesidium thinks the Parliament seat is in the 'too hard' tray category of problems to deal with. The travelling circus of the Parliament between Strasbourg and Brussels is the stuff of late-night deals in IGCs and it is one this Convention should resolve. I cannot imagine for a minute that, once a month, the House of Commons would want to go to Sheffield, where I live, to do its business. Or equally, that the French Chambre des Députés would like to move to Marseilles on a monthly basis to do its business. I hope that the 'too hard' tray will be tackled.

**A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to--
**A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

On the idea of a congress, I am not convinced that we need a new institution but I am sure my MEP colleagues and I would look more kindly on it if the congress were to go to Strasbourg, leaving us to meet in Brussels.

4-142

Lequiller (Parl.-FR). - Mes chers collègues, ne perdons pas de vue l'essentiel. Regardons le chemin que nous avons déjà parcouru ensemble à la Convention. Il faut le dire clairement: la Convention est déjà une réussite. Jamais une conférence intergouvernementale n'aurait abouti à ce que nous avons construit depuis quinze mois, jamais elle ne pourra être aussi efficace. La méthode conventionnelle est donc la seule qui puisse réussir. C'est pourquoi je soulignerai, comme d'autres l'ont fait pour commencer, combien notre responsabilité à nous conventionnels, est capitale. Nous n'avons pas le droit d'échouer au regard de la confiance qui nous est faite, des espoirs placés en nous. Il nous faut donc un vrai consensus le 20 juin pour éviter un blocage ultérieur qui constituerait un très grave préjudice pour l'Europe.

Je souscris à l'esprit général des propositions du praesidium, à savoir la

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clarification du rôle du Conseil européen avec la stabilité de sa présidence indispensable à l'extérieur comme à l'intérieur - si nous n'aboutissons pas sur ce point, ce serait un échec pour l'Europe et nous serions ridicules aux yeux des citoyens européens qui attendent cette réforme comme dans le monde -, le renforcement du Parlement européen comme colégislateur, la distinction des fonctions législatives et exécutives du Conseil des ministres, la création d'un forum ou d'une Convention - au passage je préfère ces dénominations qui me paraissent plus populaires que celles de congrès - pour avoir un débat annuel sur l'état de l'Union devant les représentants du Parlement européen et des parlements nationaux.

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Je suis également partisan d'une Commission reserrée parce que la Commission ne représente pas les Etats mais promeut l'intérêt général européen. J'ai participé à des très nombreuses réunions sur le terrain, notamment au cours de ce dernier mois de mai très européen, avec des citoyens et notamment des jeunes. Pour eux, nous devrions consacrer la Commission comme gardienne de l'intérêt général européen, dans son rôle comme dans sa composition. En cédant à une représentation de chaque Etat, on consacrerait un comble et une immense chance manquée. J'ajoute, comme je l'ai dit ce matin à l'occasion d'un carton bleu, que nous aurons bien cette période transitoire qui devrait rassurer les inquiets. Mais, au terme de cette période, il nous faudra faire progresser l'Europe, en instaurant une proposition reserrée de la Commission et en s'inspirant peut-être de certaines propositions qui ont été faites par le Bénélux.

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Pour ce qui concerne la présidence du Conseil des ministres, je crois nécessaire de rechercher un équilibre entre l'indispensable stabilité du Conseil européen et le nécessaire partage des responsabilités entre les différents Etats membres. J'ai déposé un amendement dans ce sens qui prévoit un mécanisme de présidence par équipe de trois pays pour une période de 18 mois.

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J'ai la conviction qu'il nous faut faire preuve à la fois d'imagination et de pragmatisme pour atteindre l'efficacité et le consensus. C'est ce que nous avons fait en ce qui concerne le ministre européen unique des affaires étrangères. Compte tenu du débat contradictoire dans cette Convention sur la double présidence de la Commission et du Conseil, nous pourrions, afin de rapprocher les points de vue et de défendre une idée véritablement européenne, proposer au moins à terme une présidence unique de l'Union, comme l'ont exposé Lamberto Dini, Andrew Duff, Michel Barnier, Marco Follini, Antonio Tajani, René Van der Linden et d'autres. Je serais heureux, Monsieur le Président, que le Praesidium prenne en compte cette idée. Elle permettrait, selon moi, une grande visibilité, une simplicité de compréhension et une force sur la scène internationale comme sur la scène intérieure. Encore une fois, nous sommes régis depuis le 1er février 2003 par le Traité de Nice qui restera en vigueur jusqu'à la ratification de la Constitution. Nous pourrions proposer ce Président unique par exemple au terme de deux législatures. Ce serait faire déjà un pas en direction de ceux qui ont exprimé leur réserve quant à la double présidence.

Si l'on est frileux, si l'on s'arc-boute sur l'avantage de chaque institution ou chaque Etat, on tourne le dos à l'idéal de Monnet, de Schuman, de De Gasperi et on affaiblit l'Europe. Le mandat que l'on nous a donné est de construire une Europe forte et cohérente. Je souhaite qu'on aboutisse le 20 juin à une proposition forte de la Convention.

4-143

Chabert (Comité des Régions). - En date du 5 mai 2003, le Comité vous a transmis un certain nombre d'amendements concernant le chapitre

**A_argue--
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

B_demand, call for, desire-

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institutionnel pour la partie 1. Je résume brièvement ces propositions et ces amendements.

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D'abord, le Comité des régions propose d'être élevé au niveau d'institutions, d'être associé pleinement au travail législatif de l'Union en ce qui concerne les problèmes d'intérêt local et régional, d'être intégré dans le mécanisme d'alerte rapide pour le contrôle de l'application du principe de subsidiarité au même titre que les parlements nationaux, de pouvoir introduire des plaintes devant la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne non seulement en cas de violation du principe de subsidiarité mais également pour la défense de ses propres prérogatives, d'étendre la consultation obligatoire du Comité à tous les cas où le principe de subsidiarité est en cause, de recevoir de la part des organes législatifs de l'Union des explications en cas de non reprise des avis du Comité des régions.

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A_claim (facts and values)-

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Monsieur le Président, les membres du Comité des régions sont des mandatés politiques. Ils sont élus au niveau local et régional. Le Comité dispose donc de la pleine légitimité qui lui permet d'être associé au travail législatif de l'Union, d'autant plus que les autorités locales et régionales sont responsables de la mise en œuvre de trois quarts des actes législatifs et des actions de l'Union.

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Permettez-moi enfin de répéter ce que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de dire antérieurement. Ceci ne doit ni allonger, ni compliquer la procédure législative de l'Union. Le Comité des régions accepte tout délai raisonnable que les organes législatifs de l'Union pourraient lui imposer.

B_demand, call for, desire~

4-144

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Andriukaitis (Parl.-LT). - Mr President, last weekend Lithuania held a referendum on its membership of the European Union. The preliminary result showed that as many as 63% of all eligible voters in Lithuania came to cast their ballot and 91% of them said 'yes' to Lithuania's accession to the European Union. It was a conscious decision made by our citizens in their endorsement of the results of the accession negotiations that are now enshrined in the Accession Treaty signed on 16 April in Athens. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to thank all the Members of the Convention who contributed to this success.

The constitutional articles that we are debating today and that are to determine the institutional set-up are, in most cases, inconsistent with the provisions of the Nice Treaty. They clearly promote the intergovernmental method and do not provide for a strengthening of the European Parliament or of the European Commission. The articles are very declarative, ambiguous and require further detailed consideration. It has become clear that the European Union has not done its homework, but it does not mean that we need to hurry and create an entirely new legal basis for institutional interrelations. After all, we are not acceding to a *new* European Union.

Lithuania thinks that it is very important to respect the principle of equality among Member States, to retain the rotating presidency and to ensure institutional balance. Lithuania is also strongly in favour of strengthening the Community method and we also believe that the European Parliament should have the right to select the President of the European Commission from several candidates. The budgetary powers of the European Parliament should also be expanded, and its control over the activities of a foreign minister should be increased. We believe that the Commission should be based on the principle of one representative per Member State.

1346 We oppose the creation of new institutions and can see no legitimate
 1347 reason for the creation of the 'Congress of the Peoples'. We are not
 1349 interested in reviewing all the compromises made in Nice and I agree
 Today we should, without any delay, set up working groups and
 discussion circles to identify the mainstream tendencies and to explore
 possible compromises and alternatives

B_reject, decline, refuse-
 B_demand, call for, desire-

4-145
 1350 **Kelam (Parl.-EE).** - Mr President, in March, sixteen government
 1351 representatives made a common contribution to the Convention.
 Estonian Members of Parliament share their approach. We firmly believe
 that in reforming the EU institutions, principles such as the Community
 method, retaining the institutional balance and respecting the equality of
 all Member countries, small or big, should be maintained and even
 reinforced. This above all concerns the proposals relating to the Council
 presidency. At the January plenary session, Estonian delegates presented
 the arguments for maintaining the present system of a rotating
 1352 presidency. Today, the idea that a directly-elected super-president of the
 1353 Council could best solve our main concern, that of enhancing democratic
 legitimacy and so creating a European demos, raises more new questions
 than it answers.

A_claim (facts and values)-

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-

**A_give reasons-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

1354 Firstly, hoping to involve European citizens more actively in democratic
 1355 governance by direct election of the Council president seems to be a
 rather superficial and fragile way to overcome the enormous gap
 between institutions and peoples. Moreover, it runs contrary to the very
 principles of equality, democratic control and balanced functioning of
 the institutions. As for Estonia, I cannot imagine going home and asking
 my voters to say 'yes' to the EU if they clearly see themselves playing
 only a statistical role in the future. On a large democratic stage, a player
 with less than one million votes can influence practically nothing. Quite
 the opposite. Such an approach would promote the division of Europe
 into 1st class and 2nd class Members in the eyes of many of its new
 1356 citizens.
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B_accommodate-
 B_demand, call for, desire-

In addition, a directly-elected President of the Council lacks the
 mechanism of parliamentary control and accountability, and would pose
 a real threat to the institutional balance. Therefore, the Estonian
 parliamentarians are in favour of maintaining the principle of equal
 rotation. As has been said today, rotation has kept the EU alive and
 democratically functioning thus far. There could be several ways of
 improving the efficiency and co-ordination of the Council, which have
 not been tested yet. These include, among others, multi-annual
 programming of its activities, developing a strong secretary-general,
 transferring more functions to the Council's General Secretariat or to the
 Commission, especially at working-group level.

Moreover, I would not exclude forming team presidencies for a longer
 period. There should be only one President of the EU which should be
 the President of the Commission and should have more authority and
 freedom to organise the work of the commissioners. Estonian MPs
 support sticking to the rules established in the Nice Treaty. As Mr Roche
 said today, small Members have already paid the price for the principle
 of equality in Nice.

When there are twenty-five commissioners, some kind of groupings
 might be formed within the Commission; however each Commissioner
 should continue to have equal voting rights. I liked what Mr Vitorino
 said today, as a paradox of Convention debate, that in spite of apparent
 differences there is a surprising amount of consensus regarding the
 principles. I hope that if we concentrate upon principles we can have a

successful conclusion.

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4-146

De Rossa (Parl.-IE). - Mr President, something that we should bear in mind, particularly in the light of recent events, is that to a large extent we are all small states. Some are smaller than others but, nevertheless, we would not have a Union if there was not a sense of interdependence. That is why the Union exists and why it is growing. There is a sense that we need each other in order to act in the world.

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We also need to bear in mind that we are involved in a process that is constantly evolving. We would all like to lay down the burden and say that we have settled the institutional and constitutional issues, but in trying to settle the constitutional issues now, we have to allow for the fact that we will continue to evolve and develop. Therefore, we should not close off all possibilities for further developing our ideas. For instance, election of the President of the Commission by the European Parliament is a practical proposition now. It is reasonable to leave open the possibility of having a popular election for the President of the Commission in the future. Our Constitution should allow for such a development. If Mr Bruton was prepared to accept that, I would add the possibility that Parliament could also be dissolved under certain circumstances. That is probably an offer that Mr Bruton could not refuse at this stage.

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While the Praesidium's proposals are interesting, they fail to maintain the balance between the institutions, the Member States and, in some respects, the equality of Member States, particularly in relation to the Commission. However, I do not agree with those who say that only small states paid the price for equality of Member States in the Commission. All states paid the price through the loss of one commissioner by those Member States which previously had two and through rotation. It is important to bear in mind that it is not so much representation that is important in the Commission but sensitivity, the need to ensure that the Commission is sensitive to all the issues that may arise in relation to Member States. It is difficult to foresee how that can be achieved without having, at some point, representation of each Member State on a rotational and equal basis. That needs to be maintained.

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

With regard to the Parliament and the number of MEPs, leaving aside the question of practicality in terms of how we decide how many MEPs to have, it is difficult to perceive a situation where all the political diversity of individual Member States could be represented in the European Parliament unless there are at least six Members for the smaller Member States and we build on that. It is important that the citizens of Europe feel that they are represented in the European Parliament. By reducing the representation of each Member State to a point where only large groups - that is, the large political entities - are represented, there would be alienation of large sections of the population in Member States, and therefore alienation from the European Parliament.

(Applause)

4-147

Kacin (Parl.-SI). - Mr President, I find it hard to understand how a weak president - as it is envisaged in the draft articles submitted to us by the Praesidium - could contribute to the EU playing a larger role in the world. I do not understand how someone whose political career at home has faded out, who does not have a secretariat and whose powers overlap with those of the foreign minister would be able to deliver. How would

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this solve Kissinger's dilemma of who you should call if you want to talk to the President of the EU? How is a weak President of the Council better than the rotation of the presidency, which at least reflects equality among Member States and has, for small and new countries, not only a symbolic meaning but also helps these countries to put themselves on the European map and gives them the opportunity to promote their political excellence and the multilateral operational capabilities of the states holding the presidency?

A_claim (facts and values)-

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Please do not misunderstand me. I do not wish for a strong president of the Council. I advocate a strong Commission, one that will be set up in such a way as to reflect the equality of Member States and will be the main and efficient executive authority, a Commission whose Vice-President will be a double-hatted foreign minister. This is a Commission that will be capable of safeguarding common European interests and of promoting and developing them both at home and abroad. The legitimacy of the Commission should be achieved by having the European Parliament vote on the Commission's president. Otherwise, voters will not see any point in attending European elections.

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**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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If they cannot have an influence on the political orientation of the Commission and if the set-up of the Commission more or less matches the political set-up of the European Council, then voters will see no meaning in voting in European elections. It is clear, however, that the set-up of the Parliament must take into account national states. I believe that digressive proportionality - as suggested by the Praesidium - is not the right answer. We have to insist on the Nice agreements, which adequately reflect relations between the states. The EU needs positive discrimination against small states in order to promote their political development, which is manifested in the European Parliament. Reducing the number of MEPs from small countries would not enable the national political distribution to be reflected in the European Parliament, as Mr De Rossa mentioned. In smaller states the MEPs would be members of large political parties, since smaller parties would not be able to reach the threshold of 20%. The Nice compromise is a balanced and just solution.

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A_approve, admit as correct-

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The EU, as it was outline at Nice, has also been agreed upon by citizens of candidate countries in four referenda. Changing these agreements would call into question the accountability of the work of this Convention.

In the area of foreign policy the Convention made a big step forward when we agreed to merge the functions of High Representative and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. This will give us a lighthouse with a clear face that will allow us to react to foreign policy challenges and defence challenges in real time.

4-148

Cisneros Laborda (Parl.-ES). – Señor Presidente, quisiera intervenir con gran brevedad, porque cuando básicamente se coincide con las propuestas de la Presidencia y del Praesidium, se siente uno relativamente eximido de la necesidad de argumentar tan fuertemente como cuando se discrepa o se disiente.

Yo pienso que, como tantas veces hemos dicho, tenemos el deber de superar viejas querellas y pienso que, sustancialmente, el documento propuesto por la Presidencia y el Praesidium lo consigue en buena medida en orden al mantenimiento de los equilibrios básicos y a la preservación de las características del método comunitario. Pienso que el Parlamento Europeo es, inequívocamente, la institución emergente: sus poderes han venido siendo ampliados y han de serlo en el futuro Tratado

1385 constitucional, y la adopción de la codecisión como procedimiento
1386 legislativo ordinario parlamentariza, sustantivamente, la futura
arquitectura institucional.

1387 Creo que una Comisión fuerte e independiente, como la deseamos, debe
ver reforzada su derecho de iniciativa en todas las materias y que hay
que reconocerle la facultad de aprobar la legislación delegada y extender
1388 el método comunitario al conjunto de las materias pertenecientes al
espacio de justicia e interior.

1389 Creo también que el cumplimiento en plenitud de las responsabilidades
1390 que el artículo 4 del Tratado atribuye al Consejo Europeo, reclama, en
1392 orden al impulso de la Unión y definición de sus orientaciones y
políticas generales, la figura del Presidente estable, definido por el
artículo 16 bis del proyecto del Praesidium. Creo sinceramente que la
ampliación no hace realista ni viable el mantenimiento de la Presidencia
rotatoria y que esta Presidencia estable dotará de una enorme visibilidad
a la Unión Europea tanto hacia el exterior como hacia el interior.

1393 Y para terminar, Señor Presidente, por señalar un punto de discrepancia,
1394 no creo prudente, en cambio, revisar las previsiones institucionales del
1395 Tratado de Niza, sobre todo en lo que se refiere a la determinación de la
1396 mayoría cualificada. Cuando menos es prematuro. Y tampoco debe
ignorar la Convención el complejo equilibrio de compromisos y
compensaciones que subyace tras los acuerdos de Niza. Me temo que
revisarlo suscitaría las reticencias de la futura CIG sobre el conjunto de
nuestro trabajo.

4-149
1397 **De Villepin (Ch.E/G.-FR).** - Monsieur le Président, chers collègues,
nous sommes aujourd'hui confrontés à une urgence internationale qui
souligne bien le besoin de plus d'Europe. Il y a une attente, un désir
d'Europe. L'Europe élargie doit prendre la mesure, non seulement du
changement que représente le passage de quinze à vingt-cinq mais aussi
de la nécessité, pour l'Union, de décider et d'agir davantage à la mesure
des enjeux. Il nous appartient à nous, conventionnels, de trouver les
réponses.

Les propositions du praesidium nous encouragent à avancer dans cette
voie. Nous voulons le faire tous ensemble, comme nous l'avons proposé
hier avec l'Allemagne, et comme nous y invite aujourd'hui le Bénélux.

A mes yeux, la dynamique institutionnelle a construire doit combiner
efficacité, légitimité et équilibre entre les institutions. En ce qui concerne
l'efficacité tout d'abord, plusieurs projets d'articles constituent des
avancées essentielles pour l'avenir de l'Union. Je pense en particulier à la
création d'un président à plein temps pour le Conseil européen, comme
c'est le cas pour le Parlement et la Commission. Je pense à celle d'un
ministre européen des affaires étrangères. En ce qui concerne la
légitimité ensuite, l'autorité politique des institutions doit être rehaussée.
Ainsi, les modalités d'élection du président de la Commission doivent
donner un plus grand rôle au Parlement européen. Par ailleurs, au
Conseil, les ministres directement concernés par une négociation doivent
continuer à participer activement aux travaux législatifs. Sur ce point, il
nous faut encore approfondir et clarifier la proposition du praesidium.
En ce qui concerne l'équilibre enfin, le projet du praesidium vise à
assurer un meilleur fonctionnement de l'équilibre institutionnel, qu'il
s'agisse du Parlement européen, des modalités de vote au Conseil ou de
la composition et l'organisation de la Commission. Cette proposition
renforce précisément l'efficacité et la légitimité de chaque institution,
notamment celles du président de la Commission européenne à diriger et
à organiser son équipe. Il faut préserver la cohérence interne du système
institutionnel. C'est une condition du succès de nos travaux.

- ⊗ A_approve, admit as correct-
- ⊗ B_reject, decline, refuse-
- ⊗ B_threaten-
- **A_argue-
- ⊗ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- ⊗ B_demand, call for, desire-
- **A_argue-
- ⊗ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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Pour conclure, je souhaiterais insister sur l'importance que la Convention trouve un accord sur les institutions. Il est illusoire de penser que la conférence intergouvernementale parviendrait à réussir ce que la Convention aurait échoué à faire. C'est pourquoi je voudrais lancer un appel à chacun et à chacune des membres de cette Convention pour qu'ensemble, nous acceptions de chercher un consensus, comme nous y invite le praesidium et comme beaucoup l'ont dit aujourd'hui. Nous devons saisir cette occasion historique pour l'Europe, pour ses citoyens et pour chacun de nos Etats. Ne laissons pas cette chance nous échapper.

**A_argue-

A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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(Applaudissements)

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Marinho (PE). - Senhor Presidente, o nosso modelo de União assenta a sua legitimidade na vontade dos Estados e na vontade dos cidadãos. Nunca a Europa se fortaleceu no choque ou nas rupturas de equilíbrio entre estes dois pilares. A governamentalização da União, que começou com a partida de Jacques Delors e levou um primeiro-ministro a liderar a Comissão, é uma experiência que, como sabemos, acabou mal. Prosseguir nela presidenciando pessoalmente o Conselho Europeu é enfraquecer a União. Uma coisa, Senhor Presidente, é ser um *primus inter pares* liderando um colégio por si próprio escolhido ou influenciado - como acontece na Comissão - e outra é ser designado por um colégio de chefes de Estado e de Governo e ter em seguida a força e autoridade para lidar ou liderar quem o escolheu. Na circunstância, o escolhido presidente ou *chairman* do Conselho já não é um par dos que o nomearam e muito menos será um *primus*: será uma personalidade, uma referência moral ou intelectual, talvez útil para aconselhar mas não para exercer o poder político, que já não lhe advém de parte nenhuma.

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A solução da presidência pessoal da União é, portanto, uma solução frágil e frouxa. Em vez de representar, o presidente será um representante, em vez de liderar será um porta-voz, em vez de mandante será um mandatário. Por isso, conjuntamente com a senhora deputada Pacciotti, defendemos a presidência do Conselho por um chefe de Estado e de Governo em exercício, por alguém com dupla legitimidade, a que advém de liderar democraticamente um dos Estados da União e a que lhe foi conferida pela confiança dos seus pares no Conselho. Obviamente no âmbito do sistema de rotatividade actual.

Onde for necessária mais estabilidade e continuidade, no Conselho de Assuntos Gerais, nos Assuntos Económicos e Financeiros, na Segurança e na Justiça, a rotação por país dilata-se, talvez por um período de um ano. Deste modo o governo não tem de suportar o excesso de trabalho e de responsabilidade quando exercer a presidência da União, como é o caso de hoje. Pode, assim, o presidente do Conselho fomentar a coesão e o consenso nos dois Conselhos do seu semestre, isto é, fazer política. E deste modo haverá, numa legislatura de cinco anos, dez presidências do Conselho Europeu e quinze presidências das três restantes formações rotativas do Conselho. Teremos assim vinte e cinco presidências possíveis para vinte e cinco Estados-Membros, ao que acresce a presidência do Conselho dos Assuntos Externos exercida estavelmente pelo ministro ou comissário dos Negócios Estrangeiros.

Finalmente, teremos a presidência do Conselho Legislativo, verdadeira câmara de Estados, que elege o seu presidente em toda a liberdade, como faz o Parlamento Europeu, câmara dos cidadãos, pelo período também que entender. Pelo menos vinte e seis ou vinte e sete presidências são possíveis conjugando a igualdade entre Estados com estabilidade e com eficácia. Quanto aos comissários, Senhor Presidente, haja um por Estado-Membro. Há governos bem maiores e não me parece que haja interesse comum sem auscultação do interesse nacional. A não ser que se

1410 acredite - como o senhor presidente dizia esta manhã - que pode haver
1412 comissários que são bafejados pelo espírito santo.
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4-150 Translation

Marinho (PE). - Senhor Präsidente, o nosso modelo de União assenta a sua legitimidade na vontade dos Estados e na vontade dos cidadãos. Nunca a Europa se fortaleceu no choque ou nas rupturas de equilíbrio entre estes dois pilares. A governamentalização da União, que começou com a partida de Jacques Delors e levou um primeiro-ministro a liderar a Comissão, é uma experiência que, como sabemos, acabou mal.

1414 Prosseguir nela Präsidenciando pessoalmente o Conselho Europeu é enfraquecer a União. Uma coisa, Senhor Präsidente, é ser um *primus inter pares* liderando um colégio por si próprio escolhido ou influenciado - como acontece na Comissão - e outra é ser designado por um colégio de chefes de Estado e de Governo e ter em seguida a força e autoridade para lidar ou liderar quem o escolheu. Na circunstância, o escolhido Präsidente ou *chairman* do Conselho já não é um par dos que o nomearam e muito menos será um *primus*: será uma personalidade, uma referência moral ou intelectual, talvez útil para aconselhar mas não para exercer o poder político, que já não lhe advém de parte nenhuma.

1415 *Die Governamentalisierung der Union, die mit der Abgang von Jacques Delors angefangen hat und dazu geführt hat, dass ein Premierminister die Kommission geleitet hat, ist ein Experiment das, wie wir wissen, ein schlechtes Ende gefunden hat. Es durch die Personalisierung des Europäischen Rates fortzusetzen, würde eine Schwächung der Union bedeuten. Eine Sache ist es, Herr pr, ein "primus inter pares" zu sein, der ein von ihm selbst ausgewähltes oder beeinflusstes Kollegium leitet - wie es der Fall in die Kommission ist - eine ganz andere Sache, von einem Kollegium der Staats- und Regierungsoberhaupten nominiert zu werden und darauf die Macht und Autorität zu besitzen, die die einen gewählt haben zu leiten. Unter diesen Umständen, ist der gewählte Präsident nicht mehr ein „par“ derer, die ihn gewählt haben, und noch weniger ein „primus“: er würde eine Persönlichkeit sein, eine moralische oder intellektuelle Bezugsperson, vielleicht nützlich beim Beraten aber nicht, um die politische Macht auszuüben, für die er nicht mehr über eine Legitimation verfügt.*

1417 A solução da Präsidência pessoal da União é, portanto, uma solução frágil e frouxa. Em vez de representar, o Präsidente será um representante, em vez de liderar será um porta-voz, em vez de mandante será um mandatário. Por isso, conjuntamente com a senhora deputada Pacciotti, defendemos a Präsidência do Conselho por um chefe de Estado e de Governo em exercício, por alguém com dupla legitimidade, a que advém de liderar democraticamente um dos Estados da União e a que lhe foi conferida pela confiança dos seus pares no Conselho. Obviamente no âmbito do sistema de rotatividade actual.

Die Lösung durch eine persönliche (=personal) Präsidentschaft der Union ist, also, eine fragile und schlappe Lösung. Statt zu repräsentieren, würde der Präsident ein Repräsentant sein, statt zu leiten würde er ein Sprecher sein, statt ein Mandant ein Mandatar. Daher setzen wir uns zusammen mit der Frau Abgeordneten Pacciotti für die Ratspräsidentschaft in den Händen eines amtierenden Staats- und Regierungsoberhauptes ein; jemand der doppelt legitimiert ist, einmal durch die demokratische Führung einer der Unionsstaaten und einmal durch das Vertrauen, das seine „pares“ im Rat in ihm gesetzt haben. Natürlich im Rahmen des jetzigen rotativen Systems.

Onde for necessária mais estabilidade e continuidade, no Conselho de Assuntos Gerais, nos Assuntos Económicos e Financeiros, na Segurança e na Justiça, a rotação por país dilata-se, talvez por um período de um ano. Deste modo o governo não tem de suportar o excesso de trabalho e de responsabilidade quando exercer a Präsidência da União, como é o caso de hoje. Pode, assim, o Präsidente do Conselho fomentar a coesão e

**A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_reject, decline, refuse-
**A_explain-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

**A_argue-
A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

o consenso nos dois Conselhos do seu semestre, isto é, fazer política. E deste modo haverá, numa legislatura de cinco anos, dez Präsídências do Conselho Europeu e quinze Präsídências das três restantes formações rotativas do Conselho. Teremos assim vinte e cinco Präsídências possíveis para vinte e cinco Estados-Membros, ao que acresce a Präsídência do Conselho dos Assuntos Externos exercida estavelmente pelo ministro ou comissário dos Negócios Estrangeiros.

Da wo mehr Stabilität und Kontinuität gebraucht wird, im Rat Für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, in Wirtschaftlichen und Finanziellen Angelegenheiten, Sicherheit und Justiz, wird die Rotativität pro Land vielleicht bis zu einem Jahr ausgedehnt. Auf diese Weise, braucht die Regierung nicht den Überschuss an Arbeit und Verantwortung auszuhalten, während sie die Präsidentschaft der Union ausübt, wie es heute der Fall ist. So kann der Ratspräsident die Kohäsion und den Konsens in den zwei Räten seiner Semester fördern, was bedeutet, Politik zu machen. Und auf diese Weise wird es, in einer funffährigen Legislatur, zehn Präsidentschaften des Europäischen Rats und 15 Präsidentschaften der restlichen rotativen Abteilungen/Formationen (=formacao) des Rates. Wir würden so 25 mögliche Präsidentschaften für 25 Mitgliedsstaaten haben, hinzu kommt die Präsidentschaft des Rates für Außenangelegenheiten, vom Außenminister oder Kommissar für Außenangelegenheiten ausgeübt.

Finalmente, teremos a Präsídência do Conselho Legislativo, verdadeira câmara de Estados, que elege o seu Präsidente em toda a liberdade, como faz o Parlamento Europeu, câmara dos cidadãos, pelo período também que entender. Pelo menos vinte e seis ou vinte e sete Präsídências são possíveis conjugando a igualdade entre Estados com estabilidade e com eficácia. Quanto aos comissários, Senhor Präsidente, haja um por Estado-Membro. Há governos bem maiores e não me parece que haja interesse comum sem auscultação do interesse nacional. A não ser que se acredite - como o senhor Präsidente dizia esta manhã - que pode haver comissários que são bafejados pelo espírito santo. *Als letztes, werden wir die Präsidentschaft des Legislativen Rats haben, einer echten Staatenkammer, die ihren Präsidenten in voller Freiheit für die Periode, die sie für richtig hält, wählt, wie es sich beim EP, der Bürgerkammer, verhält. Mindestens 26 oder 27 Präsidentschaften sind möglich, die Gleichheit der Staaten mit der Stabilität und der Wirksamkeit (efficacy) abstimmd. Was die Kommissare angeht, Herr Pr, soll es einen pro Mitgliedsstaat geben. Es gibt viel größere Regierungen und es kommt mir nicht so vor, als ob es ein gemeinsames Interesse geben kann, ohne die nationalen Interesse zu zu hören. Außer, wenn man glaubt - wie der Herr Pr heute morgen sagte - dass es Kommissare geben kann, die von dem heiligen Geist angehaucht sind.*

**A_argue~
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

B_demand, call for, desire~
B_threaten~

4-151

Kalniete (Gouv.-LV). - Mr President, I would like to express my appreciation for the extensive and excellent work of the Praesidium and for your work, Mr President. I believe that our common aspirations for the outcome of the Convention as a whole and of the present draft of the Constitutional Treaty are rooted in our understanding of the basic principles of the Union. Equality of the States and institutional balance within the EU are the most important of those principles.

We are also concerned with the enforcement of the Community method. However, the institutional part of the present draft does not comply fully with those principles. I also believe that we have to have a common reading of the Nice Treaty as regards the institutions and to agree to keep the Nice Treaty intact. Otherwise, a Pandora's box will be opened.

The draft revises the Nice Treaty with regard to the number of Members of the European Parliament. The present draft refers to the European

1430 Parliament as a body representing only the citizens, not both the citizens
 1431 and the States. This infringes the principle of equality of the Member
 States and does not comply with the principle of the dualistic nature of
 the European Union.

- B_demand, call for, desire~
- **A_justify~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

1432 I strongly believe that, for the sake of the equality of the States, the
 1433 principle of the rotating presidency of the European Council has to be
 maintained. The system of the rotating presidency translates the role of
 every nation state in the EU. It also embodies the equality of each
 Member State. The responsibility and visibility of the rotating
 1434 presidency enables each Member State to strengthen the vision of the
 1435 European Union as a Union of different nation states with common aims
 and values. For the sake of retaining institutional balance, the proposal
 to grant the status of EU institution to the European Council is not the
 best solution. I also doubt whether having an elected president of the
 Council would conform to the principle of equality, even if Europeans
 were to elect him or her directly; it would disturb the institutional
 1436 balance of the European institutions.
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- B_uphold (an offer, promise)~

1439 As regards the voting procedures provided in the draft, I welcome
 1440 qualified majority voting as the general procedure as regards action
 taken by the Council of Ministers. Meanwhile I would like to suggest
 maintaining the definition of qualified majority voting in accordance
 with the Nice Treaty.

- B_demand, call for, desire~
- **A_give reasons~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

1441 To conclude, a few words about the composition of the European
 1442 Commission. Keeping to the logic of the Nice Treaty, we have an
 opportunity to preserve the current principle of representation: one
 1443 commissioner, one Member State. Doubts have been raised concerning
 1444 the capacity to work efficiently. Let us test our capability to work among
 twenty-five. After the transitional period, we shall have the right
 experience to decide on the appropriate functional arrangements as to the
 composition of the Commission.

4-152

Griecius (Parl.-LT). - Mr President, I would like to draw the
 Convention's attention to the following points concerning the new
 institutions.

Firstly, it is important to emphasise the need to preserve, at least for ten
 or fifteen years, the rotating presidency of the European Council.
 Rotation guarantees respect for the principle of equality of the Member
 States and direct involvement of the administrations of the Member
 States in the life of the Union. The work of the European Council could
 be driven forward by a secretary-general of the Union, appointed by the
 European Council. The Secretary-General could ensure proper
 cooperation and continuity, as well as facilitating cohesion and
 consensus within the European Council by, *inter alia*, presiding over the
 General Affairs Council.



I support the proposal of establishing the post of EU Secretary dealing
 with the foreign and defence matters of the European Union. He or she
 should handle the Union's external relations by chairing the Foreign
 Affairs Council. In that way the European Union Secretary could ensure
 that the Union is effectively represented in the world.

As regards the Commission, it is essential that each Member State has a
 national in the Commission. Adherence to this principle is important for
 several reasons. It will enable the new Member States easily to adjust to
 working within the EU institutional framework. It will also strengthen
 the Commission in terms of legitimacy. States having proposed their
 own member to the Commission will also strengthen their citizens'

1445 confidence in this institution.
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1447 Regarding the European Court of Justice, I support the proposal to drop
1448 the idea of a six-year renewable term of office for the judges. The vast
and complex body of the Court's jurisprudence merits a longer term of
office. I therefore support a nine-year, non-renewable term of office.

1449 Nor can I support the idea of establishing a Congress of the Peoples of
1450 Europe. I do not see how the Congress could improve the efficiency and
transparency of the EU decision-making process. Instead, I would
encourage the signing of an inter-parliamentary agreement between the
European Parliament and the parliaments of the Member States.



 **A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

 B_reject, decline, refuse-

4-153

1452 **Voggenhuber (PE).** – Herr Präsident, liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen!
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Ich sehe die Hauptaufgabe des Konvents und seine historische
Herausforderung darin, eine europäische Demokratie zu entwerfen. Die
Institutionenordnung ist die Architektur dieser supranationalen
Demokratie. Deshalb ist es mir wichtig, alle Vorschläge auf die
Einhaltung der Kriterien Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Grundrechte,
Öffentlichkeit, Legitimation und Kontrolle zu prüfen. Ich habe schon am
Vormittag die schweren Demokratiedefizite im Vorschlag eines
hauptamtlichen Ratspräsidenten aufgezeigt. Die Legitimation des Rates
besteht ausschließlich darin, dass seine Mitglieder Teile einer
parlamentarisch legitimierten Regierung sind. Wie kann also jemand, der
nicht Mitglied einer parlamentarisch legitimierten Regierung ist,
Präsident des Europäischen Rates werden? Das ist ein
Legitimationsdefizit völlig neuer Dimension! Das kann niemandem in
Europa klargemacht werden!

 **A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

1458 Nun zu einigen anderen Fragen, die man auch stärker unter
1459 demokratiepolitischen Aspekten berücksichtigen sollte: Wenn wir den
Außenminister nach dieser Doppelhuttheorie sowohl zum
Vizepräsidenten der Kommission als auch zum Außenminister machen,
hat dies konstitutionelle Konsequenzen. Wenn er nämlich als
Vizepräsident der Kommission nicht nur einen leeren Titel trägt, ist er
Teil dieser Kommission. Dann muss er aber auch durch das Europäische
Parlament bestätigt werden und unterliegt als Mitglied der Kommission
dem Misstrauensvotum, sonst ist das ein leerer Titel und von Doppelhut,
von einer wirklichen doppelten Funktion, ist keine Rede. Das ist zur
demokratischen Legitimation dieses neuen hochdiffizilen Amtes
unverzichtbar

Beim Parlament würde ich dringend bitten, die Bedeutung der
Haushaltshoheit neben der Gesetzgebung als Herzstück des
Parlamentarismus zu sehen. Der Haushalt und die Finanzielle
Vorausschau sind Gesetze. Es widerspricht der Gewaltenteilung, das
Parlament nicht daran teilhaben zu lassen. Diese Gesetze würden ein
schweres Defizit an Legitimation aufweisen, würde man das verweigern.

Die Wahl des Kommissionspräsidenten - das ist auch an Peter Hain
gerichtet - ist die Beibehaltung des Status quo. Das ist keine Neuerung
und keine Stärkung des Europäischen Parlaments. Aber bei diesem
Vorschlag handelt es sich nicht um eine Wahl. Das ist ein
Etikettenschwindel, es handelt sich nur um eine Bestätigung. Daher mein
Vorschlag: Das Europäische Parlament wählt die Kommission, der Rat
bestätigt sie. Spielen wir nicht mit Worten, das, was derzeit vorgesehen
ist, ist keine Wahl, sondern lediglich eine Bestätigung!

Zum Europäischen Gerichtshof: Hier würde ich mir dringend wünschen,
dass die Funktion, die Grund- und Bürgerrechte zu garantieren, in den
Text aufgenommen wird. Das ist dann wichtig für den Teil III, in dem

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der Zugang zum Europäischen Gerichtshof bei Individualbeschwerden behandelt wird. Der Europäische Gerichtshof garantiert die Grund- und Bürgerrechte. Das ist eine wesentliche Funktion.

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Zum Kongress habe ich nur zu sagen, dass es auch hier im Konvent seit Monaten einen gewaltigen Konsens dagegen gibt. Parlamentarismus lässt sich nicht in Wochenendsitzungen herstellen. Parlamentarische Legitimation ist das Ergebnis eines großen, kontinuierlichen Kontroll- und Legitimationsprozesses. Er lässt sich nicht durch ein gemischtes Gremium von Parlamentariern verschiedenster Parlamente in Wochenendsitzungen verwirklichen.

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Le Président. - Nous avons quatre cartons bleus. La parole est à Madame Almeida Garrett.

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Almeida Garrett (PE). - Senhor Presidente, agradeço ter-me dado a palavra e desta vez não me ter trocado pelo meu querido colega Rainer Rack. Sei que se diz por aí que o poder é um assunto tipicamente masculino, mas também é voz corrente, não sei se sábia, que a busca da harmonia e do consenso são qualidades essencialmente femininas. E o que gostaria de apoiar são as intervenções de abertura de muitos que mostraram que estamos na altura de convergir e de construir pontes entre nós, sem perdermos de vista a coerência e o equilíbrio do sistema e as nossas próprias convicções. Esse é que é verdadeiramente o espírito "convencional".

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Quanto à composição da Comissão e ao risco de nacionalização dos comissários, é importante dar o seu a seu dono e lembrar que a responsabilidade histórica dessa confusão recai em primeiro lugar nos países que em Amesterdão exigiram, em troca da perda do segundo comissário, a reponderação dos votos no Conselho. O que pedem os representantes que defendem agora um comissário por país não pode ser visto como ajuste de contas. E é nesse espírito que venho apoiar a ideia de confiar ao presidente da Comissão a exclusiva responsabilidade da organização da sua equipa, apenas com critérios gerais de enquadramento normativo.

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Quanto ao Conselho Europeu, a estabilidade e a continuidade necessárias, mais do que na mão de um *chairman* a tempo inteiro contratado entre um ex-primeiro-ministro, ex-par, perdedor de eleições ou aposentado político, essa estabilidade e continuidade estará seguramente num programa político plurianual de que aqui falaram Andrew Duff, António Vitorino e outros e que, esse sim, afastará a instável alteração das prioridades da União fixadas de seis em seis meses.

4-155 Translation

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de confiar ao Präsidente da Comissão a exclusiva responsabilidade da
organização da sua equipa, apenas com critérios gerais de
enquadramento normativo.

*Was die Zusammensetzung der Kommission angeht und das Risiko einer
Nationalisierung der Kommissare, ist es wichtig, jedem zu geben, was ihm
zugesteht und in Erinnerung zu rufen, dass die historische
Verantwortung für diese Verwirrung in erster Linie den Ländern
zuzuordnen sei, die in Amsterdam eine Neuverteilung der Stimmen im
Rat gefordert haben, als Gegenleistung für den Verlust des zweiten
Kommissars. Was die Repräsentanten, die sich für ein Kommissar pro
Land einsetzen, jetzt verlangen, kann nicht als eine Abrechnung
angesehen werden. Und es ist in diesem Sinne, dass ich die Idee
unterstütze, dem Präsidenten der Kommission die ausschließliche
Verantwortung für die Organisation seines Team anzuvertrauen, nur
unter allgemeinen Kriterien des normativen Rahmen.*

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necessárias, mais do que na mão de um *chairman* a tempo inteiro
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Andrew Duff, António Vitorino e outros e que, esse sim, afastará a
instável alteração das prioridades da União fixadas de seis em seis
meses.

4-156



Tomlinson (Parl.-GB). - Mr President, I would like to return to two
points raised earlier.


The first, raised by Mrs McAvan, concerns the Court of Auditors, about
which we have not heard a great deal but which is extremely important.
The original proposal in the Praesidium's paper to leave the number of
members of the Court of Auditors at 25 does not stand up to the rationale
of the rest of the debate we have had. Although my personal preference
is for a Court of Auditors which has a professional controller and auditor
general at the top with a non-executive board, I am prepared to go along
with the kind of compromise put forward by some members of the
European Parliament for a limited executive board of about nine
professional people, with all countries represented by non-executive
members. That would be an important extension of power to the
European Parliament, particularly if it were given the power proposed by
Mr Christophersen's reflection group in relation to value for money
accounting and to ensuring not just the proprietary and regularity of
expenditure but also value for money.

The other point is that I strongly support Mrs Thorning-Schmidt, not in
stating where Parliament's seat should be, but in that the most
fundamental power of any parliament - and all sorts of people have used
all sorts of language about how much additional power this Parliament
ought to have - is to decide its place or places of work. If it chooses to
work in two seats, let it accept the responsibility for its own stupidity.
But, if it does not want the blame, let it have the power to choose its seat.

4-157

Severin (Parl.-RO). - Mr President, we are all in favour of equality, but
equality does not, and should not, mean the complete representation of
each Member State in each institution of the Union. Equality means
checks and balances between the institutions. Equality means

 **A_argue~
 A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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transparency. It means chances. With this in mind, I do not see how a longer presidency - which means more efficiency and continuity - is against equality. Perhaps we could add to that the idea of a presidential board, where a certain, more dynamic rotation could be achieved.

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At Commission level, we should see equality but not inefficiency. Efficiency should be there. From this point of view, quality would be the best answer to our need for equality.

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Le Président. - Je vous remercie de vos propos Monsieur Severin. Dernier carton bleu et dernier orateur, Monsieur Peter Hain.

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Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB). - Mr President, I should like to come back to the subject of the new single Legislative Council, which worries me greatly and is an idea to which we are opposed. This is a new institution. I want to explain why I do not believe that any of the cabinets of our Member State governments will buy it.

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If I have to go back to my cabinet and say to the Transport Minister, the Minister for Agriculture, the Finance Ministers who rejected the idea yesterday, that they cannot legislate any longer because this is the responsibility of a European minister in a single Legislative Council based in Brussels, I will not be able to get that through. I do not think I should try. Under the sectoral Councils we have succeeded in binding into Europe the environment ministers, the transport ministers, the agricultural ministers much more effectively than delegating this responsibility to one person who, in a coalition government, would find it much more difficult to carry out.

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We ought to take the best ideas from this and improve transparency and openness in existing Council meetings. All sectoral Councils, when they are legislating, should be open, democratic and transparent. We should also look at how we can strengthen the ability of the General Affairs Council, when it has the report back from other Council formations - usually a ritual item that goes through in a matter of seconds. They have the ability to look again at any legislation that has come up from a sectoral Council and ask if it is in the general European interest.

That way, rather than in a new institution which will not be acceptable to all of our cabinets and would indeed be rejected by them, is the way to go forward and meet some of the very good ideas that Mr Amato, amongst others, has put forward for greater transparency and accountability when the Council legislates.

4-160

Le Président. - Monsieur Peter Hain, je prends moi-même un carton bleu pour vous répondre, pour vous expliquer la position du praesidium sur ce point. Si le praesidium a proposé qu'il y ait un conseil législatif, c'est tout de même que dans la plupart des pays démocratiques, on cherche une certaine unité de la législation. Et il est très difficile d'atteindre cette unité s'il y a des cellules autonomes qui légifèrent chacune dans leur secteur et en fonction de leurs compétences techniques ou autres. C'est de là que provient l'idée d'avoir un conseil de synthèse pour la législation. Mais, en même temps, nous avons prévu dans notre proposition, qui sera sans doute discutée, que dans ce conseil législatif, on puisse amener d'autres membres du gouvernement et notamment ceux qui auront pu siéger dans des conseils spécialisés afin que, comme vous l'avez dit, l'expertise des conseils spécialisés puisse être transportée au sein du Conseil législatif. Nous croyons que c'est une meilleure procédure parce que elle permet d'avoir l'expertise, tout en ayant un travail législatif synthétique, commun à l'ensemble des sujets

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que traite l'Union.

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Nous avons encore quelques orateurs pour le débat général ainsi que quelques cartons bleus. Nous avons commencé tôt ce matin et nous allons commencer demain matin à 9h30. Par conséquent, nous prendrons les 6 derniers orateurs et les 2 ou 3 cartons bleus pendant une demi-heure environ demain matin. Nous passerons ensuite au rôle international de l'Union et aux problèmes de défense. Nous mènerons cette discussion jusque dans l'après-midi, en nous efforçant de ne pas aller, si nous le pouvons, au-delà de 18h du soir pour que vous puissiez éventuellement prendre d'autres dispositions. Je vous remercie. La séance, que je crois avoir été utile, est levée.

(La séance est levée à 19h30)