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Memos: 0

Quotations: 239

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EN
EUROPEAN CONVENTION
THURSDAY, 11 JULY 2002

4-011

EN
External action of the EU: general debate

4-012

FR

Le Président. - Nous en venons à l'important sujet qui nous occupe d'aujourd'hui.

Ce matin, certains parlementaires nationaux s'interrogeaient sur l'opportunité de faire précéder nos débats d'une introduction. Comme le temps nous est compté, je ne veux pas empiéter sur vos délibérations. En préalable à ces débats, il convient simplement de rappeler que l'Union est un acteur très important sur la scène internationale, même si, parfois, son action paraît modeste quand on la mesure à certains résultats en tant qu'acteur. Son poids économique, les moyens financiers qu'elle consacre à l'aide au développement dans le monde, qui est la contribution la plus importante actuelle sur le plan international, les liens historiques et les positions géographiques de ses États membres font en sorte que les citoyens européens attendent beaucoup du rôle que doit jouer l'Union européenne dans le monde. Cette attente est partagée par nombre de nos partenaires internationaux. Ainsi dans nos débats, à l'instar du questionnement qui vous a été adressé, la question ne sera pas de savoir si l'Union a un rôle à jouer. En effet, nous savons tous qu'elle a un rôle à jouer. Nous devons définir comment elle peut le faire le mieux possible. Dans vos dossiers, vous trouverez le document 161, qui décrit la situation actuelle en matière de commerce international et d'aide au développement, les aspects internationaux des politiques internes de l'Union, la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, la politique de sécurité et de défense et, enfin, la difficile question de la représentation de l'Union dans les enceintes internationales. Tels sont les points que nous aimerions voir traités par nos orateurs. À cet effet, nous avons préparé un groupe de questions qui figurent à la fin de ce document.

Nous pouvons donc commencer notre réunion. Le premier orateur inscrit est Mme Ana Palacio à qui je donne la parole. <BRK>

4-013

ES

Palacio Vallelersundi (Ch.E/G.-ES). - Señor Presidente, he querido que mi primera intervención, después de mi nombramiento como ministra de Asuntos Exteriores del Reino de España, fuera en mi calidad de miembro de esta Convención y en este hemiciclo.

(Aplausos)

Usted ha destacado, señor Presidente, que mi nombramiento es un espaldarazo a esta Convención. Es la prueba de la importancia que le presta el Presidente Aznar. Pero hay más: nombrar ministro de Asuntos Exteriores a alguien cuya experiencia política se ha desarrollado en este Parlamento, en el seno de un partido europeo, de uno de los grandes partidos que han hecho Europa, creo que es un reconocimiento simbólico de primera magnitud de la realidad de Europa, del calado de Europa, de la presencia de Europa. Y más aún: creo también que es una prueba de que el lema de la Presidencia española "más Europa" refleja un convencimiento profundo.

Señor Presidente, España quiere más Europa en política exterior, de seguridad y de defensa, y la pregunta es: ¿cómo lograr este objetivo? España siempre ha unido a su europeísmo un marcado carácter pragmático. Y en el ámbito de la PESC, este pragmatismo es aún más necesario, ya que el verdadero desafío es forjar una auténtica voluntad política común. Es correcto así el planteamiento de extender progresivamente el método comunitario a la PESC. Debe reforzarse el papel de la Comisión convirtiéndola en el centro de gravedad de la iniciativa política en esta área.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN]-

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

024 Pues bien, señor Presidente, en mi opinión el método clásico comunitario ha
025 funcionado maravillosamente cuando se trata de regular y de legislar, y España, allí
026 donde deba aplicarse, lo defenderá con todas sus consecuencias. Sin embargo, hay
027 que tener en cuenta que la PESC no tiene un carácter legislativo, sino eminentemente
028 ejecutivo.

029 Además, señor Presidente, quiero dejar constancia de que la aceleración del proceso
030 de mundialización acrecienta la interdependencia de las distintas políticas tanto en el
031 ámbito económico como en el ámbito político. El 11 de septiembre reveló de forma
032 trágica que la seguridad interior tiene un carácter transnacional y que los Estados no
033 pueden ya abordar unilateralmente problemas como el terrorismo. Una visión
034 restrictiva de la política exterior, de seguridad y de defensa no permite responder
035 adecuadamente a las expectativas de los ciudadanos europeos, para quienes no es
036 comprensible que la respuesta global de la Unión Europea contra el terrorismo y
037 otras amenazas similares no pueda incluir la dimensión militar.

038 Por lo tanto, señor Presidente, uno de los grandes retos de esta Convención es
039 encontrar un sistema pragmático para responder a esta demanda de los ciudadanos.
(Aplausos) <BRK>

040 4-014
041 FR

042 **Le Président.** - Je vous remercie. Je vous appellerai maintenant "Madame le
043 Ministre". Nos relations vont changer. <BRK>

044 4-015
045 DE

046 **Brok (PE).** - Herr Präsident! Die Bevölkerung will eine gemeinsame europäische
047 Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, wie wir das aus Umfragen wissen.
048 Sie hat erkannt, dass der Nationalstaat diese Probleme nicht mehr alleine bewältigen
049 kann, sie hat sogar erkannt, dass die bisherige Politik zur Marginalisierung Europas
050 führt und dass nur gemeinsame Anstrengungen es gestatten, dass wir in dieser Welt
051 noch eine Rolle spielen.

052 Der Mehrwert lässt sich nicht durch die alte Allianzmethode gewinnen, sondern nur
053 durch die Gemeinschaftsmethode.

054 Es kann nur einen Weg geben, dass wir eine einzige Administration haben, dass all
055 die Instrumente in einer Hand sind. Es kann nur so gehen, dass ein Mehrwert
056 gewonnen wird, indem man eine einzige Analyse hat. Statt 15 nationale Analysen
057 zusammenschreiben, brauchen wir eine Analyse aus gemeinschaftlicher Sicht.

058 Es kann nur so gehen, dass man in der Handelspolitik alles zusammenfasst, nicht nur
059 den Bereich des klassischen Warenverkehrs, sondern auch beispielsweise den der
060 Dienstleistungen, die bisher nicht in europäische Zuständigkeit fallen.

061 Ich meine, dass aus diesem Grunde die Synergien auch nur gewonnen werden
062 können, wenn wir dies alles auch in einer Arbeitsgruppe behandeln und nicht in zwei
063 Arbeitsgruppen.

064 Aus diesen Folgerungen heraus ist es wichtig, dass die Positionen von Solana und
065 Patten zusammengefasst werden müssen.

066 Da sind zwei hervorragende Persönlichkeiten tätig, aber wenn wir zwei Bürokration
067 aufbauen, bekämpfen sich diese Bürokration nach aller Erfahrung mehr, als dass sie
068 zu gemeinschaftlichen Zwecken zusammenführen.

069 Deswegen ist es notwendig, dass wir die Aufgabe eines Hohen Beauftragten für
070 Außenpolitik verschmelzen mit der eines Außenkommissars in der Kommission, der
071 eine besondere Legitimationsbindung zum Rat hat, weil natürlich die Außen- und
072 Sicherheitspolitik nicht zu 100% allein mit der Gemeinschaftsmethode bewältigt
073 werden kann. Dieser kann eine gemeinsame Analyse und gemeinsame Vorschläge
074 unterbreiten.

075 Aber das ist genau der Unterschied zur Gemeinschaftsmethode: Es geht nicht um ein
076 Initiativmonopol auf Seiten der Kommission, sondern es müssen auch Initiativen von
077 Seiten der Mitgliedstaaten möglich sein.

078 Ich glaube, nur wenn auch diese Möglichkeit einer wirklichen parlamentarischen
079 Kontrolle gegeben ist, kann mit einem Haushalt gefahren werden und können
080 Verantwortlichkeiten klar geregelt werden. Das ist übrigens eine Regelung, die auch
081 mit einem Superpräsidenten nicht geschaffen werden kann. Wenn ein Superpräsident

- 024 A_claim (facts and values)-
- 025 **A_argue-
- 026 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- 027 **A_argue- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- 028 **A_argue-
- 029 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- 030 **A_argue-
- 031 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- 032 **A_argue-
- 033 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- 034 A_conclude, (logically) infer-
- 035 **A_give reasons-
- 036 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- 047 **A_clarify

auf Seiten des Rates geschaffen wird, der exekutive Aufgaben erfüllen soll, wenn er im Bereich der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik die alleinige Zuständigkeit erhält, wenn er Haushaltszuständigkeiten bekommt, dann kann es keine parlamentarische Kontrolle mehr geben, weder durch die nationalen Parlamente noch durch das Europäische Parlament. Dies kann auf Dauer nicht funktionieren! Ich glaube, ein entscheidender Punkt ist, dass wir Verantwortlichkeiten und Transparenz schaffen, und nicht neue Nebenhaushalte. Deswegen ist die Anbindung an die Kommission von ungeheurer großer Bedeutung.

Letztlich geht es bei dieser Entscheidung, ob wir einen Superpräsidenten im Rat schaffen oder eine Lösung finden, die im Zusammenhang mit der Kommission steht, darum, ob Jean Monnet oder Metternich gewinnt. Ich glaube aber, dass Metternich daran gescheitert ist, weil er keine Legitimation hatte. Deswegen zeigt die Geschichte, dass dies der falsche Weg ist!

Ich meine, dass wir den Rat natürlich mit einer starken Rolle versehen müssen. Es müssen Entscheidungen gefasst werden, die Mehrheitsentscheidung muss möglich werden. Aber im Bereich der Verteidigungspolitik werden natürlich Mehrheitsentscheidungen nicht notwendig sein. Aus diesem Grunde müssen wir dort Möglichkeiten schaffen, die eine *coalition of the willing* ermöglichen, das heißt, wenn es einen Weg gibt, wo verstärkte Zusammenarbeit sinnvoll ist, dann im Bereich der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, um eben diese *coalition of the willing* zu ermöglichen.

Die Synergien zeigen uns auch, dass dies im Bereich der Rüstungspolitik, der Forschung der Rüstungspolitik vorangebracht werden muss. Wir geben 60% des Betrags aus, den die Amerikaner für Verteidigungspolitik aufwenden, erzielen aber nur 10% des operationellen Ergebnisses. Die knappen Haushalte unserer Mitgliedstaaten zeigen, dass gemeinschaftliche Lösungen uns die Chance geben, nicht marginalisiert zu werden!

(Beifall) <BRK>

4-016

PT

Lopes (Ch.E/G.-PT). - Senhor Presidente, caros colegas, portadora de valores fundamentais que desejamos universais e de princípios que se fundam na salvaguarda da paz, na prosperidade, na liberdade, na segurança e na justiça, a acção externa da União tornar-se-á ainda mais justificada num mundo que mostra alguns sinais de poder tender para politicamente unipolar, culturalmente homogéneo e economicamente desregulado. Perante a globalização, a União deve ser capaz de afirmar-se como entidade económica e politicamente reguladora, e como factor de equilíbrio e estabilidade nas relações internacionais.

Mas não nos deixemos iludir: a tarefa com que nos confrontamos é difícil e obrigamos também, enquanto União, a mudar velhos hábitos e modelos. Alterar a visibilidade e a eficácia da acção externa da União não é meramente uma questão técnica ou que se produza por simples alteração de alguns articulados dos Tratados. É certo que os instrumentos e os meios de que a União já dispõe podem e devem ser aperfeiçoados e desenvolvidos. Mas de pouco valerá esse esforço se lhe faltar o essencial, isto é, a sustentação de uma forte vontade política comum para alcançar objectivos partilhados. Essa vontade política comum, que se tem construído e sedimentado ao longo da história recente do continente europeu, faz-se e continuará a fazer-se das várias e diferentes realidades históricas de cada um dos Estados membros, incluindo as suas relações com o espaço extra-europeu, nomeadamente em África e na América Latina.

Elas representam mais-valias, não devem ser vistas como obstáculos ou impedimentos. A acção externa da União terá, por isso, de continuar a desenvolver-se, tal como o próprio processo global da construção europeia, de forma gradual e evolutiva. Grandes saltos em frente são teoricamente possíveis, mas se for esse o caminho escolhido, correremos o risco sério de criar fracturas que, em última análise, se traduziriam em retrocessos perigosos.

Concordamos que, para ser mais eficaz e melhor responder às nossas expectativas e aos desafios concretos de hoje, a acção externa da União necessita de mais meios e mais instrumentos. No desenvolvimento da PESC a Comissão deverá ter um papel acrescido de iniciativa e de coordenação, para o que deverá dispor dos

correspondentes recursos. Por outro lado, a acção ou capacidade política não pode ser independente da capacidade de mobilização dos instrumentos da acção externa. Não se trata de duas moedas distintas, mas de duas faces de uma só moeda. Caminhemos, pois, em frente, mas façamo-lo com os olhos na nossa realidade; com espírito aberto, mas sentido de equilíbrio; com ambição, mas sem rupturas. <BRK>

Translation : 4-016

Lopes (Ch.E/G.-PT). - Senhor Präsident, caros colegas, portadora de valores fundamentais que desejamos universais e de princípios que se fundam na salvaguarda da paz, na prosperidade, na liberdade, na segurança e na justiça, a acção externa da União tornar-se-á ainda mais justificada num mundo que mostra alguns sinais de poder tender para politicamente unipolar, culturalmente homogéneo e economicamente desregulado. Perante a globalização, a União deve ser capaz de afirmar-se como entidade económica e politicamente reguladora, e como factor de equilíbrio e estabilidade nas relações internacionais.

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Aber wir sollten uns keine Illusionen machen: die Aufgabe, vor der wir stehen, ist schwer und zwingt uns auch, als Union, die alten Gewohnheiten und Modelle zu ändern. Die Sichtbarkeit und die Wirksamkeit der Union zu ändern, ist nicht lediglich eine technische Frage oder eine Sache, die sich durch eine einfache Änderung einiger Paragraphen der Verträge ereignen wird. Es stimmt, dass die Instrumente und Mittel, die die Union zu Verfügung hat, können und sollten verbessert und entwickelt werden. Aber diese Bemühungen werden nicht viel bewirken, falls das Wesentliche fehlt, nämlich die Erhaltung eines starken gemeinsamen politischen Willens, das Erreichen der geteilten Ziele betreffend. Dieser gemeinsame politische Wille, der sich im Laufe der jüngsten Geschichte des europäischen Kontinents aufgebaut und gesetzt hat, entsteht und wird weiter entstehen, durch mehrere und unterschiedliche geschichtliche Wirklichkeiten jedes Mitgliedsstaats, einschliesslich dessen, was die Beziehungen/Verhältnisse mit dem außereuropäischen Raum, nämlich in Africa und Lateinamerika, betrifft.

Elas representam mais-valias, não devem ser vistas como obstáculos ou impedimentos. A acção externa da União terá, por isso, de

continuar a desenvolver-se, tal como o próprio processo global da construção europeia, de forma gradual e evolutiva. Grandes saltos em frente são teoricamente possíveis, mas se for esse o caminho escolhido, correremos o risco sério de criar fracturas que, em última análise, se traduziriam em retrocessos perigosos.

Diese repräsentieren einen Mehrwert, sollten nicht als Hindernisse oder Abhaltungen gesehen werden. Die externe Handlung der Union wird sich also weiter entwickeln müssen, so wie der globale Prozess des europäischen Aufbaus, in einer weiterentwickelnden und abgestuften Weise. Große Sprünge nach vorne sind durchaus theoretisch möglich, aber sollten diesen Weg wählen, laufen wir ernste Gefahr, Frakturen zu verursachen, die sich im Endeffekt in einen gefährlichen Rückschritt umschlagen könnten.

Concordamos que, para ser mais eficaz e melhor responder às nossas expectativas e aos desafios concretos de hoje, a acção externa da União necessita de mais meios e mais instrumentos. No desenvolvimento da PESC a Comissão deverá ter um papel acrescido de iniciativa e de coordenação, para o que deverá dispor dos correspondentes recursos. Por outro lado, a acção ou capacidade política não pode ser independente da capacidade de mobilização dos instrumentos da acção externa. Não se trata de duas moedas distintas, mas de duas faces de uma só moeda. Caminhemos, pois, em frente, mas façamo-lo com os olhos na nossa realidade; com espírito aberto, mas sentido de equilíbrio; com ambição, mas sem rupturas. <BRK>

4-017

NL

Timmermans (Parl.-NL). - Mijnheer de voorzitter, in de afgelopen twaalf jaar is de onmacht van Europa om zijn rol op het internationale vlak te spelen voor de Europeanen, vaak een bron van frustratie en soms ook van schaamte. Daarom vragen de Europeanen van ons dat wij met voorstellen komen om die positie te versterken. Idealiter zou het zo zijn dat we, als we in deze conventie toch toewerken naar het opruimen van de pijlerstructuren, dan ook het buitenlands beleid geheel onderbrengen in wat tot nu toe de eerste pijler heet en dus helemaal communautariseren.

Ik weet ook dat dat een onmogelijke opgave zal zijn omdat bepaalde onderwerpen altijd voor een voorzienbare periode tot het domein van de lidstaten zullen behoren. Denk bijvoorbeeld maar aan het uitzenden van troepen: dat zal nooit een onderwerp zijn waarover door het Europees Parlement wordt besloten, dat zullen de nationale parlementen zelf willen blijven doen. Dus dat is voor een deel onmogelijk.

Maar ik vind wel dat we moeten uitgaan van de opzet in het buitenlands beleid - dat hoort ook bij de aard van het buitenlands beleid - dat dat op het hoogst mogelijk niveau wordt geformuleerd: als het ware omgekeerde subsidiariteit. We spreken af dat iets op het communautaire niveau wordt aangepakt, dat op het communautaire niveau initiatieven worden genomen, tenzij blijkt dat dat onmogelijk is. Pas dan als teruggangpositie gaan we dingen intergouvernementeel aanpakken.

De eerste taak moet zijn om weer veilig te stellen dat datgene wat in de verdragen al communautair is geregeld, weer communautair wordt, want in de afgelopen jaren is de communautaire taak in het internationaal beleid geërodeerd, steeds meer naar de Raad gegaan ten koste van de Commissie. Dat is slecht. Kijk maar naar de handelspolitiek. Dus dat is onze eerst opgave. En vervolgens moeten we onderzoeken welke gebieden geschikt zijn om gecommunautariseerd te worden en alleen als dat niet lukt weer op een intergouvernementele aanpak overstappen. Daarvoor is nodig: een grotere rol van de Commissie; personele unie tussen de Hoge

Vertegenwoordiger, die zitting moet hebben in de Commissie, en de commissaris extern beleid: maximalisering van de meerderheidsbesluitvorming, inclusief altijd co-decisie door het Europees Parlement; rechtspersoonlijkheid van de Europese Unie, een zeer belangrijk punt; Unievertegenwoordiging in internationale organisaties, hetgeen wellicht dichterbij kan worden gebracht indien door wijziging van het systeem van voorzitterschappen daar een meer evenwichtige positie tussen lidstaten kan worden gekozen.

Maar op dit laatste punt wil ik één heel duidelijke waarschuwing laten horen. Ik heb namelijk de indruk dat de Raad en de Europese Raad ondertussen bezig zijn de eigen zaakjes alvast te regelen, ten nadele van de rol van deze conventie. Het mag niet zo zijn dat in de Raad en in de Europese Raad al conclusies worden getrokken over het functioneren van die instellingen waardoor aan deze conventie de mogelijkheid wordt ontnomen om daarvoor voorstellen te formuleren en om het buitenlands beleid meer te communautariseren dan momenteel het geval is. <BRK>

4-017 Translation
the Netherlands

Timmermans (Parl.-NL). - Sir the chairman, during the past twelve years, the inability of Europe to use its power to play a key role on the international level for the European people has often been a source of frustration and sometimes also of shame.

Therefore the European people ask us to make proposals to strengthen that position. Ideally, if we in this convention really work at eliminating the pillar structure, then we should also house the entire foreign administration department in what until now is called the first pillar and thus communitarize completely.

I also know that it will be an impossible assignment because particular policies will always belong for a foreseeable period in the domain of the member countries. The dispatching of troops for instance: this will never be a policy area on which the European Parliament can decide, the national parliaments will want to continue doing this. Thus this is partly impossible.

But I do find that in foreign administration, we must at least start with the intention - which is part of the nature of foreign administration - and that this is formulated at the highest possible level: as if it were subsidiarity reversed. We agree that things should be handled on a community level; that initiatives should be taken at a community level, except when that turns out to be impossible. Only then as fallback position, we should handle things at an intergovernmental level.

The first task must be to ensure again that what has been regulated on a community level in the treaties, becomes community again, for in the past years the community's role has eroded in the area of international administration; more and more has gone to the Council at the expense of the Commission.

That is bad.

Just look at the area of trade policy. Thus that is our first task. And then we must examine which areas are suitable for bringing to a community level and only when this doesn't work we should revert again to an intergovernmental approach.

Consequently we need; the Commission to play a larger role; the unification of personnel of the High Representative, who should be a part of the Commission, with the commissioners' external administration, maximal use of qualified majority voting, giving European Parliament a bigger say via the co-decision procedure; a legal personality for the European Union. A very important issue is the Union's representation at an international level, which could possibly be facilitated by changing the current system of presidencies into a more balanced position between

- **A_argue~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- A_conclude, (logically) infer~
- A_establish, mention~
- A_concede, grant, acknowledge, accept, admit~
- **A_argue~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_demand, call for, desire~
- **A_give reasons~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_judge~
- **A_explain~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_demand, call for, desire~

091

the member states.

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But on this last point I want to give a very clear warning. I have the impression, actually that the Council and the European Council are busy trying to solves these problems in their own way, at the expense of the role of this convention. The Council and the European Council should not yet draw conclusions about the functioning of those institutions. It would deprive this convention of the possibility to formulate proposals on this and to communitarize the foreign administration more than is presently the case. <BRK>

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4-018
EN

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Puwak (Romanian Government). - Mr President, allow me to add a word of welcome to our young colleagues here and to wish them success in their work for our common future.

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I want to refer to two interlinked aspects concerning the form and the substance of EU external action.

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The first concerns expectations about the CFSP. All of us and our citizens want it to have a higher profile and greater credibility. Europe has to speak with a single voice on the international stage.

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Let us give the Union a political identity equal to its economic force. Let us not forget the social implications. We should not delude ourselves into thinking that the

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Union can prosper without facing the political challenges of globalisation. The EU has to assume global responsibilities. EU action in relation to the CFSP should strengthen international stability, conflict prevention, the fight against international terrorists, extremists, poverty, and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

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The second element I find very important is that a coherent and prompt response to international events by the EU requires positive political action based on a common political will of the Member States.

In the meantime, we must remedy the anomaly that one EU body has the competence in this area and the power to decide, while another has the means and the instruments to implement decisions.

My third point is that the EU should aim to be the best example of institutionalised multilateral cooperation, with national sovereignty transferred for a common purpose.

Citizens expect a CFSP which is not narrowly interest-based but reflects solidarity, tolerance, engagement, commitment and inclusiveness.

The second aspect I want to mention is institutional change. Increased efficiency and coherence of EU external action may also require greater fusion of the responsibilities of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Relations.

This is a solution that can and should be considered. How the High Representative fits into the new framework needs to be clarified. Qualified majority voting must be extended to increase the efficiency and consistency of EU external action. <BRK>

4-019
FR

Barnier (CE). - Monsieur le Président, quand on parle, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui, des relations extérieures de l'Union, on est frappé par deux paradoxes. Le premier paradoxe est celui qui existe entre les souhaits des citoyens qui s'expriment via l'Eurobaromètre ou via les jeunes citoyens européens membres de la Convention, et les actes que posent dans certains cas les gouvernements ou les institutions européennes. Le second paradoxe est celui qui existe entre le foisonnement d'instruments juridiques permettant à la Communauté européenne d'exister en droit international - plus de 800 accords internationaux, bilatéraux, 200 accords multilatéraux - et la difficulté de l'Union à faire entendre sa voix ou à peser de son vrai poids lorsqu'un conflit ou une crise la concerne. Pourtant, comme vous l'avez vous-même dit, Monsieur le Président Giscard

- A_claim (facts and values) -
- B_demand, call for, desire -
- B_suggest (e.g. a solution) -
- A_argue -
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1] -
- A_argue -
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1] -
- A_argue -
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1] -
- A_claim (facts and values) -
- A_claim (facts and values) -
- A_argue -
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1] -
- B_demand, call for, desire -

d'Estaing, la Communauté est efficace lorsqu'il s'agit de développement et de coopération, de transport, d'environnement ou de normes techniques. Ainsi, elle a joué un rôle extrêmement important et reconnu dans la conception du protocole de Kyoto. Avec les 128 délégations et bureaux dont dispose partout dans le monde la Commission, l'instrument communautaire a les moyens de fonctionner.

En revanche, et malgré le rôle essentiel du Haut représentant pour la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune, Javier Solana, qui travaille en bonne intelligence avec la Commission et Chris Patten, l'Union est insuffisamment présente lorsqu'elle ne parvient pas à surmonter, lorsqu'elle se heurte à des différences de stratégie, de volonté et de culture politiques qui existent entre les États membres. Ainsi, une politique commune se construit dans les Balkans, mais elle a du mal à s'affirmer sur le dossier du Moyen-Orient.

Il nous faut donc, chers amis et collègues, réfléchir à ce qu'est une action de politique étrangère au niveau de l'Union, à la manière de concevoir au mieux les initiatives politiques, de représenter le point de vue des États membres et de les mettre en œuvre.

Et comme, dans ce domaine, c'est le pragmatisme qui est important, il faut donc partir de ce qui existe et de ce qui marche. Je voudrais donc dire un mot en conclusion de la politique commerciale de l'Union.

En matière commerciale, l'Europe a indiscutablement acquis le statut de super-puissance, sans être pour autant devenue un super-État. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de commerce, d'ailleurs. Cette politique nous permet de concrétiser nos valeurs de solidarité et de progrès social, notre volonté de maîtriser la globalisation, notre engagement en faveur du développement durable.

Il y a à cela trois raisons que je cite rapidement. D'abord, une vraie convergence de vues entre les États membres, qui a pris du temps pour se construire; ensuite, un dialogue permanent entre les institutions, entre la Commission qui propose et qui négocie, le Conseil qui décide, pour l'essentiel à la majorité qualifiée, et le Parlement européen que la Commission tient à associer aux débats stratégiques sur ces questions; et enfin, troisième raison du succès, parce que la Commission est chargée de la défense permanente de l'intérêt commun, surtout lorsque certains pays, à l'extérieur, pensent pouvoir nous diviser pour mieux régner eux-mêmes. En cas de crise, surtout face à un partenaire puissant, il faut que quelqu'un soit le garant de l'intérêt général.

On dit souvent que l'enjeu pour l'Europe est de parler d'une seule voix. Sans doute. Mais pour que cette voix soit entendue, encore faut-il qu'elle existe et que l'on prenne les moyens de la faire entendre. Cela touche aux problèmes de la personnalité juridique de l'Union, à la représentation de notre Union commune ou unique dans les instances internationales, et naturellement la question du budget.

Nous avons, Monsieur le Président, chers collègues et amis, quelques mois encore pour chercher, comme l'a dit Ana Palacio, sans idéologie et sans préjugés, les moyens de faire entendre cette voix de l'Europe. <BRK>

4-020

EN

McDonagh (Ch.E/G.-IE). - The starting point for our discussions today is that the citizens of Europe, including the young citizens of Europe represented here this afternoon, want the European Union to live up to its responsibilities on the global stage. Any analysis of where we are and where we want to go should begin with the reaffirmation of the objectives, values and interests that our citizens share, while recognising also that there is a genuine diversity of views within and across our countries about some of the implications of those objectives, values and interests. The ideals on which the EU was founded are the very ideals that can and should inspire its international role: conflict prevention, justice and the rule of law, the primacy of human rights and democracy, the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict resolution through negotiation, not war, and collective security.

In the era of advanced globalisation and interdependence that we live in, responsible global citizenship is not only right but necessary. The centrality of the UN Charter and the commitment to multilateral management of our common destiny on this planet is a core value.

The Union is uniquely placed, as a community of values and common interests and

as a prototype of advanced regional cooperation, to play a key international role for peace, stability and prosperity. We have a unique range of instruments at our disposal from trade and aid, to political and diplomatic relations across the globe, through to our early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management tools. There are our strengths. We should play to them.

I share the view of many that our debate should not be framed around the idea of the Union becoming some kind of global 'superstate', competing with the United States for world domination. A coherent, strategic approach drawing on the appropriate mix of instruments in response to or in anticipation of events is the way forward. It is difficult to foresee agreement to any proposals to collapse the Second Pillar into the First Pillar or to move away from a CFSP which is essentially intergovernmental. Foreign policy remains closely identified with national sovereignty for all Member States, large and small, in military alliances or otherwise.

There is, however, widespread agreement that the coherence of the CFSP and other aspects of external action can be improved.

Mr Solana, as High Representative, has proven the value of his office. He and Mr Patten, working together, have shown what can be achieved when these resources are harnessed together and work in tandem. The Council secretariat and the Commission could be more clearly mandated to provide the Council with single, unified recommendations both at the strategic level in terms of identifying and prioritising common interests, and at the more specific policy level in anticipation of, or in response to events.

It is clear that the common foreign and security policy and the Council secretariat need significant additional resources, both human and financial, to equip them for their expanded role, particularly for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. These issues can and should be addressed in the short term.

In discussions about further development of the EU's international role we tend to concentrate on what may not be working at the expense of what is. We should try to avoid reinventing the wheel. Many of the ideas such as generalised QMV in this area or communitarisation of the CFSP have been discussed and rejected in the past, for good reason.

External action is a hugely important area for the Convention and for Europe. We need to move forward in a practical, strategic way, building on two important things: first, on our strengths, which include diversity; second, on our shared values. <BRK>

4-021

IT

Tajani (PE). - Signor Presidente, qualche tempo fa un politico europeo definì il nostro continente un gigante economico, un nano politico ed un verme militare. Questo non può più essere, anche pensando ai giovani che partecipano ai lavori della Convenzione. Dobbiamo invece diventare protagonisti della fase che si è aperta dopo le tragiche vicende dell'11 settembre contribuendo attivamente al mantenimento della pace nel mondo.

L'Unione dovrà, inoltre, essere dotata di una reale capacità operativa militare in coordinamento con la NATO, e per questo, di fronte al parziale fallimento dell'UEO, occorrerà istituire un corpo militare europeo per il *peace keeping* e il *peace enforcing*.

Attenzione, però: con queste considerazioni non voglio assolutamente mettere in discussione il ruolo e la sovranità degli Stati nazionali! Sarebbe, questo, un grave errore strategico che ci priverebbe delle consolidate capacità di azione esterna e di difesa dei paesi dell'Unione. Si tratta, invece, di migliorare l'efficienza dell'azione comunitaria nei settori in cui è evidente l'inadeguatezza dei singoli Stati. La lotta al terrorismo, alla criminalità e al traffico di droga, il controllo dei flussi migratori chiedono la condivisione di oneri finanziari, di personale e di attrezzature. Per questo è necessaria una polizia unica per il controllo dell'immigrazione alle frontiere, come altresì indispensabile è una modifica delle politiche della cooperazione. Gli investimenti nei paesi dai quali proviene il grande flusso migratorio dovranno essere legati alla verifica della loro efficacia e alla disponibilità alla cooperazione fra polizie.

Da un altro punto di vista, un'Europa che superi gli attuali confini e voglia finalmente diventare protagonista di un'azione di pace dovrà anche darsi chiare direttrici di

A_claim (facts and values) -

*A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

politica estera. Se vorrà veramente essere forte, l'Unione non potrà non tener conto di un nuovo rapporto privilegiato con la Russia di Putin e non potrà fare a meno di essere protagonista nell'area del Mediterraneo. Proprio di recente, del resto, nella tormentata vicenda della Basilica della Natività di Betlemme, abbiamo potuto verificare quanto importante possa essere l'azione europea per disinnescare la mina del terrorismo e favorire una pace duratura tra Israele e palestinesi. Più in generale, riteniamo che tutti i paesi europei debbano far propria la grande direttrice politica mediterranea, fondamentale non solo per le questioni dell'immigrazione e degli equilibri geopolitici, ma soprattutto in relazione alle prospettive di crescita economica del continente, le quali rendono peraltro necessaria la costituzione di una vera Banca del Mediterraneo.

Concludendo, signor Presidente, per quanto riguarda il modello istituzionale della PESC e della PESD, occorre rivedere il principio dell'unanimità in seno al Consiglio ed aprire la strada alle cooperazioni rafforzate, evitando tuttavia di costituire direttori di pochi grandi Stati. Naturalmente toccherà al Parlamento europeo più forte il ruolo di indirizzo e controllo in materia di politica estera: una politica estera che, nella sua attuazione operativa, dovrà vedere, naturalmente, un miglior coordinamento tra Consiglio e Commissione.

(Applausi) <BRK>

4-022
EN

Attalidis (Cypriot Government). - Mr President, it has been repeatedly pointed out in our discussions that the external action of the Union must be strengthened. National debates, as well as public opinion polls, show that this is an area where European citizens favour stronger Union action.

The secretariat document on external action interestingly points out that the decisions on whether and how far we use the existing options provided for by the Treaties depends entirely on the political will of the actors involved and that there are no impediments deriving from the delimitation of competences between the Union and the Member States. This indicates that progress in this area is not only a question of designing more effective instruments, it is also a question of forging the necessary common political will.

Common will and common interest do not yet extend to all areas. This fact limits the scope of action and the speed of possible progress. At the same time, we must bear in mind the enormous importance of the Union's international action. The aims enshrined in the Treaties are too important to be left without effective means of pursuit.

So we must find ways to strengthen the trend towards the definition of the common interest in joint action and, in parallel with this, gradually advance to make the instruments available more effective.

More use of the instrument of common strategies will have many advantages. It would lead to the definition of more areas of common interest, it enables more flexibility in decision-making within the common strategy and it makes possible the coordination of the various components of external action.

A necessary element of enhanced external action is greater coordination and cooperation between the Commission and the High Representative.

One of the aims of this cooperation could be to propose additional common strategies or joint actions. This does not exclude the extension of the method used in the area of external trade, though in this case we must be clear that the Commission would retain its autonomy and right of initiative in other areas

Establishing Europe-wide institutions in the area of foreign relations and security would be important in promoting the convergence of analyses and views. A European institute of foreign relations and a European diplomatic academy could be considered.

4-023
EN

Peterle (Parl.-SI). - Mr. President, today we are debating the future of Europe together with the younger generation. Older generations in Slovenia went through

-  A_claim (facts and values) -
-  A_claim (facts and values) -
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-  A_claim (facts and values) -
-  **A_explain-
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-  **A_argue-
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, ex
-  A_claim (facts and values) -
-  B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-
-  **A_explain-
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

160 fascism, communism, two World Wars and, eleven years ago, Slovenia was attacked
by the former Yugoslav army.
I come from a place where, over the last ten years, very convincing arguments have
been made in favour of developing a common foreign and security policy. In the
161 Western Balkans, for example, such arguments are still produced when crises arise.
Developments in turbulent parts of south-eastern Europe have built an awareness of
the need for a common defence and security policy. I am very happy that foreign and
162 security policy is one of the key phrases in this Convention. It is admittedly one of
the most demanding, but hopefully also one of the most promising phrases used in
this forum.

163 Without wishing this to sound like a slogan, I would like to point out that the
European Union must be able to provide peace and security in its own territory in
164 partnership with the United States of America, and also export peace across the
165 globe. We must answer the question of whether, as a Union, we should focus on the
166 diversity of our various foreign policies or have an efficient unified policy.
167 This Convention should aim to make a big step forward towards a unified common
and security policy instead of making cosmetic embellishments to existing
achievements. This will probably be more difficult than the introduction of the single
currency. We have to be sensitive enough to define the scope of our common policy
and the means and procedures we should use to implement it. I cannot imagine a
168 strong euro combined with a weak CFSP. All pillars of the European Union should
stand firm. We cannot walk on one leg. <BRK>

169 4-024

170 EN

171 **Serracino-Inglott (Gouv.-MT).** - Mr President, the sixth and last, but certainly not
172 least, of the questions posed by the Praesidium to guide our debate concerns the
173 mode of representation of the European Union with third states. I will restrict myself
to just one additional consideration in support of the point made by our colleague
174 from Italy, to the effect that the European Union has a special mission in the
Mediterranean world.

There is a reason why the non-European Mediterranean world constitutes a field
within which the external action of the European Union needs to be deployed in a
very special way through specifically designed instruments: because there is a sea
between the European and the non-European part of the Mediterranean world. It is
the only inland sea of its kind on the surface of the earth. It provides an interface and
factor of communality rather than a frontier and barrier between north and south; a
rich repository of resources both natural and cultural, which - rationally - can only be
managed in an holistic way, through a cooperative endeavour between the European
and non-European sides of the same sea.

So it is necessary for the European Union to create some kind of special diplomatic
agency which can deal with the non-European Mediterranean states in an
exceptionally privileged way. The existence of such an agency - which could
eventually be responsible for the cooperative and holistic management of all the
resources of the sea - would provide perhaps the most effective network to promote
peace and development in the area. <BRK>

4-025

DA

Bonde (PE). - Hr. formand, Europas eliter diskuterer, om den fælles udenrigs-,
sikkerheds og forsvarspolitik skal styres af en næstformand i Kommissionen eller en
rådsformand. Målet er ikke bare at tale med en stemme i verden, nu skal der også
handles i fællesskab.

Udviklingspolitikken skal gøres til et stormagtsinstrument og lægges ind under
udenrigsministrenes råd. Handelsaftaler skal udstyres med hjemmel til at blande sig i
andre landes politik. Vi skal have øget fælles udenrigspolitisk repræsentation.
Militærmagt skal kunne bruges, når diplomatiet ikke længere rækker. EU er på vej til
at blive en supermagt.

Supermagter lader ikke deres handlinger begrænse af FN, og derfor skal EU heller
ikke være begrænset til kun at kunne handle militært, når FN giver mandat til det.
Den såkaldte fredsskabelse i Nice-traktaten er ikke bundet til folkeretten og FN. Den

175 eneste reelle begrænsning er, at EU-landene skal være enige for at kunne bruge det fælles militær. Men den begrænsning kan fjernes, uden at man spørger vælgerne om lov.

176 Så vi står over for en ny enhed i den internationale politik, som i andre lande vil kunne opfattes som en statsdannelse. Flertallet i Konventet formentlig, vil gøre EU til en militær supermagt som USA. Jeg spørger: er det klogt? Alle militære stormagter har indtil nu altid været involveret i krig. USA havde sit Vietnam, Sovjet sit Afghanistan. Hvorfor skulle en ny militært bevæbnet europæisk supermagt være 177 så meget anderledes.

Jeg tror, det er klogere at adskille civil udenrigspolitik og militærmagt og holde 178 forsvaret i NATO og fredsskabelse i FN og OSCE. Jeg tror, verden har mere brug 179 for, at EU optræder som en civil stormagt med tilbud om bistand til bæredygtig 180 udvikling. Det er bedre at forberede gavmilde forslag til topmødet i Johannesburg og bruge ressourcerne til gavn for miljø og udvikling.

181 Så til sidst lidt om formerne. I dag hedder de udenrigspolitiske instrumenter fælles strategier og aktioner. De binder politisk, men kan ikke kontrolleres af Domstolen. Jeg foreslår en forenkling, så alle udenrigspolitiske beslutninger fremover vedtages som henstillinger. Så er det op til landene, om de vil følge dem eller have deres egen udenrigspolitiske stemme. Dermed kan vi understrege, at EU er et samarbejde 182 mellem selvstændige lande og ikke en ny supermagt, som skal gøre USA rangen stridig som verdens leder. <BRK>

Translation 4-025

183 Mr. President, the elite of Europe discusses whether the common foreign-, security- and defence policies should be governed by a vice 184 minister in the Commission or a board president. The aim is not only to speak with one voice in the world, now it should also be acted together.

The development policy has to be made a super-power tool and put in under the board of the minister of foreign affairs. Trade agreements must be equipped with a title to interfere in the politics of other countries. We must have increased common foreign political representation. It should be possible to use military power when the diplomacy is no longer sufficient. EU is on the way to become a super power.

Super powers do not let their acts be limited by UN, and therefore should EU also not be limited to only use military force when the UN gives a mandate. The so called peacemaking in the Nice Treaty is not bounded by international law and the UN. The only real limitation is that the EU countries must agree before a common military force can be used. But this limitation can be removed without asking the voters for permission.

We are therefore facing a new entity in the international politics that might be taken by the other countries as a making of a state. The majority of the Convention will make EU a military super power like US. I ask: Is that wise? All military super powers have so far always been involved in wars. USA had Vietnam and Soviet had Afghanistan. Why would a new military armed European super power be so different?

I think it is wiser to separate civil foreign policy and military power, and keep the defence in NATO and peace making in UN and OSCE. I

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think the world has a larger need for EU as a civil great power with the offer of assistance to sustainable development. It is better to prepare generous suggestions to the top meeting in Johannesburg and use the resources as benefit for the environment and development.

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Then in the end something with regard to the forms; Today the foreign political tools are called common strategies and actions. They bind politically, but can not be controlled by the Court. I suggest a simplification so that all foreign political decisions from now on will be agreed as recommendations. Then it is up to the nations whether they want to follow them or have their own foreign political voice. Thereby can we emphasise that EU is a cooperation between independent states and not a new super power that wants to challenge USA as the leader of the world.

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4-026

FR

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Michel (Ch.E/G.-BE). - Monsieur le Président, Messieurs les Vice-Présidents, chers Collègues, parler des relations extérieures de l'Union, c'est parler de l'Europe politique. L'identité politique de l'Union est largement tributaire de notre volonté réelle de développer une politique étrangère efficace. Cela implique une politique de sécurité et de défense crédible qui présuppose, bien entendu, des engagements solides en termes de capacité. Le monde change. De nouveaux défis apparaissent. Les citoyens ne cessent de nous adresser des signaux clairs qui traduisent à la fois des incertitudes mais aussi des attentes. Ils souhaitent que l'Union soit, non pas le simple sujet ou observateur d'un monde en mutation permanente, mais plutôt un véritable acteur sur la scène internationale, avec une nature qui ne correspondrait bien entendu pas à celle des États-Unis. Je crois pouvoir ajouter que c'est très bien ainsi. Dans cette perspective, j'aimerais partager avec vous les considérations suivantes : <BRK>

4-027

NL

De Europese Unie is het product van een internationale samenwerking gebouwd op de diversiteit van de naties en belichaamt een nooit eerder bereikt integratiemodel. In dat opzicht fascineert ze en is ze ongetwijfeld voor velen een inspiratiebron. Op het vlak van de buitenlandse betrekkingen biedt het Europees model een opmerkelijke meerwaarde, wat haar tot een unieke organisatie in haar soort maakt. De Unie beschikt immers over een brede waaier instrumenten die ze ten dienste van haar buitenlandse beleid kan stellen. Ik denk hier met name aan de instrumenten van de eerste pijler, zoals het gemeenschappelijk handelsbeleid, ontwikkelingssamenwerking, humanitaire hulp, de politieke dialoog. Deze specificiteit stelt ons in staat onze aanpak aan te passen aan het soort uitdaging waarmee we geconfronteerd worden, onze initiatieven te nuanceren en de doeltreffendheid ervan te versterken. <BRK>

Michel (BE)

4-027 Translation

the Netherlands

The European Union is the product of an international cooperation built on the diversity of nations and embodies a unique integration model. From that perspective the EU is a fascinating phenomenon and it's undoubtedly for many a source of inspiration. Concerning foreign

200 affaires, the European model offers a remarkable surplus value which
 201 makes her an organization unique in her kind. The Union has a broad
 202 range of instruments at its disposal that it can put to service its foreign
 203 administration. I am particularly thinking of the instruments of the
 204 first pillar, such as the common trade administration, development
 205 cooperation, humanitarian aid. This specificity enables us to adept our
 206 approach to the kind of challenge we are facing, to nuance our
 initiatives and to strengthen their effectiveness. <BRK>

A_claim (facts and values) -
 B_judge -
 B_suggest (e.g. a solution) - B_demand, call for, desire -

207 4-028

208 FR

Toutefois, la crédibilité de notre politique extérieure dépend de notre efficacité et de l'adéquation des instruments aux objectifs que nous nous fixons.

La formule actuelle, à savoir le Haut représentant, a prouvé son efficacité.

Dès lors, il me paraît indispensable de la renforcer. En d'autres termes, il convient de le doter d'un droit d'initiative aux côtés des États membres et de la Commission,

d'assurer une coordination plus étroite, voire un rapprochement, avec la

Commission, et permettre l'utilisation optimale des instruments de politique

extérieure du premier pilier. Dans cette logique, le Haut représentant devrait

également présider le Conseil Affaires générales et Relations extérieures.

Enfin, selon moi, le nouveau contexte stratégique, apparu au lendemain du 11 septembre, doit nous amener à revoir ou du moins à remettre en discussion les tâches de Petersberg.

Pour terminer, j'ajouterai que nous devons nous donner les moyens des politiques que nous entendons mener. Cela doit se traduire par l'engagement des budgets nécessaires afin d'assurer de réelles capacités militaires mais aussi une politique européenne d'armement appuyée sur des programmes de recherche et de développement en matière de haute technologie.

Je suis convaincu, Monsieur le Président, que notre approche pragmatique et réaliste est de nature à créer les conditions favorables à l'apparition d'une véritable culture stratégique européenne. <BRK>

*A_argue -
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1] -

4-029

FR

Duhamel (PE). - Monsieur le Président, j'aimerais poser une demande, au risque de déplaire, et une question, pour détendre l'atmosphère. Je commencerai par la demande au risque de déplaire.

Nous, conventionnels, jeunes conventionnels et citoyens européens, voulons une politique étrangère de l'Europe. Nous le disons et le répétons. Maintenant, dans les travaux de cette Convention, je voudrais autre chose que des conventionnels qui redisent la même chose en y apportant des nuances ou des demandes particulières, un peu plus démocratiques, parfois un peu moins ennuyeuses et plus précises. Je souhaiterais que l'on sorte de l'hypocrisie des relations entre Présidium et conventionnels. Je demande au Président, M. Giscard d'Estaing, et aux Vice-Présidents, MM. Amato et Dehaene, d'avancer dans le débat démocratique avec nous. Ils disposent d'éléments de réflexion. Il est donc impossible qu'ils ne travaillent pas sur les mêmes questions. Ils s'expriment parfois ici ou là, plutôt en privé. Mais quand ils sont à la Convention et donc au coeur de ces questions, nous ne les entendons pas.

Quelles sont, selon vous, les options pertinentes afin d'avoir, demain, cette vraie politique extérieure de l'Union ? Quel est le type d'articulation souhaitable entre Conseil et Commission ou quels sont, au moins, les scénarios de réflexion que vous jugez pertinents ? Il n'est pas possible de continuer sans que, jamais, vous ne nous disiez un mot là-dessus. Je vous avais interrogé en vous demandant si vous étiez Blair ou Barnier. Vous ne m'aviez pas répondu, avec l'immense talent qui est le vôtre. Accepteriez-vous de répondre, fût-ce avec un peu moins de talent ? MM. Amato et Dehaene pourraient-ils, eux-aussi, nous faire partager leurs idées et participer ainsi au débat démocratique ? De cette façon, la pause estivale serait

216 également nourrie de leurs réflexions. Il n'est pas normal qu'il n'en soit pas ainsi. Je vous demande donc de prendre cette exigence en compte. Après tout, elle est plutôt gratifiante pour moi.

217 J'en viens maintenant à la question complémentaire, visant à détendre l'atmosphère.
218 Pourriez-vous nous expliquer, Monsieur le Président, à quoi correspond cette sorte
219 de tortue ou de dragon vert qui est entre vous et Sir John Kerr? Faut-il y voir un
220 premier élément de réponse ? <BRK>
221

222 4-030
FR

Le Président. - Je vais répondre à M. Duhamel. Ce sera d'ailleurs très commode, la deuxième question fournissant la réponse à la première.

223 Ce petit animal est une tortue chinoise. C'est un symbole de longévité et, en même temps, le symbole d'une démarche prudente qui aboutit à son objectif. C'est pourquoi cette tortue a une tête de dragon. Et c'est un peu la démarche de notre Convention, qui avance de manière progressive mais qui, lorsqu'il le faudra, saisira dans ses griffes le texte final de la Convention.

224 Je l'ai placée là-bas en prévision d'une éventuelle question de M. Duhamel sur le
225 rythme de nos travaux. Je préférerais être protégé par ma tortue dragon. Je vais vous
226 répondre aussi parce que je sais bien que la presse, qui nous observe et nous écoute,
227 aime ce genre de débat. Si nous vous présentions des conclusions, à ce stade, vous
228 nous reprocheriez d'abuser de votre fonction. Nous sommes là pour que vous
229 débattiez. J'ajouterai que dans ce qui a été dit aujourd'hui, pour le traiter avec un peu
230 d'ironie, nous avons entendu des interventions très remarquables, émouvantes pour
231 certaines, utiles pour d'autres. Si vous écoutez bien ces interventions, vous
232 constaterez qu'elles dégagent une espèce de corpus de la Convention. C'est de cette
233 manière que nous préférons procéder.

234 Toutefois, j'insiste sur le fait que ni M. Dehaene, ni M. Amato, ni moi-même, ne nous déroberons lorsque nous serons amenés à vous fournir l'expression de notre propre conviction et de ce que nous retirons de nos débats. Nous le ferons en conclusion et non pas pour vous empêcher de discuter librement et de formuler vous-mêmes vos propositions. C'est ce que ma tortue vous répond avec sa petite voix, M. Duhamel. <BRK>
235

4-031
EN

Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB). - Mr President, while the tortoise has been appropriate for this stage up to the summer, I hope that we have a hare ahead, to make more speed.

Britain wants Europe to be a powerful player on the international stage with a strong and successful external policy.

We need to make use of all our trade, the international development of Community instruments, the common foreign and security policy and the new European security and defence policy. I welcome the four issues raised in the Praesidium paper.

Although the Seville reforms are an important start, more needs to be done to get real and essential coherence in the European Union's external policy.

My proposal would be that the new external relations sub-formation of the General Affairs Council should be chaired by the High Representative.

Most people recognise that, amongst its other problems, a rotating presidency system undermines continuity and, therefore, an effective European Union foreign policy.

Without reform, a serious foreign policy will not be deliverable. Washington will ignore Europe, and we will not get the partnership with the United States Mr Peterle rightly called for.

Secondly, on common interests, I agree with the Praesidium paper that we need to look at the role of the European Council and the General Affairs and External Relations Council.

All of us, both Member States and the Commission, need to bring our different knowledge and expertise to the table. We should consider whether the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative should make joint proposals to the Council.

Thirdly, on flexibility, we should make the historical and traditional diversity within the Union a strength and asset. For example, in East Timor, Europe acted promptly

- A_claim (facts and values) -
- *A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- **A_argue- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_suggest (e.g. a solution) -
- *A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_demand, call for, desire-

and effectively because the Netherlands and Portugal had close associations there. Equally, a Member State may wish to act because of its own national interests, while the Union chooses not to. Britain in Sierra Leone, for instance, in what Mr Brok called "a coalition of the willing". It should not be seen as a challenge to, but as an asset of, the European Union.


Fourthly, although the appointment of the High Representative has provided a clearer Union voice, as Mr Michel said, this should be strengthened by giving him the formal right of initiative in common foreign and security policy issues and a greater say about CFSP resources. He should also attend Commission meetings on external policy.

Former Yugoslavia is a striking example of what Europe could do: consistent diplomacy, coordinated with the US and Russia, tough economic and political sanctions, the promise of aid and the engagement of democratic forces, and the active involvement of both Commissioner Patten and Mr Solana.

Britain wants Europe to be a global force for good - preventing and solving conflict, conquering world poverty, supporting international environmental protection, backing human rights and democracy, and promoting equality and social justice. But, as Mr McDonagh said, the common foreign and security policy will only be strong if it draws on the experience and assets of the Member States. As he said, communitisation will simply not work. The credibility of the European Union in foreign policy depends on the national assets and the diplomatic forces of its governments, its military assets and its diplomats, but not on Community rules or the legislative powers that come from the Commission. If foreign policy is to enjoy legitimacy, there must be accountability through elected governments to national parliaments.

We are ready to contribute fully to the collective effort, using our global diplomacy and our national assets. We need strong institutional structures at European Union level, but we must also recognise that this sort of collective effort requires tailor-made procedures and methods of operation with a clear link back to national parliaments.

My suggested reforms will help to deliver this. <BRK>



4-032

EN

Lenmarker (Parl.-SE). - Mr President, I will start by telling you of three recent experiences that, in a way, shape my view on this matter.

The first is very successful: the enlargement process, where the Union acts decisively, in a coordinated and very efficient manner. The second is the Balkans, in the first half of the 1990s. That was a catastrophe - Europe could not act, was too weak and did not have the capacity to do its job. The third is Africa where Europe could do much more. We spend a lot on development aid - hundreds of billions of euros throughout the decades - but still we achieve very little because we do not have a coordinated policy.

In the light of these three recent experiences, convergence of views is not the big problem. I am sometimes astonished at how uniform the attitude of the Member States is. The big problem is a lack of coherence. The Union acts in very different, even contradictory ways.

One big problem is that the Union is still too protectionist. Protectionism hinders the effective use of the foreign policy of the Union. It is now time that we set as a goal the dismantling of tariffs. That was done in Rome, in terms of European trade - 45 or 50 years ago. It is now time for us, in this Convention, to set the goal of eliminating tariffs in Europe. That should be our goal in the policy of the future.

When it comes to the decision-making procedures, it is time we no longer had three units: the Commission, the Council and the foreign office of the presidency. It is time to merge them into one. We cannot have three foreign ministries or state departments. We need one that coordinates the policies. That is the only way. We should think about creating a decision-making mechanism within one pillar. We need a special decision-making process when it comes to foreign policy. It is not legislation, not the budget, but something more that requires coordination.

Finally, on Question No 6: first of all, the Union should do what it has said it will do, namely ensure we have the necessary capacities. Sometimes I feel that it is only

250 Britain that takes this seriously. The others run away from their responsibilities. We must do that first. It is a responsibility of national parliaments, not the Union itself. We in the national parliaments are responsible.

251 Secondly, we should think about making arms exports a Community matter and also
252 a part of the single market. That would save billions of euros for the taxpayers of
253 Europe. Perhaps these could be used to enhance our capacity for peacemaking and
254 peacekeeping. <BRK>

256 4-033

257 EN

258 **Duff (PE).** - Mr President, I would like to ask Mr Hain to clarify something he said.
259 He said he would wish Mr Solana to have more power and more resources.
260 My question is: whose resources? Is he referring to the European Union budget? If
261 so, why does he think that Mr Solana should be solely and exclusively responsible to
262 national parliaments? What role does he foresee for the European Parliament in all
263 this? <BRK>

264 4-034

EN

265 **Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB).** - Mr President, the resources would come from the Council. Of
266 course the European Parliament would have the ability to debate and so on, but this
267 is essentially a matter that is answerable to national governments. It is national
268 governments who commit their troops. It is national governments who will provide
the diplomatic assets. I am open to ideas from Mr Duff or from anybody else as to
what the European Parliament's role might be in debating and in influencing, but this
is essentially an intergovernmental matter. That is the truth. If you do not recognise
that truth you will not get a serious foreign policy. <BRK>

269 4-035

270 FR

271 **Haenel (Parl.-FR).** - Monsieur le Président, tous les collègues qui se sont exprimés
272 jusqu'à maintenant sont tous d'accord pour affirmer qu'il faut une action extérieure
273 de l'Union européenne beaucoup plus efficace. Mais nous faisons comme si tous les
pays membres et tous les pays candidats étaient d'accord sur les objectifs à atteindre
et sur les voies et moyens pour y parvenir.
Or, nous savons bien que nous n'avancerons jamais tous ensemble, au même rythme
et au même moment, et que donc il y aura nécessairement une avant-garde, peu
importe le terme employé, un groupe d'États qui voudra aller plus vite et plus loin et
qui n'acceptera pas les ralentisseurs ou les freins. Il me paraît donc souhaitable que,
le moment venu, nous abordions, dans le cadre de notre réflexion, le système des
coopérations renforcées dans le Traité. Je dis bien en envisageant des coopérations
renforcées, assouplies et plus ouvertes. Je pense rejoindre M. Fini sur ce point. Cela
signifie qu'un pays peut rejoindre à tout moment le groupe-pionnier ou d'avant-
garde<BRK>

4-036

FR

Berès (PE). - Monsieur le Président, je souhaitais demander à M. Peter Hain de
préciser sa pensée. Il a parlé de la diversité des politiques étrangères et des traditions
des États Membres. L'un des outils pour exprimer cette diversité ne serait-il
justement pas l'utilisation des dispositions présentes aujourd'hui dans le Traité de
Nice, s'agissant de la coopération renforcée, pour autant qu'on en étende le champ
d'application ? Pourrions-nous imaginer au sein de cette diversité que les valeurs, les
droits et les concepts figurant dans la Charte des Droits fondamentaux soient le socle
d'une conception commune de la dimension extérieure de la politique étrangère et de
sécurité de l'Union dans le monde ? <BRK>

4-037

EN

Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB). - Mr President, first of all, I am open to looking at the ideas

274 Mrs Berès suggests. We are not approaching this with a fixed mind.
In addition, on the issue of budgets and resources, the European Parliament has
responsibility, at least in part, for some CFSP finance held at a central level. If we
275 were going to get extra money for policing - for example, for civilian policing
operations in the Balkans and elsewhere where we might want Europe to be active -
276 then clearly Parliament would have to be consulted. That is a way in which we could
277 work in partnership.
278 I do not see that it is realistic to communitise foreign policy. It will not work in
279 practice. Let us start with something practical and serious, not something idealistic
that is not deliverable. <BRK>

4-038

280 FR

281 **Fayot (Parl.-LU).** -Monsieur le Président, pour être efficace et crédible,
l'engagement de l'Union européenne sur la scène internationale doit être cohérent. Il
en va ainsi actuellement pour la politique commerciale extérieure. Dans ce domaine,
la Commission et le Conseil collaborent étroitement sur la base de l'initiative de la
282 Commission. Celle-ci conduit les négociations en étroite relation avec le Conseil qui
283 décide à la majorité qualifiée ou à l'unanimité dans des domaines très sensibles.
Ainsi, les problèmes spécifiques de l'un ou de l'autre État sont pris en considération.
L'efficacité de cette méthode ne s'est pas fait attendre. Eu égard aux débats sur la
284 nécessité d'avoir un « visage » dans les médias, on rappellera que le commissaire
chargé de la politique commerciale s'est rapidement fait connaître aux médias dans le
monde entier. Le visage doit venir de la politique et non l'inverse.
C'est vers ce schéma institutionnel que nous devons tendre pour toute l'action
extérieure. Une retouche importante doit être introduite: les parlements nationaux
doivent conserver un rôle important sur le plan budgétaire ou encore, par exemple,
285 s'il s'agit d'envoyer des soldats pour une mission de prévention de crise ou de peace-
making. Il convient d'intégrer ce rôle dans le processus décisionnel.
286 La voie intergouvernementale serait celle de l'inefficacité, alors que nos opinions
287 publiques exigent une présence plus efficace de l'Union européenne sur le plan
288 international. En outre, la voie intergouvernementale mènerait facilement à un
directoire des grands avec, pour conséquence, le retour à une Europe dominée par les
grandes nations et non pas à une Europe du partenariat.
Enfin, l'idée un peu curieuse de nommer un Président de l'Union pour représenter
l'Europe à l'extérieur aboutirait à une confusion institutionnelle encore plus grande.
Ainsi, faut-il une seule tête pour l'action extérieure ? Je pense qu'il faudra sans doute
une ou plusieurs têtes pensantes. En effet, n'oublions pas que le Président de
l'Europe ne sera jamais le chef de la politique étrangère comme l'est le Président des
États-Unis. L'essentiel, à mon avis, n'est pas la représentation, mais plutôt la façon
d'élaborer la politique étrangère et, dans ce domaine, j'ai plus confiance en la
méthode communautaire qu'en la méthode intergouvernementale.
Évidemment, il y a un revers à la médaille. Dans les débats institutionnels, la pensée
dominante est actuellement de restreindre le nombre des commissaires, au nom de
l'efficacité. On verrait dès lors un Vice-Président de la Commission en charge d'un
énorme conglomérat en matière d'action extérieure qui engloberait la politique
étrangère, la coopération au développement, le commerce extérieur, etc. Dans ce
contexte, la politique de développement, par exemple, risquerait d'être
instrumentalisée pour les besoins de l'action extérieure. Ce processus a déjà été
enclenché avec la suppression du Conseil Développement et son intégration au
Conseil Affaires générales. Or, une des caractéristiques importantes de la
Commission est sa collégialité et l'engagement de chaque Commissaire pour son
domaine. Je verrais très bien une Commission avec plusieurs commissaires chargés
des différents aspects de l'action extérieure, à condition d'avoir un Président, ou un
Vice-Président, fort, qui aurait pour tâche de les coordonner.
Mais, bien évidemment, au-delà de ces aspects, c'est plus que jamais la cohérence
des politiques de l'Union européenne sur le fond qui doit imposer la cohérence de
l'action extérieure de l'Union. <BRK>

4-039

EN

289 **Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB).** - Mr President, I just want to say to my friend from Austria
 290 that I do not want a *directoire*, and certainly not a presidency system reformed for
 291 the large countries only. There will be 19 small countries in the Europe of 25, and six
 292 large ones. It will be impossible for it to be run just by big countries - impossible and
 293 not desirable.
 294 You have to answer the Henry Kissinger question: "Who does Washington pick up
 295 the phone to in Europe?". At the moment it picks up the phone to Chirac, Blair,
 Schroeder, Aznar, Berlusconi and maybe one or two others. To stop that happening,
 Europe must have a credible voice. Yes, it should have a High Representative and,
 we would suggest, a president of the Council who is not necessarily from a big
 country.
 A serious policy must be based on governments. You simply will not get it
 otherwise. The European Union will be bypassed in the way that it is now because it
 does not have a credible voice for Europe on foreign policy. <BRK>

- **A_clarify
- A_claim (facts and values)-
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_demand, call for, desire-
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-040

DE

296 **Voggenhuber (PE).** - Herr Präsident! Peter Hain hat uns hier sozusagen auf das
 297 kleine Einmaleins der Politik eingeschworen. Ich will bei dieser Rechnungsform
 298 bleiben. Wir reden hier über europäische Außenpolitik. Kollege Hain, wir reden
 299 nicht über die Summe nationaler Interessen, wir reden nicht über Additionen und
 300 Subtraktionen von nationalen Interessen, sondern wir reden von europäischem
 Interesse! Wie sollen nationale Regierungen im Stande sein, durch Subtraktion,
 Balancen und Addition statt einen nationalen Interessenbasar ein europäisches
 Interesse zu definieren und zu vertreten? Das können nur europäische, demokratisch
 legitimierte Institutionen. Herr Hain, der Rat hatte seit Maastricht mehr als genug
 301 Zeit, uns vorzuführen, wie er denn zu Definitionen von europäischem Interesse
 302 kommt. Es ist ihm in keinem einzigen Fall gelungen, weil es nämlich der Natur der
 303 Sache nach nicht der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner, nicht die Balance- und
 304 Hegemoniepolitik des 19. Jahrhunderts sein kann, die die Zukunft Europas ist,
 305 sondern das europäische gemeinsame Interesse, das in einem offenen, europäischen
 und demokratischen Prozess definiert, gewonnen, beschlossen und durchgesetzt
 werden kann!
 (Beifall) <BRK>

4-041

FR

Barnier (CE). - Monsieur le Président, la méthode communautaire, que M. Hain
 juge inutilisable pour la politique étrangère et que M. Fayot juge souhaitable, ne se
 résume pas et ne se réduit pas au seul travail de la Commission. Elle est fondée sur le
 travail en bonne intelligence de trois institutions fortes et qui restent fortes, à savoir
 le Conseil, le Parlement et la Commission. Si l'on veut regarder les choses comme je
 l'ai recommandé tout à l'heure, avec pragmatisme et sans idéologie, je pense que le
 document traitant de ce domaine précis, que nous avons élaboré et mis à la
 disposition des conventionnels le 22 mai, contient les voies et les moyens d'un usage
 pragmatique de la méthode communautaire, sans idéologie, progressif, avec des
 étapes, avec des modalités, avec des flexibilités. Cet usage permet de respecter la
 volonté exprimée par M. Hain. Il permet également aux gouvernements de décider.
 Je voudrais inviter ceux qui cherchent la voie d'une efficacité accrue dans ce
 domaine à une nouvelle lecture de ce document car, même si nous avons pris le
 risque d'avoir raison dix ou quinze ans trop tôt, on y trouve selon moi les voies et les
 moyens permettant de concilier les points de vue qui viennent de s'exprimer. <BRK>

4-042

DA

Christophersen (Ch.E/G.-DK). - Hr. formand, jeg behøver ikke at gentage, hvad
 der er sagt om behovet for at forstærke samarbejdet på det område, vi taler om. Men
 jeg har fire bemærkninger, jeg gerne vil gøre.
 Der er for det første brug for en bedre udvikling af fælles strategier. Man må være
 meget mere kohærent og samtænke, hvad man vil gøre på det handelspolitiske
 område, på udviklingsområdet, på det sikkerhedspolitiske område og også på det
 forsvarspolitiske område. Der er ofte en mangel på sammenhæng i den måde, der

306 tænkes på, og den måde, der dermed ageres på. Det kræver derfor en styrkelse af
fællesskabsmetoden og en mere effektiv måde at træffe beslutninger på.
For det andet - og det er delvis en bemærkning til Peter Hain - er der brug for, at
Fællesskabet i højere grad taler med en stemme i relation til tredjelande og i
internationale organisationer. Men det er ikke tilstrækkeligt, at hr. Kissinger eller
307 hans efterfølger ved, hvilket telefonnummer han skal ringe til i Europa. Det er ligeså
vigtigt, at der ikke, hver gang der er et problem, er fire europæiske regeringschefer,
der ringer til hr. Kissingers efterfølger eller til den amerikanske præsident. Problemet
er jo ikke bare, at amerikanerne ikke ved, hvem de skal henvende sig til. Problemet
er jo ofte, at de store europæiske lande fører hver deres politik i forhold til De
308 Forenede Stater. Det er i langt højere grad vores reelle problem. Derfor er der brug
for nogle institutionelle forenklinger og en meget bedre koordinering af, hvad
Kommissionen, Rådet og medlemsstaterne gør.
Min tredje bemærkning drejer sig om ressourcer. Det forsvarspolitiske er et særligt
309 kapitel - det vil jeg ikke tale om her. Men generelt kan man sige, at Fællesskabet
310 disponerer over meget betydelige ressourcer både direkte på sit budget i form af
311 finansielle instrumenter, i form af Den Europæiske Udviklingsfond og gennem
medlemsstaternes indflydelse i IMF og andre internationale organisationer og
312 finansielle institutioner. Men det tager tid, det går alt for langsomt at få anvendt disse
instrumenter. Der er ikke en tilstrækkelig god koordinering af deres anvendelse, og
derfor har vi en "suboptimal" udenrigspolitisk anvendelse af de ressourcer, der står
til vores rådighed.
313 Min sidste bemærkning drejer sig om den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik
konstitutionelle stilling. Vi skal være opmærksomme på, at i alle medlemsstaterne
har denne del af det politiske liv sin egen orden, sin egen konstitutionelle placering.
Her er det i langt højere grad regeringerne, der har ansvaret, og Parlamentet, der
efterfølgende kan kritisere regeringernes dispositioner. Det system bliver man nødt
til at lade afspejle også i Fællesskabets organisation af sin fælles udenrigs- og
sikkerhedspolitik. <BRK>

Tranlsation: 4-042

Mr. President, I do not have to repeat what has been said about the need to make the cooperation stronger on the subject we are discussing. But I do have four remarks I would like to make.

First, it is necessary to have a better development of common strategies. One has to be much more coherent and think together what one wants to do on the area of trade, development and security, and also on the area of defence politics. It is often an incoherence in the way of thinking and thereby the way of acting. It is therefore necessary to improve the method of community and a more efficient way to make decisions.

Second - and this is partly a comment to Peter Hain -it is a need for the Community to a larger extent speak with one voice in relation to third party and in international organisations. But it is not sufficient that Mr. Kissinger or his successor knows which phone number he should dial to Europe. It is just as important that when ever there is a problem, not four European state leaders call Mr. Kissinger's successor or the American President. The problem is not only that the Americans don't know who to contact. The problem is often that the big European states each have different policies towards the US. That is to a much larger extent our real problem. Therefore, it is necessary with some institutional simplifications and a much better coordination of what the Commission, the Board and the member states do.

314 My third remark is about resources. One special thing is the defence
policy, I will not deal with that here. But generally one can say that the
Community has disposal of significant resources both direct towards
315 its budget through financial tools, through the European
Developmental Fond and through the member states influence on IMF
and other international organisations and financial institutions. But it
takes time, it is too slow to use these tools. It is not a sufficient
coordination of the resources we have available.

316 My last remark is about the constitutional position of the common
317 foreign and safety policies. We have to be aware of that this part of the
318 political life has its own order and its own constitutional location in all
319 the member states. Here it is to a larger extent the governments that
320 have the responsibilities, and the Parliaments that afterwards can
321 criticise the arrangements of the governments. This system has to be
322 reflected in the Community's organisation of the common foreign- and
323 defence politics.

4-043

EL Translation

Κατηφόρης (Ch.E/G.-GR). - Katefores:

324 Mr. President, our Conference has already positioned itself with
emphasis for the stronger international presence of Europe. That was
the goal that got the biggest support from my colleagues, just as the
fact that 70% of the European co-citizens seek more, much more
Europe on the international scene.

It is a natural preference that is at the same time not natural. It is not
natural because Europe today does not face direct outside threats that
would force it to move its defense mechanism for its self-protection. It
is natural for the fact that the European citizen sees a political and
economic superpower of Europe that does not translate into
corresponding international diplomatic presence.

Oppositely, he sees the Union from one side to be overshadowed by
the USA and from the other side to face the sometimes offensive
behavior of small countries that have as their only positive attribute
that they have so much (thrasos/mut). The European citizen is annoyed
with this situation more for a reason of ethos and good principles and
less for opportunistic reasons. This feeling of annoyance is
strengthened by the 'showy', and somehow hard to understand for the
European, exempt ional behavior of the US on many issues, of which
one some are of ethical importance, such as the International Criminal
Court; some of strategic importance, such as the one-sidedness in the
middle east; some with regards to the survival of the planet, such as the
one-sided leave from the Kyoto Protocol; and some are the self-
beneficiary disobedience of the important rules of free trade.

The EU citizen would worry less if she saw that what the EU cannot
accomplish the national entities could, but she sees that there is not the
slightest hope of opposition towards the giants that surround us in the
international scene. We do not have to choose between a European
foreign policy and national foreign policy. We have to choose between
EU foreign policy and the non-existence of a foreign policy.


325 Today's constitution that we are discussing and that we want to better
 gives us a base for the creation of a unified foreign policy and in
 326 reality some steps have been taken, which are however very small in
 comparison with the size of the needs and the problems. We have to
 agree on some steps that will put us, not into a new stage because that
 327 will be late, but on a new path.

328 The first thing that I would say is our conference to ask for a yearly
 grand-scale conference in the national parliaments for the international
 329 relations. To that will follow a large discussion in the European
 Parliament with introduction by the 'conference members' that will
 showcase the attitudes of the national bodies.

330 The conversation will end in the determination, each time, of a one
 331 sector at least where the uniformity of the Union's organs will be
 replaced with increased majority and joint decision making process.
 332 This way we can gradually reach a unified European dogma of a joint
 333 foreign policy.

334 Secondly, the member states have to decide that they will have a
 335 unified diplomatic representation and third, the legal organs will unify
 336 in a predetermined time frame, which will be decided by the meeting,
 the responsibilities of the representative of the Council and the person
 337 responsible for foreign affair issues.

339 All this effort has to give priority to the furthering of the European
 values and later for Europe's benefits. It is time for us to note that the
 340 biggest threat for us is to find ourselves in a world that has rejected our
 values. If that is lost, everything else will be lost too. Europe gave birth
 to Machiavelli, and the time has come for us to overtake him, exactly
 so that we can continue the journey of the grand society that the
 Renaissance set the foundations of in Europe.



4-044
 EN

Hamzik (Parl.-SK). - Mr President, establishing a strong common foreign and security policy represents one of the most important new priorities for the future. This is an area which has, until now, been considered to be the most internal part of a state's national sovereignty. Despite achieving only partial progress thus far, history proves that this policy can be further coordinated and harmonised. It is obvious that for a long time yet this policy will remain a common and not a single European policy, as it does not rule out the ability of each Member State to implement its own foreign policy. However, a broad consensus, as well as the application of a certain degree of flexibility, are required whilst maintaining the internal solidarity and efficiency of a unified procedure.

The implementation of the CFSP requires a further shift towards Community-level decision-making, including an extension of the areas with decisions made by qualified majority. This should be related to the strengthening and deepening of the role of the EU as a sovereign entity in international relations. As such, only military aspects of cooperation should be excluded from this communitarisation process and remain the domain of intergovernmental policy-making.

The fight against international terrorism requires the bond between internal and external security to be strengthened, for instance, between military and intelligence bodies. This enhanced interaction between foreign and defence policies should be reflected in the establishment of corresponding agencies.

Enhanced cooperation between the Commissioner for International Relations and the

341 EU High Representative for CFSP should equally contribute to the reinforcement of
the EU's role. In the long-term perspective, both offices could be matched which
would, however, require the application of the Community method to non-military
aspects of the CFSP.

342 Equally, any possibility of weakening or questioning the transatlantic bond should be
343 rejected. An enhanced and efficient EU must not weaken transatlantic solidarity.
344 Newly established institutions within the European Security and Defence Policy,
345 which constitutes part of the broader CFSP, highlighted the EU's new involvement
346 and role in the security and defence area but also have produced further
347 complications regarding the relations between the individual institutions within the
348 aforementioned policy.

349
350 4-045
351 DE

352 **Glitz (Ch.E/G.-DE).** - Herr Präsident! Es ist sichtbar, dass es hier zwei Linien gibt,
353 eine eher intergouvernementale und eine eher integrationistische.

354 Aber ich will doch feststellen: Schon die Einrichtung des Hohen Repräsentanten war
ja ein erster Schritt in Richtung auf eine eher gemeinsame Außenpolitik. Es gibt jetzt
355 noch ein paar Übereinstimmungen, die darüber hinausgehen.

356 Auch Peter Hain hat ein Initiativrecht, also ein formales Vorschlagsrecht, für den
Hohen Repräsentanten gefordert sowie den Vorsitz im Rat bei der Behandlung
außenpolitischer Fragen - das ist auch etwas Neues. Es wurde auch von mehreren
Sprechern in diesen außenpolitischen Fragen die Abschaffung der Troika gefordert.
357 Wir können nicht mit drei Mann in außenpolitische Verhandlungen gehen. Das wird
nie funktionieren. Man braucht in der Tat einen, der diese Verhandlungen führt.
358 Nun gibt es den Konflikt.

Louis Michel hat von einer Annäherung des Hohen Repräsentanten an die
Kommission gesprochen. Elmar Brok hat von einer Anbindung gesprochen. Die
schwächste Lösung hat Peter Hain vorgeschlagen, *joint proposals*, also gemeinsame
359 Vorschläge von Patten und Solana.
360

Ich möchte sagen, die deutsche Regierung vertritt in der Tat die Auffassung, die
auch Elmar Brok vorgetragen hat, nämlich den Doppelhut.

Ich glaube zwar nicht, lieber Elmar Brok, dass irgendjemand hier Metternich will,
auch Peter Hain nicht.

Wenn schon, sind wir in der Tat eher für Monnet, wenn es diese Alternative geben
sollte. Aber jetzt geht es um die Frage, die Andrew Duff aufgeworfen hat, nämlich
die einer effektiven Organisation.

Damit dieser Doppelhut effektiv agieren kann, muss er auf einen leistungsfähigen
diplomatischen Dienst aufbauen können.

Ich meine, er müsste drei Elemente haben. Erstens, dass, was Patten hat, also die
Generaldirektion der Kommission, die mit Außenbeziehungen befasst ist. Zweitens,
eine eigenständige außenpolitische Einheit, die aus den Leuten besteht, die mit
Außenpolitik im Ratssekretariat umgehen, und entsandten Diplomaten aus den
Außenministerien der Mitgliedstaaten. Das wäre allerdings eine Arbeitseinheit, die
sozusagen in Verantwortung des Rats tätig wäre. Drittens, die funktionierenden
Außenvertretungen, die dem Doppelhut berichten, und dabei sollten die
Kommissionsdelegationen in EU-Delegationen umgewandelt werden.

Das heißt, wir glauben, wir brauchen in der Tat eine Figur, die eine doppelte
Funktion hat, die einerseits Kommissar ist, aber auch im Vertrauen und im Auftrag
des Rates in den außenpolitischen Fragen handelt, weil ich einige wichtige
Mitgliedstaaten sehe, die in der Tat nicht bereit sein werden, diesen Hohen
Repräsentanten einfach als Kommissar einzuordnen wie alle anderen Kommissare.
Insofern wäre der Doppelhut eine Kompromissmöglichkeit, die uns jetzt die
Möglichkeit gäbe, zwar nicht eine vollständige Vergemeinschaftung der
Außenpolitik zustande zu bringen, wie wir Deutschen sie in langer Frist für sinnvoll
halten würden, aber doch einen deutlichen Schritt nach vorne zu machen über die
Verbesserung hinaus, die der Hohe Repräsentant und Solana jetzt schon gebracht
haben!

(Beifall) <BRK>

- A_claim (facts and values)~
- **A_argue~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
- A_inform, report~
- **A_argue~ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
- A_claim (facts and values)~
- A_inform, report~
- A_claim (facts and values)~
- **A_argue~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~
- B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~
- B_suggest a compromise~
- **A_explain~
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]~

361 4-046

362 EN
363

364 **Bruton (Parl.-IE).** - Mr President, it is important to place this debate in an historical perspective. From 1948 to 1989 the Cold War froze the external relations of Europe in a particular form. Under a nuclear umbrella, dissent was minimised. Europe lived in an igloo - cold on the outside but comparatively secure and, for some, comparatively comfortable on the inside. Since 1989 the igloo has melted, allowing

365 long-hidden grievances, dissension and threats to re-emerge. Seven years ago this week, in Srebrenica, 8 000 Bosnians were murdered, the largest mass murder in Europe since 1945. This week, just a few days before that fateful anniversary, the United States delegate in the United Nations Security Council vetoed the continuance of the mandate of the United Nations police in Bosnia in pursuance of a policy that will, if it continues, eventually lead to the withdrawal of all UN peacekeeping forces from trouble spots all over the globe. Can we afford to allow such a vacuum to develop?

366 Meanwhile, the freeing-up of capital movements, the fall in the cost of air travel and the explosive growth of information technology have together intensified phenomena such as stock market contagion, the global spread of disease, the gradual destruction of the global environment and the new surge of human migration.

367 They have exposed our societies to new threats like cyber-terrorism, bio-terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the colonisation of failed states like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Colombia by paramilitary organisations which respect none of the rules of international order. And the capacity of individual European nation states to cope with such problems has simultaneously diminished. In an open economy there are financial limits on the amount of tax each state can raise for security purposes and demographic limits on the number of local young people available to serve in their military and police services. Who will provide the money if Europe is to have its own airlift capacity rather than be solely reliant on the

368 Americans? No one state is big enough to do that.

369 Against that background, the development of a common, shared external security capacity for the European Union since the Helsinki summit has not been so much a choice as an absolute economic and strategic necessity. European states could just not afford to do the job separately. They could not afford the duplication. Their only hope was to pool resources. The job was, and is, too important to leave solely to part-time intergovernmentalism.

370 I hope that my country - Ireland - notwithstanding its sporadic rhetorical neutralism, will fully accept its responsibilities in the development of a common foreign and security policy. Ireland's choice is simple. Given that we are just as open to all the threats I have mentioned as any other European country, do we want to have a say in how these threats are guarded against, or do we want to leave the responsibility and decision-making to others? For me the answer is clear. <BRK>

371 4-047

372 EN

373 **Stuart (Parl.-GB).** - Mr President, I would like to say this in German so that I am not accused of being a "little Englander". <BRK>

374 4-048

375 DE

Ich möchte auf die Verteidigungspolitik und auf das zurückkommen, was Herr Voggenhuber über die Truppenbereitschaft sagte. Wenn es darum geht, Truppen ins Feld zu schicken, ist es Sache der nationalen Regierungen und der nationalen Parlamente, die Entscheidung darüber zu treffen. Es hat keinen Sinn, im Augenblick so zu tun, als ob das nicht so wäre. Es gibt aber zur selben Zeit ganz viele Gebiete, wo wir als Europäische Union gemeinsam und im Gegensatz zur äußeren Welt mit einer Stimme sprechen möchten. Ich möchte nur sagen, wir sollten den Unterschied ganz klar machen! <BRK>

4-049

NL

Maij-Weggen (PE). - Mijnheer de voorzitter, ik wilde reageren op wat de Duitse regeringsvertegenwoordiger, de heer Glotz, heeft gezegd. Hij heeft een lans gebroken voor een Europees diplomatiek stelsel. Ik denk dat hij daarmee een heel

belangrijk punt aan de orde heeft gesteld. Ik kan hem wel zeggen dat commissaris Patten al bezig is om een Europese diplomatieke dienst op te bouwen. Hij heeft daarvoor ook de steun van het Europees Parlement en daarvoor zijn inmiddels ook middelen uitgetrokken. De status van die Europese diplomatieke dienst is echter heel diffuus en eigenlijk ook niet correct. Het probleem is dat de Europese ambassadeurs in de diverse landen in de wereld een lagere status hebben dan alle andere ambassadeurs. Dat betekent dat zij eigenlijk geen positie hebben zodra ze coördinerend of in de plaats van die landen die daar niet aanwezig zijn, moeten optreden.

Mijn vraag aan de Duitse regeringsvertegenwoordiger is dan ook of het niet tijd wordt om die Europese diplomatieke dienst een coördinerende status te geven, zodat hij ook werkelijk coördinerend en naar behoren in de plaats van de lidstaten kan optreden wanneer dat vanuit Raad en Commissie wordt gevraagd. <BRK>

4-049 Translation

the Netherlands

Maij-Weggen (PE). - Sir the chairman, I wanted to react on what the German government representative, Mr. Glotz, has said. He has broken an opportunity for a European diplomatic system. I believe that with that he put a very important issue on the list of priorities. I can tell him that Commissioner Patten is already busy building a European diplomatic service. He also has the support of the European Parliament and meanwhile resources have also been mobilized for it. The status of the European diplomatic service is however quite vague and also quite incorrect. The problem is that the European ambassadors in the various countries in the world have a lower status than all other ambassadors. In fact, this means that they have no real say if they had to co-ordinate or act in the name of countries that are not present there.

Therefore my question to the German government representative is; is it not about time to give that European diplomatic service a co-ordinating status, so that it can really co-ordinate and act properly in the name of the member countries when asked by the Council and the Commission. <BRK>

4-050

EN

Belohorská (Parl.-SK). - Mr President, if we discuss transatlantic solidarity, we also need to discuss more European responsibility in the field of defence and security. We need to establish both whether we will be friends with the United States in war and whether we will be able to provide humanitarian military action.

I am very grateful, Mr President, that you proposed a new working group on this very important issue. In the Eurobarometer survey, the citizens of Europe said overwhelmingly that they would like to live in a secure Europe. <BRK>

4-051

ES

Muñoz Alonso (Parl.-ES). - Señor Presidente, Señorías, a estas alturas del debate se han hecho propuestas muy interesantes y resulta difícil hacer aportaciones que no contribuyan más a la confusión que a la claridad del tema que nos ocupa. Voy a analizar brevemente de dónde partimos, dónde estamos y a dónde deberíamos llegar en esta cuestión de la política exterior común.

Durante muchos años, la política exterior fue la gran ausente del proceso de

397 integración, aunque cada vez ha sido más patente que el gran objetivo de la unión
política se nos escapará de entre las manos si no logramos que la Unión pueda tener
una proyección exterior que exprese la voz común de nuestros pueblos y de nuestros
Estados y promocióne y defienda en el mundo nuestro sistema de valores, basado en
la paz, los derechos humanos, la libertad y la democracia.

398 Culminada con éxito la unión económica y monetaria, esta exigencia de una política
exterior común se ha hecho más perentoria y muchos pensamos que, junto con la
Política Común de Defensa, es el gran objetivo que la Unión debe afrontar en este
primer tramo del siglo XXI y aprovechando, además, la gran ocasión que representa
esta Convención.

399 Ciertamente, no partimos de cero y desde hace años se ha entendido que las
competencias exteriores en el ámbito económico pertenecían a la Comunidad. A
400 partir de ahí, la Unión se ha ido convirtiendo en un destacado actor internacional, en
un proceso continuo que culminó primero con el Tratado de Maastricht y después,
más tarde, con el Tratado de Amsterdam. Pero si no hemos avanzado más rápido,
401 debíamos preguntarnos por qué. No se pueden disimular las dificultades de hacer una
Política Exterior Común en una Unión formada por Estados con prolongadas
402 trayectorias y con arraigadas tradiciones, no siempre compatibles, y, en todo caso, de
403 compleja coordinación.

404 No es posible perder de vista que no se trata de absorber y unificar las políticas
exteriores de los Estados miembros, que tienen y deben seguir teniendo sus propios
ámbitos de actuación exterior, de acuerdo con sus intereses y sus tradiciones. Se trata
405 de que la Unión fije unos objetivos de política exterior específicos y limitados, con
unas prioridades previamente establecidas y con los medios adecuados para llevarlas
a cabo.

406 Seguramente será necesario llevar a cabo retoques institucionales y esta tarde se han
407 hecho aquí algunas aportaciones en ese sentido, pero creo que no se puede perder de
408 vista que el centro de gravedad tendrá que seguir siendo el Consejo Europeo, por
410 razones de obvio realismo, sin perjuicio de que se incorporen al proceso, cada vez
411 más intensamente, las otras instituciones de la Unión, especialmente el Parlamento y
412 la Comisión.

- B_demand, call for, desire-
- A_argue- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- A_conclude, (logically) infer-
- B_demand, call for, desire-

Por supuesto, con la actual estructura de pilares, -en otro de los pilares también se
llevan a cabo actuaciones exteriores-, creo que es indispensable llevar a cabo una
política coherente y bien estructurada.

Quisiera señalar cuáles deberían ser los requisitos, desde mi punto de vista, de esta
política exterior. Creo que son tres, fundamentalmente.

En primer lugar, una mayor dosis de voluntad política por parte de los Estados que
les permita superar arraigados egoísmos que impiden avanzar al conjunto.

Ciertamente, los Estados son los jueces de sus intereses nacionales, pero la gran
empresa de la construcción europea requiere superar ópticas estrechas y hacer
renuncias. La renuncia ha sido clave en todo el proceso de construcción europea.

En segundo lugar, es necesario que se pongan al servicio de la PESC suficientes
recursos materiales para permitir que la Unión esté donde tenga que estar y con los
medios que sean precisos. En el horizonte está la creación del servicio exterior y de
un cuerpo diplomático europeo compatible con los de los Estados miembros.

En tercer lugar, la Unión Europea necesita potenciar la política europea de seguridad
y defensa, que forma parte indisolublemente de la PESC. Esto significa que la Unión
requiere también un respaldo militar; pero como es un tema del que se hablará
mañana, no voy a entrar en él. <BRK>

4-052

EN

Nahtigal (Gouv.-SI). - Mr President, the area of CFSP should be tackled with a
great deal of caution and hasty decisions should be avoided.

One could agree with the statement that the external relations of the EU do not
correspond to its economic power.

It is therefore right that the CFSP is discussed separately by the Convention. It is
crucial to reduce this gap - the gap between the economic and foreign affairs aspect.
When seeking to strengthen the role of the EU in foreign affairs, a cautious approach
should be taken and we should resist the temptation to strengthen this aspect of
political integration forcefully and at any cost.

413 It is a fact that it took 50 years to introduce a common currency, that is monetary
 414 union. In this period the Coal and Steel Community gradually deepened. It has been
 only 10 years since the Common Foreign and Security Policy was put in place and
 415 only three years since the inception of European Security and Defence Policy.
 On the other hand, the problem of the efficiency of the CFSP has nothing to do with
 416 the forthcoming enlargement of the EU. As stressed by Jacques Delors, European
 foreign policy will be no more difficult with 27 Members than is it now with the
 417 present 15 Members - do not look for excuses, it is not the enlargement which will
 cause obstacles.
 418 In addition, I would like to note that the six-month rotation of the EU presidency
 itself does not represent an obstacle to a more efficient CFSP.
 419 The problem arising from frequent changes of the presidency can be overcome by
 adopting longer-term working programmes, binding on several consecutive
 420 presidencies. In this way, we could provide for the continuity of EU functioning in
 foreign policy, without marginalising the role of small Member States.
 A good example of that is the recent decision of the Seville Council to reorganise the
 421 GAC General Affairs Council and separate its agendas and sessions horizontally and
 by foreign policy issue of the EU.
 The urgently needed strengthening of the foreign policy image of the EU can be
 422 attained also through enhanced cooperation between the Council and the
 423 Commission - especially through closer linkage between different aspects of EU
 424 external action - I mean trade, development, foreign policy and other aspects. The
 425 High Representative could play an important role in this linkage.
 In this way, we could overcome the rigidity of the present Three Pillar structure. The
 actions of the High Representative so far have fully met initial expectations.
 Therefore, we see this office as having the greatest potential for even greater
 426 coordination between various fields of EU foreign affairs.
 In the present circumstances, it is unlikely that the principle of unanimity in the
 CFSP will be abolished. The method of enhanced cooperation gives additional
 opportunity to improve the efficiency of the CFSP. This is, however, limited to
 special cases, when not all of the Member States are willing to participate in certain
 activities of the CFSP and ESDP, but do not oppose these activities either. Of course,
 in these cases they should be given every opportunity to join at a later stage under the
 same conditions.
 Our goal remains to hear the EU speaking with a single voice at the global level in
 the nearest possible future. In order to reach this goal, we have to find a way which
 will lead to the organic development of common institutions, while at the same time
 paying the utmost attention to the differences between Member States and their
 interests. <BRK>

- ⦿ A_establish, mention~
- **A_argue~
- ⦿ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- **A_argue~
- ⦿ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- ⦿ B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~
- **A_explain~
- ⦿ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- ⦿ B_suggest (e.g. a solution)~
- **A_argue~
- ⦿ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- ⦿ A_conclude, (logically) infer~
- A_claim (facts and values)~
- **A_argue~
- ⦿ A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-053

FR

Lequiller (Parl.-FR). - Monsieur le Président, je voudrais d'abord partir d'un constat que j'ai fait lors d'un de mes séjours à l'ONU auprès de la délégation française, lorsque la France présidait l'Union européenne, avec M. l'Ambassadeur qui était sur place. Il me faisait remarquer que 95 % des résolutions et décisions qui sont prises par l'Europe à l'ONU le sont à l'unanimité. Le problème, ce sont les 5 % sur lesquels l'Europe se divise. Ce sont souvent les décisions les plus importantes et sur lesquelles les États-Unis ne sont pas d'accord. Je crois donc que nous devons faire en sorte que l'Europe soit toujours unie. Si elle est d'accord avec les États-Unis, tant mieux, mais sur certains sujets elle doit pouvoir adopter une position autonome et unie. Je crois qu'il n'y a pas d'opposition entre les petits et les grands pays, entre ceux qui sont plus ou moins fédéralistes. En effet, nous sommes arrivés, selon moi, à une conception en commun de la fédération d'États-nations. Ainsi, au-delà des problèmes déontologiques, l'objectif doit être le pragmatisme. Je proposerais donc de mettre à l'ordre du jour l'idée suivante : la décision de proposer ensemble, chaque année, une déclaration de politique générale en matière d'affaires étrangères sur laquelle pourraient se prononcer les trois organes (Conseil des Ministres, Commission et Parlement européen) en fonction de leurs responsabilités effectives et actuelles. Cette déclaration de politique générale en matière d'affaires étrangères pourrait évoluer progressivement vers un

427 rapprochement de ces positions.
Je crois que l'Union a fait énormément de progrès dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, notamment suite au conflit majeur des Balkans, avec la création du Haut représentant pour la PESC, mais nous devons aussi fournir un effort cohérent en matière de défense. Je le mentionne parce que le gouvernement français a l'intention de remonter progressivement les efforts de défense de la France, de façon à atteindre l'objectif de 2,5 % du PIB, non atteint actuellement. Les pays désireux d'entrer dans cette politique étrangère et de sécurité commune devraient consentir des efforts parallèles.

429 Dans le domaine de l'industrie d'armement, il faut, selon moi, une coopération et, parfois, une complémentarité. En effet, certains pays ont chacun leurs spécialités, et il est un peu dommage que nous nous fassions concurrence, entre nous, au sein de l'Europe. Alors notre collaboration pourrait être beaucoup plus intelligente et beaucoup plus forte. Il me semble donc très important que nous ayons une coopération avec les États-Unis au sein de l'OTAN, dans un respect mutuel et que nous sachions non pas être indépendants mais autonomes quant il s'agit d'intervenir sur le théâtre européen mais parfois aussi à l'extérieur. Il va de soi que chaque État a sa souveraineté mais je crois qu'autour de cet objectif de déclaration commune de politique étrangère, de renforcement de la PESC, de coopération en matière industrielle, nous pouvons avancer, après l'euro, vers un nouvel objectif qui doit être défini, lui aussi, avec pragmatisme et sans opposition.

436 Je crois beaucoup à la démocratie parlementaire. Je souhaiterais voir, au poste auquel je viens d'être élu, se développer cette diplomatie parlementaire entre les parlements et le Parlement européen afin de voir de quelle façon nous pouvons donner un visage à l'Europe. Ce visage est très important, non seulement par rapport à l'extérieur mais par rapport aux citoyens qui, selon moi, ont besoin de savoir qui est leur président. Nous devons y réfléchir. <BRK>

437 4-054

438 IT

Fini (Ch.E/G.-IT). - Signor Presidente, tranne rarissime eccezioni, siamo davvero quasi tutti d'accordo, almeno qui nell'ambito della Convenzione, circa la necessità di avere più Europa nelle relazioni internazionali, ma credo che sia un errore pensare che l'efficienza della PESC dipenda unicamente dalla qualità dell'architettura istituzionale che vogliamo disegnare.

Ricordava giustamente il collega Muñoz poc'anzi che è sempre innanzitutto un problema di volontà politica: volontà politica degli Stati e, ovviamente, dei popoli europei.

Io voglio dare per scontato che ci sia in questa fase storica, soprattutto dopo l'11 settembre, come l'Eurobarometro fotografa, una precisa volontà politica dei popoli e degli Stati per un maggior protagonismo e una maggiore unitarietà dell'Europa in politica internazionale, e allora è giusto chiedersi, come stiamo facendo, con quali istituzioni.

Al riguardo voglio intervenire nel dibattito avanzando qualche proposta. Penso innanzitutto che, per garantire una maggior tempestività ed efficienza dell'azione della PESC, senza per questo alterare quell'equilibrio tra l'ambito comunitario e l'ambito intergovernativo che rappresenta certamente uno dei valori che la Convenzione deve saper difendere, perché non immaginare l'unione delle funzioni dell'Alto rappresentante e del Commissario per le relazioni esterne? La personalità prescelta dovrebbe godere, oltre che del controllo delle risorse, come già è stato detto, anche di un potere d'iniziativa nella PESC. Non penso ad un potere che sia esclusivo; penso ad un potere che sia comunque condiviso con gli Stati membri. In questa unità delle funzioni tra l'Alto rappresentante e il Commissario per le relazioni esterne, noi garantiremmo un ruolo di rappresentanza esterna all'Unione che dovrebbe essere potenziato con una forma giuridica precisa e chiara per un unico soggetto istituzionale: in buona sostanza, colui che agisce in nome e per conto dell'Unione.

....

Ulteriore considerazione: uno strumento indispensabile da attivare per garantire una maggiore efficacia della PESC, soprattutto in un'Europa più larga, in un'Europa riunificata e allargata, è, a mio modo di vedere, quello della flessibilità. La storia

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_claim (facts and values)-

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

recente ci ha dimostrato che non tutti gli Stati vorranno o potranno prendersi cura di situazioni che si verificano in paesi terzi, in paesi lontani e in cui non hanno interessi diretti. Ma se la politica estera non deve essere il minimo comun denominatore delle politiche nazionali, ma qualche cosa di più, allora credo che occorrerà ammettere che l'attuazione delle politiche, decise dall'Unione nel suo complesso, possa essere rimessa anche ad un gruppo di Stati, non necessariamente a tutti gli Stati. Un'ultima considerazione relativa al bilancio, questione su cui credo che davvero non si possano avere posizioni diverse rispetto a quelle che già sono state ampiamente espresse. Noi dobbiamo fare in modo che i paesi membri concorrano in misura sostanziale ad un adeguamento dello sforzo economico finanziario comune. Questo deve accadere nel rispetto dei parametri legislativi di spesa disciplinati dai singoli Stati, ma anche garantendo un'efficace opera di vigilanza e di controllo da parte dei parlamenti nazionali. Nella scorsa sessione, signor Presidente, parlammo del ruolo dei parlamenti nazionali: su questa materia il ruolo credo che sia essenziale. Agendo lungo queste linee, credo che si possa garantire la piena applicazione dell'articolo 19 del Trattato sull'Unione e quindi anche garantire, com'è nell'auspicio di tutti, che l'Europa parli ad una voce e sia più protagonista in politica estera.

(Applausi) <BRK>

4-055

EN

Yilmaz, Ayfer (Parl.-TR). - Mr President, at this stage of the debate I will not repeat what has already been said about the need and merits of having a strong common foreign and security policy which is a must if we are to have 'more Europe'. I will concentrate more on the economic dimension of the Union's external relations. Globalisation is the key aspect of the 21st century. Beside the positive spillover effects, we must consider the possible negative effects of uncoordinated decision making. It is important to develop a common European position in order to meet the expectations for a strong presence in the international methods related to crisis management and conflict prevention with financial and economic impacts. The Union must have a common, coherent, comprehensive and unique approach in its external relations with the rest of the world. The Union must speak with one voice which is based on shared values and common interests. Concerning the conduct of external economic relations, either at the multilateral or bilateral level, the Union should continue to use its exclusive competence in favour of common and balanced interests. By taking into account the expectations of the citizens, the complexity of economics in general, its social dimension and its effects in different areas on prosperity, the competence of the Community should be widened to cover more areas, particularly all aspects of trade in those goods and services which directly affect the life standards and the potential benefits of the European citizens. It is obvious that the notion of the single market, which has external as well as dimensions the internal ones, itself clearly implies that foreign economic relations should be handled by a single authority. On the other hand, in the ongoing globalisation process, which day by day forces all economic operators to take a large number of changing and developing conditions into consideration, the Union should give priority to the development of existing modalities with a view to satisfying the real needs of the Member States in a more balanced way. Each sector will differ in importance depending on the Member State and thus none should be scarified or ignored in favour of others. Strategic administration at Community level, and more active participation of the Member States in pre-decision making procedures should be reviewed and strengthened. Measures should be previously prepared to manage any crisis which may be faced by all or some Member States in the future. Internal structures should not be allowed to diversify in such a way that they spoil the integrity of the process. We are very pleased that another aspect of external relations, the development policy, has been included in the Convention's agenda. Development cooperation and assistance is of vital importance to the billions of people living in every corner of the globe. Therefore should constitute one of the most significant dimensions of the Union's external relations. It should be handled with ultimate care and effectiveness since it is not only a matter of humanity but also an investment for the future prosperity of Europe. <BRK>

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4-056

FR

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Lamassoure (PE). - Je vous remercie, Monsieur le Président. Désormais, nous avons la monnaie du 21^{ème} siècle mais, curieusement, nos politiques étrangères et nos dispositifs militaires restent prisonniers du monde des années cinquante et soixante.

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En témoignent trois questions, sur des sujets tabous au demeurant, que nous pose l'homme de la rue. Première question: à quoi servent nos ambassades bilatérales ? Je citerai en exemple l'Ambassade de France à Madrid, chère à Ana Palacio, celle de Belgique à La Haye. Un ministre français qui ne connaît pas personnellement son homologue allemand est un mauvais ministre, cher Gunter Pleuger. Les relations entre nous ne revêtent plus un caractère diplomatique mais un caractère communautaire.

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Deuxième question : À quoi jouons-nous à l'ONU? Pierre Lequiller parlait de l'ONU tout à l'heure. Nous nous y comportons comme si le monde et notre propre continent n'avaient pas changé depuis 1960. Comment pouvons-nous justifier, au 21^{ème} siècle, la représentation des pays européens au Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU? Sujet tabou. Et comme nous ne voulons rien changer à cette représentation, nous refusons par exemple l'accès à l'Inde, pays démocratique, deux fois et demi plus peuplé que la grande Europe ici représentée. En d'autres termes, à l'ONU, nous défendons un statu quo où, en pratique, l'Inde est toujours une colonie, l'Allemagne est toujours un pays vaincu et coupable, et l'Union européenne n'existe pas. Il ne nous vient même pas à l'esprit de traduire, dans l'enceinte de l'ONU, ce que nous avons ensemble fait de plus positif pour la paix du monde, depuis 50 ans, à savoir la décolonisation et la construction d'une Europe unie.

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Troisième question : la défense. On dit, à juste titre, que c'est le coeur des souverainetés nationales. Pourquoi n'acceptons-nous pas simplement d'accorder à l'Union européenne les transferts de souveraineté que beaucoup d'entre nous ont accordés à l'OTAN, pendant et après la guerre froide ? Aurions-nous moins confiance en nos voisins européens qu'en la lointaine Amérique ? Parmi nous, qui a encore peur de qui ? Ayons le courage de nous le demander et de le dire. Achéons de tuer les fantômes du passé afin de pouvoir, enfin, affronter les défis de notre temps. Pour y parvenir, proposons une démarche progressive en nous inspirant de celle qui a si bien réussi pour l'Union monétaire. Nous pourrions par exemple mettre en place trois étapes, échelonnées sur une période de 10 à 12 ans, qui nous permettraient de réunir les conditions politiques et de consolider entre nous l'indispensable confiance.

La première étape serait celle de la séparation du diplomatique et du communautaire. La seconde serait celle de l'harmonisation des politiques nationales et la troisième serait celle de la véritable politique commune. C'est sans doute un domaine où notre Convention devra proposer, non pas un cadre figé, mais le lancement d'un nouveau processus. <BRK>

4-057

EN

MacLennan of Rogart (Parl.-GB). - Mr President, yesterday at the Youth Convention you held out the prospect that we are entering the third age of the European Union. The achievement of the first age was 50 years of peace within our frontiers. The second age is that of liberation and the reunification of our continent. The third is the age when Europe may choose to reach beyond its borders to advance the achievement of citizenship of a global society.

In a dangerous world, external action is necessary to safeguard what we have achieved for ourselves in the first two ages of European Union. But self-defence is not enough. Europe must aspire, in its third age, to share its growing good fortune. This is not an imperialist vision. It is a willingness to be a leading partner within a developing world community. This is a community to be enriched by the husbanding of its natural resources; a community to be protected from the violation of fundamental human rights; a community to be safeguarded from the rapacity and cruelty of the mighty by the extension of the rule of law; a community in which globalisation does not signify heartless exploitation or the uncontrolled belittling of

our diverse cultures and beliefs but rather, the ever wider spread of enlightenment and opportunity.

We have to ask ourselves the question in this Convention: do we have the strength, the will and the means to do it? Certainly we have the economic resources to let us choose to be effective. Do we have the will? The signals in this year of international lawlessness are mixed. The scale of American power and willingness to go it alone has not yet evoked a bell-like clarity of response from Europe, but the need for a strong and independent-minded partner for the United States, founded on democracy and the rule of law, must be met. A mere declaration of intent by Europe without the means to deliver coherent, agreed and effective common foreign and security policies would stand, like the Locarno Pact, as a mockery of good intentions.

In the sphere of foreign and security policy, capability must match aspiration.

However well-intentioned, the recent visit of the High Representative to Jerusalem only advertised how ill-prepared was Europe for a role in the Middle East. Common policies cannot be plucked from the air in rapid reaction to crisis. Agreeing the mandates and the means for their delivery requires painstaking continuing application by dedicated public servants, not just a publicised dash around the capitals of Europe.

It is more important to secure that professionalism than to decide whether it should be located in the Council, the Commission or both. The Council must provide sustained leadership but mere concertation of foreign policy by heads of government is not enough. Nineteenth century Europe tried that at the Congress of Berlin and in the so-called 'Concert of Europe'. It failed spectacularly. The very different prospects for Europe today require us to build upon the three great institutions of the Union, to adapt them further, certainly, but to use them all for their inherent strengths in fashioning for Europe a beneficent role in the new, wider world community.

(Applause) <BRK>

4-058

EN

Zile (Gouv.-LV). - Mr. President, the Convention's ability to create new instruments in EU external policy and to improve existing ones should be one of the most clear results that the Convention can achieve within its mandate. EU external policy is an area that can bring the European Union closer to a wider public, promoting at the same time the EU's role on the international stage.

I would like to start with the EU's external trade policy. This area, being the exclusive competence of the Community, is usually considered to be relatively effective. The Community approach safeguards the interests of each EU Member State, finding the best compromise to satisfy both small and large Member States. But what about other EU external policy areas - are they as positive?

The EU's external policy activities have resulted in the creation of the post of CFSP High Representative. However, every half year, the representatives of EU institutions organise and participate in about 200 events involving political dialogue in which the EU presidency plays a significant role. However, each new presidency starts its activities with a completely different vision and different priorities. By assessing the EU's activities, one could conclude that the time and resources invested far outweigh the benefits gained. Is the European Union satisfied with the results achieved?

What I just said shows the advantages and disadvantages of the two different approaches. It clearly shows the achievements of the Community approach and the limitations of the intergovernmental approach in reaching results on external action. That is why we would suggest that the effectiveness of EU external policy can be improved only where all EU external policies and trade instruments are used in a systematic and structured way.

Political dialogue should be closely linked to EU development policy and the common refugee and asylum policy. EU external policy activity should be flexible and should ensure faster decision-making. The current system should be reformed because, at present, decision-making is a Council competence, whilst implementation is a Commission competence.

There is no doubt that the external dimension of the EU should also include such areas as the environment, justice and home affairs and illegal migration. At the same time, we must simplify the complicated legal basis.

477 Finally, it is too early to speak about creating a common defence system within the
 478 EU. However, there is no doubt that we should further develop the EU's capacity to
 479 prevent military or civilian crises and provide crisis management. The EU's security
 480 and military activities currently come under the scope of the Petersberg tasks.
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482 4-059
 483 EN

484 **Duff (PE).** - Mr President, clearly there is some broad agreement that the
 485 competence of the Union should grow in the field of foreign security and defence
 486 policy.


487 But it is more important, therefore, to appreciate that the present treaty system fails.
 488 It fails on the grounds of clarity, consistency, democracy and cost-effectiveness. It
 489 fails to nurture mutual trust among Member States and it fails to develop the Union
 490 as an assured performer on the world stage.

491 Therefore, just to want more of the same system is not the answer. It is vital to
 492 reform the decision-making process because Europe cannot speak with one voice,
 493 should it fail to agree on what to say.

I believe that, ultimately, we will see the cloning, perhaps, of Mr Patten and Mr
 Solana, but much better synergy between the Commission and the Council can be
 created in the meantime.

By all means grant Mr Solana the right of initiative, but why not insist that in cases
 where Mr Solana and Mr Patten can agree to table a joint proposal, the Council
 should act by qualified majority. That would bring more of the Community method
 into the common foreign and security policy and break down the barriers of theology
 which too often impede rational political thought.

QMV in foreign policy will bring about more expediency and more compulsion -
 leading to greater achievement - and is absolutely essential in a Union of 25 or more
 Member States. <BRK>



4-060 Translation

Augerinos:

Mr. President, we are observing all the indicators of the Eurobarometer in which the demand of the European citizens for a more extensive presence of the Union in the international arena and for a more effective presence in the administration of international crises, are being recorded.

There are three sectors for potential external action for the EU: foreign economic relations, foreign policy, and defense & security policy. In my belief, Mr. President, all three of these sectors interact with and affect one another, and for that reason they should consist of one solid framework, so that the Union will be better able to operate with effectiveness and coherence in its foreign relations. The foreign relations schema of the EU in operation at the moment is difficult to define, ineffective and dissatisfying. This became obvious during the operations in the Balkans, which proved out difficult to administer, but also in its apparent incapacity to play a leading role in the Middle-East. That is why there exists such a need to examine the gradual merger of the second pillar to the first pillar, and to communalize foreign policy at the Union level. Proof of the unsuitability of the structure of the pillars of the Union is the fact that the representation of the Union abroad is today realized by the Presidency, the High Representative for Foreign Policy and the designated commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

That sort of division can only lead to a conflict of responsibilities and foster confusion among European Citizens but also among the international partners of the Union. That is why the Union should be expressed abroad through one forceful voice and presence. The responsibilities of the High Representative should be gradually incorporated with those of the responsible Commissioner. Additionally, the position of vice-president of Committee for foreign relations and the Common Foreign and Defence Policy needs to be constituted, who will of course be subject to the Council and the European Parliament. For the European Union to play a leading role in the

international political arena it should possess the essential means but it should also not lack the right decision-making mechanisms. The system of unanimity that is in effect today impedes the work of Union and it delays the decision-making process so that the Union cannot respond to situations which require swift reactions. The wider use of the majority rule (instead of unanimity) is a necessary condition for a more effective achievement of the objectives of the Union in the foreign policy arena.

Finally, a unified Defence Policy should constitute an integral part of the foreign policy planning of the Union. The European Union should gradually pass from a Crisis Management System to a system of collective safety. In what concerns the member states which will not prove to be able to follow this effort, this shouldn't prevent those member states that will wish to advance. This of course assumes a certain level of willingness to promote an even more strengthened collaboration in the subject of defence.

4-061
IT

Dini (Parl.-IT). - Signor Presidente, nel contributo che ho reso disponibile ai membri della Convenzione ho illustrato le premesse, le ragioni geopolitiche che richiedono di dotare l'Unione europea degli strumenti necessari a condurre una credibile politica estera di sicurezza e difesa. E' appunto il compito della Convenzione - il nostro compito - saper raccogliere con coerenza gli insegnamenti imposti dalla necessità e identificare, sul piano delle istituzioni, i punti sui quali l'Unione deve innovare rispetto ai Trattati esistenti.

Chiarezza ed autorevolezza potranno aumentare, riducendo - come da lei auspicato, signor Presidente - il numero delle voci incaricate di far sentire le posizioni dell'Unione. L'ipotesi di fondere in una stessa persona, anche se con ruoli e mandati diversi, l'attuale Alto rappresentante e il Commissario, ed eventuale Vicepresidente della Commissione, responsabile per le relazioni esterne, potrebbe contribuire a tali chiarezza e autorevolezza. Non si tratterebbe di comunitarizzare la politica estera - un passo per ora troppo audace - bensì di riunire nella stessa persona due mandati distinti: l'uno proveniente dalla Commissione, l'altro dal Consiglio, per quanto riguarda le materie di competenza di quest'ultimo. Non ritengo pertanto né pratico né sufficiente quanto detto al riguardo dal collega Peter Hain, cioè che i due personaggi potrebbero presentare proposte concordate. Sono invece d'accordo con quanto detto dall'onorevole Brok all'inizio della nostra riunione, dall'onorevole Glotz e anche dal rappresentante del governo italiano, l'onorevole Fini.

4-062
EN

Hain (Ch.E/G.-GB). - Mr President, we all agree that we need a serious foreign policy. We all agree that vital reforms are needed, and nobody is defending the status quo. That is agreed between us. As Mr Christophersen asked earlier: how do we stop four voices speaking to the US instead of one European voice? If you want a common voice from Europe, it has to have the confidence of heads of government. If you do not have the confidence of the heads of government, you will not get a common voice. That is the brutal truth. That is why Mr Solana, apart from his own abilities, has been so successful, because he is the High Representative of the Council. Mr Avgerinos asked about qualified majority voting. I see potential advantages in making more use of qualified majority voting for implementing the CFSP. It would reduce the scope for individual nations blocking progress, but I cannot see it for policy decisions. I doubt that QMV would be either realistic or good for cohesion. If QMV were applied to all European policy decisions, it might make more public where the divisions are and therefore weaken Europe's external voice. Those are my concerns, but I am not shutting the door on it. I was interested in the comments made by Mr Dini and others on the double-hatting of the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative. My

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
**A_explain-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
B_reject, decline, refuse-
B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-

A_ascertain agreement-

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_claim (facts and values)-
A_ask, want to know-

question - and those that want to merge them have to answer it - is to which body
 510 would that individual answer and be accountable: the Council or the Commission?
 Who is the master? That is the question. Can you have two bosses?
 511 Mr Duff's proposal for QMV where Mr Solana and Mr Patten have a joint proposal
 512 is an interesting one, but does that imply codecision with the European Parliament.
 513 Would this be possible? That is my question to him. <BRK>
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4-063

FR

Barnier (CE). - Monsieur le Président, comme tout le monde ici, je trouve que le
 débat progresse de manière très intéressante et de manière non idéologique.
 Alain Lamassoure, tout à l'heure, a plaidé pour la progressivité. Il a employé le mot
 de "processus". Je m'inscris dans cette idée que nous devons avoir une perspective,
 518 car nous savons bien que nous ne modifierons pas fondamentalement les traités aussi
 facilement que cela après 2004 ou 2005.

Il est donc temps d'avoir une vision sur 20 ou 30 ans, comme cela a été le cas dans
 les années 50, et de prévoir, dans le cadre de cette vision, des étapes.

Voilà pourquoi également la question du "Monsieur PESC", que je connais assez
 519 bien pour avoir été l'un des négociateurs du traité d'Amsterdam. À l'époque, si nous
 520 avons voulu mettre le "Monsieur PESC" dans la Commission, nous ne l'aurions mis
 521 nulle part. C'était absolument impossible d'imaginer qu'il soit autrement qu'aux côtés
 522 du Conseil et qu'ainsi il fasse ses preuves, comme M. Solana a fait les siennes. Je suis
 523 sûr d'une chose, en ayant ce souvenir, c'est que l'heure arrive où, pour la voix de
 524 l'Europe, pour la force de cette voix, il devient nécessaire de fusionner les énergies
 525 et, notamment, de mettre dans la même main la capacité d'initiative. Peut-être cela se
 526 fera-t-il par étapes, comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, sans renoncer en quoi que ce soit
 527 à la vision finale.

Par étapes: il faudra donc peut-être en tout premier lieu doter "Monsieur PESC" du
 529 droit d'initiative. Imaginer, comme Andrew Duff l'a dit, que, lorsque la possibilité se
 530 présente d'une initiative commune du commissaire et du Haut représentant, la
 531 majorité qualifiée soit utilisée au Conseil. C'est pour cette raison que je dis que le
 débat progresse de manière intéressante. Je suis sûr qu'on peut, lors de l'étape
 suivante, fusionner les deux postes et, néanmoins - je le dis à Peter Hain - prévoir,
 pour élaborer l'initiative, de la part de cet homme qui aura une double casquette,
 prévoir des modalités particulières pour élaborer l'initiative, lesquelles rassureront les
 ministres. On peut prévoir de telles modalités, et c'est ce à quoi nous devons
 travailler dans les mois qui viennent. <BRK>

4-064

FR

Le Président. - Je vous remercie. Chacun de nous aurait des observations à faire sur
 ces différents points qui sont importants. Et je crois que pour la qualité de notre
 débat, il faut poursuivre la discussion. Nous aurons peut-être l'occasion de nous
 exprimer, si je peux le faire, en fin de séance ou demain matin. <BRK>

4-065

EN

Tiilikainen (Ch.E/G.-FI). - Mr President, many people here have argued that the
 European Union should be able to speak to a greater extent with one voice.
 I agree with Mr Duff that it is not just the number of voices that matters, but whether
 the Union has anything to say with its voice.
 I see that the real challenges at the moment are connected to the formulation of a
 cohesive and consistent policy to be implemented with those instruments that have
 recently been created for the European Union.
 First, as I see it, it is a question of the formulation of the EU's political interests.
 In order to become a credible international actor, the European Union must be
 provided with a much clearer formulation of its international policy and interests. It
 must be able to turn its basic values - those, for instance, expressed in Article 6, as
 well as the starting-points for the common foreign and security policy - into a more
 concrete policy formulation, in terms of both the geographical and ideological goals
 of this policy.
 In present Second Pillar matters, the European Union's policy is excessively *ad hoc*

532 in character. Consistency, even in the historical sense, is a precondition for
 533 credibility. Better formulation of the common policy must also result in increased
 534 loyalty to the common foreign and security policy on the part of the Member States.
 535 The EU's lack of proper institutional machinery, both in the planning and
 536 articulation of its external position and interests, is the main cause for the defective
 537 formulation of a consistent external policy.
 538 The Union needs machinery that is capable of dealing with the international
 539 environment from the perspective of the EU as a collective actor. The EU currently
 540 lacks machinery that would guarantee both coherence and continuity in its external
 541 relations.
 542 It is evident that the legal and institutional division of the EU's external relations into
 543 two pillars must be dismantled as a condition for the creation of a coherent policy.
 544 The Commission must be made the key actor in the analysis and planning of the
 EU's external policy, as well as in its representation.
 Member States retain their position as key decision-makers, but the role of the
 Commission guarantees that the common perspective and political consistency will
 shape the result. Majority decisions must be made the rule in an enlarged Union, with
 the exception of defence.
 A more cohesive policy formulation must also contribute to the Union's interests
 being communicated more firmly and coherently to the international audience. The
 EU must strengthen and coordinate its representation in international organisations.
 It must also have a clearer profile as regards those individuals representing the EU in
 international fora. Giving the mandate of external representation to the Commission
 would contribute to the coherence of this policy area, both inside and outside the
 Union.
 To conclude, the European Union does not lack international capacities. The problem
 is how to put these capacities to more efficient use.
 To start thinking more in terms of common EU interests, including in the field of
 external relations, is a basic condition. This cannot be done as long as the field is
 divided both in institutional terms at EU level and in terms of historical and
 geographical interests at the Member State level. <BRK>

- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_demand, call for, desire-
- **A_justify-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_demand, call for, desire-
- B_demand, call for, desire-
- B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-
- A_conclude, (logically) infer-
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- A_claim (facts and values)-
- A_establish, mention-
- A_approve, admit as correct-
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- A_establish, mention-
- A_claim (facts and values)-

4-066

DE

Meyer (Parl.-DE). - Herr Präsident! Sie haben uns und auch den Jugendkonvent mehrfach aufgefordert, mutig zu sein, Visionen zu entwickeln und auch Europa zu träumen. Deshalb will ich an den Satz erinnern, mit dem der amtierende deutsche Außenminister, Joschka Fischer, sein Amt angetreten hat - er hat erklärt, er wolle daran arbeiten, sein Amt als nationaler Außenminister überflüssig zu machen. Nun, ist das sicher eine Vision, die weit vorseilt. Aber in der Politik kommt es ja häufig darauf an, dass auch kleinere Schritte in die richtige Richtung weisen. Deshalb verdient nach meiner Überzeugung der Vorschlag der Personalunion zwischen den Ämtern von Solana und Patten, wie ihn auch meine Kollegen Peter Glotz und Elmar Brok vorgestellt haben, nachhaltige Unterstützung.
 Die Menschen, für die wir hier arbeiten, erwarten, dass Europa in Krisen, die die Welt erschüttern, wie etwa im Nahen Osten, mit einer Stimme spricht. Sie erwarten das auch bei der Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, und ich hoffe, dass das so bleibt, wenn es um die Forderung nach dem internationalen Strafgerichtshof geht, einer ganz wichtigen Forderung nicht nur Europas, sondern vieler anderer Länder. Aber wenn man dieses fordert und auf der anderen Seite auf Souveränität pocht, dann sollte man doch bitte bedenken, dass es zum einen bei den Beispielen, die ich genannt habe, immer auch um europäische Interessen geht, und zum anderen muss man sich doch wenigstens fragen, ob eine wirkungsvolle Durchsetzung nationaler Interessen tatsächlich aussichtsreich ist, wenn man alleine auftritt, statt mit einer europäischen Stimme und entsprechender Unterstützung zu sprechen. Im deutschen Bundestag, das wird niemanden überraschen, treten wir ein für eine schrittweise Vergemeinschaftung der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik, wie sie unter anderem der Kollege Lamassoure eben skizziert hat. Wir sind für die parlamentarische Kontrolle einer integrierten gemeinsamen Außenpolitik, die vom Europäischen Parlament wahrgenommen werden soll. So lange und so weit der intergouvernementale Charakter der Außenpolitik fortbesteht, bedarf diese der Kontrolle durch die

nationalen Parlamente in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Europäischen Parlament.

Etwas besonderes, da hatte die Kollegin Gisela Stuart eben völlig recht, gilt aus unserer Sicht für militärische Einsätze, bei denen nationales Verfassungsrecht zu beachten ist. Deshalb sagen wir, europäische Außenpolitik sollte künftig im Rat mehrheitlich entschieden werden können. Bei Militäreinsätzen wird es immer, wie Kollege Brok das formuliert hat, um eine *coalition of the willing* gehen. Wir sind für eine Verbesserung der gemeinsamen Außenvertretung der Europäischen Union durch ein europäisches diplomatisches Corps. In dem Zusammenhang sind wir für den ganz praktischen Vorschlag einer Intensivierung des Personalaustauschs zwischen Mitgliedstaaten und den für die GASP zuständigen EU-Strukturen im Rat und der Kommission.

Eine letzte Bemerkung zu der Frage 2, die uns das Präsidium vorgelegt hat, nämlich zu der Frage der Entwicklung von Gemeinsamkeiten und der Abstimmung in der Entwicklungspolitik. Der deutsche Bundestag ist für eine stärkere Verzahnung aller für die zivile Krisenprävention notwendigen Politikbereiche, also neben der Außen-, der Entwicklungs-, der Finanz- und der Migrationspolitik. Wir meinen, dass das eben nur europäisch geleistet werden kann, durch europäische Planungskonzepte unter Einbeziehung der Kommission und des Europäischen Parlaments. Mich hat eben sehr gefreut, dass die Kollegin Tiilikainen, meine Vorrednerin, auch davon gesprochen hat, dass wir Grundwerte haben, die wir auch nach außen offensiv vertreten sollten. Wir bekennen uns in der Grundrechtecharta zur Solidarität. Das hat ja auch, wie wir wissen, mit Entwicklungspolitik zu tun. Deshalb sage ich, es ist schön, wenn wir in der wirtschaftlichen Außenvertretung dafür sorgen, dass wir zum Beispiel Autos exportieren. Aber wir sollten uns auch gemeinsam darum bemühen, unsere europäische Werteordnung zu exportieren. <BRK>

4-067

IT

Muscardini (PE). - Signor Presidente, nel titolo V del Trattato sull'Unione europea sono definiti gli obiettivi della politica estera e di sicurezza comune, per realizzare i quali sono stati creati strumenti quali l'azione e la posizione comune. In seguito, la figura di Alto rappresentante della PESC ha rafforzato il coordinamento della politica estera dell'Unione nella gestione delle crisi. Non sempre, tuttavia e purtroppo, l'Unione è stata in grado di affrontare, tempestivamente e unitariamente, le vicende internazionali. Oggi, la politica estera dell'Unione deve essere più tempestiva e visibile ed essere conosciuta all'esterno anche dai *media*, dalle organizzazioni internazionali, dal cittadino comune.

Per soddisfare questa esigenza occorre, oltre ad una ridefinizione dei ruoli dell'Alto rappresentante, che vi sia anche un'espressione univoca della volontà politica dei governi per assumere posizioni di volta in volta rispondenti agli interessi generali dell'Europa e quindi anche dei singoli Stati. Anche le questioni della solidarietà internazionale e della difesa della pace sono maggiormente garantite da strategie comuni, piuttosto che da singole decisioni nazionali. Le capacità diplomatiche, analitiche e rappresentative degli Stati membri devono essere utilizzate continuativamente anche attraverso l'uso delle tecnologie più avanzate, affinché l'Unione possa assumere iniziative immediate in caso di crisi. Devono perciò essere anche utilizzate le competenze specifiche e le tradizioni storiche delle diplomazie dei singoli Stati nazionali, che dovrebbero sfociare sinteticamente nella cellula di programmazione politica e tempestivo allarme che è stata istituita in base ad una dichiarazione allegata al Trattato di Amsterdam.

La convergenza e l'unificazione della PESC e delle politiche esterne diviene una necessità. Il frazionamento dei comportamenti non giova alla credibilità dell'Unione. Per queste ragioni riteniamo degno di particolare attenzione l'incremento dell'utilizzo dello strumento delle strategie comuni. Riconosciamo la necessità del rispetto della sovranità nazionale ma ci rendiamo conto che, su questi temi, una formula che modifichi il diritto di veto debba essere trovata con un voto a maggioranza, per snellire la procedura ed evitare un *blackout* che paralizzerebbe l'azione dell'Unione nella politica estera. Per questo motivo dovrà essere data massima attenzione alla ricerca del punto di equilibrio tra il rispetto della sovranità nazionale e il rispetto dell'interesse collettivo dell'Unione, tenuto altresì conto che tra le missioni dell'Unione, delle quali abbiamo parlato nella prima seduta, vi sono anche e

- A_claim (facts and values) -
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- **A_argue-
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- B_demand, call for, desire-
- **A_argue- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
- B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-
- **A_argue-
- A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

soprattutto il garantire la pace e la libertà al di fuori dei propri confini e la lotta al terrorismo. Proprio per dare all'Europa una sola voce, sempre più autorevole, in politica estera e di difesa risulta perciò evidente che il processo di riunificazione europea deve essere attuato con grande determinazione e tempestività. <BRK>

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4-068

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EN

Martikonis (Gouv.-LT). - Mr President, in less than two years the strategic situation of Lithuania will be changed profoundly. In several months Lithuania will become a Member of the European Union and Nato, thus arriving at a qualitatively new stage of its international life. We have clear views about the complementarity of European Union and North Atlantic Alliance membership in the Baltic states.

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My country already sees itself as a good and responsible member of the European and transatlantic community. The task of further developing the Union's external action comes at a time of great domestic introspection about the best ways and means to build Lithuania's foreign policy roles into the greater construction of the European Union.

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The Praesidium has put good questions to us. The answers will not be quick or easy. But let me briefly comment on two points. First, while putting our common interests on the map, I agree with those who argue that the Union's global role starts with neighbourhood or proximity policies, be it in the east, north or south. Talking about what I know best - looking east - it is in relations with Russia, Ukraine or even Belarus that the political will, coherence, flexibility and effects of our actions are being and will be tested. The concept of wider Europe should be further elaborated, allowing for individual strategies to be employed for individual partners. Let us think for a second about the situation of the Russian region of Kaliningrad. This is a matter of cross-border cooperation, energy, environment cooperation, and the movement of people and goods. Lithuania's efforts and expertise in this is already an important piece of regional or should I say European *acquis*. We have every chance to work with Russia for the success of this pilot project. For that we need properly concerted European Union action.

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On the mechanics, who is best equipped to act in the interests of Europe? How shall we get to the situation of 'all-for-one and one-for-all'? Polarising the Council and the Commission is wrong. Polarising the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations does no good either. We need them both, and together.

A number of good suggestions to this end were put forward. This will be achieved by the interaction of the EU institutions. To my mind, the Union's external trade policies are a result of that. They work well. I draw some inspiration along the lines that Commissioner Barnier put. If the Community method in European Union external action sounds unusual to some of us, let us have a hand in reinventing it. For my government, the pragmatic result is important. The end result of this must be that the Union is respected globally and its citizens and countries are proud to be its members. <BRK>


4-069

NL

Maij-Weggen (PE). - Mijnheer de voorzitter, het is heel opvallend dat uit alle Eurobarometers van de laatste jaren blijkt dat de Europese burgers een grotere rol van de Europese Unie wensen op het gebied van de buitenlandse politiek.

Vaak is dat zelfs een van de drie belangrijkste wensen van de Europese burgers. En tegelijk is het opvallend dat die rol zoals ze op dit moment wordt uitgeoefend door de Commissie en door de Raad steeds diffuser en steeds onduidelijker is geworden. Bij cruciale internationale vraagstukken zien we optredens door en naast elkaar van de Raad, via de Hoge vertegenwoordiger, de heer Solana, van de Commissie, via de heer Prodi en de heer Patten, en dan zien we ook nog nationale ministers van buitenlandse zaken hun bemoeienis tonen, soms individueel, soms via de bekende trojka waardoor er ook nog eens een Europees etiket op wordt geplakt.

Het is dus niet te verbazen dat de burgers geërgerd en teleurgesteld raken door dit vertoon en het is minstens even erg dat we in de internationale politiek daardoor onvoldoende serieus worden genomen. Willen we de rol spelen die we zouden moeten spelen dan moeten we, en ik volg hier de heer Brok en vele andere collega's,



de rol van de heer Solana op de een of andere manier versmelten met die van de heer Patten. En we moeten de Commissie veel meer ruimte geven om de buitenlandse politiek van de Unie één duidelijk gezicht te geven, én namens de Raad én namens het Europees Parlement.

En dat gezicht moet ook versterkt worden door de opname van de pijler van het GBVB in het communautaire deel van de Verdragen en dat lijkt mij een van de belangrijke taken van onze Conventie te zijn. En ook het Europese defensiebeleid zal opgenomen moeten worden in het communautaire deel van de Verdragen.

De Europese Unie moet naar mijn oordeel een duidelijke Europese poot van de NAVO worden. Dat versterkt onze positie in de buitenlandse politiek ook. Iedereen weet dat je voor een effectieve buitenlandse politiek ook nog eens een stok achter de deur moet hebben.

Voorzitter, nog enkele extra opmerkingen over de externe politiek, want daartoe behoort niet alleen het GBVB, maar ook het terrein van de externe handel en de Europese ontwikkelingshulp. Het externe handelsbeleid is communautair en het is eigenlijk het volste recht van de Commissie om hier op te treden. Maar ernstig genoeg blokkeert de Raad regelmatig het optreden van de Commissie. Een heel berucht voorbeeld is het handelsakkoord met Zuid-Afrika dat vier jaar lang getraineed heeft om de meest banale en bizarre redenen. De ene keer ging het om de Italiaanse grappa, met alle respect voor de Italiaanse collega's, een andere keer ging het om Portugese port, met alle respect voor de Portugese collega's, en met alle respect voor de voorzitter ging het soms ook om Franse champagne, die kennelijk goed werd nagemaakt door de Zuid-Afrikanen. En ondanks de herhaalde massale steun van het Europees Parlement aan de Commissie ging dat traineren steeds verder.

Naar mijn oordeel zou er een voorziening in de Verdragen moeten komen die dit Raadsgedrag voorkomt, want het is buitengewoon schadelijk. Het is ook in de verhouding tot de zuidelijke Afrikaanse landen schadelijk gebleken. Want voorzitter, hoe kun je effectief interveniëren in bijvoorbeeld de Zimbabwe-kwestie als je nog korte tijd daarvoor zo'n ruzie hebt gemaakt met die landen over zulke banale onderwerpen?

En dan, voorzitter, het gebied van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Daar is een heel groot probleem van de democratische controle. De financiën van de Europese ontwikkelingssamenwerking, en samen met de lidstaten zijn we de grootste donor in de wereld, vallen niet onder het begrotingscontrolerecht van het Europees Parlement. En ook onze nationale parlementen hebben geen recht of praktijk van toezicht. Wij vinden dat het Europees Parlement volledig toezicht moet krijgen op de financiën in de "European Development Fund" van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking. En tenslotte, voorzitter, nog een laatste opmerking over de broodnodige afstemming. Een van de zaken die we ook zo snel mogelijk moeten beoordelen, is hoe intern beleid van de Europese Unie, landbouwbeleid, milieubeleid, afgestemd wordt op het Europees buitenlands beleid, want ook daar haakt veel. De tijd is nu te kort om daarop in te gaan, maar ik denk dat we daar in de desbetreffende werkgroep ook nog eens diep over van gedachten moeten wisselen. <BRK>

A_claim (facts and values)-

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

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4-069 Translation

the Netherlands

Maij-Weggen (PE). - Sir the chairman, it's quite striking that all the Eurobarometers of the last few years show that the European citizens want the European Union to play a more important role in international politics.

Often this is even one of the three most important wishes of the European citizens. And at the same time it's striking that this role, as it's being practiced at this moment by the Commission and the Council, becomes more and more vague and unclear. For crucial international problems we see actions of the Council, via the High representative, Mr. Solana, and alongside those of the Commission, via

580 Mr. Prodi and Mr. Patten; and then you also have the national
ministers of foreign affairs meddling, sometimes individually or
sometimes via the known troika which has a European label stuck to it
as well.

581 Thus it's not a surprise that citizens are getting irritated and
disappointed by this show and it is at least just as awful that as a result
of this we are not taken seriously in international politics. If we want
to play the role we ought to play, and on this I agree with Mr. Brok and
many other colleagues, then we must combine together in one way or
582 another the role of Mr. Solana with the role of Mr. Patten. And we
must give the Commission more full play on behalf of the Council and
the European Parliament for the Union's foreign policy to be more
583 coherent.

B_demand, call for, desire-

This coherency must be strengthened by the insertion of the CFSP
pillar in the community part of the Treaties and this is to my opinion
one of the important branches of our Convention. The European
defence administration will also have to be inserted in the community
part of the Treaties.

584 To my judgement, the European Union should clearly become the
European division of NATO. That would also strengthen our position
in international politics. Everyone knows that in order to have an
effective foreign policy you also need punishments in case of non-
585 respect.

Chairman, still some extra remarks on the external politics, since this
not only includes the CFSP, but also external trade and European
development aid. The external trade policy is worked out at
community level and the Commission perfectly has the right to take
action on this matter. But the Council regularly blocks the actions of
the Commission, which is a serious matter. A quite notorious example
of this is the trade agreement with South-Africa which dragged on for
four years for the most banal and bizarre reasons. Once it was about
the Italian grappa, with all respect for my Italian colleagues. Another
time it was about the Portuguese port, with all respect for my
Portuguese colleagues; and with all respect for the chairman,
sometimes it was also about the French champagne, which was
obviously being well duplicated by the South-Africans. Despite the
European Parliament's massive continual support for the Commission
it kept dragging on.

To my judgement there must come a provision in the Treaties which
prevents this kind of behaviour of the Council, for it is extremely
harmful. It has also turned out to be harmful for the southern African
countries. Chairman, how can you intervene effectively for instance in
the Zimbabwe-issue when not long before you've had a quarrel with
those countries over such banal subjects?

Next, chairman, the territory of the development cooperation. There is
a very large problem of democratic control. The finances of the
European development cooperation, making us the largest donor in the

world when combined with those of the member countries, are not subject to the budget control laws of the European Parliament. Furthermore our national parliaments have no right or practice of supervision. We find that the European Parliament should get complete supervision on the finances of the development cooperation's "European Development Fund".

Finally, chairman, just one last remark on this much-needed harmonisation. One of the matters we also have to assess as soon as possible is how internal policy of the European Union, agricultural policy, environmental policy, are brought into line with the European foreign policy, as there are many deficiencies. We don't have enough time now to go further into that matter, but I think that the relevant study group should exchange views thoroughly. <BRK>

4-070

EN


Kiljunen (Parl.-FI). - Mr President, the European Union, especially when enlarged, will be clearly the biggest economic entity in the world. This entails global interests but, at the same time, global responsibilities. The European Union has provided a successful model of peace and development based on common democratic values, economic co-operation and social partnership. We are creating sustained security based on cohesion. I think we need to understand and acknowledge this more clearly. The rest of the world shares this same need. We have to build on this in our common foreign policy. Europe must offer its assistance to neighbouring countries and beyond. The challenges of globalisation - from the trade barriers the developing countries face to the HIV endemic and from global warming to trading in small arms - are so huge that the European Union must play an increasingly active role in the building of real global governance.

To support sustainable development worldwide, we need coherent and consistent EU external policies across the board. I welcome the great efforts the Commission and the High Representative have put into this question in the last few years, but there is still a lot of work to be done.

The process towards a closer and stronger foreign policy for the Union calls for a real political will and confidence among the governments and parliaments. Institutional changes, however ambitious and far-reaching, can never replace political will.

In the debate in the first session this afternoon, there seemed to be a contradiction between two different approaches. Some of us argued for a strong national representation in foreign policy, others for a Community approach in this area. There is a compromise to be found. I propose that we achieve a new, combined approach to the common foreign and security policy. This means combining some features of the current intergovernmental reform with the Community method. I recognise the merits of the Community method, but we have to recognise that the common foreign and security policy will inevitably continue to have some intergovernmental characteristics, especially with regard to defence policy. We must combine the Community method and the intergovernmental aspects in a new way. ... thirdly, the actions of the High Representative in the last few years have demonstrated that the need for an EU spokesperson is evident. In order to make the spokesperson stronger, we have to consider whether to merge the Office of High Representative in a new way with the function of the Commission Vice-President, creating a new office of Foreign Affairs Representative. The new office would thus have the twin legitimacy of the agreement of the Member States and the European Parliament. The EU Foreign Affairs Representative should be a member of the Commission, but with special accountability to the Council.

Finally, with regard to the external representation of the Union, the EU should propose common candidates for posts in international organisations. <BRK>



597 4-071

598 FR

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Le Président. - Je vous remercie.

Je vous demande vraiment, c'est une question de courtoisie pour les autres, de respecter votre temps de parole. Il reste encore vingt orateurs. Nous ne pourrons pas les écouter. Ils se sont préparés, ils ont préparé leur discours. C'est tout de même très difficile pour eux. Je ferai donc respecter impérativement le temps de parole. Je m'en excuse, mais c'est une nécessité vis-à-vis de vos collègues. <BRK>

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4-072

DA

Skaarup (Parl.-DK). - Hr. formand, ingen europæere vil dø for EU, men de fleste europæere er villige til at dø for deres fædreland. Så simpelt kan spørgsmålet om EU's muligheder for at føre en effektiv sikkerhedspolitik efter min mening stilles op. EU er en konstruktion, som mest er præget af kommercielt samarbejde og bureaukratisk management. Det vil og skal ingen dø for.

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I spørgsmålet om EU's evner og muligheder for at handle udadtil rører vi ved et centralt aspekt af EU's identitet. Kan EU gøres til en så handlekraftig enhed, at den kan drive sikkerheds- og udenrigspolitik på samme måde som traditionelle nationalstater. Det er spørgsmålet. Erfaringen viser, at det ikke kan lade sig gøre. Det er ikke nok med god vilje og enhedsdrømme. EU mangler den historiske forankring, som karakteriserer nationalstaterne, og derfor får Kissinger nok ikke det telefonnummer, som nogle har været inde på her i dag. Ville Storbritannien f.eks. have kunnet befri Falklandsøerne, hvis EU havde haft en fælles udenrigspolitik? Næppe. EU's miserable indsats i Eks-Jugoslavien skyldes bl.a., at de europæiske stormagter havde historisk betingede forskellige interesser, og måske godt for det. EU kan og skal ikke fornægte historien. Europa er ikke en politisk enhed, og alle hidtidige forsøg på at gøre Europa til en politisk enhed har været ulykkelige og forfærdelige. Europa består af nationer. Nogle er små, nogle er store, men så godt som alle er de forankrede i mere end tusinde års historie, og vi skal snarere anerkende den historie end forsøge at fornægte den eller modarbejde den. Anerkende, at Europa er nationernes Europa, og så acceptere NATO som Europas vigtigste kilde til sikkerhed. NATO er dannet for at beskytte nationalstaternes selvstændighed. Det er stadig den vigtigste opgave.

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EU kan ligesom FN godt tage sig af mange af de blødere sikkerhedsopgaver. Det kan være mægling i konflikter, der kan være katastrofehjælp osv. Men vi skal huske på, at EU ikke nødvendigvis i alle sager er repræsentativ nok. Norge, Island og Schweiz er ikke med, og andre lande har undtagelser eller forbehold over for dele af samarbejdsområderne. Sådan vil det nok fortsat være. F.eks. er der i Danmark nervøsitet ved, at EU-hæren skal blive en konkurrent til NATO. Nogle i EU har det mål med EU-hæren at køre USA ud på et sidespor. Det kan vi efter min opfattelse ikke være med til.

Desuden bør diskussionen af en fælles sikkerheds- og udenrigspolitik ledsages af en diskussion af de mulige trusselsscenarier. Hvor kommer truslerne egentlig fra i dagens Europa? Er der overhovedet nogen, der truer os? Jeg tror nok, man kan sige, at terrorismen udgør en af de alvorligste trusler. En anden er de meget store demografiske ændringer, der i øjeblikket ændrer Europa radikalt, og her tror jeg ikke så meget på EU som løsning på sikkerhedsproblemerne, men mere på NATO.

<BRK>

Translation: 4-072

Mr. President, no Europeans want to die for EU, but most Europeans are willing to die for their mother country. That simple can the question about EU's possibilities to perform an efficient security policy, in my opinion be asked. EU is a construction that mostly is characterised of commercial and bureaucratic management. Nobody wants or has to die for that.

In the question if EU's skills and possibilities to handle externally are


we touching a central aspect of EU's identity. Can EU be made such an active unit that it can perform security- and foreign politics the same way as traditional national states? That is the question.

Experience show that this cannot be done. It is not enough with only goodwill and dreams of unity. EU is lacking the historical roots that characterises the national states, and therefore does not Kissinger get the phone number that somebody mentioned today. Would for example Great Britain have freed the Falkland Islands if EU had had a common foreign policy? Probably not. EU's miserable effort in ex-Yugoslavia is among others due to that the European great powers had different historical interests, and that is maybe good.

EU cannot and should not deny the history. Europe is not a political unity and all attempts so far to make Europe a political unity have been miserable or terrible. Europe consists of nations. Some are small, some are big, but almost all are rooted in more than thousand years of history, and we should rather accept that history than try to deny it or work against it. Accept that Europe is the Europe of the nations, and then accept NATO as Europe's most important source to security. NATO is established to protect the independency of the nations. That is still its most important task.

EU can just like UN take care of many of the softer security tasks. That may be conciliation in conflicts, that may be help in disasters etc. But we have to remember that EU not necessarily is representative enough in all cases. Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are not included, and other nations have exceptions or reservations to some parts of the cooperation areas. It will probably stay like that. For example is it a worry in Denmark that the EU army will become a competitor to NATO. Some in EU has an aim that only the EU army may drive USA on the side. In my opinion we can not do that.











Besides, the discussion of a common security and foreign politics should be followed by a discussion of possible scenarios of threats. Where are actually the threats coming from in Europe today? Is it anybody that is threatening us at all? I think so, one may say that terrorism is one of the most serious threats. Another is the very large demographic changes, which in this moment change Europe radically, and I believe less in EU as the solution of the security problems, and more in NATO.



4-073
EN

Vassiliou (Parl.-CY). - Mr President, we all feel very proud of the way the European Union has developed through the years and of its achievements. We also know that, after the next two waves of enlargement, the Union will embrace practically the whole continent, with a population of nearly 500 million and the largest GDP in the world. The power of the Union today, however, is essentially limited to the economic and social spheres and its effectiveness in world affairs is therefore limited. It resembles a one-legged giant, and we all understand how unstable such a one-legged creature can be. We therefore need to give this giant more strength and more stability in order to play a proactive role in world affairs.

622 It is about time that the Union was given the power to take concerted action in its
external affairs on behalf of the Member States, taking into consideration the views
and the interests of the Member States. As we all know, today we have a
623 fragmentation of initiatives, decisions and actions taken by the European Union in its
external affairs. We have two centres of gravity. This state of affairs cannot and
should not be allowed to continue if we really want to push the Union to the
624 forefront of the international scene. The two offices must merge, and this single
office should form part of the Commission.
625 The idea that this Commissioner of External Affairs should be jointly chosen and
agreed upon by the President of the Commission and the Heads of State and
Government is a good one. After his or her confirmation by the European
Parliament, the legitimacy of the office will be secured. We therefore hope that
626 Member States will be prepared to adopt such a decision at the next
627 Intergovernmental Conference in 2004.
628 Nobody underestimates the sensitivities of the Member States in external affairs and
629 nobody alleges that this will be an easy decision. It presupposes the political will of
the Member States to move in this direction. We hope they will, realising that this is
630 the only way to render the EU a leading international player in all respects.
You may say that, coming from a small applicant state, it is natural for me to take
this view. This is true. It is also true, however, that no Commission of the European
631 Union can be complete if it does not include a Commissioner for External Affairs
vested with the powers that office needs to play a full role in today's world. For a
632 common foreign policy to succeed, it must be backed by a common security and
defence policy. Nevertheless, neither the time constraints nor this session's agenda
allow me to go into this aspect. <BRK>

-  **A_argue-
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
-  B_demand, call for, desire-
-  B_accept, endorse, approve of, consent to-
-  A_claim (facts and values)-
-  B_demand, call for, desire-
-  **A_argue-
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
-  **A_argue-
-  A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

4-074

633 DA

634 **Kristensen (Parl.-DK).** - Hr. formand, det er helt afgørende, at vi satser på at
udvikle EU's fælles udenrigspolitik. I dag er EU en progressiv kraft i kampen for en
bæredygtig udvikling på globalt plan. Det skal EU også være i fremtiden. Det er EU,
der har været førende, når vi har indgået internationale klimaaftaler. Det er EU, som
forhåbentlig også, når det gælder en "global deal" i Sydafrika, skal være førende. Det
har vi set mange eksempler på, at EU har både kunnet og villet.
Vi har besøg af de unge mennesker, og de arbejder herinde ved siden af. Det er min
opfattelse, at netop EU's internationale rolle er noget, der optager de unge mennesker
i Europa. De ønsker, at Europa skal gøre en forskel. Og vi står over for nye store
udfordringer i de kommende år; fattigdom, etniske konflikter,
menneskerettighedskrænkelser, menneskehandel, terrorisme osv er eksempler herpå.
Her er det afgørende, at EU spiller en rolle, en rolle der gør, at det bliver en bedre
verden. Skal vi gøre det, skal vi selvfølgelig samarbejde i EU, i FN og i NATO om at
skabe løsninger, som kan være med til at klare internationale konflikter.
Jeg synes også, det ville være naturligt at diskutere, om EU kan have en mere fælles
rolle at spille i en række sammenhænge, f.eks. i FN, i Sikkerhedsrådet, i G8-kredsen.
Jeg hører mange kollegaer give udtryk for, at vi her må finde løsninger, så EU er i
stand til at tale med en fælles stemme.
Som mange andre kollegaer har givet udtryk for, har det været en styrkelse, at vi fra
1999 fik Den Høje Repræsentant. Det har betydet, at EU's udenrigspolitik er blevet
mere synlig og effektiv, men problemet er i dag, at vi langt hen ad vejen er enige om,
at EU skal spille en aktiv rolle, men samtidig er der stor uklarhed om, hvem der gør
hvad, hvor og hvornår? Alle de kollegaer, jeg har hørt indtil nu, har ønsket og givet
udtryk for, at EU skal have en stemme i det internationale, at EU skal gøre en
forskkel. Jeg har undervejs og også i dag hørt repræsentanter for Europa-Parlamentet
være prisværdigt præcise i deres ønske om at få en større indflydelse. Det er måske
forståeligt nok.
Men hr. formand, jeg vil gerne her til slut komme med en lille advarsel.
Udenrigspolitik handler også om suveræniteten. Og skal vores nye konstruktion være
holdbar, så skal vi på en eller anden måde sikre, at vi får inddraget de nationale
parlamentar, ellers bliver det, der kommer ud af det, nemlig hverken samlet eller
holdbart. <BRK>

635 4-074 Translation

636 **Kristensen (Parl.-DK).**

637 Mr. President, it is crucial to concentrate on developing the common foreign policy of EU. Today EU is a progressive power in the fight for a sustainable development on a global level. This is what EU should be also in the future. It is EU that has been leading when we have made international climatic agreements. It is hopefully also EU that will be leading when it comes to a “global deal” in South Africa. We have seen many examples on this, that EU both can and is willing to. We have a visit from the young people, and they work in here next to us. It is my opinion that exactly the international role of EU is something that engages young people in Europe. They want that Europe should make a difference. And we stand next to new great challenges the next years; poverty, ethnic conflicts, human right violations, trade with humans, terrorism etc are examples. Here it is crucial that EU plays a role, a role that makes the world better. If we should do that we should of course cooperate in EU, UN and NATO about making solutions that can clear international conflicts.

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_threaten-

639 I also think it would be natural to discuss whether EU can have a more joint role to play in several contexts, for example in UN, the Security Council, in the G8-circle. I hear many colleagues express that we have to find solutions here, so that EU is capable of speaking with one joint voice. As many other colleagues have said, it has been a strengthening that we from 1999 got the High Representative. That has made EU’s foreign policy become more visible and efficient, but the problem today is that we have come far in agreeing upon that EU should play an active role, but at the same time is it unclear who makes what, where and when? All the colleagues I have heard so far have wished and expressed that EU should have one voice internationally, that EU should make a difference. I have during the time and also today heard representatives from the European Parliament being commendably accurate in their wishes on having a greater influence. That is maybe understandable. But Mr. President, I would like to end with a small warning. Foreign policy is also about sovereignty. And if our new construction should be good enough, we have to one way or another make sure that we get the national parliaments involved, if not what comes of it will neither be joint or sufficient.

4-075
ES

Borrell Fontelles (Parl.-ES). - Señorías, a través de su política exterior cada Estado expresa una visión del mundo que es parte fundamental de su identidad. No descubro ningún Mediterráneo, pero hay que reconocer que los Estados europeos no han sido capaces de construir una visión común de sus intereses estratégicos, y por ello la política exterior de la Unión Europea se ha limitado a influir de forma marginal sobre la política de los Estados Unidos o a ser dependiente de ella. Sin embargo, la política exterior y de seguridad común debe estar en el corazón de la Europa del futuro, y nuestra Convención así debe proponerlo en su texto constitucional. ¿Por qué? Porque frente a los nuevos desafíos globales la Unión está mejor situada que cada uno de sus Estados en solitario, y la gente lo sabe, y por eso los europeos piden una Europa de la seguridad y la defensa.

645 La política exterior de la Unión debe empezar, en mi opinión, por hacer de la Unión
 Europea un actor global capaz de regular la mundialización, de influir en el
 646 equilibrio Norte-Sur y de resolver los conflictos regionales a través de la defensa de
 los derechos de los pueblos. Al servicio de este objetivo hay que poner todos los
 instrumentos de la política exterior: el comercio, el desarrollo y la diplomacia. Y para
 647 ello hará falta combinar medidas estructurales y organizativas.
 Entre las estructurales, la primera medida es, por supuesto, un mayor compromiso
 con la ayuda al desarrollo. No podemos, aunque quisiéramos, igualar la potencia
 militar estadounidense, pero podemos impulsar un ambicioso *New Deal* en favor del
 desarrollo sostenible y de una mundialización equitativa. La segunda es la apertura
 de los mercados europeos a las producciones agrícolas de los países en desarrollo.
 Entre las organizativas, comunitarizar la participación de la Unión Europea en todas
 648 las grandes negociaciones de regulación económica internacional, como ya hemos
 hecho con la política comercial exterior; unificar la representación de la Unión ante
 las grandes organizaciones internacionales, empezando por el Fondo Monetario y el
 649 Banco Mundial y acabando -¿por qué no?- con el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU;
 650 votar por mayoría cualificada todos los temas relativos a los derechos humanos para
 651 definir nuestra posición ante el Tribunal de Ginebra; y un punto muy particular, hay
 652 que relanzar el partenariado euromediterráneo. Lo hicimos hace unos años, pero la
 realidad ha defraudado las expectativas levantadas. No habrá solución a los
 653 problemas de emigración sin un fuerte compromiso con el desarrollo de África, ni
 seguridad posible para nuestros pueblos si no estabilizamos sus sociedades después
 del 11 de septiembre. Ello implica más apertura de los mercados agrícolas, gestión
 común de los flujos migratorios, apoyo a la inversión pública y acelerar de forma
 asimétrica la zona de libre cambio mediterránea.
 Pero tampoco podemos contentarnos -y con esto acabo- con ser la Grecia de
 654 Washington. También tendremos que desarrollar un proyecto de defensa autónoma
 una vez que la funcionalidad y la legitimación de la OTAN se han transformado,
 655 después del fin de la guerra fría y la ampliación al Este de la Unión Europea. <BRK>

**A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
 **A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-
 B_demand, call for, desire-
 **A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

656 4-076
 657 EN

Wittbrodt (Parl.-PL). - Mr President, playing the role of a key force in the global arena requires a strong external policy in terms of both economic and foreign and security policy. Europe must clearly respond to the challenge of the globalisation process. We do not want to be, as has already been mentioned here, an economic giant and a political dwarf. Therefore, reform of the common foreign policy and security area should follow the integration process within the First Pillar of the European Union, and move towards an ever-closer Union. I am convinced that when the European Union acts collectively on the global stage and speaks with one voice, the benefits will be much greater than we suppose. The Union should speak with one voice and, if possible, one face on the most important global questions. In order to enhance external representation, the European Union should have a legal personality. The Community method should be applied to policy made under the current Second Pillar, with the exception of issues of European security and defence policy. All matters which relate to common foreign and security policy in the Council should be voted on using a qualified majority voting procedure, but maintaining the possibility of opt-out. The position of High Representative and a European Commissioner for External Relations should be unified in the European Commission. In order to increase legitimacy, the role of the European Parliament in formulating an assessment of the common foreign and security policy should be strengthened. What is important, as was proved during the Kosovo and Yugoslavia crisis, is that Europe should have its own identity in defence and security policy and be efficient - not only in Petersberg tasks. Therefore, we should have a real operational capacity, including a military one. All the reforms should be undertaken whilst respecting and maintaining the role of Nato. Finally, I would like to mention that from the point of view of the applicant countries, like Poland, we will be strong if we are in a strong and efficient Union. <BRK>

4-077

658 EN

659 **Migas (Gouv.-SK).** - Mr President, European integration based on historic
 reconciliation between the European nations and peoples has consolidated peace and
 stability in Western Europe. It is now exporting this stability. Enlargement is,
 660 without any doubt, the biggest political step the Union will take in the near future. I
 661 am sure that this will increase Europe's potential to be a better place and will help
 within the international framework in the governance and stabilisation of the
 662 international system. This is why the European Union should work towards more
 cohesion and co-ordination in its external activities.

11A_argue-
 11A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

In order to achieve greater cohesive action, the European Union must gradually get
 rid of its three pillar structure and replace it with one single structure.
 663 Secondly, the forces of globalisation are proving that questions of security need to be
 viewed comprehensively. Internal security cannot be clearly separated from external
 security. There is a connection between international crime and external trade policy,
 664 for example.

11B_demand, call for, desire-
 11B_offer-

We support the use of qualified majority voting in matters pertaining to non-military
 crisis management. Enlargement to bring in more Member States may put more
 strain on the existing decision-making mechanisms. Even today, a number of policy
 tools relevant to the area of non-military crisis management fall within the First Pillar
 665 of the European Union. The posts of High Representative and Commissioner for
 666 External Relations should gradually be merged. This would be in addition to our aim
 667 of simplifying the structure to make it more transparent and accountable. We are
 668 ready and prepared to participate fully in the development of the ESDP.

11A_argue-
 11A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

In this respect, it is important not to harm transatlantic relations. It should be in the
 European Union's interests to include the soon-to-be partners under a more
 encompassing umbrella of partnership. For applicants, the ESDP should have a
 669 definite Euro-Atlantic dimension. From our point of view, one of the preconditions
 for active inclusion in the ESDP is Nato involvement and satisfactory agreement
 between the European Union and Nato on strategy, assets and capabilities and
 structures of consultation.

11A_argue-
 11A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

In helping to formulate a more comprehensive and multifaceted European Union
 eastern policy, my country, Slovakia, can add a new value to future specific
 initiatives. Its comparative advantage stems from common historical ties, geographic
 and linguistic proximity, as well as the shared experience of the post-Communist
 transition. The common foreign and security policy domain may become sensitive,
 with possible future implications for national sovereignty. This has not been an issue
 in my country so far. Solving the issue of legal personality would bring more clarity
 and legitimacy to the external actions of the European Union. <BRK>

4-078

IT

Follini (Parl.-IT). - Signor Presidente, le relazioni internazionali sono il cuore del
 problema europeo e forse sono anche il cuore della soluzione che siamo chiamati a
 cercar di dare a quel problema. L'Unione è stata capace di mettere in comune la sua
 politica commerciale e di cooperazione allo sviluppo, ma non è stata altrettanto
 capace di allargare il campo della collaborazione all'argomento cruciale della sua
 proiezione internazionale. Ci siamo mossi in ordine sparso nelle aree di crisi, anche
 quelle che prendevano forma a ridosso dei nostri confini; abbiamo parlato con più
 voci, anche se quasi mai con voci dissonanti, e ancora oggi, se il dottor Kissinger
 cercasse di comporre il famoso numero telefonico dell'Europa, dovrebbe fare almeno
 quindici chiamate telefoniche, e domani ancora di più.
 Ora, è evidente che in un mondo globalizzato il significato e il valore della nostra
 Unione consiste nel riuscire a parlare con una sola voce. La politica internazionale
 dell'Europa, e in essa la politica strategica di difesa, richiede per sua natura
 l'immediatezza di interventi, e richiede, per la sua efficacia, una fiduciosa cessione di
 competenze dagli Stati membri verso l'Unione. Questo è il campo dove la
 comunitarizzazione è più difficile perché le abitudini e le sovranità difficili da
 scalfire, ma dove la mezza comunitarizzazione sarebbe del tutto inutile, poiché non si
 può né spezzare in due la trama dell'azione internazionale né dividerne la
 responsabilità tra due teste. Non credo che un centauro o un ippogrifo farebbero più
 strada della tartaruga del Presidente Giscard d'Estaing.

670 Il superamento della regola dell'unanimità in questo campo appare doveroso, per
 671 quanto difficile. Ci può essere spazio perché chi non è d'accordo con la politica
 comune faccia valere il suo diritto all'obiezione, l'*opting out*, ma non c'è ragione
 perché chi è d'accordo non faccia valere la sua scelta di conferire all'Unione una più
 forte responsabilità di iniziativa.

Vorrei fare ancora due considerazioni a titolo di esempio. La prima: parlare con una
 sola voce, come in tanti abbiamo detto oggi, significa riportare ad unità ogni
 possibile dualismo tra Consiglio e Commissione. La presenza simultanea di un Alto
 rappresentante collocato presso il Consiglio e di un Commissario addetto alle
 relazioni estere finisce, a lungo andare, com'è stato osservato da tanti questa sera, per
 672 rendere meno credibili e incisivi l'uno e l'altro. La seconda: parlare con una sola voce
 673 significa ricercare e coltivare con ottimismo, e anche con un certo grado di coraggio,
 674 occasioni e situazioni nelle quali l'Europa si trovi ad avere un solo rappresentante
 675 piuttosto che due o quindici. Da questo punto di vista occorre modificare - ripeto
 676 anch'io un argomento ricorrente - la personalità giuridica dell'Unione, ma occorre
 677 soprattutto un forte atto di volontà politica che ci porti ad occupare un solo seggio,
 678 quello europeo, nel Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite. Se riuscissimo a fare
 680 questo, il dottor Kissinger avrebbe trovato quel numero di telefono che da molti anni
 dice di stare cercando. <BRK>

**A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_establish, mention-

**A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

681 4-079
 682 FR
Le Président. - Je vous remercie. Si vous pouviez nous donner ce numéro de
 téléphone, cela faciliterait bien les choses. <BRK>

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

**A_argue-
 A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

683 4-080
 684 DE
Farnleitner (Ch.E/G.-AT). - Herr Präsident! Ich habe eine schöne Rede vorbereitet.
 Ich werde sie drucken und verteilen lassen und nur das sagen, was mich als Ihr
 Muntermacher zu so später noch Stunde bewegt!

Erstens: Wenn es einen Code of Arms, ein Wappen der EU geben müsste, müsste der
 Wappenspruch lauten: *learning by doing*. Wir haben die letzten Jahrzehnte ohne
 Finalität im Vertrag unglaubliche Dinge zusammengebracht. Wir haben die
 Agrarpolitik nach Brüssel verlagert, von der 100% der Ernährung abhängt. Wir
 haben die Außenhandelspolitik nach Brüssel gebracht, von der ein Drittel der
 Arbeitsplätze abhängt. Wir haben den Euro nach Brüssel gebracht, an den nur 20%
 der Bürger glaubten. Und jetzt, wo wir bei der Außenpolitik sehen, dass 40% daran
 glauben, dass es sie geben muss, trauen wir uns nicht! Wäre es nicht Zeit, die
 Außenpolitiker zu bitten, einmal über ihren historischen Schatten zu springen? Sonst
 müssten wir in ihr coat of arms *doing without learning* hineinschreiben, was nicht
 schlecht wäre...

B_suggest (e.g. a solution)-

(Heiterkeit)

Ich bin sehr für einen schrittweisen Ansatz. Wir sollten die europäischen Bürger
 durch ein graduelles Vorgehen überzeugen. Ich schlage vor, eine Stimme im
 Weltwährungsfonds. Das würde übermorgen dazu führen, dass der Sitz des
 Weltwährungsfonds nach den Statuten nach Europa übersiedeln müsste. Das hätte
 den größten Werbeeffekt für die gemeinsame europäische Außenpolitik, den Sie sich
 vorstellen können! Wer die Bilder der letzten G7 und G8-Konferenzen gesehen hat,
 wie der Hohepriester Bush zelebriert und unsere Minister als Ministranten
 herumstehen, würde wahrscheinlich einen völlig anderen Eindruck haben! Ich
 glaube, dass wir durch graduellen Ansatz, durch einige konkrete gemeinsame
 außenpolitische Maßnahmen Europas Bürger rascher überzeugen könnten.
 Ich habe mir vorgestellt, dass es klug wäre, eine Stimme in Europa zu haben. Wir
 könnten einen Außenminister mit einem Sonderstatut bei der Kommission etablieren.
 Das wäre überhaupt kein Problem. Wir könnten auch bei dieser Gelegenheit deutlich
 Mehrheitsentscheidungen empfehlen, denn bei dem Rückhalt, von dem ich glaube,
 dass wir ihn bei den Bürgern haben, müsste das möglich sein.

Die Verteidigung wird wahrscheinlich der letzte Schritt sein, aber ich glaube
 wirklich, dass Europa als Europäer in allen Bereichen zu einem Europlayer werden
 sollte. Dies wäre die größte Publicitätsaktion, die wir für Europas Bürger und auch
 im eigenen Interesse setzen könnten.

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689 (Beifall) <BRK>

4-081

EN

690 **Medalinskas (Parl.-LT)**. - Mr. President, the very first discussion about the mission
of the European Union showed that the majority of us support the notion of a
stronger voice for Europe. Therefore we are now submitting our proposals on how to
691 come up with this strong voice.

The final document will be produced by a working group. There are those that
692 support a stronger Europe, and those that support the notion of greater powers for the
Commission and the Council. Lithuania, as well as other candidate countries, has
certain links with the CFSP and it is only natural that our positions must be
693 coordinated somewhat. I understand that we will have an opportunity to participate
in these policies.

We also appreciate the fact that we are already able to participate in dialogue, which
is extremely important. The implementation of our policies, especially those relating
to Belarus, the Ukraine and other countries in the region, proves that we already have
experience and can make a significant contribution to these kinds of policies. We
694 believe that a single voice should speak on European foreign policy.

695 On the other hand, I would like to say that the active policy participation of Lithuania
696 in certain areas shows that those areas which are of the greatest interest to us are
697 agreed upon by the Commission and the Council. There are also quite a few areas in
the world that call for the same position. EU presidencies, especially the last three,
698 have shown that the foreign policy does not change with the changing of the
presidency. We support this because otherwise we would see different priorities
relating to the differing interests of countries and regions.

We also believe that concrete proposals for making our foreign policy more effective
699 should now be put on the table. There are areas that do not need conflict-resolution
or crisis management. However, the Balkans, and the events of September 11, for
example, have shown that discussions on strong foreign policy should be continued.
We see Mr Solana acting to solve critical foreign policy issues. We also see the
United Nations Secretary General's involvement in these international issues. We
believe, therefore, that it would be extremely good to have an arrangement, a
mechanism, that would ensure the coordination of our actions in order for Europe to
be able to speak with a single voice. Will this be possible? The answer will be the
result of all of our work here in this hall. I can only hope that the decision we make is
a unified one, irrespective of differences. <BRK>

4-082

SV

Hjelm-Wallén (Ch.E/G.-SE). – Herr ordförande! Efter fyra år som svensk
utrikesminister är jag starkt övertygad om att EU behöver en starkare gemensam
utrikespolitik. EU måste kunna tala med en tydligare röst. EU måste kunna agera mer
kraftfullt för fred, mänskliga rättigheter, fattigdomsbekämpning, fri handel osv., det
vill säga allt som är baserat på våra gemensamma värderingar.

Under de senaste åren har det faktiskt hänt en hel del vad gäller samordnad
utrikespolitik. Det har blivit bättre, eftersom det har funnits en politisk vilja hos
medlemsländerna, hos regeringarna och parlamenten att stärka EU:s utrikespolitik.
Jag vill understryka detta med politisk vilja, därför att utan den hjälper egentligen
inga institutionella förändringar. Det är naturligtvis angeläget att finna smidigare
beslutsformer. Jag anser att instrumentet gemensam strategi bör användas på ett
bättre sätt. Det ger nämligen också möjlighet att använda kvalificerad
majorietsomröstning för att genomföra politiken. För mig förblir dock
utrikespolitiken huvudsakligen mellanstatlig. Jag vill således inte flytta över de
utrikespolitiska frågorna till första pelaren.

Funktionen som hög representant, och kanske Javier Solana personligen, har betytt
mycket för en positiv utveckling. Jag tror också att beslutet i Sevilla att samla de
externa relationerna i ett särskilt råd kommer att förstärka utrikespolitiken. Det ger
dessutom bättre förutsättningar att ta breda utrikespolitiska grepp och ge EU en
större enhetlighet genom att hålla samman politiska områden, t.ex. handel och
bistånd, med den traditionella utrikespolitiken inklusive konfliktförebyggande och

700 krishantering.
 701 Vad gäller förslagen att slå samman funktionen hög representant och
 kommissionären för de externa relationerna vill jag hävda att om så skall ske bör den
 sammanslagna funktionen placeras hos rådet och inte i kommissionen.
 702 Herr ordförande! Avslutningsvis vill jag påpeka att försvarspolitiken inte är en från
 703 utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken separat företeelse. När presidiet nu talar om att sätta
 704 upp en särskild arbetsgrupp för försvarsfrågor, anser jag därför att det är olämpligt.
 Jag menar att försvarspolitiken måste utgöra en integrerad del i unionens
 utrikespolitik, med särskild inriktning på civil- och militär krishantering och
 konfliktförebyggande. Jag menar bestämt att försvarspolitiken handlar just om
 krishantering och *inte* om att ge unionen ett territoriellt försvar och ömsesidiga
 säkerhetsgarantier. <BRK>

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Translation 4-082 SV

Hjelm-Wallén (Ch.E/G.-SE). – Herr Vorsitzender! Nach vier Jahren
 als schwedischer Außenminister bin ich stark davon überzeugt, dass
 die EU eine stärkere gemeinsame Außenpolitik braucht. Die EU muss
 mit einer deutlicheren Stimme sprechen. Die EU muss kraftvoller
 706 eintreten können für Frieden, Menschenrechte, Armutsbekämpfung,
 Freihandel usw., soll heißen, für alles, was auf unseren gemeinsamen
 Werten basiert.

707 In den letzten Jahren ist faktisch eine ganze Menge passiert, was die
 koordinierte Außenpolitik betrifft. Es ist besser geworden, weil es
 einen politischen Willen bei den Mitgliedsländern, bei den
 Regierungen und den Parlamenten gibt, die Außenpolitik der EU zu
 708 stärken. Dies mit dem politischen Willen will ich unterstreichen, weil
 ohne diesen eigentlich keine institutionellen Veränderungen helfen. Es
 ist natürlich wichtig bessere Beschlussformen zu finden. Ich finde, das
 Instrument der offenen Koordinierung, sollte auf eine bessere Weise
 angewendet werden. Dies ermöglicht nämlich, die Wahl mit
 qualifizierter Mehrheit für die Durchführung von Politik anzuwenden.
 Für mich verbleibt dennoch die Außenpolitik in der Hauptsache
 zwischenstaatlich. Ich möchte folglich die außenpolitischen Fragen
 nicht in die erste Säule verschieben.

Die Funktion des höchsten Repräsentanten, und vielleicht auch Javier
 Solana persönlich, bedeuteten viel für eine positive Entwicklung. Ich
 glaube auch, dass der Beschluss von Sevilla, die externen Beziehungen
 in einem speziellen Rat zu sammeln, die Außenpolitik verstärken wird.
 Dies ergibt außerdem bessere Voraussetzungen, die Außenpolitik
 weiter zu fassen und gibt der EU eine größere Einheitlichkeit, in dem
 es verschiedene politische Bereiche vereint, zum Beispiel Handel und
 Entwicklung mit der traditionellen Außenpolitik inklusive der
 Konfliktprävention und dem Krisenmanagement.

Was den Vorschlag betrifft, die Funktion des höchsten Repräsentanten
 und des Kommissars für die auswärtigen Beziehungen
 zusammenzulegen, will ich geltend machen, dass, wenn es so
 geschehen soll, die vereinte Funktion beim Rat angesiedelt werden soll
 und nicht bei der Kommission.

Herr Vorsitzender! Abschließend möchte ich darauf hinweisen, dass

**A_argue~
 A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

**A_argue~
 A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_demand, call for, desire~

B_reject, decline, refuse~

**A_argue~
 A_Justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

B_demand, call for, desire~

die Verteidigungspolitik keine Erscheinung ist, die von der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik getrennt ist. Wenn das Präsidium jetzt davon spricht, eine besondere Arbeitsgruppe für Verteidigungsfragen einzusetzen, betrachte ich dies folglich als unangemessen. Ich meine, dass die Verteidigungspolitik einen integrierten Teil der Außenpolitik der Union ausmachen muss, mit besonderer Ausrichtung auf ziviles und militärisches Krisenmanagement und Konfliktprävention. Ich sage nachdrücklich, dass Verteidigungspolitik genau von Krisenmanagement handelt und *nicht* davon, der Union eine territoriale Verteidigung und gegenseitige Sicherheitsgarantien zu geben.

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4-083

DE

Bösch (Parl.-AT). - Herr Präsident, meine Damen und Herren! Die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union arbeiten bis jetzt im Bereich der gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik auf völkerrechtlicher Basis zusammen. Dies sollte nach meinem Dafürhalten auch so bleiben. Das scheint mir auch kein Widerspruch zu einer Effizienzsteigerung der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik in allen Bereichen, über die wir schon gesprochen haben. Da es sich dabei aber um einen Kernbereich der nationalen Souveränität handelt, brächte jedwede Erledigung durch einen supranationalen Rechtsetzer eine Marginalisierung der Staaten und eine Bevormundung in wesentlichen Bereichen mit sich. Wir werden doch nicht glauben, dass ein Mitgliedsland über längere Zeit hinweg entgegen seinen Interessen eine Position der Union im Außenwirkungsbereich wird mittragen können!

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Eine Effizienzsteigerung der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik ist aber unabdingbar. Die Ziele der gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik sind deshalb klar zu definieren. Die demokratische Kontrolle - das wurde heute auch schon angesprochen - ist durch einen Ausschuss, in welchem auch die Parlamente der Mitgliedstaaten vertreten sind, sicherzustellen. Da die Sicherheit aller Mitgliedsländer und die der Union eng miteinander verbunden sind und die neuen sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen und Risiken durch internationale solidarische Zusammenarbeit zu bewältigen sind und allein dadurch, um also das Prinzip der europäischen Solidarität zu gewährleisten, kann das Gewicht der Union nach meinem Dafürhalten vergrößert werden, indem wir einen EU-Sicherheitsrat aus dem bereits bestehenden Rat für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen folgendermaßen einrichten: Der Europäische Sicherheitsrat - und hier gibt es ja auch schon Vorschläge von verschiedenster Seite - soll sich aus den Außen- und Verteidigungsministern unserer Mitgliedstaaten zusammensetzen, wobei am Prinzip der Einstimmigkeit in den wesentlichen Bereichen festzuhalten ist. Das Institut der konstruktiven Enthaltung ist akzeptabel, eine weitere Aufweichung ist jedoch zu vermeiden.

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Jene außenpolitischen Agenten, die derzeit noch in einigen Kommissariaten residieren, sollten bei diesem Sicherheitsrat und dessen Generalsekretär hinkünftig gebündelt werden. Dieser Generalsekretär führt den Vorsitz in diesem Rat und hat für die Umsetzung der gesamten gefassten Beschlüsse Sorge zu tragen. Das würde meiner Auffassung nach die Außenwirkung hinkünftig erheblich verstärken. <BRK>

4-084

EN

Yilmaz, Mesut (Gouv.-TR). - Mr. President, one of the fundamental tasks of this Convention is to define and develop the extent of the capabilities of the European Union. I think we all agree that the ability of the Union to project its values beyond its borders to meet the challenges of the 21st century, especially the challenges brought about by new threats such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the alarming fault lines created within nations through the process of globalisation is very limited. The credibility of the Union around the world is measured mainly by its economic

and financial assets. Certainly, the Union has been helpful in alleviating the plight of many nations, but this is only a damage control operation. We need to stop the political crisis, prevent humanitarian disasters and maintain peace and stability, especially in the regions close to the Union. For that, we need a positive and future-oriented agenda.

The Union cannot prosper or ensure its security by protecting its borders. We have to address the causes of new divisions and threats. This requires a more global and active policy on the part of the Union. This, in turn, calls for an effective foreign and security policy. In order to be credible, this policy must have legitimacy and broad public support within the Union. This requires more active involvement by the European Parliament and Member States' parliaments in relation to common foreign and security policies.

We also need a range of tools for the implementation of these policies. These should include changes in the representation of the Union in international fora, necessary adaptations to allow for a coherent Union voice and the elaboration of a strategic vision that will combine internal community policies with international objectives. A common European foreign and security policy can only be successful if it is inclusive, transparent and non-discriminatory. In this context, the European policies must not evolve to duplicate existing international and regional mechanisms, but must be complementary to such assets.

Transatlantic dialogue and cooperation must be maintained. The Union must also develop its particular policies in the light of its own experience, historical background and social consciousness. This is particularly relevant for regions that are feeling increasingly alienated from the West. With its specific tradition of social awareness and strong historical ties to different cultures, the Union can offer hope and inspiration to millions of people beyond the European continent. <BRK>

4-085
EN

De Rossa (Parl.-IE). - Mr President, a good case has been made here today for the employment of a very efficient telephonist, someone who knows who to put you through to when you ring them and tell them your problem. The complexity we have in Europe today in relation to the common foreign and security policy reflects the reality that we do not have a fully federal Union. It reflects the fact that some States, the bigger States in particular, are not prepared to cede sovereignty in relation to taxation or economic governance to a democratic control. But at the same time we are demanding that we all concede our sovereignty in relation to common foreign, security and defence policy. But that is an unrealistic position. I think the sooner we come to grips with that reality the better. I am in favour of a strong common foreign and security policy. I am in favour of a defence policy. I am not in favour of giving it over to an unaccountable body. It needs to be democratic. It needs to be accountable in the first instance, in my view, to the European Parliament. It needs to have some mechanism to ensure that it is accountable to the national parliaments. There are real issues here. Fiddling around with instruments, fiddling around with bringing two people under one hat is not the solution. There is no institutional cure-all for the problems of the European Union in relation to a common foreign and security policy. There are real, fundamental issues here in relation to sovereignty and democracy and how we make the common foreign and security policy accountable as well as effective and efficient.

The second thing I want to say is that this Convention must ensure that we incorporate a strong statement of the values of this Union in relation to common foreign and security policy in the constitutional treaty. There is no way that the citizens of Europe will give over sovereignty willy-nilly in relation to this issue, unless they know the context and the principles according to which these powers are going to be conceded to a European body. I think it would be hard to find a better expression of those principles and values than in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights which was constructed by a Convention representative of the whole of the Union. That needs to be taken into account in tandem with the Laeken Declaration which made it clear that what we were about was applying a moral framework to globalisation, ensuring solidarity was built into the way in which we

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_contradict, reject, dispute, object-


**A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

731 conduct our foreign policy. <BRK>

732 4-086

733 EN

734 **Balázs (Gouv.-HU).** - Mr President, in the new century we often ask the question:
 735 "What is external at all?" This morning, when discussing the reform of the Council,
 736 somebody asked the question: "is the action inside the EU external or internal?" In
 737 trade it is much easier because statistics distinguish internal and external trade. The
 738 Seville Summit made great progress in trying to separate internal and real external
 739 issues on the agenda of the General Affairs Council. However, most areas that
 740 remain the responsibility of the foreign ministries in the Member States are
 741 considered possible elements of the external action of the European Union.
 742 Mr President, the EU's external action could and should not be identical to what is
 743 considered and classified as foreign policy in the Member States. Expanding upon a
 744 Member State's foreign policy will give us the ideal scope and content of the EU's
 745 external action. I could speak about this problem at length, but there is no time.
 I would like to conclude by mentioning two positive cases of EU external action.
 One is an achievement, the other a challenge or an opportunity.
 The achievements of the external action are the strategies. We have an excellent
 paper from the Secretariat of the Convention with a lot of institutional and legal
 ideas. Concrete cases merely illustrate the issues, but I think that we should highlight
 the importance of strategies. Three of them have been accepted recently, concerning
 the Mediterranean, Russia and Ukraine. The EU was able to fuse different
 instruments in the framework of such strategies, and they are decided upon
 unanimously and are binding on Member States. The common point of all three
 strategies is that they are dealing with neighbours. Why not try to go on and develop
 them further? The challenge and opportunity lies in the fact that the EU will get ten
 more Member States which will change its role and place in international
 organisations. Why not try to improve the EU's role and strengthen its legal
 personality and competences in international organisations? <BRK>



4-087

EN

Oleksy (Parl.-PL). - Mr President, everybody agrees that European Union
 enlargement and the consolidation of its position in the international arena is one of
 the most difficult challenges the European Union faces at the beginning of the 21st
 century. An enlarged Union which is politically stable and economically strong has a
 much better chance of gaining a position in the international arena that corresponds
 to its aspirations and economic and population potential.
 The European Union has, in recent years, made significant progress in the area of the
 common foreign and security policy. Is that progress sufficient, however, to face the
 new threats and challenges of a globalised world? My answer is no. In order to build
 a coherent and effective foreign policy, the structures and the instruments at the
 Union's disposal need to be improved. An increase in the coordination of Member
 States' foreign policies seems to be needed.
 A common framework for such coordination will, in turn, have to consider bringing
 the functions of the External Relations Commissioner and the High Representative
 closer. Improving the synergy of what the Commission and the Council do in
 external relations should primarily be based on drafting joint action and common
 projects. Such an approach should proceed gradually, through evolution.
 The role of the Council in shaping foreign policy needs to include a clearer
 distinction between the areas of Council activity and its co-ordinating functions in
 general affairs. In that context, the Seville Summit decisions are the first step in the
 right direction. This right direction, in my opinion, is also to create more Community
 areas in the field of common foreign and security policy.
 Poland's ambition is to strengthen and more precisely define the Union's external
 role. This concerns, most of all, its eastern dimension. We want to become a bridge
 between the Union and its future eastern neighbours, sharing with them our
 experience and know-how from the transitional period. We should also make the
 Union's eastern policy more open-minded and constructive. I believe that our
 experience, the level of our development and the infrastructure of economic and

746 administrative co-operation with our eastern neighbours can and will contribute to

the development of the EU's eastern policy.

A_claim (facts and values) -

747 To conclude, I wish to stress that as the Union is being reformed, its common foreign
748 and security policy must definitely be strengthened. The Union's position and its
749 international initiatives must be more than the sum of the positions of individual
750 Member States. The world needs a new European presence. <BRK>

751 4-088

ES

Carnero González (PE). - Señor Presidente, si le preguntamos a la gente su opinión en torno a si la Unión Europea tiene que hacer más política exterior, seguramente, la respuesta será afirmativa. Pero estaríamos haciendo una pregunta incompleta, porque me da la impresión de que la ciudadanía quiere que hagamos más política exterior, de otra manera y con objetivos distintos a los que clásicamente se han entendido.

752 La gente que responde en las encuestas o se manifiesta ante cada cumbre, incluso los
753 que hace dos días tomaron el *stand* de la Unión Europea en la Cumbre del Sida de Barcelona, exigiendo que cumplamos los compromisos, que haya dinero de la Unión
754 para combatir esa plaga, nos piden que intervengamos, por ejemplo, en la globalización para democratizarla y para socializarla, que contribuyamos a construir un nuevo orden internacional justo y democrático, no cualquier orden, que también hagamos lo nuestro para proteger el medio ambiente. Y se indignan, con razón,
755 cuando ven, por ejemplo, que la Unión adopta compromisos de incremento de ayuda oficial al desarrollo que están verdaderamente en límites ridículos para los problemas que se quieren afrontar.

756 Por lo tanto, tenemos el apoyo ciudadano. Y si tenemos el apoyo ciudadano para ir
757 más allá y actuar de otra manera, nos tenemos que preguntar cómo podemos hacerlo.
758 Creo yo que la carga de la prueba, en este caso, no está en el método comunitario
759 sino que está en la intergubernamentalidad.

760 Lo que ha fracasado hasta la fecha es la unanimidad; lo que fracasado hasta la fecha es recordar que el tema "política exterior" es de soberanía de los Estados y casi intocable. ¿Pero la moneda única no es también de soberanía de los Estados? Y está en el bolsillo de los ciudadanos. ¿No tenemos un euro? ¿No han desaparecido las monedas de muchos Estados miembros hasta la fecha? Lo mismo podría suceder con la política exterior.

A_claim (facts and values) -

**A_argue-

A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

Por eso yo creo que la introducción del método comunitario significa cosas muy sencillas. Adoptar decisiones por mayoría, ciertamente. Que la Comisión tenga su iniciativa. Que el Parlamento pueda controlar y no sólo controlar, que, por ejemplo, el Parlamento pueda dar su dictamen sobre el nombramiento de *Mister PESC*. Que éste esté en la Comisión, o que sea propuesto por el Consejo y por la Comisión conjuntamente eso es lo de menos. También que el Parlamento Europeo pueda pronunciarse sobre todos los acuerdos políticos internacionales, incluidos los comerciales, o que realmente pueda usar los medios precisos para que la cláusula democrática se active cuando se violen los derechos humanos.

La gente quiere una política exterior integral: diplomática, política, económica, comercial, de desarrollo. Y, por supuesto, que tenga como instrumento una defensa nueva, no una defensa clásica, basada en un nuevo concepto de seguridad humana. Para eso una Unión con personalidad jurídica, desde luego, estaría a la altura de lo que pide la gente. <BRK>

4-089

FR

Moscovici (Ch.E/G.-FR). - Monsieur le Président, la France va transmettre prochainement une contribution écrite accompagnée de propositions précises sur les sujets qui nous occupent aujourd'hui, en réponse à l'excellent document du Secrétariat.

Je vais me borner à quelques remarques liminaires. Tout d'abord, la France, et cela va de soi, est attachée à une Europe politique forte, qui soit un véritable acteur sur la scène internationale, à la hauteur de son poids économique et commercial, et au service des valeurs qui fondent nos sociétés. L'évolution récente et considérable en la matière en témoigne et va dans ce sens, parce que l'Union a su, dans le cadre de l'architecture en piliers, exercer sur la scène internationale les responsabilités

politiques que lui confère son statut de première puissance commerciale et de premier fournisseur d'aides publiques au développement. En effet, l'Union a su récemment assumer de nouvelles responsabilités, lesquelles correspondent à des convergences croissantes d'intérêt. La création par le traité d'Amsterdam du Haut représentant a été un élément tout à fait déterminant de la montée en puissance de la politique extérieure et de sécurité commune de l'Union. Sans oublier le travail accompli par Javier Solana dans les Balkans ou au Proche-Orient, appuyé par notre unité politique, qui a permis de renforcer notre visibilité, notre présence au monde. Cela dit, il va de soi également que nous devons réfléchir aujourd'hui à la façon d'aller plus loin pour que l'Union remplisse pleinement son rôle. Les quatre questions recensées dans la note du Secrétariat sont, à cet égard, d'une très grande pertinence. À quinze, et demain à vingt-sept, l'action extérieure de l'Union doit s'inscrire dans le cadre d'une véritable diplomatie animée par une volonté politique. Cette diplomatie doit reposer sur trois points. En premier lieu, sur la visibilité et la continuité de nos engagements, ce qui suppose une certaine permanence du *leadership* et une capacité à définir une stratégie européenne globale. Ensuite, sur la cohérence de l'ensemble de nos politiques, notamment celle des moyens financiers, des actions de coopération, des moyens humanitaires et des capacités militaires, ce avec des objectifs politiques définis. Cela pose la question de l'aménagement de la structure en piliers. Enfin, sur la légitimité et la crédibilité de nos positions, ce qui implique un système institutionnel responsable, suffisamment souple pour permettre de tirer profit des situations géographiques et des contextes historiques nationaux, tout en maintenant - et c'est très important - l'égalité entre les États. La nature de cette action diplomatique et de sécurité doit nous conduire à dépasser - et c'est ce que nous faisons aujourd'hui, me semble-t-il - le débat sur l'idée de communautarisation pure et simple du deuxième pilier. Nous devons d'abord nous poser des questions concrètes: comment favoriser la définition d'intérêt européen, qui doit prendre l'initiative, quelles doivent être les procédures de décision, comment doivent être exécutées les décisions en matière de relations extérieures.

Quant à la question de la nomination d'une seule personne qui occuperait les fonctions de Haut représentant et de commissaire aux relations extérieures, elle doit être étudiée soigneusement et, sur ce point, je partage l'avis de M. Michel Barnier: il doit y être procédé de façon non idéologique, pragmatique, en ayant toutefois à l'esprit toutes les conséquences institutionnelles de ce choix, et elles sont importantes, sur le rôle respectif du Conseil et de la Commission. <BRK>

4-090

DE

Einem (Parl.-AT). - Herr Präsident! Ich kann kürzer sprechen. Ich werde das, was ich sagen wollte schriftlich liefern. Ich stimme dem, was die Herren Brok, Glotz, Lamassoure, Meyer, Borrell und Farnleitner gesagt haben, voll inhaltlich zu. Ich denke, wenn die Europäische Union tatsächlich auf dem Weg zu einer politischen Union ist, dann macht es auch keinen Sinn, dass wir uns darum kümmern, dass sich künftig immer noch 15 oder dann 27 Einzelstaaten selbst verteidigen können, sondern dann müssen wir darüber nachdenken, dass auch diese Union sich verteidigen kann, weil sie auch nur dann ein Partner im Gespräch mit den USA wird sein können.

(Beifall) <BRK>

4-091

EN

Szent-Iványi (Parl.-HU). - Mr President, it is very difficult to play the role of the last speaker. I know that I have very little time and I would like to make three proposals. Firstly, we must identify our major priorities. If we have too many priorities none of them will get done. The first task is to have clear priorities. Secondly, I would like to join the long list of speakers who proposed merging the position of the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative, to avoid any duplication, any rivalry. We have to bridge the gap between the supranational and the intergovernmental side of the foreign policy of the European Union.

B_demand, call for, desire-

*A_argue-
A_justify, argue, give reasons, explain [SN 1]-

A_approve, admit as correct-

B_demand, call for, desire-

776 My last point is that we need to remedy the shortcomings of the slow decision-
making procedure. I am sure that there are options in place in the Union. We have to
use them. One of the options is qualified majority voting. Another option is
777 constructive abstention and the third enhanced co-operation. Using them, we can
778 have a credible, a stronger and viable foreign policy. As far as I see, that was the
779 major conclusion of that vital debate today: most of the speakers would like to have a
780 real, credible foreign policy.
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My proposals are very modest, not revolutionary, not Utopian, but they add value
and are feasible. <BRK>

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783

4-092

FR

Le Président. - Je vous remercie vivement. J'indique à M. Duhamel, qui m'a posé
des questions tout à l'heure, que j'aurais été heureux de répondre à certaines de vos
interrogations et d'essayer une synthèse de vos délibérations, mais l'heure ne me le
permet pas. Ce n'est donc pas une dérobade; ce sont simplement les contraintes de
l'exercice. S'il se trouve que demain matin nous avons dix minutes, j'essaierai de le
faire.

(La séance est levée à 20 h 01) <BRK>