Who Cares about Genocide in Europe?

Identity-Related Reactions to Interventions and the Srebrenica Massacre in French, German, Dutch and American Newspapers

Dissertation vorgelegt von

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Isque habitus animorum fuit ut
pessimum facinus auderent pauci
plures vellent
omnes paterentur.

Tacitus
Historiae I 28

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EC	European Community
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force (various EU military missions including EUFOR Althea to Bosnia)
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IR	International Relations
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army, Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (of the Socialist Federalist Republic of Yugoslavia)
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO-led peace-keeping mission to Kosovo)
NIOD	Dutch Institute for War Documentation, Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party, Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Bosnian Serb nationalistic party)
SFOR	NATO Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UÇK	Kosovo Liberation Army, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës
UN	United Nations
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (UN peace-keeping mission to Croatia and Bosnia)
US	United States (of America)

Introduction

In July 1995, about eight thousand Muslims were killed around Srebrenica after Bosnian Serb nationalists, under the command of Ratko Mladić, had conquered the town. The region had been declared safe area by the United Nations and Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers were stationed to protect it. When the area was attacked, these Dutchbat soldiers did not fire back and when Muslim men and women were separated, they helped in evacuation, which became a selection process for genocide. They did so even when gunfire was heard from the alleged interrogation buildings and when personal documents of those allegedly scanned for war crimes were burned. Women and girls were brought to safety while men and boys, from ten to seventy years of age, were brought to killing sites along with those who had earlier tried to flee Bosnian Serb nationalists. Srebrenica was totally ethnically cleansed in a genocidal manner.

The heinous goals of the Bosnian Serb nationalists policy of so-called ethnic cleansing became evident in 1992 after the Bosnian War started, and pictures from concentration camps were published. The pattern of ethnic cleansing was clear, with Muslim (and Croat) minorities as well as majorities of villages and towns being forced to leave, and executions, rape and arson attacks carried out by Bosnian Serb nationalists. The UN intervention in Bosnia, however, had a humanitarian focus, bringing food and medicine into cut-off and besieged towns. NATO air power was not used for fear of retaliation against UN soldiers held hostage. Only after it became more and more clear that the eight thousand men missing from the former UN safe area would not return, was air power used effectively, the United States engaged more seriously, and Bosnian Serb nationalists were identified as aggressor. In November 1995, the Dayton peace accord was signed, ending the three and a half years of war in Bosnia and Croatia, which had seen more than two hundred thousand people killed.

Srebrenica was neither the first nor the most extensive genocide to take place since the Holocaust, but it was the first genocide committed in Europe since 1945.[1] Atrocities com-

[1] I refer to Srebrenica as a genocide in accordance to the ruling of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia which found Radislav Krstić, commander of the Drina corps, guilty of genocide (ICTY ruling, Rodrigues et al., 2001) later reduced to aiding and abetting in genocide. While this legal precedent is a clear justification for use of the term, sociological definition of genocide are even wider and include massacres and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia with Srebrenica as the most lethal and systematic example

mitted by nationalist socialists across Europe were more large-scale compared to those in the Yugoslav region[2] and yet most individual experiences were similar to those made by Bosnians: deprivation, massacres, war and flight. After World War II, the Europe-wide longing for peace resulted in the foundation of an integrated Europe. Robert Schuman had the ingenious idea of bringing about peace by interlinking the national economies. Rather than making Europe "at once", it was to be "built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity". From then on, declarations related to European integration have come back to the value of peace and the overcoming of national differences, which was supposed to mark the end of war and genocide. And yet war and genocide happened again in Europe, even while soldiers from a European country were present. It is clear that various actors failed to prevent genocide. In my study, I go beyond the analysis of foreign policy action and ask *whether, and how, genocide in Europe evokes identity references by Europeans in the debate on military interventions*.

The question of *whether* European identities are affected refers to the general side of the debate on intervention between 1990 and 2006, comparing different crises and the discussion on them in newspaper articles from different countries. Here, I focus on whether there are identity-related responses to war and genocide in Europe and identity references in general. For this purpose, I put Bosnia in the context of other major crises. The question of *how* Europeans refer to their identities takes Srebrenica as an instance of genocide in Europe. As European countries, I included France, Germany and the Netherlands; the United States serves as a non-European reference country. In the Srebrenica debate that includes articles mentioning Srebrenica within the overall debate on war and intervention, I study the identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica genocide and its content regarding values and memories.

To investigate the general response to genocide and war in Europe, I focus on the identity evolution in the debate on military interventions. Such interventions take place in a conflict (transnational or within a country) and involve soldiers from a country other than the crisis region. The aim is to end the conflict, but not to conquer or establish permanent rule over the region. With soldiers being sent to regions of conflict originally not involving their own country, there is a strong need for argumentation on the reasons for intervention in a particular crisis (and not in any of the others) and it seems likely that there is some identity debate surrounding interventions. With fewer wars and more interven-

(cf. Subsections 4.1; 2.2).

[2]I refer to Yugoslavia as the whole region of the Yugoslav state in the year 1991, i.e. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia, even after independence. Often, journalists call the region Balkan, which is not simply a geographic location, but carries with it an – often negative – evaluation: rough, backward, drunk and violent (Todorova, 1994). In many Yugoslav regions, people emphasize that they are not part of the Balkan (Rumiz, 2000). To make clear the difference to the Yugoslav state formed by the republics which did not (yet) dissolve and declare independence, I distinguish between the Yugoslav region and the Federal State of Yugoslavia.

tions fought, these are the most confrontational situation for Western democracies today, posing the question of what soldiers are dying for to governments and parliaments as well as the public. So when is identity referred to in the debate on military interventions? In most studies on the Yugoslav war and genocide (including my own), there is a normative subtext that something should have been done to prevent it. But does it really matter that genocide is committed in the region of (also potential) intervention? And does it matter that conflict is in Europe for European countries? In other words, is there a reaction to the atrocities committed and is there an Eurocentric bias in the identity-related reactions to interventions?

Rather than starting from the perspective of individual conflicts, genocides and interventions with their particular course of events and actors involved, I start from the theoretical perspective of identity construction generating hypotheses on the factors that make identity reactions more likely. Apart from the geographic location of the crisis region (in Europe) and the character of crisis (genocide), I will also consider the national participation in interventions as explanatory factors derived from the theoretical discussion of identity formation and control for political ideologies. For Bosnia and Srebrenica as an example of genocide in Europe, a short overview of events will be given, but for the content of identity reactions, identity formation as undergone so far in the countries of debate guides the analysis.

The Yugoslav war is widely considered the foundation of a European foreign and defense policy. Isabelle Delpla even writes, "The massacre in Srebrenica [...] was the sad foundation of post-Cold War Europe, especially of the emergence of a European security and defense policy." (Delpla et al., 2007)[3] The underlying assumption is that the events in Bosnia, particularly the genocide in Srebrenica, touched upon identity and changed something fundamentally in European countries and in Europe as a whole. I want to find out if that is really the case and, if so, in which way. I am not only interested in whether there was an identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica genocide, but rather if any identity debate (however small) relates to European identity. Although such identity is not tied to institutional integration, the idea of a united Europe stems from the goal of preventing another catastrophic war in Europe and another reign of terror and mass killings on the continent. I thus assume that there is a special European reaction opposed to fighting and killings because they are considered things of the European past; part of the continent, but not to occur again after the lessons learned from World War II. Srebrenica in that sense is not Europe, but rather Europe's past. Therefore, I expect more identity issues to be raised in Europe, and references to World War II and the Holocaust to be evoked in the memory.

From studies of European identity, tendencies of Europeanization of national identities can be witnessed across Europe, with reluctance evident in Great Britain and Scan-

[3]My translation: "Le massacre de Srebrenica a [...] été tristement fondateur pour l'Europe de l'après-Guerre froide, notamment pour l'émergence d'une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense."

dinavia (Risse, 2010). Such findings make it clear that transnational identity needs to be accounted for in a more sophisticated manner than simple and direct identity references to Europe. Therefore, I go into details of the identity debate and argumentation – although it is only a limited part of the public debate. To account for Europeanization tendencies, I consider convergence of values and memories among European countries, as well as the direct relation of identity to Europe. To ensure that it is a European phenomenon I am measuring, I will check for indications of a Westernized identity by including the United States as a non-European country.

The *first* major finding of my analysis shows that genocide in Europe matters to Europeans – and the geographic location in Europe is more important to them than any other location. The positive answer to the research question also means that Europeans are Eurocentric and in comparison to the American debate, Europeans do not care more about genocide. In other words, Europeans do not care as much about Africa as Americans do, whereas all care about genocide. Regarding the specific case of Srebrenica, there is no increase in the identity-related reaction compared to the general intervention debate, but there are more references to the countries' own multiple identities especially of the European countries. Although there is no overwhelming identity reaction, there is something special about Srebrenica. This is particularly clear from Srebrenica emerging as part of collective memory in the debate on war and intervention. With symbolic references to Srebrenica years after the events and Srebrenica used as an iconographic catchword in different contexts, there is evidence that memory "of Srebrenica" is self-evident needing no further explanations. In most countries, Srebrenica stands for atrocities and genocide, in line with genocide in Rwanda and the Holocaust – only the Netherlands, as the country directly involved, sees things differently and remember Srebrenica as a moral and military failure.

The *second* major finding shows that rather than geographic location or the character of conflict, national participation matters most. From the study of identity in the debate on military interventions as well as the debate on Srebrenica, it emerges that national participation is the most influential factor in accounting for differences among countries. If soldiers from the same country are involved, the debate refers more frequently to identity matters. Even more pronounced is the effect of national participation of Dutch soldiers in the intervention in Srebrenica, with national self-centering increasing. There is less focus on the region, local actors and developments; instead Dutch actors and domestic affairs are more prominent compared to the other countries. The involvement of Dutch soldiers results in a more national perspective on everything surrounding the events in Srebrenica. The involvement of its own soldiers also means a highly increased focus on Dutch *national* identity. The Netherlands shows multiple identities in the intervention debate with European and Western identity as frequent as national Dutch identity. When the focus is

on Srebrenica, where Dutch soldiers did not prevent the fall of a UN safe area and the genocide of local Muslims, there is a dominance of Dutch national identity. The non-heroic behavior by Dutchbat soldiers also triggered increased interest in the events years later and there are even some signs that colonial war in Indonesia as another past wrong is more critically discussed in the context of Srebrenica. Moreover, notions of failure and shame in Dutch behavior are evident. The Dutch Srebrenica debate thus shows signs of recognizing collective wrong-doings in an identity debate, which is also evident in the memory of Srebrenica as a symbol of moral and military failure rather than of atrocities.

The *third* major finding of my empirical analysis is a difference between European debates on interventions and on Srebrenica and the debate in the United States. The most conspicuous and consistent difference are multiple identities which are manifest in European countries combined with a low degree of national identity. These multiple identities also include direct references to Europe, which are most prominent in the Netherlands. Most characteristic, though, is that national identity is not taken as an exclusive identity, but that there is room for attachment to transnational communities. Apart from Europe, the multiple nature of European identities also refers to Western identity. Although Western identity occurs in the US, compared to the focus on American national identity the share is marginal. The self-centered nationalist focus of the United States as a superpower is also clear from the many self-references across different crises. As far as the content of identity reaction is concerned, pacifism can be considered a Europeanized value. It is prominent in all European countries, but not in the US, and it is often referred to as a national value of a European country or as European. For the identity reaction in Europe it means that even genocide in Europe triggers not only an outcry over human rights violations and the return of massacres (which is also evident in the US), but rather an emphasis on war and the value of pacifism and peaceful conflict resolution.

For the analysis of identity evolution, I work in a constructivist framework. This touches on International Relations (IR) only slightly since the theoretical background is focused on identity formation theory, studies on nationalism and European identity. Constructivists in IR aim to show the influence of identity (norms, values) on state behavior and foreign policy decisions, holding that political communication is important in understanding international politics (e.g. Checkel, 1998). Rather than showing the influence of political debate on actors, I consider innerstate developments and open the black box of the state because I agree that it is necessary to analyze the domestic arena as well to be able to understand state behavior and differences among states (Hopf, 2002: 294). On the other hand, for the construction of identity, international events and politics play a prominent role.

Constructivists in the theory of identity formation emphasize that collective identity is not an eternal factor, and not something existing naturally or fixed in form and content but

purposefully constructed and based on values. In contrast to post-structuralism, I assume that there is an identity consensus with agreement on common values within a group. Although this consensus may change or even cease, it is a starting point for studies and assumptions. Constructivism makes it possible to develop empirically testable hypotheses on identity debates in the public sphere in general and on identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica massacres as genocide in Europe.

The public sphere as an open network for communication is the arena in which identity becomes manifest. I assume in accordance with Habermas' theory of deliberation that everyone can join discussion on any subject of interest and consensus when people are convinced by rational argumentation (Habermas, 1989). With communication in the public sphere, it is possible for new values to evolve or the current set of values to change. This means identity changes and the reification of identity are visible in the public sphere and memories can be evoked or forgotten. As it is not possible to analyze the whole public sphere of communication ranging from face-to-face discussions to public protest and the internet, I focus on national daily quality newspapers with a wide circulation. Their articles feature a variety of topics, including international politics. Moreover, journalists may be considered educated gate-keeper who ensure a selection of typical and rational arguments in the debate. I want to contribute to the growing number of empirical studies on European identity and the public sphere (for an overview cf. Risse, 2010) by taking a theoretical focus on identity processes and using the public sphere as an arena instead of a subject of my empirical analysis.

To answer the research question, I will consider different debates in the public sphere, i.e. in newspaper articles, which are all interlinked. War and intervention are central to all of them, refocusing on certain aspects in the subsamples. All articles dealing with war and intervention are retrieved with a keyword search yielding more than one hundred thousand articles from eight newspapers published between January 1990 and March 2006. These articles cover the *overall debate on war and intervention*. Such large amounts of data can best be analyzed with computer-based corpus-linguistics. This method yields frequencies of words, which are of interest, such as geographic names (Bosnia), and typical combinations of words (Bosnia-genocide). This way, not only can a large-n sample be handled, but an impressions of the issues discussed can be gained.

I will analyze two more (sub-)debates, whose articles were taken from the overall debate on war and intervention. From a representative data set of this overall debate on war and intervention, only those articles that focus on interventions are included in the *intervention debate*. For the third debate, all articles that include the word "Srebrenica" within the overall debate on war and intervention make up the *Srebrenica debate*. For these two samples and debates, I rely on a content analysis with the help of frames. As this is done by manual coding, more subtle arguments can be accounted for and identity masterframes as operationalization of the dependent variable can be coded. Frames are

the interpretative background journalists or cited speaker use to make complex events easier to understand.

The time period under investigation, the four countries selected and the choice of newspapers with ideologically different orientations ensures that the explanatory factor derived from theoretical considerations are well represented in their variety. In the fifteen years after the Cold War from January 1990 to March 2006, a number of military interventions took place as a result of enthusiasm for new forms of conflict resolution with the help of the United Nations and peace-keeping missions.[4] The conflicts differ in the countries participating, the character of conflict in which intervention took place and the geographic location of the crises – all explanatory factors for identity-related reaction in the countries intervening. The inclusion of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States in the study means that European and non-European countries are considered. Germany is an example of a nation that has included a shameful past (perpetration of the Holocaust) in their national identity in a self-reflexive way, which may lead to more sensitivity to present genocides. Dutch soldiers were present in Srebrenica before and partially during the genocide in Srebrenica assuming that national participation makes identity-related reactions more likely. France did not participate in the intervention in Srebrenica and does not hold a self-reflexive national identity showing great similarity to the United States, but it is another founding member of the European Union.

By posing questions on identity in public debates on interventions and assuming that the occurrence of genocide matters to those potentially intervening, I hope to contribute to genocide studies. Works on the reaction to genocide refer more or less explicitly to identity and constructivist approaches to state behavior (see e.g. Sobel and Shiraev, 2003). Samantha Power was able to show that American policy towards genocide is characterized by a lack of will to engage more fully (Power, 2002). Karen Smith showed for Great Britain, France and Germany that framing atrocities as genocide is guided by the goal to not oblige the country legally, and especially socially, to intervene (Smith, 2010). Both authors assume that there is a collectively held belief, norm or value of preventing genocide in these countries, and both substantiate their claims with selected quotes. With the help of identity theory, I will ground such values in the collective identity of nations and Europe and the memory of the Holocaust. Empirically, I will show the effect of genocide on identity matters in the debate on interventions.

Focusing on Bosnia, and Srebrenica as instance of genocide in Europe, I contribute to the literature on the Yugoslav wars and Bosnia which is concerned with reactions in the West.[5] In contrast to post-structuralist approaches by David Campbell and Lene Hansen

[4]Until 2012, only the intervention in Libya was added to the list of those with military/combat participation from at least one of the four countries. Fortunately, no new genocides occured.

[5]Major studies include Gow (1997); Cushman and Meštrović (1996); Sobel and Shiraev (2003).

(Campbell, 1998, Hansen, 2006), I have taken a constructivist position that makes it possible to take existing identities as a starting point for analysis and formulate hypotheses from these.[6] I am able to explain the variance in Hansen's results that the Bosnian War is considered a question of genocide in the US while it is read as a humanitarian problem in Europe (i.e. Great Britain only). The European-American divide relates to the different values cherished: pacifism as a Europeanized value and memory in contrast to American focus on multiculturalism yield similar results in the case of Srebrenica. Furthermore, I integrate Campbell's political explanation of the causes for conflict as a category of understanding Bosnia and genocide in Srebrenica in newspaper articles, as well as Hansen's results that include that the conflict was seen either as an eternal ethnic quarrel or an ethical problem of genocides.

The contributions to Eric Shiraev and Richard Sobel's edited volume (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003) show that national public opinion (including media reports) was eventually successful in pushing national policies towards more intervention in Bosnia by France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. Most scholars see a link of normative considerations within countries and the pressure for more action – also in the American public debate which is mostly considered skeptical of intervention in Bosnia (cf. Kull and Ramsay, 2003). Analyses of the media reaction are often unsystematic, but there are specific media analyses of national newspaper coverage of the Bosnian War, which all search the link to the policy level.[7] Erna Rijsdijk looks more specifically at Srebrenica and finds that it is only the framing of events as genocide that puts Srebrenica high on the agenda for politicians and researchers. Yet the term genocide also led to a relocalization of the events to an international level where responsibilities are diffuse and can be more easily avoided (Rijsdijk, 2003). I argue that the prevention of genocide has become part of multiple identities, especially in the form of memory of the Holocaust and World War II.

Overall, studies on identity and nationalism and on genocide and identity mostly lack systematic qualitative and quantitative analysis. With my focus on newspaper coverage, I have enough available cases (articles) to account for more than an impressionist view on the identity reaction to a foreign policy event. To International Relations, I hope to contribute a view on identity processes important to foreign policy and a perspective that theoretically starts from questions of identity formation. To identity studies, I hope to contribute a better understanding of the evolution and activation of identity with a view

[6] I use the term hypotheses for my theory-guided testable propositions on observable phenomena. The hypotheses are not suited to test the validity of alternative theories.

[7] Such systematic media analyses include, for example, Auerbach and Block-Elkon, 2005 for the US with different results compared to Kull and Ramsay (2003); Robinson (2000) more comparative; or Ruigrok (2005) for Dutch press coverage of the Bosnian War, finding that Dutch journalists were attached to (national?) obligation to fight for the oppressed.

on a single event that obviously stands contrary to different identities. Finally, I hope also to contribute to a better understanding of identity beyond the national sphere: Is there a European identity evolving in the face of genocide in Europe?

To accomplish these aims and give insight into identity in the debate on military interventions and the case of Srebrenica as genocide in Europe, I have divided this study into two major parts. Part I (Chapters 1 and 2) is concerned with the theory of identity formation and the hypotheses that can be derived from theory as well as the empirical design to trace identity-related reaction in the debate on military interventions and on Srebrenica. The second part (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) focuses on the empirical findings of the analysis of newspaper articles in comparative perspective across countries and crises in more than fifteen consecutive years. Here, the research question and hypotheses are scrutinized.

There is an abundance of theoretical literature and studies on identity formation, national identity and public debates from various scientific fields, especially psychology, history and different parts of social sciences. In Chapter 1, I introduce the theoretical framework for my study relying on a psychological basis to justify the reference to identity and memory as collective phenomena.

The theoretical chapter begins with basic definition of collective identity in Section 1.1. Starting from the personal identity of the individual, I develop my definition of collective identity as a value-based integration of a group and its members. Studies of nationalism give insight into the most powerful political-territorial identity to date. Nations as imagined communities result in the hypothesis that it is national participation in interventions that leads to identity references in the debate "back home".

The definition of collective identity as value-based is further elaborated in Section 1.2, which defines values and their relation to the individual. Moreover, the changing yet fixed nature of identity is further explored. I expect that national values as set against genocide will result in identity-related reactions to genocide in all Western countries.

A shortcoming of constructivist identity theory is its neglect of emotions, which I try to overcome by pointing to the importance of collective memory in Section 1.3. The emotions elicited by past events can thus be integrated into present identity, which is also true for negative experiences. Collective trauma produces feelings of shame, which often results in neglect and forgetting of such negative events. Self-reflexive identity is an example to the contrary, which accepts past wrong-doings collectively and vows to learn from it. I expect that nations that have integrated shameful past behavior into their present identity (especially perpetration of the Holocaust), are more likely to relate present-day genocide.

European identity is a form of political-territorial identity that is beyond, above or integrated into national identities. Despite European integration as a political reference point, European identity is open for the whole continent. Referring to European iden-

tity, its values and memory in Section 1.4, I develop the hypothesis that genocide on the European continent results in a European identity-related reaction because European integration is founded on the idea of overcoming past war and terror.

Finally, Section 1.5 presents ideologies as a different form of adherence, with world views set on more numerous social situations than political-territorial identities. The differentiation between liberal-left and conservative ideology results in the hypothesis that the former is more sensitive to identity in the debate on interventions and genocide.

In Chapter 1.6, I present the public sphere as the arena of communication where identity emerges, evolves and changes. With open debate on values, any event can affect prior consensus on values. Newspapers are considered a sound proxy for the public sphere and its debates.

After the theoretical outline, I turn to the case selections made for my empirical analysis in Chapter 2, starting with the country selection. France, Germany, the Netherlands and United States allow for testing hypotheses after their identities, memories and participation in the intervention in Bosnia and Srebrenica have been presented in Section 2.1. The presentation of the newspaper selection in Section 2.1.5 takes into account the ideological differences as an explanatory factor. In Section 2.2, I introduce the time period under investigation with a great number of the interventions and genocides carried out between 1990 and 2006. These events vary regarding the countries participating in interventions as well as the location of crises. The time period can thus also account for variance regarding the explanatory factors. In Section 2.3, I introduce the details of the sampling strategies to arrive at the different debates for further analysis. With more than 100 000 articles for the overall debate on war and intervention, as well as more than 2000 articles for the intervention debate and more than 4000 for the Srebrenica debate, the large-n character of the cross-national longitudinal study becomes evident. In Section 2.4, I present the methods of content analysis with a special focus on frames and corpus-linguistics. Both methods are used for the analysis of newspaper articles. Finally, specifics of the operationalization are given in Section 2.5.

The empirical Part I is composed of three chapters. First, I take a general look at Bosnia in the context of military interventions. The second and third chapters focus on the more specific case of Srebrenica analyzing the identity debate in detail. In this vein, the third part centers on the long-term effects of Srebrenica as it becomes part of collective memory.

In Section 3.1, I first gain general impressions from a corpus-linguistic analysis of all articles on war and intervention published in the four countries between January 1990 and March 2006. The analysis of this very large sample yields first insights into the importance of Bosnia as a post-Cold War crisis. The coding procedure of articles that have intervention as their main issue confirms the findings in Section 3.2. The Yugoslav region is the most continuous and important crisis region after the Cold War until September 11,

2001. With the help of frame analysis, the hypotheses are scrutinized in Section 3.3 for the intervention debate, showing that national participation is the most important explanatory factor for identity-related reactions.

Before focusing on empirics, I give a short introduction to the Bosnian War and genocide in Srebrenica in Section 4.1. I argue that events did not come as a surprise and could have been prevented. To emphasize the importance of Srebrenica in the public debate and to establish a comparative perspective in Section 4.2, I analyze references to Srebrenica (as done with major crises in the previous Chapter 3), applying corpus-linguistics to the overall debate on war and intervention as well as frame analysis to the intervention debate.

Section 4.3 is the heart of the study, when I concentrate on the identity references and the content of identity in the debate surrounding the Srebrenica. Apart from explicit references to identity, I consider the values mentioned and the memory evoked, and trace transnational convergence. With the very thorough and detailed content and frame analysis, it is possible to find an answer to the difficult question of how Europeans reacted to genocide in Europe. Apart from human rights, the central value evoked by Europeans in particular is pacifism and World War II is the dominant memory evoked by Srebrenica across countries. With convergence and specific reference to national as well as European and Western communities, I find trends of Europeanization as well as similarities between all countries under investigation. References to failure and shame are particularly frequent in the Dutch debate confirming the importance of national participation in intervention for identity references which became evident throughout the empirical analysis.

In Chapter 5, I look in detail at Srebrenica itself becoming part of collective memory and thus collective identity. This particular form of identity-related reaction is considered along different factors, which focus on the context in which Srebrenica is mentioned, e.g. in crises other than those in the Yugoslav region, and on the content of what Srebrenica means. In the Netherlands, Srebrenica has become a symbol of moral and military failure, whereas Srebrenica has become a symbol of atrocities in the non-participating countries.

The concluding chapter, offers a summary of the results of the empirical research along the hypotheses made The analytical as well as normative implications of my study suggests that it is worth to consider identity within states and the effect international events have on – but that it is only years after the genocide that European countries in particular recognize the horrors committed.

Part I

Theoretical and Conceptual Foundations

1

Identity, Values and Memory

In the theoretical outline, I introduce the foundation for my study and hope to contribute to a better understanding of political-territorial identity. While relying on a constructivist identity theory, I argue that there is a neglect of more emotional content. I uphold the understanding of identity as value-based but it is with the introduction of constructed memory that communities founded on the same values set each other apart and gain a territorial and emotional foundation. In most cases, the memory includes heroic accounts of military or moral battles won, but in cases of so-called self-reflexive identity room is given to shameful accounts of the collective past. The relation to painful episodes of the past opens up two ideal types of identity. While self-reflexive identity integrates negative events into collective memory, heroic identity relies on a purely positive account of the past – forgetting or denying any other events.

The first part of the theoretical chapter refers to collective identity and national identity as imagined communities. The solidarity among strangers along national lines has become and still is so natural to us that we seldom reflect on it. Regarding genocide in Srebrenica, I want to see whether there is an imagined community of the intervening soldiers and those "back home". In the next sections, I specify values as the basis for collective identity, and collective memory as a temporal and emotional side to identity. Values and memories are manifestations of collective identity and will be measured in the empirical part. Self-reflexive identity integrates negative past events – especially genocide committed – to collective memory. I will examine in the empirical part whether such self-reflexive identity also results in more identity issues raised in the case of a present genocide. In the next section, I come to the special case of European identity, which may be supranational or transnational. In my empirical study, I will also check for European and Europeanized values and memory as well as a European imagined community. The theory of the public sphere lays the foundation for the empirical analysis of newspaper articles. Finally, a short section on political ideologies introduces the theory for the choice of newspapers with different ideological orientations in the empirical part.

1.1 Collective Identity

1.1.1 Social and Collective Identity

The term identity is a psychological one which has proven to be useful to describe personal and social orientation and behavior of an individual and also of collectives. Identity is a basic category of human behavior and therefore a basic concept in all social sciences. The self as the location for personal identity has been central to philosophical discussion for two millennia, identity entered social science research with psychology at the end of the 19th century.

An individual is not confined to himself, but every individual interacts with multiple groups. George Herbert Mead was one of the earliest to develop a concept of identity stressing that social interaction is crucial to identity building and becoming conscious of oneself as apart from the mere organism (Mead, 1934: 135–141). As children, we internalize attitude and expectations, and fulfill roles in a group. This way, security is enhanced and individual behavior is easier to predict based on group affiliation. The individual learns to act socially in a group and forms his identity (Mead, 1934: 153–159). Seen from the outside, the group acts cohesively with all members adhering to particular rules, and can be considered a whole.

While Mead focused on personal identity formation in relation to others, social identity theory concentrates on the self defined in terms of group membership. Starting with stereotyping and intergroup behavior, social identity theory was developed by Henri Tajfel (Hogg and Abrams, 1999: 10–12). His definition of social identity is by now widely accepted not only in social psychology, but also in sociology and political science:

> "Social identity [is] that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." (Tajfel, 1981: 51)

The theory of social identity does not state that all members of a group always act in the same way. Rather, there are limits to their behavior set by the group. Within these borders, individuals are free and dissent as well as leaving groups is possible. Moreover, a prototype can change and evolve over time partly because its members and individuals are members of different social groups. It is possible to alternate between different roles and values depending on the situation. Usually, individuals will choose the social identity that is clearest and generates most satisfaction (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008: 309; Linville, 1987). It is possible that differentiation or similarity is more satisfying. Being surrounded by other people from your country, you may emphasize your regional identity to stress difference or national identity to stress sameness. It depends on whether you feel superior,

considering your region as old and orderly, or inferior, considering (the same) region as backward and narrow-minded.

Social identity theory includes the relation of an individual to a group and vice versa. In the end, the individual and its self remain central to social psychology (Hogg and Vaughan, 2008: 113), while sociologists and political scientists focus on collectives. Only from a psychological perspective can collective phenomena be traced to the individual level and only individuals can scientifically feel and physically act. With this in mind, it is justified to speak of a collective.

Collective identity – in contrast to personal and social identity – involves a group as a unit considered to have properties of its own or a collective conscience, as sociologist Émile Durkheim stated:

> "The totality of beliefs and feelings common to the average of the members of a society forms a system with its own properties: you can call it the collective or common conscience. Without a doubt, it does not have a single organ as substrate: it is, by definition, diffuse throughout society; but it has nonetheless specific characteristics which make it a distinct reality. In effect, it is independent of the particular conditions in which individuals are placed; they pass and it stays." (Durkheim, 1893: 81)[1]

Without going into detail of the specific claims made by Durkheim, constructivists have shown that what he considered so eternal has actually been made by men. Yet, the fundamental insight is taken: collective identity as collective conscience goes beyond the individual and attributes characteristics to collectives as if they were unitary. The relations within a group are neglected and values, action, feeling and memories are regarded as collective phenomena from the outside. Yet, it is taken for granted that collective identity exists in, and can be measured in, individuals. As my argumentation has shown, such implications are justified by psychology.

What I refer to as collective identity is just *what* is integrated in the self-concept as members of different groups. *Collective identity is a set of those values of a group that its members incorporate (to different degrees) into their self-understanding. Thus, collective identity is not only the (individual) feeling of attachment to a group and its values, but the group's (collective) self-understanding with regard to common values.* And just as individuals learn and change throughout their lives, identities change – personal as well

[1] My translation: "L'ensemble des croyances et des sentiments communs à la moyenne des membres d'une société forme un système déterminé qui a sa vie propre: on peut l'appeler la conscience collective ou commune. Sans doute, elle n'a pas pour substrat un organe unique: elle est, par definition, diffuse dans toute l'étendue de la société; mais elle n'en a pas moins des caractères spécifiques qui en font une réalité distincte. En effet, elle est indépendentante des conditions particulière où les individus se trouvent placés; ils passent et elle reste."

as collective. Major events and resulting discussions of them, may result in a change or a shift of emphasis in values cherished by a group. American identity changed from slavery and segregation to embracing diversity as a key value; identity is strong although it may change over time. The sense of unity prevails because the values change within the whole group.

Collective identity is thus founded on individuals' personal and social identities, yet the focus is on those things that they have incorporated from the communities of which an individual is part. Identity is thus manifest in the values shared by the members of a group. Yet, this basis is not necessarily explicit. Members feelings of attachment, belonging and worship of the group as such can be considered expression of collective identity. Empirically, it is thus not only the reference to values related to a certain community that give evidence of a collective identity, but it is also such emphatic, at times pathetic, reference to a community.

For political scientists, this collective level is of major interest because here the legitimacy of a political system is grounded. In this sense, collective identity is particularistic in its relation to a limited group and its institutions. It does not have to be political *per se*; it may also refer to groups as families, sports clubs or companies.[2] And political collective identity does not have to be territorial. Ethnic and national identities are connected to a land, which is not necessarily politically sovereign, but gender identities, for example, are not tied to a particular area. National identity is the collective identity upon which the most research has been done, and remains a central reference point for research on collective identity in general.

1.1.2 Imagined Communities

The most powerful collective social identity today is national identity and it is the largest territorial group to which most people feel attached (Guibernau, 2007: 9–11). As such, national identity is an important example of collective identity and its formation. If national identity is the feeling of attachment to a nation, than what is a nation?

Debates on national identity have been going on ever since nationalism developed in the 18th and 19th century. Before nations evolved, sovereign territorial states developed. The process of state formation evolved gradually and was contingent upon its competitiveness to other systems. What seems so natural to us, was once one system surrounded by others such as city states and the Hanseatic league (Spruyt, 1996).[3] Eventually, history

[2] Of course, collective identities can turn political in different context as is particularly true for gender identities, but also in the case of overall civic culture and clubs (Putnam, 1993).

[3] Hendryk Spruyt attributes the victory of the sovereign territorial state to the better adaption to economic growth by the king-burgher alliance for institutions like taxation, law and centralization in a modernization theory (Spruyt, 1996: 86; 153–180). Charles Tilly stresses the importance of war to form the state (Tilly, 1992: 67–95), but without looking for variance on the independent variable. For a good Marxist reading of

saw the victory of territorial sovereign states with a state apparatus, a distinct political sphere and (a claim to) a monopoly of coercion (Tilly, 1992). For the question of legitimacy, this meant a shift from loyalty towards a prince to loyalty towards the state. With the rise of the nation state, loyalty shifted to the nation (Hall, 1999). It is the last major identity formation process and remains the most powerful political-territorial identity. Moreover, it is in a continuous evolution which can help us to understand the emergence of new identities such as European identity.

The most influential theory of national identity formation is the constructivist approach pioneered by Benedict Anderson. Published in 1983, "imagined communities" have become commonplace in research on nations: "[nation] is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." (Anderson, 1991: 6) The central finding is that members of a nation do not know each other personally and thereby have to be imagined – just like other larger collectives. Nevertheless, members of nations feel tied to other members without knowing them, just because they imagine themselves to belong to the same nation. By alluding to the limits of nations, Anderson refers to the fact that nations never comprise the whole world. Even though many nations have striven to conquer more territory, they do not want all humankind to be included in one nation, as messianic religion or totalitarianism does. The third attribute of nations is sovereignty, which refers to their strive for territorial congruency and independence. This principle, which can be defined as nationalism, is in turn a theory of political legitimacy (Gellner, 1983: 1). Nevertheless, nationalism can also remain a political striving for state-nation congruency; just as there are states without nations, there are nations without states (Gellner, 1983: 6). In a nation state, a politically sovereign state relies on a nation as legitimatory basis. Lastly, nations are communities which means that there is an internal comradeship. It is in fact this fraternity which makes the idea of nations so strong and alludes to their national identity.

When it comes to national identity, the solidarity among strangers in imagined communities seems natural to us. Michael Billig calls it "banal nationalism", which does not mean that it is trivial, but rather that it is taken for granted and unconscious; we consider it natural that we belong to a nation and that the world consists of such (Billig, 1995). Collective identity in many cases is uncontested and even unaware: If an American soldier dies in Iraq, it is "natural" that other people of different race and faith in the same country, thousands of miles away from the soldier's hometown, grieve with the soldier's family. As an American, he fought and died for them.

Theorists of nations are particularly interested in the formation of nations. They can be separated into two groups: essentialists and (social) constructivists. The first group puts emphasis on objective characteristics such as language, culture, religion and ethnic-

state-formation, see Anderson (1974).

ity which generally are difficult to define. For many people today, nations and national identity seem natural and eternal. Social constructivists did their research against the unreflected usage of the term which also appears in scientific research.

Before Anderson made popular the "imagined communities", Ernest Gellner formulated his modernist, functionalist theory of nations. The growth of industrialization, with its spirit of rationality, demanded common knowledge, education and language, for which nationalism was the solution (Gellner, 1983: 20–38). New homogeneous high cultures, with which people willingly identified, were invented. Although these high cultures consisted of "arbitrary historical inventions" (Gellner, 1983: 56), it was and is the nation itself which is worshiped. In fact, popular belief in nations is so strong that studies on nations, nationalism and national identity begin with the inevitable remarks that they are, in fact, no eternal facts and have not always existed.

Benedict Anderson is more descriptive of the formation mechanism, but his non-Eurocentric view of nations is refreshing. Economic change, social and scientific discoveries, and increasingly rapid communication led to new communities being formed which were able to cope with these new developments (Anderson, 1991: 35–36). The main instrument in the popularization of nationalism was print capitalism and the use of vernacular languages which made the nation appear real to people. Not only printing but its wide distribution led to the spread of standardized language and enhanced vernacular languages in Europe. Reading of events in books and newspapers suggested to people that they exist simultaneously in time with others. The social ties created by print made people feel that their coexistence was not accidental, but full of meaning (Anderson, 1991: 61–62; 76–78). Anderson deserves credit for refraining from demonizing nations. Of course, there is a question of power related to the diffusion of the national idea, but it appeals to people nonetheless. Unfortunately, Anderson does not go into more detail of his term "community" and its relation to collective nation identity.

Although nations are imagined, they are real to people, and millions have given their lives for them. The construction mechanism social constructivists offer as a purposeful creation of nations, their memories, their traditions etc. is compelling and mostly accepted today. And yet, it does not quite answer the question of what made this identity so strong. It is this question that motivated Gellner's student Anthony D. Smith to look for a more essentialist view on nations and national identity.

Essentialists emphasize a continuity of pre-modern culture in today's nations (Smith, 1991) or define a nation as an ethnic group which self-identifies as unique (Connor, 1994: 103). Emphasizing the ancient roots of nations is supposed to reveal the strong national identity that springs from it. While primordial and eternal criteria are contrafactual to historic development of nations, the belief in such things actually played and still plays a role in many nations. What constructivists can learn from these critics is that memory – even if it is inaccurate – accounts for much of the content of national identity and

strengthens it.

In the study of identity and identity formation, constructivism includes social process and change. Essentialists like Smith also consider nations as modern phenomenons (contrary to many nationalists themselves), but they focus on continuity rather than the emergence of nations, and cannot explain change. Thus, essentialists and social constructivists focus on different aspects. It is important to take seriously the essenstialists' reminder that identity is real and concrete. Values and memories may account for this fact in constructivist approaches.

1.1.3 Summary and Hypothesis

Psychology and social psychology reveal that all identity is rooted in individuals who incorporate social identities into their self-concepts. Individuals need groups and their collective identities to find orientation. The group at the basis of collective identity has its own self-understanding, feelings and values. The content, e.i. common values, incorporated into individuals and thus forming a community, is their collective identity. Although the values and group members may change, there is a sense of similarity that prevails.

National identity, the most powerful collective identity for many people in Western nation states, is based on an imagined community of factual strangers who construct unity. Individuals are often unaware of the ties they hold to their compatriots. Yet, national identity is constructed, and with modernization and print capitalism came the suggestions that people should feel solidarity with strangers from the same nation. Nations are particularly strong imagined communities, to such an extend that they are considered natural, also as the basis of inter*national* relations.

For identity issues in the debate on interventions, this means that collective identity is more likely to be called upon when compatriots are involved. A war or an intervention in which soldiers (may) die is therefore an appropriate context to look for debates on values and identity. The concept of imagined communities suggests that participants in an intervention are more likely to relate a debate on interventions to their national identities. Our identity is only called upon when it involves us. Also, for the specific case of genocide, participation is likely to be central to an identity-related reaction to such events because the imagined community is involved. If not perpetrators or victims of a genocide itself, soldiers deployed to protect in a situation of (prospective) genocide are part of an imagined community with compatriots "at home". To put it colloquially, we care for genocide if our boys are close to it. If there is national participation in an intervention surrounded by genocide, an identity-related reaction is more likely to occur.

1.2 Value-Based Identity

1.2.1 Values

If collective identity is the set of values that members of a group incorporate into their own self-understanding, values are at the heart of collective identity. As socio-psychological considerations as well as national identities have shown, identity is more than a pure numerical identification. Firstly, it is necessary that there are categories (evolving) to which people can be classified – in the case of citizens this is, first and foremost, citizenship. Citizenship cannot account for national identity, though. The case of numerical identification also shows that objective categories are insufficient to determine identities. This is particularly important with regard to essentialist approaches of national (and eventually European) identity: (re-)constructing history, cultural heritage or common descent does not tell us whether these categories are also valued by members of a(n alleged) community – and the existence of a collective identity does not mean there has to be a researchable history, cultural heritage or common descent of the members (cf. Kantner, 2006: 507–509; Kantner, 2009: 49–52). For identities, a value-based integration is necessary.

Values are attributes or nouns – usually abstracts – and determine their worthiness of preference to a certain group (Tietz, 2002: 109–110).[4] Different sets of attributes can be values depending on the community that cherishes them: beauty is a value in the fashion community where beauty is a goal for members and the community as a whole. Values can refer to all different abstracts because they are not stating facts but evaluations made by a community. By defining and rating values, a community sets itself apart from others and founds a distinct profile. Of course, values are not set, but can change over time. It is the order of values that changes, particularly after, and in the light of, critical historic events (Giesen, 2004). In Germany, values such as private family life and diligence ranked higher after World War II than before when racist ideology fostered values such as racial purity, extended *lebensraum* and readiness to make personal sacrifices. The end of Nazi power in Germany and social change at the end of the 1960s marked a turn-around in political values with democracy, rule of law and human rights gaining importance.

Values answer the ethical question asked by members of a community: *What is good or better for us?* Members of a community define themselves in regard to this question because a will to achieve something together for all within the community becomes manifest. Present problems are related to a common future (Kantner, 2009: 58). It is this project-like character that makes value-based communities so strong: they exist to realize certain values for themselves, sometimes over generations. It is with these values in mind that a community relates to present and past events, interprets, evaluates and reacts to

[4] I call these groups communities if they discuss or have values, thus being a bit more specific than others who refer to communities as a group of people who share beliefs (Rortry, 1986).

them. Values prove their relevance in debates as well as practice. Although they are not always at stake, values of political-territorial communities build the borders of public – and in many cases private – action. Often, the antagonistic interests and values of social identities such as political parties or regions prevail in public, but at times in a world of nation states, ethical questions come up: where does Dutch national tolerance end when the provocative artist van Gogh is murdered by an offended Dutch Muslim and populist politician Fortuyn murdered by an activist in the name of a tolerant life?

Nationalism has shown that values and identity are a political project promoted by movements and their leaders.[5] It is not sufficient that an elite supports the values; they also have to be integrated in individuals that form a collective. For the personal identity and orientation in the world, values are important to individuals. As (social) psychology has shown, identity is part of the socialization process all individuals endorse (cf. Subsection 1.1.1). For new values to evolve and identity to be activated, a public debate is necessary. On the basis of rational arguments, values as the core of identity can be negotiated. While different opinions ensure that integration and pluralism is possible, communication itself helps to establish a continuity of community and commonness.

The moments for new values to evolve are characterized by social, economic and ultimately political change. As Taylor notes, it is only with modernization that individuals are capable of adopting identities based on personal choice beyond socialization. With territorial sovereign states forming, national identity evolved to thrust aside regional, religious and class identities. The new national identities were introduced in a nationalist movement supported by the cultural and intellectual elite.[6] The same may hold true for European integration as a new polity *sui generis* and an evolving European identity (cf. Subsection 1.4).

In principle, any situation and the accompanying debate can potentially turn to questions of values and identity. Yet, some external events, such as catastrophes that affect many individuals (and thus also their relatives and friends) as well as positive achievements, are particularly apt to generate or activate feelings of pride, despair and commemoration (Kantner, 2009: 73–77). Only if the values are negotiated, is it possible to have a basis for identity because values incorporate a striving for a common (better) future. Military issues of war and interventions are instances where questions of values can easily arise, with the ultimate question being: *What are we willing to die for?* Or, for the individual: *What am I willing to die for?* A further look at philosophical and psychological theories will show how values can render such strong identities in individuals.

[5] For an interesting case study of nationalism in the break-up of the Soviet Union, see Beissinger, 1996.

[6] Although there is much disagreement about accents, scholars of nationalism agree on these points (cf. Anderson, 1991; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 2001).

1.2.2 Values as Changing and Fixed Concept

Values are not fixed, and they can change and evolve within the community cherishing them. Apart from the very moment of emergence, collective identities do not start from scratch when a new member enters or an event challenges the group's identity. Values are negotiated, but at any given moment there is a previous consensus which forms the basis and reference point for debates. Especially if identity is not challenged but only called upon, the set of values does not have to be and in fact is not constructed anew. I maintain that identities are both fluid and stable – it depends on the situation whether ther is change or reification. Rather than a metatheoretical debate, it is an empirical question (Klotz and Lynch, 2007: 70–74).

While post-structuralists agree that identity is discursively constructed, their emphasis is on the linguistic construction of it every time it is discussed. All concepts are tied to the language and arguments used to name and describe it; nothing is outside the discourse or can be regarded independent from it (Hansen, 2006: 25). Yet even post-structuralists consider national identities as existing. Moreover, when engaging in empirical research, it is necessary to introduce more fixed notions of concepts including identity. So for Hansen "there is a discursive terrain that is already partially structured through previously articulated and institutionalized identities." (Hansen, 2006: 26) It is hardly possible to deconstruct identities because there is always a starting point for studies, especially when analyzing particular events in foreign affairs. This is particularly true for national identities, which have become social facts and can actually be measured at any given moment.

The content of identities are values, and while they are at times contested and reified, they are also fixed to a certain degree, e.g. in national constitutions. The concept of constitutional patriotism serves as a useful insight to an identity concept for political-territorial rule. German political scientist and journalist Dolf Sternberger coined the term "Verfassungspatriotismus" (constitutional patriotism) in a 1979 editorial article. In his opinion, a new phenomenon had evolved in post-war Germany in which citizens identified with the constitution, and democratic institutions had come to life with active democratic engagement by Germans (Sternberger, 1980). Constitutional patriotism does not mean that the people should identify with the state as something superior, but means that they become an active political part in the public life of the state on the basis of the constitution and its humanistic values. The constitution is not just a document, but it is the will of the people to unify: it shows that they care about their nation (Molt, 2006: 30). In this sense, the "living constitution, in which we are involved on a daily basis" (Sternberger, 1980: 227) resembles Renan's "plébiscite de tous les jours": renewing the identitarian basis of the nation in citizens' action.

Elaborating on Sternberger's ideas when tracing back concepts of sovereignty, Haber-

mas shows that in the 18th century, the collective subject of the state (a nation) constituted itself with its constitution as literally as the word suggests. The nation was thus not taken as prerequisite for a sovereign and legitimate constitution, but rather created within and by the constitution. The tradition was taken up again by the republicans of the 20th century, who – in opposition to such theorists as Carl Schmitt – saw the nation as a product of the social contract and voluntary agreement between free and equal citizens (Habermas, 1996d: 159–164). Constitutional patriotism is thus a contribution to the principle of national identity.[7]

Constitutional patriotism is a useful starting point to understand any form of collective identity related to a political-territorial unit. Although the values may be too strictly defined as political, the concept makes it quite clear that constitutional patriotism refers to a particular set of values as it is the foundation of a particular constitution and a particular constitutional practice, which Sternberger emphasized (Sternberger, 1980). In the case of constitutional patriotism, the reference community becomes most clearly visible in the constitution itself. It is the reference to the political system of a certain territory that sets a framework for its identity. This does not mean that a constitution has to pre-date constitutional patriotism in a positivist sense, but as in Sternberger's emphasis on practice, and as Habermas in his elaborations suggest, it is the values themselves that are under constant discussions among citizens. The constitution as (written) part of a consensus is a reference point in these discussions. For researchers of identity, constitutions are thus an important source.

In the constitutions, a particular order of often universal principles takes form. And it is here that the particularity of these values and identity becomes visible; to answer the question on whom the values refer to and who wants to fulfill them, it is necessary to draw on a community. This question itself can be answered in the discussion and discursive practice (Habermas, 1996c: 284–286)): What do individuals, institutions and collectives say as to whom the values refer to?[8] It is not only with reference to different communities in constitutions that similar values fond particular identities. A closer look at different nations also reveals that the order of and emphasis put on similar values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law varies across countries. Especially in the light of collective memory of every nation, values take on these different nuances. In Germany, human rights are cherished as lessons taken from Nazi rule and the strong role of the rule of law can be considered a reaction to Adolf Hitler's democratic election as

[7] Gebhardt would deny the conclusion that German constitutional patriotism can be generalized like this. Writing on Sternberger's idea, he contrasted it against the US national identity, which he sees in a broader republican order and not so judicially fixed as in Germany (Gebhardt, 1993: 35). In my opinion, it makes sense to generalize, despite differences, in order to evolve categories and definitions.

[8] As questions of citizenship show (cf. e.g. Brubaker, 1992), the community, and in particular membership in the community, are part not only of the discussion on values but of identity itself.

chancellor. It is in the light of memory that values shine.

With consensus, or at least a basis of discussion in form of constitution, it is possible to find a empirical basis for studies on national identities. For this study, I thus consider it possible to describe national identities as well as their values and memories. As they are not constructed anew every day or in every debate, values can be named and taken as a starting point. This does not mean that they are fixed, but certain assumptions can be made on the ground of existing and lasting consensus. For a classification of national identities, I therefore rely on the analysis of constitutions and secondary literature.

Critics of constitutional patriotisms point to the lack of "thick" content (e.g. Calhoun, 2005: 260), but they neglect that constitutional patriotism is open to other values, also culture, as long as they are voluntaristic (Habermas, 1996b: 139–140). Unlike the 19th century nationalists, who saw an opposition between the French and German model, both components play an important role. For modern multicultural societies to be stable, it is desirable that civic components outweigh naturalistic ones. The factual importance of other values in a nation of linguistic and historic community cannot be denied, nor should it be neglected. From a procedural democratic view, it may be sufficient for legitimacy to have a community of people "sitting in the same boat" (cf. Kantner, 2009: 56) – yet political-territorial identity is more complex, which makes it necessary for them to be distinguishable from the others. Constitutional patriotism shows the way to incorporate universal principals to a particularistic community.

Values are the constitutional part of collective identities, and they are sufficient to generate solidarity and build the community as a unit. While notions of culture may be integrated as values, it is still important to recognize that other (constructed) components are also part of collective identities. This is particularly true for collective memory which ensures a continuity over time.

1.2.3 Summary and Hypothesis

Identities are based on values which express the wish for a community's future answering the question: *What is good or better for us?* Values evolve in discourses, especially in situations of crisis and change. Constitutional patriotism is a concept on national identity that relies on values enshrined in constitutions and thus connected to a territory. Universal values can thus refer to particularistic communities whose consensus on values can be read in constitutions. The institutional political practice ensures a continuance of actually changing values. With the help of secondary literature on national identities, it is thus possible to classify identities for empirical analysis.

For the reaction to genocide, this means that values contradicting genocide should evoke an identity-related reaction. The hypothesis thus is that crisis region of intervention involving genocide trigger more identity-related reactions than other places. However, as

all Western nations have constitutionally enshrined values that are at odds with genocide, there should be a similar reaction in all countries under investigation. I consider this an alternative to other hypotheses I made because no variance across countries could thus be explained. A good understanding of values is also needed to measure any identity relation of genocide because values as content of identity. For the research question this means that values can identify *how* Europeans react to genocide. Whenever collective values are evoked, identity is called upon; it is only necessary to look for the community to which they refer. With the case selection presenting the values cherished by the nations considered for this study, I rely on the argument introduced here that despite changes, national values and identity can be taken as fixed to a certain degree at a certain time and thus used as an explanatory factor. Similar assumptions are made for collective memory.

1.3 Collective Memory

1.3.1 Memory and Identity

It has become a commonplace that "Without memory, there is no future." (e.g. Wiesel, 2008) and that we have to pay respect to our past. Psychologists have established the link between identity and memory in their studies of Alzheimer and amnesia, as well as in developmental psychology: the self is not only a concept or image, but the self is one's own memory for oneself (cf. Klein, 2001).

Maurice Halbwachs was among the first to discuss and analyze memory as a collective phenomenon and elaborate ideas of social context first expressed by Emile Durkheim (Halbwachs, 1992: 53). Contrary to Sigmund Freud, Halbwachs saw memory not only as a passive infiltration, but as a conscious process within a group or society (Brundage, 2000: 3). Unfortunately, Halbwachs' works on collective memory remain fragmented. Nevertheless, there is a focus on the idea that individual memory is constructed by the collectives in which an individual is a member.[9] Not only is individual memory dependent on collectives, but every social group develops its own identity and determines which events, and which interpretation of them, are passed on. Thus, memory is ultimately dependent upon the present and its construction is shaped by today's concerns.

Memory includes autobiographical experience of our past. It entails a representation of the self as the agent or experiencer; e.g. my mother used to sing songs to me. By contrast, semantic memory consists of context-free facts about the world; e.g. the Atlantic Ocean separates America from Africa and Europe. Semantic memory is related to our social identity because we recall our birth place, friends' names or nationality with it. Identification as an Italian includes a semantic memory of Italy, the Italian nation and its

[9]For more details on the relationship of individual and collective memory in Halbwachs' thoughts, see Heinrich (2002): 26–31.

values. So memory is an integral part of social identity (Kihlstrom et al., 2002). Overall this means that – as with identity – there is not only the personal memory but also the social and the collective memory.

According to McAdams, past events are connected to our current identity and especially our current goals in a narrative way. They become vivid when integrated in a coherent story that incorporates intentions, feelings and goals in a plot. In this narrative processing lies the key to what makes the self so compelling – mere events are stored and recollected according to our goals (cf. Singer and Blagov, 2004: 124). We can substitute goals by values as they are the things which we strive to realize. Values are thus tied to emotions and make identity affective. Values are tied to memory of, for example, how they were first established in revolution, how they were defended in a war or how they survived suppression.

Apart from coherence and emotions, memory fulfills another function for personal identity that is also relevant for collective identity; not only to remember but also to forget. The memory, as opposed to accurate recording, is actually able to selectively recall events and emotions, to put them together and to enrich them. Our memory is a construction. Memory does not represent what actually happened in the past, but rather what we believe has happened. Thus, it is a reconstructive and not a reproductive process. The human memory's ability to not store accurate information, but to piece different impressions together, probably shows an adaptive rather than a defective process of our brain (Schacter and Addis, 2007). Regarding our identity, the selective memory helps us to uphold a positive self-image.

For social sciences, the relevance of collective memory to thinking and action is of particular interest. As part of our semantic memory, we incorporate not only the values but also the memory of the community we are part of. Firstly, there needs to be an explicit reference to events or facts of the past; mathematical definitions are thus excluded whereas presidential terms are part of the collective semantic memory. Secondly, and for identity as a political concept of particular importance, memory relates to the present (Hirst and Manier, 2002: 43–46). As the collective memory is (re)constructed just like the individual one, it is the present community that determines in the frame of its current collective identity and values, which past events are to be preserved in which way. Collective memory is logically related to identity, but also functionally related because the members of a community commit to a certain perspective of the past and therefore construct and/or assure a common identity (Assmann, 2002).

With Aleida and Jan Assmann's interdisciplinary approach to collective memory, the concept has undergone social scientific clarification and systematization.[10] As a literary and cultural scholar, Aleida Assmann refers to political memory (Assmann, 2008: 215–

[10]For a good English summary of the their theories, see Assmann, 2006: 24–26.

220). This is an explicit reference to national memory as something less fixed than cultural memory and it is the ground for my (empirical) understanding of collective identity in this study. Political memory has to be actively remembered and cherished by a community to exist (Assmann, 2008: 220). It is thus in the present and in communication that the collective past is preserved.

Present events enter collective memory in a communicative way: Witnesses exchange and report their experiences to the present generation. Their memory is not only combined and aggregated but transformed and set in relation to the community's values. The French Revolution was once part of the informal communication of a generation, but has become entrenched in French and European memory. Only if memory is functional and serves the present community, will it become part of the political (or cultural) memory (cf. Assmann and Assmann, 1994: 122–123). Such memory is suggested as a reference point and a comparison to present events, as it illustrates and narrates the values at the heart of collective identity. A political memory thus exists if people know what the events referred to mean, without the necessity of a scholarly debate. It stands for itself and is a reference point. It is not enough to store memory for today's political memory and political-territorial identity – that would be akin to Stonehenge, of which most knowledge is lost while the archive still stands. Rather, memory has to be present in active communication to be considered relevant collective memory.

The idea of present communication on past events is the theoretical foundation for my empirical analysis of the events in Srebrenica forming part of collective memory. I will examine whether references to Srebrenica are still present years after the genocide. Part of the relevance to a present-day community is knowledge of events. Rather than an accurate account of historical facts, it is important for memory to incorporate the meaning of the past for the present. Thus, I will examine whether the name of the town alone implies meaning beyond geographic location.

Whether calculated or not, memory and identity depend on one another. And it is in this way, that I define *collective memory as the shared knowledge and meaning of those events of a group's past that its members incorporate into their individual memory and identity. Collective memory thus includes only events that are considered relevant for today's community in the light of the group's values.* This understanding of collective memory as intertwined with collective identity is twofold. On the one hand, memory depends on present identity, on the other hand values gain particularity in the historic light of collective memory.

Even Habermas refers to memory as the one moment of distinctiveness for constitutional patriotism. Although it predominantly relies on universal principles, the historic frame or memory sets German constitutional patriotism apart from other national identities:

> "the overcoming of fascism forms the particular historical perspective from which a post-national identity centered on the universal principles of the rule of law and democracy understand itself." (Habermas, 1990: 152; cited in Müller, 2007: 33)

By referring to particular historic events or historic documents, today's community asserts that it considers itself to be continuous over time with the historic community. Identity is constructed with the help of memory and in a discussion, past events help to legitimize arguments. Furthermore, the past serves as a convenient background before or against which current events and questions can be discussed. By referring to the past, the collective interpretation manifests a certain evaluation guided by its present values. Thus, whenever a collective memory is evoked, there is a present collective identity existent whose values guide the importance of certain past events remembered in the present. Even without direct reference to identity or values, memory is an indicator for collective identity.

For identity, collective memory also helps to activate emotions otherwise neglected. As psychology has shown, in memory we recollect not only facts but also the emotions connected to a certain event. In the case of collective memory, the individual members of the community have not themselves experienced the past that is remembered, but with the help of collective values they are able to connect feelings such as pride and joy to past events that are interpreted or constructed as the fulfillment of values. The memory of the fall of the Berlin Wall[11] fills people who did not live through the Cold War with joy because values of unity and self-determination were fulfilled. Collective memory helps to add context and emotional meaning to present identity. Although identity is also complete if emotions run low, it is especially with reference to the past that positive and negative emotions can be activated by the collective interpretation of the past as positive and negative – and identity is thus strongly called upon.

Critics of a value-based concept of identity have often found fault with the alleged lack of emotions (e.g. Cederman, 2000: 19). It is important to note that emotions are related to (the memory of) events that touch the community's values. Although memory is constructed, it adds these emotions to collective identity.

Despite the importance of memory, especially to the affective side of identity, values are at the core of national identity. It is always on the ground of its present values that a community constructs its collective memory. Even if nationalism constructs ties to past communities, and they are considered to be continuous or even the same as (identical to) present day value-based political territorial ones, this is not true for values. Rather than importing past values, present values determine our memory of the past. The temporal ties suggest a quasi-eternity of the community – based on the belief. Such continuity over

[11] The term re-unification already evokes a particular memory of a certain territorial community.

time is important to uphold a positive self-image of a community. Nevertheless, there are instances when events are so horrible they leave traces in memory.

1.3.2 Collective Trauma

Memory does not only mean to remember, but it also means to forget: certain past events are not considered for collective memory especially if they cast a negative light on the community. In the case of traumata, it is hard to ignore horrible events. For collective memory and identity, trauma plays an important role as an extraordinary situation with regard to the common values of a community. Like the concepts of identity and memory introduced before, trauma is also a psychological term. It is a specific form of memory and refers to a part of the past in which "members of a collectivity feel they have been subject to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways." (Alexander, 2004: 1)[12]

Collective trauma thus strongly relates to collective memory and identity and, like these, it is ultimately constructed by the community that embraces it. A trauma is not an event itself, but rather its representation in the collective memory (Alexander, 2004: 8–11; for a contesting view, see Neal, 1998: 9–10). Thus, not all events that may objectively seem to constitute a fundamental shock are traumatic to a community. What has happened needs to be interpreted as shattering the values that lay the foundation for the collective identity in order to enter collective memory. For an event to qualify as a collective trauma, it has to relate to the collective's values which the community considers to be violated in a massive way.

The event considered a trauma is impossible to forget and to ban from memory. As a specific case of collective memory, today's community has to relate somehow to the past collective enduring the trauma. There are different ways in which that is possible; namely through continuity with the victims, perpetrators or bystanders. As always in the case of collective memory, it does not necessarily mean logical or genealogical continuity.[13] Of course, feelings associated to the event differ depending on which role is remembered by the community. In the construction process, feelings are associated to the traumatic event. This process of "mnemonic socialization" (Zerubavel, 1996) may be contested within the community and it can change. Thus, something once considered traumatic

[12] Jeffrey Alexander calls collective trauma cultural trauma, but from his definition it can be read that he refers to a general phenomenon of collectives. In his further explanations, he does not specifically relate to culture or even define it, so I use his understanding calling it collective trauma in line with collective identity and collective memory.

[13] West German memory identified with national-socialist past on the side of the perpetrators, while at the same time East German (socialist) identity upheld collective memory as victims to fascist dictatorship (Kattago, 2001: 79–86) – although there were victims and perpetrators in both East and West Germany.

may diminish, while another past event considered unimportant may gain meaning. Such changes ultimately depend on the present community's identity and values.

In the case of identification with past victims, feelings range from pity to sympathy and debates focus on the degree of heroism shown by victims (Saito, 2006: 259). The most prominent case is the national identification with the Jewish victims of the Holocaust in the state of Israel (e.g. Yerushalmi, 1982; Young, 1993). In the case of Yugoslavia, the memory of a lost battle against the Turks in the 14th century was able to mobilize large parts of the Serb community in 1990s to take action against Muslims within their common state (cf. Subsection 4.1).

Identification with the perpetrators of events remembered as traumatic is a rather new development. Ernest Renan is of the opinion that it is a necessary condition for the evolution of national identity to forget certain events if they cast a negative light on the community:

> "Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical inquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality; the union of northern France with the Midi was the result of massacres and terror lasting for the best part of a century." (Renan, 1996: Chapter 1)

It seems that, for the sake of a coherently positive identity, many horrible events are deliberately forgotten and not considered traumatic.

In the case of identification with perpetrators of a trauma, feelings such as guilt and shame are dominant. Shame refers to the incongruence of values or what action should have been taken. Collective identity and values are considered to be violated (cf. Deigh, 1980: 23–25; Piers and Singer, 1991). Maybe even more than other memories, this touches the core of identity by confronting one with one's failure to live up to the values cherished today – even though the past community apparently did not share the same values and goals.

In studying the specific reaction to the Srebrenica genocide, I consider the events as potential trauma by examining the Dutch identity-related reaction. As bystanders in the events, it may well be that feelings of guilt and shame arise for the Dutch. As Dutch values (like those of all other Western states) oppose genocide, the knowledge of not having prevented it, despite being present, shows an incongruence of values and action.

1.3.3 Self-Reflexive Identity

In the case of traumata, negative events may also be included in collective memory enriching collective identity by an additional dimension. I refer to *self-reflexive memory as a shared knowledge and meaning of shameful traumatic events that contradict the present community's values, particularly genocide*. In self-reflexive identity, such memory is of great importance and accounts for much of the collective identity. Self-reflexiveness is particularly related to the Holocaust but may refer to other shameful past events as well, for example, civil war, other genocides or colonialization. Yet, the scale of horrors makes the Holocaust very likely to qualify as a trauma. Nevertheless, nations involved can still uphold heroic identities. Heroic identities stress positive behavior, like resistance and liberation, and ignore, forget or deny wrongs to relate to the whole community and its identity.

Forgetting is a result of shameful events that question the continuity of a community. A self-reflexive identity is able to integrate negative past events in its collective memory and uphold continuity with the community that committed crimes. Self-reflexive memory is only possible if there is a continuity of the imagined community and a discontinuity of values in the present collective memory. With reliance upon common values, it is possible to recognize a differentiated view of the collective memory. The trauma is incorporated critically, i.e the present community distances itself from itself. Compared to the standard view on identity, such a pattern may seem more sophisticated. But in response to the traumatic memory of past wrongs within a community, feelings such as shame can serve as a common and emotional ground for present values.

The integration of negative memory is only possible if an overall positive self-image is upheld. Present values in contrast with past wrongs create shame, but also make it possible to cope with past horrors. There is pride to have recognized that what the community did was wrong. A self-reflexive identity may even hold the belief that it has overcome its past and is today a better version of itself, not only because other values are at the heart of the present identity but also as pride to acknowledge one's wrong-doing. Normatively, the past should not be overcome in the sense of finishing with it, but it should remain a constant reminder in the present. Psychologically, a positive self-image may be more important to the group. Moreover, collective political memory indicates that the past is active and present in today's community.

The ability to deal with a negative past and integrate collective shame is a trait of collective identity that can help to keep violent tendencies low. Compared to territorial differentiation, the "past as the other" diminishes existential threats (Diez, 2004: 332). Furthermore, feelings of collective superiority can also be downgraded. If even one's own community has made horrible mistakes, it is harder to judge other communities.[14]

[14]It is also possible, though, that a community that dealt with its own past in what it thinks to be an

A self-reflexive identity shows that identity and values change because otherwise a feeling of shame for previous generations and their values, now considered wrong, would not be possible. It is more likely that a self-reflexive identity evolves if the change in identity comes with a break and cherished values are abandoned within a single generation. If there is a gradual progress of change, the difference between past and present values as well as past events and their memory are harder to recognize.

Thomas Diez relies on a post-structural concept of identity construction against 'the other' (Diez, 2004; Campbell, 1993). Traditionally, such othering takes place as differentiation between communities over territory.[15] Diez argues that a self-reflexive identity evolved in Europe after World War II because territorial othering had become obsolete with the continuing integration of European nations. Referring to Ole Wæver, Diez claims that with the lack of distinct territorial boundaries and a low profile on power politics, the EU can better rely on a temporal other of the continent's past as belligerent and extremist (Diez, 2004: 325–328). The same can be said with regard to Western democratic nation states among each other. War is not an option in conflict resolution and is dismissed as a wrong in international relations.

While the decline of territorial delimitation made self-reflexive identity possible, its development has to be seen against the background of the Holocaust and World War II. For national identity, these events most clearly affected German and Israeli identity, as well as Jewish and gypsy identity. The crimes committed by national socialists surmount imagination in their scale and the willingness of so many to help (Arendt, 1963: 269–274). To describe the extermination of a people, culture, and even the memory of entire groups, new terms like genocide and Holocaust were coined. With the realization and publication of industrialized killing in the death camps, Auschwitz in particular, the crimes came to be considered a civilizational breach. Yet, it is not the actual event itself that resulted in any identity change. Rather, it was the memory of the Holocaust as the ultimate horror and crime against all humankind that changed memory.

The political change of the 1960s in Western countries encouraged questioning and alteration of the values previously upheld. Student revolts of the late 1960s challenged the World War II generation in Western countries.[16] Although no government was revolutionarily turned over, new views influenced public debates. It was then that minorities and other marginalized groups made claims questioning national identity and memory,

exhaustive manner will feel superior to others which have not.

[15] In the concept of the territorial other, a temporal component is often implicit. For example, Islam as Europe's 'other' (often evident in the discourse on EU accession of Turkey) is not so much a question of territory and whether Turkey is on the European continent, but it is rather a construction of Islam as backward and pre-modern (Diez, 2004: 332).

[16] Also in East European countries, there were significant student revolts. Their revolt targeted the present oppression of Communism directly rather than the non-self-reflexive continuity criticized by their Western fellow students.

and more and more people accepted and supported these claims; including the civil rights movement in the US, emancipation of women and the question of crimes and collaboration during national socialism. And it was only then that a self-reflexive identity started to evolve in West Germany.

The evolution or independence of new nations in former European colonies brought new challenges to many countries' national identity. In the uprising for independence and nation-building in African and Asian colonies, so-called mother lands had to accept that their rule was not welcome in other parts of the world. Moreover, colonial policy and crimes as well as decolonization wars were addressed by the newly independent states. Not only recently independent states, but exile and immigrant groups who identify with victim groups, initiated international pressure on nations of perpetrators, not only for money but for recognition; e.g. Armenians in France or Chinese in the US who try to gain attention for the Nanjing massacre, so that the US would pressure Japan to face its past – often using "Holocaust" as a catchword (Chang, 2007; Yoshida, 2006).

The new values and communities which question heroic memory are further enhanced by increasing internationalization putting pressure on nations to deal with their own past wrong-doings with the help of international justice, as well as scholars and pressure groups. In a globalizing and digitalizing world, not only goods and services but an overwhelming amount of information crosses borders, and often perpetrators and victims alike have documented crimes waiting to be evaluated by science and the public. International interest was triggered by the aftermath of the Holocaust and World War II when, bit by bit, Germans as a nation came to terms with their past of totalitarian rule, terror and genocide. Historians' scholarly work also contributed to a more self-reflexive form of memory in nation states (Echternkamp and Marens, 2007).

A self-reflexive identity of total acceptance of all past wrongs as integral part of identity and memory, is a Weberian ideal type. There is no moral judgment to either a self-reflexive or a heroic memory, the other ideal type. Heroic memory may not give room to shameful events such as slavery but it may include achievements by slaves as moments of collective pride. Study of secondary literature on national memory of the Holocaust and other past genocides and massacres will help to categorize present national identities.

1.3.4 Summary and Hypothesis

As identity, memory is constructed and ultimately rooted in the individual, but can also take a collective form. For collective identity, collective memory is important but not a necessary condition. Memory is able to construct identity and continuity over time and helps collectives as well as their individual members to remember values that stand out in historical light. Moreover, memory gives emotions and context to identity. Trauma is the most extreme encounter of identity and memory because members feel that their con-

sciousness is fundamentally shaken. For perpetrators, such traumata can result in denial as well as shame, i.e. the feeling of incongruence of collective memory and collective values. In a self-reflexive identity, collective memory includes negative events of wrongs committed by the same community that distances itself from itself. This new notion evolved after the traumatic experience of World War II and the Holocaust, which was followed by social change when new groups, such as students and newly independent states addressed collective crimes. An increasing internationalization of information and justice as well, especially through less territorial delimitation in an increasingly integrated Europe also contributed to the rise of self-reflexive identity.

Self-reflexive identity is especially sensitive to shameful behavior within one's own community. The inclusion of the negative past is a development visible in reaction to the Holocaust. As related to genocide, I hypothesize that communities with self-reflexive identity react more sensitively to present-day genocide as it touches upon their past. Through the acceptance and recognition of the horrors one's own community has inflicted upon others in the past, there is more knowledge of and attention paid to the issue of atrocities and genocide. Moreover, in an effort to (re-)construct a positive self-image, communities holding self-reflexive identities, especially in regard to the Holocaust, may consider it a responsibility to speak up against present genocide as demonstration of a lesson learned. This hypothesis extends the previous one made on values which contradict genocide, namely that genocide triggers identity reaction. While values opposed to genocide are present across countries, self-reflexive identity varies and could account for differences in the identity-related reactions to genocide even among European nations.

1.4 European Identity

1.4.1 Postnational, Transnational and Supranational

European identity has become a favorite topic of identity researchers and researchers of European integration alike. To characterize European identity in contrast to other, older forms, such as national identity, the terms postnational, transnational and supranational identity are often used. As all terms end with -national it is clear that the nation and its identity are always a reference point. These concepts are most dominant for people in the Western world.[17]

Postnational refers to a development in policies, polities and politics that renders nation states less central. A postnational world is one in which nations as well as states cease to be the dominant actor. Such world is assumed to develop as a result of economic glob-

[17]For social science and history it may also be helpful to have a look at other forms of identity, such as the Reich in Central Europe or the Hanseatic League prior to the dominance of territorial states. I owe this idea to Dietmar Schirmer.

alization accompanied by political and cultural (globalized) answers (Habermas, 2001: 87–97). Nation states' sovereignty is increasingly eroded by international companies acting on international markets that can hardly be controlled by individual states. Financial actors are among the first actors which can no longer be traced to an individual state or which are tied by laws and rules limited by territorial states. In the face of the globalized economy, Jürgen Habermas calls for a postnational answer in global politics as well (Habermas, 2001). Only if policies are enacted on a global level and processes institutionalized in a global polity, will negative effects of a globalized economy be matched and controlled. So far, the United Nations is not suited to do so and institutions such as the IMF are restricted to economic issues. The EU is thus currently the only postnational system that is more than an international organization with legislative powers that affect many nation states.

With globalization eroding the sovereignty and borders of nation states, concepts of postnational citizenship have evolved. Migrant workers have crossed borders in the global labor market and live, work and send their children to school in different countries. With migrants in virtually all countries around the globe, territorially based citizenship and the political rights of participation are questioned. A postnational citizenship is thus based on universal personhood and confers upon everyone the duty and right to political participation regardless of decent, birth, or nationality (cf. Soysal, 1994: 2–3). Thus, the legal status of citizenship would no longer be tied to nationality but to postnational citizenship, and national identity and political rights would be detached, calling for a postnational identity as well.

Jürgen Habermas' answer to legitimizing globalized politics is postnational identity as constitutional patriotism. It is part of a postnational constellation seeking a universal identity in support of a universal political system to match the globalized economy. Until such visions of an effective universal political system can become reality, nations will remain valuable to most people – with European integration as an intermediate step. In fact, national identities can also be postnational in character. With national myths deconstructed, national identities no longer rely on nationalism but incorporate universal values. It is in the mutual recognition among citizens that judicial ethics are uniting them and that a community of postnationals is constituted (Ferry, 1994: 37–38). For national identities, a universalistic orientation can become integral and core to national identities with its institutionalization in constitutions (cf. Subsection 1.2.2). Postnational thus refers to the content of political identities and is part of constitutional patriotism.

The postnational character of the EU refers to its philosophical character as a concept that goes beyond, not only above (supranational) or between (transnational), the dominant system of nation states. What differentiates European identity from its national counterparts is that it actually relates to them. Transnational and supranational identity here refer to the dual character of the European Union itself. While the European Council con-

sists of the member states' governments and can be considered intergovernmental, the European Commission is a supranational institutions, despite national nominations (Hix, 1999). Also beyond the EU, nation states remain the political reality in Europe with some notion of unity beyond them. The same holds true for European identity, which is both transnational and supranational.

Supranational identity is a collective identity that refers to something larger than the nation. This does not necessarily mean that in personal identities the attachment is greater than that of the nation. Every individual holds multiple identities and even strong political- territorial identities such as national identities are not exclusive. In many nation states, regional identities are strong and do not contradict national identification by individuals or content and values of the nation. This is especially true for European identity as integration — whether in the EU or elsewhere – which has in fact been initiated and fostered by nation states. Conflicts may arise, but the same is true for regional and national identities. Polls like the Eurobaromenter have shown that most people in EU member states identify with both their nation state and Europe (European Commission, 2008).

Conventionally, these identities are in fact interpreted as being nested in concentric circles or Russian Matruska dolls (Kantner, 2004: 86); members of the smaller group also feel attached to the larger one (cf. Figure 1.1).[18] Different combinations are possible, as some may identify strongly with their region and Europe, bypassing the national level (Westle, 2003[19]). There is a specific reference to the supranational level necessary. Supranational identity is similar to national identity, but refers to a political-territorial unit above (not beyond) the nation state; it does not overrule other levels.

In Figure 1.1, the different relations of collective identities are graphically shown (cf. Risse, 2001: 201; Risse, 2004: 252). Multiple identities can first exist as separate identities as it is impossible to be Atheist and Catholic at the same time. Many nations, though, accept multiple citizenship, acknowledging a loyalty and identity towards more than one nation. The second relation is like that of concentric circles, in which mothers are women (but not all women mothers) or that of region and nation. Identities as overlapping sets refer to different roles that may, but do not have to, be chosen simultaneously as they are scarcely linked, such as a researcher and a soccer fan.

For political-territorial identities, which stand central in this study, the marble cake fits best because they are in fact not always neatly separated in circles or shells, but transgress boundaries. Thomas Risse describes the relation of national and European identity as a marble cake (Risse, 2004: 252). It refrains from a hierarchical conceptualization of nested identities. Instead, the image of a marble cake evokes a smooth transition between

[18] I apply the model used to general collective identity not necessarily political-territorial identities. For a more delicious and less abstract graphic, see Kantner (2009): 47.

[19] Westle misses the point though that the relation of European identity to national and regional ones is non-exclusive.



Figure 1.1: The relation of different collective identities.

different identities, where aspects such as values or memory of national identity cut into European identity and vice versa. Various components of identities influence each other, meshing and blending in a way that makes it impossible to have one completely dark and one completely light piece of cake (cf. Risse, 2001: 201; Risse and Grabowsky, 2008: 2). The marble cake model refers not only to the composition but also to the content of multiple identities. In the case of German national identity, this is particularly clear because it includes the value of European integration itself; to be a good German is to be a good European. On a lower level, within towns and nations, the same phenomenon may be evident. From neighborhood to continental identities, it is not always possible to tell which values exclusively belong to which community.

As I do not want to rely solely on the national aspect of imagined communities as political-territorial identities, it is important to understand that various identities can be held simultaneously by one individual and that different collective identities may be related in different ways. This is particularly true for national and European identity. Europe may not be visible explicitly, but is evident as part of the national identity of European states. Such relation of collective identities is only possible because individuals are holding multiple identities.

From the national perspective, this suggests a Europeanization of national identities

pertaining to distinct political communities, rather than the addition of a European layer to other political identities that people might hold. From the other perspective, European identity can be characterized as transnational. Content of national identities blends into the European level, particularly when identities (values and memories) among European nations converge. Being European can mean identifying directly with Europe or the EU, but it can also mean feeling closer transnationally to other European nations as opposed to non-Europeans (cf. Bruter, 2004): As a German, I belong to Europe in which French and Dutch are also part, and we share a Europeanized national identity with the same values. Our values and even our memories are compatible to a certain degree, particularly because we agree that we are united on a European level.

Transnational identity can also refer to federal states with strong regional identities, as well as to Western identity. In contrast to European identity, Western identity does not have an institutional crystallization point.[20] Nevertheless, as values among European nations converge, the same is true for Western nations; so being Dutch also incorporates the consciousness of being part of the West. Transnational identities consist of national identities with similar contents.

1.4.2 Europe, the EU and the West

Questions of European identity have become a political debate, which has been going on for years. Whenever the membership of Turkey in the European Union is on the table, and politicians, commentators and citizens discuss whether the country fits into the EU (Gerhards, 2004); emotions run high. The debate itself shows that there is something like a European identity and that it is of political importance.

The EU today takes decisions that affect citizens not only indirectly but directly. From its (potential) member states, it demands democracy and has taken democracy as a legal principle for itself (Bogdandy, 2007). Although it is a construction *sui generis*, the European Union as a political system needs diffuse support in the form of a common identity in order to be considered legitimate. The success of 50 years of European integration would presumably not have been possible without a permissive consensus. The populations of the member states accepted the political decisions made for more and more integration without being interested in the details. This tacit agreement came to an end with the close results of referendums since the beginning of the 1990s, as well as with the introduction of a common currency (Kohler-Koch et al., 2004: 206–209).

Ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the historic possibility of the "return" of middle

[20] Similarly to the EU in Europe, NATO is comprised of many (but not all) states that can be considered Western. In contrast to the EU, NATO is a purely intergovernmental organization. The governments of the nation states make decisions without any supranational body or even directly legitimized body being part of the process.

and eastern European states to Europe has been emphasized, suggesting that the countries of central and eastern Europe had somehow disappeared from the continent. This framing reveals the identity dimension of enlargement and shows that the process of European integration renders territory less important to European identity. In academic and political language, the legitimizing basis of the European Union is called *European* identity, rather than EU identity. The focus on the EU is thus not restricted to member states as linguistic imperialism, but also holds true for non-member states which in fact define themselves as wanting to "return to Europe" (Risse, 2004: 254–255).

Many scholars agree that European identity is more fluent and less determined than national identities in particular (Castano, 2004; Breakwell, 2004). Of course, this is not necessarily a disadvantage.[21] Europe can be seen as a container, open for the future (Brague, 1999).

The European Communities have changed their institutional setting as well as their treaties, competencies and borders over and over. The member states and the territory which are part of the EU have changed with enlargements and inner-state border and sovereignty issues.[22] [23] Not only widening but also deepening leaves the EU with a different size: the Euro is the official common currency in 17 member states of the European Union and micro-states whose currencies were tied to those of countries that joined, but also Kosovo and Montenegro. The Schengen zone of lifted border control comprises of 23 EU member states (plus microstates and Norway, Iceland, Switzerland), but Ireland for example only joined the Euro and not the full Schengen Agreement. It is thus not easy to determine what the EU even is. In regard to identity, these changes demand a more flexible and less territorial based form of identity.

The EU is fixed only at certain moments and for certain aspects and Europe as a continent is also an open concept. While most geographers see the Ural Mountains as the boundary between Europe and Asia, this definition is actually changing depending on the view of history taken (e.g. Molden, 1990; Seibt, 2004). In any case, European or EU identity cannot rely upon fixed territorial boundaries. Despite the existing tradition of defining a more or less unspecific "East" as the "other" of Europe (or the EU?) (Neumann, 1996; Neumann, 2006), the question of whether Russia would fall in or out becomes

[21] There is the risk, though, that an empty category such as European identity is filled with national ideas. This projection may lead to misunderstandings as well as negative evaluation of fellow-European (Mummendey and Waldzus, 2004).

[22] With the changing status of Greenland in regard to Denmark, the territory dropped out of the EC in 1985, fundamentally changing the size of territory.

[23] Nevertheless, enlargement does not seem to be infinite. It reaches its limits with the existing EU's capacity to integrate more member states but also with some territorial definition of Europe. When Morocco filed for accession to the EC, it was also denied because the country was not "European", which in its categorical use seems to point to the geographical location. A similar formulation can be found in the draft constitution (d'Estaing et al., 2003: Article 3).

difficult to answer.

As all Europeans define themselves in regard to the EU, and consider themselves as inside or outside, all are "potential Europeans" (Eder, 2005: 201), Europe and the EU have become hard to disentangle. Since Europe and the EU are so closely connected, I will continue to refer to European identity emphasizing the open character of Europe and the EU alike.

A similar territorial openness characterized a still less specific notion of Western identity. For Samuel Huntington, who defines the West as regions influenced by Protestant-Catholic traditions, Europe and the EU are divided between the West and Eastern Orthodox civilizations (Huntington, 1997). The divisions of the West, East and third world have lost importance and territorial definition of the West is as difficult as the definition of Europe. For both cases, there are a number of countries which can be safely said to be part: Germany, France and the Netherlands are considered European as well as Western, while the United States is always part of the West, never of Europe. Depending on the (implicit) definition of the West or Europe, Latin American countries may be part of the West or Russia may be part of Europe.

European identity is a legitimizing necessity for the European Union, but there is no such demand for the West. Only NATO comes close to be a Western organization according to the amount and exclusiveness of Western member states. Its purely intergovernmental character as an international organization does not call for a common identity and the lack of direct affect on people in the member states makes NATO no crystallization point for Western identity. Nevertheless, a consensus on liberal democratic values has emerged within NATO (Risse-Kappen, 1996) which can be seen as Westernized, and Western identity is a research topic in sociology, history and political science (cf. e.g. Dougherty, 2000; Gress, 2004; Huntington, 1997). Apart from religious tradition, Samuel Huntington also mentions values as self-determination, liberalism and democracy as inherent to Western identity (Huntington, 1997: 93). As these values also apply to Eastern nations as Korea or Japan, the relation of religion or morals and the state, and the relation of the community (and the state) and the individual should be considered as well (Barr, 2002: 8–11). These values, rather than essentialist argumentation, make a differentiation of Western states and Korea and Japan possible.[24]

1.4.3 European Values and Memory

Various studies have shown that there is identification with Europe visible on an individual level. This is particularly true for elite survey, such as EU officials (Wodak, 2004).

[24]Huntington's argumentation that in East Asia, Western values are on the decline and an "indigenization" of values takes place means on the other hand that Western values were at place for years in Japan and that the country at least was part of the West.

Generally, better educated and informed citizens identify more with Europe (Hooghe, 2003), but also in mass public opinion, European identification, secondary after national identification, has been on the rise since the early 1990s (Citrin and Sides, 2004). These studies show that a European identity exists and is not just a theoretic concept. Europe is real to most Europeans despite all its shortcomings and its subordinate position behind the home nation.

In its treaties, the EU puts emphasis on political values that define the European Union as a whole as well as its member states: liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (European Union, 1997: Article F). Values for European integration are most fundamentally stated in the Copenhagen criteria. Those countries willing to join the EU have to adhere to them, not only theoretically but in practice. Criteria include democracy, human rights, the rule of law and minority rights as political criteria along with a functioning market economy and the legal adoption of the EU *acquis communautaire*. With regard to the high demands for new member states, the EU treaties now explicitly also state these values (Sedelmeier, 2003: 10).

The EU is well aware of its foundation in nation state members and their national identities are protected (European Union, 1997: Article F). The EU motto "unity in diversity", which is most visible (though not stated) on the coins of the common currency, can in fact be considered as a formulation of the value of diversity, respect for minority rights and non-discrimination. With diversity in mind, integration itself includes the idea that national identities and nationalism shall not be used against other nations and especially fellow member states. With the choice of integration as policy after World War II, extreme nationalism shall be overcome.

With the US as the counter-model, the European Union can be characterized as a civilian power in foreign policy in contrast to a military power. Security arrangements to constrain the use of force through cooperation, integration up to partial supranationalism, democracy and human rights promotion, non-violence in conflicts, social equity and sustainable development, interdependence and the division of labor, and cosmopolitan international law are goals and preferences in foreign policy (Maull, 2001: 124–126; Sjursen, 2006: 249).

While European values are stated in the treaties, European memory is more contested. There have been some attempts to agree on a memory beyond the Second World War. The EU Commission promotes a European dimension to be introduced to the history curricula, (Savvides, 2006) and European history textbooks are written. The focus remains, however, on a transnational Franco-German note (cf. textbooks Geiss and Quintrec, 2006a; Geiss and Quintrec, 2006b).

War experience is the central element of European memory. By 1945, the continent had witnessed the horrors of industrialized war twice in one generation. Today, the battleground of Verdun is a symbol of the first warning against Europe's engagement in war

(Cerutti, 2001: 21–22). When European integration began in the late 1940s and 1950s, national leaders across Europe agreed that the economic and political conditions that led to World War II had to be overcome (Jaspers, 1960: 53), and that a deep economic and political integration should ensure that the European nation states are unable to engage in war again.

Gradually, at the beginning of the new millennium, European memory has also included the Holocaust in its account of war and becoming more self-reflexive (Rousso, 2004: 7) with regard to it. There is a desire in the European Union since the late 1990s to officially change the focus of memory and values from avoidance of war to the avoidance of another Holocaust (Levy and Sznaider, 2006: 184) and of Stalinist crimes.[25] *Ex post* it may be possible to state that with regard to European values, the Holocaust was a founding myth of European integration (Probst, 2003). The empirical analysis of the public debate can reveal whether collective memory rather focuses on war or the Holocaust.

1.4.4 Summary and Hypothesis

There are also collective identities beyond, between and above nation states. While postnational identity refers to universalistic values as content of identity, supranational identity relates directly to a polity above the nation state such as the European Union. Transnational identity is the tendency of convergence among national identities when values and memories grow similar to become Europeanized or Westernized. In regard to content, national and European identity are intertwined. As Europe and the European Union offer no fixed territorial concept, European identity can rely on the othering of the past and self-reflexive identity. In contrast to the EU as European polity, there is no political system that needs a Western identity, for which there are , nonetheless, signs of evolution and which is territorially as open as Europe.

With European identity potentially stretching across the whole continent including the Yugoslav region, geographic proximity of a conflict on the same European continent is more likely to be related to European identity compared to events in other parts of the world. War, intervention or genocide *in Europe* thus trigger European identity debate. Moreover, European values and memory show that regarding content there may be a transnational or supranational identity-related reaction to genocide, especially on the same continent. European integration has been initiated in an attempt to stop another catastrophe of war and genocide as occurred during World War II. Thus, anything similar happening again challenges the idea of European integration which would become visible

[25]The Stockholm Conference not only saw the EU as a driving force, but also included middle and Eastern European countries whose national memories focus more on the Stalinist crimes of deportation and the GULag (Kroh, 2006: 234). Overall, with regard to its Eastern part, European memory remains somewhat divided (Troebst, 2005).

in the public sphere.

1.5 Political Ideologies

1.5.1 Ideology and Cleavages

Theory of and the hypothesis derived from imagined communities, values, self-reflexive identity and European identity are all related to political-territorial identities. Without any territorial basis *per se*, political ideology is an alternative concept which contrasts all hypotheses introduced before. Individuals can identify with a political-territorial unit as well as an ideology. I briefly introduce the two major ideological schools relevant to control for political orientation in the empirical part.

Ideologies are a modern philosophical concept introduced with Enlightenment(cf. Eatwell, 1999 for the historical introduction). In empirical political science as well as (Anglo-Saxon) political theory, ideology refers to coherent belief systems of empirical and normative views on human nature, social structure and how both should evolve (Eatwell, 1999: 17). The concepts, values and symbols that are included in ideology are meant to describe as well as prescribe human nature (Vincent, 2010: 18). Ideologies thus give orientation in a complex social reality and help to integrate, but also differentiate and ostracize.

Ideologies are not tied to nations at all but the system of nation-states has become so dominant that even the proletarian revolution based on class as a category opposed to nations is often nationally oriented. In many cases, the fulfillment of ideological goals apply to the nation of which the people are part. There is nationalism in socialism as well as in liberalism although the ultimate goal may be to see politics and social behavior across the world work according to socialist or liberal ideas.

Empirical studies of electoral systems have shown that there are divides among political parties and their supporters along different dimensions (Lipset and Rokkan, 1990), e.g. state vs. church and workers vs. employers. The foundation of the positioning along these lines are different political ideologies. Ideologies are thus manifest along the major cleavages in the political party system and the political spectrum they cover. Today's parties are categorized along the major cleavage of capital and work as well as a new cleavage of materialists and post-materialists. Cleavages are assumed to cover the major political questions which are important in domestic politics, but there is no principle cleavage regarding questions of foreign policy and international interventions.

In this way, ideological cleavages also translate into the media and its reporting and supporting of different parties (Vincent, 2000: 324). This assumption is supported by behavioral theory that argues consumers of news media would like to find confirmation of their own ideological view in the news (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). It is also

possible to differentiate media empirically along political ideologies by analyzing media consumers or the ownership and the tradition of individual newspapers or television stations. For example, the readership of a newspaper can be categorized by party preferences (e.g. Kelly et al., 2004). This way, major national newspapers and television stations today are commonly associated with the liberal-left or conservative end of the political spectrum.

1.5.2 Liberal-Left and Conservatism

Liberalism and social democrat ideology are combined to the liberal-left because they (today) share many ideas and political values. Both evolved as reformist ideologies to uplift humans to a better society. There is disagreement on the degree of state intervention in economic affairs, but both have given up support for a radical economic order (purely capitalist or socialist).[26] Overall, socialism and liberalism share a positive image of human nature and support for equality. As reformist movements, liberalism and socialism have a revolutionary tendency and strive to establish their ideas throughout the world. Prominent values are democracy, human rights and the limitation of the church (Lipset and Rokkan, 1990; Vincent, 2010). Promotion of democracy and human rights are also central for the foreign policy understanding.

Both also share an internationalist orientation for these values as the French and socialist revolutions have shown. They want all people to profit from the values they cherish. In foreign policy, there is support for the promotion of democracy and human rights. Overall, I refer to the liberal-left and thus include liberals and socialists.

The opposite of the liberal-left according to the classic political cleavage is conservatism. It was introduced by Edmund Burke who foresaw in 1790 the end of the French Revolution in terror (cf. Eccleshall, 1994). As conservatism has an aversion against social change, there is no classic body of theoretical literature.

In contrast to liberals and social democrats, conservatives do not uphold a positive view on human nature. A society should preserve its traditional values and institutions – in many cases this includes the prominent role of the church or religion in politics (Lipset and Rokkan, 1990). For a long time, conservatives were skeptical of democracy and nationalism because they presented a change to the established order. In contrast to reactionaries, conservatives are willing to accept such change if it has proven stable and positive. Today, patriotism is among those values considered to be worth protection (Hoffman and Graham, 2006: 35–45). With the focus on the established political system and institutions, conservatives have a national orientation in contrast to the more internationalist view of the liberal-left.

[26] The acceptance of capitalism with state interventions as economic order is a major difference between social democrats and communists.

1.5.3 Summary and Hypothesis

Political ideologies are another possibility of identification apart from political-territorial based identities. Ideologies offer comprehensive belief systems on social orders which is also the case for nationalism as a political movement in general. Political parties have evolved along major ideological cleavages especially on questions of organization of the economy and the role of state and church in politics. The major divide in the political spectrum today is between the liberal-left and conservatives.

Liberals and social democrats are united in their belief in a positive human nature and the equality of humans. Liberals and social democrats want to carry their reforms to the international level and support the promotion of human rights and democracy. This internationalist outlook stands in contrast to conservatives who focus on the national level and the preservation of traditional institutions and values as upheld in families or churches.

Although there appears to be no ideological vision with regard to military interventions and genocide on ideological theoretical ground, the more internationalist orientation of the liberal-left with a focus on human rights and democracy should make this thinking more sensitive to identity issues in the debate on military interventions. Especially in terms of democracy as a liberal value to be diffused, it can be expected that newspapers with such ideological orientation will also stress democracy as a goal in military interventions, introducing value and identity references to the debate.

1.6 Public Sphere

1.6.1 The Public Sphere and Collective Identity

Having laid out the theory and the hypotheses derived from it, I turn to the public sphere where it is possible to analyze them. I will not test whether the debates analyzed are examples of an ideal public sphere or a European public sphere. Rather, the theory of public sphere will show a link to identity and thus introduce the field in which identity will be scrutinized. Psychological grounding of concepts of identity and memory showed that identity needs individuals to adhere to it, but it also exists as a collective form and may as such serve a unit of analysis. One way to study identity, or rather identification, is through interviews or polls that rely on individuals. If identity is considered as a social collective phenomenon and if the focus is also on the evolution of identity argumentation and content, it is best studied in the public sphere. In contrast to polls, it is possible to see the twists and turns of development and not only snapshots of identity. Before, and when, values are incorporated in an institutionalized form, they are shaped, contested and re-evaluated in the public sphere not only by politicians, but by the public as a whole.

Tracing the idea back to the (idealized) times of the Athenian polis, Jürgen Habermas

developed one of the most influential theories of the public sphere (Habermas, 1989).His deliberative model of public sphere also helps to understand where collective identity evolves and thus where it can be measured. In a deliberative democracy, a continuous process of public discussion (deliberation) is necessary to render it legitimate – in contrast to direct democracies or a representational democracies. Only if all people discuss the problems of their lives, will it be possible that a common understanding of legitimate policy can evolve. Thus, a deliberative public sphere is characterized by the normative idea of inclusion and a coercive-free setting, which can be seen as an ideal typical goal for the public sphere (cf. Dahlberg, 2005: 127). Principally and ideally, everyone is able to participate on an equal footing in the public sphere, as there are no formal terms of exclusion or pre-dispositions necessary.

The public sphere can be considered as a network to communicate opinions which is open to anyone who can communicate in a natural language and who accepts the rules of rationality (Habermas, 1992: 436). Reason can be seen as the central criterion for the expression of information and opinion (Baynes, 1994: 317). Deliberation is not a passion-free discussion because any subject can be relevant, so that it is often dominated by those themes of daily life that people are most affected by and care about. A public sphere is, furthermore, not limited to a specific community or a single language. Moreover, there is not necessarily *the* public sphere because the idea of a network includes sub-spheres which may be temporary or issue-specific. This understanding is thus open to different forms of public spheres apart from national media as well as face-to-face meetings.

There is disagreement on the preconditions that are necessary for a public sphere to function. The discussion, in fact, parallels that of constructivists and essentialist theorists on collective and national identity. For essentialists and communitarianists like Charles Taylor, a collective identity is required to form a public sphere, while constructivists argue that the collective identity evolves in the process of debate in the public sphere.

The central critique remains, though: To know and understand what is discussed in the public sphere, it is necessary that there is a certain common understanding, i.e. a collective identity. Otherwise, those speaking are unable to communicate their arguments and those perceiving them are overburdened (Giesen, 2002: 70–71). This is especially important in non-personal communication. Of course, a collective identity is helpful in the public sphere, but is not a necessary precondition for its existence or functioning. Understanding public sphere as a deliberative process like Habermas describes it, helps to solve two problems outlined here: where does identity come from, and how can public deliberation evolve without it? The only precondition for deliberation is the acceptance of rationality, with which all matters of daily life and every public affair about which people care can be deliberated – that includes explicitly ethical self-understanding and values (Habermas, 1996c: 284–285). Discourses establish the democratic procedure as a public process. Any individual or group questioning the preceding consensus or common values

and identity is able and free to do so, and to bring up alternatives in the public sphere. Here, emotions may well be the ground for intervention. To persuade others, however, the power of reason rather than rhetorical manipulation is decisive. It has to be noted that persuasion in the case of values does not have to be total in the sense of conformity, but there has to be agreement on the range of acceptable goals and values.

The public sphere is thus the place for values as understandings of what is good in a general sense for those affected by an event. The public sphere is a social space open to every one, as its values transcend to all members of the self-constituting community. The circular process thus stands central in the identity formation:

> "The ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic community must not be taken as a historical-cultural *a priori* that makes democratic will formation possible, but rather as the flowing contents of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalization of citizens' communication. This is precisely how national identities were formed in modern Europe. (Habermas, 1997: 264)

The deliberation process is never ending. Only if deliberation starts with arguments and counter-arguments, and if a true discussion of reason sets in, can the existing identity consensus be transformed or a new collective identity evolve. It is also possible that identity is just called upon and evoked without changes to the existing consensus. The event that originally triggered the discussion may not seem at first sight to touch upon questions of values, but in the course of the debate questions of self-understanding may arise. The focal point of identity formation can thus be any event, but something of general interest that touches on a previous consensus has more potential to trigger a discussion on common values. Events that start deliberation on values may also originate in the public sphere itself. In the end, there will never be a total consensus, as Habermas recognizes the possibility of difference. Regarding values and identity, a full identity in the mathematical sense is impossible and consensus evolves. As long as there is no total cut between groups but a discussion and the attempt to persuade, a common identity-related debate is possible.

In retrospect, it is possible to speak of critical junctures, which according to historic institutionalism change long standing path dependencies in institutional developments (Mahoney, 2000). Here, I refer to crucial events that change established identities or help to evolve new identities in the public sphere. Such an event could possibly affect all people of a (potential) political community because of its fundamentally new, essential, dramatic and/or revolutionary nature. Triumph and catastrophes especially qualify for such power; war and social conflict have a special potential to lead to identity formation as the history of nationalism has shown. War asks the ultimate question of what you are willing to die for and many bloody wars have proven that the nation has had and still has many people willing to die for it (e.g. Anderson, 1991: 1–3). Although the Kantian thesis that

democracies do not wage war against each other has not been falsified, democracies fight wars. Often, these are interventions in accordance with international law. Nevertheless, they ask the same question of life and death.

1.6.2 Relation to Nationalism, Memory and Europe

Theorists of national identity stress the role of the public sphere, especially of newspapers, in the process of identity formation. Ernest Gellner emphasizes the outstanding role of industrialization. In the new production process of factories and cities, people need to find a common basis to work efficiently (Gellner, 1983: 23–26). Here, the schooling system and the military take important roles to forge nations. Modernization did not only bring about industrialization but also print capitalism to reach out to the masses. While print is older, only capitalism led people strive to sell information and news comprehensively. What makes print media so attractive for nationalism is its construction of a common concern for events allegedly happening in one context (Anderson, 1991: 61–63). It is only in this framework constructed by the media that people can be affected by events beyond their personal perception. But media not only set a standard by reporting on different events together (even if only by printing them on one page) and thus suggesting a connection and commonness among strangers, but nationalists like Benjamin Franklin actively sought to establish a nationalist meaning in events. With the dawn of the American and French Revolutions, newspapers also grew to disseminate events and arguments to audiences beyond the present.

The same is true for collective memory. Monuments and museums of the nationalist ages easily come to mind as means to establish and preserve collective memory but memory is mostly stored in a less ostentatious. For the French national memory, Pierre Nora collects *lieux de mémoire* (memory places) which are not necessarily real places but rather symbols that transport values (Nora, 1992). Assmann and Assmann emphasize the importance of a vivid usage of memory in everyday interaction for communicative memory, i.e. collective memory as I defined it (Assmann, 2008: 220).

While national identity's relation to newspapers as well as the public sphere in general is implicitly clear to most theorists, for Europe this relation is more complicated. I will not examine the existence of a European public sphere, but my search for a specific European reaction to genocide implies that I look at convergence among European debates. Evidently, there is no European newspaper, magazine or television market on a genuinely European level as there are on national levels (Gerhards, 1993). Thus, the key to an understanding of a European public sphere is to not confuse media as fora of a public sphere with the sphere itself and not to take language for communication (van de Steeg, 2002: 502–503). Newspapers or television channels are simply containers for the public sphere.

With reference to Habermas (Habermas, 1995: 306), there is a rule of thumb in mea-

suring a European public sphere; that the same issue is debated at the same time with the same criteria of relevance in different national news fora (Eder and Kantner, 2000: 81). Although nationally transmitted, there is simultaneous debate on the same thing. A discussion using the same criteria of relevance suggests that a common understanding of the issue exists. This does not mean that other national speakers or media have to be cited, but the interpretive perspective has to converge. So far, empirical studies show that European issues stand way behind national issues but that there is a gradual Europeanization of public spheres in Europe (Risse, 2010).

1.6.3 Newspapers

The public sphere is thus the space for values to be debated and identities to become traceable. As the public sphere is a social space it is virtually impossible to analyze it as a whole: personal communication among friends, political and other organizations, and public protest as well as different media such as the internet in fora and blogs, television, radio, journals, newspapers, pamphlets are all part of it. Especially in regard to personal communication, topics are discussed with limited outreach, while the impact on the individual may be more lasting. Media guarantee a certain frame because their continuity helps to detect relevant discussions. Their independence from time helps to track down past discussion that proved to be relevant only in retrospect.

Print media in the form of nation-wide quality newspapers are good fora for collective identity, with values and memory, to show. They cover a diversity of issues and sub-debates as they report on different policies as well as cultural issues. With high circulation, newspapers are able to reach out to many people, ensuring influence on the deliberation. Often, newspapers are even agenda-setters that influence the process themselves. Moreover, newspapers are easy accessible and as print form store information more permanently.

Critics of an open debate fear that matters of identity and memory will become arbitrary. Friedrich Nietzsche saw the end of true *Bildung* (culture, education, formation) and eventually the end of orientation provided by identity (Nietzsche, 1954: 230–235; cf. Assmann, 2004: 53).For a present collective identity that respects modernization with the secularization of knowledge and the democratization of politics, people need to have the opportunity to decide on the importance of events for their identity. Yet, print media, and especially newspapers, are not totally unfiltered as they are fixed to a certain date, and as journalists make a selection who is present in this public sphere. The high standard of journalism in quality press newspapers ensures rational argumentation in the public sphere. Journalists can thus function as educated gate-keepers as Nietzsche demands; with their decisions, they give orientation in contrast to the much less selective internet and thus regulate memory, so that it takes a more definite form as collective memory and

collective identity.

Newspapers are, of course, far from a Habermasian ideal of a public sphere. If newspapers compete on a free market, dependence on advertisement as well as corporate ownership has become widespread (McChesney, 2000). This may run contrary to a free exchange of arguments as owners strive to realize their business and sometimes even political interests. While some see the internet as a solution to give citizen journalists voices, new interest conflicts may emerge that are less visible than those in conventional newspapers. Moreover, the journalist culture that has evolved in the past centuries, with general relevance criteria as well as reliance upon expert knowledge, stands in contrast to bloggers' attitudes of personal contexts (Beers, 2006: 123–124). The selection process in newspapers follows the news value of events; what people are interested in.[27] Different techniques are used to present the news and to attract readers. Tabloid press concentrates on human-interest and sensational drama focusing on the personal sides of events. Quality press on the other hand focuses on the political dimension, covering more issues from political-institutional events and foreign policy (cf. Craig, 2004: 73–75). A high standard of journalism and the dominance of text over pictures guarantees that a rational argumentation prevails. When focusing on issues of international politics, as I will do, it is necessary to consider the quality press with more extensive coverage on these issues. Especially in this area not genuinely stated in tabloid newspapers, the coverage is largely influenced and framed by quality press (Díez-Medrano, 2003: 170–171 citing Bröder, 1976). Thus, there is an elite-mass diffusion in foreign policy, while on other issues the direction of influence also flows vice-versa, e.g. in the case of domestic violence (Lumby, 1999). Although quality press certainly does not cover all arguments, it includes the typical ones (Kantner, 2009: 111). Quality newspapers are thus the ideal social space for studying developments in the public sphere.

Newspapers did not only play a prominent role in the evolution of national identity as the previous section has shown, but the ideological cleavage has translated in the newspaper market. Although newspapers seldom formally adhere to a political party, their lead articles and editor's notes prefer a certain position. For media analyses it has thus become common to include both sides of the dominant cleavage (Vincent, 2000) as such variations can possibly influence the debate as they reflect value variations within other collective identities. For the analysis, I chose a conservative as well as a liberal-left quality newspaper for every country. This makes it possible to consider explanations beyond political-territorial identities in the debate on war, intervention and genocide.

[27]The number of factors that determine the news value are continuously being added to. Among the classical ones: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, reference to elite people, reference to persons and reference to something negative (Galtung and Ruge, 1965).

1.6.4 Summary

The public sphere as a network for communication is not only essential for a deliberate democracy but also for identity formation. With the acceptance of rationality as the only criterion for entering a public sphere open to everyone, discussion evolves on any subject considered important by humans. In the course of a debate, a consensus will be reached among (sub-)spheres that touches or founds a collective identity. Catastrophic events or joyful achievements are especially apt to influence a debate in the public sphere with regard to the values of a community. The public sphere is also important for collective political memory of present communities. Before memory is carved into stone or constitutions, it has to be vivid in the communication of the community cherishing it. On the European level, no common media market or language is necessary for a European public sphere. Rather, European identity may evolve in national spheres when issues are debated at the same time and under the same interpretative schemes. Newspapers as daily media to transport both news and opinions are particularly suited to the negotiation of values and the carrying of identity-related debates. Although economic considerations play a role, journalists can be considered educated gate-keepers who set, structure and summarize debates.

It is possible to analyze an identity-related reaction to genocide in the debate on war and intervention in the public sphere. Here, arguments are exchanged and values can evolve; thus, it is possible to cut deeper into the content of identity. Although quality nation-wide newspapers are only one forum in the public sphere, their articles are good units of analysis because journalists ensure the quality of content, and wide circulation ensures the inclusion of participants in deliberation as well as holders of collective identity. Among newspapers, there are differences, for which I control with regard to political ideologies.

2

Choosing the Cases for Analysis and Measuring Identity

2.1 Country Selection

From the theoretical introduction, I have arrived at four explanatory factors for identity-related reaction which are ultimately based on a political-territorial perspective on identity formation: intervening soldiers from nation of debate; national values against genocide; self-reflexive identities and geographic proximity to conflict – alternatively political ideologies may play a role. To search for differences and similarities in the public references to identity, I include four countries in my study: France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. It is not possible to select countries on the explanatory factors systematically, but in this choice of countries I can account for most variance.

Variance is not only ensured by this country selection but also by the variety of interventions undertaken in the time period under investigation from 1990 to 2006. The different interventions in different geographic regions, with the respective national participation and the genocides committed is presented in the next section (cf. Section 2.2). With special focus on the Bosnian War and the genocide in Srebrenica, the participation in the intervention varies among the countries selected, as does the type of national identity and the geographic location of the countries.

In Table 2.1, the country selection is shown along the explanatory factors. Only the

type of identity	**participation in Srebrenica intervention**	
	groundtroops	no
self-reflexive		Germany
(partly) self-reflexive	Netherlands	
heroic		France, *United States*

Table 2.1: Case selection for my empirical study.

Netherlands had groundtroops stationed in Srebrenica during the genocide; Germany and the Netherlands hold (partly) self-reflexive national identities while France and the United States hold heroic identities; and Germany, France and the Netherlands are European (and thus close to Srebrenica) while the US is included as non-European nation which is otherwise similar to France.

From the reflections on values, it has become clear that they are at the heart of identity. Although values are changing and not fixed, there is a certain consensus evident in nation states, on which a community rely in their living-together and which ensures continuity (cf. Subsection 1.2.2). Not every national adheres to them at all times, but values provide a spectrum for choice and reference points for debates. I assume on the basis of constitutional patriotism that there is consensus on values evident in political practice which makes it possible to regard a set of values representative for a nation state and classify them. I rely on secondary literature on national identities and memories, constitutions and political institutions to portray the identities, values and memories of all four nations.[1]

For every country, I present the values at the heart of national identity, collective memory with reference to classification as either self-reflexive or heroic identity and the national participation in the Bosnian War with special focus on the role in the Srebrenica safe area. The values help to understand the specific content of the identity reactions in the public debate as analyzed in the Srebrenica debate. Lastly, the newspaper selection for the four countries is presented.

2.1.1 France

French Values, Memory and Heroic Identity

French national identity evolved during the French Revolution and its values are prominently stated in the republic's motto "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité". French identity traditionally includes a voluntary adherence to values.

The liberal state is defined as a neutral arbitrator and executor of the people, guided by the idea that the nation itself dominates and leads the government. It is vividly discussed in French *laïcité*. The absolute neutrality of the state in questions of religion meant that question of faith are delegated to the individual shunning the church from political life (Chanet and Pelletier, 2005).

French equality was always meant to apply to all, regardless of race or religion.[2] At

[1]The national and other identities presented subsequently are all collective identities with collective memory. With social identity, they are also rooted within the individual members of the communities. I refrain from explicitly referring to collective identity.

[2]Equality did not refer to women, but two years after the declaration of human rights, Olympe de Gouges published the "Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne" fighting for truly universal human

the same time, equality in France resulted in the disregard and destruction of regional or linguistic plurality of collectives (Schnapper, 1994: 90–91; Braudel, 1986) and is still highly individualized.[3]

The French Revolution stands for these values and is essential for French memory; in fact it saw French nationalism evolve for the first time.[4] The terror imposed on opponents to the revolution with the guillotine executing thousands of people and the wars Napoléon inflicted over Europe are not critically reflected in French memory (Lindenberg, 1994: 80). The *mission civilisatrice* of bringing universal freedoms and human rights to the world still prevails as a French value (Conklin, 1997: 140); other cultures should profit from the achievements of Enlightenment spread through education and sometimes violence. Despite some public interest since the late 1990s in French crimes during colonial rule and in the Algerian war (cf. Branche, 2001; Granmaison, 2005), the heroic self-portrayal remains.

The same is true regarding memory of World War II which focuses rather on France as a victim and long excluded the Holocaust. Since the 1970s and the French movie "Le chagrin et la pitié" (1971) by Marcel Ophuls, the Holocaust was increasingly discussed and remembered (Wolf, 2004). Yet, the heroic memory largely remains untouched because French Jews are recognized as victims without recognizing collective crimes by Vichy France or French in the occupied part of the country. Rather than self-reflexive, French memory is heroic but the integration of Maghrebian French is a challenge to individualized French values and memory of colonial times.

French Involvement in Yugoslavia and Srebrenica

For France, the conflict in the Yugoslav region was an opportunity to demand for European institutions to play a crucial role in conflict resolution. Within the United Nations, France was very active in the conflict and send a large number of groundtroops to the UNPROFOR mission.

French general Philippe Morillon had declared the besieged Bosnian town Srebrenica a safe area without any prior consultation in 1993. In France and Bosnia, he was much admired for his personal courage (Burg and Shoup, 1999: 254). When the Srebrenica safe area was attacked in 1995, the UN hierarchy to approve NATO close air support (CAS) to the groundtroops failed. French general Janvier held a decisive position when calls for air support came in from Srebrenica. With French soldiers in Bosnian Serb custody, Janvier kept emphasis on negotiations ignoring the military situation on the ground (Mat-

rights and equality.

[3]For an excellent discussion of the ambivalence nature of Enlightenment with regard to Jews and anti-Semitism, cf. an essay by Jean-Paul Sartre (Sartre, 1985).

[4]In French memory, the Bastille, July 14, Marianne, the tricolor all came to stand for the motto and the value of France: liberté, égalité, fraternité.

ton, 2005: 282).[5] After the fall, Janvier as UN contact person for Dutch UNPROFOR Karremans, was not able to persuade or order Karremans to take a stronger stand against Bosnian Serb nationalist proposals and action (Matton, 2005: 358).

Diplomatically, the French accused the Dutch of failing during the Srebrenica crisis (Eisermann, 2000: 307); in the Bihać safe area under their command, French soldiers had deterred a Bosnian Serb nationalist attack. Politically, the French role in the "events" (évenements) in Srebrenica was investigated in a parliamentary report in 2000/2001 concluding that there was failure only on an individual basis (Loncle, 2001).

The atrocities in Srebrenica and the attack on the Sarajevo market encouraged a shift towards more coercion in the French policy (e.g. Lucarelli, 2000: 187) and French combat troops for a European Rapid Reaction Force were sent. In the Kosovo conflict, France supported and participated in the NATO bombing against Yugoslavia although it originally had insisted on a UN mandate (Auerswald, 2004: 649–650). French prime minister Jospin argued that lessons had been learned from the horrors of Srebrenica (cited in Stahl, 2007: 13).

2.1.2 Germany

German Values, Memory and Self-Reflexive Identity

After the deception of the French Revolution which turned violent against Germany, unity became the central value of German national identity (Berger, 2004: 29–33; 259–260). It is a political term calling for the self-determination of collectives to join a common German state. For the construction of German-ess, focus lay on culture in general and German language in particular, which ultimately became a value for German identity (Dann, 1993: 41). It is visible in the memory of classical literature with Goethe and Schiller as symbol of a cultural nation. In unity, regional diversity prevails and is evident in the value of federalism, which still holds emotional significance to Germans (Berger, 2004: 258). After national socialism, federalism was integrated in the German political order in the West as an important devise to hinder central control of power.

In fact, all political values are strongly associated to German memory of national socialism and how to avoid any recurrence. Constitutional patriotism evolved with a "free democratic basic order" at core, a success of re-education programs (Bernhard, 2001): free elections, press and a pluralist party system is considered an achievements in clear delimitation to the memory of the latest German past (Müller, 2007). Characteristic is a traditional emphasis on law and the constitution in the value of the rule of law (Gebhardt,

[5] It remains unclear whether Janvier and Mladić even had an agreement to refrain from air power. A French parliamentary report investigating the French role in the fall of the Srebrenica safe area concluded there was no deal in vote 2-8 (Loncle, 2001: 193).

1993: 32–33) which overrules the participatory element of democracy.[6]

Since a consensus on European integration had been established in the 1950s, European integration itself has become a value of German national identity, mixing the two levels as seen in the marble cake model. A good German today is a good European (Risse, 2001: 209).

West German national memory and identity has become self-reflexive since the 1960s.[7] The generational challenge to collective identity could rely on early scholary and literary efforts as well as the first research for criminal persecution of the late 1950s (cf. Kansteiner, 2006: 214–220). With West German chancellor Willy Brandt, once persecuted by the Nazis, new commemoration was taken to an official level when in 1970 he knelt down at the monument for the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (for a good short overview cf. Giesen, 2004). Eventually, the Holocaust became the major reference point for German memory and identity.[8]

Far from being a model of self-reflexivity, German identity is still very much soul-searching – with the central focus on the Holocaust and World War II.[9] Nazi extermination policy against Slavic Poles or crimes by the German army are still neglected (Kansteiner, 2006: 287–288). Colonization is totally absent from national memory despite parallels of the Herero genocide in Namibia and Nazi crimes (Kössler, 2005). Memory of the Nazi past has in fact shaped other memory of German history. While World War I has become a mere prelude to the next war, periods and people once popular in German national memory, such as medieval kings, are remembered in a European context. German memory is not perfectly self-reflexive but memory World War II and the Holocaust is ubiquitous and essential for values.

German Involvement in Yugoslavia and Srebrenica

In the break-up of Yugoslavia, Germany took a strong position at the beginning of the crisis, favoring the principle of self-determination.[10] German self-reflexive identity held that the country shall not fight again and the German government announced it would not

[6]This belief in the superiority of regulations was humorously portrayed by Zuckmeyer in "Der Hauptmann von Köpenick" and lethally executed by so-called *Schreibtischtäter* in the Third Reich.

[7]In Eastern German memory, the German population – ironically only those living in the GDR – was even seen to have been composed of anti-fascist resistant fighters. East German accusation against Western German officials for a personal and political continuity from national socialist times were not only justified in many cases but also put pressure on politics.

[8]This is particularly evident when debates of "normalization" arise as in the Historikerstreit (e.g. Maier, 1988).

[9]In fact, the relation of World War II and the Holocaust are complex historically, but also in memory war seems to surpass genocide.

[10]Rather this value than any old ties from World War II were the reason for support of Slovene and Croatian independence.

send soldiers where Nazi Wehrmacht had fought, but focused on the airlift to Sarajevo, control of arms embargo in the Adriatic sea and AWACS air patrols (Calic, 1996: 65–66; Gow, 1997: 173). Even these missions were contested in German constitutional court but were ruled constitutional. On the diplomatic level, Germany was member of the Contact Group as it headed EU presidency and stayed to use its influence on Croatia (Gow, 1997: 260–261). For Germany, it was a possibility to be internationally more active again and succeeded in including the war in Croatia in the Dayton peace treaty.

After the international failure in Bosnia with regard to ethnic cleansing and genocide in Srebrenica, German policy changed. Shortly after the Srebrenica genocide, party leader of the Green pacifist party, Joschka Fischer, argued that in the case of genocide non-violence can amount to complicity and military intervention becomes necessary (cf. Fischer, 1995). The reaction to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo proved to be the test for the new foreign minister Fischer in 1998. The NATO bombing was the first fighting by Germany since World War II. Germany was the largest contributor of groundtroops to the KFOR mission in Kosovo.

2.1.3 Netherlands

Dutch Values, Memory and Partially Self-Reflexive Identity

The Netherlands is traditionally deeply divided by *verzuiling* (pillarization), structuring public and private life until the middle of the 20th century. From the cradle to the grave, everything was organized according to confessional and ideological cleavages: Catholic, Protestant or socialist schools, newspapers, sports clubs, political parties etc. (Lijphart, 2008). A cooperation at the top level of society integrates centrifugal tendencies in such a consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1968) with a common identity based on the value of *verdraagzaamheid* or tolerance.

Tolerance as noninterference includes a liberal legislation on issues like drug legalization, abortion, euthanasia and LGTB rights (van Noort and Wiche, 2006). In many areas, other countries followed the Dutch examples years later and the Netherlands were regarded as a progressive forerunner and considers itself *gidsland* (guide country). It includes a feeling of moral superiority with regard to large states, which is particularly evident in foreign relations (Baehr, 2000; Couwenberg, 2001: 19).

In international relations, *vredesliefde* (pacifism) characterized the Netherlands for a long time. It is particularly apt for a small country that depends on foreign trade. As a *gidsland*, the Netherlands was active in the peace movements, the promotion of international law and European integration (Voorhoeve, 1979: 50–60). Today, the pacifistic value lives on in a focus on human rights, very much compatible to the value of tolerance.[11] The

[11] Walter Laqueur warned that the pacifist idea is a dangerous role model for states in the Cold War

conflict of a pacific value and a non-neutral country has recently been challenged by accounts of Dutch colonialism as more than a trade policy, and the events in Srebrenica, as my study shows.

When it comes to colonization, a heroic memory is largely upheld. Dutch colonization is seen as more humane and better than British, French or Portuguese rule overseas (Brand, 1980: 267). Yet, the focus on economic interests rather than cultural dominance saw great earnings in slave trade and slavery was only abolished in 1868, thirty years after the British (Emmers, 2006: 48–49). Some commemoration of the victims of Dutch colonialism started in the early 2000s,[12] but decolonization and Dutch so-called "politionele acties" (police action) against Indonesian nationalists and fighters for independence find limited room in Dutch national memory (Scagliola, 2007: 243–245).

Dutch memory of the Holocaust is more self-reflexive. The Netherlands upheld a memory of heroism after World War II until Lou de Jong's "De Bezetting" was broadcasted on Dutch television from 1960 to 1965 and became a national event (van Vree, 1995). The extensive public debates that set in included questions of Dutch collaboration and came almost a decade earlier than in Germany (Kossmann, 1985). The combination of institutional and popular coming-to-terms with the past made Dutch memory partially self-reflexive (Kesteloot, 2007: 51) and victims often forgotten in German memory, like gypsies and homosexuals, have been included.

Dutch Involvement in Yugoslavia and Srebrenica

The Dutch government was under pressure domestically to actively support the Bosnian government which reflects its tradition as *gidsland* on the humanitarian field. Without thorough assessment, the Dutch government, supported by the Dutch parliament, sent troops to the UN safe area in Srebrenica because it had invested so "much moral and political capital" (Both, 2000: 193).

When Bosnian Serb nationalists attacked the safe area, Dutch soldiers retreated without firing (Faber, 2002: 65, 97). In reaction, local Bosnians killed a Dutch soldier which tensed the atmosphere further during the precarious situation (Rohde, 1997: 29–41). The Dutch groundtroops failed to make precise calls for NATO close air support and the Dutch army and government intervened to stop NATO airplanes, worrying for Dutch hostages in Bosnian Serb hands (Honig and Both, 1996: 21–26).

After retreating to a UN compound with Bosnian Muslim civilians, UNPROFOR Lieutenant-Colonel Karremans let Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladić take control of the situation and the Bosnian Muslim – something that the Dutch defense ministry did

(Laqueur, 1981).

[12] In 2002, a memorial for the victims of slavery was unveiled by Queen Beatrix in Amsterdam (van Noort and Wiche, 2006: 11) and changes to school books were made (Donk et al., 1990: 242). For my empirical analysis this comes only at the very end of the time period under investigation.

not worry about either (Kreemers, 2002: 85). It emerged that the Dutch were no match for Mladić who had the encounter filmed: Karremans and his accompanies can be seen apparently toasting Mladić's victory.

Some Dutch soldiers opposed helping Bosnian Serb nationalists to separate men and women because they had seen dead bodies of executed men[13] and documents of Muslim men being burnt although the men were allegedly to be "screened for war criminals" (Blom, 2002: 2738–2741). Other Dutch soldiers actively searched men for weapons and handed them to the Mladić's troops who killed them along with thousands of other men and boys (Nuhanović, 2007: 37–40).[14]

At the UN headquarters in Zagreb and in the Netherlands, Dutchbat were welcomed like heroes. There was no word of atrocities, but Karremans declared: "We have learned that the parties in Bosnia cannot be divided into 'good guys' and 'bad guys'." (Kreemers, 2002: 100–101)[15] Dutch army commander Lieutenant-General Hans Couzy even publicly denied, without any pressure, that there was a genocide taking place although Dutchbat soldier Rutten, who had taken pictures of murdered Muslims, had already spoken to him (Kreemers, 2002: 154).

After numerous reports and many more political failures which were assembled in the government-initiated independent report by Dutch War Documentation Institute NIOD, the Dutch government of Wim Kok resigned on 16 April 2002. In the years before, the Netherlands had participated in the SFOR mission led by NATO and EUFOR mission in Bosnia as well as in the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and in the KFOR mission to Kosovo. Politically, the Netherlands put great emphasis on the arrest of sought-after war criminal Karadžić and Mladić and blocked the accession process of Serbia to pressure the country for more cooperation with the tribunal (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2008).

2.1.4 United States

American Values, Memory and Heroic Identity

The Declaration of Independence lay the value-driven foundation of American identity (Garry, 1992: 128) based on equality, liberty, individualism[16] and democracy. Memory

[13] A film with pictures of dead bodies taken by Lieutenant Ron Rutten was later destroyed in a Dutch military laboratory.

[14] While Doctors without Borders included family members of local co-workers on their waiver list, Dutchbat higher officers even erased names from the UN list made by Dutchbat soldiers (Blom, 2002: 2763; Nuhanović, 2007).

[15] My translation: "We hebben geleerd dat de partijen in Bosnië niet kunnen worden verdeeld in good guys en bad guys."

[16] For an elaborate discussion of the term "pursuit of happiness", see Malloch and Massey, 2006: 1–20.

of independence and the American revolution is vivid until today, representing a starting point rather than conquest and genocide of Native Americans.

Democracy[17] and liberty focus on the community as a self-organization with great suspicion of an overtly powerful central authority (cf. de Tocqueville, 2001; Waever, 2006). Liberty as elaborated in the Bill of Rights, the American list of human rights, is clearly directed against state interference in free individual manifestation. Apart from a political component, individualism also incorporates a materialist and economic side evident in the triad "life, liberty and property", instead of the "pursuit of happiness". A liberal free market and economic progress are key American values (cf. Flibbert, 1980).

Equality is a prominent value which guarantees the same rights to all citizens. While historically by far not all inhabitants were citizens and the system of slavery and discrimination lasted until the middle of the 20th century, ethnocultural Americanism has lost almost all of its credibility (Smith, 1988: 232–236).[18] Today, equality is specified in values as tolerance and non-discrimination as well as multiculturalism.[19] In American memory, achievements of various groups such as women and African Americans are honored despite historic marginality in many cases. This may be considered an inclusionary tendency of American identity. Memory of the Civil War thus concentrates on reconciliation between the North and the South rather than slavery (Blight, 2001)

For World War II, a heroic memory of the "greatest story ever remembered" is celebrated with the US as liberator of the world (Scholz, 2008). It was on the initiative of Jewish Americans that the Holocaust entered American memory. The Holocaust is framed as the universal evil that the United States stopped, but without any self-reflexive view (necessary). It comes cost-free because no moral or material demands are necessarily connected to it (Novick, 2002: 17–18). The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is marginal in the American memory (Hein and Selden, 1997).[20]

This heroic script was embraced for the Cold War in particular with the assumption of American moral and technological superiority over the Soviet Union. The position as a superpower since the end of World War II has led to American believe in exceptionalism, i.e. foreign policy based on values rather than (European) power politics. Only the Vietnam War is a challenge, the memory of which is not clearly framed (Young, 1994). There

[17] In fact, early US democracy can rather be characterized as a Roman republic with only those men who owned land being eligible to decide on the common state.

[18] Samuel Huntington nevertheless stressed the cultural tie of the principles of the creed to the effect that he suggests that the values will gradually disappear in the US with a Hispanic dominance of the country (Huntington, 2004). This hypotheses has been challenged with empirical data (Citrin et al., 2007).

[19] In fact, most research on American identity today account for various hyphens added (cf. Hagenbüchle and Raab, 2000): African-American, Native-American, Irish-American, Chinese-American, but also women or working class.

[20] In a rare public dispute over the atomic bomb on the occasion of a planned exhibition in the Smithsonian Institute in 1995, veteran organizations won political support to stop the exhibition (Harwit, 1996).

country	values	memories	characterization
France	equality, human rights, laicity, *mission civilsatrice*	French Revolution, World War II as victims, some Holocaust	heroic
Germany	unity, rule of law, federalism, democracy	World War II, Holocaust as perpetrators	self-reflexive
Netherlands	tolerance, liberalism, pacifism, international law	Golden Age, World War II, some collaboration and Indonesia	partly self-reflexive
United States	democracy, equality, pluralism, individualism, superpower	American Revolution, liberator in World War II (no Hiroshima)	heroic

Table 2.2: *Summary of the values and memories at the heart of French, German, Dutch and American identity.*

is an agreement though that the war was a military rather than a moral disaster that should be avoided for all future American wars. Even if moral issues are raised, emphasis of interpretation is directed towards healing but not revealing (Hagopian, 2009). American identity is clearly based on a heroic memory.

American Involvement in Yugoslavia and Srebrenica

Key US analysts judged the break-up of Yugoslavia too murky to intervene, especially because the US had no vital interests in Yugoslavia (Powell, 1992). During the war in the Yugoslav region, Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton opposed American groundtroops and supported the NATO air mission. The lack of further engagement led to the resignation of several officials from the Department of State accusing their government of complicity to genocide (Gow, 1997: 208–211). Overall, the United States feared to get involved in a quagmire like that in Vietnam or Somalia, with high ethics but even deeper ethnic hatred.

The US role during the events in Srebrenica is typical for the Yugoslav crisis: its passivity influenced the course of events. During his process at the ICTY, former Yugoslav President Milošević claimed that Clinton had offered Srebrenica in turn for peace – surely he did not offer 8000 Bosnian lives. But American non-involvement along with European focus on humanitarian issues had encouraged aggressive strategies in the war. When French president Chirac proposed to reconquer the safe area, the US declined to lift French soldiers to do so.

The United States was active in making public the atrocities committed in Srebrenica. In August 1995, the American UN ambassador Madeleine Albright presented air pictures of prisoners and mass graves around Srebrenica to the General Assembly. The evidence helped to raise sensibility for the genocide committed and helped investigators to find the sites of killings and burial. Yet it is also evident that the US military and secret service failed to recognize the crimes committed before their visual instruments.

Passivity was morally impossible to uphold after the fall of Srebrenica and the United States pressured for more power to the NATO air mission (Burg and Shoup, 1999: 352). With the US taking the lead, Europeans were happy to follow (unlike American behavior towards European efforts before) and all belligerent parties gathered in Dayton, Ohio, for a peace treaty. Srebrenica became part of the new Republika Srbska where American groundtroops in the NATO-led SFOR mission were responsible for this region and protecting the international investigator, but only reluctantly searched for war criminals.

With regard to the Kosovo crisis, President Clinton supported a coercive solution.[21] The intervention was an opportunity to restore lost credibility in the fight against genocide and find a new role for NATO after the Cold War (Wines, 1999: 1; Gowan, 1999: 93).

In summary, countries differ in the specific values which are all opposed to genocide. Content of French, German, Dutch and American identity with values and memory are summarized in Table 2.2. While German memory is most explicitly directed against a repetition of genocide (in Germany), German values can only be understood as opposing genocide with regard to this memory; the rule of law and regionalism do not contradict genocide *per se*, but they are cherished in Germany as opposing any concentration of power to enforce terror against minorities.

2.1.5 Newspapers

For each country, two nation-wide daily quality newspapers, one center-left and one center-right, have been selected for the analysis. *Le Figaro* is the oldest French daily and has been influenced by conservative to right-wing oriented owners with political ambitions (Thogmartin, 1998). It is the only conservative nation-wide daily quality newspaper in France, but due to problems with its online availability, the financial daily *Les Echos* with its pro-market liberalism serves as ersatz for time periods missing in the sample. *Le Monde* was the first independent newspaper introduced after World War II and its journalists are financial stakeholders in it. Until the 1980s, it was the most frequently read newspaper in France. *Le Monde* can be regarded as a center-left newspaper – where left rather means progressive rather than communist (Thogmartin, 1998: 218–220).

Regional newspapers are typical for Germany where *Süddeutsche Zeitung* from Munich and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)* have emerged as the leading nation-wide quality papers. The former can be regarded as ideologically center-left with a traditional social-democrat readership, while *FAZ* is center-right with a conservative readership (cf. Kleinsteuber, 2004: 79–80). Until 2007, Süddeutsche Zeitung was owned by several

[21] The analogy to Bosnia (as well as the Holocaust, Bates, 2009) for the understanding of events in Kosovo may even have blocked the negotiations (Hehir, 2006).

Munich publisher families.[22] FAZ is owned by the FAZIT foundation, which wants to guarantee independent media and promotes science and education.

The Dutch media landscape has long been dominated by traditional pillarization of Dutch society. Originally a Catholic newspaper, by the 1960s *de Volkskrant* had detached from that pillar. Today it is a center-left oriented daily newspaper widely read among young educated people (Bakker and Scholten, 2007: 6–8). *NRC Handelsblad* stems from the 1970 merger of *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* (1844) and *Algemeen Handelsblad* (1828) and is politically oriented to the center-right with an older readership (Bakker and Scholten, 2007: 6–8). Since 1995, *NRC Handelsblad* and *de Volkskrant* have the same owner: Nederlandse Dagbladunie, which was later taken over by the media publisher PCM Uitgevers.

The American newspaper market is less ideologically oriented than European media (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 208–209). Since 1868, *The New York Times* has been owned by the Jewish-American Ochs-Sulzberger family, who also promoted the newspaper as a liberal beacon for the freedom of speech (Tifft and Jones, 1999). Apart from its liberal orientation, the paper stands out by its international coverage and motto "All news that fit to print". As the capital-based quality paper in the United States, *The Washington Post* has a more domestic focus and a more conservative orientation. It is one of the leading daily newspapers of reference in the US, although it publishes no national edition.

2.2 1990 to 2006: Interventions and Genocides

In the fifteen years under investigation in this study (January 1990 to March 2006), a great number of interventions and an unfortunate number of genocides took place. Guided by questions of identity, two of my hypotheses read that the national participation of soldiers matters for identity debates in the home countries and that the occurrence of genocide does so as well. The introduction of the time period thus includes the participation of the scrutinized countries in interventions and the geographic location of these as well as genocides that occurred.

2.2.1 Interventions

There are numerous ways to intervene in a country, e.g. economically or by statements issued,[23] but military interventions are the most coercive and direct means. For this study, interventions refer to military action by one or several outside actors in a country engaged

[22] Today, a group of different investors owns most of the Süddeutsche Verlag publishing house, among them Holtzbrink who also owns the Berlin newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel* and the national weekly *Die Zeit*.

[23] There are different ways to classify interventions, e.g. along goals (Amstutz, 2005: 136).

in internal conflict, broadening Talentino's definition that only considers an overt deployment of military ground forces neglecting targeted air strikes (Talentino, 2005: 10–12).

While wars rely on conquest and control for the mere satisfaction of a country's interests, such as security or expansion, interventions share three characteristics (Lahneman, 2004: xiii-xiv). Firstly, intervening actors refer to disinterested, mostly humanitarian reasons for interventions: to stop famine (Somalia) or supply civilians in conflict (Bosnia). Such non-traditional goals are related to a changing security understanding that views instability within and between states as threats to peace caused by humanitarian issues within states (Talentino, 2005: 60–64). Secondly, interventions rely on a UN mandate for their legality given by the Security Council. With veto rights in the Security Council, interventions may be considered legitimate if they follow the United Nation's idea of preventing severe human rights violations – even without formal mandate (Talentino, 2005: 81–82), as in the case of Kosovo in 1998/99. This third characteristic of limited temporal and power engagement sets interventions apart from imperialist conquest.

In the case of the Iraq War in 2003, categorization as an intervention is not clear. While I do not aim to find "the true" reasons for action, the discussion around it is strongly related to the defining aspects of interventions: oppression of minorities, human rights violations, establishing a democratically (and not externally) accountable government and trying to get a UN mandate. Yet, it is ultimately in the debate, i.e. in articles, that cases are categorized as war or intervention, thus there may be cases that are argued as war by some and intervention by others.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, not only has the international attitude within the UN changed towards more pro-interventionism, but also the number of actual interventions. Since 1990, 34 operations under UN authorization started throughout the world (mostly in Africa) while several more continued from earlier times. All missions but three were supported by at least one of the four countries studied. Additionally, there were eight NATO as well as unilateral interventions with or without UN mandate (cf. Table 2.3).

The states scrutinized in this study all participated to various degrees in different interventions since 1990; none is principally neutral. Germany underwent major changes in its policy on interventions;becoming more robust as a civilian power (Maull, 2001). In 1992, more than 2000 German soldiers were deployed to Somalia to support the UN mission logistically – a first (marginal) military involvement. NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia seven years later was the first instance of German active participation in a combat operations. France was most active with 22 military operations, while Germany was militarily active only in nine, lending material, logistic and medical support in another seven missions.

With regard to the classification for empirical analysis, I paid attention to different intervention in the same country or change in the engagement by individual countries, e.g. for interventions in Iraq or Bosnia. Until 2012, Libya is the only new intervention

region	country	year	name	participation
Gulf	Iraq, Kuwait	1990–1991	Desert Shield, Desert Storm	France, Netherlands, US
	Iraq	1991–1996	Provide Comfort, Safe Haven	France, US
	Iraq	1996	Desert Strike	US
	Iraq	2003–	Operation Iraqi Freedom	Netherlands, US
other	Somalia	1992–1993	UNOSOM/UNTAF (Operation Restore Hope)	France, Germany*, US
		1993–1995	UNOSOM II	France, Germany*, Netherlands*, US
Yugoslav region	Bosnia (Croatia)	1992–1995	UNPROFOR	France, Germany*, Netherlands, US*
	Bosnia	1993–1995	NATO Deny Flight	France, Germany*, Netherlands, US
	Yugoslavia	1993–1996	NATO/WEU Sharp Guard	France, Germany*, Netherlands, US
	Yugoslavia	1992–1993	NATO Maritime Monitor, Maritime Guard	US
	Macedonia	1995–1999	UNPREDEP	US
	Bosnia	1995–1996	NATO IFOR (Joint Endeavor)	France, Germany, Netherlands, US
	Bosnia	1996–2004	NATO SFOR	France, Germany, Netherlands, US
	Croatia	1996–1998	UNCRO and UNTAES	France*, Netherlands, US*
	Yugoslavia	1999	NATO Allied Force / Allied Harvest	France, Germany, Netherlands, US
	Kosovo	1999–	NATO KFOR	France, Germany, Netherlands, US
	Macedonia	2001–2002	NATO Amber Fox	France, Germany, Netherlands
	Macedonia	2002–2003	NATO Allied Harmony	Germany
	Macedonia	2003–	EU Concordia	France, Germany, Netherlands
	Bosnia	2004–	EUFOR Althea	France, Germany, Netherlands
other	Cambodia	1992–1999	UNTAC	France, Germany*, Netherlands, US*
	Rwanda	1993	Operation Turquoise	France
	Haiti	1993–1996	UNMIH/Uphold Democracy	France*, Netherlands, US
	Angola	1995–1997	UNAVEM III	France, Netherlands*
	DR Congo	1999–	MONUC	France
	Ethiopia/Eritrea	2000–2008	UNMEE	France, Germany*, Netherlands, US*
	Afghanistan	2001–	Operation Enduring Freedom, NATO IFOR	France, Germany, Netherlands, US
	Liberia	2003–	UNMIL	France, US*
	Haiti	2004–	MINUSTAH/Operation Secure Tomorrow	France, US

Table 2.3: *Military interventions starting between 1990 and 2005 with participation of France, Germany, Netherlands or US.*
Despite thorough research, I do not claim the list to be complete.
** no military participation but material, logistic, humanitarian supplies etc.*
Sources: APMC, 2009; Global Security, 2012; Bundeswehr, 2012; AJFC NATO, 2009; United Nations, 2012

not included in the list or the study that would have been of interest. During the NATO campaign, France and the United States flew the majority of military attacks while the Netherlands contributed refueling facilities and back-up planes. Other interventions into new crisis regions that started after 2006, namely Sudan and South Sudan, Chad and Central African Republic, and Congo, did not include troops from any of the countries under investigation.

2.2.2 Genocides

Among the interventions from 1990 to 2005, there were a number that were surrounded by genocide or gross human rights violations based on ethnic discrimination. This can be seen most evidently in Rwanda, where more than 800 000 people, mostly Tutsi, were murdered within about 100 days.

The concept of genocide was introduced to international law after World War II and the Holocaust although the term's inventor Raphael Lemkin's work on the crime was inspired by what came to be known and contested as the Armenian genocide (Power, 2002: 17–19). During the Nuremberg trials, judges were confronted with German state officials responsible for crimes without names and thus had little legal grounds for ruling. In 1948, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide settled for a definition of genocide (Article 2 Genocide Convention) that includes: "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such:

a) killing members of the group,
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
c) deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."

For genocide, it is not necessary that all members of a group are killed or are intended to be killed, but the perpetrator has to target a group *as such* because of its nationality, ethnicity, race or religion – no matter what the trigger. For a conviction of genocide, the public incitement, attempt or complicity is sufficient. For international relations, it is important to note that there is a responsibility to prevent genocide although this may not be necessarily in form of military intervention.

In sociology, there is a vivid debate on the inclusion of other groups, such as gender or political ones, or to account for these groups in separate concepts as democide, gendercide or urbanocide, which often cover aspects of genocide (Shaw, 2007: 66–80). Contested cases of genocide include slavery and Stalin's terror against the Kulaks. All genocides are seen against the background of the Holocaust and in fact there has been no other incident

country or region	time period	victims
Cambodia	1975–1979	educated people, Buddhist monks, Cham, Vietnamese and Chinese minorities
Kurdish part, Iraq	1987–1991	Kurds
Bosnia	1992–1995	Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats
Burundi	1993	Tutsis
Rwanda	1994	Tutsis
Chechnya, Russia	1994–2000	Chechens
Kosovo, Yugoslavia	1997–1999	Kosovo Albanians
DR Congo	2000–	Hutus
Darfur, Sudan	2003–	predominantly African local population

Table 2.4: *Overview over genocide or genocide warnings from 1990 to March 2006 as issued by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, USHMM, 2012.*

of similar comprehensive, systematic and industrialized extermination of a specific group. The Holocaust still stands unique and as reference point for atrocities (Jones, 2004: 254–255). To do research on genocides, call them such and compare them, does not mean to play down millions killed by national socialists.

Since the introduction of genocide to international law, there have been only two cases of international *ad hoc* jurisdiction judging specific events as genocide: Rwanda and Srebrenica – in the case of Darfur charges have been filed by the International Criminal Tribunal against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir for genocide. Regarding the time period under investigation, secondary literature of genocide studies agrees that Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Congo, Cambodia (before intervention), the Anfal operation against Kurds in Iraq (and most also the major resettlements) and Darfur fall under the definition of genocide (cf. e.g. Shaw, 2007; Totten and Parsons, 2008; Jones, 2010). Moreover, similar events have occurred in the time period without actual military interventions taking place. Genocide awareness and prevention NGOs such as the US Holocaust Memorial Museum name Burundi and Chechnya (USHMM, 2012). For the inclusion of cases as genocide in this study (and Table 2.4), it is sufficient that there is a scholarly debate on the matter for events in the respective regions. Since 2006, there has no new genocide been reported, but the events in Sudan are still pressing and also present in the newly found state of South Sudan. Despite severe bloodshed in Syria and an Arab League observer calling the massacres on civilians "a genocide", there are no signs that a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group "as such" is target by the government.[24]

For the case of Yugoslavia, today there is broad agreement that genocide took place in Bosnia and was at least on the way in Kosovo. While the break-away of Slovenia is not

[24]Sunni Muslim minority may get at risk according to NGO Genocide Watch (GenocideWatch, 2012).

considered to involve any genocidal elements, opinions on Croatia are more ambivalent.[25]

Lene Hansen traced an American genocide debate in her discourse analysis (which also included editorial and opinion articles from daily newspapers) of the Bosnian War while in Europe argumentation relied on notions of ancient hatred as something impossible to solve (Hansen, 2006: 115–147). In my analysis, I have a closer look at whether the American-European distinction Hansen made is true for the public debate. Instead of relying on a single European country to trace a European discourse, I include three countries. Moreover, I also consider other interpretations of the Bosnian War as mentioned in the literature: political and ethical interpretations (Campbell, 1998: 33–81), and reference to external influence by Yugoslavia/Serbia on the events in Bosnia (Gow, 2003). The question of genocide thus becomes a subject of analysis for the Srebrenica debate.

2.3 Data Collection and Sampling

To cover the debates on war and intervention between January 1, 1990 and March 31, 2005 in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States in two newspapers respectively, a large sample was generated from a keyword search in LexisNexis and the FAZ CD archive. [26]

The sampling strategy included keywords from the semantic field of war and military intervention such as "peace-keeping", "Auslandseinsatz" plus the name of countries where interventions took place or war was waged from 1990 to 2006. This was done for all four countries with country-specific lists (cf. Table 5.4 in the appendix) yielding from roughly one thousand to over ninety thousand articles per newspaper. Three debates are derived from this sample.

(1) The sample was subsequently cleansed of duplicates and sampling errors (cf. Kantner, 2009: 118–127) and the remaining articles comprise the *overall debate on war and intervention* in my empirical study. Nearly half of the articles stem from the American newspapers and only 10 000 from the Dutch newspapers adding up to more than one hundred thousand articles for four countries (cf. Figure 2.1 and Table 5.5 in the appendix). These articles were used for software-based corpus-linguistic analysis.

(2) A representative random sample of about 1000 articles per country was drawn from the overall debate on war and intervention[27] ensuring that the varying intensity of

[25]Claims are made politically on both sides (Croatian and Serb) that the other side inflicted policies of racial purity and conducted ethnic cleansing, but neither genocide scholar nor NGOs include this case.

[26]Unfortunately, not all years could be included for all newspapers, and due to copyright, there might even be single articles missing, but the crucial time period from 1995 to 2005 is covered by all papers. Particularly for the French conservative *Le Figaro*, there were so many years missing that a second conservative newspaper, *Les Echos*, was included.

[27]Only for the Netherlands, the sample was half the size due to limited coder availability. With weighted



Figure 2.1: *The three debates analyzed in the study as overlapping.*

Note that the size presented is not representative of actual shares.

news coverage on the issue of war and intervention is also visible in this sample. The representative sample was manually coded within the DFG/RECON research project with the help of a detailed codebook (cf. codebook starting on page 253 in the appendix). 34 tests to the intercoder reliability were conducted in which variables as well as coders were checked on whether the coding matched the master coding by the project leaders. To guarantee good work, feedback was prepared in case results fell below 0.7 in the Holsti coefficient (Rössler, 2005)[28]. Holsti coefficients for all variables but two showed satisfactory levels of reliability reaching more than 0.80 (as set by Rössler, 2005: 192); the others remain well above the level of 0.60 (set by Brosius and Koschel, 2001: 75). For all Holsti coefficients, compare Table 5.3 provided in the appendix.

The in-depth coding with a frame analysis was only conducted for those articles of the representative sample that deal with interventions as the main topic of the text. These

measures, this disparity was corrected. For subsequent N in the statistics the weight accounts for the differences.

[28]The coefficient is the number of correct codings divided by the number of total codes generated.

articles represent the *intervention debate* in my empirical study (cf. Figure 2.1) and will help to find answers to the research question and hypotheses.

(3) For a detailed analysis of the Srebrenica massacres, all articles that include the word "Srebrenica" were drawn from the sample of the overall debate on war and intervention (cf. Figure 2.1). They are all extensively coded with a separate codebook which included frame analysis (starting on page 269 in the appendix). Since all articles were coded by myself as a single coder, there is a consistent coding guaranteed with intracoder-reliability of a model reader (Esser, 2005: 61–62). All articles were considered with regard to the identity framing in them, whether Srebrenica was at the heart of the article or not.

Overall, the three overlapping debates include 6461 manually coded articles and 103 924 articles analyzed corpus-linguistically.

2.4 Methods

For the analysis of newspaper articles, content analysis and corpus-linguistic methods are used. The former is a demanding and time consuming technique, which was used to detect identity framings in the intervention and Srebrenica debates. While content analysis was used to account for explanatory factors and the identity-related reactions, the frame analysis as a specific technique of content analysis was used to detect the identity-related reactions. Corpus-linguistics makes it possible to handle a large amount of data and is used for the analysis of the overall debate on war and intervention with more than one hundred thousand articles.

2.4.1 Content Analysis and Frames

Content analysis is a technique for making replicable and valid inferences from a text to the context of their use (Krippendorff, 2004: 18). The very simple first step of reading a text (or listening to a radio show etc.) already bears the challenge of a common problem in social science; the researcher and the reader are never independent from the social context and must be aware of that. There is no single meaning to a text, but it is the researcher's task to transparently locate the words in the world that gives meaning to them. Theory is thus necessary to understand the social context and the related meaning of words. Transparency remains the key problem.

Content analysis is ultimately qualitative research, but with categories translated to numbers, data can be used quantitatively. With the possibility of assembling data in nominal, ordinal and metric scales, results can be used for graphical analyses.[29] Quotes to

[29]For the coding process, I relied on data management based on SPSS Clementine as well as a coding

illustrate categories are not only essential to transparency but also to remind the readers and researcher of the nature of sources and the human process of coding. This interpretation of a text is conducted according to observer-independent rules (Krippendorff, 2004: 126). Such rules have to be laid out in a codebook that guides trained coders and their human interpretative abilities (Shapiro, 1997).For example, the conflict under discussion in an article can be coded with content analysis as well as the major understanding of it as e.g. genocidal, asymmetric or interstate. To track down identity, coding stands central and in doing so frames are best suited.

Framing is a construction of social reality in the (mass) media and is thus operationalized on the basis of social constructivism (Scheufele, 1999: 104–105). Frames "largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some important degree, for us who rely on their reports" (Gitlin, 1980: 7). While they help journalists in the working routine, they are particularly important to readers. Frames are able to put facts in a meaningful light by

> "selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of action within one's present or past environment. [...] Frames allow individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label events within their life space or the world at large." (Snow and Benford, 1992: 137)

On the one hand, they are distinct from the news story and the facts themselves; on the other hand, frames are not only used in editorials and commentaries. Framing is an interpretative scheme which can be evoked by single words, but which ultimately refers to the context and reading given to an event by the author of a newspaper article. Thus, the Bosnian war can be framed as stemming from conflicting local ethnic identities:

> "The mood was one of feverish nationalism, encouraged by posters vaunting the invincibility of Serbian forces or showing the wide areas of Bosnia that have been occupied by Serbian troops, over the legend, 'This is ours.' Many voters expressed vehement opposition to the idea of sharing power with other ethnic factions. 'We just want to live alone, without Muslims or Croats,' said Biljana Jelic [...] 'We just want to get away from these people who don't like us.'"
> (*The New York Times*, May 16, 1993: Burn, 1993b)

Communication theory centers around factors within and surrounding framing. For this analysis, frames are considered depending variables showing identity formation processes, while neglecting media-internal processes and theory. Different studies suggest

web page developed in the frame of the DFG/RECON project and atlas.ti. I conducted the quantitative analysis using SPSS and graphics were also generated with MS Excel.

that organization pressures and constraints within the media business influence the framing of news – as do values, ideology, political opinions and prejudices journalists hold (Entman, 1993: 232; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). With two ideologically different newspapers per country, I partially account for factors other than nationally-based ones that influence framing.

In accordance with public sphere theory, framing can be understood as a circular process because journalists themselves are part of the same communities as their audiences. It is not necessary to principally differentiate news and audience or individual frames (Scheufele, 1999), as all are part of the public sphere. As Entman states, "[f]rames have at least four locations: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture" (Entman, 1993: 52). What he, unspecifically, calls culture, is the identity-related world that frames can construct and change in the public sphere. Although there are differences in power relations between journalists and audiences as well as interest groups, politicians and others that seek to change the coverage, concurring frames can be used simultaneously. Just like support for arguments, the resonance of frames has to stem from the audience. The audience does not represent a complete community, but as members of smaller and larger communities the overall understanding of events is shaped by the coverage. This is particularly true for international events outside the personal experience of practically all readers.

For my analysis of identity formation, master frames are used to detect the occurrence of identity-related interpretations in the news (cf. variable 507 on page 260 in the appendix). They give broad orientation without envisioning a particular call for action or one of concurring specific interpretations (Snow and Benford, 1992: 138). Identity frames show events in a context related to a specific community including values and memory. The masterframes and subframes are further discussed and illustrated with examples in the next Section 2.5. For my empirical analysis, I give quotes for identity frames throughout.

Apart from such master frames as identity (and interest), frames are refined according to the research questions under investigation. Frames reflecting the arguments are used to simulate hypotheses testing. The coder is asked if the text can be read in support or opposing the given set of propositions (Krippendorff, 2004: 137–139). For that matter, there is no differentiation made as to whom frames are used by. In contrast to discourse analyses, the power relation, hegemony and legitimizing strategies are neglected in order to trace the social construction of identity in general. This does not mean that such structures of media as well as real-world power do not exist in the public sphere but they are part of the construction itself and not subject to the hypotheses.

While content analysis is a qualitative method, the coding in nominal and ordinal scales makes it possible to obtain more quantitative data. For details, I rely on cross-tabulation to illustrate the direct correlation of explanatory factor and the identity-related

reaction. As statistical measures of association, I refer to Cramer's V based on Pearson's χ^2 (for details including mathematical calculation, cf. e.g. Riffe et al., 1998: 168–170). In contrast to χ^2, Cramer's V yields relative results and ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being a perfect relation. Although the direction of statistical correlation is not provided, the figures help to show it. I consider values for Cramer's V below 0.1 as low, values from 0.1 to 0.3 as moderately strong and values above 0.3 as strong (Healey et al., 1998: 84). α* gives the significance level, which is considered acceptable at 0.050. This shows that association is unlikely to have occurred by chance: 5 in 100 or a 95% level of significance.

2.4.2 Corpus-Linguistics

Corpus-linguistics relies on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze large amounts of digitally stored texts (corpus). Such corpus is considered to represent a (sub-set of) language or a particular theme. In this study, the corpus consists of language- and country-based newspaper articles for the thematic field of war and intervention. The evidence-based methods relies on language and words and all words and their order are analyzed with the help of computer softwares Wordsmith and Atlas.ti. Newspaper articles can thereby be searched for frequencies and patterns of words as well as for their co-occurrences (Baker, 2006: 1–3). From the evidence of frequency and co-occurrences, corpus-linguistics makes it possible to deduce from general linguistics the way words are used and combined, e.g. most frequent words or adjectives associated to a particular noun Regarding content, this makes it possible to find typical lexicographic usage and thus meaning: the frequent occurrence of the word "Iraq" in combination with "war" in one country and with the word "liberation" in another shows that events are understood differently. In theory-guided hypotheses, it is thus also possible to make some careful preliminary assessments on argumentation.

With automatic search functions, keywords can be retrieved that cover a common thematic field and thus frames become more easily detectable. Collocates are "lexically and/or pragmatically constrained recurrent co-occurrences of at least two items which are in a direct syntactic relation with each other" (Bartsch, 2004). This corpus-linguistic method makes it possible to identify the most frequent associations made to a keyword searched for. It is possible to use corpus-linguistics in a deductive or inductive way. Deductively, lists of all possible association to the concept under investigation (e.g. Dutch, Hague, Netherlands, Kok) can be made and collocates help to show their meaning (the Hague may rather refer to international courts and tribunals than to the Dutch capital).[30]

I inductively searched the most frequent collocates to names of crisis regions and categorized them to semantic fields with the help of Wordsmith software. This way, I was able to find the elementary reading of the conflicts and make them comparable. Seman-

[30]For a study using such deductive way with inductive and analytical corrections, see Kantner, 2009.

tic fields include all keywords that define one another regarding one concept: this may be synonyms and subcategories as well as typical explanations used or parallels drawn (Mackey, 1965: 76). I arrived at a number of semantic fields typical for all crisis regions, which were subsequently divided to actors mentioned with regard to a particular crisis (local, regional, US, UN etc.) and events that describe what happened in the crisis (fighting, human rights violations, matters of values and identity etc.). To better compare the relation of the conflicts, I particularly considered the cross-references made between crises, i.e. the names of crisis regions as collocates.

Since corpus-linguistics makes it possible to handle large amounts of text, the overall debate on war and intervention comprising over one hundred thousand articles could be analyzed. While the automatic retrieval of collocates with the help of software tools such as Wordsmith does not catch sophisticated connotations, irony or understatement detectable by human coders, the semantic fields of collocates help to show how words are linked to frames. For my study, this is especially true for the semantic field of values and identity that include words such as "democracy", "our" or "history". General conclusions can be drawn on differences between corpora, i.e. articles from different countries.

2.5 Operationalization

2.5.1 Bosnia in Context

To answer the research question of whether genocide in Europe affects Europeans, I do a media analysis in Chapter 3 comparing different crises and interventions with and without genocide and in Europe as well as outside. To find out whether the conflict is regarded differently and is related more to identity matters, I compare the intervention in the Yugoslav region to others around the world. Firstly, I employ corpus-linguistics in the focus on the overall debate on war and intervention consisting of over one hundred thousands articles. Secondly, I employ content analysis in the focus on the intervention debate, which is comprised of roughly 300 to 600 articles per country dealing with interventions. In Table 2.5, the details of operationalization also for the other empirical chapters are summarized.

Bosnia in the Overall Debate on War and Intervention

I use corpus-linguistics to analyze the overall debate on war and intervention to find out whether there is a different view of Bosnia compared to other crises. Wordsmith software gives automatic lists of collocates. For the top crises, I regard words associated with the name of the country or region of conflict five positions left or right to it. For crises with more than 10 000 occurrences in the overall sample of articles, I consider words that amount to 0.1 per cent of the crisis name, respectively for each country. For those crises

DEBATE	EXPLANATORY FACTORS	OPERATIONALIZED	OPERATIONALIZATION OF IDENTITY-RELATED REACTIONS
Bosnia in Context			
overall debate on war and intervention			- frequent collocates to a country's own **actors** - frequent collocates related to an **understanding** of the crises with regard to values and identity - **cross-references** between the crises to show independent meaning of a crisis
intervention debate	geographic proximity	crisis region and country of newspaper on the same continent	1) **explicit identity frame** 2) **country's own multiple identities** coded as explicit identity frames with reference to political-territorial communities of which newspaper is part 3) **wide identity frame**, which explicit identity frames, cleavages and historic references)
	character of conflict	character of conflict manually coded as genocide/human rights violations; character of conflict attributed according to secondary literature (genocide/no genocide)	
	participation in the intervention	participation of country of newspaper in the intervention attributed according to secondary literature (full, partial, none)	
	ideological orientation of newspaper	automatic coding of newspapers as liberal-left or conservative	
Focus on Srebrenica			
Srebrenica debate	participation in the intervention	automatically categorized groundtroops/no groundtroops from country of newspaper	1) **identity masterframe** and their communities 1a) **explicit identity frames** 1b) **values** mentioned (deductively and inductively) and their communities 1c) **memories** mentioned (deductively and inductively) and their communities 2) references to **failure and shame**
	type of national identity	categorization according to analysis of secondary literature on memory for country of newspaper	
	geographic proximity and transnational affiliation	automatic categorization as European and non-European country of newspaper	
	ideological orientation of newspaper	automatic coding of newspapers as liberal-left or conservative	
Srebrenica in Collective Memory			
Srebrenica debate	geographic proximity	automatic categorization as European and non-European country of newspaper	- Srebrenica **traveling** - Srebrenica mentioned **in other wars** and interventions - Srebrenica evoked as **symbol** - Srebrenica enumerated in line with other **historic events**
	participation in the intervention	participation of country of newspaper in the intervention	
	type of national identity	categorization according to analysis of secondary literature on memory for country of newspaper	
	ideological orientation of newspaper	automatic coding of newspapers as liberal-left or conservative	

Table 2.5: Operationalization of the empirical analysis.

with fewer occurrences, the threshold is 0.5 per cent.

While the method does not allow for a useful operationalization of the explanatory factors nor identity, it can help to find out tendencies of typical associations for different crises. Firstly, the actors associated show whether the focus is rather regional, international or specifically linked to the nation debating. Secondly, different understandings associated to a crisis include events described (fighting, massacres) and also interpretations relevant to identity with keywords like"we", "nos" (our), "Geschichte" (history), "lessen" (lessons) etc. Thirdly, cross-references between major crises can show Bosnia in the web of war and interventions and whether it stands for itself and is self-explanatory.

Bosnia in the Intervention Debate

In the intervention debate, Yugoslavia is contrasted with other interventions that differ in location, character and intervening countries from Bosnia.[31] The country, date and *ideological orientation* of the paper in which the article was published is automatically registered so that the alternative assumption is accounted for. The conflict discussed in an article is manually coded.[32] In combination with the country of the newspaper's origin, *geographic proximity* of discussion and interventions and *national participation* are operationalized as explanatory factors.

With values opposed to genocide in all countries, variance is upheld by the *character of the crisis*, e.i. whether genocide is at stake. Since manual coding of event types[33] only allows one focus per article which has to relate to the main issue, genocides are less likely to be coded, especially because all articles focus on interventions. Thus, I re-code the crises according to secondary literature aggregated in above Table 2.4 on page 67 to include the character of conflict.

Still considering the intervention debate only, the identity-related reaction is operationalized in a frame analysis. There are three different ways the dependent variable may become manifest: explicit identity frames, countries' own multiple identities and wide identity frames. They are summarized in the last column of Table 2.5 on page 75.

(1) Most demanding is the identity master *explicit identity*[34] because it is only coded whenever there is a particular community mentioned in its ethical constitution, e.g. its values, culture, heritage, or future, in at least one complete sentence with regard to the main issue. It has to be an explicit, emphatic statement of a specific community's value basis, nationalism or pride.

[31] For further specification on the coding, the codebook is provided in the appendix starting on page 253. For the detailed information on the background and coding within the framework of the DFG/RECON project, see Kantner, 2009.

[32] Variables 106 on page 254 and 202 on page 257 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.91.

[33] Variable 203 on page 257 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.69.

[34] Variable 507 on page 260 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.83.

Alternative to identity framing, frames for interest and universal principles are coded.[35] Interests mirror a logic of consequence which prevails over one of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1998). An interest master frame includes economic, power and judicial interests all accompanied with countable numbers and based on a zero-sum perspective. Universal principles refer to moral goals assumed to relate to all humankind such as human dignity and human rights. The identity, interest and universal principle masterframes may be used in parallel and be interlinked. Yet, apart from no identity masterframes being used, dominance of other masterframes would falsify identity-based reactions to genocide in Europe and Srebrenica.

(2) As a further specification of the explicit identity frame, the communities to which it refers are considered.[36] Those referring to the *countries' own multiple identities* combine respective national, European (if applicable) and Western identities if it is the same community as the one the newspaper is part of as well as all human kind [37] I shall give an example of an explicit identity framing referring to American national identity in an American newspaper:

> "The suffering in Bosnia is heart-rending. But so too the suffering in Liberia. Shall we intervene there? Unless we are prepared for endless wars of altruism, we will have to draw a line. Drawing it at genocide satisfies the claims both of morality and prudence. America will not stand by if another people are dying and there is a way for America to save them."
> (*Washington Post*, December 11, 1992: Krauthammer, 1992)

(3) To include less explicit references, *wide identity* is considered as a third operationalization of identity-relevant reactions in the debate. All explicit identity references, i.e. the identity masterframes, are included as well as three related variables refined to focus on specific communities: historic references, cleavage for different understanding of actor behavior and cleavage of different understandings of the limits of community. Historic references[38] are events that occurred prior to the main issue discussed in an articles and are likely to be manifestations of a self-evident collective memory.

Cleavages cover a range of different answers to a major (value) conflict, of which the author or quoted speaker can pick as well as balance them. The actors' behavior[39] may vary between peaceful-cooperative and violent conflict resolution with the former mirroring values endorsed by European countries as well as within European integration

[35] Variables 501 and 517 on pages 260 and 262 in the appendix.

[36] Variable 508 on page 260 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.97.

[37] Here, of course, the overlap with universal principles is evident although the latter refers more to a moral, philosophical side while identity is considered less abstract.

[38] Variable 516 on page 261 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.89.

[39] Variable 409 on page 259 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.75.

itself. The definition of communities[40] ranges from ethnocentrism to cosmopolitism. I assume that these cleavages touch on the values of the countries debating conflict and intervention, as well as on those at stake within conflicts, as the ethnic imaginary of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region shows:

> "Many Pakistanis are far more sensitive to bombing of their ethnic cousins in the south than they are to military action in the north. [...] The CIA and Pakistani officials are trying to woo leaders of the Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group in the south, away from the Taliban militia."
> (*Washington Post*, October 31, 2001: Ricks and Struck, 2001)

2.5.2 Focus on Srebrenica

To better understand who cares about genocide in Europe, articles are coded in-depth from the overall debate on war and intervention if they include the word "Srebrenica" at least once and thus refer to an actual genocide in Europe. Compared to the other empirical Chapter 3, explanatory factors are slightly modified because a single event is considered (cf. again 2.5 on page 75). *National participation* in the intervention was thus constant but special focus is on the Netherlands with Dutchbat soldiers in Srebrenica.

With the genocidal character of events evident, countries with *self-reflexive identities* as established to this date and presented in Section 2.1 are contrasted to those with heroic identities to see whether the formal are more sensitive. For a further dimension of the argument, it is coded whether the events in Srebrenica are portrayed as humanitarian crisis, with regard to human rights violations, or even as genocide. A theoretical question is is thus turned empirical.

France, Germany and the Netherlands are *geographically close* to Srebrenica compared to the United States. For a further specification of the geographic dimension, it is coded whether Srebrenica and Bosnia are considered to be situated in Europe or outside Europe explicitly.[41] This way, conscious ostracizing can be detected. The *ideological orientation* of newspapers was also coded automatically.

For the coding of the dependent variable, the *identity masterframe* includes all emphatic reference to a community as well as references to values and historic references that help to understand events and give a setting of collective memory raised. Whenever in the debate a personal pronoun like "we" or "our" alludes to a collective that is related to values, a common past or future, I coded an identity frame. It is thus similar to the wide identity frame of the comparative part. To explore the setting in which Srebrenica is discussed, the identity frame and Srebrenica do not have to occur in the same sentence. The argumentation in the article should draw a line from identity matters to the events in

[40] Variable 412 on page 259 in the appendix; Holsti coefficient 0.93.
[41] Variable *in_Europe* on page 274 in the appendix.

Srebrenica, which may serve as illustration or continuation. For a deeper analysis of the identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica genocide, there are three sub-frames to the identity frame: explicit identity references, values and memory with the respective reference community.The overview of all factors is given in Table 2.5 on page 75.

Explicit identity frames[42] include emphatic references to a community, for example when pride and joy over achievements are mentioned:

> "Maybe because we don't believe it ourselves; but France is still a great cultural power. We are a country from which messages come, a country which can understand the world. This is no boasting. Since our language allows for perfection, as Borges said, we are obliged to it. "
> (*Le Monde*, February 20, 1996: Ferenczi, 1996)[43]

Values show the content of identities used in regard to the coverage of events and Srebrenica. From the theory and the conflict itself, the following values are to be expected: violent/peaceful conflict resolution, ethnic and national discrimination and exclusion/multiculturalism and multireligious community, freedom of self-determination/inclusion coherence[44] Similar values in all countries hint at Westernized identities, while convergence among European countries show a Europeanized identity.

Historic references as evoked *memory* may relate to the regional past as well as the context of World War II and the Holocaust or to the colonial past of the reporting countries.[45] A convergence of memories may hint at Westernized or Europeanized memory of particular events. As for identity in general and values as content, the explicit community of memory is also coded.

Finally, references to *failure and shame* are also considered to indicate an identity-related reaction.[46] While self-reflexive identity is considered an explanatory factor, failure and shame can be discussed in reaction to Srebrenica, hinting at collective ascriptions of responsibilities and their gravity. Failure may refer to individual or collective behavior that was considered inappropriate. Shame is coded if the collective is considered to have not lived up to the community's values.

[42] Variable *explicit_identity* on page 278 in the appendix.

[43] My translation: "Peut-être parce que nous n'y croyons plus nous-mêmes; mais la France est encore une grande puissance culturelle. Nous sommes un pays dont émanent des messages, un pays qui peut avoir une intelligence du monde. Ce n'est pas la forfanterie. Notre langue, comme le desait Borges, parce qu'elle permet la perfection, y oblige."

[44] These and open categories for other values refer to Variables *values* and *which_values* on page 277 in the appendix.

[45] Variables *memory* and *which_memory* on page 279 in the appendix

[46] Variable *fault* on page 282 in the appendix.

2.5.3 Srebrenica in Collective Memory

Apart from the coverage of the events in Srebrenica, the effect of the genocide beyond the actual situation in Bosnia is of interest for its sustainable relevance. I consider Srebrenica becoming part of collective memory an indicator for a mark the events left on collective identity in the debates on war and intervention. With genocide being witnessed by the UN troops, this may have an effect on later interventions and how they are covered and debated. Mentioning "Srebrenica" here does not result in an identity-related reaction in the debate, but as a collective memory it is already part of collective identity. The dependent variable thus differs from those in the two previous empirical chapters while explanatory factors are the same (cf. Table 2.5 on page 75).

I examine whether, and how, Srebrenica has entered collective memory for a lasting effect. As theory has shown, political collective memory is only existent if today's community members know the meaning of past events without many words. Thus, I combine four indicators which suggest that what happened needs no further explanation in the public sphere but that the knowledge can be taken for granted.[47] All these indicators are also considered for themselves and differences may occur along the explanatory factors.

Firstly, Srebrenica may be a references point in other conflicts or it may secondly 'travel' if other events may become "another Srebrenica". In these two cases the context in which Srebrenica is mentioned is no longer the Bosnian town, but an event in the overall debate on war and intervention. Thirdly, Srebrenica is used as symbol (in other crises or with regard to Bosnia). Again, no explicit explanation is made as to what happened but the reader understands implicitly for what Srebrenica stands. Finally, the meaning of Srebrenica as a symbol may also vary; Srebrenica may stand for genocide or failure. Finally, Srebrenica may be in line with other historic events. If Srebrenica, for example, is mentioned along Auschwitz, Cambodia and Rwanda, it is clear without more words that it stands in line with other genocides of the 20th century.

[47] Variables *war*, *travel*, *symbol* and *historic_cross-references* starting on page 272 in the appendix.

Part II

Empirical Results

3

Bosnia in the Context of Military Interventions

To explore whether genocide and the location in Europe, e.i. in Bosnia, matter, I put Bosnia in the context of military interventions. The first empirical chapter takes a look at the French, German, Dutch and American public debates on interventions in particular as well as the overall debates on war and intervention.

I particularly examine Bosnia and the whole Yugoslav region in contrast to other major crises, such as Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. Before going into detail of the identity framing in the Srebrenica debate in Chapter 4, the examination of the general context makes it possible to understand if Bosnia is discussed in a different way.

In Section 3.1, more than 100 000 articles are analyzed by corpus-linguistic means. Although I cannot analyze the details of identity framing with this method, I can account for the overall debate on war and intervention of which the Srebrenica debate of the next Chapter is a sub-debate. This way, it is possible to evaluate the importance attributed to genocide in Europe and the identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica massacre.

The other two Sections 3.2 and 3.3 focus on articles with the main issue of interventions as another part of the overall debate on war and intervention. The content analysis with special focus on identity framing helps to examine the hypotheses made. Moreover, the intervention debate can be analyzed for changes in focus over time and for differences in the identity framing across interventions and countries which debate them.

3.1 Bosnia in the Overall Debate on War and Intervention

For a first overview of the context in which Bosnia is discussed, I have a corpus-linguistic glimpse at the overall debate on war and intervention. It is difficult to directly account

country	total number of words	Bosnia	Kosovo	Rwanda	Somalia	Haiti	Iraq	Afghanistan	Srebrenica
France	52,636,416	0.041%	0.036%	0.010%	0.005%	0.002%	0.115%	0.017%	0.004%
Germany	40,468,108	0.060%	0.071%	0.011%	0.011%	0.003%	0.143%	0.041%	0.005%
Netherlands	29,181,303	0.063%	0.062%	0.014%	0.019%	0.005%	0.173%	0.039%	0.015%
United States	168,315,640	0.037%	0.014%	0.053%	0.010%	0.007%	0.094%	0.031%	0.003%

Table 3.1: *Share of search words for major crises related to the total number of words in the sample, by country, in per cent.*

for identity references directly with this method, but a large set of data can be handled and analyzed for typical vocabulary. This way, first insights can be taken as to the way Bosnia is understood in contrast to other crises and how the same crises are understood differently in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. To understand who cares about genocide and answer the research question whether genocides in Europe affects Europeans in their identity, I look at actors and understandings most frequently associated to major crises. Actors mentioned along with a crisis show if the crisis is seen as related to the nation discussing it. Understandings of a crisis show whether genocide is taken into account or focus is on military action.

I refer to all articles included in the sample for the overall *war and* intervention debate, i.e. just over 10 000 (Netherlands) to almost 56 000 (US) (cf. Figure 2.1 in the previous chapter on page 69). With the help of Wordsmith tool software, I am able to search the whole sample for collocates, i.e. recurrent co-occurrences. I focus on the five words to the left and right of my search word generating lists of words. For further analyses, I group the collocate words to thematic word fields ignoring their grammatical status (verbs, nouns, reflected form) and using only the most frequent collocates (cf. Section 2.5). These thematic fields give an overview of the focus associated with a certain crisis.

I take a closer look at seven regions of conflict mentioned most frequently in the overall debate on war and interventions and which cover Africa, America, Asia and Europe.[1] To understand the attention that was paid to different crises, I present the occurrences of these major crisis regions and relate them to the total number of *words* in the sample, evident in Table 3.1. As can be seen, the crises were all mentioned in about the same amount. The numbers and shares of the conflict mentioned do not necessarily reflect a whole debate on the respective crisis region because only occurrances can be counted. Yet, it can be concluded which crises are at least reference points in the debates.

The most frequently mentioned crisis region in all countries was Iraq – around 0.1 per cent of all words in the debates refer to it Clearly, Iraq was the country most present in the overall debate on war and intervention, especially because different names evolved for the Yugoslav region.

[1]Each crisis region has a share of at least 0.010% of all words in all articles on war and intervention in each of the four countries under investigation.

Comparing the four countries of debate, the United States differs in its discussion on Kosovo and Rwanda. Rwanda scores low in all three European countries, lowest in France which actually intervened there.[2] For the United States, Rwanda is the crisis region which scores second after Iraq and even higher than Afghanistan. While this does not necessarily mean that the crises or the genocide was deeply discussed, it was a reference point in the American debate – not in Europe.

Turning to the Yugoslav region, Kosovo and Bosnia are of less importance in the American debate than in any of the European countries with only 0.014 per cent and 0.037 per cent of all words used. Both Bosnia and Kosovo score similarly in Germany and the Netherlands (0.060 to 0.071 per cent), while the share in France is a bit lower. In all European countries, the two major wars in the Yugoslav region are second in occurrence to Iraq. At least in sheer numbers of references, Bosnia and Kosovo matter relatively more to Europeans than to Americans.

The shares for Srebrenica shown in the last column of Table 3.1 are low in the overall debate on war and intervention because it is a single town compared to names of whole countries. Yet, Srebrenica is mentioned as often as Rwanda in the Netherlands and it is as frequent as Somalia in France. In the European countries, Srebrenica is more often referred to than Haiti. The share of Srebrenica is clearly highest in the Netherlands suggesting that national participation matters for the references. Overall, Srebrenica is definitely a place that is important in the overall debate on war and interventions. In this chapter, I will focus rather on Bosnia than Srebrenica to compare the overall crisis to others. Corpus-linguistic details on Srebrenica will follow in Section 4.2.

3.1.1 Actors in Major Crises

For a qualitative view of the seven major crises in the overall debate on war and intervention, I looked at the five collocates (words) most frequently accompanying them. The thematic fields that were generated in the collocate search were separated into two groups: actors and understanding of events. This way, it is possible to detect which importance is attributed to the own nation, Europe, as well as the characterization of events, e.g. as a genocide.

I discuss crises from all three categories to show the differences between crises and the perspective in which Bosnia is seen. For each crises name, all actors were considered as one thematic field which yields the total N numbers to which the shares refer in the following figures. Within the thematic field of actors there are individuals as well as

[2] In fact, in France all crises except Iraq and Bosnia have the lowest score compared to other countries. This may have linguistic reasons because the name of the country is not repeated as often in articles. For Afghanistan, though, the share is clearly lower at 0.017 per cent compared to 0.03 to 0.04 per cent in the other countries.



Figure 3.1: *Share of different actors compared to all collocates of the thematic field of actors co-occurring with "Bosnia", by country, in per cent.*

groups included and then subsumed to the following categories: local actors, regional actors, US actors, European actors, European (sub-)national actors, own (sub-)national actors, other (sub-)national actors, UN, NATO and any other actors (e.g. continents like Africa, civilizations like the West, the African Union or NGOs). It is not possible though to differentiate between a purely geographic location and an actual actor. Yet even the geographic name shows the orientation chosen in the reference to a crisis. Local and regional actors indicate a focus on a war and local action apart from external intervention – the other actors suggest that the region is associated with intervention and that local or regional actors are not seen as important.

For the seven major crisis regions on four continents, there are three different groups:

- the first group focuses on local and regional actors suggesting emphasis on conflict followed by an intervention in the case of Bosnia, Kosovo and most clearly Rwanda;
- the second group focuses on few outside actors and thus an interventionist view on conflicts in Somalia and Haiti;
- the third group focuses on international crises with attention to local and many different outside actors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Among the four countries, there is consensus regarding Bosnia that it is mainly a local and regional conflict into which outside actors intervened (cf. Figure 3.1). Much more than half of the actors associated are from Bosnia or the region, the rest is distributed among all other eight actors in all four countries. In Germany, local and regional actors



Figure 3.2: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the thematic field of actors co-occurring with "Rwanda", by country, in per cent.*

score only slightly above 50 per cent while in France they account for more than 80 per cent of all actors.

Regarding the respective countries' own national actors, those states with no ground troops in Bosnia during the war score highest. Since American actors are also clearly visible in the other countries, the high share of American actors in the US debate (over 10 per cent) can only partly be attributed to the self-centric American view. Seven per cent of the actors being German in the German debate, is surprisingly high. Although Germany was only active in the beginning of the conflict on the diplomatic level actors are often related to Bosnia suggesting that Bosnia is important to Germans. In France and the Netherlands, the own actors are not so prominent with around two per cent.

In all four countries, all eight different outside actors are mentioned in association to Bosnia. Despite the focus on regional and local actors, Bosnia is obviously seen as an international crisis that relates to the respective countries as well as international organizations like UN and NATO. Compared to all other crisis regions under investigation here, even the EU is quite present in Bosnia with a share of around two per cent. The only other crisis with some references to European institutions is Kosovo. While the EC was involved in the Bosnian peace process throughout the conflict and EUFOR was later stationed, bombardment of Yugoslavia and the intervention in Kosovo was led by NATO and reconstruction mainly by the UN. Nevertheless, European institutions are only visible in the European conflicts suggesting that on this level geographic proximity plays a role.

Kosovo and Rwanda show similar distribution of word fields compared to Bosnia (cf. Figures 3.2 and 5.7 in the appendix). For Rwanda, the focus on the local actors is



Figure 3.3: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the thematic field of actors co-occurring with "Somalia", by country, in per cent.*



Figure 3.4: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the thematic field of actors co-occurring with "Iraq", by country, in per cent.*

even more distinct: around eighty per cent of all actors are local or regional. Among the international actors, European national actors stick out with France (and to a lesser degree Belgium) as interventionist forces in Rwanda, while otherwise only the UN is mentioned – the exception being the United States where the US is also discussed as an actor and the UN is less important.

The situation is clearly different in the other crises: Somalia and Haiti are overwhelmingly referred to as interventions with dominant outside actors (cf. Figures 3.3 and 5.8 in the appendix). It seems there was no major crisis in the country before intervention, but focus on the country rather only evolved because of the intervention. In both conflicts, interventionist actors and especially the United States are most frequently mentioned. Clearly less than half of the actors are local or regional. In Germany, Somalia is surprisingly often related to Germany. As in France and the Netherlands, the debate sometimes refers to other European national actors. Since Germany is not present in the other European countries, though, the German discussion seems to relate to the internal debate on a first engagement of German troops, although they are no combat troops. Again, the United States is very self-referential but also scores high in all other countries. Haiti is similiar to Somalia (cf. Figure 5.8 in the appendix). Overall, Somalia and Haiti are interventions without any actors mentioned on whose behalf, protection or against whom action is taken.

Iraq and Afghanistan are similar to the interventionist views on Somalia and Haiti because international actors are very prominent (cf. Figures 3.4 on the previous page, 87, and 5.9 in the appendix). In contrast to the limited number of actors in the case of Somalia and Haiti, Iraq and Afghanistan trigger a great variety of outside actors. In the four countries of debate, all eight categories for international actors are mentioned. The Netherlands and Germany give international actors apart from the US more room than the American themselves do. Both countries thus prove an internationalist orientation.

While the European Union plays only a marginal role in the Bosnian conflict, it is more visible in this war compared to all others. NATO is present in more conflicts (Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan) with most reference shares in Germany and the Netherlands. This indicates that these countries have stronger Western ties than France or the United States. Bosnia is rather a civil or regional war than associated with intervention in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. Although all international actors are associated to the war, mostly regional and local are mentioned with Bosnia. Bosnia resembles Rwanda with a focus on actors at place and it resembles Iraq and Afghanistan as an international crisis that regards the variety of outside actors.

In Germany, references to all crises result in a remarkably high share of self-references – not as high as in the American debate, but higher than in the other European countries. Somalia with a quarter of all actors mentioned being German reveals that discussion of potential involvement in military action abroad relates to the country because it was the

first military intervention with (marginal) German engagement after World War II. Germany can be said to relate military intervention and war more to German actors than other European countries, even if those have ground troops deployed while Germany has not (e.g. Iraq). The United States is by far more self-referential, but is also frequently referred to in the debate in the other countries.

While there seems to be no crisis to which Dutch actors are more frequently associated, Rwanda stands out for the French. The intervention in Afghanistan is the only one for which actors from the country of discussion do not score lowest in the Netherlands.[3] It seems that the numerically small engagement of Dutch actors is reflected even in the Dutch debate, but this could be different when it comes to less countable notions of identity. In France, over eight per cent of actors associated to Rwanda are French reflecting the unilateral French intervention in the country at the beginning of the crisis.

Overall, all four countries under investigation view the crises in a similar and differences mainly show between crises. Along with Kosovo and Rwanda, Bosnia proves to be a true intervention with a focus on local and regional actors fighting while international actors get involved.

3.1.2 Understanding of Major Crises

While the actors involved showed in which country which crises were considered to relate to home, the understanding of a crisis refers to events, interpretations and associations related to it. Although it is no framing analysis, it helps to see any particularities of a crisis as Bosnia compared to other regions. To find out in which way the seven major crises are understood, nouns and predominantly verbs were categorized yielding eight groups: fighting (may refer to war as well as interventions); human rights violations; diplomatic and other non-military interventions; islamistic terror[4]; interpretation (categorization such as ethnicity or superlatives, e.g. "worst"); values and identity (e.g. first person plural); parallels (other crises not part of the region of conflict). As before, these categories are shown as percentage of all collocates (words) that belong to the thematic field of understanding.

The crises are not as easy to structure along understandings as was the case for actors. It seems each crisis is special which particularly refers to Bosnia, Rwanda and Afghanistan. I grouped the seven crises according to the two most frequent categories in the understanding of all crises: parallels drawn to other crises and fighting as characterization of events. Parallels give an indication whether it is debated in its own right with few parallels drawn or whether the crisis does not stand for itself because the name often goes along with other crises' names. A focus on fighting indicates that there is much debate

[3] It is the case for Haiti, too, but while Dutch ships were sent, there were no German actors involved in that intervention. For all other interventions, despite Dutch involvement Dutch actors are neglected.

[4] This does not suggest that Islam is terrorist, rather that people misuse the religion for crimes.

on the military side of events. With these two most prominent categories of the thematic field of understanding of events as guidelines, there are three groups:

- firstly, crises which do not stand for themselves but have mainly other crisis names associated with them: Haiti and Somalia;
- secondly, crises rendering very mixed results regarding their understanding: Rwanda, Bosnia and Afghanistan;
- thirdly, crises with focus on fighting and military terms associated: Kosovo and Iraq.



Figure 3.5: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the thematic field of understanding co-occurring with "Haiti", by country, in per cent.*

Collocates to Somalia and Haiti are dominated by references to other crises while fighting does not play a very important role (cf. Figures 3.5 and 5.10 in the appendix). For Somalia, major shares of parallels drawn within all different understandings of the crisis are evident across all four countries of investigation. For the understanding of crisis in Haiti, Americans take a different view: there are few parallels drawn with 3.60 per cent of all understandings compared to 48 to 63 per cent in the European countries. Instead, the questions of an embargo (other events) as well the establishment of democracy as a value are widely discussed. For Haiti, there is thus a clear European-American divide and difference between countries not evident for any other crisis. The only intervention on the American continent is discussed in more depth by the United States, suggesting an importance of geographic proximity also for the US. Somalia and Haiti (in Europe)



Figure 3.6: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the thematic field of understanding co-occurring with "Rwanda", by country, in per cent.*

are not standing for themselves but rather serve as exemplary interventions in a general context with little attention on developments regarding the countries themselves. For Somalia and Haiti, the actors already showed an outsider's view which is confirmed by the understanding of the two crises; little attention is paid to what actually happened.

The heterogeneous group of Rwanda, Afghanistan and Bosnia shows many differences and the country combined into one category by default because they are neither dominated by parallels drawn to other crises as Somalia and Haiti nor are they dominated by reference to fighting as Kosovo and Iraq are (cf. Figures 3.6 to 3.8). Regarding the amount of parallels drawn, Afghanistan and Rwanda are similar: A third of all different understandings associated to Afghanistan and Rwanda are references to other crises – clearly more than in the case of Bosnia. Yet, regarding the share of collocates referring to fighting compared to all different understandings of the respective crises, Afghanistan and Bosnia are similar: Around fifty per cent of the understandings relate to the military action in Afghanistan and Bosnia whereas in Rwanda human rights violations are more important. Finally, Afghanistan has many collocates that relate to values and identity while Bosnia has many interpretative collocates.

For Rwanda (cf. Figure 3.6), the debate in all countries is dominated by the genocide as well as its punishment in an international tribunal. Only in France, and to a lesser degree, in the United States, are values and identity also associated to Rwanda. This is evident in the frequent use of the pronouns like "nous" and "we". Although Rwanda is also often seen in combination with other conflicts evident in the frequent reference to other crises, it seems to be an example of genocide rather than of intervention. There



Figure 3.7: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the thematic field of understanding co-occurring with "Afghanistan", by country, in per cent.*

is a focus on human rights violations visible in words like "volkerenmoord" (genocide), "Massaker" and "slaughter". In combination, Rwanda is an important example of genocide in the overall debate on war and intervention.

Afghanistan (cf. Figure 3.7 on the next page, 92) is also a crisis with many different understandings and there is great similarity among the four countries' understandings of the events in Afghanistan. As with Rwanda, about a third of all understandings of this crisis are references to other crises. A vast majority of these parallels drawn relate to Iraq, with the interventions taking place at the same time, and to the Soviet intervention of 1979. In contrast to Rwanda, fighting is prominent in around half of the interpretations of the crisis. Values and identity are most prominent in Afghanistan compared to all other crises: many references are made to the respective country's own community in form of personal pronouns: "we", "nos" and "uns" but also "geschiedenis" (history). More than all other conflicts, the Afghanistan intervention that followed 9/11 was considered a matter of community in these four countries, which all participated in the intervention. The references to islamistic terror, of course, also stem from the background of the intervention. Afghanistan can thus be considered an intervention with focus on the military and some identity matters.

For Bosnia (cf. Figure 3.8, second on the next page, 93), there are clearly fewer parallels drawn to other crises than it is the case for Afghanistan, whereas fighting is only slightly less important. Bosnia is a complex crisis with predominantly military and diplomatic reading in all four countries. As has become clear from the actor collocates, fighting is mainly related to regional and local actors. On the other hand, human rights violations



Figure 3.8: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the thematic field of understanding co-occurring with "Bosnia", by country, in per cent.*

play a role, especially in the French debate. While genocide was dominant for the understanding of Rwanda, in Bosnia there are also frequent references to values and identity.

All other crises have a clear profile: Haiti and Somalia are not of major interest and rely on references to other wars, Kosovo and Iraq are prominent for the military fighting, Rwanda is associated to genocide and parallels, Afghanistan to fighting and cross-references. Bosnia is even more mixed: fighting is important – and especially so in the German debate – while parallels are not very important and identity matters are moderately high. Most evident is the high share of interpretations related to Bosnia. There is much struggle on how to interpret the conflict correctly as so many words relate to "ethnic", "multiethnique" (French), "multinationale" (German) or "nationaliste" (French). In the variance of these words, it becomes evident that it is difficult to read the thematic field of understandings of Bosnia in the overall debate on war and intervention because there is much uncertainty of the understanding of the Bosnian War in the debates themselves. Although Kosovo has a high share of interpretations of conflict in all countries as well, here the interpretations are not contested but clearly ethnic.

The high interest in the nature of the Bosnian conflict and the fact that the interpretation is obviously contested show that Bosnia raised particular curiosity. To the public, it is not only important to know which actor does what but there is an interest to understand the roots of the conflict and the truth about it. This strive for a deeper insight to the Bosnian war distinguishes the crisis region from all others under investigation.

There is an interesting difference regarding the role of human rights violations if Bosnia and Kosovo are compared (cf. Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Although the scale of ethnic



Figure 3.9: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the thematic field of understanding co-occurring with "Kosovo", by country, in per cent.*

cleansing in Kosovo was clearly lower than in Bosnia, in the discussion in all countries but France human rights violations are more prominent when Kosovo is mentioned. This is especially true for Germany where the share rose from 5 to 13 per cent. The development may be interpreted as a learning curve: In Bosnia, diplomacy was important and despite large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide, human rights violations were referred to only moderately; whereas in Kosovo lower scale human rights violations triggered more human rights debate. Yet regarding the high attention paid to fighting, Kosovo is more similar to Iraq where it accounts for about 70 per cent of all interpretations (a bit lower for the US).

Overall, the understanding of what is happening in the different intervention crises differs much from crisis to crisis but not so much across countries. Only for Haiti is there a clear divide between Europe (just another intervention) and the United States (we want democracy established). Bosnia has the greatest variety of possible apprehension: it is diplomatic efforts for peace, it is military fighting, human rights play a role and so does the struggle of how to interpret the conflict itself. Most interestingly, Kosovo shows that the debate was focused more on ethnic cleansing – although it was not as severe as in Bosnia. This may be attributed to the lessons learned during the Bosnian War. Only the French had the human rights focus already in the Bosnian crisis. Regarding values and identity, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and especially Afghanistan are important to the four countries.



Figure 3.10: *Share of co-occurring crisis place names in all co-occurrences per respective crisis in French newspapers, in per cent.*

3.1.3 Cross-References among Major Crises

From the understandings of crises in the overall debate on war and intervention it emerges that references to other crises are important. It has also become clear that there are few parallels drawn only for Bosnia. By taking a closer look at the cross-references, it is possible to see whether Bosnia is referred to and which crises are linked. Cross-references are part of the understanding of crises in all countries because they give orientation in the whole debate on war and interventions. Thus, I proceed along crises rather than countries of debate in the discussion of the figures pointing at the differences between countries along the way. The tendency to cross-refer from crisis to crisis can be seen in the web of arrows drawn (cf. Figures 3.10 to 3.13). The arrows account for the occurrences of other crisis names six places left and right to the crisis place under investigation and relate the occurrences to the total number of co-occurrences per respective crisis. In the American papers for example, 8.49 per cent of all words co-occurring six places left or right to the word "Afghanistan" are the word "Iraq".

There are many cross-references among the Yugoslav crises symbolized by triangles in the graphics. The war in Kosovo was in fact fought by a Yugoslav army so it comes to no surprise that there are many reference to this country when Kosovo is mentioned. The cross-references involving Bosnia and Kosovo mostly originate from Kosovo as the



Figure 3.11: *Share of co-occurring crisis place names in all co-occurrences per respective crisis in German newspapers, in per cent.*



Figure 3.12: *Share of co-occurring crisis place names in all co-occurrences per respective crisis in Dutch newspapers, in per cent.*



Figure 3.13: *Share of co-occurring crisis place names in all co-occurrences per respective crisis in US newspapers, in per cent.*

conflict that turned violent three years after the Bosnian War ended. In all countries, "Bosnia" accounts for more than three per cent of of all words co-occurring with Kosovo. Since there are no other references made to other crises, it shows the regional conflict with an aggressor in Belgrade.

Afghanistan and Iraq are a clear case of linked interventions. They took place in parallel and are geographically close. Moreover, major troop deployment was made by all (Afghanistan), or half of the countries of debate. While Iraq has the same cross-reference pattern in all countries, Afghanistan stands singular in the American debate. For Europeans, the intervention in Afghanistan is also linked to those in Kosovo/Yugoslavia, and even to Haiti and Somalia. To Americans, the intervention that followed the terror attacks on American soil is more outstanding and unparalleled than in Europe.

The picture that already emerged from the word fields of events is also confirmed: When Haiti, Somalia or Rwanda are mentioned, other different crises are also mentioned. The Rwanda-Somalia connection in both directions is visible in all countries. This is astonishing since the two crisis places are only similar in their geographic location, whereas the character of conflict, the intervening parties and the time of conflict are different.

There are some interesting differences between the cross-references in the four countries under investigation, the American cross-references (cf. Figure 3.13) especially prove

different. A European-American divide is evident for Kosovo, which stands without references in the American discussion. Its seems Kosovo has no major importance in the American overall debate on war and intervention. For Europeans at least Afghanistan, the intervention two years later, refers back to Kosovo. In Germany and France, there are also references made to Kosovo when Haiti is mentioned. Similar to Kosovo, Afghanistan is another intervention which is special in the American debate because it is only related to Iraq. In the European countries, Afghanistan is referred to when debate is on Iraq, Haiti and Somalia – and reference are made from Afghanistan to Bosnia as well as to Kosovo and Yugoslavia in France and Germany.

Not only is the American debate clearly different from the European ones, a closer look shows that Germany and France are particularly similar varying only in the strength of cross-references and one arrow pointing from Bosnia to Somalia, which is nonexistent in the French debate. Although the Netherlands is more like the other European countries, there is a Atlantic tendency leaning towards the United States.

Bosnia is referred to from Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia – and Afghanistan in the European countries. Only in Germany and the Netherlands, arrows run away from Bosnia and as seen before, there is no relation between Afghanistan and Bosnia in the American debate. Bosnia is thus a reference point in the debate on war and interventions while rarely needing or having other reference points to which it is related. In this way, Bosnia is similar to Iraq, which stands in a similar position with more arrows pointing at it than running from it. Although they are similar, between these two major crises of the post-Cold War era, there is no linkage. When Bosnia or Iraq are the subject of debate, they stand for themselves.

In sum, Bosnia is an important reference point for other crises, but it does not need many references itself. Regarding the cross-references, Bosnia is interpreted similarly in all countries. Differences between European countries and the US showed, particularly regarding Afghanistan which stands out as singular in the American debate.

3.2 The Yugoslav Wars in the Intervention Debate

The intervention debate is a subdebate of the general debate on war and intervention and articles were manually coded. I will consider whether the impressions gained from corpus-linguistic analysis of the overall debate on war and intervention are confirmed. For a first overview of the Yugoslav region and identity, I use all coded articles that deal with interventions as their main topic from a representative random sample of 1000 articles per country . The size of the sample thus decreases to 540 articles for French newspaper papers, 590 for German newspapers, 691 (weighted) for Dutch ones and 531 for the US



Figure 3.14: *Issue cycle with share of articles in the intervention debate on the ten major crisis regions compared to all articles on interventions in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the US (N=2414); by quarter of a year (1990 to first quarter 2006); in per cent;respective moving average over three periods.*

(cf. Figure 2.1 in the previous chapter). [5]

Issue cycles help to detect continuous preoccupation with a certain area of conflict and thus relate to its sustainability. Although such circles relate to actual events, they also mirror the attention attributed to them some time later. This way, the focus on different crises can be compared as can differences across countries.

Figure 3.14 shows the share of articles per quarter of a year that focus on the ten crises most frequently mentioned compared to all articles coded in the intervention debate for the same quarter. Although the total number of articles were combined for all four countries under investigation, some crises score below 20 articles for the whole period from January 1990 to March 2006, the lowest being eight for the Near East with intervention as a main issue. Firstly, this means that there are many articles in the intervention debate which discuss no one clear crisis region. Secondly, the total number of articles and the shares they take show that there are only two major intervention in the years under investigation: Iraq and Yugoslavia.

The attention paid to the Yugoslav region follows very closely the course of events (cf. Section 4.1): tension was high in the Yugoslav region from 1991 to 1995 with the ten-days war in Slovenia, the Croatian and the Bosnian War. From 1997 to 1999 insurgency, war and intervention were evident in Kosovo and again in Macedonia in 2001.

[5] With the weighting of the Dutch sample, case numbers may vary in the figures.

Some weariness with regard to the Yugoslav region occurred at the end of 1994 because ethnic cleansing and fighting continued on the same scale, foreign soldiers were present in Bosnia, but without escalation nothing caught the attention of the intervention debate.

Comparing the share of articles coded which mention (the former) Yugoslavia as crisis region to articles mentioning any other of the ten major intervention targets between 1990 and 2006 proves that the Yugoslav region was of continuous importance (cf. Figure 3.14). Only Iraq also has major shares of articles and overall there are more articles on Iraq than the Yugoslav region. Yet the discussion on Iraq is characterized by (three) peaks of which only the last elapses over several quarters of the year. The Yugoslav region on the other hand drops only once under the 10 per cent share for about a year from 1997 to 1998 – and ceases to appear as a topic in the public debate since 2001.

It is clear from the time line that 9/11 was a turning point after the Cold War. Until 2001, Yugoslavia was of continuous importance in the public debate on interventions while only the interventions in Iraq (Kuwait in 1990/1991 and air strikes in 1998) peaked as well. After the terror attacks on New York and Washington, Yugoslavia ceased to play a role in the debate although tens of thousands of soldiers were still stationed in Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Yet the intervention debate focuses shortly on Afghanistan and then overwhelmingly on Iraq.

Iraq and the Yugoslav region are the only crisis regions that took a majority of articles in a quarter of a year except for the Afghanistan intervention in mid-2002. For the Yugoslav region, this majority was evident in 1993 when Serb military advances and atrocities reached a first climax in the Bosnian War and in the second half of 1995 when the Srebrenica genocide took place and the Dayton peace treaty was signed as well as in 1998 and the first half year of 1999 during the Kosovo crisis.[6] The share of articles on the Yugoslav region during the Srebrenica massacres (quarter from July to September 1995) reaches a major peak at 92 per cent of all articles on interventions dealing with Bosnia.[7] The decisive moment of the Bosnian War can thus be identified as such, regarding relative attention attributed to the region in the public debate on interventions. Bosnia was thus on people's mind in the summer of 1995 when ethnic cleansing reached its climax with genocide in Srebrenica.

For the Yugoslav region, Figure 3.15 shows the differences among countries. The figure gives the share of articles that mainly deal with Yugoslavia compared to all articles on interventions published the same quarter of a year in the same country. Overall, the attention paid to the Yugoslav region is very similar when the four countries under investigation are compared. Yet, minor differences are visible. As evident from the course of

[6]The second quarter of 1999 has the highest share of a single crisis (Kosovo) in the whole sample with 97.06 per cent of all articles coded. Not evident from Figure 3.14 which shows a time line per country in moving averages.

[7]The maximum is not evident from Figure 3.14, which shows a time line per country in moving averages.



Figure 3.15: *Share of articles coded on the region of the former Yugoslavia by quarter of a year (1990 to first quarter 2006) compared to all articles in the intervention debate coded, by country, in per cent, moving average over three periods*

events, Germany was most active at the beginning of the crisis. In the country's newspapers, the public debate on intervention starts slightly earlier than in the other countries. In the Dutch debate, there are few articles on Yugoslavia published at the beginning of 1995 before peaking with the other countries starting in summer of the same year. In all countries, discussion on the Yugoslav region was again more intensive during the atrocities and intervention in Kosovo and Yugoslavia (1997 to 1999), and in 2001 when insurgencies in Macedonia rose.

Despite these minor shifts, there are no striking differences between the US and the European countries or between countries with soldiers committed and those without. Yet overall the Yugoslav crisis almost always scores lower in American newspapers. This may give a small hint that the crisis in Europe in effect was more important to Europeans than to Americans. As for the general agenda in the public sphere, all four Western countries have the same focus.

On closer investigation, it is clearly visible how the focus within the former Yugoslavia shifts. In Figure 3.16 on the next page 102, the region of the former Yugoslavia is divided into different crises whose shares per year compared to all articles on Yugoslavia published that year add to the total articles on Yugoslavia. While the Yugoslav region in general remains the backdrop to all other crises, crisis regions change from Bosnia to Kosovo to Macedonia. The Bosnian intervention is most prominent in the public discussion with 43 per cent of articles in the whole period from 1990 to the first quarter of 2006 and with a majority of articles in all quarter from 1992 to mid-1997. As fighting was long-lasting and fierce here and eventually soldiers from all four countries were stationed in Bosnia, this comes to no surprise.

What is more astonishing than the shares of Bosnia are the high shares for Kosovo: almost 33 per cent on all articles coded dealing with the Yugoslav region are devoted to Kosovo. Compared to Bosnia, though, the fighting was short lived from late 1997 to



Figure 3.16: *Share of articles in the intervention debate on the different regions of the former Yugoslavia by quarter of a year (1990 to first quarter 2006) compared to all articles on the region (N=669), in per cent.*

mid-1999 as compared to early 1992 to fall 1995; ground troops were only stationed in Kosovo since 1999. An explanation for this over-representation of Kosovo in the public debate compared to the course of events may be that after the Bosnian War, the public was more sensitive to conflict and atrocities in the Yugoslav region and even the low share in Kosovo triggered much reporting. Bosnia can thus be regarded as a learning subject that put more focus on the region.

3.2.1 Identity Framing in the Intervention Debate

All articles which focus on interventions (intervention debate) were also coded for frames, i.e. the interpretative schemes used by the author to give the reader orientation in the complex matters being reported on. In the codebook there were three alternative frames, which are not mutually exclusive: identity frames, interest frames and frames for universal principles. Moreover, authors may choose not to present frames at all to the reader, but to rely on a report of facts without giving further help how in understanding these facts. The null hypothesis for identity-related reactions is thus either a different framing of events or no interpretations made at all.

Turning to identity framing in all articles on interventions coded, differences between countries become more prominent compared to reporting on the different crisis regions.[8] Identity frames are used least in Germany (less than twenty per cent of all German articles in the intervention debate) and most frequently in the United States (more than a third)

[8]The identity frames presented here refer to explicit identity rather than the recoded wide identity frame used in the analysis of hypotheses in the next Section 3.3 and used to compare the share of identity frames in the Srebrenica debate later in Section 4.3.2, Table 4.3.

	identity frames	interest frames	universal principles frames
France	28.62%	30.54%	22.45%
Germany	18.57%	19.25%	17.58%
Netherlands	28.80%	30.62%	14.16%
United States	36.00%	27.19%	20.91%

Table 3.2: *Share of frames referring to identity, interests and universal principles in articles of the intervention debate, by country (N_{France}=583, $N_{Germany}$=641, $N_{Netherlands}$=651, N_{US}=539).*

***for identity framing**: Pearson's χ^2=43.054 with α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.136; **for interest framing** Pearson's χ^2=25.914 with α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.105; **for frames of universal principles** Pearson's χ^2=16.611 with α*=0.001, Cramer's V=0.084*

(cf. Table 3.2). In Germany, interventions are thus not so much seen as relating to the self-understanding of any community including German identity. The impression gained from the corpus-linguistic analysis of the overall debate on war and intervention which saw German actors prominent in the German debate (cf. Subsection 3.1.1), is thus not confirmed. The reference to German actors means that the crises are of importance but that overall interventions do not call on German identity. For the United States, the self-referential tendency is confirmed regarding identity references. France and the Netherlands are most similar, in between the other two countries.

But what is there if there is no identity framing? Identity frames occur in 27.82 per cent of all 2414 articles coded in the intervention debate.[9] Other ways of framing what happens during interventions is in relation to interests. Instead of stressing community and its achievements, collectiveness, values etc., it is possible to interpret events with regard to the economic or political benefits of money or power for the actors involved. Such framing is evident in almost as many articles as identity framing (26.98 per cent). Moreover, universal principles as values not related to a specific community but rather to all human kind are an alternative framing, which occurs in 18.48 per cent of all articles.

A focus on the four countries shows that interest frames are a bit more frequent than identity frames in the European countries, while universal principles score lowest in all four countries (cf. Table 3.2). Identity framing is thus the most prominent way to interpret external interventions in the US. Americans obviously relate interventions more to questions of identity than European do. This may be a result of American self-understanding as a superpower that matter of conflict and fighting are considered to relate to the own nation. Nevertheless, these numbers do not show whether it really is a country's own identity which are evoked or whether these are rather identity matters in the region of conflict for example. In Europe, interests are as important as identities – and in Germany universal principles are also as important as identity and interests. For Europeans, events

[9]The differences in numbers are due to the weighting applied for the Dutch sample which saw less articles coded.

are slightly more frequently interpreted as having a logic of consequence; even if it is not European money or power, events in the intervention debate are related to interests. Despite significant country differences regarding the three frames, it has to be considered in particular that the three ways of framing interventions are interrelated.

While interests and universal principles are alternative ways to frame events, they may still be used together with other framing like identity. Kantner was able to show for the overall debate on war and intervention that communities of interests and identity are theoretically and empirically linked (Kantner, 2009). Statistically, the correlation between identity frames and interest frames is quite strong and significant with Pearson's χ^2= 164.090, α*=0.00 and Cramer's V at 0.365. The following quote from a newspaper article illustrates the simultaneity of identity and interests:

> "Paris traditionally nurses warm feelings for Bagdad. [...] The fact that Iraq was a good customer of French weaponry explains part of the good relation. But politics is not always cynical. France feels ideologically related to Iraq, says the Parisian political scientist Alfredo Valladao. 'Iraq is like France a laical republic in contrast to fundamentalist Iran and that appeals extremely strongly to French feelings.' "
> (*Volkskrant*, February 12, 1998: Sommer, 1998) [10]

While commercial relations between France and Iraq show that interests are important to understand the French policy towards Saddam Hussein, there are also values shared by both Iraq and France: laicism. This value of a strict separation of church and state was shown to stand in French national identity and it guides French foreign policy towards other countries, thus preferring Saddam Hussein's Iraq over the Ayatollah's Iran.

Some numbers can also show the degree of overlapping between identity and interest frames in the intervention debate across countries. In 22.87 per cent of all articles in the intervention debate where there is no identity framing, there is an interest framing instead – in 14.67 per cent there is a framing in terms of universal principles. There is none of the three different framings in 65.99 per cent of cases, while there are 9.72 per cent of articles which rely on all three frames. Identity, interests and universal principles are thus clearly interrelated. The majority of articles in the intervention debate – almost two thirds of articles are without any framing and rely on enumeration of facts without any background information giving the reader an idea of why the things reported happened.

If we are looking for a null hypothesis that there is no identity-related reaction in the public debate, it is not possible to rely on alternative framings; these are too much

[10] My translation: "Parijs koestert van oudsher warme gevoelens voor Bagdad. [...] Dat Irak een goede afnemer van Frans wapentuig was, verklaart een deel van de mooie relatie. Maar politiek is nooit helemaal cynisch. Frankrijk voelt zich ook ideologisch verwant met Irak, zegt de Parijse politieke-wetenschapper Alfredo Valladao. 'Irak is net als Frankrijk een leken-republiek tegenover het fundamentalistische Iran, en dat appelleert aan een extreem sterk Frans sentiment.' "



Figure 3.17: *Share of countries' own national, European and civilizational identities as subframes in all articles with identity frames in the intervention debate, by country, in per cent.*

interrelated with identity issues. While the logic behind identity and interests may seem totally different, in the public debate both are frequently used simultaneously to account for the course of events in interventions. No framing at all is the most common and best alternative to identity framing in the intervention debate. Even if related to interests and universal principles, identity is frequently evoked in the intervention debate to make the reader understand what has happened. For a better understanding of the identity frame, the communities to which identity is related are discussed.

Turning to the details of identity framing, there is a major share of identity frames coded that have no further specification on the community to which the identity refers in all countries except the Netherlands: 31 per cent in France, 25 per cent in Germany and 22 per cent in the United States (compared to 7 per cent in the Netherlands). As the Holsti coefficient for this variable is very high (0.97) showing that intercoder reliability is good; it seems that Dutch are more pronounced in the reference to specific communities to which identity is related.

Figure 3.17 shows the share of different communities to which the identity frames were related: the respective own national identities of the four countries, European identity (which is also type of identity for French, Germans and Dutch), civilizational identity (e.g. Western, Arab, Christian), identity related to the respective region of conflict and identity of a major power (US, Russia, China). Although civilizational identity does not equal Western identity, the coding has inductively shown that is the overwhelming major-

ity of cases this identity referred to the West.[11]

As already assumed regarding the frequent use of identity frames in general, focus on the countries' own national identities shows that this reference is most prominent in the US. Over 40 per cent of all identity frames in American articles refer to American identity which are eight per cent of all articles in the total American intervention debate. This stands in stark contrast to the 15 to 17 per cent in European papers that refer to the respective national identities. Thus, in European countries, war and intervention touch less upon the national self-understanding. The American role and self-understanding as superpower results not only in many interventions – France even undertook more different missions. In the US, interventions are also more closely related to American identity. Despite a *mission civilisatrice*, this is not the case for France.

European identity and civilizational identity are two other possibilities in attributing a community of identity to the identity frame and are also given in Figure 3.17. Both categories were interpreted generously: not only reference to the European Union or a strict interpretation was necessary for frames to be coded as "European identity". The same is true for civilizations which may be Western, Muslim, Arab or other, as defined within the article. European identity scores surprisingly low in the German debate with overall 5.50 per cent of all identity frames, in a country whose national identity is so closely related to Europe. Instead, the Netherlands show many references to Europe. Overall, there is a clear difference between the European countries and the US: in the US, the intervention debate is more related to identity and especially to American identity than it is the case in Europe. This may be attributed to the more pacifistic values in Europe. As a military superpower, the United States also relies in its self-understanding on military interventions, while Europe as civilian power does not.

Another difference between the European countries and the US is the fact that identities are multiple in Europe. In Germany, national and Western identity even score the same; in the Netherlands, Western identity is even more often referred to than national identity. The two countries' national identities are closely related to Europe and the West as in a marble cake. Although both countries are active in military interventions, they seem to relate their engagement to a broader perspective such as the West and probably NATO, visible in the high shares for civilizational identity, which is mostly related to the West. France scores higher on European identity, too, but similar to the US with regard to civilizational identity. In regard to the French skepticism towards transatlanticism, this shows an American reluctance to refer to other identities than its national identity. Europeans don't rely so much on their respective national identities, but rather see interventions as events related to the different communities of which they are part.

Americans not only refer frequently to identity in the intervention debate, they also re-

[11] There are no numbers on the share of Western and other civilizations because coding with multiple coders was in progress. The statement here refers to the feedback given by the coders.



Figure 3.18: *Share of identity frames in articles coded on one of the three crisis regions respectively (at least ten identity frames per country), by country, in per cent.*

France: $N_{Iraq}=236$, $N_{Afghanistan}=33$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=140$; *Germany:* $N_{Iraq}=147$, $N_{Afghanistan}=45$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=216$; *Netherlands:* $N_{Iraq}=279$, $N_{Afghanistan}=52$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=189$; *US:* $N_{Iraq}=212$, $N_{Afghanistan}=28$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=120$

late interventions most frequently to American national identity. Interventions are important to the country's role and especially the country's self-understanding as a superpower on the international scene. It still has to be seen whether the strong reference to American identity in the US debate is related to the participation of American soldiers and a strong imagined community in American identity.

The country of conflict is not frequently referred to as a community of identity (still Figure 3.17). Only in France, is the share a bit higher than in the other countries at 7 per cent, but this accounts for 11 cases. Identity frames that refer to the great powers are more frequent in the European countries. In the Netherlands as a small country, a look at issues related to the biggest nations is important. In the American debate, such references don't play any major role because there are only two country left to which identity could be referred to (Russia and China). For the following figures, I will not include these two communities to which identity may refer because they are not part of the four countries' own multiple identities.

To put the Yugoslav region in the context of other interventions, a closer look at those three major crises that have at least 10 identity frames in every country reveals similar country differences for Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia (cf. Figure 3.18).[12] For each crisis, the figure shows the share of articles that have identity framing compared to all articles coded on the respective crisis. Although all countries report on the same crises in

[12]The inclusion of all ten major crisis regions would have yielded low case numbers in the seven countries and regions left out here.



Figure 3.19: *Share of identity frames referring to the countries' respective own identities in articles coded on the three crisis regions (at least ten identity frames per country), by country, in per cent.*

France: $N_{Iraq}=236$, $N_{Afghanistan}=33$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=140$; *Germany:* $N_{Iraq}=147$, $N_{Afghanistan}=45$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=216$; *Netherlands:* $N_{Iraq}=279$, $N_{Afghanistan}=52$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=189$; *US:* $N_{Iraq}=212$, $N_{Afghanistan}=28$, $N_{Yugoslavia}=120$

almost the same amount, identity plays different roles in the debates. Overall, as has been evident before, the American debate more often refers to identity as an interpretative framing of the debate regarding the four major crises than all other countries. For Yugoslavia, the Dutch use identity framing even more than Americans. The high shares of identity frames in the American debate is clearly visible for Iraq and, particularly, Afghanistan. In France and Germany, all interventions have a similar share of identity frames. From the comparison of identity framing in the major crises, it emerges that Afghanistan is much related to identity in the United States and Yugoslavia is to the Netherlands.

If considering the identity frames which relate only to those communities that are part of the countries' own multiple identities (respective national identity, European identity for the three European countries, civilizational identity and universal identity), the tendencies evident before are the same with an interesting finding on Dutch identity (cf. Figure 3.19). Americans are proven to focus on their own national identity while Europeans evoke European and civilizational (Western) identity as well.

Even if identity references occur, below ten per cent of these refer to the national identities in the European countries (about a quarter of all references to the countries' multiple identities). For the Netherlands, this means that Yugoslavia is as prominent for national identity as Afghanistan – but Yugoslavia frequently relates to European and Western identity in the Netherlands. Even more so than French and German identities,

Dutch identity is multiple. Also in France and Germany, however, the share of Euroepan and civilizational identity is higher for the Yugoslav intervention than it is for Iraq and Afghanistan. In the American debate, the share of national identity surpasses European shares with 15 to 26 per cent of all articles, i.e. 80 to 90 per cent of all communities of identity in the American debate relate to American national identity. The Afghanistan intervention is most important to American national identity. In the intervention debate in all four countries, nearly half of the identity frames refer to American national identity.

In summary, identity framing in the intervention debate on the four major crises confirms the previous insights. American identity is more sensitive to military interventions than European national identities. Instead, there are other political-territorial identities visible in Europe: European, civilizational and universal identity. Especially in the debate on the Yugoslav region, multiple identities are evident in France, Germany and the Netherlands. When considering all different identities in a country, the Netherlands reaches almost the same shares as the US: The Dutch relate their multiple identities to military intervention in the debate on the Yugoslav region and Afghanistan almost as often as Americans relate their national identity to any of the three major crisis regions. While American identity in the intervention debate relies on the countries' status and self-understanding as superpower, the Dutch relate to their role as a *gidsland* whose values relate to international conflict as they regard the prevalence of international law and a humanitarian conscience.[13] It becomes evident that Dutch self-understanding as a *gidsland* also includes an openness towards multiple identities.

Most evident is the high share of identity-related frames in American articles on Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan followed the terrorist attacks on the United States and thus touches directly a country attacked on home soil.[14] In the US, this resulted in more than 50 per cent of all articles on Afghanistan relating to identity issues and almost 27 per cent to American identity.[15] When US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stressed that the intervention in Afghanistan is not directed against Muslims, he calls on American values for human rights along numerous reference to the American community by using the first person plural (italics added).

> "The United States has organized armed coalitions on several occasions since the cold war for the purpose of denying hostile regimes the opportunity to oppress their own people and other people. In Kuwait, in northern Iraq, in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States took action on behalf of Muslim populations against outside invaders and oppressive regimes. The same is

[13] French *mission civilisatrice* plays no role.

[14] In effect, this very point makes the intervention in Afghanistan closer to a war than most other examples. Yet, the Taliban de-facto government of Afghanistan was not the author but the host of the attacker.

[15] In the European countries all crises range under 10 per cent reference to their respective national identities.

	Iraq	Somalia	Yugoslav region	Afghanistan
France	0.131	0.151***	0.144***	0.041
Germany	0.049	0.303*	0.193***	0.117
Netherlands	0.069	0.809	0.216***	0.010
United States	0.239***	0.072	0.113	0.121*

Table 3.3: *Cramer's V and significance for the correlation of four major crisis regions as dummies and multiple identities of the four countries (national, European, civilizational and universal).*
*** significance at 99% level; * significance at 90% level

> true today. *We* stand with those Afghans who are being repressed by a regime that abuses the very people it purports to lead, and that harbors terrorists who have attacked and killed thousands of innocents around the world of all religions, of all races and of all nationalities. While *our* raids today focus on the Taliban and the foreign terrorists in Afghanistan, *our* aim remains much broader. *Our* objective is to defeat those who use terrorism and those who house or support them. The world stands united in this effort. It is not about a religion or an individual terrorist or a country. *Our* partners in this effort represent nations and peoples of all cultures, all religions and all races..."
> (*New York Times*, October 8, 2001: n.a., 2001)

In all European countries, the Yugoslav wars relate most frequently to the countries' own identities. The high share of Dutch articles concerning Yugoslavia with identity frames related to Dutch multiple identities suggests that the region is special to the Dutch, whose soldiers were stationed in Srebrenica as the enclave fell and massacres were committed.[16] Regarding purely national Dutch identity, the share is not much higher than French or German national identity.

The association of the countries' own multiple identities with the identity framing was determined for each crisis and country (cf. Table 3.3). Only the four crises that show significant results in at least one country are displayed. In American newspaper articles on intervention, there was a ninety per cent chance of systematic relation between the crisis region in Afghanistan and the use of identity frames related to the countries' own communities. Apart from the three major crises, there are also significant results for Somalia in France and Germany.

In Europe, the war in the Yugoslav region is significant in triggering references to the all countries' multiple identities. In the Netherlands, this relation is a bit stronger (Cramer's V=0.216) than in France and Germany. In the US, the relation of the Yugoslav region and identity framing is not significant, but it is in the case of Iraq. The interventions in Iraq relate strongly to American identity (Cramer's V=0.239) while in the other countries the relation is weak and insignificant. The two major crisis regions of the post-Cold

[16]The same is true for the mere reporting and media attention paid to the region in the overall debate on war and interventions (Kantner, 2009: 153–156).

War era, Iraq and Yugoslavia, thus relate differently to the respective identities in Europe and the US. It seems that war and intervention in Europe matters more to Europeans than any other crisis event and more than it matters to Americans.

Otherwise, the relation of intervention in Somalia and references to the country's multiple identities is significant but weak in France, and strong and slightly significant in Germany. The American identity is surprisingly moderately strong in regard to Afghanistan: the relation is only significant at 90 per cent level. The statistics thus clearly confirm that the Yugoslav region is important to European (multiple) identities while Iraq is important to American (national) identity.

The first general view on different crisis regions revealed that the Yugoslav region was the most important crisis in the decade after the Cold War until September 11, 2001, and more continuous than Iraq. Within Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Kosovo were the two major regions on which the debate focused. National identity plays a major role in the general debate on interventions in the United States. This is especially true regarding Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany and the Netherlands turn more to European (the latter) or Western identity (both). Among European countries, the Netherlands particularly often relate their multiple identities to interventions. European countries relate their multiple identities more to Yugoslavia, while the US relates its identity more to Iraq.

3.3 Checking Hypotheses on the Intervention Debate

The intervention debate offers a prime opportunity to check my hypotheses on imagined communities of participant soldiers, self-reflexive identity and genocide and European solidarity in geographic proximity can be tested as well as ideological orientations. In my analysis, I rely on three modes of the dependent variable: firstly, *identity frames* in the strict sense with explicit emphatic references to a community and its self-understanding (e.g. "we as good Americans"); secondly, *wide identity frames* which add references to the type of community ("France as a secular country") and historic references as evidence of collective memory to the previous; thirdly, *communities of reference for explicit identity frames*.

Apart from the explicit identity frames also used to compare different frames in the intervention debate, the use of wide identity frames opens up a broader perspective on identity and includes value statements and memory as well. Therefore, all explicit identity frames and cleavages for different understanding of actor behavior and of the limits of community as well as historic references were included in the wide identity frame (cf. Section 2.5). The share of identity frames in the intervention debate thus rises as shown in Table 3.4 on the next page, 112. Germany still has the lowest share among the four countries, but differences are less pronounced. Overall, wide identity is a very important

	explicit identity	wide identity
France N=540	28.62%	35.14%
Germany N=590	18.57%	30.22%
Netherlands N=691	28.80%	40.24%
US N= 531	36.00%	37.45%

Table 3.4: *Share of articles with explicit and wide identity frames in all articles of the intervention debate.*

	national participation	character of conflict	European continent	ideological orientation
explicit identity frame	0.106***	0.013	0.018	0.066**
wide identity frame	0.427***	0.274***	0.248***	0.004
frames referring to the countries' multiple identities	0.222***	0.133***	0.132***	0.022

Table 3.5: *Cramer's V for identity framing in the intervention debate*

*** α = 0.000, ** $\alpha \leq 0.005$, * $\alpha \leq 0.010$

interpretative orientation in the intervention debate in all countries.

The Cramer's V for the correlations of the four explanatory factors for the three modes of identity frames as independent variable shows that only national participation is significant for all three different notions of identity and has the strongest relation (cf. Table 3.5). This first empirical impression of the explanatory factors introduced in the theoretical part shows that imagined communities are strongest: when soldiers from our own country are involved in an intervention, we care about what happens and relate it to ourselves as a nation. Interventions carried out without national participation are less important and remain crises not related to the peaceful communities in the countries of debate. If considered in one model, national participation outmatches any of the other explanatory factors.

Apart from national participation, the character of conflict and geographic proximity of European countries yield significant results for the wide identity frame and those explicit identity frames referring to a nation's own multiple identities. Both factors are clearly lower than national participation, but are both moderately strong and quite similar. It is not only the participation of national soldiers, but also a conflict that includes genocide and a conflict close to home that causes identity framing. Ideology proves to be the only factor with no effect on identity framing and no significant results.

For each explanatory factor, I will check the frequency of explicit and the wide identity frame as well as the communities of identity that refer to the respective multiple identities of the four countries under investigation: national identity, European identity, civilizational (Western) identity and universal identity. As the explicit identity frame does not prove significant in a number of cases while the wide identity frame and the communities of identity are significant, I will examine the latter two in more detail. Yet, I do not want to omit the explicit identity frame as it is the basis to which the different communities

of identity refer. The countries' own multiple communities are important to see whether intervention events are related to the respective selves in the different countries. To ensure that results and statistics are easier to compare, I take the same steps for each of the four explanatory factors.

3.3.1 National Participation

The first hypothesis reads that national participation in interventions matter for the identity framing. The idea is that there exists an imagined community of discussants in the public debate (journalists, readers) and soldiers from the same nation. The discussion is framed more often in terms of identity if soldiers from the country of debate are at risk. Therefore, I categorized crisis regions with at least 10 cases in the whole sample of four countries (accounting for 40 to 60 per cent of all crises) along participation (cf. Section 2.2, Table 2.3). For some crises discussed, there was no intervention, e.g. Chechnya or Iran, for others, all countries sent ground troops, e.g. Afghanistan in 2001/2002.

The relation of participation to identity framing is significant for all three cases of identity framing including explicit identity framing (in contrast to the other explanatory factors) (cf. Table 3.5 on the previous page, 112).

When differentiating between degrees of intervention, full participation in the sense of a direct involvement of soldiers on the ground or in other combat (air strikes) often carries with it identity framing in the intervention debate (cf. Figure 3.20 on the next page, 114). The debate on a conflict in which the country of debate participates in the sense of logistic organization, evacuation, supply of material, air or troop lifts (some participation) has fewer identity references. The explicit identity frame is even less frequent for these cases than for conflicts with no participation at all. For references to the countries' own multiple identities in the country of debate, there is an increase with the depth of participation. The relation of participation and a wide identity framing in the intervention debate is significant and strong (Cramer's V=0.472). Overall, national participation in the crises is important to explain the identity framing of the intervention debate.

To account for differences between countries, I focus on wide identity and the countries' own multiple identities, which are both more strongly related to national participation and are significant for all explanatory factors. The view on the wider identity frame reveals that participation matters, in particular for identity framing in the American debate (cf. Figure 3.21). The share increases from less than 12 per cent to more than 70 per cent if the US military is fully involved in the intervention (Cramer's V=0.599). The American imagined community, i.e. American national identity, is strong making it decisive whether American soldiers are involved and at risk for any occurrence of identity-related reactions. For the other countries, the relation between participation in the intervention and identity framing of its debate is significant and moderately strong. This is also true for



Figure 3.20: *Share of identity frames in all articles of the intervention debate along national participation in the conflict by the country of debate, in per cent.*

***identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=26.305, α*= 0.000, Cramer's V=0.106; **wide identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=727.126, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.427; **countries' own multiple identities**: Pearson's χ^2=195.469, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.222*



Figure 3.21: *Share of wider identity frame in all articles of the intervention debate along national participation in interventions, by country, in per cent.*

***France**: Pearson's χ^2=169.006, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.412; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=82.449, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.288; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=146.412, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.384; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=356.922, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.559*

Germany and France, which did not participate in the Iraq intervention in 2003 although it was a major part of the intervention debate.[17] [18] Nevertheless, there are also references to values and identity in the discussion on whether to send soldiers before the intervention in Iraq took place:

> "Mrs. Merkel criticized the government's foreign policy in her half-hour speech, but used less sharp phrasing compared to the budgetary debate fourteen days ago. It has not been achieved to disarm the dictator in Iraq peacefully, 'as we all wanted it to'. With applause from her own party fraction and some representative from the FDP [liberal party] only, she said: 'We hope for the victory of democracy over dictatorship... We cannot remain neutral in this war. We stand at the side of those who fight for democracy.' "
> (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 4, 2003: Carstens, 2001)[19]

In all countries, it makes no differences whether it is is full intervention with ground troops and combat or only partial involvement – in the Netherlands, full participation generates only a slightly lower share of wide identity frames than partial participation.

National participation also results in more identity references to the countries' own communities. Figure 3.22 shows to which communities explicit identity frames refer in case of intervention with respective national participation and without. A major difference between the European countries and the United States is the multiple character of collective identities in Europe. While the low share of European identity in the United States comes as no surprise, European identity plays an important role in France and the Netherlands, although, surprisingly, not in Germany. Instead, Germany and the Netherlands both have a comparatively high share of civilizational (presumably Western) identity that clearly surpasses the respective national identities (5.82 and 7.45 per cent respectively for full participation).

The Netherlands and the United States have more identity subframes that refer to their own communities of identity than France or Germany. In the Netherlands, this is related to the country's multiple identity: Dutch national identity is as low as German or French

[17] Iraq as well as Bosnia were split into several time periods as there were different interventions (Iraq) or a totally changed mission (Bosnia).

[18] The surprisingly low share of French articles that relate to crises in which the country intervened (39 per cent) can also be explained by the high share of articles related to Iraq since 2002 and missing time periods in the sample for earlier interventions.

[19] My translation: "Frau Merkel kritisierte in ihrer etwa halbstündigen Rede die Außenpolitik der Bundesregierung, gebrauchte dabei jedoch weniger scharfe Formulierungen als noch vor vierzehn Tagen anläßlich der Haushaltsdebatte über den Kanzleretat. Es sei nicht gelungen, den Diktator im Irak friedlich zu entwaffnen, 'wie wir alle das wollten'. Unter Beifall ausschließlich aus den Reihen ihrer Fraktion und einiger Abgeordneter der FDP sagte sie: 'Wir hoffen auf den Sieg der Demokratie über die Diktatur... Wir können in diesem Krieg nicht neutral sein. Wir stehen an der Seite derer, die für die Demokratie kämpfen.' "



Figure 3.22: *Share of different communities of identity in all articles of the intervention debate along the degree of national participation in the conflict, by country, in per cent.*

***France**: Pearson's χ^2=22.374, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.151; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=23.826, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.156; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=46.278, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.217; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=76.822, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.280*

national identities. Yet the Netherlands relates its multiple identity more clearly to interventions with participation of Dutch soldiers. Dutch identity as a pacifist *gidsland*, i.e. as a role model for fair and good (foreign) policy, seems to make the country sensitive to its soldiers in interventions. As a small country, the Netherlands relies on moral superiority with soldiers engaging to promote international justice and humanitarian improvements. The same is true for American national self-understanding as a superpower. In the US debate, it does not play a great role whether own soldiers are directly involved in fighting or only engaged in other support to missions. As long as American soldiers are involved in an intervention at all, these are related to the United States establishing community with the national soldiers in regions of conflict.

In the Netherlands, there is an even greater increase of references to European and Western identity than to national identity if Dutch soldiers are involved in an intervention: European identity rises from 1.74 per cent to 5.88 per cent and Western identity rises from 0.87 to 7.45 per cent compared to national Dutch identity rising from 1.74 per cent to 4.31 per cent. In Germany, Western identity also increases more strongly than German national identity (from 0.63 to 5.82 per cent). Even if participation is based on nationality, effects also reach the multiple identities of European countries.

Overall, the hypothesis has been strongly confirmed for all countries: Imagined communities of nations are strong and generate a discussion of crises far away if soldiers from the same nations are involved. People discussing intervention care about conflicts more if they know that compatriots are at risk. Yet, it is only in the United States that it is a clearly national community that is referred to as affected by the conflict. The European countries evoke multiple identities when national soldiers are engaged.

3.3.2 Character of Conflict

My second hypothesis is related to the character of conflict under discussion. I aim to find out whether those conflicts that are characterized by genocide, ethnically motivated expulsion and massacres are more often interpreted with regard to identity. Comparing the explanatory factors and their relation to identity framing, the character of conflict proved to be significant and Cramer's V moderately strong. In reaction to the Holocaust and the realization of its horrors, the countries under investigation vowed that it shall never happen again and integrated and national values contradict genocide and ethnic discrimination. While this similar tendency in all countries would account for a similar reaction in all countries, different national identities may account for inter-country differences: Germany and to a lesser extent the Netherlands have self-reflexively integrated their shameful participation in the Holocaust to their memory and identity, which I expected would render them more sensitive to present-day genocide as well. Again, the focus of the discussion is on intervention. When a massacre itself is discussed without an interventionist



Figure 3.23: *Share of different characters of conflict as coded in all articles coded with identity frames, by country, in per cent*

focus, such an article is not included in the intervention debate and this analysis.

The articles of the intervention debate all focus on action taken by outsiders in conflicts originally not directly involving the intervening party. So if emphasis is on external military intervention rather than on the war, civil war, unrest etc. in the crisis country, it comes as no surprise that there are few articles which have been coded to deal mainly with genocide and atrocities at all: 67 all together. The same is true for the distribution of identity frames along the coded character of crisis, which has a very low share of atrocities (cf. Figure 3.23).[20] In Germany, the share is a bit higher but still clearly behind the majority of crisis types. Overall, most articles focus on diplomatic and military conflicts, i.e. genocide and massacre or expulsion may be mentioned, but due to the interventionist focus, they are not accounted for here.

Figure 3.24 on the next page, 119, shows the share of the three identity frames for articles with conflicts coded to relate to atrocities and other conflicts. Atrocities trigger more identity framing in the debates, but results are only significant on a 95% level for the wide identity framing. In fact, only 67 cases have atrocities coded as the focus of the article. To be able to analyze the identity reactions in the case of genocide, a regroupment of articles is necessary to assure higher case numbers.

I regrouped all crisis regions along their attributed character of conflict.[21] In many conflicts as in Bosnia, massacres occurred, but the intervention was not started for that reason or directed at stopping them – ethnic cleansing was nevertheless the background

[20] Atrocities include also massacres, forced expulsion as well as genocide.

[21] For the regrouping and arguments for decisions, compare Section 2.2.



Figure 3.24: *Share of identity frames in the intervention debate along the character of conflict as coded, in per cent.*

***identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=0.427, α*= 0.513, Cramer's V=0.014; **wide identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=44.835, α*=0.002, Cramer's V=0.106; **countries' own multiple identities**: Pearson's χ^2=6.426, α*=0.011, Cramer's V=0.040*

against which the intervention was carried out. While this was not sufficient to code an article as event type "massacre, genocide, expulsion", it does play a role in the understanding of the region (and the intervention). In contrast to the coded character of conflict, atrocities do not stand central after the regrouping, but only conflicts that are related to genocide are considered.[22] The total number of articles with these conflicts at focus is 513, guaranteeing more valid results. With this regrouping, it is also evident that intervention in Cambodia is still seen against (the memory of) genocide in the 1970s:

> "Here's some good news that deserves to be heard above the Soviet din: The killing in Cambodia's killing fields is nearing a negotiated end. Yesterday, leaders of Cambodia's four political factions agreed to reduce their armies by 70 percent and put the rest under U.N. supervision. That reinforces a cease-fire in place since June. Major hurdles still stand in the way of a comprehensive settlement. But two decades of intermittent carnage seem truly over."
> (*New York Times*, August 28, 1991: n.a., 1991)

The character of conflict matters for the identity references in the intervention debate (cf. Figure 3.25). The relation for the wide identity frame is not as strong as for

[22] In the figures, the category names were changed from atrocities to genocide to mark the difference.



Figure 3.25: *Share of identity frames in the intervention debate along the character of conflict as attributed, in per cent.*

$N_{other\ conflict}$=1834, $N_{genocide}$=513

***identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=0.021, α*= 0.884, Cramer's V=0.013; **wide identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=298.370, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.274; **countries' own multiple identities**: Pearson's χ^2=70.896, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.133*

national participation, but still clear. And although the explicit identity frame is statistically insignificant, the frames which refer to the respective multiple identities of the four countries under investigation are significant. It shows that not only in wide sense identity matters are touched upon in cases of genocide, but that genocide relates to French, Germans, Dutch and Americans as nationals and their supranational communities. Although the significant relation is not very strong, the share of identity frames that relate to the multiple identities (national, European, civilizational) rises from about 6 to almost 16 per cent. Genocide and conflicts with similar violence are more frequently related to all countries' own multiple identities. It becomes evident that there is a difference between conflicts that lies beyond the pure matter of national participation which proved to be most relevant.

For a closer look across all countries, I refer to the wide identity frame along the attributed character of conflict because it proved significant (cf. Figure 3.26 on the next page, 122). All results for all countries are significant, but vary in strength. If debating conflicts that are associated to atrocities, identity shares are higher in all countries. There is a surprising difference between countries: In the German debate, genocide does not result in as many more identity frames being used to interpret events compared to the other three countries. The share only rises to almost half of all articles, while in the other countries, the share doubles to around two thirds of all cases. The self-reflexive German

identity does not mean that in the German intervention debate there are more references to identities if the conflict is associated to genocide. There are, in fact, even less.



Figure 3.26: *Share of wide identity frame in all articles coded of the intervention debate along attributed characters of conflict, by country, in per cent.*

***France**: Pearson's χ^2=45.411, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.214; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=25.109, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.159; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=63.947, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.254; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=51.283, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.227*



Figure 3.27: *Share of different communities of identity in all articles of the intervention debate along attributed characters of conflict, by country, in per cent.*

***France**: Pearson's χ^2=6.261, α*=0.180, Cramer's V=0.080; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=27.333, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.167; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=29.519, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.173; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=12.420, α*=0.014, Cramer's V=0.113*

For the communities to which identity is related, case numbers are low leading to insignificant results for France and the US (cf. Figure 3.27 on the previous page, 122). The overall picture resembles the results for national participation: In Europe, identities are more diverse and national identity is not as important as in the United States. While the Netherlands ranks highest at just below 25 per cent for all its identities, the country is more similar to France and Germany regarding its low share of national identity: 5.00 per cent compared to 2.70 per cent for German national identity and 4.67 for French (US 8.47 per cent). Dutch identity is particularly related to civilizational identity, most likely Western identity.

Differences among countries are not very pronounced but they show in line with the self-reflexive character of identity. German *national* identity has the lowest rise compared to the other three countries if interventions in regions with genocide character are discussed. Yet, the correlation of identity framing for multiple identities and occurrence of genocide in the crises is strongest and significant only in Netherlands and Germany. There is some reaction to genocide, as in the quote from the beginning of the Bosnia War:

> "Pressure from the CDU [German conservative party] also grows on the federal government to become militarily active against Serbia with participation of the German army. Chief Secretary of the CDU social committees (CDA), Franz Dormann, said to Neue Presse (Hanover) that the federal government has to finally push through within the UN, so that the international community gets a mandate to end militarily the genocide committed by the Serbs. If humanitarian help for Somalia was possible, then it is especially necessary to act against Serbia."
> (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 22, 1992: n.a., 1992)[23]

Although insignificant, the sharpest rise is evident for American national identity, which reaches 18 per cent if interventions with genocide are discussed. In Germany and the Netherlands, there is a clear increase for European and civilizational identity instead. It seems that the two countries with (partially) self-reflexive national identity see the impact of genocide less on their national identities but if at all in their belonging to Europe and the West: in Germany, European identity rises from 0.48 to 2.03 per cent if crises with genocide are debated and Western identity rises from 1.08 to 6.76 per cent. In the Netherlands, European identity rises from 2.92 to 8.75 per cent if crises with genocide

[23]My translation: "Auch der Druck aus der CDU auf die Bundesregierung, mit Beteiligung der Bundeswehr militaerisch gegen Serbien vorzugehen, waechst. Der Hauptgeschaeftsfuehrer der CDU-Sozialausschuesse (CDA), Franz Dormann, sagte zur Neuen Presse (Hannover), die Bundesregierung muesse endlich in der UNO durchsetzen, dass diese der Voelkergemeinschaft ein Mandat gebe, militaerisch den Voelkermord der Serben zu beenden. Wenn die humanitaere Hilfe in Somalia moeglich sei, dann sei es erst recht noetig, gegen Serbien vorzugehen."



Figure 3.28: *Share of identity frames in all articles of the intervention debate along geographic proximity of conflict, in per cent.*

$N_{same\ continent}=591$, $N_{different\ continent}=2382$

***identity frame**: Pearson's $\chi^2=0.785$, $\alpha^*= 0.376$, Cramer's V=0.018; **wide identity frame**: Pearson's $\chi^2=244.033$, $\alpha^*=0.000$, Cramer's V=0.248; **countries' own multiple identities**: Pearson's $\chi^2=69.706$, $\alpha^*=0.000$, Cramer's V=0.132*

are debated and Western identity rises from 3.41 to 8.75 per cent. For France, the increase is only marginal.

Overall, self-reflexive national identity is very limited in its effect on identity reactions to present-day genocide. However, there is some evidence that genocide evokes European and Western identities in particular in (partially) self-reflexive German and Dutch identities.

3.3.3 Geographic Proximity

Like national participation and the character of conflict, geographic proximity yielded significant results in its relation to identity framing (cf. Table 3.5 on page 112). The hypothesis is that conflicts on the same continent as those discussing it should have more references to identity in the public debate than conflicts far away. Especially for Europe, this should be true because European integration envisions to overcome war on a war-torn continent. I thus presume that the debate on conflicts in Europe is framed in terms of identity more frequently in French, German and Dutch newspapers than in US newspapers. This would be the case for the Yugoslav wars. On the other hand, in the American press such frames are more important regarding conflicts on the American continent, with Haiti as the only relevant case.



Figure 3.29: *Share of geographic regions of intervention in articles coded with identity frames, by country, in per cent.*

The direct correlation of geographic proximity and identity references in the debate shows that there is a significant relation of intervention on the same continent for wide identity framing and frames referring to the countries' multiple identities (cf. Figure 3.28). For explicit identity framing, the relation is not significant and only weak. For the wide identity frame, the share rises from 30 per cent to over 60 per cent if the conflict discussed is on the same continent as the debate – the relation is significantly strong (Cramer's V=0.248). Although the multiple identities relate to explicit identity references, it is also significantly influenced by the geographic proximity of the conflict. Thus, geographic proximity matters.

When looking more closely, I distinguish regions of intervention and countries of newspaper issue. The distribution of the identity frame along regions shows that only in Germany the Near and Middle East scores below fifty per cent (cf. Figure 3.29).[24] For all countries, the Near and Middle East is the most important region for identity frames. Yet, as the total number of articles coded on this region (especially Iraq) is very high, it is important to look at relative shares.

For the broader interpretation of identity, there is no clear tendency towards more identity frames for interventions on the same continent as the debate (cf. Figure 3.30 on the next page, 126). As low case numbers really only allow comparisons of Africa, Europe, and the Near and Middle East, exceptionally high shares of the identity frames in Dutch articles for Asian crises or in German articles for American crises should be neglected. For the other three regions, the association in all four countries is significant

[24]The low case numbers are caused by the many articles that relate to several regions of conflict or have non specified.



Figure 3.30: *Share of wide identity frame in all articles of the intervention debate along regions of conflict, by country, in per cent.*

statistics refer only to three major crises (Africa, Europe and Near and Middle East). ***France****: Pearson's* χ^2*=372.700,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.612;* ***Germany****: Pearson's* χ^2*=210.925,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.460;* ***Netherlands****: Pearson's* χ^2*=212.899,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.463;* ***US****: Pearson's* χ^2*=363.629,* α**, Cramer's V=0.605*

and very strong with Cramer's V rising from 0.460 to 0.612. For wide identity frames, it does not matter whether the continent of conflict is the same as that of debate. Only for the Netherlands, does identity seem to be more important in Europe compared to the other continents.[25] In the other countries, identity framing is used for both Europe's and the Near and Middle East's crisis regions in approximately the same amount. American identity references to all continents are frequent and there is also a higher share of identity references to the American continent compared to European references to the American continent, mostly related to Haiti:

> "Some people argue that the U.S. should promote democracy abroad by force. But a U.S. invasion of Haiti would not be widely seen as upholding such a principle, and it would not convince the world that the United States would act decisively when elected leaders in other countries were overthrown. We hardly blinked at the forcible negation of the elections in Algeria and the ouster of an elected leader in the former Soviet republic of Georgia in recent years. In this hemisphere, few Latin Americans would be persuaded that we would invade other countries, say Venezuela or Brazil, in response to a coup. Instead, the lesson the world would extract from an invasion would be that

[25] In fact, only for the Netherlands the relation is also significant when considering all continents of crises and not only the major three as done for the statistics in Figure 3.30.



Figure 3.31: *Share of different communities of identity in all articles of the intervention debate along regions of conflict, by country, in per cent.*

statistics refer only to three major crises (Africa, Europe and Near and Middle East) ***France****: Pearson's* χ^2*=56.180,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.239;* ***Germany****: Pearson's* χ^2*=50.268,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.226;* ***Netherlands****: Pearson's* χ^2*=62.153,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.262;* ***US****: Pearson's* χ^2*=111.439,* α**, Cramer's V=0.337*

> if a U.S. President is humiliated long enough by strongmen in a relatively powerless country with a history of American involvement in its internal affairs, he will send in the marines. This would not be an especially impressive lesson."
> (*New York Times*, May 12, 1994: Carothers, 1994)

The relation of geographic proximity and identity is not so clear if the different regions of intervention are taken into account separately. While Europe is important to all so is the Near and Middle East. It comes as no surprise that the two crisis regions of the post-Cold War era, the Yugoslav region and Iraq, emerge as the two interventions that trigger most identity framing. In the direct relation of geographic proximity and identity, Iraq is not able to level the low identity shares for other conflicts outside the Yugoslav region and Iraq.

Focusing on the multiple communities to which explicit identity frames refer and to which the discussants may relate themselves (nation, Europe, civilization) in Figure 3.31 on the previous page, 127, conflicts on the European soil are prominent in all European

debates, while in the US, distribution is more even.[26] While in the general identity framing, the Near and Middle East is still as important, this does not apply if focusing on the multiple identities of the European countries. In French, German and Dutch papers, much identity framing for Iraq is obviously related to the US. Intervention on the European continent, i.e. intervention in Yugoslavia, triggers clearly more reference to the multiple communities of identity in the three European states. In the Netherlands, this refers to a quarter of all articles focusing on intervention in Europe. The association of the three major continents of crises and the countries' own multiple communities of identity is significant and strong in all four countries, particularly the US.

The identity communities in the European debates are again more diverse than in the American debate; European and Western identity play an important role, too. Especially in the Netherlands, European and Western identity have higher shares overall than national Dutch identity. Also in France and Germany, the shares of Western and European identity rise if interventions in Europe are discussed: In France, share of European identity increases from 2.17 per cent to 4.23 per cent if focus is on intervention in Europe instead of the Near and Middle East. In Germany, the share of Western identity increases from 2.45 per cent to 5.96. Intervention in Europe matters to Europeans particularly regarding the multiple character of their identities, including direct reference to European identity as in an article by British prime minister Tony Blair in the German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung*:

> "I believe that our decision to partake in military action [in Kosovo] was right, that we have to continue and that NATO may not compromise regarding its (five) conditions. I also believe that all of us in Europe have to learn the right lessons as soon as this conflict is won. In particular, we have to cut our losses for the European defense policy. It has to evolve in the embracing framework of NATO. There has to be a complete compatibility with NATO. Everything else would be contra-productive. But we have to discuss if we in Europe have the will to act together under certain circumstances – if we also have the appropriate military potential to do so. If we are serious about a European defense capacity, we have to think about which capacities we need in Europe."
> (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 12, 1999: Blair, 1999)[27]

[26] I have excluded Asia and America as case numbers were too low (see above).

[27] My translation: "Ich glaube, dass unser Entschluss zu einer Militaeraktion richtig war, dass wir sie durchhalten muessen und, dass die Nato sich auf keine Kompromisse bei (ihren fuenf) Bedingungen einlassen darf. Ich glaube auch, dass wir alle in Europa die richtigen Lektionen lernen muessen, sobald dieser Konflikt gewonnen ist. Ganz besonders muessen wir die Konsequenzen fuer eine gemeinsame europaeische Verteidigungspolitik ziehen. Diese muss natuerlich im uebergreifenden Rahmen der Nato entstehen. Es muss eine vollstaendige Kompatibilitaet mit der Nato geben. Alles andere waere kontraproduktiv. Aber

Yet, interventions in Europe are not less related to American identity in the US than to Dutch national identity in the Netherlands. The share of American identity is higher than the multiple identities in the European countries, but interventions in Africa or the Near and Middle East are related in about the same amount to American identity. For Europeans and especially Dutch, intervention in Europe yields clearly higher shares than those in other regions. In the United States, it matters less in which region of the world a conflict takes place for it to be understood in identity terms or for it to be related to the national identity. Europeans are less internationally minded in their debates of interventions.

Overall, geographic proximity matters. A closer look reveals, though, that it is especially the two major post-Cold War crises and interventions, the Yugoslav region and Iraq, that triggered identity reactions in all countries. With these two interventions as the most intensely debated cases in the time period under investigation, the high share of identity reactions comes as no surprise. Yet there is an important finding on the countries' own identities: Europeans care more about Europe than for other regions of intervention, while American identity is more related to all interventions no matter which continent they take place on. Even the interventions in the Near and Middle East, i.e. in Iraq, are not clearly more important to American identity than interventions in Europe or Africa. American identity is thus related to interventions around the world, while Europeans are Eurocentric.

3.3.4 Ideological Orientation of Newspapers

Lastly, I turn to an alternative explanation for identity references in the intervention debate: ideological orientation of the newspapers. For each country, two major daily broad sheet newspapers were analyzed: one center-left liberal newspaper and one center-right conservative newspaper. As the liberal tradition relies more on an internationalist view of the world, they are more likely to use identity frames in their articles on interventions.

The results of analysis differ from all other explanations because the ideological orientation of the newspapers is insignificant in its relations to two of three different modes of identity references (cf. Figure 3.32). In the case of explicit identity framing – the only case which was insignificant for the other explanatory factors – the relation is significant at 95% level and conservative newspapers refer more often to identity than liberal-left newspapers.

Since the explicit identity frame is only slightly insignificant, I rely on it rather than the wider identity frame as in the other cases for a focus on the four countries (cf. Fig-

wir muessen diskutieren, ob wir in Europa den Willen haben, unter bestimmten Umstaenden gemeinsam zu handeln – ob wir auch das entsprechende militaerische Potential dafuer haben. Wenn wir es ernst meinen mit einer europaeischen Verteidigungsfaehigkeit, muessen wir darueber nachdenken, welche Faehigkeiten wir in Europa dazu benoetigen."



Figure 3.32: *Share of identity frames in all articles of the intervention debate along ideological orientation of newspapers, in per cent.*

***identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=10.355, α*= 0.001, Cramer's V=0.066; **wide identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=0.064, α*=0.801, Cramer's V=0.004; **countries' own multiple identities**: Pearson's χ^2=1.920, α*=0.166, Cramer's V=0.022*

ure 3.33). Although the relation is clearly insignificant in all countries, the conservative newspapers in all countries use identity frames more often than their liberal-left counterparts. Contrary to my hypothesis, conservative newspapers rely more on identity framing in the intervention debate. Obviously, the internationalist orientation of liberal ideology includes less identity references in the intervention debate. Rather than orienting towards the subject of debate (intervention), it seems that identity framing should be considered. Conservatives rely on (established) communities, such as families, nations and ethnicities, to understand relations and events. Identity framing is thus a common understanding for conservatives – even when conflicts in other countries are discussed.

The differences within nations are overall marginal and insignificant, while across nations, Germany and France show lower shares of identity framing than the Netherlands and especially the United States. The overall similarity of both ideological orientations shows that it is not a valuable indicator for debates with identity relations.

3.4 Summary

The first part of the empirical studies took a closer look at the overall debate on war and interventions with help of corpus-linguistics and at the intervention debate with content analysis relying on frames. There are two perspectives on all data: a comparative



Figure 3.33: *Share of identity frames in all articles of the intervention debate along the ideological orientation of newspapers, by country, in per cent*

***France**: Pearson's χ^2=1.317, α*=0.251, Cramer's V=0.049; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=3.593, α*=0.058, Cramer's V=0.078; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=3.519, α*=0.061, Cramer's V=0.071; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=2.649, α*=0.104, Cramer's V=0.071*

perspective on the different crises occurring between 1990 and 2006 and a comparative perspective on the four countries of debate, namely France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. As I aim to understand what the identity related reaction to genocide is, particularly in Europe, Bosnia plays an important role in all analyses.

Corpus-linguistic analysis of the overall debate on war and intervention has shown that Bosnia is a crisis place which brought attention to a great variety of actors as well as perspectives on the crises – more so as any other crises in the time 1990 to 2006. Considering all words that co-occur with the crisis name and refer to actors, there is dominance of local conflict parties. Yet, among the outside actors a great variety of is mentioned with the United Nations, NATO and the respective nations referred to. Moreover, only in Bosnia and Kosovo, do European institutions play some role as actors in a conflict. Regarding the understanding of a conflict, Bosnia proves to be the most manifold: fighting and diplomacy are important, but there are also many collocates that show there is much effort made how to interpret the conflict at all. Human rights and values and identity also play a role. In the direct relation of different conflicts and the co-occurrence of their names in the debate, there are fewer parallels drawn between Bosnia and the others. On the other hand, Bosnia is an important reference point in other crises, and more so, stands for itself.

Issue cycles presenting media attention on major crises in the time period analyzed show that the Yugoslav wars and the Bosnian War in particular are of great importance

in the overall intervention debate. In fact, they can be considered as the major focus in the decade following the Cold War, achieving continuous reporting while reports on Iraq were only frequent for short periods of time. After September 11, 2001, the focus shifts to the Middle East, to Afghanistan and more so to Iraq.

Regarding identity framing in the intervention debate, there is a striking difference between the American debate and that in European countries; identity frames, especially those referring to a country's own national identity, are more frequent in the US. Obviously, all conflicts (and especially the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan) are interpreted as being related to American self-understanding. In contrast to the American reliance on national identity, it has become evident that there are multiple identities in Europe. Especially German and Dutch debates show a high share of Western identity and even France has more references to Western identity than the US. The Dutch reveal a very internationalist orientation with low scores for national identity and higher ones for European and Western identity. In all European countries, interventions are discussed as relating to European and Western identity rather than to the respective national identities.

The question of who cares about genocide and war in Europe was split in two: the character of conflict (genocide) and the continent of conflict (in Europe). Identity framing shows that genocide (and ethnically motivated massacres and expulsion) are important for identity framing in all countries. The character of the conflict does matter and all care about genocide. Yet, for the question of whether the location in *Europe* matters more to Europeans, the picture is not so clear because Americans pay as much attention to Europe as Europeans do. And Europeans and Americans care about the Near and Middle East as well. Unsurprisingly, Yugoslavia (Europe) and Iraq (Near and Middle East) as the two major regions of conflict are also most important for identity framing. European own multiple identities are more related to the European continent than to other continents and than American identity is related to the European continent. Regarding other regions namely Africa, identity is important in the American debate only. It can be safely said that all care about genocide, but Americans are the only ones who care about Africa. Regarding the research question, it can be summarized that genocide in Europe evokes identities in Europe in particular.

More so than genocide and the continent of conflict, national participation in an intervention matters for the framing of the intervention debate in terms of identity. Whenever soldiers of the own nation are involved, an imagined community of the discussants in the public debate and the men and women in arms is visible. Yet even with this nationalist view on interventions, European countries refer identity not only to national identity but also to European and Western identity. "Our boys and girls" are not only French, Germany and Dutch but part of European and Western communities in European debates. The ideological orientation of the newspapers does not matter for the identity framing of the intervention debate.

Aside from the fact that participation matters most and regarding the research question, it can be stated that Europeans relate their multiple identities to genocide (and war) in Europe in particular. Yet, when compared to American reactions, there is no more identity framing in the European debates; when compared to other regions of conflict, Europe is of importance to Europeans while Americans care about other regions as well. Moreover, the multiple identities Europeans refer to show that there is a different way Europeans evoke their identities. For more details on the second part of the research question – how identity is evoked by genocide – I have a closer look at the public debate surrounding the genocide in Srebrenica.

4

Focus on Srebrenica

Srebrenica was the first genocide in Europe since the Holocaust and it could be expected that this fact triggered debates related to identity in the European countries whose identities rely on values, and memory of the Holocaust and "never again". My aim is to find out if there were identity-related reactions in the face of genocide in Europe and of what type they were.

A short introduction to the events in Bosnia and particularly in Srebrenica, will show how ethnic cleansing was the goal rather than a by-product of the Bosnian War that waged from 1992 to 1995. The engagement by outside actors was not appropriate to face the violence and atrocities. In Srebrenica, failure by different actors, UN and Dutch in particular, led to the fall of Srebrenica declared UN safe area and to the unprevented genocide, killing more than 8000 people.

For a first empirical overview, corpus-linguistics will be employed again. This way, the reading of Srebrenica can be compared to other events in the overall debate on war and intervention from the previous chapter. For comparative reasons, a quick look at Srebrenica in the intervention debate is taken before turning to the Srebrenica debate itself. Then, hypotheses will be investigated regarding participation, type of national identity, transnational identities and ideological orientation of the newspapers to check for differences among the national debates in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States. The chronology of the chapter will follow the different perspectives on the identity-related reaction; identity matters in general, explicit identity references, and values and memories evoked. For a better understanding of the substance of the debate, I will study values and memory as different components of identity in greater detail to detect convergence among countries towards, for example Europeanized identity or indications of a Westernized memory. Along with these details, I will also examine the general understanding of the character of conflict and at the question of locality to find out whether Srebrenica is ostracized from the European continent and whether it is considered a genocide. Lastly, I analyze questions of failure which may be attributed to

different communities including a country's own.

4.1 War in Yugoslavia and Genocide in Srebrenica

After the fall of communism and in an insecure international environment, the transition process to democracy failed to ensure minority rights in Yugoslavia and saw the rise of charismatic nationalist leaders relying on the suppressed memory of genocide against Serbs in World War II. I argue that the war and the genocide in Srebrenica followed from the idea of Great Serbism. This nationalist program that restructured identities in the region was promoted by Serb president Slobodan Milošević as well as, and not independent of the former, by the president of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serbian republic Radovan Karadžić.

Inspired by visits to Kosovo, communist bureaucrat Milošević made his career by stressing national Serb ideas and constructing Muslims as the other to Serbia (Rogel, 1998: 19; Funke and Rhotert, 1999: 19–22). He embraced Great Serbism founded on traditional nationalism long suppressed in Tito's Yugoslavia: Serbs who are minorities in many Yugoslav regions should all live in Serb land – even if that means that the majority population has to be expulsed to "ethnically cleanse" the land. With Milošević already holding three votes in the Yugoslav federation after incorporating Kosovo and Vojvodina, he blocked Slovene and Croat attempts to reform federal institutions which led these republics, as well as all others, to hold multi-party elections in 1990. The victorious nationalist parties in Slovenia and Croatia held referendums and declared their independence on June 25, 1991. With international recognition on the way, Bosnia was confronted to decide on whether to stay in a federation even more dominated by Miloĕsvić.

Already before the referendum on Bosnian independence was held, Bosnian Serb nationalist politician Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Croat politician Mate Boban had founded their own autonomous entities within Bosnia.[1] At the time Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović, head of multiethnic government, announced the referendum, Croat president Franjo Tuđman and his Serb counterpart discussed a partition of Bosnia among them (Rogel, 1998: 31) and Bosnians from all different backgrounds demonstrated for tolerance in Sarajevo (cf. Campbell, 1998: 57–60). After the successful referendum, Bosnian independence was recognized on April 6, 1992 and confrontation started between the Bosnian government and self-proclaimed Bosnian Croat state Herceg-Bosna and Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska.[2]

[1] As early as 1990, Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups are founded in Bosnia.

[2] Serb nationalism met similar tendencies of ethnic Croats reminiscent of independence during World War II as well as of the anti-Serbian genocide of Ustaša modeled after German terror organization SS. Muslim nationalism was ideologically no match (Funke and Rhotert, 1999: 85–91; Rogel, 1998: 50–51). The war against Bosnian Croats ended due to international arbitration in 1994 (Washington Agreement).

Shortly after the war started, there were reports of concentration camps and crimes against civilians, forceful expulsion as well as systematic rapes committed by Bosnian Serb nationalists (Rogel, 1998: 32). While the camps were closed or hidden shortly after broad international protests in reaction to pictures showing skinny, frightened prisoners resembling those in Nazi concentration camps, ethnic cleansing was even intensified (cf. Hasenclever, 2001: 417–419).

The strategy of ethnic cleansing was the execution of Great Serbism since it had the goal of homogenizing a territory where ethnic Serbs lived by systematically using force. While in its ethnic dimension the policy of violent identity constructions stresses racism, its violent execution amounts to genocide (cf. ICTY ruling, Rodrigues et al., 2001: 180–213). Thus, ethnic cleansing was no by-product or result from the war but its ultimate goal, as regards the Bosnian Serb extremists in particular. The pattern remained the same in all regions (Croatia, Bosnia and later Kosovo) (cf. Gow, 2003: 118–144): Parallel institutions were set up by the SDS nationalistic Serb party in all regions where Serbs lived. Loyal locals were thus engaged in cooperation with JNA (army) and paramilitary forces, e.g. identifying local Muslims as well as public buildings for detention or execution. Before attacks, rumors of murders were systematically spread and often combined with memory of World War II massacres on Serbs to frighten the local Bosnian Serb population (Samary, 1995: 99; Sells, 1996: 36–37). Muslim men were then separated from women to prevent the birth of further Muslim children which could – so the belief goes – eventually reconquer cleansed Serb lands (Rohde, 1997: 214). The women, children and elderly were left with little time to flee, and girls and women were often systematically raped. Cultural and religious symbols such as mosques and libraries were destroyed. Men were concentrated in camps and tortured to discourage resistance and return, intellectuals were often murdered (Gratz, 2007). Yet, little was done to stop the genocide as such.

Interpretation of events long focused on the humanitarian sufferings caused by the policy of ethnic cleansing and resulted in a UN intervention to Bosnia. More than 16 000 UNPROFOR soldiers (spring 1994) had a purely humanitarian task to supply medicine and food to civilians.[3] NATO air power to protect UN personnel was only a theoretical option after UNPROFOR soldiers and other UN workers had been taken hostage by Bosnian Serb nationalists. Meanwhile, diplomatic missions were launched and a number of different peace plans were proposed, which failed because the Bosnian Serb nationalists saw the chance for more gains on the ground and the coercion to accept was low (Burg and Shoup, 1999; Eisermann, 2000; Gow, 1997). Eventually, the Bosnian government only had 15 per cent of the country under its military control.

Srebrenica and Eastern Bosnia in general were very much contested during the war due to their proximity to the Serb border. In 1992, Bosnian Muslims local fighters had

[3]The situation was seen like a natural disaster, also and especially striking in the case of Srebrenica (Rijsdijk, 2003).

been successful in reconquering the region after the first Bosnian Serb attacks. Consecutively, Bosnian Muslims – at least with tolerance by the Bosnian army – attacked Serb villages and massacres were committed (Honig and Both, 1996: 76–81).[4] After Bosnian Serb nationalists attacked anew, thousands of Muslims fled to the town, almost doubling the people staying there from pre-war 37 000 to over 60 000 in March 1993 when UNPROFOR commander General Philippe Morillon visited Srebrenica.

Without prior consultation with higher UN institutions, he declared Srebrenica a safe area. The poorly developed concept of safe areas then ordered the enclaves to be demilitarized, while Bosnian Serb fighters agreed to let humanitarian supply through and held the fort. The first resolution 819 on the Srebrenica safe area also included a passage that reminded Yugoslavia that the International Court in the Hague had demanded it "to take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of genocide." This shows that the potential of a genocide had already been evident in 1993 and that support by the Yugoslav state had also long been obvious.

After British troops had prevented the conquest of Goradže, Bosnian Serb troops under the command of Ratko Mladić attacked Srebrenica safe area on July 6, 1995. Dutch soldiers did not return fire from their observation post although Bosnian Serb nationalists approached with heavy weaponry. Instead, they demanded close air support to hit the artillery, but the requests were imprecise and not granted by the UN (Honig and Both, 1996: 7–8). Within the UN, the hostage crisis was still on the mind of commanders, who also hoped for negotiations with the Bosnian Serb nationalists. Local Bosnian soldiers tried to prevent the Dutch retreat and killed a Dutch soldier.

After the military victory, many Muslim men feared what would follow and tried to flee across the mountains while 350 Dutch soldiers and 25 000 refugees (among whom 1200 men) were packed in and around Potočari UN compound on July 11, 1995 (Honig and Both, 1996: 28–29). Upon the arrival of Bosnian Serb general Mladić, the Dutch UNPROFOR let him have full control of the situation and negotiated only for their personal safety.

The separation of men and women was a typical first step in ethnic cleansing because only men were deemed able to resettle in the cleansed territory and were therefore killed in massacres during the war campaign. As the ICTY judgment against Bosnian Serb commander Krstić emphasizes, the patriarchal character of society in Eastern Bosnia made the killing of men in combination with the forced transfer of women and children a strategy for the physical disappearance of the all Muslims from Srebrenica (ICTY ruling, Rodrigues et al., 2001: 209–211). The explanation for the separation given to the Dutch, though, was military: detect Muslim war criminals hiding among refugees. For this pur-

[4]For these crimes, policeman and Bosnian general Naser Orić was later trialled by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and sentenced to two years of prison before being acquitted of all charges (ICTY, 2008).

pose, men would be interrogated while women could leave ahead. Among the men, there were also boys of just over 10 years of age as well as elderly men in their 70s, but Dutchbat did not intervene. Moreover, personal documents helpful to screening were burnt. By July 13, 1995, 23 000 people had been deported in just thirty hours.

Approximately 1000 men were taken from Potočari to Bratunac and later to various killing sites such as schools, warehouses and factories. "Most ... were slaughtered in carefully orchestrated mass executions ... [which] followed a well-established pattern." (ICTY ruling, Rodrigues et al., 2001: 20–21) The killing sites had been identified by local SDS radicals to the Bosnian Serb nationalists. The killings were executed with machine guns, at many instances Muslim prisoners first had to shovel graves into which they were shot. Meanwhile, UN brought fuel to pay Bosnian Serb nationalists for the deportation costs (Rohde, 1997: 291–293).

On July 14, 1995, in Tuzla, where the (female) refugees had been brought, the UN realized that there was a shortfall of 4000 men. Yet no measures were taken and the largest executions were still to come. Most victims of the genocide were men who had tried to flee across the mountains. Some were captured shortly after the fall of Srebrenica, others were entrapped in the woods with Bosnian Serb nationalists guarding the roads (Honig and Both, 1996: 50). Local SDS nationalists identified all men as "war criminals" to make it seem a legitimate and military campaign against Serb enemies. This illusion made it easier for the murderers and kept the campaign disciplined and well organized.

The Red Cross list of those missing from Srebrenica read 6546 names, which is more than half of all people missing from Bosnia as a whole: Muslims, Croats and Serbs. What actually happened came to light only gradually: reports by Dutch soldiers were not forwarded to the UN, but as early as July 18, the Dutch minister of development cooperation, Jan Pronk, summarized on tv: "Het is genocide die plaatsvindt." ("It is genocide that is taking place", cited in Rijsdijk, 2003: 313) Hard evidence came to light in August 1995 when the American ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, showed CIA pictures of mass graves in the Security Council. On November 18, 1995, the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia filed suite against Karadžić and Mladić for genocide committed in the safe area Srebrenica. In April 1996, international investigators uncovered the first mass graves. In August 2001, the ICTY stated in its ruling against Radislav Krstić and after hearing 128 witnesses that "beyond any reasonable doubt ... a crime of genocide was committed in Srebrenica" (ICTY ruling, Rodrigues et al., 2001). Since 2008, Radoslav Karadžić stands trial in the Hague for charges including genocide and Ratko Mladić does so since 2011.

The events in Srebrenica were a turning point of the war. Afterwards, strict neutrality in a humanitarian mission was given up, NATO became more active and the international community recognized Bosnian Serb nationalist aggression and to a lesser extent crimes in the frame of Great Serbism. In November 1995, the Dayton peace treaty was signed

with Serb president Miloĕvić representing the Bosnian Serb nationalists – showing in this war's last chapter how political power had been distributed all the way. The peace treaty ended the wars in Bosnia and Croatia with about 250 000 people killed (many of them civilians) and several hundred thousand driven from their homes.

A shortcoming of the Dayton treaty was the exclusion of regulations for the Serb province of Kosovo. The way the Yugoslav army and troops from the Yugoslav ministry of the interior as well as paramilitaries reacted to separatist UÇK attacks clearly showed systematic ethnic cleansing similar to that in Bosnia (Gow, 2003: 200–205). Tens of thousands were driven from their homes and thousands were killed before NATO intervened in March 1999.[5]

4.2 Comparing Srebrenica

The first part of my empirical analysis has shown that the Yugoslav region was the most important debate in the first decade after the Cold War until 9/11. To concentrate on Srebrenica, the same graphics were generated for those articles with a reference to Srebrenica: corpus-linguistic views on the overall war and intervention debate and a closer look at identity framing in the intervention debate only. Naturally, case numbers for articles that include the word Srebrenica are low compared to articles that include Bosnia or have it as their main issue, so that only careful conclusions can be drawn in this section.

4.2.1 Srebrenica in the Overall Debate on War and Intervention

The word "Srebrenica" occurs in all languages more than one thousand times when war and intervention are discussed. As shares of all words in the total sample of the overall debate on war and intervention, it ranges from 0.0028% (US) to 0.0147% (Netherlands). If compared to whole regions of conflict (Iraq or Bosnia), Srebrenica scores low as was clear from the analysis of the Yugoslav region and Bosnia in perspective (cf. Table 3.1 on page 83): Bosnia has a share of 0.05% and Iraq even 0.13% across the four countries. To get a better impression of how important the town of Srebrenica is in the news coverage, other single important towns as sights of atrocities are included. These range from historic wars (World War II, Vietnam) to more recent (Beirut) and contemporary events of the time period 1990–2006 (Somalia, Rwanda) and are provided in Table 4.1. It has to be kept in mind that some names are closely associated to the horror taking place at it (Auschwitz, Abu Ghraib) while capitals such as Beirut, Sarajevo or Kigali may be used in different contexts.

[5]There are some studies to inaccurate media representation of the atrocities in Kosovo as propaganda unreflectedly published (Wolfgram, 2008; Vincent, 2000) but the aggressive Serb cleansing is not proven wrong by them.

place of atrocities	France	Germany	Netherlands	US
Srebrenica	0.0039%	0.0051%	0.0147%	0.0028%
Auschwitz	0.0011%	0.0037%	0.0026%	0.0009%
Dien Bien Phu	0.0005%	0.0001%	0.0001%	0.0001%
Beirut	0.0069%	0.0052%	0.0041%	0.0019%
Mogadishu	0.0022%	0.0023%	0.0024%	0.0030%
Kigali	0.0028%	0.0022%	0.0018%	0.0011%
Nyarubuye	no occurrence	no occurrence	no occurrence	0.0000%
Vukovar	0.0014%	0.0009%	0.0016%	0.0002%
Sarajevo	0.0145%	0.0084%	0.0079%	0.0026%
Mostar	0.0018%	0.0041%	0.0037%	0.0010%
Abu Ghraib	0.0009%	0.0009%	0.0013%	0.0024%
total number of words	52 636 416	40 468 108	29 181 303	168 315 640

Table 4.1: *Share of names of single places of atrocities related to the total number of words in the sample on war and intervention; by country; in per cent.*

In the Netherlands, Srebrenica has the highest share as a single town famous for the horrors taking place there. It shows the importance of the place in the Dutch debate on wars and interventions. In France and Germany, Beirut and Sarajevo are more often used – in the US Mogadishu, while Sarajevo is also quite frequent in the Dutch and US debate. All three of these places, though, do not stand singularly for atrocities as Srebrenica does. Although in the case of Rwanda, a whole country is more or less synonymous with the horrors of genocide,[6] it is only in Srebrenica that specific events and a specific place of genocide have a share in the general debate on war and intervention in all four countries. As a single place, Srebrenica is thus very prominent compared to the other places of horror in the overall debate on war and intervention.

Corpus-linguistic word lists showing co-occurrences (collocates) of thematic fields with the keyword "Srebrenica" help to reveal the general associations made to the events in the enclave. The sample used for this analysis includes all the articles of the overall debate on war and intervention. As for the general perspective on the Yugoslav region, I include those collocates of Srebrenica which belong to the thematic fields of actors and of understandings and which have a share of at least 0.5 per cent of all collocates in every language. This way, I could generate figures comparable to those in the previous Chapter 3.1.

For the actors that are most frequently mentioned in the context of Srebrenica, a vast majority (70 to 90 per cent) are local (cf. Figure 4.1). This indicates that the events in

[6]The horror of Nyarubuye in Rwanda when the refuge of a church became a killing sight for more than 2000 women, men and children was named only in the US newspapers at all. This events is virtually unknown in the public debate.



	France (N=1361)	Germany (N=1606)	Netherlands (N=2189)	US (N=3887)
other				
NATO		0.62%		
UN	4.48%	18.68%	8.09%	8.62%
other national				0.98%
countries' own national	2.35%		25.45%	
European national	1.18%	1.81%		1.88%
European				0.72%
US				
regional		0.75%		
local	91.99%	78.14%	66.47%	87.81%

Figure 4.1: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the word field of actors co-occurring with "Srebrenica", by country, in per cent.*

N_{France}=1361, $N_{Germany}$=1606, $N_{Netherlands}$=2189, N_{US}=3887

Srebrenica are not seen under the aspect of intervention. The role of United Nations and Dutch UNPROFOR soldiers in the safe area are marginal compared to Bosnian Serb nationalists and local Muslim refugees. None of the crises analyzed before showed such a high share of local actors.

It is not surprising that the share of local actors is lowest in the Netherlands because the involvement of national actors is highest. Once again, national participation matters in this case. French officials involved in the UN hierarchy result in 2.35 per cent of articles mention French national actors in the French debate. American and especially German involvement was still lower and has no share in the respective debates. In the French, German and American debates, the Netherlands are the only European national actor – French actors do not play any role outside of France. Rather than national actors, the non-involved countries refer more often to the United Nations as being active in the events in Srebrenica. Overall, the Netherlands is not seen as an important actor in Srebrenica. Instead, the United Nations are.

While in the Netherlands, the national view is dominant with a quarter of actor references to Dutch actors, in all other countries the United Nations score second behind local actors. In Germany, the UN has the highest share with more than 18 per cent. This is prob-

ably due to the internationalist outlook that characterized Germany (and the Netherlands) in all crises. This contributes to the view that Germany is also the only country in which NATO is at least sometimes mentioned in the context of Srebrenica. The impression given in the literature that Dutch politicians intended to blame everyone else (especially the UN and France) for the failures in Srebrenica (cf. van den Boogaard, 2005) does not hold for the public debate in the country. Here, focus is on the Netherlands itself.

For the United States, the neighbor Canada is another actor that plays a role in Srebrenica. The Canadians were the predecessors of the Dutch UN forces in the safe area. Another interesting difference between the American and the European debates is that Europe is mentioned in the US – and not in any European country. These collocates do not necessarily refer to the EU or any other institution but rather the continent of events. Although it may be a geographic help to the reader, it may also be the case that in European countries the geographic proximity is ignored. Overall, there is no great difference between the European countries and the US regarding actors related to Srebrenica.

Compared to the other crisis regions, Srebrenica is among those which are seen as a local conflict rather than as an intervention. Thus, Srebrenica is similar to the whole Bosnian War. Yet the outside actors are not as multiple as for Bosnia in general but have a clear focus: the United Nations and the Netherlands. Details such as French official, NATO bombings or Canadian soldiers are accounted for only in single countries.

Regarding the different understanding of Srebrenica as shown in Figure 4.2 on page (143), I used the same categories as for the corpus-linguistic analysis of the major crises (cf. Section 3.1): fighting, human rights violations and other events (mostly diplomatic) for the action taking place as well as interpretations of events, values and identity, and cross-references.[7] The shares of the different categories were related to the total number of collocates of the thematic field of understandings.

Overall, human rights violations are prominent with around half of understandings in France, Germany and the US and a quarter of understandings in the Netherlands. There is the same pattern among the four countries under investigation visible as for the actors involved; the Netherlands understands Srebrenica in a different way to the other countries. Most surprising is the low share of human rights in the Dutch debate. In all other countries, human rights violations are the most prominent way to see what happened in Srebrenica. Rather than explicitly genocide, events are described as “massamoord” (mass murder), “Massaker”, “massacres” and “killings”.

In the Netherlands, fighting is most frequently mentioned. While at first sight this may mean that the conquest and fall of the proclaimed safe area is most important in the Netherlands, it is also evident that for the Dutch Srebrenica means more that what happened in that Bosnian town. In fact, the share of fighting as an understanding of events

[7] Islamistic terror does not play any role regarding Srebrenica.



Figure 4.2: *Share of different understanding in all collocates of the thematic field of understanding co-occurring with "Srebrenica", by country, in per cent.*

is as high in the United States as it is in the Netherlands. So rather than concentrating on the military aspects instead of human rights, there is yet another dimension to the events in the Netherlands: between 12 and 13 per cent of words co-occurring with Srebrenica in the thematic field of understandings are associated to interpretations and values and identity. While the pure facts of genocide play a lesser role, words such as "drama", "trauma" and "lessen" (lessons to be learned) are mentioned frequently when Srebrenica is discussed.

It is clear again that the national participation of the Netherlands results in a different discussion and understanding of the events in Srebrenica, but there are also other patterns. French marginal involvement as power in the UN military structure also seems to matter in the French debate; France comes second to the Netherlands with interpretative words as "tragédie" or "drame". It seems that in the case of Srebrenica with many questions raised on responsibilities (afterwards) for failing to prevent a genocide, even minor involvement – as with the French within UN command – results in slightly more identity issues raised. This first impression could not be confirmed in the later analysis of the Srebrenica debate. Similar to the actor collocates, Germany and the US are outsiders with fewer words of interpretation and identity associated with Srebrenica. In contrast to all three European countries which mostly compare Srebrenica and Rwanda, there are no parallels drawn in the American debate.

When compared to the major crises analyzed earlier, Srebrenica is more similar to Rwanda than to Bosnia because of the dominance of human rights violations. Yet, the high share of fighting suggests that the contexts of war plays an important role in the debate, too. So while the genocide context is clearly at focus for Srebrenica, otherwise

the understanding of events in the town is a part of the Bosnian War.

In summary, Srebrenica is a local event in which the United Nations played a key role. In cases of national (Dutch) participation only, national actors are also part of the respective national debates. National participation is also important for the understanding of events; the Dutch neglect of human rights violations leaves room for a national debate on interpretations, values and identity. The first overview already makes it clear that Srebrenica is important in all countries and that it is special to the Dutch. Since differences between countries are more distinct than in other crises, participation seems to matter even more.

4.2.2 Srebrenica in the Intervention Debate

In order to have a first impression that is somewhat comparable to the analysis of the intervention debate portrayed in the preceding section (cf. Section 3.3), I marked those articles that at least mention the word Srebrenica in the intervention debate. As was to be expected, the share in the approximately 500 articles per country coded as dealing mainly with interventions is quite low (1.9 per cent for France, 1.8 per cent for Germany, 1.4 per cent in the US) and higher in the Netherlands (5.2 per cent). Considering that the sample is representative of all articles with focus on intervention from 1990 to 2006, Srebrenica is surprisingly frequently referred to. In the overall debate on war and intervention share reached 0.01%; with over 5% in the intervention debate, Srebrenica is an important event in the discussion on interventions.

Despite low case numbers with only 87 articles that mention Srebrenica across all four countries,[8] the relation of identity framing and Srebrenica occurring in the same article are significant for the wide identity frame and the countries' own multiple identity framing (cf. Figure 4.3). Even for the explicit identity framing, the relation is significant at the 95% level. If Srebrenica is mentioned in an article, identity framing is more likely.

Focusing on wide identity among countries, case numbers decrease to allow only for the Netherlands to say that there is a significant relation. In fact, case numbers in all other countries are so low that no figure needs to be placed. The relation in the Netherlands is also the strongest with Cramer's V=0.175 suggesting again that national participation is key to identity framing: 90 per cent of the articles that mention Srebrenica also refer to identity in the Dutch intervention debate. Put another way, 79 per cent of all identity frames in the Dutch intervention debate also mention Srebrenica – just 31 do not. Srebrenica is a strong keyword that triggers identity reactions in the Dutch intervention debate. In fact, it can be carefully concluded that Srebrenica has become part of Dutch

[8] Due to weighting necessary to account for the smaller Dutch sample, the number of articles increases to 103 in the statistics. Moreover, case numbers for the coded character of conflict in the previous chapter were even lower at 67.



Figure 4.3: *Share of identity frames in all articles of the intervention debate along mentioning of Srebrenica, in per cent*

***identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=8.295, α*= 0.004, Cramer's V=0.059; **wide identity frame**: Pearson's χ^2=50.677, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.113; **countries' own multiple identities**: Pearson's χ^2=25.088, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.079*

identity – and Chapter 5 shows that Srebrenica indeed is a Dutch *lieux de mémoire*.

Framing in terms of the countries' own multiple identities is also significant only in the Netherlands. In the American debate, no article refers to American, Western or universal identity when Srebrenica is mentioned. In France and Germany, two articles respectively refer to the countries' own multiple identities: to European and to national identity in France and both to civilizational identity in Germany. Srebrenica thus has no relevance for the self-understanding in countries that did not participate in the intervention. In the Netherlands, 18 articles refer identity to Dutch own identities: 10 to Dutch national identity, 6 to European identity and 2 to civilizational identity. Even as national participation is central to identity framing, the Dutch prove to hold multiple identities with strong European and Western ties.

Compared to other articles in the intervention debate, those that mention Srebrenica seem to trigger more identity frames although no safe conclusions can be drawn due to low case numbers.

4.3 The Srebrenica Debate

In the previous Section 4.2, I considered Srebrenica in the large sample of the overall debate on war and intervention with the help of corpus-linguistics. Then, I considered the

debate	number of articles				share			
	France	Germany	Netherlands	US	France	Germany	Netherlands	US
Srebrenica in the intervention debate	15	17	44	11	2.78%	2.88%	6.36%	2.07%
Srebrenica in the overall debate on war and intervention (Srebrenica debate)	779	849	1243	1489	4.38%	4.17%	12.40%	2.67%

Table 4.2: *Total numbers and shares of Srebrenica in the intervention debate and in the overall debate on war and intervention, by country.*

sample of articles which were coded to mainly deal with interventions to have a comparative perspective on the instances when identity plays a role. This was done in the same steps as the previous Chapter 3 which presented Bosnia in the context of interventions.

Since the intervention debate is comprised of only a few articles which include references to Srebrenica, I turn to the larger sample of war and intervention and those articles from it which include the word "Srebrenica". In Table 4.2 the numbers and shares of articles which mention Srebrenica within the intervention debate and within overall debate on war and intervention are presented. The intervention debate comprises roughly 2100 articles, 87 of which mention Srebrenica. In France, Germany and the United States this is a share of around 2 per cent of all articles coded in the intervention debate. As the total numbers are clearly low, I rather consider those articles which mention Srebrenica in the overall debate on war and intervention: 4360 articles which were coded manually.[9] Although most articles in absolute numbers have appeared in the US newspaper (1489), due to the large sample of the overall debate on war and intervention, the share of Srebrenica is lowest in the American debate. As expected, the share is highest in the Netherlands: in 1243 articles, i.e. 12.40 per cent of all articles, Srebrenica is mentioned. France and Germany score about the same and closer to the US.

I call this new sample of articles coded the Srebrenica debate, but it has to be noted that this is a subsample of the war and intervention debate. From all articles that were published in the nine newspapers considered for the four countries, first sampling and cleansing of data made sure that only articles that deal with war and intervention were considered – and from these articles only those which mention Srebrenica were considered for the Srebrenica debate. Articles that discuss Srebrenica without any context of war and intervention whatsoever are not considered. On the other hand, articles that mention Srebrenica just by the way are included. In this way, war and intervention is still the context of analysis and it is possible to see what role Srebrenica plays.

Turning to a timeline of the Srebrenica debate (cf. Figure 4.4), all countries have about the same focus, with most distinctions in the United States. The graph is based on total numbers and shows their development over time as well as the news worthiness. In

[9]For the sampling strategy and the three debates analyzed in the study, refer back to Section 2.3.



Figure 4.4: *Total number of articles mentioning Srebrenica published per quarter of a year, by country, moving average over three periods.*

the American debate as many articles were written in 1993 as in 1995 with Srebrenica mentioned. The first crisis when the Bosnian Serb troops closed in on the town and starved the population whereupon a UN safe area was proclaimed, got almost as much attention as the massacres in July 1995. Also, the genocide in the summer of 1995 clearly has more reporting in the US than in the other countries. American attention thus focuses very much on the crucial moments of the events on the ground (in 1993 and 1995) are more important than the aftermath, suggesting that literal *new*s are more cherished and the debate fast-moving.

Overall, the Netherlands shows most continuous interest in Srebrenica. It is only by mid 2003 that there are less than 10 articles per quarter mentioning Srebrenica but the first quarter of 2006 has 32 articles with Srebrenica mentioned published again. In the other countries (including the US with about the same total amount of articles), there are less than 10 articles per quarter almost constantly from the beginning of 1997. At the end of 2000, there is a rise of Dutch articles mentioning Srebrenica related to new revelations on a possible cover-up and the independent report by NIOD as well as the first decline by the Netherlands to a UN request for troops (to Eritrea). The long-term interest taken in Srebrenica in the Netherlands suggests that the Dutch are much affected by what happened in the Bosnian town in 1995. More than ten years after the genocide, Srebrenica is still virulent in the Dutch debate.

For all countries, a quarter of all articles that mention the word Srebrenica also mainly deal with the events in Srebrenica.[10] A closer look at the main issues of articles that men-

[10]In the Figure 4.5 on page 148, the number is a bit lower because the overall context is also considered. Articles that mainly deal with Srebrenica yet focus on the UN decision-making procedure fall into the



Figure 4.5: *Share of categories for main focus of article in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

tion Srebrenica (cf. Figure 4.5 on page 148) reveals the same differences as the corpus-linguistic analysis had suggested. In the Netherlands, the focus is more on domestic aspects than in the other countries. Yet, all other countries also mention the Bosnian town in the context of national debates. On the other hand, the dominance of local events is less characteristic for the Dutch debate. Rather, the discussion focuses on the national and international context in which the fall and genocide of Srebrenica took place. The participation of Dutch soldiers in the events results in a different perspective on Srebrenica with more a domestic view and a focus on the fall of the enclave.

Among the other three countries there is no pattern of differences and therefore no European-American divide. In the details, the French debate is a bit more similar to the Dutch one in its neglect of the Bosnian context and larger share of articles that were probably published in the feuilleton section and are more profoundly discussing background, wider causes and aftermath. This may be the result of a French tendency towards more intellectual debates or the limited involvement of French officials in decision-making procedures during the fall and genocide of Srebrenica. Furthermore, the ICTY plays a surprisingly important role in France. This could have been expected for the Netherlands where international law is important to foreign policy and self-understanding.

category of international politics.

Overall Srebrenica is visible in the debate on war and intervention in all countries, and especially in the Netherlands. This presence already points to the importance events have for France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States when analyzing the meaning "of Srebrenica".

4.3.1 Understanding of Events

Before turning to the identity framing, I will look at the general understanding of the debate on Srebrenica as recorded with the content analysis. As with the corpus-linguistic analysis, I will consider the actors that play a role in the debate as well as at the interpretations of the Bosnian War and the events in Srebrenica. These aspects were coded, partially automatically, for the whole article – not only the words surrounding Srebrenica. In this way, the Srebrenica debate can be analyzed more thoroughly.

The main actor of an article may refer to a collective, an institution or an individual portrayed as dominating the chain of events described in the article. Although its action may be a reaction to other events, the main actor is decisive. In those articles that mention Srebrenica, local actors are most important (cf. Figure 4.6) – and the distribution does not change if only those articles which focus on Srebrenica as the main issue are taken into account. Their roles as aggressors and victims is central to 32 per cent of articles overall. Only in the Netherlands, local actors are not the most frequently mentioned main actors.

It is clearly visible that the debate in the Netherlands focuses on the national participation, with Dutch actors ranking top at almost 37 per cent of all articles that mention Srebrenica. This is particularly striking as the Netherlands ranks quite low as main actor in the other countries (just below 2 per cent for France and the US, 4 per cent for Germany). France, Germany and the US focus on the UN and the ICTY as main actors instead. As the Netherlands, the United States also sees its own country frequently as main actor when Srebrenica is in the debate – more so than France or particularly Germany. For the United States, this comes as a surprise as the country was not involved in the intervention, but it corresponds to earlier findings that Americans perceive their country as dominant in international politics. Even in cases when the US was factually only very marginally involved, the self-understanding as a superpower makes the US part of the debate. This perception is partially shared by all other countries where the US is more frequently reported to be the main actor; with the exception of the respective country of debate Apart from this national bias, the main actors discussed are very similar across all four countries.

Apart from the main actor, I coded all other actors occurring in each article of the Srebrenica debate (cf. Figure 4.7).[11] The Netherlands and the US refer to their own nation

[11]The automatic coding with key words such as the country's name had to be corrected, especially because the Hague may stand for the Netherlands as well as the ICTY.



Figure 4.6: *Share of articles with different main actors compared to all articles of the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

more often in the Srebrenica debate. In the case of the Netherlands, the presence of Dutch actors results from national participation in the intervention. This cannot account for the frequent reference of American actors in the American debate. Again, American self-understanding as a superpower makes self-references more frequent as the analysis of the main actors as well as overall actors mentioned shows.

It is astonishing that other actors are present in approximately the same amount in all countries. Even the EU is mentioned only slightly less frequently in the American debate than the European countries – the UN is even more present in United States. The ICTY is more visible in the French debate than in the other three countries, especially in the Netherlands. This comes to a surprise as the promotion of international justice is part of Dutch national identity. In the Srebrenica context though, the national perspective is so dominant that the judicial persecution of actual perpetrators of genocide is neglected.

In summary, the actors associated to the debate around Srebrenica show that there is a national bias. All countries relate events to their own national actors. As this is especially true for the Netherlands and the United States, participation matters and there is a European-American divide again which can be explained by the American self-understanding as a superpower which perceives the US as important even if it did not play a prominent role in events. While the actors mentioned form a quantitative state-



Figure 4.7: *Share of articles that mention different actors compared to all articles of the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

ment, interpretational frames give a more qualitative view on the debates.

I argued that the Yugoslav war has its origin in a violent political project of new identity and state foundation, but the public debate may focus on different interpretations. I coded five different frames for the understanding of the Bosnian or Yugoslav war in the Srebrenica debate: external aggression, political motivation, diffuse ethnic reasons, fatalistic ethnicism and other readings (economic, religious). With this categorization, I rely on the academic discussion. Lene Hansen's distinguishes between a Balkan discourse, which argues fatalistically that ancient hatred caused atrocities, and a genocide discourse, which sees genocide at work rather than an ancient ethnic struggle (Hansen, 2006). David Campbell's deconstructivist account of the Bosnian War focuses on an ethnic ideology by some Bosnian politicians whose ethnic categories were easily taken up by outsiders (Campbell, 1998). James Gow argues that the Yugoslav wars have their origin in the Serb promotion of new identity and state formation in the former Yugoslavia (Gow, 2003) (cf. Subsection 2.2).

External aggression relates to argumentations that hold Yugoslavia/Serbia responsible for the war and crimes in Bosnia. Such frames give political reasons for the conflict and stress individual and institutional responsibilities:

> "This war, which was started in the name of defence of racial purity and of conquest of living space, was racist. 'Wherever there is a Serb, there is Serbia': this political slogan has characterized the whole logic of the war

> within the former Yugoslav federation. This contagious logic has driven the conflict parties to define themselves with regard to their race."
> (*Le Monde*, December 15, 1995: Saulnier, 1995)[12]

Diffuse ethnic reasons are evoked when "the Bosnian Serbs" do something. This may not be an approval of nationalist or racist concepts, but rather due to shortage of lines. Nevertheless, it suggests that an ethnic group is considered homogeneous and to act collectively: "The UN says Serbs violate the truce." (*Washington Post*, May 15, 1993: Service, 1993) An alternative understanding of the conflict would be to describe it as complex political process. It is also possible to keep it short and convey a political rather than an ethnic reading of the conflict:

> "There has been a groundswell of antagonism for the United Nations among Bosnians, Muslims in particular, that has grown out of a widespread sense that the United Nations force has failed to restrain the Serbian nationalists."
> (*New York Times*, March 30, 1993: Burns, 1993)

Explicit ethnic fatalism relates, for example, to the impossibility of different ethnic groups to live peacefully together, or to the ancient hatred. Economic and religious reasons are very seldom given. The results are presented in Figure 4.8 with different interpretations given for the war in Yugoslavia as a share of all articles that give any such interpretation. In the Netherlands, 31 per cent of articles that mention Srebrenica do not give any framing for the Yugoslav conflict. In the other countries, the share of no interpretational frame for the war ranges from 3 per cent (US) to 6.5 and 8 per cent in Germany and France. The Dutch debate is thus not so much focused on Srebrenica as a Bosnian town in the context of the Bosnian War. Instead, Srebrenica carries a meaning beyond its geographic and political context for the Dutch. This was already evident from the different foci of the articles (cf. previous Figure 4.5 on page 148).

Diffuse ethnic reading is dominant especially in the Netherlands and the United States, with more than two thirds of articles interpreting the Bosnian War as some kind of ethnic struggle or war. While in the European countries, ethnic fatalist interpretation are marginal, they are clearly more frequent in the American debate:

> "As UNHCR seeks ways to get aid to more than a million residents of those regions, most of them Muslims and Croats, it finds itself more dependent than ever on those peoples' enemies – the Bosnian Serbs and their ally, Serbia."
> (*Washington Post*, November 1, 1993: Ottaway, 1993)

[12] My translation: "Cette guerre déclenchée au nom de la défense de la pureté de la race et de la conquête de l'espace vital fut raciste. 'Là où est un Serbe, là est la Serbie': ce slogan politique a jalonné toute la logique de la guerre à l'intérieur de l'ancienne fédération yougoslave. Cette logique contagieuse a conduit par la suite chaucune des parties en conflit à se définir par rapport de sa race."



Figure 4.8: *Share of different interpretations of the Yugoslav wars in all articles that give an interpretation in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

Apart from less ethnic fatalism, there is no convergent framing in Europe and no American-European divide. This is in contrast to Hansen's discourse analysis of the Bosnian War as a whole where Americans portray events as (politically motivated) genocide while Europeans see ancient hatred at work. In France, a political understanding is present in almost half of all articles that mention Srebrenica. In Germany they account only for a third of all articles, while in the Netherlands and US the share amounts to only about a quarter. The two countries already proved to relate interventions more to their own identities compared to France and Germany. The reading of the Bosnian War in a rather unspecified (neither clearly political nor strictly ethnic) way may reflect a tendency to neglect local specifics because the domestic arena is more important.

To see how interpretations evolved across time, I take the two most frequent and contrasting interpretations (political and diffuse ethnic reasons for conflict) and presented their relative frequency across time in Figure 4.9. Time periods are categorized along the events in Srebrenica: before the establishment of a safe area in April 1993, the period until its fall in July 1995, July to December 1995 as the period of the fall and discovery of atrocities, the years following the genocide from 1996 to 2004 and the tenth anniversary of events. Results in Figure 4.9 show that after the end of the war in Bosnia in 1995, political interpretation is on the rise for the Yugoslav conflict while (diffuse) ethnic readings decline. This can be attributed to the different reading of the Kosovo conflict in whose context Srebrenica is also mentioned. Here, the aggression by Milošević was evident. Moreover, the time line may be interpreted as a learning curve that already changes with the fall of Srebrenica and the year 1995. The Dayton peace treaty divided Bosnia



Figure 4.9: *Share of different interpretations of the Yugoslav wars in all articles mentioning Srebrenica along time periods, by country, in per cent.*

along ethnic lines, but left it as one country suggesting that a common future regardless of ethnicities is envisioned. Moreover, all four countries sent troops to defend the unity of Bosnia – something pointless if you believe in the division along ethnic lines. This gives more room for political readings.

Across countries, there is the same development evident. The French tendency to debate the Bosnian War more in political terms is less clear across time. Although before the 1993 declaration of the Srebrenica safe area, political interpretations are high (as the only country), they account only for few cases in total numbers. Ever since the genocide in Srebrenica and the end of the Bosnian War, political interpretations rank highest in the French newspapers. Moreover, the debate was most vivid in France between 1995 and 2005 – a time period characterized by more political interpretations of the Yugoslav wars in all countries.

By the tenth anniversary of events in Srebrenica, 67 per cent of French interpretations given on the war refer to political understandings and only 27 per cent to diffuse ethnic ones. At that time, ethnic interpretations to understand the Yugoslav wars have declined in all countries. In the Netherlands, political interpretations are still less frequent than ethnic ones, and in the US, the difference is only minimal. Americans were a bit lower with political understandings across the whole time and proved to use more fatalist ethnic understandings before, so that it may be said that Americans regard the events as an ethnic turmoil on a war-torn continent. The comparatively less frequent use of political understandings in the Netherlands may be read as a focus on the domestic side of events in a country directly involved. This direct participation seems to have led to a neglect of

the mechanism on the ground relying rather on a diffuse ethnic understanding. In the long run, it is likely for all countries that political understandings will prevail which means that the public debate tunes in with dominant academic interpretations. Thus is the context of the specific case of Srebrenica.

Not only can the Yugoslav conflict be framed in different ways but also the events in Srebrenica themselves. I inductively put the interpretations given to events in Srebrenica into six categories, which may of course co-occur in one article so that the dominant interpretation was coded. The focus of the debate may lie

- on military questions such as conquest, cease-fire or retreat;
- on a humanitarian crisis of refugees with questions of shelter, supplies of food and medication or the evacuation of patients;
- on ethnic cleansing and the forcible transfer of people based on their subscribed ethnic or religious affiliation;
- on other human rights violations such as massacres, rape and torture;
- on genocide as an explicit characterization of ethnically based massacres;[13]
- or on Srebrenica as an emotional place of homeland without ever mentioning what happened.

The last category refers mostly to the time period after the genocide when questions of a possible return of refugees or voting rights are discussed. An example of such a framing as an emotional place can be found in a Dutch article from 1996:

> "Their [The Bosnian Serbs'] opposition has increased because of a OSCE step to prevent manipulation of the voters registry: people may only vote in the place where they lived before the war in 1991 or where they live today. A third uncontrollable option was dropped: the place where the voters want to live in the future. This had allegedly made possible that Bosnian Serbs from other towns could vote in Srebrenica although they never lived there."
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, October 23, 1996: van de Roer, 1996)[14]

Overall, 7 per cent of all articles in the Dutch Srebrenica debate have no interpretation of the events in Srebrenica compared to under one per cent in all other countries. It is left

[13]Even if the article describes different human rights violations, I coded the frame genocide if the word was explicitly used because it is such a strong term for crimes that it overshadows other characterizations.

[14]My translation: "Hun verzet [van de Bosnische Serviers] was nog toegenomen door een OVSE-maatregel om manipulatie met de kiezersregistratie tegen te gaan: kiezers mogen alleen nog stemmen in de plaats waar ze in 1991 voor de oorlog woonden, of waar ze nu wonen. Geschrapt werd de derde en oncontroleerbare optie: de plaats waar de kiezers in de toekomst willen gaan wonen. Die zou het bijvoorbeeld mogelijk hebben gemaakt dat Bosnische Serviers uit andere plaatsen in Srebrenica konden gaan stemmen, terwijl ze daar nooit gewoond hebben."



Figure 4.10: *Share of different interpretations of the events in Srebrenica in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

to the Dutch readers more so than to French, German and American readers to know that what in Srebrenica. As was already evident from the interpretations of the Yugoslav wars, the debate is not only on the events themselves but also beyond them, taking knowledge "of Srebrenica" for granted in the Netherlands. This will be taken up in the next Chapter 5 on Srebrenica as part of collective memory.

Regarding the interpretation of events in Srebrenica shown in Figure 4.10, the general tendency is the same across countries. As before, Dutch and American articles focus more on fighting and military aspects than is evident in French and German articles. 26 and 28 per cent of the characterizations of the events in Srebrenica are related to fighting in the Netherlands and the US, while the share is lower at 14 and 19 per cent in France and Germany. Dutch soldiers were more affected by fighting rather than the human rights violations, which were more (but not totally) concealed to them. The American focus on fighting goes hand in hand with a lower share of human rights violations altogether (ethnic cleansing, genocide and others) which account for 58 per cent of interpretations. This difference may be caused by the increased reporting in American newspapers on Srebrenica before the genocide. Such a conclusion is confirmed by the higher share of humanitarian interpretations given which refer to the time when Bosnian Serb nationalists tried to starve the population in 1993 and the UN safe area was established. In France and Germany, reporting centers more on the period since 1995 and since the genocide, so that the share of human rights violations is clearly higher at about 70 per cent, while Srebrenica as military question is only evident in below 20 per cent of articles.

A particularity is the high share of explicit genocide references in the French debate.

Even before the ruling by the ICTY in 2001, the accusation already established genocide as a possible way to understand the killings in Srebrenica. The court and genocide are closely linked:

> "After three months of abstention from the political arena which followed the Dayton peace treaty and his indictment with genocide in the Srebrenica affair Radovan Karadzic is back."
> (*Le Monde*, April 18, 1996: Ourdan, 1996)[15]

Overall, the mentioning of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia correlates significantly and quite strongly with genocide framing in the Srebrenica debate (Cramer's V=0.321, α*=0.000). In Figure 4.11, the shares of those articles which interpret events in Srebrenica as a genocide are shown per country for the time period before the massacres in July 1995, prior to the court ruling in 2001 and ever since. In all countries, the court ruling plays an important role in calling Srebrenica a genocide. Public debate follows judicial judgment on the sensitive term of genocide rather than any social analysis.



Figure 4.11: *Share of genocide frames in the Srebrenica debate before the massacres, before and after the ICTY ruling, by country, in per cent*

***France**: Pearson's χ^2=53.111, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.261; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=80.263, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.307; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=33.109, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.163; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=144.082, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.311*

Erna Rijsdijk has denounced this focus on the period of massacres because Bosnian Serb nationalist military had already in 1993 begun their genocidal war to starve local

[15]My translation: "Après trois mois d'absence de la scène politique, qui ont suivi l'accord de Dayton et son enculpation pour génocide dans l'affaire de Srebrenica, Radovan Karadzic est de retour."

Muslims to death (Rijsdijk, 2003). As argued before, ethnic cleansing itself may be considered genocide and the Bosnian Serb nationalists' policy towards Srebrenica in 1993 certainly was one of the clearest actions taken towards the physical destruction of Bosnian Muslims. "A slow motion genocide", as UN observer called it. The analysis of the Srebrenica debate shows that genocide is only mentioned before 1995 in the United States (cf. Figure 4.11). In the US, Srebrenica had also been discussed more intensively before the fall of the safe area and in this debate, genocide also played a small role. Yet, all countries show that genocide was a possible framing already before the ruling in the Hague judged it to be so: In France, more than twelve per cent of all articles published after the massacres and before the ruling include genocide. This is clearly higher than in all other countries where the share is around five per cent. After the ruling in 2001, shares of genocide framing rise in all countries. While French, German and American articles mention genocide in about a quarter of cases, the Dutch debate is different. It is striking that genocide is least frequently referred to in the Netherlands even though it is the only country directly involved. This may be due to a special focus on the military events before the massacres. In any case, it eases the responsibility for Dutchbat if events are not considered a genocide. As seen before, close involvement changes the focus from the events to the national actors.This obviously also means neglecting the fact of horrors.

The neglect of human rights prior to the massacres in 1995 criticized by Rijsdijk was confirmed when I regrouped the interpretations of Srebrenica presented above to account for human rights violations (including genocide) and humanitarian aspects. I present results as shares of the total number of articles referring to either one of these two possible interpretation reducing case numbers this way (cf. Figure 4.12 on page 159). Human rights violations combined with genocide include framings that recognize the severeness and deliberate creation of a catastrophe while not explicitly calling it a genocide. Such a framing is evident in 15 to 33 per cent of all cases.

The relation between the period of discussion (before or after July 1995) and framing as humanitarian or human rights violation is significant and strong for every country. Yet, there are no differences across nations and the results are insignificant for the relation of nation and framing: If it is not only explicitly genocide, there is no American-European divide over genocide and humanitarian framing of the events in Srebrenica. The American debate is not more focused on human rights aspects than the debate in the Netherlands or Germany. In all countries, it was only after thousands had been killed that human rights violations stand central although UN observers called Srebrenica a slow-motion genocide in 1993.

In sum, there are no principal differences in the understanding of the events in Srebrenica across the countries studied. Yet the Netherlands set themselves repeatedly apart with lesser focus on the local perspective, political reasons for conflict and human rights violations. In many ways, the American debate is similar to the Dutch one, e.g. the



Figure 4.12: *Share of humanitarian and human rights interpretations of the events in Srebrenica before and after July 1995, by country, in per cent.*

France *Pearson's* χ^2*=487.538,* α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.889;* ***Germany*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=355.968,* α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.767;* ***Netherlands*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=356.055,* α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.767;* ***US*** *618.189,* α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.804.*

Netherlands and the US show more self-references than France and Germany regarding actors involved. For the Netherlands, the domestic orientation is caused by participation in the intervention, while the American self-understanding as a superpower results in a more self-centered perspective even if not actually involved. In general, differences are evident over time rather than across countries. After the fall of Srebrenica and the end of the war in Bosnia, political understandings of the conflict rose while diffuse-ethnic reasons declined. The same is true for the events in Srebrenica which were only understood in terms of human rights after the massacres took place. The deliberate strategy to hunger the town before is seen instead as a humanitarian crisis. Only in the United States, are there signs of an earlier recognition of genocide, even before the massacres. National participation of the Netherlands on the other hand led to a neglect of the genocide that took place.

4.3.2 Identity in the Srebrenica Debate

To analyze the identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica massacres as an instance of genocide in Europe, I have established a masterframe of identity which includes all explicit identity frames, values and memory references. It is thus more open than an explicit identity frame and similar to the wide identity frame in the intervention debate. Whenever in the debate a personal pronoun like "we" or "our" alludes to a collective that is

country	identity masterframes		countries' own multiple identities			countries' own national identities		
	intervention debate (wide/explicit)	Srebrenica debate	intervention debate	Bosnia in intervention debate	Srebrenica debate	intervention debate	Bosnia in intervention debate	Srebrenica debate
France	35.14 % / 28.63%	28.88%	5.11%	12.08%	12.58%	2.34%	6.78%	4.65%
Germany	30.22% / 28.57%	32.27%	5.02 %	11.93%	14.38 %	1.93%	5.62%	5.74%
Netherlands	40.24% / 28.80%	28.80%	11.46%	25.91%	19.34%	2.96%	5.56%	13.79%
United States	37.45% / 36.00%	29.62%	10.64%	12.29%	15.11%	8.39%	15.63%	11.15%

Table 4.3: *Share of identity frames and frames referring to the countries' multiple identities in the intervention and Srebrenica debates compared; by country; in per cent.*

France: $N_{intervention\ debate}$*=583,* $N_{Srebrenica\ debate}$*=779; Germany:* $N_{intervention\ debate}$*=641,* $N_{Srebrenica\ debate}$*=849; Netherlands:* $N_{intervention\ debate}$*=339,* $N_{Srebrenica\ debate}$*=1243; US:* $N_{intervention\ debate}$*=539,* $N_{Srebrenica\ debate}$*=1489*

identity masterframes in intervention debate*: Pearson's* χ^2*=23.397,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.077;* ***identity masterframes in Srebrenica debate****: Pearson's* χ^2*=3.412,* α**=0.332, Cramer's V=0.028 ;* ***multiple identities in intervention debate****:* χ^2 *47.582,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.109;* ***multiple identities in Srebrenica debate****: Pearson's* χ^2*=31.411,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.085*

related to values, a common past or future, I coded an identity frame. Rather than speaking of the Dutch soldiers, it is "onze jongens in Srebrenica" ("our boys in Srebrenica"; *NRC Handelsbald*, March 22, 1995: van den Boogaard, 1995). Thus, there is a collective identification with other persons and the events they are engaged in. In fact, an imagined community is established without many words.

With this view on identity, around 30 per cent of articles of the Srebrenica debate use identity framing with little variance across countries leading to insignificant results. In Table 4.3, the share of identity frames in two different debates is shown: the intervention debate with articles that have military interventions as a main focus and the Srebrenica debate with articles related to war and intervention and mentioning Srebrenica. While the Netherlands and the United States distinguished themselves more by identity framing in the intervention debate, this is not the case for the Srebrenica debate. It has to be noted, though, that the Srebrenica debate is no subdebate of the intervention debate but rather, like the intervention debate itself, part of the overall debate on war and intervention. The focus on intervention relates the argumentation more to an outsider to a conflict or crisis in another country because at least the possibility of direct involvement is discussed. In the overall debate on war and intervention, from which the articles of the Srebrenica debate were retrieved, the focus may well be solely on the country of conflict without any references to an external side. Considering the previous evidence of the importance of imagined communities for identity framing, the intervention debate as such is more likely to include identity references than the overall debate on war and intervention or the Srebrenica debate.

For the multiple identities of the four countries, there are interesting differences across countries and in the comparison of the intervention and Srebrenica debate. Comparing the intervention debate and the Srebrenica debate, references to the countries' multiple identities rise starkly in France and Germany (more than double) and moderately in the Netherlands (almost by three quarters). In contrast, identity references to the country's own identity rise only marginally in the American debate, from almost 11 per cent to 15 per cent. In all European countries, the genocide in Srebrenica results in a clear increase of identity references that refer to a country's multiple communities whereas in the United States, Srebrenica is not clearly different from other intervention issues in terms of identity framing that refers to a country's multiple communities.

A look at the frames that refer to a country's multiple identities in relation to Bosnia puts the shares for Srebrenica into a different perspective yet, especially for the Netherlands. Focus on Bosnia in the intervention debate results in more references to Dutch communities than the Srebrenica debate. It means that Srebrenica does not carry with it more relevance for Dutch identities than Bosnia does in general. But compared to the other countries, the Dutch identity relevance of both Bosnia and Srebrenica is clearly more pronounced.

This is also evident for national identities. While European countries have a low profile of national identities in the intervention debate (including the Netherlands), the share clearly rises if focus is on Bosnia in general. The same is true for the United States. The Srebrenica debate only sees yet another increase in references to national identity in the Netherlands surpassing the American national identity. In France, Germany and the US, the share of references to national identities in the Srebrenica debate compared to Bosnia in the intervention debate stays about the same or even decreases.

Overall, results from the previous chapter have confirmed that Bosnia is particularly related to identity, the countries' own multiple identities and national identities. It has to be considered, though, that the focus on intervention in itself carries with it more relevance for (potential) intervening countries than it is the case for the Srebrenica debate as part of the overall debate on war and intervention. Regarding Srebrenica as an example of genocide in Bosnia rather than the Bosnian conflict overall, there is only an increased identity-related reaction in the Netherlands and its *national* identity which previously ranked low as in all European countries. The presumably more military discussion on Bosnia in the intervention debate is even more related to the countries' own multiple identities than the specific case of genocide in Bosnia – except for the Dutch. More detailed analysis of the different specifications of identity in the Srebrenica debate shall clarify how this limited reaction becomes manifest in the different countries.

The identity relation in the Netherlands is evident when looking at a timeline of identity masterframes referring to the respective country's own multiple identities which is given with total numbers of articles per year in Figure 4.13. In the Dutch debate, there



Figure 4.13: *Timeline of frames referring to the countries' own multiple identities in the Srebrenica debate, by country, total numbers.*

are references to Srebrenica still years after the event. It seems that Srebrenica was as a turning point that particularly relates to Dutch identity:

> " Also [... for the] promotion of international stability, the Netherlands is tied to international obligation and self-imposed ambitions: participate in risky, complex and damn expensive peace operations. It is good that this happens and that our country despite the bitter experience in Srebrenica and the change of government in the past two and a half years didn't run from its responsibility."
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, June 24, 2003: n.a., 2003)[16]

In 1995, the US debate was more related to American identity than the Dutch debate was to Dutch identity while there were only slightly more articles published in the US. Moreover, the American focus on Srebrenica as a safe area before its fall results in a first peak in 1993. This reflects the increased reporting on Srebrenica early on in American newspapers and indicates an American tendency to refer crisis events to their own self-understanding.

[16]My translation: "Ook bij [... de] bevordering van de internationale stabiliteit is Nederland met handen en voeten gebonden aan internationale verplichtingen en zelfopgelegde ambities: meedoen aan riskante, ingewikkelde en peperdure vredesoperaties. Het is goed dat dat gebeurt en dat ons land ondanks de bittere ervaringen in Srebrenica en de regeringswisselingen van de afgelopen anderhalf jaar zijn verantwoordelijkheid niet uit de weg gaat."



Figure 4.14: *Share of identity frames in articles mentioning Srebrenica, by main focus of the article, by country, in per cent*

***all**: Pearson's χ^2=90.718, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.147; **France**: χ^2 17.530, α*=0.001, Cramer's V=0.152; **Germany**: Pearson's χ^2=53.282, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.253; **Netherlands**: Pearson's χ^2=8.758, α*=0.084, Cramer's V=0.084; **US**: Pearson's χ^2=70.067, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.224*

Otherwise, the time line shows that the Dutch view on Srebrenica changed to include more reflection on its identities. Since 1997 when more details on the events and on the role of different (Dutch) institutions therein emerged year after year, the identity relation rose in the Netherlands with a peak in 2000 at the time of the fifth anniversary. At this time, a number of failures by the Dutch military and government had emerged that that gave the impression of a cover-up and that made it clear that the Dutch soldiers could have done more to prevent killings:

> "The Dutch had collectively an unpleasant feeling about themselves: we are in the meanwhile fifty years beyond and now we have put them on the train to Auschwitz again." (van den Boogaard, 2005: 265)[17]

There was more reference to Dutch identities in the Srebrenica debate than in all other countries on their respective identities, especially in the years after the genocide. Yet, it is also clear that at the moment decisive things happened, a relation to identity was most clearly established in the American debate reflecting the country's general tendency to relate interventions more to themselves.

[17]My translation: "Nederlanders hadden collectief over zichzelf een onaangenaam gevoel gehad: zijn we inmiddels meer dan vijftig jaar verder en nu hebben we ze toch weer op de trein naar Auschwitz gezet."

Identity masterframes are differently distributed along the focus of discussion (cf. Figure 4.14). While it makes no difference whether Srebrenica stands central or not, the context does make a difference: A regrouping of the different foci gives an overview over the national debates. Focus on Srebrenica, Bosnia and the Yugoslav region was merged to events on the "ground". Focus on international diplomacy and the international tribunal was merged to focus on the "international arena", domestic politics of any country merged to "domestic" focus. Feuilleton and others were regrouped as "other". For each of the four possible foci, the share of identity masterframes is given per country. The focus in the Netherlands lies more on domestic themes with 25 per cent compared to a maximum of 10 per cent in the other countries. In France, Germany and especially the United States, the focus is on events in Srebrenica and Bosnia. The focus on events other than those on the ground also increases over time as there are little developments in the town itself regarding the debate on war and intervention. In the Netherlands, the share of other focus, mainly feuilleton articles with broader and cultural views, is higher than in the other countries – especially than in the US.

What is surprising is the comparably low share of identity masterframes in the domestic focus of the Dutch debate (cf. Figure 4.14). So far, the share was expected to be rather high. But results show that when the focus of articles mentioning Srebrenica is on domestic issues, the Dutch use even less identity masterframes to interprete events than the French, German or Americans. Yet, identity is overall not so important to understand events on the ground or in the international arena, but rather for domestic politics and other issues such as more background and philosophical themes in the feuilleton section or historic outlines.

A closer look at the different communities to which a country's own identities may refer (cf. Figure 4.15 on page 165) confirms the first results. For the Dutch, articles with reference to Srebrenica are more frequently related to their own national identity. In the intervention debate, the Netherlands showed more multiple identities.Yet in the case of Srebrenica, national participation results in national framing. In comparison to Bosnia, this means that Srebrenica matters for *national* Dutch identity and even changes the structure of communities to which Dutch usually relate their identity. With regard to Srebrenica, the Netherlands has a clear national bias more like the United States – in contrast to the Dutch intervention debate and in contrast to the other European countries. In the case of Srebrenica, national participation does not only matter for an identity-related reaction, but it clearly shows the national imagined community evoked. While the Dutch showed most multiple identities before, in this case focus is on the nation.

Apart from the Netherlands, the American national identity is prominent in the US debate while national identities in the other European countries reach shares of around five per cent only. When the Yugoslav wars were compared to other conflicts, it has become evident that national identity in the US plays an important role (cf. e.g. Section



Figure 4.15: *Share of different communities of identity in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=52.825, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.129*

3.3). In the US, Western identity is also more seldom referred to than in the European countries.[18]

While national identity is more prominent, others are also present. Even in American articles, European identity is referred to in the Srebrenica debate. In France and Germany, European identity is even more important than national identity when framing the Srebrenica debate. This is a clear difference to the intervention debate where it was the Netherlands which had more references to European identity than to their own national one. Overall, the importance of Europe has been confirmed for the Srebrenica debate and is only surmounted in the case of high national participation. In the two other European countries – and even seen so by outsiders, i.e. by Americans – European identity is prominent. A genocide on European soil seems to relate to European values of peaceful conflict resolution and overcoming ethnic discrimination. European identity frames often refer to the obligation Europe has vis-à-vis Srebrenica on its continent. As François Léotard, president of the French Parti républicain, stated in an intellectual discussion cited in *Le Monde*:

> "In the past three years, we were confronted with a European model in which money was worth more than man, in which Frankfurt prevails over Srebrenica. The question is simple: At the end of the year, the American tanks

[18]The direct correlation of Western identity framing and the country of debate is insignificant as is the correlation for universal identity.



Figure 4.16: *Share of different geographic locations of the Yugoslav region in all articles mentioning Srebrenica, by country, in per cent.*

> will leave Bosnia. Will we be capable to make respectable a certain idea of the European man in central Europe and the Balkans, a certain type of civilization? If we don't do it, it's not worth the pain to talk about a single currency."
> (*Le Monde*, February 20, 1996: Ferenczi, 1996)[19]

The question of European identity may also be posed in the question whether the Yugoslav region qualifies at all as European. In the face of war and genocide deemed as events of the past, Europeans may ostracize Yugoslavia and consider it as not-European. As Delanty argues, failure of pluralism and peaceful multicultural coexistence prompted the EU to consider Bosnia outside of Europe (Delanty, 1995: 158–163). Since the borders of Europe are not fixed, it is possible that Yugoslavia is excluded from the continent due to gross value violation. In Figure 4.16, the share of articles with explicit references to the location of Srebrenica and Bosnia are shown. For most of the debate, there are no geographic specifics on the location of the region or Bosnian towns like Srebrenica. In a small number of articles only there is an explicit ostracism of Bosnia from Europe, but it

[19]My translation:"Au cours des quatre dernières années, on nous a présenté en effect un modèle européen dans lequel la monnaie comptait plus que l'homme, dans lequel Francfort l'emportait sur Srebrenica. La question est simple: à la fin de l'année, les chars américains vont quitter la Bosnie. Sommes-nous en mesure de les remplacer? Ou partirons-nous avec eux? C'est une question au moins aussi importante que celle de la monnaie unique. Serons-nous capables de faire respecter en Europe centrale et balkanique une certaine idée de l'homme européen, une certaine forme de civilisation? Si nous ne le faisons pas, ce n'est pas la peine de parler de monnaie unique."

was what locals felt according to Susan Sontag:

> "But of course this couldn't happen, could it? Not in Europe. My friends in Sarajevo used to say during the siege: How can 'the West' be letting this happen to us? This is Europe, too. We're Europeans. Surely 'they' won't allow it to go on. But they – Europe – did. For something truly terrible happened in Bosnia. From the Serb death camps in the north of Bosnia in 1992, the first death camps on European soil since the 1940's, to the mass executions of many thousands of civilians at Srebrenica and elsewhere in the summer of 1995 – Europe tolerated that. So, obviously, Bosnia wasn't Europe."
> (*New York Times*, May 2, 1999: Sontag, 1999)

In the US, more than 18 per cent of all articles that mention Srebrenica locate the region explicitly in Europe. In the other European countries, this share is lower, in the Netherlands even below 10 per cent. There does not seem to be an increased awareness that the war and horrors happened in Europe. It may be common sense to Europeans that Bosnia is in Europe, but more emphasis of this fact may have stressed the closeness of events to the readers. On the other hand, Srebrenica or Bosnia are very seldom ousted from Europe, as has been suggested.

After the general analysis of the usage of an identity masterframe in the Srebrenica debate and in comparison to the intervention debate, I turn to the factors that may explain identity-related reactions. Such reactions may be evident in different ways: the masterframe discussed so far, explicit identity references, values and memory. The correlation of the explanatory factors with the identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica genocide in Table 4.4 on page 168 makes a comparison between the four explanatory factors possible. Identity-related reactions in general, national participation and ideological orientation yield significant results. The ideological orientation of newspaper yields significant results and surprisingly strong relations. Overall, values for Cramer's V are quite low.

Turning to the content of identity, it is national participation and the European continent that yield significant results. It shows that national participation yields a systematic pattern in its influence on identity in general and different aspects of its content if referring to the respective country's own multiple identities. The similarity among European countries has an effect on values while other factors are weaker and less significant in their correlation. Self-reflexive identity has low values for Cramer's V and only one slightly significant outcome. Apart from this factor, there is support for all other hypotheses and for the more specific analyses, I will therefore consider ideological orientation and differentiate not only along countries. Again and unsurprisingly, national participation is the most important factor explaining an identity-related reaction to the events in Srebrenica.

	national participation	self-reflexive identity	European continent	ideological orientation
identity masterframe	0.013	0.027	0.002	0.086***
identity masterframes for the countries' multiple identities	0.082***	0.006	0.050*	0.058***
explicit identity	0.042	0.046*	0.005	0.074***
explicit identity referring to the countries' multiple communities	0.092***	0.033	0.053***	0.075***
values	0.039	0.025	0.062***	0.034
values referring to the countries' multiple communities	0.058**	0.017	0.075***	0.030
memory	0.027	0.027	0.039*	0.063***
memory referring to the countries' multiple communities	0.068***	0.012	0.033	0.019

Table 4.4: *Cramer's V for identity framing in the intervention debate*

**** α = 0.000, ** $\alpha \leq 0.005$, * $\alpha \leq 0.010$*

	identity frame		**countries' own multiple identity frame**	
	liberal-left	conservative	liberal-left	conservative
France	26.88%	37.01%	8.29%	11.91%
Germany	28.75%	38.61%	11.20%	9.09%
Netherlands	26.73	30.22%	7.88%	12.54%
United States	24.64%	37.08%	13.47%	17.48%
overall	26.47%	34.51%	13.04%	17.25

Table 4.5: *Share of identity frames and multiple identity frames of liberal-left and conservative newspapers in the Srebrenica debate; in per cent, by country.*

liberal-left *N_{France}=625, $N_{Germany}$=546, $N_{Netherlands}$=505, N_{US}=893;* ***conservative*** *N_{France}=154, $N_{Germany}$=303, $N_{Netherlands}$=738, N_{US}=596*

wide identity frames, France *Pearson's χ^2=6.176, α*=0.013, Cramer's V=0.089;* ***Germany*** *Pearson's χ^2=8.666, α*=0.012, Cramer's V=0.101;* ***Netherlands*** *Pearson's χ^2=1.775, α*=0.183, Cramer's V=0.038;* ***US*** *Pearson's χ^2=26.555, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.134;* ***all*** *Pearson's χ^2=32.598, α*=0.000; Cramer's V=0.086*

multiple identities frames, France*: Pearson's χ^2=0.571, α*=0.450; Cramer's V=0.027;* ***Germany*** *Pearson's χ^2=4.915, α*=0.027, Cramer's V=0.076;* ***Netherlands*** *Pearson's χ^2=3.629, α*=0.057; Cramer's V=0.059;* ***US*** *Pearson's χ^2=5.347, α*=0.021; Cramer's V=0.060;* ***all*** *Pearson's χ^2=14.878, α*=0.000; Cramer's V=0.058*

Since the ideological orientation is significant in the binary logit regression, I will take a closer look at this factor in the four countries (cf. Table 4.5). Conservative newspapers use identity framing more frequently than liberal-left newspapers, and the same tendency is also visible regarding framing in terms of a country's own identities. Both relations are significant. It has already become evident in the intervention debate, that conservative newspapers apply more identity frames (cf. Section 3.3). This may be rooted in the reliance on community and belonging in the interpretation of events. If considered within countries, the influence of ideology is only significant for the United States with regard to identity framing. For the framing in terms of multiple identities of the four countries, the results are not only insignificant and weak, but the liberal-left newspaper in Germany even uses more such framing than its conservative counterpart. Overall, the ideological orientation of newspapers makes a difference for the identity-related reaction to Srebrenica, but is not significant for the different countries except the United States. The high American case number has most likely changed the balance in the whole sample.

In sum, national participation makes a difference in the discussion around Srebrenica and so does ideology. In the Netherlands, Srebrenica is not only mentioned when the discussion is on events in the Yugoslav region but also when the focus is on the international and especially the national arena. The Dutch refer to their national identity more frequently than others and thus lose much of their otherwise multiple identities. Overall, identity is not prominent and is about the same in all four countries. In Germany, self-reflexive identity does not result in more identity-framing or national identity-framing. Conservative newspapers use a general framing in terms of identity more frequently compared to liberal-left newspapers, but the results are not unambiguous. The geographic location of the war in Europe is not more present in the debate in Europe.

For a better understanding of the content of the identity-related reaction to Srebrenica, I take a closer look at the identity frames and consider the factors which are at the heart of the identity masterframe: explicit identity reference, values and memories. Regarding values and memories, identities can also be further characterized as Europeanized or Westernized.

4.3.3 Explicit Identity Frames in the Srebrenica Debate

Explicit references to identity are, of course, less frequent in the Srebrenica debate than the general identity masterframes. The frames are characterized by direct quotation of identity and identification as in an outspoken praise or disgrace with regard to a specific community like French national identity in the establishment of a safe area in Srebrenica:

> " 'He has become very popular because I think the French are tempted to say, 'Morillon is a hero, therefore, as a Frenchman, I am also a hero,' " a French



Figure 4.17: *Share of different communities of reference for explicit identity frames in articles with an explicit identity frame in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=364.418, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.461*

> Government official said. 'But it's true. We are proud of him. He does honor to the French Army and the United Nations force.' [...] For many ordinary French, the general's gesture has also brought the reality of the Bosnian conflict into their homes. 'He's very French, he has a 'look francais,' ' the Government official said, 'so it's easy for the Frenchman who drinks red wine and eats Camembert to identify with him.' "
> (*New York Times*, March 20, 1993: Riding, 1993)

The share of explicit identity frames is similar in all countries: 11 per cent in France, 12 in the Netherlands, 13 in the US and only in Germany higher with 16 per cent. As with the identity frames in the Srebrenica debate before, the explicit identity frames show a clear difference between conservative newspaper with more explicit identity frames than left-liberal oriented newspapers. This difference is visible across all countries, yet it does not prevail for the communities to which they refer. Moreover, the correlation of country-based explanatory factors (reflexive identity, European continent and participation in the intervention) and explicit identity frames is insignificant.[20]

Figure 4.17 shows, the communities to which the explicit identity frames refer in the four countries. These communities are rather similar in all countries except the Netherlands. In the Srebrenica debate, national identity is very prominent in the Netherlands

[20]Values for significance are: for participation α*=0.093, for European continent 0.732 and for self-reflexive identity 0.011.



Figure 4.18: *Share of explicit references to the multiple identities of the four countries, for four explanatory factors in the Srebrenica debate, in per cent.*

***self-reflexive identity**: Pearson's χ^2=4.748, α*=0.029, Cramer's V=0.033; **European continent**: Pearson's χ^2=12.333, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.053; **participation**: Pearson's χ^2=35.264, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.090; **ideological orientation**: Pearson's χ^2=24.320, α*=0.000; Cramer's V=0.075*

with almost 61 per cent of communities referring to it. What is surprising is that national identity is less frequent in the US when it comes to explicit frames (32 per cent), but it is still higher than in France (22 per cent) and especially in Germany (7 per cent). While identity frames are more frequent in Germany than in the other countries, a high share of these frames (almost half) relate to local communities. The self-reflexive identity does not reach to present-day genocide. National identity references are low and the abstinence from any nationalism for fear of turning radical seems to prevent Germans, even in a debate around events of genocide in their own neighborhood, from relating emphatically to their nation although identity frames in general are frequent. References to any German community (German, European or Western) are clearly lower than in the other three countries with below one quarter of all communities to which explicit identity refers. Self-reflexive identity seems to be not sensitive to genocide today and not to be a helpful indicator of an identity-related reaction to Srebrenica.

In contrast to the other countries, local identities of Yugoslav regions are marginal (11 per cent of all communities to which identity refers) in the Netherlands with their national focus. In France, Germany and the US on the other hand, such identities play a prominent role (39, 48 and 34 per cent). Again, the difference between a participating and non-participating country in the Srebrenica intervention results in a difference between national and regional (the Yugoslav region) focus.

European identity is important in all countries. This is especially true for France, but it also includes the United States, where the share is as high as in Germany and the Netherlands. If identity is thus explicitly used to frame the events in Srebrenica, Europe is the second most important community to which it refers in the European countries.

Figure 4.18 above gives the share of explicit identity frames that refer to the countries' own multiple communities for the cases in which an explanatory factor is given and in which it is not. Participation has the clearest, but still not very strong relation (Cramer's V=0.090) and is also significant. From the preceding analysis, a stronger relation might have been expected. Not only do participating countries refer more frequently to their identities, but European countries also refer to these more than non-European, and conservative newspapers more than to liberal-left ones. The statistics show that Europeans relate events in Srebrenica more to themselves than Americans do – despite a general inclination by Americans to relate matters of war and intervention to the own nation. Apart from self-reflexive identity, all correlations are significant.

In sum, explicit identity frames are less frequent and about equal across countries in the Srebrenica debate than the more general identity masterframes. In the Netherlands as participating country they are particularly related to the country's national identity while the theoretically sensitive self-reflexive German identity does not result in more references to the country's own identities. European countries and conservative newspapers use more explicit identity frames than their American or liberal-left counterparts, participation is confirmed to play an important role to explain explicit references to identity in the case of Srebrenica.

4.3.4 Values in the Srebrenica Debate

Theory has shown that identity is manifest in the adherence to particular values and the reference of these to a community. Members of a community integrate values into their social and personal identities and the community as a whole defines its goals and future and why they belong together. A direct reference of values to a community makes values national, European or Western. A Europeanized or Westernized identity is evident in a convergences of the values among European or Western communities, in contrast to countries outside. It is not possible to find Westernized values and identity in this study because there is no non-Western country in the sample to control for universal tendencies. Therefore, a convergence across all four countries can only give a hint at such a development.

For the Srebrenica debate, I coded the specific values that were derived from the national and European identities discussed before (cf. Section 2.1): peaceful conflict resolution, democracy, opposition to slaughter, human rights, multiculturalism, pacifism, liberalism and the promotion of international law. Moreover, I inductively added values

of general humanitarianism, ethnic purity/discrimination and a category for other values. As the case numbers are rather low (65 to 99 per country) and some values are seldom applied, I reduced the number of categories to six: opposition to slaughter was included to human rights; peaceful conflict resolution and pacifism merged and humanitarianism, liberalism and the promotion of international law were included in the umbrella category "other".[21]

From the comparison of correlations earlier, it is already evident that the ideological orientation of newspapers plays no role for the value framing of the Srebrenica debate, but location on the European continent does – for general value framing and values related to the same communities (national, European, Western, universal) as the country of debate (cf. Table 4.4 on page 168). This is confirmed by a closer look at the use of values in newspapers with different orientations per country shown in Figure 4.19. There are differences within the four countries (least so in the Netherlands), but they show no clear left-right divide across countries. Instead, in the US and Germany, conservative newspapers have more value frames, while in France the opposite is true. Consequently, results are insignificant for country differences and within countries only the American newspapers yield significant results. The irrelevance of ideology for value framing is thus confirmed.

The difference between Europe and the US, also evident in the comparison of correlations (cf. Table 4.4 on page 168), is visible regarding the appliance of value frames. In only 4.3 per cent of all articles in the American Srebrenica debate, is there a value frame. In the European countries, the percentage has doubled and is nearly the same in all countries: 8.4 per cent in France, 8.0 in Germany and in the Netherlands.

For Figure 4.20, the share of the six different categories for values as described above are shown in relation to all articles in the Srebrenica debate that include values per country. The same values are used across countries and the value framing is not principally different, but there is clearly a different emphasis of the same values. A first look at the value frames applied reveals that there is again a clear difference between the European debate and the American debate as indicated by the significant and moderately strong Cramer's V at 0.238.[22] In Europe, the debate is more dominated by questions of peace, pacifism and peaceful conflict resolution apart from human rights and the opposition to slaughter. In the US, pacifism has as little room in the debate as ethnic purity and discrimination – upheld by actors from the conflict region. The American debate is instead more centered around multiculturalism human rights and democracy.

The upholding of human rights plays a similar role in all four countries. It is thus

[21]The promotion of international law was truely only applicable to the Netherlands where it accounts for 11 per cent of all value frames. In all other countries, cases do not exceed three.

[22]In contrast to the other countries, the promotion of international law plays a role in the Netherlands. It accounts for the higher share of the "other" category in the Dutch debate.



Figure 4.19: *Share of value frames in the Srebrenica debate, by country and orientation of newspaper, in per cent.*

liberal-left $N_{France}=625$, $N_{Germany}=546$, $N_{Netherlands}=505$, $N_{US}=893$; ***conservative*** $N_{France}=154$, $N_{Germany}=303$, $N_{Netherlands}=738$, $N_{US}=596$

France: Pearson's $\chi^2=2.833$, $\alpha^*=0.092$, Cramer's $V=0.060$; ***Germany***: Pearson's $\chi^2=5.227$, $\alpha^*=0.022$, Cramer's $V=0.078$; ***Netherlands***: Pearson's $\chi^2=0.264$, $\alpha^*=0.608$, Cramer's $V=0.015$; ***US***: Pearson's $\chi^2=9.854$, $\alpha^*=0.002$, Cramer's $V=0.081$



Figure 4.20: *Share of different values in articles with a value frame in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's $\chi^2=56.670$, $\alpha^*=0.000$, Cramer's $V=0.238$

more than a nationally or European-wide cherished value, but can be considered at least a Westernized and maybe an international value. The universal spirit of the idea of human rights is thus evident in the Srebrenica debate. As expected from the discussion of national identities, all countries are agree over the opposition to genocide.

Pacifism and peaceful conflict resolution on the other hand are Europeanized values are prominent in the debate in Europe only. The relation of European countries and this value is significant with Cramer's V at 0.08.[23] The context of Srebrenica is a question of human rights to all, yet for the Germans and the Dutch, questions of peace (and therefore war) are more important and for French at least quite so. Europeans thus really have internalized the idea that the use of force should be avoided and conflicts should rather be solved diplomatically or politically. This was one of the central lessons learned after the devastation and high toll of civilian victims of World War II. The value is part of the founding idea of European integration itself, but also linked to national identities as Dutch minister Voorhoeve stresses in an interview:

> "Do the Netherlands have a special task in the world? 'Don't exaggerate. It is about structuring for peaceful conflict resolution and helping to contain wars. A Dutch goal for which we can only contribute a small part.' "
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, April 29, 1996: van der Velden, 1996)[24]

The European value of pacifism is slightliy more important to the two countries with self-reflexive identities than to European countries in general. Cramer's V for the relation of self-reflexive nations and this value is significant at 0.07[25]. The European notion to present the continent's violent past as "the other" is particularly vivid in Germany and the Netherlands. The idea to let it never happen again seems to refer mostly to war rather than genocide.In the face of a present-day genocide, the value of pacifism is also more frequent in Germany and the Netherlands than the value of human rights, which includes opposition to slaughter. In France and the United States, it is vice versa. So while pacifism is a Europeanized value because it is more frequent across European countries, the avoidance of war prevails over the opposition to slaughter in self-reflexive countries.

Rather than pacifism and peaceful conflict resolution, multiculturalism is prominent instead in the American debate surrounding Srebrenica. This value is clearly less important in the European countries. In the American debate, multiculturalism reflects American national identity based on the an immigrant society in which different cultures live

[23]Cramer's V= 0.08, $alpha$*=0.000, Pearson's χ^2=25.39.

[24]My translation: "Heeft Nederland een bijzondere taak in de wereld? 'Niet overdrijven. Het gaat om structuren voor vreedzame conflictbeslechting en het helpen terugdringen van oorlogen. Een Nederlands belang, waaraan we maar een kleine bijdrage kunnen leveren.' "

[25]Cramer's V 0.07, α*=0.000, Pearson's χ^2=18.94



Figure 4.21: *Number of articles referring values to different communities in articles with value frames in the Srebrenica debate, by country, totals.*

together without assimilation. Despite the lack of major immigration[26], pre-war multicultural society is seen as something familiar to Americans:

> "American instinct and values point toward the preservation of a multicultural Bosnia, but the follies of past policy make that an extremely difficult objective."
> (*New York Times*, October 9, 1995: Lewis, 1995)

Going even more into detail, I look at the communities to which the values refer (cf. Figure 4.21 on the next page, 176). Thus, I can trace European and Western as well as different national values. I do this despite low case numbers which can only give an impression of the distribution and cannot yield statistics. The case numbers have been reduced another time because not all values were attributed to a community and in the case of ethnic discrimination they were so low (2 to 5 cases per country) that I did not include this value in the tables.[27]

Multiculturalism, which is an important value in the American debate on Srebrenica, is seen in all countries as important in the region of the crisis region itself. This highlights

[26]Bosnian Muslims today are descendants of local converts, instead of Turkish migrants from the Ottoman times.

[27]Otherwise, almost all values were attributed to a community. Only in the Netherlands 14 per cent of all value frames have no community related to. They are almost evenly distributed across the frames.

that there is recognition of a peaceful community in the Yugoslav region (at least in the past) where different faiths and ethnicities are no cause for trouble.

> "Senior Bosnian commanders who gave President Alija Izetbegovic clearance last week to sign a peace pact drawn up by the United Nations and the European Community made it clear beforehand that they considered the plan, which provides for 10 provinces functioning as ethnic enclaves, amounted to a repudiation of their fight for a multi-religious, multi-ethnic state."
> (*New York Times*, March 30, 1993: Burn, 1993a)

Considering that multiculturalism is (also) an American value, it is astonishing that it is so seldom framed as such in the American debate. Instead, the general positive attitude towards a peaceful community of different cultures and religions at home seems to result in a focus on the Bosnian community as a (destroyed) example of it in Europe.

Democracy is another value more frequent in the American debate than in the European ones and it is also mostly related to the American nation (7 out of 11 cases). It becomes evident that America also sees itself as the cradle of democracy when it comes to international conflicts. This orientation of democracy as an American value is not shared by the European countries. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, the few cases refer to different communities showing no pattern.

The promotion and upholding of human rights is a value important in all countries of investigation. For the communities to which it is related, there are again clear differences between the US and the European countries. In the United States, human rights are considered an American value: 12 out of 13 references are made to the US. The attribution is often quite explicit:

> "In struggling to find an appropriate response to the Bosnia crisis, U.S. policymakers also were struggling to find a proper place for the United States in the post-Cold War world. The victory over communism produced an initial wave of euphoria in Western capitals, with talk about the construction of a 'new world order' and the final triumph of American democratic values. Having borne the burden of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, Americans looked forward to the long-promised 'peace dividend.' Hundreds of thousands of American soldiers began coming home from Europe."
> (*Washington Post*, December 3, 1995: Dobbs, 1995)

In Europe, human rights reflect the multiple character of identities in the three countries with specification as European, Western and universal value. As human rights were declared and are *per definitionem* universal, it is surprising that they are not seen so in the

US at all.[28] Overall, human rights are almost always considered in all countries as part of their own multiple identities: in Europe, this means multiple identities of national, European, Western and universal. In the US, it is limited to the national American identity. On the other hand, this means that there is agreement that human rights have no particularistic roots in the Yugoslav region.

Pacifism can be characterized as a Europeanized value frequent in the European countries and not in the United States. Looking at the communities to which the value refers, this is confirmed. In the US, pacifism is never seen as an American value but only as European: Of seven cases, three refer to Europe directly, the others to European nations. In Europe, pacifism is either seen as part of European countries' own national identities (especially Germany and the Netherlands) or as a European value (most clearly in France) as in *Le Figaro* in 2003:

> "Since its origin, Europe has built itself on the refusal of war. More than in any part of our continent, the peoples of the Balkan know that it [war] only leads into ruin."
> (*Le Figaro*, March 17, 2003: Lenoir, 2003)[29]

As a Europeanized value, pacifism is also frequently related to other European countries, most importantly to Germany (six times in France, the Netherlands and the United States). Overall, there is great convergence across European countries with regard to pacifism as a Europeanized value and the outside look from the United States confirms that it is a European value.

The focus on peaceful conflict resolution was also evident in the policy approach of Europe and European countries during the Bosnian War. European peace-keepers who were sent to Bosnia were meant to ease the humanitarian sufferings. In the United States, the preservation of multiculturalism was a central value and ethnic discrimination was more important which shows that the community as such is at focus. In comparison to the European focus on war, American values are probably more sensitive to genocide. The events in Srebrenica make clear that there is a Westernized opposition to slaughter and a value of human rights (which are considered to be American in the US, though). Characteristic for Europe is additionally a strong opposition to war.

In sum, the values in the Srebrenica debate are the same in all four countries: human rights, democracy, multiculturalism and pacifism. Only in the Netherlands, does the promotion of international justice also play a role. The frequency of value frames and

[28] In Europe, the frequent notion of human rights as German value could have been expected rather than for France as the country of the first declaration of human rights. Yet, even in France human rights were once seen as German as well.

[29] My translation: "Dès l'origine, l'Europe s'est édifiée sur le refus de la guerre. Plus que partout sur notre continent, les peuples des Balkans savent que celle-ci ne conduit qu'à la ruine."

the communities to which they are associated differs across countries with a clear divide between Europe and the US. Human rights are important in all countries and are related to all countries' own multiple identities. Yet, in the US this means human rights are considered American, while in Europe, multiple identities are visible with human rights as a national, European, Western and universal value. In the US, democracy and multiculturalism play an important role whereas they are not as important in the European countries. Democracy in the US is regarded as an American value. Pacifism is a Europeanized value used frequently in European countries – especially in Germany and the Netherlands with (partially) self-reflexive identities – and associated to different European nations and Europe as a whole. In contrast to overall identity, a deeper look at values shows no different framing in the Dutch debate.

4.3.5 Memory in the Srebrenica Debate

To evoke the memory of past events constructs continuity over time and thus suggests stability of communities. For a community with a common identity, emotions and connotations associated to the memory are evoked for the present community. The past events allude to a specific meaning related to certain values today and are of collective importance. A reference to Auschwitz or the Holocaust – and even if it is only with a few words – brings to mind the horrors of mass killing and the breach of civilizational customs:

> "Europe that is more than the market and the currency, believe the European parliamentarians of the VVD [Dutch liberal party]. And thus they made a tv spot with pictures of which they genuinely hope that they will never be seen again thanks to the Constitution: Srebrenica, Holocaust."
>
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, June 4, 2005: Giebels et al., 2005)[30] [31]

I included the memory frames deductively and inductively. World War II and the Holocaust are important to all countries' national identity as well as European identity and especially German self-reflexive identity (cf. Section 2.1). For Americans, the Vietnam War is also of importance, particularly if it comes to questions of military intervention. Although it has not entered national identity in a self-reflexive way that accounts for wrong-doings of the country's own community, colonialism is part of national identities in France and the Netherlands with their empires dissolved. While pre-reading articles, I added the memories of World War I and the Ottoman empire as particularly important to the Yugoslav region where the Great War started and which was part of the Ottoman

[30] "Europa, dat is meer dan markt en munt, vinden de Europarlementariers van de VVD. En dus lieten zij een tv-spotje maken met beelden waarvan ze oprecht hopen dat die dankzij de Grondwet nooit meer te zien zullen zijn: Srebrenica, Holocaust."

[31] The spot can be watched on youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ghETDuhhDRs.



Figure 4.22: *Share of memory frames in the Srebrenica debate, by country and ideological orientation of newspaper, in per cent.*

liberal-left $N_{France}=625$, $N_{Germany}=546$, $N_{Netherlands}=505$, $N_{US}=893$; ***conservative*** $N_{France}=154$, $N_{Germany}=303$, $N_{Netherlands}=738$, $N_{US}=596$

France: Pearson's $\chi^2=6.743$, $\alpha^*=0.011$, Cramer's $V=0.093$; ***Germany***: Pearson's $\chi^2=1.357$, $\alpha^*=0.244$, Cramer's $V=0.040$; ***Netherlands***: Pearson's $\chi^2=0.077$, $\alpha^*=0.782$, Cramer's $V=0.008$; ***US***: Pearson's $\chi^2=14.621$, $\alpha^*=0.000$, Cramer's $V=0.099$

empire for 500 years. Moreover, there were references to the more recent past of the Cold War and other (failed) interventions like those to Lebanon and Somalia. I coded up to two different memories of past events per article – the number of memory frames is therefore a bit higher than that of total articles with at least one memory frame.

In the Srebrenica debate, memory is a more frequent frame than values in all countries which all show similar shares. In France and Germany, 18 per cent of all articles with memory frames include references to past events that are not chronologically connected to those in Srebrenica or (the former) Yugoslavia. In the Netherlands and the United States, it is marginally higher at 19 and 21 per cent. Compared to the intervention debate, the shares are lower in the Srebrenica debate while the country differences are similar: 20 and 24 per cent for Germany and France and 28 per cent for the Netherlands and the US respectively. It has to be noted, though, that coding for the intervention debate did not explicitly treat "historical references" as part of collective memory but rather as unspecific mentioning of past events (cf. variable 516 of the codebook on page 261 and variable memory on page 279 in the appendix).

The influence of the newspapers' ideological orientation is shown in figure 4.22 on page 180. It reveals that conservative newspapers have slightly more memory frames in all countries – a relation that proved significant in some correlations with the identity-related reactions (cf. Table 4.4 on page 168). A closer look at the different countries with



Figure 4.23: *Share of memory to different past events in articles with memory in the Srebrenica debate (may be two per article), by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=121.034, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.223*

respective shares of memory frames in liberal-left and conservative newspapers shows that the significance is again only evident for the United States and is still weak. As before, ideological difference does not prevail if a closer look is taken at the data.

In Figure 4.23, the share of nine different past events evoked as memory are shown in comparison to all articles that have memory references per country. The distribution of the memories reveals that overall, the same memories are virulent in all countries. As with values, there is an agreement across Western countries which past events are important for today's understanding of the events in Srebrenica as part of the debate on war and intervention. Statistically, the country differences prove to be significant and moderately strong with Cramer's V at 0.223.

In all countries, World War II is most often referred to followed by the Holocaust. While the memory of war evokes images of fighting and warfare as well as civilian victims, the memory of the Holocaust is associated with systematic mass killing of men, women and children according to racist categorization. Although a clear differentiation between war and genocide is not quite possible for the national socialist crimes[32], the horrors associated differ and the framing carries different emotions and values with it: it is different thing to say Srebrenica was the worst massacre in Europe since World War II than it is to say it was the worst massacre in Europe since the Holocaust. In all countries, the ratio of World War II to Holocaust is about 2:1. The framing thus operates rather in

[32]Especially in the war against its Eastern neighbors, the German army assisted to the Holocaust and the military attacks found their justification in Nazi racist ideology.

terms of war than genocide. World War II is more frequently remembered in Germany as Holocaust perpetrator with a self-reflexive memory as well as in the United States.

The tendency to rather oppose war than slaughter evident from the value framing in countries with self-reflexive identities is confirmed for memories evoked but Germany and the Netherlands are not different from France and the United States. Instead, France and the US also remember World *War* II more than the Holocaust genocide. Despite overall similarity, there are again differences in the emphasis of memories in the debate. These differences between countries are significant and moderately strong. For the values, there was an American-European divide, this is not evident for memories. Values show that peaceful conflict resolution is a Europeanized value and presumably lesson from World War II while human rights are prominent in the US and Europe. Contrary to the expectation which war enhanced by the value framing, there is no specific European reaction that puts the continent's past of war and terror as the "other". Although there is some awareness of the events in Srebrenica as something that should belong to the European past, it is no specifically European characteristic. Such explicit othering does not necessarily include explicit reference to memory, though:

> "The responsible for the Srebrenica massacre, Ratko Mladic, is the archetype of a criminal of war. He personifies a past Europe wants to get rid of." (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 24, 2006: n.a., 2006)[33]

The country differences for memory set the Netherlands apart from the other countries again. World War II and the Holocaust account for not even half of all memory frames in the Netherlands. In the other countries, the share is over 70 per cent. Instead, the Dutch refer more often to the colonial past (15 per cent), while such events are very marginally remembered in all other countries. The references to its colonial wrongs hint at a self-reflexive turn to Dutch memory which has not been very strong regarding its colonial past. Dutch participation in the events in Srebrenica clearly triggers more debate on Dutch decolonizational wars:

> " 'Srebrenica' – the drama, the confusion, the responsibilities, someone's guilt somebody else's courage – is a major chapter in the national history. It deserves to be written up as mercilessly as possible. It is also a major chapter in the lives of at least three generations who cannot be asked for patience as 'new facts appear' or old facts are put into a new context. Otherwise, research is caught up by the news and politics. Last week, I made a comparison with the Dutch war in Indonesia which we still like to call 'the Indonesian question'. Twenty years after independence, the first official investigation was

[33]My translation: "Der für das Massaker in Srebrenica verantwortliche Ratko Mladic ist der Archetypus des Kriegsverbrechers. Er verkörpert eine Vergangenheit, die Europa gerne loswerden möchte."



Figure 4.24: *Share of different communities of reference for all memories in articles with a memory frame in the Srebrenica debate (may be two per article), by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=512.569, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.528*

> conducted into Dutch 'excesses'. Then as well, the news had caught up with research."
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, August 19, 1998: Hofland, 1998)[34]

Figure 4.24 includes communities to which memory is referred if there was a community mentioned.[35] Overall, over 40 per cent of Dutch and American memory frames are related to the countries' own nations – while in France and Germany the the shares are lower at 22 and 32 per cent. Since Germany and France have a higher share of European identity, the differences decrease when all different communities of multiple identities are considered. Memory in the French and German debate often refers to other European nations (category other) which further enhances the European orientation of these countries. The national orientation in the Netherlands leads to a neglect of local memory. Overall, differences between countries are significant and strong.

[34]My translation: " 'Srebrenica' – het drama, de verwarring, de verantwoordelijkheden, de schuld van de een en de moed van de ander – is een hoofdstuk in de vaderlandse geschiedenis. Het verdient zo onbarmhartig mogelijk te worden opgeschreven. Het is ook een hoofdstuk in het leven van zeker drie generaties die men niet tot geduld kan manen als er 'nieuwe feiten boven water komen' of oude feiten in nieuw verband worden geplaatst. Dan wordt de wetenschap door het nieuws en de politiek ingehaald. Vorige week heb ik een vergelijking gemaakt met de Nederlandse oorlog in Indonesie die we nog graag 'de Indonesische kwestie' noemen. Twintig jaar na de soevereiniteitsoverdracht is voor het eerst officieel onderzoek gedaan naar Nederlandse 'excessen' Ook toen had het nieuws de wetenschap ingehaald."

[35]For the American memory frames, 144 cases were dropped because they had no community specified to the memory reference. For France one case was deducted.

	France	Germany	Netherlands	US
World War II	39.71% (of 68)	60.94% (of 84)	54.29% (of 105)	36.22% (of 196)
Holocaust	88.24% (of 34)	74.36% (of 39)	65.96% (of 47)	64.29% (of 70)
Vietnam War	5 of 7	6 of 8	14 of 22	21 of 25
Ottoman empire	12 of 12	11 of 11	10 of 10	18 of 18

Table 4.6: *Share of memory frames that have a community referred to, by country, in per cent.*

To analyze the communities to which particular content of memory refers, I had to drop some events or periods to have at least five cases per country. Not all memories in the discussion have a reference to a community at all. Memories included in this study are World War II, the Holocaust, the Ottoman empire and the Vietnam War.[36] Table 4.6 gives the share of memory frames that have a community associated to them per country and crisis. A closer look at the different memory events shows that memory is not always linked to one specific community. While the Ottoman empire is most clearly associated to specific communities which commemorate these events, the Vietnam War, the Holocaust and especially World War II are less tied and co This is evident in the frequent relation of it to Srebrenica:

> "The latest accounts of mass killings in Srebrenica in July, Europe's worst massacre since World War II, are a horrifying reminder of the ethnic slaughter that has marked this war."
> (*New York Times*, October 29, 1995: Editor, 1995)

Memory of World War II has become so familiar that it is easy to associate with anything. The vivid presence of World War II makes it an important part of Western – if not universal – memory and identity. Going even more into detail, I have a look at the communities to which the memories refer (cf. Figure 4.25). Thus, I can trace European and Western as well as different national memories. I do this despite low case numbers which can only give an impression of the distribution and cannot yield statistics, but are higher than those for values. But only in this way can Europeanized and Westernized memory be traced. The case numbers have been reduced another time because not all values were attributed to a community and in the case of ethnic discrimination they were so low (2 to 5 cases per country) that I did not include this value in the tables.[37]

Results show that the references are the same and have a similar share in all countries. The Ottoman empire is clearly, as expected, a local memory of Yugoslavia. The Vietnam

[36] I reduced the number from ten to five to include the Vietnam War – an American (and earlier a French) intervention in Asia should give better insight as the two intermingled issues of World War II and the Holocaust.

[37] Otherwise, almost all values were attributed to a community. Only in the Netherlands 14 per cent of all value frames have no community related to. They are almost evenly distributed across the frames.



Figure 4.25: *Share of different communities of reference for memories in articles with a memory frame in the Srebrenica debate, by country, total numbers.*

War is an American memory in all countries. In the US, that is the only interpretation. In the European countries, there is also some memory of opposition to the Vietnam War, as the quote from a Dutch newspaper shows:

> "Trees Kosterman, who lives in Israel, said in the discussion by the Civil Coalition [Dutch NGO for peace and international understanding]: 'This song keeps coming to my mind in the past few days: "Mister President, sleep well" by Boudewijn de Groot. That was a success during the Vietnam War. I would like to have the dust removed from that disk and have it played four times every hour by every radio station. Nothing has damn changed since that time thirty years ago.' "
> (*De Volkskrant* September 26, 2001: Clowting and Verdonck, 2001)[38]

World War II and the Holocaust are not only memories very present across Europe and the US, they are also associated to multiple communities in all countries. There is a clear

[38]My translation: "Trees Kosterman, woonachtig in Israel, op het forum van de Civil Coalition [Nederlandse organisatie voor vreede en verstandhouding tussen de volkeren]: 'Ik loop al dagen met een liedje in mijn hoofd: Meneer de president, slaap zacht van Boudewijn de Groot. Dit was een hit tijdens de Vietnamoorlog. Ik ben ervoor om deze plaat uit het stof te halen en ieder uur vijf keer via elk radiostation te laten horen. Er is potverdorie sinds die tijd, dertig jaar geleden, niets veranderd.' "

tendency to relate the events and especially the Holocaust also to the respective country's own nation. In the Srebrenica debate, World War II is also frequently seen as a memory of the Yugoslav region. This indicates that there is awareness of the role German occupation played for the 1990s war in the region. In the Netherlands, the local memory of World War II is less important (5 of all 57 cases with communities to which it is related).

The Dutch speak more often of their national memory of World War II and the Holocaust than the other nations in the Srebrenica debate (24 and 19 times respectively). The Dutch Srebrenica debate is more centered around national memory in the face of national participation. From the comparison of correlations with identity-related reactions, it is evident that participation leads to more memories related to a country's own communities in the four countries in the Srebrenica debate (cf. Table 4.4 on page 168). Especially in France, national memory of World War II is surprisingly low with only one case. In contrast to earlier instances, the French do not relate this part of their identity to Europe in place of their own nation, but see the Second World War mostly as a local event and memory.

For the Holocaust with multiple communities of association, the local perspective is less prominent in all countries compared to World War II. The story of Jews, gypsies and Serbs as victims of the Holocaust in Yugoslavia is rarely commemorated in contrast to general warfare and occupation in the cause of World War II. While identity in general has so far been proven to be clearly less multiple in the United States, memories of the Holocaust and World War II are more multiple here than in the European countries with more references to Western and universal memory.[39] While American identity is nationally self-centered, it is open to other memories of World War II and the Holocaust in the context of events in Europe.

The self-reflexive identity of Germany is not prominent for the memory in the Srebrenica debate and the correlation was insignificant in the comparison of Cramer's V – and the same is true for European identity. The participation of the Netherlands in the Srebrenica interventions triggered Dutch memory of World War II and the Holocaust. Germany only scores second with German memory of World War II and the Holocaust. Memory is often so internalized that it proves the necessity of human coding, as in a report on a visit to Bosnia by German parliamentarians of the green ecologist party:

> "At least from the small Jewish community (which lost two thirds of its 1500 members to flight in the 1395 days of the Sarajevo siege), the greens expected resentment against the German soldiers. But community leader Danilo Nikolic doesn't show any. The 59-year-old says that German soldiers are also welcome on Bosnian ground if they maintain peace. When the greens leave Sarajevo again, a few views of the world have been shaken. The actual cathar-

[39] Although in France and the Netherlands, there are a few cases of the Holocaust as an American memory.

sis is still to come for the travelers. Place of action: Tuzla."
(*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 28, 1996: Schloetzer-Scotland, 1996)[40]

In sum, memory is very similar across Western nations. World War II in particular, but also the Holocaust are central to the understanding in the Srebrenica debate. This convergence hints at a Westernized memory. There is no specific framing that puts the Holocaust as 'the other' to present-day Europe, as suggested. Differences emerge with the communities to which memory is referred. As before in the study of identity, American and Dutch memory is more oriented towards the national perspective. In France and Germany, memory is more European and Europeanized and not otherwise related to national or Western identities. Overall, the Second World War and the Holocaust relate to multiple communities in all countries, suggesting an international and less fixed character.

4.3.6 Failure and Shame

So far, results have shown that imperfect behavior by Dutch soldiers does not result in ostracizing individuals but rather in an increased emphasis on the imagined community of the Dutch at home and in service in the Srebrenica debate. National participation thus explains much of the identity-related reactions. A self-reflexive identity, which the Dutch have at least partially with regard to the Holocaust, also addresses and recognizes wrong-doings by the countries' own community. As an explanatory factor, self-reflexive identity was not very helpful so far. Events in Srebrenica themselves may in the long run contribute to a self-reflexive identity; the memory of colonial times evoked in the Dutch Srebrenica debate certainly points in that direction. The emerging debate on Dutch colonial wars points in that direction. Without going into details and turning an independent into a dependent variable, there are some few instances where self-reflexiveness regarding Srebrenica can be witnessed. A case of Dutch self-reflexive identity in reaction to Srebrenica can be found as early as three months after the genocide:

"The fact that Holland the Netherlands is in the midst of a painful reassessment of the role of Dutch collaborators during the Nazi occupation, and that the country is also facing unpleasant aspects of its war against Indonesian guerrillas in the late 1940's, has made the pain of Srebrenica even more acute, [Dutch diplomat] Mr. Hoekma said. 'There is a very intense linkup of various

[40] "Zumindest bei der kleinen jüdischen Gemeinde (die in der 1395 Tage langen Belagerung Sarajewos zwei Drittel ihrer 1500 Mitglieder durch Flucht verlor) erwarten die Grünen Ressentiments gegen deutsche Soldaten. Doch Gemeindechef Danilo Nikolic kann damit nicht dienen. Der 59jaehrige sagt, ihm seien auch deutsche Soldaten auf bosnischem Boden willkommen, wenn sie den Frieden bewahrten. Als die Gruenen Sarajewo wieder verlassen, sind bereits einige Weltbilder ins Wanken geraten. Doch die eigentliche Katharsis steht den Reisenden noch bevor. Ort des Geschehens: Tuzla."

historical events,' Mr. Hoekma asserted.said. 'We always thought, and some still think, that Holland is a white angel in a dark world. Now we are wondering if we really are always heroes. Psychologists and sociologists have not begun to comment on this yet, but I believe they will.' "
(*The New York Times*, October 8, 1995: Kinzer, 1995)[41]

Similarly, there were few cases of heroic identity with past wrongs played down, justified, glorified or the fact of collective silence on it is mentioned. Regarding the Holocaust, Americans, for example, ignore the fact that they put up restrictive quotas for Jewish immigrant from national socialist Europe and that the US air force did not consider stopping deportation of people to the extermination camps because of disbelieve in the reports of survivors. Instead, a heroic memory of World War II is upheld that leaves no doubt that everything was done to stop national socialists:

"Stopping genocide in Bosnia is not deemed a significant enough American interest to commit a single soldier. Indeed, it isn't even considered significant enough to send air support to permit French soldiers to do the job [in Srebrenica]. Enough. The American people cannot be proud of a president who, in their names, refuses to permit U.S. soldiers to end this merciless destruction of unarmed people. Every American who has visited the Holocaust Museum leaves thinking, "I wish we could have helped before so many died." This time we can. The administration should immediately announce a new policy, which would consist of the following [...]
(*Washington Post*, July 25, 1995: Burkhalter, 1995)

So there are explicit references to both self-reflexive and heroic memory. But even the hypothesis based on the conclusion drawn from secondary literature that Germany and the Netherlands have self-reflexive identities did not materialize. During the fall and genocide in Srebrenica, there were various actors who failed and communities which may take the blame collectively. Firstly, the local and overall Bosnian Serb community had a high degree of support and even participation in the genocide. Secondly, the Dutch UN soldiers in Srebrenica and the Dutch military and government as well as the United Nations made poor decisions in the course of events. Thirdly, there was a lack of willingness by other governments and nations to protect the Bosnian Muslims in the Eastern enclaves.

It is worth looking at failure and shame as addresses of poor behavior by a collective without any deeper discussion of identity issues. I differentiate three possible ways to characterize the failures: general failure, guilt and shame. Failure in a general sense includes things not done in a good or appropriate way – this refers to all argumentation

[41]The repetition of words is in the original and probably due to internal corrections made. Jan Hoekma is not aware of sociological made on on Dutch identity (cf. Subsection 2.1.3.



Figure 4.26: *Share of different types of failure in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=40.772, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.164*

which suggest that the course of events could have gone differently and the genocide may have been preventable. I interpret guilt as a merely judicial question of responsibility and accountability. As failure, guilt mostly relates to an actual person or institution. Shame was only coded as a collective failure to meet the community's values and the realization of this failure. All three ways have to relate directly to the events in Srebrenica and not to general failure in Bosnia or other (past) events, such as the Holocaust. It is thus not the same as the independent variable operationalized in the the public reaction.

In Figure 4.26 the share of articles with notions of general failure, guilt and shame as well as articles with none of these in comparison to all articles of the Srebrenica debate can be seen. Questions of failure arise quite frequently in all countries: 19.93 per cent of Dutch articles refer to failure, guilt or shame and 9.40 per cent of American articles. France and Germany are in between, with 13.74 per cent of all French articles and 16.73 per cent of all German articles mentioning such notions.

Differences between nations are significant, while the influence of the ideological orientation of newspapers has a low and insignificant influence on referring to failures.[42] The share of articles mentioning no failure in the Srebrenica debate is lowest for the Netherlands (70 per cent) whereas in the other countries, it is 83 to 90 per cent. Although the ICTY was clearly visible in all countries, guilt is not important in any country. Despite the obligation by the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide, the not-prevention of

[42]For nations, compare Figure 4.27; for ideologies, Pearson's χ^2 is 3.231, α*=0.199 and Cramer's V=0.065.

genocide in Srebrenica is not a legal but a political and moral question.

References to failure are highest in the Netherlands, where 21 per cent of all article see a general failure and almost 8.5 per cent refer to collective shame. The Dutch do not believe that the events in Srebrenica simply happened, but that there was potential for different decisions and action which could have changed the course of events. There is also more shame involved in the Dutch debate on Srebrenica than in the other countries: Participation as an explanatory factor for framing with failures is significant and moderately strong: Pearson's χ^2=30.575, α*=0.000 and Cramer's V=0.200.

Regarding the communities to which general failure and shame refer, the differences between nations are significant and strong for both failure and shame (cf. Figure 4.27). The Dutch put most blame on their own country: in 63 per cent of the cases when failure during the events in Srebrenica is discussed, the Dutch refer to their own country. In the other countries, the UN are the collective most failure is attributed to: 40 per cent in the US, 43 per cent in Germany, 44 per cent in France.[43] In the Netherlands, the share for UN failure is only 24 per cent:

> "[...] the United Nations itself are now seen as center of power. Here is the gap between hope and desperation and between ideal and reality. The events of the past decade show that the UN was not or hardly capable to master crisis situations and to ensure its authority is respected. I think of Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Under its eyes, and surely with joint responsibility of the UN, thousands of people were slaughtered in Srebrenica; in Afghanistan the UN couldn't ease the human pain, let alone get rid of the Taliban and for Kosovo see above."
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, March 22, 2003: Ellian, 2003)[44]

In Germany and the US, the Netherlands rank second behind the UN as the actor that failed in Srebrenica (19 and 20 per cent respectively). In France, French failure is more frequently mentioned than that of the Netherlands. So far, only the visibility of French national actors is increased in France showing a special relevance of events to the country, while the identity-related reaction is not higher in France than in Germany. For

[43]The correlation of participation and failure to the own community is significant and strong: Pearson's χ^2=234.825, α*=0.000 and Cramer's V=0.641.

[44]My translation: "[...] de Verenigde Naties worden nu zelf als het machtscentrum gezien. Hier ligt de kloof tussen hoop en wanhoop en tussen ideaal en werkelijkheid. De gebeurtenissen van het afgelopen decennium tonen aan dat de VN in crisissituaties niet of nauwelijks in staat waren de conflicten te beheersen of hun gezag te laten gelden. Daarbij denk ik aan Bosnie, Kosovo, Afghanistan en Irak. Onder het toeziend oog, en in zekere zin met medeverantwoordelijkheid van de VN, zijn in Srebrenica duizenden mensen afgeslacht; in Afghanistan is het de VN niet gelukt het menselijk leed te verminderen, laat staan het Talibaan-regime te verdrijven, en in Kosovo idem dito."



Figure 4.27: *Share of different communities of reference for failure and shame in articles with such references in the Srebrenica debate, by country, in per cent.*

***for failure**: Pearson's χ^2=220.867, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.357; **for shame**: Pearson's χ^2=135.832, α*=0.000, Cramer's V=0.525*

the question of failure, even the limited involvement of France in the UN command during the events in Srebrenica as part of the UN hierarchy results in more self-references.

The notion of shame as a collective and embarrassing failing is clearly less frequent outside the Netherlands. For France, this confirms that the marginal involvement results in no identity-related, collective understanding of Srebrenica. This is only the case for the Netherlands as can be seen in the great difference between the Netherlands and the other countries; 94 per cent of the communities to which shame is related in the Dutch Srebrenica debate is the country itself. Only small shares relate to other communities. In France, nine cases are evenly distributed between Europe, the UN and the Netherlands. In Germany, most references to shame are made for the Netherlands (9 of 25), while in the US it is the UN (7 of 25). In the US, there are more different communities, with three cases even referring to the US itself. In theory, American identity may be heroic regarding its past, but for a present-day genocide notions of shame are evoked in the American Srebrenica debate although – or rather in the argumentation, because – the country was not directly involved. France and Germany also show some cases of shame for Europe (three and five cases respectively); for example in the quote by the former UNPROFOR commander Jean Cot:

> "To what does this alliance serve us? Foremost, it serves to guarantee the United States the strategic control over Europe at lowest cost. In this present alliance there will never be a European security and defence identity. But attention, Europeans! For us, after Vukovar and Srebrenica, the shame returns!"
> (*Le Monde*, January 20, 1999: Cot, 1999)[45]

In sum, there are a number of references to failure and shame in the Srebrenica debate. General interpretations of failure and shame are quite frequent in relation to Srebrenica. National participation is a clear indicator for the communities to which failure is related: In the Netherlands, there is most talk of failure and shame and it is mostly referred to the Dutch nation. While it is not explicitly self-reflexive identity, collective shame is an identity-related reaction to the Srebrenica genocide in the Netherlands.

4.4 Summary

The events in Srebrenica are most present in the Dutch general debate on war and intervention as well as in the Dutch intervention debate. Also for the framing of the debate,

[45] My translation: "A quoi nous sert cette Alliance? Elle sert avant tout à garantir au moindre coût le contrôle stratégique des Etats-Unis sur l'Europe. Il n'y aura jamais d'identité européenne de sécurité et de défense au sein de l'Alliance actuelle. Mais attention, Européens! Pour nous, après Vukovar et Srebrenica, la honte revient!"

national participation of the Netherlands proves to be the most important difference across the countries examined. Regarding the actors related to Srebrenica or mentioned in the debate, Dutch actors are highly present in the Netherlands and only marginal in the other countries. The national perspective is shared by the United States where American actors get a lot of attention.

For the understanding of events, diffuse ethnic categories prevail in all countries during the conflict. After the Dayton peace accord, there is a shift towards more political readings of the events in Srebrenica as well as the former Yugoslavia as a whole. While there is not more focus on human rights in the American debate, genocide is introduced earlier to the understanding of Srebrenica. In the Netherlands, this term is used less frequently even after the ICTY ruling. In combination with less references to the local context, the Dutch focus on their perspective results in a neglect of sufferings for the victims of genocide. Not naming the horror that happened when Dutch soldiers stood by means to ease responsibility.

Compared to the intervention debate, identity frames are not more frequent in the Srebrenica debate, but there are more identity frames that refer to the countries' own multiple identities. In France and Germany, identities are multiple and quite often European. This had been the case in the Dutch intervention debate in particular, but Dutch national identity is dominant with regard to Srebrenica.

With their national participation in Srebrenica, the Netherlands are more similar to the US when it comes to a national perspective on the events in Srebrenica. When only the Srebrenica debate (newspaper articles of the overall debate on war and intervention that mention the word "Srebrenica") is considered, such understanding is more frequent in the two countries than in France or Germany. The same is true for identity framing of the Srebrenica debate. Combining any explicit identity framing, memory or values, the Netherlands and US are more focused on their own national identity.

Conservative newspapers are more sensitive in framing the Srebrenica debate with regard to identity in general and specifically to memory. Yet, these differences are not present when looking at values or which (and whose) memories are employed. Moreover, the communities to which identity in general or the more specific subframes relate do not differ along the ideological orientation of the newspapers but rather across countries. The ideological difference shows the range of national pluralism rather than an ideological cleavage in the reaction to Srebrenica.

A closer look at the content of identity framing reveals similarity regarding which values and memories are mentioned. For example, human rights are important in all four countries. In the order of values, Americans focus on multiculturalism and democracy while pacifism (refrain from any war and violence as well as peaceful conflict resolution) is dominant in all European countries, especially in those with (partially) self-reflexive identities. Differences also prevail for the communities to which values are related; hu-

man rights and democracy in the US are clearly seen as an American value, while in Europe these values are related to different communities, accounting more for a universal character. Pacifism is a Europeanized value; it is frequently used in the European debate and it is related rather to European nation states (including the own) and also to Europe as a whole.

Memory is similar in all four countries: World War II and the Holocaust play an important role. The Second World War and to a lesser degree the Holocaust are not necessarily tied to a community. If so, both are mostly related to a country's own nation, but especially in the US various communities occur as holder of the memory. World War II and the Holocaust are Westernized memories with a free-floating, international character. Memories of the Ottoman empire and Vietnam War are also frequently mentioned, but are tied to local and American communities. For the Netherlands, memory of the colonial past is also frequent and related to the country itself. In the Srebrenica debate, there is indication that the Dutch come to reflect more critically on their colonial past in Indonesia.

Values and memories show that there is a Westernized lesson learned from World War II and the Holocaust. Human rights are cherished in all countries under investigation. Peaceful conflict resolution is a specifically European second lesson from the past. Rather than the Holocaust past as 'the other' to present Europe, it seems typically European to avoid violence and war.

A framing of failure is prominent particularly in the Netherlands. The communities to which failure is related are more diverse in France, Germany and the US: Not only the Netherlands, but rather the UN failed. Apart from a general interpretation that there was failure and events in Srebrenica could have been different, there is also collective shame mentioned in the Netherlands.

5

Srebrenica in Collective Memory

It has become clear that Srebrenica triggers identity-related reactions in all countries under investigation but particularly in the Netherlands. This is also visible in the continuous presence of Srebrenica in the Dutch debate years after the enclave fell and genocide was committed in July 1995. The sample includes newspaper articles until March 2006 so that over ten years of debate after the fall and genocide in Srebrenica are covered. Although it may take several decades for a collective memory to form, some indications for a memory to form can be gained. Srebrenica as a memory is not an identity-related reaction, but Srebrenica itself becomes part of collective memory and thereby of collective identity.

5.1 Context and Content of Srebrenica in Collective Memory

Events in collective memory are reference points, *lieux de mémoire*, which are evoked with the values and emotions associated to them. To find the first indication of collective memory of Srebrenica, I look at the context in which Srebrenica is used and at the content for which it stands. In all cases, it is important that Srebrenica is the memory of something beyond a Bosnian town:

- reference to Srebrenica when the focus of the debate is on a crisis other than Bosnia or the Yugoslav region,
- Srebrenica as a historic event in line with other events not directly associated by geography and time like Rwanda or Auschwitz,
- symbolic value attributed to Srebrenica that is implied and not explicit,
- traveling of Srebrenica when some other event is “a Srebrenica”.

Across countries, there is a remarkable share of articles that mention Srebrenica as a memory in at least one of the described ways. By far the highest share is evident in the Dutch debate where 47.39 per cent of all articles in the debate (1243) do not discuss Srebrenica in detail but mention it as a memory. In all other countries, the share is around twenty per cent: 21.82 per cent of 779 articles for France, 25.68 per cent of 849 articles for Germany and 19.41 per cent of 1489 articles for the United States. The country differences are significant with α*=0.000 and moderately strong with Cramer's V=0.260. The large Dutch share made such a strong relation possible and shows that the country most closely linked by participation in the intervention has Srebrenica more clearly established as memory. Keeping in mind the strong relation of identity and the occurrence of Srebrenica in articles of the intervention debate (cf. Subsection 4.2.2), Srebrenica can be considered a *lieux de mémoire*.

The distribution of Srebrenica as memory in the four different categories, as described above, in comparison to all cases of Srebrenica shown as a memory (more than one case per article possible) is shown in Figure 5.1. Although country differences are moderately strong, there is the same general tendency evident in all countries. Srebrenica has mostly frequently entered collective memory as a symbol with around half of all cases in all countries. Shares of memory that put Srebrenica in a different context (other wars, traveling) rather than giving it a special meaning in form of symbols or as a historic event, are more frequent in the Netherlands. I will come back to this figure throughout my analysis of Srebrenica as a memory.

The comparison of Cramer's V shows that participation is particularly fit to explain the emergence of a collective memory of Srebrenica (cf. Table 5.1).[1] As part of the identity reaction to the events, the Dutch begin to integrate Srebrenica to their memory. While self-reflexive identity and the ideological orientation of newspapers have insignificant influence on memory formation, European countries are more likely to build such memory than the United States. Overall, however, the explanatory value is not very strong. The same is true for the individual factors contributing to memory where only participation and ideological orientation prove relevant.

Contrary to the identity-related reaction, liberal-left newspapers are mentioning Srebrenica more often for the town as part of collective memory. Yet, the correlation of ideology and Srebrenica as collective memory reveals an insignificant and weak relation (Pearson's χ^2=3.341, α*=0.063, Cramer's V=0.028).[2] Ideological differences will not be further taken into account as they are insignificant for the components of collective memory except for Srebrenica traveling in the Dutch newspapers. For a better understanding,

[1]The statistics were only carried out for Srebrenica as a memory in general, Srebrenica in other wars and Srebrenica as symbol as case numbers for the other categories are rather low.

[2]The correlation is also insignificant for all countries. In Germany, conservative newspapers have included Srebrenica more frequently to collective memory.



Figure 5.1: *Share of different ways in which Srebrenica has entered memory, by country, in per cent*

Pearson's χ^2=68.549, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.183*

Note: Increased case numbers are due to some articles featuring more than one way of remembering Srebrenica.

	national participation	**self-reflexive identity**	**European continent**	**ideological orientation**
Srebrenica as memory	0.253***	0.036	0.153***	0.028
Srebrenica in other crises	0.062***	0.017	0.040*	0.004
Srebrenica as symbol	0.193***	0.015	0.132***	0.010

Table 5.1: *Cramer's V for identity framing in the intervention debate*

**** α = 0.000, ** $\alpha \leq$ 0.005, * $\alpha \leq$ 0.010*

I take a closer look at the four factors indicating the emergence of memory.

Memory evolved already five years after the genocide as Figure 5.2 on page 198 shows with the share of memory in different time periods. The differences across time are significantly strong in all countries. In the American debate, there are even indications of a memory for Srebrenica before the massacres occured in 1995 because Americans recognized the importance and genocidal character of Srebrenica earlier than Europeans, particularly the Dutch. Anniversaries account for around five per cent of all articles in the Srebrenica debate with most shares in France (6.16 per cent) and least in the United States (3.29 per cent). Over time, the share of articles on anniversaries in the Srebrenica debate remains constant at five per cent with the exception of the 10th anniversary. In 2005, a quarter of all articles on Srebrenica were published in July.

For a detailed analysis, I examine the four different ways in which Srebrenica is remembered: Srebrenica mentioned in articles that focus on crises outside of the Yugoslav



Figure 5.2: *Share of different time periods in Srebrenica as a memory, by country, in per cent.*

France *Pearson's* χ^2*=55.438,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.267;* ***Germany*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=78.458,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.304;* ***Netherlands*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=315.888,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.504;* ***US*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=138.824,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.305*

region, Srebrenica as a traveling catch word in different context, Srebrenica as a symbol of atrocities, military or moral failure as well as Srebrenica in line with other historical reference points.

5.2 Srebrenica Mentioned with Other Wars

As a first sign pointing to the context in which Srebrenica is evoked, I examine how Srebrenica relates to conflicts outside Bosnia. It can either mean that the focus of the article is not Bosnia or that the word truly travels. This is more frequently the case in the Netherlands than in the other countries (cf. introductory Figure 5.1 on page 197). In the Netherlands, Srebrenica is more frequently considered in different contexts, while the other countries mention Srebrenica apart from its Bosnian and Yugoslav context in about a third of all cases.

country	overall Yugoslavia	other war(s)	Bosnia (as share of Yugoslav region)	Kosovo as share of Yugoslav region
France (N=779)	89.73%	10.27%	70.67%	5.74%
Germany (N=849)	90.58%	9.42%	72.17%	7.41%
Netherlands (N=1243)	69.99%	30.01%	77.70%	6.55%
United States (N=1498)	89.86%	10.14%	86.70%	2.62%

Table 5.2: *Share of article with focus on on different crisis regions in the Srebrenica debate ; by country; in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=269.832, α=0.000; Cramer's V=0.249*

Note that percentages for Bosnia and Kosovo do not refer to the whole sample but only to articles that focus on Yugoslavia.

In Table 5.2, the share of conflict regions to which all articles in the Srebrenica debate (not only those with Srebrenica as memory) relate, are given to contrast the Yugoslav region with other regions of conflict plus a further differentiation of the Yugoslav region. It comes to no surprise that the Yugoslav region is most frequently the focus of the articles that mention Srebrenica. Yet there is a clear difference between the Dutch debate and those in other countries, with Cramer's V indicating a clear association of national context while the ideological orientation of the newspapers plays no role.[3] The distinction already shows that Srebrenica is not only a town in Bosnia for the Dutch but a reference point in various wars and interventions. The differences between the other countries are minimal.

Within the Yugoslav region, Bosnia dominates in all countries followed by some general notion of Yugoslavia, as shown in Table 5.2. In the European countries, the war and intervention in Kosovo also has some importance with shares from 5 per cent (France) to more than 7 in Germany, with the Netherlands in between at 6.5 per cent (share within articles with focus on the Yugoslav cases only) – in the US, the share is only 2.6 per cent. Considering the intensive debate on the legitimacy of intervention, it is a bit astonishing that Srebrenica is not more frequently mentioned in relation to Kosovo. For the debates on war and intervention in the Yugoslav region, Srebrenica is a reference point in all European debates. Srebrenica only plays a larger role in wars and interventions outside the Yugoslav region for the Netherlands.

Considering only cases which focus on a crisis outside the Yugoslav region, Figure 5.3 gives the different crisis regions in whose context Srebrenica is mentioned. All countries show similar distributions. Clearly, various other wars are the most prominent category because they include a purely domestic focus. The share is highest in the US at 73 per cent and lowest in the Netherlands with 57 per cent, dominating all debates. In the United States the share of articles outside the Bosnian context is lowest among all countries – but

[3] Pearson's χ^2=0.063, α*=0.801, Cramer's V=0.004



Figure 5.3: *Share of Srebrenica mentioned in articles coded with other than Yugoslav crisis regions at focus, by country, in per cent*

Pearson's χ^2=68.549, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.183*

if the context is different it is rather domestic than other interventions. In the Netherlands, Srebrenica is related to other interventions in almost half of the cases.

It seems that the mentioning of Srebrenica in other wars reveals no patterns but rather country specific cases: The German debate on the Iraq war triggers more references to Srebrenica than in other countries. In the Netherlands, Afghanistan as the first post-Yugoslav combat mission for the Dutch army scores higher than in other countries – as does the intervention in Eritrea with a debate on whether to participate:

> "As a government decision over the participation in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) is expected this week, supporters and opponents exchange arguments in the media. As supporter of participation, I notice that some opponents are infected by the Srebrenica virus and in fact don't want to participate in any peace operation any more."
> (*Volkskrant*, October 3, 2000: Homan, 2000)[4]

[4]My translation: "Nu het kabinet deze week naar verwachting een beslissing neemt over de deelname aan de United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Unmee), wisselen voor- en tegenstanders argumenten in de media uit. Als voorstander van deelname valt mij vooral op dat sommige tegenstanders besmet zijn met het Srebrenica-virus en in feite aan geen enkele vredesoperatie meer willen deelnemen."

5.3 Srebrenica Traveling

Traveling is a special case of a different context for the events in Srebrenica. Even if the focus is on a crisis other than the Yugoslav region, the reference to Srebrenica can still carry with it clear explanations of what happened in the enclave and what that means for the respective conflict. In the case of Srebrenica traveling, the town is mentioned when the focus of an article is really on another (aspect of) war and intervention and there is no further explanation to the meaning of it. For the European debate on the strategy to deal with Austria when right-wing party became part of government, the name party leader Jörg Haider figuratively traveled to new contexts when for example there was "a Haider from Rhine" mentioned (Risse and van de Steeg (2003)). Traveling is very common for catch words that help in explaining without using many words because meaning is part of the memory associated. Auschwitz is such a word for other historic and historical events that need no further explanation when warning of "the Holocaust on your plate" (animal rights NGO PETA's 2005 campaign against the meat industry) or "Auschwitz in the United States" (pro-life NGO "Jesus" campaign against hospitals with abortion clinics).

In the Netherlands, Srebrenica has become a term that travels much to other contexts – even though the sample of article originates only from the debate on war and intervention without articles purely on Dutch domestic affairs or culture and without reference to Bosnia and war (cf. introductory Figure 5.1 on page 197): 13 per cent of cases in which Srebrenica is entrenched in Dutch memory are cases of Srebrenica traveling compared to 11 per cent in France, 10 per cent in Germany and only below 7 per cent in the US. Again, Dutch participation matters most in putting Srebrenica into different contexts. The direct correlation of the ideological orientation of newspapers and the traveling of the term Srebrenica is insignificant (Pearson's χ^2=0.105, α*=0.668, Cramer's V=0.007). The catchy character of such traveling is evident from the Dutch headline:

> "Senate investigates Belgian Srebrenica – Did Belgium share responsibility in the bloodshed in Rwanda?" (*NRC Handelsblad* of May 1, 1997: Donker, 1997)[5].

Although just over ten years have elapsed after the genocide, there already is an iconographic meaning to Srebrenica. No explanation needs to be given at all (especially not to the Dutch); when the word Srebrenica is mentioned, it stands for itself.

Figure 5.4 shows the share of other contexts to which Srebrenica has traveled compared to all articles that include Srebrenica as traveling. Although the crises to which Srebrenica travels are different for every country, France and Germany are similar in the main focus: Only in these two countries, is the Yugoslav region most important, while

[5]My translation: "Senaat onderzoekt Belgische Srebrenica – Was Belgie medeverantwoordelijk voor het bloedbad in Rwanda?"



Figure 5.4: *Share of Srebrenica traveling by crisis regions, by country, in per cent.*

France *Pearson's* χ^2*=357.193,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.677;* ***Germany*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=321.662,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.0.616;* ***Netherlands*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=594.258,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.691;* ***US*** *Pearson's* χ^2*=852.905,* α**=0.000, Cramer's V=0.757*

it is Iraq for the United States and African wars for the Netherlands. In the Dutch case, the crises in Eritrea emerges again indicating focus on questions of participation, whereas African wars for the United States refer to Somalia instead. The distribution also shows the close relation of traveling with the focus on other crises, which is manifest in the high values for Cramer's V. The warning character of Srebrenica is evident in the word traveling here, too:

> "The Iraq crisis, EU diplomats say, is something like a second Srebrenica for their foreign policy. Then, the Europeans began to think militarily."
> (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 23, 2004: Wernicke, 2004)[6]

The context in which Srebrenica is used, when referred to in other crises or as 'traveling', also gives some impression of the content of this memory. References to Srebrenica as an iconographic word beyond the Bosnian context show that Srebrenica means something that does not have to be spelled out. Memory is most present in the Netherlands where it is part of the debates on the participation in various later interventions – especially when the Netherlands decided for the first time not to participate in a UN intervention after the United Nations asked for troops from the Netherlands.

[6]My translation: "Die Irak-Krise, sagen EU-Diplomaten, bedeutet für ihre Außenpolitik so etwas wie das zweite Srebrenica. Damals begannen die Europäer militärisch zu denken."

5.4 Srebrenica as a Symbol

The question what the meaning is of Srebrenica remembered can be answered by looking at the symbolic value of Srebrenica and the other historic events which are mentioned along with Srebrenica. The implicit evaluation of the events in Srebrenica was coded from the argumentation within the article. The parallels drawn have to be evaluated after coding included only the name of the event, not the meaning.

To directly account for the symbolic value of Srebrenica, those cases were coded where the word "Srebrenica" implied a certain judgment: a military or moral failure, a humanitarian or human rights crisis. There are no explanations given to why a judgment is adequate. Rather, the reference to Srebrenica serves as an example that does not need more explanation because the reader knows about the events and their implications. When Srebrenica is used as a symbol, it is an indicator for the emergence of collective memory.

As the introductory Figure 5.1 on page 197 has shown before, symbolic references are the most frequent instances of Srebrenica in the collective memory across countries. The share is lowest in the Netherlands, where 45 per cent of cases with Srebrenica as a memory employ it as a symbol. The other countries show higher shares of 55 to 60 per cent. The ideological orientations of newspapers show different results across countries: In Germany, the conservative newspaper uses Srebrenica as a symbol more often, while in France and the US, the liberal-left newspapers do so. Consequently, the correlation of Srebrenica being used as a symbol and ideological orientation of newspapers is weak and insignificant: Pearson's χ^2=0.470, α*=0.493, Cramer's V=0.010.

Turning to the meaning of Srebrenica as a symbol, Figure 5.5 gives the share of military failure, moral failure, atrocities and humanitarian catastrophe as substance for symbols compared to all articles with Srebrenica mentioned as a symbol. The Netherlands is again different from the other countries. In France, Germany and the United States, Srebrenica is mostly understood as a catastrophic human rights violation. Atrocities and mass murder stand central although there is no clear genocide framing as noted above.

> "'Can you be a pacifist after Srebrenica?' This question is at the heart of a very vivid debate in Germany."
> (*Le Monde*, December 5, 1995: Delattre, 1995)[7]

In the Netherlands, Srebrenica is predominantly a question of failure. As participant in the events, the Dutch focus on the external view of military and especially on moral failures. Three quarter of all symbols are related to failures whereas the share is less than half in all other countries. Nevertheless, the other countries also differ: In the French debate, 60 per cent of all symbols refer to Srebrenica as atrocity. In the US, military

[7] My translation: " 'Peut-on demeurer pacifist après Srebrenica?' Cette Question est au cœur d'un débat très vif en Allemagne."



Figure 5.5: *Share of different symbols associated to Srebrenica in all articles with symbols used and mentioning Srebrenica, by country, in per cent.*

Pearson's χ^2=484.702, α=0.000, Cramer's V=0.193*

failure is more frequently evoked than in France or Germany, while in Germany, moral failure is clearly higher at over 40 per cent. Overall, participation results in a view more from the outside and on one's own failings, while the atrocities on the ground are taken more seriously in countries not involved:

> "[Member of Parliament] Bert Koenders is annoyed by the moral appeal by [Dutch minister of defense] Kamp. Koenders has not forgotten 'Srebrenica': 'Interests may not be based on good intentions'. It is a fact that Kamp speaks with passion about the mission in Iraq, 'the looted country where a dictator has been driven out after thirty year and where there finally is hope for a better future'."
> (*De Volkskrant*, June 3, 2004: Koele, 2004)[8]

5.5 Srebrenica as a Historic Event

References to Srebrenica as a historic event are another way Srebrenica becomes evident as a collective memory. I have included direct comparisons or analogies made between

[8]My translation: "Bert Koenders ergert zich aan het 'morele appel' van Kamp. Koenders is 'Srebrenica' niet vergeten: 'Beleid mag niet gebaseerd zijn op goede bedoelingen '. Feit is dat Kamp met passie spreekt over de missie in Irak, 'dat geplunderde land, waar een dictator na dertig jaar verdreven is, en waar nu eindelijk hoop bestaat op een betere toekomst'."

Srebrenica and another historic events. For the coding, there either had to be an enumeration of historic events among them Srebrenica or an explicit comparison that "Srebrenica is like..." Historic events are thus part of the memory evoked in the Srebrenica debate, but are distinguished by a close relation to the events in Srebrenica. With Srebrenica mentioned in one line with other events, it becomes laden with the meaning and emotions of these other past events as well (and vice versa). Across countries and newspapers, such parallels are seldom drawn, only around five per cent of all articles that mention Srebrenica as memory (cf. introductory Figure 5.1 on page 197).

Case numbers are low for Germany, France and the United States when focusing on the different events to which Srebrenica is related. Yet, it emerges that the Holocaust and Rwanda are recognized across countries as resembling what happened in Srebrenica the most. Of 20 articles which feature Srebrenica in line with other historic events in France and Germany, sixteen times one of these to events is also mentioned: (Holocaust has six cases in France and ten in Germany, Rwanda has ten cases in France and six in Germany). In the United States, a similar distribution is evident with 20 of 26 cases referring to the Holocaust (16) and Rwanda (4). Since Rwanda and the Holocaust are two prominent and undisputed cases of genocide, there is a clear orientation in these historic events and with the moral interpretation associated to them.

> "Whoever hasn't learnt from Auschwitz that military power may be necessary against inhumane dictators, he had to be woken up by Sarajevo and Srebrenica."
> (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 3, 1999: Kamm, 1999, letter to the editor)[9]

In France and the Netherlands, there is a preference for the Rwanda parallel, while in Germany and the US almost two thirds of parallels are on the Holocaust. Apart from the genocidal character of both, Rwanda also implies a genocide with an intervention that did not prevent atrocities. While the Dutch focus on failure is evident again, French parallels drawn between Srebrenica and Rwanda may be triggered more by the French involvement in Rwanda. Pacifism was an important Europeanized value and World War II was the dominant collective memory present in the Srebrenica debate, but it played no role if Srebrenica stands in line with other historic events. When trying to understand the present events in Srebrenica, the dominant framing was war, but as a collective memory, Srebrenica is a genocide. Even if not called such, eventually the nature of events, e.i. genocide and not war, prevails.

With some more cases in the Dutch sample, Figure 5.6 on the next page gives the share of events which are put in one line with Srebrenica in all Dutch articles that feature

[9]My translation: "Wer nicht aus Auschwitz gelernt hatte, dass gegen menschenverachtende Diktatoren auch militärische Gewalt erforderlich sein kann, musste durch Sarajewo und Srebrenica aufgerüttelt werden."



Figure 5.6: *Events to which parallels are drawn from Srebrenica in all Dutch articles mentioning Srebrenica and a parallel, in per cent.*

$N_{Netherlands}=70$

historic references for Srebrenica. Not only more historic events are visible in the Dutch debate on Srebrenica, but there is also more variety: nine different events are associated to Srebrenica compared to four or five in the other countries. Especially references made to colonial times hint again at a self-reflexive debate on Dutch identity and memory.

> "Our campaign in Srebrenica resembles [...] many other Dutch military campaigns in this century. There is incidentally a remarkable analogy to the police action in Indonesia and the campaign in New Guinea: We wanted well but it is the evil outside world – in this case the UN with its lax instruction on the use of force – which prevented our good intentions coming into full bloom."
> (*NRC Handelsblad*, March 22, 1995: van den Boogaard, 1995)[10]

Srebrenica stands for something else in the Netherlands than in the other countries: a failure rather than a symbol for atrocities. For French, Germans and Americans, Srebrenica has entered collective memory on lower scale and as (another) genocide, while Dutch memory is focused on the country's role in events and the country's failing.

[10] "Onze campagne in Srebrenica gaat [...] vele andere Nederlandse militaire campagnes in deze eeuw achterna, waarbij er trouwens een opvallende overeenkomst is met de politionele acties in Indonesie of de campagne in Nieuw-Guinea: wij wilden wel, maar het is de boze buitenwereld – in het onderhavig geval de VN met hun lakse geweldsinstructie – die heeft verhinderd dat onze goede bedoelingen tot volle ontplooiing konden komen."

5.6 Summary

In all countries Srebrenica has become a self-explanatory reference in the public debate on war and intervention. Participation in the intervention most clearly explains the emergence of a collective memory of Srebrenica, but liberal-left newspapers are also more likely to show this development; the relation ceases, however, when focusing on the details of Srebrenica as a memory.

Srebrenica is not only present when the focus is on the Yugoslav region but also in other conflict regions. In fact, the word even travels to other situations and events that become a "second Srebrenica" or a "Belgian Srebrenica". In a short time, Srebrenica has achieved iconographic status in the overall debate on war and interventions. This is particularly true for the Netherlands. In the Dutch debate, Srebrenica has also high symbolic values. In contrast to the other countries, Srebrenica stands for moral and military failure. In France, Germany and the US, the focus is rather on atrocities. The Bosnian town is also used in parallel to other historic events, with both Srebrenica compared to historical events and Srebrenica itself as historic(al) reference for later events. While the events in Srebrenica evoke the memory of World War II in the identity-related reaction to Srebrenica, memory of Srebrenica is associated with the Holocaust.

Overall, there is an emerging collective memory of Srebrenica in the debate on war and intervention, especially in the Netherlands. As part of collective memory, Srebrenica is thus related to collective identities. While this is not an identity-related reaction to Srebrenica, it may be considered even something stronger as being part of identity content itself.

Conclusions

Having vowed that a Holocaust should never happen again, the world saw a number of genocides, none of which reached the same industrialized efficiency of national socialist, but in which millions of people were murdered because of who they were rather than what they had done. With the Bosnian War and most clearly the massacres in Srebrenica, genocide had returned to the European continent in the 1990s – but did it matter to Europeans in terms of their identities? This study had the aim of investigating the evolution of identity in the public debate on interventions, particularly on the Srebrenica genocide, and found mixed support for the research question. Europeans care about genocide in Europe but so do Americans who also care for events in other regions of the world. I started from a constructivist understanding of identity formation that put emphasis on the changing nature of collective identity and its values, so that a consensus about the values cherished can be constituted at a certain moment in time. In the public sphere, challenges and reiteration of identity are evident and can be investigated. I assumed that the debates on war and interventions are particularly appropriate to relate to identity because questions of life and death and values worth fighting for are taken to a collective level when soldiers are sent to conflicts not involving the own nation or transnational community.

By analyzing literature on collective identity and paying special attention to collective memory as well, I developed hypotheses on those explanatory factors that can account for the reference to identity matters in the public debate on interventions and on the Srebrenica genocide. In a long-time and comparative media analysis, which relies methodologically on corpus-linguistics as well as content analysis, I scrutinized my hypotheses. The frame analysis in particular helped not only to find the instances when identity is referred to but also to clarify in which way this is done regarding values and memories as content of collective identity.

I will start this concluding chapter with an overview of the theoretical journey taken before I summarize and evaluate the empirical findings with reference to my research questions and hypotheses. Lastly, I will discuss the implications of my study from an analytic as well as a normative perspective to give directions for future research and political practice.

Theoretical Departures and Methods Used

Psychological studies have made it clear that identity is central to the personal development of humans and for them to learn who they are. Personal identity relies greatly on social relations to groups which show collective behavior and collective properties, and can be studied by social scientists as if the group was a unitary actor. Although individuals are not identical in a group, they integrate the values of the communities of which they are part to their own self-understanding. There is thus a collective self-understanding in a community with regard to the values cherished by its members. From this starting point, Section 1.1 explored national identity as the most powerful collective identity today.

Benedict Anderson made famous the notion of nations as imagined communities (Anderson, 1991). Emphasizing the constructed character of identity, he makes it clear that national identity is nonetheless real and important to many people who feel comradeship towards compatriots they have never met. The first nations were founded in the late 18th century with the advent of industrialization and increased capitalization (Gellner, 1983). The latter contributed to a collective identity when print capitalism suggested commonness in time and place to people reading the same newspaper on past events in different places. The mateship was and is particularly virulent during wars when members of the imagined community fight and die for the nation. I examined whether the same is true for interventions today.

As values are at the heart of national identity as well as other forms of collective identity, I looked more closely at this concept in Section 1.2. Values answer to the ethical question of what is good or better for the community. In this sense, values are the goals of the community and at the same time guidelines for the members' behavior. Individuals incorporate values of the community, but have a number of different sets, derived from multiple identities, to chose from according to the situation in which they are in. Despite the possibility of changing values, a consensus may be reached which is often institutionalized. With this argumentation, it is justified to rely on secondary literature and take national consensus of values and memory as a starting point to analyze identities.

I identified two shortcomings of constructivist identity theory which can be overcome in the same school of thought. Constructivists often do not take seriously the strong emotional side of national and other identities. Essentialists stress the "thickness" of their concept when referring to continuity of ethnicity or traditions from pre-modern times before there was national identity (Cederman, 2000). By introducing collective memory in Section 1.3 as another collective construction, I added to the content of identity, which also carries emotions tied to past events remembered. The concept also has roots in psychology and is mostly transmitted in a narrative way which allows emotions to add to its construction, e.g. allowing rejoicing in the success of the French Revolution or American independence. Moreover, by including collective memory in the study of collective

identity, the great similarity of values at the heart of most Western national identities gives way to more differences among national identities. This indistinctiveness was a second shortcoming of value-base identity concepts. Nations as established communities with a collective identity cherish different national memories that relate to their political-territorial unit. Although events are remembered today only if they highlight or enrich present values, they vary among nations which otherwise cherish the same values.

In the center of my reflections on the theory of memory, I looked at traumatic past events of genocide, which have left a mark on collective identity and have changed it in a fundamental way. While in many cases horrendous events qualifying for a trauma are deliberately forgotten (Renan, 1882)[11], in the case of self-reflexive identities memory of traumata in which the collective had the role of perpetrator are integrated to the collective self-understanding. This concept gives the opportunity to study different degrees to which memory of the Holocaust and its lesson "never again" are integrated into national identities. Western nations share very similar values, but they vary in their national memories as well as their remembrance of the role their nation took in the Holocaust.

Going beyond national identity, I introduced European identity in Section 1.4 as another political-territorial identity evolving. It can be considered to be postnational (as something beyond the nation) as well as transnational (among nations) or supranational (above them). In fact, the open character of Europe as a whole and European integration as its political institutionalization make all forms possible. The mixing of national and European identities in a 'marble' cake is one relation of identities with Europeanization of national identities and a national view of European identity. Even the question of what territorially belongs to Europe is not set, so that a delimitation against its past is one way to find meaning (Diez, 2004). This is the foundation to my research question of whether Europeans react in a particular way to present genocide and war in Europe.

Finally, I introduced political ideologies in Section 1.5 as an alternative to the political-territorial based identities presented so far as theoretical background for hypotheses. Offering complete world views on social relations, major ideologies have translated into cleavages between the political parties to which many newspapers more or less explicitly relate. The most evident divide is the traditional one of conservative and liberal-left parties and newspapers. Through this, it is possible to control for political ideologies in the public debate while accounting for difference within countries at the same time.

The theoretical background to my empirical procedure is a Habermasian view on the public sphere as an open network for rational argumentation (Habermas, 1989, Habermas, 1996a), as presented in Section 1.6. While essentialist theorists consider certain preconditions to be necessary for people to communicate, Habermas argues that it is in the process of communication itself that consensus and changes on values occur, which in turn found

[11]The possibility of forgetting a trauma shows that it is ultimately constructed like every memory. If the mark on consciousness was objective, there would be no possibility of ignoring it.

identity. The public sphere is thus closely related to identity which, also historically, is especially true for newspapers. Quality daily newspapers in particular contribute to the debate on foreign policy and world politics including military interventions and genocide based on rational argumentation. Thus, they serve as proxy for the public sphere in the empirical analysis.

With this theoretical background, I was able to investigate more thoroughly into identity matters in the debate on interventions and genocide. Moreover, I hope have contribute to constructivism in different ways. Firstly, constructivists in identity formation put emphasis on showing that collective identity is neither fixed nor objective, neglecting the emotional strength of the construction and its content. I argue that collective memory as a constructed part of identity that lets abstract values come to life, carries with it emotions of triumph and devastation. In this study a question of foreign policy is considered for its effect on identities. With the empirical study, I hope to contribute to genocide studies as well as constructivists in International Relations. A closer look at collective identities which are considered important to explain state behavior on the international level has seldom been taken.

The first two Sections of Chapter 2 introduced the selection of countries and newspapers to be investigated and established the time period from January 1990 to March 2006 with the different interventions and genocides that have occured. All these factors account for variance in the explanatory factors derived from the theoretical considerations: national participation in interventions in general and in Srebrenica in particular, self-reflexive identities, European countries and ideological differences. Germany was included as a self-reflexive, European country, while France is not self-reflexive but also European. The Netherlands is a third European country with a partially self-reflexive identity that had ground troops stationed in Srebrenica. The United States resembles France, but as a non-European country it can show whether convergence among countries is a European phenomenon or rather hints at a broader tendency among Western nations. The following Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 introduced the data of newspaper articles sampled and chosen for further analyses, as well as the methods employed and the operationalization of identity in frames of different extent to account for the dependent variable of the study. I put special emphasis on the different debates I analyzed with different methods. Large amount of data on all war and interventions between 1990 and 2006 needed a computer-based corpus-linguistic study that included collocates. The intervention debate of those articles that mainly deal with interventions and the Srebrenica debate with those articles that mention Srebrenica were manually coded in a content analysis focusing on (identity) frames in particular. These methods yielded interesting empirical results, which I evaluate in light of the hypotheses.

Empirical Findings Evaluated

To find out whether Europeans care about genocide on the European continent, I evolved a number of hypotheses based on the theory of identity formation that can account for different and similar reactions to military interventions and genocide in Srebrenica across nations and political ideologies.

Firstly, I considered national identity as the strongest political-territorial attachment active today. The idea of imagined communities between strangers of one nation led to the hypothesis that identity is visible if the soldiers who are involved in the intervention come from the same nation as the one where the debate takes place. This hypothesis was strongly confirmed in the analysis of the intervention debate as well as the Srebrenica debate. Since nations and national identities are so dominant, it is often seen as natural to care for national soldiers. This study confirms this strong role of imagined communities.

Participation by soldiers from the same country was the variable yielding the most significant results throughout the study. This tendency was not only evident if participation included combat engagement by soldiers stationed or air power involved. Simple logistic or humanitarian assistance also resulted in more identity framing, especially in terms of a county's own identities. This means that the solidarity in an imagined community was not only related to actual questions of life and death, but includes all involvement by the nation.

Even more than for interventions in general, participation matters for the reaction to the events in Srebrenica. The Netherlands, as the country with ground troops in the Srebrenica area before and during its fall and the genocide, differed clearly from the other countries. This finding does not regard the identity framing in general and the question of whether genocide and war in Europe is related to identity issues in the Netherlands. While identity frames were, overall, not more frequent in the Srebrenica debate as compared to the other countries, nor as compared to the debate on interventions in general, there was a pronounced effect on Dutch national identity. Moreover, the extent and continuity of the Dutch speaking of Srebrenica clearly surpassed the interest shown by the other countries. In all countries, Srebrenica, as a single word referring to a geographic place of atrocities, was very prominent in the overall debate on war and intervention compared to other such places, even if they were more ambiguous in meaning as capital cities like Kigali or Sarajevo. In the Netherlands, not only was the frequency of the word Srebrenica higher, but there were also more articles referring to the Bosnian town with many of them published years after the genocide in 1995. It is clear that events in Srebrenica matter to the Dutch.

The quality of the Dutch identity-related reaction to genocide in Srebrenica was even more outstanding than the frequency of such reactions. In the Dutch Srebrenica debate,

there are more references to national actors and national identity. This is particularly noteworthy because in the intervention debate, the Dutch referred quite frequently to their multiple identities, but this meant especially European and Western identity. With Dutch soldiers and no others in focus, there is an orientation towards national Dutch identity explicitly. The Dutch soldiers are not so much seen in the UN context – which is more evident in France, Germany and the US. The imagined community is strong to endure situations of failure which are also interpreted as such, these are still "our boys in Srebrenica".

The national perspective of events in Srebrenica also means that the Dutch focused on their own actors and the military side of the events. Compared to the other countries, local actors were marginally present in the Dutch debate. The neglect of the local perspective in favor of domestic focus means that the events in Srebrenica were understood differently in the Netherlands. There was more consideration on military aspects, on failure – also moral one – than on the human rights abuses, massacres and genocide that was committed while Dutch soldiers were stationed to protect the safe area. Dutch involvement in the intervention is factual, but in France, Germany and the US there was more attention paid to the local environment and events (such as genocide) and Dutch actors were only marginal and associated to the UN cadre in which they were sent.

Regarding content, the specific values and memories evoked in the Dutch debate were not different from those in other countries with the exception of the memory of the Indonesian war of independence. There were some indicators for the integration of Srebrenica to Dutch memory in a self-reflexive way. While all the countries studied evoked World War II and the Holocaust as memory in the Srebrenica debate, the Dutch also saw parallels to their colonial involvement in Indonesia. The similarities to national socialist horrors were evident to all Westerners, but the Dutch references to a decolonizational war suggests that they are conscious of similar injustice committed by their own nation. Srebrenica thus has not only evoked national Dutch identity but it had an effect on it and changed it.

The comparatively frequent notions of shame in the Dutch Srebrenica debate showed a collective feeling that Dutch values were not fulfilled or even betrayed during the events in Srebrenica. There was a reference to national identity and shame as the characteristic feeling which accompanies self-reflexive identity. In the Netherlands, Srebrenica provoked more debate on colonial wrongs, while Srebrenica itself made the Dutch feel ashamed of themselves. The Dutch imagined community integrated the shameful behavior; in a self-reflexive notion the (in)action of Dutch soldiers was not seen as un-Dutch but it was rather discussed whether it was typically Dutch.

The memory of the events in Srebrenica itself, analyzed in Chapter 5, was not only more distinctive in the Netherlands but also different. With national participation and the role Dutch soldiers played when not preventing the fall of and genocide in a UN safe area, Srebrenica is remembered more frequently in the overall debate on war and intervention

in the Netherlands. Moreover, it means something different: Srebrenica is a symbol of moral and military failure to the Dutch, while it is a symbol of atrocities in the other countries. The case of Srebrenica shows a strong national Dutch imagined community – in the face of failure.

Secondly, I considered values as the basis of any collective identity. Secondary literature showed that values cherished in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United States differ in detail and emphasis but are all opposed to genocide. For the identity-related reaction in the intervention debate, I thus assumed that there are more references to identity if the conflict in which intervention was launched involved genocide or similar atrocities compared to other conflicts, which was confirmed for the intervention debate. This hypothesis is closely related to my consideration of memories that give identities which are otherwise very similar more emotional content, which varies among nations and is relevant to my third assumption.

Thirdly, I found a theoretical ground for differentiated memory and identity with regard to the "never again" integrated into it. In the case of self-reflexive identities, traumatic past events in which the past but imagined to be the same community played a role as perpetrator in wrong-doings (most prominently the Holocaust) are integrated with the lessons learned into the collective memory. This way, I categorized national identities with reference to their self-reflexiveness and assumed that those most conscious of their own failings (Germany and the Netherlands) are the ones with most identity framings in reaction to present genocide as well.

Empirically, the assumption that genocide matters was only confirmed to a limited degree and there is even less evidence for more identity references in self-reflexive nations. While the result of policy behavior in the case of Srebrenica is known, namely that genocide was carried out despite intervention, it is taken for granted by constructivist scholars that this contradicts identity. The analysis of the intervention debate has shown that there was an increase in identity references if genocide or similar massive human rights violations occur in the region of intervention. This relation was visible in all countries with only minor differences confirming that overall genocide matters to French, Germans, Dutch and Americans. The differences among the four countries show that self-reflexive national identity also mattered because the Netherlands and Germany with (partially) self-reflexive identities witnessed a significant and stronger increase in their own multiple identities. Both countries referred more often to their Western identity in particular and in the Netherlands, European identity increased clearly, too, if the debate is on crises with genocide. In France and the United States, there was increase in references to the countries' own communities of identity as well, but the correlation was statistically insignificant. Overall, the values opposed to genocide resulted in an identity-related reaction to genocide, while the impact of self-reflexive identities was more limited.

Comparing the intervention debate and the Srebrenica confirmed an identity-related reaction to genocide. Overall, there was not more identity framing in the Srebrenica debate than in the intervention debate, but there were more references to the own identity communities in the Srebrenica debate. This means that a specific case of genocide in Europe did not result in a greater focus on identity matters in general, but it did result in more references to the countries' understandings as nations, Europeans, Westerners or part of the world. While I have shown that French, Germans, Dutch and Americans cared about genocide with more identity references in the intervention debate, they did also care about Srebrenica in particular. There was no evidence of a special German reaction to genocide, as was expected from the country's self-reflexive identity. More national interpretation and high references to Dutch identity showed that this country's national identity was affected by the events in Srebrenica in a special way.

For the content of the identity debate on Srebrenica, it was the convergence of values and memory rather than the self-reflexive character of identities which prevails. The same values and memories were evoked across European and Western countries. Yet, pacifism was particularly strong in Germany and the Netherlands. The two countries with self-reflexive identities seem to be more reflexive towards war than towards genocide although human rights also play a role. They foremost want to stop the war than to stop the genocide, in contrast to France and the United States which put human rights before pacifism, especially the US.

Memory of both, World War II and the Holocaust, were frequent in the Srebrenica debate in all countries, hinting at a Westernized memory open to all. World War II was more often used in all countries, including the United States, showing that Srebrenica is more readily interpreted as a situation of war accompanied by atrocities than as a situation of genocide *per se*. Memory of the Holocaust and World War II were not fixed to certain communities (as memory of the Ottoman empire was) and could be referred to all countries' own identities. All these findings show that memory of the Holocaust has become free-floating and ready to be used in different contexts and with different associations. All Western states can make use of the reference and relate it to themselves as well as to locals or Germany.

Convergence across the four countries was also visible for the long-term affects of Srebrenica. Across time there was agreement that the conflict in the Yugoslav region can be understood as a result of political conflicts rather than having their roots in (ancient) ethnic struggles. On this question, the public debate slowly follows scholary analysis of the conflict. A similar tendency is visible regarding the atrocities in Srebrenica which have come to be understood as genocide. In this case, the public debate followed the decision of the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia which found that the events qualified as genocide in 2001. In all four countries, Srebrenica has become part of collective memory on wars and interventions. In the public debate on those, the

name of the Bosnian town is today an iconographic catchword that is used in relation to other crises as well. Srebrenica stands as an example of major atrocities and genocide committed – at least in the lasting memory, Srebrenica is what it always was, a genocide. Only in the Netherlands, has national participation the country considering the notion of collective failure. Overall, memory of Srebrenica shows that genocide is remembered in all countries with similar values opposing genocide in all countries.

On a theoretical level, the differentiation of self-reflexive identities and heroic identities with no memory of past wrong-doings committed by the community helps to systematically understand the incorporation of "never again" into national identities. Empirically, I did not test whether these categories were evident regarding national memory of its past. Therefore, self-reflexive national identity could not be proven wrong. Instead, I took the categories as a potential explanatory factor. In the case of genocide in Srebrenica, they were only of little help in understanding the differences in identity reaction. These reactions are not more frequent in Germany and for the Netherlands, with a partially self-reflexive identity, more identity reaction can be attributed to the participation in the intervention. It can be said that self-reflexive German identity has only limited influence on the country's relation of present genocide to its national identity. The lesson learned from the Holocaust means that similar atrocities in other countries and regions touch in a distinctive way upon Western identity in Germany at the most.

Moreover, the United States was the only non-participant country in the Srebrenica intervention to show feelings of shame regarding the genocide that happened in the UN safe area. Americans characterized events in Srebrenica as genocide earlier on in the conflict (before the massacres in Srebrenica) and they were quicker to react to dramatic events in reporting and referring it to their own community. This shows that while Americans may not have integrated memory of the US as perpetrator in wrong-doings such as genocide or war, there is some evidence that American identity as superpower active across the world is more sensitive to present-day genocide. Not to have prevented genocide in Srebrenica because no ground troops were contributed to the international intervention parallels American behavior during World War II which did not focus on extermination camps. But there is no evidence for Americans being self-reflexive regarding the Holocaust. Instead, feeling shame for events in Srebrenica shows that for present behavior American identity was more aware of the country's doings than countries with self-reflexive identities, which are more related to the past than the present.

Fourthly, I focused on European identity evolution which has an institutional reference point in the European Union and the integration process. This process started with, and still has, the goal of overcoming the continent's past of war and terror. From this European value, I derived the assumption that genocide in Europe results in increased identity reference in Europe and to European identity.

Results from the empirical analysis confirm that Europeans care about genocide more than about other crises and that they care about what happens on their continent more so than on other continents. Having included the United States as a non-European country, this finding can be specified: Americans care as much about genocide as Europeans and are also interested in the European continent as much as in other regions of the world. This perspective leads to the conclusion that there is evidence of a identity-related reaction to genocide across Western countries and that Europeans focus more on their own continent, whereas Americans keep a broader perspective.

In the intervention debate, identity frames were most prominent if the debate focused on either Europe, i.e. Yugoslavia, or the Near and Middle East, i.e. Iraq. The two major crises were thus also the ones more frequently interpreted with identity issues, but in Europe the Yugoslav region was most clearly and significantly related to the countries' multiple own identities while for the United States this was the case for Iraq. The Kosovo intervention was so marginal in the US that it had no associations related to it as the corpus-linguistic analysis of the collocate words has shown. Overall, Americans considered the different regions of conflict as affecting American identity more evenly. There is only little evidence that Americans had a special eye on their continent: in the overall debate on war and intervention, corpus-linguistic analysis shows that the intervention in Haiti was considered more with regard to values than in the European countries. It can be concluded that Europeans have a stronger relation to their own continent than Americans have to theirs in the intervention debate. In contrast to Europeans, Americans also care for other regions without being Eurocentric either.

The clearest finding regarding European identity is that Europeans adhere to multiple identities evident throughout the analyses of different debates. In all three European countries, national identities were only one possible source of value orientation and memory reference among others: Europe, the West or a universal view. The Germans and the Dutch showed much relation to Western identity, which was not as frequent in France. All three countries adhered to European identity with highest shares in the Netherlands. There was a rise in the countries' multiple identities with all explanatory factors; even if participation was measured as the commitment of national soldiers to an intervention, there was a rising European and Western identity in these countries. Americans focused on their national identity exclusively, which was prominent in the intervention debate as well as the Srebrenica debate. In contrast, European national identities are evidently more compatible with supranational identities and able to tolerate them beside, and even as part of, national ones.

The closer look at the identity frames in the Srebrenica debate, showed the evolution of European identity. Overall, the values referred to in the Srebrenica debate were the same across all four countries hinting at Westernized identities. In the details, there were differences regarding the importance of values and the communities to which values

referred. Apart from human rights (which were important across countries), Americans focused on democracy and multiculturalism, while Europeans considered pacifism more important. As with human rights, democracy was considered American in the United States.

The European reliance on pacifism as a value, which includes peaceful conflict resolution besides the refrain from war in general, was characteristic. It was not only more frequent in the European countries than in the United States, but it was referred to their own nations, other European nations or Europe as a whole. It can thus truly be considered a Europeanized value. It also shows that Karen E. Smith's finding of a German focus on "no more war" rather than "no more genocide" in Bosnia (Smith, 2010: 140; 242) in fact applies to all Europe. Since human rights and the opposition to slaughter are important to all countries, the finding can be specified in the sense that "no more genocide" is a Western lesson, "no more war" a European lesson. Peaceful conflict resolution is also an important value of European integration as it was begun in the spirit of overcoming national violent conflicts on a war-torn continent. Obviously, pacifism has deep roots in European countries with their multiple identities today. The particular European lesson learned from national socialist wrongs seems to be not to have another war – the goal of not having another genocide is evident in Europe and the US.

Finally, I introduced political ideologies as an alternative to political-territorial based identities to account for differences in the identity framing of the intervention debate and the reaction to genocide in Srebrenica. I assumed that the international orientation of liberal as well as socialist ideologies would result in more identity framing in liberal-left debates that focus on international conflicts and interventions as well as genocide, compared to conservatives.

The empirical analysis rather showed that if there was any influence of political ideologies, newspapers with a conservative orientation were framing debates on interventions more frequently in terms of identity. In the intervention debate, ideological orientation was insignificant and weak as an explanatory factor.

The Srebrenica debate yielded some influence of ideological orientation on the identity references. The conservative inclination to more identity frames could only be fully upheld for the American newspapers in the Srebrenica debate. In some cases, even the direction of direct correlation between newspapers' ideological orientations and identity framing changed, and thus the French liberal-left newspaper used more values in the Srebrenica debate than their conservative counterparts while in the United States it is the other way around. The collective memory of Srebrenica shows that the events were more frequently preserved in liberal-left newspapers than in conservative ones. The differences between states suggest that political ideologies may mean different things in different countries; an American liberal is something different from a German liberal. This means

that political-territorial identity also matter for political ideologies and that the different newspapers accounted for differences within nations rather than cross-national ideology. Overall, factors based on political-territorial identity were significant and clearly more helpful in explaining differences in identity framing than political ideology was.

Implications

On an analytical level, my study offers many perspectives for further empirical as well as theoretical research. Proposals for further research are made in various studies, but often cannot be done in the next study because of limited technical accessibility or limited financial and time resources.

The long time period under investigation has opened up opportunities for this study which many other media analyses do not have. In the analysis of European identity evolution, the inclusion of a non-European country has proven valuable in putting the answer to the research question in a more comparative perspective. The time period of more than fifteen years even made it possible to show the lasting effect Srebrenica has on the debate of interventions. Yet, further variance among European countries, with the inclusion of new EU member states and non-member states, as well as variance on the international level with the inclusion of a non-Western state would give greater insight into possible divergence within Europe or universal convergence.

Since 2006, there has only been one further intervention that would have to be added to the long list of already ongoing interventions. The Arab spring brought North Africa and the Near East to the center of international attention. In 2011, NATO forces attacked Muammar Gaddafi's Libyan forces fighting popular protest against his rule. In a similar situation in Syria, no military intervention has taken place as of now. Fortunately, no further genocide has taken place since 2006 – keeping in mind the still ongoing events in Sudan and now South Sudan. With the results from this study, intervening countries in Libya (France, the United States and partially the Netherlands) should have seen an increase in identity references in the intervention debate.

The analysis of identity formation in newspaper articles cannot, despite theoretical foundation as a proxy, account for the whole public sphere. A combination of newspaper frame analysis with other empirical data from polls and public protests, for example, would yield a more complete picture on identity processes. A step in this direction was taken with the comparative edited volume on public opinion and the Bosnian War, but the media analyses by the contributors lack systematics, mostly quoting from selected editorial articles (Sobel and Shiraev, 2003). Regarding interventions, there have been major shifts in the peace movement as well the profile of human rights organizations since the end of the Cold War. After years of silence, the peace movement saw millions

of protesters rallying across the world before the Iraq intervention in 2003 and Amnesty International is no longer neutral in questions of the use of force. A long term analysis of these profiles and their relation to the public debate could give insights into interaction.

In the empirical analysis, it became clear that a closer look into the details of identity framing could give valuable insights into the convergence of values and memories. These specifics have only been examined for the case of Srebrenica as an instance of genocide in Europe. From the intervention debate, there is evidence that the genocide in Rwanda, for example, is more present in the American debate on war and intervention than in Europe. To understand differences between genocides not prevented, especially with presence of intervention forces, and to see what role the geographic proximity plays, a systematic, detailed comparison of the framing of debates on Rwanda and Darfur may put Srebrenica into another perspective. Regarding political responses, Chris Klep's study (2008) shows similarities in the cover-up and the long way to recognition of failings in Somalia by Canadians, in Srebrenica by Dutch and Rwanda by Belgians. Investigations into the public debate could account for different responses in terms of identity.

There have been various studies published on the Bosnian War until today and the genocide in Srebrenica is also well covered by scientific, journalistic and legal studies – including new revisionist literature (Herman and Peterson, 2010). The external failure is well documented and there are well-written studies on the repetitive failure to prevent genocide by Americans and Europeans (most notably Power, 2002; Smith, 2010). Most scholars of genocide rely more or less explicitly on a constructivist understanding of international politics and are most interested in the policy answers to genocide. I focus on what most assume to be clear; whether genocide touches upon the self-understanding. Although in general this assumption was confirmed, it has also become clear that identity-related reactions can only safely be predicted if there are soldiers from the same country involved.

For constructivists in International Relations in general, the findings show that it is worth opening the black box of the state to look at the identity processes within nations and the public sphere. Not only can identities account for foreign policy behavior, but international politics in turn have an effect on identity settings as they have evolved until the external events occur.

On a theoretical level, there are two points to be considered after the empirical analysis. Firstly, self-reflexive identity proved to be a helpful category for the the different roles the Holocaust plays in collective memory across nations. Yet nations with self-reflexive identities do not relate genocide today more clearly to their own identities than other nations. Instead, the heroic American identity that largely ignores the harm its nation caused accepts its own failing in preventing genocide in Srebrenica despite little participation. I do not consider this a sign of self-reflexive American identity because there is no evidence of a changing memory to historic past wrongs like genocide of Indians (as

was evident for the Netherlands and their colonial past). Instead, I argue that American identity as a superpower includes a consciousness of its moral and military power in the world. Whenever American values such as upholding a multicultural peaceful society are violated by genocide, there is an identity-related reaction stronger than in nations who consider themselves powerless to prevent genocides in other countries.

Despite the limited help as an explanatory factor in this study, the integration of memory to the theoretical and empirical concept gave some valuable insight into the dependent variable of identity reactions. For scholars of nationalism, the differentiated forms of memory and negative past can help to account for a change in identity. Such a change can be witnessed in the Netherlands where the imagined community is strong and self-reflexive, integrating behavior framed as failure to the collective and initiating more debate on another shameful past in the colonial wars.

Secondly, there is an interconnection of alternative framings to identity evident from empirical analysis that should find consideration in theoretical studies as well. While interests are commonly used as alternative interpretations of events and relations in the world, empirically the two are closely related – and there are theoretical approaches to account for communities based on interest as the first step towards communities based on values (cf. Kantner, 2009; Grabowsky, 2008). The logic behind interests is one of consequence that pays attention to the rational goal of attaining security and wealth in particular (March and Olsen, 1998; Weber, 2006: 12–13). Yet, with the possibility of changing the definition of national interests and the definition of the nation, it becomes clear that there is a construction process going on that can hardly be separated from values. By viewing interests as national interests they are tied to a constructed and changing community and are thus less objective as those claiming them usually thinks. Interest as something unrelated to certain communities that either hold a collective identity or evolve one are tautologic (Hirschman, 1993: 132–134).

On a *normative level*, there are implications for the political moral response to genocide in several regards. The massacres in Srebrenica were another genocide in Europe in the 20th century which happened despite the vow to never let something like the Holocaust happen again. The promise was broken a number of times, with genocides committed in Africa, Asia and Europe. Most infamous are the mass killings in Rwanda and Bosnia because they were executed during military interventions in the region. The international community failed to prevent or stop genocide before its eyes. While the Bosnian War was the major crisis region of the post-Cold War intervention debate until 9/11, the discussion of Rwanda was shorter and less intense than that of Yugoslavia, even at its peak.

For Germans there is no reason to be proud to have worked through past wrongs and feel morally superior to other nations who have not, because self-reflexive identity is not more sensitive to present genocides. Although in Srebrenica, Bosnia and even Rwanda

far less people were killed in terms of pure numbers compared to the Holocaust, the devastating long-term effects are similar to the regions. The horrors of the Holocaust are not played down by the recognition of genocide with the murder and expulsion of thousands of Bosnian Muslims whose property and cultural sites were destroyed, erasing present and past traces of this group in the whole region. Such events did not touch upon German identity and only the Dutch as the nation directly involved were clearly ashamed to not have done more. Apart from the Dutch, Srebrenica did not touch Europeans particularly as a genocide and it is rather American inclusionary identity that leaves more room for compassion and reference to the national identity. The external view of Americans on the conflict also left more room for the recognition of the evil at work.

If it is true that you have to fail twice to learn, the reaction to genocide since 1995 should be more effective. With a view to the present atrocities in Sudan and South Sudan, it is hard to believe. If applied only to Europe particularly, the intervention in Kosovo with decisive action after expulsion and massacres below the scale of those in Bosnia, the wisdom holds true. The focus of the debate also shows that there has been a learning process since the Bosnian War when human rights abuses were only marginal and the conflict was considered to have roots in the local ethnic structure rather than in politics. Identity issues ran high for Kosovo and human rights abuses were central to the debate of the crises. The debate on Kosovo has already shown a shift towards more sensitiveness of genocide.

The evidence from the values and memories evoked in relation to Srebrenica suggests that there is is particular memory of World War II as something different from the Holocaust. This was the historic experience in Germany, Western Europe and especially Great Britain. In countries east and southeast of Germany, the war and genocide were intertwined with crimes committed by the Wehrmacht and the framing of racial persecution and genocide in terms of war against partisans and the subhuman classification of the Red Army. In Western Europe, war affected all, while terror and extermination was less visible. Regarding the Bosnian War, a similar distinction between warfare and genocide was evident and for Europeans and particularly for the self-reflexive nations Germany and the Netherlands, pacifism as the prevention of war is the prominent lesson learnt, while the prevention of slaughter is also visible but more so in the United States. Never again seems to mean foremost no more war and only secondly no more Auschwitz. There are signs, though, that the focus has shifted more towards genocide, especially because of the genocide in Srebrenica. Getting the memory right and recognizing the genocidal character of German warfare, would also have helped to recognize the character of the Bosnian War. In the memory established since 1995, the genocidal character of the massacres in Srebrenica has been accepted.

For those fighting for the prevention of genocide, there are rather ambiguous signs regarding military interventions. On the one hand, participation in an intervention triggers

more references to identities and values and lets the events thus get to the essence of an outsider's community. On the other hand, participation in an intervention means that the focus is on these soldiers rather than on local events, victims and perpetrators. From this study, it can thus not be concluded that it is better to get involved in order for the public to care. Instead, it is with national identities, and multiple identities in Europe, that the foundation for the understanding and reaction to present-day genocide is laid. It is still about the lessons from Auschwitz and now the lessons from Srebrenica.

In the Netherlands, there are signs that the events in Srebrenica themselves have brought change to Dutch national identity. As in Germany, the dominance of pacifism has been and should be put into relation with the prevention of genocide. Otherwise, the understanding of the national-socialist past and the horror of the Holocaust remains incomplete. American heroic identity as a superpower has the power to accept failings and relating international events to its national identity. This integrative power reveals a great capacity to care but seems to lead to shorter attention spans on any particular event. For Europe, including France, a Eurocentric view also means that the European continent is special.

Srebrenica has the potential to become part of a European memory, which is evident in the multiple communities of French and German identity references. In the past 15 years, Srebrenica is mostly remembered as (another) atrocity in these European countries. As a bystander to genocide, the Netherlands has to ensure that it is not forgotten that the massacres not only happened, but that they were not prevented despite the declaration of a safe area in Srebrenica and soldiers stationed to protect it.

The European Parliament stated on the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide that "the shortfalls in the EU decision-making mechanisms and the lack of a genuine common foreign and security policy also played a negative role in the determination of the events" (P6 TA(2005)0296). In 2009, the European Parliament called for July 11 as the "day of commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide all over the EU" (P6 TA(2009)0028). There seems to be some acceptance that not doing anything was also a failure. Moreover, the massacres are considered a genocide. Apart from a memorial day, there certainly is a special responsibility of Europe in form of the European Union towards Bosnia in the accession process. Victims and perpetrators live in the state and apart from recognition of the first and prosecution of the latter, reconciliation within the country as a whole has to be supported.

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Appendix: Measuring Identity

variable	Holsti coefficient
crisis hot spot	0.91
event type	0.69
cleavage behavior	0.75
cleavage community	0.93
interest frame	0.87
identity frame	0.83
community of identity	0.97
historical reference	0.89
universal principles	0.90

Table 5.3: *Coder reliability in Holsti coefficients for variables in the intervention debate.*

French newspapers	(guerre OR guerre au terror! OR intervention milit! OR intervention humanit! OR engagement milit! OR engagement humanit! OR operation milit! OR operation humanit! OR action milit! OR invasion milit! OR invasion humanit! OR envoi de troupes OR mission de paix OR mission de maintien de la paix OR operation de maintien de la paix OR peacekeeping OR activite de maintien de la paix OR peace-keeping OR activite de retablissement de la paix OR peace-enforcement OR peaceenforcement OR imposition de la paix OR peacemaking OR peacemaking) AND (Iraq OR Irak OR Israel OR Syrie OR Liban OR Palestine OR Inde OR Pakistan OR Yougoslavie OR Bosnie OR Kosovo OR Serbie OR Indonesie OR Aceh OR Timor-Oriental OR Soudan OR Tchad OR Ethiopie OR Erythree OR Afghanistan OR Haiti OR Cambodge OR Somalie OR Angola OR Congo OR Cote d´Ivoire OR Rwanda OR Sahara occidental OR Georgie OR Sierra Leone OR Liberia OR Burundi OR Coree du Nord OR Iran OR Koweit OR Albanie OR Algerie OR Armenie OR Burkina Faso OR Costa Rica OR Ecuador OR El Salvador OR Guatemala OR Honduras OR Jemen OR Croatie OR Lybie OR Mali OR Mauritanie OR Mosambique OR Myamar OR Burma OR Namibie OR Nacaragua OR Niger OR Panama OR Peru OR Philippines OR Senegal OR Sri Lanka OR Gibraltar OR Coree du Sud OR Tadschikistan OR Uganda OR Zaire OR Azerbaïdjan OR Macedoine OR Moldavie OR Slovenie OR Tchetchenie OR Chypre OR Republique Centrafricaine OR Karabakh)
German newspapers	(Krieg OR Krieg gegen Terror! OR Auslandseinsatz OR milit! Einsatz OR milit! Intervention OR milit! Mission OR humanit! Einsatz OR humanit! Intervention OR humanit! Mission OR Friedensmission OR humanit! Operation OR milit! Operation OR milit! Aktion OR Militäraktion OR humanit! Invasion OR milit! Invasion OR peace-keeping OR peacekeeping OR friedenserhaltend! OR friedensschaffend!OR peace-enforcement OR peaceenforcement OR friedenssich! OR friedenserzwing!) AND (Aceh OR Afghanistan OR Albanien OR Algerien OR Angola OR Armenien OR Aserbaidschan OR Äthiopien OR !karabach OR Bosnien OR Burkina Faso OR Burundi OR Costa Rica OR Ecuador OR El Salvador OR Elfenbeinküste OR Eritrea OR Georgien OR Guatemala OR Haiti OR Honduras OR Indien OR Indonesien OR Irak OR Iran OR Israel OR Jemen OR Jugoslawien OR Kambodscha OR Kongo OR Kosovo OR Kroatien OR Kuwait OR Kuweit OR Libanon OR Liberia OR Libyen OR Mali OR Mauritanien OR Mazedonien OR Moldawien OR Mosambik OR Myanmar OR Burma OR Birma OR Namibia OR Nicaragua OR Niger OR Nordkorea OR Osttimor OR Ost-Timor OR Pakistan OR Palästina OR Panama OR Peru OR Philippinen OR Ruanda OR Senegal OR Serbien OR Sierra Leone OR Slowenien OR Somalia OR Sri Lanka OR Gibraltar OR Sudan OR Südkorea OR Syrien OR Tadschikistan OR Tschad OR Tschetschenien OR Uganda OR Westsahara OR West-Sahara OR Zaire OR Zentralafrikanisch! Republik OR Zypern)
Dutch newspapers	(orloog OR orloog tegen terreur OR militaire inzet OR militaire interventie OR militaire missie OR humanitaire inzet OR humanitaire interventie OR humanitaire hulp OR vredesmissie OR humanitaire operatie OR militaire operatie OR militaire actie OR humanitaire invasie OR militaire invasie OR peace-keeping OR peacekeeping OR peace keeping OR vredesoperatie OR vredesbewaring OR vredesmissie OR peace-enforcement OR peace enforcement) AND(Atjeh OR Afghanistan OR Albanië OR Algeria OR Angola OR Armenië OR Azerbeidzjan OR Ethiopië OR !karabach OR Bosnië OR Burkina Faso OR Burundi OR Costa Rica OR Ecuador OR El Salvador OR Ivoorkust OR Eritrea OR Georgie OR Guatemala OR Haiti OR Honduras OR Inidie OR Indonesie OR Irak OR Iran OR Israel OR Yemen OR Joegoslavie OR Cambodja OR Congo OR Kosovo OR Kroatie OR Koeweit OR Libanon OR Liberia OR Libie OR Mali OR Mauritanie OR Macedonie OR Moldavie OR Mozambique OR Birma OR Namibie OR Nicaragua OR Niger OR Noord-Korea OR Ost-Timor OR Pakistan OR Palestina OR Panama OR Peru OR Philippinie OR Ruanda OR Senegal OR Servie OR Sierra Leone OR Slovenie OR Somalie OR Sri Lanka OR Gibraltar OR Soedan OR Zuid-Korea OR Syrie OR Tadzjikistan OR Tjaad OR Tsjetsjenie OR Uganda OR Westelijke Sahara OR Zaire OR Centraal -Afrikaanse Republiek OR Cyprus)
US newspapers	(war OR war on terror! OR foreign mission OR military mission OR milit! intervention OR human! intervention OR human! mission OR human! operation OR milit! operation OR milit! action OR human! invasion OR milit! invasion OR peacekeep! OR peace-enforcing OR peace-keep! OR peace keep! OR peace-enforc! OR peace enforc! OR milit! force) AND (Iraq OR Israel OR Syria OR Lebanon OR Palestine OR India OR Pakistan OR Yugoslavia OR Bosnia OR Kosovo OR Serbia OR Indonesia OR Aceh OR East Timor OR Sudan OR Chad OR Ethiopia OR Eritrea OR Afghanistan OR Haiti OR Cambodia OR Somalia OR Angola OR Congo OR Ivory Coast OR Rwanda OR Western Sahara OR Georgia OR Georgian Republic OR Sierra Leone OR Liberia OR Burundi OR North Korea OR Iran OR Kuwait Albania OR Algeria OR Armenia OR Azerbaijan OR Nagorno-Karabakh OR Karabakh OR Burkina Faso OR Costa Rica OR Ecuador OR El Salvador OR Guatemala OR Honduras OR Yemen OR Croatia OR Libya OR Mali OR Mauritania OR Macedonia OR Moldova OR Mozambique OR Myanmar OR Burma OR Namibia OR Nicaragua OR Niger OR Panama OR Peru OR Philippines OR Senegal OR Slovenia OR Sri Lanka OR Gibraltar OR South Korea OR Tadzhikistan OR Tajikistan OR Chechnya OR Chechenia OR Uganda OR Zaire OR Central African Republic OR Cyprus)

Table 5.4: *Sampling strategy for newspapers for the overall debate on war and intervention*

Source: Kantner et al., 2007

country	newspaper	electronic availability	missing	original sample war and intervention	cleansed sample war and intervention
France	*Le Monde*	1990-01-01–2006-03-31	none	42 641	12 120
	Les Echos	1993-01-05–1996-12-30	1990-01-01–1992-12-31; 1994-7-1–1994-12-31; 1995-1-1–1995-5-31; 1995-7-1–1995-12-31; 1996-1-1–1996-1-31	942	261
	Le Figaro	1997-01-09–2006-03-31	see *Les Echos*	20 129	5 390
Germany	*FAZ*	1993-01-02–2006-03-31	1990-01-01–1992-12-31	24 142	8 531
	Süddeutsche Zeitung	1991-02-11–2006-03-31	1990-01-01–1991-02-10	39 232	11 836
Netherlands	*NRC Handelsblad*	1990-01-08–2006-03-31	2002-8	22 255	6 660
	de Volkskrant	1995-01-02–2006-03-31	1990-01-01–1994-12-31; 1995-10-1–1995-10-31	12 434	3 362
United States	*Washington Post*	1990-01-01–2006-03-31	none	80 532	27 396
	New York Times	1990-01-01–2006-03-31	none	92 140	28 368

Table 5.5: *Time periods and numbers of articles for war and intervention sample and intervention subsample, by newspaper.*



Figure 5.7: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the word field of actors co-occurring with "Kosovo", by country, in per cent.*



Figure 5.8: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the word field of actors co-occurring with "Haiti", by country, in per cent.*



Figure 5.9: *Share of different actors in all collocates of the word field of actors co-occurring with "Afghanistan", by country, in per cent.*



Figure 5.10: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the word field of understanding co-occurring with "Somalia", by country, in per cent.*



Figure 5.11: *Share of different understandings in all collocates of the word field of understanding co-occurring with "Iraq", by country, in per cent.*

Excerpt from the Codebook "In Search of Europe's International Role – Public Discourses about Humanitarian and Military Interventions and their Effects on European Identity Formation, 1990 to 2005" by Cathleen Kantner and Swantje Renfordt

Formal Coding

Variable 101: date of issue (date)

The date of issue is generated automatically.

Variable 102: year of issue (year1)

The year of issue is generated automatically, ranging from 1990 to 2006.

Variable 103: month of issue (month1)

The month of issue is generated automatically.

1 January

2 February

3 March

4 April

5 May

6 June

7 July

8 August

9 September

10 October

11 November

12 December

Variable 106: nation (nation)

The country of issue is generated automatically.

1 Austria

2 France

3 Germany

4 Ireland

5 Netherlands

6 United Kingdom

7 United States

Note: For this study, only 2,3,5 and 7 were included.

Variable 107: paper (paper)

The name of the paper is generated automatically.

1 Der Standard (DST)

2 Die Presse (PRE)

3 Le Figaro (LFG)

4 Les Echos (LEC)

5 Le Monde (LMO)

6 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)

7 Süddeutsche Zeitung (SDZ)

8 The Irish Times (IRT)

9 De Volkskrant (DVK)

10 NRC Handelsblad (NRC)

11 The Guardian (GUA)

12 The Times (TIM)

13 The New York Times (NYT)

14 The Washington Post (WPO)

Note: For this study, only articles from 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 and 14 were included.

Variable 107a: ideological orientation of paper (ideology)

This variable is generated automatically.

1 left-liberal/centre-left

Die Presse
Le Monde
Süddeutsche Zeitung
The Irish Times
De Volkskrant
The Guardian
The New York Times

2 conservative/centre-right

Der Standard
Le Figaro
Les Echos
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
NRC Handelsblad
The Times
The Washington Post

Variable 112: issue intensity (art_typ2)

Coding varies by how frequently and how prominently the subject area "military interventions" (or related questions about problems, causes, and effects) is referred to in the article. *Instructions for coding follow in table 5.6. Note: If articles are coded 3, 4 or 5, there was no further coding conducted. If articles were coded 2, further coding did not include variables relevant to this study.*

	issue intensity	explanation
1	Military interventions are the main subject	One or several military interventions (or related questions about problems, causes, effects, the legitimacy of an intervention etc.) stand at the centre of an article. The report or the analysis discusses the issue in depth. Frequently, the headline, subheadline, or opening paragraph addresses the intervention or related questions. The subject area "military intervention" (i.e. one or several instances of intervention or related questions about the causes and effects of interventions, problems arising from action and inaction, legitimacy of a given intervention or interventions in general etc.) is discussed most intensively. In addition, relevant secondary subjects may appear (for instance: main subject = humanitarian intervention in general, secondary subject 1 = EU experiences concerning such interventions to date).
2	Military interventions are a secondary subject	The text primarily discusses a different subject (compare the short list of main subjects, for instance: environmental, economic, or cultural policy or a foreign and security policy subject that did not conform to intervention criteria). The main subject of the article is neither one of several military interventions, nor related to questions about problems, causes, effects, the legitimacy of an intervention etc. However, one or several interventions are discussed in at least two complete sentences. These passages constitute a secondary subject. The secondary subject or subjects are treated less extensively than the main subject. If treatment of the main subject and secondary subjects is of similar length, the secondary subject is discussed after the main subject. No more than three secondary subjects are coded for each article. In news summaries, the passages referring to interventions are coded as secondary subjects. However, if the news summary primarily deals with interventions, the passages most detailed in their treatment of a given intervention are coded as the main subject. Additional passages relating to interventions can be coded as (up to three) secondary subjects.
3	Military interventions are only mentioned as a reference	The article discusses other subjects (e.g. environmental, economic, or cultural policy or a foreign and security policy subject that did not conform to intervention criteria). Military interventions and related questions about problems, causes, effects, the legitimacy of an intervention etc. are also not discussed as secondary subjects. However, the article does mention one or several military interventions in passing, without a clear statement being evident. *Example: an article may deal primarily with the budgetary policy (or any other domestic policy issue) of a state and point out in passing that this policy or policies will impact on military interventions, for instance, through an increase in defence spending. Example: an article may open with an overview of the geo-political situation, which will include certain key words that led to the article being sampled in the first place. However, interventions are not discussed further in the article.*
4	The article treated a war or violent conflict since 1990 as a main or secondary subject or mentions it in passing. The article is not concerned with military intervention, but its inclusion is not due to sampling error.	Careful! Many of the articles about Iraq, Afghanistan, or the "War on Terror" discuss operative aspects of the troop deployments without touching on the context of the missions. In order to decide whether to code the article as 1, 2, or 3 (depending on the extent to which interventions are discussed) or 4, you should refer back to the list of definitions. Are any of the criteria fulfilled? Troops may be referred to as international (or carry the label by definition e.g. ISAF) rather than as parties involved directly in the conflict, in which case a coding of 1, 2, or 3 would be appropriate. By contrast, if the conflict is portrayed as though it were a "normal" war, e.g. a violent conflict between two sovereign states, coding as 4 is appropriate. Unfortunately, these questions can not be easily answered in a general manner and difficult decisions will have to be made based on every article individually. Articles that discuss a conflict, which later became the object of a military intervention, but do not (yet) explicitly entertain military intervention as an option, belong to this category. References to economic sanctions, embargoes, and initial UN debates, which do not (yet) explicitly entertain the possibility of an intervention, should therefore also be coded in this way. If you code too generously here, the extensive list of subjects will no longer fit.
5	This article is a sampling error	Military intervention (or related questions of problems, causes, effects, the legitimacy of an intervention etc.) were not discussed. No war or violent conflict since 1990 is discussed either. The article does not discuss (neither as main subject, nor as secondary subject, nor as a mention) military intervention or war / violent conflict. The article in question may also be a book review related to the issue of war or humanitarian intervention. Book reviews are sampling errors.

Table 5.6: *Guideline for the coding of issue intensity*

variable	cleavage	first pole	second pole
cleav_01	legality	priority of (international) law	relativation of law
cleav_02	international cooperation	multilateralism	unilateralismus
cleav_03	sovereignty	supranationalism	intergovernmentalism
cleav_04	enforcement	civil power	military power
cleav_05	behaviour	pacific-cooperative	violent
cleav_06	activism	political activism	political fatalism
cleav_07	basic rights	community	individual
cleav_08	community	ethnocentrism	cosmopolitism
cleav_09	religion	private manifestation of religion	public manifestation of religion
cleav_10	economy	alternative models	capitalism
cleav_11	social	security social welfare state	individual provision
cleav_12	distribution	solidarity	conditionality
cleav_13	progress	skepticism about technology	innovation

Table 5.7: *Overview of cleavages*

Coding of Content

Variable 202: crisis hot spot (crisis_place)

The place where the crisis in the focus of the primary issue takes place is specified according to the list of countries provided in table 5.8 on page 263.

Variable 203: event type (event_type)

The type of conflict is coded as discussed in the article and relates to the type of actors and actions taken.

1 conflict on diplomatic / political level

2 cross-national conflict

3 asymmetric conflict

4 civil war

5 terror attack

6 massacre, genocide, expulsion

7 humanitarian crisis (also due to natural disaster)

8 other

98 unclassifiable

Variable 404: ideological cleavages (cleav)

The primary issue is discussed in at least one full sentence with regard to ideological cleavages -– either by a directly or indirectly quoted speaker or the author. There is reference to a basic conflict with regard to values and interests to which almost any issue can be related. It is not necessary that both alternatives of a conflict are explicitly mentioned, but just one can be taken as granted reference or the author/speaker can argue in supported or opposition to it.
Is at least one ideological cleavage as shown in table 5.7 mentioned in the article?

0 No

1 Yes

Variable 409: behaviour (cleav_05)

The author or one directly or indirectly quoted speaker argue (morally) in at least one full sentence that the behaviour of individuals or other actors is oriented towards peaceful cooperation or violent conflict resolution. The first pole refers to the argumentation that, in principle, humans are good and it is possible to come to a compromise and reach a peaceful solution. While the second pole sees (at least some) humans as having no interest in finding a solution to problems but rather as stirring unrest and violence.

0 conflict is not mentioned at all

1 very high approval of first pole

2 moderately high approval of first pole

3 both poles countervail, ambivalent or neutral position, no preference to be identified

4 moderately high approval of the second pole

5 very high approval of the second pole

Variable 412: community (cleav_08)

At least one directly or indirectly quoted speaker or the author relate to the question of what the definition of a particular community is or should be. The discussion may relate to ethnocentrism as the first pole: emphasis on the supremacy of the own culture, ethnicity or nation compared to others – with exclusion, assimilation and homogeneity as key words. The second pole includes cosmopolitism with an emphasis on the equality of different cultures, ethnicities and nations – with inclusion, cosmopolitism and pluralism as key words.

0 conflict is not mentioned at all

1 very high approval of first pole

2 moderately high approval of first pole

3 both poles countervail, ambivalent or neutral position, no preference to be identified

4 moderately high approval of the second pole

5 very high approval of the second pole

Variable 501: interest frame (mf_int)

The main issue is discussed in at least one full sentence with regard to interests — either by a directly or indirectly quoted speaker or the author. The interests may be of a material nature, refer to the enforcement of judicial titles or refer to the accumulation of (political, military, not economic) power and influence or questions of national or international security interest, geopolitical strategy.

0 No

1 Yes

95 No information

96 Variable not coded

Variable 507: identity frame (mf_iden)

The primary issue is discussed in at least one full sentence with regard to identity or a we-group and an other-group -– either by a directly or indirectly quoted speaker or the author.

0 No

1 Yes

95 No information

96 Variable not coded

Variable 508: community of identity (we_who)

The we-group in whose name identity issues, values, ethical conceptions are discussed is specified according to the list of groups.

000000 No further specification possible

100000 sub-national territorial unit, region and its population

101010 sub-national area of conflict

200000 country / nation and its population

201000 country of issue

202000 foreign country (not country of issue)

202010 EU member state

202020 great power: USA, Russia, China

202030 country of conflict

300000 Europe / EU (and other units)

400000 a civilisation (e.g. Western or Arab)

500000 world community, all people

600000 other groups

601000 non-state actor, civil society

602000 non-state violent actor

700000 several groups of different categories

900000 unclassifiable

Variable 510: values (we_vaex)

The variable is coded if values are explicitly referred to in the article.

0 No

1 Yes

95 No information

96 Variable not coded

Variable 516: historical reference (hist-event)

There are historical events mentioned that are referred to in the context of the primary issue, e.g. as comparable cases. The events may be prior or after 1990 if they belong to a different chain of events.

0 No

1 Yes

95 No information

96 Variable not coded

Variable 517: universal principles frame (mf_princ)

The primary issue is discussed in at least one full sentence with reference to universal principles like human rights.

0 No

1 Yes

95 No information

96 Variable not coded

Table 5.8: *List of countries used for coding*

continent	sub-continent	state	province	meaning
10	00	00	00	Africa
10	10	00	00	Northern Africa
10	10	01	00	Egypt
10	10	01	10	Golan Heights
10	10	02	00	Algeria
10	10	03	00	Libya
10	10	04	00	Morocco
10	10	05	00	Sudan
10	10	05	10	Darfur
10	10	06	00	Tunisia
10	10	07	00	Chad
10	10	08	00	Central African Republic
10	10	09	00	São Tomé and Príncipe
10	10	10	00	Western Sahara, Democratic-Arab Republic of Sahara
10	20	00	00	Western Africa
10	20	01	00	Benin
10	20	02	00	Burkina Faso
10	20	03	00	Côte d'Ivoire
10	20	04	00	Gambia
10	20	05	00	Ghana
10	20	06	00	Guinea
10	20	07	00	Guinea-Bissau
10	20	08	00	Equatorial Guinea
10	20	09	00	Gabon
10	20	10	00	Cameroon
10	20	11	00	Kap Verde
10	20	12	00	Liberia
10	20	13	00	Mauritania
10	20	14	00	Mali
10	20	15	00	Niger
10	20	16	00	Nigeria
10	20	17	00	Senegal
10	20	18	00	Sierra Leone
10	20	19	00	Togo
10	30	00	00	Eastern Africa
10	30	01	00	Ethiopia
10	30	02	00	Eritrea
10	30	03	00	Burundi
10	30	04	00	Djibouti
10	30	05	00	Kenya

Table 5.8: *(continued)*

10	30	06	00	Comoros
10	30	07	00	Madagascar
10	30	08	00	Mauritius
10	30	09	00	Rwanda
10	30	10	00	Seychelles
10	30	11	00	Somalia
10	30	12	00	Tanzania
10	30	13	00	Uganda
10	40	00	00	Southern Africa
10	40	01	00	Angola
10	40	02	00	Botswana
10	40	03	00	Lesotho
10	40	04	00	Malawi
10	40	05	00	Mozambique
10	40	06	00	Namibia
10	40	07	00	Zambia
10	40	08	00	Zimbabwe
10	40	09	00	South Africa
10	40	10	00	Swasiland
10	40	11	00	Burundi
10	40	12	00	DR Congo (formerly Zaire)
10	40	13	00	Republic of the Congo
10	40	14	00	Reunion
20	00	00	00	Asia
20	10	00	00	Eastern Asia
20	10	01	00	People's Republic of China
20	10	02	00	Taiwan
20	10	03	00	Japan
20	10	04	00	North Korea
20	10	05	00	South Korea
20	20	00	00	South Asia
20	20	01	00	Bangladesh
20	20	02	00	Bhutan
20	20	03	00	India
20	20	03	10	Kashmir
20	20	04	00	Maldives
20	20	05	00	Nepal
20	20	06	00	Pakistan
20	20	06	10	Hindu Kush
20	20	06	20	Kashmir
20	20	07	00	Sri Lanka
20	30	00	00	South-East Asia
20	30	01	00	Brunei
20	30	02	00	Indonesia
20	30	02	10	Aceh

Table 5.8: *(continued)*

20	30	02	20	East Timor
20	30	03	00	Cambodia
20	30	04	00	Laos
20	30	05	00	Malaysia
20	30	06	00	Myanmar, Burma
20	30	07	00	Philippines
20	30	08	00	Singapore
20	30	09	00	Thailand
20	30	10	00	Vietnam
20	40	00	00	South-West Asia
20	40	01	00	Armenia
20	40	02	00	Azerbaijan
20	40	02	10	Nagorno-Karabakh
20	40	03	00	Bahrain
20	40	04	00	Georgia
20	40	05	00	Iraq
20	40	05	10	Northern Iraq, Kurdish part
20	40	05	20	Shiite part of Iraq
20	40	05	30	Sunnite part of Iraq
20	40	06	00	Iran
20	40	06	10	Kurdish part of Iran
20	40	07	00	Israel and Palestine
20	40	07	10	Jewish State of Israel, Jewish Israeli
20	40	07	20	Palestinian towns in Israel, Palestinian Israeli
20	40	07	30	Occupied, Palestinian territory, Palestinian Authority
20	40	08	00	Jordan
20	40	09	00	Qatar
20	40	10	00	Kuwait
20	40	11	00	Lebanon
20	40	12	00	Oman
20	40	13	00	Saudi Arabia
20	40	14	00	Syria
20	40	14	10	Kurdish territory
20	40	15	00	Turkey
20	40	15	10	Kurdish part of Turkey
20	40	16	00	United Arab Emirates
20	40	17	00	Cyprus
20	40	17	10	Northern Cyprus, Turkish part
20	40	17	20	Republic of Cyprus
20	50	00	00	Central Asia
20	50	01	00	Afghanistan
20	50	01	10	Hindu Kush
20	50	02	00	Kazakhstan
20	50	03	00	Kyrgyzstan
20	50	04	00	Mongolia

Table 5.8: *(continued)*

20	50	05	00	Tajikistan
20	50	06	00	Turkmenistan
20	50	07	00	Uzbekistan
30	00	00	00	America
30	10	00	00	North America
30	10	01	00	Antigua and Barbuda
30	10	02	00	Bahamas
30	10	03	00	Barbados
30	10	04	00	Belize
30	10	05	00	Costa Rica
30	10	06	00	Dominica
30	10	07	00	Dominican Republic
30	10	08	00	El Salvador
30	10	09	00	Grenada
30	10	10	00	Guatemala
30	10	11	00	Haiti
30	10	12	00	Honduras
30	10	13	00	Jamaica
30	10	14	00	Canada
30	10	15	00	Cuba
30	10	16	00	Mexico
30	10	17	00	Nicaragua
30	10	18	00	Panama
30	10	19	00	Puerto Rico
30	10	20	00	St. Kitts and Nevis
30	10	21	00	St. Lucia
30	10	22	00	St. Vincent and the Grenadines
30	10	23	00	Trinidad and Tobago
30	10	24	00	United States of America
30	20	00	00	South America
30	20	01	00	Argentina
30	20	02	00	Bolivia
30	20	03	00	Brazil
30	20	04	00	Chile
30	20	05	00	Ecuador
30	20	06	00	Guyana
30	20	07	00	Columbia
30	20	08	00	Paraguay
30	20	09	00	Peru
30	20	10	00	Suriname
30	20	11	00	Thailand
30	20	12	00	Uruguay
30	20	13	00	Venezuela
40	00	00	00	Oceania
40	10	00	00	Oceania

Table 5.8: *(continued)*

40	10	01	00	Australia
40	10	02	00	Fiji
40	10	03	00	Kiribati
40	10	04	00	Marshall Islands
40	10	05	00	Micronesia
40	10	06	00	Nauru
40	10	07	00	New Zealand
40	10	08	00	Palau
40	10	09	00	Papua New Guinea
40	10	10	00	Salomon Islands
40	10	11	00	Samoa
40	10	12	00	Tonga
40	10	13	00	Tuvalu
40	10	14	00	Vanuatu
50	00	00	00	Europe
50	10	00	00	Northern Europe, North-Western Europe, North-Eastern Europe
50	10	01	00	Denmark
50	10	02	00	Estonia
50	10	03	00	Finland
50	10	04	00	Iceland
50	10	05	00	Latvia
50	10	06	00	Lithuania
50	10	07	00	Norway
50	10	08	00	Sweden
50	20	00	00	Western Europe, Europe Central-West
50	20	01	00	Belgium
50	20	02	00	Germany
50	20	03	00	France
50	20	04	00	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
50	20	05	00	Liechtenstein
50	20	06	00	Luxembourg
50	20	07	00	Netherlands
50	20	08	00	Austria
50	20	09	00	Republic of Ireland
50	20	10	00	Switzerland
50	30	00	00	Eastern Europe, Europe Central-East
50	30	01	00	Bulgaria
50	30	02	00	Moldova
50	30	03	00	Poland
50	30	04	00	Romania
50	30	05	00	Russia
50	30	05	10	Chechnya
50	30	06	00	Czechoslovakia
50	30	06	10	Slovakia
50	30	06	20	Czech Republic

Table 5.8: *(continued)*

50	30	07	00	Ukraine
50	30	08	00	Hungary
50	30	09	00	Belarus
50	40	00	00	Southern and Southeastern Europe
50	40	01	00	Albania
50	40	02	00	Andorra
50	40	03	00	Gibraltar
50	40	04	00	Greece
50	40	05	00	Italy
50	40	06	00	(former) Yugoslavia / Balkan
50	40	06	10	Bosnia and Herzegovina
50	40	06	20	Kosovo
50	40	06	30	Croatia
50	40	06	40	Macedonia
50	40	06	50	Montenegro
50	40	06	60	Serbia
50	40	06	70	Slovenia
50	40	07	00	Malta
50	40	08	00	Monaco
50	40	09	00	Portugal
50	40	10	00	San Marino
50	40	11	00	Spain
50	40	11	10	Basque Country
50	40	12	00	Vatican
50	50	00	00	all or several EU member states
50	60	00	00	several European countries, not only EU
70	00	00	00	several countries, across continents
98	00	00	00	unclassifiable

Codebook for Articles of the Srebrenica Debate: Identity-Related Reactions to Genocide

nation

The country in which the newspaper article was published.

1 United States

2 France

3 Germany

4 Netherlands

newspaper

The newspaper in which the article was published.

1 New York Times

2 Washington Post

3 Le Figaro

4 Les Echos

5 Le Monde

6 Süddeutsche Zeitung

7 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

8 Volkskrant

9 NRC Handelsblad

ideology

The newspaper's ideological orientation in which the article was published.

1 liberal-left
New York Times, Le Monde, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Volkskrant

2 conservative
Washington Post, Le Figaro, Les Echos, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, NRC Handelsblad

Variable 102: year of issue (year1)

The year of issue ranges from 1990 to 2006.

month

The month of issue from which the article stems.

1 January

2 February

3 March

4 April

5 May

6 June

7 July

8 August

9 September

10 October

11 November

12 December

day

The day of the month of issue from which the article stems.

focus_Srebrenica

Is the main discussion of the article focusing on the events regarding Srebrenica? It may be that the article does not focus on events geographically happening in Srebrenica, but rather on e.g. a debate in national parliament on events in Srebrenica. What happens or happened in Srebrenica is the subject in whatever arena.

0 No

1 Yes

which_focus

The main focus or issue of the article relates to the overall context in which events are discussed. The most part of the article is set in a particular context regarding the policy level or region of which actors are part. The newspaper section and the place of reporting may give an indication.

1 Srebrenica

2 Bosnia

3 domestic policy of the country where the article was issued

4 international level (e.g. peace negotiations, UN decision making)

5 Yugoslavia

6 other

7 International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

8 historic setting (e.g. discussion of World War II)

9 feuilleton (e.g. philosophical discussion, literature)

33 domestic policy of another country but the one where the article was published

war

The place where the war or conflict in the focus of the article takes place is specified.

1 Bosnia

2 Yugoslavia

3 Croatia

4 Kosovo

5 Macedonia

6 Afghanistan

7 Iraq

8 Rwanda

9 Somalia

10 other war in Africa

11 various wars

12 terror

13 Darfur

20 other

interpretation_war

The dominant interpretation or framing of the Bosnian War in the article is coded as it is portrayed by the author or any speaker cited in the article. The interpretation relates to the causes of the war, but may be indicated by the naming of actors, e.g. as extremists, and giving their intentions and motivations.

0 no interpretation given

1 ethnic fatalist interpretation

2 political interpretation

3 economic interpretation

4 external aggression

5 diffuse ethnic interpretation

6 religious interpretation

interpretation_war2

Another interpretation or framing of the Bosnian War apart from the main one is coded as it is portrayed by the author or any speaker cited in the article. The interpretation relates to the causes of the war, but may be indicated by the naming of actors, e.g. as extremists, and giving their intentions and motivations.

0 no interpretation given

1 ethnic fatalist interpretation

2 political interpretation

3 economic interpretation

4 external aggression

5 diffuse ethnic interpretation

6 religious interpretation

interpretation_Srebrenica

The interpretation or framing of the events in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War (not only in 1995) as it is portrayed by the author or any speaker cited in the article. The interpretation relates to the general understanding and categorization of events in the town.

0 no interpretation given

1 military action (e.g. fighting, conquest, also territorial demand in the negotiation process)

2 ethnic cleansing (any forceful expulsion of (parts of) the local population)

3 human rights violations (e.g. massacres, rape)

4 humanitarian crisis (e.g. refugee influx, food supplies, starvation)

5 genocide (coded with at least one explicit reference to genocide)

6 emotional place (Srebrenica as homeland to refugees)

symbol

There are cases when Srebrenica is mentioned only briefly without any further explanations given implying some meaning. The reader is expected to know what happened in Srebrenica and for what Srebrenica stands.

0 no symbol

1 military failure

2 moral failure

3 atrocities including genocide

4 humanitarian crisis

in_Europe

Is Srebrenica or Bosnia explicitly located in Europe or outside of Europe?

0 No explicit statement made.

1 Srebrenica is in Europe

2 Srebrenica is not in Europe.

main_actor

The main actor of an article is a collective or individual which is the driving force behind events discussed. The actor may be reacting to other events, but is in the focus of attention as events are portrayed. For individuals, the collective in whose name they act are given.

1 United States

2 European Union

3 NATO

4 other European country

5 Netherlands

6 United Nations

7 international community

8 other

9 France

10 Germany

11 other or various European countries

12 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

US

Is the United States mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

France

Is the France mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

Netherlands

Is the Netherlands mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

Germany

Is Germany mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

EU_EC

Is the European Community or the European Union mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

European_states

Is any other European country mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

UN

Is the United Nations or any of its suborganizations mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

NATO

Is NATO mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

court

Is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia mentioned in the article?

0 No.

1 Yes.

identity_broad

Is there any reference to identity issues? This broad frame includes any emphatic statements referring explicitly to identity as well as values or memories mentioned. For coding, argumentation in the first person plural (we, our, us) is also sufficient.

0 No.

1 Yes.

values

Are values mentioned in the article? Values refer to collective goals set by a community to be fulfilled by it. Such values are usually abstracts which give orientation what appropriate behavior is or should be.

0 No.

1 Yes.

which_values

Values are usually abstracts which give orientation what appropriate behavior is or should be for a community and its individuals. If such goals were mentioned in an article, they are coded with the following list.

1 peaceful conflict resolution

2 multiculturalism

3 democracy

4 opposition to slaughter

5 human rights

6 pacifism

7 humanitarianism

8 ethnic purity, ethnic discrimination

9 liberalism

10 other

11 international law

whose_values

The community to which the values are referred: which collective set the values coded as their own?

0 none

1 United States

2 European Union

3 NATO

4 other European country

5 Netherlands

6 United Nations

7 international community

8 other

9 France

10 Germany

11 other or various European countries

explicit_identity

Are there any explicit references to identity given in the article? These may, for example, be evident in an open praise of a community and its members, reference to identification of individuals with a community as well as nationalist emotions.

0 No.

1 Yes.

whose_identity

The community to which the explicit identity is referred was coded with the following list:

0 none

1 United States

2 European Union

3 NATO

4 other European country

5 Netherlands

6 United Nations

7 international community

8 other

9 France

10 Germany

11 other or various European countries

memory

Is memory mentioned in the article? Memory refers to past events which are evoked to give orientation for the reader in understanding the present events with relation to the present community.

0 No.

1 Yes.

which_memory

The past event that is mentioned in the article is coded according to the following list.

1 World War II

2 Holocaust

3 colonial events

4 World War I

5 Vietnam War

6 Ottoman empire

7 Cold War

8 previous missions like Lebanon, Somalia

9 other

whose_memory

The community to which memory is referred was coded according to the following list.

0 none

1 United States

2 European Union

3 NATO

4 other European country

5 Netherlands

6 United Nations

7 international community

8 other

9 France

10 Germany

11 other or various European countries

memory2

Is there another memory evoked in the article? Memory refers to past events which are evoked to give orientation for the reader in understanding the present events. In some cases more than one past event was mentioned.

0 No.

1 Yes.

which_memory2

The past event that is mentioned in the article is coded according to the following list.

1 World War II

2 Holocaust

3 colonial events

4 World War I

5 Vietnam War

6 Ottoman empire

7 Cold War

8 previous missions like Lebanon, Somalia

9 other

whose_memory2

The community to which memory is referred was coded according to the following list.

0 none

1 United States

2 European Union

3 NATO

4 other European country

5 Netherlands

6 United Nations

7 international community

8 other

9 France

10 Germany

11 other or various European countries

historic_cross-references

There are parallels drawn between Srebrenica and other events, Srebrenica is mentioned in one line of enumeration with past events that put it in a particular context. There may also be an explicit comparison of Srebrenica resembling another historic event.

0 no parallel

1 Rwanda

2 Iraq

3 Holocaust

4 Near East

5 Vietnam War

6 other

7 colonial events

8 World War II

fault

Events in Srebrenica may be considered to be the result of the failure of individual or collective actors suggesting that the fall of the safe area or genocide could have been prevented.

0 no failure

1 shame (only referring to the collective failure to meet the community's values and the realization of this failure)

2 guilt (judicial question of responsibility and accountability)

3 failure

whose_fault

The community to which the fault committed is referred was coded according to the following list.

0 none

1 United States

2 European Union

3 NATO

4 other European country

5 Netherlands

6 United Nations

7 international community

8 other

9 France

10 Germany

11 other or various European countries

travel

Is Srebrenica mentioned in a different context without any explanation given to its meaning. Srebrenica is iconographic to carry with it meaning that needs no explanation.

0 No.

1 Yes.

****