The second-class citizens of Sudan

A study of southern Sudanese in Khartoum

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Abbreviations

AD	Anno Domini
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EU	European Union
FGT	Formal Grounded Theory
GONU	Government of National Unity
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GTM	Grounded Theory Method
GT	Grounded Theory
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (since 1997 IGAD)
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JIU	Joint Integrated Units
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MP	Member of Parliament
NCP	National Congress Party
NCSC	National Civil Service Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front (became National Congress Party in 1998)
NUP	National Unionist Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
POP	Public Order Police
RCCNS	Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SGT	Substantive Grounded Theory
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USA	United States of America

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I Introduction

1 Conflicts and their approaches in Sudan

Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic country dominated by an authoritarian Islamist regime. Because of persistent marginalisation of the vast majority of Sudanese, Sudan is currently sliding towards potentially violent secession of the South and maybe even complete disintegration of the entire country. The humanitarian situation in wide parts of the country is increasingly alarming.[1] The main mechanisms to end conflict between the central government and the marginalised peripheries – the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Darfur Peace Agreement and the East Sudan Peace Agreement – are all falling far behind with implementations or are already abrogated.[2] Among these, the CPA was the clear hope for inducing transition towards an inclusive approach to the heterogeneous Sudanese society and maybe even the pacification of the country. Yet, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) continues with its policy of complete intransigence and International Crisis Group came to the conclusion that since 2005 the political goodwill, which the NCP and SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Movement) may have had to implement the CPA when signing it, has dwindled if not completely vanished.[3] The joint Government of National Unity (GONU) has failed to bring about democratic transformation or conflict resolution that might have prevented the South from seceding. Unity has not been made attractive and, recently, southern Sudanese have voted for independence in the self-determination referendum sparked by the CPA.

Unfortunately, the antagonistic groups do not appear to be able to agree on peaceful means of separation either, and outbreaks of violence in case of southern secession cannot be ruled out. Even before the referendum results were officially released, the NCP already started to request an extension of the interim period beyond the July 9th date stipulated by the CPA.[4] North and South are both preparing for a possible recurrence of violence; on 24th of September 2010, Time wrote:

[1] cf. Oxfam et al. (2010), p. 6
[2] On 12th of December 2010, Minni Minnawi declared the death of the Darfur Peace Agreement he signed in May 2006 with the Sudanese government. Cf. Sudan Tribune (12.12.2010)
[3] cf. International Crisis Group (17.12.2009)
[4] cf. Sudan Tribune (25.01.2011)

"The north has used the cease-fire to upgrade its arms, but the south is no longer the guerrilla movement it once was, having stocked up on its first aircraft and an array of antiaircraft weapons."[5] Sudan shares its border with nine countries, cutting through various ethnic groups. An imploding Sudan would threaten the stability of the entire central and eastern African region. All nine bordering countries could be pulled into a new conflict. The South shares borders with the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia, none of which could afford another influx of southern Sudanese refugees or any of the other many pressures or regional instability.

The CPA is an agreement between two parties – the NCP and the SPLM – and does not include any other marginalised region of the country but the South. Far from that, the CPA rather adds upon their marginalisation by excluding them from the treaty and power-sharing at the centre. Rebel movements from Darfur, for example, are demanding relative participation in the government according to their population size, which, however, would require the complete revision of the power-sharing negotiated in the CPA. Fearing a loss of power, the SPLM refuses to start process which will equate opening Pandora's Box.[6] Violent conflict in Darfur does not simply spill over to bordering Chad and the Central African Republic; its impacts also escalate already existing conflicts inside the two countries. These cross-national conflicts have come to be deeply interwoven and the solution of one conflict presupposes the solution of the others. The crisis in the border region of Chad, Central African Republic and Sudan has to be understood as a system of intertwined conflicts and can only be solved when addressing the problems of all three areas at the same time.[7] The pacification of Sudan, and the success of the CPA as the most promising means for this, has tremendous effects on the entire region.

At the same time, the success of the CPA, of course, also has immense impacts on the people of the whole of Sudan and also affects the lives of approximately two million southern Sudanese living in the northern capital Khartoum.[8] They have been scared by suggestions from senior

[5] Time (24.09.2010)
[6] cf. Berg (2008), p. 31
[7] cf. Berg (2008), p. 33 ff.
[8] cf. Schißau (2008), p. 198

northern officials that they would not be welcomed in Khartoum if the South decided to secede,[9] thus, prompting mass return movements.[10] BBC News wrote on 24th of August 2010 that there "have been warnings of possible violence against southerners living in the north"[11] if the South should secede. At the same time, in the South "war seems closer than peace" as "a humanitarian disaster widely thought more serious than that in neighbouring Darfur is unfolding."[12] The lack of education, development and security in the South renders repatriation a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. In fact, not even southern government officials are willing to permanently return with their families, and a southern minister living in the West stated that he was working for a "graveyard".[13]

The urgent advancement of the peace process in the whole of Sudan highly depends on the willingness of its government. Yet, neither the authoritarian and Islamist regime in Khartoum nor the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) shows genuine interest in protecting its population or in fair power-sharing and the equal distribution of resources. Instead, their first and foremost priority appears to be the consolidation of their own power at any price. "Put simply, the one obstacle to a just and lasting peace is the unwillingness of hegemonic rulers (and their constituents) to acknowledge the plurality of Sudan's people and their rights of empowerment as equals in the land."[14] The northern regime has proved its bad intentions many times; the GOSS is still suffering from lack of experience and it remains to be seen whether it will succeed in overcoming underlying structural problems currently leading to misgovernment and corruption. The CPA has not been based on genuine policy changes, but on the recognition that no party could win the war by force. In fact, it has to be assumed that the only true interest the North has in the South is its resources, in particular the oil. Apart from that, the SPLM with its claims for democratisation and secularisation constitutes a great annoyance and destabilising factor for the incumbent regime.

[9] cf. BBC News (12.11.2010)
[10] cf. BBC News (24.08.2010)
[11] BBC News (24.08.2010)
[12] Guardian (21.06.2009)
[13] Guardian (21.06.2009)
[14] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 17

Ever since independence, all consecutive regimes in Khartoum have tried to accomplish total control over the Sudanese society and enforced homogenisation in the form of rigid Islamisation and Arabisation campaigns. Herewith, they have sparked exactly the opposite of what they intended, namely resistance and the formation of counter-identity. Sudan has entered into an identity crisis. Lacking any country-wide nationalism or patriotism and not providing any other benefits to the vast majority of the people for their citizenship, Sudan is heading towards disintegration.

The causes of war in Sudan are numerous and so are the exacerbating factors. At its roots a lack of equal economic development and the centralised control of political power can be found. These causes are aggravated by the long history of separate development and the formation of political groups based on tribal, ethnic and cultural identities and the division of power based on these groups. Regional and international interests have further worsened the conflict and, sadly to say, no viable solution is in sight. Even if the secession of the South should happen in a peaceful way, this would not solve any of the underlying problems of the North or the South. Both parts would still be plagued by notorious competition over scarce resources, unequal power-sharing, chronic underdevelopment, deeply rooted racism, and the mismanagement of ethnic minorities. Whether independence will be accomplished or not, both North and South need to earnestly address their internal problems, either together as one country or as two separate entities.

2 Objectives of the study

The presented research deals with marginalisation in Sudan and examines the relations between southern Sudanese in Khartoum, the society of Khartoum and the state. The research arose from the assumption that the settlement of war between North and South Sudan and the corresponding official termination of hostilities affects the reality of civilians in Khartoum. In 1994, Simone described how the frontier between northern and southern tribes had turned the southern state of Bar al-Ghazal into a wasteland and how some of these problems had been displaced to the capital:

> Khartoum, once an orderly city of river gardens and clean streets and a civility unmatched in the Arab world, now embodies the murkiness of that frontier. Arab and African orientations push against each other, becoming fiercer in their solidity as the push goes on. There is a seepage of cultures but little mutual incorporation.[15]

How does one have to picture the situation more than 15 years later and after hostilities between North and South have – at least officially – come to an end? The city is believed to hold a population somewhere between five and six million. It brings together all the peoples of the country and also forms a significant meeting point for northern and southern Sudanese.[16] In spite of a long history of southern and western (African) presence in Khartoum,[17] Simone's description does not convey the image of a multicultural society, which incorporates the diverse people of the country, but that of another war inside the capital itself. A crucial component of the CPA was to make unity attractive, to unite northern and southern Sudanese and prevent disintegration from happening. Southern Sudanese voted on exactly this question from 9th of January until 15th of January 2011 when an overwhelming 99% opted for secession.[18] Apparently, the CPA has not succeeded in maintaining the country integrated.

Many southern Sudanese – some of whom have been living in Khartoum for decades – continued to stay in the capital after the peace agreement had been concluded. This fact must not hastily be taken as an indication of approval of life in Khartoum and, in this paper, not only the situation of southern Sudanese in Khartoum but also conditions in the South, will be scrutinised. The research participants, too, preferred to prolong their stay in Khartoum where all meetings took place. The research examines the relations of southern Sudanese living and working in the inner city of Khartoum with the Khartoum society and the state. An elite group of privileged and educated southern Sudanese has been chosen as research group, which – as will be seen in the presentation of the results – has considerable influence on the political opinion-making in the southern community in the North and even in the South. Their work in ethnic communities, church groups and political parties – and the general acceptance that they are more educated than

[15] Simone (1994), p. 117 f.
[16] cf. Simone (1994), p. 100
[17] cf. Simone (1994), p. 101
[18] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)

the majority of southern Sudanese – allows them to seriously influence the southern community. It will be surveyed, how accessible society and the system are for southern Sudanese, who have been living and working in Khartoum for at least two decades.

Furthermore, it will be analysed, how relations between the distinct groups change over time. Apparently, in the consideration of process, the CPA is of particular importance. This study will look at if the CPA has changed relations and whether it has made unity attractive to the research group, which, at least from an economical perspective, is able to lead a better life in the North than is possible in the South. The research takes the challenge of looking into everyday matters and strategic, long-sighted projects under drastically transformed conditions, namely the termination of war, the potential division of the country into two parts and changing perspectives for return to the South. The theme has been selected with the belief that it can make a relevant contribution to understanding Sudan's society at this unique time of history. Through in-depth analysis, it will be possible to draw conclusions relevant to other marginalised minorities of Sudan.

3 Methodology and structure

The presented research has been conducted according to the principles of grounded theory. If entering into a rather unknown research field, where access is difficult, and when seeking in-depth analysis of a rather unknown phenomenon, qualitative social research methods are recommendable. The selected research group and its context are remarkably complex, which is why grounded theory methods have been evaluated as particularly useful. With the goal of generating theory in an explorative and possibly inductive manner, it was, from the very beginning of the research onwards, intended to gather data from group members themselves. The conduct of research and emergence of theory were designed to follow an order of induction, abduction, deduction and verification.

To meet the above-described objectives, a particular research group has been chosen and analysed in depth. Extensive field study has been conducted in Khartoum in autumn 2008 and autumn 2009. During the two field stays intensive interviewing was carried out, an open-ended, directed conversation that explores a participant's deep first-hand

knowledge and the research is based on about 60 hours of formal interview material. Furthermore, observation and informal conversations and interviews, as well as articles from local newspapers (sometimes even written by interview partners) entered into the analysis. To render the empirical project into a comprehensive grounded theory, specialised literature has been reviewed extensively.

Accordingly, the study is structured into three main blocks. The first block, which embraces part II to IV, provides a detailed theoretic framework. The second block, which embraces part V and VI, presents the empirical core piece of the study. In the third block, which embraces part VII, a resumé of the research is provided and conclusions are drawn.

The analysis will be started with a country review of multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic Sudan in part II. Strained relations between northern and southern Sudanese have not developed within years or decades, but within centuries. They cannot be explained simply by long-standing religious, cultural or linguistic differences. Therefore, the complex history of the formation of the country will be reviewed. Emphasis is put on those events which are understood to have the greatest impact on prevailing relations, namely the legacies of slavery and colonialism, which in turn structure the relationship between the racialised postcolonial state and its oppressed groups. With respect to the post-colonial state, emphasis is put on the rise of political Islam and its consequences. Furthermore, the conclusion of the CPA is reconstructed and the core periphery divide is analysed, with the latter being considered one of the main origins of conflict in the country. Special emphasis is given to impacts on the society of the primary city of Khartoum, where the empirical investigation has been conducted. In this context, internal displacement to the North will be discussed and it will be analysed how the government deals with its large displaced population. It will become clear that southern internally displaced persons (IDPs) are pressured to return to the South, yet, the analysis of conditions in the South will show that the South is barely prepared to receive them.

In part III, heuristic concepts – which, due to their lack of empirical content permit the generating of variable approaches to the data – are reviewed and applied to the particular case of Sudan. To start with, race

and ethnicity will be discussed in detail and northern and southern identity will be subjected to a detailed constructivist analysis. The two identities are surveyed according to their comprehensiveness, the type of assignment and the bonds holding members together. In this conduct, southern identity will be assessed to be an identity of resistance, sparking strong nationalist sentiments among its members. Hence, nationalism, patriotism and separatism are discussed, also making a review of other concepts necessary, such as state, nation, multination state, nation-building state or quasi-nation state. The research will then specifically discuss southern nationalism and its impacts on the whole of Sudan.

Part IV is the most foresighted part of this work. Here, the tenor and feasibility of democratic transformation in Muslim African Sudan will be surveyed and verified against the hard facts of the nature of Sudanese society and its incumbent regime. It will be concluded that under the current leadership any transformation towards a more inclusive state form is highly unlikely, since leaders are, first and foremost, interested in the consolidation of their own power, not in a fair distribution of power and resources. Liberal citizenship will be reviewed and evaluated as falling far short of meeting the demands of the marginalised people of Sudan and more comprehensive concepts, such as federalism and multiculturalism, will be discussed. In part III, it will be revealed that Sudanese society is not only segregated by cultural, religious or linguistic differences, but by deeply rooted, all-pervasive racism. Hence, the contrasting of multiculturalism with measures of de-racilisation is mandatory and will be provided without delay. Before moving on to the empirical chapters, possible future developments will be contemplated on.

In order to meet high quality standards of scientific theorising, research procedures have to be described in detail as to provide transparency on the emergence of the theory. This requirement will be met in part V, where all steps of the investigation – from the selection of research methods and the conduct of research until its verification – will be explained in detail. A general discussion on methodology is provided to guarantee transparency on which methodological guidelines have been followed and why. Next, the distinct steps of research conduct are

discussed, providing an understanding of how guidelines have been applied and adjusted in this particular research project.

In part VI, the grounded theory will be presented. Outcomes of the analysis are displayed and discussed. To convey the participants' viewpoints, illustrative data will be used. Many issues addressed in this research are highly charged with emotion and often a quote can provide a much better understanding of the profound feelings of the interview partners. Nevertheless, in grounded theory the goal is not description but conceptualisation of social phenomena. Theoretical interpretation will be substantiated when reasonable with carefully selected pieces of data, hence, meeting all of the classical requirements of so-called verstehen, credence, sense of reality, and reader comprehension.[19]

Lastly, in part VII, a resumé of the research will be provided and conclusions will be drawn on the research group and the wider context affecting the marginalised people of Sudan. The results of the referendum prove that previous strategies have failed to pacify the country and to bond together the various nations of the multination state. In the conclusions, the consequences of the referendum will be discussed, as well as the lessons that should be learnt from history, the CPA and the referendum results.

[19] cf. Glaser (1987), p. 216

II Multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic Sudan

The Sudanese society is highly diverse and the country embraces all kinds of nations. With its variety of peoples different in their origin, language, religion, outlook and life-style, Sudan is virtually a reproduction of the whole of Africa, a microcosm of the entire continent. Sudanese society can be described as multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic. The population of Sudan is about 43.94 million.[20] According to Eltayeb (2001), Sudan embraces at least five hundred tribes and sub-tribes who speak about 26 distinct languages in over 100 dialects.[21] Identities of people are complex and often overlapping in confusing ways. Lamentably, it has to be said that this diversity has not been able to enrich the country. On the contrary, Sudan has a long history of civil war and internal division. It is a fragmented country, home to a racial society, and only a stone's throw away from complete disintegrating. The South has voted for independence already.[22] In the following lines, it will be analysed who the Sudanese people are and how they came to be brought together in one country in spite of their tremendous differences.

1 The formation of the country

Before Islam took root in Sudan just before the 12th century, northern Sudan had been Christian for several centuries. Although both traditions of Islamic orthodoxy (Sunni) and mysticism (Sufi) were introduced, the latter became predominant.[23] With the establishment of the Funj Sultanate (1504-1820), Sudanese Islam began one of its most active phases of expansion.[24] Nevertheless, in spite of having been home to various significant ancient kingdoms, it was the coming of the Turks and the British before and after the Mahdist revolution that sparked the formation of an (artificial) state controlled by new forms of government. While the Turks and the Egyptians brought with them the civilisation and cultures from the Ottoman Empire and the Arab world in the 19th

[20] cf. CIA (07.12.2010)
[21] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 137
[22] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)
[23] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 135 ff.
[24] cf. Cudsi (1983), p. 36

century, the British introduced imperialism, education, religion and technology of the West in the 20th century.[25]

The official boarder of Sudan, as it is known today, was drawn during the colonial era. The first part of Anglo-Egyptian rule from 1899-1936 was based on the so-called Condominium Agreement. Amid pressure from Italy's Mussolini – who wanted to establish a New Rome stretching from Tripoli to Addis Ababa – Britain and Egypt signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, with the aim of defending British strategic interests at Suez and in the Nile Valley and Egyptian claims to sovereignty in Sudan. No Sudanese person has been involved or consulted in this process.[26] In 1917, Darfur was the last province to become part of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan after its last Sultan, Ali Dinar, was killed by British-led forces.[27] As a result, a colossal multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic country has been artificially created.

The area of Sudan is gigantic. It is the largest country in Africa and embraces with its 2,505,823 sq km[28] nearly two percent of the total land mass of the world or one-tenth of the total area of Africa.[29] No other country in the world has such a varied climate, which results in a matchless diversity of vegetation from which Sudanese derive their livelihoods. According to House (1994) there are three lateral geographical areas:

1. The northern zone is the area from the Egyptian border to Khartoum is flat and arid, the Nubian Desert stretches east to the Red Sea mountains, and the Libyan Desert in the west merges with the Sahara.
2. The central zone is intersected by many rivers and streams. In the west mountains rise to over 10,000 feet, and the east is bordered by the massif of the Abyssinian plateau.
3. The southern zone is one of vast swamps, savanna, and tropical forest.[30]

The geographic indications of the country are as diverse as its people and correspond with their lifestyles. Sudan shelters an estimated 600 ethnic and linguistic groups, which are commonly divided into two ample categories, Muslims and Non-Muslims. Although the majority of Muslims

[25] cf. Collins (2008), p. 1 ff.
[26] cf. Collins (2008), p. 46
[27] cf. Harir (1994a), p. 150 f.
[28] cf. CIA (07.10.2010)
[29] cf. House (1994), p. 17
[30] House (1994), p. 18

can be found in the North, there are nevertheless considerable numbers in the South.[31] Although the majority of Christians and followers of traditional beliefs can be found in the South, there are nevertheless considerable numbers in the North.[32]

Map 1, which has been taken from International Crisis Group, displays the North-South border (of 1956),[33] which divides the country into two separate parts.

Map 1: The Sudan – North-South border[34]

[31] Sunni Muslims 70% (in North), Christian 5% (mostly in South and Khartoum), indigenous beliefs 25%. Cf. CIA (07.12.2010)
[32] cf. Peter (2008), p. 152
[33] On 22nd July 2009, the Permanent Court of Arbitration released its award that suggests redrawing the boundary. For more information see PCA (22.07.2009)
[34] International Crisis Group (02.10.2010)

The Muslims of the North are far from forming a homogenous group and fall into further groups according to claims of Arab ancestry and/or loyalties to pre-Arab culture. The first category splits further into two groups. The first is basically constituted by the riverain farmers of the Nile and the urbanised trading class, the so-called “jallaba”, who have spread throughout the country and form the wealthiest class in the towns. The second group lives away from the river to the east and to the west and are traditionally cattle or camel-herders. As will be demonstrated below, Arab descent in Sudan has to be understood as a cultural identification rather than genetic descent, for “Arab” Sudanese represent a mixture of Arab, Nubian and other blood. In spite of decade-long taking of slaves, concubinage and intermarriage with non-Muslim Africans, which has even changed their physiognomy, they never abandoned Arabic or Arabic culture.

Thirty percent of the northern Sudanese are of non-Arab descent. They include Nubians along the Nile bordering with Egypt; Beja nomads in the Red Sea Hills; several ethnic groups of Nuba in the Nuba Mountains of southern Kordofan; the Ingessana and other tribes in Southern Blue Nile Province; and the Fur, Masalit and other tribes in Darfur. These non-Arab tribes are farmers, herders and craftsmen and have widely accepted Islam. Only few people in the Nuba Mountains and the Ingessana Hills adhere to Christianity and traditional religions.[35] Among the non-Arab northern Sudanese, the Nuba form the biggest group which constitutes of 50 distinct ethnic groups speaking more than 70 different languages and practising distinct African traditional religions. In the 19th century, the Baqqara Arabs broke into their isolation and Arabic became lingua franca.[36]

The South is dominated by non-Muslim Sudanese, who constitute about one third of the Sudanese and embrace some 60 distinct groups. They can also be divided into two main groups. The first consists of the Nilotic people who are primarily cattle-herders and secondly farmers, fishermen and hunters. Among them the Luo, Shilluk, Anuak, Acholi, Jur, Dinka and Nuer are found who inhabit the central grasslands of the South up to the Ethiopian border. They practise traditional religions and some are Christians and Muslims. The second group includes Sudanic tribes such

[35] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 135 ff.
[36] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 136

as Azande and Moru-Madi and Nilo-Hamitic tribes such as Bari and Lotuka who live and cultivate in the woodlands along the borders with the Central African Republic, Zaire and Uganda. The second group has embraced Christianity, and sometimes Islam, to a greater extent than the Nilotic tribes.[37]

Sudan, apparently, has been formed by lumping together various nations into one tremendously big and diverse country. The various governments of Sudan have failed to properly deal with the plurality of society and the country is struggling with an identity crisis. As Deng (2006) writes, those "who have been in control of the country define themselves as Arabs and also Muslims, and identify more with the Middle East than with black Africa, though they are essentially Arab-Africans. Their physical features are similar to other African groups in the region, and their cultures and even Islamic practices are an amalgam of Arab and Islamic culture with indigenous belief systems and cultures."[38] The country is dominated by a fundamentalist Islamic and Arabic identity, which has led to the majority of Sudanese being marginalised.

Although the North-South conflict is only one of the various violent conflicts of the country, it is certainly the longest running one and the southern people are religiously, culturally and linguistically the most divergent ones. Yet, common distinctions between Arabs and Africans do not explain the eruption of the North-South conflict and its continuation. Instead, the history of violence and slavery, the British "southern policy" and its legacy, i.e. racism that stamps the institutional and individual attitudes of the northern Sudanese towards the southern Sudanese, and socio-economic disparities between the two regions have to be considered. In the following chapters, the historic formation of identities and chasms between the people of Sudan will be surveyed, with particular emphasis on relations between northern and southern Sudanese.

In order to avoid confusion, at this early point of the paper and before continuing with explanations, a word on terminology is said. As has been seen above, grouping people together in Sudan is a difficult and sometimes harmful venture. In fact, people are too diverse, to reduce

[37] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 136; cf. Embassy of the Republic of the Sudan Washington D.C.
[38] Deng (2006), p. 155

them to a few categories, such as northerners and southerners. Other terms, such as “the Arabs”, are frequently used in the vernacular, however without clear boundaries of who is included and who not. Same is true for terms such as “the Africans”. Nevertheless, in order to speak about Sudanese society, terminology is needed. The Sudanese popular notions of race are not based on phenotypes alone, but also on religion, economic activities, material conditions, the naming of people and other cultural practices. Furthermore, geographic distances between groups, the natural environment in which each group lives and their maternal languages are considered part of the racial schema. Important to notice, notions of race in Sudan are not fixed.[39] Jok (2007) clarified that “racial boundaries are very fluid in Sudan, and there are many ways in which people who may be classed as blacks could also pass as Arabs, while those who have known to be Arabs could decide to label themselves as African or black if their political circumstances demanded and allowed it.”[40] In a country like Sudan, race cannot be attributed to physical characteristics. Nevertheless, the dominant group from its position of political and economic power imposes its notion of identity on the rest and group boundaries are created.

In this paper, the term northern Sudanese refers to all the people living north of the official political border between North and South. When speaking of the southern Sudanese, all the people living south of this border are meant. Furthermore, when speaking of political units capitalisation will be applied (North, South, East and West). The term “Arab” as label for a Sudanese group is avoided when possible, due to its lack of scientific justification and unclear boundaries.[41] The riverain elite is considered to be composed of those people, who identify themselves as Arabs and who form the dominant elite of the country. If not referring to all northern Sudanese, but only to the African Sudanese (e.g. Nubiens, Darfuris, Beja), they will be termed northern African Sudanese. In the empirical part (VI), it will be seen that research participants are not precise on their definitions; an issue attention will be paid to when relevant. Throughout the entire paper it should be kept in mind that categorising Sudanese is extremely difficult and always temporary. Also, Sudanese are capable of code-switching, culture-

[39] cf. Jok (2007), p. 1 ff.
[40] Jok (2007), p. 3
[41] When citing other works, authors’ uses of the term “Arab” will be adapted.

switching and discourse-switching, and might present different identities to different groups, therefore making labels even sketchier.[42]

2 Historical relations between North and South

Strained relations between northern and southern Sudanese have not developed within years or decades, but within centuries. They cannot be explained simply by long-standing religious, cultural or linguistic differences. To understand the deep distrust and the huge gap that southern Sudanese feel towards their northern countrymen, one has to go back far and understand the complex history of the formation of the state, which has already been hinted at above. Therefore, in the following paragraphs the history of state formation, nation-building and of corresponding conflict between North and South will be discussed in detail. The aim is to better understand the current happenings in Sudan and lay out the starting position of the presented research. Emphasis will be put on those events, which are understood to have the greatest impact on prevailing strained relations. Idris (2005) explains that the "violent political conflicts in the Sudan are manifestations of legacies of the past, namely slavery and the colonialism. The legacies in turn structure the relationship between the racialised postcolonial state and its oppressed groups."[43]

Early encounters with Islam, slavery and the colonial rule will be reviewed in the following lines and their impacts on the post-colonial state be discussed. With respect to the post-colonial state, emphasis is put on the rise of political Islam and its consequences. It will be analysed how the insistence of consecutive governments on creating racial and cultural homogeneity has, in fact, caused counter-radicalisation in the people of Sudan. Through this, the country has been set on the path of self-destruction and the South has recently voted for secession from the North. Since independence from the colonisers, South Sudan has not experienced any long-lasting period of peace. It will be demonstrated that up to today exploitation of the South continues. Underdevelopment is chronic almost everywhere outside Khartoum. As a direct consequence, many southern Sudanese and others seriously came to

[42] cf. Streck (2007), p. 95
[43] Idris (2005), p. 10

question, whether unity with the North is desirable and peace in a united country possible at all.

2.1 The slave trade, its legacy and early Islamisation

Considerable political and cultural influence from Egypt already started about 3000 BC when northern Sudan was still known as the kingdom of Kush. Although interweavement of the two regions never came to a complete halt again, Egyptian hegemony over Sudan strongly varied in military strength over time and Sudan developed its own political structures. By the sixth century AD, Christianity had been introduced to the Nile Valley and the Nubian monarchs converted to the Christian faith. The invasion and conquest of Egypt by Arab Muslim armies in 640 was followed by an invasion of Nubia in 642 and again about ten years later.[44] Strong resistance by the Nubians resulted in a treaty between the two parties, which included a tribute as "symbol of goodwill"[45] of grain and other provisions on Arab side and slaves on Nubian side. Slavery in those days was already wide spread in the Christian Nubia as in the Muslim world. For more than 600 years Nubia and Egypt lived in more or less peaceful co-existence, which eventually lead to Arab migration into Nubia. With further penetration, the kingdoms and their culture were undermined and by the beginning of the 16th century most of the indigenous peoples of the North had embraced the Islamic faith and Arabic culture.[46]

Importantly in Sudan, Islam was introduced by merchants, tribesmen and fugitives, and not by the ulama, i.e. learned scholars, who in contrast to the first might have properly taught the fundamentals of the new religion.[47] In the Funj sultanate of Sinnar, which was conquered by the Turko-Egyptian army in 1820-21, the royalty embraced Islam, yet the political system continued being based on traditions.[48] In the Fur sultanate, which lasted until British conquest, Islam was declared to be the official religion of the kingdom. In fact, although Islamisation by Muslim jurists had started earlier, Sufism was far more popular and easier to comprehend than its orthodox counterpart. Khalafalla (2002) comments on Sufism that "its absorption into a superficially Islamised

[44] Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 1 ff.
[45] Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 3
[46] cf. Duany and Duany (2000), p. 170 ff.
[47] cf. Khalafalla (2002), p. 79
[48] cf. Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 4 f.

population, such as that of the Sultanate of Sinnar, was much easier because local customs and superstitions were simply assimilated by the Sufi orders."[49] The Arabisation and Islamisation process lasted about four centuries and reached maturity during the 18th and 19th centuries.[50] Although the Sudanese states perceived their moves toward Islamisation and Arabisation "as their own way of making inroads to the abode of the Muslim *ummah*" (the Islamic community) due to their hybrid character, in fact, "the surrounding Muslim communities never included them within their geographical and anthropological imagined communities."[51]

While the earlier process of the Arabisation and Islamisation is thought to have taken part generally peaceful and through mutual interaction and integration, the later part was pursued through organised force and military intervention.[52] The South, however, was much more difficult to access and natural barriers kept it fairly isolated. The Sudd, a labyrinth of lakes, lagoons and meandering channels, which Collins (2008) calls "[o]ne of the most formidable natural obstacles in the world",[53] hampered penetration into the South, where people, thus, maintained a separate social and cultural identity. Additionally, the merchants were, above all, interested in the material-value of the blacks as slaves and therefore had no wish to integrate or Islamise them, given that Islam prohibits the enslavement of Muslims.[54] Lovejoy (1983) explains that the "religious requirement that new slaves be pagans and the need for continued imports to maintain the slave population made black Africa an important source of slaves for the Islamic world."[55]

Because menial labour even on one's own land was a threat to one's social status in northern and central Sudan, slaves became crucial in performing agricultural activities. Arabic-speaking riverain Muslims of Sudan came to consider their cultural norms and values as being superior. With the increased demand of slaves in the late 18th century, ideological and racial categories were constructed. In this process, descent mattered most. Colour became quite irrelevant and not even

[49] Khalafalla (2004), p. 100
[50] cf. Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 1 ff.
[51] Gallab (2008), p. 20
[52] cf. Deng (1995), p. 36 ff.
[53] Collins (2008), p. 2
[54] cf. Deng (2001), p. 14
[55] Lovejoy (1983), p. 16

conversion to Islam could compensate for the absence of an accepted Arab ancestry.[56]

Even before the conquest of Sudan through Turkish-Egyptian forces in 1820, the main cultural identities that characterise Sudanese regions today already began to show.[57] The joint Turkish-Egyptian forces were lead by Muhammad Ali who was seeking the extension of Egyptian power. With his ambitions of empire building, he was, above all, interested in Sudan's human and economic resources. During the following so-called Turkiyya, Sudan was brought together under one central authority for the first time with its seat being the riverain city of Khartoum. Thus, the central region was further strengthened at the expenses of the peripheries. The favourable geographic location facilitated the formation of a strong riverain merchant class and southern Sudanese found themselves confronted with a much stronger opponent than ever before. The Ottoman Egypt furthered economic differentiation by prescribing Islamic inheritance protocols and personal property rights throughout the Muslim North.[58] In addition, the conquered areas in northern Sudan were exposed to new forms of taxation, which demanded even more slaves from the South.

In 1855, foreign traders and the so-called jallaba, indigenous traders of riverain origin, entered into the region of Bar al-Ghazal seeking ivory and, above all, slaves. Although slavery had been a part of Sudanese society since ancient times, under the rule of the Ottoman Empire the extent drastically increased and domestic slavery became common in northern Sudan. In these times, up to two million Africans were forced into slavery. With the introduction of steamships and firearms, the remote areas of Sudan became particularly vulnerable to the slave trade. Although the Dinka captured Arabs as well, they consider the concept of slavery as antithetical to Dinka cultural values and adopted them into their families.[59]

The period of Turko-Egyptian rule was characterised by "brutal slave raiding, corruption, and economic exploitation".[60] Also the Islam practised by the rulers was hardly recognised as such by the northern

[56] cf. Idris (2005), p. 28
[57] cf. Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 8
[58] cf. Boddy (2009), p. 103 ff.
[59] cf. Deng (1995), p. 69 ff.
[60] Idris (2005), p. 31

Sudanese, who viewed them as foreign unbelievers. As pointed out above, Islam in Sudan had been dominated by the rituals of popular Sufi mysticism and Sudanese found no interest in the orthodox Islam of Egypt. Nevertheless, Egyptian orthodox religious leaders were appointed to the highest offices of Islamic law and all Sufi mystics were firmly excluded as ignorant peddlers of superstition.

The suffering created by the Turkiyya together with the mysticism of the popular Sufi saints, became the dynamic appeal of Mahdism, which resulted in a joint revolt by northern and southern Sudanese forces and eventually overthrew the Turko-Egyptian regime.[61] Though involving southern forces, particularly the Dinka, the Mahdia must not be misunderstood as early Sudanese nationalism. After the overthrow of the regime, the first Islamic theocratic state in the history of the country was established under the rule of Muhammad Ahmad Ibn Abdullah, the Mahdi or redeemer.[62] Racial attitudes in the North remained unchanged from the Turkiyya, and the Mahdist state developed its own way of internal oppression. The majority of Turkish, European and other foreign merchants and slave traders were forced to leave the South in the hands of the jallaba who regarded themselves as “members of an imagined single Arab community”.[63] Whereas central Sudan developed into becoming a great trading centre, the South (and other peripheries) continued to be exploited. A much sharper line than ever before was drawn between the abode of peace and abode of war, thus justifying exploitation of the southern regions through Jihad, holy war.[64] It was therefore natural that slave raiding, which was directed towards non-Muslims, acquired some characteristics of religious war between Muslims and non-Muslims.[65]

Although export trade in slaves collapsed due to a British and Egyptian blockade, slavery continued and slaves were now directed exclusively into the local economy.[66] Categories such as Islamic versus non-Islamic, Arab versus non-Arab, brown versus black became well-established, imposing “social meanings on social, cultural and religious differences among the people of the Sudan” and serving “as the basis for the

[61] cf. Collins (2008), p. 10 ff.
[62] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 137
[63] Idris (2005), p. 31
[64] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 6
[65] cf. Fisher and Fisher (1970), p. 17
[66] cf. Lovejoy (1983), p. 202 ff.

structuring of society".[67] Non-Muslims came to be considered slaves, even if they had not been enslaved by force. It can be said that the "cultural fabric of the society was imagined by the dominant ruling groups to be Arab-Islamic"[68] and everybody who did not belong to this group was considered as slave. During this time, considerable areas of western and southern Sudan were left depopulated or reduced to exiguity.

After 13 years, due to the heterogeneous character of the Mahdist revolution and the early death of its charismatic leader, the Mahdist state gave way to British Conquest. In fact, the recapture was "a massacre and the Mahdist state lay in ruins along with thousands of the dead Ansar who remained absolutely loyal to the Khalifa",[69] the Mahdi's successor. The long history of slave trade had serious consequences on the colonial and postcolonial eras. According to Jok, of "all the occasions of encounter, slave raiding and enslavement were probably the most damaging of the relationships"[70] between northern and southern Sudan. It left a "residue in the collective psyche of the Sudanese communities from which the slaves were taken",[71] which, as will be seen in the following paragraphs, still defines relations today.

2.2 The colonial period and its legacy

In 1898, Sudan was turned into an Anglo-Egyptian condominium.[72] Although the conquest cost large numbers of lives and imposed a colonial status on the country, it nevertheless brought relief to the people of both the North and the South. The beginning of the rule was dominated by pacification of the country and establishing law and order. Being short in soldiers, the new administration decided to extend support to traditional Islamic groups, intentionally choosing religious and tribal leaders of the groups that had opposed the Mahdia. Sudan received principles of English common law and a British oriented system of administration of justice.[73] After being ruled by several military men, in

[67] Idris (2005), p. 32
[68] Idris (2005), p. 33
[69] Fluehr-Lobban (2008), p. 35
[70] Jok (2007), p. 52
[71] Jok (2007), p. 53
[72] cf. Johnson (2004), p.6
[73] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 138

1924, the country came to be controlled by a civilian Governor-General and a native administration was established.[74]

The rise of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium did not change the social and economic reality of northern Sudan and racialised identities were reproduced. Aspiring to not making the same mistakes as the Turko-Egyptian administration and out of fear of the remaining supporters of the Mahdist movement, the colonial rulers were motivated to recognise the Arab Islamic identity of the North. Hesitation over challenging the power of northern Sudanese slave traders, furthermore, led to the continuation of the practice of slavery for several decades and the reality on the ground fell woefully short of the moral discourse of anti-slavery. As a matter of fact, the "British administration accepted the racialized ideology of the nineteenth century that the south was inferior to the north and Muslim people were civilized, while non-Muslim were not."[75] Slavery was tolerated and people grouped into legal categories as "enslaveable and freemen, non-Arab and Arab".[76] When wage-labour became available in the 1920s, slavery slowly declined in Sudan and these categories were replaced by three distinct racial categories: "Arab, Sudanese for ex-slave, and Fallata for western Africans".[77] Although these categories were partially based on the assumption that each group had particular qualities regarding labour, they were informed by the legacy of slavery.

The policy of indirect rule promoted governing through existing political and social structures and the use of tribal chiefs or sheikhs as agents. Yet, the selection of chiefs was not based on any tradition or custom of the local people, but on the interest of the colonial administrators. Herewith, "Britain implemented a largely decentralised system of administration by maintaining the tribal system while superimposing on traditionally African inter-tribal relations a European nation-state model."[78] Indirect rule fragmented the local people along ethnic, regional and tribal lines, and promoted the invention of ethnic identities, "which were to plague the state later during the nationalist struggle and in the postcolonial period".[79]

[74] cf. Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 19 ff.
[75] Idris (2005), p. 35
[76] Idris (2005), p. 33
[77] Idris (2005), p. 34
[78] Eltayeb (2001), p. 138
[79] Idris (2005), p. 40

In October 1922, the Closed District Ordinance was introduced and largely closed the southern provinces off to northern contact.[80] Without a travel permit one could no longer enter the closed region of southern Sudan and "[t]raffic from the South to the North was virtually nonexistent".[81] The purpose of this policy was to "eradicate Arab-Islamic influences and to preserve the African identity in the south".[82] While the colonial rulers felt that separation between religion and state was not acceptable to the Muslim population of the North, they showed a much more neutral attitude towards the South, thus introducing state neutrality or impartiality on religious matters to the region. Although Islamic influence also increased in the South, Christian missionaries clearly got the upper hand and Arabisation of the region was almost halted.

In 1930, the British released a "Southern Policy"[83], thus establishing the South as a separate territory administered under emergency military rule.[84] The policy declared that the administration of the South was to be developed along African rather than Arab lines and further isolated the South from the North. In elementary schools, the vernacular was taught, English became the lingua franca and return to indigenous southern customs was encouraged. Everything that appeared to be northern on the contrary was discouraged.[85] Elements of cultural tradition were preserved, but the price for this was almost total economic neglect. Logically, the two regions' cultural and religious identities also became more divisive.[86] The promotion of separation was intended to prevent economic integration of the two regions and thus decreasing the North's Arabic and Islamic influence. The colonial administration invested largely in the political, economic, social and cultural development of the North; the South, in contrast, remained isolated and underdeveloped. The administration system allowed riverain merchants, religious leaders and tribal notables in northern Sudan to accumulate rights to labour and land and therefore strengthened their power while at the same time neglected the needs of the peripheries. Political participation was discouraged in the South and no relevant education provided.[87]

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[80] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 12; cf. Gallab (2008), p. 31
[81] Deng (1995), p. 80
[82] Idris (2005), p. 39
[83] Johnson (2004), p. 11
[84] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 5 ff.
[85] cf. Deng (1995), p. 77 ff.
[86] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 5 ff.
[87] cf. Tvedt (1994), p. 70 ff.

As described above, the experience of slave trade drove the two groups apart and created a polarised self-description of identities. These Arab and African identities were taken up by the colonialists, who gave them "a new legal dimension by institutionalizing these racialized identities through colonial polices of indirect rule".[88] Thus, through the state policies of the colonial powers, identities, which emanated from the period of slave trade, were transformed from "flexible cultural identities" to "rigid political identities".[89] Idris argues that "race and ethnicity need to be seen as political and not cultural" identities, however they embody cultural meaning.[90]

Then, only nine years before independence, amid growing pressure from Egypt, the British reversed their policy of separate development. Yet, they had neither the time nor the political will to put in place arrangements that would ensure protection for the South in a united Sudan.[91] Logically, through this, the South lacked any real or potential influence on the country's political matters. All pledges for self-determination or postponement of independence were ignored by the British administration as well as by the northern politicians.[92] Not a single representative from the South was included in the all-party negotiations in Cairo that paved the way for self-government of Sudan.[93] The future of the southern Sudan was decided upon without southern participation. In 1947, a conference was held in Juba, in which the southern Sudanese were convinced to opt for unity with the North. In the words of Francis M. Deng (1995), this conference "was an opportunity for the more experienced northern politicians to induce the selected few southerners to rubber-stamp the decisions that had already been reached."[94] He continues that the "destiny of a people, indeed a nation, was thus determined by an intelligent ploy that was devoid of fundamental moral and political principles other than the shortest-term objective of connived independence, and the South naively took it at face value as sincere."[95] Necessarily, southern Sudanese felt gravely cheated by the way independence was accomplished and unity established. The field

[88] Idris (2005), p. 20
[89] Idris (2005), p. 20
[90] cf. Idris (2005), p. 21
[91] cf. Deng (1995), p. 11
[92] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 11 ff.; cf. Tetzlaff (1992), p. 222
[93] cf. Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005), p. 24 ff.
[94] Deng (1995), p. 129
[95] Deng (1995), p. 133

research has proved that this deception remains a serious divisive factor between the two groups until today. The treason is neither forgiven nor forgotten but still nourishes a deep distrust towards all that is “Arab”. (cf. VI)

2.3 The post-colonial state and the politisation of Islam

As a result of the above-described conferences and developments, in January 1956, independence was rapidly granted to Sudan as a whole. In fact, the Sudanese government had not even agreed on a permanent constitution yet. Political power was exclusively transferred to the North[96] and by early 1957, the Constitutional Committee had committed itself to the principle that Islam was the official religion of the state and that Shari’a was one of the basic sources of legislation.[97] The following Sudanisation – the process of replacing colonial administrators by nationals – was rather a Northernisation, as power was inherited by the heterogeneous riverain elite constituted of members from different families, clans, towns, Sufi-brotherhoods and socio-economic backgrounds. In fact, the northern government missed out on a real opportunity to reconcile history and a new beginning for Sudan. Instead they became the new colonialists of the country. Collins (2008) comments on this issue:

> The tragedy of decision assumes even greater magnitude, for despite all the historic cultural, ethnic, racial, and religious differences between the northern and southern Sudanese or the legacy of the slave trade, this ignorant and insensitive decision could have been avoided. No one in 1954 could undo the introduction of Christianity and English into the South. No one in 1954 could wave the magic wand of economic development to transform the South into a cornucopia of productivity. No one in 1954 could provide instant education; there is no such thing. But in 1954, by heeding the warnings from southern members of the NUP [National Unionist Party] in parliament, by taking into account aspirations, not simply civil service exams, by demonstrating the unity of the nation and honoring lavish election promises, by including all of its participants, North and South, the government of Isma’il al-Azhari, by specific action visible to all southerners, could have taken a decisive step unimpeded by the weight of history, elevated by the optimism of a new beginning for Sudan, and within the abilities of men untrammeled by any cosmic forces beyond their control, to include the southern Sudanese in the administration of the new nation. They failed

[96] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 29
[97] cf. Cudsi (1983), p. 38

> and within the year reaped the bitter seeds of insurgency they had sown.[98]

In fact, not only the South, but also the East and West were further marginalised. Hitherto, Sudanese nationalism is tantamount to the riverain elite's ideology of Islam and Arabism, who view Sudan as an extension of the Islamic world, rather than a nation of its own.[99] Accordingly, for the South, independence was perceived as merely a change of outside masters, with the northern Sudanese taking over power from the British and defining the nation in accordance to the symbols of their Arabic-Islamic identity. Deng (1995) significantly describes the relationship between northern Sudanese and southern Sudanese as "internal colonialism".[100]

Even before independence was granted, the absolute marginalisation of the South from the political, administrative and economic matters of the country led to a severe mutiny: a two-week-long massacre in the province of Equatoria against northern officers, administrators, merchants and their families.[101] The so-called Torit mutiny progressively escalated into a southern-wide rebellion.[102] The South continued to be taken as a mere source of wealth for the development of the North. Because southern calls for self-government were understood to eventually lead to total secession, all northern parties intended vehemently to suppress them.

In 1958, the ruling Umma Party handed power over to the army, which was thought to have better means for dealing with the southern rebellion than a political party. Herewith, the democratisation process of Sudan came to an early halt and "brute force in an effort to bring the multitudes of nationalities into the fold of the state"[103] was unleashed. Although being of clear military nature, the regime used religious terms to justify atrocities against the South as defence of the Islam state; a strategy, which continued to be used by all consecutive governments. Regardless of whether they were civilian or military, all regimes that the independent Sudan has seen exercised power on the notion that only a Muslim state can legitimately rule over a Muslim majority. In response to the brutal

[98] Collins (2008), p. 65
[99] cf. Harir (1994), p. 21 ff.
[100] Deng (1995), p. 135
[101] cf. Ali and Matthews (1999), p. 193 ff.
[102] Collins (1975), p. 67
[103] Jok (2007), p. 54

approach, combined with the intensification of Islamisation and Arabisation, armed struggle in the South increased and in 1963 the Anya Nya movement was formed in order to fight the government.[104]

In the course of the decades that followed independence, distrust has been fortified and deeply planted into the collective psyche of the southern Sudanese. Too many promises remained unmet, too many agreements were dishonoured. The Peace Agreement of Addis Ababa brought about 11 years of relative peace, yet, it also failed to address the core problems of the country. In the end, the peace agreement added to the reinforcement of distrust between the two parts of the country. Jok (2007) remarked that when the peace agreement was reached in 1972 "one of the tricks used to attain a quick agreement was to sweep under the carpet all of the atrocities and crimes against humanity committed during the first round of the war, to prevent the peace negotiations from getting bogged down on issues seeking justice for the victims of the seventeen-year-long war." He continues pointing out that instead of these attempts to cloak the violent past, "[i]ndividuals and families remembered the kinds of experiences they had during the war, 'the real scars of war', as many people described them."[105]

Although Sudan's peace was short lived, it brought about some crucial, albeit temporary, changes. The South was rendered a semi-autonomous region, with legislative power and (poorly defined) economic powers.[106] Yet, soon – and after Chevron had discovered commercial oil deposits in Bentiu area of Upper Nile[107] – Nimeiri started gradually dismantling the main clauses of the agreement. He divided the South into what Madut-Arop (2006) calls "three mini-regions"[108] – the Upper Nile, Bahr al Ghazal, and Equatoria[109], thus "leaving three ghost regions in the South to masquerade as new institutions of regional self-government".[110] Although, this act escalated southern rebellion, it was especially the

[104] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 30 ff.
[105] Jok (2007), p. 250
[106] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 39 ff.
[107] cf. Gore (2007), p. 171
[108] Madut-Arup (2006), p. 54
[109] cf. Burr and Collins (1995), p. 15. Since 1994 these provinces have been divided into ten sub-provinces: Western Bahr al-Ghazal, Northern Bar al-Ghazal, Warab, Unity, Buheirat, Western Equatoria, Bahr al-Jabal, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Upper Nile. cf. Krieger (1999), p. 256
[110] Alier (1992), p. 246

imposition of the Shari'a Law that "galvanized the insurgency into full-blown rebellion".[111]

Except from the unsuccessful effort of the Mahdist State, there had not been attempts of establishing an Islamic state until 1983. The most sustained and politically significant voice of protest against this development clearly came from southern politicians, who were joined by some Muslim secularists in their opposition to the theocratic trend of government. The proclamation that laws would be brought into conformity with the principles of Shari'a and follow the Islamic path amounts to Islamic government and thus a dream came true for the Muslim restorationists. With the new application of Shari'a, the hadd punishment was introduced into Sudanese law: amputation for proven theft; the death penalty for adultery, proven or admitted, between married persons, and for robbery; the Islamic punishment of flogging for drinking, or the possession, sale or transport or manufacture of alcoholic beverages. The alleged intent of applying these laws exclusively to Muslim Sudanese has never been met.[112] As a consequence, in July 1983, the SPLM/A was launched with Dr. John Garang de Mabior being elected chairman of the SPLM (political wing) and Commander in Chief of the SPLA (military wing).

Several authors agree that Nimeiri concluded the peace agreement for political means rather than out of genuine interest for peace with the South.[113] Likewise, he abrogated it upon political circumstances. After surviving the 15th coup attempt, Nimeiri was under severe political pressure from the conservative and fundamentalist elements and, in particular, the sectarian parties and the Muslim Brotherhood. When, in 1982, oil was discovered in Nuer territory of southern Sudan, he realigned himself with those who had hitherto opposed him the most, the political-religious forces.[114] The Islamic movement in Sudan had already started in universities and schools in the 1940s and the Muslim Brotherhood organisation, "the offshoot of the NIF"[115] (National Islamic Front), had been officially founded in 1954. However, the real rise of political Islam happened in 1965, when Hassan al-Turabi, a western-

[111] Madut-Arup (2006), p. 58
[112] cf. Fluehr-Lobban (2008), p. 278 ff.
[113] cf. Deng (1995), p. 149 ff; cf. Madut-Arop (2006), p. 35 ff.; cf. Jok (2007), 249 ff.
[114] cf. Beswick (2004), p. 195 f.
[115] Khalafalla (2004), p. 105

educated legal scholar holding close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, returned to Sudan. The Muslim Brotherhood "is based upon a radical amalgam of nationalism and Islamic rejuvenation, propounds a moral regeneration by drawing upon the spiritual resources of Islam to make possible modernization without Westernization."[116] Al-Turabi united the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood with other groups of same beliefs and ideas and founded the Islamic Charter Front, the forerunner of the National Islamic Front, which was founded in May 1985.

Many northern and southern Sudanese, who already lived in Khartoum before Nimeiri introduced the so-called "September laws"[117] in 1983, describe this as the real and still unrevised change of atmosphere in the capital. Alfred Taban from the Khartoum Monitor described the peaceful coexistence, which he experienced before, as follows:

> I mean, not that you existed as one, maybe yes, in a bar you might be drinking together, but of course in the mosque, they will go in their own mosque and the church, you go to your own church, but there was in other words no tension of people. Maybe there was, that is not integration, they were not really integrated. Only that, ah, they coexisted peacefully. I mean, they allowed each one of them to practise what ever they wanted to do without any feeling of, you know, any feeling that this is bad, this is good, so people just, they mixed up like that, which is virtually impossible now. It was not integration, but it was peaceful coexistence.[118]

In reaction to these changes, the second civil war erupted and military conflict started anew. Ever since, the SPLM/A challenged the regimes in Khartoum for a more equitable sharing of power and wealth. Since the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) were understaffed and mass induction encountered resistance among northern Sudanese, Nimeiri started arming irregular or militia forces a practice continued by consecutive governments.[119] Thus, major parts of the war were carried out by proxy. Khartoum recruited, trained and armed Arab tribal groups supposedly against southern rebels, but in fact unleashed them against their civilian neighbours.[120] In this course, Darfuris were also heavily recruited to fight for the government in the South, a deed still staining relations between

[116] Young (1976), p. 401 f.
[117] Burr and Collins (1995), p. 15
[118] personal interview with Alfred Taban in Khartoum (autumn 2008)
[119] cf. Human Rights Watch (1990), p. 65 ff.
[120] cf. Deng (2001), p. 19

western Sudanese and southern Sudanese.[121] Up to today, southern Sudanese find it extremely difficult to come to terms with the excessive and inhuman atrocities attributed to the North.

In 1985, a popular rising in the streets of Khartoum, the so-called Intifada, prompted a Transitional Military Council under General Swar al Dahab taking over power, which the SPLM/A, however, denounced to "Nimeirism without Nimeiri".[122] The following coalition government under Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi resembled the previous two democracies in "ethnocentrism, political myopia and the self-righteousness typical of central riverain Islamic-Arabic elite".[123] In 1989, General Umar Hasan Ahmed al-Bashir, backed by the NIF, staged a coup and aborted the peace process, which was pointing to the temporary abrogation of the Shari'a laws.

The new NIF regime solely built its legitimacy on the issue of Shari'a and Islamisation of state and society. Consequently, rigorous Islamisation attempts followed, which included the indoctrination of the public by the state organs (through the media, and educational and cultural institutions), as well as imposition of strict dressing-codes on females. Mosques duplicated and greater emphasis was laid on congregational prayers. Over 20 new universities were formed and spread all over the country with the clear aim of spreading Arabisation by making Arabic the only language of instruction. In 1992, a Jihad against the SPLA was declared and again projecting the war between North and South as a religious war.[124]

The version of Islam promoted by the government is politicised and extremist and stands in contrast with most of the Islamic traditions of northern Sudanese, which are founded upon Sufi-orders. It should be kept in mind that although the extremist Islam practised by the government "plays upon deep currents in Northern Sudanese political culture, the extremist agenda is not shared by the majority of the Northern Populations."[125] Accordingly, during the fieldtrips, many northern and southern Sudanese in Khartoum mentioned that Islam in Sudan is used as a means of control and that, hypocritically, the

[121] cf. Berg (2008), p. 32
[122] Khalid (1990), p. 353
[123] Harir (1994), p. 16
[124] cf. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, p. 50 ff.
[125] African Rights (1995), p. 16

influential politicians and their families, protected by their political power, do not stick to the laws they officially promote.[126] As Jok puts it "they are simply interested in using Islam as a vehicle for access to and control of the government rather than genuine devotion and commitment to a return to the sacred fundamentals of Islamic belief."[127]

3 The incumbent regime

In part III and IV, the significance of ethnicity, race and identity in Sudan will be analysed in detail and the needs of a society as plural as the Sudanese will be discussed. In this process, logically, all facts and corresponding limitations to the feasibility of transformation have to be considered, in particular, the nature of the incumbent authoritarian regime. Therefore, here, the nature of the current theocratic state and the way it has been formed will be discussed in detail. Islamists believe that as a consequence of the disappearance of Islam from the governance, the history of the Muslim peoples has been marked by steady regression and decline. "Islamists see Islam as more and more marginalized in the lives of Muslims, leading in turn to the marginalization of the Islamic world",[128] hence creating a new fundamentalism. The Islamist rule in Sudan can be divided into two phases. During the first one, from 1989 until 1996, the Islamists established their first republic under the uncontested leadership of sheikh Hasan al-Turabi, which will be discussed in chapter II 3.1. After years of power struggle between president Omar al-Bashir and the religious head Hassan al-Turabi, the latter was removed from his positions of power and sent to prison. Hence, the second phase, which lasts until today, has been induced and will be discussed in chapter II 3.2.

3.1 The Islamist revolution under al-Turabi

When the military took over, "the majority of the public did not shed tears on the departed democracy".[129] They were tired of failed regimes and political manoeuvring in an unworkable sect-based coalition which was widely believed to only have brought paralysis to the country and

[126] Personal conversations with northern Sudanese in Khartoum throughout six years
[127] Jok (2007), p. 51
[128] Khalafalla (2002), p. 71
[129] Khalafalla (2002), p. 123

retarded its development. Although al-Bashir arose as leader of the aforementioned coup, another man, Hasan al-Turabi, secretary general of the NIF, "was the primary architect of the first Islamist republic".[130] Within a few months after the military coup, it became clear that the Islamists were involved in all its stages. Some of the leading Sudanese politicians, including Sadiq al-Mahdi and Muhammad al-Mirghani, as well as some Islamists, including Hasan al-Turabi, were sent to prison;[131] the latter, however, only to camouflage the true Islamist nature of the coup.

The so-called Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation (RCCNS) intended to overcome the failure of the previous regimes through the radical restructuring of the entire political system and to create new impulses of development by adapting the state and society to Islamic principles.[132] The revolution furthermore aspired to the full Islamisation of the Sudanese economy.[133] What factually followed was the "emergence of a dictatorial polity and totalitarian project that used oppressive means to establish one Islamist model under all conditions."[134]

The elitist group behind the coup had not developed overnight, but during preceding centuries. As indicated above, already during the colonial rule, power and prestige was centralised in the hands of the growing class of the educated elite. The northern urban and administrative centres were clearly privileged and developed into the major locations for public education, cultural activities, and social and economic development.[135] In order to consolidate its power the regime rapidly placed loyal adherents in administrative, political and economic key positions; few months after the coup, 20,000 administrative employees had already been replaced through military people, NIF-activists and other sympathisers of the regime.[136] The Islamist elite was transformed into "an invisible corporation with a national and international scope hiding behind the Islamic economy, its banking system, and their Islamist managers and workers".[137] From this, the

[130] Gallab (2008), p. 1
[131] cf. Collins (2008), p. 185
[132] cf. Khalafalla (2004), p. 125
[133] cf. Lichtenberger (2002), p. 1 ff.
[134] Gallab (2008), p. 6
[135] cf. Niblock (1987), p. 204 quoted in Gallab (2008), p. 48
[136] cf. Lichtenberger (2002), p. 23
[137] Gallab (2008), p. 79

group developed and shared knowledge, accumulated wealth, and "developed new tastes as markers that set them apart from the rest of the population and fellow Islamists as a new and distinctive class".[138] With the introduction of the Islamic banking system, Islamic banks came to be fiscally and judicially privileged to the benefits of the new business-oriented class. Through transferring and promoting back and forth its members from the party to the private economic institutions, from the government to the public sector, from the private and public sector to the government, the corporation consolidated its powers. The NIF, hereby, came to control the banking system, the economy and the political regime to the benefits of its clientele.[139]

Citizens, who do not cooperate with the regime, are denied licenses to open up businesses and loans for commercial activities. Needless to say, the Islamic economy is exclusively to the benefits of the small elite and not meeting the needs of the heterogeneous society of Sudan; the non-Muslim population is excluded from any economic development per se. The clientele of the NIF is clearly favoured and the banking system reinforces this interest. Common welfare is reserved to a privileged elite and can only be accessed through cooperation with the regime.[140]

The corporation has come to be closely associated with the use of violence as a measure to bring forward the Islamist project. A Jihad was declared and carried out against Sudanese citizens, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, against apostates, heretics, and unbelievers.[141] In fact, the Islamist elite calls for the Islamisation of the entire population, including Sufi Muslims who are perceived as superstitious, backward, and ignorant. Force has therefore become a common measure in the regime's approach to political engagement, disagreement, and resolution of conflict. Herewith, a sharp line between the regime, which is advocating its own idea of Islam, and the ordinary Sudanese Muslims has been drawn. Thus, in Sudan not only inter but also intra-religious persecution is existent. The Shari'a law is not only "susceptible to be abused, but also inherently in contradiction with universally accepted standards of freedom of thought and conscience."[142] In fact, throughout

[138] Gallab (2008), p. 79
[139] cf. Lichtenberger (2002), p. 12 ff.
[140] cf. Lichtenberger (2002), p. 39 ff.
[141] cf. Collins (2008), p. 228
[142] Eltayeb (2001), p. 182 f.

Muslim history the persecution of alleged apostates and heretics has been a politically motivated one and been designed to benefit hegemonic orthodox groups, which resort to religious justification to legitimise their power.[143] Although affecting Muslims and non-Muslims, those adhering to traditional African religions are targeted the most. A state-sponsored fatwa supporting Jihad against the mainly Muslim Nuba shows the brutal totalitarian conduct of destroying those groups who resist by either eliminating them physically or by eradicating their culture and assimilating the survivors.[144] Since there is no justification for mere violence, violence has to be justified through other means.[145] Jihad against unbelievers serves as the perfect justification for the use of violence.

The corporation has established a rule in which it can follow its own course with unchecked power and a management free from any form of supervision or accountability.[146] Hasan al-Turabi believes that "the Sudanese understand only one brand of political relationship; a top down decision-making procedure initiated and executed by an elite leadership."[147] In 1991, Shari'a was re-implemented and turned the Sudanese state "from one merely governed by a Muslim majority to a full-fledged, formally Islamic one – a dramatic change of status both de jure and de facto."[148] The only will accorded to the people is limited to their duty to find the most appropriate Islamic law that can be applied to the particular problems facing society.

The Islamist regime can be described to share the characteristics of a typical totalitarian system. Lefort (1986) explains that the ideology of the party and its state propaganda together with the ideology of terror were instrumental in obliterating freedom and instituting totalitarian structure.[149] "In a totalitarian context, the state's role is to regulate all aspects of the public and private life of the individual, applying strong and sometimes oppressive measures to reach that goal."[150] Therefore, the totalitarian ideology cannot tolerate any social, ethnic, tribal or national intrinsic segmentation or political authority that operates

[143] cf. Eltayeb (2001), p. 186 ff.
[144] cf. Gallab (2008), p. 115 ff.
[145] cf. von Trotha (1995), p. 9
[146] cf. Gallab (2008), p. 93 ff.
[147] Abdalla (2003), p. 113
[148] Ronen (1999), p. 82
[149] cf. Lefort (1986), p. 286 ff. quoted in Gallab (2008), p. 100
[150] Gallab (2008), p. 105

independent from the divine order. In the case of the Islamist total order, all rights of the individual and society came to be subordinated to God's absolute sovereignty, guaranteed through the order of the Qur'an and intolerant to any differences. Al-Turabi placed himself at the centre, so that he alone would understand, know, and direct the various inward organisms of the totalitarian regime and established a system of total domination. The Shari'a state automatically excludes all non-Muslims from participation in administration and denies them full citizenship rights, as non-Muslims, for example can never be the head of an Islamic state or hold a sensitive post in the administration.[151] Although the government includes some ministers who are Christians, these are only tokens intended more for propaganda than for substance.[152]

In this totalitarian system, any potential dissent had to be eradicated, resulting in the arrest and imprisonment of human-rights activists, intellectuals, and university professors, as well as professionals, particularly doctors, lawyers, and journalists. The most despaired were taken to the infamous ghost houses, which came to be known for their "bestial interrogation, torture of every conceivable means, and mock executions, as well as the use of drugs, electric shock, and death." Furthermore, many Sudanese "simply 'disappeared,' their whereabouts unknown, their deaths unrecorded. Others were publicly flogged for the manufacture, possession, or consumption of alcoholic beverages; others were publicly executed for possession of heroin or undocumented foreign currency."[153] Furthermore, the media were brought under complete state control and replaced by institutionalised propaganda campaigns as to monopolise the interpretation of the truth. Another measure of consolidation of power was the regime's effort to destroy the economic and religious base of the dominant religious sects and their supporters. In 1993, the Revolutionary Command Council was dissolved and al-Bashir was formally made president. Yet, all but two of the Council were given seats in the 20-member cabinet and the largest single identifiable allegiance of the cabinet was with the NIF. In 1996, al-Bashir was formally elected as president.[154]

[151] cf. Abdalla (2003), p. 115 ff.
[152] cf. Gallab (2008), p. 103 ff.
[153] Collins (2008), p. 189
[154] cf. Khalafalla (2002), p. 98 f.

3.2 The lasting rule of al-Bashir

The uncontested leader behind the above described Islamist revolution was shaikh Hasan al-Turabi. On 12th of December 1999, however, he was removed from power. Until that day, al-Bashir had appeared to have reconciled with a subordinate relationship to al-Turabi in order to secure the revolution and enjoy the perquisites of power.[155] In spite of that, for a long time, the two had been in struggle over power and when al-Turabi tried to introduce measures weakening the presidency in a way that would have rendered al-Bashir an ineffective figurehead, he surprisingly removed the religious leader. As a matter of fact, "[i]deologically, al-Bashir and the military had been less committed to the Islamist ideal, its fuzzy economic policies, and Turabi's machinations to achieve power through the legislative process at the expense of their chief and president."[156] After having disempowered al-Turabi, al-Bashir declared a state of emergency and announced new elections, in which he received 86 percent of the votes. He introduced a bureaucratic centralism and contracted all power in his own hands, giving him potency to manage the narrow Islamist clique. The National Congress, which was once perceived and described as the ruling party, had been turned into the party of the state.

Behind the second republic a ruling clique can be found, which is made up of Islamist artisans who can be divided into three distinct categories, senior party bureaucrats, security personnel, and the military Islamists, although certain people have overlapping affiliations.[157] Since the shaikh has been removed, al-Bashir is the sole political entity that manages these three groups. Additionally, serious steps have been taken toward an authoritarian system with an absolute and maximum claim over all citizens. An important change under al-Bashir was his attempt of reconciliation with the opposition. In his inauguration ceremony al-Bashir stated that reconciliation should be based on mutual recognition between the government and the opposition and that citizenship was the basis of rights and obligations of the Sudanese, furthermore guaranteeing the expression of diversity.[158] Von Trotha (1995) has made a point that no matter how ideological the rhetoric used by the

[155] cf. Collins (2008), p. 194 ff.
[156] Collins (2008), p. 226
[157] cf. Gallab (2008), p. 150
[158] cf. Gallab (2008), 161 ff.

authoritarian ruler to legitimate his rule and politics might appear, in the end, ideology is irrelevant to the exercise of authority; its only goal is the maintenance of power.[159] This is very true for al-Bashir who, in spite of verbally reassuring citizenship rights, does not provide the most basic equalities to the people of Sudan or give them any political or social rights at all. Instead he commits himself to preventing any process of democratisation or move towards political pluralism. Other than reconciling the opposition, serious attempts to weaken it are undertaken.

Whether with or without al-Turabi, the Islamist movement in Sudan has not ended, and the situation for the people of Sudan has by no means improved. As Gallab (2008) puts it, "al-Turabi's former disciples discovered that they had sacrificed the mind that used to think, plan, and explore new frontiers for them, only to find themselves and their movement hostage to a new form of control. They traded the potentially soft power of the shaikh for the intrinsically hard power of the general. In effect, they traded Islamism without al-Turabi for an authoritarian military system without Ja'far Nimairi."[160] Discontent with the Sudanese regime is extremely high. Accordingly, "[f]or many Sudanese politicians, scholars, journalists, and observers, the most important question has been what mechanisms the Sudanese people might utilize to change the regime and restore a democratic path once again."[161] With the emergence of the Islamist regime, the population was denied their political, civil, and sometimes religious participation. The Islamist affiliation was projected to be superior to other religious representation or citizenship.

Although, one of the first victims of the regime certainly was the civil society,[162] the people of Sudan have not remained without response to the clear exclusion of the majority of the population. In fact, the imposition of an Islamist state religion "awakened among the orthodox and Sufi adherents as well as non-Muslims more interest in reaffirming their religious identities in a way that would reflect the gamut of human expressions of religiosity and group solidarity",[163] thus prompting creative ways of resistance. Non-Muslims and Africans became more

[159] cf. von Trotha (1995), p. 3 ff.
[160] Gallab (2008), p. 166
[161] Gallab (2008), p. 132
[162] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 308
[163] Gallab (2008), p. 139

militant in affirming their religious and cultural resistance and many Muslims instead of turning away from Sufi-sects found refuge in them. "These forces have responded to their political exclusion by socially isolating the Islamist and pro-regime people. Sufi brotherhoods have thus succeeded in setting their own effective social network."[164] While some Muslims articulated their resistance through secular parties and organisations and women unions, others deliberately chose to argue from within Islam on the basis of an Islamic perspective, such as the Republican Brothers.[165] These oppositional activities have demonstrated to the regime the narrowness of their power base and made it even more aggressive in its attempts to eradicate or at least neutralise the opposition and anyone who does not conform to the regime.

4 The conclusion of peace between North and South and the era of the CPA

In 1993, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was formed as a committee of the heads of state of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda to look into resolving the civil war in Sudan.[166] Before, two rounds of Abuja peace talks had been held in Nigeria between the government and the SPLA-Mainstream (Torit faction) under John Garang and the SPLA-United (Nasir faction) under Riek Machar and Lam Akol.[167] Both rounds failed to solve the core issue of the relationship between religion and the Sudanese state. In April 1997, the government in Khartoum signed the "Khartoum Peace Agreement" with six SPLA breakaway factions and shortly after Riek Machar became the chairman of the newly created Southern States Coordinating Council. It took until January 2002 for Machar to leave Khartoum and reconcile with Garang; however, the symbolic implication was much greater for the SPLA than the actual military benefits, since he had only few loyal troops remaining on his side.[168] Following the reconciliation, the IGAD finally accomplished a serious breakthrough with the signature of the Protocol of Machakos leading to a temporary ceasefire. In the following years, a series of protocols were signed, which

[164] Gallab (2008), p. 140
[165] The founder of the Republican Brothers, Mahmud Mohammed Taha, was executed in Khartoum on 18th of January 1985. Cf. Krieger (1998), p. 319 ff.
[166] since 1997 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
[167] cf. Johnson (2004), cf. 100 f.
[168] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 126

together constitute the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which was signed between the SPLM/A and the NCP on 9th of January 2005.

The CPA stipulated a self-determination referendum for southern Sudanese to either confirm the unity of Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession. The referendum has been carried out from 9th to 15th January 2011 and southerners overwhelmingly opted for the latter. Unity has apparently not been made attractive during the interim period.[169]

According to Samson Wassara (2009), Dean of Faculty of Economics of the University of Juba, the history of Sudanese conflicts "has been shaped by the country's geographical setting, social diversity and poor governance". He continues explaining that socio-political structure in Sudan is dominated by "the struggle for power and rights between the centre and the periphery".[170] The CPA arose out of this context and mainly focuses on the relation between the South Sudan and the government in Khartoum (not on relations with other segments of the country). The CPA was signed between two parties only and does not address the other conflicts of the country; it does not include any other opposition party.

In September 2005, the Government of National Unity (GONU) was sworn in. Due to the lack of functional party structures, the SPLM/A had a difficult start and faced serious problems in challenging the NCP on most issues relating to the implementation of the CPA. They took up their new function as a political party with little experience and no model from which to operate.[171] To make matters worse, on July 30th 2005, only three weeks after his assumption of office as president of the South and first vice president of the North, Dr. John Garang de Mabior died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by Salva Kiir Mayardiit. Furthermore, South Sudan faces serious problems in meeting the new demand of educated people for the administration of the country,[172] since two generations were more or less left without schooling.[173]

As it has been pointed out before, in Sudan many agreements have been signed and many agreements have been broken. The CPA,

[169] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)
[170] Wassara (2009), p.
[171] cf. Young (2005), p. 538 ff.
[172] cf. Öhm (2006), p. 6
[173] cf. Breidlid (2006), p. 22

however, is generally accepted as being different, more reliable, but still fragile. Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper from Juba, described it as a "timed bomb",[174] which could explode and bring back war at any time. Nevertheless, there are crucial differences in comparison to former agreements, such as being predicated on one country with two systems. While the government in the North maintained institutions that operate within the values of Shari'a law, the government in the South aspires to operating in a secular system. Both parties were allowed to maintain their own army, which were complemented by Joint Integrated Units (JIU).[175] Furthermore, the unequal wealth and power sharing started to be corrected. Dhal (2007) wrote on the CPA that it "is to be seen as a shift away from extreme centralization of economic power and inequitable distribution of wealth and revenue sharing to a more comprehensive decentralization of power, and a more equitable wealth distribution and revenue sharing. For the first time, 50% of oil revenues and non-oil resources were allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan".[176]

Yet, already from very early stages on, implementations of the CPA fell behind the plan.[177] The CPA was supposed to bring about a re-distribution of wealth in an equitable manner, and particularly the war-affected regions were supposed to be developed. These objectives remained unmet.[178] Although some of the institutions stipulated by the CPA have been established, many of them remained dysfunctional. The legacy of the long civil war and the resurgence of new civil wars in the country lead to a sluggishness of institutional development "characterized by nominal institutions, poor performance of existing institutions, and weak operational mechanisms".[179] The CPA does not include any sanctions for non-compliance; it provides a structure, but the implementation is up to the willingness of the leadership. The bilateral nature of the CPA confirmed the NCP's domination of government structures in the North, where it has systematically maintained near total control.[180] Additionally, the full implementation of the CPA should have helped to transform the "oppressive governmental system" into a "more

[174] Personal interview with Jason in Khartoum (autumn 2009)
[175] cf. Wassara (2009), p. 4
[176] Dhal (2007), p. 159
[177] cf. Human Rights Watch (2005)
[178] cf. Gore (2007), p. 176
[179] Wassara (2009), p. 3
[180] cf. International Crisis Group (26.07.2007), p. 7 ff.

open, transparent, inclusive and democratic one".[181] Obviously, this had posed a threat to the survival of the ruling regime and thus led to the NCP undermining reforms and resisting full implementation.

A key issue of the CPA is the aforementioned interim period, during which unity was supposed to be made attractive, and which led to a self-determination referendum in January 2011. While John Garang at least in his rhetoric promoted a united New Sudan, Salva Kiir always held much more independence-centred motives and does not show any particular interest in the North, such as democratising the GONU or solving the Darfur crisis.[182] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006) conclude that "Garang's death robbed Sudan of an invaluable interlocutor who may have been able to prevent the spiralling violence in Darfur and the possible unravelling of the fragile peace in the south."[183]

Today, it is clear that southern Sudanese prefer independence. Unfortunately however, the way of how to divide the country peacefully into two parts remains unclear and might spark yet another war. In fact, the NCP and Omar al-Bashir will be evaluated in consecutive chapters as one of the main endangerments of the implementation and peaceful termination of the era of the CPA. Apparently, this confirms the scepticism of the Sudanese people, who "have long learned not to expect real progress to emerge out of agreements reached by politicians and armed men."[184]

Before 9th July, when the interim period will expire and when the South could potentially become independent, there are many issues left to be solved; particularly negotiations on citizenship, the sharing of oil revenues, border demarcation and the distribution of the country's debt. Furthermore, the state of Abyei was due to hold a separate referendum at the same time as the South, in which its residents should have decided whether to become part of the North or the South. However, the vote has been postponed, as the largely northern-supported Misseriya community demands a right to vote, too. Already during the referendum days, deadly clashes between Misseriya Arab nomads from the North and pro-Southern Dinka Ngok took place in the area.[185] Douglas

[181] International Crisis Group (26.07.2007), p. 1
[182] cf. Young (2005), p. 547
[183] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 169
[184] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 15
[185] cf. BBC News (19.01.2011)

Johnson, a Sudan expert and former member of the Abyei Boundaries Commission comments, “Abyei has so far proved to be the most difficult part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to implement, more difficult than the determination of the rest of the North-South boundary or the division of oil revenues."[186] Southern Sudanese have voted for independence, yet it remains to be seen if outstanding issues between North and South can be solved and independence be accomplished peacefully.

5 The core-periphery divide and the urban primacy of Khartoum

The problem in Sudan is not one of mere North-South strife, but one affecting the whole country. There is a tremendous core-periphery divide, leading to unrest and war throughout the entire country. In this divide, Khartoum has come to be the primacy city, uncontested in its development throughout the entire country. Greater Khartoum is the largest metropolitan area of the country and enjoys a unique status within the regional and national framework. It brings together all the peoples of the country and also forms a significant meeting point for northern and southern Sudanese.[187] In a census conducted in 1990, the population of the capital region was estimated to be 3.6 million people.[188] However, the population was later estimated at somewhere between five and six million, including approximately two million people from the South.[189] These numbers are currently changing significantly and more than 180,000 southern Sudanese returned from the North just within the three months before the referendum day.[190]

The capital city Khartoum is made up of the “Three Towns” which are all separated from each other by the river Nile: Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman.[191] The following map, which has been taken from Abdulla and Abu Sin (1991), clearly displays the distinct parts of Khartoum and their use.

[186] IRIN News (19.01.2011)
[187] cf. Simone (1994), p. 100
[188] cf. Davies (1991), p. 132
[189] cf. Schißau (2008), p. 198
[190] IRIN News (19.01.2011)
[191] cf. Davies and Abu Sin (1991), p. 7 ff.



Map 2: Urban land use in the capital[192]

Khartoum is the administrative centre of the country, where traditionally merchants and civil servants live. All UN offices are based in Khartoum and majority of international organisations and NGOs. Khartoum North is the industrial area of the city and contains the largest number of non-Muslims. Omdurman is the oldest part of the city, the spiritual and cultural seat of the country.[193]

[192] Abdulla and Abu Sin (1991), p.83
[193] cf. Simone (1994), p. 100 ff.

The capital of Sudan is a "largely Muslim, heavily Arabized"[194] city. Yet, there has always been a southern presence, the majority of which were originally brought to the city as slaves. During major droughts in the years of 1983-1985, large numbers of western Sudanese fled to Khartoum. Being loyal adherents to Mahdist traditions and the Umma party there had been some encouragement for them to settle in the capital. Although Nimeiri had them expelled several times, they always came back.[195] Additionally thousands of war-displaced, mainly from the South and Darfur, have poured into Greater Khartoum and its outskirts. The city is facing a dramatic increase in population. Comparing figures from 1904 with figures from 1990 shows that while the national population has increased 12-fold, the population of the capital region has increased 50-fold.[196]

The underdevelopment of the vast hinterland has contributed to the overwhelming primacy of greater Khartoum. In fact, the "main causes of rural-urban migration are the wide disparities between the regions in terms of resource endowments, employment opportunities, and access to social services."[197] The capital region has "much more than its fair share of modern facilities and non-agricultural employment, and in almost every sense it is better served than anywhere else in the Sudan."[198] A vicious circle prevails: the on-going concentration of people in Khartoum leads to more investment programmes in the capital causing more inequalities and discontent in other regions, thus encouraging more migration to the capital.[199] As Jonas, a 61-year-old southern Sudanese, put it: "Khartoum is Sudan. Sudan is Khartoum."[200]

Beck (1995) distinguishes between the useful and the useless Sudan, the first referring to the area alongside the Nile, which already in early times has been inhabited by a rural population and which forms the zone of governmental organisation. The savannah on the contrary formed the useless Sudan. The colonial state got deeply involved in the useful Sudan, but links to the useless Sudan have to be considered as extremely loose.[201] The British developed Khartoum to a position of

[194] Abusharaf (2009), p. 1
[195] cf. Simone (1994), p. 100 ff.
[196] cf. Davies and Abu Sin (1991), p. 1 ff.
[197] Hassan (1994), p. 127
[198] Davies and Abu Sin (1991), p. 9
[199] cf. El-Bushra and Hijazi (1991), p. 254 ff.
[200] Personal interview with Jonas in Khartoum (autumn 2009)
[201] cf. Beck (1995), p. 228 ff.

dominance in trade, services, administration and transport, which has remained unchanged. Gore (2007) explained that despite the country's socio-economic progress, "over 80% of the people live in absolute poverty in most regions of Sudan; the country is characterized by extreme regional inequalities; the gap between the relatively rich and the poor regions is growing."[202] Abdel Rahman (1991) concluded that Khartoum can "rightfully be labelled a primate city", that is a city "which is substantially larger than its nearest rival".[203] The periphery can be understood as an internal colony and industrial growth is exclusively to the advantage of the population groups in the core, who seek to stabilise the system in order to maintain their own advantage.[204]

However, although Khartoum is much better served than other parts of the country, it is still struggling with inadequate services that fall short of satisfying the growing needs of its rapidly expanding population in any kind – water, fuel, food, work opportunities.[205] The shortage in housing is massive.[206] All services and the infrastructure are overloaded and rapidly declining in quantity and quality. The transport system falls far beneath the needs of the working population. Busses are completely overloaded during the rush-hour and often virtually impossible to board.[207]

Long delays in town plans and allocation of land push large numbers of people to the rural areas where land can be bought cheaply and quickly and where services have started to be offered.[208] With the enormous influx of IDPs fleeing from droughts and wars, unauthorised settlements have increased rapidly. Khartoum faces serious problems in providing for the needs of its large population in general and the marginalised people in particular (cf. II 6). Also those living outside of the city centre face journeys that are long, expensive and – taking into account the poor conditions of the roads – extremely time-consuming. For many it is simply impossible to pay the transport costs to the city centre on a regular base and university students, in particular, face problems in meeting the additional costs for daily transport.[209]

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[202] Gore (2007), p. 176
[203] Abdel Rahman (1991), p. 246
[204] cf. Bromely (1991), p. 240 ff.
[205] cf. El-Tayeb and Egeimi (1991), p. 188 ff.
[206] cf. El-Nur (1991), p. 142 ff.
[207] cf. Mahmoud (1991), p. 236
[208] cf. El-Awad (1991), p. 86 ff.
[209] cf. Mahmoud (1991), p. 236

In Khartoum the access to opportunities and resources highly depends on social ties, which Simone (1994) even describes to be "implicitly an economic activity and a labor intensive one".[210] Young people for example cannot realise their aspirations and needs without relying on those ties. "Economic and intellectual success must be framed as a familial and/or ethnic matter if it is to be attained at all."[211] The population is growing faster than the economy, leading to a serious shortage in employment opportunities.[212] In this context social ties become even more important. People coming from outside of Khartoum, who lack these social ties, have a serious disadvantage in the competition for jobs.

Additionally to the barriers people who lack crucial social ties have to deal with in Khartoum, there is also an element of discrimination towards non-Muslims. As Jok (2007) points out, and as will be discussed in detail in chapter III 2.2, radical ideologies held in the drive to create a unified Islamic state "have polarized the Sudanese people over religion and have resulted in a hierarchical society where Muslims are favored by the state system."[213] Simone (1994) further described the Sudanese civil service running the government bureaucracies as overstaffed and highly protective of its positions.[214] Anne Itto, head of the southern sector for the SPLM, has been quoted by Reuters on 12th June 2008: "The national government never took more than about one per cent"[215] of southern Sudanese into state services. To meet the imbalance between northern and southern Sudanese in the civil service administration and the ministries, the National Civil Service Commission (NCSC) has been established under the chairmanship of Professor Moses Machar. He also confirmed in a personal interview that southern Sudanese "were not there and if they were there, they were low ranking people".[216] Sudan's government reached agreement in the CPA to give at least 20 percent of middle and top-level civil service positions to southern Sudanese. Yet, the entire process has been long-delayed and the commission did not

[210] Simone (1994), p. 101
[211] Simone (1994), p. 105
[212] cf. El-Bushra and Nijazi (1991), p. 254 ff.
[213] Jok (2007), p. 51
[214] Simone (1994), p. 101
[215] Reuters (12.06.2008)
[216] Personal interview with Prof. Moses Machar, chairman of the National Civil Service Commission, in Khartoum (autumn 2008)

take up its work until June 2008. There is a strong perception among southern Sudanese that the NCSC is not advancing.

The over-population of Khartoum and the core-periphery divide are to the clear disadvantage of the majority of Sudanese society. Because all activities, job opportunities and services are concentrated in the capital, migration to Khartoum is rational and will continue. While the capital gains more and more people, rural areas, villages, small and medium-sized towns are on the losing-end, which will again ultimately increase the primacy of the capital.[217] Consequently, both the capital and the peripheries are facing serious deterioration. To prevent this development from continuing, the existing primacy and urban bias would have to be reduced; equal, nation-wide development must be accomplished. Only equal distribution of power and, in particular, wealth could stop the widening of the core-periphery cleavage and work against chronic marginalisation of the peripheries; which in turn might prevent further fragmentation and the secession of more segments of the country.

6 Internal displacement to Khartoum

When presenting the results of the research in part VI, it will be demonstrated that interview partners are highly influenced by the general situation of southern Sudanese living in the outskirts of Khartoum. In spite of being considerably wealthy and mostly living right in the city centre, they are nevertheless highly affected by the desperate situation of other southern Sudanese. Several interview partners work in NGOs and international organisations on issues related to IDPs and all of them have relatives and friends living in squatter areas and camps. They are highly aware of the marginalisation of IDPs and ongoing mistreatments by institutions and authorities. Through observance of their suffering, research participants' negative perceptions are being reinforced. In this chapter, therefore, the situation of IDPs in Khartoum will be analysed in detail.

Ethnic wars almost always involve deliberate, systematic attacks on civilians often generating staggering numbers of refugees.[218] Sudan has the largest displaced population in the world with some 570,000 Sudanese refugees in the neighbouring countries of Chad, Democratic

[217] cf. Abdel Rahman (1991), p. 246 ff.
[218] cf. Brown (1997), p. 92 f.

Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. Internal displacement is humongous and estimated to count three or four million people.[219] According to African Rights (1995) possibly half of the population of Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains has been displaced. The majority of them left to head towards the northern parts of the country.[220] Abusharaf (2009) in her work on IDPs in Khartoum states that Greater Khartoum alone accommodates between two and three million internally displaced who mainly fled from the South, Nuba Mountains and the western region of Darfur.[221] The greater part left their homes due to war; others fled from droughts or came as labour migrants. The majority of the ones who were displaced by famine and war were women and children.

Upon flight, IDPs who fled to the North have come under the control of the very government, which in most cases was the one originally responsible for their displacement. They fled their home to come of all places to the capital of the enemy.[222] Here they are turned into what African Rights (1997) calls "invisible citizens" reflecting the "institutionalized discrimination and historical inequities of development".[223] More often it was the availability rather than a deliberate decision that determined the final destination of flight. Several interview partners confirmed that they had no alternative but to come to Khartoum. Their stories are all very similar. Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper, narrated his escape from Juba like this:

> There were only two ways of getting out of Juba. Because the war was very tense, very tense. No way of getting out of Juba. Now, staying at Juba, your life is at risk. Getting out of Juba, your life is a risk. The mines had been planted around Juba. If it happened that you went out of the landmines, then you might get the Sudan army arrest you and kill you. When you get out of the landmines and out of the Sudan army area, then the SPLA can still arrest you, they recruit you immediately. And if you get out of all of that you might get wild animals killing you. If it happened that all this you went out, then you are now in Uganda, then you are safe. The other alternative, the safest one, is to get out of Juba by cargo plane. And this is how I came to Khartoum. Because when you go to Uganda, then you will increase the power of the SPLA. So they [the Sudanese government] prefer

[219] cf. Gallab (2008), p. 124 (with southern Sudanese returning to the South, these numbers are significantly changing)
[220] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 5 ff.
[221] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 20 ff. (with southern Sudanese returning to the South, these numbers are significantly changing)
[222] cf. Thielke (2006), p. 55
[223] African Rights (1997), p. 146

> people coming and this is why they give people the opportunity of coming to Khartoum free, by cargo plane. So many people, they rushed to the airports and came here.[224]

Not having crossed any international border, IDPs are officially under the care of their own government. But the Sudanese government is not willing to cater for its impoverished, traumatised and vulnerable displaced people. In fact, the law itself "is the foundation of many of the worst violations perpetrated against displaced people" and many of the judges who are appointed by the government "use their powers to discriminate against the non-Arab minorities in the North, especially the Southerners, Nuba and westerners".[225] During the war, migrants from the South and the Nuba Mountains came to be considered a "fifth column for the SPLA"[226] and were driven out of the capital.

Squatter settlements and camps such as Angola, Dar El Salaam, Mandela, Mayo and Soba Arabi are not only completely underdeveloped and lacking basic services, they are also far outside the city centre. The remote location of camps and settlements makes access to medical care almost impossible. In case of serious illness, the displaced have to deal with long and tiring journeys, and frequently face hostilities and denial of service upon their arrival at the hospital.[227] Abusharaf (2009) calls life in these displaced areas a "chronic emergency".[228] Here people are suffering the worst effects of poverty; malnutrition, infectious disease, malaria, diarrhoea, lack of water and insecurity.[229]

Squatter settlements and camps are subject to regular demolitions by the government. Some displaced are moved to remoter places in the desert, others are simply left to fend for themselves. As El-Kheir (1991) points out that the basic object of demolitions appears to be clearance of government sites. Referring to a series of demolitions in the 80s, he explained that the problem "was largely seen as an illegal occupation of valuable lands more than a need of a sector of the population for shelter".[230] African Rights (1997) agreed that the government regards IDPs primarily as an economic burden and security threat and that when their labour is not needed, they are being deported. Decree 941, passed

[224] personal conversation with Jason in Khartoum (autmn 2008)
[225] African Rights (1995), p. 45
[226] African Rights (1995), p. 13
[227] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 46 ff.
[228] Abusharaf (2009), p. 51
[229] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 51
[230] El-Kheir (1991), p. 161

on 20th May 1990 under the rule of al-Bashir, stated that the relevant authorities are "to immediately demolish squatter settlements on planned residential and agricultural land and are to immediately give the land to its rightful owners."[231] Demolitions were carried out without the residents being forewarned, often clandestinely and at night. African Rights (1995) describes the demolitions as "military operations implemented with overwhelming force and often with conspicuous brutality",[232] inflicting maximum suffering on those affected. They go on stating that if "relocations were, as the government claims, part of a humane exercise in urban renewal, it would make sense to move the people to their new homes *before* destroying their own homes, thereby giving them a chance to save their possessions and protect themselves and their children from hardship caused by exposure to the elements."[233] Vincent, a 41-year-old Kakwa from Yei, recalled how his house was destroyed by the government as follows:

> At this time we also had a problem with the government; it was replanning some of the squatted areas, so my house was also destroyed with all my property. All that was there was destroyed by the bulldozers.[234]

Even after the signature of the CPA insecurity prolongs; a sad example is the massacre at Soba Arabi in May 2005 in the course of which 50 people, including 14 policemen, were killed and many more wounded.[235] After the demolition of the Mandela settlement, IRIN News reported on 4th December 2008: "Thousands of people in a slum 20km south of Khartoum are living in makeshift shelters made of sticks and cloth after their homes were razed by the government."[236] Mandela settlement was set up in the early 1990s by people fleeing poverty and conflict from the western Darfur region and southern Sudan respectively. Although the conditions in Mandela settlement were poor, residents had secure mud brick homes and some had private generators providing electricity. A migrant from the central Nuba Mountains was quoted saying, "I had a house – with a door and a key. Now we are staying in the desert. We are worried about fires, sickness, criminals ... If there is a fire, not one child will survive. The houses burn easily." Another person concerned

[231] African Rights (1997), p. 157 f.
[232] African Rights (1995), p. 31
[233] African Rights (1995), p. 33
[234] Personal interview with Vincent in Khartoum (autumn 2008)
[235] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 23. ff
[236] IRIN News (04.12.2008)

was quoted as saying "They don't respect the owner of the house" and explained that he was beaten by police when he refused to leave the house. "They just come in and empty the house. They beat people." Ali Agab, legal aid coordinator at the Khartoum Centre for Human Rights and Environmental Development, was cited in the same article explaining, "That's what's happening everywhere. After people have been living a long time in a certain area, after the land becomes of value, the government doesn't care about where people go and how they will get services."[237]

In addition, official authorities have abducted IDPs in rural areas in large numbers and either used them for forced labour or pressured them to return to their areas of origin. Authorities, furthermore, captured displaced children and brought them to prison, where they live under inhuman conditions and without protection against violations and sexual assaults by prisoners and officers alike.[238] Lubkeman (2008) came to evaluate the internally displaced of Sudan as “one of the largest and most imperilled populations of displaced people”[239] and cited Ruiz (1998) stating:

> The Sudanese government has bombed camps for the internally displaced, forcibly relocated persons from Khartoum to camps where services were virtually non-existent, and abducted displaced children and placed them in camps where human rights groups report that they were compelled to convert to Islam and undergo military-training. The government has furthermore tolerated the enslavement of displaced women and children, profiteered, and actively prevented international aid from reaching displaced people with urgent needs.[240]

As the quote indicates, IDPs are subject to constant attempts of Islamisation and Arabisation. For this purpose, the government also used the education system by restricting and closing schools which used English as language of instruction. Instead Arabic was enforced as medium of instruction in all schools of the country. In 1992, the government annexed or closed all the church-run schools in displaced camps on the pretext that they had not been properly licensed.[241] At the same time, the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), which has been given the responsibility of education in the displaced camps, only

[237] IRIN News (04.12.2008)
[238] cf. Chiari (2008), p. 62
[239] Lubkeman (2008), p. 7
[240] Ruiz, Hiram (1998), p. 141 quoted in Lubkeman (2008), p. 7
[241] cf. African Rights (1997), p. 163

established traditional Qur'anic schools as kindergartens, where Islamic education is given to children regardless of whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims.[242] Islamisation is furthermore expanded through exploitation of the desperate situation of the displaced, as relief assistance is provided through Islamic relief organisations that require conversion in exchange. In prisons, sentences frequently can be reduced through conversion to Islam. African Rights (1995) reports the abduction and severe mistreatment of street children, who are taken to religious centres and acculturation camps for forced change of identity and political indoctrination. Abductions happen clandestinely. Children are smuggled out of Khartoum at night and in screened trucks, with their parents remaining uninformed.[243]

Inside the squatter settlements, shanty towns, government-run camps or prisons and detention centres, women are particularly vulnerable and physical/sexual violations are common.[244] A main crime displaced women are charged for is the brewing of alcohol. The government has been systematically oppressing the informal sector in Khartoum and makes it exceptionally difficult to obtain licenses. Most African migrants do not even have identity cards and therefore cannot obtain formal employment. Due to the lack of economic alternatives and the deep integration of brewing into southern Sudanese culture, women use this practice as a means of income generation. Another common charge is prostitution, however, most of the times without sufficient evidence being given. The definition of prostitution in the Sudanese law is in fact so imprecise that it allows the police to frame a case of prostitution against more or less whom they wish. All the more in a situation where tremendous cultural differences regarding relationships between men and women exist and continue being completely ignored.[245] Once charged and imprisoned, women are particularly vulnerable to violations such as forced conversion and the risk of being raped.[246]

In sum, it can be said that the government of Sudan is inflicting extreme suffering on thousands of its vulnerable citizens through discrimination by the law, a systematic and brutal policy of forcible change of cultural

[242] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 22 ff.
[243] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 15 ff.
[244] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 51 ff.
[245] cf. African Rights (1995), p. 40 ff.
[246] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 51 ff.

identity and religion, the demolition of their houses and forced relocation. The government in Khartoum is able to pursue these policies by insisting that issues of internal displacement, other than issues related to refugees, who have crossed international borders, are of domestic concern.[247]

7 South Sudan

As a consequence of the years of neglect described above, the South falls far behind the North in development.[248] Due to the "grossly underdeveloped state of the economy, the dilapidated infrastructure and the poor quality of the stock of human resources"[249], the majority of people in both rural and urban areas do not have access to the barest minimum of basic goods and essential services. Therefore, although many southern Sudanese who lived in the North have already returned to the South, they do so highly worried about what to expect from the future. At the same time, these return influxes exacerbate already existing humanitarian and development problems and the competition over scarce resources.[250]

According to House (1994) the population of South Sudan is estimated to number 5.3 million, or one quarter of the total Sudanese population.[251] The Sudan Tribune, on 7th June 2009, published the official numbers of the Fifth Population and Housing Census stating that "southern population has increased from 5,329,267 in 1983 to 8 260 490 in 2008".[252] The overall population of the country was counted to be 39.1 million, making the southern population 21 percent of the country's overall population.[253] These numbers have been highly contested, particularly by the SPLM, which aspired to a quota of at least one third of the total population. In fact, it can be said that the census was carried out for political purposes and that possibilities to bring about precise numbers were clearly limited.

Expectations after the signing of the CPA were high, yet remained widely unmet. Schomerus and Allen (2010) came to the sad conclusion

[247] cf. Ruiz, Hiram (1998) quoted in Lubkeman (2008), p. 7
[248] cf. BBC News (29.03.2010)
[249] House (1994a), p. 141
[250] cf. IRIN News (08.02.2011)
[251] cf. House (1994a), p. 140
[252] cf. Sudan Tribune (07.06.2009)
[253] cf. Sudan Tribune (24.05.2009)

that the "period immediately succeeding the signing of the CPA was characterised by an enthusiasm for changing times in Southern Sudan. After five years of the CPA and unfulfilled expectations, war-like behaviour and opportunism have resurfaced."[254] The South is at a historic turning point and due to form an independent state in July 2011. Yet, it seems uncertain on where to head to. "While theoretically, Southern Sudan aims to be decentralised, it has in reality become an extremely centralised system."[255] The SPLM still struggles with transforming from a rebel movement into a civil government. Regrettably, the GOSS has been found to be highly corruptive and in 2008 the disappearance of millions of Sudanese pounds of donor funding came to light,[256] thus creating distrust among the southern people.

As a consequence of history and current events, ethnic loyalties are stronger than ties to the SPLM. There is a lot of tension between the SPLM and local communities, which are resisting SPLM authority and claims for taxes. At the same time, SPLM members feel more allegiance to their tribes than to the people of the South as a whole and switch sides when conflicts erupt. "The battle for sparse resources and protection of one's community supersedes all national identification and it becomes every tribe for itself."[257] Schomerus and Allen (2010) highlight that tribal conflict, in fact, often has structural causes or is evoked by distrust. They explain:

> Major issues that emerged as reasons for local violence are either structural or can be found in a troubled, somewhat paradoxical relationship between the state and its citizens. On the one hand, the state is not strong enough to be able to suppress local violence. On the other, whenever state institutions are too strong and coercive, this causes renewed conflict which is at the heart of local violence.[258]

Due to such problems, the security situation in the South continues to worsen, ethnic tensions continue to rise, and tribal groups are fracturing from within. The SPLA is currently the first line of civilian defence, since police forces are widely considered ineffective.[259]

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[254] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 6
[255] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 7
[256] cf. Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 93
[257] Refugee International (26.03.2010)
[258] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 15
[259] cf. Refugees International (26.03.2010)

The urgent disarming of society falls behind and distrust in both the government and neighbours means that communities feel the need to guarantee their own security.[260] Furthermore, the GOSS does not have the capacity to provide security for the communities being disarmed. IRIN News quoted Claire McEvoy, manager of Geneva-based research group Small Arms Survey's Sudan project, on 17th May 2010: "We've seen patterns in the past whereby disarmed communities end up being attacked and then rearming (…). In the absence of security being provided by the government, disarmament can therefore increase insecurity and stimulate the local arms market."[261] Statistics from various sources show that at least 2,500 people were killed in inter-communal clashes in 2009 and hundreds more in 2010. A major contributor to local violence is the absence of accountable and reliable entities to deal with violence when it occurs, thus leading to locals taking the law into their own hands.[262]

The South is highly reliant on oil – which provides 98 percent of its revenues – and, hence, extremely vulnerable. BBC News (06.01.2011) noted, "If the oil stops flowing, the southern economy would collapse."[263] The pipeline to export the oil goes to Port Sudan, therefore, the South will continue depending on the North, which in turn also depends on fees paid by the South for the use of the pipeline. In the long-run however, the South will need to diversify its economy away from oil to decrease dependency.[264]

Without doubt, the South is still struggling at all fronts, including democratic transformation, state-building, disarmament, power and wealth sharing, poverty reduction, education, health provisions, infrastructure, repatriation, minority rights, etc. Furthermore, as has been pointed out before, qualified people in the South are rare, since two generations were basically left without schooling. To make matters worse, the quality of the education sector throughout southern Sudan is extremely low and reflected in the poor condition of school buildings, lack of books and other teaching materials, high pupil-teacher ratios, and the low proportion of trained teachers.[265] The referendum alone will

[260] cf. IRIN News (17.05.2011)
[261] IRIN News (17.05.2010)
[262] cf. Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 8
[263] BBC News (06.01.2011)
[264] cf. BBC News (06.01.2011)
[265] cf. House (1994a), p. 142

not be able to solve the problems of the South. Melinda Young, head of Oxfam in southern Sudan, remarks that the long-term needs are huge, stating that "The chronic poverty, lack of development and the threat of violence that blight people's daily lives will not disappear after the referendum".[266] Until today, the GOSS seems to be indifferent whether giving priority to the own enrichment or the development of the South and separation might just bring about a new elite, which oppresses new minorities.

8 Conclusion: What kind of a country is Sudan?

Sudanese society has been defined as multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-linguistic. The Sudan has been formed through forcefully uniting various nations to one single state. As a consequence, the country is plagued by conflict and heading towards disintegration. The violent political conflicts are manifestations of legacies of the past, namely slavery and the colonialism. Slavery, in particular, has left a residue in the collective psyche of the Sudanese communities from which the slaves were taken, which still defines relationships today.[267] In part VI, it will be demonstrated that southern Sudanese in Khartoum are still being called slaves by the northern society and how these racial classifications set the two groups insurmountably apart. During the colonial rule, power and prestige were centralised in the hands of a growing class of the educated elite, which at independence also inherited power from the colonialists. Instead of reconciling the various people of Sudan and start distributing power and wealth equally, the post-colonial state has continued with the marginalisation of the majority of the people.

Following the coup of 1989, the Islamist elite was transformed into an invisible corporation, through which the NIF controls the banking system, the economy and political regime to the benefits of its clientele. Citizens who do not cooperate with the regime are systematically excluded from any economic development at all.[268] All regimes since independence used religious terms to justify atrocities against the South and the two parts of the country drifted further apart. The NIF has not only alienated the non-Muslim population, but also drawn a sharp line between itself

[266] IRIN News (19.01.2011)
[267] cf. Jok (2007), p. 53
[268] cf. Lichtenberg (2002), p. 39 ff.

and the ordinary Sudanese Muslims, who do not adhere to orthodox Islam and who are not part of the corporation. Having established a totalitarian system, the regime cannot tolerate any social, ethnic, tribal or national intrinsic segmentation or political authority that operates independent from the divine order. Therefore it depends exclusively on oppression and terror, all in the name of Islam. President al-Bashir is the sole political entity that manages the corporation.[269] The majority of Sudanese face exclusion and marginalisation, especially in the peripheries.

In the case of the South, this has led to decades of civil war and an irreconcilable call for complete secession from the North, which has recently been confirmed by the referendum. Furthermore, the South was joined by other segments of the country in its claims for more participation, equal sharing of power and wealth, and claims for independence. The CPA does not address the other problems of the country apart from the North-South conflict. The South is in the process of secession, leaving behind a still multi-cultural, multi-racial, multi-linguistic and multi-religious country to an Islamist authoritarian regime, which is determined to reinforce its Islamic laws after separation, thus, fully denying the remaining society its diversity.[270] It has become clear that the North and the South are extremely diverse and that both parts struggle with the plural character of their societies.

[269] cf. Abdalla (2003), p. 115 ff.
[270] cf. BBC (19.12.2010); cf. Sudan Tribune (19.12.2010)

III Ethnicity, race and fiercely contested identities

As has become obvious in previous chapters, in Sudan ethnicity, race and identity play a mayor role in organising life and setting people apart. These three concepts are not only commonly used in academic analysis of social phenomena, but also increasingly in the mass media, often without clear definition. Understanding the concepts of race, ethnicity and identity is certainly crucial to understanding the complex and tense relations between northern and southern Sudanese in general and to answering the research question of this paper in particular. The three concepts have been discussed in detail in scholarship and a wide spectrum of literature can be used. Sadly to say they have gained "international fame" due to their bitter consequences on the subjected people. As Horowitz (1985) wrote on one of the concepts: "Ethnicity has fought and bled and burned its way into public and scholarly consciousness."[271] Nothing else could be more true for Sudan.

Apparently, a study of any given minority always has to involve analysing the structure of the entire society. Ethnicity arises from the distinction between outsiders and insiders; without social contact, ethnicity cannot exist.[272] Therefore, here the concepts of ethnicity, race, and identity will be reviewed in general and in the particular cases of the two distinct parts of the country the North and the South. Furthermore, their impacts will be analysed, thus leading directly to a discussion on nationalism and separatism. Not only will relations between northern Sudanese and southern Sudanese be discussed, but also will relations between the bulk of marginalised people and the small but clearly dominant ruling elite be considered. In conclusion, the question of who are the Sudanese will be addressed.

1 Ethnicity and race

"In recent decades, it has become apparent that ethnicity and race are among the most common categories that contemporary human beings use to organize their ideas about who they are, to evaluate their experiences and behavior, and to understand the world around them."[273] Ethnicity and race have striking potency as bases of collective identity

[271] Horowitz (1985), p. XI
[272] cf. Eriksen (2002), p. 19 ff.
[273] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 12

and action. Groups organised around them are reshaping societies, upsetting old assumptions, and challenging established systems of power.[274] As mentioned before, when analysing ethnicity and race, both the group and the circumstances it encounters have to be considered. That is to say on the one hand attributes, resources, and ideas of group members themselves; on the other hand the environment groups are exposed to. The argument begins with defining ethnicity and race and a brief review of the discourse surrounding the two terms.

1.1 Ethnicity

Although there are numerous factors capable of defining minorities and majorities – such as gender, age, education, occupation – the most relevant axis separating minorities from others is the ethnic one.[275] Ethnicity entered sociology as a term referring to a particular way of defining not only others but also ourselves. The term ethnicity became increasingly important in the social science in the 1960s, "a period marked by the consolidation of the process of decolonialization in Africa and Asia as numerous new nation states were created."[276] Accordingly, anti-colonial and anti-racist arguments contributed to the generation of a new vocabulary. Guibernau and Rex mention Max Weber as the only founding father of sociology and social anthropology, who, although in the limitations of his own times, considered ethnicity at all.[277] In his "Economy and Society", he defined ethnic groups as "those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonialization and migration."[278] Whether blood ties are real or assumed in this context does not matter. Weber clearly distinguished between the concepts of race, ethnicity and nation with the first being founded on the community of origin, the second on a subjective belief in shared origins and the third as characterised by a more intense political passion.[279] Ethnicity, therefore, is an explicitly subjective matter and the crucial issue is how one looks at

[274] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 12 ff.
[275] cf. Ben-Dor (1999), p. 1
[276] Guibernau and Rex (1997), p. 1
[277] cf. Guibernau and Rex (1997), p. 1 ff.
[278] Weber (1999), p. 18
[279] cf. Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 94 f.

himself/herself. Schermerhorn (1978) also remains close to Weber's definition:

> Each society in the modern world contains subsections or subsystems more or less distinct from the rest of the population. The most fitting generic term to designate this fraction of the whole is 'ethnic group'. An ethnic group is defined here as a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories or a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood.[280]

Such symbolic elements of peoplehood can be "kinship patterns, physical contiguity (as in localism or sectionalism), religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these."[281] These factors may be differing in degree of influence or some of them may even be completely absent.
Also common history can be viewed the same way. In fact, the initial cultural difference which lies at the root of the formation of an ethnic community often remains shrouded in obscurity.[282] Culture has been defined in many ways, yet, "[a]ll definitions of culture imply an opposition to the idea of nature, inasmuch as culture is considered to be a body of acquired elements that can be learned and taught – and which are therefore seen to be somewhat artificial – while nature is seen as a manifestation of a set of elements caught in a dialectic tension – elements which are not man-made, and that human beings can only attempt to understand."[283] Accordingly, culture is a flexible term, indicating at the flexibility of ethnicity.

An ethnic group is a subpopulation within a larger society and self-consciousness often has its source in outsiders. In the formation of an ethnic group, others may assign an ethnic identity, however it is the group's own claim to that identity that makes it an ethnic group. A boundary is drawn between "them" and "us". Thus, an ethnic group only gains meaning in a context that involves others; it cannot exist isolated.[284] Ethnicity is "in its essence a subjective phenomenon",[285] it is manifold, overlapping and interlocking. Frequently territory and political

[280] Schermerhorn (1978), p. 12
[281] Schermerhorn (1978), p. 12
[282] cf. Smith (1997), p. 27
[283] Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 62
[284] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1999), p. 15 ff.
[285] Young (1976), p. 49

unity are correlates of ethnicity; ethnic groups usually have some territorial homeland. However, it is not a must.[286]

Important modalities on which ethnicity varies are scope, scale and formality. The scope of ethnic identities may reach from the most local to the global, with religious identity being an excellent example for an ethnic identity played out on a global stage. Other examples can be taken from the language cultures, for example the so-called "English-speaking world" or "Francophonie". Furthermore, we can observe ethnicity on different scales: in macro-social formations (major economic political and economic structures of the social order), in the intermediate meso-structures of social institutions (between the individual and the state, which are sometimes independent institutions and sometimes regulated by the state, such as schools and universities), and in the face-to-face exchanges of micro-social life (negotiations of ethnicity in everyday life). Lastly, we can distinguish between ethnicity being "de facto" or "de jure", depending on the level of formality. In the first case, ethnic systems of classification are simply a matter of fact; in the latter case they become a matter of law.[287]

1.2 Race

Same as ethnic groups, races are social, culturally determined constructs, depending on human perception and classification. "Race is an imposed identity for members of the subordinate races."[288] As a matter of fact, the technical term of race, as used in biology, is of little analytic value in sociology and even modern genetics tends not to speak of races anymore, due to their unclear and untraceable meanings.[289] Interbreeding between human populations has been taking place to an extent that descent cannot be reliably traced back. Therefore, it is impossible to speak of fixed boundaries of races and many times greater variation can be found within one supposedly racial group than systematic variation between two groups. Whilst "historically 'race' has been a biological or quasi-biological concept, in the late twentieth century many people, especially social scientists, have come to see it as a social construction, and group behaviour that previously used to be

[286] cf. Young (1976), p. 47 ff.
[287] cf. Fenton (1999), p. 12 ff.
[288] Spinner (1994), p. 19
[289] cf. Eriksen (2002), p. 5 ff.

characterised as innate is now seen as socio-cultural."[290] In fact, the term race has a "dubious descriptive value"[291] and nowadays no doubt prevails that race – in its biological sense – has no value for explaining cultural variations. Young (1976) critically described race as follows:

> Race enters the list of cultural differentiators as a stepchild of prejudice, above all a legacy of stereotypes developed by Europeans in the age of expansion of Europe world dominion. It is based above all on conspicuous physical differentiations, especially skin pigmentation and facial characteristics, which facilitate the stereotyping process which is so valuable in the maintenance of prejudice. Once established, it hardens into a systematic misperception of facts and a propensity to see all members of another racial category as looking alike.[292]

He goes on, "[r]ace as a scientific basis for the classification of mankind has long [...] fallen into utter discredit. But race as a subjective basis for social differentiation and collective consciousness remains a potent factor."[293] Twenty-two years later, Cornell and Hartmann (1998) continue to agree that race still "wields monumental power as a social category" and remains "a fixture in the popular mind, a basis of social action, a foundation of government policy, and often a justification for distinctive treatment of one group by another."[294] Thus, concepts of race are, indeed, relevant. However, in the sense that they inform people's actions, which are most likely "merely negative: those who are obviously different are avoided and despised, or, conversely, viewed with superstitious awe."[295] Physical characteristics, which have the potential of marking group boundaries, are bodily features such as skin colour, hair type and stature. However, they only become "socially significant to the extent that we use them to organize and interpret experience, to form social relations, and to organize individual and collective action."[296] That is to say, racial categories only gain importance when they are given particular meanings upon which people start acting.

Interestingly, Blumer (1998) has pointed out that race prejudices are formed collectively rather than individually. Although there might be considerable difference between the ways in which individual members of the dominant group think and feel about the subordinate group, they

[290] Modood (2007), p. 39
[291] Eriksen (2002), p. 5
[292] Young (1976), p. 49
[293] Young (1976), p. 51
[294] Cornell and Hartmann (1999), p. 23
[295] Weber (1997), p. 15
[296] Cornell and Hartmann (1999), p. 25

still have a strong sense of the social position of their group. This group position is a general kind of orientation that guides group members.[297] Hence, "even though given individual members may have personal views and feelings different from the sense of group position, they will have to conjure with the sense of group position held by their racial group. If the sense of position is strong, to act contrary to it is to risk a feeling of self-alienation and to face the possibility of ostracism."[298] It follows that although actual encounters are with individuals, the picture formed of racial groups transcends experience with such individuals. Experience with individuals in daily association is subordinated to the collective image of the abstract group. It shows how difficult it is to change racial images under such circumstances. Accordingly, "one must seek the central stream of definition in those areas where the dominant group as such is characterizing the subordinate group as such."[299] It is the public arena where race prejudice and collective images have to be addressed and those people, who are able to influence the public discussion – such as intellectuals and social elites, public figures of prominence, and leaders of powerful organisation – are likely to be the key figures in forming a group's position. Strong interest groups can also direct the lines of discussion and set the interpretations that arise in such discussion toward their own self-interest.[300]

As mentioned above, colonialism has particularly fuelled the creation of racial categories. Physical differences had been long noted, but only the encounter with the colonialists has brought about the harsh racial distinctions that can be found throughout the world today. In this context, racial designation has been strongly linked to power relations. The colonialists found justification for their activities in major parts in the idea of race and in the belief that certain groups of humans naturally are worth more than others in the ranks of social hierarchies. As Cornell and Hartmann (1998) put it, the "history of race is a history of moral judgement, a division of the world into more or less worthy categories of people."[301] The need to institutionalise dominance required counting and classifying people into discrete, bounded groups, whereas before cultural identities were much looser and undefined, often interlocking

[297] cf. Blumer (1998), p. 35 ff.
[298] Blumer (1998), p. 35
[299] Blumer (1998), p. 38
[300] cf. Blumer (1998), p. 31 ff.
[301] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 28

and overlapping. Such policies over time also created widespread economic and social disparities between differing groups, herewith reinforcing the perception of being different.[302] In Sudan, for example, next to everyday experience of derision, contempt and harassment, race becomes closely associated with economic and political exclusion, if one refuses to be incorporated into the Arab race.[303]

1.3 Ethnicity and race in contrast

It has become clear that ethnicity and race are not the same. Even though ethnicity in popular discussion might be used as a euphemism for race,[304] in this work the two concepts are clearly considered distinct concepts and used according to their independent meanings; particularly because the term race will be used frequently in the empirical part of this work (cf. VI). In chapter IV 3.4, it will also be shown how over-emphasising cultural differences can dangerously cloak racial structures.

Historical usage and the legacy of now discredited theories of the division of humankind into fundamentally different types, link the term race with physical or visible difference. By contrast, ethnic group is used primarily in contexts of cultural differences and often associated with shared ancestry, language markers, and with national or regional origin.[305] Importantly, the term ethnic "does not suffer from the historical association of error in the way that the concept of race does."[306]

Ethnicity and race do not necessarily exclude each other. In fact, races can be but do not necessarily have to be ethnic groups and vice versa; they may overlap. As Cornell and Hartmann (1998) point out:

> Ethnicity refers to perceived common ancestry, the perception of a shared history of some sort, and shared symbols of peoplehood. Race refers to a group of human beings socially defined on the basis of physical characteristics. A human group might well meet both sets of criteria at ones. The identification of common physical characteristics often also involves a claim to some form of shared ancestry.[307]

Ethnicity, as well as race, is a product of interaction between diverse populations. Both terms are commonly held to be natural categories, based on common descent or origin, and systematic physical difference.

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[302] cf. Jalali and Lipset (1998), p. 320 ff.
[303] cf. Jok (2007), p. 5
[304] cf. Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 96
[305] cf. Fenton (1999), p. 3 f.
[306] Fenton (1999), p. 6
[307] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 32

Also, as has been laid out above, ethnicity and race are both social constructions. The tendency goes that ethnic distinctions tend to be overshadowed by racial designation. “Race has been first and foremost a way of describing ‘others,’ of making clear that ‘they’ are not ‘us’.”[308] Racial and ethnic categories may be delineated by others first, but when the group itself starts filling those categories with their own meaning, producing their own content of what their identities signify, ethnicity is being constructed. Through creating its on version of identity, a racial group turns itself into an ethnic group. The following figure, which has been taken from Cornell and Hartmann (1998), sums up the differences between ethnic groups and races and demonstrates how descriptions can overlap. Some groups may be better described as ethnic groups and others better as races, yet they do not necessarily fit only one group, but can be races and ethnic groups at the same time.



• Identity is based on putative common descent, claims of shared history, and symbols of peoplehood	• Identity is based on perceived physical differences
• Identity may originate in their assignment by others or assertion by themselves	• Identity typically originates in assignment by others
• Identity may or may not reflect power relations	• Identity typically reflects power relations
• Identity may or may not imply inherent differences in worth	• Identity implies inherent differences in worth
• Identity usually constructed by both selves and others	• Identity is constructed by others (at the point of self-construction, group becomes ethnic group as well as a race)

Figure 1: Ethnic groups and races in comparison[309]

1.4 Assimilationism, primordialism and circumstantialism

A question which remains, after having defined ethnicity and race and having put them into relation to each other, is whether racial and ethnic identities are fixed or fluid? Are they unchangeable or contingent?

[308] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 27
[309] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 35

In the latter half of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century sociologists still tended to explain racial and ethnic differences in biological terms. This idea was shaken up when Franz Boas, an anthropologist at Columbia University, showed that no systematic correlation between the physiological inheritance of individuals and their intelligence or temperament existed. Rather, science came to the conclusion that although biology was largely static, culture was mutable. Taking ethnic groups as primarily cultural groups, instead of biological ones, meant that they were mutable, too. Therefore, what had been understood as determined by biology and hence being permanent and fixed, became to be understood as rooted in culture and hence being changeable and fluid.[310]

A process of assimilation was assumed to be the logic consequence, which would eventually lead to the disappearance of minority identities. Assumptions continued that racial groups would eventually be integrated into the majority society's institutions and culture and thus vanish, the same as ethnic identities. This development towards a universal model in which ethnic and racial identities would be irrelevant, however, never materialised. Instead, in the post-colonial area it became clear that as colonial power loosened, ethnic, kinship, regional and religious ties, both old and new, gained importance and threatened to demolish the weak social order the colonialists had left. Additionally, assimilation could not be proved in more industrialised parts of the world either. Not even in the United States, where a melting pot of populations and cultures had been self-proclaimed, did ethnic and racial identities vanish or lose importance.[311]

The assimilationist assumption never materialised and theory and reality continuing to contradict each other eventually gave rise to the premordialist thinking that "ethnicity is fixed, fundamental, and rooted in the unchangeable circumstances of birth";[312] primordial ties "are those ties that one is born with".[313] Certain elements were believed to directly contribute to a person's basic group identity: the physical body, a person's name, the history and origins of the group one is born into, one's nationality or other group affiliation, the language one first learns

[310] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 42 ff.
[311] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 45
[312] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 48
[313] Ben-Dor (1999), p. 6

to speak, the religion one is born into, the culture one is born into, and the geography and topography of the place of birth. Obviously, these elements are all determined before the individual can make any meaningful choices and are thus fixed and unchangeable.

Primordialism has to be understood as a reaction to the failure of assimilationalism to explain social reality. It arose from the idea that ethnic ties are far more deeply embedded in the human psyche and in human relations than had been realised before. Even today, primordialists' ideas tend to dominate, often unconsciously, discussions of ethnicity in everyday life. Nonetheless, they are not able to satisfactorily explain social reality. When dealing with a person, who claims just two ethnic identities, primordialism already reaches its explanatory limits; not to speak of a person who claims being part of a series of ethnic identities. Neither does it take into account that ethnic categories and the intensity of an individual's attachment to them clearly varies in different situations and times, or that individuals can even undergo complete identity changes.[314]

A second group of social scientists has addressed the short fallings of the assimilational model not by emphasising the deeply rooted, unchangeable and static nature of ethnic ties, but by looking into their practical uses. They understood ethnic ties as deriving from the circumstances and contexts in which ethnic and social groups find themselves. In this circumstantialist approach, ethnic groups came to be understood as interest groups. Accordingly, ethnic identities were assumed to change when circumstances change. A previously utile ethnic identity can be abandoned in favour of a new, more promising identity. Furthermore, ethnic ties can be used as the basis of collective political mobilisation or claims to certain resources. Notably, individuals and groups play out their own ethnic or racial identities when such identities are in some way of advantage to them. Hereby, they use their identities to set boundaries between themselves and others, who are not eligible to be included. Most importantly, other than in primordialism, ethnic and racial identities are understood to be fluid and responding to the needs of a situation. Ethnicity and race are dependent variables; products of circumstances created by situations.[315] "The major analytical

[314] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 48 ff.
[315] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 56 ff.

project of circumstantialist approaches has been to identify the economic, political, social, and historical circumstances that form or reproduce ethnic or racial groups, crystallize their interests or the relationships within and among them, and launch them into competition or conflict with one another."[316]

The problem with circumstantialism is that in ultimate instance, same as in the assimilationist model, ethnicity and race should disappear. According to the circumstantialist approach, therefore, the assimilationist idea does not misunderstand ethnicity, but the non-ethnic forces that determine ethnic outcomes. A main critic is that circumstantialists "rather than explaining" race or ethnicity, "they explain them away".[317] The important conclusion for this research is that ethnicity and race can be explained fully neither by primordialism nor by circumstantialism. They are fluid since depending on circumstances. At the same time, because frequently being experienced as primordial, they are fixed.[318] This leads to a review of the constructionist approach.

1.5 Constructionalism

The constructionist approach takes up the idea that ethnic groups and identities are made up of both self-ascription and ascription by others. Ethnic groups and identities, correspondingly, are formed in an interaction between assignment and assertion, between what others see in us and what we ourselves claim to be. The interaction is, in fact, reciprocal. Ethnic and racial identities, and the groups that they are aligned to, change over time as the circumstances they are placed in change. Similarly, groups also change the circumstances; the claims of others on them. Ethnic and racial identities are built, rebuilt and sometimes dismantled over time. By noting the interaction between circumstances and groups, constructionalism includes crucial aspects of both circumstantialism and primordialism. At the same time, it adds to them "a large dose of activism: the contribution groups make to creating and shaping their own identity".[319] Ethnic and racial actors may instrumentalise identity in order to accomplish their goals, yet they do

[316] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 60
[317] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 66
[318] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 67
[319] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 72

little to shape, reinforce or transform those identities. They are more exploiting the identities that situations provide.

For the purpose of this work, it seems particularly utile to classify ethnic and racial identities according to their degree of comprehensiveness and manner of formation. A "comprehensive or 'thick' ethnic or racial tie is one that organizes a great deal of social life and both individual and collective action. A less comprehensive or 'thin' ethnic or racial tie is one that organizes relatively little of social life and action."[320] The comprehensiveness of ethnic and racial identities cannot only change over time, but also vary within the same group. While one member might experience their ethnic identity as very thick and influential, another member might experience their identity as rather thin and meaningless. Therefore, instead of just taking ethnicity and race as fluid, as suggested in circumstantialism, constructionalism goes a step further and looks into the matter of how the comprehensiveness of ethnic and racial identities change. Herewith, the construction of identity by circumstances is noted; at the same time the fact that circumstances, too, are subject to change is considered.[321] Furthermore, the group contributes significantly to the formation of identity. "Ethnicity and race are not simply labels forced upon people; they are also identities that people accept, resist, choose, specify, invent, redefine, reject, actively defend, and so forth."[322] There are various ways of how ethnic groups actively arrange their identities, such as establishing organisations, promoting research on the own history and culture, or revivifying the own language.

Another relevant factor is by which means group members are bond together. As Crawford Young (1976) points out, not "all cultural segments have the same degree of collective solidarity. Some are particularly susceptible to erosion under changing circumstances; others are held with extraordinary fervor."[323] Cornell and Hartmann (1998) refer to three particularly important bonds: shared interest, shared institutions, and shared culture. Based on these factors, the attachment of members to the particular group varies. The first bond refers to shared political, economic, or status interests. People feel tight together through common interests and this perception is fundamental to group identity

[320] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 73
[321] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 72 ff.
[322] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 77
[323] Young (1976), p. 44

and solidarity. Sometimes ethnic identities even originate this way. Interests are most dependable on outside factors and can change rapidly. Although they might be deep, when conditions change, shared interests may change, too, and lose their potency to bond group members together. Groups with shared interest tend to form institutions, which are reserved for members and should contribute to solving their particular problems, thus bonding them together. Institutions tend to be a stronger basis for group identity and facilitate its embedment into sets of social relations over which the group has partial control. Furthermore, group members can be bond together by a shared culture; the shared perception that to a large extent they think alike, or at least have similar perspectives of their own lives and the world at large. A shared culture has the greatest potency to bond people, as it provides a system of interpretation and a conceptual scheme for making sense of the world.[324] Compositions of how groups are bond together can vary; the more bonds are combined, the bigger solidarity gets.

1.6 Ethnic stereotyping and rank determination

Stereotypes are held by dominated groups and dominating groups alike. They make it possible to divide the world into certain kinds of people, and also provide simple criteria for such classification. Stereotypes are notions held by one group against another, which are "part and parcel of the 'cultural knowledge' of a group and thus regularly and more or less predictably guide their relationships with others".[325] Often stereotypes are mentioned in connection with racism and discrimination and frequently they have a tendency to be pejorative; commonly they are morally ambiguous. Stereotypes do not even need to be true or to give good descriptions of what people actually do. Stereotypes are also used to justify privileges and differences in access to a society's resources.[326]

Stereotypes inform the boundaries of the own group, in the process of which, they usually ascribe an idea of superiority to it. Yet, this is a tendency and there are also groups, which have a rather negative stereotype of themselves and a positive one of the dominating group. Stereotypes can produce self-images; they can function as so-called self-fulfilling prophecies. This process will be discussed again later on

[324] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 85 ff.
[325] Eriksen (2002), p. 23
[326] Eriksen (2002), p. 25

when speaking of research participants' worries that their children might develop an "inferiority complex" (cf. VI 3).

Although stereotyping in its core is based on generalisation, there is always space for exceptions to the rule, individuals who are acknowledged to be different as well as people who do not comply with typically held stereotypes. Markers constructed by dominant ethnic groups to differentiate minorities include racial categories such as skin colour and other physical features, as well as cultural markers represented by dress, language, religion and customs.[327]

Ethnicity may appear either as horizontal or vertical aspects of social classification. This means, that in some societies ethnicity and stereotypes are relevant in the competition for scarce resources and/or in the process of dichotomisation and maintenance of group boundaries; yet, competition takes place on a more or less equal footing. Other societies, such as the Sudanese, are based on systematically unequal access to resources and mainly ethnicity informs power relations. Of course, there are other relevant aspects besides ethnic or racial stereotypes determining social hierarchy and a person's rank. Such aspects typically can be gender, class membership or age. Nevertheless, ethnicity and race and the according stereotypes play an important role in informing hierarchical structures and in many plural societies there is a high correlation between them and class membership.[328]

2 Identity in Sudan

This chapter analyses how identity has been formed in Sudan, on which facts and assumptions it is based and how it influences the current political situation of the country. For this, in the following chapters, northern and southern identity will be subjected to a constructivist analysis according to their comprehensiveness, assignment and bonds. The country presents an extremely diverse society with religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural and ethnic differences. As has been noted in part II, in spite of its diversity, the Sudanese society is politically and economically dominated by a riverain elite.

[327] cf. Castles and Davidson (2000), p. 62 ff.
[328] cf. Eriksen (2002), p. 49

The national identity is clearly based on Arabism and Islam. Arabness has been consistently privileged over Africaness and the so-called "Arabs" of Sudan have drawn a racial boundary around themselves, excluding the Africans of the country. This identity is enforced on all people of Sudan, no matter how contradicting the self-perceptions they hold. Collins (2008) points out that, belonging partially to the Arab world and partially to the African world, a Sudanese identity was developing, until stopped by the NIF. He writes that "the individuality of many ethnicities has been melted and forged into a new, unique, and distinct identity called 'Sudanese.'"[329] This development has been brought to a harsh halt through the Islamist revolution of 1989, which sought to end the search of identity by homogenisation of the Sudanese society under the umbrella of Arabism and Islam.

2.1 Competition of identities

Heterogeneous Sudan, whose population is over 70 percent non-Arabs,[330] is being considered an Arab country; on 19th of January 1956 Sudan became a member of the Arab league.[331] Nonetheless, Sudanese society is much more diverse and identities are much more complex than the official rhetoric suggests. As will be shown below, not even the majority of the northern Sudanese comply with the officially suggested Arab identity. Abusharaf (2009) explains that in a society as diverse as the Sudanese, "with hundreds of cultural and linguistic groups with distinctive outlooks on life, cosmologies, faith traditions, and localized experiential knowledge, the impossibility of reaching consensus about national identity has entailed untold miseries and intractable disputes, especially for the peoples of Southern Sudan and Darfur."[332]

In Sudan, the wrongly assumed Arab identity does not reflect society and, instead, prompts an identity crisis within both the alleged Arabs and the rest of the country. In the process of Arabisation and Islamisation, the Arab-Islamic identity was favoured, while "the African Negro was considered inferior, an active or potential slave the downtrodden of the

[329] Collins (2008), p. 302
[330] cf. Collins (2005), p. 5
[331] cf. Barsella and Ayuso Guixot (1998), p. 20
[332] Abusharaf (2009), p. 23

earth."[333] Conversion to Islam was, therefore, an irresistible way of becoming a free man and a respectable member of the community; converts ultimately believed they belonged to the Arab race. Although indigenous customs and practices were partially embraced, emphasis on the Arab-Islamic identity as unifying element for the community, and later on the emerging state, remained. "Arab culture and high prestige correlate on every status scale. Arabic is the unchallenged medium of high religious culture."[334] Nevertheless, Islamisation, as well as Arabisation, has clearly failed to produce a homogenous Sudanese group. As Deng (1995) puts it, the "popular view of the North as uniformly Arabized and Islamized is both factually incorrect and politically misleading"[335] and, at the same time, creates a sharp line between the people of the North and the people of the South. Regardless, the northern regime continues to deny flatly the linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity of its people and, hence, "the northern Sudanese still respects the Arab-Islamic identity and disdains the negroid African non-Muslim."[336] In chapter VI 2, it will be demonstrated how official policies directly determine social relations in Sudan.

The Arab world, however, does not fully accept the Sudanese as Arabs and rather discriminates against them as black Africans. In Egypt or the Gulf States northern Sudanese, who believe themselves to be Arabs, suddenly can hear people naming them nigger [sic] or slave.[337] There is a big disparity in northern Sudan between the assumed self-image and the visible physiognomy which, in fact, reflects the disdained and denied African background. As has been noted in part II, the majority of northern Sudanese are descendents of the Nubians and their Arab identity is primarily a social construct.[338] Deng (1995) believes that "the northern Sudanese tendency to exaggerate Arabism and Islam and to look down on the negroid races as slaves could well be the result of a deep-seated inferiority complex, or, to put it in reverse, a superiority complex as a compensational device for their obvious marginality as Arabs."[339] In sum, although the Arab identity is a complete failure in

[333] Deng (1995), p. 35
[334] Young (1976), p. 410
[335] Deng (1995), p. 44
[336] Deng (1995), p. 64
[337] cp. Streck (2007), p. 154
[338] cf. Krieger (1999), p. 254
[339] Deng (1995), p. 64

representing the diverse people of Sudan, it still remains the official, politically decisive identity of the country; albeit a fiercely contested one.

While analysing northern and southern identity in the following chapters, it should be kept in mind what has been stated above about identities being fluid and formed in an interaction between assignment and assertion. Identities are not fixed and individuals can instrumentalise them in order to accomplish their goals (cf. III 1.5). Sudanese are capable of code-switching, culture-switching and discourse-switching, and might present different identities to different groups.[340] Fixed labels are, therefore, of limited use to describe Sudanese individuals. Here, however, collective identities are being considered, which are in large formed through official policies and political discourse. Individuals, on the other hand, are much more flexible and active in their positioning and, in part VI, it will be analysed in detail how they choose and switch their affiliations in different contexts.

2.2 A constructionist analysis of the national identity of Sudan

In the next paragraphs, the national identity of Sudan will be subjected to a constructivist analysis. For this, it will be looked into the matter, how comprehensive it is and whether it is rather self-ascribed or ascribed by others. Furthermore, which intra-group bonds tie members together and how substantial they are.

Comprehensiveness

As has been pointed out in chapter III 1.5, ethnic identity differs in the role it plays in organising social life and collective action in a given situation. “A comprehensive or ‘thick’ ethnic or racial tie is one that organizes a great deal of social life and both individual and collective action. A less comprehensive or ‘thin’ ethnic or racial tie is one that organizes relatively little of social life and action.”[341]

In Sudan ethnicity – including race, religion and language – forms a remarkably comprehensive aspect of social life. It is the organising principle at the core of most northern Sudanese institutions; political, economic, and social. As noted before, the Sudanese people have been polarised over religion and a hierarchical society has been created, in which Muslims are favoured by the state system. Religion offers not only

[340] cf. Streck (2007), p. 95
[341] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 73

a comprehensive world view, but also an all-embracing social identity.[342] In Sudan, status is not only defined by economic criteria. Race, religion, language, cultural values and symbols, are all factors which are capable of determining who one can marry, how one is treated by the police, what one's employment opportunities are, how much political power one has, and many other things. Collins (2005) points out that race in Sudan "becomes closely associated not only with economic and political exclusion if one refuses to be incorporated into the Arab race, but also with everyday experiences of derision, contempt and harassment."[343] Not being part of the Arab group means not being a full and equal member of the Sudanese society at large. McLaughlin (1964) summarised the forces reinforcing incorporation in Khartoum:

> The non-Arabic speaker … must learn Arabic to retain his job, or perhaps to be employed in the first place. He might also need to learn Arabic to purchase commodities in the shops and markets, read legal notices that affect him, and so on. Social pressures are equally strong and take many forms, such as being snubbed or scorned for use of poor Arabic, for inability to converse about events and people, or to read newspapers or communicate with neighbours. If the language barrier is combined with other factors that denote lower status, such as very dark complexion, heavier facial features, nonobservance of Moslem dress or custom. ... working at menial wage labor, and so on, then there is a nexus of interrelated pressure to conform, and learning Arabic is perhaps the fastest and easiest start on the road to social and economic acceptance.[344]

Although the Arab society is not completely closed, the extent to which access is permitted to minority groups varies and is clearly limited. The Fur of western Sudan, for example, have accepted Arabic "without question as the language of communication with outsiders" and a young Fur "can achieve identity as an Arab for most social purposes by fluent command of the language, careful observance of Islam and appropriate dress."[345] Nevertheless, there are clear limits to the acceptance. In fact, even the so-called "riverised" Darfuris, referring to those Darfuris living in Khartoum who have adapted many of the customs and characteristics of the riverain Arabs, have "become increasingly embittered by marginalized treatment and discrimination toward them, despite their partial integration into the urban life of the capital."[346] Descent or origin is

[342] cf. Young (1976), p. 49 ff.
[343] Jok (2007), p. 5
[344] McLoughlin (1964) p. 54 quoted in Young (1976), p. 108 f.
[345] Young (1967), p. 108 f.
[346] Collins (2008), p. 287

given clear priority before colour or religion in deciding over one's status in this racialised context.

Opportunities for southern Sudanese to be included into the official identity are even less. As Idris explains, "in the case of Southern Sudanese, those converted to Islam were not fully accepted into society. They were not treated by the Arabized and Islamized state as citizens with social and political rights."[347] In fact, exclusion in Sudan is to a large extent institutionalised and conversion is little guarantee for becoming a fully accepted member of society. Jok (2007) writes that "those who seek to be included in the power structures by submitting to the notion of Arabism and in the process risk losing their indigenous identity […] still become something like second-class Arabs in the eyes of those who regard themselves as more Arab."[348] Parekh (2000) points out that regardless to how strenuously one tries, assimilation is "generally unable to redeem its promise of full and unqualified acceptance [...] [since] [t]he demand for total assimilation springs from intolerance of differences, and for the intolerant even the smallest differences are sources of deep unease."[349]

In conclusion, it can be said that ethnic identity in northern Sudan is extraordinarily thick and embraces strong racial categories. With the politisation of Islam and corresponding changes in social attitudes, it has grown more and more important as an organiser of daily life.

Type of assignment

As has been pointed out in chapter III 1.5, ethnicity and race are products of interaction between distinct populations. Ethnic and racial categories can first be ascribed by others, but than be taken up by the people themselves, be transformed, absorbed, adjusted and create a new identity of oneself. This interaction is ongoing; the process is mutual and fluid. Thus, ethnicity and race are not simply labels forced upon people; they can rather be described as a dynamic process in which people accept, resist, choose, specify, invent, redefine, actively defend and so forth their identity according to their own preconceptions, agendas and dispositions.[350]

[347] Idris (2005), p. 85
[348] Jok (2007), p. 5
[349] Parekh (2000), p. 198
[350] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p.72 ff.

In Sudan identity formation is a century-long process of mutual influences between assertion and self-assertion. Since the dominating Arab identity is reason for political conflict, exclusion from citizen rights and discrimination of minorities, identity formation is a continuously and fiercely debated process. During the pre-colonial process of enslavement, social meanings were imposed on social, cultural, and religious differences among the people of Sudan and served as the basis for the structuring of society. The cultural fabric of the society was imagined by the dominant ruling groups to be Arab-Islamic and those who did not belong to this identity were considered to be enslaveable. The importance of race in Sudan is linked with the construction of Arab origin. Categories – such as abd or slave for southern Sudanese and Fallata or Gharaba for western African immigrants and western Sudanese – used to be flexible cultural categories, however, during the colonial period the British transformed them into rigid political categories. These racialised identities, which were reproduced and reinforced by the British, were afterwards taken up and maintained by the post-colonial state.[351]

A common way of constructing and reproducing the own identity is the retelling of history.[352] Idris (2005) points out that after independence "the postcolonial state embarked on the reconstruction of 'national history.' Precolonial 'heroes' and nationalist leaders (mainly Arabized and Islamized) were reinvented as the embodiment of 'national essence,' and used to encourage the belief that Sudanese had shared historical experience." He continues that in Sudan "history has never been about the past, but about the present contested realities. The past was misrepresented purposely in a way that served the present purposes: the legitimacy of a racialized state."[353] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006) comment that in Sudan "the dominant sociopolitical discourse emphasized the geographic factor while deemphasizing the 'blackness' that comes from having Sudanic ancestry" herewith claiming "superiority over the native/enslaved communities."[354]

The authors emphasise that the constructed genealogies of the northern Sudanese were legitimated by outsiders. Yet, the outside world has

[351] cf. Idris (2005), p. 9 ff.
[352] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 77 ff.
[353] Idris (2005), p. 14
[354] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 67

belatedly come to terms with the fact that it has helped in creating these identities and that they are actually constructed; it is on the contrary the very members of the invented tribes and traditions that are now proudly acclaiming authenticity.[355] Therefore, ethnicity has been constructed in the sense described earlier in this paper. Racial categories that have been delineated by others have been filled with the group's own meanings, thus producing their own content of what their identities signify and herewith creating ethnicity. Nowadays it is, above all, the riverain elite itself, which is radically maintaining and reproducing the invented identity. The other groups of the country and the outside world, on the contrary, are challenging their claims.

Bonds holding members together

As has been pointed out in chapter III 1.5, crucial bonds that hold group members together are shared interests, shared institutions and shared culture. Shared interests strongly depend on external factors and when circumstances change, interests may change, too. Institutions form a stronger foundation, yet, cultural bonds are most potent.[356]

On the surface, in northern Sudan all three kinds of intra-group bonds have a significant role in maintaining the collective identity. Yet, underneath the surface, relations are much more complicated and bonds much weaker than they might appear at first sight. In a country, where the periphery is chronically underdeveloped, leading to unrest and war in wide parts, the existence of shared interest has to be seriously questioned. The regime clearly gives priority to the integrity of Sudan as an Islamic State and not to the welfare of its people. Marginalisation and exclusion have few limits and Iyob and Khadiagala (2006) point out that "with the exception of the ruling elites, Arabized/Africanized Muslim and non-Muslim Sudanese have been disenfranchised by the various regimes exercising power from Khartoum."[357] The ordinary Sudanese surely aspire to development and welfare for their own regions, an interest they apparently do not share with the regime.

Inevitably, institutions in the totalitarian state are strong in bonding people together; in fact, Sudanese do not have any other choice but

[355] cf. Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 31
[356] cf. Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 85 ff.
[357] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 32

complying with them, for deviance directly leads to punishment. Not being included into the national identity and hence society's institutions, does not only mean social but also political and economic exclusion. Nevertheless, since country-wide state structures are weak, the further one moves away from the centre, the weaker the regime gets.

The shared Arab culture is, first and foremost, an assumed one and in effect only includes a limited number of Sudanese. In Sudanese history, Islam has always advanced itself along indigenous lines and rather than erasing animist ideas and institutions, it cloaked them with outward symbols of Islam. Through this, it was easily incorporated into northern society. Sufism was closer to the people's traditional African religious beliefs and practices, and thus became localised and institutionalised. It can be understood as a reaction to the more abstract orthodox Islam of the Islamic scholars. Nevertheless, the politisation of Islam has tended towards favouring orthodoxy over the Sufist tolerance in the Islamic doctrine and the current Sudanese state is based on the assumption that the secular cannot be separated from the religious side of life. The shared culture, therefore, is only shared on the surface. Underneath northern Sudanese are clearly heterogeneous.

Through coerced homogenisation, the regime tries to bond its people together. The forceful unification of all Muslims within Sudan leads to the banishing of political parties and the amalgamation of Muslims of different denominations or religious groups; Islam is officially understood as a pure Islam, inspired by the principles of Islamic law and all believers belong to the one umma (the Islamic community). However, there is a great discrepancy between the moderate Muslims and the fundamentalists of the country. In spite of all rigid attempts to bond the Sudanese together under one artificial national identity, the country is disintegrating.

Members of the northern society participate in exclusively shared institutions and have an elaborate set of cultural understandings, symbols and traditions in common. Yet, what holds people mostly together is the authoritarian regime, with its total control and forced homogenisation of the diverse people of Sudan. It has been shown that national identity in Sudan is a very solid and all-pervasive identity, which is mainly imposed on the people by the regime. It remains to be seen for how long the regime will succeed in preventing complete fragmentation

of the country through force and whether it will go on increasing violence or, instead, assume new and humane strategies.

2.3 The competing identity of the South

It has become clear that the official national identity of Sudan neither reflects the diverse people of the North nor provides a point of identification for the people of the South. Unlike other parts of the country, the South has already accomplished a high degree of self-determination and political participation and recently southern Sudanese have voted for independence.[358] Apparently, they do not feel included into the national identity or benefiting from their official citizenship to Sudan, and therefore, prefer to form a country of their own. In the following chapters, the identity formation of southern Sudanese, understood as an ethnic minority and a separate cultural community, will be analysed in detail.

2.3.1 The southern Sudanese as an ethnic minority

Southern Sudanese form an ethnic minority. An ethnic minority can be defined as "a group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population in a society, which is politically non-dominant and which is being reproduced as an ethnic category."[359] Castles and Davidson (2000) provide two sets of factors to assess whether a specific group is an ethnic minority or not:

1. indicators of exclusion from equal participation in the economic, social, cultural and political subsystems of society
2. indicators of collective consciousness, such as language use, cultural practices, associations and political mobilization.[360]

Southern Sudanese clearly comply with both sets of factors and form a well-defined ethnic minority in Sudan. Minorities vary in their compactness and can be placed on a theoretical continuum. At one end, compact minorities can be found, at the other end diffuse minorities, and in between semicompact and semidiffuse minorities. Diffuse minorities, lacking a territorial base, constitute less of a threat to the majority than compact minorities. Southern Sudanese can be referred to as a compact

[358] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)
[359] Minority Rights Group (1990) quoted in Eriksen (2002), p. 121
[360] Castles and Davidson (2000), p. 63 f.

minority. They occupy a well-defined geographical territory that makes up the smaller part of the state and where they constitute a comfortable majority. Their territory is relatively far from the political centre and hence difficult to control.[361]

Nevertheless, southern Sudanese are ethnically diverse within themselves. As has been pointed out before, a minority can only exist in relation to a majority and vice versa. The redefinition of the system boundaries, leads to the shifting of these relations. In the case of Sudan, this means that if the South is looked upon as a separate entity, the southern Sudanese are being turned into the majority. As a logical consequence, new majority/minority relations would emerge, most likely based on a lower level of ethnicity with smaller and smaller nationalism oppressing smaller and smaller minorities, as has happened for example in Yugoslavia.[362] Even before independence has been accomplished, fear for ethnic domination – mainly by the largest tribe the Dinka – has started. Beswick (2004) refers to a downright "Dinkaphobia"[363] based on the experience of century-long Dinka expansion, which led to Dinkas widely being referred to as the new colonisers of the South.

2.3.2 Formation of identity in the South

The southern Sudanese identity is not the official or dominant identity of Sudan, yet, it is the identity of a compact minority and maybe soon of a new state. Identity formation in the South occurred in close association with the North. As a matter of fact, identity in the South can be considered an identity of resistance. According to Abusharaf (2009), the North-South conflict "has proven the most intractable to political settlement" and "[n]ationalism and the quest for a unified cultural identity have proven especially deadly, as northern-dominated governments have stressed Arabism and Islamism as a main frame of reference for the inculcation of national subjectivity, while southern movements have resisted the imposition of these measures."[364] Southern identity has proved resistant to attempts of Islamisation and Arabisation and the two parts share a long history of violent conflict over the issue.

[361] cf. Ben-Dor (1999), p. 11 ff.
[362] cf. Jalali and Lipset (1998), p. 333
[363] Beswick (2004), p. 207
[364] Abusharaf (2009), p. 21 f.

Southern identity formation is a process of resistance, which started when the South was a hunting ground for slaves. During centuries of violent interaction, southern Sudanese developed a distrust that Deng (1995) describes to be a "deep-rooted suspicion and hatred of any foreigners coming from the North; they regarded all of them as invaders and exploiters."[365] Memories of institutionalised slavery "has indeed remained the most glaring reminder of the bitter history of North-South, Arab-African hostilities and animosities"[366] and "emerges as proof of Arab duplicity, arrogance, and contempt for the African to feed more contemporary issues of African dissatisfaction."[367] Abusharaf (2009) agrees that "[t]he kaleidoscope of events surrounding the enslavement of southerners is the most frequently remembered atrocity etched in the collective of Southern Sudanese communities."[368]

What matters for southern Sudanese today is primarily the history, which is still influencing them directly. "[P]eople reconstruct their past in light of their present and interpret their present in light of their past."[369] History also determines the present when it is reproduced; "when history repeats itself, as recent allegations of the return to slavery have tragically demonstrated, and those wounds are reopened, whatever prospects for healing there might be are considerably diminished."[370] Anti-Slavery International estimates that there are still some 10.000 southern Sudanese slaves unaccounted for.[371] "What counts the most for southerners are the historical practices that still have practical implications in their present context. The history of the North-South relations has more contemporary significance for them than the historical conduct of the now far removed Europeans."[372]

During the Anglo-Egyptian condominium rule, people in the South developed a sense of identity based on both indigenous elements and Christian Western cultural norms.[373] Although the condominium administration was essentially secular, it permitted and encouraged Christian missionary societies to operate within the South, where they

[365] Deng (1995), p. 71
[366] Deng (1995), p. 74
[367] Collins (2005), p. 27
[368] Abusharaf (2009), p. 31
[369] Abusharaf (2009), p. 31
[370] Deng (1995), p. 75
[371] cf. BBC (04.05.2010)
[372] Deng (1995), p. 76
[373] cf. Deng (1995), 77 ff.

offered education and medical services. Christianity slowly found its place in southern society. At the beginning, it was much more associated with modern skills and literacy than with the adaptation of a new spiritual order. Finally, Christian education has fostered a new sense of identity that transcended tribal loyalties and created a southern nationalist sentiment that was intrinsic as well as anti-North. After independence, the southern Sudanese rejected the vision of national identity imposed by the North and instead asserted their own narratives of national identity.[374]

Especially after independence, Christianity has become an important vehicle of shielding oneself from Islamisation, while at the same time complementing southern Sudanese's secularist ideas of a state. Christianity has become an essential component of political identity among southern Sudanese and is understood as a political, social and cultural movement against the North.[375] In fact, the governments' policy of forced assimilation and domination based on segregation, contrary to its intention, ended in strengthening the southern Sudanese's ties with Christianity. When the northern Sudanese army took control in November 1958, Major General Ibrahim Abboud launched a crude attempt at forced Islamisation in Equatoria and Bar el-Ghazal. In 1964, he passed a Missionaries Act, which expelled all European missionaries from the South, followed by executions of all Southern Christian Pastors and, when possible, their congregations. As a reaction to this violent prohibition of Christianity, southern Sudanese started to embrace it even more fervently, for it now represented the religion of resistance.[376] The governments' blatant contempt and racist attitudes towards the southern culture, including their religion, sparked mass conversion to Christianity. Two Comboni missionaries, Barsella and Buixot (1998), explained that the "process of Islamization in Southern Sudan as a whole was a failure in spite of the energy and resources used."[377] Beswick (2004) summarises, "[f]rom a religious point of view, therefore, South Sudanese have undergone a religious revolution that is closely connected to politics. Since this time Christianity has been the means by which to tie the South into a unified block as well as to connect it to the Western

[374] cf. Idris (2005), p. 13 ff.
[375] cf. Idris (2005), p. 66 ff.
[376] cf. Beswick (2004), p. 202 ff.
[377] Barsella and Guixot (1998), p. 30

world. It has also become a powerful weapon to resist the last several decades of the Northern Sudan government's policy of forced Islamization in the South."[378]

Southern communities have retained a cohesiveness, plus sense of solidarity and pride in their indigenous identity and Christian faith, which is not easy to change. Large parts of southern Sudanese are profoundly committed to Christianity and take any attempt to be Islamised and Arabised as an intolerable offence to their integrity, religion and tradition. Yet, "faced with the increasing dominance of the Arab Muslim identity within the new framework of the nation-state", the traditional southern Sudanese "is becoming less self-confident and basically defensive."[379] In the modern state, southern Sudanese found themselves disadvantaged. Deng (2005) explains that "[w]hile the benefits of change affected a relatively narrow group within the community, it was more widely accepted that the traditional culture and way of life were indeed inferior. The subordinated masses, seeing that they were discriminated against as inferior by those wielding superior power, turned this value judgement into a truism."[380] Southern Sudanese perceived themselves to be economically and socially deprived in comparison with the North. Suffering from humiliation and feeling that there was no justice in the political system, at the same time increasingly suffering from discrimination, violence, oppression and intolerance, southern Sudanese distanced themselves more and more from the idea of being part of one legitimate state.

However, southern identity being an identity of resistance also means being an identity which highly depends on its context; in fact, it has to be questioned, whether the identity of southern Sudanese is strong enough to bond people together once the shared enemy vanishes, independence is accomplished and the uniting factor of resistance ceases. Numerous feuds and wars fought between the many southern communities – above all over scarce resources – leave a legacy of grievance, memories of slave and cattle raids, and territory lost to stronger groups. As Iyob and Khadiagala (2006) point out, "southerners insist on a homogenous identity that hardly stands the test of inquiry, mainly because of the contentious relations that have marred inter-

[378] Beswick (2004), p. 205
[379] Deng (1995), p. 202
[380] Deng (1995), p. 211

communal relations in the past and that mirror the internecine rivalries of the guerrilla armies of the twentieth century."[381] The identity conflict is, therefore, by far not limited to the Sudan as a whole. Instead, an independent South, too, will have to come to terms with its own heterogeneous society and their internal identity conflict.

2.3.3 A constructionist analysis of the identity of South Sudan

In the foregoing chapters, it has been pointed out in detail that identity formation in southern Sudan is, first and foremost, a product of resistance. In the following lines, southern identity will be analysed in detail, as has been done with the official national identity above. It will be investigated, how comprehensive it is and whether it is rather self-ascribed or ascribed by others. Furthermore, which intra-group bonds tie members together and how substantial they are.

Comprehensiveness

The way identity has been formed in the South, plays an important role in its comprehensiveness today. In fact, tribal conflicts and rivalries between the innumerable ethnic groups in the South have been going on for long. The biggest ethnic group in the South, the Dinka, have been at war with their closely related Nilotic neighbours, the Nuer, for at least three centuries and wrong-doing by one people or clan against another are rarely forgotten through the generations. Yet, when the Turko-Egyptian forces started to penetrate into the South in 1821, the southern Sudanese historical era, in which intra-Southern events dominated people's lives, temporarily came to an end. "Now, externally generated traumas would equally, although not exclusively, consume the lives of Southern peoples."[382] In these times, the era of resistance started, which continues until today and tends to overshadow internal divide in the South.

At the national level, southern identity plays an important role in organising life. Southern national identity became a significant part of southern Sudanese's own self-concepts and a basis of collective action. People who are not from the South are collectively considered as jallabas; even southern Sudanese who have taken refuge in northern Sudan are, upon their return, frequently excluded as jallabas. In the

[381] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 37
[382] Beswick (2004), p. 195

official discourse of a united South and with the collective aim of forming an independent state, southern identity appears to be thick. In their daily lives, however, people feel primarily loyal to their own communities. After decades of war between North and South, a distinct and unified identity, other than shared sentiments of resistance, is still missing. Southern identity plays little role in organising social life and social group action can be reduced to political claims. Identification with the southern identity is not skin deep and plays no important role in organising life in the South. Instead family, clan, and tribe are the most concrete institutions of identity.

Type of assignment

With the beginning of the slave raids, southern Sudanese came to be viewed by their reference groups as inferior, as pagans and as slaves. Flexible racial categories have been institutionalised by the colonial government and then been taken up by the post-colonial independent state. Instead of embracing this purely negative image of inferiority, southern Sudanese responded with defiance and redefined their identity according to their own understanding of who they are. Yet, this self-image continues to be based, primarily, on resistance. Up to today, mistrust of all that is Arab and northern pervades the nationalistic views of some southern Sudanese.[383] Internal conflicts and tribal wars are played down, while the ethnic chasm which separates northern and southern Sudanese is exaggerated.

Same as in the North, in the South history is being retold according to present intentions. As Abusharaf (2009) explains, "Southerners recount incidents from recent Sudanese history that, in their eyes, demonstrate the untrustworthiness and brutality of Arabs. The act of remembering, rather than history as such, is at play in the process of constructing the Arab as a contemptible enemy; the past matters only because it echoes recent conflicts, not because it evokes 'ancient' antagonism."[384] Although the colonisers have a great and well-known share in the creation of insurmountable obstacles to national unity, southern Sudanese today put almost exclusively blame on the northern political parties and successive governments since independence. Stories of resistance to Arabisation circulate widely and fuel dissent and

[383] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 29 ff.
[384] Abusharaf (2009), p. 31

resistance. Missionaries have also contributed to the way remembering is practised today, for they used every opportunity to keep southern Sudanese's memories of enslavement alive. The centrality of slavery to the missionary education system shaped southern Sudanese subjectivity and through listening to their own biographies over and over again, identity was formed up.

Discriminatory practices within Arabic-speaking communities towards southern Sudanese advanced a sense of marginality as southern Sudanese increasingly became aware of their lower ranks in society. Accepting the national claim to Arabism, for southern Sudanese, in fact, would mean accepting an inferior status and exclusion from the national identity. Therefore, they maintain resistance. Southern Sudanese have been told by the outside world that they are racially distinctive from the rest of the Sudanese and been graded as inferior. They have rejected this negative image and started to claim their own identity as southern Sudanese Africans and often Christians. Unfortunately, however, their own conceptions of themselves have found little acknowledgement in the North and in the course of time slowly relegated. Southern identity is clearly a reaction to the image others are trying to impose on them. Southern identity is held up when calling for the right to form an independent state, but breaks away when the common enemy vanishes. While the outside world refers to the people of the South as "southerners" a southern Sudanese himself/herself feels much more loyal to his/her tribe, clan or family. Being a southern Sudanese in this context is, in the first instance, a statement in reference to not being an "Arab". Therefore, it can be considered as primarily ascribed by others.

Nature of bonds holding members together

Southern Sudanese form a self-conscious population that defines itself in terms of common descent (southern Sudan as homeland), a distinctive history (slavery and oppression), and a broad set of cultural symbols (cloth, food, etc). Above all, however, southern Sudanese share interest, the interest to protect themselves from northern oppression, to resist and to protect their rights.

Shared political, economic and status interests are fundamental to Southern Sudanese group mentality and solidarity. As has been shown ahead, southern Sudanese form a national movement and claim the

formation of an own independent state. Therefore, the shared interest is extremely strong in bonding members together. It is basically the trigger that sparked the emergence of a unifying identity in the South in first place. Although bonds of interests are very strong, they are also fickle and as conditions change, shared interests that used to bond people together might also change, as has happened before. When regional autonomy was attained with the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement in 1972, a fierce competition between returning refugees, Anya Nya soldiers and those who had remained inside started. During this time, tribalism increased drastically, and the elite's political culture, obsessed with job-distribution, prompted an increasing emergence of a Dinka domination issue at the end of the 1970s, which has not ceased to this day.[385] As Tvedt (1994) suggests "the question of distribution of positions soon became an obsessive game".[386] Ethnic distribution of administrative posts had for decades been a central conflict in the South and escalated when the political struggle against the North lost importance. In fact, "[w]hatever universalistic ideology about a 'Southern cause' existed among state administrators in the first years after regional autonomy was attained, evaporated quickly in this inter-tribal conflict about control and jobs."[387] Soon calls for decentralisation and re-division could be heard, as the historic fear of Dinka domination was vehemently reinforced. In the early 1980s, Dinka and other Nilotics were expelled from Equatoria,[388] and a campaign for a separate Equatoria Region to escape Dinka domination was initiated.[389] In the moment when the shared interest of resistance broke away, universalism immediately broke away, too, and rendered into tribalism, fierce internal competition and disintegration.

When circumstances change through secession in July 2011, also the main shared interest of resistance against the North disappears. The South is still chronically underdeveloped and the battle over sparse resources and the protection of one's community supersedes all national identification. Even before independence has been accomplished, universalism is being ousted by factionalism. Same as during the Addis

[385] cf. Tvedt (1994), p. 70 ff.
[386] Tvedt (1994), p. 73
[387] Tvedt (1994), p. 81
[388] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 85 ff.
[389] cf. Johnson (2004), p. 51 ff.

Ababa Peace, the question of “who is ruling” seems to be much more important than the question of “how”.

The most important shared institution bonding people together is certainly the GOSS and the SPLM, which is also forming part of the Government of National Unity. Among southern Sudanese, the SPLM is understood to be the only party which is able to enforce their rights, since they are the only group that holds significant military power. Unfortunately, confidence into the SPLM about stops here; for many the SPLM is only attractive in its function as protector against the North. After decades of civil war the administration of the South is completely underdeveloped and politicians are more concerned with their individual advancement than with the advancement of the emerging nation. Corruption is omnipresent and preventing the South from developing. SPLM members in the South have a strong tendency to be rather loyal to their own families, clans, and communities, than to the southern Sudanese society as a whole. People have started to resist taxation and do not agree to the official rule. SPLM institutions in the South are still weak, often random; so far they have failed in forming a South-wide government respected by the people beyond mere desire of resistance to the North.[390] Although institutions can be considered to be strong enough to promote independence, nevertheless, colossal reason for serious doubt whether institutions are strong enough to hold southern Sudanese together after secession remains.

Southern Sudanese are further bond together through their participation in a common culture. Most notably to disassociate themselves from the official Arab identity of the country, southern Sudanese have formed a strong African identity. In their resistance to the North, southern Sudanese appear to form a homogenous group with a shared African culture, widely shared religious beliefs, and English as common lingua franca. Yet, without reference to the North, southern Sudanese are extremely heterogeneous. Their shared understanding of who they are is primarily based on shared experience and the shared history of slavery and northern oppression. Although the South is widely referred to as dominated by Christian belief, as has been pointed out before, Christianity has basically found its way into southern identity in its function as a means of resistance against Islamisation. Next to the

[390] cf. Refugees International (26.03.2010)

Christian “overcoat”, many southern Sudanese have remained loyal to their local beliefs, based on their tribal roots.[391] Also, there is a substantial Muslim community, which will be joined by converted IDPs returning from the North. Although English is officially considered lingua franca, by far not all southern Sudanese speak it. Local dialects continue being dominant and Arabic is used widely throughout the area. Those southern Sudanese who spent many years in Khartoum, who were brought up or even born there, usually have Arabic as their first and only language, a deficit for which they are likely to be discriminated against in the South. It is questionable, if the shared culture is strong enough to make up for the lack of a shared interest once independence is accomplished, and to compensate for the weak institutions of the region.

As for now, southern identity plays an important role in organising life, but how will the situation change after independence? As Streck (2007) points out, since more than 100 years, southern Sudanese have become used to Khartoum being an external arbitral authority and it remains to be seen if other conflict lines – which in the beginning were overshadowed by desire for peace and oil wealth – will re-emerge and dominate the situation.[392] Until today, all references to a southern identity have to be considered as temporary and remain to be analysed again under the light of upcoming political developments. Beyond doubt, ethnicity and identity in the South have been transformed into nationalism; southern Sudanese claim the right over the territory they inhabit and have voted for independence.[393] Nevertheless, “[a]fter decades of war between north and south Sudan, the absence of a distinct and unified southern identity is a deep rooted issue that citizens of south Sudan must overcome in their quest to establish an independent state.”[394] The South having been identified as a national movement, in the following paragraphs it will be reviewed what the terms nation, nationalism and separatism refer to and which meaning they have in the context of the South.

[391] cf. Beswick (2004), p. 205
[392] cf. Streck (2007), p. 137, ff.
[393] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)
[394] Refugees International (26.03.2010)

3 Nation, nationalism and separatism

When the idea of the nation state emerged in Western Europe,

> [t]he notion of man's freedom identified with nationalism spread like an ideological prairie fire from this time on, and had as its chief components the ideas of a sovereign independence of people with homogeneous characteristics – common language, history, literature, religion or culture, the state as the embodiment of the people's will, equality expressed in the electorate with the numerical majority as the ruling element, and this new social form of nationality as 'the source of all creative cultural energy and economic well-being.'[395]

Unfortunately, the confusion of what is a state and what is a nation, and the insistence that the two concepts described the same thing, has been cause for suffering and war ever after. A state is a legal community, which binds people together through common citizenship.[396] The main components of the state are decision making structures (executives, parties, parliaments), decision-enforcing institutions (bureaucracies, parastatal organisations, and security forces), and decision-mediating bodies (primarily courts, tribunals, and investigatory commissions).[397] A nation on the contrary "is a collectivity which has moral claim over the territory it inhabits; it is the fusion of territory and culture which gives birth to nationhood."[398] Nationalism is a political sentiment and movement; "an ideological formulation of identity".[399] There are various forms of nationalism, such as political nationalism, Zionism and ethno-nationalism.[400] Although nationalism is commonly based on ethnic ties, it is not the same as ethnicity; under certain circumstances, ethnicity can, however, become nationalist.

Walker Connor (1998), a pioneer in the nationalism studies,[401] distinguishes between nationalism and patriotism; the first referring to an emotional attachment to one's people, one's ethnonational group, the second referring to an emotional attachment to one's state or country and its political institutions. He explains that in the case of "true nation-states", in which borders of an ethnonational group closely coincidence with the borders of a state, nationalism and patriotism reinforce each

[395] Kohn (1955), p. 10 quoted in Schermerhorn (1978), p. 134
[396] cf. Oommen (1994), p. 43 ff.
[397] cf. Chazan et al. (1990), p. 39
[398] Oommen (1994), p. 45
[399] Young (1976), p. 71
[400] cf. Bolaffi et al. (2003), 200 ff.
[401] cf. Conversi (2002), p. 1

other.[402] Yet, most states are not nation states, but multination states, containing at least two statistically and/or politically significant groups, often many more. “Ethnic heterogeneity and *not* homogeneity is therefore the rule.”[403]

In fact, in times of belated national unifications and annexations, the central idea that uniformity and homogeneity were good, while any form of pluralism was considered bad, dominated. Yet, national boundary lines are impossible to be drawn with the exactitude demanded by the norm of homogeneity and minority groups are automatically produced.[404] In Africa, for example, the legacy of colonialism is reflected in a tremendous number of plural states. As a matter of fact, “colonial states are the *classical form* of plural societies” meaning societies with “maximal enclosure of ethnic groups”.[405] Kymlicka (2004) accordingly describes the term nation state as misleading, since 90 per cent of the current states are being shared by more than one national group and boundaries have been drawn to include the territory occupied by pre-existing and often previously self-governing cultures. Nevertheless, modern states typically aspire to be nation states and have adopted various nation-building programmes to achieve greater national integration and homogeneity. The author, therefore, concludes that these states might not be nation states, but nation-building states.[406]

Colonial states have been rapidly labelled “nations” regardless to whether they were maintained as one entity or broken into fragments. Oommen (1994) consequently concluded: “It is this erroneous labelling of states as nations that is at the root of a large number of problems experienced by the ‘new nations’ of Asia and Africa.”[407] Today, minorities and majorities commonly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalisation policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national anthem or public holidays.[408] As a matter of fact, states are not constrained to promote one single societal culture, but can encourage the sustaining of two or more

[402] cf. Connor (1998), p. 41 ff.
[403] Connor (1998), p. 43
[404] cf. Dallmann (2002), p. 324
[405] Schermerhorn (1978), p. 148
[406] cf. Kymlicka (2004), p. 54 ff.
[407] Oommen (1994), p. 37
[408] cf. Kymlicka (1995), p. 1

societal cultures.[409] Since multination states need their national groups to feel some kind of alliance to the larger political community they cohabit, they often forcefully impose one national identity. Yet, a shared patriotism should be enough. National groups feel alliance to the larger state when it recognises and respects their distinct national existences and when they benefit from their membership[410], not when being forced to. Beyond doubt, complete and uncontested homogeneity is not achievable, neither with nor without violence.

Krieger (1998) critically remarks that many so-called nation states are in fact quasi-nation states or nominal-nation states, as they do not fulfil structural criteria of a nation state such as the existence of a central-instance holding a legitimate monopoly on the use of force; the existence of a civil society; institutional separation of powers; the granting of human rights through basic rights for all citizens. The majority of nation states outside Europe were created during colonialism and lack tradition. Characteristically, in these quasi-states power is of despotic and not of structural nature, meaning that state elites have to enforce their will onto individuals and groups instead of being able to rely on structures to reach achievement. Accordingly, in the so-called weak states, politics of the government are not embedded in civic consensus, but have to be implemented through force.[411]

The territorial boundaries of virtually all African countries divide autochthonous ethnic and, in large number of cases, veritable "would-have-been nationality groups"[412] between various states. Yet, although Africa might be the "most ethnically complex continent on this planet"[413] most borders in this world whether in Africa, in Europe or elsewhere, are not natural. If they seem so it is because states have succeeded in giving citizens a reason to identify with the state and to embrace it as their own. In Africa people tend to view themselves as part of collectives, thus destabilising the national unit. If such collectives feel excluded from power and perceive their rights being violated, they often feel obliged to use force to either bring themselves into power or to accomplish secession. As Connor (1998) points out, when the two loyalties of

[409] cf. Kymlicka (2007a), p. 33 ff.
[410] cf. Kymlicka (1995), p. 11 ff.
[411] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 122 ff.
[412] Oyelaran and Adediran (1997), p. 178
[413] Oyelaran and Adediran (1997), p. 177

nationalism and patriotism are perceived as being in irreconcilable conflict, meaning when people are forced to choose between them, nationalism customarily proves the more potent,[414] thus sparking separatism.

Nationalists seek distinct corporate rights for the group as a whole within an encompassing state or a certain degree of political autonomy. Through "assertions of peoplehood and common cultural heritage and on appeal to the past, to blood ties, and to shared understandings and practices that set the group apart from other groups"[415] nationalists feel entitled to claim self-determination. There have been basically two waves of nationalism, the anti-colonial movements and the post-colonial independence movements of nations which have been included into a nominal-multination state often involuntarily and followed by the continuation of oppression.[416] In African, and to less extent in Latin American countries, nationalism was hardly developed at the moment of independence. Young (1976) explains that in Africa some countries "acquired sovereignty almost by default".[417] The new political elites inherited the previously described nationalist idea and were then bound to follow it. Although in certain instances cultural identities may become politicised, mobilised, and ideologised to the point that they result in nationalist movement, in most instances conflicts arise over distribution of resource and advantage within the given state context.[418] Nationalism is not necessarily based on pre-existing ethnic ties, but the movements sometimes try to create or enhance common identities. Nationalism therefore claims that there are certain similarities within a population that should form the basis of its political unity. These similarities can be either assumed or real.

The call for an own nation is frequently triggered by the way a state is treating its minorities. And sometimes the separatist impulse threatens and disturbs dominant powers to an extent that it improves the situation of minorities in a country and helps to make the lives of the oppressed a bit better.[419] There are several ways a state can deal with a minority. One option is to insist on assimilation. Although assimilation strategies

[414] Connor (1998), p. 54
[415] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 36
[416] cf. Nagel (1998), p. 346
[417] Young (1976), p. 72
[418] cf. Young (1976), p. 70 ff.
[419] cf. Young (1995), p. 164

are often said to help the minority group in achieving equal rights and a better social standing, in fact they often inflict suffering and loss of dignity, since the minority is taught that their own culture and tradition is of no value. A second option is domination, usually based on segregation on ethnic grounds. In this case, there is always power asymmetry prevalent and the majority seeks to maintain group boundaries. A third option would be the state adopting an ideology of multiculturalism, thus not relying on cultural identity in its distribution of citizenship and full civil rights. The last – and most human and just option – will be discussed in detail in chapter IV 3.3. The minority can respond to these actions with assimilation, subordination or – as in the case of nationalist movements – secession.[420]

Castles and Davidson (2000) explain that "if a group is marginalized by strongly negative other-definitions (that is, racist structures and practices), it may emphasise its cultural identity as a source of resistance."[421] Herewith, the dominant group's very fear of separatism can be reinforced, prompting even more discrimination. In fact, secession results more from failure than the objective impossibility to achieve viable and fair pluri-ethnic coexistence within the borders of the same state. Therefore, usually there are only two choices, either continuous ethnic discrimination and tension or secession. Self-determination herewith is turned into a peace-keeping measure.[422]

Nevertheless, nationalist movements seeking for independence from an officially recognised and independent state usually meet little international support; "[s]ecessionists in the postwar epoch have elicited an icy response in their search for external support."[423] Although colonialists have drawn national borders most arbitrarily in Africa, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) made it a firm and official diplomatic doctrine to maintain them. At its first conferences in Addis Ababa (1963) and Cairo (1964), the OAU established a charter stating that one of its purposes was to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state.[424] This firm stand in large part arose from the fact that in Africa more or less every state has such a plural society that fragmentation

[420] cf. Eriksen (2002), p. 121 ff.
[421] Castles and Davidson (2000), p. 63
[422] cf. Bornträger (1999), p. 72 ff., 95 ff.
[423] Young (1976), p. 81
[424] cf. Bornträger (1999), p. 46 ff.

could occur about everywhere. Southern Sudan, for example, in spite of having a strong claim upon the moral sympathies of the world at large, during the first civil war did not encounter any serious diplomatic support for its claim for a separate state. Instead of accomplishing independence, therefore they had to settle for limited autonomy, trying to coexist peacefully in the given state of Sudan.

3.1 Southern nationalism

Nationalism in post-colonial Sudan was, to a large extent, invented[425] and none of the consecutive regimes ever made a serious effort to unite the ethnonational groups. Instead, to impose their new political order on the population and to bring those elements trying to resist into conformity, the state elite used force. As has been pointed out before, the nation-building process resulted in the opposite of its intent and formed sub-identities and sharp divisions rather than a united Sudanese society.[426] Sudan, as the state that we know today, has not existed before colonialism and southern Sudan has been included into the frontiers against its will. As in many African countries, the anti-colonial leadership transformed the arbitrary colonial state into a nation.[427]

Most citizens of Sudan do not benefit from their formal citizenship. Not surprisingly, there is a strong southern national sentiment within the people of the South, who have been identified as a compact minority before (cf. III 2.3.1). With ongoing discrimination and marginalisation, southern Sudanese came to feel that there was no legitimate state and no obligation to obey to it. In fact, in a country like Sudan, where state structures are extremely weak, nationalism is likely to be based on ethnic distinctions instead of being based on the idea that everyone who lives in the same country has the same rights and privileges.[428]

The southern national movement reflects the desire for a more equitable distribution of political and economic power. The South fights a typical political struggle in which "one party feels alienated and has no loyalty to the nation of which it is an acknowledged part".[429] According to Eriksen (2002), southern Sudanese as an ethnic group could be described as a "proto-nation". As he states, "these groups have political leaders who

[425] cf. Eriksen (2002), p. 102
[426] cf. Ronen (1999), p. 77
[427] Young (1976), p. 93
[428] cf. Brown (1997), p. 83 ff.
[429] Oyelaran and Adediran (1997), p. 175

claim that they are entitled to their own nation-state and should not be 'ruled by others'."[430] Southern Sudanese can, hence, be viewed as a nation without a state, an ethno-nationalist movement.

Separation might seem an easy exit, if a group of people believes that its ethnic security, linguistic and religious aspirations or economic development cannot be satisfied in the current nation state. The shortcoming of communal safety and cultural fulfilment could then be assured by the new state which reflects the solidarity of the separating group. Yet, secession "is a costly adventure, which can only be contemplated when perceived cultural threat reaches an extraordinary level of immediacy",[431] as in the case of South Sudan. As a matter of fact, states rarely break away voluntarily. In Sudan, the central government has chosen to deal with its minorities through forced assimilation and domination, leaving them no other choice but pleading for secession. Khalid (1992) explains that

> [n]orthern Sudanese have, traditionally, dismissed all legitimate grievances expressed by the marginalised regions of the country as racist or secessionist causes although those grievances were championed by respectable regional politicians and political parties acting within the bounds of the established system such as the Sudan African National Union (SANU) in the South, the Beja Congress in the East and the Nuba Mountain Union in the Centre West. Those regional movements that pleaded for justice and equality were, invariably, depicted by Northerners as fractious racial movements conjuring up hatred between non-Arabs and Arabs.[432]

Already at independence, the South has tried to accomplish a separate state, but was denied its aspiration and persuaded to agree to alleged federalism. Since all claims for equal inclusion in the post-colonial state continued to be ignored, the people of the South entered into a civil war. The first southern national movement, the Anya Nya, began the struggle more or less empty handed. Receiving little international support, the political-military struggle failed to lead to independence, as has happened to many other African nationalist movements, and southern politicians settled for autonomy.[433] Peace was short-lived as agreements continued to be dishonoured. Twenty-two years later, after another devastating civil war, politicians of the South and the northern central

[430] Eriksen (2002), p. 14
[431] Young (1976), p. 460
[432] Khalid (1992), p. 2
[433] cf. Young (1976), p. 489 ff.

government once again concluded a peace agreement, which, although promoting to make unity attractive, in fact, is another attempt to accomplish independence. John Garang, the leader of the SPLA had a vision of creating a New Sudan, in which all the people of the country would enjoy equal rights. Yet, this idea has always been contested and for some it was merely a vehicle to accomplish international support. Therefore, when Garang died, his idea basically died with him. Today, it is out of question that the South aspires to full secession, which southern Sudanese clearly expressed when 99% of them voted for separation.[434]

4 Conclusion: Who are the Sudanese?

Previous chapters have revealed that northern and southern Sudanese strongly cling to separate and incompatible national identities which are to a great extent based on false assumptions and exaggerated commonalities within their own groups. The official national identity has been found to have an extraordinary strong influence in organising life in northern Sudan, albeit, primarily through the use of force. The southern identity has been found to be less firm as it continues to depend strongly on resistance against the North as unifying factor. Southern identity obtains its importance primarily in the nationalistic discourse, but aside of that continues to have little influence. Due to the far-reaching implications of the inclusion or exclusion into the national identity in Sudan, it has been – and continues to be – fiercely contested and constant cause for often violent conflict.

Interestingly, the official national identity does not only exclude southern Sudanese but also to large extent northern Sudanese. The national identity is based on an alleged genealogy, which is factually wrong and contradicting to the outer appearance even of the so-called Sudanese Arabs, thus, leading to discrimination against them in the Arab world. The truth is that both groups of the country, Arabic speakers of the North as well as southern Sudanese, exaggerate the ethnic chasm that separates them. Even without reference to the South, northern Sudanese by no means form a cohesive group. Some northern areas accepted Arabisation and Islamisation to a much lower degree than others and are facing exclusion, too. The Nubians of northern Sudan, for

[434] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)

example, have entered into civil resistance in form of the "Nubian Alliance". Through this, they try to protect themselves against economic and cultural marginalisation and Arabisation as well as the destruction of their homeland through the building of retaining dams.[435] Not even calls for self-determination are limited to the South anymore. On August 3rd 2010 a senior Darfuri rebel stated that "[t]he people of Darfur will soon be left with no option but to demand the right of self-determination in a manner similar to Southern Sudan."[436] Large numbers of northern Sudanese do not comply with the religious fundamentalism promoted by the Sudanese government. In fact, the adoption of Shari'a as main source of governance has been contested over years, not only by non-Muslims but also by secular Muslims who firmly believe in separation between religion and the state in a pluralistic society.[437]

Conformity in the North can only be accomplished through oppression. On the surface and in sight for the outer world, many northern Sudanese profess the orthodox Islam expected from them and comply with the official rules. Yet, inside, behind the walls, everything can be different. Especially northern Sudanese women, who spend large part of their time protected from outside observance and segregated from men, have maintained pre-Islamic and also pre-Christian views. While the men of the family proudly present their orthodox belief to the outside world, the women silently practise their own, superstitious beliefs inside.[438] Although men and women alike might claim to be orthodox Muslims, many strongly believe in A'in, the evil eye which is believed to bring about illness or even death, and the Zar cult, in the ceremonies of which women shall be freed from the Zar daemon.[439] Accordingly it can be concluded that, in private, northern Sudanese are much less orthodox and fundamentalist in their religious beliefs and attitudes than official rhetoric suggests.

About southern Sudanese it can also be said that they are much less orthodox in their beliefs than usually assumed. Although the South has come to be considered widely Christianised, the people of the South still cling to their traditional beliefs and practise simultaneously their ancient

[435] cf. Schmidinger (2006), p. 202
[436] Sudan Tribune (04.08.2010)
[437] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 29 ff.
[438] cf. Streck (2007), p. 114 ff.
[439] cf. Ismail and Makki (1999), p. 94 ff.

religions alongside newly acquired Christianity, and sometimes, Islam. Within the Dinka culture and history, for example, totems continue to be very important even for those who have officially accepted Christianity.[440] As has been seen, Christianity has been embraced at large with the intention of resisting forced Islamisation; identity in the South to great extent can be interpreted as counter-culture. In conversations with southern Sudanese Muslims and Christians, it has become clear that to majority of them religion is a private matter. They are extremely tolerant to other religions and often Muslims, Christians and Animists can be found in the same family. Therefore, it can be concluded that both ordinary northern and ordinary southern Sudanese in private are much more moderate in their beliefs and attitudes than in public and that the fundamentalism implemented by the government does not mirror the attitudes of the gross of the Sudanese.

The government of Sudan for decades has insisted in maintaining the country unified under the one umbrella of orthodox Islam and herewith alienated many, even sparking movements of violent resistance. At the same time, they have done little to make being part of Sudan attractive to the majority of people. The government has herewith provoked exactly the opposite of what it had intended. Instead of assimilating themselves minority groups opted for resistance. A group of people, as in the case of southern Sudanese, simply cannot feel part of a society if its very self-definition denies them political and moral legitimacy. The state has failed to provide an inclusive definition of national identity. The current exclusive definition alienates minorities and even some sections of the dominant group and discourages a common sense of belonging. Marginalisation has serious consequences for the socio-economic development of the different areas of the country and continues to spark violent conflicts over claims for economic, political, legal, religious, social, cultural equality; fair share of natural resources; and resistance to racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination.

As has been seen in Sudan and other countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and many other developing countries, not even the harshest attempts of oppression and forcible assimilation have any chance to homogenise a multicultural society.[441] At the moment, the majority

[440] cf. Beswick (2006), p. 98 ff.
[441] cf. Parekh (2000), 165 ff.

community defines itself as the nation and seeks to monopolise the state, therefore clearly sparking the defensive reaction of resistance in southern Sudanese and other marginalised groups. In the case of the South, distrust against northern Sudanese, who are altogether considered Arabs or jallaba, is deeply planted into the collective consciousness of southern Sudanese. “The more bitter the memories, the more intractable the conflicts and the more difficult it becomes to restore normal relations between the communities involved.”[442] In fact, without reconciliation, both sides are likely to be plagued by the duty to cherish the memories of the thousands who died in war and will be compelled to continue with solidarity to the lost. Certainly, without coming to terms with history, southern identity will continue being dominated by sentiments of resistance, making unity well-nigh impossible.

The government has failed to give recognition to the country’s extreme diverse society and to provide equal co-existence of all its components. As a consequence southern Sudanese have clearly voiced their preference for independence. In the following part of the work, concepts which could help to meet demands of recognising the diversity of the people of Sudan will be discussed. Unfortunately, changes need time and time was rare; the referendum has already taken place. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the South is not the only relevant minority in Sudan. Regardless to whether with or without the South, Sudan is in urgent need for new concepts of managing its multicultural society, provided that it wants to prevent complete disintegration. The same can be said about the South, which also needs to establish a reasonable plan for managing its cultural diversity. In order to finally halt violent conflict, all relevant parties should aspire to the formation of a tolerant society, granting the same rights to all the numerous ethnic groups they embrace, for homogeneity is an illusion and – regardless of how much force is being applied – will never be accomplished in Sudan.

[442] Parekh (2000), p. 212

IV Approaches to the multicultural society of Sudan

When speaking about northern and southern identity, one might get the impression that they were the only two competing groups in Sudan or that they were homogeneous within themselves. Yet, none of this is true; there are numerous different groups competing in the country, all of them being heterogeneous within themselves. Unfortunately, lumping people together often leads to misinterpretation and dangerous generalisation, or even the underpinning of wrongly assumed and undesired identities. Therefore, in this paper, in spite of dealing with the North-South conflict and frequently making use of generalising categories, it has been stressed that southern Sudanese are not the only national minority or marginalised group of the country. Exclusion and discrimination are not limited to ethnic or racial criteria, but can, for example, be based on gender, class, political attitude and sexual orientation. By focusing on relations between ethnic groups, these other categories are being obscured and so are relations within the two groups themselves. In this paper, light is shed on relations between distinct ethnic groups and it has to be accepted that not all determining categories or inter- and intra-group relations can be scrutinised in one paper. While various relations are being considered, clear focus is put on issues related to the North-South conflict, most importantly, relations between southern and northern Sudanese and the role of the state.

Chapter II 2.1 has shown that the geographic borders of Sudan embrace an innumerable amount of different ethnic groups, the majority of which, unfortunately, remain marginalised and excluded. As discussed in chapter II 5, underlying the well-known wars in the South and the West, and the less-known conflict in the East, a general hostility between centre and periphery can be found. Hostilities were "perpetuated by the inability of Khartoum at any time in the past 200 years to govern its remote provinces" and "exacerbated by the intellectual, cultural, and economic power of [...] the people of the river, whose increasing economic prosperity contrasted dramatically with the poverty of the marginalised Sudanese."[443] Since independence not a single president

[443] Collins (2008), p. 300 f.

has come from outside the northern region.[444] Regrettably, the centre-periphery divide has long been neglected and also does not find consideration in the CPA. The CPA was exclusively concluded between the NCP and the SPLM; herewith, it added to the frustration of the other marginalised areas struggling for their rights.[445]

Major categories of differentiation in Sudan are ethnicity, race, religion and regionalism. It has been shown that a shared identity in its philosophic meaning will remain an illusion in Sudan, for its people are too diverse to be grouped under one homogenous ideology; even if attempted through appliance of brute force. Accordingly, national identity cannot be based on homogeneity, for homogeneity is far from existing in any part of the country. Instead, it has to be based on shared interest and objectives of people who acknowledge their differences but accept the boundaries of the state. One of the most difficult questions is clearly which political concept could facilitate the peaceful coexistence of the diverse people of Sudan. Based on the fact that the current national identity is factually incorrect and only to the advantage of a small group of people, forthcoming paragraphs will follow up these questions, scrutinise whether democratic transformation is preferable, sensible and feasible, discuss techniques for managing ethnic minorities and review in detail the idea of multiculturalism as a liberal counter-concept to forced assimilation and domination.

How could the state ensure political unity while respecting cultural diversity? Or, more precisely, was the call for separation by the South inevitable considering the plural character of Sudanese society? Simone (1994) believes that if each group in Sudanese society was granted relative autonomy and felt that it could develop its own agenda, entities might naturally move forward to a meeting place with the others.[446] With the southern Sudanese being a compact national minority, only territorial autonomy and at least a proportional share in the central state's administration might provide for a long-lasting settlement of conflict. Bornträger (1999) concluded that "[t]he better the rights of a minority are protected, the more it will be prepared to comply fully with its civic obligations."[447] In the case of Sudan, the rights of southern Sudanese

[444] cf. Gallab (2008), p. 158
[445] cf. Berg (2008), p. 38 ff.
[446] cf. Simone (1994), p. 24 ff.
[447] Bornträger (1999), p. 93

have apparently not been protected sufficiently; after decades of war they have voted for independence.[448] Other nations, such as Darfur, are demanding similar rights as the South; if the regime is not prepared to reconsider its policies, the country might disintegrate completely.

The question of what could have been done to prevent separatist aspirations is otiose; marginalisation and exclusion are notorious. The South has been demanding its rights for decades and consecutive governments have stubbornly proved their complete ignorance of these demands. It has become obvious that the majority of people in Sudan, whether from North or South, are being oppressed in a totalitarian system which denies them freedom and instead causes tremendous suffering for the ordinary people (cf. II 3). Although southern Sudanese have voted for independence, so far the future of the country is unpredictable. Even if the South should accomplish full independence from the North, both parts of the country will still have to newly define themselves.

When discussing alternative concepts to forced assimilation and oppression in the following paragraphs, the question of whether Western-based concepts – such as liberal democracy, secularism, federalism and multiculturalism – can even be applied to non-Western countries, will be addressed. It will be surveyed if such alternative concepts might be able to provoke positive change towards a more inclusive and just understanding of the state and citizenship in Sudan.

1 Is there room for change in Sudan?

Before looking into the matter of how to correctly approach a society as diverse as the Sudanese, there is the question of whether under current circumstances change in Sudan is feasible. According to findings in chapter II 3, the incumbent authoritarian regime does not show any willingness to facilitate changes. Although over 70 percent of Sudan's population are non-Arabs,[449] the country is being run as an Arab state and governance is based on Shari'a laws. Hasan (2007) concluded that "the conservative notions of Shari'a exclude meaningful space of democracy".[450] More precisely, Shari'a is opposed to democracy in

[448] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)
[449] cf. Collins (2005), p. 5
[450] Hasan (2007), p. 42 f.

principle;[451] it accepts the legality of slavery and supports the conception of warfare as a religious obligation, undertaken in the interest of expanding Islam. Furthermore, its biased treatment of women in marriage, inheritance and leadership is anti-democratic.[452] Public-opinion surveys in Africa do not show significant differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in their support for democracy and tolerance.[453] Yet, in countries of the Arab world to which Sudan affiliates itself, strong tendency of Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam and religious politics that arraign against democracy has been detected. What does this mean for the future of multicultural Sudan, which holds Shari'a as state law? Ake (2000) concludes that it is "becoming increasingly difficult to escape the conclusion that the only response to [the deteriorating] situation and the one way to reduce the hostilities and begin to achieve incremental political coherence is to embrace democracy in the sense of participative negotiated consensus."[454]

As will be shown below, there is no general paradox between Islam, Africa, and democracy. With respect to Muslim countries, Hasan (2007) has illuminatingly explained that to

> fully understand the expanded role of Islam in the politics of Muslim societies, it is important to focus on the state and state elite, to look at them as important actors [...]. For the state, the elite in Muslim countries have often played an important role in embedding Islam politics. The state elite have done so merely in reaction to pressure from Islamist movements, but to serve their own socio-political interest. [...] As centres of power, states regulate collection and disbursement of resources, control policy-making and deeply affect every facet of their citizens' lives.[455]

Apparently, the question of which changes are possible for a country does not primarily depend on religion or culture, but its leadership. The state in Africa is based on the personification of power in all spheres of society. This personification of power implies that every person holding some public power thinks of it as their private property. In the centre of these relations, one great leader can be found, who is virtually the sole leader and who controls all public resources; the state is foremost seen as prey and public posts are the dominant sources of status, prestige,

[451] cf. Abdalla (2003), p. 117
[452] cf. Abdalla (2003), p. 115 ff.
[453] cf. de Waal (2004), p. 3
[454] Ake (2000), p. 32
[455] Hasan (2007), p. 23 f.

power and wealth. Through politics of departicipation, the access to power is mostly being monopolised.[456]

In Sudan, the authoritarian regime is the most serious opponent to democratic transition. Yet, the issue is more complex, as will be discussed further down, since certain styles of leadership require certain societal structures or the absence of such. Although liberal democracy is an "attractive and desirable form of government, especially when various alternatives appear to have failed signally, it is not a panacea"[457] and underlying problems of democracy continue to be apparent today as in the tumultuous days of independence. This is also true for Sudan which had "three spells of liberal democracy under the same simple Westminster-style constitution into which it drifted for want of anything better at independence in 1956".[458] There have also been three military regimes, which did not constitute liable alternatives either. The Sudanese aspire to democratic transformation in contrast to authoritarian oppression, yet, democracy in Sudan will need "further definition if it is to prove stable and effective".[459]

Ever since September 1983, when Nimeiri proclaimed Shari'a laws by presidential decree, events have taken a turn for the worse in Sudan. Nimeiri's military dictatorship was overthrown by a popular uprising. Yet, when the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi began to explore the possibility of ending the civil war with the South and expressed its interest in suspending the Shari'a laws until a final agreement on the future of Sudan would be reached, the next coup d'état took place.[460] The SPLM commented in their layout of their vision and programme on this development:

> The present National Islamic Front [NIF] government is the culmination of the policies of the Khartoum-based governments that have come and gone since independence. In 1989 the Old Sudan split into two, the 'NIF-Sudan' and the original 'Old Sudan'. The NIF Sudan is essentially a fascist mutation from the Old Sudan. It is the ugliest face of the Old Sudan. Both the Old Sudan and NIF-Sudan are based on an institutionalised system of injustices based on racial and religious chauvinism, a fact that has made some commentators to observe that the Sudanese situation is characterised by a system of 'Double Apartheid', racial and religious. Obviously, the myopic vision of both the Old

[456] cf. von Trotha (1995), p. 3 ff.
[457] Woodward (1994), p. 248
[458] Woodward (1994), p. 248
[459] Woodward (1994), p. 248
[460] cf. Abdalla (2003), p. 105

> Sudan and of the NIF-Sudan, can not lead the Sudan into prosperity and happiness, but only into wars and misery as they have already done. The Sudanese people must therefore look for a correct alternative to both the NIF-Sudan and the Old Sudan to lead them into and in the next millennium.[461]

It is difficult to believe that under the current regime any sincere changes are possible. Southern Sudanese have already voted for separation. Yet, separation also means the reshuffling of all cards and the formation of two new societies, both of them religiously, culturally and linguistically plural. In Sudan, pluralities of tribal or national groupings were fused together by the dominant colonialists; historically unrelated cultures came into contact, suddenly competing with each other for political and economic supremacy as members of the same entity. Van de Berghe (1967) remarked that "[g]enerally, the more pluralistic the society as a whole and the political institutions in particular, the more tyrannical the polity."[462] It is important to understand that with separation two pluralistic societies and not two homogenous societies will be formed. Therefore, in consecutive chapters questions of how to deal with such situations will be addressed.

2 The feasibility of democracy in Sudan

Sudan can be described as one of the greatest human rights disasters in this world. Fragmentation and disintegration are just a stone's throw away and might spark yet another civil war and further destabilise the entire area with conflicts cross-cutting national borders. The history of internal conflict is abysmal. From an outside perspective it is obvious that Sudan urgently needs changes. On the surface, it is easy to think of a series of more human alternative political concepts to the one currently applied, with democracy just making a start. However, it would be short sighted to believe that mere imposition of standardised Western concepts would bring about positive and sustainable change. In Sudan, many attempts to bring about change and democratise the system have been undertaken, so far with little or no success. The responsibility of the regime has been emphasised; here some other relevant factors will be considered, such as the Muslim and African character of the country.

[461] SPLA (31.01.2007)
[462] van den Berghe (1967) quoted in Schermerhorn (1967), p. 157

Bornträger (1999) suggests that major linguistic, religious and socio-economic divides can best be accommodated through an integrative cultural policy accompanied by democratic power-sharing.[463] The main reason for considering democratisation or transformation towards a participative negotiated consensus as a sensible development for Sudan, however, is that it is longed for by the majority of Sudanese; the very ones suffering under current conditions. Recently, in January 2011, northern Sudanese have voiced their frustration with the regime in anti-government demonstrations.[464] The SPLM called for a radical socio-political restructuring in Sudan, a restructuring of power and wealth, a New Sudan "that is democratic, secular and united in unity".[465] They claim for the establishment of a real democracy in contrast to the alleged democracies of before.

In spite of the various uses and interpretations that have been made of the term democracy, it has a common core of meanings lying beneath. "At the root of all definitions of democracy, however refined and complex, lies the idea of popular power, of a situation in which power and perhaps authority too, rests with the people."[466] In the following paragraphs, some arguments on the feasibility of democracy in Muslim and African states will be analysed in general and its implications for Sudan in particular. Hereby, the specific context of Sudan being an Arab-African post-colonial country under the rule of an authoritarian, fundamentalist regime will be explored.

2.1 The Muslim context

In much of contemporary Western scholarship Islam is universally blamed for the Muslim world's socioeconomic and political ills and anti-Westernism. Islam is frequently said to support authoritarism, undermine freedom, nurture aggression, oppress women and reinforce premodern hierarchies.[467] The following paragraphs challenge these assumptions and provide a more comprehensive understanding of Islam and its impact on democratisation. As el Fadl (2004) points out, a Muslim jurist writing a few centuries ago on the subject of Islam and government would have described the best political system to be "the caliphate,

[463] cf. Bornträger (1999), p. 57
[464] cf. Sudan Tribune (30.01.2011)
[465] Khalid (1992), p. xxv
[466] Arblaster (1987), p. 8
[467] cf. McDaniel (2005), p. 35

based on Shari'ah law – the body of Muslim religious law founded on Qur'an and the conduct and statements of the prophet. [...] Because it is based on the rule of law and thus deprives human being of arbitrary authority over each other, the caliphate system was considered to be superior to any other."[468] However, attitudes are changing and, although "competitive and party-based elections are not a common feature of the polities of the Muslim world", there is evidence that it can work; however, "provided there is an emphasis on pluralism and equality".[469]

Islam, or what some people presume to be Islam, has much more influence than other world religions in determining the identity and conduct of its adherents;[470] "Islam is a religious belief that covers all aspects of life and denies the validity of any philosophical separation similar to that in the West between 'church' and state."[471] There has been extensive argument that many key aspects of democracy, such as the separation between religion and the state, are lacking in the Islamic tradition. In this discourse it has been concluded that Islam and democracy are incompatible.[472]

On the contrary, el Fadl (2004) believes that it is a question of willpower, an inspired vision and a moral commitment. Yet, he confines that "[f]or Islam, democracy poses a formidable challenge."[473] Bayat (2007) makes an important point, stating that the question of whether Islam is compatible with democracy is the wrong question posed in first place. He writes:

> The question is not whether Islam is or is not compatible with democracy, or, by extension, modernity, but rather under what conditions Muslims can *make* them compatible. Nothing intrinsic to Islam – or, for that matter, to any other religion – makes it *inherently* democratic or undemocratic. *We*, the social agents, determine the inclusive or authoritarian thrust of religions because, from this perspective, religion is nothing but a body of beliefs and ideas that invariably make claims to authentic meaning and a 'higher truth.'[474]

Herewith, he clearly wants to express that religious injunctions are nothing but the people's understanding of them; they are what one makes out of them.

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[468] el Fadl (2004), p. 3
[469] Hasan (2007), p. 11 f.
[470] cf. Eickelman (1997), p. 17 ff.
[471] Khalafalla (2004), p. 1
[472] cf. Voll (2005), p. 86 ff.
[473] el Fadl (2004), p. 4
[474] Bayat (2007), 4

As a matter of fact, today the majority of the world's Muslims live in electoral democracies, although they tend to be weak ones. The assumption that in the Muslim world there is, as a matter of principal, no separation between religious and political spheres is a "myth to which Islamist rhetoric has contributed in considerable measure".[475] Hasan (2007) argues that Muslim leaders maintained the fiction of religion and state being inseparable to legitimise authoritarian rule and to cover up the fact that religious establishment was subservient to temporal authority. As in all politics, Muslim politics involves a contest over state control[476] and individuals and groups with diverse interests and orientations may find their own, often conflicting, truths in the very same religious scriptures.[477]

Furthermore, the experience by Muslim societies with Western imperial rule has contributed to the authoritarian nature of modernising regimes in the Muslim world. Voll (2005) speaks of a "dual heritage of authoritarian reformism and autocratic imperialism",[478] which has shaped the emerging political systems of the Muslim world. Islam is extremely utile for social mobilisation and often abused by leaders. Accordingly, Islam has to be understood within its wider socioeconomic and political context,[479] which, as will be explained further down, is often very similar to that of the majority of developing countries. In fact, the absence of democratic political systems in Muslim and developing countries is much more a product of misdistribution of socioeconomic powers than it is owed to cultural underpinning of these societies; it is inadequate structural setting and not Islam per se.[480]

Only a few people suggest that being democratic and being Muslim are incompatible, but some readily impute antidemocratic sentiments to those who are Muslim.[481] Most Muslim countries have a whole lot in common with the majority of countries surrounding them and struggle with corruption, misgovernance, underdevelopment and their negative impacts on the conditions for civic culture. Relying on surveys on Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia, Hasan (2007)

[475] Hasan (2007), p. 15
[476] cf. Hasan (2007), p. 14 ff.
[477] cf. Bayat (2007), p. 3 ff.
[478] Voll (2005), p. 91
[479] cf. Abootalebi (2000), p. 122
[480] cf. Abootalebi (2000), p. 213 ff.
[481] cf. Eickelman (1997), p. 17 ff.

concludes that "[w]hilst there have been many ups and downs in their political trajectories, there is no evidence of any fundamental incompatibility between Islam and democracy."[482] The fact that these countries have not been successful in the consolidation of democracy, he continues, has to be seen in the context of Third World development and cannot be attributed to the Muslim element per se. At the same time, he remarks that "we should not run away from the fact of tension between Islam and democracy in the politics of Muslim countries", as we see "plenty of countervailing trends in the form of Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam and religious politics that arraign against democracy."[483] If wanting to deal with the question of whether democracy is compatible with Islam, two separate aspects have to be addressed. In the words of Ben-Dor (1999), "[o]ne main theme of this struggle is the distinction between a state of Muslims and a Muslim state, a distinction that is in many ways the crux of the matter in any state claiming to have a religious character."[484] To the question of whether a country of Muslims can, in general, establish democracies, the answer is yes; people have their own understanding of what religion means to them. However, the question of whether Islamic ideas can be incorporated into democracy remains to be answered.

Krieger (1998) clearly negates this question arguing that Islamic democracies do not embrace the judicial standards of citizen and minority rights of liberal democracies. He continues that democracy by definition is a secular form of rule and that any attempt of grounding its institutions on religion inevitably has to bring about discrimination of religious minorities, thus contradicting the principal of judicial equality as the most fundamental principal of liberal-democratic rule. He furthermore points out that general doubts on the protection of minority rights in states ruled by religious fundamentalists get intensified if the state religion perceives itself as superior to other beliefs, such as in the case of Islam.[485] Sachedina (2001) criticises this exact attitude, stating that the "secular culture tends toward a negative characterization of anything religious as soon as it crosses the boundary from the private to the public sphere. The religious culture, on the contrary, holds that religious

[482] Hasan (2007), p. 41
[483] Hasan (2007), p. 41
[484] Ben-Dor (1999), p. 15
[485] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 153 ff.

values are a valuable resource in combating social and political injustices."[486] He goes on explaining that although theoretically it is true that Islam does not distinguish between church and the state or between spiritual and temporal, in practice the Islamic tradition does recognise a de facto separation between the religious and temporal realms of human activity, also including distinct sources of jurisdiction in the Muslim polity.[487] The key question is how widely one is prepared to conceptualise the idea of democracy. Often the alleged incompatibility of Islam and democracy is of definitional character, as when democracy and democratic sentiments are defined principally in terms of votes and elections. Therefore, instead of focusing principally on standard indicators, Eickelman (1997) recommends focusing on alternative measures of the growth of democratic attitudes and an understanding of just rule and governance.[488] Ake (2000) sees the widening of the democracy term critically and remarks that democracy "has been trivialised to the point at which it is no longer threatening to political elites around the world, who may now embrace democracy and enjoy democratic legitimacy without subjecting themselves to the notorious inconvenience of democratic practice."[489]

While, as a political concept, democracy is uncharacteristically precise and means "popular power" or "government of the people, for the people, by people",[490] in practice it is way more diffuse. When speaking of democracy today, reference is basically made to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy, instead of focusing on the collectivity, focuses on the individual, whose claims are ultimately placed above those of the collectivity. Usually democracy is defined through the prism of Western experience;[491] yet, democracy is an inherently debateable and changeable idea just like other terms such as freedom, equality, justice, human rights and so forth. As Voll (1997) points out "there is no necessary agreement on the essence of the concept of democracy".[492] He goes on arguing that the "Islamic tradition of political and social community and Islamic articulation of concepts and identities does not necessarily depend on what happened in Paris in 1789 or in England

[486] Sachedina (2001), p. 3
[487] cf. Sachedina (2001), p. 4 ff.
[488] cf. Eickelman (1997), p. 30 ff.
[489] Ake (2000), p. 7
[490] Ake (2000), p. 7
[491] cf. Khatab and Bouma (2007), p. 129 ff.
[492] Voll (1997), p. 10

under the rule of King John. Islam provides a broad set of concepts for discourse that can go beyond the old European and North American models."[493] Eickelman (1997) also feels that democracy is narrowly defined in a manner which privileges parts of the West.[494] In line with that, Ake (2000) remarks that the

> practice of democracy, now largely reduced to multi-party electoral competition, tells rather little about democracy. [...] There is very little interest in the doctrines and theories which are regarded as the classics of liberal democratic theory. Democracy has in some degree been reduced to an ideological representation which is well internalised; facts of realities which challenge this representation do not receive serious consideration.[495]

While for Krieger (1998) Islamic democracy is an antagonism,[496] Feldman (2004) believes that the greatest barriers are not contradicting principals but autocrats repressing any secular and liberal opposition.[497] Bayat (2007) agrees that the "compatibility or incompatibility of Islam and democracy is not a matter of philosophical speculation but of political struggle. It is not as much a matter of texts as it is a balance of power between those who want a democratic religion and those who pursue an authoritarian vision."[498]

According to this perspective, special attention has to be given to those in power. In general, contradictions with democracy primarily have to be located in the Middle East, not in the Muslim world as such. Stepan and Robertson (2003) rather consider "the democratic deficit an Arab than a Muslim democracy gap" since "the Arab states are basically engaged in building institutional structures around a shared vision of Arab community".[499] Although the Arab world forms the heart land of Islam, it is only home to 260 million out of the 1.2 billion Muslims in the world.[500]

Important to note, it is often the Western states that decide to preserve unrepresentative and unaccountable regimes, thus alienating democratic-minded forces.[501] Hasan (2007) does well in pointing out that "[c]enturies of European colonial rule followed by decades of

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[493] Voll (1997), p. 19
[494] cf. Eikelman (1997), 17 ff.
[495] Ake (2000), p. 12
[496] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 153 ff.
[497] cf. Feldmann (2004), p. 61
[498] Bayat (2007), p. 6
[499] Stepan and Roberston (2003, 2005) quoted in Hasan (2007), p. 19
[500] cf. Sadiki (2004), p. 355 ff.
[501] cf. Sadiki (2004), p. 358 ff.

authoritarian governments backed by the United States have perpetuated conditions that are not conducive to democratisation."[502] His position goes in line with other authors, such as Eickelman (1997), who argues that "[p]rogress toward representative government has been slow in the Arab world, but this is in part due to the preferences of some Western states to sustain known elites at the expenses of expanding the political arena."[503] Forces against democratisation are supported by the West. The author goes on stating that "[i]deas of just rule, religious or otherwise, are not fixed, even if some radicals claim that they are. Such notions are debated, argued, often fought about, and re-formed in practice. The issue is not whether such debates are occurring but how to recognise their contours, as well as the obstacles and the false starts, both internal and external, to making governance less arbitrary and authoritarian."[504]

Haykel (2004) believes that "if sufficient numbers of Muslims deem democracy to be constitutive of their religion and institutionalise its processes, the question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy will become moot."[505] Hashemi (2004) points out that the "real focus should be not on what Islam is but rather on what Muslims want".[506] In line with that, Sadiki (2004) writes,

> while diverse epistemic communities continue to be entangled in discourses aimed at disentangling the *essentially contested* concept of democracy, Arab nationals, like hundreds of millions of powerless human beings, need not say or do much more substantiate why democracy is a widely *uncontested ideal*. The often violent, corrupt, unjust and non-representative political orders they have known spurred them, even if intuitively, to aspire to democracy. [...] Nothing can be more eloquent or convincing than personal experience with authoritarianism. Nothing can be more relevant. It is the violence of the past that makes democracy relevant for the future.[507]

The Sudanese have suffered under authoritarian regimes for long and the clear majority is marginalised and discriminated against by the small ruling elite. In spite of its Arab identity, Sudan is geographically African and faces many problems, which are characteristic for the continent.

[502] Hasan (2007), p. 21
[503] Eickelman (1997), p. 35
[504] Eickelman (1997), p. 38
[505] Haykel (2004), p. 80
[506] Hashemi (2004), p. 52
[507] Sadiki (2004), p. 5

Islam and Arabism therefore have to be juxtaposed with other variables, such as political culture and development in Africa.

2.2 The African context

Opposite to the destiny their leaders have scheduled for them, Africans are aspiring to democratic development; Ake (2000) notes, "the drive for democratization in Africa is predominantly internally generated".[508] A general problem for countries in the process of democratisation is the context in which they are democratising; as has been pointed out above, democracy is being trivialised. Democracy has been defined and redefined many times in what Ake (2000) calls "an endless process of appropriating democratic legitimacy for political values, interests and practices that are in no way democratic".[509] Globalisation is bending democracy to the service of specific interests and countries are losing their role model of a real democracy they could aspire to. In fact, some African countries are suspicious that democracy is another ruse to conceal Westernisation.[510]

The majority of the developing countries have inherited the structures from colonial rule, which usually means cleavages among distinct groups in society along lines of ethnicity, race and religion. The only way to justify colonial oppression in Africa was through the fiction that Africans were of little value, less than human, and therefore could not be entitled to "the amenities of civilization, especially democracy".[511] The colonial state in Africa was all-powerful and arbitrary, giving itself all the rights it wanted without considering what is just and unjust. The African nationalist leaders inherited the rotten system as it was and turned against democratic change. They decided to maintain the system and benefit from it themselves, thus alienating their own people and provoking resistance. Insisting that priority had to be given to development and not to transforming the system, they turned to repression and criminalised the opposition to achieve their own objectives.[512]

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[508] Ake (2000), p. 35
[509] Ake (2000), p. 29
[510] cf. Ake (2000), p. 29
[511] Ake (2000), p. 33
[512] cf. Ekeh (2004), p. 31

The oppressed people are, therefore, demanding for a second independence from their own leaders, as opposed to the first independence from the colonisers. “The language of this demand suggests that it is a matter of survival; the demand arises from a shared feeling that the economic mismanagement and the brutal repression of the indigenous leadership in most post-colonial Africa has become life-threatening for ordinary people.”[513] These people see democratisation as an essential part of the process of getting “the economic agenda right at last, as well as managing the development project better, so as to address the intensifying poverty and the prospect of physical extinction”.[514] Yet, democratisation in multi-ethnic societies is highly problematic, since it often exacerbates existing ethnic problems.[515]

Liberal democracy presupposes an individualism which cannot be found in rural Africa. The idea of liberal democracy is a child of industrial capitalism and a product of a socially atomised society. Yet, contemporary Africa is still predominantly pre-capitalist and pre-industrial. Furthermore, “democracy is the political expression of a relationship between the individual, as a citizen, and the state”, yet, in Africa, kinship has often “assumed the role of the state in several instances because individuals do not trust the state”.[516] Historically, ethnicity has protected individuals from acts of violence by the state and the African state still has to learn to treat its people as citizens who own the state. Ake (2000) explains that “the post-colonial state in Africa is very much like its colonial predecessor; its power over economy and society is enormous, arbitrary and it is largely privatized. For all but few of its citizens, it is alien and remote, uncaring and oppressive.”[517] Only when individuals can rely on the state to supply them with basic security needs and when the state ceases to be the very threat of violence, the ethnic group will slowly be rendered more unattractive and democracy will have a chance to develop.[518]

In fact, we are looking at two completely different principles of human organisation; the Western civilisation with its individualistic canon of values reflected in human rights and liberal democracy stands in sharp

[513] Ake (2000), p. 31
[514] Ake (2000), p. 31
[515] cf. Brown (1997), p. 85 f.
[516] Ekeh (2004), p. 36
[517] Ake (2003), p. 114
[518] cf. Ekeh (2004), 34 ff.

contrast to the non-Western civilisations and cultures in which the individual primarily forms part of an ethnic or religious collective. Accordingly, individuals of the latter will always be determined by their ethnic belonging or religious affiliation and elections according to Western standards will be trivialised to merely being a population census. Without profound transformation at the roots, elections, regardless to whether they meet democratic standards or not, will only allow choosing between different oppressors.

Contrary to their aspirations to social change and democratisation, ordinary people often support the elite in power as it has transformed its power into authority and its domination into hegemony. Often large support for the elite resisting democratisation can be found "arising from fear of change, the alienation of ordinary people which sometimes work in favour of those in power by inculcating the attitude that it is futile for ordinary people to engage in the struggle of power, because their plight will never change even if power changes hands."[519] This general hesitation is joined by the above-mentioned ethnic factor, which leads to solidarity between exploitative rulers and their victims. Opportunistic leaders appeal to communal, ethnic and nationalistic impulses, herewith mobilising support and winning elections.[520] Religion, too, is extremely utile in this process of manipulation. Abootalebi (2000) explains that "poverty and illiteracy can create fertile ground for religious and secular elites' manipulation of the masses of people for the purpose of maintaining the socioeconomic and political status quo."[521]

As Krieger (1998) points out, the application of supposedly democratic elections in the Western understanding, in Africa caused a worsening of the human rights situation, in particular, for minority groups. In place of liberal democracies, illiberal democracies are emerging.[522] Conflicts between ethnic collectives cannot be solved with conventional measures of Western politics[523] and democratisation ought not to be understood merely as multi-party elections, but as participative negotiated census.[524] Importantly, economic development has to be brought forward, as to give the people the opportunity to be politically active and

[519] Ake (2000), p. 71
[520] cf. Brown (1997), p. 87
[521] Abootalebi (2000), p. 2
[522] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 144 ff.
[523] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 147
[524] cf. Ake (2000), p. 28 ff.

get involved into the nation-building project. The demand of the masses for economic incorporation therefore can be understood as democratising measure.

In fact, the success of democratisation in Africa strongly depends on its utility; for most people in rural Africa the national political society remains an incomprehensible abstraction.[525] As long as the state remains fearsome and violent, it will continue losing relevance and people will rather build on other loyalties, such as ethnic or religious, and self-help schemes. Not surprisingly, there are claims for two kinds of democracy. One is a minimalist liberal democracy focused on multi-party elections, which is supported by the bourgeoisie, who are basically in control of the leadership of the democracy movement in Africa and looking at democratisation merely as a strategy of power. The other is a social democracy supported by the masses of peasants and human rights activists. This type presupposes substantial investment in the empowerment of ordinary people who aspire to "material betterment, equal opportunity and cultural upliftment, and concrete rights".[526] Eventually these two groups will clash and the ordinary people are likely to get disappointed by a trivialised liberal democracy. Worse, in many cases, as has been pointed out before, no type of democracy will be established at all, as democratic development can be considered a move into the opposite direction, away from the fate those in power are envisioning.[527]

The gist of the matter appears to be the condition that those people who are genuinely interested in democratisation are the ordinary people, the most politically and economically marginalised with little power or resources to fend for their objects. Instead, their marginality and cultural deprivation tend to reduce their self-esteem and weaken their social position, leaving them to the mercy of the disfavourable elite. The problem is complex and the success of democracy strongly depends on the characteristics of the people who form the society. "The better educated, and the healthier, wealthier, and more organized the people, and the more broadly these resources are spread, the stronger will the society be in protecting itself from domination by the state."[528] But

[525] cf. Ake (2000), p. 70 ff.
[526] Ake (2000), p. 136 f.
[527] cf. Abootalebi (2000), p. 33 ff.
[528] Abootalebi (2000), p. 140

developing societies suffer vehemently from structural inadequacies. “Social, economic, and political settings are such that the vast majority of the population remains relatively poor, uneducated, and in poor health. This, coupled with underdevelopment and ineffective social organizations and the absence of a civil society, has often meant the domination of society by the state, which leaves the society vulnerable to the whims of elites in and out of power.”[529]

Apparently, developing countries need social transformation and reduction of vulnerability of the ordinary people. In the light of the dramatic reality on the ground, the question of whether economic development has to precede democratisation or the other way around is rendered insignificant. Ake (2000) explains that “[w]hile it is the case that economic development is necessary for making democracy feasible, it is mistaken to conclude that attention has to shift from democratization and focus on enabling conditions.”[530] Long enough, giving priority to economic development has served as an alibi to resist democratic progress and often military intervention.[531] In fact, by empowering and uplifting the ordinary people, economic development significantly contributes to the democratic process. Kamrava (2005) points out that for economic development and democratisation to occur, interrelated developments are needed, and namely the emergence of a sizeable middle class that is financially autonomous from the state and concomitant, the development of a private sector that also retains a meaningful level of economic and political autonomy from the state.[532]

Most importantly, the ordinary people of Africa have to be brought into the centre, they need to be privileged and their vulnerabilities have to be removed. Power and resources have to be redistributed and monopolies have to be forced open. The success of demands for a bigger say in the allocation of power resources strongly depends on the formation of a viable civil society that is truly independent of control by the state, well-organised and strong enough to challenge the centre.[533] Nevertheless, there is no reason to get too euphoric about the impact civil society can make, since the associations of civil societies are usually themselves

[529] Abootalebi (2000), p. 6
[530] Ake (2000), p. 167 ff.
[531] cf. Onwumechili (2005), p. 316 ff.
[532] cf. Kamrava (2005), p. 53
[533] cf. Abootalebi (2000), p. 1 ff.

already defined and divided by ethnic lines. Berman (2004) describes hopes that the development of civil society would be a force capable of bringing about democratisation as "particularly unrealistic" and goes on pointing out that "[w]ith distressing frequency, the rhizomes of ethnic factionalism and patron-client politics reproduce themselves within these parties and associations, rendering them, like so much of the apparatus of the state, into ideological and institutional facades covering the reality of business as usual."[534] Accordingly all linkages, those between the state and its agents and the ethnic communities with the wider society would need to be weakened, which is certainly not an easy task.

3 Approaches to the multicultural society of Sudan

Cultural diversity is not limited to the African context, neither to the post-colonial or Third World context. In fact, most countries today are culturally diverse. "This diversity gives rise to a series of important and potentially divisive questions. Minorities and majorities increasingly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalization policy, even national symbols, such as the choice of national anthem or public holidays."[535] Many African countries, Sudan certainly being among them, urgently need to change their strategies to manage their diversity. As Laitin (1992) observed, "[p]erhaps the most grievous horror in postcolonial nationalism has been the treatment of minorities".[536] Throughout history, governments have pursued a variety of policies regarding cultural minorities to achieve the ideal of a homogeneous polity.

> Some minorities were physically eliminated, either by mass expulsion (what are now called 'ethnic cleansing') or by genocide. Other minorities were coercively assimilated, forced to adopt the language, religion, and customs of the majority. In yet other cases, minorities were treated as resident aliens, subjected to physical segregation and economic discrimination, and denied political rights.[537]

Sadly to say, Sudanese governments have used all these and many more strategies to subordinate the Sudanese to the totalitarian system. Southern Sudanese and other marginalised people of Sudan feel

[534] Berman (2004), p. 51
[535] Kymlicka (1995), p. 1
[536] Latin (1992), p. 160 f. quoted in Oyelaran and Adediran (1997), p. 194
[537] Kymlicka (1995), p. 2

discriminated and condemned to a status of inferiority. Irrespective of its feasibility in Sudan, sheer liberal democracy would not be able to bring about those changes needed in Sudan; it is not a sufficient mechanism to manage the diversity of Sudanese society.

Sudanese are highly influenced by their ethnic belonging or religious affiliation and elections according to Western standards are trivialised to merely being a population census. Identification with political parties barely depends on their agendas, but on religious, ethnical and regional affiliations[538] and the sole motive of the sectarian politicians is "to muster enough votes from the faithful through the ballot box in order to reach power for self-seeking purposes".[539] In 1986, for example, the Umma party of Sadiq al-Mahdi, which is the political party of the Ansar sect with its origins in the Mahdia, won 38.2 percent; the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) of the Kathmiya sect won 29.5 percent; and the National Islamic Front 18.4 percent. The sectarian nature of these parties is inherently undemocratic, for their leaders exercise almost total control over the organisation and policy-making of the parties and the elections were followed by political and economic chaos.[540] Tetzlaff (1992) commented on the results that the Western voting system apparently does not work for a society so strongly influenced by religious-political clientelism, in which free elections cannot take place, as there are still no free and politically mature citizens.[541] Additionally, a non-Muslim Sudanese is not even considered viable for the position as president of the country. In this context, minority rights, which will be discussed in detail below, become increasingly important.

The research group of this paper demands equal citizenship. Undifferentiated citizenship will, however, be evaluated in the next chapter to be morally arbitrary and inherently discriminatory, necessarily creating first- and second-class citizens. Therefore, federalism will be discussed as an alternative form of government. In addition to selecting a form of government, a multicultural state also has to choose policies of how to manage its society and three approaches – integration, assimilation and multiculturalism – will be examined towards their utility for Sudan.

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[538] cf. Lichtenberger (2002), p. 3 f.
[539] Abdalla (2001), p. 40
[540] cf. Thielke (2006), p. 302
[541] cf. Tetzlaff (1995), p. 1 ff.

3.1 Citizens and subjects

Southern Sudanese demand their rights as full citizens instead of being treated as subjects of less value and status. Yet, without the provision of minority rights, in plural societies citizenship is unable to create equality. Khalid (1992), a northern Muslim who joined the SPLM in 1984, describes Sudanese society as one with "'so-called' equality with some more equal than others".[542] Equal citizenship requires equal and full membership and both qualifications combined presuppose the above-discussed democratic political community.[543] Southern Sudanese research participants have insisted in claims for equal citizenship, yet a "political system of equal citizenship is in reality less than equal if it is part of a society divided by unequal conditions"[544] such as in the segregated society of Sudan.

Gebhardt (1998) writes, "[w]hatever other meaning it may have, citizenship in its most formal meaning identifies a person as belonging to some legally defined political unit and this status is certified by an identity card or passport".[545] The underlying problem with citizenship is that

> [i]n the modern world, talk about citizenship sometimes presupposes, as a background assumption, an idealised (and misleading) conception of the nation-state as an administratively centralised, culturally homogeneous form of political community in which citizenship is treated primarily as a legal status that is universal, equal, and democratic. In this idealised conception, the nation-state is the only locus of political community that really matters and citizenship just means membership in a nation-state.[546]

Chapter III 3 has shown that the assumption that states were nation states is misleading and, hence, the idea that mere citizenship provided equality is misleading, too. Southern Sudanese are not aspiring to colour-blind citizenship, which will still keep them in a disadvantaged position. Such unitary citizenship, as for example promoted in Barry's (2001) "Culture and Equality", suggests that "liberal commitment to civic equality entails that laws must provide equal treatment for those who belong to different religious faith and different cultures".[547] Barry's understanding of equal treatment implies that the Sudanese state

[542] Khalid (1992), p. xii
[543] cf. Bauböck (1999), p. 5
[544] Barbalet (1988), p. 1
[545] Gebhardt (1998), p. 105
[546] Carens (2000), p. 161
[547] Barry (2001), p. 24

should remain impartial. This impartiality, however, would make the state incapable of meeting the aspirations of southern Sudanese and other ethnic minorities that want to secure the survival of their culture and maintain their particular way of life. Opposite to this understanding, in the emergence of the minority rights discussion, to "ascribe rights or benefits on the basis of membership in ascriptive groups" has become seen "as morally arbitrary and inherently discriminatory, necessarily creating first- and second-class citizens".[548] In fact, Barry is wrong with his assumption that culture could be privatised as has religion in some states before. A state cannot completely ignore or avoid cultural matters.[549] The alleged difference blind state still has to make decisions about the language of public administration, public health care, schools, public media, road signs and so forth.[550] Accordingly, it can be concluded that the "discourse of citizenship has rarely provided a neutral framework for resolving disputes between the majority and minority groups; more often it has served as a cover by which the majority nation extends its language, institutions, mobility rights, and political power at the expense of the minority, all in the name of turning supposedly 'disloyal' or 'troublesome' minorities into 'good citizens'."[551]

This sounds all too familiar in the Sudanese context. Here, "[i]nstead of mobilizing different groups around the notion of citizenship and equal rights, nationalists instead advocated an exclusive vision of a nation that divides its people into two categories – citizens and subjects."[552] Since "African versus Arab in the Sudan is perceived as given and unhistorical [...] no efforts have been made to transcend these racial identities in a way that could have institutionalised citizenship instead of ethnic, racial, or regional entitlements in the postcolonial state."[553] Merely calling people citizens will not be enough to meet the much more comprehensive and profound aspirations of southern Sudanese and other marginalised people to achieve equality and de-racialisation. The "legitimate concern" brought forward by Kymlicka and Norman (2000) that "some minority groups, perhaps in response to rigid conceptions of citizenship advanced by the majority, have appealed to notions of

[548] Kymlicka and Norman (2000), p. 2
[549] cf. Moore (2003), p. 165 ff.
[550] cf. Berman et al. (2004), p. 13 ff.
[551] Kymlicka and Norman (2000), p. 11
[552] Idris (2005), p. 56
[553] Idris (2005), p. 111

identity and differences that leave little room for the promotion or nurturing of these aspects of democratic citizenship and social unity" and that "some groups may indeed seek to reject their citizenship in the larger society altogether, through secession"[554] has materialised in the case of southern Sudanese long ago.

Even though southern Sudanese have voted for independence, secession will merely relocate the issue of conflict and minority rights to the successor state.[555] Both parts of the country will still need to find ways of managing the diversity of their societies beyond labelling them citizens. In sum, southern Sudanese aspire to an equality that cannot be granted merely through citizenship concepts or sheer liberalism. Instead, the real debate should be about what legal arrangements reflect and enhance the commitment to equal citizenship and what arrangements violate or obstruct it; it has to be considered which ways of treating people differently can be defended as compatible with a conception of justice and even-handedness and which can not.[556]

3.2 Multinational federalism

Since the suppression of minorities has widely failed in the West and in Africa alike and considering the fact that most nation states are multination states, multinational federalism has come to be considered a relevant alternative, if minority groups form compact minorities as in the case of Sudan. Bornträger (1999) suggests that "[m]ajor linguistic, religious and socio-economic divides can only be bridged by an integrative cultural policy (for instance federalism in a pluri-national society like in Nigeria or South Africa) accompanied by democratic power-sharing."[557] In countries where ethnic groups are not territorially concentrated, federalism can apparently not work, which is why in these cases consociationalism, with all ethnic groups sharing power at the central level, might be considered.[558] Federalism, in theory, allows the creation of regional political units controlled by the national minorities with substantial powers of self-government. These federal systems can

[554] Kymlicka and Norman (2000), p. 11
[555] cf. Kymlicka and Norman (2000), p. 12 ff.
[556] cf. Carens (2000), p. 162 ff.
[557] Bornträger (1999), p. 57
[558] cf. Berman et al. (2004), p. 20 (In consociational democracies political leaders of major subcultures cooperate in a grand coalition to govern the country. However, the dependence on elite conciliation makes consociationalism less effective in less developed countries. Cf. Jalali and Lipset (1998), p. 331 ff.)

be referred to as “multinational federalism”.[559] In fact, there is a wide spectrum of different kinds of federalisms, from centre-dominated to sub-centre-dominated federations, some being strictly symmetric others quite asymmetrical. They also differ in the degree to which they concern themselves with the points of national and multinational identities.[560] Bauböck points out that the specific about multinational federations “is not the mere correspondence between cultural and political boundaries, but a political representation of perceived differences of collective identity through the division of federal units so that such groups exercise powers of self-government within some or all of the units.”[561]

In 1958, the first article of the draft constitution of Sudan proclaimed Sudan to be one united country with the aim of abrogating the division of North and South and modifying any calls to federalism.[562] Herewith, deep distrust has been created and never been atoned for. In spite of officially having been turned into a federal nation under the NIF, with numbers of states rising to 26, no serious changes in northern policy can be noted. Although Sudan is a federal nation on the paper, as has been pointed out before, the ruling party is all-pervasive and deeply penetrates into all administrative, political, fiscal and economic spheres. The distinct states have little political power and all important positions are occupied by a small elite. In other plural societies – such as the Ethiopian – endeavours to establish ethnic federalism have been debatably promising;[563] in the case of Sudan, however, it can be concluded from previous chapters that the central government has never been willing to share power with its federal states.

The South is not the only part of the country being affected by the absence of real federalist structure. In May 2000 and August 2002, Darfur militants published the “Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth”, laying out in detail the disproportional political control by few northern Sudanese and the marginalisation of the rest. Prunier (2008) comments that “it said nothing to the average Northern Sudanese that they did not know already. What created a shock were not the contents of the book but simply the fact that an unspoken taboo had been broken

[559] Kymlicka (2004), p. 58
[560] cf. Resnick, p. 43 f.
[561] Bauböck (2000), p. 369
[562] cf. el-Badrawi (1971), p. 88
[563] cf. Bornträger (1999), p. 51; cf. Berman et al. (2004), p. 19

and that somebody […] had dared to put into print what everybody knew but did not want to talk about."[564] In Sudan, the allocation of public resources has been skewed in favour of the northern/riverain elite, therefore creating conflict between the various groups. Furthermore, even if a federalist structure is established, each federal unit still remains highly diverse and still requires the protection of internal minorities. Berman (2004) observed that federalism often simply devolves power to levels where problems and patronage and political tribalism are even greater;[565] especially because tribalism most of the time depends on economic and political interests. Any policy aiming at the recognition or accommodation of a minority group, also must take into account its effects on various subgroups and how it might affect the power relations between those groups. Furthermore, elites might have differing interests from the ordinary people of the same minority group.[566]

3.3 Integration and assimilation

Some common ways of approaching multicultural societies are assimilation and integration. While assimilation is a one-way process, in which migrants or minorities adapt to an existing culture eventually giving up on their own cultural background, integration is understood to be a profound incorporation into the different parts of society herewith also changing the existing culture.[567] The latter is understood as a two-way social interaction, thus the majority society on one side and immigrants and ethnic minorities on the other are jointly responsible for the success or failure of integration. As has been pointed out before and will be confirmed in the empirical part of this work (VI), southern Sudanese have never wished to assimilate and not been offered integration. Attempts at forced assimilation have offended southern Sudanese to an irreconcilable extent and sparked the formation of an identity based on resistance. They feel that no matter how hard they tried, northern society would never allow them full integration due to deeply fixed racial structures. Southern Sudanese have their own cultural and religious identity, which they hold important. Over time they have developed a striking will to defend their identity by any means.

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[564] Prunier (2008), p. 77
[565] cf. Berman (2004), p. 45 ff.
[566] cf. Mason (2007), p. 227
[567] cf. Oswald (2007), p. 93

Since neither integration nor assimilation is capable of managing Sudanese society, in the next paragraphs, the discourse of multiculturalism will be reviewed. It will be analysed if concepts of multiculturalism can be transferred to the non-Western context and whether they could facilitate peaceful coexistence within the various possible units in Sudan.

3.4 A multiculturalist approach to a multicultural society

The importance of ethnicity and race and culture and identity – as well as their deeper implications for the relevant groups and human beings – has been discussed in detail in part III of this work. When analysing multiculturalism now, this discussion should be kept in mind. In fact, although political philosophers, such as Parekh and Kymlicka provide a vast philosophical humanistic approach of multiculturalism,[568] here focus is put on political multiculturalism as suggested by Modood (2007).[569] He explains that "identities and cultures are important because they are important to the bearers of those identities, people who are members of our society, fellow citizens, and so have to be included into the polity in ways consistent with respect and equality."[570]

Before moving on to the substance of this chapter the used terminology will be discussed. Multiculturalism is often used as being synonymous with pluriculturalism or cultural pluralism resulting in a certain amount of theoretical and conceptual confusion.[571] In recent scholarships, the term multiculturalism has become more common than pluralism and authors distinguish between multicultural societies, as a mere description of society and multiculturalism as an approach to manage such a society. More explicit "[w]hatever else it is, multiculturalism is an approach to cultural diversity"[572]; multiculturalism is used as the common term in this work (unless quoting authors who give preference to other expressions).

Concepts of multiculturalism arose in rejection of earlier models of the unitary, homogenous nation state, where national homogeneity was given clear priority.[573] As has been pointed out before, this understanding of the nation state often leads to the entire exclusion of

[568] cf. Taylor (1985); Kymlicka (1995); Parekh (2000)
[569] cf. Modood (2007), p. 66; cf. Laden and Owen (2007), p. 11
[570] Modood (2007), p. 66
[571] cf. Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 185
[572] Mason (2007), p. 221
[573] cf. Kymlicka (2007), p. 61 ff.

minority groups, unless "accepting assimilation and second-class status, stigmatised by the racialist and ethnocentric ideologies used to justify nation-building".[574] Multiculturalist approaches have displaced formerly almost uncontested aspirations to classical democracy; assimilationist models that suppress diversity have been replaced by accommodationist models that recognise diversity.[575] In fact, trying to homogenise a plural society exacts an unacceptable degree of internal repression, limited contacts with the outside world, forcible assimilation of cultural minorities, restrictions on foreign travel, control of the media, total bans on foreign literature and technology, and so forth. Even if all these measures are applied, countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and many other developing countries have shown that there is no chance for success.[576]

Liberalism is "a political theory that is concerned with giving people power over their own lives and equal say in how the government is run".[577] Yet, its use for plural societies is limited and the dominant liberal view that treating everybody equally meant treating everybody similarly has been challenged.[578] This shift in thinking has not been uncontested and theorists keep on debating passionately over the right way to guarantee equality.[579] The tension between universalism and particularism has been summoned by Lukes (2006) in the two terms "politics of equal dignity" as a abstract, neutral and difference-blind principle demanding the equal treatment of human beings and the equal consideration of different conceptions of the good life; and "politics of recognition" as a less abstract, partial and difference-aware principle focusing on the special identity of an individual or a group and respectively the individual as part of a group.[580] While liberal theories presuppose that equality simply means granting the same rights to all people, multiculturalism "leads to calls for policies to assist the survival of minority groups, to offer group-based representation, to provide exemptions from public duties, to alter traditional conceptions of the cultural basis of political communities, to establish forms of differential

[574] Kymlicka (2007), p. 65
[575] cf. Bashir (2009), p. 48
[576] cf. Parekh (2000), p. 165 ff.
[577] Spinner (1994), p. 3
[578] cf. Laden and Owen (2007), p. 13
[579] cf. Laden and Owen (2007), p. 7 ff.
[580] own translation cf. Steven Lukes (2006) quoted in Mackert (2006), p. 74 ff.

treatment, or simply to 'recognise' the particularity of various group experiences."[581]

Multiculturalism gains its importance from the fact that the state is never culturally neutral, for it inevitably reflects the interests and perspectives of the dominant elements of society.[582] Laden and Owen (2007) explain that the ultimate ground for the protection of individual liberties is "not the merely pragmatic matter of ensuring social peace, but a claim about the importance and even necessity for mutual respect as a matter of justice"[583] with the basic idea underlying that

> although people may belong to different religions, and thus have, as John Rawls famously put it, a variety of 'conceptions of the good,' beneath these differences, citizens are basically the same, in that they have a claim and a desire to be treated equal, where this involves having a fair share of the same basic goods, like liberty, opportunity, income, and respect.[584]

Rawls, in fact, "develops a political liberalism that acknowledges the pluralism of society but does not recognise it."[585] While the political liberalism of Rawls "gives rise to constitutions that recognise individuals as bearers of equal rights and entitlements, multicultural liberalism invites a political community in which disadvantaged identities receive recognition."[586] Political philosophers, such as Kymlicka, in answer to Rawls are presenting identity as the basis for self-respect and autonomy.

In order not to exceed the capacity of this work, about the crucial liberalist and multiculturalist theorists it is only summarised in the words of Kelly (2003) that Bhikhu Parekh's multiculturalism, "like that of other 'left' multiculturalists such as Will Kymlicka or Iris Marion Young, is offered as a way of developing richer and more substantive account of what equality demands than that associated with the liberal egalitarianism of John Rawls or Brian Barry."[587] Most importantly, multiculturalists do not separate persons and their cultures when they confer equality of concern and respect on people; instead, "the

[581] March (2009), p. 18
[582] cf. Tilley (2003), p. 46 ff.
[583] Laden and Owen (2007), p. 8 f.
[584] Laden and Owen (2007), p. 8 f.
[585] Ejobowah (2004), p. 301
[586] Ejobowah (2004), p. 303
[587] Kelly (2003), p. 95

egalitarian aspiration to treat people equally must entail equal respect for cultural practices as part of what it means to treat people equally."[588]

Multiculturalism provides differentiated citizenship as an alternative to liberal citizenship. To some differentiated citizenship is an oxymoron, since citizenship by definition describes the equal treatment of individuals by equal rights under the same law, which means that they cannot vary among citizens. This exact characteristic is supposed to set democratic citizenship apart from feudal or other pre-modern citizenship views which determine people's political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership. Yet, as has been pointed out above, citizenship is a much more differentiated and far less homogenous concept than often assumed.[589] In this paper, differentiated citizenship is not understood as an oxymoron, but as a concept that tries to prevent the creation of second- and first-class citizens. In chapter IV 3.4.2, it will be explored how these concepts can be used in the Sudanese context. Before, however, it will be challenged, if multiculturalism, a Western-based concept, can even be transferred to the non-Western context and Sudan in particular.

3.4.1 The transferability of multiculturalism to non-Western countries

Kymlicka (2007) explains that liberal multiculturalism is apparently easier to adopt where liberal democracy is already established and where the rule of law and human rights are well protected. Yet, it is exactly the opposite type of countries, namely those where democracy has not been consolidated, in which violent ethnic conflicts are notorious and where a peaceful way of ethnic co-existence is urgently needed. Indeed, in some cases, multiculturalism might not be possible without previous democratic consolidation, in any case it will be more unstable and difficult to establish.[590] Krieger (1998) is no more optimistic when stating that the protection of minorities, in fact, is characteristic for democracies and that post-colonial states do not possess the necessary cultural and institutional traditions. On the contrary, he points out that alleged democratically elected regimes abuse their electoral victory to oppress minorities.[591]

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[588] Kelly (2003), p. 101
[589] cf. Kymlicka and Norman (2000), p. 30 ff.
[590] cf. Kymlicka (2007), p. 306
[591] cf. Krieger (1998), p. 144 ff.

Since it is the nature of the nation-building, which determines what sorts of threats minorities face, it has to be considered when analysing the rights minorities are demanding. Although, in Africa there are some states which do not have a clear majority that tried to diffuse their language and culture throughout the territory of the state, there are still many other countries, such as Sudan, where state nation-building policies have been a matter of majority nation-building, just as in the West. In many African countries, no ethnic group had the power to diffuse its language and culture to monopolise public space and public institutions. In these cases, the formation of a common identity has, typically, not been based on the majority's language, history, and identity, but has rather involved the diffusing of the colonial language, trying to develop "pan-ethnic bases for state identification" which "would appeal to most or all ethnic groups in the territory of the state".[592] In the case of Sudan, the Arab language and culture clearly dominate public space and public institution, and the Arab identity plays an important role in organising life. Here nation-building means "nation-destroying"[593] just as many times in the West and minorities are clearly endangered.

For Sudan therefore, Western concepts, which consider special rights to protect minorities from the injustices that arise as result of majority nation-building, are desirable. In fact, the struggle of minorities in Sudan and other African countries has many parallels with the struggle of Western minorities, such as the Québécois, Flemish and Catalans.[594] "In both contexts, we see that groups are seeking some form of regional autonomy; that this mobilization was triggered, or intensified, in response to the threat posed by dominant-group nation-building; that this has generated demands for the adoption of federalism; and that there is the threat of secession if this desire for autonomy is not met."[595] Although "[n]o one would propose transplanting any particular form of consociationalism or federalism from the West to Africa, given their different economic, political, historical and demographic circumstances", nevertheless "the underlying dialectic of nation-building and minority

[592] Kymlicka (2004), p. 65
[593] Kymlicka (2004), p. 65
[594] cf. Kymlicka (2004), p. 65 ff.
[595] Kymlicka (2004), p. 67

rights is similar" and "justice in multi-ethnic countries will always require some balancing of nation-building and minority rights."[596]

In practice, however, it has to be acknowledge that most African countries are far from moving into the direction of creating a more multicultural or multination conception of the state. Those forms of minority autonomy that predated independence have usually been abolished and in those few states where some form of territorial autonomy exists, it is result of violent struggle and civil war.[597] Berman et al. (2004) suggest that the goal should not be "utopian harmony or altruism amongst all ethno-cultural groups, but simply learning to manage ethno-cultural diversity and ethno-cultural conflict in a constructive rather than destructive way".[598] Before progress can be made, however, historic injustice has to be reconciled. Demands made by minorities often involve the "voicing of a collective memory of exclusion, the acknowledging of historical injustice, and taking responsibility and offering an apology for causing these injustices."[599] Every African country will have to come up with their own model, adapted to local conditions and customs. With this in mind, the utility of multiculturalism in the Sudanese context will be discussed in the next chapter.

3.4.2 The feasibility of multiculturalism in Sudan

So far, the Sudanese state has used assimilationist models that suppress diversity to manage its heterogeneous society. As has been pointed out in part II, different areas in Sudan accepted Arabisation and Islamisation to different extents and majority of the Sudanese face exclusion. It is important to distinguish between multicultural states, the members of which belong to different nations, and polyethnic states, the members of which have emigrated from different nations. National minorities typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture and demand various forms of autonomy and self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies. Immigrants rather wish to integrate into the larger society and be accepted as a full member of it. They do not aim at becoming a separate

[596] Kymlicka (2004), p. 69 ff.
[597] cf. Kymlicka (2007), p. 247 ff.
[598] Berman et al. (2004), p. 15
[599] Bashir (2009), p. 49 f.

and self-governing nation, but to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural differences.[600] In Sudan types both can be found.

The cultural diversity in Sudan is characterised by demands from national minorities for more autonomy; compact minorities such as the southern Sudanese do not aspire to integration but to maintaining themselves as separate nations. Nonetheless, there are other groups, which usually have assimilated to a certain extent but still face exclusion, who seriously wish to change the general set up of society and the state. Even the SPLM, until recently and particularly under the leadership of John Garang, did not merely claim rights of self-government or complete independence, but a general change of the Old Sudan into a New Sudan according to democratic and secular standards. In fact, in Sudan the extension of rights has been promised for long, but promises have largely remained unmet, thus turning demands for inclusion into demands for secession.

Multiculturalism appreciates that groups vary in all kinds of ways and also will become part of the social landscape in different ways. It approaches human beings with the assumption that they are similar enough to be intelligible and make a dialogue possible, yet different enough to be puzzling and make a dialogue necessary. Individuals are herewith neither denied their particularity and forcefully assimilated, nor are they denied their universalism which they hold in common with the rest.[601] In this context, the formation of what Modood (2007) calls "hyphenated identities"[602] is being legitimated as basis for political mobilisation and lobbying, instead of being attacked as divisive or disloyal. Identities – such as Arab-Sudanese, African-Sudanese, Southern-Sudanese, Muslim-Sudanese, Christian-Sudanese – no longer necessarily compete with a sense of nationality, such as Sudanism. It is believed that adopting certain ideas of multiculturalism could provide a higher degree of human freedom, which Sudan urgently needs. In principle there is no conflict between ethnic, religious and other identities on the one hand and national identity on the other. It can arise in practice if either one of them is defined to exclude or undermine the

[600] cf. Kymlicka (1995), p. 10 f.
[601] cf. Parekh (2000), p. 114 ff.
[602] Modood (2007), p. 49

other. The conventional wisdom that cultural homogeneity is a prerequisite for democracy, certainly, is dwindling away.[603]

Various contradicting opinions and critiques of multiculturalism exist. Kymlicka, as one of the most important and here frequently quoted contemporary liberal political philosophers, is, for example, being blamed for failing to acknowledge the particularity of liberal culture and assuming that all other cultures are exclusive and in need of being liberalised in what Chaplin (1993) calls his "liberalizing mission".[604] In conclusion, there is not one panacea that can be taken as the solution for Sudan and other countries troubled by their diversity. Yet, the Sudanese state has clearly failed to remain neutral in any sense and with that created great suffering for its people. Kymlicka's approach is "in commendable detail, a culture-friendly"[605] one and multiculturalism provides some general ideas and concepts that are indeed believed to be capable of bringing about positive changes in Sudan. Sadiki (2004) in his "Search for Arab Democracy" cites that "Kymlicka's advocacy of group-specific rights as one way of securing equal participation is of immense importance not only in a democratic society but also in democratising societies. [...] Group rights are not alien to Islam or the Islamic world [...] [and] besides being a strategy for maximising justice, special treatment may be one way of preventing future conflict and social upheaval."[606]

Jalali and Lipset (1998) note that many countries have adopted preferential or affirmative action policies to reduce ethnic conflicts[607] which, as has been explained before, do not only depend on primordial ties but also on economic disparities. Indeed, affirmative action policies could be used to compensate for the great disparities between the different groups in Sudan, which are the result of decades of neglect. Accordingly, "the key question about minority rights is not whether they are justifiable in universal terms, but whether they are necessary in specific historical and political contexts to balance the nation-building power and projects of majorities."[608] However, focusing on group rights

[603] cf. Sadiki (2004), p. 35
[604] Chaplin (1993), p. 46
[605] Appiah (2005), p. 122
[606] Sadiki (2004), p. 34 f.
[607] cf. Jalali and Lipset (1998), p. 334
[608] Laden and Owen (2007), p. 12

also means obscuring the rights of individuals and minorities within the groups, a situation which in Sudan is likely to be exploited.

3.5 De-racialisation as prerequisite to multiculturalism in Sudan

Multiculturalism concerns itself with claims of justice concerning cultural differences. Mills (2007) argues that multiculturalism can be seen as

> a backhanded, belated, and oblique (too oblique for some) acknowledgement that the modern world has in certain respects been a global polity shaped by the fact of transnational white European domination – invasion, expropriation, settlement, slavery, colonization, the colour bar, segregation, restricted immigration and citizenship – and that a political correction for this history of general Euro-hegemony is called for.[609]

In previous chapters, it has been observed hat Africa is still branded by the colonial legacy which has highly contributed to the racialisation of society. Racism "attaches significance to bodily characteristics – skin color, hair type, facial features – and constructs hierarchies of standard or ideal body types against which others appear inferior, stigmatised, deviant, or abject."[610] As a part of the discussion on multiculturalism, it has to be critically reviewed if multiculturalism is sufficient in addressing the legacy of ethnic exclusion and racial subordination.

As has been argued before, in Sudan and other post-colonial states, societies are not merely multicultural, but highly racialised with clear structural inequality between the dominant groups and cultural minorities. In Sudan elaborate vocabulary of racial identification that classifies people into racial groups on the basis of physical characteristics exists. Distinctions are mainly phenotypic as complexion and an array of skin colours like blue, black, brown and red, which are all in essence types of black, is used.[611] Chapter III 2 has shown that in Sudan racism is mostly based on false assumptions of ancestry; frequently Africans are discriminated for being African by Africans. Schöning (2008) explains that the Sudanese Arabs assume themselves to be purer and superior and show an open pejorative attitude towards the supposedly black Sudanese, irrespective of their colour, which is often confusingly similar.[612] Southern Sudanese and other Sudanese Africans are systematically excluded from opportunities for achieving

[609] Mills (2007), p. 90
[610] Young (2007), p. 69
[611] cf. Jok (2007), p. 6
[612] cf. Ille (2008), p. 131

status and income; through modes of racism they are subject to stereotypes, lack recognised political voice, and majority of them lives in segregated neighbourhoods, often even camps. Merely permitting Christians to go to church or excluding non-Muslim women from the duty of veiling, will not equalise the structural discrimination and racial injustice that they face on a daily base.[613]

Apparently, in a racial society, multiculturalism falls short; it is not enough to focus on terms of religion and culture, while denying a large part of the public space to minorities and ignoring issues of poverty, unemployment, poor education, segregation, discrimination, etc. In the words of Young (2007) "the paradigm of cultural difference obscures racism as a specific form of structural injustice".[614] She goes on remarking that the "politics of cultural difference does not have a conceptual place for racial differences [...] however, racialization and racism consist in a great deal more than that other groups perceive themselves as distinct in ration to one another and refuse to recognize the equal legitimacy of the culture of others."[615] Although racism often has cultural dimension, focusing only on this one aspect would be underestimating the problem. Mills (2007) writes, "it seems odd to represent the history of racism, with all its attendant atrocities, as a matter of mere cultural misunderstanding and deprecation".[616]

Keeping cultural imperialism and its legacy in mind, any comprehensive anti-racist project must include the repudiation of such hierarchy and the affirmation of multiculturalism. Law can only provide a framework of equality, yet societal discrimination and processes of marginalisation and segregation as prevalent in Sudan, need to be addressed through deracialised policies of churches, universities, production and marketing enterprises, clubs and associations. In fact, racism usually does not fail to recognise the equal worth of the culture of the racialised group, but rather their very humanity. Accordingly, anti-racist policies need to be centred on issues of racial justice and the demanding of an end to the colour-coding in the racialised society.[617]

[613] Neither will it provide freedom of choice and equality to the individual members within the groups, such as for example Muslim women who do not want to veil themselves.
[614] Young (2007), p. 80
[615] Young (2007), p. 81
[616] Mills (2007), p. 94
[617] cf. Mills (2007), p. 89 ff.

As has been discussed in chapter III 1.2, race nowadays has been dismantled as biologically irrelevant, yet being significant for being given significance by the people. Accordingly, scientists tend to speak of ethnicity, a supposedly more respectable term. Yet, the problem emerging is that ethnicity is often used to simply cloak down-right racism. If racism exists and produces systems of domination and subordination it is not enough to cover it up through the ethnicity cloak, but has to be displaced by dismantling the structures of racial oppression themselves. Mills (2007) argues that "insofar as multicultural politics is primarily oriented towards the cultural, it will have difficulty in even seeing these structures."[618] Yet, liberalism is not the least better in addressing racism, as liberalism in racialised societies automatically means "racial liberalism."[619] In the case of Sudan, Arabness remains a prerequisite for full personhood and Africans are mostly seen as sub-persons. What has been elaborated before continues to be valid: producing equality demands more than equal treatment in the sense of treating everybody similarly.

Herewith, multiculturalism is not dismissed as a promising concept for countries troubled by their diversity. But, "the displacement of race by culture, or fusion of race with culture, is methodologically dubious both in terms of socio-historical analysis and in what it leads to as public policy prescription. Race and racial injustice need to be theorised in much broader terms than simply culturalist ones even where cultural difference *is* the key factor. And in many cases it is not."[620] A multicultural approach, which confines itself to recognition of racism mostly through the ethnicity lens but does not seek to address the true dimensions of the problem of racial stratification, is unlikely to bring about any change at all. At the worst, it even obscures profound racial structures underlying the institutionalised inequality of a diverse society. Multiculturalism and anti-racism therefore should go side by side but "to the extent that multicultural theory fails to distinguish between questions of cultural difference and racial hierarchy, multiculturalism itself may stand in the way of racial justice."[621]

[618] Mills (2007), p. 105
[619] Mills (2007), p. 112
[620] Mills (2007), p. 101
[621] Laden and Owen (2007), p. 13

Beyond doubt, the Sudanese society is too racialised to ignore this fact and mere multiculturalism will be too oblique to address the profound racial segregation. For the moment, those classified as Africans in Sudan remain discriminated against for being Africans, regardless of whether they speak Arabic fluently, work in northern companies, live in northern neighbourhoods, regardless of whether they have been born in Khartoum, and even regardless of whether they are adhering to Islam. At the end of it all, they remain racially stereotyped as inferior Africans.

4 Conclusion: Where is Sudan heading to?

In previous chapters, general and wide questions have been approached and eventually been narrowed down to the particular case of Sudan. The country has been identified as a multination state in the sense that it includes more than one nation, and as a nation-building state, because it tries to achieve greater national integration and homogeneity among its people. Assuming that there is only space for one single societal culture, Sudan has chosen a hegemonic approach to its diverse society. In fact, after the coup of 1989, in Sudan totalitarism has increased to an extent that any pluralistic thought has come to be considered an offence against the regime, which is not interested in promoting justice or protecting human dignity. Collins (1999) explained:

> The officers who seized control of the Sudan government on 30 June 1989 were committed to building a 'New Sudan' from the debris of a lost generation of Sudanese in search of an identity. The so-called New Sudanese would be defined by Islam and the Qur'an as interpreted by the National Islamic Front (NIF) in doctrines promulgated in Arabic. Upon these twin pillars would reside a defined and homogenous Sudanese society. To be Sudanese required conformity to this rigid ideology. Those who could not conform to its creed would be excluded for not being Sudanese.[622]

For a country like Sudan, continuing to think of itself as "Arab" is both inaccurate and perpetuating an ideology of exclusion. Democracy is incapable of bringing about agreement on existential key questions of society; the other way round, agreement on existential key questions of society is a precondition for democracy.[623] Yet, North and South have completely different ideological and practical perceptions of how to run a state.

[622] Collins (1999), p. 106
[623] cf. Tetzlaff (1995), p. 23

The CPA promoting the thinking in dualistic terms, as if society was consisting of two populations, Muslim Arabs and Christian Africans, certainly falls far short; it overlooks the wide spectrum of nations desperately seeking for inclusion in the North as well as in the South. It is time to acknowledge that Sudan embraces numerous groups which cannot be assimilated and never will. The absence of any type of national identity or patriotism and the lack of any other benefit from officially being a citizen of Sudan, has reinforced the southern call for complete secession from Sudan and motivated others to demand similar rights. Profound centre-periphery cleavages affect the majority of the ordinary people regardless of their descent or religious affiliation. The ordinary people, suffering from constant marginalisation and exclusion, are longing for democratic transformation as an escape from authoritarian rule. However, as "centres of power, states regulate collection and disbursement of resources, control policy-making and deeply affect every facet of their citizens' rights";[624] apparently, without the cooperation of the regime transformation is extremely difficult to bring about. This is aggravated by the fact, that changes southern Sudanese and other minorities want to invoke in society and state structures, and the rights they are claiming for themselves and others, are taken by the current leadership to be anti-Islamic. The government believes its own interpretation of Islam to be the only true one, thus being anti-pluralistic and not giving any value to other interpretations or religions.

The incumbent regime has no interest in democratisation – or any other way of sharing power and wealth – and, instead, works hard to consolidate its power. Although the Sudanese share a history of popular uprisings, this has never brought about sustainable transformation. The current regime has established a system of total control and as long as it can, it will continue to resist sharing its power. As a consequence, democratic transition will not be possible until the authoritarian regime is confronted with a crisis of power, which means that the civil society and its organisations have to aim at weakening the state in order to be successful.[625] Furthermore, the simple collapse of the authoritarian elite is likely to lead to their replacement by another group of authoritarian

[624] Hasan (2007), p. 24
[625] cf. Kamrava (2005), p. 58 f.

elite instead of bringing about genuine democratisation.[626] Change, whether in its social, economic, political, or cultural context, must be understood as a process, not as an event. "It is through structural changes within the society that demands grow for participation in power-sharing, leading to increasing pressure on the dominant elites, inside and outside the state domain, for political changes."[627] Therefore, engaging in social and intellectual mobilisation, building networks of activism, and providing education "must be accomplished on a massive scale".[628] In fact, "political systems do not vary at random rather, they continuously respond to their changing environment."[629] In Sudan "[f]or the struggle against neo-fundamentalist intolerance to succeed [...] the intellectual leadership of Muslims [has] to create a civil society in the broader and more fundamental sense of an open society, that welcomes debate and is ready to debate subversive and even heretical ideas."[630]

It has become obvious that Sudan is in need of change, be it as one united country or as two separate entities. For this challenge it will have to find its own context-related way. Certainly "[n]o culture contents itself with repeating borrowed foreign ideas or concepts. To parrot a foreign concept, especially when it comes to an unavoidably relative and value-laden term like democracy, is to clutter reality and overlook specificity. [...] It is this dynamic of change, not of fixity, that is at the core of rethinking democracy as a pluralising ethos."[631] In this paper, when suggesting democratic transformation, therefore, a change towards negotiated consensus is meant which will have to be adapted to the contexts of the differing units. Multinational federalism has been found to be a promising alternative to the centralised exploitive state. However, it is highly dependent on the cooperation of the state and might simply devolve power to levels where problems may even be greater. Multiculturalist concepts have been found to be approaching diversity in an inclusive and culture-friendly manner, providing minorities with a wide spectrum of freedom. Important to note, multiculturalism has to be practised in a way, which does not cloak the racialised structures of a society but explicitly addresses them.

[626] cf. Kamrava (2005), p. 61 f.
[627] Abootalebi (2000), p. 5
[628] Bayat (2007), p. 18
[629] Abootalebi (2000), p. 3
[630] de Waal (2004), p. 257
[631] Sadiki (2004), p. 35

V Empirical Approach

The presented research was taken up with the object of furthering the understanding on the lives of marginalised ethnic minorities in Sudan. For this venture, a particular research group has been chosen and analysed in depth. Before presenting the results of the empiric approach in part VI, here the entire research process is laid out in detail, with transparency and traceability provided on all stages.

1 Selection of methodology

1.1 Quantitative and qualitative options

For the analysis of a certain research area, empirical social research generally provides quantitative and qualitative approaches. While in quantitative research primarily deductive hypotheses are sought to be confirmed, in qualitative research the intention is to generate theory in a more inductive manner. When choosing between quantitative and qualitative social research, the nature of the field of research and the phenomenon of interest have to be considered. If entering into a rather unknown research field, to which access is difficult and when seeking in-depth analysis of a rather unexplored phenomenon, such as in this research, quantitative research methods are of limited use. Thus, having the aim of generating theory, in this project it is recommendable to work with qualitative research methods.[632]

Lamnek (1993) explains that in qualitative social research the development of new hypotheses is of priority, in contrast to the verification of ahead designed ones. They emerge during the research process from the social field in study; they are disclosed in an inductive manner and conclusions are drawn from the particular to the more general.[633] Lamnek (1993) contrasts the central principals of qualitative research to his own understanding of the central principals of quantitative research as follows:

[632] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1990), p. 4 f.
[633] cf. Lamnek (1993), p. 225

- Openness: While in quantitative research a “filter” is developed before the data collection (certain hypotheses are formed in advance and surveyed in the field), in qualitative research the researcher remains possibly open for the research subjects, the research field and the research methods so that unexpected pieces of information can enter into the emerging theory.
- Research as communication: While in qualitative research the interaction between the research subject and the researcher is understood to be a source of irritation, which has to be eliminated, in qualitative research interaction is an integral part of the data collection and desired. Qualitative research is interaction in which hypothesis are developed belatedly and can be changed throughout the research conduct.
- Processual character: Social phenomena are subject to change, meaning that not only research is a process, but the object of the research is also subject to process. Qualitative research aims at documenting and analysing the constituting process of a social reality; the emergence of a social phenomenon is included into the research conduct.
- Reflexivity of object and analysis: The analysis of a research object and the research object are reflexive. Any meaning is context-bound and can only be understood in the context it emerged from.
- Explication: The distinct steps of analysis have to be disclosed and methods be laid open. Traceability or the emergence of the theory has to be provided.
- Flexibility: While in quantitative research it is assumed that the field of research is known enough to make openness and flexibility unnecessary, in qualitative research exploration needs a high level of adaptability. The researcher adapts his or her methods and definitions of what relevant data are in a flexible manner during the research process.[634]

When intending to examine social and cultural topics as well as the behaviours and actions of human beings, qualitative methods are clearly most promising, for they allow the researcher to get into close contact with the subjects in focus. Qualitative methods can provide insights of complex and complicated phenomena, which would be difficult to disclose with quantitative means.[635] Qualitative research tries to embrace social environments from the perspective of acting individuals and hereby aspires to provide a better understanding on social realities. The research subject is brought into the centre of analysis. Perspectives of the acting persons, their ways to express themselves, their perceptions and evaluations, are included into the analysis and interpreted. They are not understood as source of interference, but

[634] cf. Lamnek (1993), p. 21 ff.
[635] cf. Strauss (1996), p. 3 ff

rendered sources of insight.[636] Wanting to generate theory means wanting to make statements beyond subjective opinion and experience. To accomplish this goal the research process has to be made traceable to the scientific community, for which specific empiric methods are used. Methodologically generating theory means gaining knowledge in a target-oriented, systematic and thoughtful way. Nevertheless, it does not mean rigid use of rules. Instead, procedures have to be reflected and adapted carefully throughout the research process.[637]

1.2 Selection of methodology: Grounded theory

Grounded theory is "currently the most widely used and popular qualitative research method across a wide range of disciplines and subject areas."[638] Nevertheless and in spite of the many methodological papers devoted to the outlining of the procedures of grounded theory, its "guidelines can be opaque and confusing" and to make matters worse "there is also a war of sorts being fought among different GTM [grounded theory method] interpreters".[639] The "war" LaRossa speaks of will be discussed in detail in chapter V 1.2 "Grounded theory – but whose?". Before that, this paragraph explains why grounded theory has been selected in first place.

The aim of the presented paper is to gain knowledge about a very specific and hardly reviewed group. With the goal of generating theory in an explorative and possibly inductive manner, it was intended to gather data from group members themselves from the very beginning of the research onwards. Conduct of research and emergence of theory were designed to follow an order of induction, abduction, deduction, and verification. Relying on earlier experience and the careful review of methodologies, for this venture grounded theory methods have been selected as most potent. However, it has been clearly distinguished between what is key to the method and what is part of a positivist, philosophically naïve methodological discourse. That way grounded theory is rendered into what Star (2007) calls "an excellent tool for understanding invisible things. It can be used to reveal the invisible work

[636] cf. Lamnek (1993), p. 21 ff.
[637] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 2
[638] Bryant and Charmaz (2007), p. 1
[639] LaRossa (2005), p. 838

involved in many kinds of tasks".[640] One of its founding fathers, Anselm Strauss (1987), described grounded theory method as follows:

> The methodological thrust of the grounded theory approach to qualitative data is toward the development of theory, without any particular commitment to specific kinds of data, lines of research, or theoretical interests. So, it is not really a specific method or technique. Rather, it is a style of doing qualitative analysis that includes a number of distinct features, such as theoretical sampling, and certain methodological guidelines, such as the making of constant comparison and the use of a coding paradigm, to ensure conceptual development and density.[641]

Over time, grounded theory has been modified and refined in many ways. Although their applications vary, some elements have stood firm and led to Hood (2007) referring to them as to the "Troublesome Trinity".[642] They are 1) theoretical sampling, 2) constant comparison of data to theoretical categories and 3) focus on the development of theory via theoretical saturation of categories rather than substantive verifiable finding. Those who claim to be using grounded theory should have met these three principles at the minimum level.[643]

The selected research group and its context are remarkably complex, a point which will be explained in chapter V 2 "The scope and complexity of the study". Grounded theory methods have been evaluated as particularly useful in addressing complex situations. Grounded theory emphasises the need for developing many concepts and linkages in order to capture a great deal of variation, which characterises the central phenomenon in study. Furthermore, grounded theory has been evaluated as truly inclusive and holistic. As Kearney (2007) has written, "a fully developed grounded theory does not simply posit that A always leads to B, but rather that the degree of which A leads to B and what that relationship looks like depends on a range of factors that influence A, B, and the relationship between them."[644]

A central aspect is the consideration of the phenomenon's larger structural conditions and interactional consequences. Therefore, in the previous parts of this paper the macroscopic structural conditions have been analysed in detail. In grounded theory, no given structural conditions whether economic or sociological (e.g. class, gender,

[640] Star (2007), p. 79
[641] Strauss (1987), p. 5
[642] Hood (2007), p. 163
[643] cf. Hood (2007), p. 163 ff.
[644] Kearney (2007), p. 128

occupation, capitalism, etc.) are automatically assumed to be relevant to the phenomenon being studied. In fact, a general characteristic of grounded theory is that anything and everything has to earn its way into the theory; nothing is taken for granted. Hereby, also the exclusion of relevant factors is prevented; early emphasis on gender differences, for example, could lead to the oversight of other relevant factors. Yet, not cases but data are compared against emerging theoretical codes.[645] Any structural condition has to prove relevance in the process of analysis; they must be linked as specifically as possible with the interactional/processual. Structural conditions can be of any level whether immediately contextual (like institutions in which people live and work) or more obviously macroscopic (class system, type or state of economy, government legislation).[646] Because the field of research is highly complex, the different levels of structural conditions have been considered and analysed carefully towards their relevance for the phenomenon in survey and been brought together in a comprehensive theory.

Conducting research is an art which should not be constrained through rigid rules. From a constructivist perspective "grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories 'grounded' in the data themselves. The guidelines offer a set of general principles and heuristic devices rather than formulaic rules."[647] Yet, in order to meet high quality standards procedures have to be described in detail as to provide transparency on the emergence of the theory,[648] which will be done in detail in the following chapters. In sum, the benefits and attractions of grounded theory method, according to Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), are:

- Fulfils a need to justify qualitative approaches (justification of process);
- justifies qualitative research in terms familiar to quantitative researchers – data, validity, systematic, empirical, etc. (justification of ontology);
- and thus keeps the gate-keepers placated and satisfied (justification by publication and acceptance);

[645] cf. Hood (2007), p. 160
[646] cf. Strauss (1987), p. 78 ff.
[647] Charmaz (2006), p. 2
[648] cf. Berg and Milmeister (2007), p. 183

- offers a rationale for researchers as they begin their research – the method eliminates and precludes need for hypotheses and conjectures at the start (justification of methodological flexibility and indeterminacy);
- warns against an unexamined or too briefly considered application of extant ideas and theories and instead urges fresh theorizing (justification of open-mindedness);
- requires a comparative approach;
- keeps the analyst engaged through adopting emergent guidelines.[649]

1.3 Grounded theory – but whose?

Above it has been explicated in detail why the presented research has been conducted with grounded theory method. However, as the headline of this chapter suggests, more than just one branch of grounded theory exist. Accordingly, this chapter discusses what has previously been called a "war" and specifies which branch has been used in the presented paper.

Not only has a dispute between the founding fathers of grounded theory, Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, erupted; but also have several modified versions of grounded theory emerged over the years. Strübing (2007) indicates that two co-existing directions of grounded theory have been established, which both claim the same label, thus creating confusion.[650] Therefore, it is necessary to specify which type of grounded theory is used. At the simplest level of distinction, according to Bryant and Charmaz (2007) three versions exist; the Glaserian school of grounded theory methods, which Glaser himself defines as "traditional" or "classic", the Strauss and Corbin school, and the Constructivist.[651] Green, Creswell, Shope and Clark (2007) also speak of three designs, the constructivist by Charmaz, emergent by Glaser, and systematic by Strauss and Corbin.[652] Other authors, such as Olesen (2007), also mention a postmodern approach, as used by Clarke (2005).[653]

Glaser and Strauss's "The Discovery of Grounded Theory" was published in 1967 and continues to be ground-breaking literature until today. Their work emanated from their profound dissatisfaction with the prevailing approach of university-based social research in the USA in the 1960s. They stressed the need for developing or generating novel

[649] Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 49
[650] cf. Strübing (2007), p. 159
[651] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007), p. 9 ff.
[652] cf. Green et al. (2007), p. 472
[653] cf. Olesen (2007), p. 420

theories as opposed to verification of existing grand theories by grand theorists and, hence, encouraged researchers to go to the field and come up with their own theories. Olesen (2008) recalls: "I well remember the excitement the book's publication brought: a challenge to orthodox positivism, entrenched in functionalism, and an invitation to a different research future, which I doubt anyone then visualized, that being a pre-postmodern era."[654] Glaser and Strauss intended to justify an urgent need for new approaches, distinguishing their own clearly from hypothesis-driven deductive method. Their "Discovery of Grounded Theory" was "part epistemology, part political manifesto, part methodology, part symbolic interactionist theory."[655] Unfortunately, this led to a highly criticised over-emphasise of inductive concepts with theory almost mystically emerging from data, an aspect of grounded theory which has been repeated like a mantra.[656] In their positivist understanding, data is considered as being unproblematic and simply what one observes and notes down during research conduct. How researchers define, produce, and record data largely remains unexamined.[657] Nevertheless, in their time, the authors offered a method that could claim equivalent status to the quantitative work and brought about important change in the methodological discourse, clearly challenging the prevailing paradigms.

"The Discovery of Grounded Theory" remained the only jointly published book on methodology of the two authors, who soon after the publication headed off into different methodological directions.[658] The considerable growth of interest in grounded theory methods dates from the late 1980s, thus after their divergence.[659] Accordingly, it is essentially misleading to speak of *the* grounded theory; to be precise one has to distinguish well between the different branches of grounded theory and their methodological implications. Between the two founding fathers of grounded theory a harsh dispute irrupted, which was initiated by Glaser. He blamed Strauss and later Strauss's co-author Corbin for betraying the ideas of the classical grounded theory through downgrading it to just

[654] Olesen (2007), p. 418
[655] Timmermans and Tavory (2007), p. 494
[656] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 46
[657] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 43 ff.
[658] cf. Mey and Mruck (2007), p. 11 ff.
[659] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007), p. 4 f.; cf. Timmermans and Tavory (2007), p. 494

another qualitative data analysis.[660] In his "Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis: Emergence Vs. Forcing" Glaser (1992) attacked Strauss and Corbin's "Basics of Qualitative Research", published in 1990, writing: "I request that you pull the book. It distorts and misconceives grounded theory, while engaging in a gross neglect of 90% of its important ideas."[661] Through his radical position on the invariability of grounded theory, according to Mey and Mruck (2007), Glaser has manoeuvred himself into a methodological offside.[662]

The practical procedures suggested by the two authors, however, do not pose unbridgeable differences. Strauss suggests in addition to open and selective coding a third type of coding, i.e. axial coding. In this coding step, categories and subcategories are related to each other and properties and dimensions are specified through the use of the so-called coding paradigm. Glaser instead suggests the so-called theoretic coding as a third step, providing a list of coding families, which are also used to specify possible relationships between codes that have been developed during open coding. Practical procedures proposed by the two authors, therefore, can be evaluated as similar; the differences between the two approaches, instead, are rather of superordinate nature. Questions on how to handle theory and pre-knowledge, and the use of literature (before and during the research work) particularly set them apart.

The two authors come from different backgrounds, with Glaser having undergone a "rigorous training in quantitative methods and middle range theories" at Columbia University. Strauss's "background in symbolic interaction",[663] in contrast, derived from studies with the Chicago School and in close cooperation with Herbert Blumer. In fact, "the defining characteristic of Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss's 'grounded theory' (1967, p. 1), directed toward the 'discovery of theory from data,' is a direct descendant of Blumer's sensitizing concept."[664] The "sensitizing concept", indeed, was Blumer's "own answer to what he perceived to be the failings of the social theory of the time".[665] Remembering this exact context, in which Glaser and Strauss also developed their grounded

[660] cf. Strübing (2004), p. 64 (Glaser has consistently sought to distinguish between grounded theory as an inductive methodology and what he terms qualitative data analysis. Cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2010), p. 13)
[661] Glaser (1992), p. 2
[662] cf. Mey and Mruck (2007), p. 18
[663] Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 32
[664] van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 5
[665] van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 2

theory method – as "an alternative to the classical hypothetic-deductive approach which requires the construction of clear-cut categories and hypotheses before data are collected"[666] – it is no surprise that they overemphasised the inductive power of emergence. At least from today's perspective, it can be said that they chose a too positivist epistemology, assuming that by using grounded theory method, theory would emerge purely inductively from the data.[667] Accordingly they suggested that the researcher entered the research field with no pre-knowledge at all, a position that cannot be maintained. However, in large parts their suggestions are more owed to rhetorical purpose than reflected in actual practice,[668] as detailed studies from this period offer many hints and arguments, which show that they understood the research process in a more complex way.[669]

While Glaser maintains the classical position and continues to insist on the principle of pure induction, Strauss, after their split, took a more reasonable position. Glaser insists that "[w]hat is important is to use the complete package of GT [grounded theory] procedures as an integrated methodological whole"[670] and continuously refers to the worrisome accuracy desired by qualitative data analysis, which, when applied to grounded theory supposedly blocks it from fully unfolding its capacity.[671] Strauss on the contrary suggested that "[m]ethods, too, are developed and changed in response to changing work contexts."[672] Referring to the operational aids, which proofed usefulness in his researches, he required: "*Study* them, *use* them, but *modify* them in accordance with the requirements of your own research."[673] Various authors such as Antony Bryant (2007), Udo Kelle (2007) and Jörg Strübing (2007) criticised Glaser as "incoherent and inconsistent"[674] and "exceptionally polemic".[675] Strübing (2007) sees Glaser caught in a trap of naïve inductivism, since he promotes a principal of pure emergence which in

[666] Kelle (2007a), p. 191
[667] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 32 ff.
[668] cf. Reichertz (2007), p. 223
[669] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 32 ff.
[670] Glaser (2007a), p. 50
[671] cf. Glaser (2007a), p. 50 ff.
[672] Strauss (1987), p. 8
[673] Strauss (1987), p. 8
[674] Bryant (2007), p. 106
[675] Kelle (2007), p. 141

reality cannot exist and which, furthermore, stands in contrast to the idea of theoretical sensitivity.[676]

Theoretical sensitivity, according to Glaser (1992), is "an ability to generate concepts from data and to relate them according to the normal models of theory in general, and theory development in sociology." He goes on stating that a researcher "may be very sensitive to his personal experience, his area in general and his data specifically, but if he does not have theoretical sensitivity, he will not end up with grounded theory."[677] Making theoretical sensitivity a precondition for the success of a grounded theory, yet requiring the researcher to be some kind of a tabula rasa, apparently contradicts and confirms the above-mentioned chasm between rhetoric and practice.

Bryant (2007) points out that Glaser only accepts one use of grounded theory: his own;[678] whereas Strübing (2007) in contrast describes Strauss's approach as a more differentiated and research-logically better substantiated method, which deals in a more accurate manner with the questions of theoretic previous knowledge and issues of verification.[679] In this paper, too, Strauss's approach is considered to be more utile and closer to today's understanding of the researcher being an interpreter of a situation. Among others, the presented research makes use of a repositioned, constructivist grounded theory approach, which has been vehemently disapproved by Glaser and which aims to solve the numerous epistemological problems of the original approaches.[680] According to Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), this approach "is interpretivist in acknowledging that to have a view at all means conceptualizing it. Data are always conceptualized in some way."[681] Glaser criticises the interpretations of the main protagonist of constructivist grounded theory, Kathy Charmaz, as being "unbelievably wrong",[682] accusing her of misunderstanding grounded theory and trying to model it into something it is not. He writes, "CHARMAZ sees emergence as interactive not objective. But for GT what is emerging just depends on the type of data, how much of it, how many participants,

[676] cf. Strübing (2007), p. 160 ff.
[677] Glaser (1992), p. 27
[678] cf. Bryant (2007), p. 106 ff.
[679] cf. Strübing (2007), p. 170 ff.
[680] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 51
[681] Bryant and Charmaz (2007a), p. 52
[682] Glaser (2007), p. 96

etc., etc. to see if research impact is generating a bias in its conceptualization." He goes on that she "tries to bolster her GT remodelling position by invective against GT as originated",[683] making it just another qualitative data analysis method. Herewith, he continues with the previously described discourse that grounded theory is supposedly purely inductive and accuses Charmaz of neglecting "the carefulness of the GT method which makes the generated theory as objective as humanly possible. BUT also she neglects that the product is conceptual which provides an abstract distance from the data."[684] Bryant (2007) considers Glaser's critique of Charmaz "an incoherent and inconsistent article formatted like a poor piece of tabloid journalism".[685]

Charmaz, in fact, distinguishes between objectivist and constructivist concepts of the grounded theory method. The former assumes the reality of an external world, takes for granted the neutrality of the observer, and views categories as derived from data; the latter recognises the constant interaction between the viewer and the viewed. Charmaz writes: "I assume that neither data nor theories are discovered. Rather we are part of the world we study and the data we collect. We construct our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices." Her approach explicitly assumes that "any theoretical rendering offers an interpretive portrayal of the studied world, not an exact picture of it";[686] a researcher is an interpreter of a scene, not an ultimate authority who defines it. Although Glaser has been identified as disagreeing with Charmaz's emphasis on concerns with, for example, difference, reflexivity and positionality, it sustains and enhances Strauss's "deep symbolic interactionist commitments".[687] While the two authors in their joint projects did not emphasise context or situatedness, Strauss in his later studies, and those done collaboratively with Corbin, did. The most important differentiations between objectivist grounded theory and constructivist grounded theory, are here summarised in Table 1:

[683] Glaser (2007), p. 101
[684] Glaser (2007), p. 97
[685] Bryant (2007), p. 106
[686] Charmaz (2006), p. 10
[687] Clarke and Friese (2007), p. 363

Objectivist grounded theory	Constructivist grounded theory
• Data are real and represent objective facts. • Objective reality and the researcher are separate entities. As an impartial observer who maintains distance to the subjects researched and their realities, the researcher uncovers the data and develops a theory from them. • To do so, he/she applies suitable procedures. • This enables the scientist to generate objective knowledge that can be verified. • And does not require the self-reflexivity of the researching process.	• Both data and analyses are social constructions reflecting their process of production. • Each analysis embodies a specific index in terms of time, space, culture, and situation. • The scientists' data and values are inter-linked, for which reason data are value-related. • In constructivism, methods play a lesser role than in objectivism and the theories generated in the style of the constructivist grounded theory rather tend to be plausible accounts more than theories that claim any objective status. • As a result, the constructivist grounded theory does not cling to the discovery of a basic process or a core category because this would excessively freeze up the social reality in the researching process. • Instead the constructivist grounded theory calls for an obdurate, yet ever-changing world but recognises diverse local worlds and multiple realities, and addresses how people's actions affect their local and larger social worlds.

Table 1: The most important differentiations between objectivist grounded theory and constructivist grounded theory[688]

The presented research primarily follows recommendations made by Charmaz, Strauss, and Strauss and Corbin. It strongly relies on the epistemology of constructivist grounded theory methods. Nevertheless, it also makes use of axial coding and, most importantly, a core category has been developed. It studies how and why participants construct meanings and actions in specific situations. It is understood that the theory, which has been developed during the process of research, is an interpretation that depends on the researcher's view. While an objectivist approach assumes "that data represent objective facts about a knowable world"[689] which the researcher only discovers, in this research, data is understood to be socially constructed, the same as the analysis. Time, place, culture, and situation are considered crucial to the emerging theory.[690] In this spirit, the context of the phenomenon in

[688] cf. Hildenbrand (2007), p. 556 f. referring to Charmaz (2006)
[689] Charmaz (2006), p. 131
[690] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 129 ff.

survey and the relation of the interaction between research group and researcher have been reflected and interpreted carefully. The relationship between research group and researcher, and some ways of how interview partners literally constructed data, will be laid out in chapter V 4.1.

Glaser and Strauss (1998) distinguish between substantive and formal theory. While the first is developed for a specific area of inquiry and only allows making statements on this specific area, the latter aims at generating theory for a conceptual area of inquiry allowing to make general statements on specific phenomena. Formal theories aim to be independent of a specific setting and therefore require data from differing empirical areas.[691] Generating a formal grounded theory is the next logic step after having developed a substantive grounded theory. Glaser (2007) writes "Thus FGT [formal grounded theory] can be defined as a theory of a SGT [substantive grounded theory] core category's general implications, using, as widely as possible, other data and studies in the same substantive area and in other substantive areas."[692] In their structure and function and in their discovery and development, however, they are viewed as the same; the differentiation only means the degree of abstraction and generality across contexts.[693] In this project, it was possible to create a theory beyond the mere case study, which captures the phenomenon more generally, rather than analysing just one particular place of interaction. Nevertheless, the presented theory is not abstract of time, place, and people; or, put differently, this research did not have the cross-phenomenon goals inherent to Glaser and Strauss's formal theory. Instead, a substantive grounded theory has been developed.

2 The scope and complexity of the study

Before getting into the methodological details, a word about the complexity of the study and the scope restrictions will be said. As laid out before, Sudan is a conflict-ridden country and, possibly, at a turning point in its history. In fact, peace is closer in reach than ever, yet, at the same time, it remains but a fragile hope. The conflicts of the country are numerous and highly complex. Nevertheless, for this research project a

[691] cf. Glaser and Strauss (1998), p. 42 ff.
[692] Glaser (2007b), p. 99
[693] cf. Kearney (2007), p. 136 f.

small and specific group has been selected as the research subject. The situation of a small elite in Khartoum, which is part of the wider southern Sudanese ethnic minority of the country, has been surveyed. Before starting with a research project, every researcher has to reflect on the possible research volume and put limits accordingly. Choosing one group or theme over another, however, does not mean denying others their relevance; they deserve study of their own and other researchers are invited to probe the analytic value of the presented study and to assess its compatibility with other research questions.

The presented research touches sensitive and highly politicised issues. It is up-to-date research, which is directly affected by ongoing events. The research has been conducted during an extremely eventful time, including, for example, the issuing of an arrest warrant against the president of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court in The Hague[694] or the first multi-party national poll in 24 years, which was held in April 2010 and confirmed al-Bashir as president of Sudan and Salva Kirr as president of the South and first vice-president of Sudan.[695] Throughout the entire research period, speculations on whether the referendum would be held on time, or even at all, went on. Referendum laws and border demarcation kept on being negotiated and the implementation of the CPA continued to fall further behind day after day. Throughout the last months of the interim period, constant threats of return to war dominated the national and international press. Interview partners, being politically highly aware, are sensitive to political events. To demonstrate impacts, a practical example from the research follows.

In the beginning of September 2009, during the second field stay, the EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, spoke in favour of unity of Sudan as opposed to the establishment to an independent state in southern Sudan. Few days later an interview with Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper from Juba, took place. A couple of days before the interview he had already nervously indicated that his plans of going back to the

[694] cf. ICC (04.03.2009)
[695] cf. BBC News (26.04.2010) In spite of several major opposition parties and politicians having boycotted the elections, which furthermore have not reached international standards, results were acknowledged by the international community. Cf. BBC News (17.04.2010); cf. BBC News (26.04.2010)

South had changed from the year before. In the interview he explained with great concern:

> My plans as a person, as an individual are in place, but we don't know exactly, because there are lot of scenarios, you know everything has changed in Sudan. And with the announcement now of the EU, the announcement of EU foreign affairs secretariat, Solan, so things are changing now. The statement was delivered in Cairo four days, five days ago, it is now creating very serious concern among the southern communities. The opinions or the attitudes of the southern Sudanese and the government are changing so we don't know what will happen.[696]

Of course, not only events in the North, but also in the South are affecting interview partners' perceptions. Alfred Taban, editor-in-chief of the Khartoum Monitor,[697] explained, "you can talk to that person today, he says, I want to go to Yei. You come to him two days later, he heard there was a LRA [Lord's Resistance Army] attack, he changed his mind. So you cannot get a long-term concept of what is happening."[698] At the same time he agrees that "it is quite an interesting time"[699] to do research, since the range of options for southern Sudanese seems to have increased.

In fact, the research intents to grasp progress and change in the society of Khartoum and doing newsworthy research necessitates dealing with changing contexts. It is a challenge, yet a worthy one. Southerners experience a new level of recognition and political empowerment. Through in-depth analysis, the changing context has been embraced and a theory developed, which is dynamic enough to deal with these developments. In spite of the research having been conducted during eventful times, the elaborated theory is prognostic and comprehensive, reflecting the situation of the research group in detail and attending process.

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[696] Personal interview with Jason in Khartoum (autumn 2009)

[697] The Khartoum Monitor is a daily newspaper published in English and was established in 2000 by journalists coming from South Sudan. It is the main newspaper that publishes articles relating to South Sudan, the war and peace proposals and initiatives, issues on which the government exercises heavy censorship. According to Amnesty International Khartoum Monitor is harassed for its articles critical to the government and authorities "are using excessive fines and unfair and arbitrary trials to curtail freedom of expression." Cf. Amnesty International (21.01.2002)

[698] The LRA is a military group based in northern Uganda, which is known for its inhuman and cruel attacks on civilians, as well as the abduction and sexual enslavement of children, and has a long tradition of using the Sudan as sanctuary. Formerly supported by the Government of the Sudan, the LRA is an opponent to the SPLA. Cf. Acker (2004), p. 335 ff.

[699] personal Interview with Alfred Taban (October 2008)

3 The conduct of research

3.1 The research question

In grounded theory, the primary goal is generating theory. Other than with most methodological approaches, in grounded theory the researcher does not start the research project with a clear research question, but rather with a field of interest. As the research goes on, it is specified and made more concrete. Similarly, a hardly known field can be approached openly and, while getting more familiar with the field, the research question emerges.[700] The initial research question has to be constructed accordingly, in a way that permits flexibility and openness to do in-depth analysis of the selected topic. The research field can be basically untouched or, alternatively, only relations between certain concepts remain unclear and ought to be disclosed. Logically, the research question has to be developed in accordance to the level of already existing knowledge on the subject. In the case of the presented paper, no research on the particular research topic existed. The selection of a research question means the selection of a phenomenon to be surveyed;[701] in this particular case, relations between southern Sudanese professionals living and working in Khartoum and the majority society of the same location as well as the state have been selected. The research was started in a very open and wide manner, and the research question slowly narrowed down during the advancement of the research. Hereby, the research remained open enough to include any unexpected aspects brought forward by the research group itself.

3.2 The phases of research conduct

In grounded theory, selection of participants, data collection and data analysis are carried out simultaneously. Like this, the researcher's feet are kept in both "the data gathering and analytical stages, which in both theory and practice should not, or cannot, be separated".[702] The research project was started by exploring general research questions. It was not intended to form hypotheses from a pre-existing body of theory, but to begin with collecting and coding first hand data. Coding means "naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorizes,

[700] cf. Truschkat et al. (2007), 236
[701] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1990), p. 23
[702] van den Hoonard (1997) p. 22

summarizes, and accounts for each piece of data".[703] While, at the beginning, data is collected on a wide base and coded openly, with the advancement of the research and the specification of the research question, data collection and coding become more selective and precise. Not being interested in verifying existing theories, Glaser and Strauss introduced procedures of constant comparison to generate and discover new categories for analysis.[704] Using comparative methods, during all research stages, is essential to "establish analytic distinctions – and thus make comparisons at each level of analytic work".[705]

At the beginning, data is compared with data to find similarities and differences. This could be comparing statements and incidences within the same interview, or with statements and incidences of other interviews or other data. Comparison can take place with basically anything that can shed light on the data. Theoretic sensitivity like this is being increased and new questions regarding the data appear.[706] Methods of constant comparison are, furthermore, crucial for the theoretic sampling, with which the selection of interview partners is directed according to expected contributions to preliminary categories. Depending on whether maximum or minimum differences between cases are intended to be compared, data are selected either through going back into old data or generating new data. Contrastive cases can serve to discover new relevant categories and to differentiate their attributes; similar cases can help to consolidate existing categories.[707]

All theoretic ideas are kept in theoretical memos. With the advancement of the research, memo-writing becomes more intense and focused. Strauss (1987) writes: "Note that data collecting leads quickly to coding, which in turn may lead equally quickly – or at least soon – to memoing. Either will then guide the searches for new data. Or – please note! – they may lead to inspecting and coding *already* gathered (and perhaps analysed) data. The *return to the old data* can occur at any phase of the research, right down to writing the last page of the final report of the theory."[708]

[703] Charmaz (1996), p. 43
[704] cf. Krassen Covan (2007), p. 63
[705] Charmaz (2006), p. 54
[706] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 69 f.
[707] cf. Truschkat et al. (2007), p. 246 f.
[708] Strauss (1987), p. 18

The requirement that analysis begins as soon as the researcher has data is unique to grounded theory.[709] Conducting research with methods of the grounded theory is not a linear process, but one of jumping forwards and backwards between the different research stages. Data collection and analysis proceed "simultaneously and each informs and streamlines the other"[710] as demonstrated in the following graphic taken from Strauss (1987).

Phases of Research



Figure 2: Different phases of research[711]

This "iterative process of moving back and forth between empirical data and emerging analysis makes the collected data progressively more focused and the analysis successively more theoretical."[712] In grounded theory, coding takes place in phases, with open coding being the first of them. The concepts being developed in this early stage of analysis are the closest to the data. In this particular research, therefore, after having conducted and transcribed the first interviews, I started going through the data word by word and line by line categorising segments of data. I developed first provisional concepts, which naturally remained rather vague and with gaps and holes; as further data were collected concepts became more clearly rooted in the empirical world.[713] I initiated the theoretic sampling and started looking for sources for the needed data and continued with my interviews. In the second phase of analysis, I

[709] cf. Clarke and Friese (2007), p. 367
[710] Bryant and Charmaz (2007), p. 1
[711] Strauss (1987), p. 19
[712] Bryant and Charmaz (2007), p. 1
[713] Cf. Van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 10 ff.

raised the level of abstraction and started with the focused coding. Focused coding can commence when strong analytic directions have been developed throughout the initial coding. The most significant codes can be used to sift through large amounts of data. In the first phase, accordingly, I compared data to data with the aim of developing first provisional concepts. In the second phase, I compared data to these concepts in order to refine and elaborate them.

The general problem with the different simultaneous and interrelated phases of research is that they are all extremely time consuming. When depending on a tight schedule and having limited time in the field, collecting data, transcribing them, coding them, elaborating lead categories and following them up through the directed collection of new data, in fact, becomes a real challenge; all the more when staying in an environment little supportive to office work. In Khartoum for example, long power-cuts can easily delay transcriptions or any other computer-based work. During the first field stay, I highly depended on field notes and pre-transcribes for the elaboration of preliminary codes and the corresponding sampling. Having made experience with the time consuming procedures of the grounded theory in other research projects,[714] from the beginning on the field stay was planned in two parts. Like this, lead categories could be elaborated in calmness at the home office and be probed and saturated during the second field stay. Every researcher should be aware that grounded theory is time-consuming and that the parallel conduct of research steps is extremely unhandy for short field stays, particularly when entering into "complicated" field areas.

Throughout the entire process of data analysis, I relied on above mentioned memo-writing in order to refine my codes and raise the level of abstraction of my ideas; memos are analytic notes which allow free association with ideas.[715] Also memos were used to identify which codes were strong enough to be treated as analytic categories. Later on, at an advanced stage of the research, I also used memos to compare categories with categories, to get a close idea of their relations towards each other. Further down precise examples will be given of the different stages of coding and memo-writing.

[714] cf. Bützer (2007), p. 126 ff.
[715] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 72 ff

4 Data collection

4.1 The interview

The literature suggests that qualitative interviews provide a high level of control over the survey process and a wide possibility to capture complex situations, a necessity for any explorative approach.[716] Doing research according to grounded theory means that the researcher's method of collecting data evolves while he or she is engaged in doing it. Therefore, the data collection tools are developed and refined during the process of collecting the data.

While observation and informal conversations and interviews, as well as articles from local newspapers (sometimes even written by interview partners) entered into the evaluation, the empiric core piece of this research is clearly formed by a series of formal interviews conducted during two field stays in Khartoum, in autumn 2008 and 2009. The aim of the data collection was to gain in-depth understanding of a particular social setting and behaviours from a "native" point of view. For this intensive interviewing was carried out, an open-ended, directed conversation that explores a participant's deep first-hand knowledge. According to Charmaz (2006), intensive qualitative interviewing "fits grounded theory methods particularly well". She reasons that grounded theory and intensive interviewing are alike "open-ended yet directed, shaped yet emergent, and paced yet unrestricted".[717]

In the cases where interview partners were not yet familiar with the researcher, meetings of introduction were organised ahead of the actual interview. In these meetings I introduced myself, explained my background and the research project and also answered any kind of questions. Furthermore, most of the times, somebody confidential to the participant had introduced me ahead. Herewith, important confidence between me and interview partners was created, which led to a highly appreciated degree of cooperation and a frank sharing of thoughts. Interviews clearly ranged in degree of guidance by the researcher. The first ones were basically loosely guided explorations of topics while, with length of stay and advancement of theory, the level of structure increased. Often interviews were started with the simple plea "Please tell me what life in Khartoum is alike for you." These interviews were

[716] cf. Schäfers (1998), p. 216 ff.
[717] Charmaz (2006), p. 28

unstructured and “excellent for building initial rapport with people before moving to more formal interviews”.[718] The further the research advanced, the more specific inquiries became and began taking into account specific areas of interest and developing categories. In the second phase of the fieldwork, in 2009, primarily semi-structured interviews were conducted and a list of topics, which should definitely be covered, was used.

Interview partners being intellectuals had its advantages and disadvantages. Clear advantages were their English-skills, their positive attitude towards education and research in general and their agreement to the importance of the presented research in particular. Interview partners, hence, were extremely willing to participate and to contribute their time and experience. The research topic was of great interest to the majority of them, who therefore responded in detail and length without requiring much incentives or interference by the researcher. Most of the times, their stories just tumbled out and a small incentive was not seldom followed by very long responses up to one hour without any interruption. At all times and stages participants were given the opportunity to talk about every subject of concern to them and never interrupted or cut off (even if the information was irrelevant to the research). If interviews became too long for one session, most of the times it was possible to arrange for a second or third session, thus bit by bit obtaining all the relevant information. All questions were kept in an open and possibly unbiased manner, never suggesting a certain response was right or wrong or expected. Nevertheless, as will be discussed more detailed in the next chapter (cf. V 4.2), being educated also led to interview partners sometimes trying to manipulate the situation and to convey a certain picture – mostly with political intentions – that could not be confirmed in the process of verification. In general, this was evaluated as disadvantage, however, one that could be tackled in ways described below.

In sum, it can be said that most participants really wanted to tell their story and to share their opinion. Even if it was painful for them, they felt eager to continue speaking regardless to the emotional implications. I never pushed interview partners to tell painful experience in order to grasp interesting data. If they did so, it was of their own free will, their

[718] Bernard (2002), p. 206

trust and their wish to share their story. In one interview for example, Jonas, a 61-year-old Adio, after the first five minutes of the interview, all of a sudden burst out in tears telling me:

> People like me, happiness I don't know. I don't know when I was happy. I have never been to the war, but we are suffering. The traumatisation of the brain is too much. The general feeling I have is that we are living in a foreign country, the southerners. No help from the government. The UN, what the UN is doing, I don't know.

I went to get him tissues and, after having pulled himself together again, he continued talking to me for more than two hours. A couple of days later he spontaneously came back to my house to pick me up and give me a "city tour through the eyes of a southerner" as he called it. He took me to various places in Khartoum, Mayo (a government-run camp south of the capital), Kalakla (a squatter area south of Mayo) and Sallamah, the place where he and his family lived. Later on he came to pick me up again, so that I could attend a rehearsal of his sons' band. During the research process, it became clear that many of the interview partners had a serious interest in making me understand their situation in the North, even if talking about it was sometimes painful to them. At the same time, friendships developed from interview situations and interview partners allowed me deep insights into their lives. Sudanese people in general are incredibly hospital people and most of the times very welcoming to foreigners coming from Europe.

In grounded theory, all is data, meaning that everything one learns in the research setting or about the research topic can be used as data. Stern (2005) goes as far as writing that for her "the beauty of the method lies in its everything-is-data characteristic; that is to say, everything I see, hear, smell, and feel about the target, as well as what I already know from my studies and my life experience, are data."[719] I have tried to be as open and receptive as possible and to systematically incorporate any bit of information I could grasp and to fuse all this together into one theory. The presented research is based on two field phases, with a pause of almost one year between them. Contrary to earlier assertions, social scientist have come to recommend shorter stays in the field; like this fatigue and irritation that attend too long stays in the field are sought

[719] Stern (2007), p. 115

to be prevented.[720] All formal interviews were tape-recorded and all records were transcribed. Informal interviews and observation-like situations, such as the above mentioned city tour, were documented in field notes. In addition to extended observations, I sometimes also had the opportunity to spontaneously lead an interview-like conversation, which I could not record. If the level of formality was very high and I was able to produce detailed and precise field notes afterwards, I included these interviews into the coding. In most cases, however, field notes and observations were used to probe and buttress the formal material, but not for coding as such.

4.2 Data collection in a cross-cultural setting

The data collection of the presented research has been conducted in Khartoum, where the researcher is clearly considered a foreigner with a completely divergent cultural background from its inhabitants. This particular situation makes it necessary to grapple with the implications of doing research in a cross-cultural setting and its compatibility with grounded theory. Conducting research in a cross-cultural setting requires a lot of adaptability and flexibility from the researcher's side.[721] Rigid use of methodological strategies appears to be insufficient and even counterproductive. A methodology should not stand in the way of research conduction, but support and guide it; a quality affiliated with grounded theory. Charmaz (2006) defines grounded theory methods as "a set of principles and practices, not as prescriptions or packages".[722] Cross-cultural research often requires an explorative approach with room for creativity and adjustment to the particular setting. Indeed, grounded theory enables the researcher to flexibly develop a theory grounded in the data themselves.

While lack of understanding for a cultural setting might provoke misinterpretation, understanding one's own culture is not necessarily easier. On the contrary, due to its all-pervasive character, it is often difficult to understand our own culture. Mey and Mruck (2007a) warn that "the more researchers and participants belong to similar cultures, the more interviewers may pre-suppose concepts and values as shared, and therefore fail to attend to elaboration during the interview, so that

[720] cf. van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 46 ff.
[721] cf. van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 46 ff.
[722] Charmaz (2006), p. 9

even central topics will be obscured or lost."[723] In a cross-cultural, racially and ethnically diverse setting, self-reflection of the researcher's positionality is critical for both the grounded theory researcher and research process. The research and its results depend on time, place, and the context the researcher belongs to and a reflexive stance is explicitly recommended within constructivist grounded theory methods.[724] Green et al. (2007) suggest that "[d]ue to the researcher's positionality along various dimensions of race, class, ethnicity, etc., the researcher is certainly prone to a type of cultural bias that guides: (1) how the interview is conducted, (2) what type of questions are asked, (3) how the interview is recorded, and (4) what observations are ultimately made." They add that likewise "the social positions of respondents also influence how their responses are framed and how they conduct themselves in the interview."[725] In the case of Sudan, not only race and ethnicity but also gender has to be considered in a reflexive manner. Van den Hoonaard (1997) concludes that cross-cultural settings "provide a hospitable environment to develop sensitizing concepts, because it is easier to develop such concepts in a world that we are not able to take for granted."[726] The outsider status, he goes on, can furthermore be an advantage during the data collection, since it permits the researcher "to ask and have answered questions that are simply too 'ignorant', 'obvious' or 'outrageous' to be tolerated from anyone but a child".[727]

In the particular case of the research, an insider most likely would have gotten more biased responds from individuals, since it is a very common and often necessary habit to comply with officially suggested and expected opinion in public.[728] Relying on many years of experience in interaction with southern Sudanese inside and outside the country, the own positionality was carefully considered. It was intended to lead interviews in a way that allowed gathering and interpreting the information in a possibly unbiased way. Yet, in all interview situations an ultimate bias remains, which has to be acknowledged and analysed.

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[723] Mey and Mruck (2007a), p. 523
[724] cf. Mey and Mruck (2007a), p. 516 ff.
[725] Green et al. (2007), p. 482 referring to Barnes (1996)
[726] van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 74 (Blumer's "sensitizing concept" is a forerunner of grounded theory and "allows the researcher to sensitize herself conveniently to a particular category of data about which she initially knows little." Cf. van den Hoonaard (1997), p. 4 f.
[727] Berreman (1962) quoted in Lubkemann (2008), p. 34
[728] cf. Streck (2007), p. 114 ff.

Sometimes, for example, participants tried to convey a certain impression to me, which could not be confirmed in the overall interview and analysis. In some situations, for example, interview partners clearly denied having any relationships with northern Sudanese at all, but later on in other interviews recalled reunions with northern neighbours or colleagues. These responds were not taken as outright lies. The researcher being a member of the so-called international community, apparently, brought about the desire to convey a certain picture in accordance with the own and/or official political attitudes. Interviews are flexible enough to provide various possibilities of checking stories, and after careful analysis according to the wider context, descriptions entered the research in their interpreted version, above all in their function as political statements. In other situations, participants seemed to prefer being identified by their past rather than their present. This had to be understood in the context that although changes are taking place in Khartoum, these are often not viewed as crucial enough to balance out history or justify unification. Participants sometimes did not want to create a positive image that could overshadow the bad experience of the many years before the signature of the CPA. In these situations it was important to pose questions and to gain a clear picture of whether participants were talking about past or present. In more advanced stages of the research, interview partners were asked to compare the different stages of their stay and how their situation had changed over time.

As noted above, with a variety of respondents multiple interviews have been conducted. Hereby, confidence has been increased and in-depth elaboration has been permitted. Mey and Mruck (2007a) point out that "intimate knowledge will hardly be given to strangers, so familiarity will provide other insights than in the case of a researcher unfamiliar with a person or issue".[729] Through establishing friendly relationships and confidence, while at the same time being a foreigner, a good balance between distance and familiarity has been created. Furthermore, getting back to the same person various times allowed to tackle the previously described problem of participants being highly sensitive to current happenings; narrations on the same issues could be followed up over time. Many times, interview partners invited me to visit them in their

[729] Mey and Mruck (2007a), p. 523

homes, at work or at church, or took me out to have coffee or lunch. I played with children, chatted with grandparents, looked at family albums, admired beautiful gardens, and listened to family-made music. Interview partners, therefore, allowed me to get much more thorough insights into their lives, than mere questioning could ever have provided. Furthermore, in several cases, interview partners had some kind of relations with other interview partners. For example, I conducted separate formal interviews with a father and his daughter and also went to their house to get to know the rest of the family. I conducted separate interviews with husband and wife, visited both of them various times separately at their working places and together at their home, where I met their relatives and children. Some participants were colleagues or friends to each other. Even at the time of this writing, I still remain in contact with some interview partners and they keep me informed on what is happening in Khartoum and in the South, and how their own plans are developing.

So, in spite of my divergent cultural background, I was able to reach a wider scope of understanding on participants' social environments, their attitudes and lives and, in particular, their political involvement and its effects on their statements. In retrospect, being an outsider to Sudan was clearly of advantaged and so was being female. In spite of sometimes being considered a member of the international community, to whom certain images were sought to be transmitted, by not being part of the highly politicised situation myself, I was able to gather less biased information from the interview partners than an insider could have done. Also being female was of clear advantage. Research participants all being from the South, to a certain degree, reduced the relevance of gender segregation built-in to Sudanese society. In fact, in Sudan being a foreign woman places female researchers into the privileged position of being able to spend time with men and women in private and public alike. In spite of these advantages, nevertheless, statements have always been understood as social constructs and been treated as such. Because the research touches profound and sensitive issues, the verification of interpretations of data has been taken very serious.

4.3 Selection of interview partners

The research is concerned with southern Sudanese living and working in the inner city of Khartoum and their relations to the Khartoum society and the state. It is not concerned with the "classical" southern IDP, who typically lives inside IDP camps or squatter areas. In fact, some of the interview partners did not even come as IDPs to the North, but as the children of work migrants or in search for education or jobs, some even during the Addis Ababa peace. The extreme marginalisation and desperation of the southern Sudanese living in IDP camps around Khartoum – which has been discussed in length in chapter II 6 "Internal displacement to Khartoum" – sets them automatically apart from the northern Sudanese living in the inner city of the capital. Although, they frequently mix and cooperate with displaced and marginalised Sudanese who are not from the South, it is usually their marginalisation that unites them.[730] Therefore, they would be unable to make relevant contributions to the research question.

As Morse clarifies, "[t]he primary key to excellence in grounded theory, as in all qualitative inquiry, is that both data collection and techniques of analytical conceptualization must be rigorous […]; [e]xcellent data are obtained through careful sampling."[731] In order to reach saturation of categories, randomisation is inefficient and misleading. Instead, inquiry must be purposeful and interview partners must be selected according to their knowledge about the topic being researched, or type of information which is needed to complete or to complement the understanding.[732] It is important to understand that in grounded theory the selection of interview partners, the collection of data and its analysis are simultaneous processes and mutually determine each other. Grounded theory does not deviate its claim to produce scientific theory from representativeness of the sample, but through theoretic sampling.[733] Theoretic sampling is a way of purposeful sampling according to the categories emerging during the conduct of research. Therefore, it is not based on quota, but on theoretic concern with the purpose of elaborating and refining categories. It is "strategic, specific,

[730] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 71 ff.
[731] Morse (2007), p. 235
[732] cf. Morse (2007), p. 233 f.
[733] cf. Muckel (2007), p. 215

and systematic"[734] and aims at finding data, which have the highest likeability of providing relevant information about the surveyed phenomenon.[735] In short, "theoretical sampling pertains only to conceptual and theoretic development; it is *not* about representing a population or increasing the statistical generalizability of results."[736] Sampling in grounded theory has two main phases, initial sampling and theoretic sampling. Criteria for the first phase of sampling are already determined before entering the field of research. Most importantly, it aims at recruiting participants who have experienced the research topic in question.[737] Initial sampling is the point from which to start the research, whereas theoretical sampling gives the direction of where to go. One can enter the second phase of sampling as soon as first preliminary categories have been developed in a way that they can provide the direction for the theoretic sampling.[738]

Getting into touch with interview partners was considerably easy. Before this research, I had already been to Sudan twice (in 2003 to study in Khartoum, in 2005 to do research in Equatoria, South Sudan). Also I have done extensive field research on southern Sudanese refugees in a refugee settlement in northern Uganda. Therefore, upon arrival to Khartoum in 2008, I was already equipped with ample previous knowledge, relevant experience and a strong social network of friends and colleagues on whom I was able to depend from the very first day on. With their help and assistance, it was easy for me to get into touch with first interview partners. Within the first days after my arrival, I was already able to start conducting interviews. The same people also put me into touch with people who became my supporters and guides, who presented me to their families, relatives, friends and colleagues and helped me find new interview partners for many times.

All research participants were chosen to be from South Sudan, to have lived in Khartoum for at least 20 years at the time of the interview, but to still clearly define themselves as southern Sudanese. Since the relationships between southern Sudanese and the non-African Sudanese are known to be particularly complicated, it has been made a

[734] Charmaz (2006), p. 103
[735] cf. Muckel (2007), p. 214 ff.
[736] Charmaz (2006), p. 101
[737] cf. Morse (2007), p. 232
[738] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 96

condition that participants either lived in the inner city or worked in the inner city together with so-called Arab-Sudanese. For example, one participant, an accountant, was working as the only southern Sudanese in a northern-based company and also for a Sudanese newspaper with mixed staff. The majority of his colleagues were so-called Arab Sudanese. Yet he was living in a neighbourhood in Khartoum North, where the majority of people were Africans from Darfur. Another research participant worked for the UNMIS[739] and for a southern local NGO. The majority of his colleagues were foreigners or southern Sudanese. Yet, he was living in a neighbourhood in the inner city of Khartoum, where basically all of his neighbours were so-called Arab Sudanese. Both participants were included into the research, because they had a relatively high exposure to so-called Arab Sudanese. Southern Sudanese living in the inner city are automatically considerably well-off. Additionally, all research participants were required to have professional employment. It has not been enough to be an un-skilled employee. Therefore, the research group can be considered an educated elite. In one single case, a young interview partner was not yet working at the time of the first interview. Instead she was studying at the University of Khartoum, where she spent significant time with so-called Arab Sudanese. Her father being a permanently employed pilot, made her part of the described elite, in spite of not having had professional employment. During the second interview after one year, she had already finished her studies and become the headmistress of a primary school.

Data collection was started on a wide range as to gather the widest possible spectrum of material. Preliminary categories slowly started to emerge and to direct the sampling. The theoretic sampling was initiated and geared towards the elaboration and saturation of the preliminary categories. The interim time between the two field stays was used for intensive data analysis and the development of way-paving concepts. The second research phase was used to gather more data to illuminate, elaborate and refine those concepts. Sampling strategies are adjusted and changed during the process of data collection and analysis in order to guarantee maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

[739] The UNMIS is the United Nations Missions which was established in response to the signature of the CPA on 24.03.2005

Sometimes it is difficult to access the field in the desired way and to sample purposeful. In that case, and particularly at the beginning of a research, sampling can be done randomly or systematic, meaning following precise strategies or, for example, going from one place to the next.[740] At the beginning of this research, sampling was done more or less randomly, depending on the mediation of friends and colleagues, while at the same time complying with the initial criteria mentioned above. By establishing good relations with mediators who were part of the research group itself, later on, theoretic sampling could be conducted quite precisely and efficiently.

For example, during the data analysis, it turned out that the perception of the environment influenced the strategies participants employed in their relations with the majority society. The first participants looked at the northern society as hostile to them. They described their situation, basically, as an invasion by the majority society and thus applied strategies to reduce exposure to the highest degree possible. They had come to Khartoum in their early twenties, spoke Juba Arabic, but no "Khartoum Arabic" and worked in southern-dominated NGOs. A different participant who was also working in a southern-dominated NGO, but who had already spent parts of his childhood in Khartoum, accepted the situation as more natural and used action strategies to master interaction rather than just cutting it off. I started developing first categories related to coping strategies which remained to be probed and saturated. After having realised that the age of arrival might change the perception of the situation in Khartoum, participants were sampled who had come as young as possible and who received at least parts of their basic school education already in the capital. These participants confronted their environment in an active manner, rather dealing with the situation than trying to completely withdraw from it. With the collected data, those categories related to coping strategies were elaborated. Another time, I started looking for southerners who were Muslims. I did so, because participants were having differing ideas about what was setting them apart from the majority society. Some blamed religion and assumed that southern Muslims were much more included into society than they were themselves. The majority, however, explained that the Darfur crisis has proved that their problems cannot be explained through

[740] cf. Truschkat et al. (2007), p. 242

religious differences. They gave examples of southern Muslims who were disregarded alike and assumed that it was more a cultural or racial issue than a religious one. I purposefully sampled a southern Sudanese Muslim, in order to learn about his specific situation and to compare whether it differed from previous findings.

The research has not been designed to be representative for the whole of southern Sudanese. This would have required research on a massive scope, exceeding far beyond the capacity of the project. Systematic documentation or official data on the number or location of southern Sudanese living or working inside the city centre of Khartoum does not exist and a random survey was neither possible nor desired. The research aimed at gathering in-depth knowledge about a specific group; thus, valuable and rich data was given priority over a large but shallow quantity of data. In total more than 30 formal interviews have been conducted, summing up to about 60 hours of formal and tape-recorded conversation. The following demographic characteristics describe the research participants at the time of conduction of research (autumn 2008 or 2009). Of the 20 respondents, 14 were men and six were female. Two participants were between 25 and 29 years of age; six participants were between 30 and 39; nine participants were between 40 and 49; three were older than 50. All participants hold a university degree and had formal employment. 15 individuals have their houses in the Three Towns of Khartoum (eight in Khartoum; five in Omdurman; two in Khartoum North) and five further outside the inner city either in Kalakla or Sallamah (see Map 2).[741] All of them worked right inside the centre. Eight participants worked for local NGOs; three for the UN or other international organisations; five in private northern-led companies; and the remaining worked as newspaper editor, as headmistress of a primary school, as a pastor or for the SPLA.

Participants' social and economic class levels are difficult to define, most notably, because all of them use the extra money they have to support less wealthy southern Sudanese. Therefore, one might have a considerable income, but be responsible for such a large number of dependents that even the better earning persons sometimes barely meet the needs of the own nucleus family. Luka, a 42-year-old Bari

[741] For more precise geographic descriptions and a map of Khartoum see chapter II 5.

proper is an engineer with a leading position in a big northern milling company. He explained:

> They are all depending on me, this is why we are unable to make any money in Khartoum. It could be very hard for me really to make money out of my salary. I have my mother there in the South, so I have to send her money. Relatives around, I am supporting them. Although I am going to save some money, but when you compare to someone in my position, no, you will find that, especially the Arabs, you will find that they got very good houses around here in this area [al-Riyad, one of the better areas of the urban district Khartoum]. Nobody is forcing me, but it comes out of my heart. If he has nothing and I don't support him, whom will he look for?

Jonas, a 61-year-old Adio and pilot, remembered:

> During the war, 25 people in my house, 25. You cannot imagine! 25 in the house and I am the only source of income, very difficult. If there was no war at all, and the whole country would be at peace, I would be a millionaire now! [...] The relatives who are living around in Khartoum, in Omdurman, in Khartoum North, they are looking at me as a big tree with a lot of fruits, everyone who has a problem will come and pick a fruit, so this is how I see myself. But one day the tree is also becoming tired, no more fruits. But what could I do? I had to help them. So as I said, if there was no war in the South, I would be somebody different. But because of this situation, all the money is gone. Helping here, helping there, those who have medical treatment, fees, all that.

Amath, a 34-year-old Dinka and Member of Parliament for the SPLM, described her situation as follows:

> The problem for me is that it is difficult for me, because I am not satisfying my needs myself. So, I cannot save. I cannot built a house, I just rent and all, because it is very difficult every time to say no I don't have money. And sometimes it is really a matter of life, somebody to live or to die, so we don't have any will. Some people are going to school, they want money, if they are not given, they are not going to school. So for me it is difficult, it is very heavy, because for myself, I cannot plan freely, because I have to take care of others.

For those interview partners who have less paying jobs, such as in local NGOs, the situation is even more complicated. Maria, a 39-year-old Balanda and executive manager of a local NGO, explained:

> You see, most of my aunts, because of their financial situation, they sometimes will ask me, at least I can contribute something for them. [...] My uncle in Haj Yousif has a daughter, she studies at Ahfad. I paid her school fees. Then you see, in my house, there are dependents. There is the daughter of my sister, she is studying at Ahfad University, I am the one who pays the fees for her. And there is the daughter of my other uncle, she is also staying with me in the house and I am the one to pay her fees.

> […] I cannot choose, but if they ask me, I have, I will pay. And if I don't have, I will not pay. Like the daughter of my cousin, she stayed with me, but the last two years, there was no funds for the NGO, I was not able to pay her fees. I called the mother in Wau that this year I am not able to pay the fees for her child. If you do not give, people can get angry with you, but you can't. I used to tell them that also I have children.

These quotes reveal that although economical backgrounds vary widely, all interview partners are challenged with the economic needs of the extended family. If there is any extra money available, it is usually used to assist more dependents. Considering the desperate situation of the majority of southern Sudanese, there is no end to the number of people in need of assistance of a wealthier relative. At the same time, southern Sudanese face serious barriers to their economic forthcoming in Khartoum. Holding a university degree and having formal employment being criteria of selection is, of course, a clear (and intended) pre-selection according to social status. All participants are undoubtedly much better off than the majority of southern Sudanese in the North. Being able to live in the inner city of Khartoum, which the majority of participants does, is already an indication of wealth. Southern Sudanese are usually not given land for free and therefore either have to buy land at a high price or have to cope up with expensive rent.

Yet, not everybody who chooses to live outside the inner city does so because of lack of money. Some simply want to avoid constant involuntary movements and disturbances through landlords, thus preferring to put up with long daily rides to the place of work instead. Priorities, of course, matter. Living outside the inner city is an option to save money and invest into other projects. One participant, for example, prefers living in Kalakla, but sends his children to boarding school in Kampala, a very pricy matter. A clear distinction of social class status is, due to aforementioned reasons, not possible. Neither is grouping interview participants according to their economic status considered necessary. In thematic areas where the available financial means do matter, participants' situations were considered individually and situational.

5 Theoretical sensitivity

A crucial factor needed to conduct grounded theory is "theoretic sensitivity" including "experiential data".[742] Theoretic sensitivity refers to the personal competences required from the researcher; one's ability to see relevant data and to perceive variables and relationships. The concept of theoretical sensitivity can also be understood as an indication that Glaser and Strauss, although nowadays often being accused of naïve inductivism, had not completely overlooked the problem that the emergence of categories cannot be fully neutral and independent from the researcher.[743] Instead, every researcher brings along some kind of experience, research skills, previous knowledge and the alike. That is to say, no researcher is a tabula rasa. Theoretic sensitivity emerges from the studying of literature, work experience, personal experience or even the research process itself.[744] Strauss (1987) wrote that "[e]xperiential data are essential data […] because they not only give added theoretical sensitivity but provide a wealth of provisional suggestions for making comparisons, finding variations, and sampling widely on theoretic grounds."[745] Kathy Charmaz (2006), as a constructionist, writes, "we are part of the world we study and the data we collect. We construct our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives, and research practices."[746] A theory is not just emerging out of the data, but depends on the theoretic sensibility of the researcher, which is further sharpened through the data. This means the researcher begins the research project with certain qualifications at his/her disposition, which are furthermore complemented by skills and knowledge gained during the research project itself.

Similarly, grounded theory on the one hand is systematic and follows a specific theoretical methodology; on the other hand, it provides space for associative creativity, fluidity and openness. In fact, creativity is a crucial aspect of theoretic sensitivity, which "manifests itself in the ability of the researcher to aptly name categories; and also to let the mind wander and make the free associations that are necessary for generating

[742] cf. Strauss (1987), p. 10 f.
[743] cf. Kelle (2007a), p. 196 ff.
[744] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 25 ff.
[745] Strauss (1987), p. 11
[746] Charmaz (2006), p. 10

stimulating questions and for coming up with a comparison that leads to discovery."[747] To limit the influence of creativity and to prevent getting lost in the data, clear rules are followed;[748] equilibrium between creativity and science is established. Not only personal and professional experience, but also literature is used in a creative manner.

A research depends on the theoretic sensibility of the researcher from the first steps on, for it is already crucial to the initial focus of the research project. As has been stated before, grounded theory is not started with a precise research question, but with an open research idea. Theoretic sensibility helps the researcher to direct his/her attention towards an interesting phenomenon.[749] In my specific case for example, my experience with issues related to Sudan and displaced southern Sudanese in particular, clearly directed me towards selecting a theme related to these issues. I was aware of the existence of a small southern Sudanese elite in Khartoum and already knew that no relevant literature had been published so far. Also, I was able to assume that they were quite influential in comparison to other marginalised southern Sudanese and expected interesting findings. Theoretic sensitivity gave me an idea of where and how to start. While bringing important previous knowledge into the research, at the same time it was intended to remain open for the new. Apparently, it is impossible to enter a field of research completely unbiased and being able to compare with existing knowledge can even be of advantage. Nevertheless, through deliberately remaining sceptic towards all emerging categories, early fixture of hasty hypotheses was prevented.

6 Analytical procedures

The central procedure of data analysis is the coding. As Strauss (1987) puts it, "[t]he excellence of the research rests in large part on the excellence of the coding".[750] Coding is the process of defining what the data are about. While above coding has been discussed in general, in the following lines, the specific way of how coding procedures have been applied in the presented research will be explained in detail and laid open in full transparency.

[747] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1990) quoted in Reichertz (2007), p. 224
[748] cf. Berg und Milmeister (2007), p. 202 f.
[749] cf. Truschkat et al. (2007), p. 238
[750] Strauss (1987), p. 27

6.1 Different types of codes

A code is used to set up a relationship between the data and the respondents.[751] The meaning of the terms code, category and concept is not always clear. Bryant and Charmaz (2007) suggest placing them in a hierarchy from bottom to top respectively.[752] Strauss and Corbin (1996), on the contrary, ascribe a lower level of abstraction to a concept in comparison to a category. They suggest that a concept is a conceptual term or etiquette for distinct happenings, incidents or other types of phenomena. A category is an abstracter classification of concepts, which arises in the process of constant comparison.[753] In this paper, Strauss and Corbin's suggestion has been applied. Accordingly, pieces of data (indicators) have been labelled with different types of codes (substantive, in vivo and theoretic). If various codes could be grouped together, concepts were formed.[754] If indicators were ample and concepts proved to be relevant for the emerging research, they were further elaborated and, hereby, raised to categories. The three codes, which were used in this research to form concepts, are substantive codes, in vivo codes and theoretic codes. In general, grounded theory suggests the translation of nouns into verbs when developing codes and categories. Hereby, particular sensitivity to process is sought to be created from the very beginning on.[755]

Substantive codes and in vivo codes have been used more frequently during the coding of data than theoretic codes. Theoretic codes, which Strauss and Corbin (1996) also call "borrowed codes"[756] – for they are labels adopted from already existing theory – have been widely avoided. Their advantage is that they are already containing analytical meaning, which can be benefited from. Yet, theoretic codes are already occupied with predetermined associations.[757] In this work, concepts and categories were, above all, sought to carry their own and research-relevant meaning. Nevertheless, in some cases, the data clearly indicated towards well-known and analysed phenomena, such as in the case of the category "racism". In these situations, concepts have been

[751] cf. Star (2007), p. 80
[752] cf. Bryant and Charmaz (2007), p. 18
[753] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 45 ff.
[754] for more details on how concepts have been formed see chapter V 6.2
[755] cf. LaRossa (2005), p. 847
[756] Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 50, own translation of "geborgte Konzepte"
[757] Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 49 ff.

"borrowed", yet, they have also been given their own research-relevant meanings and, for this, heavily been support with illustrative data.

Substantive codes are formulated by the sociologist and summarize empirical substance. If well done, they hold much analytic utility since they are constructed clearly and systematically.[758] Other than sociologically constructed codes, in vivo codes derive directly from the language of the field; they "serve as symbolic markers of participants' speech and meanings".[759] In vivo codes are a laconic way of letting the research participants speak. Yet, just being catchy is not enough to make a good code. Like any other code, in vivo codes need to be subjected to comparative and analytic treatment. In vivo codes can reflect condensed meaning, while at the same time being anchored in a particular fragment of data. They are "imagery" and, therefore, need less illustrating to convey their meaning.

The data itself usually suggests which type of category serves best and any label can be taken as provisional and be changed to a more appropriate one later on. In this paper, in vivo codes have been found very useful and strong in transmitting meaning. During the initial coding many in vivo codes have emerged and often been maintained throughout the entire research process. The way how in vivo codes were used in this research is illustrated in the following example. Yousif, a 46-year-old accountant, described in an interview how he managed to maintain his employment in a northern company as follows:

> But I am sitting, I am just putting my heart to the prison, to the freezer there. I don't become aggressive to them, I am always trying to be cool and always, if you see me there, I don't quarrel with them. I just always being silent and quite, doing the work, the assignment which was given, I just do it.

From this statement, the category "putting the heart to the freezer" has derived and been developed into a category, which later on has been identified as a "coping strategy" in respond to "the war of the mind", another lead in vivo code. These two categories are highly relevant to the theory and hold a strong unifying potential for various codes and subcategories. Labels are precise in conveying the complex meaning behind the categories. Other in vivo codes are, for example, "not talking politics", a further coping strategy in respond to "the war of the mind";

[758] cf. Strauss (1987), p. 33 f.
[759] Charmaz (2006), p. 55

and “the gap”, a crucial in vivo subcategory to “the war of the mind”. In fact, many more examples could be given, but will be left to appear during the presentation of the results of the research. This much is clear, even the core category “feeling like a second-class citizen” is a textbook example of an in vivo code.

6.2 Open coding

Coding starts with the open coding, a process in which “we remain open to exploring whatever theoretical possibilities we can discern in the data. […] Through comparing data with data, we learn what our research participants view as problematic and begin to treat it analytically.”[760] Initial codes are provisional, comparative and grounded in data. The rudiments of this open coding are captured in the so-called concept-indicator model, which is based on the principals of constant comparison. While coding an indicator for a concept, one compares that indicator with previous indicators that have been coded in the same way. An indicator refers to a word, phrase, or sentence or series of words, phrases or sentences within the material being analysed.[761]

A statement (indicator 1) can be coded to trigger a concept (concept A), and a second statement (indicator 2) is then compared to the first. If the comparison brings about that the two indicators belong together, the two statements would be classified as indicators for concept A and be grouped together. If the two statements do not seem to belong together, a second concept would be developed (concept B). Through this, a series of concepts can be developed in the process of constant comparison. While at the beginning a single indicator might bring about a concept, eventually multiple indicators will be needed to theoretically sustain a concept. In this process, the level of abstraction is an important delimiter. “A totally restricted level of abstraction would result in thousands of concepts, each with a single indicator. A totally unrestricted level of abstraction would result in one concept that incorporated every indicator.”[762] Groupings can take place in two ways. First, putatively similar but not identical concepts can be brought together under one abstract heading. Second, putatively dissimilar but still allied concepts can be brought together under one abstract heading.

[760] Charmaz (2006), p. 47
[761] cf. LaRossa (2005), p. 840 f.
[762] LaRossa (2005), p. 842

Strauss and Corbin (1998) provide examples as follows: A putatively similar group might be constituted by birds, planes and kites according to their similarity as objects that fly; a putatively dissimilar one might group together toy grabbing and toy hiding under the headline of different strategies to avoid sharing a toy.[763] By applying LaRossa's modified model, in the following figure using a selected number of exemplary indicators, it is demonstrated how the indicator-concept model was used to integrate indicators and concepts during the open coding.[764]



Figure 3: Example of a concept-indicator model

LaRossa took Glaser and Strauss's original concept-indicator model and adjusted it according to his own enhancements. In his model, LaRossa allowed for connections between indicators and concepts, but also to each other, demonstrating the principle of constant comparison. He furthermore changed the arrows between indicators and concept from pointing into one direction into going in both directions. Through these bidirectional arrows, he intends to compensate previous short-comings to consider deduction, an issue which will be discussed in chapter V 9. Since in the case of the presented example indicators were ample, the concept was further elaborated and raised in its level of abstraction to form a category. Also, properties of categories have to be developed and dimensionalised according to their intensity, for example, as from high to low. As Dey (2007) writes, "categories lack clear boundaries

[763] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1990) quoted in LaRossa (2005), p. 842 f.
[764] cf. LaRossa (2005), p. 842, for the original indicator-concept model see Glaser (1978), p. 62

defined by an unambiguous set of criteria; categories are fuzzy and a category membership is a matter of degree."[765] In this research, for example, the category "the natural gap" has been developed in terms of its properties and their dimensions as follows:

Category	Properties	Dimensions
The natural gap	Language barrier	Perception high, middle, low (depending on own language skills)
	Cultural / religious gap	Perception high, middle, low

Table 2: Example of a dimensionalisation

In this way, interview partners could be surveyed according to particular attributes and their dimensions. Particularly at the beginning of the analysis, I coded interviews word-by-word or line-by-line, meaning staying very close to the data and not prematurely factoring out supposedly irrelevant pieces of data. Every fragment of data (indicator) was labelled with a possibly short, simple, active and analytic code. The following chart is an example of the open coding done.

Excerpt 1: Maria, age 39, Balanda from Wau, came to Khartoum with her parents at the age of 17.	
	Commenting on the need to wear a thob (a full-body veil traditional in northern Sudan) when visiting neighbours:
Neighbours putting social pressure, disobedience being punished with exclusion, Avoiding exclusion through obedience, obeying to social pressure, complying with invitations, wanting to be recognised as southerner, establishing a boundary, affection for own African clothing style, complying with official clothing requirements (tall), disobeying social requirements, discovering fake responses,	Yes! It forces me to do something which I don't want! If I did not go like that, next time when I invite them, they will not come. So it forces me to do the way they want. I will not go without thob, it is a must to go with thob. You see, one day, just my neighbour close to my house, their daughter got married, we go to the party, I said that this time, because I am a southerner, I want to be different from them. I have very nice cloth, I bought it from Zairean design, just you see like this, very nice and tall, I just made my hair nice. Oooh, very nice, very nice Maria! But it is not real from their heart, you see!

[765] Dey (2007), p. 170 referring to McNeil & Freiberger (1994)

being criticised for disobedience, encountering lack of comprehension for own fashion (tradition), not meeting understanding for being different, receiving instructions on “accurate” social behaviour, defending her African identity, searching for understanding (conform with laws), being criticised for not complying with Muslim clothing tradition, defending her Christian identity, being vehemently criticised for disobedience, giving up on defending herself, promising conformity, feeling hurt about conditions to her acceptance, withdrawing from social life to avoid obedience	Next day my neighbour she comes and says that my dress was very beautiful, but that most of the people said that why did Maria come like this? Most of the people they are talking like this. She said next time you come, don’t come like that. I say that is my cloth, it is tall, according to the Shari’a, even it goes up to here, the neck is not open, why do you say that? She said, you know, our people, because of Islam. I said, I am not Muslim. They talk, they talk, they talk, I say ok, thank you, next time I will go like you. Sometimes it makes me not feel alright. Like somebody invites me to a celebration, I say that no. Because I don’t want to wear a thob, I don’t like it.
Excerpt 2: Rebecca, age 33, Lotuka from Torit, came to the North with her family at the age of 3 and to Khartoum at the age of 22.	
Being given bad names, facing racism, being stigmatised through skin-colour and history of slavery, being insulted, lack of intermarriage, relations taking place in a context, the extended family not accepting southerners, being considered as different, being discriminated, being insulted, being unworthy for marriage, being considered as different, being considered as enemy, being stigmatised through skin colour, being unworthy for marriage, Arab community not accepting southerners, being unworthy for marriage being stigmatised through history of slavery, being unworthy for marriage	Here, as I told you before, they say they are the black people, they are slaves, you know, something like they are animals, bad words, they are always telling us. And there is no intermarriage. If you marry, you are not alone there is the relatives, the extended family. They will always consider you as other, as I told you. They will underestimate you, they insult you, why you marry her, she is black, she is not like us, she is our enemy. Even the children, how the children are going to look like? You have to divorce her, you have to marry from us, from Arab. […] So always they have that thing and from us to marry from them they will say no, this is abid, a slave, they will say it very clear you cannot be our daughter.

Table 3: Example of open coding

Concepts developed during the process of open coding are preliminary. Accordingly, they are not labelled in an obsessively precise manner. At this stage of coding, it was rather intended to start understanding the phenomenon of interest and gain sensitivity for what is relevant to the research group. In the next step, the focused coding, valuable concepts were selected, some were renamed, some grouped together, others appeared to be uninteresting for the emerging theory and, accordingly,

were dismissed. While some researchers prefer to select in advance which sections of the data material are of interest and only code the supposedly relevant parts,[766] at the beginning of this work, I coded literally everything. Since sensitivity for the relevant, in my opinion, has to develop during the examination, it was considered too risky to pre-select during the early stages. Although this means an extra load of work, coding the entire material until being able to put clear foci is considered essential to not missing relevant insight.

6.3 Focused coding

With the advancing of the research, concepts were slowly raised to more abstract levels and categories developed. "Focused coding means using the most significant and/or frequent earlier codes to sift through large amounts of data."[767] Through comparing data to data focused codes are being developed, which are afterwards refined through comparing data to these codes. The second excerpt of the initial coding example is used to demonstrate some focused coding.

Excerpt 2: Rebecca, age 33, Lotuka from Torit, came to the North with her family at the age of 3 and to Khartoum at the age of 22.	
Racism Communities influencing relations Racism Distrust towards each other Racism Communities influencing relations being unworthy for marriage Racism	Here, as I told you before, they say they are the black people, they are slaves, you know, something like they are animals, bad words, they are always telling us. And there is no intermarriage. If you marry, you are not alone there is the relatives, the extended family. They will always consider you as other, as I told you. They will underestimate you, they insult you, why you marry her, she is black, she is not like us, she is our enemy. Even the children, how the children are going to look like? You have to divorce her, you have to marry from us, from Arab. […] So always they have that thing and from us to marry from them they will say no, this is abid, a slave, they will say it very clear you cannot be our daughter.

Table 4: Example of focused coding

[766] cf. Berg and Milmeister (2007), p. 183
[767] Charmaz (2006), p. 57

Focused codes have been used to synthesise and explain large segments of data. They have been used to analyse old data and to analyse new data and through comparing them with other data and other codes, some were developed into lead categories.

6.4 Axial coding

Axial coding is a technique, which methodologically guides the systematic elaboration of a category and helps to structure the emerging theory. A preliminary concept or a preliminary category is being analysed according to its conditions, strategies/tactics, interactions and consequences. Axial coding can be and should be carried out at any stage of the coding. It provides theoretic thickness to the emerging categories.[768] Several authors describe axial coding as crucial to developing coherent theory,[769] which Strauss himself called "part and parcel of the analyst's thought process."[770] Charmaz (2006), on the contrary, writes that "relying on axial coding may limit what and how researchers learn about their studied worlds and, thus, restricts the codes they construct."[771] Same as other authors, she criticises that axial coding might lead to the researcher applying an analytic frame to the data.[772] In this research, axial coding has proved useful. It has not been done in a rigid way, but applied whenever reasonable and beneficial for the development of a category. It was avoided to enforce pre-existing categories on the data or to limit the emergence by applying an analytic frame as Charmaz worries.

Axial coding is a way of analysing a category around an axis and linking categories and subcategories to each other by asking how they are related. A subcategory in grounded theory does not mean a category subordinated to a superior category, but denotes a category that is related to a focal category.[773] A category is put into the centre and the coding process circles around it. Strauss and Corbin (1996) apply a set of scientific terms to make links between categories visible.[774] They designed an organising scheme for data which includes

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[768] cf. Muckel (2007), p. 224
[769] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 76 ff.; cf. LaRossa (2005) p. 846 ff.
[770] Strauss (1987), p. 27
[771] Charmaz (2006), p. 62
[772] cf. Mey and Mruck (2007), p. 31
[773] cf. LaRossa (2005), p. 847 f.
[774] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 78 ff.

1. Conditions – the circumstances or situations that form the structure of the studied phenomena
2. Actions/interactions – participant's routine or strategic responses to issues, events, or problems
3. Consequences – outcomes of actions/interactions[775]

To give a practical example from the presented research, here we look into the phenomenon of "being discriminated at work":



Figure 4: Example of axial coding

A crucial factor setting the research group apart from the majority society is the racism that they encounter in every sphere of life in Khartoum. Figure 4 shows that one important scene for racist discrimination is the place of work in northern-led companies, where southern Sudanese generally are the clear minority among the staff. Discrimination at work has emerged as a subcategory to the category racism. The context is formed by the racially segregated society, which does not differentiate between distinct places; discrimination is omnipresent. While in other situations, research participants can withdraw or use other strategies, at the place of work their coping scope is extremely limited. Disobedience or conflicts with colleagues or superiors can easily be sanctioned with expulsion. Accordingly, research participants respond with full subordination and endurance. The category "putting the heart to the freezer" has been developed as a strategy in response to the subcategory "discrimination at the place of work". It is also another good example for an in vivo code. The direct consequence is that "the gap" between the research group and the

[775] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 61

majority society is getting wider, the dimension is alternated. Also, it reaffirms the attribute of “unbridgeability”, which means that “the gap” is impossible to be overcome, due to this and other factors. In the process of constant comparison, it turned out that “putting the heart to the freezer” is a strategy, which is not only applied at the working place, but also, for example, at university. Interview partners respond with subordination and endurance, whenever there is no alternative left. It is a way of putting certain objects as a priority to the own integrity, since endurance, in fact, always has negative impacts on the individual. With this information in mind, I sifted through all data again to find other text passages with statements related to the category “putting the heart to the freezer.” This strategy, applied at differing places and situations, was then upgraded to be a response to “the war of the mind” the superior category to racism which embraces the entire war-like situation in Khartoum. Many more ideas have sprung from this session of axial coding and other sessions of axial coding on other categories. Axial coding is a way of addressing questions on relations of categories towards the data. That does not mean that axial coding has to be done rigidly with any emerging category, but, as the example has shown, it can indeed help to further the understanding of links between categories and subcategories, their contexts, responds, consequences and so forth.

6.5 Selective coding and the formation of a core category

The goal of grounded theory is to generate theory. This theory occurs around one or more core categories. In any research project with limited capacity, it is highly recommended to focus on one core category. Elaborating the core category can be understood as the ultimate densifying step.[776] Not all scientists recommend the selection of a core category. While Charmaz for example discounts the relevance of the core category, in a classic grounded theory it is an indisputable requirement.[777] In this research, a core category emerged and was taken up and elaborated in detail. After having chosen a core category, all other subordinate categories and subcategories become systematically linked with the core; it is a way of axial coding only on a

[776] cf. Muckel (2007), p. 22f f.
[777] cf. Holton (2007), p. 279 f.

more abstract level.[778] Although some links might have been established before, after having selected the core category the search for them and their coding are done concertedly. This is when selective coding begins.

Especially when having a big quantity of data and after having started in an open manner, several phenomena can appear to be central. As has been pointed out above, in the majority of the cases, it is necessary to choose one single category as core category. During the examination of data and the advancement of the research, several lead categories have emerged. The category “feeling like a second-class citizen”, at the beginning, was treated as one of them. As the research advanced, however, it turned out that all categories could be related to it. It proved to be abstract enough to unify all other categories, while at the same time being substantive enough to convey the multifaceted meaning found in the data. The core category emerged naturally; it was, in fact, not necessary to select between various phenomena. The core category has been naturally upgraded in the different stages of coding due to its high relevance and theoretical reach and all supplementary categories were related to it. Strauss (1987) provides six criteria for judging which category should serve as core category:

1. It must be central: It must be related to as many other categories and their properties as possible
2. It must appear frequently in the data: By frequent recurrence of indicators pointing to the phenomena represented by the core category, it comes to be seen a stable pattern
3. It relates easily to other categories: Connections do not need to be forced but come naturally and abundantly
4. In substantive study, it has clear implications for a more general theory
5. When working out analytically its details, the theory moves forward appreciably
6. It allows for building in the maximum variation to the analysis, for the researcher is coding in terms of its dimensions, properties, conditions, consequences, strategies and so forth[779]

As will become clear in the presentation of the results, the core category of this work, “feeling like a second-class citizen”, complies with all these requirements. Through developing different types of “second-class citizens” different attributes and dimensions of the core category have been elaborated and described in detail. Furthermore, different strategies to master the core phenomenon have been related to the

[778] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 94 ff.
[779] cf. Strauss (1987), p. 36

different types of "second-class citizens". Hereby, it has been brought to light why certain individuals show completely different responses to the phenomenon in survey than others. The core category having high explanatory and predictive power makes it very utile for capturing process, a crucial aspect in the conduct of research with grounded theory. As will be shown in the presentation of results, with the categorisation of the different types of "second-class citizens" and the thorough elaboration of dimensions and attributes according to the intervening conditions and the context, it can be anticipated how individuals adapt their strategies if circumstances change. Thus, the changing nature of the context is analytically incorporated, individuals are embraced in their nature as active and strategic players, and the presented theory is rendered into a dynamic constructivist grounded theory.[780]

7 Memo-writing

The entire process of analysis is accompanied and documented by the composing of memos. Charmaz (2006) writes: "Memo-writing is the pivotal intermediate step between data collection and writing drafts of papers. […] Memo-writing constitutes a crucial method in grounded theory because it prompts you to analyze your data and codes early in the research process."[781] Stern (2007) points out that if "data are the building blocks of the developing theory, memos are the mortar. The analyst must write out their memos because unwritten inspired theorizing at night wafts away, the next morning it's gone, and the grounded theory never materializes."[782] Memos are not sought to simply describe data, but to conceptualise them in narrative form.[783] Various types of memos exist and are selected depending on what the researcher intends to discover through memoing. Examples of possible types of memos given by Strauss (1987) are:

- Initial, orienting memos
- Preliminary memos
- Memo sparks
- Memos that open attacks on new phenomena
- Memos on new categories
- Initial discovery memos

[780] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 118 ff.
[781] Charmaz (2006), p. 72
[782] Stern (2007), p. 119
[783] cf. Lempert (2007), p. 245

- Memos distinguishing between two or more categories
- Memos extending the implications of a borrowed concept[784]

Through memoing the researcher remains involved in the analysis and is able to raise the level of abstraction of ideas. Memos can be used to make comparison between data and data, data and codes, codes and data and other codes, codes and category, and category and concept and to note down assumptions on these comparisons.[785]

Memos can and should be written at any time about any code, concept or category. There is not a single way of writing a useful memo. Every researcher has to find his/her own way of memoing, which also highly depends on the kind of material one has. The way it has been used in this research, will exemplary be described below. Memo-writing should prompt the elaboration of process, assumptions and actions covered by codes, concepts or categories. They should also help to analyse which concepts deserve to be treated as analytic categories.[786] According to Charmaz (2006), the following can and should be done in a memo:

- Define each code[/concept] or category by its analytic properties
- Spell out and detail processes subsumed by the codes[/concepts] or categories
- Make comparison between data and data, data and codes, codes and codes, codes [and concepts, concepts and concepts, concepts] and categories, categories and categories
- Bring raw data into the memo
- Provide sufficient empirical evidence to support definitions of the category and analytic claims about it
- Offer conjectures to check in the field setting(s)
- Identify gaps in the analysis
- Interrogate a code[/concept] or category by asking questions of it[787]

In the presented research, memos have been written from the very beginning of the data collection on and coding was frequently interrupted for doing so. They have been crucial in determining the theoretic sampling and planning the next steps to be taken in the research. I wrote many memos on individuals, trying to understand their context and intervening conditions as to direct my sampling towards minimum alteration at the beginning and maximum alteration later on.

[784] Strauss (1987), p. 128 f.
[785] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 72 ff.
[786] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 72 ff.
[787] cf. Charmaz (2006), p. 82 (As has been pointed out above, Charmaz understands concepts to be of an abstracter character than codes and categories. In this research, however, codes are understood to be distinct forms of labels used to form concepts and categories are the highest in abstraction of the three. [cf. V 6.1])

The first memos were quite simple and unstructured, focussing on isolated codes. They were used to assess which codes were representing best what I found in the data and which codes deserved to be treated as conceptual codes in the focused coding. In advanced stages, through comparing memos with memos, different categories were related to each other. I was able to distinguish between major and minor categories, brought them into relation and discovered their strengths and weaknesses. I also compared memos written during the first field stay, with memos written during the second field stay, often comparing comments of the same person on the same concept at different times and different contexts. This procedure helped a lot in discovering process. As the research advanced, memos got more complex and comprehensible. Below, with the help of examples, applied procedures of memo-writing will be laid open.

The first memos produced in the field were, in fact, more like field notes, scribbled down in a rush and without a standardised system. Serious memoing was viewed more as a tiresome trouble than as an important research technique. However, as data accumulated and became unmanageable, a standardised routine of memoing was started and made a compulsory part of the coding. While the beginning was really difficult, as time went by, the writing became more and more natural. The scribbled field notes were reviewed and, in part, belatedly brought into the standardised form. In the following, memo-writing is displayed through the example of the category “being ineligible to marriage”. A first memo on the category was written during the first field stay in Khartoum, in autumn 2008, and reads as follows.

Memo: Lack of intermarriage
Intentions: Gathering first ideas on the code that has appeared during the open coding
In the first interview conducted with Jason, he mentioned that he would never allow his children to marry a northern Sudanese. In fact, he pointed out that the “Arabs” were trying to marry southern women to change their religion and to produce children, but that the other way around, marriage was not acceptable. He also talked about forced marriages, clearly referring to rape, and indicated that his sister had been raped during the war and that she had given birth to an “Arab” child, which was now living with them in the South. He was very strict on not letting his children marry “Arabs”. _____ In the second interview with Michael, I asked him, whether he would allow his children to marry a northern Sudanese. He answered:

No, I would not allow. Because the religions, because there is a problem with the religion. Northerners are all Muslims. The Muslim will not give their daughters to you and I would not give my daughters to them. There is Shari'a here and they do not allow to marry a Christian. How can I give my daughter to you? Unless I am Muslim, I am southerner Muslim, I can give my daughter to a northerner Muslim. Or the northerners can give their daughter to you, southerner Muslim.

In the third interview with Vincent, I also asked him, whether he would allow his children to marry a northern Sudanese. He answered:

Yah, if we allow them to marry, but do they allow us to marry from them?!

I responded: But you would allow your children, you would allow your daughter-

He interrupted me immediately saying: Yes we allow to marry, but now with the other side also saying no, we are also saying no. If they would allow, we will do the same. But if they don't like it, then it is difficult. We don't allow.

So far, not a single interview partner would allow his children to intermarry with a northern Sudanese. It appears that religion is a big separating issue in this. Jason was furious about forced marriages and rapes during the war. This surely influences his attitudes towards northern Sudanese in general. He indicated that the situation with the unwanted child was difficult and that they were not allowing the child to go to university in the North, since he might be corrupted by the society and then turn against his own southern people. This goes beyond religion it seems. Michael, in fact, was not a very talkative interview partner. It was difficult to get him talking about things. He spoke so silently, I could hardly understand him. He did not seem to have strong opinions; with most things he rather appeared indifferent, completely different from Jason, who is a very political man. Michael clearly sees the reason for intermarriage not talking place in religion. If he was a Muslim southerner, his children could marry Muslim northerners. With Vincent I am not exactly sure. He says that he would allow his children to marry a northern Sudanese, if they would allow their girls to marry southern men. It might be true that, in general, his/their opinion against intermarriage is a counter reaction. Yet, Vincent is a very bitter man. He knows that the Muslims of Sudan will not allow their girls to ever marry a Christian man (unless maybe he converts?), so it is easy for him to say that if they would allow, he would allow, too.

Intermarriage seems to be an issue on which interview partners hold strong opinions. The question is what they make out of the lack of marriage. Apparently, marriage would bring the groups closer. Yet, if it was merely an issue of differing religious rules, one could understand the lack of marriage as "natural", as Michael seems to believe. Jason and Vincent however, make me wonder on which other reasons the lack of marriage might be blamed and which consequences it has on the overall relations of the two groups. I will continue to survey this issue in other interviews: In fact, it is not possible to sample for opinion on intermarriage, since that is nothing to be asked beforehand. In respect to this code, the sampling will be done randomly and I will try to gather information on the code just from any interview partner. However, it might be a good idea, when possible, to have an interview with a southern Sudanese Muslim to have an opinion for comparison on the religious issue.

Table 5: Example of an early memo

This early memo was followed by another one, already discussing the category on a more abstract level. The memo is considered a comparative memo, for it was used to compare the emerging category with two other emerging categories. Same as the previous memo presented in Table 5, this one was also written during the first field stay in autumn 2008.

Memo: Lack of intermarriage / ineligibility to marriage
Intention: After having conducted and coded various additional interviews, new insights on the code “lack of intermarriage” emerged and shall be discussed in this memo
Categories to compare with: - trying to keep children apart from the majority society - feeling a gap between themselves and the northerners
Meanwhile, I have developed some other categories which are interesting to compare with. The first interesting insight is that interview partners, in general, try to keep their children apart from the majority society. They have made very bad experience in schools, neighbourhoods, etc., and do not wish them to mix with “Arabs”. Would you let somebody marry someone, with whom you would not even allow playing? Furthermore, interview partners clearly feel a gap between them and the majority society, a category which I am still working on. There are some aspects, which form a “natural” gap it seems, such as religion, tradition, and others. However, there are other aspects, which are accredited to the racist segregation in the country. I am learning more and more about interview partners feeling discriminated, for example at work, making reference to skin colour. I have started to sample for racist discrimination and am comparing these codes to the code on intermarriage. The lack of marriage is not, as had been assumed previously, understood as something natural, blamed on religion. Instead, there is a clear element of not being worthy to be married to an “Arab”. That does not mean that interview partners feel unworthy or inferior themselves, in fact, they do not seem to be strongly affected by the neglect (a fact I am following up in other codes). Yet, interview partners feel insulted and offended; they respond with counter-neglect. They are very strict in their reaction, if they don’t want us, we don’t want them, is the prevailing attitude. I found many more indications for the lack of marriage having deep consequences on relations. A clear boundary is established between the “we group” the eligible and the “they group” the ineligible. What does not being worthy for marriage mean? If it was for religion, it would be easy to explain and not creating the same anger that I can sense in people. Instead, interview partners make clear statements on racism, which will have to be followed up. I will continue coding on racist discrimination and on how interview partners regulate the interaction of their children with the majority society and will compare these codes with the code. From now on I will call it *ineligible to marriage* to make very clear that the lack of marriage is NOT understood to be natural. It is already part of the discrimination and it is related to racism (skin colour, being southern). It would be good, if possible, to code much more thoroughly for all codes, in order to compare more precisely. Note: Find more time for transcription and coding. Find a place with constant electricity! Power-cuts are unbearable and coding has to be made priority in order to permit good and purposeful sampling!!! Questions: Is “ineligibility to marriage” creating a gap or is the gap making intermarriage impossible??? Where else are boundaries of eligibles and ineligibles created??? How has intermarriage changed over time? Has there been more before? Do parents, who are less radical on separating their children from the non-African society support intermarriage? So far it seems that NOONE would ever allow intermarriage!

Table 6: Example of a comparative memo

I continued elaborating the code into a category and kept on writing memos. For the purpose of the example here, however, only the final memo will be presented. After the second memo, presented in Table 6, I talked to the director of the German Development Service (DED) and

received permission to do transcription work in their office. During the first field stay, I stayed in a guest house which did not have a generator. In this season, extended power-cuts, which sometimes lasted the entire day, took place up to five times a week and I fell behind with transcriptions and coding; data started overwhelming me. I had to rely on pre-transcribes and tried to catch up with coding. Parts of the transcription work and the coding had to be done after the field stay.

The next memo on the category, I wrote after having done an interview with the editor-in-chief of the Khartoum Monitor, who gave profound insight on how society had changed with the emergence of the current government. The fourth memo I wrote after having conducted interviews with a Muslim southern Sudanese, gathering extremely rich and valuable data on several codes, including the presently discussed one. Back home I also wrote a theoretic memo, searching the literature for general comments on intermarriage between minorities and majorities in plural societies and specifically on intermarriage in Sudan. During the second research phase, one year after the first, I already had strong preliminary categories, which I was starting to relate to each other. I conducted many new interviews but also several with interview partners of the year before. Through this, I was able to densify the discussed category. The last memo integrated eight memos on the category “being ineligible to marriage.” It is a memo written on the memos and reads as follows:

Code: being ineligible to marriage
Intention: This memo will be used to “close” the category. In previous memos, the code has been elaborated into a category and been brought into relation with other categories. In this memo, the final meaning of the category is being discussed.
Since the second memo, the category *being ineligible to marriage* has been maintained with the same label, yet the meaning has changed. In fact, looking back, I feel that the label was too wide for a category. By now, being *ineligible to marriage* has been developed into a relevant category, which has clearly earned its permanent place in the theory. Intermarriage has proved relevant to EVERY SINGLE interview partner. Data on the issue is substantial. There are several aspects to the absence of intermarriage. Interview partners, for example, believe that if a southern Sudanese woman would accept marrying a northern Sudanese man, she would surely be mistreated by him and his family and be converted. From a southern perspective, it does not make sense to give away daughters to anybody, who does not allow their daughters to marry southern men. Southern females would be absorbed and their southern and Christian elements would vanish. A “one-way-marriage” in which daughters are given away for absorption, but none are received back, is unacceptable for the research group. However, this category is about the boundary created through the feeling of being considered **unworthy** of marriage!

What does being ineligible to marriage mean?

Ineligibility to marriage is an interactional category. It is negotiated between the two groups. Intermarriage, between educated southern and northern Sudanese does hardly exist and is not desired from either side. Although, some interview partners say that they would allow their children to intermarry with northern Sudanese if they would allow their women to marry southern men, in fact, the racist segregation of the society is so deep that this is mere rhetoric. The category does not stand alone, but is a subcategory to racism.

Nevertheless, **intermarriage is understood to have the potential to bridge the gap between the two groups**. It would be able to soften the boundaries and be seen as a sign of credible mentality change. The fact – that southern Sudanese Muslims and southern Sudanese Christians or followers of traditional religions do intermarry – is taken as an indication for two things: one, northern society is fundamentalist, two, northern society looks at southerners as inferior.

Alfred Taban in an interview described how northern soldiers took southern wives while being stationed in the South. While many have been abandoned soon, other were brought to the North. He comments: "Yes, some of those came to the North and eventually, see they became part of the northerners and when they die, the children of course do not have any links, except of course remembrance of what they were taught, that yes, your mother is from there. This, I really don't call it integration. Cause the southern element has disappeared. The southern way of life, the southern language, the southern dances, it is not there. So how you call it integration?! I don't know what your definition of integration would be, I would call it absorption, you are absorbed, khallas, you disappeared into that, ah, that kind of, into that family." He looks at forced intermarriage as a means to extinguish the southern culture.

Southern Sudanese clearly do not want a one-way integration, which rather is absorption. They feel of equal value and want to be respected as of equal value. In the process of coding interviews conducted with Yousif, who is a Muslim, many previously established racial links could be confirmed. An enlightening moment happened during an interview at his place of work. A northern Sudanese colleague entered the room to advise us that the main door would be closed soon. Yousif spontaneously exclaimed:

"So, for instance, like this girl, just as an example, now, if I ask her, I say, I want to marry you, she won't accept. She will not accept and if I ask you, I want to marry, you might accept, but she won't accept. Yani, because they will say, how can you be married with an African, with a black. A human being is a human being. Whether I am black or I am white, is a human being, isn't it?! There is no difference. Yani, a woman, whether she is a black or a white, she is a woman, she is the same. A man also is the same, no difference. But for them, it is because of our, our, our, ah, this, this Arabs and Africans second-class citizens, it has in" – [colleague entered again and interrupted the conversation].

Yousif makes a clear reference to racial discrimination, same as others have done before and after this interview. (Remember also Rebecca and Maria!!!) The difference is Yousif is a Muslim. Interestingly, Yousif is married to a woman from Darfur. She has been abandoned completely by her entire family for 7 YEARS for having married a southern Sudanese man. Apparently, not even northern Muslim Africans take southern Muslims as worthy of their daughters. Yousif does not allow his children to play with "Arab" children, not to mention considering intermarriage.

Ineligibility to marriage is clearly embedded in racial attitudes, which set the two groups unbridgeably apart from each other. While there are some natural aspects setting them apart, racism and deep distrust are making the gap irreconcilable. How does the category relate to other categories?

Excerpt of a diagram displaying relations of the lead categories and their subcategories



The ineligibility to marriage and discrimination at the place of work and on the housing market, share a lot of similarities. While religion in all categories plays a role, in ultimate instance racism always turns the balance. Interview partners are astonishingly precise in their statements on racism. Words like blacks, slaves, abdt and kaffir are used frequently. All interview partners are strikingly used to hearing these words.

Review of the theoretic memo

Cornell and Hartmann in their work on ethnicity and race quote Lieberson and Waters (1988) saying that intermarriage "has consequences for the individuals involved and for the future viability and nature of the ethnic groups themselves. For the individuals involved, intermarriage functions to create more ethnic heterogeneity in their social networks and may possibly lead to a diminution or dilution of ethnic identity."[788]

Cornell and Hartmann go on explaining that should intermarriage "occur on a large scale in a single generation, it could be followed by a rapid decline in the number of persons for whom a single ethnic identity is central to both self-concept and social relations."[789]

This is what the research group is talking about. Boundaries would be softened as identities would lose their sharpness. As Lieberson and Waters are quoted again intermarriage "can be viewed as a potentially important factor working against the long-run maintenance of the groups as a separate entity."[790] Yet, as long as racist discrimination persists, this positive development is unthinkable.

Cornell and Hartmann confirm that normative prohibitions against intermarriage across ethnic, racial or religious lines "create or reinforce ethnic and racial identities in three ways. First, by designating categories of eligibles and ineligibles, they construct a specific boundary between populations. Second, because prohibitions against intermarriage invariably involve statements – explicit or implicit – of the relative worthiness of the respective groups, such prohibitions attach differing value to the categories on either side of the boundary: Not only are they different, but one is unworthy of the other. They thereby reinforce boundary. Third, through their practical effect on the marriage pool, they encourage marriage within the ethnic or racial boundary, thereby avoiding the dilution of felt identity that intermarriage often fosters."[791]

In Sudan, mere friendly relations between the two groups are often already sanctioned by the communities. Intermarriage in such a racialised environment is rendered impossible and the gap between the two groups is clearly widened. The fact that intermarriage could bridge the gap, makes it an opportunity not taken, prompting the perception of interview partners that real integration is not desired. Unbridgeable racial and religious aspects are clearly setting them apart.

[788] Liberson and Waters (1988), p. 162 f. quoted in Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 170
[789] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 170
[790] Lieberson and Waters (1988), p. 165 quoted in Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 170
[791] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 171

Simone confirms in his book on Sudan the perception that intermarriage might have the power to bridge the gap by writing that "[s]ome of the journalists view the cessation of intermarriage over the years as having arrested the Sudanese character. The previous existence of racial interpretation produces a self-conscious recognition by the Sudanese individuals of themselves as disparate, unfixed people. This recognition, in turn, prompted a kind of spiritual nomadism, a search for connections and an interweaving with others."[792] This "spiritual nomadism" has clearly ceased to exist. Nowadays, borders are drawn sharply and intermarriage has become inconsiderable for northern Sudanese as well as for southern Sudanese.
_____
Being ineligible to marriage is a subcategory to *racism*, which is a subcategory to *the gap* which is a subcategory to *the war of the mind*. It shows crucial similarities with the other categories embraced by racism and seriously contributes to the unbridgeable character of *the gap*. Since the concept *lack of intermarriage* arose from the very first interview conducted and was followed up ever after, there is abundant material on the category. It has been probed by data and by literature and been confirmed as a permanent category.

Table 7: Example of a final memo

8 Saturation of categories

In the process of conducting research with grounded theory, slowly a firm theoretical skeleton is constructed, which, through the saturation of the theoretic categories, bit by bit is given flesh to form the corpus. In grounded theory, data can be analysed and even collected until the very final stages of the research. In the ideal case, data collection and coding come to a halt when categories are saturated meaning "when gathering fresh data no longer sparks new theoretical insights, nor reveals new properties of these core theoretical categories";[793] or in a more metaphoric way: "Like a sponge which can hold no more water, the theory needs no more elaboration or refinement."[794] However, this does not mean mere repetition of events or stories. Instead, Glaser (2001) defines saturation as the conceptualisation of comparisons of incidents which yield different properties of pattern, until no new properties of the pattern emerge.[795] Accordingly, one continues sampling until categories are saturated; until the full corpus of theory has unfolded and been filled densely. Following the logic of saturation, there is no particular number of cases that has to be fulfilled. Rather, the purpose of the research has to be matched with the data and comply with credibility. Charmaz (2006) writes: "A small study with modest claims might allow proclaiming saturation early. Researchers who make hefty claims should be

[792] Simone (1994), p. 29
[793] Charmaz (2006), p. 113
[794] Dey (2007), p. 185
[795] cf. Glaser (2001) quoted in Charmaz (2006), p. 113

circumspect about the thoroughness of their data and the rigor of their analysis."[796]

Exactly because of this, before the research project was started, serious thought was given to the possible frame of the project. As explicated in detail above, the research project was narrowed down to a manageable size. Yet, it is almost impossible to exactly estimate and adjust the size of a research project to the available time. Therefore, saturation has to be understood as the ideal goal of research, which will not necessarily be accomplished for all categories. According to my understanding of research ethics, would-be saturation should not be enforced on any category at any time. If data collection has to be arrested before saturation of certain categories could be accomplished, they should be left unclosed and further investigation should be invited.

While it was possible to saturate several lead categories, which were transformed into a comprehensive theory, others could not be finished completely. Unfinished categories, however, are not necessary futile for the research. They surely contributed to the emergence of the theory and if they were elaborated to an advanced level entered into the theory in their function as indicators. Other codes just remained as vague ideas, which wait to be followed up in other research projects. Either way, all lead categories were taken as assumptions and remained assumptions until they were densely and sustainable confirmed through data and theory.

9 The use of literature

Originally, with the aim to avoid preconceptions and allow categories to emerge from the data, Glaser and Strauss recommended not to engage with existing literature in the field of interest in advance of the research.[797] Dey (2007) calls this suggestion "[o]ne of the most striking but controversial recommendations"[798] of the founding fathers of grounded theory. Later on, Strauss and Corbin (1996) came to the evaluation that literature can be used at any stage of the research. Specialised literature can be used to increase theoretical sensitivity, to bring about questions, to direct the theoretic sampling, to verify findings

[796] Charmaz (2006), p. 114
[797] cf. Glaser and Strauss (1998), p. 37
[798] Dey (2007), p. 175

or as secondary data.[799] Other than Strauss and Corbin, Glaser has gone on warning that the early use of specialised literature dangerously narrows down the openness of the researcher.[800] Kelle (2007) comments on the relation between data and theory:

> Thereby it is of outmost importance to abandon inductivist rhetoric and to develop a clear understanding of the role of inductive and abductive interference in the process of empirically grounded theory generation. Furthermore the insight must be stressed that any scientific discovery requires the integration of previous knowledge and new empirical observations and that researchers always have to draw on previous theoretical knowledge which provides categorical frameworks necessary for the interpretation, description and explanation of the empirical world.[801]

Abduction means a type of reasoning that begins by examining data and after scrutiny of these data, entertains all possible explanations for the observed data, and then forms hypotheses to confirm or disconfirm until the researcher arrives at the most plausible interpretation of the observed data. It is a second step after induction; "the intellectual jump which adds something very new to the data, something that they do not contain and that does not already exist as a concept or theory either."[802] Abduction, therefore, is a third form of interference next to induction and deduction, which adds new ideas to the emerging theory.[803] Neither Strauss nor Strauss and Corbin took into account that "observation and the development of theory are necessarily always already theory guided" and none of them has "systematized this logic of abductive discovery".[804]

Although it should be avoided to enforce pre-knowledge on the data, most authors nowadays agree that literature can and often has to be used from the beginning on; either to comply with official expectations (e.g. professors, funding committees, etc.), or to avoid reinventing the wheel, or to even be able to choose an appropriate research interest.[805] The following figure taken from Strübing (2007) demonstrates how the grounded theory-oriented research process can be seen as moving in a

[799] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 31 ff.
[800] cf. Glaser (1992), p. 35
[801] Kelle (2007), p. 154
[802] Reichertz (2007), p. 225
[803] cf. Locke (2007), p. 566 ff.
[804] cf. Reichertz (2005), p. 215
[805] cf. Holton (2007), p. 269 f.; cf. Dey (2007), p. 167 ff.

series of loops between the empirical process under scrutiny and the stream of conceptual thinking and theorizing about it.



Figure 5: Logic of inquiry in grounded theory[806]

Gibson (2007) also points out that it is problematic to develop theoretical sensitivity without some familiarity with the relevant literature.[807] Because theoretic sensitivity and experiential data were well developed already at the beginning of this research, these considerations were not of serious relevance and long and extensive research analysis was left for the later phases of the research. Previous knowledge has entered into the early research phases in its function as background information; it has not sparked the formation of hypotheses. Yet, to render the empirical project into a comprehensive grounded theory and to discover macroscopic structural conditions, specialised literature has been reviewed extensively. Hereby, the emerging theory was embedded into a strong theoretic framework. Just like any other variable, the theoretic framework has to earn its relevance in the emergent theory.[808] Literature review accompanied the research conduct and was not carried out in advance; instead literature was selected according to the emerging theory. Knowledge gained during the research phases has been mingled with theoretic knowledge and compared to the data. Through this, the data was reviewed from new perspectives, analysed from

[806] Strübing (2007a), p. 594 f.
[807] cf. Gibson (2007), p. 436 ff.
[808] cf. Holton (2007), p. 269 ff.

differing angles, new questions arose and were directed towards the data and new insights discovered.

Two kinds of theoretic knowledge can be distinguished; 1) theoretical notions with high empirical content and 2) notions with low empirical content. The first kind is particularly essential to hypothetico-deductive research strategy, but can easily prompt the forcing of data if used in a grounded theory approach. On the contrary, a grounded theory can clearly benefit from the latter kind, as they may be used as heuristic devices. Theoretic notions with low empirical content, which due to their lack of empirical content permit the generating of variable approaches to the data,[809] can be, for example, concepts like culture, institutions, social structure, mores and personality. Kelle (2007) explains that "a sensible way to use a heuristic concept like identity in grounded theory research is not to derive a 'hypothesis,' which can be 'empirically tested' […], but to employ it as a conceptual frame which helps to understand empirical phenomena found in the research field."[810] Put simply, they are abstract enough to not corrupt the impartiality of the researcher's mind. Some of the most relevant heuristic concepts used in this work are ethnicity, race and identity. Thus, abstract theoretical concepts have been used as heuristic device during the development of categories. Theoretic notions with high empirical content have been used belatedly to ground categories which had emerged earlier and to shed light onto the highly complex field of research which forms the context of the phenomenon in survey.

10 Verification: The grounding of theory

To prove credibility of a developed theory, applied methods have to be described in detail and be presented in a comprehensible way;[811] this has been done in the previous paragraphs. Other than the traditional method of deriving and testing hypotheses from existing theory, in grounded theory all aspects of the emerging theory have to be verified during the research process itself. This approach, in fact, is seen by some authors as very problematic. Kelle (2003) for example argues that "the prerequisite of independent testing requires that a hypothesis is not

[809] cf. Baugh (1990), p. 72 ff.
[810] Kelle (2007a), p. 208
[811] Berg and Milmeister (2007), p. 182 f.

tested with the empirical material from which it was developed."[812] Dey (2007) suggests that "the research community provides the medium through which a theory can be tested, whether through replication, application, or evaluation".[813] He furthermore writes that the grounding of theory "requires keeping an open mind, rooting categories in the data being analysed, seeking the underlying logic of apparently disparate events, recognizing causal inferences at work through our categorizations, checking, revising, and amplifying interpretations through comparison across settings, and using representational techniques to evaluate evidence and explore connections between categories."[814] The research community is, of course, invited to test the presented work. In addition, serious effort to ground the data according to the logic of grounded theory has been made.

On the one hand, the process of generating theoretic hypotheses has been done empirically; data have been given crucial importance and theory has been developed in direct contact with them. On the other hand, the central aim of grounded theory is conceptualisation, not description, meaning that the power of data is limited through interpretation. Interpretation highly depends on the above described theoretic sensitivity, but also on deductive elaboration and verification. Demands of traceability and openness have to be met at the same time.[815] Verification, in the logic of Strauss, means probing the plausibility of the emerging theory. Hereby, verification is not a separate research phase, but an integral part to the process of theory emergence. Grounding a theory, therefore, "refers to the use of data obtained through social research to generate ideas" and "to some methodological guidelines to make this possible in principle".[816]

As has been mentioned above, conduct of research and emergence of theory were designed to follow an order of induction, abduction, deduction, and verification. Induction means actions which bring about preliminary and conditional hypotheses. Abduction adds new ideas to the data. Deduction refers to the development of hypotheses and systems of hypotheses, which are used to prepare the verification.

[812] Kelle (2003), p. 485 quoted in Dey (2007), p. 174
[813] Dey (2007), p. 174
[814] Dey (2007), p. 188
[815] cf. Berg and Milmeister (2007), p. 182 ff.
[816] Dey (2007), p. 172 f.

Verification means the procedure in which these hypothesises are checked for their accuracy, meaning the probe of whether they can be fully or partially confirmed or have to be dismissed.[817] These four crucial steps have been followed during the entire research conduct. Every conclusion drawn from the data has – without exception – been considered preliminary. Only after having been probed and confirmed by data and theory were they permitted permanent status. If interpreted afresh, for example, in a different context or in relation to a different category, every conclusion had to hold out against strict verification anew. It has been applied, what Dey (2007) calls "safeguards"; to avoid the danger of fallibilities and self-serving bias, "Glaser and Strauss warned about the dangers of preconceptions, emphasized the importance of emergence, and promoted a 'constant comparative' method as a means of producing fresh evidence with which to challenge and refine theory."[818]

With the help of an example, it will be shown how verification took place; to make understanding possibly easy, the already known category "being ineligible to marriage" will be used. As we have seen in the coding examples, during open coding first of all a "lack of intermarriage" was recognised. Many research participants in fact complained about intermarriages not taking place. During the open coding, I started realising that interview partners considered their own position against intermarriage as a reaction to the refusal of intermarriage by the majority society. The sociological code "ineligibility to marriage" was developed to clarify that the lack of intermarriage was, by far, not as neutral or innocent as the first code had suggested. There was a clear indication that interview partners perceived the lack of intermarriage as a boundary established by the majority society, which is understood to consider them as unworthy of marriage. At the beginning, it was assumed that ineligibility was blamed on Islam. In general, Islam allows a Muslim man to marry a Christian woman, but a Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a Christian man. Several interview partners had commented on this fact, stating that under these circumstances they were also not prepared to marry away their daughters. My attention had been awoken and I started addressing questions about intermarriage during formal

[817] cf. Strübing (2007), p. 167
[818] Dey (2007), p. 175

interviews and informal conversations as well as to the already existing data. I went on with focused coding of old and new data, which revealed that ineligibility was only partially attributed to Islamic rules and to a higher degree to racist segregation. The previous, preliminary interpretation could not be confirmed. I adapted the category, embracing the racist context, and went back to coding. Through constant comparing with other categories on racist discrimination, for example at the place of work, the category was densified and related to the category *racism*. In this process, the category was probed through data over and over again. Also, I started going through specialised literature, searching for comments on the lack of intermarriage in general and in Sudan in particular, in order to get a clearer idea of where my data was leading me. As Dey (2007) comments, if "we want to ground our categories, we need to give as much attention to their theoretical provenance as to their empirical base" therefore requiring revision of "the degree to which our theoretical claims are consistent with well-established knowledge in the field."[819] The category "ineligibility to intermarriage" emerged inductively from the data, was abductively refined, deductively rendered into a hypothesis and then jointly verified by data and literature. It has earned its way into the theory.

11 The presentation of the research

Qualitative research methods not depending on statistics and the corresponding diagrams, gives an interesting set of options of how to present data.[820] Presentation can be kept very abstract or use a great deal of data illustrations. In this research, I prefer to use a balance of the two. The decision is not only based on personal preference, but also oriented at the purpose of the paper and the type of audience that I want to reach. Being a qualification work, of course high scientific requirements have to be met and the use of scientific language is not up for discussion. Yet, also a portion of social engagement lies in this work; a certain degree of activism. As Strauss and Corbin (1996) suggest a researcher should always opt for a research theme that really catches their interest, since they will be occupied with it for an extended and intensive period of time.[821] Corbin described in an interview the attitude

[819] Dey (2007), p. 177
[820] cf. Glaser (1987), p. 215
[821] cf. Strauss and Corbin (1996), p. 20

of the early school of Chicago sociologists by calling them “a stirrer upper of ideas” and explaining that “activism is an important part of doing research”. She goes on emphasising that no one will listen to you “if you don’t present your findings in a credible scientific manner.” Corbin inspiringly points out that “the purpose of theory is to provide a theoretical base for action, not to entertain. The theoretical base is built on concepts derived from data, data gathered from persons who are living with and experiencing the situation under study.”[822]

The presented paper being a dissertation gives it certain conditions concerning the requirements of procedure, use of language and presentation of results. At the same time, reasons to select the particular research theme go far beyond mere desire for qualifying and I intend to present my findings in a manner accessible to a wide audience and not only to the scientific examiners. Berg and Milmeister (2007) compare grounded theory with the Centre Pompidou in Paris, where all supply tubes openly run outside the building without harming the beauty of the architecture. Similar, a grounded theory publication should reflect the own position and lay it out openly, without harming the content of the theory.[823] In this work, pieces of data are presented to increase the understanding and to virtually let the interview partners have their say. Glaser (1987) suggests that “illustrative data can be used deliberately to convey the viewpoint of actors, giving so-called *verstehen,* especially when their viewpoints are far removed from that of the readers.”[824] In fact, many issues addressed in this research are highly charged with emotion of research participants. Their feelings have of course been analysed and entered thoroughly into the emerging theory. Yet, often a quote can do much better in providing understanding of the profound marginalisation that southerners feel and the unbridgeable gap that they see between themselves and the majority society and the state. Nevertheless, quotations are not used without conditions and reflections. In fact, there is “much more reliance […] on an interweaving of discursive proportions – utilizing the results of coding and memoing – with carefully selected pieces of data.”[825] Properly done, “this style of rather tightly interwoven theoretical interpretation and descriptive data

[822] Cinceros-Puebla (2007), p. 89
[823] cf. Berg and Milmeister (2007), p. 203
[824] Glaser (1987), p. 216
[825] Glaser (1987), p. 217

meets all of the classical requirements of verstehen, credence, sense of reality, and reader comprehension."[826] In this spirit, the generated theory will be presented in the following chapter.

[826] Glaser (1987), p. 217

VI Results of the research

The intention of this work has been to further the understanding of the lives of marginalised ethnic minorities in the capital city Khartoum. In Sudan we can find a huge and complex chasm between the government and major parts of its people, as well as within between the different groups of people. In this work, it was intended to survey these relations and to provide knowledge on the underlying causes creating segregation.

It is not revealing secrets to say that the segregation between northern and southern Sudanese is particularly severe and that marginalisation has sparked a vehement and persisting call for the creation of an independent South Sudan. Nevertheless, southern Sudanese do not stand alone with their demands for de-racialisation of society and inclusion into state matters. The problem of marginalisation in Sudan is a country-wide problem and not limited to particular regions or ethnic groups. By aiming to shed light on one specific marginalised group, apparently, other important relations remained unconsidered. In chapter II 3, it has been noted that apart of a small elite around the leadership, basically all the ordinary people of Sudan find themselves in a marginalised situation. The relationship between the state and the vast majority of its people is alarmingly bad and when speaking about the particular situation of the research group it should be kept in mind that in Sudan no group stands alone with the feeling of marginalisation.

Every time I mentioned the research theme to a northern, supposedly "Arab" and privileged Sudanese, he or she immediately started stressing their own marginalised situation. One night I went out with a female friend from university. She would easily be considered as being part of the privileged "Arab" group in Khartoum. She told me about how she was imprisoned together with a group of women for demonstrating against charges of indecent clothing raised against Lubna Hussein, a Sudanese journalist. Hussein had been arrested by the Public Order Police (POP) in July 2009 together with 13 other women.[827] My friend

[827] The women were charged with violating the dress code under Article 152 of Sudanese law for wearing trousers in public. While the other females admitted their crime, which is punishable with up to 40 lashes and a fine of 500 Sudanese pounds, Lubna Hussein requested a trial, which was followed up in the worldwide press and

told me how she explained to her father after having been released from prison: “I want to leave Sudan. This country is not for us, it is for them. So if I am a guest in this country, let me better be a guest in a different country, where the government at least protects me.”[828] She talked about her feelings in a strikingly similar way like many southern Sudanese. Notably, her marginalisation is based on her belonging to the group of Sudanese women. The example shows that there is a very profound problem underlying the relationship between the government of Sudan and the great majority of the people of Sudan; even including those, who would be classified as “Arabs” by the research group.

The research group has been selected as a starting point for survey and other researchers are invited to continue widening the knowledge on the numerous marginalised groups of Sudan. In chapter III 2, for example, it has been dwelled on the fact that relations within the groups of northern and southern Sudanese are also extremely complicated. These relations have not been further elaborated in the empiric investigation and variations between different ethnic groups were not emphasised. Interview partners have primarily been chosen according to their level of education, but not according to their ethnic groups. Thus, the role of ethnic belonging or generational differences within the own group were not explicitly emphasised. Furthermore, by analysing relations between ethnic groups, other possible groups remain widely obscured, such as for example women or Muslims disloyal to the regime. When sensible and possible, some of these factors were included in the analysis; however, they were not the focus of this work and it had to be accepted that not all determining categories or inter- and intra-group relations can be scrutinised in one paper, as already has been noted in chapter IV.

Up to today, large numbers of southern Sudanese are still living in the North, above all in the capital city Khartoum and its surroundings.[829] A wide spectrum of literature on IDPs and their particularly devastating situation exists.[830] Yet, little research has been done on the southern Sudanese who live right in the centre of Khartoum and at first sight

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resulted in demonstrations of sympathisers in front of the court in Khartoum. Cf. Guardian (07.09.2009)

[828] Personal conversation in Khartoum (autumn 2009)

[829] with southern Sudanese returning to the South, these numbers are significantly decreasing

[830] Among others Abusharaf (2009); African Rights (1995); El-Kheir, O.M. (1991); also see IRIN News, Human Rights Watch, Refugees International, International Crisis Group, etc.

seem so well integrated. They live alongside their northern Sudanese countrymen; they work in local (northern) companies, NGOs, international organisations or for newspapers; they teach at schools and study at universities. Some were born in Khartoum; others came as children with their parents; some came unaccompanied in search of education or work. All look back at a long stay in Khartoum; in fact, they spent the larger parts of their lives here. Their offspring were brought up in Khartoum and most of the times were born there. They are considerably well off and can afford the costly life in the centre of the capital. This group of southern Sudanese is a small elite and a clear minority among their own people, who generally live outside the city centre in designated areas – camps and squatter sites – and who are geographically clearly cut off from the people living in Khartoum. Research participants[831] enjoy privileges that most of their fellow southern Sudanese would not even dare to dream of. Yet, the question is how interview partners look at their situation. How do they feel about their objectively privileged lives in Khartoum? And how do they relate to the people they are, indeed, living side-to-side with? Apparently it is possible for wealthy southern Sudanese to reside in the centre of the capital, but how accessible are the northern society and the system to them?

Although this elitist group in Khartoum might be small, they are considerably influential. They are the ones who make opinions and inform and advise the vast crowd of marginalised southern Sudanese. They work in NGOs and international organisations, often concerned with IDP issues and repatriation. Majority are members of ethnic communities, some even form part of the executive committees and some others are active or passive members of the SPLM. Accordingly, issues related to their perception of the situation and their relations to the society of Khartoum and the state, indeed, have a wide scope of impacts. What they feel, experience, think and plan to great extent determines the collective opinion and, therefore, has crucial effects on the larger community of southern Sudanese living in the North and even in the South (cf. VI 6).

[831] With research participants, reference is not only made to interview partners, but also to others who have been included in the analysis, such as people with whom informal interviews have been led.

According to the principles of grounded theory, the field has been entered with a vague idea of what ought to be studied, but without a clear research question. Instead, as has been pointed out before, the research question emerges during the research process itself. The seminal decision made ahead, therefore, was the selection of the research group, which clearly gave direction and limits to the emergence of the research question. The sparking interest was to learn from the people themselves what happens when common barriers, such as educational differences, economic differences and geographic segregation, fall away. A question like this, it was assumed, would open up a new angle of perspective, herewith, allowing the discovery of underlying factors, which determine relations between the different groups of the country and their leadership. As the research advanced, the picture got clearer and the research question more precise. Slowly, the understanding was reached that southern Sudanese living in the centre of Khartoum feel like *second-class citizens*[832] or even as non-citizens.

1 The second-class citizens of Sudan

The term “second-class citizen” is not new. On the contrary, it has a long tradition in Sudan and is used in literature and vernacular alike. Given the various contexts in which it can be heard, one can get confused to what it refers precisely. However, in this research, the category has been developed from the data themselves. Through careful coding, the initial code has been given comprehensive meaning and been elaborated into the core category. Various categories have been elaborated in the research process, which, in the end, all indicated the same feeling; one of being excluded, of not being considered as a full member or a member at all of the northern society and of being denied access to the majority society and the system; the feeling of being a person of lower value discriminated against by the northern society and the state alike.

Being a *second-class citizen* of your own country implies that there must be first-class citizens as a reference group. If “we” are the second, “they” must be the first. So who exactly are “they”? Defining “them” is not an easy task. As with the question of who is an “Arab” and who is a

[832] Cursive spelling is used to indicate and highlight empiric categories.

northerner, from the perspective of the research group, there is no clear-cut respond. During our first interview session Yousif, a 46-year-old Kuku[833] and Muslim, for example, stated:

> The westerners here, they can feel us that we are the same. But the northerners here, who call themselves Arabs, they isolate themselves. They stay alone, they fail us, they are better than the rest; they are the first-class citizens and the others are the second.

At a later point of the interview, however, he recalled that his wife, a woman from Darfur, was expelled from the family for having married a southern Sudanese. He laments:

> They decided to cut any communication from this lady. For seven years she was left, because she accepted to get married with a southerner, you see. If I was not a Muslim, it was going to be a huge problem, imagine this situation. You see the segregation? Even though in the area [Darfur] they are black Africans, but still inside there is hatred, there is segregation. They consider themselves far better than us.

Yousif feels closer to the northern Sudanese Africans – such as the Darfuris – than to what he calls the Arabs. Yet, he does not feel included or appreciated as equal by any of the two groups. A "second-class citizen" is anyone who is marginalised by the government and the elite. Yet, there is a hierarchy of status with successive levels of marginalisation. At the very top we find the riverain elite (the so-called "Arabs") and at the bottom we find the southern Sudanese (the most marginalised second-class citizens). Other marginalised Africans, who have been almost entirely Islamised, are being located within between these extreme poles. They are not first-class citizens, yet they are feeling superior to southern Sudanese and the system and society are much more accessible to them. In this sense, when speaking of the majority society of Khartoum in the following paragraphs, all northern Sudanese Muslims in the capital are meant.

The phenomenon of *feeling like a second-class citizen* is a challenge, a situation that interview participants have to deal with; it has a past, a present, and a future. The history of war and chronic marginalisation of the peripheries has been discussed in detail in part II. History has enormous influence on southern Sudanese. It is a deep wound which cannot be healed easily and maybe never at all. Yousif explained how the memories of the war still affect him in his relations today and how

[833] Descriptions of interview partners' ethnic groups can be found in Appendix 2

this feeling will not cease to exist even in the case of positive developments.

> Because the hatred is inside as if like a wound. If you are wounded and you have seen that it is already ok, but inside there, the wound is still there, you see. It is the way, our way with the Arabs. The Arabs, they are laughing with us, they can talk and laugh, but inside there, there is a pain, there is a hatred. For instance, somebody, an Arab gave me an example, he said the difference between Arabs and this southerners will not be resolved, unless the countries are separated. Because you have killed our sons and we have killed your sons. And this thing is there in your heart, nothing will wipe it out until separation. […] I saw how they were killing our own people, now, they killed my father! This thing is there! Because my father was not killed by the SPLA, he was killed by the Arabs. You think it won't pain me? It will pain me! They killed my brothers, they iron you, with the heat, can you imagine? Torturing! And after that people were tortured and then lastly they kill you. You are just a normal civilian, when you are captured in the ambush, they captured you, they will say, where is the SPLA. And they don't know. And even if you know, you cannot say the SPLA is there, because they are your brothers, they are fighting for your rights, you see. They will start punish you, torture you, torture you, torture you, you see. So at the end they will kill you. This thing, it will not move from the heart, it will be there!

Yousif's account represents the feelings of many research participants, for the majority of them were displaced by the war and have lasting memories. Only those who came to Khartoum at a very young age or were born there do not have own memories of the war. Yet, they are fully aware of the deeds that were done, even if they have not themselves experienced them. For several participants, their coming to the North was not the first time of displacement as they already fled with their parents or alone to Uganda during the first civil war.

Interestingly, interview partners do not mention mistreatments done by the SPLA. Other than southern Sudanese refugees in Uganda, who insist in both government soldiers and SPLA rebels having contributed to their suffering and displacement in the South, the research group completely omits the atrocities of the SPLA. Refugees already stressed that war crimes done by the SPLA – in sharp contrast to atrocities committed by government soldiers – were more or less unavoidable considering the circumstances.[834] In the context of resistance against the North, the research group clearly plays down the SPLA's responsibility. In chapter III 2.3.3, it has been pointed out how the

[834] cf. Bützer (2007), p. 101 ff.

colonisers' great and well-known share in the creation of insurmountable obstacles to national unity is similarly played down by southern Sudanese who put blame almost exclusively on the northern political parties and successive governments since independence. The northern central power clearly epitomises the concept of the enemy of southern Sudanese and the involvement of others is willingly played down. In the context of nation-building in the South, it has also become important to emphasise the southern Sudanese's capability of governing themselves without guidance from the North. The history of separation and war among the southern Sudanese is, therefore, not part of the official discourse. Nevertheless, as will be elaborated below in chapter VI 4.3, interview partners, who fear being excluded and disadvantaged in the South and worry about their return, openly and sometimes vehemently criticise the SPLM for being corrupt and self-serving.

In principal, research participants described their staying in Khartoum as involuntarily – in spite of sometimes having come to the North voluntarily – because return to the South was not considered a viable option (cf. VI 4.3). Interview partners perceive their lives in Khartoum as another war. However, they are also highly aware of the benefits – particularly the access to education for their children – and are hesitative to return to the South. Furthermore, in the South the attitude prevails that by coming to the North they had chosen an easy exit instead of contributing to the civil war and access to resources is frequently based on one's participation in the war. Interview partners try to reject these attitudes and often stress their own participation in the war to justify their entitlement to equal distribution (cf. VI 2.2.5). Hence, describing their life in Khartoum as war-like situation, in part, might be rhetoric of demanding inclusion and equal rights in the South.

Due to its high relevance and unifying capacity, the category *feeling like a second-class citizen* has been elaborated into the core category of this paper. It embraces the knowledge gained in the theoretic review as well as extensive data analysis of primary data that has been collected during the field stays. The category *the war of the mind* describes the complex situation of interview partners in Khartoum and forms a subordinated category to the core category. *The war of the mind* is not static, it describes a process and has been analysed as such. The data suggests that, most importantly, the signature of the CPA is a milestone

with enormous affects on the category. *The war of the mind* embraces two subcategories – *the gap* and *the cold war of the government* – which originated from various subordinated categories. *The gap* illuminates interview participants' relations with the majority society (cf. VI 2.1). It originated from the subordinated categories:

- *The "natural" gap*
- *Racism*
- *The deep distrust towards all that is Arab*

The cold war of the government illuminates interview participants' relations to the state and the accessibility of the system (cf. VI 2.2). It originated from the subordinated categories:

- *The state as enemy*
- *Being excluded from the system*
- *Political exclusion*
- *The imposition of culture and religion*

A consequence to the category *the war of the mind* is the research participants' fear that their children could develop an *inferiority complex* and have their identities changed (cf. VI 3). In order to deal with *the war of the mind*, interview partners apply various action strategies, which aim at reducing and managing exposure. The strategy corresponding to *the fear of an inferiority complex of the children* is *reducing exposure of the children* (cf. VI 4.1.2), which is part of a set of reducing strategies.

Strategies to master the war of the mind can be divided into two groups; the first aiming at the reduction of exposure to *the war of the mind*; the second aiming at dealing with *the war of the mind* (cf. VI 4). Ultimately, returning to the South is a way of escaping *the war of the mind*, however, not always the most popular one (cf. VI 4.3). The final strategy to deal with *second-class citizenship* is *breaking the chain*; meaning voting for separation and cutting the bonds with the North once and for all (cf. VI 6).

2 The war of the mind

The war of the mind embraces two categories, which overlap and determine each other: *the gap* and *the cold war of the government*. It bridges the fact that the different actors *of the war of the mind* cannot always be clearly told apart from each other. To distinguish social from economic from governmental would therefore ignore the relations and interdependences of the different spheres. The government is

dominated and controlled by the riverain elite and the northern society has been highly influenced by their policies. *The war of the mind* describes the general terror that southern Sudanese feel exposed to in their daily lives in Khartoum. It refers to a high degree of anxiety that the majority of research participants constantly feel, and embraces all the chicaneries, mistreatments and exclusions by society and state that they are subject to. *The war of the mind* is founded on *the deep distrust towards all that is Arab*,[835] including the ordinary northern people as well as the northern regime.

Lines between society and government are not drawn clearly. Many interview partners try to distinguish between society and government with the latter clearly being held as the origin of all problems; nevertheless, society forms the context in which all mistreatment happens. It is society who elects the government and society who tolerates the exclusion of large groups of people. Often it is even society (African and "Arab") which, through acting upon racial concepts, significantly adds to the hardship experienced by the research group. In the end, stereotypes overshadow individualistic distinctions between "good Arabs" and "bad Arabs" or a clear-cut perception of who are the people and who is the state. Attempts to overcome *the war of the mind* and to approach the "enemy" are hindered by the communities who do not tolerate disloyalty. The communities will make sure that their members do not forget past events and that the distrust is kept alive.

In spite of the conclusion of the CPA, *the war of the mind* has not stopped. Gradual changes can be sensed, most notably when it comes down to mistreatments by the police, which have been significantly reduced. Yet, racist concepts and structures cannot be dissolved within only a few years. In that respect, the interim period simply does not provide enough time to allow for serious changes. In the following paragraphs, *the gap* and *the cold war of the government* will be discussed in detail. For analytic purpose, the social and the institutional spheres have been separated. Nonetheless, they are intertwined and, therefore, brought back together under the umbrella of *the war of the mind*.

[835] The category refers to a generalisation by the research group and uses their term "Arab" for northern Sudanese. Although, sometimes they distinguish between northern African and northern Arab Sudanese, the distrust is not limited to any of them.

2.1 *The gap* between "them" and "us"

Research participants do not feel as part of society; they clearly distinguish between "them" and "us". *The gap* refers to relations between the research group and the majority society. It describes a chasm which prevents them from having genuine relations with the non-southern society; unbridgeability is its most crucial characteristic. Depending on individuals and situations, *the gap* varies in its wideness and deepness. It is also not static and can change over time. However, the one thing it cannot is disappear. *The gap* is permanent, unbridgeable and constantly parting people. When speaking of *the gap* a profound belief is touched, a truism, even a widely accepted common sense, which has an important impact on relations between the research group and the majority society. Barriers are large, in number and variety, and will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

2.1.1 The "natural" gap

The social/natural gap refers to factors, which are basically accepted to be natural differences between the research group and the majority society. They set people significantly apart, yet, if it was not for the wider context, they would not have the power of making the gap unbridgeable.

<u>The language barrier</u>

Although all research participants speak Juba Arabic,[836] the majority does not speak the standard Arabic of Khartoum, which they call "Khartoum Arabic". The two versions of Arabic are quite different and make communication difficult. The majority of interview partners indicate that their children do not know their African languages. The younger interview partners have Juba Arabic as their first language and also speak "Khartoum Arabic" fluently. Schultz (2008) points out that the Bari community, in general, has been less successful in passing on their culture and language to the younger generations than, for example, the Dinka.[837] In this research, however, it has not been elaborated how language skills vary according to the different ethnic groups. Instead, it has been analysed in the distinct cases of interview partners, how the language barrier sets them apart from the majority society.

[836] Juba Arabic is lingua franca in the Equatoria Region and widely spoken among communities from South Sudan living in Khartoum
[837] cf. Schultz (2008), p. 9

Juba Arabic is an important means of communication between southern Sudanese in Khartoum. Several interview partners and/or their children do not speak their local African language. Since interview partners often do not share an African language with their husband or wife and usually live together with many people from different backgrounds in the same house, Juba Arabic is their preferred everyday speech. This perception has been confirmed by the acting dean of All Saints Cathedral, who, in a personal interview, pointed out that the service in Juba Arabic was, by far, the best visited one. He explained that on Sundays they were having seven services in six different languages: two of them in English, one in Nuba, the others in Zande, Dinka and Nuer, and the biggest one in Arabic.

> After that we have what we call Arabic general service, where we use the colloquial Arabic; the spoken, not the classic, the spoken Juba-Khartoum kind of mix. The one you use to buy bread and things with like that. We use that language in that service and this brings most of the displaced, most of the people who live in the city. And that congregation brings a lot of young people and ladies, women. About 700 persons, it is the bigger. So we use the colloquial Arabic language to bring, because they are Moro, they are this and this, but they can worship in Arabic. That is why I say mostly young people, because some of them already lost their native language.[838]

One reason why the younger southern Sudanese in Khartoum often do not speak any African language is that their parents come from different ethnic groups. As a matter of fact, women frequently do not feel entitled to pass their own language on to the children who are considered part of the father's community. Because fathers, however, usually spend very limited time at home and the embedment in the local community is missing, in the end they learn none. Betty is 26 years old and was born in Khartoum. Her father is an Adio (alternatively Makaraka), her mother a Kakwa from Congo. The Adio are closely related to the Zande. She explained:

> I don't understand the language. Neither Zande or Makaraka, I don't speak the language. Because I wasn't taught to speak, you know. I speak rather the dialect which is spoken in Juba in general, we call it Arabic Juba. So I speak Arabic Juba. I got used to it, I speak Arabic Juba, but I don't speak my tribal language.

[838] personal interview with the Reverend in Khartoum (autumn 2008)

Betty went on explaining why her mother has not taught her Kakwa.

> And it is really difficult that when you have parents from different tribes, it is difficult to put like a strict plan. Especially because my mother, she speaks her own language. So it is actually up to my father's side to teach us, so she cannot do that. Yes, she has her language, so if she had taught us, sometimes I am blaming her. Sometimes I blame her for not teaching us her own language. She told me, Betty, in our tradition, as a wife in African tradition, me as a wife, I am a comer in that family. So I am not to force my language or my culture on my children, because my children actually belong to my husband's side. So it is him to decide, you see. Because many times I complain, because when my uncles come around, my mother's brothers and sisters, my aunts, she speaks Kakwa fluently and I was like: Mom! And she speaks to us in Arabic Juba. And she told me, I would have taught you, but I cannot, because my father's side, maybe they will say I am trying to take the children away.

Rebecca, a 33-year-old Lotuka who has come to the North at the age of three, hardly understands her mother tongue and does not speak it at all. Her six younger brothers do not even understand it a bit. She points out that knowing your own African language, in fact, can be a way of protecting yourself in the North and gives an example:

> And you know, it is really important to keep this things, your mother tongue, your local language. This is the case of a woman, the police came to the house, just wanted to tell you the importance of this mother tongue. The police come to the house and the mother is telling to her daughter, please take the alcohol and hide it or throw it. Because if she is speaking in the Arabic, then this people will listen. Also in English, maybe some of this people speak English. So the only way to communicate is only through that thing [the mother tongue]. And then she is just crying to her daughter, please take this thing, it is just behind the, because this people are coming, the police is entering. And the lady is coming to the mother, what are you saying? [laughs] What are you saying? And even she is surprised the police is there. Because if they just enter, they will tell you stop, no movement and then they will start searching every corner and then they catch the alcohol. The mother went to the jail for six months. Because of this simple thing, it is just one thing to throw it to the other side or maybe she can hide it somewhere, I don't know. Anyway, because of no communication, she falls the victim of that. Six month.

The examples of Betty and Rebecca reveal that whereas the older interview partners usually do not pass on their African languages to their children, the younger interview partners regret not having been taught them.

In general, even those who perfectly speak “Khartoum Arabic” prefer to speak in their own language – most likely Juba Arabic and sometimes their African language. In fact, at least in their daily lives in Khartoum and when looking into relations with the majority society, it does not matter so much to them in which language they speak, as long as it is not “Khartoum Arabic”, which is perceived as the language of the oppressors. In particular, those interview partners who came to Khartoum to join a university at the end of the 1980s, have developed a profound aversion against the “Khartoum Arabic”. In the early 1990s, public universities were changed from teaching in English, to teaching in Arabic and students were required to know the language before being admitted.[839] Several interview partners dropped out of university and changed to one of the few schools teaching in English. The majority of the research group basically learnt Arabic out of need and to accomplish certain goals. Some consider “Khartoum Arabic” the language of the enemy, which they refuse to learn or speak. Joshua, a 41-year-old Kakwa, entered into a conflict with himself when he was compelled to learn Arabic. He explained:

> Yes, I do speak Arabic. I do speak. I can read it, somehow. But I hate Arabic. Actually, in the end of the day I came to hate myself. Because it is a language, I took it against the personality. But it is a language, I have to learn it.

Yuga, a 41-year-old Kakwa, commented:

> I even refused to learn Arabic. Arabic, I look at it as a language which has differently influences. There are certain cultural influences that can affect a human being.

This deep dislike and sometimes even hate felt for the “Khartoum Arabic”, hints at the profoundness of *the gap*. Interview partners often view “Khartoum Arabic” as inflicted on them. Resisting anything that is forcefully imposed on them by the North, they refuse to make serious efforts to learn it. In contrast, those interview partners who came to Khartoum at a younger age or were even born there speak “Khartoum Arabic” fluently and appreciate it as a personal qualification. Betty, for example, speaks “Khartoum Arabic” fluently and with that had a very successful career at the University of Khartoum. She knows that speaking “Khartoum Arabic” fluently is a big advantage and an important entry to the majority society and the system. Nevertheless, it is an entry

[839] cf. Sudan Tribune (06.10.2004)

to a society which is “not hers” and if it is not for a purpose, she prefers speaking Juba Arabic. She explained:

> One has to feel like an African, feel like home, you make yourself comfortable with what you are doing, you know; for me like, when I wear African dress, when I go with friends like, when I have my African friends, my southerner friends. I feel at home, when I speak my own language, when I eat my own kind of food.

Schultz (2008) has pointed out that properly knowing Arabic is not appreciated in the new South. Therefore, in spite of knowing that it is an important qualification and entry to success in Khartoum, southern Arabic speakers often have to distance themselves from their abilities in the context of nation-building in the South.[840] Betty, in fact, believes that problems could only be generated, if she would not know Juba Arabic. Since she speaks Juba Arabic fluently, she does not worry about any conflict due to her “Khartoum Arabic” skills – or lack of an African language – when going to the South. Yet, it is important to note that Betty has accepted being different from the “real southerners” and does not have any political aspirations that would require compliance with political positions; therefore, the nation-building in the South does not affect her. In chapter VI 5.5, it will be further discussed how political attitudes and personal attributes such as gender and age at arrival to the North influence interview participants’ need to position themselves politically and its effects.

In spite of all interview partners having lived in the North for at least 20 years, the larger part of them does not speak “Khartoum Arabic”, which automatically sets them apart from the majority society and often prevents even ordinary conversations from happening. Before, large parts of the Sudanese society spoke English, but with the Arabisation of the country, by the late 1960s, instruction in English was being phased out in schools. “There are no official statistics for the number of English speakers in the country at present, but it is safe to say that they are few and far between – especially amongst the youth. On the streets of the capital a conversation in English is usually held with a grandfather who was taught before the so-called ‘Arabization’ of the country.”[841] Without sharing a common language, misunderstandings and conflicts are sensitive and prone to escalation. Even those interview partners, who

[840] cf. Schultz (2008), p. 12
[841] Sudan Tribune (06.10.2004)

speak “Khartoum Arabic” fluently, only do so when necessary. Therefore, the language barrier clearly sets the research group and the majority society apart from each other and, hence, contributes to the consolidation of *the gap*.

The cultural / religious gap

Southern Sudanese have a strong southern identity, full of traditions and beliefs, which they are usually not prepared to give up. The degree to which interview partners are willing to change their behaviour and adapt to the habits of the majority society varies from individual to individual and from situation to situation. Cultural barriers are closely related to religious barriers. Many practices, which southern Sudanese view as an integral part of their culture and religion – such as their traditional dances, drinking alcohol and preaching loudly – is viewed by the majority society as an offence against Islam. Celebrations like weddings or funerals are held in very different manners and people find it hard to share these moments. Research participants indicate often not being invited to northern celebrations. If they get invited, often they will comply with politeness and attend for a short moment, though leaving again as quickly as possible.

A central barrier is the rigid gender segregation in the Muslim society, which is alien to southern Sudanese. For women the situation is particularly complicated, since southern homes usually do not provide the separation of spaces needed to host Muslim women. Therefore, southern women have to make sure that male members of the house are absent, when inviting Muslim women. If southern Sudanese invite men and women together, as is common in their African culture, the Muslim women will often not stay. They might come to greet, but many will not tolerate being together in the same place with men. Furthermore, most of the times, if Christians start praying, Muslim guests will leave.

Women are also the ones who are mostly affected by the strict dress code of the northern society. Not only laws force them to dress according to the Muslim dress code, but also society. This has become particularly clear after the signature of the CPA. Southern women are officially given much more freedom of choice of dress. Nevertheless, many female interview partners do still not dare to change their habits out of worry of sanctions by the majority society. Married women, in

particular, are supposed to wear a thob, a full-body veil traditional in northern Sudan, and if they go to a Muslim meeting without putting it on, they will face constraints and exclusion. Sometimes, the Muslim women will not comply with their next invitation as a sign of disapproval. Often they make pejorative comments and female interview partners are being interrogated why they have not dressed properly. Accordingly, research participants feel that they are given conditions when wanting to associate with the majority society. The requirement to change their clothing style is just one aspect, however, the most obvious and often most humiliating one. As will be shown further down, some women feel seriously hurt by the fact that they cannot join their neighbours without putting on a "costume" which cloaks their own religion and culture.

Female interview partners frequently complain about persisting attempts from the majority society to convert them to Islam. In fact, there is a correlation between their adaptation to northern norms and attempts of conversion. The more similar their surface becomes (speaking their language, dressing their cloth, joining their meetings) the greater becomes the insistence they should take the next step and join Islam. Considering the profound role of religion in the African society[842] and interview partners being committed and active Christians, any interference with their belief and any attempt to make them reject their own religion is seen as a serious offence against their integrity. Islamisation and Arabisation campaigns vigorously carried out by the government have left southern Sudanese cautious of anyone trying to forcefully change their ideologies.

Southern Sudanese feel offended by the fact that Arab culture is practised openly at any time and any place in Khartoum, while theirs is considered to be "satanic" and has to be practised silently behind closed doors. Needless to say, those Muslims who have differing interpretations of Islam and desire to behave divergent from the majority society are not given that freedom either. Yousif, a 46-year-old Kuku, described the exclusion he experiences in Khartoum as a war. In spite of being a Muslim by birth, he is not treated equally by the majority society.

[842] In spite of modernisation, globalisation and secular transformation, in Africa the great majority of people is highly religious, regardless to whether Christians, Muslims or followers of traditional beliefs. Religion is an integral part of life. The same is true for the Sudanese society. Cf. Peter (2008), p. 150 ff.

> They want people to follow them. I am an African, I cannot be changed. I cannot be an Arab. Although my name is Yousif, it does not mean that I am an Arab. There is always conflict, always difference. Your neighbour does not want to associate with you. You are, ah, they fail you to be somebody who is from this land. […] They have completely forgotten about our rights, as if we are not even there, we are not considered. This is the problem which is happening in the common places, in the offices, in the houses, they are failing you to be Sudanese. Now if I go to an Arab house, we are staying like this, we are all visitors, they will consider me separately from the rest, they will treat me separately from the rest. If he does not say anything, he will make you feel that you are not the same, you feel it through the treatment, that you are black, you see. […] I believe in god and I pray to god to defend me from this terror. […] We have a cold war here, here in the North, we have a cold war. The soldiers are fighting with a gun, but we are fighting here, too. We have a cold war which is more dangerous, more painful than the other. Because you are staying with somebody who is fighting against you indirectly.

The example of Yousif shows that exclusion is not based on religion, but on racial concepts. Rebecca, a 33-year old Lotuka, has made similar experience. She has come to the North at the age of three and spent majority of her life in Khartoum. She studied at Ahfad University in Omdurman and, although having finished her studies at the time of the interview, she was still living in a students' house in Omdurman. She describes herself as a stranger.

> I describe myself as a stranger. It is clear, they are considering you, you are not even a part of them. You are also not a human being. […] Now in the hostel they are all Arabs, we are there together and you know, in the beginning they are just scared of you or just treating you like other person, you are not one of them. Even you are not a Sudanese, they are the real Sudanese. […] I don't feel that this is my home here. Why not? Because it is bad, the people are bad. Because always treating you as other, that you are not part of this country, always you are treated as other, always you are marginalised, always, everywhere you have this thing. Even they don't say it, but you feel it.

The intolerance in society has extremely increased with the emergence of the current government in 1989. Alfred Taban, editor-in-chief of the Khartoum Monitor and an interview partner, wrote in his column "Let us Speak out" on 20th of September 2008 about the hybrid culture in Sudan and how Islam prevents it from unfolding.

> Many people have allowed their culture and other influences such as religion to coexist side by side in their homesteads without problems. They go to church but marry more than one wife. It is Islam that has been problematic. It does not allow some of these dual activities. It would for example not allow a Moslem

> lady to marry a non Moslem although it allows the reverse. It prohibits the taking of alcohol. This has brought about double dealing, cheating, laying and all sorts of social corruption in many families.[843]

After the signature of the CPA the situation in Khartoum has gotten much better. Gabriel, a 46-year-old Kakwa, for example, recalled the humiliations they used to face on the way to church that after the CPA have stopped.

> When the southern Sudanese go to church, our dress is more southern, African. And before the CPA that was virtually impossible, we would be harassed. Up to that they tear your skirt, slashes, really bad. But now in the presence of the SPLA, it has at least gone down: people here are left a little space.

Nevertheless, changes are perceived to be above all owed to the change of official policy and not to a genuine change among the ordinary people. As Gabriel's statements shows, changes are, primarily, ascribed to the presence of the SPLA and interview partners react differently to them. Those, who primarily entertain relations for practical purposes, feel a new empowerment and, now that their actions are no longer punished by the authorities, dare to speak out openly and to display their culture in public. Other research participants, who entertain relations beyond practical purpose, are still hesitative about changing their habits – as for example gathering and celebrating in private homes and the clothing style in the case of women – since they fear social sanctions from the majority society.

Although policies have changed, society has often not. While official sanctions have stopped, above described social sanctions proceed and continue to limit the research group's freedom. The softening of the state policy towards southern Sudanese even bears some negative consequences for the relations between the research group and the majority society. While before customs, behaviours, attitudes and other factors prone to conflict were carefully hidden and never exposed in public, nowadays, as mentioned above, some research participants dare to display them openly. Differences, hereby, become more obvious and create new potential for conflict between the two groups. Changes in policy, therefore, have the potential of widening the gap between the research group and the majority society, for obedience is displaced by a new self-esteem.

[843] Taban (20.09.2008), p. 2

Language, religion and culture set the two groups apart. Yet, they are generally accepted as almost natural and if it was not for the wider context, they would not be felt so sharply. Nevertheless, the segregation in Khartoum goes much beyond these aspects and forms a deep cleavage within the society that cannot be overcome through mere tolerance or pluralistic integration. The two crucial factors, which reinforce *the gap* to an extent that it becomes unbridgeable, are *racism* and *the deep distrust towards all that is Arab.*

2.1.2 Racism

In part III, the ambiguous nature of racism and the far-reaching influence of racism in Sudan have been analysed in length; the differentiation between race as a biological term and a social concept has been found particularly important. Although, race as such does not exist, it plays a crucial role in segregating people in Sudan. Racism is one of the most decisive dividing factors in Sudan and will not be euphemised by labelling it differently. While in some societies, such as Germany and Israel, historical memories "result in blank avoidance"[844] of the term race, the author agrees with several authors, who believe that it would be dangerous to deny race and racism when it is apparently present and that it should accordingly not be suppressed in academic scholarship.[845]

Racism has far-reaching consequences and forms one of the greatest barriers between the people of Sudan. It is generally understood as an ideology which relates social inequality with specific characteristics of human beings, such as skin colour and religion, and through this "explains", justifies and propagates differences; human beings are different by nature and therefore, "naturally" different in social status.[846] In spite of this ideology, racial categories are not natural/biological categories, people are the ones who define and establish them. They are assigned, escaped, interpreted and so on. The northern "Arab" society has been identified as a closed society in chapter III 2.2; an African person can never be a full member of it. Nevertheless, the order of research conduct was opposite: first the data sparked the elaboration of the category; second, the literature has been reviewed in detail.

[844] Ratcliffe (1994), p. 6
[845] cf. Horowitz (1991) and Adam (1991) quoted in Taylor (1994), p. 96 f.
[846] cf. Oswald (2007), p. 133 ff.

Racial categories only gain importance when they are given particular meanings upon which people start acting. This is certainly the case in Sudan, where racial segregation affects all spheres of life allowing us to speak of racial discrimination. The "Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity and Culture" writes that "racial discrimination occurs where someone is *treated* less favourably on grounds of group membership signified by skin colour, 'race', national or ethnic origin and so they find their access to scarce resources or opportunities restricted or denied."[847]

It will be seen below that racial discrimination clearly exists in Sudan. To give the category its own research relevant meaning, experience and consequences of racism have been analysed in detail. To remain close to the category *racism* and the meaning given through the research group, in contrast to pre-existing concepts on racism, the following analysis is notably supported by illustrative data.

The ineligibility to marriage

Intermarriage is considered a factor, which could help to eventually bridge *the gap*. Yet, it is without exception agreed upon by interview partners that, due to religious and racial barriers, intermarriage is unthinkable. By designating categories of eligibles and ineligibles, a rigid boundary between the groups is constructed. Saying that one is not worthy of the other reinforces this boundary and at the same time provokes a vehement counter-reaction of southern Sudanese, who have come to be as strict on their intermarriage rules as the majority society. "If they don't want us, we don't want them" is a common attitude. For all interview partners, without a single exception, it is a matter of course that their children will not be allowed to marry an "Arab". They feel of equal value and want to be respected as of equal value. *Being considered ineligible for marriage* reinforces *the gap*. Rebecca, a 33-year-old Lotuka, explained:

> Here, as I told you before, they say they are the black people, they are slaves, you know, something like they are animals, bad words, they are always telling us. And there is no intermarriage. If you marry, you are not alone there is the relatives, the extended family. They will always consider you as other, as I told you. They will underestimate you, they insult you, why you marry her, she is black, she is not like us, she is our enemy. Even the children, how the children are going to look like? You have to divorce her, you have to marry from us, from Arab. […] So

[847] Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 260

> always they have that thing and from us to marry from them they will say no, this is abid, a slave, they will say it very clear you cannot be our daughter.

Rebecca's statement clearly demonstrates the racial connotation of ineligibility; interview participants perceive their ineligibility as racist discrimination against them.

It is widely believed among interview partners that intermarriage would bring northern and southern Sudanese closer to each other and that eventually the two groups could bridge their problems. Intermarriage might soften the boundaries and most importantly would be seen as a sign of credible mentality change. On the contrary, its absence sets the two groups further apart. Interview partners feel offended and discriminated by their ineligibility to marriage; it is a constant reminder of their stigmatisation as inferior. The fact that southern Sudanese Muslims and southern Sudanese Christians or followers of traditional religions intermarry, is taken as an indication for northern society being fundamentalist and looking at southern Sudanese as inferior. It is not mere religious tradition that prevents intermarriage from happening, but racial discrimination and Muslim participants do not diverge in their attitudes from the rest.

Simone (1994) confirms the perception that intermarriage might have the power to bridge the gap by writing that "[s]ome of the journalists view the cessation of intermarriage over the years as having arrested the Sudanese character. The previous existence of racial interpretation produces a self-conscious recognition by the Sudanese individuals of themselves as disparate, unfixed people. This recognition, in turn, prompted a kind of spiritual nomadism, a search for connections and an interweaving with others."[848] This "spiritual nomadism" has clearly ceased to exist.

Nowadays, borders are drawn sharply and intermarriage has become inconsiderable for northern and southern Sudanese alike. Intermarriage could serve as "a potentially important factor working against the long-run maintenance of the groups as a separate entity"[849]. Yet, as long as racist discrimination persists, this positive development is unthinkable. Cornell and Hartmann (1998) confirm that normative prohibitions against

[848] Simone (1994), p. 29
[849] Lieberson and Waters (1988), p. 165 quoted in Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 170

intermarriage across ethnic, racial or religious lines create or reinforce ethnic and racial identities threefold.

> First, by designating categories of eligibles and ineligibles, they construct a specific boundary between populations. Second, because prohibitions against intermarriage invariably involve statements – explicit or implicit – of the relative worthiness of the respective groups, such prohibitions attach differing value to the categories on either side of the boundary: Not only are they different, but one is unworthy of the other. They thereby reinforce boundary. Third, through their practical effect on the marriage pool, they encourage marriage within the ethnic or racial boundary, thereby avoiding the dilution of felt identity that intermarriage often fosters.[850]

Ineligibility to marriage is clearly embedded in racial attitudes and reinforces boundaries. In fact, southern Sudanese often do not approve inter-ethnic marriages in general. Schultz (forthcoming), for example, points out that "for the Bari marriage and the marriage ceremonies are in the centre of maintaining the border between the 'Bari' and the others."[851] Apparently, to many Bari not approving intermarriage with other southern tribes is something completely different than not approving intermarriage with "the Arabs". The first is understood as a "natural" and reasonable way of maintaining and strengthening the own group, however, as Schultz (forthcoming) explains, one which, today, is frequently contested by the youth.[852] The lack of intermarriage with northern Sudanese, in contrast, is perceived as a result of racial discrimination. Orthodox Islam, in fact, allows males to marry Christian females, but not the other way around. Interview partners clearly oppose a one-way marriage, which they rather consider absorption or even another war against their culture and tradition. Memories of forced marriages and rape during the war reinforce the belief that one-way marriage is a tool of oppression, which furthermore, automatically, is accompanied by Arabisation and Islamisation of the woman. Beswick (2004) in her study on the Dinka wrote that "[l]ittle marriage, historically, has taken place between the Islamic Northern Sudanese and non-Islamic Southerners" and goes on quoting one of her Dinka interview partners, "[t]here has always been an unwritten law that among Muslim Sudanese you do not marry a 'slave'. On the other hand, the unwritten

[850] Cornell and Hartmann (1998), p. 171
[851] Schultz (forthcoming)
[852] cf. Schultz (forthcoming)

law of the Dinka is that you do not marry a 'slave trader'."[853] Even those interview participants, who indicated that they did not see a problem in their children marrying outside of their own ethnicity, still vehemently insisted that they would not allow them to marry a northern Sudanese. Clearly being attributed to racial discrimination, the very strict marriage rules on both sides significantly exacerbate *the gap*.

Segregated labour market

Racial categories have far-reaching consequences for southern Sudanese living in Khartoum exceeding mere social interaction. Especially those who rather act inside the system than aside of it face serious disadvantages, in particular, of economic nature. In Khartoum the labour market shows extremely segregated characteristics and "institutional racism"[854] prevails, meaning procedures in companies and institutions, as for example schools and universities, which discriminate against southern Sudanese. Accordingly, most of the time, they work in lower positions and as casual labourers. Only a very small number can be found working as professionals in northern companies. In fact, the discrimination already starts several steps before. Interview partners explained how southern Sudanese are given inappropriate grades at schools and universities. Some even send their children to other African countries to protect them from such discrimination. One interview partner dismissed his own university studies, for he was unwilling to accept discriminative grades given to him.

Those few who actually work for northern companies do not only face the common racist treatment and chicaneries from colleagues, but are also exposed to racial discrimination by employers, with severe consequences for their careers. They complain about not being treated equally and not being paid and promoted according to their qualifications. Yousif, a 46-year-old Kuku, serves as very good example, since he has been working for one of the biggest northern companies for a total of 15 years. He recalled a moment, when he was directly confronted with the racist comments of the colleagues with whom he was sharing an office:

> There was a time in our office, somebody was reading the newspaper, so I just come slowly, he has not seen me, I was behind them. I was facing the financial manager, so he did not

[853] cf. Beswick (2004) p. 206
[854] Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 260

> know who is in his back. He says in Arabic, what these slaves want from us?! [making reference to the newspaper article he was reading] He said what do they want from us the slaves? So the other man couldn't say anything, because I was there, looking at him. So when he turned back he saw me, he was shocked. I said no no no, you go ahead. This is normal, we have been hearing this insults long time ago. I am not a slave for somebody, I am a slave for god. The slavery is over a long time ago, there is no slavery all over the world, no slavery in the world. If you think of the slavery, then you are wasting my time.

Consequences of such racial attitudes are far-reaching. The discrimination through colleagues has affects on the productivity of Yousif and other southern Sudanese in similar situations. Colleagues play what Yousif called "a dirty game"; they take direct actions against them such as manipulating situations to their disadvantage, withholding information from them or bashing them in front of superiors. More importantly, the racist treatment is not limited to colleagues, but includes superiors and even the system. Racism has been institutionalised in the working places. Yousif explained:

> I am the only southerner in the section, when it comes to breakfast time, we can eat together with the Arabs. We eat together, we come together, we eat together, you see. But when it comes to the time when there is maybe money or maybe there is promotions, they promote only the Arabs. You are black, you are just left outside. For example, I am now the senior, I am the elder in the section, in the accountant section, I am the senior. I am supposed to be the senior, because I have worked here for 15 years in the section. Those who came behind, I was the one signing their papers, their papers to be given to the administration. Now they have been all promoted and the highest, their senior, I am just remaining there. They don't give you responsibility, the just maintain you there, you be quiet. And I am the only black among them. People ask me how I manage to stay there, how do they allow you? I say it is actually god to defend me from this terror, so that is why I am still there.

Caesar is a 55-year-old Kuku, who same as Yousif works in a big northern company. In fact, both of them work together for a newspaper after their normal office hours, since their main income cannot provide for their living. Caesar described:

> Now, if you go to the offices, there are no southerners, there are hardly any of us, the number is almost not existing. Even the way they treat you, it is not the same, you know. When they appoint you, or they absorb you into the company, either as a labourer or as a staff, you are not given the same privileges like the other colleagues of yours. And they are always hard on you. If you ones make a mistake, they will even dismiss you. Because when you are employed and then you make a mistake, you are

> supposed to be given warnings, isn't it? You are supposed to be warned, warning number one, warning number two, warning number three, and then ultimately, because you are not listening to the advice, then you can be dismissed. With us, they don't do. And even sometimes they talk when you are not there, then they talk ill of you. Like we can be three or four there in the office, I am the only southerner and the rest are Arabs, of course when I am not there, they can talk ill of me. Sometimes you can come, of course they don't know that you are standing near them, then they are discussing certain things and you can overhear them.

It is not a surprise that most southern Sudanese working as professionals in Khartoum can be found in NGOs or international organisations, where staff usually is diverse and racism not institutionalised. The northern labour market is not completely closed. Nevertheless, those southern Sudanese who indeed work as professionals in Khartoum are the clear exception. Most of their fellow southerners, if they work at all in the centre, do so in minor positions such as labourers in construction sites, house employees or guards, as cleaners or the alike. This can also be easily observed in the cityscape of Khartoum.

The informality of society adds up onto consequences of racism. As has been laid out in chapter II 5, jobs and opportunities are frequently distributed in informal manners making the social network an important access to any kind of social and economic resource. Yuga, a 41-year-old Kakwa working for a local NGO, commented on that issue:

> Well, Khartoum, life in Khartoum is actually not all that easy. It is hectic, very difficult, especially if you are not from this background. It is not easy for people who come from out like us, who come from the South. All the time we have been in Khartoum, ah, you see, we are getting difficulties in survival. Ah, employment is not easy for many. That is why you find very many families live at a very low rate, you know, almost, I don't know how many dollars. […] Even getting casual jobs is not easy. Those who are qualified do not even have access to get jobs. There are very many qualified people here who graduated, who have experience, to get a job is not easy. […] Everything requires like a, what you call it? The system of the employment here is not fair competition, not free competition. So for you to get a job for example, ah, I have to recommend you or I have to tell you that there is a position, there is a vacancy somewhere, you come and apply for it, secretly, without the others even knowing.

Most southern Sudanese do not have these relations. They lack the social ties that are crucial in the informal society of Khartoum. Research participants are hardly connected and therefore can often not benefit

from their objective qualification. Although the informality of the Sudanese labour market surely plays a role in the ongoing exclusion of southern Sudanese, it is not meant to play down the racial dimension of the segregated labour market. In sum, social marginalisation and racist attitudes held by the majority society against the research group have a direct impact on their economic development and professional positions.

Discriminative housing policies

The general problem that southern Sudanese and other marginalised people are pushed out of the centre into the surroundings of Khartoum, where they struggle from extraordinary hardship, has already been discussed in chapter II 6. The category *suffering from discrimination in the housing market* has emerged from the data and refers to the research group's specific problems with the housing market in Khartoum.

A general problem southern Sudanese face in Khartoum is that they do not own pieces of land. Research participants feel discriminated and excluded from the allocation process and the majority has no choice but to rent houses from northern landlords with whom relations are more often than not tense. Interview partners complain about being charged higher rents while at the same time having less rights than the majority society. Landlords give them conditions and pose rules. Some go as far as checking and searching homes. Often there are problems with the neighbours, who complain about southern Sudanese practising their culture and religion or receiving visitors. Landlords are said to be arbitrary and suspecting.

Ultimately, research participants either obey to specific rules or are being expelled. These conditions lead to the majority of interview partners constantly having to move from one place to another. Hereby, they are repeatedly reminded that they are not in their own society. They have no power and when landlords expel them without proper reasons or warning, there is little they can do. Maria, a 39-year-old Balanda, lives in one of the central neighbourhoods in Khartoum (urban district). She and her family were forced to move five times already and the lack of her own property and house is a fact she seriously regrets same as all other participants in similar situations. She clarified:

> It is especially for the southerner, especially for the southerner. And sometimes the landlord used to come to the house, go and checking in the toilet to see whether you are making brew in the house or not, if or if not there is any dirt in the house and so on. If he get something which is not good, he will say no no no, leave my house! This is happening only for the southerner. […] I don't know why it happens. Even you see, like us, I am a Christian. Sometimes I used to bring those of my group, of my church, we make over-night in the house, we just make like this. Your neighbour cannot come to ask what has happened here, he just rings the landlord, you see, yesterday we didn't sleep. Those people, they are making shouting, their Allah, what what. The owner of the house will come, why do you bring those Christians into my house and I am a Muslim. I say, yes, you are a Muslim, but I am renting your house, but I am a Christian. I have a right to praise my god at any time and any hour. He will say that is the last time for you, if you bring people again, you will leave the house.

The housing market is apparently not completely closed. In fact, interview partners agree that they can always find a place even in the inner city. However, they are usually required to pay a higher price for it and have to put up with the chicanery of neighbours and landlords. As a consequence, various research participants have eventually decided to find a place a bit further outside of the centre in order to avoid some of these inconveniences. The housing market, same as the labour market, being organised along racial lines, creates clear boundaries between "them" and "us". Again, as with the impossibility of intermarriage, there is a clear division between eligibles and ineligibles, with serious consequences for southern Sudanese's overall living situation in Khartoum.

2.1.3 The deep distrust towards all that is "Arab"

A second factor next to racism, which is making the gap between the research group and the society of Khartoum unbridgeable, is *the deep distrust towards all that is Arab*. The distrust is based on history, observation and own experience. "Arabs" are understood to be completely untrustworthy. The origin of the distrust certainly lies in the long history of separated development, dishonoured agreements and the back-stabbing warfare of the various northern governments. In the words of the research group: "The distrust is not from today." It started centuries ago and was cemented in the negotiations of the independence. Southern Sudanese feel like they have been betrayed from the very first day on. During centuries of violent interaction,

southern Sudanese developed a distrust that Deng (1995) describes to be a “deep-rooted suspicion and hatred of any foreigners coming from the North; they regarded all of them as invaders and exploiters.”[855] (cf. III 2.3.2)

The research group being educated and well informed on the history of the country makes them highly aware of bygone beguilement. They are determined not to commit the same mistakes as their ancestors and not to let the “Arabs” betray them anymore. The data suggests that the past is by far not forgotten and exacerbated by prevailing negative experience. “Do not trust an Arab” is understood to be the most important lesson learnt from history. Especially now, that a new agreement has been concluded and remains to be fulfilled (or broken as usual) the deeds of history are constantly recalled and present in the minds of the people. The fact that southern and northern Sudanese have killed each other in the war is clearly taken as an incurable wound. Many northern soldiers died in the South and southern Sudanese living in the North always had a fear of becoming the victims of revenge by families and kin. Like this, relations were rendered unpredictable, unreliable and even risky. A northern Sudanese known as a friend, corrupted by events in the war, could easily turn into an enemy.

The general feeling of distrust is confirmed by the environment research participants are exposed to on a daily base. The devastating situation of southern IDPs in the capital region is considered as a proof that society and government are against the people of the South. As has been pointed out before, history determines the present when it is reproduced. Southern Sudanese in general and research participants in particular being subject to marginalisation and mistreatment leads to many interview partners perceiving Khartoum as a battlefield. The war they are fighting, *the war of the mind*, has not stopped yet, it is history continuing to be alive.

Although research participants are leading a relative decent life in Khartoum, the great majority of their people are suffering. The grief over this situation is fortified by the length that IDPs have already stayed in the North without any improvement of conditions and by the chicaneries of the government they encounter (e.g. cruel and inhuman demolitions

[855] Deng (1995), p. 71

and relocations). Those who work in humanitarian aid and issues related to IDPs feel particularly deep sorrow and agony over the complete marginalisation of their people. Official policies, herewith, have direct influence on the degree of *the gap* between the ordinary people. Research participants are not satisfied by being "the exception" of the ordinary southern Sudanese. They feel extremely close and committed to their own people and see their suffering as an offence against the entire group, including themselves. Observing how southern Sudanese are mistreated and excluded, therefore, has a direct impact on the research participants' perceptions. Society constantly reminds them of the "true" image it has of southern Sudanese and fuels the fear and distrust of what they could do to themselves, too.

In spite of living relatively well protected in the centre of Khartoum, many research participants were also subject to mistreatments. An important factor, which will be discussed in detail below, is the abusive treatment by the police. Various interview partners have been imprisoned and mistreated, their houses have been demolished and searched, their celebrations have been shut down, churches have been attacked, and so on. Herewith, a general unease on interacting and associating with northern Sudanese has developed. There is a persistent fear that neighbours, alleged friends, or colleagues could make a denunciation, which, during the war easily put a southern Sudanese's life at risk. During the war, they were readily suspected to be part of a fifth column, co-operators of the SPLA in the North.

Distrust between northern and southern Sudanese is mutual and has not decreased in spite of the CPA. Martin, a 37-year-old Kakwa, who has spent almost his entire life in Khartoum, put it quite clearly:

> The northerners in the public, they do discriminate. With the existence of the CPA a bit has changed in the mentality of the northern communities that the CPA has brought all the rights to the people who have been marginalised. Their rights have been put there in the what? In the CPA. But that concept of theirs is still there. That they always look at the southern Sudanese as incapable in trusting. It is still there.

This statement clearly shows that a change in official policy can be sensed, but that it has so far not change the mentality of the people or created trust between the two groups.

Research participants hold strong stereotypes against northern Sudanese, according to which they are all untrustworthy, complex and sneaky. They are believed to say one thing, but to think something else. In fact, an important aspect of the ordinary interaction between southern and northern Sudanese is that they avoid touching any sensitive or political issues. Naturally, a situation in which nobody dares to speak out their true opinions and attitudes, which in the case of southern Sudanese might even be sanctioned by the state, creates an atmosphere of deep distrust and suspicion. It is of no surprise that interview partners feel an element of mutual hypocrisy in all interactions with the majority society.

Some interview partners distinguish between "good Arabs" and "bad Arabs", yet, ultimately, the spark of distrust always remains. Jacob, a 52-year-old Kuku, who has been arrested by the police several times for his work as a journalist, provides an explanation:

> The history is the history of death and killers. And unfortunately, like if you ask my mother who imprisoned you, meaning me, I was in prison for many months here, she doesn't know it is the government. I mean, she will say it is the Arabs. In any case, I know, many northerners are innocent people, they themselves have suffered from Omar al-Bashir, maybe more than I have. But is that a fact known among the people?

Jacob's statement shows how generalisation contributes to the reinforcement of the distrust. The underlying fear that in case of anything friends can turn into enemies prevails and is reinforced through occasional outbreaks of violence, such as for example on Black Monday, the day John Garang died.[856] Research participants remain agitated about what they saw and experienced on that day. Many southern Sudanese were killed also in the neighbourhoods were research participants live. As a result, they were left in shock and hugely concerned about the enormous potential of violence between the various groups in Khartoum, particularly, because the police do not protect them. Simone (1994) notes that "[s]poradic outbreaks of violence [in Khartoum] are intense because the resentments are enormous".[857] Accordingly, all relationships with the majority society are considered to be instable, dependent on external factors and, therefore, in ultimate

[856] Following the sudden death of John Garang, riots broke out in Khartoum and Juba and several civilians were killed and many more hurt. Cf. BBC (01.08.2005); cf. Sudan Tribune (01.08.2005)
[857] Simone (1994), p. 31

instance, risky. The repetition of history, general living conditions of marginalised southern Sudanese and offences against them, in addition to own experience, has led to many research participants feeling that anyone who trusts an “Arab” is a fool.

2.1.4 Conclusion

In Khartoum we find a deep and unbridgeable chasm between northern and southern Sudanese civilians. Although, for the moment, they are peacefully living alongside each other, people do not genuinely interact with each other and fear eruptions of violence and traditionally known racial harassments. The conclusion of the CPA has not changed the dimensions and attributes of *the gap*. Social relations between the research group and the majority society have not improved and sometimes even gotten worse. The language barrier and cultural and religious differences, such as practice of traditions, clothing styles, and gender segregation continue to complicate interaction and differences between the two groups are frequently exaggerated. This phenomenon has also been described by Castles and Davidson (2000): “The counterpart of the culturalization of racism is a racialization of culture: language, religion and custom come to be regarded as symbolic of immutable difference.”[858] Even after the signature of the CPA, northern Sudanese are still believed to be too different to enter into earnest relations with them, which go beyond loose acquaintance.

It is considered a very high price that in order to participate in the northern lifestyle, southern Sudanese have to behave, to dress, to speak, to eat, etc. in a way which does not reflect their own culture and which, in addition, is seen as a symbol of their cultural oppression. If it was not for a purpose, interview partners would not be willing to obey to these cultural rules. Yet, living in Khartoum means being forced to enter into relationships with the majority society. While before it was also a way of avoiding police offences, today it is more about the social network crucial in African societies.[859] Being southern means being vulnerable and a target in the hostile northern society; all the more it is important for research participants to have good relations with the

[858] Castles and Davidson (2000), p. 80

[859] Since the African state tends to be arbitrary and privatized and incapable of providing welfare to its people, citizens often highly depend on the community or ethnic group. (For more detailed information on the topic see chapter IV 2.2)

people surrounding them. To which extent relations, exceeding the minimum interaction necessary, are entertained, depends on individual aspects and will be discussed in length in chapter VI 5. Women in particular often have a desire to interact and integrate with their social environment, especially with their neighbours. Regardless to the degree of interaction between individuals, in ultimate instance, *the gap* always remains unbridgeable due to *racism* and an unshakeable *distrust against all that is Arab*. In any relationship with northern Sudanese, an ultimate "but" remains. Several interview partners have amicable relations with northern Sudanese and even consider some of them as their friends. Nevertheless, a certain level of discomfort, a lack of mutual understanding and, most notably, a degree of distrust always remain.

Interview partners feel treated as inferior and stigmatised through their religion, southern culture and skin colour, often with harsh consequences on all spheres of life, more worryingly on their economic development and the lives of their children. Discrimination in hiring and promotion is standard and neither employers nor public authorities have an interest in providing upward mobility to southern Sudanese. Economic factors like these reinforce group boundaries.

History, observance and experience created an unshakable distrust against the "Arabs", which has matured throughout so many years that it is doubtful whether it can ever be overcome. Racist treatment remains a constant reminder of who are "we" and who are "they". Concepts of *the gap* are embedded in such fertile soil that even those who want to break out in the end often fail; they are *being drawn back from integrating by the community*. Distrust is so deep that interacting with northern Sudanese can cause suspicion from the own community and often meets great disapproval. The same is true for northern Sudanese, who are held back by their own society as well. Interaction always takes place in a context, which in Khartoum is all but supportive to rapprochement. Stereotypes are all pervasive and community bonds are very strong. Southern Sudanese, who have come to Khartoum at a very early age, are particularly used to interacting with the majority society. Nevertheless, they are unable to forget the chasm between them and the others and feel compelled to comply with the official practice of southern Sudanese. Rebecca, a 33-year-old Lotuka who came to the North at the age of three, explained:

> For us here, the educated people, we are flexible now, we are ok with the Arab people. Even they start to realise that this problem, this war, all these things are just the politicians who are creating all this, but on the ground, people are fine. But if this person today, we are in the university together, chatting and what, maybe he will go back to his parents, ah, my sister from the South today, I have a good friend, maybe her name is Jaqueline we are so fine. And then, if the father is not that educated person or maybe has strong attitudes, he has that mind of the Arabs and then maybe he will stop his daughter or his son: Don't go with this southerner people or this black people, this are slaves and even we have a problem. Why don't you go and have an Arab friend with you? This is your enemy, you know, something like that. And the same thing also applies for the South. If I say my friend, she is my best friend, her name is Fathima, it is the same. Oh, this is our enemy, why do you go with her? You know, it is the same, but really we don't know how to change this things. Because sometimes you just want to free yourself from all this things and then you will find yourself, something is calling you again back to accept the ideas of brothers, of your father or your mother.

Blumer (1998) analysed the impact of the group position forming racial prejudice in detail and came to similar conclusions as Rebecca in the example above: that deviation from the group position is likely to be punished. Blumer points out that the

> sense of group position refers to the position of group to group, not to that of individual to individual. Thus, vis-à-vis the subordinate racial group the unlettered individual with low status in the dominant racial group has a sense of group position common to that of the elite of his group. By virtue of sharing this sense of position such an individual, despite his low status, feels that members of the subordinate group, however distinguished and accomplished, are somehow inferior, alien, and properly restricted in the area of claims. He forms his conception as a representative of the dominant group; he treats individual members of the subordinate group as representative of that group.[860]

As will be explained in chapter VI 3, the research group holds strong stereotypes against the majority society and, in fact, often even feels superior to them. Not only the northern, but also the southern Sudanese community holds extremely strong group positions and often punishes deviation of members the same way as the dominant group. Collective positions, therefore, reinforce the gap between research participants and the majority society. Actual encounters are with individuals, yet, distinct experience is subordinated to the collective position which transcends experience. Thus, actual encounters with individuals lose their

[860] Blumer (1998), p. 36

relevance. In the next chapters, impacts of institutionalised discrimination and exclusion on relations between the two groups will be considered.

2.2 The cold war with the government

The relation between southern Sudanese in Khartoum and the central government is extremely tense and central in the creation of *the feeling of second-class citizenship*. Research participants do not only feel excluded and neglected, but also actively fought against. The social chasm is, in part, understood to be natural, since it is reflecting supposedly natural differences between the completely different groups. Also, it is partially understood to be mutual, since southern Sudanese respond to racism and exclusion with strong counter reactions. Although, blame for *the gap* is clearly put with the majority society, nonetheless, interview partners feel like an active part of it. They are active respondents to the environment they encounter and define themselves and others according to their own ideas. Through this, they succeed in maintaining an overall positive image of themselves. The state, on the contrary, is a superiority that southern Sudanese, as individuals, have little power against. It is their enemy against whom they have to protect themselves. Ever since they have come to Khartoum, the regime is fighting a war against them through permanent exclusion and use of the security forces. Accordingly, they do not feel any commitment or loyalty towards the state. In fact, *the government is fighting a cold war against them*.

2.2.1 The state as enemy

The government not only fails to provide protection for parts of its people; it also actively attacks them. In part II of this work, it has been laid out in detail how consecutive governments in Sudan have used violence against civilians. With the introduction of Shari'a laws and the declaration of Jihad against all unbelievers, the situation for southern Sudanese in Khartoum got worse and worse. Being suspected to be a "fifth column of the SPLA" not only affected social relations, but also had serious consequences on security in Khartoum. A large part of the research group has direct experience of attacks and chicanery from the

state security. The monopoly of violence has persistently been abused and continues to be.

During the war it has been common for the police to randomly search houses and to close down celebrations on charges of public disorder, often with the person considered responsible being arrested. With the fundamentalisation of the government and laws, the practice of southern Sudanese traditions came to be considered an act against the law and was treated as such. As a consequence, research participants stopped practising their culture and religion even inside their own houses, due to the high security risk. Several research participants have been abducted and imprisoned by the police without notification to their families. Three interview partners, who founded a NGO together, for example, were suspected of collaboration with the SPLA. Joshua, a 41-year-old Kakwa, came to Khartoum at the age of 20 to start his studies and then founded the aforementioned NGO with two of his university mates. He recalled:

> We got registered in 1996; that is formally the organisation acquired legal status. We started to operate for some months, you know, the reality is the reality. The northerners they envy us, because we are young and where do we get this money? They arrested us. They closed the organisation. We were brought here to the military headquarter, tied with I don't know black or red handkerchief. Three of us; I, Jason and Vincent. We are put here, moved at night here from location to location. Even our families, they lose hope. Because that time when you are arrested by security personal you will not return home. And we are told, I was told so when I came with one of the man of the assembly to find out why we are arrested, he brought me to locate him the place where we were put and where we were investigated. I know the place, I say ok, I can take you to that place. As you are a member of the assembly, I don't have fear. I don't have fear to take you. When I took him there, ah [starts laughing slightly] war broke out between the member of the assembly and the security person. Now, why that I brought this person there; they wanted to re-arrest me again. They discussed and the person in charge told him when I was sitting that this boys of yours are lucky. If a vehicle took them to the desert, the vehicle would return without the person. I was hearing say this, that we have been charged, and he is insisting that we are being helped by SPLA, money was brought to us to change the Muslims into the Christianity. And we were just training them tailoring and tie and dye cloth, for all, both southerners and northerners who are willing to do, to acquire skills. We are doing for the community. We say we don't have any connection with the SPLA or SPLM. We are students and we are here in Khartoum since the regime came up. After two years I was here, in 91 I was here. I never went to South nor to any town northern Sudan here in the North. How comes that I have connection with the SPLA or SPLM or the movement in general?

Southern Sudanese in Khartoum have been taught that the police are somebody to fear not to trust. Streck (2007) also came to the conclusion that the state and its institutions are not perceived as services for the citizen, but as instances of oppression and exploitation.[861] The Sudanese culture and religion has systematically been disrespected and prosecuted.

A particularly sensitive issue for research participants are the numerous attacks on churches, where services have been closed down by the police, often involving bodily harm of members of the community. Betty, a 26-year-old Adio and a committed and active member of All Saints Cathedral in Khartoum (urban district), gave evidence on a police attack during services with a boy losing his hand. The Sudan Tribune confirms "On December 31, 2006, police fired tear gas into the church wounding six people."[862] Although assaults might have reduced after the conclusion of the CPA, apparently, they have not stopped completely. The acting dean of All Saints Cathedral, in a personal interview, explained that the government has allowed the building of temporal churches in IDP camps, but after little time always destroyed them under the pretext of city planning.[863]

The government is considered to be the main enemy, which is corrupting all the other people of the country. Some go as far as stating that the people themselves, in fact, would not have problems among each other and that the government is the source of all division. Jonas, a 61-year-old Adio, who deliberately chose to live and work in Khartoum, explained:

> So the South and the North they go into agreement in good faith, then it will be cancelled. In one or two years it will be cancelled. Another agreement. You lose trust. Generally speaking, when I was younger, I said North, I hated everybody in the North. But because I came to work in the North here, I realised it is not the ordinary northerners, it is the government, the source of problems. Change the policy, have unity. Treat everybody equal, no problem.

Jonas' account confirms that official policies directly influence social relations.

[861] cf. Streck (2007), p. 139
[862] Sudan Tribune (24.03.2008)
[863] personal interview with the Reverend in Khartoum (autumn 2008)

Same as in the formation of *the gap*, it is not only their own experience affecting the research group. The absolute helplessness of the vast majority of southern Sudanese living in Khartoum drives an additional wedge between the research group and the state. It is believed that not being educated and not knowing their rights puts the less privileged southerners in and around Khartoum fully at the mercy of the abusive government. The extraordinary cruel treatment of IDPs and the poor – who are completely powerless against the arbitrary acts of the authorities – creates massive anger at and fear of the state.

On top of that, the application of the Shari'a law is understood to be highly hypocritical. In fact, the Shari'a is believed "to be only for the poor". This perception is not new. Beswick (2004) already wrote about the introduction of Nimeiri's September Laws that the "imposition of *Shari'a* law in the justice system led most conspicuously to floggings and amputations of limbs, most of the victims of these new holy punishments being poor Muslims from the west and non-Muslim destitute Southerners."[864] Research participants feel, for example, that "Arabs" drink alcohol against the law and their religious beliefs, without being strictly punished. A woman brewing araqui in Khartoum, a traditional date gin, voiced to BBC: "All of our customers are men and Arab, mainly Arab."[865] Research participants are simmered with grief as they feel a great inequity in the avengement of alcohol consumption by northern Sudanese and southern Sudanese. They evaluate that "Arabs" are only indicted for minor charges if at all, particularly if they are part of the government. Against southern Sudanese, on the contrary, extraordinary strictness is being dispensed. Women who brew alcohol are charged with high fines or, being typically unable to pay them, are imprisoned. Upon arrest or imprisonment, they are frequently exposed to sexual violence and their children are being left alone to fate. Following the signature of the CPA, Shari'a law is not supposed to be applied to non-Muslims living in the capital, yet zero-tolerance on alcohol brewing continues.[866] In general, it is believed that a southern Sudanese who is charged for the same crime as a northern Sudanese will always face a severer punishment.

[864] Beswick (2004), p. 196
[865] BBC News (29.04.2010)
[866] cf. BBC News (29.04.2010)

The situation has improved with the conclusion of the peace treaty. All interview partners agree that attacks on southern civilians have reduced significantly, and in the centre of the capital almost disappeared, and that they can speak and move freely in society now. With the SPLM being inside the capital, interview partners feel more protected; the monopoly of violence has been opened up. Even being associated with the SPLM no longer means being part of the fifth column and putting one's life at risk. The SPLM forms part of the Government of National Unity and showing commitment towards it is no longer considered a crime. Nevertheless, all changes are accredited to the mentioned protection through the SPLM and not understood as a change of attitude inside the government.

Accordingly, all research participants were highly worried about what would happen to southern Sudanese living in Khartoum, should the South vote for separation and the SPLA leave the capital. Although mentioning that in Khartoum there is security, this is but a vague concept, since interview partners only refer to the immediate moment. The Black Monday and other violent events in Khartoum are not forgotten and create a constant level of anxiety that violence against them might break out anytime (cf. VI 2.1.3). It was widely believed that if the majority of southern Sudanese left to the South, the few who might stay behind in Khartoum would be victims of mistreatment and violence. In fact, the great majority considered it to be too dangerous to remain in Khartoum and, accordingly, had plans to return before the referendum (although many of them would have preferred to stay longer).

2.2.2 Being excluded from the system

The research group feels excluded from the official system all together. All possible disadvantages are imposed on them and they are not accepted for any benefits. In the marginalised areas, where the majority of the displaced southern Sudanese live, governmental services such as hospitals are basically non-existent and often not even electricity can be found.[867] Therefore, it is a common belief among interview partners that the government is intentionally maintaining all southern and other marginalised Sudanese poor; if they are powerless, they are easy to control. Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper, illuminated:

[867] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 51

> Yow know Christina, we in Sudan, because of the poverty, especially southern Sudanese, westerners, people from the east, the only clique is the northern Sudanese who are ruling the Sudan. And this clique, so that they can continue ruling Sudan, they want the poor to remain poor.

The government is said to purposely deny them licenses to open up their own business and to interfere with any independent enterprise they might implement. In chapter II 6, it has already been pointed out that the government has, indeed, been systematically oppressing the informal sector in Khartoum and makes it exceptionally difficult to obtain licenses; also many southern Sudanese do not even hold identity cards and, therefore, cannot obtain formal employment. Furthermore, not being given pieces of land by the government is understood as an attempt to prevent southern Sudanese from economically growing; for interview partners having to pay high rents seriously hinders their economic development.

A serious thorn in their side is the fact that the government does not employ them. The civil administration is an important employment sector in Sudan and being excluded from it clearly limits one's opportunities. Several interview partners have applied for governmental jobs, but have never been accepted; according to them on the base of lame pretexts. As has been explained in chapter II 5, recently a quota has been introduced to include southern Sudanese into civil services, yet, implications fall far behind. Research participants all agree that for non-Muslims the government does not provide employment. Although it is believed that conversion may change the situation, nevertheless, even southern Sudanese Muslims are said to be given limited responsibility and to be maintained in low positions. Domination and exclusion has been institutionalised and is, therefore, extremely difficult to change. Amath, a 34-year-old Dinka and Member of Parliament for the SPLM in Khartoum, clarified:

> It is not changing, instead I have now become very sure, I cannot say the problem is the society of northern Sudan. The problem also is the institutions of the government, which are dominated by the northerners, ok. So now it is like, it is an organised domination, it is not just happening like that. No, it is something very organised. And before, I was not in parliament, so I thought that this domination they can give up, they can give up any time. But now I am feeling they are not ready at all to give up this domination. They mean it! It was intended actually, everything that happened all this years, it was not just a matter of we are majority. They mean it! Now it doesn't change, instead it proves

> what was in my mind. Because I am now getting closer to those political parties from the North or these political people from the North and I see, I am hearing their views really.

Amath's evaluation indicates that discrimination has been institutionalised and herewith been fixed. She does not expect any changes anymore. As a result, research participants do not feel accepted as citizens of Sudan. The system is not accessible to them; instead marginalisation is institutionalised and systematic.

2.2.3 Political exclusion

The research group feels like it is denied participation in the political process. Political exclusion refers to a lack of representation and as long as no southern Sudanese has ever been elected president of the country, research participants do not feel like full citizens of Sudan. As a matter of fact, many interview partners expressed that if a southern Sudanese would become president, they might opt for unity instead of independence. At the same time, however, they considered the idea of the inauguration of a southern Sudanese as president merely utopian. It is believed that neither northern Sudanese would vote for a southern Sudanese, nor would any incumbent regime ever allow it to happen. On 6th of August 2008, Alfred Taban wrote in his column "Let us Speak out" that "the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) has used money, political manipulation, phobia of Southerners (they are kuffars, friends of Israel who hate Arabs and Moslems and the sort) to deprive legitimacy from any contestant."[868] In April 2010, al-Bashir was confirmed in his presidency. Naturally, southern Sudanese do not feel any kind of affiliation to a government which holds racist concepts against them and condemns them to a clear status of inferiority. For many years, the only serious party representing them, the SPLM, was the main enemy of the government against which it fought a fierce war. Sudan being led as an Islamic Republic automatically excludes anyone who is not a Muslim from political power.

Following the signature of the CPA, quotas have been introduced with the aim of bringing southern Sudanese into the ministries and today the SPLM is placing its own southern members. Yet, the situation is not perceived to have changed significantly. Rather, interview partners keep

[868] Taban (06.08.2008), p. 2

on complaining about southerners being given minor positions with little influence and responsibility. At the same time, the SPLM is not considered to be on an equal footing with the NCP. MP Amath confirms the truism that even after the CPA power is not shared equally at all. When asked, if the SPLM was an equal partner to the NCP, she exclaimed:

> No! No! Not an equal partner at all. There is a suppression, no progress at all. And we have problem with them from time to time because of this. Because they don't consider us as equal partner. And they behave as if they were before, like just the ones who make the decisions. That is the core of our problem, it is difficult. So now they are not trying to accept you as a SPLM to change the laws, issues of security, all this things and also no real power sharing. We have ministers, but they are not even empowered. So if they come to the power, they change even the civil administration, they just put their people there, so they are not neutral. So as a minister you cannot get the right information and then you cannot exercise your power. And we cannot agree with them. We try! But they don't agree with us. Or you vote and then you say you do it, but they never do. We are not equal partners and we are not even partners. It is just a structure.

With southern Sudanese being excluded from the decision-making process, there is little hope for overall change. Consecutive governments have proved that they are not prepared to accept southern Sudanese as their citizens and that they are not willing to share any serious power with them. Accordingly, the great majority of research participants has no hope for change at all and strongly aspires to separation from the central government and to form a state of their own, which finally acknowledges them as full members.

2.2.4 The imposition of culture and religion

The government of Sudan has never been religiously or culturally neutral, neither has it ever intended to be so. On the contrary, it has vigorously tried to impose its own ideas of Islam on the people of Sudan and persecuted those of different beliefs. The harsh Islamisation and Arabisation campaigns carried out by the government have already been discussed in detail. Here, impacts on research participants are surveyed.

In fact, southern Sudanese feel neglected by the state, which does not consider their religious and cultural contexts and, instead, declared them to be against the law. The Arab culture, on the contrary, is all-pervasive and dictates daily life. A good example of the all-pervasiveness and

imposition of the Arab culture is the fasting month of Ramadan, in which restaurants have to remain closed during the fasting hours (from sunrise until sunset). Research participants feel highly disturbed by the fact that they are prevented from continuing normally with their lives in spite of not fasting. Reunions of people eating together, as for example on church compounds, have been shut down by the police and everybody who is not fasting faces a great number of inconveniences. Alfred Taban, editor-in-chief of the Khartoum Monitor, elucidated in a personal interview:

> We are suffering from Ramadan. Lately for us, we made a restaurant downstairs [on the compound of the Khartoum Monitor], all the Muslims and Christians around here in the area are coming here, because that is the one way, the one way they can survive. There was a case in Port Sudan, where a church had a restaurant like ours here and they came and poured down things. How can you coexist peacefully with somebody who pours down food? Even if it is their Ramadan, nobody went and forced a Muslim, say come and eat, nobody. But if you want to come and eat, that is it, if not, you don't. But that is not how they look at it and I thought this cannot bring about peaceful coexistence. This cannot bring about unity, as I wrote in my article, because politicians and so always want to gloss over differences. Our differences are there, there is no need to gloss them over. I tell you, we cannot live together, no way, no way!

The research periods included the months of Ramadan of 2008 and 2009, which clearly reinforced resentment on lack of tolerance and lack of change through the CPA.

As has been pointed out in chapter IV 3.1, a government which chooses one culture or religion to define the national identity and state structure, automatically excludes all those citizens who cannot comply with this particular identity. This applies for the language, the structuring of the working days, the selection of holidays and in the extreme case of Sudan even all private spheres of life, such as which cloth one wears, where and how one lives, where and when one eats and prays.

Christians and corresponding institutions face many obstacles in Khartoum and their needs are not nearly as assisted and advanced as those of Muslims and their corresponding institutions. On 24th of March 2008, the Sudan Tribune wrote about the discrimination of Christians: "Clerics say government schools ban Bible study, employers grant fewer holidays to Christians, and gatekeepers at Khartoum University and family parks refuse entry to non-veiled women. There are restrictions on

building new churches. Sharia law favours Muslims in inheritance and bans alcohol. Clerics say women can be stopped for what the authorities consider inappropriate dress."[869] After the signature of the CPA, southern Sudanese working for the government gained the right to come in late on Sundays, as to allow them attending mass on Sundays. Yet, the majority of southern Sudanese works for private businesses and has to subordinate to Sunday being an official working day.

Religious rules are particularly harsh on women. Salam and de Waal (2001) complain that "[n]ever before in the history of the Sudan have women's rights been so flagrantly violated and have women been so intimidated. Religion has been so falsely and oppressively used to confiscate the right of women in dress, mixing with men, travel, self-employment and other aspects of normal social life."[870] Apparently, Sudanese women are forced to obey extraordinarily strict laws in comparison to men and southern Sudanese women have to obey many laws which are not part of their culture or religion. Until the CPA, for example, it was a requirement for females to veil themselves when entering into universities. Access to education, hereby, was presupposed by obedience to the Muslim dress code. Remarkably, as will be seen further down (cf. VI 5), female interview partners by trend are, nonetheless, better integrated into northern society and fit in more easily than male interview partners.

Again, it can be noted that ethnicity or race are not the only categories, which can confine one's rights. Yet, focusing on gender, leads to the exclusion of other important factors, such as for example political or sexual orientation.[871] Muslims, who have differing interpretations of Islam and desire to behave divergent from the majority society, are not given that freedom either. Apparently, and as has been noted while analysing *the cultural/religious gap* (cf. VI 2.1.1), actions are taken against all dissenters from the system and its specific interpretation of Islam; oppression is not limited to southern Sudanese or women. The thickness of the official national identity, which comprehensively organises social life in Sudan (cf. II 2.2) is cause for great frustration and

[869] Sudan Tribune (24.03.2008)
[870] Salam and de Waal (2001), p. XXII (foreword by Amin Mekki Medani)
[871] Being governed by Shari'a law, homosexuality is illegal in Sudan. The president of the South has also made clear that in an independent South homosexuality will not be tolerated. In fact, homosexuality is a taboo in Africa and many African states have legislated laws to make it a crime. Cf. BBC (04.08.2010); cf. Sudan Tribune (31.07.2010)

strong sentiments of exclusion by those who do not fit into it. The state demands an extremely high degree of conformity from all its people. Alfred Taban wrote about this problem in the same article cited above:

> When the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) called for a secular and democratic Sudan, it was in order to address some of these issues. Due to lack of freedom, Northern Sudan has lost most of its local languages and traditions. This is because it is only Arabic and a little English that is taught in schools and Islam is the state religion. In the radio, television and other media you see and hear Arabic. You do not hear other languages. You do not hear about other religions except Islam. There is no choice. […] This is the tragedy of Sudan; lack of choice. The law should not be the one to decide the fate of a culture. It should be the people. The media should be like a market place that avails all products and goods to everyone. It is each and every person to make his or her choice. The various languages, ways of dances etc should have a slot on the national radio and television. It is up to individuals to identify with them. All religions should have space and it is the individual to decide without any coercion.[872]

He suggests that freedom of choice "would make a stable Sudan" and that if "anyone feels that his or her religion, culture and way of life are respected" he or she also "feels that his or her way of life is part of the society" and accordingly "[p]eace and stability will prevail. Otherwise you cannot avoid separatist tendencies."[873]

The CPA has not brought about any serious changes and Alfred Taban in an interview expressed that due to the lack of transformation people were still not growing any closer.[874] Although southern Sudanese are given more freedom, the government does nothing to enable them to maintain their own culture and religion. Islam clearly defines the national identity and draws a sharp boundary between citizens and non-citizens. Consequently, interview partners, who all stress that they are Africans and cannot be changed into being "Arabs," can never be full members of the society as it is defined at the moment.

2.2.5 Conclusion

The wedge between the research group and the government is as deep, if not deeper, as the gap between the research group and the majority society. The distrust towards the government, in fact, forms part of *the distrust towards all that is Arab* and is bottomless. Research participants do not only complain about persecutions condoned and tolerated by the

[872] Taban (20.09.2008), p. 2
[873] Taban (20.09.2008), p. 2
[874] personal interview with Alfred Taban in Khartoum (autumn 2008)

Sudanese state, but also about state sponsored persecution. The state is clearly unwilling to offer protection to parts of its society. Research participants do not expect any fair-minded change of the northern regime. It is strongly believed that the only reason why the government concluded the CPA was its disability to win the war by force. If it was not for the military power of the SPLA, the NCP would still be killing people in the South, so the general belief.

The ruling party being perceived as made up of “Arabs” and a few “corrupted Africans”, makes the regime completely untrustworthy to interview partners. In fact, they have nothing but negative associations with the government, such as war, exclusion, mistreatment, terror and abuse. A serious indication for the prevailing fear of the government and its security agency is that several interview partners expressed concerns, the regime could find out about the things they told in the interviews. They carefully investigated who the researcher was and what the data would be used for. In the end, often they came back to emphasising their unease, such as Jonas for example, who ended the interview stating “After this, they will be killing me!” or Betty who finished saying “Well, I hope you don’t write something and then they will come and arrest me or something.”

All interview partners, including those who were born and brought up in Khartoum, feel like strangers, like somebody who is not part of the society. The government is considered the enemy, with whom they are still in a cold war. The war is constantly fought against them and, other than military conflict in the South, has still not come to a halt. Yousif, a 46-year-old Kuku, remembers how southern Sudanese who came to Khartoum after the end of the war got surprised by his quick aging. He recalled:

> This people, when they came from bush, they were surprised to see us. They say we in the bush, our hair is black and you who stayed in the town here, drinking this, this, this cold drinks, eating good food, staying in good place. I say: My friend, there in the bush it is known that you are a fighter with the gun, you are known as a soldier, you are fighting a target. But here in the North, we have a cold war here, which is more dangerous, more painful than yours. Because you are staying and somebody is fighting against you indirectly. Then they realise this is what we face here, this is why you have seen us like this, you see.

Yousif's statement highlights the degree of exclusion that interview partners feel. As has been noted before (cf. VI 1), descriptions of life In Khartoum as war, also have to be understood as a way of rejecting common attitudes among southern Sudanese in the South that by coming to the North they had chosen an easy exit instead of contributing to the civil war being fought in the South. Access to resources in the South often depends on the participation in the war. Yousif, for example, is highly concerned that he will be excluded and discriminated for having come to the North. Therefore, he emphasises that he, too, has fought a war in Khartoum and that he, too, contributed to the victory – especially by sending money to the SPLA.

Some interview partners who have come to the North at an early age or were born there are clearly contradicting this position and emphasise that it was beneficial for them to flee to the North. Maria, a 39-year-old Balanda from Wau, came to Khartoum at the age of 17. She feels:

> For me, the life at that time in Khartoum was better from my place. I came from war especially. Because at that time, no education and there was a civil war in that time, no security there and for me, at that time, I prefer to stay in Khartoum.

In the context of nation-building and distribution of resources in the South, some interview partners, apparently, feel that it is important to highlight the disadvantages of life in Khartoum rather than its advantages. In general, the exclusion felt by interview partners leads to them not feeling as part of the state. Luka, a 42-year old Bari proper, for example, explained his feelings of loyalty as follows:

> I am a southerner. And we are really proud to be called southerners. We want ourselves to be identified as southerners. I don't feel that I am a Sudanese. I don't support the Sudanese team, if they play, I don't support. I will never sing the national anthem, completely never I will sing it. I will never raise a Sudanese flag. I am a southerner, I have nothing with this nation, I have nothing with it. What does it mean to me? There is nothing that we have in common, except what we call Sudan, the big Sudan. But it doesn't mean anything to me, the big Sudan. […] There is always segregation, always segregation. Segregation at your place of work, segregation at the school, segregation in the area, everywhere. So there is always a force that keeps the black people down. Always!

The majority of research participants clearly share Luka's perception. Considering definitions discussed in chapter III 3, it can therefore be concluded that the majority of them hold a strong feeling of what Connor (1998) calls nationalism – meaning the emotional attachment to one's

own people, one's ethno national group[875] – but no patriotism. Patriotism in Sudan – meaning the emotional attachment to one's state or country and its political institutions[876] – and southern nationalism have been constructed to be irreconcilable. Being forced to choose between the two loyalties, interview partners clearly opt for nationalism and do not hold any feeling of patriotism; they lack emotional attachment to Sudan as their state.

However, some interview partners also contradict this position, as for example Jonas. Jonas is a 61-year-old Adio, who has always tried to emotionally attach himself to the wider Sudanese society. He has deliberately chosen to live in Sudan, although his job as a pilot would have allowed him to work in many other countries. Of his seven children six were born in Khartoum and most of them have never been to the South until today. Jonas feels emotionally attached to the Sudan as a whole, yet, he also feels like being denied the desired affiliation. He explained:

> Now I feel that, emotionally, when I speak emotionally to you, this is what I am thinking about, deep in my heart, I believe that I am a Sudanese. Like in the family, if the husband is always mistreating the wife, the wife says, you are not my husband. And the fact is, he is the husband. But because of the mistreatment, no, if you were my husband, you would have done better. I am a Sudanese, but I am not treated like a Sudanese. This is the difference. I am not treated as a Sudanese. No equality. So, there is no person from southern Sudan owning a business here. All this trucks you see, the big trucks of business, all by northerners. There is not even a single hotel owned by southerners. Restaurants, what what, call it, any business, it is all owned by the northerners. Is it because we don't have the mentality? Yes, we have the mentality! But maybe I am not treated as equal, you apply, you don't get the money. Then they are using, as I said before, they are using Islam to fight us. Because I am not a Muslim, forget about it. Taxis, the transportation you see, means of transport, all belong to the northerners. That is why I told you, they are using us for the source of man power, to provide the manpower, to build the houses, the streets, what ever. So if the South separates, I don't know, they will have to bring people far from the East [starts laughing]. This is what I am talking about, we believe that we are Sudanese, but we are not treated as we are Sudanese. This is a big problem. That is the big problem. Administration in the government, even those southerners, the few southerners who are in the government here in the North, they don't take them seriously. As I said, agreement after agreement, they were

[875] cf. Connor (1998), p. 41 ff.
[876] cf. Connor (1998), p. 41 ff.

> canceled. Agreements abrogated. For how long? So, the time has come now for the South to decide what happens.

Apparently, Jonas holds sentiments of nationalism for the Sudan as a whole. The government rejecting southern Sudanese as citizens of the country causes him deep agony. Jonas has come to the North with the idea that the entire Sudan was his country. After having been a refugee in Uganda during the first civil war, he has deliberately chosen not to leave the country anymore. Luka, on the contrary, same as the majority of research participants, perceives his stay as involuntarily and does not identify with the idea of one Sudan. He spends a lot of time in the South and is preparing his return. Jonas, on the contrary, has no immediate plan of return, since his children have been brought up in the North and are not willing to go to the South.

Luka's as well as Jonas's statement indicates that the official policy of the government towards southern Sudanese is extremely hostile to social integration and directly affects relations between the research group and the majority society. Instead of advocating the consolidation of the various groups of the country, the government treats southern Sudanese and other marginalised people as if they were not part of the state, herewith, denying large parts of its people their citizenship. Jonas, for example, believes that the government is the most important reason for the existence of the social chasm.

Institutionalised exclusion clearly conditions social interaction. In the analysis it has become clear that with the ongoing fundamentalisation of the government, the ordinary people have changed, too. Religion has been made a separating factor; it has not always been one. Most importantly, the government with its policies sends out wrong signals to the society. It reinforces the boundary between the superior and inferior and gives the superior, who are backed-up by the system, extreme power over the inferior and unprotected people. That is the reason, why denigrations by intolerant neighbours, for example, have been highly feared. If they had not been backed up by the police, denunciations had not made any sense and most likely would have ceased to exist. Like this, government policies fuel social segregation and clearly reinforce *the gap*.

3 The identity of following generations and the fear of an inferiority complex of the children

Khartoum is considered to be an extremely hostile environment to southern Sudanese and parents worry about consequences on their children and that they might develop an *inferiority complex*. The majority of the research group itself, in fact, finds pride in their southern identity. They are seriously upset about negative consequences of racism and certainly feel profoundly offended and sometimes hurt by the discrimination that they meet in northern Sudanese society. As has been explained in chapter III 1.6, stereotypes can produce self-images. Yet, the stereotypes interview partners are confronted with do not affect them to an extent that would change their self-image. The "Dictionary of Race, Ethnicity and Culture" writes that ethnic minorities "may have a strong perception of their identity which does not correspond to that ascribed to them by the surrounding majority."[877] Interview partners not only maintained a positive self-image, but also formulated their own stereotypes against the "Arabs", often finding their own culture superior to the Arab culture. The research group herewith does not only reject ascriptions, but also asserts their own understandings to racial categories.

Nevertheless, the value attached to the identity assigned to them is part of their social world and what others say that they are; it is part of the environment they have to deal with. Racism and the vertical appearance of ethnicity have serious effects on all spheres of their lives. Although interview partners have found their own ways of dealing with this reality, they are still seriously worried about effects on their children's identities. There is a big fear, southern Sudanese children could absorb racial attitudes and have their self-images changed; interview partners are afraid of what has been called inferiority complex in chapter III 1.6.

As a consequence, all parents who have children at school age, without exception, send them to private, mostly Christian, schools. Although, at these schools they also often study together with northern Sudanese children, at least the system is neutral and southern Sudanese children are more protected. Some interview partners have sent their children to public schools before, particularly when it was difficult for them to meet

[877] Bolaffi et al. (2003), p. 92

the higher fees of private schools. Yet, all of them have had bad experience and felt compelled to pull their children out again, often with the children losing an entire school year. Luka, a 42-year-old Bari proper, has deliberately enrolled his son in a prestigious northern school. Luka holds a high position in a northern company and his considerable wealth allows him to choose freely to which schools his children should go. Assuming that it would be good for his son's integration and forthcoming and with the intention of having him learn proper Arabic, Luka selected an excellent "Arab" school in Omdurman. Already at the beginning there were some disturbances, which Luka was not happy about until eventually his son refused to go to school at all. He recalled:

> Then, one day, the boy was just five years old, he really refused to go to the school. So we had to talk to him. He said that the driver saw a monkey standing around on the side of the road and he said to my son, oh see, your brother is there. From that day on, I had to stop him to go to that school. So I waited, we had to lose one year, then I had to bring him to Komboni school, he is there at St. Francis.

Luka's experience is by far no isolated case. Various parents have pulled their children out of schools because of discriminative behaviour, most of the times by teachers or other students and their parents. Quite some parents go as far as completely preventing their children from associating with northern children. When I asked Yousif, a 46-year-old Kuku and Muslim whose children perfectly speak "Khartoum Arabic", whether they were playing with "Arab" children in the neighbourhood he exclaimed:

> Ooooh, I don't allow them, I prevent them. Even they don't like to go with this, with the Arab children, because sometimes they used to insult them, you are slaves, so our children used to beat them. Sometimes they argued, when they were playing and someone makes a mistake, then somebody will start insult them. Abdt, what have you done, this abdt, they call you slave. Even this boy [his eldest son of 19 years], he goes with my own people. I don't allow them to go with the Arab boys. I say, if you want to play, I have relatives in Kalakala, the ones from my cousin brother. And we have our people from our area, from Kajo Keji near there. I say, these are your people. But the Arabs, you can play football with them, you can play football, if you are a footballer. If you meet them, let it just be there, don't make friends, this is what I am saying, because their habit is different from ours. And they are not actually recognising us, in a situation of saying we are the same and so forth.

Maria, a 39-year-old Balanda, regrets:

> You see, I think because those Arabs, in their homes, they used to tell something bad to their children. That those southerners, they are not good people, they are Christians. They are Christians, don't play with them. For the child, four years or five years, he grows up with that mentality. Even now, for my son now, he used to say I don't like those Arabs, because even we are playing with them, he says that you are a kaffir, because you are not a Muslim, they call you a kaffir. They call you a slave and so on. And in case of any quarrel, you are always the guilty one, because you are southern.

Yousif's and Maria's statements highlight that parents feel a strong need to keep their children apart from the majority society of Khartoum; they fear their way of looking down on them could influence their children's self-images. In fact, they are worried about the entire environment, which does not present them or their culture as of equal value. One common complain for example is that southern Sudanese do not appear in the Sudanese media and that children might take that as an indication for their inferiority. Instead, the media – in particular the TV – show Muslims and the Arab culture as standard, from which southern Sudanese apparently diverge.

In order to prevent common labels sticking to their children, interview partners prefer to keep them as separated as possible. Otherwise, it is believed, they will gradually come to adapt the negative images held by the society around them. Young northern Sudanese children are said to already have adapted the attitudes of their parents. Therefore, the majority of interview partners' children are not allowed to play with northern Sudanese children (and vice-versa). Many interview partners recall bad experiences their children have had playing with northern Sudanese children and how they, as a consequence, started to avoid them. The segregation is, in fact, passed on from one generation to the next and boundaries are clearly being reinforced. Focusing on the identity of their children is also a way of justifying separation. After all, as of the writing of this paper, the future of southern Sudanese children can better be secured in the North and all interview partners, without exception, agree that going back to the South, in fact, means putting their children's future at jeopardy. As with many other things, interview partners face the dilemma that the South often is not a viable solution to their problems in the North. At the same time they lack any other alternative but the two parts of the country.

3.1 Conclusion

As a consequence of *the war of the mind*, interview partners fear that their children could develop an inferiority complex and therefore often keep them apart from the majority society. In chapter VI 4.1.2, it will be seen that the degree to which parents prevent contact to the majority society varies, yet, no one permits interaction unconditionally. Not a single interview partner's child attends a public school. Only some of the youngest are send to public nurseries, do to the lack of alternatives. Many interview partners have told extended and detailed stories of how their children have been mistreated and disadvantaged in all types of schools. Next to direct negative experiences with northern Sudanese adults and children, and institutions, it is particularly the lack of representation in the media, which makes parents worry that their children could come to look at themselves and their culture as inferior. With the young generations already being kept apart from each other, the gap is being reinforced and stereotypes and distrust are being passed on from one generation to the next.

4 Strategies to master the war of the mind

The situation in Khartoum has been identified as hostile to southern Sudanese. Relations between the research group and the majority society as well as between the research group and the regime have been elaborated into the category *the war of the mind*. Although, at the time of the meetings, the peace treaty had long been concluded, interview partners considered their stays in Khartoum as involuntary. They continued living in Khartoum, primarily, due to the lack of any viable alternative; the South was considered to be still too underdeveloped for them to go back. To master the extraordinary situation in Khartoum various strategies were being applied.

A mastering strategy refers to a purposeful, goal-oriented strategic activity, which interview partners perform in response to ahead described realities they are exposed to in Khartoum. A mastering strategy serves as a means to deal with the constituent aspects of *the war of the mind*. Mastering strategies can be divided into two main groups. The first aim at reducing exposure to the *war of the mind,* the second are applied to deal with it. Escaping the attacks of the regime, naturally, is more complicated than withdrawing from society. However,

good relations particularly with neighbours can also be crucial in protecting oneself, for example, during outbreaks of violence such as on Black Monday. In the end it depends on individual attributes to which extent interview partners rely on reducing or coping strategies, a fact which will be discussed in detail in chapter VI 5, when talking about different types of *second-class citizens*.

4.1 Strategies to reduce exposure to the war of the mind

Because the environment in Khartoum is perceived as hostile to southern Sudanese, all interview partners try to reduce their own exposure and the exposure of their children to *the war of the mind*. How far one reduces exposure to the majority society, however, varies and depends on personal attributes and individual living situations. Reducing strategies are combined with in chapter VI 4.2 discussed coping strategies; in this way interview partners try to handle the war of the mind the best way they can.

4.1.1 Reducing exposure to the necessary minimum

The degree to which research participants expose themselves to the *war of the mind* strongly varies. Living in Khartoum apparently means not being able to escape it completely. All interview partners in one way or the other try to *reduce exposure to the minimum extent necessary*; yet, what is perceived as necessary varies from individual to individual. Factors, which determine the degree of engagement with the environment, will be discussed in chapter VI 5. At one end of the scale, we can find those who withdraw from society completely. They *play a low profile*, intending to attract as little attention as possible. On the other end of the scale, we can find those, who desire social integration and who try to enter into quasi-voluntary relations with the majority society. Within between are those, who do not voluntarily entertain relations but out of pragmatism.

Of course, the actual level of exposure does not only depend on choices, but also on circumstances. Interview partners have selected different careers and not all are able to sustain their families with jobs aside of the northern system. Those who work in northern companies automatically have a high degree of exposure, yet they vary in the extent to which they try to reduce it. Same applies for other environments, such

as universities or neighbourhoods. Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper, who lives in a northern neighbourhood in Khartoum (urban district), during an interview at his house put it clearly:

> Me as an individual, I meet them, of course. For my own interest! For instance, now here in this area, all are Arabs. None of the southerners are here. Now this one is an Arab, this one is an Arab, an Arab this one, I am surrounded by Arabs. So I have no choice, I have to maintain good relationships with them, you see.

Also, it has to be kept in mind that interview partners have deliberately been selected according to their exposure to the majority society and were required to have at least one significant environment of contact. Other than southern Sudanese who stay and work in camps and squatter areas, living in the centre means that interview partners automatically have a certain degree of exposure. Yet, it is astonishing how some manage to avoid interaction with the majority society almost completely. Yuga, a 41-year-old Kakwa, for example, chooses not to interact with the majority society, if it is not completely necessary. He works in a southern NGO and does not interact with his neighbours, he recruits all his friends from the southern Sudanese community; he refuses to speak “Khartoum Arabic” and maintains his children separated from the majority society. Yuga and other interview partners almost completely rely on reducing strategies and therefore hardly need to apply coping strategies, as exposure to the majority society is extremely low.

4.1.2 Reducing exposure of the children

A further strategy, which has already been started to be discussed above when talking about the fear of an *inferiority complex of the children*, is the *reduction of the exposure of children*. Children are still in the process of developing their personalities and parents fear that they could adapt their identities according to projections of their environment and develop an inferiority complex. Furthermore, some parents are worried that their children could embrace certain aspects of the northern culture. With keeping children separate, they also intend to *avoid the loss of being southern* of their children.

The loss of being southern is a desire of interview partners not to get absorbed into northern society, but to clearly maintain their southern Sudanese identity. Not one research participant is willing to give up on

his or her southern culture. Yet, some are more willing to adapt to the northern society than others and these varying perceptions are transmitted to the children. All parents put certain limits to their children's interaction with northern Sudanese. Although the majority is quite strict and prevents interaction to the most possible extent, others rather carefully select playmates and have their children also decide what they want. Consistency of separation varies from individual to individual. Furthermore, while some parents find it natural to pass their own negative stereotypes against the majority society on to their children (same as the majority society is said to do), others try to raise their children in a neutral manner and not to transmit their sentiments to the next generation.

Parents, who fear that their children could lose their own southern identity and embrace northern behaviours, especially insist in keeping them apart. Those who are more relaxed on the issue usually are less strict in the application of reducing strategies for them. An example is used to demonstrate how perceptions of the same situation can differ: children, who are still too young to go to (private) schools, are often taken to (public) nurseries in the neighbourhood, if mothers are working during the day. Interview partners who live right inside the inner city usually do not have any family members living nearby and therefore have to rely on the northern system. As the nurseries are public, Islam is taught as a principal subject while Christianity is not part of the curriculum.

Maria is a 39-year-old Balanda who lives in Khartoum (urban district). She works for a NGO and sends her youngest daughter to a nursery in the neighbourhood. In an interview she expressed great discontent about her daughter singing the Qur'an at home. She seriously regrets not having any other alternative and anxiously awaits the day when her daughter can join a Christian school.

Allison is a 29-year-old Madi who also works for a NGO. Consequently, her daughter, too, goes to a nursery in their neighbourhood in Khartoum (urban district). In an interview she explained that her children's identities were made up to one third of Madi, one third of Bari (her husband's tribe) and one third of "Arab". She also spoke about her daughter singing the Qur'an, however without hard feelings. During a

dinner at Allison's house, her daughter did indeed start singing the Qur'an causing Allison great amusement.

Allison came to Khartoum when she was nine years old and never went back to the South since. She has adapted to the northern society, and although she cannot fully trust an "Arab", she has become "used" to them, as she says. She accepts the hybrid identities of her children as something natural and is not worried about them adapting to certain aspects of northern society, such as their food habits or language. Maria came to Khartoum when she was 17 years old. She wishes to integrate into society but at the same time struggles from a serious identity conflict. She is an active Christian and deeply regrets having to cloak her true identity in order to engage with the majority society. Her daughter singing the Qur'an reflects her own conflict and causes her unease. She does not want her children to adapt to the northern culture or to embrace the slightest element of Islam. Thus, she puts stricter rules for her children than Allison. She has her children eat southern food and tries to prevent them from playing with northern neighbours. These examples demonstrate how individual perceptions directly influence the way parents raise their children and the way how they regulate their contact to the majority society.

Interview partners' fear of adaptation does not only attend to religion, but also to attitudes and lifestyle. This becomes particularly clear when analysing Yousif's attitudes, which have also been cited above. Although he is a Muslim by birth, he radically prevents his children from interacting with "Arabs" out of worry they could adapt to the Arab culture. He explained that "Arab" children have very bad influence on southern children and are bad company. Instead, he wants his children to have their southern identity very clear and resist other influences. He explained:

> My daughters, they are still young, that is why you see that they should come to be brought up according to what? The habits of our people. They should know that they are from this area. Now if you ask them, they will say that they are from Kajo Keji, but they have not seen Kajo Keji. They have not seen Kajo Keji, but we have to teach them, that our area is Kajo Keji. We are just here in Khartoum conditionally, because of the education. Because you need to have an education. But you are from the South and from Kajo Keji. You are a Kuku by tribe. There is a tribe called Kuku. This is your home, not the other.

The majority society sees its own culture as standard. Furthermore, it has been established as the national identity by the regime. Although having a positive self-definition, parents need to protect their children from negative external-definitions. The dominant group uses its power to impose social definitions on the subordinated minority group of southern Sudanese against which children have to be guarded. At the same time, as Yousif's statement also shows, many interview partners, in fact, remain in Khartoum exactly because of the children. In chapter VI 4.3, it will be seen that going back to the South is understood to put the children's future at jeopardy due to underdevelopment and lack of education, creating them a great dilemma.

4.1.3 Living in alternative communities and relying on alternative social networks

Interview participants, who spend the grand majority of their free time in a southern environment and obtain here their social approval and self-realisation, are considered to *live in an alternative community*. The two most relevant alternative communities in Khartoum are the ethnic associations and the church. The lack of governmental or cooperative protection brings forward the formation of alternative communities, in which social and institutional exclusion are tried to be counterbalanced. *Living in an alternative community* is not exactly a reducing strategy; rather it is a strategy of compensating the lack of integration into the majority society and an alternative means of accomplishing ones objectives. The necessary interaction with the majority society, hereby, can clearly be reduced and missing access to northern social networks can be substituted through southern social networks. The extent to which research participants enter into alternative communities strongly depends on their individual needs and the objectives they want to meet. All of them spend time in alternative communities, yet, some only occasionally and when necessary, others deliberately and with clear purposes. Only the latter are considered to be *living in an alternative community.*

In Khartoum, ethnic associations of basically every southern ethnic group exist. Every southern Sudanese automatically is a member of his corresponding ethnic community. These ethnic communities, as research participants call them, fall into what Pratten (1996) named

migrant associations, a term that refers to “a form of community-based organisation established by urban migrant groups who share a common rural identity, provide welfare support to members in the city and channel resources to a rural home.”[878] Women are usually a member of their own ethnic community, as well as of the ethnic community of their husbands. The ethnic communities are an important meeting point, sometimes with their own premises. Here, culture can be collectively practised and be passed on to the children. As Pratten (1996) explains, migrant associations “act as agents of cultural defence in urban environments. Ethnic and religious identities are important factors in the political cleavages which divide Sudanese society. Community boundaries are most sharply defined in the city, however, and migrant associations help both to preserve rural traditions and to reconstruct ethnic identities.”[879] In fact, the migratory process enhances the sense of solidarity among those who migrate.[880]

In the ethnic communities people can, to a certain extent, compensate the lack of integration into the majority society. Here, local traditions can be practised together and Christian holidays – such as Easter and Christmas – can be celebrated in a familiar environment. Furthermore, they are social networks in which people help each other and develop together in the community. If a member is ill or in need of assistance, the community steps in, provides support or even gathers money. Often communities give scholarships to students or provide them with accommodation.

In their communities members can feel free, speak their language, express their thoughts and practise their culture. Those who have political ambitions, who want to be part of the political process and to express their political opinion, can do so in the ethnic communities. In the communities, collective opinions are made and presented through the executive committee. Herewith, the communities are not only cultural groups and social networks, but also pressure groups. Especially during the war, ethnic communities were crucial in protecting their members. In the group individuals can watch out for each other and important information can be transferred without attracting much attention. Communities protect. In the example of the imprisonment of Joshua,

[878] Pratten (1996), p. 17
[879] Pratten (1996), p. 67
[880] cf. Gonzales (1989), p. 4

Jason and Vincent, it was a community delegate who went back to the police station to clarify the situation.

Another important alternative community, in which interview partners live, is the church. Churches in Khartoum are not only places to hold services; usually they also run hospitals or kindergartens and schools and facilitate many activities. Often they also operate a small restaurant on the church ground. At the church meetings take place, people organise themselves in interest groups, practise their local language, give classes, sing in the choir, make role plays, etc. Same as the ethnic communities, churches provide a space where research participants can feel free, behave authentically and practise their culture and religion. Furthermore, it allows interview partners to escape the pressure of having to take ethnic positions; instead of defining themselves through their ethnic belonging they can plead being Christian.

In Khartoum in general and in environments like the church in particular, symbols of ethnicity, such as language or linguistic style, dress styles, dietary preferences and religious behaviour serve as reminders of their origins and bind people together, even if they were not shared in the South before.[881] Hereby, a southern identity is created, which in the South itself does not exist like that. In dissociation with the northern Sudanese, a collective southern identity is being formed up. However, this shared identity is being contested by the ethnic communities, which reinforce boundaries between the distinct southern Sudanese groups. In the context of nation-building in the South, ethnic affiliations gain importance and a clear positioning is required, at least from anyone who has aspirations in the South. It becomes clear that the environment provided by churches allows members to take distance from an ethnic positioning, while the ethnic communities on the contrary, make them a prerequisite and reinforce them.

Any of the alternative environments create and reinforce boundaries between the research group and the majority society, since the alternative communities are closed to non-southerners, “the others”. *Living in an alternative community* is a way of shielding oneself from the hostile environment; here interview partners are full members of equal status and can, at least temporarily, escape *the war of the mind*.

[881] cf. Gonzales (1989), p. 4

Alternative communities are spaces of freedom, where racial concepts are meaningless and below described coping strategies become irrelevant.

How deeply individuals get involved into alternative communities differs strongly and does not depend on their degree of integration into northern society. As indicated above, it rather reflects their personal need of being part of a community, the objectives they want to accomplish and the positioning they want to take. Some research participants spend almost all their spare time in an alternative community, while others only do so occasionally or when it is required. During the war, political activism and religiousness could not be practised openly. Naturally, southerners with respective ambitions got deeper involved into the corresponding community.

Even following the peace deal, ethnic communities and churches still remain important platforms, where research participants can express themselves freely and follow their political and religious ambitions. Ethnic communities and churches are influential and often able to provide their members with opportunities. At the same time, they are places where one can receive recognition and integrity. They are racism-free zones in Khartoum, where interview partners and their children can feel normal, in contrast to being discriminated against as inferior. They are places, where people can collectively *avoid the loss of being southerner*, meaning, where they can live their culture and habits jointly in the group and remind each other of where they are coming from.

4.2 Strategies to deal with the war of the mind

By living in Khartoum, no research participant can fully avoid being subject to *the war of the mind.* Hence, in addition to reducing strategies, all research participants apply certain action strategies to deal with the situation and to manage the interaction with the majority society.

4.2.1 Not talking politics

One of the most crucial and effective strategies in interaction with the majority society has been *not to talk politics*, meaning not to touch any conflict-ridden topics. In spite of having strong attitudes and a lot of burning issues to discuss, research participants consistently avoided

expressing their real attitudes and beliefs towards the majority society. By doing this, they assured that no one could denounce them and avoided expectable conflict. Not being able to touch a wide spectrum of fundamental topics sets the two groups apart and reinforces *the gap*. Yet, it is the only way of temporarily factoring out hard positions and make interaction possible at all.

Following the peace treaty, research participants have gained a new self-esteem and some dare to express their real attitudes, since they do not fear prosecution anymore. Michael, a 44-year-old Moru, who works in a northern company, explains:

> They try to talk politics, like you are southerners, you are not educated, you walk naked, you are slaves, some very bad words. But I used to stop them. Now they are afraid of me, because the war has stopped, because there is no war. Talking, we can talk who is the guilty!

Because only policies have changed but not attitudes, *the gap* is further widening as a consequence of this new southern self-esteem. Luka, a 42-year-old Bari proper who works for a northern company, described how relations with his colleagues have changed for the worse after he stopped using the strategy of *not talking politics*.

> You can see it. Nobody will really tell you what he or she have got, but I can see it from the way that they are with me. It is not like previous. Or because now we are speaking freely, we are speaking our heart out to them. Maybe it is one of the reasons. Because previously, before the peace, we were not speaking our own hearts out. We were not telling them who really we are, we are just here for our job. You do your job, we don't speak politics openly. We do our politics, what do you call it, hidden, in our own houses, with our own friends, those people who are closely related to you, that is the only time that you speak politics. But after the agreement we started speaking out. This could be maybe the change. And I realise it, because now, previously we were going to have our breakfast with the Arabs, usually I go with the Arabs, and I know how to go with them, I have a good relationship to some of them, we were eating together, all this. But in the last two to three years we are not eating breakfast together, I don't go.

He goes on explaining that his work is getting worse, since he is given less responsibility. This he ascribes partially to the worsening relationships and partially to the fact that both he and the employer mentally prepare for his return to the South already. *Not talking politics* used to be a very effective strategy, yet, it was applied against the own identity and another way of obedience. In situations where research

participants have no fear of losing anything, consequently, they no longer apply the strategy. The more authentic the two groups behave, the further they seem to drift apart. Hence, in some cases, relations between interview partners and the majority society have even become worse after the signature of the CPA. Interview partners, who are attending social relations on a quasi voluntary base, on the contrary, are less affected by the described changes. Not wanting to put their relations at risk, they still have a lot to lose and are, therefore, much more likeable to continue with the same strategies they used before the signature of the CPA.

4.2.2 Putting the heart at the freezer

In order to deal with the war of the mind, research participants need a high degree of endurance. They have *to put their heart at the freezer* and behave against their own personality. Who wants to accomplish something within the northern system endures; they have to keep quiet and to never show their real personality. This also means *playing the fool* from time to time and to pretend not realising the pejorative behaviour of the majority society, in order not to be forced to respond. Yousif, a 46-year-old Kuku, explained how he manages to stay inside a northern company, where he works as an accountant. He described his situation in the company as terror and recounted:

> But I am sitting, I am just putting my heart to the prison, to the freezer there. I don't become aggressive to them, I am always trying to be cool and always, if you see me there, I don't quarrel with them. I just always being silent and quiet, doing the work, the assignment which was given, I just do it. After I finish the eight hours there, then I leave. If they ask me to work over time, then I work over time. This is why I stay there, otherwise I would have left this place a long time ago, you see.

In a second interview he came back to the same point, this time also referring to his second job for a newspaper with mixed staff.

> This is my policy here, this is how we stay with this guys here: I don't show my anger to them. And if someone shows his anger, I consider him as somebody stupid, because I always say, don't be stupid like them. You be wiser than them. If they misbehave, don't also misbehave like them. You be better than them. They will go around and say walahi, this man is a good man. You are fooling them! This is how we are staying here with this guys. Even outside there, down there, the reporters, you can see, they always stay alone, they always stay separated, they don't mix with the blacks. They are alone. But if I come, I greet them all, you see. I just joke with them, but you cannot show what you

> want to do, just pretend like this, you just plan. You plan for yourself, you keep silent, keep it as a secret, you do what you are doing and then in the end you will be the successful person. That's why in the office, always when I am mistreated, I don't show my anger. I laugh with them, I share with them. When we are having contributions, somebody is sick, if we go as a group, I go with them. If my people, if somebody is sick like now one of the southerners in the company, if he is sick, he is in the hospital, they don't go. They will not go! They will say ah, this is a southerner, this is a Christian, we don't go with them. The hatred against the southerners, it is not because of the Christianity, it is because we are black, they consider us a second citizen, you see. So you have to be wise.

Yousif's statements clearly demonstrate that he well calculates and plans his interaction with the majority society. He does not act naturally or spontaneously, but strategically and for this *puts his heart to the freezer*.

Betty, a 26-year old Adio, too, describes how she *puts her heart to the freezer*, however, at university. Education is her most important objective in Khartoum and she is willing to subordinate anything else to it. She was born in Khartoum and is a very committed Christian. She speaks "Khartoum Arabic" fluently and has recently finished her studies at Khartoum University. While other students participated in Christian groups, she did not withstand the pressure and decided not to put her academic career at jeopardy in order to express her own identity. In one of the interviews she remembered:

> The thing is, the university is an academic place and I don't want to get into the religion issue at the same time. So I just separate myself and I say this is an academic issue for me and I just want to study and get my certificate and do my work. And even though sometimes between Christmas and then they were just writing bad about Christians, the unbelievers, infidels, I just, I don't go around and shout no you have to, no, I don't complain, I just leave it like that. And then I have my church, I can come to my church, I can pray, even for myself I can pray, even when I am in a bus I can pray silently.

To accomplish her goals, Betty *puts her heart at the freezer*. To compensate for the endurance, which negatively affects her, she chooses *to live in an alternative community*, the church. In another interview, she furthermore recalled how seeing her father *put his heart at the freezer* also negatively affected her. She gave an example of how she once needed him to ask a favour for her at his place of work and how it hurt her seeing him obey to colleagues in order to accomplish his objectives. Later on she realised that she was, in fact, humiliating herself

alike and giving up on her own identity in order to accomplish her objectives, same as her father had done.

> And because, because he wanted something, so he had to get it, so he had to be nice with this people. But for me I couldn't understand, what he, ah, it hurt me a long time ago, so it hurt me for many years and I talked about it, so, I, ah, and then I found myself doing the same thing at the university, you see. So, because I say, you want to get something and you know, you are not living in your community, these are not your people. So you have to act as they do, you know. When you are in Rome, act like the Romans, that is the saying. So it took me a long time to start to understand this concept, you know, this life of you have to do as this people do, because this are not your people, are not your community, you know. It just took me a while to, you know, to overcome anger and my frustration and all this stuff. So I found myself doing the same thing as my father.

Betty's statement shows how children are negatively affected by the image, which the majority society ascribes to their community. Seeing her father being treated as inferior, strongly affected her self-image, since she experienced humiliation through him. Obedience, in fact, is always considered to be negatively affecting oneself. Having to hide your own identity is considered to be humiliating. Accordingly, the majority of interview partners are only willing to do so if it is to accomplish non-social objectives, such as earning money or getting education. Only few interview partners are willing to obey social rules in order to entertain relations for social purposes.

4.2.3 Playing a low profile

Playing a low profile is a strategy which aims at drawing the least attention possible to oneself. This strategy is particularly relevant for those participants, who try to avoid exposure to the maximum degree possible. In order to deal with the unavoidable exposure that remains they try to be the most inconspicuous possible and not to draw any attention to themselves. *Playing a low profile* means, for example, rushing into the house quickly, in order to prevent encounters with the neighbours. Somebody who is *playing a low profile* will greet neighbours if necessary, but otherwise tries not to attract any attention. Yuga, a 41-year-old Kakwa, described how he *plays a low profile* as follows:

> Well, our life with them, you see, is very complicated. Is just getting into your house and moving out of your house, your business, enough. Salam Aleikum, Salam Aleikum on the street if you happen to encounter suddenly, just say Salam Aleikum. Basically there is no, let me say, interrelationship between us.

> There is no interaction at all, people live separately. But among themselves they interact. We only meet in the market. It is the only place where we can talk, because we have to.

Yuga had very bad experiences in Khartoum and does not distinguish between individuals anymore. Instead, he fears contact with any northern Sudanese and due to his complete distrust, does not even want to be noticed at all. His fear goes in line with other interview partners, who made similar experiences in Khartoum. Joshua, a 41-year-old Kakwa, came to the conclusion:

> To be a friend to an Arab, you have to bear in mind that you have to be, you have to take risk, either to be killed or to be complicated with some issues.

Perceiving any contact with the majority society as a security risk, Joshua and Yuga try to reduce exposure to the highest degree possible and prefer to remain unnoticed when ever possible.

Someone who *plays a low profile* in the sense of the category does not work in a northern company or engage in any northern institution. His/her children are not allowed to interact with northern children and he/she tries to simply stay apart, not to attract attention and not to get into trouble with the society or the police.

4.3 Return to the South

Strategies to handle *the war of the mind* are incapable of bringing about ultimate relief. They attend to the symptoms, but not to the problem and merely make the situation more bearable; they do not alter the context or change the problem at its roots. *The war of the mind* is ubiquitous and cannot be fully escaped. Accordingly, research participants aspire to *return to the South*. Yet, *returning to the South* is a highly ambivalent issue and many research participants hold serious reservations against it. This is why *return to the South* is considered a consequence not a strategy. In fact, as will become clear in the following lines, many research participants would agree to their return being involuntary, at least at the precise moment.

All interview partners express a desire to eventually go “home”. Home is embraced in quotation marks here, since for some it refers to the concept of a home, rather than a physical home. One third of the interview partners have left the South before they turned 12. One of them was born in Khartoum and others were merely three years old

when their parents brought them to the North. Betty, for example, a 26-year-old Adio, was born in Khartoum. She calls the South “home sweet home”; yet, she does not consider the South a “real country” due to the underdevelopment and cannot imagine moving there. For Betty and other research participants Khartoum is the place they are most familiar with and many of them have either never been back to the South at all or only went for a short visit following the peace treaty. Furthermore, the children of interview partners are being brought up in Khartoum. While the younger ones sometimes indirectly boycott the South, for example through rejecting the local food, some of the older ones completely say no to return.

In fact, the majority of research participants find themselves in a great dilemma; the referendum pressures them to leave the North, yet, they do not want to go to the South. Khartoum is considered to be the only place in Sudan where children can receive appropriate education. Furthermore, the South is considered to be chronically underdeveloped and lacking any kind of infrastructure such as hospitals and roads. A main argument to stay in Khartoum, hence, is the future and education of the children. Those interview partners who are considerably wealthy ponder with returning to the South while sending their children to boarding schools either in Uganda or in Kenya. However, particularly mothers are extremely reluctant about sending their children away and, instead, would prefer to continue to stay in Khartoum.

The GOSS is said to be highly corruptive and delaying development causing tremendous grief and anger among many interview partners. In 2008, the disappearance of millions of Sudanese pounds of donor funding came to light.[882] This is underscored by the majority of southern Sudanese in the South believing that the GOSS “is more self-serving than citizen-serving”.[883] So far only few research participants were able to build a house in the South and many of them do not even have a piece of land there. The majority has a plan of going to Juba instead of returning to their home villages. Those who have little resources fear having to start again from zero, without a piece of land, without a house and without a job. Jobs in the South are very limited and often distributed along ethnic lines and according to one’s role in the war.

[882] cf. Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 93
[883] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 72

Therefore, many interview partners worry about their economic situation in the South and fear being denied full access to the system.

Furthermore, although in the North discrimination against southern Sudanese prevails, for the moment in Khartoum violence is lower than in the South. Due to the long history of war, civilians have easy access to small weapons with dramatic impact on public security in the South. Moreover, alcohol consumption is high, with further negative consequences on public security. Criminality is at its rise, landmines are still a problem and the Ugandan LRA continues with its attacks throughout the South.[884]

Those research participants, who have not been back to the South for years and still cannot afford travelling there, are very uncertain on what to expect. At the same time, there is a high pressure of presently getting involved in the development of the South to avoid being accused of returning after other people have done the work. Only those interview partners who are already actively involved in happenings in the South and who are wealthy enough to travel to their homeland do not worry about their reintegration. In fact, integrating into the community in advance, and getting involved into local issues, is a strategy to prepare return. Those who are less wealthy and less connected are highly concerned about their reintegration and fear being discriminated against as jallabas, people from the North.

Male interview partners depend in their decision making mainly on the job situation. As long as they do not have full and appropriate employment, they prefer to remain in the North. At the same time, as will be seen in chapter VI 5.2, men in general are politically much clearer positioned and, therefore, more prone to comply with official southern policies, which clearly require commitment to return to the South. Those who are reluctant to return for reasons stated above clearly enter into a dilemma. In the context of nation-building in the South, they are supposed to return. Nonetheless, they are hesitative to do so, which might be punished with discrimination and exclusion in the South.

Women express not being ready to return more openly. Usually they have clear ideas of what they expect to be in place before going back, such as their own family house. By trend, women are better integrated

[884] cf. IRIN News (23.08.2010); cf. IRIN News (22.09.2009)

into the northern society and feel less obliged to comply with the official rhetoric of return (cf. VI 5.2). Also, they are more vulnerable and, hence, more likeable to fall victim to above described insecurities. IRIN News concluded on 6th October 2010 that "[i]f there is one group that faces special challenges in Southern Sudan, it is women."[885]

Those interview partners, who hold the worst perception of *the war of the mind* and are the least integrated, view return to the South as a great relief. However, even they were still found in Khartoum at the time of the research. As a matter of fact, as long as there is no positive development in the South, the upcoming issue of return for most interview partners constitutes rather a conflict than a relief. Although from an ideological perspective they wish to go home, for many the actual process of going back to the South is rather a question of lack of alternatives than a true desire to return; they do not only describe their stay in Khartoum as involuntary, but also their return to the South. Some interview partners have even tried to repatriate but came back. Jacob, for example, a 52-year-old Kuku, sold his house in Khartoum and bought a new one in Juba. Despite being wealthy, he was so dissatisfied with the overall situation in Juba that he again sold his house and returned to Khartoum. He is now planning to return shortly before the referendum.

Despite worries and fears about life in the South, the great majority considered it too dangerous to still be in Khartoum when the South separates and the SPLM leaves the North. As has been pointed out before, security and the cessation of violence against southern Sudanese in Khartoum are, above all, accredited to the presence of the SPLM. Hence, the situation is expected to get worse once the SPLM and the majority of southern Sudanese leave Khartoum. Other interview partners, on the contrary, expressed the possibility of waiting until results would be released. They have the hope that they can continue to live in Khartoum peacefully until their children have finished their studies, until they have accomplished their own goals, until the situation in the South has improved or until they have found good employment in the South.

[885] IRIN News (06.10.2010)

Important to note, decisions are taken in families and not every individual is able to behave according to his/her own will. Jonas, a 61-year-old Adio, for example, would like to return to the South. Yet, six of his seven children have been born in Khartoum and are not willing to move to the South. Two of his daughters are still going to school in Khartoum and Betty, his eldest daughter, in an interview explained that her younger sisters did not even agree to visit the South. In October 2010, she confirmed in an e-mail that the entire family planned to stay in Khartoum, even after the referendum, "leaving their fate to god". In order to remain with his family and to protect his children the best way he can, Jonas has chosen to remain with them in the North against his own preferences. Allison, as a converse example, could well imagine staying longer in Khartoum, depending on political developments. Yet, her husband Jason is determined to return before the referendum takes place and, other than Allison, wants to send their children to boarding schools outside the country. Allison will not have a choice but to return to the South with her husband irrespective of what she prefers herself.

In their decision making, research participants will definitely continue evaluating the expected situation in a post-referendum Khartoum and South and highly depend on ongoing events. As of this writing, threats to expel southern Sudanese from the North after the division of the country continue[886] and the North has so far appeared reluctant to accept any dual nationality status.[887] Furthermore, the president has announced that Shari'a will be the only source of lawmaking in the North after the secession of the South.[888] Such trends surely reinforce research participants' pressure to leave the North. Already before the official announcement of the referendum results, students and politicians complained about being treated like foreigners in the North and, therefore, spontaneously returned to the South.[889] In sum, for the majority of interview partners, the question of whether to return to the South or to stay in the North is a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea.

[886] cf. BBC News (24.08.2010); cf. IRIN (21.09.2010)
[887] cf. IRIN News (08.02.2011)
[888] cf. BBC News (19.12.2010); cf. Sudan Tribune (20.12.2010); cf. Sudan Tribune (05.02.2011)
[889] cf. Sudan Tribune (03.02.2011)

5 The different types of second-class citizens

The preceding chapters have shown that interview participants who live and work in the inner city of Khartoum, in spite of using various action strategies, have neither integrated nor built profound relations with the majority society. Especially *racism* and *the deep distrust towards all that is Arab* prevent rapprochement and make *the gap* between the two groups insurmountable. At the same time, the research group feels completely disconnected from the state and its institutions, which does not only deny them citizenship but also actively attacks them. *The war of the mind* and the long history of warfare, dishonoured agreements and marginalisation with its continuation in the present, lead to research participants feeling like the *second-class citizens* of Sudan.

Yet, *second-class citizens* are not identical. Instead, the research group is heterogeneous and four different *second-class citizens* have been elaborated in the analysis: *The outsider, the pragmatist, the disrupted* and *the adapted*. While *the outsider* and *the pragmatist* try to reduce exposure to the majority society to the highest extent possible, *the disrupted* and *the adapted* enter into association beyond mere strategic plan. In the process of analysis, gender differences ostentatiously stood out in determining membership to the different groups. While the first two types, *the outsider* and *the pragmatist*, are clearly dominated by males, the latter two, *the disrupted* and *the adapted*, are clearly dominated by females. Furthermore, the age of arrival to the North and own memories of war and mistreatment, as well as awareness of the overall situation, appeared to be of high influence. The question of how different *second-class citizens* form, will be discussed more detailed in chapter VI 5.2.

5.1 Four different types of second-class citizens

Although interview partners hold main characteristics in common, such as a constant level of anxiety, *second-class citizenship* nevertheless is a complex conception and group members are diverse. In the analysis four different types of *second-class citizens* have been developed, allowing the maximum avail of the multifaceted category. The category has been developed according to its attributes and dimensions attending to the intervening conditions and the context. With the set of categories presented in the following paragraphs, it can be anticipated how

individuals adapt their strategies if circumstances change. The changing nature of the context has been analytically incorporated and individuals have been embraced in their nature as active and strategic players.

5.1.1 The outsider

Interview partners, who were considered to be outsiders, are: Gabriel, Jacob, Joshua, Vincent and Yuga.

The outsider does not have any desire to integrate into northern society. Instead he stays aside of it to the largest degree possible, which in his case means almost completely. Within the research group, *the outsider* is unexceptionally male, justifying the use of the masculine form in this paragraph. This does not mean that women in principle could not be *outsiders*, but, as will be seen in chapter VI 5.2, they are less likely to be found among them.

The outsider has come to the North at an advanced age and usually does not know “Khartoum Arabic”; neither does he want to learn it. Typically, he can be found working in a southern Sudanese NGO and as a matter of definition, he does not work in a northern dominated environment. He has vivid memories of war and displacement and will neither forget nor forgive the past. Furthermore, he has had direct and grave experience with state-based violence, either through the police in the North or through northern soldiers in the South. The history of oppression of the South is a thorn in his heart which, together with his own experience of mistreatment by the state, has radicalised him; he longs for retaliation. His perception of *the war of the mind* is extremely high. Accordingly, reducing strategies are much more important to him than coping strategies. He avoids interaction with northern Sudanese, in particular the “Arabs”, and also does not allow his children to associate with them.

By not working in a northern environment, *the outsider* can afford almost complete reduction of exposure. To manage the unavoidable rest-exposure to the majority society, which automatically comes along with living in Khartoum, he *plays a low profile*. Through rigid use of reducing strategies, he manages to keep his de-facto exposure to *the war of the mind* as low as possible; nevertheless, he constantly suffers from a high level of anxiety.

The outsider often feels responsible for the less privileged southern Sudanese and can typically be found working in a humanitarian organisation. He has little tolerance for people who try to integrate into the northern society and looks at their failure with malicious joy. He finds pleasure in observing how even those who try to associate with northern Sudanese are still being excluded and humiliated. In fact, their failure confirms his attitude to stay apart completely; those who still think they could relate to the enemy without being betrayed are fools and do not deserve *the outsider's* sympathy. *The outsider* advocates return and does not tolerate any alternative perspective. He promotes the assistance of repatriation of IDPs, but does not have any understanding for those who want to stay. If they should be abused in post-referendum Khartoum, it will be their own fault.

As long as secession has not been accomplished, the war has not ended; independence is *the outsider's* highest goal. For him there is only black and white, friend or enemy, independence or war. He is committed to resistance and to not let history repeat itself. He will rather go back to war than agree to *second-class citizenship*.

Joshua

Joshua is a 41-year-old Kakwa from Yei and a typical *outsider*. He was displaced by the war in 1988. In that time, southern universities were transferred to Khartoum, thus making moving to the North one of the few options for those who wanted to study. He was accepted at University of Gezira, yet, shortly after he started, Arabic was introduced as operating language at almost all universities. Since he was unwilling to learn Arabic, he had to drop out again and started studying at Omdurman Ahlia University, which was still teaching in English. After having finished his studies he founded a NGO together with two colleagues which aims at assisting the displaced people around the capital.

The founders of the NGO were accused of trying to convert people to Christianity, the NGO was closed down and Joshua and the others were arrested and mistreated by the police. He feels lucky to have survived at all, since the majority of the arrested southern Sudanese simply disappeared in those days. Joshua feels such a deep hate and distrust towards all northern Sudanese that he cannot associate with them. He stays as separated as possible and does not voluntarily interact with any

northern Sudanese at all. He feels a responsibility towards his children not to forget any of the mistreatments and therefore reconciliation is a remote concept to him. He explained:

> See this, how can we stay like this? I will never stay with the enemy like this, who used to torture me from time to time, not giving me any rights, I cannot stay with him. Because as long as I stay like that, my children are going to follow the same route. I can't allow that! I better go to where my own god sues me and put my children there.
>
> But I am telling you, this message is really very strong message! We cannot be with the northerners! Whatever the case be! I cannot vote for suppression, because I have children. Do I want this children to suffer like I have suffered?

He has no hope that relations between North and South will ever improve and, in fact, does not want reconciliation as a matter of principal. When asked what changes were necessary for him to reconcile with the idea of unity, he responded:

> I want to see a change that the southern Sudan is independent, that will be a change. If we are to be a different nation, that will be a change. But if we are to be with the northerners, no change. That is why I told you, that is why I told you that if peace is to be there, attractive unity, nah, the civil war is going to be there. War will break out. Let us not dream, let us not dream that we will achieve unity, that there is attractive unity, that people will vote for unity. Some years and war will break out. Immediately, after just one year, war will break out.

To him, the war has never stopped and before agreeing to any compromise, he would rather prolong it forever.

> Here in the capital, we are also fighting. We used to tell our fellow southerners who are in the war zone that we are suffering and that we are fighting in Khartoum. We are fighting with the enemy face to face, because we don't allow them, they want to also mistreat us, but we shall not be mistreated, we shall not be mistreated! What they are doing to us, they will take you and kill you and that is the end. But we have that ideology that we do not allow them. […] We tell the enemy that he is the enemy and that we will not respect him. If we have to come closer here at work for example, his heart I know is different, my heart is different. Towards him and his towards me, we are enemies.

Joshua does not trust the northern government and, accordingly, does not trust in the sustainability of the current peace either. He continues to live with a high and constant level of anxiety.

> Up to now, we don't have peace, we know that peace has been signed, but we have the fear of what is going to happen. This fear is still there. Because the government is planning day and night against southern Sudan, day and night.

Joshua worries that in case of any political event his neighbours could attack him. He has a generalised picture of the entire northern society and is unable to distinguish between individuals.

> You know what they did to us? They killed a lot of our people, just innocently like this. And in that one, with my own witness, my own eyes, I was looking at people being killed, children, just like that at random. This is not good. And up to now, when I see an Arab, I see an enemy. Although we eat from the same plate, I still see an enemy. Although he did not do anything to me, the one that I am eating with, but I am referring to the regime, I am seeing in him the enemy.

The CPA has not brought about the changes which could have made unity attractive to Joshua. However, it is not exaggerating to assume that no possible change exists that could make him accept unity as an option for the South. His *distrust towards all that is Arab* is extremely deep. Not being able to trust any northern Sudanese, he sees in the referendum what another *outsider* has called “the golden spoon”. It is their chance *to break the chain* and to, once and for all, change the future of their people, if not peacefully, then through force.

> We southern Sudanese, we have the heart of fighting. We can fight to the finishing. We can fight to the finishing and we, our problem is only weapons, but once we acquired weapons, we can clear the northern Sudan in some days. They are just fearing people, they are not fighters. They are not fighters, they use blacks to fight blacks.

5.1.2 The pragmatist

Interview partners, who were considered to be *pragmatists*, are: Amath, Caesar, Jason, Luka, Martin, Michael, Thomas and Yousif.

The pragmatist does not have a genuine interest in relations with northern Sudanese, yet, for the purpose of improving his/her situation in the North, he/she is willing to entertain them; albeit with feelings of humiliation and grief. *Pragmatists* share a great deal of attitudes with *outsiders*; *pragmatists* are the strongest type of *second-class citizens* in number. By trend, *pragmatists* are male; yet, female interview partners can be found among them.

The majority of *pragmatists* came to Khartoum at an advanced age, however even early arrivals can be found among them. Some are fluent in “Khartoum Arabic”; others only have a basic level that allows them to communicate the necessary. *The pragmatist* typically works in a northern company. *Pragmatists* have experienced war and mistreatment

in the South. Several of them have also experienced abuse by the state power in Khartoum, such as random house searches; however, they have not been arrested or physically mistreated in the capital. His/her perception of *the war of the mind* is very high. *The pragmatist* has a much higher de facto exposure to *the war of the mind* than *the outsider*. He/she uses a combination of reducing and coping strategies. Although entertaining relations with northerner Sudanese himself/herself, *the pragmatist* usually keeps his/her children apart from the majority society. Due to numerous biases against northern Sudanese, he/she uses reducing strategies when possible, yet, his/her situation of life does not allow him/her reducing exposure to the same degree *outsiders* do. Therefore, coping strategies are profound part of his/her life.

Particularly at work in a northern company coping strategies are crucial; *he/she never talks politics, puts his/her heart to the freezer, plays the fool,* and endures *the war of the mind* the best he/she can. Like this he/she is able to maintain his/her employment. Although, after the CPA *the pragmatist* has gained a new self-esteem and partially dares to show his/her real personality, as long has his/her purpose has not ceased, *the pragmatist* will continue to primarily rely on coping strategies.

Although some *pragmatists* could imagine prolonging their pragmatic approach to life in order to further benefit from advantages in Khartoum, in fact, he/she is highly worried about the post-referendum situation in the capital. In spite of often still not wanting to return to the South, most *pragmatists* do not see any other choice but to go back before the referendum. Nevertheless, *the pragmatist* unexceptionally favours separation, irrespective of what the consequences might be. Because *the pragmatist's* approach to life in Khartoum and his/her application of strategies is clearly purpose-oriented, he/she is most sensible to changing circumstances. If his/her purpose to cooperate ceases to exist, he/she turns into an *outsider*, such as in the case of Luka.

Luka

Luka is a 42-year-old Bari proper from Juba, who used to be a *pragmatist* and is currently being turned into an *outsider*. He came to Khartoum at the age of 19 and went to a technical college. After his studies, he joined an important northern company, which sent him for

trainings abroad. Nowadays, he holds a very good and well-paid leading position in the same company.

Before the signature of the CPA, he used to secure his position through coping strategies. Only in his private time he *reduced exposure to the minimum extent possible*, attending unavoidable reunions, but not spending time with neighbours or the like. After the signature of the CPA, he started talking politics and to express his real attitudes. Through this, *the gap* between him and the majority society is widening and even his employment is put at risk; he does not cooperate with his colleagues as before and does not contribute to the company's success the way he used to. But Luka does not mind. He plans to go back to the South and already spends a lot of time there. He is no longer willing to obey northern rules and not cooperating anymore means he is turning into an *outsider*. The pragmatism that drove him to use coping strategies is fading out. For him, it is no longer necessary to cooperate and when he eventually drops out of his work, his transformation into an *outsider* will be completed.

Yousif

Yousif is a 46-year-old Kuku from Kajo Keji, a town on the Ugandan border, and a typical *pragmatist*. He came to Khartoum in 1988, in fact, by accident. A work assignment brought him to the capital, but while he was there the war in Juba deteriorated and flights were stopped. The company offered him employment in Khartoum and he stayed. In 2001, he went to the South for two days in his function as a football referee. Besides that, he has not been back until today.

For 15 years, Yousif has worked in the same northern company. His way of maintaining his position is complete obedience. He cannot defend himself, but only endures.

> Nobody can defend you, unless god will defend you. We always leave ourselves to god, god is the one defending us, you see. I will pray to god to help us to get through this.

He *puts his heart at the freezer* and *never talks politics*. While before the peace agreement he was *playing the fool* when being caught in racist situations, nowadays, he sometimes defends himself. The CPA herewith provided Yousif with a new self-esteem, yet, he still has to endure unequal and discriminative treatment in the company, for he cannot afford losing his job. Accordingly, up to today, coping strategies

determine his life and he will continue applying them until the day when he leaves the company.

Being Muslim by birth, he is fluent in Arabic and can participate in Muslim customs. Nevertheless, he considers himself through and through southern Sudanese, an African, who does not want his children to associate with “Arabs”.

> Our children, we take them to the school, after they finish they come straight away to the house. They don’t go around with the Arab people, because if they go around, if they were playing and one by mistake, maybe you hit one, khallas, they will turn against you. They will say you beat him, because you are a southerner. That is why we always try to be away! That is how we are managing to push forward their lives.

When praying with northern Sudanese, they do not accept him to lead the prayers, although he is an elder and has gone to Mecca. He feels the same discrimination as southern Christians. In order to not have his self-identity changed by the image people are projecting on him in his high exposure to *the war of the mind*, he holds strong stereotypes against northern Sudanese and silently feels superior to them. Yousif’s wounds of the war are too deep to heal and will set him apart eternally; he will not forget that his father has been killed by the “Arabs”.

Yousif can sense some changes in Khartoum following the CPA, but does not have any trust in the northern regime’s commitment towards making peace. Implementations of the CPA fall behind and there is still no development in the South. In Khartoum, he believes, above all, the southern people have changed, but not the majority society or the system. Because of the presence of the SPLM, they now dare to enforce themselves onto society, but that does not mean that society appreciates them any more than before.

> Well, it has changed, well there is a change. But, this change, yani, it has not actually come through their interest. Because they are forced to accept it and we are forcing ourselves to the society, you see? We are forcing ourselves to the society as this is, this is capital city. We have the right to do what ever we are supposed to do according to the agreement.

Without sensing any serious change, unity has not been made attractive to Yousif. His wounds of the war, however, are so deep that it is hard to believe that anything could make reconciliation viable to him. Instead, he views separation as the only way for the South and the southern

Sudanese to finally start developing. He wants to *break the chain* for his children, so that they will grow up without poverty and oppression.

Nevertheless, Yousif is extremely hesitative about going back to the South. He feels serious anger about the lack of development and corruption of the southern Sudanese government. Fearing mistreatment in post-referendum Khartoum, he is pushed to leave, yet he would prefer to stay. The lack of good educational institutions for his children is of great concern to him.

> And the thing of going in the present situation to the side of the South, as you have seen, as if I am destroying their future, you see? […] So I prefer to stay here, until when they are grown up, with a level of good education.

His children are still young and would need several more years to finish their education, exceeding the time until the referendum. In spite of all inner conflict and worry, he does not see any alternative but going back.

> If the referendum happens, automatically we go back to the South, we go back to the South. There is no way, I cannot stay here, because if I stay here, it means I want myself to be what? To be mistreated.

Nevertheless, he strongly desires separation and the return to an independent South, at least idealistically, is a great relief.

> If we are voting, I will vote for separation! I will vote for separation! […] But when it happens, when the time has come that we are given our referendum, ha! We will be able to pack, we shall pack our things and go!

His euphoria on return, in fact, is mainly a political statement. His exclamation does justice to his ideological position, which also has to be understood in the context of nation-building in the South. Yet, in his actual life plan, being forced to take his family to one of the least developed areas of the continent completely distresses him. He expects to be discriminated and excluded for having left to the North and plans with a long period of readjustment and hardship.

5.1.3 The disrupted

Interview partners, who were considered to be *disrupted*, are: Maria and Rebecca.

The disrupted wants to a certain extent be part of the majority society. Within the research group, *the disrupted* is unexceptionally female, justifying the use of the female form in this paragraph. This does not

mean that men in principle could not be *disrupted*, but, as will be seen in chapter VI 5.2, women are more prone to be found among them.

The disrupted has come to Khartoum early enough to have finished at least her secondary school education there and so speaks “Khartoum Arabic” fluently. She can be found working in a neutral rather than a northern-dominated environment. The tense situation in northern companies, which has been discussed in length before, would probably turn most *disrupted* into *pragmatists*. *The disrupted* hardly has own memories of the war and basically lives on the memories of her family and the community. She usually has made few negative experience of violent state abuse in Khartoum. Being excluded from the system is a great annoyance to *the disrupted* and her perception of *the war of the mind* is high. Yet, she has a lower level of anxiety.

The disrupted applies a combination of reducing and coping strategies and adjusts to the Arab culture in order to be able to entertain social relationships with the majority society, particularly her neighbours or, for example, colleagues from school or university. She evaluates situations and limits the exposure of her children to the majority society accordingly. She clearly puts rules and controls her children’s contact, yet, she is less strict than *outsiders* and *pragmatists*.

Entering into voluntary relations with the majority society clearly sets *the disrupted* apart from *outsiders* and *pragmatists*, who only entertain the minimum relations absolutely necessary to accomplish their objects. In spite of having the desire to associate with the majority society *the disrupted* identifies herself as southern Sudanese. She is too “southern” to be fully accepted as a member of the majority society. As has been pointed out before, the northern society is considerably closed and an African can never be a full member of the “Arab” group, even less when insisting on maintaining large parts of the own identity (cf. III 2.2).

Nevertheless, *the disrupted’s* longing for integration is so intense that she does not radically distance herself like *outsider*s and *pragmatists* do. Her main dilemma is that she wants to integrate into society, but at the same time feels hurt by society putting conditions and limits to her inclusion. Being required to give up parts of her southern identity creates her feelings of sorrow over exclusion. Ideologically, *the disrupted* is committed to the southern cause and having adjusted to some northern

customs troubles her. These disrupted feelings set her clearly apart from *the adapted*, who has accepted Khartoum as her natural environment and feels in harmony with her adapted identity.

By having adjusted to the majority society, *the disrupted* entered into an identity conflict. Having the devastating history of Sudan clearly present and still making and observing negative experience in the North, *the disrupted* has divided feelings on her voluntary association with the majority society. On the one hand, she longs for inclusion; on the other hand, she feels like betraying her own identity and the southern cause. The politicised and radicalised southern and Arab cultures are, in fact, incompatible and crossing cultural borders is frowned upon by the two communities. When among her northern peers, *the disrupted* faces rejection for being southern Sudanese. When among her southern peers, *the disrupted* faces rejection for having embraced "Arab" elements. As a consequence, she does not fully belong to any of the two cultures. Islam being integral part of the northern culture makes the situation even more difficult; adjusting hereby also means rejecting one's religious identity.

The upcoming referendum forces *the disrupted* to deal with the question of where she belongs. Eventually, *the disrupted* wants to return to the South. Currently, however, return is primarily reason for worry and fear, not for relief. If it was not for the expected insecurity in Khartoum, she would easily extend her stay for some more years and indeed, hopes to be able to stay in post-referendum Khartoum.

The disrupted are the only research participants who clearly express a preference for unity. With this, they stand in sharp contrast to *outsiders* or *pragmatists* who strictly oppose such perceptions. However, this does not mean that *the disrupted* necessarily believe in change and reconciliation. Rather, they are highly worried about the implications of separation, which would force them to return to the underdeveloped South. Furthermore, it would mean being part of a new nation they cannot fully identify with and which rejects them for having adjusted to the northern way of life and culture.

Maria

Maria is a 39-year-old Balanda from Wau, a committed and active Christian and a typical *disrupted*. She is married to a Lugbwara and active in the both communities as she explains "because I am from two communities". Maria came to Khartoum together with her parents when she was 17 years old. She finished here secondary school in Khartoum and graduated from the School of Management Studies of Ahfad University for Women in Omdurman. She speaks "Khartoum Arabic" fluently. In 1996, after her graduation, Maria started working for a local NGO concerned with women education and training. In 2001, she was promoted to be the executive manager of the same NGO. In 2008, she started a Master program at the University of Juba and at the time of the interview, she was finalising her Master thesis.

It is very important for Maria to pass her religion and her southern culture on to her children. She is proud of the fact that her children eat traditional southern food and she also started teaching them Balanda. Maria is upset about the marginalisation in Khartoum, in particular the discriminative housing policies and the exclusion from the system. She has been forced to move to a different house five times. Also, she and her husband both applied for jobs in the civil service administration without being accepted; in her opinion because of being Christians. Nevertheless, Maria knows that she benefited a lot from her coming to Khartoum, particularly in respect to education, and feels that:

> For me, the life at that time in Khartoum was better from my place. I came from war especially. Because at that time, no education and there was a civil war in that time, no security there and for me, at that time, I prefer to stay in Khartoum.

Maria entertains relationships with the majority society, particularly old university colleagues and neighbours. She wants to be part of one imagined Sudanese society, yet, the true Sudanese society is segregated and groups are closed. Her ethnic background is not recognised by the majority society, which considers all southern Sudanese as part of one (stigmatised) group. She laments:

> You see that, there is no special consideration for the southerners; they say that you are Nuba. You are a southerner, they don't consider you like as a Sudanese. Most of them, they say that, that ah, you come from, like, like the southerner, they are not Sudanese for them, they thought like that. Because sometimes they used to ask us, you come from South to Sudan? How did you come here? From South to Sudan! Like the

> southerner are not Sudanese. And I am telling them, that we southerners, we are Sudanese, why you ask like that? We argue with them.

Nevertheless, Maria really tries to integrate into her neighbourhood and holds relatively close relations with northern Sudanese women. She also used to participate in a Jabana group. Jabana is the name for a small coffee can typically used in Sudan. Women, who form part of a Jabana group, participate in a system of rotation in which they meet every week in the house of a different member. To these meetings, every member brings either goods or money for the host, depending on the type of group. To be able to get involved in her neighbourhood, Maria has to give up considerable parts of her own identity, causing her serious unease. When wanting to attend a meeting, for example, Maria has no choice but putting on a thob. In spite of wanting to interact with the majority society, she is constantly drawn back again by her identity conflict. When being asked if having to put on a thob bothered her, she exclaimed:

> Yes! It forces me to do something which I don't want! If I did not go like that, next time when I invite them, they will not come. So it forces me to do the way they want. I will not go without thob, it is a must to go with thob. You see, one day, just my neighbour close to my house, their daughter got married, we go to the party, I said that this time, because I am a southerner, I want to be different from them. I have very nice cloth, I bought it from Zairean design, just you see like this, very nice and tall, I just made my hair nice. Oooh, very nice, very nice Maria! But it is not real from their heart, you see! Next day my neighbour she comes and says that my dress was very beautiful, but that most of the people said that why did Maria come like this? Most of the people they are talking like this. She said next time you come, don't come like that. I say that is my cloth, it is tall, according to the Shari'a, even it goes up to here, the neck is not open, why do you say that? She said, you know, our people, because of Islam. I said I am not Muslim. They talk, they talk, they talk, I say ok, thank you, next time I will go like you. Sometimes it makes me not feel alright. Like somebody invites me to a celebration, I say that no. Because I don't want to wear a thob, I don't like it. The following day they will come, sometimes at the same day at night. The party is going on, they will come here, Maria, why, we didn't see you? Because you always force me to wear a thob! I don't like a thob! That is why I don't like to go. Ah, Maria, why do you talk like this? This is what I feel! I am not going! Usually they go back to the party, they bring the mother of the groom to me to force me to go. I say that sorry, I don't like. Ah, Maria today, she is not alright, she has problem with her husband. I said, no no no no, today I am not feeling like going, because you force me to wear a thob. Sometimes I did that, because I am not feeling alright. Even sometimes during Christmas, we go to the church,

> all the people they come to look, oh Maria, your dress is nice. Yah, like it is the first time you see somebody like that! They are putting a condition.

Maria wants people to be aware that she is adjusting herself out of duty, not free will. She is embracing parts of the northern culture; yet, people should recognise that she is doing so only when she deliberately chooses to. During one of the interviews she proudly showed her hennah ornaments, a traditional decoration of the skin reserved to married women in Sudan, and clarified:

> You see like I did hennah like this, because it is not in our culture, it is the culture of Arab. But because we are here in the North, we are used to do it. It is nice, just a decoration. If I did like that and I wear a thob, yiiiie! You will see that they are very happy! Maria, you are beautiful, you put hennah, like this, it is our culture. I say, I did it because I like it, but not it is a force for me.

Maria insists in doing all adjustment voluntarily, for she worries about the negative effects that forced assimilation could have on her.

> You see, culture sometimes, it will affect you. If you say, because I do for the sake of my looking for the neighbours, it will affect me for a long time.

Being a committed Christian, she also wants to be clearly identified as one. When she goes to the house of a Muslim and people start praying, she demonstratively sits apart, so that nobody can misunderstand her to be praying with them. She explained:

> You see, theirs is not like ours. If you come like this, they will pray like this, if you go like this, they think you pray with them [imitating how Muslims hold their hands]. So I just sit aside. I will meet them after the prayer, I will say I didn't pray with you because I am a Christian, I don't know what you are talking. They will say, it is easy, we just say like, I say never! I cannot! […] I can say a Christian prayer. At the same time they are praying, I am supposed to say a prayer, but if I did like this [imitating how Muslims hold their hands], they will think that Maria is praying with us, I don't like. Afterwards I will just sit apart and pray.

Maria wishes to be appreciated as a Christian Balanda. Yet, the closer she gets to the majority society and the more she adjusts, the more they try to convince her to take the next step and convert to Islam. Also, in the North, all southern Sudanese are generalised to one big mass of migrants. Maria's tribe matters a lot to her, she has a clear idea of what the Balanda are like and wants to be recognised for that. She complained about how the northern society is incapable of distinguishing the different ethnic groups:

> Most of the people here, if you say, who are those of South Sudan, they will say that they are Nuer and Dinka and Shilluk and other Equatorians, Bar al Ghazal, they will say that no, you are from Zande. You see, even in, ah, in Buri [her neighbourhood in Khartoum], there is our neighbour, they are just aside from us, he is a member from SPLA. He is from Dinka. If somebody comes and he doesn't know and he asks anybody in the road that I am looking for someone, if you want southerner, they will take you to the Dinka homes. There, you say that you need the house of Maria, they will bring you here for me. If you say that I need Zande, they will bring him to us. Then just like that, they don't know the difference between Zande and Nuer and other tribes.

Although, in Khartoum she regrets having to adjust to the majority community and feels hurt by her identity neither being known nor appreciated, in the South, in fact, she has similar problems. She travels to Wau and/or Juba at least ones a year, however, there she does not feel as if in her own culture either. The northern dress can be seen as a symbol of Maria's identity conflict. When referring to life in Khartoum she explained:

> I will force myself to wear a thob, a Sudanese thob, yes. It is not my interest, but because I want to join them, I will force myself to wear a thob.

Nevertheless, in the South, she insists in wearing northern style, although it is completely frowned upon by southern society.

> I went to Juba I take with me three taha [veils] and all my clothes are tall. I went to Juba, you see, in the airport, I realised I am the only woman wearing a long skirt. I went from Khartoum here, we were 25. The second day the conference started, I find my colleague there from Juba, oh, Maria, what happened, really you are Arab. Why are you wearing? I say because of the culture, it affects me, I cannot wear cloth without any taha.

Apparently, in spite of insisting that she was doing all adjustment to the northern society on a voluntary base, she fails to abandon the northern habits again. She does not manage to readapt to the southern culture and therefore is accused of being "Arab".

> Difficult, difficult. Even to the souq [market] near, I will put a thob, I cannot go like this. Especially the souq in the area. When I went to Juba, the souq is near, I went with madam [wife] of my brother. I just enter inside to put the thob. She asks me, why are you putting this thob? Ah, no no no, I cannot go without thob! She tells my brother, your sister you see, she behaves like Arab. I face challenges in Juba, because of my dress, even my behaviour. In the hotel, during the dinner, people take beer. I get tea to drink, my colleagues, Maria, you don't drink beer! I say, I have never taken beer in my lifetime, I never take beer. Ah! This

> is the Arab behavior! Ah, I say since we are from the South there, before we come to Khartoum, not one day I take one cup of beer, why now? They are like, no no no, Maria don't come to the South, don't come to the South, because you really act like Arab. Beer is just like water. Mushkila! Problem!

In Maria's incapability to readjust to southern culture the whole extent of her identity conflict shows. She faces serious problems, of which she does not know how to solve them.

> Culture sometimes, if you do something because of their culture, it will affect you in the long run. For us to go to stay there [in the South], we need to, I really don't know how to fix that, we need time to change!

Maria expresses a desire to eventually go back to the South. Yet, if it was not for the violence she expects in post-referendum Khartoum, she would not consider return any time soon. In fact, Maria hopes to be able to stay a few more years even after the referendum. She is also among the few interview partners who openly express preferring unity. She fears inter-ethnic conflict and lack of development in the South. At the same time she has already made experience of discrimination and exclusion in her home area Wau for having gone to Khartoum. She explains:

> Personally, for me, I don't feel like separation, I need the unity. Because it is not a right time for those of SPLA to say they need separation. Automatically there will be a big problem in the South, conflict between the tribes. Even now, there is a peace, yes, there is a stability, but up to now there is some conflict. There is a conflict in the interest of the individual. Even no, no any development happens in the South. If you can see Wau or Juba, it is the capital of South Sudan, you cannot believe that this is a capital. For me it is not the right time for the southerners to say that they need separation. Because if it says separation, there will be a big problem in the South between Nuer and Dinka, between Fertit, those of Bar al Ghazal, and Dinka. Because most, most of the Dinka, they occupy everything in the South. The most of the ministers are from Dinka and those of Bar al Ghazal like Fertit, you can count them. Because most of the southern, they say that we need separation, after that we can fight there, then we can agree. We don't need fighting. Almost 21 years people are fighting and now the peace is come, nothing happen. Just talking of money, ah, you see.

Maria fears to be forced to change exclusion in the relative stable and developed North, for exclusion in the instable and underdeveloped South. Not being fully southern Sudanese anymore, her present life in Khartoum, in fact, is more comfortable and predictable in contrast to starting afresh in the South.

5.1.4 The adapted

Interview partners, who were considered to be *adapted*, are: Allison and Betty.

Same as *the disrupted*, *the adapted* entertains voluntary social relationships with the majority society. Within the research group, *the adapted* is unexceptionally female, justifying the use of the female form in this paragraph. This does not mean that men in principle could not be *adapted*, but, as will be seen in chapter VI 5.2, women are more prone to be *adapted*.

The adapted has come to Khartoum at a very early age and speaks "Khartoum Arabic" fluently. In the case of the research group, she typically works in a neutral environment. *The adapted* does not have any direct memories of war and displacement in the South and instead lives on memories of her family and the community. Also, *the adapted* usually has few direct experiences with violent state abuse in Khartoum. Although her perception *of the war of the mind* is high, nevertheless she has a rather low level of anxiety. She applies a combination of reducing and coping strategies and adjusts to the Arab culture in order to be able to entertain social relationships with the majority society and to accomplish her goals.

In the case of the research group, *the adapted* tends to be young and does not necessarily have own children yet. Those who do, however, are less radical on maintaining them apart from the majority society. That does not mean that they are completely unbiased and do not pose conditions, but they decide according to situations instead of following rigid rules.

The most important characteristic of *the adapted* is that she has accepted Khartoum as her natural environment and feels in harmony with her adapted identity. Although she feels excluded and discriminated, Khartoum nevertheless is the place to which she belongs. She calls the South her home; yet the South is an ideological place to her and a political concept, for she hardly even knows it. In spite of being much more familiar with the northern environment, *the adapted* has been brought up with the idea of being southern Sudanese and does not feel like a full member of the northern society. Differing from *the disrupted*, however, *the adapted* does not enter into an identity

conflict; she has accepted not being a typical southern Sudanese, but a southern Sudanese who has grown up outside her own community. Instead of feeling torn between the two cultures, she has created her own and new identity. Never having lived in the real southern culture, she does not feel like betraying it by forming her own identity according to her natural environment.

Nevertheless, in spite of having accepted Khartoum as the natural environment, *the adapted* has not deeply integrated into the majority society either. She defines herself as a southern Sudanese and has not accepted Khartoum as her ideological home. The northern society does not accept her as equal and she prefers to be among her own people. In fact, the southern community in Khartoum can be understood as the true home of *the adapted*.

When engaging into the northern society she knows well how to move around and how to accomplish her goals. Nevertheless, she meets the same rejection and discrimination as the other *second-class citizens*. Obedience and endurance affect her negatively; having to comply with the rules of the "host community" might be natural for her, but certainly not pleasant. However, she does not put into question her stay in Khartoum. She does not sorrowfully contemplate about a different life in an unknown homeland, but makes the best of a bad bargain.

Regardless to the political discourse, *the adapted* wants to remain in Khartoum even after the referendum and in case of separation. The knowledge of *the adapted* of the war is purely theoretic and she tends to be rather apolitical, leaving the political discourse on independence to the more knowledgeable. Not feeling like a true southern Sudanese, *the adapted* does not want to interfere with the decision of the real southern society. Typically she makes statements such as "if it is better for the southerners to separate, they should separate and if it is better for the southerners to stay in unity, they should stay united."

The identity of *the adapted* has been formed in the southern community of Khartoum and gains its right to exist in the very society. It is the identity of a southern Sudanese having grown up as part of a minority in the North. If the South separates, her group of belonging will slowly cease to exist. *The adapted* hopes to be able to continue living in Khartoum and to continue being tolerated as a minority even after

separation. However, her community leaving to the South might eventually change her mind.

Betty

Betty is a 26-year-old Adio, who has been born in Khartoum and a typical *adapted*. Betty speaks “Khartoum Arabic” fluently and graduated from University of Khartoum in 2008. In 2009, she became headmistress of a Christian school.

Betty is a committed Christian and a highly active member of church. Although she has grown up in Khartoum, she has not entered into deep relations with the majority society. She has accepted Khartoum as her natural environment, but is highly aware that the society is not hers and that she is not a full member of the community.

Other than *disrupted* Maria, Betty does not feel like having to show her southern identity. At university, for example, she fully obeys to the rules and like this accomplishes her objectives. She felt privileged to be one of the few southern students at Khartoum University and explained her success through her ability to cover up her southern identity.

> So, well, I got used to it, you know. All the rest were from northern and from east or something like that, but still I feel like I am, I was special to attend that classes. But, but, still, like, yes, I am a southerner, but still I feel that I don’t force myself to show my identity. Like I am southerner, so I don’t have to wear something long, or like be normal and wear whatever I wanted to. Or maybe say things the way southerners say or talk, but I don’t want to do that, because I know it is not my community. So I have to respect the community, so I have to respect the community where I stay, so I just got used to this staying.

Betty’s clear priority is education. Through putting education before anything else, she has managed to justify her obedience and avoids having her self-image changed through the experience of humiliation. Education is the higher goal to which she subordinates everything, including her own identity. Her spare time, she spends at church, her most important social network and alternative community. Here she is being relieved from having to play any role. At church she is a highly accepted and appreciated member and given important opportunities, such as travelling abroad. At university, nevertheless, she also never shows her Christian identity in order to avoid putting her education at jeopardy.

> It is not that I just want to prove that I am a Christian so I have to pray. The thing is, the university is an academic place and I don't want to get into the religion issue at the same time. So I just separate myself and I say this is an academic issue for me and I just want to study and get my certificate and do my work. […] For us, it is ok, it is violated, our rights are violated, but, say it is ok. Because I want to live, you know. Yes, yes, I want to live, that's it.

Although, Betty has highly adapted herself to the majority society and fully complies with the strict rules in order to accomplish her objectives and live peacefully, she has no problem with stopping this behaviour again. Differing from Maria of the previous example, Betty stopped veiling herself and nowadays frequently wears African dress. While Maria insists in doing everything on a voluntary base and therefore finds it difficult to openly stop it again, Betty naturally puts the "costume" on and off according to the requirements. Adjusting to the majority society does not stand in conflict to her identity as a southern Sudanese born in Khartoum. She explained:

> My father was having this kind of, ah, my father, because he doesn't know Arabic first of all. He speaks most of the times English and Arabic Juba and he is like a really southerner person. And he is like, his culture influenced us as southerners. He put into our minds that we are southerners, despite the fact that we are living in the North, so we have that in mind. So when we go out to encounter with southerners, we already know who we are. So even if I am in contact with the northerners, I know that they will not influence me. And even I mentioned that my mother forced us to wear something very long, she said that we are not living in our community. So we know ourselves, we know who we are, but because we don't want to cause problems, ok, we respect the Arab community in which we are living and then we just act like them, we talk like them, we speak like them, we wear clothing like them, we just, you know, do what so ever they want us to do, ok. Because we want to survive, you see. So I have my culture, it is from home.

While she looks at her father as the one who gave her an African identity, her mother rather pushed her to adapt to the northern society. She narrated that her mother even wants her to continue dressing the same as before the conclusion of the CPA. But Betty feels:

> I don't care! Like, enough is enough. I don't want to take anymore. But my mom, she is like, she just, she got used to it, you know.
>
> Like our identity is now well known, like where we feel as Africans, you see. Now we don't fear, you know, our African dresses or maybe to be, or to wear, ah, like or to wear like European kind of dress, you see like a jeans or a tight T-shirt or something like that. It really changed after the CPA.

To Betty the southern culture is an idealistic culture, which she follows, but which she has not embraced in a way that acting against it would cause her an identity crisis. She knows that having grown up in Khartoum and speaking "Khartoum Arabic" fluently is an important resource. In fact, she is proud of being able to switch between the two cultures and of having a high level of "Khartoum Arabic" as well as of Juba Arabic and English.

The society of Khartoum is not her community, she feels like a stranger. At the same time, although embracing the South as her idealistic home, she cannot imagine living there. Different from the other *second-class citizens*, she does not feel guilty for not wanting to move to the South. She remembered:

> My first trip to Juba was in March this year, 2008. I was there only for four days. So, it was like, well, it is like, it is a really beautiful country, very simple, yah, there is lack of development, but I feel like if it is really home, you know, home sweet home. It is really nice, but deep within my heart I say, I am not quite sure if I am ready to stay there or maybe to just start a life there. Because most of my life I have been in the North and I feel like I still want to do something more, you see. And, so, I feel, like thinking of going back, living in the South, and even my friends, I have many friends who went back and they are living now and enjoying their life, they are well and Juba is fine, it is ok, they like it. But for me, I was like, well, I am not used to it, I am not used to it. Just like, I found it very hard. Maybe I can go there for a vacation, but to live there, it is like mmmh, I don't think so.

Instead, she imagines prolonging her life in Khartoum and continuing to be a stranger as before; a member of a tolerated minority. The South, on the contrary, for her is not a "real country", as it does not nearly meet the standards she is used to.

> Well, about the referendum, I am not really quite sure about it. And I will say, even the referendum comes or maybe the separation, the division of the people, you know, the South and North are divided, still, I think like, many of the southerners, who were born here and lived most of their life here, they will have difficulties to go back. Maybe they won't go back. So you have to stay in the North as a foreigner. Like many other people who are living in the North as foreigners. So, I don't think it will be difficult, because I don't have to go back, if I don't want to go back, I will stay here and obey the law, it is ok. […] Like, like, like, I don't think like people will go immediately with the referendum in 2011 and people automatically, I have to go, no. Maybe it happens in five or ten years of time, you know. Because if it is like a real country, there are like many things to be done, many things to be done, you see.

> But if the division happen, if we shall separate, I have to stay here, maybe for a while and then maybe by chance, I had the chance to go back to the South and to do my own job, so let it be. Of course, Khartoum now is a Muslim country. It is a Muslim country with churches, so, the churches, I don't think that by division they will come and break the whatever, because they will come and destroy the churches or something like that, but they won't do it. Because for years this has been a Muslim country with these churches. So I don't think like, they would just come and destroy it, the churches, because of this separation. I don't believe, so I can stay here.

Betty does not see a conflict in not wanting to move to her ideological home since it has never been her physical home and rather recalls the negative memories of her parents.

> So, I say like, I really don't have enough experience about life in Juba, I just only hear about it. But I know, I know life about Juba from my parents, they, because my parents, they, they, all of them faced or experienced the civil war, especially my father, because he was a refugee in Uganda. He had to move and all this stuff and it was a really tough life.

When asked about her opinion on separation, she hesitated to reply. Although she does not take a clear stand against separation, she puts into question whether the South is really ready to be an independent country.

> Mmh, don't ask me, don't ask me that question, I won't answer. I just, I don't, I don't, because, ah, maybe my answer was, my only answer I say, if the southerners are ready to stand on their own, then let it be. But if they are not ready to, so they stay in unity, they stay together. But if you are ready, like really, like we as southerners we can stand on our own and besides, well, like, the South so many things to stay in the South, we see struggle, you know, the development and ah, insecurity. There is so many things that we cannot, you know, you are not ready as southerner to do on our own. So, if it is like for us to, if we are ready, ok, let it be, ok, you know, we can separate, because I don't want us to separate and then we end up like the other countries, like other African countries.

While the other *second-class citizens* mainly complain about the shortcomings of the CPA, the falling behind of its implementations and the lack of serious change, Betty appreciates any kind of improvement. She does not think in categories of attractive unity or separation and does not hold any unmet expectations that cause her frustration. Likewise, she has no aspirations in the South, which would force her to take a clear positioning in the context of nation-building. Instead, her

natural environment, in which she plans to continue to stay regardless to the political events, is improving.

> Definitely, wide changes! And ah, you know, this, like the thing is, from my point of view, when I was still young, and during the war, we really as southerners, we looked at ourselves as if we don't have rights. We looked at ourselves as a second citizen, like second-class citizen. This is how we looked at ourselves. And that is why, to be honest, that I could not ask for anything. Because I felt now I am living in the North and yes, I am a Sudanese, but my country is the South and I cannot ask a northerner to give me something which is his because I don't have it. So that I had in my mind, even when it was coming to the cloth, I just put it out of respect, without questioning it, because this is not my community. And this is why I thought at that time, southerners we should be even grateful to the northerners because of having us. But since the CPA it changed because we are now equal, so a northern person cannot say anything, because I have my rights, too. So the relationship has changed definitely in that southerners are now looking at themselves as equals and even when they speak something in a language with an accent I don't understand, still I am a Sudanese, I have every right to work here in the North, I have every right to go into the area.

The positive change among her group of belonging, the southern Sudanese living in Khartoum, provides her with a new outlook and self-esteem, in fact, she feels "free like a bird".

> There are many more southerners at the university now, and amazingly since the peace agreement, CPA in 2005, we have seen changes when it comes to the way of how we dress now. I have never seen, since I entered the university, I have never seen a lady wearing a trouser. But now I can even see a Muslim lady wear a trouser inside the university, I was so surprised, like ok, now is a freedom. And the southerners also, many of them, but they are now more free to express themselves, to speak out. The freedom is there, this is like liberation. We are really in freedom now in university. And as I said when it comes to how we dress and what we wear and southerners can speak out for themselves. Especially for a girl, if she is wearing something which is not long enough and somehow she cannot be asked why, because we are now kind of 50/50 with the northerners, so you cannot ask me. I used to wear a veil, you know, to cover my hair. But now I can just go around like that and they cannot ask me. And even if they ask me, I will say I don't have to. The situation has changed. Yes, we are free as a bird now.

Apparently, Betty enjoys her new freedom in Khartoum and does not think about other aspects which have not been met. Not being politically involved and not having a plan of returning to the South, she focuses on the positive changes in Khartoum.

5.2 The formation of second-class citizens

In chapter VI 2, it has been analysed in detail why research participants feel like *second-class citizens* of Sudan and the preceding chapters have shown that in spite of having a lot in common, the group of *second-class citizens,* nonetheless, is heterogeneous. In the following paragraphs, it will be illustrated how the distinct types of *second-class citizens* are being formed. Why do individuals belong to their particular group? How did they "get" there and will they "remain"? The example of Luka, who is currently turning from a *pragmatist* into an *outsider*, has already shown that changing circumstances can change *second-class citizens*. Nevertheless, the formation of *second-class citizens* primarily depends on personal attributes. Gender and age at arrival proved to be highly relevant; furthermore own negative experience, degree of the perception of *the war of the mind* and the way relations between North and South are perceived in general. The factors are all interrelated and determine each other.

While the first two types of *second-class citizens*, *the outsider* and *the pragmatist*, can be described as highly radicalised and segregated, the latter two types, *the disrupted* and *the adapted*, are more moderate and assimilated to the majority society. The first two types are dominated by men, the latter two by women.

The different types of *second-class citizens* correspond with their holders' identities and their degree of ethnic affiliation. All research participants are highly aware of the official political discourse and know that they are supposed to comply with the new southern Sudanese national identity in contrast to the Arab national identity. The probable formation of a new nation state, which is to be based on a new southern identity, requires southern Sudanese to be more precise on their own positioning. This also means clearly distancing oneself from the "Arabs" of the country. The official southern identity requires full agreement to the southern cause; the North is the enemy and independence the highest goal. Nevertheless, southern identity is not skin deep and right underneath distribution of power and resources runs along ethnic lines. In fact, in the South "the 'tribal label' is extremely powerful, particularly for those who have an interest in rallying groups against each other to

strengthen their own support base."[890] Political power is a scarce and highly valuable resource and in the struggle for it, ethnicity can become a contestable social resource.

Although the CPA and many government documents emphasise the need for decentralisation and devolution of power, in fact, hereby they rather reinforce ethnic lines. Decentralisation "has become synonymous with dividing up and claiming ownership of land of local government authorities who act in the interest of their own communities."[891] Accordingly, with the approaching referendum and the possible return, the clear belonging to an ethnic group gains importance. Having been outside of the South for extended periods of time, belonging to an ethnic group can provide crucial access to resources to research participants upon their return.

Almost all research participants are participating in their corresponding ethnic communities. They are part of complex taxonomical systems and hold pluritaxonomical identities. Like this, it is up to the individual to select his/her identity alliance depending on the situation.[892] In the case of the research group, this can be, for example, the pleading of different ethnic alliances, such as being Kakwa or rather a member of the wider group of Bari-speakers or the husband's ethnicity instead of the own; or pleading southern Sudanese identity or even Sudanese citizenship. Meanwhile, pluritaxi also allow individuals to plead, for example, their alliance to Christianity instead of their ethnic belonging, as often happens among *the disrupted* and *adapted*.

In the research, it has become very clear that men have a tendency to be much more precise on their alliances. Belonging to one group, means not belonging to another supposedly contesting group. In her research on the Bari youth in Khartoum, Schultz (forthcoming) came to the conclusion that "in the context of nation building in Southern Sudan, specific forms of belonging are strengthened and politicized; other become invisible".[893] In the case of the male participants of this research, this means that the ethnic belonging is strengthened and politicised, while the Arab elements and even the pan-southern elements are weakened. In the context of nation-building and return, as

[890] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 20
[891] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 39
[892] cf. Schlee and Werner (1996), p. 11 ff.
[893] Schultz (forthcoming)

well as the competition for resources, for ambitious men their ethnic belonging is very important. In line with that, it is the same ambitious men, who insist in life in Khartoum being a war-like situation, thus, rejecting common complaints in the South, they had chosen an easy way out instead of fighting the civil war. Elder male participants, who have no serious political or economic ambitions in the South, do not feel obliged to reconsider their positions. Apparently, own intentions are crucial in determining one's affiliations and, therefore, also to which type of *second-class citizen* one belongs.

Women, on the other hand, are usually used to being part of various groups and experience less pressure to choose a clear stand. After marriage, they often change their ethnic belonging, albeit claiming affiliation to both ethnic groups and using affiliations situational.[894] This is also reflected in female interview partners' involvement in their ethnic communities in Khartoum. In spite of often feeling emotionally more affiliated to their own ethnic group, women receive higher recognition in their husband's ethnic community and adjust their involvement accordingly. Allison, a 29-year-old Madi, is married to Jason, a Bari proper. In an interview she explained her participation in the ethnic communities as follows:

> For example, in the Bari community there is a group of women participating together, we distribute together, work together. Also I am a member in it. Also, with the Madi, same type of group. But Bari community 60%, Madi community 40%. Because Bari community considers me a woman and Madi community considers me a girl. So I participate there 40%. Because I am a wife to a Bari.

Apparently, women are used to being part of various identity groups and to switch within between them. Furthermore, they are used to tolerating not being fully accepted in some of their identity groups. Women have learnt to evaluate different alliances and use them to their benefits. The situation in Khartoum is similar. The majority society decides to which extent southern Sudanese are allowed access. Other than women, men are not used to such a complex system of conditioned alliances and do not show the same abilities to tolerate restrictions. When being rejected, male interview partners immediately respond with counter rejection and show much less flexibility.

[894] cf. Schultz (2008), p. 6

Whereas women use their various affiliations, including, for example, being an accepted member of the "Arab" neighbourhood for social purposes, men are much stricter in their selection and use their ethnic affiliations rather as a means to access political and economic resources. It is crucial for their acceptance in the South to radically deny any adaptation or affiliation with the "Arab enemy". Through their ethnic communities, they participate in the development of the South and thus prepare the family's return. There is a high competition between the various groups – soldiers, remainees, returning IDPs and returnees from other countries – on the access to political power and other resources. In this competition, it is crucial to participate in the rehabilitation and development of the South. The one that returns after the work has been done by others is said to be discriminated against. The ethnic communities in Khartoum form influential pressure groups and allow research participants to enter into the political and economic arena of the South without being physically present. Yet, this also requires high commitment to the communities' official programmes.

Women have been identified to be the more flexible players and less pushed to take clear positions. Maria, a 39-year-old Balanda, who has been classified as *disrupted* above, for example, is highly active in her own tribal community and implementing various projects to help Balanda women in Khartoum. She is also a Lugbwara because of her husband; an active Christian and member of a church group; she is a member of her northern neighbourhood and participates in "Arab" women groups; a former Ahfad student with several "Arab friends";[895] the executive manager of a NGO dealing with the education and training of female IDPs; and a Balanda, who contributes to the development of her home area Wau and, herewith, prepares her eventual return; meanwhile she openly expresses her preference for unity.

Traditional role allocations seem supportive to the integration of women. Several male interview partners have explained that women associate more easily with the majority society, for they usually spend more time at home and frequently meet with the women of the neighbourhood. Indeed, female interview partners show a much higher interaction with their neighbours than male interview partners. Even if they have full

[895] "Arab friends" is embraced in quotation marks, because, as has been pointed out under 2.1.4, northern Sudanese are never considered to be genuine friends and an ultimate "but" always remains.

employment, they are nevertheless the ones responsible for the household and, hence, have at least one characteristic in common with the neighbour women. As has become obvious, women are usually less political and less radical in their opinions; therefore, northern and southern females have less potential for conflict than northern and southern men.

In addition to these generally different dispositions of men and women, men tend to have made more direct negative experience in Khartoum, making them even more disposed to be found among the first two types of *second-class citizens*. Experience of violence in Khartoum, direct or as observer, leads to the radicalisation of interview partners. Those southern Sudanese males, who came to Khartoum at the beginning of their twenties, were extremely likely to be suspected to have ties with the SPLA and being a fifth column in the North. Accordingly, they form an important portion of *the outsider*. In fact, *the war of the mind* has created a permanent level of anxiety felt among all *second-class citizens*. However, the level varies, ranging from high-level anxiety to low-level anxiety in the order *outsider, pragmatist, disrupted* and *adapted*. Negative experience has the power to cause upwards movement in the scale of *second-class citizenship* as in the case of Rebecca.

Rebecca is a 33-year-old Lotuka who came to the North (Kassala) with her family at the age of three, when her father was shifted for work. She has never been back to the South and has a high likeability to be found among *the adapted*. Nevertheless, she is a *disrupted second-class citizen*. When Rebecca came from Kassala to Khartoum in order to attend Ahfad University, she experienced extraordinary hardship fending for her survival in the capital, including severe hunger. In those days, her trust into northern society, which was letting her down, broke. For her Master studies, she has done extended research on southern IDPs and afterwards joined an international organisation where she also works on IDP-related issues. Her own experience and the general mistreatment of southern Sudanese she observes in Khartoum prevent her from entering into unbiased relationships with the majority society. Having spent her entire life in the North, she is not being turned into a *pragmatist*; nevertheless, neither can she accept Khartoum as her natural environment. As a result, she has entered into an identity conflict and

came to be considered *disrupted*. The example of Rebecca shows how participants, who spend considerable time in political environments and follow up the situation of the marginalised – such as in NGOs or international organisations – can be politicised and even be turned into a different type of *second-class citizen*.

Another determining factor, own memories of the war, strongly depends on the age of arrival. Those who left the South at a very early age will not have own memories. Instead, they have learnt about the effects of war from their parents and the community. For them, the experience of war-related violence has been transformed from a real act into a collective memory, nonetheless, also affecting their psyche. Those interview partners, who suffer from direct emotional wounds of the war, are more likely to be found among the first two types of *second-class citizens*. Those who came at an early age show the opposite tendency; the earlier the age of arrival the more likely they are to be found among the last two types of *second-class citizens*. Having come early to the North vehemently increases the probability of having accepted Khartoum as natural environment and even forms a precondition. It also gives individuals certain qualifications, such as speaking fluently "Khartoum Arabic", which can help in their interaction with the majority society. Those who came at an advanced age, on the contrary, primarily look at themselves as victims of war-displacement; they have been displaced from northern terror in the South to northern terror in the North. Accordingly, they are less willing to engage into the environment which they perceive as being imposed on them.

To which extent an individual interacts with the majority society strongly depends on what he/she considers to be necessary. Somebody who, for example, depends on a job in a northern company cannot separate himself/herself to the same extent as somebody who works in a southern NGO. At the same time, somebody, who looks at life in the North merely as a transitional period before returning to the South, does not depend on social integration like someone, who has grown up in the northern environment and plans to remain there.

5.3 Odd cases

Jonas is the only case, which could not clearly be classified as a specific type of *second-class citizen*. Jonas is a 61-year-old Adio, who came to Khartoum at an advanced age, when he was already 25 years old. He has a very strong southern identity, yet, he has vehemently tried to accept Khartoum as his natural environment, however, with limited success. Diverging from all other participants, he has deliberately chosen to live in the North, although his job as a pilot would have allowed him to work in many other countries. He has been displaced to Uganda during the first civil war and, therefore, did not want to turn himself into a "refugee" again. Jonas blames all problems on the northern regime. He feels that if it was not for the regime, the Sudanese people would not have any problems among themselves. Not being accepted as a citizen of Sudan deeply hurts his feelings.

He is the only participant who appears to have feelings of nationalism towards Sudan as a whole. Jonas does not have any political or economic ambitions in the South and his children, who have been brought up in Khartoum, do not want to go there. Hence, he is not pushed to take a clear ethnic positioning or to conform to the official discourse of nation-building in the South. Jonas desires to be a Sudanese, but is pushed to be a southern Sudanese. Ethnic affiliations are important to Jonas, he clearly feels like an Adio, which according to him also defines who he is. Nevertheless, he does not perceive ethnic affiliations as opposed to one inclusive Sudanese identity. In spite of not speaking "Khartoum Arabic", Jonas does not feel as if in conflict with the northern society. He has come to favour separation, however, due to rejection by the regime and exclusion from the system not because of feeling rejected by society. Jonas forms an exception and cannot unambiguously be classified as any of the distinct types of second-class citizens. Here, he is considered a resigned Sudanese nationalist.

6 Breaking the chain

Feeling like *second-class citizens*, the great majority of interview partners clearly favours separation. Regardless to their dilemma of not wanting to return to an underdeveloped South Sudan discussed in chapter VI 4.3, most of them want, once and for all, to change history and cut the bonds with the North. They are determined *to break the*

chain and to finally stop history from repeating itself. Only two *disrupted second-class citizens* indicated preferring unity. Some *adapted second-class citizens* do not feel competent enough to have a clear position and indicate that they prefer whatever is better for the future of the southern Sudanese. All others aspire to the creation of a new state, in which northern oppression will finally end and where they will be full members of society, the first-class citizens. Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper and *pragmatist*, explained:

> Well, the problem is, the biggest problem is the attitude. You know, it is very difficult for you to measure the attitude of somebody. Because our brothers in the North here, when it comes, under any circumstances, at normal circumstances, they are excellent. In terms of death, in terms of wedding, they are excellent, they can associate. But when it comes to the rights, to the interest or to the politics, then they put the southerners as the third-class citizens. And this attitude will never change. And this is one of the reasons, even until 100 years to come, as far as we vote for unity, still we are going to become third-class citizens. Then I don't think whether anyone is prepared to become a third-class citizen within his own country. No. So if this is the case, I better split. We better divide each other and we go.

Breaking the chain means fighting for a better future for the coming generations. Many simply explain their desire for separation with statements such as "I have children, I cannot vote for my children to suffer."

Breaking the chain also strongly refers to the lessons learnt by history. Only fools and the corrupted will vote for unity, so goes the truism. Anger and grief have grown to be so profound that unity is no longer considered to be an option among the majority of the research participants. Several interview partners clearly express preferring to go back to war and to continue fighting for an independent state, rather than accepting the prolongation of *second-class citizenship*. Even the larger part of those, who consider their life in Khartoum as privileged and worth prolonging, still prefer independence for the South.

Research participants, being educated and often highly politicised through their work and experience, are particularly firm in their attitudes. Apparently, the assumption that education and social and economic similarities might reduce barriers, cannot be confirmed. Whereas the *adapted second-class citizens* are to a certain extent influenced or irritated by the official discourse and prefer not to take a clear stand, all other interview partners are clear and frank about their attitudes. Those

disrupted second-class citizens, who favour unity, say so openly. Others are, directly or indirectly, part of the opinion-making process itself; often they are not influenced by the official discourse, but, indeed, part of its creation and propagation. Through their functions, for example as employees of NGOs working with IDPs or as members of the executive committees of the ethnic communities, they promote independence among the southern Sudanese people. Jason, a member of the executive committee of the Bari community, comments on the opinion making:

> Yah, yah, yah, this is very important. It is very important, it is there! It is a core. It is very important. You know, because you need to have unified opinion.

The official discourse, which requires the favouring of separation, basically coincides with the opinions of most interview partners. Thomas is a 41-year-old Kakwa and Reverend at one of the churches in Khartoum (urban district). He put it clearly:

> The war is actually there, as I see. The war is there, it has been there. But if it would be between two nations that would be a good war to be fought [laughs]. It sounds funny, but the war is there! People in the South are suffering and dying and they are fighting for that. That means the war hasn't stopped. If CPA will lead to the referendum and South Sudan will be suffering if northern Sudan by force wants us to stay with them, then it is a good war to fight. The Arab North signed, agreed on that referendum, then if you want to refuse, then I think it is a just war, if you can use the word just to describe a war. I am not afraid of war; we have been living in the war all this time. If people separate and disaster will be there, it will be there. But we know our rights, and I think the movement, they have been fighting for that, either for our rights to be given or to be in an independent nation. If northern Sudan wants war, I don't think we are the only ones going to lose.

Most interview partners approve the southern nationalism/separatism that has also been discussed in detail in chapter III 3.1. At least in their aspiration to an independent South, they comply with an emergent pan-southern identity, which stands in sharp contrast to the growing importance of ethnic affiliations discussed above. This southern identity is, however, not necessarily shared among the more marginalised southern Sudanese in Khartoum, who sometimes rather "think of themselves as belonging to the urban poor who live on the fringes of the Sudanese capital."[896]

[896] Abusharaf (2009), p. 11

In spite of clearly favouring separation, it is not automatically seen as an easy solution or an uncomplicated process. The contrary is true. The majority of research participants are quite critical on the South's future and expect serious problems. As has been stated above and been discussed more detailed in chapter II 7, the government of the South is said to be highly corruptive and research participants fear to be turned into a minority of another arbitrary state. Several interview partners express a fear of Dinka domination and worry about fair power and wealth sharing in the new country. Many interview partners, particularly those who belong to small ethnic groups and feel powerless in the decision making process in the South, hold what has been called "Dinkaphobia"[897] before.

As has been explained in part III 2.3.1, after separation new majority/minority relations would be established in the South, most likely based on a lower level of ethnicity with smaller and smaller nationalism oppressing smaller and smaller minorities. Having been to the North, many fear being discriminated and excluded for that. The SPLM is said to have weak structures and politicians to primarily serve their own interests, thus delaying development. Nevertheless, in spite of all worries and critics, the majority of interview partners generally feel that it is still "better to be mistreated by your own people, than by somebody else." Jason, a 43-year-old Bari proper, interpreted independence as follows:

> It is complicated, it is danger, it is danger, but I am looking for the future of the coming generations. For us, our time is near to going to an end. But I am looking for the future of my children or even my grandchildren. I am looking for the southern Sudan, where my grandchildren will be free. Will be free to exercise freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of thinking, freedom of everything, you see. We are going to have a lot of scenarios in the southern Sudan. We are going to have a lot of difficulties, we are even going to have a lot of civil wars, maybe, but still, it is important for us to be free and independent completely. So that we can exploit our resources, so that we can start utilising this resources. It is better for me to be, to be mistreated or to be misruled by my fellow African and my fellow Christian, than to be ruled by somebody who does not take us as equal, who doesn't have any mercy.

[897] Beswick (2004), p. 207

Many problems in the South, in particular conflicts between ethnic groups, are in fact blamed on northern manipulation and interference. Accordingly, separation itself would already reduce some of these problems. Reverend Thomas explained:

> I think, I think that is, I don't want to minimise it, but I want, yah, it is an obvious and natural issue. In the home, people fight. But it has been used in the media, that if you give the southerners referendum, they will kill themselves alone. I don't think there is justice in that, that the southern Sudanese will even kill themselves. If somebody is killing me, you unite against the enemy, then we will solve our inside problems alone. It will be easy, because in the South we have more in common, when we look to southern Sudan. What is happening in the South today, the differences, you should take the element of northern Sudan supporting the militias in the South: Who are the ones causing the trouble? Not the southern Sudan, it is still the North. Take away the hand of the northern Sudan and the South will be in peace. Because we have more in common. You talk about the tribal conflicts, we know how it can be settled. I am saying to you, because even as a church, we have a vision here. We are working towards that. The church can do it and they listen to us. Many times tribes fight, we can be in the middle, we put it down. That is an internal issue. I don't want to minimise the problem, it is a problem, but it can be solved. We can do it ourselves. But it has been used, it has been used. […] I look to Juba today, yes the problems is there, but Juba is better than when I was born there. When the Arabs were controlling people were suffering. The face of Juba has changed. So with all the challenge, I think something good is happening. Let the northern Sudan take its hands out from supporting this militias, it will be quiet. Because southern Sudanese have a way of solving their problems. Even a chief can stand and say like this, people will be quiet. Of course it will not solve 100% the problem, but somehow, the issue has been created by the North to say if we leave them alone, they will kill themselves. Yah, let us kill ourselves, better than you killing us! That will be, even, not alone that we kill ourselves and you also kill us. And you help us to kill ourselves even better. It is better to be left to kill ourselves than kill ourselves and you also kill us.

Jason's and Thomas's statements show that they are not uncritical about separation and developments in the South. On the contrary, they express fear of mistreatment and conflict. Nevertheless, being highly dissatisfied with the current situation, they prefer to separate and then try to solve their problems in an independent state, without manipulation from the North. Their attitude goes in line with findings from Schomerus and Allen (2010), who have done extended research in southern Sudan. They wrote that "southerners credit Khartoum with the ability and desire to exert power over even the most banal of issues. The more serious

accusations focus on weapons dissemination, continuing support for militias (including the Lord's Resistance Army), and the buying of political support. Yet evidence about this 'hidden hand' is scarce to non-existent and this stance has become less important since the elections made clear that southern political dynamics and power struggles carry great potential for conflict."[898] Although, the impact of the Khartoum government might be overestimated, for research participants these perceptions are severe issues and a way to justify separation. Furthermore, it underlines the severity of the *deep distrust towards all that is Arab* felt by the research group and how it adds to their desire to *break the chain*.

Independence is said to be a precondition for any kind of economic development in the South. History serves as the undeniable prime example, which is confirmed by the fact that the interim period has failed to bring about relevant infrastructural improvement in the South. History is repeating itself in the present and – particularly now that a new agreement has been signed and remains to be fulfilled – memories of broken agreements are revived. The lack of serious change and the falling behind of the implementations of the CPA are taken as proof that the government never had a genuine interest in making unity attractive. Many research participants felt that if the government was serious about making unity attractive, they would have started sharing power and even given presidency to a southern Sudanese. Jacob, a 52-year-old Kuku and journalist, explained:

> They always talk about unity, but I think, ah, they are not genuine. If they were genuine, they would have done as I proposed to them, to bring a southern president. Because that is the only way you can preserve the unity of, ah, of this country. Because it is only for four years. Bring that southerner and see. Because they have not been given this opportunity for years and they say they need this opportunity. So if they are really genuine about unity, they would have brought a southerner. I suspect, they are not very genuine. And I think they want the unity because of economic resources. Not, not, they are not actually in real unity, which is equality of the people.

The two interview partners who give preference to unity fear that the South is incapable of running a state on its own. They are both *disrupted* females who worry about their own returns to the South. One of them, Rebecca, a 33-year-old Lotuka, came to the North when she was three

[898] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 14

years old and never went back. She believes that without a harbour the South cannot develop a strong economy and that it will be better to change the system of the entire country. The other one, Maria, a 39-year-old Balanda, has come to Khartoum at the age of 17 and is highly involved in the development of her home area. She is travelling to the South at least ones a year and eventually wants to move back. Yet, before anything else, she wants her children to finish their education in the North and furthermore feels discriminated and excluded in the South. She has adjusted to many aspects of the northern culture and worries about not being accepted back in the South. She believes that intertribal conflicts will increase and that Dinka will dominate the system. She wants peace and believes that this can be better accomplished in unity with the North.

Schomerus and Allen (2010) explain that particularly among smaller tribes fear of Dinka domination and Dinka territorial expansion are pervasive.[899] Maria, for example, is a Balanda from Western Bahr el Ghazal. She emphasised that the people from her region were not included in the political process and coincides with her preference for unity with more than 20% of the people of Western Bahr el Ghazal.[900] In this research, it was impossible to assess what influence the region of origin and ethnic affiliations have on political attitudes. Nevertheless, concerns about marginalisation, unequal power and wealth-sharing, and exclusion in the South, certainly exist and differ from individual to individual and may also depend on ethnic factors.

As a matter of fact, the clear majority of interview partners shares the attitude that the problems of the South need to be subordinated until the real problem, the relationship with the North, is solved. To them the referendum is what Schomerus and Allen (2010) call the "decision day"[901] after which all points of concern can be addressed. Apart from the two *disrupted* women and the undecided among *the adapted*, all other interview partners would agree with Gabriel, a 46-year-old Kakwa from Yei, when he said:

[899] cf. Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 20 ff.
[900] in Western Bar el Ghazal (n = 118) about 21% of the respondents indicated voting for unity, for comparison, in Eastern Equatoria (n = 139) only about 6% and in Upper Nile (n = 45) about 9% of the respondents indicated voting for unity; numbers taken from Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 30
[901] Schomerus and Allen (2010), p. 96

> The referendum is like a golden spoon in the hand and it is up to us to scoop what we want. If we want to continue living as servants, we can continue like this. We feel it very much, you have open eyes, you see exactly the inequality. So are we going to continue like this, like we are worth less? We are given the chance, yes, we have to take the opportunity. So please, the world has forgotten about this, but we are still waiting for our chance. So the referendum is in our hands.

The fact that many interview partners indicated not wanting to return to the South – yet felt forced to return in case of separation and, nevertheless, still gave preference to secession – shows that they give priority to political long-term developments before their own short-term welfare. In fact, the majority feels that *breaking the chain* is the only right step to take, irrespective to its consequences; albeit not without expecting many new problems for their country and for themselves.

7 Conclusion

In spite of being part of a privileged and considerably well-off elite, interview partners feel like *second-class citizens*. *Feeling like a second-class citizen* has been elaborated into the core category of this research and in the process of selective coding all other categories have been related to it. It has been selected as core category for its explanatory reach and high relevance, its unifying capacity and its predictive power. The core category precisely describes the situation of interview partners in Khartoum and their relations to the majority society and the state. It is dynamic, takes into account process, and embraces past, present and future. The analysis has shown that the war, and its continuation in the present, has left wounds, which are too deep to ever be forgiven and which will eternally set the research group apart from the majority society.

When interview partners left the South to come to the North, they entered into *the war of the mind*. Once in Khartoum, they were confronted with *the gap* between themselves and the majority society. While differences, such as language, culture and religion are considered to be comparatively natural, *racism* and *the deep distrust towards all that is Arab* are insuperable and make *the gap* unbridgeable. Additionally, the Sudanese state is *fighting a cold war* against them. It is their enemy and abuses its power against them. Southern Sudanese in Khartoum are not integrated into the system and not given any political power.

Instead, a culture and religion is imposed onto them. Through making the Arab identity the national identity, the state automatically excluded all African non-Muslim Sudanese.

The gap and *the cold war of the government* are intertwined and mutually effecting each other. The state does not only sponsor persecution, but also condones and tolerates it, thus giving the majority society considerable power to take action against the research group without consequences. Like this, distrust is increased. Nevertheless, there are a number of interview partners who believe that if it was not for the ill-intentions of the government and their policies, the ordinary people of Sudan would manage to coexist peacefully, as they have done before.

To master *the war of the mind*, interview partners perform action strategies to reduce exposure and to deal with it. In order to maintain a positive self-image, interview partners hold their own devaluating stereotypes against the majority society and many, furthermore, spend considerable time in alternative communities to compensate the lack of integration into the majority society. The state being a clear superiority, research participants are rather powerless and can do little to protect themselves but avoiding contact and *playing a low profile*. To protect their children from developing an inferiority complex, parents try to keep them apart from the majority society.

Interview partners vary in their individual profiles and their use of action strategies. In the research analysis, differing conditions were taken into consideration and interview partners were grouped into four types of *second-class citizens*: *the outsider, the pragmatist, the disrupted* and *the adapted*. Through this, it is possible to anticipate how people with certain characteristics and contexts respond to *the war of the mind*. Further research might bring about more types of *second-class citizens*. This dissertation project had a clear frame. Yet, additional investigation based on the presented work, for example on southern Sudanese who are less strict on the maintenance of their southern identity or have even converted to Islam, might bring about additional types of *second-class citizens* and interesting points for comparison.

Because interview partners define themselves as inherently southern Sudanese, each of them, if wanting to enter into relations with the majority society, whether out of pragmatism or voluntarily, has to obey and endure. The majority society puts limits on who may enter into their system and also establishes a clear order for the interior of the system. Non-fulfilment of requirements is punished with expulsion and causes counter-demarcation by *outsiders* and (whenever possible) *pragmatists* and feelings of *deep sorrow of being socially excluded* in the case of *disrupted* and *adapted.* Society is not completely closed; *pragmatists, disrupted* and *adapted* manage to cross the line and to partially enter. However, this is only possible through obedience and endurance and even the most integrated among the *second-class citizens* only tip their toe into the majority society.

Action strategies allow interview partners to master their lives in Khartoum, yet, they do not overcome *the war of the mind*. The CPA has improved the situation in Khartoum, but it has neither bridged *the gap* nor terminated *the cold war of the government*. Research participants continue to be assigned low status in the social order and are still systematically disadvantaged in jobs, social resources and politics. Official policies of exclusion and discrimination by the state reinforce *the social gap*. A code of racial etiquette directs the majority society to treat southern Sudanese as inferior and southern Sudanese to act deferentially toward non-southern Sudanese. The presence of the SPLM provides a new self-esteem to research participants, but *the war of the mind* is still continuing. In fact, the ostensible peace brings to light the true faces and attitudes of southern and northern Sudanese and herewith even deepens *the gap*.

The research group continues fearing the state; distrust has not nearly been tackled, thus deepening the rift. Hence, all research participants fear that when the SPLM leaves, society and state will turn against them and put their lives at risk. Accordingly, all but *the adapted* who does not consider the South a viable alternative to his natural environment Khartoum, planed to return before the referendum, albeit with serious worries. Return was considered inevitable; yet, it was also considered to put the life and education of the children at jeopardy. Inveterate underdevelopment and the fear of being excluded as jallabas rendered return into an unpopular necessity for a large part of the research group.

Some *disrupted* and *adapted* still held the hope that they would be able to prolong their stay after the referendum; all others felt compelled to leave before the referendum or at least before the separation.

Despite all worries about the situation in the South – including corruption, exclusion and discrimination, underdevelopment and tribal conflicts – prolonging the *life as a second-class citizen* has never been a long-term option. The larger part of the research group viewed the national elections as the ultimate proof of the North's unwillingness to share power with the South. If the northern regime and society had really wanted to make unity attractive, they would have given presidency to a southern Sudanese, so is the perception. Having failed to make unity attractive to interview partners, what in the case of many certainly was impossible, the ultimate strategy they perform in response to *second-class citizenship* is *breaking the chain*. The overwhelming majority of research participants clearly aspire to complete secession, no matter at which price. *Breaking the chain* means guaranteeing a better future to the coming generations. The referendum, hence, is "the golden spoon", a unique opportunity to stop history from repeating itself. Whether peacefully or by force, to them separation is the only way for the South to escape the spiral of underdevelopment and discrimination.

VII Resumé and Conclusions

1 Resumé

The focus of interest of this study has been the marginalisation of minorities in Sudan. Special emphasis has been put on the situation of southern Sudanese and, to provide new insights on the issue, a particular group – southern Sudanese living in Khartoum – has been analysed in depth. The research has revealed that interview partners, in spite of their supposedly privileged situation, *feel like second-class citizens* of the country and socially, economically and politically excluded. In fact, they do not only feel excluded, but indeed fought against. The wounds that the war and, particularly, its continuation in the present have left are too deep to be overcome or forgiven and will continue to set the research group and the majority society apart. Instead of advancing reconciliation and rapprochement between its various people, the government pushes them further apart. Government institutions and policies are racist and discriminative, while authorities are clearly perceived as a dangerous enemy abusing its power.

The analysis of concepts such as ethnicity, race, culture and identity, has confirmed that in Sudan one single identity determines one's place in the hierarchical society. The country is dominated by a strong Arabic, Islamic identity; ethnicity – including race, religion and language – forms a remarkably comprehensive aspect of social life and organises a great deal of both individual and collective action. It is the organising principle at the core of most northern Sudanese institutions, political, economic, and social. Southern Sudanese are not integrated into the system and not given any political power. Being run as an Islamic state means clearly excluding all non-Muslims, but also all moderate or secular Muslims, who do not agree with the orthodox and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam postulated by the regime. Northern and southern Sudanese are culturally and religiously hybrid and neither of them can rightly be represented through a radical orthodox Arab identity. Hence, religious persecution, defined as "a situation of gross violation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or belief emanating from systematic and active state policy and action to harass, intimidate and punish individuals and religious groups in a manner that continuously infringe or threaten the right to life, personal integrity or

personal security",[902] can be found throughout the entire country; this includes the inter- and intra-religious sphere.

The relation between North and South has been historically disastrous; the slave raiding and enslavement left a particularly lasting and parting residue in the collective psyche of the Sudanese communities from which the slaves were taken.[903] Categories such as Islamic versus non-Islamic, Arab versus non-Arab, brown versus black became well-established, imposing "social meanings on social, cultural and religious differences among the people of the Sudan" and serving "as the basis for the structuring of society".[904] Strained relations were further exacerbated by the condominium rulers, who institutionalised the parting categories. Today, relations between North and South are stained by deep distrust. The South is the first nation of the country that has chosen to secede; yet, it might not be the last.

It has been noted that the authoritarian regime imposes great suffering on its own people, who, therefore, long for political transformation. The SPLM has been demanding a radical socio-political restructuring in Sudan, a restructuring of power and wealth, and the establishment of a real democracy in contrast to the alleged democracies of before.[905] Widespread economic and political discontent has recently provoked anti-government demonstrations in the North.[906] Accordingly, it has been investigated, how a state could be run in a way that allows bonding a multination state together without imposing a forced nationalism on them. Multinational federalism, which facilitates the creation of regional political units controlled by the national minorities with substantial powers of self-government, has been identified as an alternative to the centralised state.[907] However, in spite of formally being a federal state, so far, the government has been reluctant to share its power with the federal units. As a matter of fact, the ruling party is all pervasive and deeply penetrates into all administrative, political, fiscal and economic spheres; all the important positions are occupied by members of a small elite.

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[902] Eltayeb (2001), p. 34
[903] cf. Jok (2007), p. 53
[904] Idris (2005), p. 32
[905] Khalid (1992), p. xxv
[906] cf. Sudan Tribune (30.01.2011)
[907] Kymlicka (2004), p. 58

It has been noted that neither Islam per se nor being a post-colonial developing country prevents democratic transformation from happening. In fact, the absence of democratic political systems in Muslim and developing countries is much more a product of misdistribution of socioeconomic powers than it is owed to cultural underpinning of these societies; first and foremost, shortcomings are owed to oppressive, anti-democratic authoritarian regimes. Put simply, the question of which changes are possible for a country does not primarily depend on religion or culture, but its leadership. At the same time, it has also been shown that democracy is an unavoidably relative and value-laden term and a concept that cannot be imposed on any state. Instead, any unit that aspires to democratic transformation has to design its own, context-related concept. In the African context, it is especially important to acknowledge that liberal democracy presupposes an individualism that cannot be found in rural Africa.

In rejection of earlier scholarship and models of the unitary homogenous nation state, where national homogeneity was given clear priority, concepts of multiculturalism arose.[908] A multicultural approach to society acknowledges the fact that the state is never culturally neutral – for it inevitably reflects the interests and perspectives of the dominant elements of society – and therefore promotes minority rights.[909] It has been analysed, if the Western-based concept of multiculturalism can even be applied to non-Western countries and the Sudan in specific. Although it is apparently easier to adopt multiculturalism, where liberal democracy is already established, it is exactly the opposite type of countries, namely those where democracy has not been consolidated, in which violent conflicts are notorious and where a peacefully way of ethnic co-existence is urgently needed. Indeed, the struggle of minorities in Sudan and other African countries has many parallels with the struggle of Western minorities.[910] Although, to parrot a foreign concept will not be the solution, "the underlying dialectic of nation-building and minority rights is similar" and "justice in multi-ethnic countries will always require some balancing of nation-building and minority rights."[911] Multiculturalist concepts have been found to be approaching diversity in

[908] cf. Kymlicka (2007), p. 61 ff.
[909] cf. Tilley (2003), p. 46 ff.
[910] cf. Kymlicka (2004), p. 65 ff.
[911] Kymlicka (2004), p. 69 ff.

an inclusive and culture-friendly manner, providing minorities with a wide spectrum of freedom. Instead of advancing liberal, difference-blind citizenship, for multiculturalists equal treatment does not necessarily mean equality, thus advocating differentiated citizenship.[912] However, in a society like the Sudanese, which is not merely multicultural, but also profoundly racialised, multiculturalism has to be practised in a way, which does not cloak its racialised structures but explicitly addresses them. At the same time, it also has to be kept in mind that focusing on the rights of ethnic minorities can easily overshadow the needs of their individual members or differing aspirations by elites and the ordinary people of the same group.

Important to note, ethnicity and race alone are not capable of explaining the present conflicts of the country. Instead, violence over ethnicity and religion "can be considered fundamentally due to a perception of an uneven distribution of power resources among competing power groups".[913] In Sudan, power and wealth are centralised; conflict in large is owed to a huge centre-periphery divide, which is characterised by Khartoum being a clear "primate city"[914] and the peripheries being chronically underdeveloped. Without equal distribution of wealth, the conflicts of the country cannot be solved. Since 1992, the production of oil has, in particular, "turned to become a new factor of conflict among the elites and between the elites and socially marginalized groups in the country."[915] Since the first export of crude oil, in August 1999, which according to Babiker (2007) "marked a turning point in the country's complex civil war",[916] oil became a principal cause of the North-South war. The origins of conflicts in Sudan are multifaceted and include ethnic and economic inequities, social exclusion of segments of the population, social injustice, competition for scarce resources, poverty, religious differences, political tension and racism.

Today, the only way the authoritarian regime can bond together its people is through brute force and total control. With ongoing discrimination and marginalisation, southern Sudanese came to feel that there was no legitimate state and no obligation to obey to it. The central

[912] cf. Kymlicka and Norman (2000), p. 30 ff.
[913] Abootalebi (200), p. 8
[914] Abdel Rahman (1991), p. 246
[915] Wohlmuth (2007), p. 11
[916] Babiker (2007), p. 147

government has chosen to deal with its minorities through forced assimilation and total control. The case of the South, however, has proved that success of these strategies is limited and other segments of the country are voicing their desire for independence already. Only a genuine and profound change of attitude in the Sudanese society, transformation towards a more inclusive approach to society and fair power- and wealth-sharing might have prevented southern Sudanese from choosing secession and might prevent other parts of the country from making similar claims in the future.

It follows, that taking away the southern element will not significantly change the situation in the North. Same as the South, many other areas in Sudan have suffered from conspicuous neglect and been marginalised in the power- and wealth-sharing at the central level. Darfur forms another compact minority and its regional elite has not attained any adequate share of power and wealth proportional to the importance of the area in terms of geographic size and population.[917] Accordingly, today, Darfuris demand the right of self-determination in a manner similar to the South. Consecutive governments since independence have clearly failed to cope up with history and uneven development, thus, setting the country on the track of disintegration.

Especially since the emergence of the current regime, relations among the various groups have been getting worse and distrust is growing deeper. Whatever sensation of Sudanism has existed before has been overshadowed by the radical orthodox identity imposed on the hybrid people of Sudan. As Collins (2008) asked, "Who are the Sudanese? Arab, African, Muslim, Christian, or Traditionalists? Belonging to two worlds, Arab and African, but not identified solely with either, the individuality of many ethnicities has been melted and forged into a new, unique, and distinct identity called 'Sudanese.'" However, as he goes on explaining, "[a]t the time when the evolution of this idea had gained its greatest momentum, it was suddenly and dramatically challenged in 1989 by the Islamist revolution, which sought to end the search for identity by the homogenization of Sudanese society in which all Sudanese would identify with being Arab and with practicing fundamental Islam."[918] Hence, violence is the primary mode of rule. The

[917] cf. Ahmed (2007), p. 219 ff.
[918] Collins (2008), p. 302

devastating situation of IDPs living in camps and squatter areas in Khartoum, who are subject to terrible state-sponsored harassments, abuses and abductions, bluntly demonstrates the regime's attitude towards large parts of its people. The recent southern vote for independence has therefore not come by surprise, but was a natural response to the state not accepting them as equal members of society.

Not even the privileged southern elite living in Khartoum aspires to unity with the North. In Khartoum research participants led an economically advantaged life, had access to health services and, most importantly, to good school education for their children. In the South on the contrary, they are being awaited by underdevelopment, possible discrimination for having fled to the North, and for many a start from zero, without a property, without a job, without the environment they have become accustomed to over the last 20 years and more.

In spite of feeling forced to carry out the often unwanted return to the South in case of separation, interview participants are willing to accept any inconveniences for this unique chance in history to liberate themselves from northern oppression. Ever since Sudan's independence, the South has been trying to accomplish independence from the North. Until today, southern Sudanese have been ignored and betrayed in their demands and constantly been excluded from the political decision-making process. In July 2011, they will try again to form an independent nation, yet many key issues remain unsolved and the ruling NCP already started to request an extension of the interim period beyond the July 9th date stipulated by the CPA, before the referendum results were even released officially.[919] Beyond doubt, even an independent South will still be facing numerous challenges, most notably chronic underdevelopment, badly developed political structures and high influxes of returnees from all over the world.

2 The second-class citizens of Sudan

The presented research deals with the situation of the marginalised people of Sudan. The empirical investigation has shed light on the strained relations of southern Sudanese professionals living in Khartoum with the majority society of the capital and the state. It contributes

[919] cf. Sudan Tribune (25.01.2011)

significantly to the understanding of the forces which led southern Sudanese to opt for secession. Furthermore, it provides a more general understanding on the structuring of Sudanese society, which is reason for numerous other conflicts inside the country.

Extensive empiric investigation has been conducted during two field stays in Khartoum. According to the emerging knowledge, literature has been reviewed extensively, and empiricism and theoretic research have been brought together in one comprehensive grounded theory. Process has been captured and the field of research, as well as the research group, have been viewed as subject to change. Doing newsworthy research necessitates dealing with a changing environment, particularly, in such eventful times as Sudan finds itself in at the moment. Additionally, interview partners have been identified as highly sensitive to current happenings. The changing nature of the context has been analytically incorporated and individuals have been embraced in their nature as active, strategic players.

Although all interview partners were required to have been living in the capital for at least 20 years and to have a high daily exposure to the majority society, not a single one of them felt included into the society of Khartoum or the system. Instead, interview partners perceive themselves primarily as the *second-class citizens* of the country. History has widely contributed to this self-image. When being reproduced, history determines the present and perspectives for reconciliation with the past become remote.[920] Interview partners have described the society of Khartoum as hierarchic, with the so-called “Arabs” forming the first-class citizens on the top, while they are *second-class citizens* on the bottom. Other African Sudanese, such as the Darfuris, are located in between these two. They discriminate against the lowest in rank and are discriminated against by the highest in rank.

Indeed, the Sudanese society is not merely multicultural, but highly racial with clear structural inequality between the dominant group and cultural minorities. Southern Sudanese and other Sudanese Africans are systematically excluded from opportunities for achieving status and income; through modes of racism they are subject to stereotypes, lack recognised political voice, and the majority of them lives in segregated

[920] Deng (1995), p. 75

neighbourhoods, often even camps. Interview partners, accordingly, felt that the war had still not come to an end but continued to be fought against them in Khartoum. They felt engaged in what they called *the war of the mind*. *The war of the mind* refers to the social, economic and political discrimination and hostility that southern Sudanese are subject to in Khartoum. The social, economic and political cannot be fully distinguished; instead spheres are mutually influencing and reinforcing each other.

In spite of their extensive stays in the North, interview partners still felt a wide and unbridgeable *gap* between themselves and the majority society. Northern and southern Sudanese are divided by linguistic, cultural and religious differences. Yet, if it was not for the forceful imposition by the state, boundaries would be much softer and some interview partners believe that if it was not for the parting policies, the ordinary people of Sudan would manage to coexist peacefully, as they have done before. Under these conditions, however, the language barrier and cultural and religious differences, such as practice of traditions, clothing styles, and gender segregation, continue to complicate interaction and are regarded as symbolic of immutable difference between the two groups. Besides these exaggerated, supposedly "natural" differences, it is, however, blunt *racism* and *the deep distrust towards all that is Arab*, which makes *the gap* unbridgeable. Furthermore, deviation from the group position is commonly punished by the communities of both sides, northern and southern, and therefore prevents individuals from acting according to their experience with other individuals. Instead, it is the group position which determines relations and not personal perceptions and individual experience.

The war of the mind does not only embrace relations to the Khartoum society, but also to the authoritarian state, which is perceived to be fighting *a cold war against southern Sudanese*. The state does not only fail to protect segments of its people, but instead even takes hostile action against them. Southern Sudanese feel rejected by the central state, the institutions of which are not perceived as serving the *second-class citizens*, but as means of oppression and exploitation. Through social and institutionalised marginalisation, southern Sudanese face serious disadvantages in their economic development, which is taken as

a symbol and verification of the marginalisation of the entire South. The government is said to maintain all southern Sudanese poor, so that they cannot pose threat to their monopoly of power.

Institutional and political exclusion reinforce the feeling that the *second-class citizens* of the state are not meant to benefit from their formal citizenship. The official policy of the government towards southern Sudanese is extremely hostile to social integration and directly affects relations between the research group and the majority society. Instead of advocating the consolidation of the various groups of the country, the government treats southern Sudanese and other marginalised people as if they were not part of the country, herewith, denying large segments of its people their citizenship. Institutionalised exclusion clearly conditions social interaction. The regime, with its policies of segregation, exacerbates the deep distrust and drives the wedge between the ordinary people even deeper. It does not only sponsor persecution, but also condones and tolerates it, thus giving the majority society considerable power to take action against the research group. Northern Sudanese who, for example, denounce their southern Sudanese neighbours for inappropriate behaviour – such as Christian prayers or traditional dancing – are backed up by official authorities, who take action against supposedly anti-Islamic behaviour. Frequently, suspects are detained after such denunciations, leading to interview partners not daring to practise their culture even inside their own homes.

Interview partners, in spite of certainly feeling anger on their exclusion and marginalisation, have not adapted a negative self-image. Instead, they developed their own stereotypes against northern Sudanese and often even consider themselves as superior. Nevertheless, they fear that their children's self-images could be changed through the image suggested by the majority society, the media and the system. As a consequence, they try to keep them as separated as possible.

Although sharing the feeling of being *second-class citizens*, the research group is heterogeneous and four types of *second-class citizens* have emerged during the analysis. With this set of categories and through the elaboration of attributes and dimensions according to intervening conditions and the changing context, it can be anticipated how individuals respond to changing circumstances. The four types of *second-class citizens* are:

- *The outsider*
- *The pragmatist*
- *The disrupted*
- *The adapted*

The perception of *the war of the mind* is highest among *the outsider* and *the pragmatist*, while *the disrupted* and *the adapted* have a more moderate assessment. Nevertheless, all four types feel like *second-class citizens* and attend to action strategies, meaning purposeful, goal-oriented strategic activities performed in response to the all-pervasive *war of the mind*. *The outsider* and *the pragmatist* use reducing strategies to a maximum extent possible. Yet, *the pragmatist* is in a situation, in which he/she cannot avoid high exposure and therefore also strongly attends to coping strategies. Through this, he/she manages, for example, unavoidable relations at his/her place of work inside a northern company or with teachers and students at a northern university. *The pragmatist* is of all types of *second-class citizens* the most sensitive to changing circumstances. If pragmatic reasons to cooperate cease – for example because of empowerment through the CPA or perspectives of return – he/she can easily be turned into an *outsider*.

The disrupted and *the adapted* are the only ones who enter into relations with the majority society beyond pragmatism or sheer unavoidability. Both types usually came to the North at an early age and know “Khartoum Arabic” well. *The disrupted* is the only one who is seriously engaged in an identity crisis. *Outsiders* and *pragmatists* have very firm southern identities. *The adapted* have accepted Khartoum as their natural environment and look at themselves as southern Sudanese who have been brought up outside their communities; they accept their own identity as natural under the circumstances they grew up in. *The disrupted*, on the contrary, enters into an identity crisis. *Disrupted* want to be accepted, at least to a certain extent, by the majority society. Yet, for this, they have to give up on parts of their own identity, which causes them feelings of grief and rejection. Wanting to be included into two completely different, and widely evaluated as conflicting, communities prevents them from feeling like a full member of any of the two.

The politisation of interview partners through own experience of discrimination, observance of discrimination of other southern Sudanese or, for example, the work in a politically engaged organisation can cause

"upwards" movements in the set of categories. Official rhetoric and the need of taking a clear position in the process of nation-building in the South primarily affect and radicalise *outsiders* and *pragmatists*. This also correspondents with the gender composition of the different types of *second-class citizens*. Male interview partners usually cling to a clear political and ethnic positioning attended by a strong nationalist discourse. Hereby, they try to advance their individual objectives and are primarily found among *the outsiders* and *pragmatists*. Female interview partners, on the contrary, have been identified as more flexible players, who can tolerate the ambiguity of belonging to more than one group and are, primarily, found among *the disrupted* and *the adapted*.

The CPA has improved the situation in Khartoum, but it has neither bridged *the gap* nor terminated *the cold war of the government*. Research participants continue to be assigned low status in the social order and are still systematically disadvantaged in jobs, social resources and politics. The CPA has failed to create trust or to make unity attractive. Instead, in some cases, relations have even gotten worse. Because only policies have changed but not attitudes, *the gap* is further widening as a consequence of a new southern self-esteem interview partners gained through the CPA. The more authentic the two groups behave, the further they seem to drift apart.

Consequently, the vast majority of interview partners want to *break the chain* and to guarantee a future away from northern oppression to the coming generations. All but two *disrupted* interview partners firmly favour secession. All interview partners, apart from *the adapted*, are furthermore highly prone to *return to the South* before secession. Yet, return is mainly associated with underdevelopment, poverty, exclusion and misery. If it was not for the expected insecurity in post-referendum Khartoum, the majority would delay their return at least until their children have finished their school education. Under current circumstances, however, they have to choose between the devil and the deep-blue sea and the majority are likely to return against fears and anxiety.

In sum, the empiric investigation has revealed that, in spite of being part of the most privileged group of southern Sudanese living in Sudan, interview partners feel like *second-class citizens* of the country and base their perception, above all, on their own – and still ongoing – experience

in Khartoum. Their education and relative wealth and the fact that they live and work right in the inner city alongside with the majority society, apparently, has not brought about rapprochement. Instead, they are highly affected by the southern nationalism as well as the parting policies of the central government and its consequences. These finding are maintained by conclusions Abusharaf (2009) drew in her research on IDPs. She discovered that displaced Sudanese, who live inside shantytowns and camps in Khartoum, contrary to official policies, cooperate across ethno cultural and religious lines regardless of official policies and discriminations.[921] In contrast to the privileged research group, the more marginalised southern Sudanese in Khartoum, often "think of themselves as belonging to the urban poor who live on the fringes of the Sudanese capital".[922] To them, the unifying element of poverty is more important than those, often highly politicised, elements parting the privileged groups in Khartoum.

3 Conclusions

Sudan might be at a turning point in its history. Southern Sudanese have voted for secession and are due to form their own independent state in July 2011, when the interim period stipulated by the CPA officially comes to an end.[923] Considering the long history of oppression, the South had basically only two choices: either continuous ethnic discrimination and tension or secession.

Due to international policies, nationalist movements seeking for independence from an officially recognised and independent state usually meet little international support. The South has been trying to secede from the North ever since the country's independence. The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement was an important attempt, which however – largely due to the lack of international support – failed. As a consequence, Sudan experienced another 22 years of devastating civil war. It is time for the North and the world to realise that secession is inevitable. The research has revealed that southern Sudanese are by no means prepared to subordinate to the official Arab, Islamic identity and will not agree to the status of *second-class citizens* – i.e. social, political and economic exclusion and discrimination – in their own country. This

[921] cf. Abusharaf (2009), p. 73 ff.
[922] Abusharaf (2009), p. 11
[923] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011); cf. Sudan Tribune (07.02.2011)

firm stance fully coincides with the unambiguous results of the referendum, in which nearly 99% of the voters favoured secession.[924]

Southern Sudanese's separatist aspirations are not merely self-motivated, but indeed sparked by the attitudes and behaviours of the majority society and the state. The nation-building project in Sudan has failed, trust has not been created and unity cannot be maintained peacefully. The international community will have to accept these facts. Interview partners are highly aware of the fragility of the CPA and hope for the support of the international community and the official recognition of their independent state. The failure of the CPA to solve the other conflicts of the country demonstrates that a regionally bilateral agreement is not sufficient for a country plagued by nation-wide conflict and, in order to prevent further fragmentation, more holistic approaches that include all segments of the country will be needed.

In order to survive, multination states need their national groups to feel some kind of alliance to the larger political community they cohabit. In Sudan, this need led to a forceful imposition of one national identity; yet, a shared patriotism would have been enough. Through this, the regime created a situation in which nationalism – the emotional attachment to one's people, one's ethno-national group – and patriotism – the emotional attachment to one's state or country and its political institutions – exclude each other. In such a case, where the two loyalties of nationalism and patriotism are perceived as being in irreconcilable conflict, meaning when people are forced to choose between them, nationalism customarily proves the more potent.[925] With its stubborn attempts to homogenise the Sudanese society and its forced campaigns of Arabisation and Islamisation, the regime has, in fact, created the opposite of what it wanted and hereby provoked the disintegration of the country. It is clear now that complete and uncontested homogeneity is not achievable, neither with nor without violence, and should therefore not be insisted on. In fact, national groups feel alliance to the larger state when it recognises and respects their distinct national existences and when they benefit from their membership, not when being forced to comply with an identity alien to them. History cannot be undone, but it can be learned from. Since Khartoum is not prepared to share power

[924] cf. BBC News (07.02.2011)
[925] Connor (1998), p. 54

and to de-racialise and change the state system in a way that allows peaceful coexistence with nominal equality, it should stop insisting in unity and give the South its chance to develop independently.

Nevertheless, even after the secession of the South, numerous challenges remain for both the North and the South. Secession must not be misunderstood as panacea for peace in any of the two units. It is an inevitable consequence of history, but not the solution to the conflicts of the country. Importantly, it must not be forgotten that the southern Sudanese are by far not the only marginalised people of Sudan. On the contrary, they will leave behind a widely oppressed and marginalised population, which is not provided with a similar choice of whether to remain with the authoritarian regime or to break away.

Both parts of the country have to start constructing themselves anew; in Sudan "there is no static 'before,' no golden era of peace and stability that was suddenly interrupted by armed conflict"[926] and therefore, there is no model that the Sudanese could return to. If the Sudanese people – northern and/or southern – aspire to democratic transformation, they will first of all have to escape poverty. With the people being too poor and marginalised to get involved into politics, democracy is impracticable. "Though presently classified as poor, the Sudan has all the potential of becoming a rich nation. The country has abundance of land, minerals and manpower."[927] Likewise there are sufficient water resources, oil and natural gas. Yet, "rather than serving as a stimulant for accelerated development, the need to control these resources and the revenues obtained from the extraction of oil have turned the resources as the cause for and a source for the prolongation of the devastating civil war in the country."[928] Resources can only promote growth, if they are combined with the appropriate governance, yet, this is clearly absent in Sudan. In order to benefit and be able to productively use the abundant resources, Sudan has to embark on institution building. Necessary actions to tackle these problems are "long-run planning towards a broad-based development strategy, commitment at all state levels, addressing the political economy effects by good governance measures, outlining a

[926] Abusharaf (2009), p. 3
[927] Abdalla (2001), p. 47
[928] Denu (2007), p. 55

new fiscal policy strategy and the building-up of related fiscal institutions, and designing and implementing a broad institutions build-up".[929]

Whether as one state or two separate states, the North and the South will continue to depend on each other. Even if the South will separate, a peaceful post-referendum era will depend on the cooperation of the two parts. Denu (2007) explains that "[w]illingness to recognize the past without remaining its prisoner may be a first step toward correcting the injustices of the past and constructing a shared future built on mutual respect and accommodation. […] Peace cannot be realized without an acknowledgment of the violence that has ripped the fabric of Sudan's communities."[930] As a matter of fact, the parties still have to negotiate many issues related to their future relations and peaceful separation on time, so far, remains but a hope.

The northern and the southern society have been identified as highly heterogeneous. Both states will therefore have to come to terms with the multicultural nature of their territories. Unfortunately, the leadership of Sudan has been identified as one of the greatest forces against transformation towards the fair distribution of power and wealth. The regime of al-Bashir has been identified as authoritarian, self-serving and unwilling to facilitate democratic change or share power and wealth with the whole of the Sudanese people. There is little reason for hope that his regime will change its ideology or ways of dealing with society. On the contrary, al-Bashir has already announced that, after the secession of the South, the North will be further Islamised. The complete ignorance for the needs of the multicultural society of the North is bluntly reflected in statements recently made by the president, such as, "If god forbids, the South separates [then] the constitution will be amended [and] a lot of things relating to the South will go away," going on, "But the opaque talk [about] the Sudanese people I don't know what…is multi-racial and multi-religious, the [Islamic] Shari'a will be the main source for lawmaking….and Arabic language will the official language of the state as will be stipulated in the upcoming constitution".[931] In such a dramatic development, major parts of the northern Sudanese society would be further deprived from their rights. The northern government believes its

[929] Wohlmuth (2007), p. 26
[930] Iyob and Khadiagala (2006), p. 177
[931] Sudan Tribune (19.12.2010)

own interpretation of Islam to be the only true one, thus being anti-pluralistic and not giving any value to other interpretations or religions. Instead of acknowledging the diversity of the Sudanese people, the president appears determined to continue to rule through force and oppression. Peaceful coexistence and an inclusive approach to the multicultural society of the North are, indeed, moving completely beyond reach.

But the South, too, faces serious challenges in the dealing with its diverse people. As a consequence of history and current events, ethnic loyalties are stronger than ties to the SPLM. Violence is omnipresent and the state security is facing difficulties in gaining control. The SPLM still struggles with transforming from a rebel movement into the legitimate bearer of the monopoly of power. Yet, without appropriate institutions of governance, the resources of the South will not be able to promote growth and urgently needed development;[932] all the more, since the "Southern Sudan government operations start at about 100% dependency on oil revenues."[933] Additionally, the security situation in the South continues to worsen, ethnic tensions continue to grow, and tribal groups are fracturing from within. The South is still struggling at all fronts, including state-building, disarmament, power and wealth sharing, poverty reduction, education, health provisions, infrastructure, repatriation, minority rights, etc. Refugees, IDPs and other populations displaced by war including ex-combatants are returning to the South to settle, which inevitably implicates competition for limited resources and economic positions.[934] During the Addis Ababa peace, the negative impacts of internal competition have become very clear and lessons learnt from history should not be forgotten. When regional autonomy was attained a fierce competition between returning refugees, Anya Nya soldiers and those who had remained inside started. During this time, tribalism increased drastically and the elite's political culture, obsessed with job-distribution, prompted an increasing emergence of a Dinka domination issue at the end of the 1970s, which has not ceased to this day.[935] A peaceful coexistence in the independent South will need

[932] cf. Denu (2007), p. 55
[933] Wassara (2007), p. 141
[934] cf. Gore (2007), p. 177 f.
[935] cf. Tvedt (1994), p. 70 ff.

economic development and a balanced distribution of wealth among the heterogeneous society.

The identity of the South has been evaluated as an identity of resistance, which, without the shared enemy will have little unifying power. With secession, new majority/minority relations will emerge, most likely based on a lower level of ethnicity with smaller and smaller nationalism oppressing smaller and smaller minorities. If parts of the southern population feel further marginalised and excluded by new rulers, peace will not persist. The South needs to remember that "[e]thnic and religious division and rivalry can be overcome when socioeconomic and political power resources are more equally distributed across ethnic divisions."[936] In the end, one of the biggest sources of challenges, after the possible secession, might be the lack of political commitment for far-reaching reforms in the South. Until today, the GOSS seems to be indifferent on whether to give priority to the own enrichment or the development of the South; a dispute which will hopefully be decided for the benefits of the people of the South. Otherwise, separation might just bring about a new elite, which oppresses new minorities, leading to the repetition of the devastating history of marginalisation that the ordinary southern Sudanese are trying to escape from.

[936] Abootalebi (2000), p. 8

Appendix

Appendix 1

List of interview partners in order of conduct of interviews

	Year of birth	Age at arrival to the North	Years lived in the North (2009)	Years lived in KTH (2009)	Place of origin in the South	Ethnic group	Occupation	Wohnort	Number and year(s) of interview(s)
Jason	1966	22	21	21	Juba	Bari proper	UN / Lokal NGO	Azhari (urban district Khartoum)	1 – 2008 1 – 2009
Michael	1965	20	24	24	Jambo	Moru	Northern private company	Urban district Omdurman	1 – 2008
Vincent	1968	19	22	22	Yei	Kakwa	Lokal NGO	Abu-Seid (south of urban district Omdurman)	1 – 2008
Joshua	1968	20	21	21	Yei	Kakwa	Lokal NGO	Abu-Seid (south of urban district Omdurman)	1 – 2008
Martin	1972	8	22	22	Yei	Kakwa	Lokal NGO	Kalakala (south of urban district Khartoum)	1 – 2008 1 – 2009
Yuga	1968	20	21	21	Yei	Kakwa	Lokal NGO	Abu-Seid (south of urban district Omdurman)	1 – 2008
Gabriel	1963	26	20	13	Yei	Kakwa	International NGO	Kalakala (south of urban district Khartoum)	1 – 2008
Yousif	1963	25	21	21	Kajo Keji	Kuku	Northern private company / journalist	Padok (east of urban district Khartoum North)	2 – 2008 1 – 2009
Maria	1970	17	22	22	Wau	Balanda / Lugbwara (husband)	Lokal NGO	Buri (urban district Khartoum)	1 – 2008 3 – 2009
Betty	1983	0	26	26	Born in KTH	Adio (Makaraka)	Head mistress of a primary school	Sallamah (south of urban district Khartoum)	1 – 2008 2 – 2009
Jacob	1957	19	33	33	Kajo Keji	Kuku	Journalist	Urban district Khartoum	1 – 2008
Thomas	1968	21	20	20	Yei	Kakwa	Referend	Khartoum 2 (urban district Khartoum)	1 – 2008
Caesar	1954	12	31	28	North of Moyo (Uganda)	Kuku	Northern private company / journalist	Urban district Khartoum North	1 – 2008
Rebecca	1976	3	30	19	Torit	Lotuka	UN	Urban district Omdurman	1 – 2008
Allison	1980	9	20	20	Nimule	Madi / Bari proper (husband)	Lokal NGO	Azhari (urban district Khartoum)	2 – 2009
Jonas	1948	25	30	30	Yei	Adio (Makaraka)	Pilot	Sallamah (south of urban district Khartoum)	3 – 2009
Luka	1967	22	20	20	Juba	Bari proper	Private northern company	Abu-Seid (south of urban district Omdurman)	1 – 2009
Amath	1975	8	26	26	South of Abyei	Dinka	MP SPLM (northern secretariat)	District Khartoum	1 – 2009
Moses Machar						Dinka	Chairman of National Civil Service Commission (NCSC)		1 – 2008
Alfred Taban						Kuku	Editor-in-chief of the Khartoum Monitor		1 – 2008

Appendix 2

Description of interview partners' ethnic groups

Adio (Makaraka)	The name Adio is commonly referred to as Makaraka and it is difficult to trace its origin. The Adio are not a separate ethnicity per se, but are originally Azande. The Adio are found in Yei River District along the Yei – Maridi road. They number a few hundred.
Balanda	The Balanda inhabit the stretch of territory lying south-west of Wau and north-east of Tambura. Their main settlements include Mbili, Raffili, and others. They number about 40,000 to 50,000.
Bari proper	The Bari proper inhabit the whole of Juba district, which extends westwards as far Kigwado on the Juba-Yei road, northwards as far Luri; southwards as far as river Kaya and eastwards as far as Billinyang hills. They have to be seen as independent from the other Bari-speaking groups. They number about 70,000 and 80,000.
Dinka	The Dinka is the largest single national grouping in South Sudan. The Dinka are found in Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Southern Kordofan regions. Each Dinka section has a separate political entity with established rights to a well-defined territory. The main sections and sub-sections and their geographic locations include: Aweil, Pangak, Bailiet, Bentiu, Bor, Rumbek, Tonj, Gogrial, Yirol and Abyei. They number about 2.5 to 3 million.
Kakwa	The Kakwa are one of the Bari-speaking people. The Kakwa live in Yei River County, central Equatoria. However, they extend into west Nile District of Uganda and north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.
Kuku	The Kuku are found in the south-eastern part of central Equatoria and a few of them are found in West Nile District of Uganda. Their most important town is Kajo-Keji. They number about 20,000-30,000.
Lotuka	The Lotuka live in settlements. There are sixteen known such villages of which Iliu, Hiyala, Lobira, etc. are the most important in terms of their population dominance. They number about 69,000 to 70,000 (according to the 1983 population census crowded in the sixteen villages and Torit town).
Lugbwara	The Lugbwara inhabit the southernmost part of Yei River County in Central Equatoria. The nationality extends into the West Nile district of Uganda. They number a few thousand people.
Madi	The Madi people inhabit the south-western part of Torit district where the Nile River makes a sharp bend into Uganda. In Uganda, they are found in West Nile districts of Moyo and Adjumani. The civil war sufficiently diminished the number of Madi in the Sudan and most of their villages are now occupied by displaced people from other parts of the South.
Moru	The Moru are found in Mundri and Maridi Counties. The main towns are Mundri, Amadi, Lui, Jambo, Maridi, Kotobi and many other smaller settlements. They number about 80,000 to 100,000.
Nuer	The Nuer are believed to have separated - at a certain stage in the past - from the Dinka but in their latter development and migration assimilated many Dinka in their path. They now dominate large parts of Upper Nile extending from River Zeraf through Lou to Jikany areas on the River Baro and Pibor rivers. Nuer expansion pushed into western Ethiopia displacing the Anyuak more to the highlands. They are the second largest nationality in South Sudan.
Zande	Although by others known as Zande, they call themselves Azande. They are found in Maridi, Yambio and Tambura districts in the tropical rain forest belt of western Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal . The Azande are also found in DR Congo and Central African Republic; areas, which originally constituted part of the great Azande Kingdom destroyed by the Belgian, French, Mahdist and finally the British in the context of the European scramble for Africa. The Azande is the third largest nationality in South Sudan.

Information on ethnic groups have been taken from:
http://www.gurtong.net/Peoples/PeoplesProfiles/tabid/71/Default.aspx

Gurtong Trust - Peace and Media Project is an independent, non-profit, community-based project, which aims at removing all ethnic, political or personal obstacles on the way to unity, peace and mutual respect among South Sudanese. (Headed by Jacob Jiel Akol)

Appendix 3

Zusammenfassung

Die Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit der Marginalisierung von ethnischen Minoritäten im Sudan und untersucht die Beziehungen von in Khartum lebenden Südsudanesen zur Mehrheitsgesellschaft und dem Staat. Der Sudan befindet sich an einem geschichtlichen Wendepunkt; der Südsudan hat in einem Selbstbestimmungsreferendum mit überwältigender Mehrheit für die Abspaltung vom Sudan gestimmt und will nun im Juli 2011 einen unabhängigen Staat bilden. Erst im Jahr 2005 wurde das Friedensabkommen, das so genannte CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement), zwischen der Regierungspartei NCP (National Congress Party) und der südsudanesischen Rebellenbewegung SPLM/A (Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army) unterzeichnet und hiermit 22 Jahre verheerender Bürgerkrieg beendet. Obwohl der Nord-Süd Konflikt bei weitem nicht der einzige Konflikt im Land ist, ist das CPA ein bilaterales Abkommen. Es hat nicht zur Lösung der anderen Konflikte beigetragen und das Land droht vollständig zu zerfallen.

Der Sudan ist mit einer Fläche von 2.505.823 qkm[936] das größte Land Afrikas. Er ist keine historisch gewachsene Einheit, sondern ein Produkt des Kolonialismus und beherbergt eine multi-ethnische, multi-kulturelle, multi-religiöse und multi-linguistische Bevölkerung von etwa 43,94 Millionen Menschen.[937] Nichtsdestotrotz zwingt die Zentralregierung allen Sudanesen, unabhängig davon, ob sie Afrikaner oder Araber, Muslime oder Nicht-Muslime, Sufi-Muslime oder orthodoxe Muslime sind, eine radikale, orthodoxe islamisch-arabische Identität gewaltsam auf. Sämtliche Regierungsgewalt liegt ausschließlich in den Händen einer arabisch-islamischen zentralsudanesischen Elite, die eigennützig die Ressourcen des Landes für den eigenen Wohlstand nutzt. Die Zivilbevölkerung ist komplett marginalisiert und die „Peripherien" sind völlig unterentwickelt, denn die Regierung in Khartum zeigt keinerlei Interesse an der Entwicklung des Landes über den Kernbereich hinaus.

Der Sudan ist von der historischen Zweiteilung des Landes in Nord und Süd geplagt, die bis auf die Sklavenraubzüge zurückgeht, während der Kolonialzeit institutionalisiert wurde und dann von allen Regierungen nach der Unabhängigkeit übernommen und noch weiter verschärft wurde. Von den Südsudanesen wurde der Übergang in die Unabhängigkeit eher als ein Übergang zu einer neuen, arabisch-islamischen Kolonialära wahrgenommen. Mit Ausnahme einer kurzen Friedensphase

[936] vgl. CIA (07.10.2010)
[937] vgl. CIA (07.12.2010)

von 1972-1983 befand sich der Südsudan seit der Unabhängigkeit des Sudans im Jahr 1954 bis zur Unterzeichung des CPAs im Jahr 2005 in einem Sezessionskrieg.

In einer detaillierten Analyse, ist der Einfluss von der durch die Regierung vorgeschriebenen islamisch-arabischen Identität auf die Gesellschaft und das System als außerordentlich hoch befunden worden. Da die Mehrzahl der Sudanesen sich nicht mit dieser fundamentalistischen Identität identifizieren können, die volle Akzeptanz aber Voraussetzung für die Inklusion in die einflussreiche Elite und hiermit Voraussetzung für den Zugang zu wirtschaftlichen und politischen Ressourcen ist, ist der Großteil der Bevölkerung marginalisiert. Mit ihren hartnäckigen Versuchen der Zwangsislamisierung und -arabisierung hat die Regierung genau das Gegenteil geschaffen von dem was sie wollte, nämlich anstatt Homogenität eine Widerstandsidentität, und so Jahrzehnte mit Bürgerkrieg provoziert.

Zwar spielt Identität für die sudanesische Bevölkerung sicherlich eine wichtige Rolle, allerdings in großen Teilen deshalb, weil sie den Zugang zu Macht und Ressourcen bestimmt. Es handelt sich um einen Verteilungskonflikt, hervorgerufen durch die Weigerung des Nordens föderale Strukturen zu schaffen, die eine gerechte Ressourcenverteilung und politische Partizipation ermöglichen würde. Die marginalisierten Gruppen fordern nicht bloß Respekt für ihre Kultur oder Identität, sondern vielmehr die Verbesserung ihrer zumeist verheerenden Lebenssituation. Nicht nur der Südsudan sondern auch andere Landesteile wie zum Beispiel Darfur verlangen ökonomische und politische Inklusion und drohen mit Abspaltung sollte diese verwährt bleiben.

Der Übergang zu einer partizipativen Regierungsform, wie Demokratie oder multinationaler Föderalismus, ist dringend nötig und wird von der Bevölkerung gefordert. Jedoch weigert die Regierung sich vehement von ihrer alleinigen Machtposition abzurücken. Die Auflösung von rassistischen Strukturen und ein multikultureller Umgang mit ethnischen Minoritäten, der ihre Rechte schützt und ihre Kultur und Lebensart fördert, ist zwar unbedingt nötig, um die Fortsetzung von Krieg und die vollständige Desintegration des Landes zu verhindern, aber unter der derzeitigen Regierung höchst unwahrscheinlich. Hierbei sollte nicht vergessen werden, dass die Konzentration auf ethnische Minoritäten die Bedürfnisse von anderen Minderheiten, wie zum Beispiel Frauen oder Personen die politisch-, religiös-, oder sexuell anders orientiert sind als die Machthaber, leicht überschattet.

Während zweier Forschungsaufenthalte in Khartum, im Herbst 2008 und 2009, wurde umfangreiches Datenmaterial erhoben und anschließend analysiert. Die gewählte Forschungsgruppe ist eine einflussreiche Bildungselite, die – anders als

Binnenflüchtlinge, die in Siedlungen und Camps außerhalb des Stadtzentrums leben – in Khartum wohnt und arbeitet. Hier haben Interviewpartner regen Kontakt zur Mehrheitsgesellschaft z.B. ihren Nachbarn, Kollegen und Mitstudenten. Alle Interviewpartner lebten zum Zeitpunkt der Datenerhebung seit mindestens 20 Jahren in Khartum. Einige kamen als Kinder mit ihren Eltern oder wurden hier geboren, andere befanden sich auf der Suche nach Bildung oder Arbeit und zum großen Teil auf der Flucht vor dem Bürgerkrieg im Süden. Es wurde untersucht, ob das Leben in Khartum auch den Zugang zur Gesellschaft und dem System ermöglicht und wie die Beziehungen zwischen den Interviewpartnern und der Mehrheitsgesellschaft und dem Staat sich im Laufe der Zeit und unter sich verändernden Bedingungen gewandelt haben.

Trotz ihrer privilegierten Situation nehmen sich die Interviewpartner als Bürger zweiter Klasse (second-class citizens) wahr und beziehen sich hiermit auf ihre soziale, ökonomische und politische Marginalisierung. Sie spüren eine große kulturelle und religiöse Kluft zwischen sich und der Mehrheitsgesellschaft. Diese wäre jedoch zu überwinden, kämen nicht Rassismus und tief sitzendes Misstrauen gegen die so genannten „Araber“ hinzu. Die Kluft zwischen Nord- und Südsudanesen wird vehement durch das diskriminierende Vorgehen der Regierung verstärkt und mitunter hierdurch sogar hervorgerufen. Der Staat wird in erster Linie als Feind wahrgenommen und das System gilt als geschlossen. Um mit dieser Situation umzugehen, wenden Interviewpartner zahlreiche Reduktions- und Bewältigungsstrategien an. Zwar nehmen alle Interviewpartner ihr Leben in Khartum als einen Krieg wahr, jedoch unterscheiden sie sich stark da drin, wie sie mit der Situation umgehen.

Mit Methoden der Grounded Theory wurde ein Kategoriensystem entwickelt, mit dem sich Interviewpartner anhand von persönlichen Kriterien und Erfahrungen einordnen lassen und das es erlaubt, ihre Handlungsstrategien im Umgang mit der Situation in Khartum hervorzusehen. Das Kategoriensystem ist in der Lage, das Verhalten von Interviewpartnern unter sich wandelnden Bedingungen – wie zum Beispiel Empowerment durch das CPA, die Möglichkeit zur Rückkehr in den Süden und das Nationbuilding im Süden – hervorzusagen. Es wurde gezeigt, dass die südsudanesische Bildungselite, obwohl sie im Zentrum von Khartum lebt, keine engen Beziehungen zur Mehrheitsgesellschaft aufgebaut hat. Während mehr marginalisierte Binnenflüchtlinge, die in den Randgebieten von Khartum leben, sich über ethnische und religiöse Grenzen und offiziellen Regierungspolicen

hinwegsetzen und sich gruppenübergreifend als „die Armen“ wahrnehmen,[938] ist die Bildungselite hoch politisiert und stark von historischen Ereignissen, eigenen Erfahrungen im Kontakt mit der Mehrheitsgesellschaft sowie dem Prozess des Nationbuildings im Süden beeinflusst.

Interviewpartner gehören komplexen, sich teilweise überschneidenden, teilweise offiziell ausschließenden, Identifikationsgruppen und ethnischen Taxonomien an. Sie sind mit der Situation konfrontiert, dass sie nach mindestens zwei Jahrzehnten im Nordsudan, im Zuge des Nationbuildings im Südsudan zurück in ihre vermeintliche Heimat kehren sollen. Während die Formierung eines südsudanesischen unabhängigen Staates eine starke südsudanesische Identität verlangt, werden Ressourcen entlang ethnischer Linien verteilt, so dass ethnische Zugehörigkeiten an Bedeutung gewinnen. Arabische Elemente, die von Interviewpartnern angenommen wurden, wie zum Beispiel die arabische Sprache, gelten im Süden häufig als unerwünscht und müssen versteckt werden.[939]

Männer positionieren sich hierbei sehr stark entsprechend ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit und versuchen so ihre Inklusion im Südsudan nach langer Abwesenheit zu garantieren. Frauen hingegen sind flexibler in ihren Positionierungen, lassen sich eher auf die Mehrheitsgesellschaft ein und akzeptieren ihre zahlreichen Zugehörigkeiten. Da die arabische und die südsudanesische Identität als sich ausschließend wahrgenommen werden und die beiden Gruppen das Überschreiten von Grenzen häufig sanktionieren, geraten manche Frauen hierdurch jedoch in eine Identitätskrise. Es hat sich gezeigt, dass neben dem Geschlecht vor allen Dingen das Ankunftsalter in Khartum, die Erfahrung mit staatlicher Gewalt im Südsudan und in Khartum, sowie das Arbeitsumfeld die Position im Kategoriensystem beeinflusst.

Aus ideologischer Perspektive wünschen sich die Interviewpartner zwar eine Rückkehr in den Süden ebenso wie sie sich die Unabhängigkeit für den Südsudan wünschen, im praktischen Leben stehen sie aber vor dem großen Dilemma, dass der Südsudan völlig unterentwickelt ist und sie eventuell für ihre Flucht in den Norden bei ihrer Rückkehr diskriminiert und weiter marginalisiert werden. Diejenigen, die sehr jung in den Norden gekommen sind oder hier sogar geboren wurden, können sich eine Rückkehr nur schwer vorstellen und planen teilweise sogar in Khartum zu bleiben. Viele Interviewpartner würden zumindest noch solange in Khartum bleiben wollen, bis dass ihre Kinder ihre Schulausbildung abgeschlossen haben. Die Rückkehr in den Süden stellt für die Meisten derzeit in der Tat eher eine Bedrohung

[938] vgl. Abusharaf (2009), S. 11
[939] vgl. Schultz (2008), S. 12

dar. Jedoch eine, die weitgehend als unvermeidlich betrachtet wird, da Interviewpartner nach der Abspaltung des Südens mit einer eklatanten Verschlechterung ihrer Lebenssituation in Khartum rechnen. Zusätzlich gilt eine zügige Rückkehr in den Süden und die aktive Beteiligung am Aufbau des Landes als Voraussetzung, für die Beteiligung an politischen und ökonomischen Ressourcen.

Wie bereits erwähnt, haben die Südsudanesen mit überwältigender Mehrheit für die Abspaltung vom Sudan gestimmt. Nichtsdestotrotz haben sowohl der Norden als auch der Süden noch einen weiten Weg vor sich und die Zweiteilung des Landes darf nicht als die Lösung der zahlreichen Konflikte missverstanden werden. Die beiden Staaten werden noch lange ökonomisch und politisch eng verknüpft bleiben und es bleibt abzuwarten, ob die Abspaltung friedlich und pünktlich im Juli 2011 vollzogen wird. Des Weiteren ist die nordsudanesische Regierung nicht gewillt aus der Geschichte zu lernen und insistiert weiterhin in der alles bestimmenden, islamisch-arabischen Identität. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass die nordsudanesische Regierung sich, wie bereits von ihr selber angekündigt, weiter fundamentalisiert und die anderen regionalen Konflikte in naher Zukunft nicht gelöst werden können.

Aber auch der Südsudan steht vor großen Herausforderungen. Nach Jahrzehnten des Bürgerkrieges ist die Region völlig unterentwickelt und die unerfahrene SPLM muss sich noch von einer Rebellenorganisation in eine zivile Regierung wandeln. Die Verteilungskonflikte im Südsudan sind nicht weniger harsch als im Norden und bisher scheint die Regierung sich noch unklar zu sein, ob sie eine inklusive Politik betreiben wird, oder Macht und Ressourcen in ihren eigenen Händen zentralisiert. Im schlimmsten Fall werden durch das Wegfallen des Nordens lediglich neue marginalisierte Minderheiten geschaffen, die fortan von einer südsudanesischen Elite statt der nordsudanesischen Elite unterdrückt werden.

Der Lebenslauf ist in der Online-Version aus Gründen des Datenschutzes nicht enthalten.

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