Euro-Mediterranean Security Cooperation

Striking a Sub-Optimal Bargain?

Promotionsschrift

Otto Suhr Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Fachbereich Politik und Sozialwissenschaften
Freie Universität Berlin

Mark Furness, MA (Hons)
m.furness@jmc-berlin.org

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First Examiner

Prof. Dr. Michael Bolle, Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, Freie Universität Berlin

Second Examiner

Prof. Campbell Craig, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton

Final Examination Participants

Prof. Dr. Dr. Hans-Joachim Mengel, Freie Universität Berlin

Prof. Dr. Cilja Harders, Freie Universität Berlin

Dr. Isabel Schäfer, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin

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I dedicate this thesis (and probably most of what I will do subsequently) to our daughter Emily.

List of Abbreviations

ACRS – Arms Control and Regional Security negotiations
ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CBM – Confidence Building Measure
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the European Union)
E3-EU – British, German, French and EU body negotiating nuclear issue with Iran
EADS – European Aeronautic Defence and Space company
EC – European Commission
EMP – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP – European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI – European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy
ESS – European Security Strategy
EU – European Union
EUPOL-EUCOPPS – European Union police mission in the Palestinian Territories
EuroMeSCo – Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
FEMISE – Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes
FIS – (*Front Islamique du Salut*) Islamic Salvation Front
GAERC – General Affairs and External Relations Council
GIA – (*Groupe Islamique Armé*) Algerian Islamist organisation
GSPC – (*Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat*) Offshoot of the GIA
IDF – Israeli Defense Force
MEDA – (*mésures d'accompagnement*) Commission funding programme for the EMP
MENA – Middle East and North Africa
MPC – Mediterranean Partner Country
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PBM – Partnership Building Measure
PD – Prisoners' Dilemma
PKK – Kurdistan Workers' Party
UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC – United Nations Security Council
UPM – Union for the Mediterranean (*Union pour la Méditerranée*)
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter I

Introduction

The European Union is not a fortress, and even if it were, a short tour taking in some of Europe's finest medieval ruins would leave few illusions about impregnability. As the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) clearly acknowledges, the security of Europe is affected by events in other parts of the world, especially neighbouring countries – the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and the Maghreb and Mashreq countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean Sea (European Council, 2003). Since 1995, a central tenet of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been to build peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean basin through the Barcelona Process, the framework for relations with Europe's southern neighbours.[1] The EU's official policy has been to foster deepening intergovernmental cooperation on security in the Mediterranean region, based on the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) model reliant on multilateralism, rules and 'shared values' (Edis 1998; Biscop 2003).[2]

The ultimate, long-term vision of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is to expand the European 'security community' to Europe's near abroad. The principle behind this process is that intergovernmental cooperation should be based upon a 'comprehensive' understanding of regional security, where formal, multilateral cooperation addresses

[1] The terms 'Barcelona Process' and 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' are often used interchangeably in the literature. In this thesis, 'Barcelona Process' refers to the general framework of relations between the EU and 12 Mediterranean Partner Countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Confusingly, the Barcelona Process incorporates several sub-frameworks with varying membership. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been the main institutional framework for EU-Mediterranean relations since 1995. The EMP is in practical terms about to be replaced by a new multilateral framework, the Union for the Mediterranean, which also includes Croatia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina – but does not include Libya. Since 2004 all Mediterranean partners (except Libya, Algeria, Mauritania and Turkey) participate in the bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy.

[2] 'Cooperation' is understood in this thesis as an actor's general agreement on the form, content and legitimacy of the rules of peaceful interaction, an undertaking not to break them as long as they are respected by other actors, and the willingness to work with other actors towards common goals while refraining from unilateral policy decisions that impose costs on other actors. 'Conflict' is the opposite – the rejection of rules-based peaceful interaction whether other actors agree or not, leading to policy choices that impose costs on other actors.

potential military, political, economic and social threats to states and citizens. The formal guidelines were to be based on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, the forerunner of a negotiated security pact for the Mediterranean (Schumacher, 2008).[3]

Such an ambitious policy has inevitably raised high hopes among policymakers, scholarly analysts and commentators, many of whom believe in the duty and the power of the EU to make the world a better place. The high hopes of many have been dashed not so much by ongoing conflict in the region as by frustration at the inability of the EU, its member states and Mediterranean partner governments to reach agreement on how best to mange national and international security problems. The 1995 launch of the EMP came during a period of optimism that the Arab-Israeli conflict would soon be resolved and that signs of greater political openness in the Arab world would facilitate intergovernmental cooperation. This optimism did not last – the mid 1990s witnessed the horrors of the Algerian civil war, and the turn of the century was marked by the breakdown of the Middle East Peace Process amid the second *Intifada*. The Euro-Mediterranean security community agenda was quietly but officially shelved in November 2000 when negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability were suspended at a foreign ministers' meeting in Marseille. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the subsequent US-led 'global war on terror,' the Iraq war, and terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and London in July 2005, national priorities for Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation have been redrawn to reflect more immediate concerns.

EU and Mediterranean partner governments have quietly abandoned the grand goal of building a regional security partnership for the Mediterranean, along with many aspects of the multilateral cooperation on political and economic development that was envisaged to support formal security cooperation. Instead, a compromise bargain on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation has been reached. Specific steps towards building formal, multilateral and comprehensive security cooperation have never been taken and

[3] For details see 'Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers, Stuttgart 15 – 16 April 1999, Chairman's formal conclusions.' The draft 'Guidelines for Elaborating a Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Stability' are annexed to this document.

this is unlikely to change. Cooperation will continue to be based on dialogue, the exchange of views, and ad-hoc initiatives when positive-sum outcomes are clearly available. Essentially, south Mediterranean cooperation on policing migration and fighting Islamist terrorism is being traded for an unspoken agreement by Europeans to hold off from exerting pressure for political and economic reform in the Arab world. Under the recently-launched Union for the Mediterranean (UPM – *Union pour la Méditerranée*), concrete initiatives are to be concentrated on projects where cooperation is unlikely to 'spill over' into politically sensitive issue-areas. Most importantly, European and south Mediterranean governments are reasonably satisfied with this outcome, given their interests, what they know about the interests of other governments, and the broader geo-strategic environment in the region. No major steps towards building regional security institutions can be expected unless these circumstances change.

How did the EU, its member states and Mediterranean partner governments arrive at this bargain? A comprehensive agreement addressing the economic, social and military dimensions of international and domestic security would seem to be clearly in the best interests of the region's governments and citizens. A formal, binding, multilateral agreement to cooperate in a transparent manner would seem to be the best way of managing security interdependence in the Mediterranean Basin. This begs the obvious questions of why the region's leaders, who are presumably rational and intelligent, declared their intention to work on a comprehensive regional security agreement in 1995, and why they have not been willing or able to make much progress towards its realisation since. This thesis aims to develop an understanding of the reasons behind these decisions.

The key to understanding the institutional outcomes of intergovernmental bargaining on security cooperation in the Mediterranean is to concentrate on three main questions: first, why did the European Union propose a framework for building a comprehensive, formal multilateral security regime in 1995? Second, why did Mediterranean partner governments sign up to this framework, even though it demands political reforms and transparency in their domestic and international security policymaking? Third, why have

European Union member and Mediterranean partner governments decided to settle for an outcome that is considerably less ambitious than that originally proposed?

This thesis argues that a more complete explanation of the state of security cooperation between the EU, its members and Mediterranean partner governments can be developed by viewing this institutional outcome through the lens of an actor-oriented analytical framework focussing on preferences, restrictions and bargaining. In many ways, the choices of governments on both sides of the Mediterranean are influenced by the logic of the 'two level game' in which domestic and international preferences and restrictions must be balanced (Putnam, 1988). It is argued here and in subsequent chapters that by focussing on the relevant actors, identifying their preferences, recognising the restrictions that they face, and considering the formal and informal rules that govern their interaction, important insights can be drawn regarding the observable institutional outcomes of security cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin.

In pursuing this aim this thesis has the broader objective of building on theoretical approaches that are common among scholars asking questions about international institutions. The methodological approach taken is to build an 'analytic narrative' combining tools borrowed from political economy with a descriptive, anecdotal narrative that provides context to questions of international cooperation (Bates et al 2000). This approach necessarily shares several of the assumptions of the 'liberal' tradition of international relations scholarship, in particular that state preferences are shaped by the dynamics of domestic political competition, that the character and quality of domestic institutions affects the way governments value potential international outcomes, and that states create international institutions as a means of reaching desired bargaining outcomes (Moravcsik, 1997). In applying a liberal, rationalist framework to the analysis of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation this thesis offers analytical insights that are relevant to the study of international bargaining problems elsewhere in world politics.

The EMP literature: suffering an 'expectations – outcomes gap'

A rich literature on European Union foreign and security policy in the Mediterranean neighbourhood has developed, especially since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995. Much of the extensive research and commentary on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has aimed to judge the EMP's progress towards its stated goals of achieving a shared area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean Basin. Given the political and economic realities of the region, most analysts that hold these rather abstract notions up as benchmarks have inevitably come to the conclusion that the Barcelona Process has failed, and that the Mediterranean basin is not nearly peaceful, stable or prosperous enough for their liking.

Several years ago, Christopher Hill famously wrote that EU policymakers face a 'capability-expectations gap' – their aims are often higher than their ability to achieve them (Hill, 1993). The reactions to Hill's metaphor revealed a commendable characteristic common among many international relations scholars: a belief that national governments actually intend to deliver exactly what they promise rhetorically, especially when it comes to international institutions. Much of the scholarship and commentary dealing with the EMP shares this optimistic view of the world – the peace, stability and prosperity promised by the Barcelona Declaration's signatories are held up as performance benchmarks against which progress should be judged. Clearly, the expectation that European and Mediterranean partner governments, together with the European Commission, would be able to realise these three rather abstract notions is far removed from the compromise outcomes that have been reached.

Inevitably, the questions that have occupied scholars (and many policymakers) are the reasons for the Barcelona Process' supposed failure. Three main types of explanation have been offered. Some scholars focus on the effects of intractable regional conflicts on the EMP; others on the inadequate policy responses of external actors to the region's problems, including the EU and its member states but also the United States and other

powers; while others concentrate on the implications of the domestic political economy of south Mediterranean countries for regional peace and stability.

The first and most prominent set of explanations hold that that Euro-Mediterranean political and security cooperation is undermined by unresolved regional, bilateral and domestic conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). While the conflict most cited is that between Israel and its Arab neighbours, other long-running conflicts in Western Sahara, Lebanon and Algeria are also blamed for preventing the region's governments from cooperating on security issues with Europe and with each other (Balfour, 2004; Gillespie, 2004). Another area where violent conflict has affected cooperation is in the response to terrorist attacks, especially those of 11 September 2001, the Madrid and London public transport bombings of 2004 and 2005, and the ongoing 'Global War on Terrorism' (Joffé, 2008). Furthermore, the negative externalities of conflicts involving MENA countries that are not part of the EMP also affect the political and security partnership, such as the Iraq war and the (thus far) diplomatic wrangle over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme.

Most scholars and commentators believe that these conflicts are insurmountable obstacles that prevent actors from reaching the intergovernmental bargains that may resolve them – a conundrum that results in regional bargains undermined by a lack of trust. The effects of regional conflicts have led many analysts to implicitly or explicitly portray security relations in the Mediterranean as a classic Prisoners' Dilemma in which mistrust undermines cooperation, and strong incentives to defect result in sub-optimal outcomes (cf. Spencer, 2002; Heller, 2003; Attina, 2003; Soltan, 2004).

The Israel/Palestine conflict clearly has had a major affect on the EMP, perhaps most symbolically when the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was suspended at the height of the second *Intifada* in 2000. As one Egyptian expert has noted, 'The Middle East Peace Process created the conditions for the EMP to take off. Consequently, the slowing down of the peace process and its later collapse has deprived the Euro- Mediterranean Partnership of much of the needed wind to keep sailing' (Soltan

2004, p. 3). Analysts have highlighted several mutually reinforcing ways in which the Israel/Palestine conflict impacts on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation and MENA security more generally. Foremost among these are traditional politico-military disagreements: Israel is highly reluctant to engage in multilateral negotiations involving countries with which it has no diplomatic relations. Arab governments, on the other hand, cite the physical threat posed by Israel's nuclear weapons as the main cause of regional strategic imbalance (Jones, 2003). A less direct impact noted in some analyses is the legitimacy the conflict has offered to incumbent Arab governments as leaders in the resistance struggle against Zionism, pushing them away from multilateral cooperation (Yousef, 2004) Analysts have also noted the centrality of the Middle East to EU efforts to build a more effective CFSP, and the divisions among EU institutions and EU member states over appropriate European responses to ongoing violence between Israelis and Palestinians (Schmidt, 2003).

Nevertheless, the sad fact that political conflicts frequently turn violent in the Mediterranean Basin, together with the casual observation that MENA conflicts may be more debilitating than in many other regions, does not explain the failure of the region's governments to progress towards a comprehensive regional security agreement. Regional security cooperation does not mean that actors must resolve the conflicts between them (Jones, 1998). Rules governing interaction do not transform hate into love. Rather, governments create regional security institutions to manage their differences in ways that reduce the costly externalities of conflict. This notion is borne out by the ability of governments to overcome seemingly intractable conflicts in other parts of the world. In Europe, Franco-German reconciliation was at the heart of the gradual emergence of the European security community. In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN regional forum (ARF) includes Taiwan, China, the United States and two states technically still at war in North and South Korea. Cooperation among governments that disagree about fundamental issues and interests is not easy to achieve, especially when violence breeds fear and resentment. Nevertheless, the vicious circle created by the security dilemma can be escaped when governments decide to do so, based on their interests and the restrictions they face.

A second strand of the Euro-Mediterranean and MENA security literature focuses on the role of external actors. Some argue that the EU and its member states pursue narrow European interests without regard for the interests of south Mediterranean governments and societies (Soltan, 2004), or that Europeans are reluctant to treat Mediterranean partner governments as equal partners (Biscop, 2003). Another common critique praises the EU for its comprehensive regional vision, but doubts the EU's ability to implement controversial policies given complex decision-making procedures and conflicting member state interests (Attina, 2004). Common EU strategies are often seen as weak, undermined by the overbearing role of member states in foreign policy matters, and trumped by the greater financial, diplomatic and military support provided to some Mediterranean partner governments (and some non-governmental actors) by the United States, China, the Gulf states and Iran. Other observers consider divergent European and American strategies as a significant limiting factor: whereas the United States' regional strategies are based on the Bush Doctrine and the Administration's 'forward strategy for freedom,' the EU favours dialogue and the use of incentives to encourage cooperation (Perthes, 2004 b).[4] This has raised the question of whether the EU and its members really have a genuine interest in building multilateral security cooperation in the Mediterranean (Cavatorta et al, 2006). A common recommendation to the EU is to 'act more rapidly and coherently' (O'Donnell 2008, p. 30). Very often, this advice is given without due consideration of the reasons why the EU sometimes appears to act slowly and ambiguously in the Mediterranean.

The focus on external actors sometimes diverts attention away from the role of the Mediterranean partner governments themselves. The MENA region's domestic political economy is a third oft-cited factor undermining security and stability. Perthes draws attention to the critical role of the 'politically relevant elites' in Arab countries. These power clubs make the key decisions, define the 'national interest' and dominate the military and security agencies in their countries (Perthes, 2004 a). Saif notes that the power of many south Mediterranean elites is based on rentier or semi-rentier economies,

[4] See also 'President Addresses American Legion, Discusses Global War on Terror,' Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., 24 February 2006, www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 9 July 2008).

where state revenues are distributed among bureaucratic and tribal actors in return for support for the regime (Saif, 2007). The regional security ramifications of these Middle Eastern domestic political and economic structures have been compared with those in East Asia. Solingen argues that whereas East Asian governments pursued export-led development strategies that necessitated cooperation, resulting in a relatively stable region, Middle Eastern governments preferred inward-looking statist models that relied on rent-seeking and a prominent role for the military in the economy, leading to the promotion of militant nationalism and the suppression of domestic political opposition in many Arab countries (Solingen, 2007). This has prompted some observers to argue that autocratic Arab governments have refused to cooperate with each other or with the outside world because to do so might undermine their autonomy and their grip on power (Heller, 2003). Meanwhile, domestic political coalitions in Israel have been unable to agree on a strategy for resolving conflict with the Palestinians and Israeli policy is oriented towards conflict management rather than engagement with multilateral peace initiatives (Solingen, 2000).

All three of these common explanations serve as partial accounts for the development of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation since the launch of the EMP in 1995. What is missing is an analysis that focuses explicitly on the actors involved in making decisions. EU member governments, the European Commission and Mediterranean partner governments approach the Barcelona Process in light of the benefits it can bring, the actual and potential restrictions it entails, and the opportunities it provides for them to pursue their interests. For them, the Barcelona Process is a political framework for negotiations among regional actors with specific goals and strategies. An analysis of the preferences of the actors and the institutional setting that facilitates their interactions can help us understand the outcome – a certain level of regional security cooperation – that has emerged from their bargaining.

Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation: a 'sub-optimal bargain'

The Barcelona Process framework is not designed to resolve regional conflicts on its own. Rather, it is meant to help with the management of interdependence by facilitating

the convergence of national security policies. The intended, long-term outcome of this process is the realisation of a 'public good' – the political and economic stabilisation of the Mediterranean Basin (GO-EuroMed Consortium, 2008). The EMP's political and security basket is designed to provide partner governments with a stable forum for general confidence-building, enabling them to take advantage of opportunities for cooperation where security preferences converge. However, just as the EU's common foreign and defence policies (CFSP/ESDP) have evolved more slowly than other areas of European integration, the EMP's political and security basket remains the least developed area for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Rather than pursue a comprehensive, formal multilateral security agreement for the Mediterranean basin, the EU, its member states and south Mediterranean governments have tacitly agreed to focus on short-term security priorities. These include firstly the interest of most south Mediterranean governments in domestic regime stability; secondly European fear of regional instability and uncontrolled migration; and thirdly a shared interest fighting terrorism at the operational level.

Negotiations on rules governing Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation can be said to have reached a Nash equilibrium-type situation, where no government can see advantages in changing its position while the positions of the other governments remain unchanged (Furness, Gándara and Kern, 2008). The impasse became clear in 2000 when the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was shelved amid the violence of the second Intifada. No progress on the Charter appears likely without exogenous shocks – for example, serious progress towards the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would alter the mutual policy stance of Arab elites and the Israeli government and create new windows of opportunity for mutually beneficial agreements. A second exogenous change that would, in theory, influence preferences in ways that could break the deadlock and restart negotiations is a change in policy from the United States leading to closer coordination with the EU on Mediterranean security. The US and EU have clear common interests in the area stemming from their desire to reduce the negative externalities of instability throughout the MENA. However, in recent years there have been significant transatlantic disagreements over the best strategy for pursuing these interests (Crespo et al 2007).

The question of whether EU member and Mediterranean partner governments are satisfied with the level of security cooperation they currently enjoy can be answered in the affirmative – the existing Mediterranean security equilibrium can be considered Pareto efficient. No government is left worse off by the EMP than they would be if it did not exist, and governments that do not consider that the multilateral partnership serves their interests are not forced to participate. Whether the Euro-Mediterranean bargain on regional security is Pareto-improving is another matter. While a critical mass of the EMP's member governments consider that their security interests are well served by the state of multilateral cooperation, there are questions as to whether they are better off than they would be if a formal regional security pact were in force. However, as no government is likely to attempt to risk the current equilibrium, major new initiatives aimed at building formal, multilateral and comprehensive security cooperation are highly unlikely.

Despite the views of most analysts and commentators that the Euro-Mediterranean partnership should do better, most of the region's governments are content with this situation for the time being. Since 1995 there have been no major wars between European and Mediterranean partner countries (also known as MPCs), cooperation on the fight against Islamist terrorism – which many of the region's governments see as a shared threat – is taking place, and south Mediterranean security services are helping their European counterparts deal with illegal migrants. The EMP framework provides the region's state actors and even some non-state actors with a stable forum in which formal and informal exchanges can take place on a variety of issues, including regional security. These arrangements are reasonably stable and there is no reason to expect that they will collapse anytime soon.

However, it is unlikely that regional security cooperation based on what seems to be a sub-optimal bargain will be sustainable in the long term. The Euro-Mediterranean compromise does not address several issues at the heart of the region's instability – the unaccountability of the region's ruling elites and the in-transparency of their governing practices; the massive prosperity gap between the southern and northern shores of the

Mediterranean; the disillusion of the poor and unrepresented in Arab societies, and the geopolitical conflicts that exacerbate social and economic schisms, leaving the impression that the region's problems are too big to be solved by human actions. These problems are, of course, not unique to the Mediterranean Basin. But in other parts of the world governments approach these kinds of issues through formal regional security structures. As Javier Solana has warned, the Mediterranean is in danger of remaining the exception in a world where multilateral security cooperation is becoming the norm.[5]

Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation: actors, preferences and bargaining

Euro-Mediterranean governments do not view the southern expansion of Europe's comprehensive security community as a concrete goal with a set deadline, but as an incremental process that by its nature serves their interests. For Europeans, ever closer cooperation in the Mediterranean is the key to building a stable and prosperous southern neighbourhood, and reducing the likelihood that dangerous externalities stemming from underdevelopment and state failure manifest themselves within the borders of the EU. For Mediterranean partner governments, closer cooperation provides them with opportunities to benefit economically, diplomatically and financially from closer engagement with the EU.

In the heady post-Cold War years, a shift from reliance on military deterrence to reliance on spreading values such as liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights was seen as a way of achieving Europe's long-standing security and economic objectives (Youngs 2004). When basic standards of governance are respected in third countries, European strategic interests are served as well – especially the risks posed by the negative externalities of weak government, including state failure, uncontrolled migration, WMD proliferation and the risk of terrorists acquiring the means to pose a military threat. The Barcelona Declaration linked the economic, social, political and military aspects of security in a comprehensive agenda that promised benefits to third

[5] Javier Solana 'Countering globalisation's dark side.' *Europe's World*, no. 7, Autumn 2007.

countries that were able to implement it. However, not all of the benefits that would accrue to third countries in implementing this agenda are intrinsic, and transition cannot, therefore, be achieved without incurring costs. For Europe, the incentives that would need to be offered to help Mediterranean partner governments manage the short term costs of transition are significant. The steps that Europe would have to take to compensate or coerce MPC governments are risky in terms of the political consequences of engaging more deeply with the south Mediterranean.

Fear of Islamist terrorism has shifted the focus of European governments to immediate security concerns. While large-scale terrorist attacks in European countries are still relatively rare, voters have demanded action from their governments to protect them from random violence. Migration from the Arab world and political Islam – issues that have long been sources of discomfort for Europeans – have become 'securitised' in recent years. Migrants from south and east Mediterranean countries have been portrayed in some circles as potential ideological enemies with murderous intentions. Growing uneasiness about migration from and through the Arab world has been reflected in policy shifts: between 2001 and 2005 policing of migration from south and east Mediterranean countries was stepped up at member state and community levels. In recent years the EU issued several declarations, and political Islamist organisations were added to lists of banned terrorist groups. The EU has used its external relations resources to pursue anti-terrorist measures, including CFSP 'political dialogues' with third countries and the targeted use of financial instruments (Monar 2007). In early 2008 the Commission proposed sweeping measures to beef up airport and border security technology (Guild, Carerra and Geyer, 2008). Since 2005 several EU member governments have entered into bilateral arrangements with their south Mediterranean counterparts, bypassing the common EU initiatives (Khasabova and Furness, 2008).

Meanwhile, Mediterranean partner governments have developed mostly divergent interpretations of geopolitical developments and national security interests and objectives, driven by concerns about their survival as independent sovereign entities. The main barriers to the Arab Mediterranean partners responding cooperatively to European

security initiatives stem from their domestic political and economic structures. From an empirical perspective the Mediterranean provides a clear example of a region where political outcomes are shaped by the preferences of domestic coalitions that have captured the institutions of government in their countries. Perthes describes 'the politically relevant elite' as the 'stratum [that] comprises those people in a given country who wield political influence and power in that they make strategic decisions or participate in decision-making on a national level, contribute to defining political norms and values (including the definition of "national interests"), and directly influence political discourse on strategic issues.' In Arab Mediterranean countries the core elite, comprising the king or president, senior members of the military and security services, and other figures that make up the inner circle, set the political agenda and decide about the best way to deploy the resources of the state in pursuit of their goals (Perthes, 2004, p. 5). Formal, multilateral and comprehensive security cooperation with Europe would threaten the decision-making independence of these elites, while the political reforms upon which Europeans hinge their plans for long-term regional stability directly undermine elite control of the key political and economic institutions in their countries.

The rules of the game for Euro-Mediterranean bargaining are highly asymmetric. Bargaining power is heavily weighted towards the European side. EU member governments first strike a bargain among themselves regarding common policy in the Mediterranean Basin, which the Commission is then tasked with implementing. On the other side of the table sit the Mediterranean partner governments, each with their own preferences with regard to relations with Europe. In this setting, MPCs do not have the power to affect the configuration of the rules – essentially they are presented with the common European position as a *fait accompli*. EMP Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans are negotiated with the EU bilaterally, in a classic 'hub and spokes' pattern. This does not favour the development of a formal, comprehensive security agreement for several reasons. There is little prospect that south Mediterranean governments will easily accept a bargain that they feel they have been unable to influence. Furthermore, the lack of a common Mediterranean bargaining position towards the EU has left the EU to cope with a wide array of preferences, which it is very difficult to satisfy at the same time.

This has lead negotiations on some of the key issues in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation towards effective deadlock, because few actors are able to improve their chances of moving closer to their desired preferences while other actors remain intransigent. A further consequence has been that some EU member states have lost patience with the common EU policy framework, and have chosen to step outside and make deals with individual south Mediterranean governments on issues where voter preferences are strongest.

Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation: an institutional outcome

Comprehensive security, democracy, human rights and economic development remain the EMP's official objectives. These goals were reiterated by leaders in the July 2008 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, which launched the Union for the Mediterranean and re-stated the long-term goal of reaching agreement on a regional security pact. They are also on the lips of leaders when they meet and greet and inevitably invite comparisons between rhetoric and reality. It is only when one focuses on the region's governments, their interests and the rules under which they engage with each other, it becomes clear that in the EMP rhetoric and reality are not the same things.

Euro-Mediterranean governments seem to enjoy high-mindedness and are in no mood to dispel high expectations: while the leaders assembled in Paris announced their intention to focus on practical matters such as building motorways and de-polluting the sea, they also re-stated the lofty security goals of 1995. French President Sarkozy declared that peace in the Mediterranean would be built in the same way as 'yesterday we built peace in Europe.'[6] With the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit, forty-two EU and Mediterranean partner governments repeated their original promise to work on building confidence and security, 'with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.'[7]

[6] See 'Sarko's southern dream,' *The Economist* 19 July 2008.
[7] See 'Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008, p. 10.

Although European and Mediterranean partner governments have not succeeded in realising the goal of forming a formal regional security pact, most of them do not share the view common among analysts that the Barcelona Process is a failure. When viewed through the lens of an actor-oriented analytical framework, it becomes apparent that the region's governments are reasonably satisfied with the level of security cooperation under the EMP. While most would prefer deeper cooperation on their own terms, they have reached an equilibrium that represents the best possible outcome on security cooperation, given their interests, the domestic and international restrictions they face, the information they have about the intentions of other actors, and the institutional setting that they have created to facilitate Euro-Mediterranean negotiations. The Euro-Mediterranean regional security bargain is sub-optimal in terms of its potential to stabilise the region in the long-term, and it is far less comprehensive than security agreements elsewhere in the world. However, given the three factors that most influence international institutional outcomes – the interests of the actors involved, the domestic and international restrictions they face, and the rules of the institutional setting they have created – it is unrealistic to expect a different outcome unless external conditions change.

Surprisingly enough, this is not a view that is shared by many (although by no means all) of the scholarly and media analysts and commentators who write about Euro-Mediterranean relations. A common tendency among these observers is to lament the failings of political processes against standards of peace, prosperity and stability that they themselves consider should be maintained. This is an admirable stance, which can at times remind all of us that a better world is possible if politicians are wise and brave enough to reach for it. Unfortunately, bravery, wisdom and altruism are not qualities that can be attributed to all policymakers all of the time.

The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter II provides a more detailed picture of the state of the art as regards Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation, particularly with regard to cooperation on three key issues – 'hard' security, terrorism and illegal migration. Chapter II also outlines the three explanations common in the literature and discusses the implications of regional conflicts, the interventions of external actors, and

the region's domestic political economy for regional security cooperation. Chapter III develops an actor-oriented analytical framework drawing on the large literature on the rational design of international institutions. The aim is to present a structured analysis explaining actors' preferences and the features of the Euro-Mediterranean intergovernmental bargaining process. The interplay of these factors has produced the institutional outcome that we can observe in Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation as it currently stands. Context is provided with reference to the two other commonly used theoretical research programmes in international relations: realism and constructivism.

Chapters IV and V discuss the interests of European and Mediterranean partner governments respectively, arguing that these interests are shaped and ordered according to the outcome of bargains between domestic social actors with competing preferences. In Europe, this has led to an ambiguous common position that leaves EU members with the option of making separate bilateral deals with non-EU governments when under pressure from domestic voters and/or lobbies, so long as these arrangements do not impose unacceptable costs on other EU member states. On the south Mediterranean side, security preferences are overwhelmingly shaped by the interests of powerful elites in maintaining their hold on the levers of power in their countries. These preferences and the policies through which they are pursued have fostered rivalry among South Mediterranean regimes, exacerbated domestic and international conflicts in the region, and made multilateral cooperation with outside actors very difficult.

Chapter VI discusses the Euro-Mediterranean bargaining process that has led to the sub-optimal bargain on Mediterranean security. While EU member governments have been able to use EU institutions to arrive at a common position on Mediterranean security, Mediterranean partner governments have not been able to influence this process. Consequently the bargaining process is asymmetric and the resulting institutional objectives expressed in the Barcelona Process' policy declarations reflect European preferences much more than they do south Mediterranean preferences. Unsurprisingly, few Mediterranean partner governments are enthusiastic about this outcome, and choose instead to use what leverage they can muster in bilateral bargains with individual member

states. Grand declarations are made from time to time, but multilateral negotiations are sidetracked by conflicts, rivalries and extreme positions that are difficult to reconcile. Nevertheless, this bargain is relatively stable as enables governments on both sides to protect their core interests without imposing unacceptable costs on others, and is therefore unlikely to change. Chapter VII concludes, revisiting scholarly debates and predictions regarding Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation, summing up the research conducted in this thesis and offering some thoughts on avenues for future empirical research.

Chapter II

Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation: disappointing analysts since 1995

In November 1995 the signatories to the Barcelona Declaration declared their intention to work towards formal, multilateral and comprehensive regional security cooperation. Leaders agreed to 'promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among [signatories, and to] support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation… including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.'[8] Many observers regarded the Barcelona Declaration as the first step towards a regional security community based on formal rules, inherent responsibilities and 'shared values.' One prominent expert has described the Barcelona Declaration as 'the fundamental agreement of a regional security system' due to its multidimensional three-chapter overall strategy and the specific initiatives proposed under the political and security chapter (Attina, 2004, p. 2). Another describes the EMP as 'the EU programme designed to establish an integrated regional community around the Mediterranean' (Volpi, 2004, p. 146).

This optimism has, of course, not been borne out by events. The Barcelona Process has not been enhanced by a formal, comprehensive security agreement based on the shelved Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability. European and Mediterranean partner governments have faced several high-profile security crises since the 1995 signing of the Barcelona Declaration. International, domestic and transnational security problems continue to plague the arc of countries from Morocco to Turkey.

The Algerian civil war and terrorist bombings in Paris in the mid 1990s, the second *Intifada* in Israel and Palestine from September 2000, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent US-led 'global war on terror',

[8] Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference 27 – 28 November 1995, available at www.ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm.

the 2002 Parsley Island dispute between Spain and Morocco, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and ensuing civil war, the Madrid and London train bombings of 2004 and 2005, the 2006 election of Hamas in Palestine, the summer war between Israel and Hezbollah and the ongoing diplomatic fracas over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme have all overshadowed the more mundane process of formalising cooperative relationships among the governments of the Mediterranean basin. Furthermore, two 'traditional' (in the sense that they are about control of territory) conflicts, one over the final status of Western Sahara, and the other the ongoing tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours, remain unresolved.

In the last 13 years some long-term socio-economic and political trends have developed into regional security issues. Illegal migration from and through Mediterranean partner countries to Europe has increasingly come to be regarded as a security concern by EU and MPC governments (Joffé, 2008 a; Dover, 2008). At the same time, the removal of internal border controls throughout much of the EU has been accompanied by increased security measures at the personal level (Guild, Carerra and Geyer, 2008). Concerns about migration have been sharpened by the embrace of violent Jihadist philosophies by some radical Islamists. The tendency of these groups to oppose incumbent secular Arab governments while simultaneously rejecting Western liberal ideologies has raised official angst on both sides of the Mediterranean at the prospect of an unpredictable and undeterrable enemy.

Moreover, the 'root causes' of the security problems of the Mediterranean often cited by most Western (and many Arab) experts – economic underdevelopment and authoritarian rule – appear to have been only barely addressed despite more than a decade of cooperation under the EMP. Although some progress has been made in reducing barriers to trade and investment in the region, the economic wealth gap between Europe and the south Mediterranean remains substantial (GO-EuroMed Consortium, 2008). Economic reforms have proceeded fitfully (Bodenstein and Furness, 2009). Meanwhile, political reforms in MPCs have been virtually non-existent and most remain ruled by narrow elites unwilling to relinquish power over key institutions (Ottaway and Dunne, 2007).

In the light of all of these causes for complaint, it is unsurprising that many experts have come to regard comprehensive security cooperation in the Mediterranean as a major disappointment. This view is supported by the observation that European policy initiatives aimed at reducing instability in the south Mediterranean have thus far resulted only in rhetorical, rather than concrete, initiatives to prevent violent conflict and address its underlying social and economic causes. The Mediterranean Basin appears no closer to achieving the political and economic stability enjoyed by other regions than it was in the mid-1990s. Israel and the Arab states have repeatedly stonewalled European initiatives, while EU member governments have not tried particularly hard to convince their south Mediterranean counterparts of the benefits of change. And yet, ambition does not seem to have deserted the region's governments entirely – the intention to work towards a formal regional security pact was re-stated by the Euro-Mediterranean leaders assembled in Paris for the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008.[9] Nevertheless, given the disappointments of the past 13 years many observers remain sceptical that the new spirit of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will lead to much substantive change, especially in the security field.

This chapter has a dual purpose. The first objective is to provide a description of the sub-optimal bargain that characterises Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. Under the terms of this cooperation, Mediterranean partner governments have agreed to continue to participate in EU-led regional cooperation, while the EU and its members have agreed to refrain from anything other than rhetorical efforts to induce political reform in the south. European and Mediterranean governments have tacitly agreed to discuss regional security issues on an ad-hoc basis without making any formal commitments, and to cooperate on terrorism and illegal migration at the operational level on a mostly bilateral basis. This chapter attempts to draw a detailed picture of this arrangement.

The chapter's second objective is to discuss the ways in which Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation – or lack of it as the case may be – has been explained in the extensive literature on international institution-building, EU foreign policy and the EMP.

[9] Joint Declaration of Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008.

The three most common explanations for the lack of a formal, comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean security agreement are discussed: firstly, that regional conflicts have prevented multilateral cooperation; secondly, that external actors have upset the regional balance of power; and thirdly, that the region's domestic political economy has undermined cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean governments.

The state of cooperation in the EMP's political and security partnership

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched with the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 and has since represented the central framework of relations between the EU and the countries to the South and East of the Mediterranean Sea. Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey signed the Barcelona Declaration along with the then 15 EU member states in 1995. Mauritania and Albania have recently joined the EMP as full members, while Libya has had observer status since 2004. The EMP's ambitious objective is to achieve an area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean Basin, marked by economic integration, security cooperation, intercultural dialogue and understanding. Cooperation among partners takes place in more than 40 sectors which are assigned to three so-called 'baskets' of policy areas – the political and security partnership; the economic and financial partnership; and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.

In governance terms the EMP's aim is to create a long-term political and institutional framework governing relations between the EU and its southern neighbours. Cooperation under the EMP is both bilateral and multilateral. Bilateral Association Agreements between the EU and each Mediterranean partner constitute the legal foundation of the 'Barcelona Process'. These are reinforced by the bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans that have been agreed with most Mediterranean partners. On the multilateral level annual Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministerial Conferences are held, which are supported by lower level meetings on a plurality of issues. From 1995 to 2007 the EMP was supported financially by the MEDA programme (*mésures d'accompagnement*). The MEDA programme has since 2007 been incorporated into the

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) which supports institutional reforms and technical assistance in neighbouring countries. In July 2007 the multilateral track of the EMP was relaunched as the Union for the Mediterranean, an expanded body that includes the EU, all 27 EU member states, all Mediterranean partner countries with the exception of Libya, and the Arab League.

Many analysts agree that security concerns were at the heart of European thinking behind the Barcelona Process, and that the fine language and comprehensive approach of the EMP was merely a normative cloak for European security interests (cf. Joffé, 2008 a; Youngs, 2004). This view is probably too harsh – while the EU and its Mediterranean partners did not explicitly declare their intention in 1995 to establish a 'security community' in the Mediterranean, European policymakers clearly intended the EMP to be more than just 'a technical attempt at rationalising the various pre-existing agreements – particularly in the economic and financial domains – signed between the EU and countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, as well as providing a unified framework of reference for new agreements' (cf. Volpi, 2004, p. 147). Formal security cooperation, based on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, was intended to develop into regional security cooperation based on the OSCE model (Biscop, 2003). The Barcelona Declaration and the draft Charter acknowledged the indivisibility of the security of Europe and the south and east Mediterranean, and that addressing regional and national security concerns required a combination of political, socio-economic and military responses structured by formal intergovernmental cooperation.

However, the Mediterranean's regional security architecture was stillborn. The process of downgrading the EMP from its initial ambitions was underway as early as 1997. Schumacher points out that no documents adopted by Euro-Mediterranean partner governments since the Barcelona Declaration explicitly link the security dimension of the regional process with its economic and socio-cultural dimensions, a key requirement of comprehensive security Schumacher notes that 'it was decided at the ministerial meeting in Palermo in the summer of 1998 to dilute the security-related contents of 'Barcelona'

even further by abandoning the concept of confidence-building and replacing it through partnership-building' (Schumacher 2008, p. 16). Negotiations on the final wording and implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability never commenced, and the document was finally shelved at the Marseille ministerial meeting in November 2000. After Marseille, the EMP was effectively downgraded from the foundation agreement for an ambitious regional institution-building programme to a framework for diplomatic dialogue between the EU and Mediterranean partner governments (Balfour, 2004).

The extent to which European and Mediterranean partner governments actually cooperate on security can be illustrated with reference to three security issues: 'hard security,' meaning intergovernmental cooperation on military and political measures for dealing with traditional threats to the security of the state; and two 'soft security' (issues that constitute threats to the security of the individual) concerns that have become affairs of state in recent years: Islamist terrorism and illegal migration across the Mediterranean to Europe. These interrelated issue-areas dominate the regional security discourse at the policy level as well as analytically. Their handling provides an enlightening view of the essential tension between long-term and short-term security objectives that is at the heart of relations between EU member and Mediterranean partner governments.

Hard security cooperation

While intergovernmental security cooperation does take place in the Mediterranean basin, to date there has been a distinct lack of progress in establishing robust institutional barriers against violent conflict. This is not from lack of attempts: several multilateral initiatives have been launched since the Second World War aimed at deepening security cooperation among Middle East and North African governments and outside actors. These efforts include the Arab League's Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty in the 1950s, which includes a collective defence clause that has never been invoked. The post-Cold War period has witnessed a flurry of efforts to address national and regional security concerns collectively, including NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, the EU-

sponsored Barcelona Process and the ‘5+5’ agreement among Maghreb and southern European countries. So far, none of these efforts has resulted in a substantive bargain on national security cooperation that may lead to a formal regional security agreement. Persistent tensions in the Mediterranean and Middle East punctuated by periodic wars have led most analysts and many policymakers to conclude that cooperation on national security in the Mediterranean is highly unlikely. Indeed, aside from the EuroMeSCo network of foreign policy research institutes, a series of training seminars for diplomats held twice yearly in Malta, and a programme aimed at strengthening cooperation among European and south Mediterranean police in combating organised crime, there are no functional confidence-building measures under the EMP’s political and security partnership (EC, 2008).

Fundamental geo-strategic differences are held to be the most insurmountable obstacle for hard security cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. As Soltan writes, ‘the prevalent tendency in the Arab world is to confine the concept of security to issues of hard security. Consequently, it is more common in the Arab world to limit perceptions of threat and security to interstate relations, including those in the Mediterranean.’ Europeans, by contrast, are often held to be more interested in dealing with ‘soft security’ risks linked to terrorism, migration, environmental degradation and organised crime. Certainly since the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was shelved in 2000, official European discourse has shifted from talk of building a security pact to efforts to build cooperation on ‘justice and home affairs’ with Mediterranean partners (Bicchi and Martin, 2006).

An oft-cited argument is that Arab governments have refused to discuss hard security issues with Europe under the EMP framework due to the presence of Israel. According to Adler and Crawford, ‘when it became evident that CBMs, with their share of hard security measures, such as arms control, were a non-starter for conflicting Israelis and Arabs, the discourse shifted to Partnership Building Measures (PBMs), a softer security concept based on political dialogue’ (Adler and Crawford 2004, p. 30).

The non-inclusion of the United States in the Barcelona Process appears to further undermine the EMP's hard security objectives. It is highly improbable that any formal security agreement involving the Arab states and Israel that does not include the United States could be successful. Unsurprisingly, this home truth has not escaped the attention of some EU member governments. Spanish officials especially have suggested that the United States and possibly Russia would need to be included in any Mediterranean security regime (Gillespie, 2001). It has been common among analysts to dismiss the EU's ability to address hard security problems without American assistance, as was the case during the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s (Treacher, 2004). Following the US-brokered Dayton Agreement, it became common among EU foreign policy researchers to argue that the EU should stick to the 'civilian power' activities that it knows best and leave hard security to NATO (Smith, 2003). The relationship between NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and the EMP's political and security partnership would appear at first glance to fit such a pattern – NATO can privilege hard security relationships while the EMP focuses on economic development and capacity-building.[10] As it has turned out, NATO's efforts have come to nought due to American reluctance to involve Europeans in initiatives that may compromise US autonomy in the Arab-Israeli peace process (Musu, 2006).

Aside from principled arguments over the status of the Occupied Territories, a further Arab-Israeli factor affecting hard security relationships in the region has been the regional military balance. Arms control negotiations have been stalled for many years by tension over Israeli ambiguity over its arsenal of nuclear weapons. The refusal of Israel to admit that it possesses nuclear weapons or to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty led to the failure of arms control and regional security negotiations (ACRS) in the early 1990s. In a series of meetings held between 1992 and 1994, the Egyptian government argued that Israel's nuclear weapons represented a real threat to the Arab states. Israel could not be drawn into placing its nuclear arsenal on to the negotiating table, and in the absence of any binding commitment negotiations broke down (Jones, 2003). Like negotiations on

[10] NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 and includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, the ACRS negotiations were suspended.

The lack of progress in arms control negotiations has had wide-ranging implications for regional cooperation on hard security. During the ACRS process the Egyptians pointed to several other weapons of mass destruction programmes in the Middle East which they argued were efforts to balance Israeli military superiority (Jones, 2003). In recent years as the international community's concern that Iran is developing nuclear weapons has grown, leading to speculation that an Iranian bomb could spark a nuclear arms race in the region among the likes of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt.[11] Several Arab states in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf have announced plans to develop nuclear power plants, and the French, Russian and American governments are competing for influence over the region's nuclear programmes (Datan, 2008).

Islamist terrorism

The 'war' against Islamist terrorism is often portrayed as a conflict with negative implications for comprehensive intergovernmental security cooperation (see Press-Barnathan, 2005). In fact, terrorism is the best example of a security issue where European and Mediterranean partner governments' interests have converged since 1995. Most Western governments and security agencies are concerned at the prospects of terrorist groups, generally considered immune to traditional strategies of deterrence, obtaining and potentially using weapons of mass destruction. In the south Mediterranean, Islamist radicals have long posed a direct threat to the incumbent governments' hold on power. The Maghreb governments in particular have objected strongly in cases where people they have accused of terrorist activities have received political asylum in Europe, especially during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s (Joffé, 2008 a). Some south Mediterranean governments have also expressed concern at the numbers of Islamists radicalised in Europe returning home to launch attacks in their home countries. In recent

[11] See *The Economist* 'Nuclear Succession' 28 September 2006.

years EU and MPC governments have redoubled cooperation on catching terrorists, breaking up networks, and repatriating suspects to the custody of the security services in their countries of origin.

The fight against terrorism has certainly had significant influence on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The EMP has been reconfigured to reflect the new focus the terrorist threat: in 2005 a joint declaration on combating terrorism was heralded as a major achievement at the 10th anniversary summit in Barcelona and terrorism has frequently been a prominent topic of discussion at EMP ministerial meetings.[12] Schumacher argues that September 11, 2001 and more especially the Madrid and London train bombings changed the perspective of northern EU member states in particular. Whereas previously the governments of Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the UK regarded the EMP primarily as a regional development project, terrorist attacks and foiled plots in the Schengen zone have encouraged them to re-adjust their focus to the security aspects of relations with south and east Mediterranean countries (Schumacher 2008, p. 15).

In Europe, 9/11 and the Madrid and London public transport bombings raised fears among policymakers and voters of the random threat that terrorists pose, and, while large-scale terrorist attacks in European countries are still relatively rare, the need to respond to the terrorist threat has led to significant shifts in policy at national and European levels. Former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar has described terrorism as much more than isolated acts of cruelty and violence: 'Jihadism has replaced communism, as communism replaced Nazism, as an existential threat to the liberal democracies,' he writes, '[terrorism] is the tip of the iceberg of a radical and extremist Islam that amounts to a global insurgency' (*Europe's World*). Whether Mr. Aznar's concerns are genuine is unknowable – however, his description of the terrorist threat as 'existential' is an overstatement. Unlike jihadism, Nazism and Communism were ideologies whose proponents had state institutions at their disposal, and posed a military

[12] The proceedings of annual Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers Meetings are available at www.ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed

threat to the Western democracies. Notwithstanding the Iranian revolution and the unstable politics of Pakistan, the appropriateness of grouping Islamist terrorists into an apocalyptic threat to 'the west' is questionable.

European governments' responses to the terrorist threat have indeed been swift and wide ranging, and have had a major impact on the implementation of community policies in the Mediterranean. Joffé sees three major impacts of these responses on the comprehensive regional security agenda: First, the response has been to further securitise the issue of migration; second, the EU and its members have adopted the agendas of South Mediterranean states towards Islamist terrorism and have consequently nullified the EU's 'normative' policies, a process Joffé terms 'externalisation in reverse.' A third consequence is that common EU policy platforms have been marginalised by bilateral agreements between states across the Mediterranean, leading to closer ties between national security agencies that have, in Joffé's view, 'undermined formal accountability for the actions of both organs of the states and the EU' (Joffé 2008 a, p. 167).

Using a discourse analysis approach, Bicchi and Martin argue that European fear of terrorism has prompted a securitisation process largely at the national level, and that this shift in member state priorities has begun to affect common EU policies towards Muslim countries. They note that the UK has brought in new legislation and security measures which frame radical Islamic ideology as the existential threat, rather than individual terrorists or groups. They also argue that the EU displays a securitisation process in relation to some parts of its external security strategy. According to Bicchi and Martin the EU has problems in deciding the role of Islamists in democratisation processes in their countries. Although it calls for more participation of civil society, the EU has shied away from engaging with political Islam (Bicchi and Martin 2006).

Daniel Keohane notes that while EU governments cooperate at the community level in justice and home affairs, they also pursue their own relations with third countries outside the EU institutional and policy framework. He cites the example of British officials who work more closely with Pakistan than do EU agencies, as do French officials with their

colleagues in Algeria (D Keohane, 2008). Most of the terrorist problems in Britain have a Pakistani component, and given the nature of the problem British authorities consider it is more efficient to deal with their Pakistani colleagues directly, rather than through an EU interlocutor. The key question is whether the EU could deal with this particular problem better than national security services can, coordinating their activities through EU-level institutions and organisations where necessary. German police pursuing a terrorist group into Italy would be better off contacting Italian police directly, rather than trying to coordinate the operation through Brussels. Similarly, Spanish police would be better off following a trail that led to Casablanca with the help of their Moroccan colleagues, particularly where there is a need for urgency.

In the wake of the Madrid and London terrorist attacks, several EU member states have entered into bilateral arrangements with south Mediterranean governments that focus on the tactical requirements of the fight against terrorism. The French and Algerian security services have worked together closely for many years and Spanish-Moroccan cooperation on terrorism has deepened since the Madrid train bombings. In August 2005 the UK government signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' with the Jordanian government on the treatment of deported individuals believed to pose a threat to public order. In October and December 2005 similar agreements were signed with Libya and Lebanon, with both Mediterranean countries pledging that they would respect international human rights norms in their treatment of suspected terrorists deported from the UK.[13] A diplomatic 'exchange of letters' between the UK and Algeria provides similar assurances. Italy and Libya have signed several bilateral agreements to fight terrorism, organised crime, and illegal migration in return for substantial financial support.

Bilateral agreements signed between some EU member states and Mediterranean partner governments have raised questions as to their consistency with EU and international human rights law (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Moreover, arrangements to catch terrorists and break up their support networks are necessarily implemented by security services at the local level. Most of these operations take place out of the public eye and

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[13] See www.fco.gov.uk.

sometimes involve close cooperation among EU member state police and anti-terrorist units and their colleagues from Mediterranean partner countries, which are not subject to the same level of civilian or judicial oversight as in Europe. Transparency is questionable, and the potential for unsavoury incidents is high.

Bilateral cooperation between national security services, assisted by multilateral information-sharing, is regarded as the most effective way to combat terrorists that cross borders to carry out attacks, or who source money, training, weapons or other resources in other countries. This cooperation very often takes place between the security services of a European democracy and their colleagues in an autocratic country where civilian oversight and transparency are not maintained to the same levels. A recent special report on terrorism published by *The Economist* argued that Islamist terrorism will not be defeated by Western countries but rather by governments in the Muslim world. 'This will take time, Western assistance and much diplomatic skill,' the report concluded, 'Until then the West will have to cooperate with other countries (at times holding its nose) to contain the threat.'[14] Holding one's nose occupies a hand that could be used for other purposes – it is unlikely that the French or British governments will want the EU to push too hard for reform while they need close cooperation to catch terrorists with roots in Jordan or Algeria. It is also clear that while European governments perceive a high threat from Islamist terrorists, they will not change their policy regarding security cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Terrorism by definition spreads fear among the general public of being caught up in indiscriminate violence. Its proponents aim to establish a degree of social control by means of spectacular violent acts that create the impression that everyone is at risk, even though the statistical chances of being affected are small. In this sense Islamist terrorists have had a major impact on the collective mind of Western policymakers, media and publics. While the risk of a group bent on mass murder obtaining and using weapons of mass destruction cannot be ruled out, to date terrorists have lacked the material or military capabilities to threaten Western states or their institutions directly. This is

[14] See 'Winning or losing? A special report on Al Qaeda,' *The Economist*, 19 July 2008, p. 12.

certainly due to sound policing, backed by intelligence sharing and operational cooperation with security services in countries where independent oversight is not taken as seriously as in Europe. Nevertheless, it is clear that fear of terrorism has also shaped policymaking to such an extent that many of the EMP's comprehensive security and reform objectives have been recast as anti-terrorism measures.

The 'securitisation' of illegal migration

The term 'securitisation' refers to a process whereby an issue that is not inherently security related comes to be treated as such. According to the so-called 'Copenhagen school' security issues do not exist as such, but materialise when social processes are 'securitised' through presentation by public authorities as 'an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure' (see Buzan et al, 1998). The Copenhagen school's characterisation of security as a wholly socially constructed phenomenon is unlikely to be considered relevant by governments charged with protecting their societies from real threats. An army crossing an international border or a group of nuclear armed terrorists constitute a security threat that is not mere perception. Nevertheless, the Copenhagen School's insights are helpful when considering the treatment of issues that are not by their nature security related. In particular, the policy response to the widespread fear generated by terrorist attacks has been to emphasise the security aspects of trans-Mediterranean migration.

The figures on illegal migration across the Mediterranean are somewhat patchy.[15] A study conducted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) estimated that 100,000-120,000 irregular migrants to cross the Mediterranean every year, of which 55,000 are citizens of Mediterranean partner countries, 35,000 are of sub-Saharan origin and 30.000 come from other regions, such as Asia (Simon, 2006). The most commonly used route for illegal migration is from Libya to Sicily, Malta and nearby islands and carries over 80,000 migrants per year, making Libya the primary departure

[15] An August 2008 request to EuroPol for estimates of the annual flow of illegal migration to the EU, and the total number of undocumented persons residing in the EU, was declined.

and transit country (ICMPD 2004). Recent data from FRONTEX counts 1,230 arrivals in Malta and 7,889 in Lampedusa from January to August 2007, rising to 2,187 and 17,302 for the first seven months of 2008.[16]

Existing research does point to some important and often overlooked facts about of illegal immigration to the EU. First, only a minority of undocumented residents in member states entered the EU illegally. Illegal immigration across the Mediterranean by sea has attracted the most dramatic headlines: as one report put it, 'on arrival they make a far bigger impact than those who slip across land borders… Every time a party of wretched Africans is filmed landing ashore, it shows the public that illegal migrants are still coming.'[17] However, clandestine entrances into the EU territory – especially by sea, but also by land or air – constitute only a small percentage of total illegal immigration. The vast majority of undocumented immigrants residing in member states enter the EU legally and then overstay their visas (Sciortino, 2004, OECD, 2007). According to the Italian Interior Ministry of Interior, only 10% of undocumented residents in Italy in 2002 arrived illegally by sea, 15% entered the country illegally by land, and the majority 75% overstayed short term visas. In 2004, illegal arrivals by sea were estimated to amount to approximately 4% of the entire undocumented population, increasing to 14% in 2005 and 13% in 2006 (Coluccello and Massey, 2007).[18] It should be also noted that the main irregular migratory flows originate in Eastern Europe, rather than in the southern Mediterranean countries, suggesting that an increased emphasis on Europe's southern borders is only a partial solution to the multifaceted problem of illegal immigration (European Commission, 2004 b).

The ancient phenomenon of migration across geographical and cultural borders has become increasingly 'securitised' in recent years. Migration policy is now a key element of the security strategy of most European countries. Supply and demand for economic migrants from the South Mediterranean to Europe are expected to grow during the next

[16] August 2008 request to FRONTEX for estimates on the annual flow of illegal migration in the Mediterranean.
[17] 'Italy and Libya: Undoing the damage', *The Economist* 2 August 2008.
[18] See also Ministero dell'interno, *Lo stato della Sicurezza in Italia*, 2005, p. 41; Ministero dell'interno, *Note sulla sicurezza in Italia*, 2006, p. 16.

few decades. The difficult issues raised by efforts to 'assimilate' these migrants into European societies are well known and several EU governments have opted for policies that are economically inefficient but reflect their political priorities. Already, the difficulty of controlling numbers and perceived risks of allowing criminal elements to enter the EU have placed political pressure on some European governments and EU institutions. The result has been a concerted European effort to beef up border security and to establish cooperation with the governments of several Mediterranean partner countries to prevent as many migrants as possible from reaching the EU illegally.

Several scholars have argued that trans-Mediterranean migration has become increasingly securitised since the shocks of 9/11 and the Madrid train bombings, some even going as far as to argue that '…migration itself has, in part, come to 'signify' transnational terrorism' (Joffé 2008 a, p. 148). Joffé considers that the greatest concern of EU member governments has long been unrestrained labour migration, particularly from North African countries. Recent moves by southern EU member states – especially Spain and Italy – to equate migration with terrorism and to use military and paramilitary resources to prevent illegal migrants reaching their shores are a clear example of the securitisation of labour migration, ostensibly an issue that is more economic and social in nature Khasabova and Furness, 2008).

Joffé argues that while the notion that migrants from the Arab world represented a security threat to Europe was one of the main factors behind the development and launch of the Barcelona Process in the mid-1990s, the EMP itself was presented in normative terms that were more likely to garner support in Europe. According to Joffé, this changed after the 9/11 attacks as security objectives related to fighting terrorism have been pursued with more vigour. As Joffé writes: 'Migrants, in addition to their economic and humanitarian identities, began to be seen as potential threats to European order at both the national and community levels on the assumption that they could also be the transmission trains of violent ideologies of conflict from North Africa and, to a lesser extent, from the Middle East into Europe' (Joffé 2008 a, p. 159).

Media attention has engendered a widespread perception of poorly controlled borders that present a serious security problem for Europe (Lavanex, 2006). Since the shock of September 11, 2001, fears have been raised that organised criminal groups may attempt to smuggle not only economic migrants and refugees, but also potential terrorists (Demleitner, 2008; Sarrica, 2005). This fear has profoundly influenced border management policy in the EU, especially since the March 2004 Madrid train bombings (Widgren et al, 2005). The threat extends to all EU member states since internal EU border controls were lifted, and policymakers often speak of 'terrorism' and 'illegal migration' in the same breath.[19] However, what little research that exists on the terrorism/illegal migration link suggests that the relationship is rather tenuous – especially as highly risky and unpredictable asylum and illegal migration routes are unlikely paths for bringing terrorists into the EU. Terrorists do not normally need to risk a one-way trip to Spain or Italy in an unseaworthy boat (Guild, 2003).

The Commission's EuroBarometer data shows that concerns about immigration are similarly high across the 27 member states. In the latest Justice, Freedom and Security poll, 27% of respondents said that asylum and migration policy should be among the three highest priorities for the European Union. Furthermore, a large majority of respondents considered that in all of the justice, freedom and security areas covered by the poll (the fight against terrorism, the fight against organised crime and trafficking, promoting and protecting fundamental rights, the exchange of police and judicial information between Member States, the fight against drug abuse, the control of external borders and asylum and migration policy) more decision-making should take place at the EU level.[20] The report summary interprets these results as showing 'that EU citizens support the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union even if the policy details are perhaps considered somewhat abstract to most citizens.'[21]

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[19] See, for example, Gunter Verheugen 'The European Neighbourhood Policy,' speech to the Prime Ministerial Conference of the Vilnius and Visegrad Democracies, Bratislava, 19 March 2004.
[20] Special EuroBarometer 290: The Role of the European Union in Justice, Freedom and Security Policy Areas (summary), June 2008.
[21] EuroBarometer 290, Summary, p. 15.

Whether this strong support has directly resulted in more EU-level responsibility for anti-illegal migration policy and border security is unclear. The increasing concern of citizens has accompanied an expansion of responsibilities at the EU level, but it is also reflected in the growing number of bilateral agreements on border security signed between EU members and Mediterranean partner governments. Of four EU members that have such agreements, three – the UK, France and Spain – all showed higher levels of support for greater EU involvement in border security than the EU average. The other – Italy – was below the average.

It is unlikely that Mediterranean partner governments will unquestioningly accept Europe's lead in these matters. The situation becomes more delicate regarding the oversight of readmission agreements and other forms of bilateral cooperation between EU member governments and their Mediterranean counterparts. These agreements bypass EU institutions, and Brussels is effectively sidelined because it has no jurisdiction over the governments or security services of Mediterranean partner countries.

Three common explanations for Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation

The impact of regional conflicts

Violent conflict is by definition physical and has a geographical dimension. For post-Cold War security analysts, the regional level is where the action is. Conflicts in the post-Cold War era often take place at the regional level. Wars tend to be fought between groups competing for domestic influence, with consequences for people living in neighbouring states – such as in East Africa, where conflict in Sudan affects Chad, or in East Timor where the risk of wider instability has drawn peacekeepers from Australia and New Zealand into the conflict. International conflicts are often fought between neighbouring governments – France and Germany, for example, or more recently the removal of the Islamic Courts from power in Somalia by the Ethiopian military in December 2006. The American- led conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are notable

exceptions that prove the rule, in as much of the controversy surrounding these wars centres on the issue of whether it is appropriate for a government to attack another located thousands of miles away.

Table 1: Militarised interstate disputes involving MPCs 1992-2002[22]

Year	Start Date	End Date	State A	State B	Level of Hostility
1993	04/06/93	12/18/01	Israel	Lebanon	4:4
	07/12/93	07/07/01	Israel	Saudi Arabia	4:4
1995	03/20/95	07/10/95	Turkey	Iraq	4:1
1996	06/96	06/96	Syria	Turkey	3:3
	06/26/96	06/26/96	Turkey	Iran	4:1
	09/05/96	02/17/99	Turkey	Iraq	4:1
1999	07/18/99	07/18/99	Turkey	Iran	4:1
	09/29/99	09/29/99	Turkey	Iraq	4:1
	10/22/99	10/22/99	Egypt	Iran	3:1
	10/22/99	10/22/99	Jordan	Iraq	3:1
2000	07/25/00	01/01	Turkey	Iraq	4:1
2001	08/25/01	08/26/01	Turkey	Iraq	4:1
2002	07/11/02	07/18/02	Spain	Morocco	3:3

Source: Correlates of War Dyadic Militarised Interstate Disputes Dataset 3.10 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004).

Many analysts argue that the lack of a formal Euro-Mediterranean regional security agreement is best explained by the persistent conflicts that plague the Mediterranean basin, from Western Sahara in the west to the Israel-Palestine conflict in the east. Several other regional conflicts with a transnational dimension also prevent governments from reaching agreement. These include the Turkish military's ongoing conflict with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), simmering conflict remaining from the civil war in Algeria, and Hezbollah's sporadically violent conflict with Israel. Conflicts involving external actors, such as the Iraq War and the (thus far) diplomatic battle between 'the

[22] The level of hostility is the highest reached by States A and B across all incidents in the dispute. 3: a state placed armed forces on alert, fortified its border or violated another state's border. 4: a state imposed a blockade, seized or occupied territory or clashed with the armed forces of another state. Level of hostility 4 also includes formal declarations of war. 5: side A or side B engaged in or joined an interstate war. Unfortunately this dataset has not been updated since 2001 – a more recent set would include Israel's summer war with Hezbollah in 2006 and Turkish incursions into northern Iraq in 2008.

west' and Iran also influence the progress of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. These conflicts are inextricably linked with arguably the defining conflict of our age – the United States-led 'global war on terror' that was launched following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 2001. Needless to say, most analysts believe that the impact of conflict on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation has been negative, and that no formal agreement is possible without prior conflict resolution (Jones, 1998).

It has also been argued that domestic conflict is a major factor precluding the establishment of comprehensive regional security cooperation (Nathan, 2006). Internal conflicts in the south Mediterranean are fought between governments and two main types of opposition group: ethno-nationalist and Islamist. Fighting between the Turkish military and Kurdish nationalists caused over 1000 casualties every year from 1992 – 1997, and has continued at a lower level since. Conflict between governments and Islamist organisations in Algeria started when the GIA (*Groupe Islamique Armé*) began a violent campaign after the military government refused to accept the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in the December 1991 elections. The GIA attacked civilian and government targets, and assassinations, bombings and the military response caused over 1000 casualties each year from 1993 – 2001.[23]

Table 2 presents data from the UCDP/PRIO dataset on internal and internationalised internal conflicts in the MENA between 1990 and 2007. The dataset defines internationalised internal conflict as taking place 'between a government of a state and one or more opposition group(s) with intervention from other state(s)' (Gleditsch et al, 2006). Due to the large number of internal conflicts, only those where more than 1000 fatalities were recorded have been included. The table includes the worst conflicts that were confined to a single state's territory according to casualties. It also includes all conflicts that involved the crossing of an international border by either actor.

[23] The violence in Algeria has since continued at a lower level – i.e. with less than 1000 killed each year. Another lower level conflict between a MENA government and Islamist opposition took place in Egypt between 1993 and 1998.

Table 2: MPC internal and internationalised internal conflicts 1990 – 2007

Year	Government	Non-State Actor	Type
1990	Lebanon	Lebanese Forces (supported by Syria)	Internationalised
	Israel	Fatah, Hezbollah	Internationalised
	Israel	Fatah, Hezbollah	Internationalised
1992	Turkey	PKK	Internal
	Israel	Fatah, Hezbollah, PIJ	Internationalised
1993	Turkey	PKK	Internal
	Algeria	GIA, MIA/FIS	Internal
	Israel	Hamas, Hezbollah	Internationalised
1994	Turkey	PKK	Internal
	Algeria	GIA, MIA/FIS/AIS	Internal
	Israel	Hamas, Hezbollah	Internationalised
1995	Turkey	PKK	Internal
	Algeria	GIA, MIA/FIS/AIS	Internal
1996	Turkey	PKK	Internal
	Algeria	GIA, MIA/FIS/AIS	Internal
	Israel	Hamas, Hezbollah, PNA	Internationalised
1997	Turkey	PKK	Internal
	Algeria	GIA, MIA/FIS/AIS	Internal
	Israel	Hezbollah	Internationalised
1998	Algeria	GIA	Internal
1999	Algeria	GIA, GSPC	Internal
	Israel	Hezbollah	Internationalised
2000	Algeria	GIA, GSPC	Internal
2001	Algeria	GIA, GSPC	Internal
	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PFLP, PNA	Internal
2002	Israel	AMB, Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, PNA	Internationalised
2003	Israel	AMB, Hamas, PIJ	Internationalised
	Israel	AMB, Hamas, PIJ	Internationalised
	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PIJ	Internationalised
2006	Israel	Hezbollah	Internationalised
	Israel	Fatah, Hamas, PIJ	Internationalised
	Turkey	PKK	Internationalised

Source: UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 4-2008 (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008)

Table 2 suggests that domestic conflict in MENA countries easily acquires an international dimension, posing a major challenge to regional security initiatives. Kurdish nationalism has always had a trans-national element as Kurds are an ethnic minority in

four MENA countries. Recent military and political developments in Iraq and Turkey have raised fears that international conflict over Kurdish nationalism may escalate, with wider destabilising effects for the region. Turkey has built up its military presence along its border with Iraq, and its parliament has given the army permission to pursue Kurdish rebels into Iraq.[24] Conflict between Islamists and MENA governments can also involve diaspora and international terrorist activity. In 1995 the Algerian GIA was held responsible for a nail bomb attack on the Paris Metro. In 1996 the GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), an offshoot of the GIA, was established, reportedly with links to international Islamist extremist groups.[25] While conflict between Israel and Palestinian groups has an international dimension almost by definition, the 2006 summer war with Hezbollah was a major escalation and its uncertain conclusion led to an increase in the involvement of external actors, especially through the United Nations peacekeeping force UNIFIL.

Unresolved conflicts represent risks for incumbent governments, creating pressures for military buildups that exacerbate the security dilemma. As Ferreira Pinto writes, 'Mediterranean societies are highly militarised due to the existence of a series of bilateral or regional conflicts that pit the states against each other' (Ferreira Pinto 2001, p. 31). MPC governments spend around 5.5 per cent of their GDP on defence, compared to a global average of around 2.5 per cent. Three Mediterranean partners – Jordan, Israel and Syria – are among the top dozen military spenders in the world in per capita terms.[26] Unsurprisingly, the security dilemma has undermined efforts to reduce tensions through arms control efforts, such as the ACRS negotiations that took place as part of the Madrid peace process in the 1990s (Jones, 2003).

[24] BBC News 18 October 2007.
[25] BBC News 14 May 2003.
[26] CIA World Factbook, see www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.txt.

The Arab Israeli conflict

The effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the EMP has been widely discussed, and most commentators agree that the conflict presents the one insurmountable obstacle to deepening Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. According to a recent EuroMeSCo report, 'the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict has complicated attempts at cooperation, finally leading the process of partnership towards a political deadlock' (Aliboni et al, 2008). The EU's approach under the Barcelona Process has always been that the EMP can help to facilitate the Middle East Peace Process even if it is not the forum under which a settlement will be reached (EC, 2005). In this sense the EMP aims to facilitate the resumption of the peace process by providing creative diplomatic formulas rather than pressures and sanctions on the parties (Shamir, 2007). The EMP has long been lauded as the only regional forum in which Israel and the Arab states sit around the same table, creating a space in which protagonists can interact, albeit indirectly. This strategy has been reaffirmed under the latest Euro-Mediterranean policy declaration, the joint declaration following the Union for the Mediterranean summit in Paris in July 2008. Nevertheless, as the Commission itself acknowledges, the Arab-Israeli conflict has presented a serious obstacle to the EMP's political and security objectives and as much as Europe has tried to tiptoe around the issue, it is not about to fade away.

Due to widespread support for the Palestinian cause in the 'Arab street,' the Arab/Israeli conflict affects the whole Middle East and North Africa region. The one Euro-Mediterranean issue that virtually all Arabs agree on is that intergovernmental cooperation on hard security especially is impossible in the absence of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Much of this agreement is based on principle: Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza have alienated even moderate Arabs, who regard the idea of cooperation with Israel as a reward that should only be granted when the Israelis change their ways (Jones, 2003). Many Arabs want the EU to put pressure on Israel to change its policies and lament what they consider Europe's failure to do so, especially as the United States is normally seen as backing the occupation of Arab land. Euro-Mediterranean

meetings at all levels break down frequently over this issue, with Arab representatives simply refusing to discuss anything else on the agenda (Schumacher, 2008).

Southern Mediterranean commentators tend to be forthright about the chances of success of an EU policy that attempts to sidestep the Arab-Israeli conflict. Senyucel et al argue that 'effective security cooperation relies upon the EU taking affirmative impartial steps towards resolving the Mashreq countries' conflict and reaffirming its stance towards Israel's nuclear capability.' This is due to the widespread negative perception of the 'West' that many south Mediterranean commentators argue is fuelled by Western reluctance to exert pressure on the Israeli government. Senyucel et al add 'the perceived bias of the USA and the EU in the conflict between Palestine and Israel are counter-productive to demands for a greater promotion of the rule of law, human rights and peaceful conflict management, for cooperation based on partnership, and for common definitions of foreign and security objectives' (Senyucel et al 2006, p. 17).

For similarly morally tinged reasons, some Israeli scholars have also been critical of the EU. One argues that 'European political officials, NGOs, journalists, and academics are perceived as playing a leading role in support for Palestinian objectives, and in the international campaign to de-legitimise Israel and Jewish sovereignty.'[27] The EU and Israel disagree over specific issues such as whether the Geneva Conventions apply in the Occupied Territories (the EU says they do, the Israeli government says they do not), as well as more general issues concerning the role of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process (Del Sarto, 2007). As is the case with Arab countries, Israeli officials bristle at European intrusion into issues that they consider are no business of the EU.

Beyond high-minded rhetoric and symbolic acts of resistance lies normal politics. The Arab-Israeli conflict provides political actors with windows of opportunity to protect and pursue their interests. Resistance to the state of Israel has long been cited by Arab governments as legitimising their rule, as justification for resources invested in national

[27] Gerald M. Steinberg, 'Learning the lessons of the EU's failed Middle East policies, *Jerusalem Viewpoints*, 1 January 2004.

and domestic security, and as a good reason for delaying internal reforms (Perthes, 2004 a). In Jordan – a country heavily affected by the externalities of the Arab-Israeli conflict – upsurges in violence in the Palestinian territories have coincided with state crackdowns on opposition groups (Choucair-Vizoso, 2008). The split between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority has also created opportunities for other governments. The Egyptian government justifies its role in the blockade of Gaza due to Hamas' close association with the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's main opposition group. The Iranian government has been able to use its association with Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon to play a greater role in Mashreq affairs. Israeli policies accentuate political divisions in Palestine, lending credence to claims that Israeli policy is oriented towards conflict management rather than long-term resolution.

Much of the writing on the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is contradictory, and authors sometimes have difficulty reconciling their policy recommendations. According to Adler and Crawford, 'the Israeli-Arab conflict in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular… provide one of the most visible obstacles to the realisation of the Barcelona Process. Since the EMP's inception in 1995, the Middle East peace process was halting and uncertain, and the higher the tensions, the more the EMP was disrupted and weakened' (Adler and Crawford 2004, p. 39). Similarly, Biscop argues that the main reason for the paralysis of the EMP's political and security basket is the persistence of conflict in the Middle East, which leads to a lack of trust between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. Biscop's answer is to open up the ESDP to participation by south Mediterranean partners in order to make them less suspicious of the EU, while providing a basis on which a close, institutionalised security partnership could be built (Biscop 2003, p. 183).[28] In the light of the argument that the Middle East conflict represents an 'insurmountable obstacle' to Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation, it is difficult to see how Biscop's suggestion would make any difference even if it were able to be implemented.

[28] Biscop does not speculate as to the likely outcome of attempting to include Arab and Israeli security and military services in ESDP training and operations.

The Western Sahara conflict

The three decades old Western Sahara conflict has damaged bilateral relations between Spain, France, Algeria and Morocco and undermined EU efforts to encourage multilateral security cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. While there has been little armed violence since the late 1990s in Western Sahara, no deal on the final status of the territory has been reached. Darbouche and Gillespie note the influence of the Mediterranean's 'forgotten war' on regional security cooperation in the North African context. They point out that the long-running feud between the Algerian and Moroccan governments has been a major reason for the failure of the Arab Maghreb Union. They add that the Western Sahara conflict has undermined Euro-Mediterranean cooperation more generally, as the prospect of deepening political and economic ties among the Maghreb governments was to be one of the cornerstones of the EMP (Darbouche and Gillespie 2006, p. 5).

The EU's role in the Western Sahara dispute has been constrained by disagreement between France and Spain over the final status of the territory. In 1976 the nine member EC decided to stay out of what it considered to be an African issue, a position it maintained until 1988 when the EC declared that it supported the UN's call for a free and fair referendum on self determination (Fanés, 2004). The French and German EU Presidencies in 1998 and 1999 reiterated the EU's full support for the UN Secretary General's plan. The EU has repeatedly called upon all parties to move negotiations forward and has raised the Western Saharan issue during its Association Council meetings with Morocco.[29] The most prominent EU body on Western Sahara has been the European Parliament, which in 1999 called on Morocco and the Polisario Front to cooperate fully with the United Nations.[30] The European Commission has been somewhat silent on the issue and does not provide a clear affirmation of the EU position on its website, despite Western Sahara's importance to the Barcelona Process.

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[29] Statement by the European Union, Fifth Meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council, 22 November 2005. EU press release C/05/308.
[30] *Bulletin EU* 1/2-1999 point 1.2.9.

It is evident from the frustrated efforts of the EU and UN that the Western Sahara conflict cannot be resolved by outside actors. Any lasting solution will require agreement among the governments of Morocco, Algeria, Spain and France. This may be possible: Morocco has recently indicated to the UN that it is ready to negotiate on Saharawi autonomy, while Algerian President Boutiflika has asserted that Algeria is no longer a party to the conflict and will accept any settlement between Rabat and the Polisario Front (UNSC 2006, p. 3). Gillespie argues that the election of the Spanish socialist government of Luis Rodriguez Zapatero has seen a change in policy: Spain has proposed a fresh solution that recognises autonomy for Western Sahara within Morocco, provided that all parties agree. Gillespie believes that the Spanish plan – rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, cooperation between France and Spain, and backing for the UN resolutions combined with greater support for the Saharawi refuges – may be the key to a compromise solution (Gillespie 2004, p. 13).

The role of external actors

Some analysts believe that Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is possible even while the region's conflicts remain unresolved – after all, regional security agreements are not meant to resolve conflicts but to enable governments to manage their differences without resorting to violence (Jones, 1998). Landau and Ammor assume that 'lack of progress on regional security cooperation among the Southern partners in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to date cannot simply be summed up as the result of the negative impact of unresolved conflicts in the South' (Landau and Ammor, 2006, p. 3). As discussed in the previous section, the EU has tried to work around the central Middle East and North African conflicts, indicating that key European policymakers share this assumption despite the shadow that conflict casts. As Landau and Ammor put it, 'even when there is tension and conflict, there are very likely common interests that can be built upon, and there is a need to explore attitudes toward the value of such cooperation (2006, p. 3). Researchers looking for interests upon which security cooperation can be built in spite of conflict have produced insightful results, some of which are unintended. The main outcome of this work is that it is highly probable that even if the Arab-Israeli and

Western Sahara conflicts were able to be resolved to the satisfaction of their protagonists, there would still be major barriers to formal, comprehensive security cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Scholars writing from the realist perspective especially have tended to downplay the sociological impact of conflict and concentrate on the geopolitical strategies of external actors in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. A common observation made by many foreign policy realists is that the EU, its members and the United States have long competed for influence in the region. Several scholars have lamented missed opportunities given the collective military and economic power that the West could bring to bear in the Middle East if it were united. But Western disagreements have not only resulted in weaker initiatives than would otherwise be the case. From a geopolitical perspective, Western conflicts of interest and competing policy initiatives have provided the Arab states and Israel with plentiful opportunities to play external actors off against each other.

Musu argues that confusion about the division of labour between the EMP and NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue 'reflects the divisions amongst the allies within NATO, and particularly the different European and American approaches to the region. Europeans tend to focus their attention on the Mediterranean, whereas Americans tend to focus on the Gulf countries, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the new balance of power created by Iraq's defeat and Iran's emergence as a regional hegemon' (2006, p. 424).

In their analysis of the transatlantic context of Euro-Mediterranean relations, Aliboni and Qartarneh conclude that 'while there are similarities between American and European policies towards key areas in the Middle East and North Africa that suggest there are significant opportunities for cooperation, this has not happened because of the strong differences in strategic perspectives' (Aliboni and Qartarneh 2005, p. 5). The differences between Europe and the United States were accentuated after 9/11 and the serious transatlantic disagreement in the leadup to the invasion of Iraq. Rather than complementing the strengths and weaknesses in each other's ability to induce

cooperation among MENA governments, European and American policymakers have been unable to come up with a common strategy. According to Perthes, Europeans have relied on pragmatic strategies for fostering cooperation based on political reform, the rule of law and human rights principles. Americans have relied on George W. Bush's 'forward strategy of freedom' and regime change for countries that are not US allies (Perthes 2004 a, pp 86 – 87).

A common critique of EU policies in the Mediterranean is that divisions among member states weaken common European policy initiatives. Conflicts of interest among EU member states are often held to prevent clear policy initiatives, undermine the European Commission in implementing ambiguous policies, and confuse partner countries which have to work out for themselves what it is that Europe wants from them. The EU is often criticised for failing to design clear conditions for association with third countries, a problem normally blamed on member state disagreements. Writing from a neofunctionalist perspective, Sandra Lavanex argues that it is easier for the EU to extend its 'network governance' to countries and regions where interests converge and enforcement costs are low. She adds that convergence is more likely in technical issue-areas rather than 'high politics' (Lavanex, 2008).

A further critique of the EU stems from characterisations of Europe as a 'normative actor' or 'civilian power' that has been unable to face up to the 'hard power' realities of the Middle East and North Africa. Cavatorta and his colleagues write: 'The European Union is not perceived as suffering from the same difficulties of reconciling normative and material interests because, as an international actor, it is considered to be and perceives itself as being wholly normative' (Cavatorta et al, 2006, p. 2). There are several problems with this claim.

The main problem with critiques that focus on the weaknesses of European policies is that they fail to present a clear concept of the EU as an international actor. The EU is often portrayed as a cohesive and autonomous policy maker that is somehow 'undermined' by conflicts among member states, with which it must compete for

influence overseas. Obviously, the EU is far from being a unified international actor with the same autonomy as a sovereign state. For a start, the EU is not autonomous but an agent of the member states – it carries out their bidding in international affairs. Member states express joint policy positions through the European Council, and they delegate different roles and responsibilities to the European Commission and the European Parliament. The Commission in particular is able to exercise limited autonomy through the exploitation of agency slippage, but it remains well short of exercising the autonomy of a sovereign state at the international level.

Often, the tendency of the EU to pursue normative objectives is due to member states' retention of their sovereign abilities to exercise 'hard power,' especially in the military sense. EU member states have been reluctant to pool their sovereignty in military matters. Even as greater responsibilities and competencies are placed on the institutions of the ESDP and the CFSP, it is hard to imagine that France or Great Britain will allocate soldiers, weapons and a military budget to the EU and allow Brussels to decide when these assets will be used.

Domestic political economy explanations

International political economy scholarship has provided us with some useful analytical techniques for highlighting the basic features of security policymaking – especially regarding the influence of preferences and restrictions on the behaviour of actors, and the fundamental features of the international bargaining process. In addition to providing insights about the impact of complex underlying tensions wrought by economic underdevelopment in the Arab world on regional security cooperation, focussing on actors and their preferences can help explain the influence of unresolved conflicts and statist elite rule on the long-term stability of the Mediterranean basin. This literature is still reasonably small – analyses focussing on normative motivations or geopolitical strategies are much more common.

Most political economy analyses share the liberal assumption that the outcomes of international negotiations cannot be explained without reference to domestic politics. While the main actors in international politics are sovereign states, these are not 'billiard balls' but representative institutions that pursue the interests of powerful domestic actors. This assumption has led to some insightful work on cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa. according to this explanation, domestic politics both motivates and reacts to the moves of intra- and extra-regional actors, and domestic actors are those most affected by conflicts and in the best position to exploit them for their own ends. Domestic politics is the reason why regional governments find cooperation so difficult; it is also behind much of the external policies of the EU.

Solingen argues that alternative explanations for regional security processes that are not captured by the three main groups of international relations theory can be obtained through analysing the interests and actions of domestic coalitions. Solingen defines coalitions as "policy networks" spanning state and private political actors. Solingen believes that state autonomy is both a matter of degree and subject to empirical analysis, as few governments are able to act in the international arena without considering the impacts of their actions at the domestic level. For Solingen, 'focussing on coalitions helps avoid sterile debates between purely statist notions of a completely autonomous state and purely societal-reductionist conceptions of states as instruments of social, particularly economic, forces' (Solingen 1998, p. 9).

Solingen's hypothesis is that 'coalitions more strongly committed to integrative policies (internationalist) are more likely to converge with similar neighbouring coalitions in creating cooperative – more peaceful – regional orders. Conversely, coalitions aggregating statist-nationalist interests – often allied with confessional movements – create far less cooperative regions, particularly where they try to overwhelm their internationalist rivals at home and in the region.' While Solingen's argument is similar to that proposed by the influential democratic peace thesis, she does not insist that internationalising coalitions be democratic, or that their national governments function as institutions representing the majority and protecting the individual in the western liberal

sense. For Solingen, the key variable is the extent to which ruling coalitions are committed to cooperation with their neighbours. They may have preferences that are inherently amenable to cooperation, such as a desire for the provision and maintenance of a public good. Or, they may have preferences for more discrete gains that they believe are best pursued cooperatively, rather than through unilateral, zero-sum competition. In any case, a government like that of Singapore, while not necessarily democratic (control of Singapore's key governance institutions is not on the line during elections), or even Vietnam (which is a one-party state) have been able to pursue cooperative relations with neighbouring countries, most clearly economically but also in the realm of 'high' politics and security. In the Middle East and North Africa countries that are also governed in an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian manner have not been able to come to similar arrangements (Solingen, 2007).

For Heller, the key factor explaining the lack of formal barriers to conflict in the Middle East is a lack of what he terms 'cognitive convergence among elites.' Heller is aware that shared democratic governance, normative convergence and a sense of moral community are neither panacea for regional security problems nor necessary for the creation of regional security institutions. Nevertheless, he argues, 'the perception of a common interest among elites is minimal' due to their own political, economic and military insecurities (Heller 2003, pp. 128 – 129). Mediterranean partner governments have developed mostly divergent interpretations of national security objectives, driven by concerns about their survival as independent sovereign entities.

Heller and Solingen agree that the Middle East and North Africa is behind most other parts of the world in terms of making the most of its potential, and reforms have been slow and tentative. This is because Mediterranean partner governments are reluctant to introduce reforms that might undermine their domestic political power-bases. Political reform in the Arab Mediterranean partners has been virtually non-existent. Those reforms that have taken place have been mostly cosmetic and designed to strengthen the incumbents' hold on power, rather than transfer power to representative institutions. In

the absence of reform, multilateral cooperation on comprehensive security has been difficult.

More optimistically, de Vasconcelos argues that security cooperation will develop as repeated interaction deepens ties. He maintains that a formal security agreement is probably unnecessary for building cooperation among the governments of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. Rather, the level of political and security co-operation will be an outcome of the progress of the EMP rather than a condition upon which deeper cooperation must be built. As de Vasconcelos argues, 'the degree of… security cooperation at the multilateral level shall reflect progress achieved overall' (de Vasconcelos 2003, p. 48).

The domestic political economy view shifts the focus away from the EU, its members and other external actors. Instead, Mediterranean partner governments are seen as the key decision-makers, reacting to the pressures from within their own societies. This approach enables the use of a crucial insight that analyses that assume state preferences do not – how the differentiated interests of actors affect international outcomes. With regard to the Mediterranean, it is clear that widely distributed preferences for comprehensive security cooperation have presented a major obstacle for security institution-building. Mediterranean partner governments, as well as (arguably) some European governments, are wary of a formal, comprehensive agreement governing Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation because of the binding nature of such agreements. One actors reach an agreement on the issues, negotiations turn quickly to how the agreement will be enforced. The whole point of a regional security regime is to lock actors into their multilateral strictures, reducing their options for unilateral action.

Tying it all together: the case for an actor-oriented approach

Given the lack of concrete institutional achievements in the security field, it is not surprising that the EMP has been written off by many analysts as a failure that has contributed little to regional peace and stability in the Mediterranean Basin. Such

disappointment is understandable following the ambitions expressed in 1995 and yet it has tended to obscure some aspects of the Barcelona Process that are central to security cooperation among EU and Mediterranean partner governments. Although specific confidence-building measures have largely been considered too controversial, partner governments have been able to take advantage of a stable forum for dialogue and exchange that would otherwise not exist. The EMP is not an endgame, but a negotiated framework designed to deepen over time, enabling governments to take advantage of opportunities for cooperation where security preferences converge. While the speed of deepening does not satisfy many onlookers, the framework itself has remained in place despite the challenges member governments face. In recent months international bargaining over the new Union for the Mediterranean has provided strong indications that EU member and Mediterranean partner governments remain interested in cooperation.

Europeans cannot abandon the Mediterranean to its own fate – it will always be Europe's southern frontier, and Europe will always be the northern neighbour of the Arab world. Events in the countries bordering the Mediterranean have long had security implications for Europe and actors on both sides are well aware that this will not change (bin Talal, 2007). The Mediterranean is arguably becoming more important to Europe: economically, as Europe's own energy resources dwindle it is turning increasingly to the Mediterranean – especially Algeria and Libya – for oil and gas. From the socio-cultural perspective, an ever-increasing percentage of Europe's population has roots in Mediterranean partner countries. But Europeans cannot simply step in and remake the region into the political, economic and social entity that they would like to see. The power required – whether soft or hard power – is beyond Europe's current capabilities, while the political will required to build greater capacities is lacking.

As Europe cannot abandon its Mediterranean neighbourhood, and nor can it transform it, what is the alternative? There appear no 'quick fixes' to the region's problems, and yet Europeans can neither build a wall around themselves nor recreate the region in their own image. Policies that support authoritarian regimes in the Arab Middle East while condoning Israel's occupation of the West Bank and blockade of Gaza appear

unsustainable in the long run, not least because authoritarian governments have been widely condemned for providing fertile ground for extremist influence. The only option appears to be a long, hard slog towards an uncertain objective defined by Europe's interest in long-term political, economic and social stability in the Mediterranean. It is likely that events will continue to knock this process off course, just as events affect the priorities and the incentives available to European and Mediterranean partner governments. Moreover, events such as the 2004 Madrid train bombings or the 2006 Lebanon war capture public attention, which in turn demands an immediate response from policymakers. Focussing on abstract concepts such as 'peace,' 'stability' and 'prosperity' is much more difficult, as these represent step-by-step processes rather than objectively identifiable goals.

Comprehensive security cooperation is predicated on the notion that the security of the state and the individual are intrinsically linked. In practice, this notion is pursued in accordance with two basic principles of conduct: respect for human rights, and civilian oversight of the military and security services. Most south Mediterranean governments maintain a domestic survival strategy based on patrimonial state-society relations and internal security agencies not subject to independent civilian oversight. The decision of some EU member governments – notably Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy – to back away from policies that would require them to push Mediterranean partner governments towards greater domestic accountability merely serves to maintain the status quo, while the long-standing European interest in a comprehensive security agreement remains un-addressed. Specific bilateral agreements for dealing with individuals suspected of involvement in Islamist terrorism are already creating legal difficulties in some European countries. More specifically, there have been few moves towards independence for the judiciary and civilian oversight of the military and security services. The simple reason for this lack of political and administrative reform is that the political elites that run most Mediterranean partner countries have no interest in reform.

Nevertheless, Europeans have not lost sight of their long-term objectives in the Mediterranean region. President Sarkozy's Paris Mediterranean Union summit in July

2008 was a spectacular media event which, by virtue of the fact that it took place at all indicated that European and Mediterranean partner governments place significant value on their relationships. Also, the summit was accompanied by a declaration of intent, signed by all present, to continue to work towards regional peace and stability. The UPM project itself, with its project-based focus on achievable goals and cumulative confidence-building, is indicative of a realisation that step-by-step progress is a necessary and potentially fruitful path to take, even though it is unlikely to grab headlines. Indeed, in a region where headlines can sometimes prevent progress, concentrating on mundane tasks may help defuse crises when they occur. From time to time, events such as President Sarkozy's summit serve to remind the public, scholarly and media commentators, and the policymakers themselves that work towards creating an economically and politically stable Mediterranean basin is continuing.

It is unlikely that the motives of European policymakers are entirely mercenary. EU member governments do want to see democracy in Arab countries, and they do believe that the Mediterranean region would be more peaceful if comprised of stable, secular democracies. Furthermore, formal regimes improve the efficiency of future bargaining processes. The mechanism by which this occurs is through equilibrating the preferences of the actors involved in a compromise bargain – theoretically, this makes future agreements easier to reach as preference outliers are brought into the initial bargain and extreme positions that might be unacceptable to other actors are ironed into the multilateral agreement. Negotiations are much easier to conduct within an institutional framework with clearly defined rules and established practices than on an ad-hoc, bilateral basis, where preference outliers have the potential to derail the process by taking positions unacceptable to other actors. If Euro-Mediterranean governments consider that future cooperation would be in their best interests, then a formal, institutional framework covering a wide range of issues is the way forward.

Problems arise concerning the risks that stem from firstly, fear of the potential negative externalities of the transition period for Europe; second, the type of democracy Europeans want to see is not the same as what the majority of Arab populations want;

third, Europeans are aware that a concerted effort to bring about political reform would require an investment of resources that are currently allocated to other priorities; and fourth European voters are demanding that attention be paid to shorter term issues that concern them (terrorism and migration), requiring cooperation with incumbent governments. This does not mean that Europeans have given up on desiring political reform in Arab countries, but rather than they are aware of the difficulty of pursuing this goal. In the absence of an exogenous shock that forces European governments to look at new policy options, the status quo is unlikely to change.

Attributing blame for the supposed failure of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation has become a popular activity among analysts, the usual suspects being the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, meddling external actors (including the United States, the EU, and member states acting unilaterally), and arguments drawing on the interests of domestic actors. None of these explanations can on its own provide a satisfactory explanation for the observable level of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation discussed in the first part of this chapter. Focussing on conflict and the role of external actors makes sense only in the context of a theory of the influence of domestic politics on international outcomes. Focussing solely on domestic actors risks losing sight of the international context, particularly the restrictions imposed by other actors and the international institutions they create to facilitate bargaining. If an analysis aims to provide a comprehensive explanation of international institutional outcomes, domestically grounded preferences and the rules of the international bargaining process must be taken into account.

The key to a comprehensive explanation to the questions of why the EU tried to launch a comprehensive security process in the Mediterranean, why Mediterranean partner governments signed up to it and why Europeans and Mediterranean partners have settled for much less is to focus on the factors influencing the decisions taken by the actors themselves. Chapter 3 develops an actor-oriented framework that stresses the importance of preferences, restrictions and bargaining on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation and on international institution-building efforts more generally.

Chapter III

An analytical framework for Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation

Like international actors everywhere, the governments of European and south Mediterranean countries sometimes have to make a choice between building long-term security relationships and addressing immediate security concerns. There are times when the two goals complement each other and times when they do not. Decisions about when, how and how deeply to engage in security cooperation with other governments are therefore usually taken after consideration of the potential costs and benefits of available courses of action. These costs and benefits are incurred by the domestic constituencies that national governments represent – few political leaders can survive responsibility for decisions that leave their constituents vulnerable when they backfire. Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is the outcome of a process of decision-making and bargaining among national governments, with the European Commission also playing an important role. Explaining this outcome necessitates understanding the interests of these actors defined in terms of the benefits they hope to receive, the costs they try to avoid and the strategies they use when negotiating with other actors.

This chapter aims to develop an analytical 'toolbox', based on insights from political economy and international relations theories, for the analysis of security institution-building in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This framework has a dual purpose: firstly to provide an analytical basis for understanding the security cooperation under EMP, given the conflicting arguments in the literature discussed in the previous chapter; and secondly to develop a logical analytical framework which may serve as a general frame of reference for discussion of the choices facing governments engaged in international security cooperation and institution-building.

This chapter therefore represents an attempt to address two debates. First, in the specific context of Euro-Mediterranean security relations, the intention is to provide an analytical

framework upon which to base plausible answers to the questions of why the EU calls for comprehensive, multilateral security cooperation, why Mediterranean partner governments have signed up to it, and why neither side has much intention of acting on their rhetorical commitments. The framework is based on the liberal international relations theory developed by Andrew Moravcsik in 1997 and 1998.

The framework is also informed by the three most prevalent hypothetical explanations prominent in the literature on Euro-Mediterranean political and economic cooperation that were discussed in the previous chapter: that comprehensive security has been undermined by conflict, that divisions among external actors have hampered regional security initiatives, and that the region's domestic political economy has been a major factor in incentivising obstacles to cooperation. In the context of an actor-oriented framework all of these explanations are valid, and rather than competing they complement each other. More details regarding how the sociological impact of unresolved conflict, the geo-strategic game played by external actors and the interplay of domestic political coalitions influence state- and EU-level decisions to engage in multilateral security cooperation become apparent through an analytical framework focussing on actors, preferences and bargaining strategies.

The second objective of this chapter is to address the more general debate among international relations scholars over the best approach to the study of the regionalism phenomenon. The idea that regional institution-building processes are too complex to be captured by any one theoretical tradition has long been acknowledged by scholars of international politics (Carr, 1939; Bull, 1977). This chapter does not, therefore, aim to propose rival hypotheses that can be tested (cf. Katzenstein 2005, chapter 1). Rather, the intention is to develop an 'analytical narrative' combining insights provided by the analytical tools of political economy with a descriptive, anecdotal narrative that provides context to Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation (Bates et al, 2000). The rationale behind this approach taken in this thesis is that through identifying the issues that the principle actors regard as important, taking account of the restrictions that prevent them from freely pursuing these interests, considering the strategies they use when negotiating

with other actors, and reflecting on the ways in which they judge the efficiency of outcomes, many-faceted international agreements become more understandable (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 1999). From a more normative point of view, focusing on actors, preferences and bargaining may draw attention to strategies that may foster cooperation, leading to policy-relevant conclusions (Oye, 1986).

An actor-centric framework stressing preferences, restrictions and bargaining strategies can tell us a great deal about the who, the what, the how and the why of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. In the international arena political outcomes are usually determined by strategic bargaining among state actors pursuing specific agendas. If one wants to understand these outcomes, one must first have some knowledge of the various agendas governments are seeking to fulfil, the strategies they use to pursue them, and the incentives they provide other actors to get them to behave in a desired manner. As Moravcsik argues, the decision of governments to coordinate policy through international institutions is a three stage process. First, state actors must form a set of preferences about the 'state of the world' that they would like to realise in their dealings with one another. Second, once preferences have been formed, states enter into a bargaining process on the substantive issues at hand. Third, once a substantive bargain has been reached, states decide about the design and management features of the institutional framework they create to secure the agreement they have made (Moravcsik 1998, p. 5). If we are to understand the observable outcomes at the third stage of international cooperation, we need to know what is happening at the first two stages – what their preferences are and how they negotiate, given the rules of an institutionalised bargaining system that they themselves determine.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section explains the three core assumptions upon which the analysis rests, and attempts to justify their use as parameters for the study of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. Section 3 builds the actor-oriented framework in more detail with reference to theoretical debates common in the literature on international institution-building. Section 4 provides context with reference to two alternate theoretical frameworks commonly used by IR scholars: realism and

constructivism. Section 5 concludes with some hypothetical answers to the questions of whey the EU proposed a formal, comprehensive security agenda for the Mediterranean, why Mediterranean partner governments signed up to it, and why the region's governments have settled for less. These arguments are discussed in more detail in chapters 4, 5 and 6 with reference to European and south Mediterranean interests in security cooperation, and the bargaining framework under which negotiations are conducted.

The political economy of security studies

Political science is the study of how societies organise and make rules to govern the interaction of their members. As we all know, people do not have the same interests – societies are characterised by heterogeneity of interests. Individuals differ as to their material wants and their moral principles, and they attribute different priorities for their goals. They also have different views about the best strategy for achieving them. This observation applies to all levels of society at which people have organised themselves politically – the family, the workplace, the community, the state, and the international community of states. At all of these levels, individuals and groups make decisions about how to aggregate heterogeneous preferences about scarce resources into collective action. It is a recurring fact of human existence that collective decision-making based on groups pursuing their own preferences leads to conflict, precisely because some win and some lose.

International security has long been a central topic for scholars from the international relations branch of political science, as it has for many historians, international lawyers and some sociologists. With a few notable exceptions, political economists have shown less enthusiasm for international security studies, largely because the key variables are difficult to grasp objectively and thus to be captured by mathematical models. Those that have engaged with international security issues have found that the success or failure of advanced theoretical approaches cannot be judged according to the same standards as one would apply to research in the natural sciences, where experiments can be proved beyond

reasonable doubt, or economics, where variables are more amenable to quantitative analysis. Security studies suffers from theoretical indeterminacy because, as one leading scholar puts it, 'human behaviour is too free, protean, variable, creative and unpredictable to provide a solution to the security dilemma… knowledge is knowing what problems you have, not just knowing what solutions may be available' (Kolodziej 2005, p. 68). Analyses of security policy will always retain a significant element of subjectivity. The theories that analysts use to make some sense of security policy are likely to remain relatively blunt instruments that capture variables in much broader terms than is satisfactory for most political economists and devotees of rational choice methods.

Nevertheless, the need to reach as objective a conclusion as possible confers a duty on the security analyst to employ standards of interpretation, benchmarks and logic that are capable of pointing to causal mechanisms, even if this must be done only in broad terms. The political science discipline has benefited from insights based on assumptions and methodology drawn from the field of economics (Miller, 1997). Political economists have asked how individuals and groups manage their competing demands for wealth, power, security, and the freedom to live according to a certain moral code. One of the first questions addressed by political economists regards the welfare consequences of the aggregation process. Some decisions will increase overall social welfare by making make everyone better off – in other words they will be Pareto-efficient. Other decisions will make some people better off but others worse off – in other words they will be Pareto-inferior. In order to work out whether actors will be better off or not, political economists argue that it is first necessary to know what each actors' interests are. The second big question political economists ask is what are the distributional consequences of the aggregation process – in other words, who benefits and who loses from collective decision-making, and who gets what, when and how? One must have an understanding of the bargaining process – the 'rules of the game' – if one is to provide answers to this question.

A central task for security analysts is to come to the answer of the 'why question' by identifying, as clearly as possible, the 'who,' the 'what' and the 'how'. This raises the

need to identify the actors who shape the decision-making process, work out what their preferences are – what they are trying to achieve – and observe how these actors bargain their preferences against each other in the institutional settings they have created. Actors themselves define what threatens them – security is what actors make of it (cf. Wendt, 1992). The keys to understanding national security policies and international bargaining over security-related issues are the interests of the actors involved in the process. Their interpretations of economic, political, social and military issues depend on the degree to which they consider that the issue in question presents a threat not only to their survival but also to their ability to pursue the goals they consider important. Understanding what these goals are and how they are prioritised is crucial to any analysis of the institutional outcomes of an international bargaining process.

Two highly useful analytical tools that economists have lent to political science are the general concepts of Pareto Optimality and Nash Equilibrium. Pareto and Nash are especially relevant in the study of international institution-building, as they provide general benchmarks that can be used for assessing outcomes. In general, the political and economic stabilisation of the Mediterranean basin region would make all actors better off, thus representing a Pareto improving outcome. On some issues, however, bargaining outcomes either resemble deadlock, where no agreement has been reached, or a sub-optimal outcome where there is agreement but the long-term objective of pursuing political and economic stability is poorly served or even endangered (GO-EuroMed Consortium, 2008).

There are many obstacles on the path to Pareto-optimality: the interests of powerful domestic lobbies may prevent governments from committing themselves to an agreement, or prevent their dealing with an issue at all. Such an outcome may represent a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium. An example is the Arab position on the Palestine/Israel conflict, where in general Arab governments cannot see how they can improve their position unless Israel and the EU change theirs. In other issue areas where multiple equilibria are possible but where no solution has been reached, bargaining towards a Pareto optimal outcome continues (Furness, Gándara and Kern, 2008).

An actor-oriented analytical framework: core assumptions

The analysis of any political process inevitably involves some degree of subjectivity on the part of the researcher. No political scientist can entirely exclude bias from his or her work, whether it is in making decisions about the selection of cases or whether to include or exclude certain variables in a model. The following three core assumptions are intended to make as clear as possible both what the parameters of this research project are, and to thereby lay bare the biases of this researcher.

This analytical framework rests on three basic assumptions about preferences and bargaining in international politics. These assumptions are common to most rationalist or liberal analyses of international politics, and are normally used to generate context-specific hypotheses about the reasons behind decision-making and outcomes that can be discussed in the light of the empirical record at each stage of the international institution-building process.

The first assumption is that *domestic politics matters* - governments pursue domestically defined preferences at the international level, and that they have to think about the effects that decisions taken at the international table will have at home.

A second assumption is that *domestic institutions also matter* in international security politics. Countries that have more open and transparent domestic institutions are generally more receptive to the rule of law, and more willing to engage in comprehensive security cooperation than countries whose institutions are intransparent and inefficient.

A third assumption concerns the bargaining process. *States use international institutions to further their goals, and they design these institutions accordingly*. This means that bargaining focuses mainly on the distribution of gains. The actor standing to gain the most from a given outcome will offer the most significant concessions and side-payments in order to get less interested actors to accept a given outcome.

Assumption 1: domestic politics matters

The abstract distinction between the anarchical international realm and the hierarchical domestic realm is a relatively recent phenomenon in political science. Following in the tradition of the neorealist scholars Waltz and Morgenthau, the assumption that states are unitary actors has nonetheless attained the status of IR orthodoxy (Spruyt 1998). This thesis makes the opposite assumption: sovereign states are not 'billiard balls' but representative institutions subject to capture and recapture by powerful domestic actors and coalitions. State policies are the outcomes of bargaining among actors at the domestic level. Domestic political competition confers the preferences of domestic actors to the international level, where the offices of the state become a tool for pursuing international goals that will confer benefits at home.

As Moravcsik argues, 'the fundamental actors in international politics are individuals and private groups, who… organise collective action to promote differentiated interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values and variations in societal influence' (1997, p. 516). This 'bottom up' view of politics maintains that rational individuals and groups, differentiated by tastes, capabilities, material needs and moral codes, define their interests independently of politics and then advance those interests competitively through collective action. Governments' external and internal security preferences reflect courses of action and outcomes that they believe will enhance the position of dominant social groups in their countries.

The implications of this assumption for Mediterranean security institution-building are captured by the 'two level game' metaphor, which posits that governing elites pursue deals at the international and domestic levels at the same time. As Robert Putnam argued, international negotiators have to consider the simultaneous implications of their decisions at the international level, where bargains are struck with other sovereign governments, and the domestic level, where the costs and benefits of international agreements will be felt by constituencies which in turn influence the domestic balance of power. According to Putnam, 'it is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine

international relations, or the reverse. The answer to that question is clearly "both, sometimes". The more interesting questions are "when?" and "how?"' (Putnam 1988, p. 427). According to Putnam, international agreement is possible only when 'win-sets' (defined as the range of international agreements that can be domestically ratified in all participating countries) overlap. National policymakers must consider the potential domestic political consequences of their decision-making at the international level, and they respond to domestic pressures when they negotiate with international partners. At the domestic level, ratification becomes possible when powerful constituents perceive that an international agreement will serve their interests. In this way domestic politics acts both as a constraint and as a motivator of the international negotiation strategies of governments (Pearlman, 2008/09).

The logic of the two-level game holds for autocratic as well as for democratic countries. Although it may seem obvious that democratic polities can 'punish' their elected leaders more easily than can the citizens of an autocracy, autocratic rulers also rely on domestic support. When autocrats are overthrown, it is often because they have lost the backing of a key constituency – whether an ethnic group, an economic sector, or the military. In a democracy political power changes hands when an incumbent loses an election or, as in the United States, following a constitutionally-defined term of office. In autocratic countries, changes of leadership are seldom smooth and few ex-presidents are able to take up directorships or write their memoirs in comfortable retirement – in some cases domestic constraints on autocratic leaders may even be stronger than in democratic polities.

Governments engage in international security negotiations both as a means of pursuing domestically grounded preferences, and in order to ensure that other governments do not take steps that hurt domestic constituencies. This creates the possibility for several kinds of international bargaining strategies. Governments can refuse to cooperate with an international agreement on the grounds that it would be impossible to ratify at home, and can hold out for a better agreement that their domestic constituents will accept. In this way they can try to extract greater concessions or compensation from international

partners. Alternatively, governments can play 'tied hands' with their domestic constituencies, where national leaders claim that they have no choice but to comply with an international agreement even though it imposes costs on some domestic groups. In this way governments can use international negotiations to achieve domestic objectives and pursue the preferences of one group at the expense of another.

A further implication of the assumption that the domestic level matters is that governments negotiating internationally can have several preferences simultaneously. Dominant domestic coalitions task their governments with pursuing more than one preference at any given time. Some governments may be tasked with juggling the preferences of more than one domestic constituency or social group, which may be difficult to reconcile. This means that governments may enter international negotiations with preferences that are contradictory. It also means that side payments and package deals become possible, as incentives in one preferred issue are used to compensate costs in another.

Assumption 2: the nature and quality of domestic institutions matter

The process by which individual preferences are aggregated into collective decisions is at the very heart of politics. Social groups tend to have varying (and often competing) preferences for outcomes on the ideological, material and political dimensions of social organisation (Moravcsik 2008). These group preferences are mediated through the institutions of the state. As Hegel once wrote, 'the State is therefore the basis and centre of all the concrete elements in the life of a people: of Art, Law, Morals, Religion, and Science' (cited in Kaufmann 1959). Domestic institutions matter because they structure the domestic bargaining process that produces the positions that governments take at the international table.

Power, defined as the ability to get other individuals and groups to do things that they might otherwise not do, is fundamental to the pursuit of political goals. Political power is a desirable commodity that actors will seek to develop and maintain in the face of

competition from other actors. An actor without political power is an actor unable to pursue preferences. Given that actors competing for power in an interdependent political system will inevitably impose costs on other actors, the rules that structure the game determine how actors deal with winning and losing. Domestic institutions define the rights and responsibilities of individuals and groups, the extent to which they can impose costs on other actors, and the sanctions that may be applied when the rules are broken. The nature and character of domestic institutions constitute the rules according to which power is exercised (and sometimes even distributed) by various competing social groups.

The strength and independence of representative domestic institutions, and the degree of openness and transparency in the domestic political process strongly influence a government's ordering of preferences and the strategies and tactics by which these interests are pursued domestically and internationally. In general, countries that have more open and transparent domestic institutions are generally more receptive to the rule of law, and more willing to engage in comprehensive security cooperation than countries whose institutions are intransparent, inefficient or corrupt. This is because the domestic institutional setting reflects the preferences of dominant social actors for an open and transparent system or for a closed and opaque system – whether they consider their interests will be better served by treating all other individuals and groups equitably in accordance with the rule of law, or whether it is desirable to grant more rights to certain individuals and groups than others. It is likely that dominant domestic actors will transfer these institutional preferences to the international level as well.

Considering domestic institutions allows a necessary partial relaxation of the assumption that governments work solely at the behest of sub-national groups with no agency of their own. Governments are not necessarily merely instruments of domestic forces – they have agency in the conduct of their relations with other states, but are not immune to domestic pressures (Solingen 1998). Within limits imposed by the nature of domestic competition, bureaucratic and representative actors at the state level sometimes act independently from the wishes of their constituents, and may sometimes even play domestic lobbies off against each other (Drazen, 2000, Chapter 8).

The principle-agent relationship between domestic political actors and international negotiators is mediated through domestic institutions. Governments have the ability to make international deals on behalf of the domestic constituencies they represent. While few international negotiators are able to agree to terms that will impose significant costs at home, policymakers lead by setting the agenda and by 'selling' ideas to the domestic constituencies they represent. As domestic institutions perform a mediating role between policymakers and their constituencies, their independence and transparency is crucial in determining the extent to which policymakers have agency, and the stability of the process by which domestic political opposition to the choices of policymakers is conducted.

Assumption 3: international institutions are sets of rules

International relations scholars have long argued over definitions of international institutions. Robert Keohane once wrote that 'institutions are often discussed without being defined at all' (R. Keohane 1988, p. 382). The IR literature tends to group conceptions of institutions into four categories: institutions as formal organisations with offices, staffs and budgets; institutions as the practices of the actors; institutions as rules; and institutions as consisting of sets of intersubjective norms (Duffield 2007). These four categories have differing implications for analyses of bargaining. Perhaps the most useful conceptualisation of institutions is provided by Mearsheimer, who defined institutions as 'sets of rules that stipulate ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other' (Mearsheimer 1994/95, p. 8). According to this logic actors come first – they make rules that enable or prohibit certain activities. Institutions can be formalised by bilateral or multilateral treaty and are sometimes administered by an international organisation. The rules of the game can also be informal, tacitly agreed by actors for pragmatic political purposes, but without legal status (Conceição-Heldt, 2006). The key feature of all of these formal and informal institutional forms is that states build and maintain them in order to structure their interaction, manage interdependence, and thereby make the task of achieving their goals easier (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Just as at the domestic level the 'rules of the game' that structure international negotiations do not come about by accident, but are deliberately designed by actors as a means of reducing the costly externalities of competition in an interdependent environment (Koremenos at al, 2004). As at the domestic level, power is distributed unevenly in the international system and actors have an incentive to design instruments to manage the use of power in a predictable manner. When bargaining internationally governments accept codes of behaviour in order that other governments will also be bound by them. This reduces uncertainty about the actions of other actors. Formal and informal commitments also restrict the future options of actors for pursuing preferences unacceptable to a 'critical mass' of other actors in the system.

As Calvert (1995) argues, the best way to research institutions is regard the institution itself as a kind of equilibrium. 'All institutions must have a common property,' he writes, 'it must be rational for nearly every individual to almost always adhere to the behavioural prescriptions of the institution, given that nearly all other individuals are doing so' (p. 60). If a set of rules is to be stable it must provide actors with benefits that make them better off – or at least no worse off – in terms defined by their preferences. An actor or coalition of actors that wishes to design or alter an institutional setting does so because they perceive potential gains that will flow from these changes. If the cooperation of other actors is required for these changes to be made, then their preferences must be taken into account if the new institutional setting is to be stable. This feature of institution-building requires the analyst to consider the factors that are required if an equilibrium is to be achieved. Institution-building requires actors to reach bargains that incorporate issue-linkage and side payments as well as measures to improve information and reduce tension. Successful bargaining depends on the willingness and ability of actors to include or exclude certain issues from the institution-building process, and to incentivise desired behaviour on the part of negotiating partners (Furness, Gándara and Kern, 2008).

Preferences, restrictions and bargaining

As stated earlier, there are three stages in the process of building formal international institutions. Researchers need to know the preferences of the actors that shape the bargaining process and to understand the domestic and international restrictions that these actors face in pursuing their preferences. Given preferences and restrictions, actors then bargain towards an equilibrium outcome that they hope will leave then better able to realise their goals than they would be in the absence of such a process. Given a substantive bargain, actors decide upon the kind of institutional setting in which their agreement should be embedded – be it an informal agreement, a formal treaty, an international organisation, or some kind of combination of these (Moravcsik, 1998).

If we want to explain a given institutional outcome, we need to first understand what actors want, what stops them from taking it, and how they manage to accommodate other actors in a world of finite resources. This is not to say that the third stage – the type of institution that states create – is unimportant. On the contrary, the form that formal institutions especially take is a core determinant of their role and mandate (Ruggie, 1992). In cases such as Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation, where no formal decision to build an institution has been taken, the central question is 'why not?' Focussing on the preference and bargaining stages of regional institution-building can provide answers to this question.

Explaining state security preferences

Domestic actors, including median voters, lobby groups, civil society organisations and political parties, ethnic groups and power clubs, constantly debate, bargain, form coalitions, and compete with each other in order that the state is mobilised in pursuit of their preferences on various political, economic, social and moral issues. While the assumption that state preferences remain constant during each round of international negotiations is central to political economy analysis, the question what these objectives are cannot be assumed and must be explained (Conceição-Heldt 2006). What matters is

not how an actor's interests are formed, how they change, whether they are influenced by external forces or how they are internalised. The crucial question is what does an actor actually want to achieve from a given political process?

The process of preference formation is complex and this thesis does not aim to explain the precise means by which social groups develop their own preferences. Suffice it to say that human nature determines that social actors develop material and normative preferences, which they order according to individual and collective priorities, the restrictions imposed by the preferences of other actors, and the rules of the institutions through which preferences are channelled. At the most basic level, social groups form their preferences based on responses to influences which can be grouped under two headings: resource scarcity and fundamental beliefs (Drazen, 2000). These two basic, sometimes conflicting motivations – the material and the moral – are central to individual or collective decisions about the acquisition and use of political power to pursue the goals the group sets for itself. Individuals are by nature heterogeneous – they think differently about how the world works and they have different ideas about the best policy path to achieve a certain aim.

Rationality is to a certain degree subjective. Not all rational courses of action are easily measurable – individuals and groups decide for themselves, based on their own internal calculation of costs and benefits, about what the best outcome may be for them. Individuals consider the positive and negative aspects of a given course of action as these are defined by the group to which they belong (Miller, 1997). 'Positive' and 'normative' choices are both equally available, depending on an actor's own definition of desirability. Sometimes preferences are determined by a process that analysts have termed 'innate impulses to act' (Binder and Niederle, 2006). Courses of action that promise 'logics of consequence' are often just as rational as those that promise 'logics of appropriateness' (Wendt, 2001). When governments bargain internationally, they pursue outcomes that will make their constituents better off materially and morally, as these standards are defined by the constituents themselves.

Preferences are 'pre-strategic'

According to Moravscik's formulation of a 'liberal' theory of international politics, the best way to understand a state's preferences is to regard them as 'pre-strategic': preferences are 'causally independent of the strategies of other actors,' developed in isolation and analytically prior to the influence other actors may have on them. Preferences do not depend on exogenous influences such as threats, incentives, manipulation of information and other tactics. For Moravcsik, maintaining the balance of power, containing or accommodating an adversary, or 'exercising global leadership' are not preferences, but policies designed to bring the realisation of pre-existing goals closer (1997, pp. 518 – 519).

The assumption that actors form preferences before they interact with other actors is the subject of a lively scholarly debate, leading to some confusion about whether to regard preferences as fixed or malleable (Hix 2005, chapter 12). Several scholars argue that state preferences as malleable depending on changes in the configuration of power at the domestic level. A domestic power-shift caused by an election or a revolution results in a new government, which can pursue different preferences as these are now defined by the group that has taken control of the levers of power. For the purposes of this analytical framework, it is important to consider that the preferences of the domestic groups themselves do not change despite changes in the domestic institutional setting – presumably, had Saddam Hussein not been overthrown, Iraq would have continued to pursue the interests of the al-Tikriti family and its allies. It is likely that the Baath party elite would resume their pursuit of these goals if they were miraculously returned to power. The preferences of the al-Tikriti family have not changed even though they are no longer in power. However, the elected Iraqi government pursues the preferences of a new constituency, the priorities of which are not the same as those of the previous ruling elite. The key difference is not a shift in preferences, but a change in the make up of the domestic coalition or power club that has taken control of the institutions of the state. The Iraqi state is now controlled by a different social group than before the 2003 invasion, and therefore brings a different set of preferences to the international bargaining table.

Figure 1: the formation of state bargaining positions in a two level game



A second common confusion among proponents of theories of domestic influences on international politics surrounds whether preferences change as a result of developments in other countries, the actions of other actors, and the influences of supranational and international institutions. Hix argues that 'preferences change as individuals' economic interests and opportunities are redefined in the face of changes in the global system' (Hix 2005, p. 332). Similarly, Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis suggest that state preferences change as a result of interdependence in the international system (1999, p. 61). In a recent article, Moravcsik goes as far as to argue that 'globalisation' is the source of social interests (2008, p. 236). This is not only inconsistent with the concept of pre-strategic preferences but is also close to the constructivist assumption that institutions are constitutive of actors – as institutions develop, they generate new norms of behaviour that influence the ways in which actors form their preferences (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Scharpf has argued in favour of an actor-based institutionalism, where policy is the outcome of interactions among actors whose preferences, capabilities and perceptions are partially shaped by the institutional setting in which bargaining takes place (Scharpf, 1988).

As few international negotiations start from a 'clean slate,' do institutions shape actors' preferences? Naturally, actors do not form preferences in splendid isolation. Individuals and groups are not able to make structured choices in an environment free of external

influences – they respond to the constraints of the social system of which they are a part (Miller, 1997). To a certain extent the implications of 'globalisation' for preference formation can be explained by the fact that resources are finite and that interdependence is the inevitable consequence of competition. Individuals and groups have organised themselves into nation-states in order to manage interdependence and competition, and to protect themselves from the aggression of other groups. 'Globalisation' merely means that actors compete for scarce resources on a global scale – the earth is finite and the 'feedback' of strategic circumstances will affect the preferences of actors at some stage.

However, for analytical purposes, considering preferences independently from political interchanges in the first instance is a necessary first step, especially when analysing institutions that are at an early stage of development. If we are to consider international bargaining as an instrumental activity, it is necessary to distil 'pre-strategic' preferences and to consider institution-building as a two-stage process of bargaining and outcomes. Essentially, this means that actors bargain over their pre-strategic preferences according to certain rules and practices. These rules are defined by several factors, including relative power, technical capacity, and expectations about the likely moves of other actors. Essentially, the institutional setting acts as a constraint on the actors, forcing them to prioritise their preferences, to decide which interests can be compromised in the course of bargaining, and to take into account the preferences of other actors.

While there can be no question that international institutions 'feed back' into preferences in the long run, this notion fits uneasily with the assumption that actors define their interests pre-strategically. The analytical framework employed in this thesis adheres to Moravcsik's original conception of preferences as pre-strategic. Considering an actor's interests in isolation enables clearer explanations of what those interests are and how they relate both to other preferences an actor may have, and to the preferences of other actors. It also enables a better grasp of the issues that are at stake when actors decide whether and under what terms to cooperate with other actors.

Logics of consequence, or of appropriateness?

Politically organised groups at the domestic level maximise utility as this is defined by the groups themselves. This means that preferences can be material or ideational, depending on the way that benefits and costs are defined by the group itself. Preferences can be based on the desire of a dominant group to maximise its material utility in terms of wealth and power. Preferences can also be based on collective definitions of the legitimacy or appropriateness of a course of action. Indeed, the conflict that often exists between these two fundamental motivations is at the heart of politics. The need to balance material and moral goals is often the source of the most fundamental – and interesting – choices facing policymakers (March and Olsen, 1998). The task for political scientists is to explain (in the positivist sense) and to understand (in the post-positivist sense) how and why policymakers make these choices (Wendt, 1998).

Economists working on political issues have come to realise that pure, atomistic utility-maximisation is not always possible in the political sphere (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Utility has to be calculated in terms of social values as well as political power and economic gains and losses. People often pursue altruistic preferences: when faced with a decision about how to manage a non-excludable resource, people often do not attempt to maximise individual or group control (Opp, Voss and Gern, 1995) When confronted with questions about how to manage public goods provision, people do not always rush immediately to an inefficient Nash equilibrium, but are capable of finding solutions that allocate access to the resource equitably, without the need for an overarching authority to define the terms or enforce the agreement (Koremenos et al, 2004).

Broadly held social values are rational objects of political policymaking, just like any other goal (Miller, 1997). If enough people consider an issue to be important enough for whatever reason, then it becomes rational for a political actor to pursue it, unless the policymaker is prepared to face the consequences. In democracies, politicians often stand on 'values based' political platforms. Moral issues – in terms of notions about 'right and wrong' held by a broad enough section of society – are powerful motivators of policy.

Political actors are often able to draw on the moral preferences of their constituencies. In the United States, abortion, gay marriage, and gun ownership are all issues that affect the way that people vote, and therefore the policy options of congressmen and presidents. Sometimes political leaders make fatal mistakes on social issues – in New Zealand, the Labour government's decision to push through a ban on people smacking their children contributed to its defeat in the recent general election. And yet none of these issues necessarily affects the material wealth of the average citizen. Liberal gun ownership laws arguably impose significant costs on society in terms of violent crime. The political salience of these issues is drawn from the fact that large groups of people believe strongly in one side of the debate or the other.

Many international relations scholars who argue that states and other international actors pursue 'normative' goals do not consider adequately how these norms become political priorities through the preferences of dominant domestic coalitions. This tendency has led some scholars to interpret political processes as pursuits of intersubjective understandings of what is right, rather than the narrow pursuit of what will benefit the political actors themselves (see, for example, Smith, 2003; Sjursen, 2006). As Solingen has noted, 'safeguarding a certain preference or value requires the formulation of policies that often span the domestic, regional and global spheres. Political actors – institutions, interests associations, state agencies, political parties, religious groups, social movements – aggregate those preferences and cloak them in ideological cloth' (Solingen, 1998, p. 18). Successful political leaders are usually adept at exploiting the fact that individuals and groups at the domestic level often prefer those they entrust with making decisions to 'do the right thing' in the moral sense.

The Israel-Palestine issue is one that straddles the material and moral no-man's land of state preferences. While there may be strong material reasons for Western support for the state of Israel – maintaining a strong Western presence in an oil-rich region, for instance, or the Jewish vote in America – there are also powerful motivations stemming from collective European guilt about the long history of anti-semitism, religious affinity between Orthodox Jews and fundamentalist Christians, and the liberal idea that it is

simply 'right' to support a fellow democracy in a region dominated by autocratic governments. Arab rejection of Israel is similarly motivated by a combination of material and moral factors. Control over land is a central factor, but not the only one – if anything the morality of Muslim solidarity with the Palestinian people is an even stronger factor in shaping popular positions on Israel in the Arab world. This stance is not always reflected in government policy. Arab governments have long been adept at exploiting the moral weight of the Israel issue in their own societies and in international negotiations with Western countries.

Sometimes, logics of appropriateness extend to social groups that express a preference for convincing other groups of the superiority of the form of social organisation that they have chosen. This desire to convince others is not always confined to the domestic arena – states that have the material capability are able to influence groups in other countries as well. Moravcsik describes this process as 'a more cosmopolitan attitude towards political rights, extending political identity beyond the nation state' (2008, p. 242). George W. Bush has termed the process 'the forward strategy for freedom' in the post-Cold War and post 9/11 world.[31] When a powerful international actor happens to adhere to an ideology that has universalist pretensions, it becomes highly likely that attempts will be made to convince people elsewhere who do not necessarily share the ideology to conform to it. The use of military power to spread the world's greatest religions is a long-standing example of this process at work. More recently, states have tried to spread the universalist systemic political ideologies of communism and liberal democracy to other countries. The language of universal normative concepts such as freedom and justice is often employed in the service of these international political goals.

Multiple, ordered state preferences

If domestically grounded preferences change, they do so slowly in response to a complex interaction of moral and material factors that are beyond the scope of most studies of

[31] See 'President Addresses American Legion, Discusses Global War on Terror,' Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., 24 February 2006, www.whitehouse.gov (accessed 9 July 2008).

international politics. For analytical purposes, it is changes in the ordering of domestically-grounded preferences that are of greater interest as this creates opportunities for the use of incentive-based bargaining strategies. 'Where social incentives for exchange and collective action are perceived to exist,' writes Moravcsik, 'individuals and groups exploit them: the greater the expected benefits, the stronger the incentive to act.' Some preferences recede as priorities while others gain precedence in response to shifts in the domestic political landscape, external shocks resulting from the actions of other actors, or changes in the institutional setting that open up opportunities for pursuing alternate goals. These priorities can be affected by the actions of external actors.

Domestic and international actors have a hierarchy of preferences on any given issue – outcome A is preferable to outcome B, which is preferable to C and so on. Given this hierarchy of interests, it is likely that actors engaged in international bargaining will have multiple preferences for outcomes across several linked issues. Outcome A might be the most desirable in issue 1, but not if it means that an actor must accept outcome C for issue 2. On the other hand, an actor might be able to accept outcome B on both issues. This is particularly relevant when actors consider the impact of outcomes on the Pareto frontier, which is defined by the potential benefits accruing from bargaining outcomes on several issues concurrently – an actor might be willing to forgo outcome A in issue 1 if they consider that any outcome less than A in issue 2 would leave them worse off overall. The fact that there are several points along a Pareto-frontier than will leave an actor better off than they are currently creates the opportunity for multi-issue bargaining and for institutional outcomes that incorporate trade-offs and side payments among actors and across issues (Koremenos et al, 2004).

The pursuit of preferences at the domestic and international levels is not, therefore, a zero-sum game in which one actor must lose if the other wins. If we consider that preferences are ordered, this creates incentives for pursuing multiple goals simultaneously, for waiting for a window of opportunity when a policy might succeed in bringing about the realisation of a cherished goal, or for pursuing one goal as a means of preparing the way for the pursuit of another. In a multiple actor setting, the idea that

actors have a number of preferences that they weight differently opens up the possibility that actors will try to use preference hierarchies to change the behaviour of other actors. Coercion is only one means for doing this, and is in most cases a costly strategy that risks negative externalities and a loss of control of the bargaining process. From a rational perspective, bargaining strategies that use trade-offs and side payments to help actors reach an outcome where all are better off than before are preferable.

Whereas scholarly analysts have the task of judging a particular political process or outcome according to objective standards of analytical rationality, high-level decision-makers must take into account other considerations. After a long and distinguished academic career, the American scholar Alexander George concluded that virtually all political decisions involve some kind of trade-off between a variety of different factors. George included trade-offs between analytical quality (the option most likely to achieve policy objectives at an acceptable level of cost and risk), the need to obtain support, the time and resources it would take to obtain support, the potential political side effects and opportunity costs, and judgements about short and long-term payoffs (George, 2006, pp. 67 – 72). Sometimes, policymakers are forced to choose an option that promises a limited payoff, but that is more likely to be supported by key constituencies. Policy options that promise a higher payoff are very often neglected, especially when they involve costs and will take time to come to fruition. All of these choices are shaped by the ordering of preferences.

Modern, multifaceted bureaucratic states are capable of pursuing multiple and at times contradictory preferences, ordered according to their relative desirability to the actors concerned, the relative power of the actor desiring them, the restrictions posed by other actors pursuing their own preferences, and the formal and informal rules that actors make to manage this interdependent preference-seeking process. The way in which preferences become government policy positions in international negotiations is a function of the rules of the domestic political game.

Restrictions and interdependence

Domestic social groups, including lobby groups, power clubs, political parties, bureaucratic actors, firms, and militaries, compete for control of the institutions of state, the right to use the state's resources as they see fit, and the ability to make decisions on behalf of other actors. This competition inevitably generates costs, creating demand for institutions that structure the process, distribute costs equitably and efficiently, and provide better information (R. Keohane, 1984). Institutions are not just the agreed outcome of bargaining, but also constitute the rules guiding the process through which a substantive bargain is reached. Domestic political institutions play a key role in the ways in which domestically grounded preferences are brought to the international table. The character and quality of domestic institutions is therefore a major factor in determining the type of preferences and strategies that that are pursued internationally.

The nature and quality of domestic institutions

Domestic institutional structures that enable preferences to be expressed at the international level reflect domestically formed preferences at the same time as they become vehicles for their pursuit. Some political actors choose to allocate resources openly and equitably, through transparent bargaining processes, clear rules about rights and responsibilities, and the search for efficiency. Other actors choose to restrict the distributional process, dominating resources and allocating them according to logics of political efficacy through an intransparent institutional process. Countries where state capture has been accompanied by domestic institution-building processes directed towards maintaining transparency and the rule of law above all actors in society are expressing a preference to create an environment in which competing actors can engage peacefully and predictably. Countries where state capture has been accompanied by intransparent institutions, alternate rules for members of different social groups, and a low degree of meaningful public scrutiny are expressing a preference for concentration of power in the hands of an unaccountable ruling elite. Several indicators can be used as benchmarks for the nature and quality of domestic institutions: the level of constraints on

the ability of the executive to act with impunity, the level of civilian oversight of the military and security services, the independence of the judiciary and the freedom of the press are all measures of domestic transparency.

A large literature stemming from the liberal tradition suggests that governments that are able to act with impunity within their own borders are less likely to pursue cooperative strategies abroad. More precisely, governments that operate without the checks and balances of strong domestic institutions are less likely to favour international institutions that may constrain their behaviour (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). The link between domestic and international institutions is explored by Alons, who argues that that variations in 'internal polarity' result in variations in the tightness of domestic constraints on a government's foreign policy options. By 'internal polarity' Alons means 'the degree of concentration in the hands of the government relative to society' (2007, pp. 211 – 212). Although Alons' article is an attempt to explain the sources of state foreign policy preferences, his idea that the freedom of the government to act without domestic constraints may affect its foreign policy is useful with regard to regional security cooperation. Alons' work suggests that less constrained executives are more likely to pursue their preferences unilaterally rather than cooperatively – in the regional security context this would predict a higher level of resistance to institutional constraints on their unilateral options.

The argument here is not that democratic countries are less likely to go to war, or that Arab countries will not be peaceful until they are democratic. Democracy, in the sense of the representative model common in Western countries, is not necessarily relevant. What is important is the quality of the institutions that allocate resources and costs among various social groups. States that choose to deal with domestic interdependence in an open and transparent manner are more likely to seek similar arrangements internationally than states whose methods are closed and intransparent. The central issue is whether a country's domestic institutional settings for allocating resources and for making collective decisions are transparent – are their proceedings able to be publicly examined? Moreover, are they independent – are actors other than those who stand to benefit

responsible for allocative decisions? More specifically, are security agencies subject to public scrutiny and civilian control, or are they closely controlled by the state that they protect?

Democracy vs. autocracy

The implications of the 'democratic peace thesis' have been widely debated among scholars for many years (see Bueno de Mesquita et al, 1999). The contested notion that democracies do not go to war with each other is not at issue here. What is of concern is whether democracies, by virtue of their more equitable domestic preference aggregation mechanisms, are more easily able to cooperate on regional security than autocratically governed countries. This does not appear to be the case. Democratic countries usually cooperate in formal, multilateral settings, and democracies with similar cultural backgrounds tend to cooperate even more closely. And yet, major domestic institutional differences did not prevent the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Southeast Asia. As Solingen has noted, peaceful relations in Asia 'preceded a growing cluster of democratic states, and indeed still operate in a region hosting major and smaller nondemocracies' (Solingen 2007, p. 759).

The character and quality of domestic institutions manifests itself in two ways that distinguish between autocratic and democratic polities: the type of preferences pursued and the type of benefits demanded by the domestic actor. In democratic polities, while governments have their own preferences over policy, they cannot simply ignore public opinion when they negotiate internationally (Pahre, 2003). Similarly, the factors that determine whether an issue is political salient vary considerably depending on the domestic political system. Liberal principles protect against abuses of power, and compensate losers. The principles that protect open debate and the free press encourage policymakers to declare their intentions, while increasing the likelihood that a policymaker who fails to achieve their declared objectives will face public scrutiny.

Four key domestic institutions – an independent judiciary, civilian control over the military and security services, guaranteed property rights and a free press – are central to the functioning of a modern democratic state. The judiciary, the military and property rights are perhaps the most important levers of power in any country. An independent judiciary is necessary to check the influence of elected officials in the legislature as well as the executive branches. This constraint is a cornerstone of democratic governance, since all people subject to the laws of a country must be treated equally in accordance with those laws – elected politicians can have their own agendas, and tyrants can be elected. Civilian oversight over the military and security services is just as crucial. At the core of the institution of sovereignty is the notion that each state has a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. By definition, military and security services are coercive tools, empowered with the ability to use violence to force third parties into succumbing to the will of the state. When they are not subject to the laws of the land, and when their activities cannot be independently overseen by an independent civilian body, the risk that their considerable powers will be used in ways that may not be in the interests of citizens is very great indeed. Guaranteed property rights are central to any democratic state. Citizens must be confident that they can conduct their lawful economic and personal affairs without the risk that their assets will be appropriated arbitrarily, either by the state or by any other actor. Leaders in countries with a free press are more likely to react to the issues that voters consider politically salient, whereas in autocratic systems leaders are likely to react to the concerns of the politically important power clubs that occupy the centre of the decision-making structure. No country where these four institutions are controlled by a narrow elite acting in their own interests can be classed as democratic no matter how free are its media or how its elections are conducted.

Several scholars writing in the Kantian tradition have taken up the idea that states governed in accordance with democratic principles are more likely to respect the fundamental rights of their citizens, while engaging in peaceful relations with each other. As preferences pursued at the international level tend to reflect the wishes of broad sections of the electorate, they also tend to be defined broadly and in line with the wishes of the median voter (Tusicisny, 2007). If government preferences are those that emerge

from competition among domestic social groups, then in democratic countries governments should react to the issues that concern the voting public. Presumably, voters expressing a preference on a given issue can be expected to consider a government's policy record when they decide whether to re-elect the incumbent, or cast their vote for the opposition. If an issue is held to be important for a long period of time then it is likely that a government's policies will have been adjusted to better pursue voters' preferences in a given issue area. It is also likely that an issue that voters consider to be a top priority will also be at the top of a government's order of preferences.

A further important distinction between democratic and autocratic polities concerns the time horizon. It can be assumed in both types of system that governments choose those policies that strengthen or maintain their hold on power. In democratic systems – where the time horizon is shorter – this may be through electoral politics and the management of parliamentary coalitions; whereas in autocratic systems this may be by other means entirely. In democratic political systems, any leader who takes a decision at the international level likely to impact negatively on the preferences of large numbers of voters is likely to lose the next election. This consideration is not as much of a concern for autocratic ruling elites. While the concerns of the public cannot be disregarded – popular will can be expressed in plenty of ways apart from elections – the electoral cycle does not form part of the win-set in autocracies as it does in democracies.

In recent years influential liberal scholars have argued that democratic states should have special rights, especially with regard to the use of force – essentially assuming a right to abrogate the sovereignty of non-democratic states (Reus-Smit, 2005). The idea of a 'concert of democracies' ratifying the democratic peace by treaty was originally advocated as a key step towards 'building a world of liberty under law' by a group of scholars based at Princeton University (Princeton Project 2006, p. 25). Republican US Presidential candidate John McCain has proposed to build a 'league of democracies' that 'would form the core of an international order of peace based on freedom.'[32] While this

[32] See 'Senator McCain Addresses The Hoover Institution on U.S. Foreign Policy,' Stanford University, Stanford, 1 May 2007, www.johnmccain.com (accessed 11 July 2008).

idea has been strongly contested by political analysts in the US and elsewhere, the notion that liberal democratic political and economic systems are an appropriate model for the rest of the world is mainstream among Western scholars. As several analysts have noted, EU member governments and European institutions have become fond of the idea of 'exporting' the political and economic institutional forms that have been successful in Europe to other parts of the world, especially the European neighbourhood (Börtzel and Risse, 2004; Lavanex, 2008).

Bargaining on international institutional outcomes

As Fearon argues, international regimes, rules and conventions deserve greater attention as forums for bargaining rather than primarily as organisations that aid the monitoring and enforcement of international agreements. Interstate bargaining increasingly takes place in the context of international regimes created by states – the institutional setting in which preferences are equilibrated (Fearon, 1998). International agreements set the parameters for future negotiations, and make future agreements easier to reach. International institutions are not only the outcome of bargaining processes, but also provide the setting for future bargains. Fearon argues that, assuming fixed preferences, it would be helpful for scholars to conceive of international institution-building as a two-stage process: firstly a bargaining problem, and secondly as an enforcement problem. Fearon shows that enforcement can be modelled as a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, where maintaining the terms of the agreement became easier as the 'shadow of the future' lengthened. Before reaching this stage, however, international actors need to go through the bargaining process.

Formal international institutions are the outcome of negotiations among participating international actors. This bargaining process is itself structured by institutionalised rules and conventions which help actors to manage their heterogeneous preferences, send each other signals and information and reduce the likelihood of breakdown (Walsh, 2007). The 'rules of the game' under which international actors bargain may change as the process continues and these changes may enable partners to break deadlocks. Rules that enabling

new issue-linkages, that introduce new partners, or that take into account changes wrought by external shocks, may provide new windows of opportunity for actors to work towards Pareto-improving outcomes.

Fearon cites the famous definition of a bargaining problem proposed by Nash and Schelling. 'A bargaining problem,' writes Fearon, 'refers to a situation where there are multiple self-enforcing agreements or outcomes that two or more parties would all prefer to no agreement, but the parties disagree in their ranking of the mutually preferable agreements' (Fearon 1998, p. 274) In other words, actors engaged in bargaining are aware that an outcome that is better than nothing is available, but they have different preferences over the terms of the agreement.

Shoppers and carpet sellers in Istanbul's Grand Bazaar are familiar with Fearon and Schelling's bargaining problem: the customer knows that a carpet would look much better than the plain floorboards of their living room, a sentiment with which the carpet seller is in full agreement as the carpet would be better on the customer's floor than on the pile in his shop. Naturally, the terms of the agreement are the sticking point – the customer wishes to part with as little cash as possible, whereas the seller sees a tourist with a fat wallet. As Fearon points out, bargaining problems are typically dynamic, resolved through time in sequences of offers and counter-offers, or with one or both parties "holding out" in the hope that the other will give in. Stall holders in the Grand Bazaar are often aware that their customers have only a few days in Istanbul, limiting the time they have to buy a carpet. Holding out in the expectation that the customer will cave in and pay a higher price is common. Fearon also posits that bargaining problems typically involve uncertainty about what the other side's "bottom line" is, raising opportunities for bluffing and misrepresentation. This asymmetry of information is also common to bargaining in the bazaar – tourists are routinely unaware of the true value of the carpets on offer, and many have little idea about how to discern between a high quality naturally coloured and hand-stitched carpet, and a cheap machine-made version. They are often reliant on the integrity of the carpet seller in providing this information,

which, bearing in mind the latter's preference for extracting as much money as possible from the unwitting tourist, is a poor bargaining position to be in.

Most international agreements are more complex than the example of the Grand Bazaar, because there are typically more actors potentially affected by the bargain, and more issues at stake. Nevertheless, some clear parallels can be drawn. As Fearon writes, 'Regardless of the specific domain, there will almost invariably be *many* possible ways of writing the treaty or agreement that defines the terms of cooperation, and the states involved will surely have conflicting preferences over some subset of these various possibilities' (Fearon 1998, p. 274). Most bargaining situations involve a series of offers and counteroffers, with actors trying to reach an agreement that is as close to their preferences as possible. Moreover, uncertainty about the minimum that the other side would accept is usually a key factor in defining a bargaining strategy, as no actor wants to give up more than they have to.

Scharpf notes that according to the Coase theorem, in the absence of transaction costs and with side payments and package deals available to all, the potential welfare gains which a benevolent and omniscient dictator might provide could also be realised by negotiations between self-interested and fully informed individual actors. Of course, transaction costs are far from zero, side payments and package deals are often not feasible, and complete information about true preferences and the alternative options of other participants is hard to come by. These difficulties increase with the number of participants. Self interested bargaining between large numbers of actors faced by these problems is likely to generate sub-optimal policy outcomes which Scharpf sees as 'resulting either in blockages or in inefficient lowest-denominator compromises' (Scharpf 1998, p. 848).

Scharpf argues that this outcome is perfectly acceptable for liberal political theorists, who display a 'strong preference for unanimous decisions,' which 'presupposes that agreements that are in fact reached are welfare-improving, since all participants must prefer the outcome to the status quo, whereas the liberty of individual action will continue to prevail if negotiations should fail.' Scharpf points out that Coase's

assumption holds only for 'voluntary negotiation systems' when negotiators are still writing on a clean slate, and when there are no pre-existing binding commitments that can influence the negotiations (Scharpf 1998, p. 848).

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a clear example of a voluntary negotiation framework, unlike a federal country such as Australia, the United States or Germany, where states and *Länder* are to a greater or lesser extent constrained by the federal level of government, and where exiting the negotiations is not an option for any of the participants. Bargaining under the EMP is carried out between sovereign governments and their agents, with no higher authority. Bargaining is affected by transaction costs, side payments and package deals have to be negotiated, and actors sometimes obfuscate their preferences depending on their calculation of the benefits this may bring them.

Deadlocks and wars of attrition

Alesina and Drazen show that bargaining over the distribution of costs often turns in to a 'war of attrition' as each actor attempts to hold out and wait for the other to concede and bear a disproportionate share of the burden. While Alesina and Drazen were referring primarily to the distribution of costs from changes to fiscal policies aimed at reducing current account deficits, their work provides useful insights for the process of international bargaining on security cooperation, where disagreements often surround the distribution of costs. Alesina and Drazen argue that the war of attrition cannot end until one side concedes and the other side decides the allocation of costs. Governments delay raising taxes to balance the budget until such a political consolidation occurs: Alesina and Drazen noted three features that are common to such 'wars of attrition.' First, all parties agree on the need for change, but there is a political disagreement over the distribution of costs. Second, when agreement is reached, this comes about as the result of a *political* consolidation. One side often becomes politically dominant, while politically weaker groups bear the costs disproportionately. At the domestic level this consolidation can follow class lines and be regressive to a particular group. Third, successful agreements are usually followed by several failed attempts, and when agreement is finally reached

the details are often similar to the content of earlier efforts (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). When applied to international bargaining over security cooperation, this hypothesis would predict that negotiations are characterised by stonewalling that normally ends when one side concedes on a key point.

At the international level, the nominal sovereign equality of governments and the niceties of diplomacy normally rule out agreements that are explicitly regressive towards the weaker party, unless the settlement follows defeat in war – as was the case with Germany under the harsh conditions of the Treaty of Versailles (Ikenberry, 2001). Overly regressive agreements can be counter-productive, as the requirement that governments justify international agreements to their domestic constituencies necessitates a degree of 'face saving' on the part of the conceding party. This becomes even more important when domestic rejection of an international agreement contributes to a change of government in the conceding country and a return to stand-off – again, the German experience of the 1920s and 1930s provides a clear example.

Bargaining over multilateral security agreements often features Alesina and Drazen's first and third conditions. Disagreement over the costs of public good provision are common to international bargains over security – the United States has regularly called upon Europe to contribute more resources to NATO, and has chided individual members for their reluctance to provide troops to the Afghanistan campaign without conditions on their deployment. These disagreements over burden-sharing emerge even though there is broad agreement among Europeans and Americans over the need for NATO to ensure the security of Europe, and on the validity of its 'out of area' mission in Afghanistan.

Since governments design international institutions as a means of pursuing their interests, bargaining tends to focus on the distribution of gains. States that stand to gain the most from a cooperative outcome offer the most significant compromises, linkages with other issues or side payments (Koremenos et al, 2004). There are many possible bargains that can be reached, and these multiple equilibria are a major obstacle to cooperation. In a PD game, there is only one point of mutual cooperation – the Pareto optimum where both

sides choose to cooperate rather than defect. In practice, governments have a wide range of choices and many possible cooperative outcomes along the Pareto frontier, often with different distributional consequences (Koromenos et al, 2004).

A key element in this final stage of international negotiations is whether governments consider that the gains outweigh the losses, leaving them better off than they would be without an agreement. Generally speaking, governments will agree to enter into formal international cooperation when they consider that the benefits outweigh the costs, especially to their ability to act unilaterally (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). When a bargain is available that enables governments to pursue their preferences more efficiently than they could by unilateral action, they will decide to cooperate and select an appropriate institutional form in which to embed the bargain they have made. Alternately, the absence of a bargain indicates that governments have decided that unilateral or non-cooperative actions would serve their preferences better than cooperation would.

Sovereign governments are extremely wary of institutional arrangements that bind them in to future commitments that reduce their unilateral options. Fearon posits that the longer the shadow of the future governments perceive, the more likely they are to hold out for favourable terms. '[T]he analysis here suggests that though a long shadow of the future may make *enforcing* an international agreement easier, it can also give states an incentive to *bargain harder*, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal… the more an international regime creates durable expectations of future interactions on the issues in question, the greater the incentive for states to bargain hard for favourable terms, possibly making cooperation harder to reach' (Fearon 1998, p. 270).

Often, the unwillingness of state actors to invest heavily in a bargain is blamed on a 'lack of political will.' However, political will can and is found when actors consider the issue to be important enough. The bargaining framework itself reflects the political will of the actors – when governments have a strong enough preference for cooperation, they will design an institutional setting that enables positive-sum outcomes. When they do not, it is likely that the institutional setting will exhibit in-built weaknesses that hinder rather than

facilitate bargaining. Significant changes to the institutional setting that would make positive-sum outcomes more likely are only likely after priority shifts bring preferences for cooperation to the fore. Institutions can ease the bargaining process, but in the absence of the right combination of preferences it is unlikely that conflicts of interest will be overcome by adjustments to the bargaining rules.

Alternate international relations theoretical frameworks

The actor-based analytical framework outlined above is not the only approach that has been used by scholars interested in understanding the decisions of governments to build formal institutions to manage security interdependence. During the past few decades international relations scholars have tried to make sense of world politics by advancing and debating the merits of several theories explaining international political processes and outcomes. This intellectual journey has resulted in the division of mainstream international relations scholarship into three major schools or 'research programmes': realism, liberalism and constructivism (Moravcsik, 1997).

These groupings are relatively broad churches, each incorporating several approaches. The lively and sometimes acrimonious debate among proponents of one school or another has from time to time obscured the basic truth about international relations theory: that all three research programmes have contributed to understanding of the why and how questions in international affairs. As such, no approach is 'right' or 'wrong' – by stressing different basic assumptions and advancing alternate hypotheses, realism, liberalism and constructivism enable the relationship between variables to be weighed against each other, facilitating a structured debate about causes and effects.

At their heart, the three research programmes rest on markedly different assumptions about international actors and the structure of the political setting in which they operate. Realism assumes that state actors always try to maximise material power relative to each other. Liberalism – the general framework employed in this thesis – assumes that

governments work to maximise the utility of dominant domestic actors. Constructivism assumes that intersubjective understandings about the appropriateness or otherwise of alternate courses of action shape political decision-making. Each research programme stresses a different independent variable: realism, stresses relative power; liberal institutionalism stresses interests, information and transaction costs; and constructivism stresses dominant ideological beliefs and perceptions (Moravcsik, 2008). As the analytical framework developed in this chapter rests on assumptions commonly used by scholars writing in the liberal tradition, it is useful to explore alternative theories that can provide context.

Realism

Realist analytical frameworks have dominated the study of international security politics for many years, but have not been so popular in studies of the EU. As Hyde-Price argues, 'neo-realism is one of the most sophisticated and influential theories of international politics, yet there have been few attempts to apply it to the EU's foreign, security and defence policy' (Hyde-Price 2006, p. 218). Realist analyses assume that the nation-state is the basic unit of analysis and that domestic politics are unimportant. International security is a game played by states acting in the national interest, rather than in the interests of any particular constituency. The system itself is assumed to be anarchic, as there is no power higher than sovereign nation-states (Waltz, 1979).

Realist frameworks are also predicated on the notion that a state's behaviour in the international realm is fundamentally different from the way that it governs at home (Walt, 1997). For realists, state preferences are always the same: the national interest is defined exogenously in terms of a state's military power relative to the other states in the system. Realists note that political power, or the ability to get other actors to do what you want them to, is the currency of domestic and international politics. Without power, an actor cannot pursue their preferences. It is therefore reasonable to expect that actors try to maximise their own power relative to other actors. In an anarchic international system, no actor can trust another. States seek to build military power and alliances because they

must, whether they want to or not (Maoz, 2003). State behaviour at the bargaining level is determined by the relative material and military power of the states involved in the process (Waltz, 1979). States may govern equitably within their territorial borders, but when they engage internationally all economic and diplomatic activity is subservient to the principle of maximising power and protecting the state against other states, which are assumed to be competing in a zero-sum game.

Constructivism

Constructivist explanations posit that state actors pursue 'logics of appropriateness' defined by dominant domestic actors or by the political elites themselves. For constructivists international bargaining and institutional choices reflect what actors believe ought to be the outcome as well as what makes sense in terms of military and economic necessity (March and Olsen, 1998; Wendt, 2001). Constructivism assumes that institutions and practices are constitutive of actors – in other words, the preferences of the actors, and even the form and character of the actors themselves, are constantly shaped and changed by exogenous influences.

Constructivists regard international institutions as social creations that reflect prevailing inter-subjective understandings of what constitutes appropriate behaviour in international society. In turn, institutions generate new norms and patterns of behaviour, while international organisations take on the role of protecting norms by defining standards of legitimate behaviour. The agency exercised by international institutions over time shapes actors' preferences by way of influencing changes in inter-subjective perceptions of what constitutes appropriate policy (Reus-Smit, 2005; Duffield, 2007).

The standard hypotheses implicitly or explicitly argued by scholars in this tradition is that institution-building, whether international or domestic, is more likely to succeed when actors share normative points of view about the appropriateness or otherwise of certain courses of action. This is especially important as regards security cooperation, where formal, multilateral initiatives are far more likely to succeed when governments share a

common 'strategic culture' (Cornish and Edwards, 2001). Norm-based reasoning has been used to explain the purposes and behaviour of regional security institutions like NATO, both during and after the Cold War (Adler, 2008) or the differences between NATO and SEATO (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002). Constructivist scholars have proposed norm-oriented explanations of the EU's regional institutional initiatives in the Mediterranean (Adler and Crawford, 2004).

Scholars writing in the constructivist tradition have contributed some important insights to the study of international security politics. The constructivist hypothesis has two important implications for regional institution-building. Perhaps the most influential of these is the 'security community' concept of regional security agreements (Deutsch, et al, 1957). Security communities blend material and normative goals, and are generally understood to have two defining – though intangible – normative characteristics: firstly a 'strategic culture', meaning the institutions and practices which develop habits and structure the evolution of policy, and secondly a sense of 'we-ness' among members, fostered by shared interests, perceptions of threat, ideologies, worldviews and mutual loyalties (Adler and Barnett, 1998). According to this view, the security community concept emphasises the power of trans-national ideas in international community building, holding out the possibility that international anarchy can be overcome by governments that 'do the right thing.' The flip side of this argument is that cultural and ideological differences and divergent moral values serve to compound heterogeneous state interests, placing even greater barriers in the way of multilateral community building (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002).

Second, many constructivists build on this symbiosis between actors and institutions with the application of neofunctionalist logic. Neofunctionalism, which has been especially influential among scholars of European integration, posits not only that integration works best when actors' normative points of view converge, but that the mechanism of convergence is the process of 'spillover.' According to neofunctionalist logic, the successful institutionalisation of a prevailing norm in one issue-area will often lead to its institutionalisation in other areas (Haas, 2004). This normally occurs in the first instance

when it can be proven by example that an institution works – for example, the free movement of goods in the EU. This success becomes both a blueprint and a benchmark for integration in other issue-areas, whether economic – such as European monetary integration – or socio-political, such as the Schengen accords. Neofunctionalist logic is clearly evident in the design of the EMP, where cooperation in each of the three baskets is supposed to reinforce cooperation in the others.

The Hungarian mathematician and philosopher Imre Lakatos famously set forth a prescription for judging the worth of theoretical research programmes. Instead of asking whether a hypothesis is right or wrong, Lakatos argued that scholars should ask whether one research programme is better than another, so that there is a rational basis for preferring it. Lakatos argued that empirical facts are always subject to reinterpretation and qualification depending on the perspective of the researcher. The researcher's task is therefore more than simply finding conflicts between facts and theories – or data that appear to either support or contradict a theory or its predictions. Lakatos believed that the real test of a theory is that of evaluating its claims by comparing its findings to other relevant conceptual frameworks or paradigms (see Kolodziej 2005, pp. 43 – 44).

Lakatos' prescription has been taken too literally by many international politics scholars. Moravcsik, for example, has been forthright about the need for scholars to generate alternate hypotheses and test them against the empirical record to see which theory captures or explains the most observable facts (Moravcsik, 1997). The problem with this approach is that in explaining a great deal, theoretical alternatives risk glossing over factors that could also be important. An alternative approach is suggested by Taliaferro, who argues that scholars should not brand each others' research programmes as 'degenerative' but should develop and test hypotheses derived from the same set of core assumptions. In this way, theories can be refined and new facts explained (Taliaferro, 2000/01). The main problem with this approach is that is does not acknowledge that the different assumptions upon which alternate research programmes rest can often highlight different aspects of a political issue. These different perspectives often mirror the difficult choices facing policymakers. From the perspective of the analyst, considering a decision-

making process in the light of alternate assumptions about the choices facing actors can help to clarify the alternatives that are on the table.

Implications for the analysis of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation

Political processes are complex phenomena of human activity, involving any number of individual or institutional actors and chains of events whose causes and effects can be interpreted in any number of ways. Security policies are especially difficult to analyse objectively, as they inevitably raise subjective moral concerns among policymakers and analysts alike. Security cooperation is usually much more about the process itself rather than the achievement of clearly identifiable, concrete goals (Kolodziej, 2005). In contrast, economic policy usually has much clearer goals than security policy, and economic outcomes (trade and investment figures, GDP growth, unemployment rates) are more amenable to measurement – and therefore benchmarking and assessment – than security outcomes. There are, therefore, limits to the extent to which political scientists can discover the absolute truth of these processes, because measurement of most of the core variables – power, interests and ideologies especially – inevitably involves some degree of subjective interpretation on the part of the researcher.

Naturally, scholars and commentators – this author included – are inclined to believe that a more peaceful world would be a better place to live, that our leaders should work harder to avoid violent conflict, and that binding rules respected by all are the best barriers against violence, whether domestically or internationally. It is natural for such observers to be disappointed at the seemingly glacial progress of a process that has at times promised much but seemed to deliver little. Putting aside one's own values is difficult – only a sociopath can set aside their subjective side entirely. Nevertheless, scholars have a responsibility to explore their own biases in their attempt to analyse political processes as objectively as possible.

Bias is especially difficult to avoid when the rationality that led decision-makers to embark on a particular policy choice is not easy for the observer to grasp. As Alexander

George has written: 'One must not underestimate the extent to which important policies are shaped by factors other than scholarly knowledge and objective analysis' (George 2006, p. 64). The 'analytical narrative' is one way of being open about bias, if not avoiding it entirely. An analytical framework based on clear assumptions enables the analyst to be open about his or her own biases. This has the added benefit of focussing the narrative so that it does not rely overly on factors outside the theoretical framework (Bates et al, 2000). An analytical narrative also enables explanation of political variables that are not easily captured by precise mathematical reasoning.

Focussing on the actors that are involved in the process can help in the quest for balanced analysis. '[Actors] are often neglected or marginalised in the debates between rival schools of security thought,' writes Kolodziej, '[Scholars] tend to have a bias of presenting their selected notion of security as if it were coterminous with what actors think or do about security' (Kolodziej 2005, p. 3). That the actors involved in any political process should be the main referents for analysis is, of course, an obvious point – few political analyses fail to discuss events without references to governments, policymakers, lobbies, courts or other actors. And yet, as Kolodziej reminds us, many analysts do not take the actors' perspective seriously enough. A common error made by scholars is to make unsolicited policy recommendations without taking careful note of whether these courses of action are even remotely realistic given the preferences of the actors and the restrictions they actors face.

Political actors are multidimensional and are capable of having more than one preference, which can (and often do) conflict with each other. A government can pursue a long-term international agreement based on openness, trust and broad understandings of decent behaviour at the same time as it abrogates these principles in order to protect short-term interests. What matters is how these preferences are ordered at any given time. The ordering of state preferences is determined by several factors – the preferences of powerful domestic social groups, the ways in which these interests are channelled to the state level through the domestic institutional setting, whether the interests of other governments are complementary or conflicting, the distribution of power at the

international level and the rules of the international bargaining process are all crucial in shaping outcomes. All of these factors must be taken into account when explaining the form and function of international institutions, whether formal or informal. The next three chapters take up this task with reference to European and Mediterranean partner government preferences and the Euro-Mediterranean bargaining process.

Chapter IV

The European Union policymaking process

The principles and objectives of EU foreign and security policy are detailed in the 2003 European Security Strategy *A Secure Europe in a Better World* (European Council, 2003). The ESS puts forward a comprehensive view of security, in which social, political, economic and military factors contribute to the security of states and citizens. According to the ESS, the key to dealing with threats is for governments to engage in formal, multilateral cooperation in which the rule of law is paramount, violence is a last resort, dialogue is ongoing and the 'root causes' of instability – poverty and weak governance – are systematically addressed (Quille, 2004). In the Mediterranean, the EU's common position is expressed in the Barcelona Declaration and the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit: to pursue regional peace, stability and prosperity through economic openness and democracy, offering economic and political carrots as incentives to persuade south Mediterranean partners to transform their economies, polities and international behaviour (Adler and Crawford, 2004). Working towards a formal, multilateral and comprehensive security pact is a central aspect of Europe's common position.

Many EU foreign policy analysts argue that the most distinctive characteristic of the EU as a foreign policy actor is the 'normative power' that shapes both its goals and its strategies (Youngs, 2004). As noted by Cavatorta and his colleagues, EU foreign policy is officially based 'on a conceptualisation of international security resting on the theoretical assumption that international stability and security can only be achieved through the promotion of norms upon which the EU itself is built: legally binding treaties, multilateral institutions, democratic governance and economic interpenetration' (Cavatorta et al 2006, p. 1). The EU is said to use its own organisational structures to induce neighbouring countries to behave in accordance with European norms and regulations (Lavanex, 2008). Given these ambitions it is unsurprising that the EU is said to suffer from the 'capability – expectations gap' into which the hopes of policymakers, analysts and citizens often disappear (Hill, 1993).

Of course, the south and east Mediterranean has not transformed and its governments have not adopted European forms of legalistic multilateralism in their relations with Europe or with each other. Many analysts lament the EU's inability to bring about this transformation, and blame various factors within Europe that they consider weaken the EU's Mediterranean policy. The nefarious national interests of certain EU member states are often held to undermine the EU's ability to implement its policies, especially those aimed at building security cooperation – normally explained as a core interest of sovereign governments which they are loth to entrust to Brussels (Edwards, 2008). The European Commission is often criticised for lack of clarity in the rewards and conditions that it offers Mediterranean Partners in implementing reforms and changing their international behaviour (Dannreuther, 2006). Frustration at muddled policy documents (perhaps compounded by an over-reliance on 'Eurospeak') has prompted some analysts to use the phrase 'strategic ambivalence' to sum up the EU's foreign policies in the neighbourhood (Lippert 2007 b, p. 183). Some commentators even argue that the EU does not have a genuine interest in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the south Mediterranean at all (Cavatorta et al, 2006). In the south, the honesty of the EU's motives are sometimes called into question, with Europe being portrayed variously as a neo-colonialist power, an oil-hungry demagogue, or a naked emperor with no power at all (Soltan, 2004, Saleh, 2007).

These various explanations for the EU's behaviour in the Mediterranean are often highly interesting and sometimes insightful, but they usually lack a key component: a systematic explanation of the interests which the EU pursues in the region. Certainly, scholarly attempts to discover Europe's Mediterranean purpose have yet to make use of a common set of analytical tools and assumptions (Bicchi, 2002). The theme that is common to all of the arguments mentioned above is the conceptualisation of the EU as a monolithic actor, somehow separate from its member states. Analysts who make the argument that the EU is somehow 'undermined' or 'weakened' by the competing interests of its members assume firstly that the EU tries to act independently from what its members want, and secondly that it has interests that are somehow different from or competing with member state interests. Aside from the partial exception of the European Commission, these

arguments are hard to sustain in the light of an actor-oriented analytical framework. The Commission has a limited ability to act independently in foreign policy, although only within a mandate granted by the member states and a limited degree of 'agency slippage' (Nugent and Saurugger, 2002). However, in general, it is the member states acting in unison that make the decisions. This pattern can be seen at work in the case of Euro-Mediterranean relations, especially in the security field.

EU foreign policy is intergovernmental – EU member states, pursuing the preferences of dominant domestic coalitions, empower the offices of the High Representative for CFSP and the Commission's DG Relex to work on policy goals that they consider more likely to be achieved collectively (Wagner, 2003). When an EU member government considers its list of foreign policy interests, it makes decisions about the best or most likely means by which they might be realised. Depending on the issue, EU member states differ as to the extent to which they rely on the EU, on their own resources or on other actors. These differences are equilibrated through intra-EU negotiations, resulting in EU foreign policies that represent the common position of member states on a given issue. Issues where member states have widely distributed preferences are usually deemed to be 'controversial' – a common EU position is more difficult to reach, and member states are more likely to investigate their options outside the EU foreign policymaking framework. Member states consider some of their foreign policy preferences better pursued unilaterally, others by using alternative institutional strategies such as NATO, the transatlantic alliance or as part of some other coalition – for example the Nordic, the Visegrad or the southern EU member countries.

Christian Jouret, head of the Mediterranean/Barcelona and Middle East Task Force at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, recently commented that the complexities of the EU foreign policymaking process make it difficult for EU member states to define common interests. He said that the necessity to reach consensus on every issue forces the EU to concentrate on structures, principles and processes as a means of

skirting around member state sensitivities.[33] However, this would appear to be a conservative view of the EU's common position on cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries. EU member states have a long-term interest in political and economic stability in the Mediterranean basin, for which a formal, comprehensive security agreement is an integral part. As Biscop points out, 'The neighbourhood can be seen as the area in which the EU deems it has a specific responsibility for peace and security, and therefore aspires to a directly leading role, as opposed to its general contribution to global stability through the UN' (Biscop 2005, p. 3). The EU, as the initiator, has taken on the role of anchor, providing incentives and conditions to assist and persuade Mediterranean partner governments to engage with the process. It is no accident that the job of implementing this strategy falls to the EU – no member state acting alone has the ability to convince European and non-European governments to sign up to it, let alone implement it.

EU member state interests in comprehensive security cooperation in the Mediterranean are genuine – but they are balanced by other concerns. Put simply, European interests in the Mediterranean are threefold: long term interests related to the provision of the public good of political and economic stability in the region, short-term preferences related to the interests of voters in EU member states, and the interests of political elites at the member state level. Different member governments weight these interests differently, and the interplay of these priorities has resulted in an array of policymaking tools and institutional strategies. Long-term political and economic stability is to be pursued through a strategy of formal political and economic institution-building, primarily through stable bargaining under the Barcelona Process framework leading to multilateral regional pacts, especially on security cooperation and on trade. Much of this work is done by the European Commission with the Council, the rotating presidency, and key member states providing political impetus and formal agreement from time to time (Philippart, 2003). Short term interests that resonate with European voters tend to be taken up at the national level in the first instance, as this is where voters make their judgements. In cases

[33] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace event 'The EU and Conflict in the Middle East,' Washington, DC, 26 November 2008.

where member governments consider that the EU level would achieve better results for their voters than unilateral or coalitional policies, they task the EU with taking care of short-term priorities. Similarly, the political and economic interests of member state political elites are often pursued more efficiently at the EU level, where national policymakers can use 'tied hands' strategies to overcome domestic constraints. When elites judge that, given the likely response of their peers, the EU level is not the most promising place to pursue a given interest – as is sometimes the case – then policymakers will find other ways.

Developing a common EU member state position

Putnam's two-level game metaphor has often been used in studies of multilevel policymaking in the European Union because the EU does not fit easily with traditional distinctions between the domestic and international realms. Some studies have examined two-level decision-making on the part of national-level decision-makers negotiating and ratifying EU treaties, in an effort to identify domestic veto-players (see, for example, König and Hug, 2000). Others have treated the member states themselves as veto players, and the EU-level institutions as the 'government' sitting at the international table, although in practice the institutions acting as international negotiator and domestic ratifier vary considerably across issues (Pahre, 2003). Another influential characterisation that builds on two- and multi-level analyses posits that EU foreign policy-making is driven by an executive comprised of member governments negotiating in the European Council, the Council Presidency and the European Commission (Stetter, 2004). A few studies of have gone beyond the national government level to look at the influence of subnational actors, including political parties, on the positions taken by delegates during European-level bargaining on the CFSP (Jensen, Slapin and König, 2007). Further analyses have taken the two-level metaphor further, conceptualising the EU as a 'multi-level' polity where decision-making is decentralised to varying degrees across actors and issues (Hooghe and Marks, 2001).

When the EU 'speaks with one voice' on foreign policy its words are carefully chosen. The development of EU foreign and security policy in the Mediterranean can be conceptualised as a bottom up process. EU member state security preferences are the outcome of bargaining among political parties, trade unions, business groups, civil society organisations, single-issue lobbies, ethnic minorities and other politically organised groups. The preferences of these groups are channelled through a political elite comprised of the highest ranking members of political parties, top civil servants, the main media organisations and prominent private figures with influence over policymakers. For the EU's member governments the EU-level represents a mezzanine between the high table of international negotiations and the low table of domestic politics. This view of the EU usefully captures Brussels' role as an equilibrating mechanism for the preferences of the EU's member governments, 'determined by the preferences of the [national] executives and by the rules of the domestic political game' (Conceição-Heldt, 2006, p. 283).

National policymakers take domestically grounded interests into negotiations in the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which meets every month. Policy outcomes are the result of tough negotiations – the Council has been aptly described as 'a rough, swaggering sort of grouping, [which] operates not by finding cosy consensus, but by reaching grubby compromise after lots of camp-forming, bribery and bullying.'[34] Intra-EU bargaining is also shaped by institutional constraints represented by the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors and the Court of Justice (Stetter, 2004). Depending on the policy area, Euro-Mediterranean agreements are also influenced by the Commission, sometimes in concert with the rotating Council Presidency and interested member states. In some cases the Council asks the Commission to come up with a detailed plan for the implementation of a common policy, which the Commission produces in the form of a Communication to the Council and the Parliament. Once a common EU position on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is reached, it is carried forward into the EMP bargaining framework in negotiations proceeding periodic Heads of State

[34] *The Economist*, 31 May 2008, p. 42.

summits where major declarations are made, and the annual Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Philippart, 2003).

Agreements with third countries have to be ratified formally and/or informally, sometimes by the European Council, sometimes by the European Parliament, sometimes by national parliaments and at other times by public opinion in key member states. Formal ratification by all 27 EU member state legislatures is required for Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, although not for ENP Action Plans, which are negotiated by the Commission. Common Foreign and Security Policy decisions do not require formal ratification by member states, but the principle of unanimity means that informal ratification is necessary (Pahre, 2003). In cases where the Commission is asked to prepare a detailed implementation plan, it normally uses its considerable resources to research the likely implications of foreign policy platforms for ratification inside Europe as well as outside. The Commission must consider member state interests and the likely coalitions that may form on a given issue, the bargains that could be struck and the side payments that may be available when designing and implementing policies. The Commission does not make proposals that would be rejected by the Council acting unanimously.

The key actors in shaping the EU's security policies in the Mediterranean basin are the EU's member governments and the European Commission. Not all 27 member states have an equal weight in the policymaking process. The EU's common position on Mediterranean security reflects those interests that are most keenly held by member states that are politically powerful and express a strong interest in Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. Some, like France, Spain, and Italy, have greater material capacities and stronger interests in the region. Germany and Great Britain are global political and economic actors in that they have interests in most regions of the world – both are interested in protecting their Mediterranean interests and at the same time ensuring that the intra-EU balance of power in EU foreign policy is maintained. Others, like Poland and Sweden, have significant material capacities but choose to focus their attention on the eastern neighbourhood. To the extent that the Nordic countries are interested in Euro-

Mediterranean security cooperation, their preferences are for a holistic approach linking security cooperation to economic development and human rights. Countries like Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands have neither strong preferences in the region nor significant material capacities. The Visegrad and Baltic member states are interested in the Mediterranean insofar as European attention and funds are not diverted from the Eastern neighbourhood and Russia. Greece and Cyprus are in a different situation entirely, located in the Mediterranean but with a firm focus on relations with Turkey rather than with the Arab states and Israel. Malta has strong preferences for stability in the Mediterranean basin but few capacities, and has repeatedly called for more action on burden-sharing as it bears a disproportionate responsibility for dealing with illegal migrants.

Most common EU foreign policy initiatives are driven by the 'big three' – Germany, France and Britain. Small EU member states have not had a major influence on the development of the CFSP and ESDP. Major milestones, such as the 1998 St. Malo declaration, the 2003 European Neighbourhood Policy and the 2008 Union for the Mediterranean are initiated by one or more of Britain, France and Germany, and progress after the 'big three' reach agreement. While the Spanish government was the main driving force behind the Barcelona Declaration, it needed France's support. Sometimes, small EU member states can be left in the uncomfortable position of having to either support or veto an agreement that may not address their security interests (Wivel, 2005). Nevertheless, smaller or 'less interested' EU member states cannot be discounted entirely – intergovernmental bargains over EU foreign policy positions should not alienate smaller countries or stronger countries that have strong preferences for an alternate allocation of the EU's common resources. In EU bargaining, serious disagreements can result in political fallout that sometimes obscures gains (Biscop, 2008). Part of the European Commission's role is to act as an interlocutor, so that serious fallouts are avoided.

This policymaking process does not necessarily produce 'lowest common denominator' policy outcomes. While the EU's common position and the strategy that is selected to

pursue it reflects a point that is acceptable to all member states, this is not necessarily the least that they could do. Rather, it represents an agreement among the member states on the goals that are best served at the EU level. The EU's common position on security cooperation in the Mediterranean does not necessarily serve all of the security interests of all EU member states, but neither is it a decision to maintain member state spheres of influence or to ignore the region altogether. Instead, the EU has designed a policy platform based on common European interests in regional stability and comprehensive, cooperative security relations, and has invited Mediterranean partner countries to conduct their relations both which each other and with the EU on the same basis. The declaration of intent to work towards a regional security pact remains the official EU position, but must be implemented in an international environment where there are other forces at work at the same time.

EU member state preferences

Several analysts have dismissed the idea that the EU and its members are interested in building formal, multilateral security cooperation in the Mediterranean (Cavatorta et al, 2006). According to this view, the grand ambitions of the Barcelona Declaration and the Union for the Mediterranean are either a bare-faced lie or a smokescreen for nefarious political and economic interests, or both. This is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, European political elites are aware of the value of multilateral institutions for preserving stability in troubled times. As Ruggie points out, the highly developed web of multilateral institutions was invaluable in preserving international order amid the chaos and uncertainty of the breakdown of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European empire in 1989 and 1990 (Ruggie, 1992). Secondly, even if the EU and its member governments have no intention of building multilateral institutions, the fact that they declare their intention to do so indicates that there must be political gain to be had from this public position. Presumably, if no European voter or lobby cares about comprehensive security there would be no incentive for governments to make costly commitments.

National preferences with regard to the outcomes of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation are prioritised according to issue specific calculations of the expected costs and benefits of interdependences between EU member states, individual Mediterranean partners and the wider region. EU member governments share two central security preferences: to protect their territory, infrastructure and population against attacks by hostile external actors, and to ensure a benign international environment grounded in formal, comprehensive and multilateral security cooperation among nations in order that ideas and commerce can flow freely (European Council, 2003). In order to pursue these goals, EU member states try to fuse hard power (the power to coerce) with soft power (the power to attract). The European experience has taught most Europeans that there are limits to the efficacy of hard power, necessitating strategies that rely on building relationships based on common interests rather than trying to force other states to accept European priorities. Increasingly, European governments have looked to combine their resources to increase their bargaining power in international affairs and thereby realise goals that would be out of the reach of individual European countries.

Mediterranean issues are likely to be more salient in EU member states geographically more proximate to the Mediterranean (Gillespie, 1997; Schimmelfennig, 2001). Spanish, French and Italian voters are more likely to be swayed by Mediterranean issues – such as bilateral deals on migration – than voters in northern European countries. The higher profile among southern European voters is likely to stem from social factors including the higher numbers of south Mediterranean families in Spain, France and Italy. Economic factors are likely to play a role as well – southern EU member states trade with MPCs more than northern EU members do as a percentage of total trade, and southern European agricultural producers feel more threatened by south Mediterranean cooperation (Lippert, 2007 a). The strong interests of some northern European governments – such as Germany or Sweden – in the south Mediterranean are maintained by lobbies (human rights groups in Sweden; political party foundations and business groups in Germany) that have political or economic interests in the region.

Musu identifies several more specific interests common to most EU member states: reasonably priced oil and secure energy supplies, reducing political and economic pressures on migration, and the development of markets for EU exports. And yet, as Musu points out, EU policy in the Mediterranean neighbourhood is also heavily shaped by the conflicting member state interests in the region. Musu argues that France wants to develop a common European policy that is independent from the USA. Germany wants to develop relations with Arab states without offending Israel, while the UK wants to mediate between the EU and the USA. Italy and Spain want to ensure a coherent Mediterranean dimension for EU foreign policy (Musu, 2006).

Regional stability – both in the long term and in the short term – is the key priority for EU member governments when they think about the Barcelona Process. While the two are not mutually exclusive, there is some tension between long-term stability, based on transparent governance, respect for human rights, economic prosperity, and binding commitments to regional security institutions, and short term stability dealing with threats perceived as immediate, such as those posed by terrorists, illegal migrants and the negative externalities of regional conflicts. Most EU policymakers are aware that the 'root causes' of short-term security problems need to be addressed by long-term measures. The conundrum they face is twofold: long-term stability has public good characteristics, raising the inevitable question of the distribution of costs; while short-term security problems affect the way citizens vote, and must be dealt with even of this means cooperating with authoritarian, in-transparent regimes.

Southern Europe

France

Of all the EU member states, France probably has the most to gain from stronger cooperation with South Mediterranean countries in all three of the Barcelona Process' 'baskets' – political and security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and

socio-cultural cooperation. France also has the most to gain from leading the Mediterranean lobby within the European foreign policymaking process. French President Nicolas Sarkozy's leadership role in the recently launched Union for the Mediterranean was a clear expression both that the French government is interested in continuing to play a leading role in the Mediterranean region, and that France intends to make an indelible imprint on EU foreign policy more generally. The UPM proposal is also an important aspect of President Sarkozy's global diplomatic ambitions. The French government is certainly prepared to ensure that French interests in the region are maintained, and the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean has been a core plank of France's 2008 EU Presidency agenda.

France has a long history of engagement in the Mediterranean region, with the most recent phase dating back to the colonial period. Part of the motivation behind France's push for stronger Euro-Mediterranean relations has been the desire to reduce feelings of alienation in the large communities in France with Maghreb roots (Coeurderoy, 2008). This has domestic political consequences, as few French voters want to see a repeat of the *banlieue* riots of 2005. The French political elite also has strong preferences for deeper engagement with Mediterranean partners. The French government has the closest ties with North African governments of all the EU members. French politicians and businessmen also have a long history of involvement in the Mashreq. In Lebanon, a French League of Nations protectorate (along with Syria) following the First World War, France still retains an important influence over the economy, especially the banking sector.[35]

While the assertion of that France wants to 'revive its dominance' in the Mediterranean is perhaps putting it too strongly, the French government certainly does not wish to lose influence over events in the Maghreb especially.[36] Meanwhile in the Mashreq, President Sarkozy has seen an opportunity to influence political developments in the Middle East.

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[35] Bernard Schmid, 'Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean: France as a Centre of Political Gravity,' www.qantara.de, 16 July 2008.

[36] Isabelle Schäfer, 'Mediterranean Union: First Partner, Then Neighbour, Then Member State?' www.qantara.de, 4 April 2008.

While President Sarkozy's act in standing between Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian President Abbas as they shook hands in Paris was little more than a symbolic photo opportunity, Sarkozy's role in bringing Syria out of international isolation has been crucial. France will be a key player in any peace deal between Israel and Syria, and if a settlement between Damascus and Beirut is reached it will also bear the imprint of the Elysees Palace (Salem, 2008).

In an interview given shortly before Sarkozy's election victory in May 2007, French President-to-be listed what he considered France's three core foreign policy interests. First, President Sarkozy mentioned national security in a new environment in which the major threats were posed by terrorism and proliferation. Sarkozy said that the key to addressing these threats would be through cooperation with foreign governments. Second, President Sarkozy re-iterated the need for France to promote the 'universal values of liberty and the respect for human rights and dignity,' which France would not be 'truly itself' if it failed to embody. Third, Sarkozy stated that France would pursue 'economic and commercial interests that will strengthen France as it takes on globalisation.'[37]

France is a good example of a country where the competing preferences of politically influential groups at the domestic level have proved difficult to equilibrate not only at the level of French foreign policy but for at the EU level as well. Sarkozy correctly listed France's liberal internationalist agenda of building a more democratic and dignified world – which must be tackled multilaterally – as secondary to the need to address immediate security concerns. National security pursued through cooperation on terrorism with south Mediterranean governments is necessary to ease the concerns of voters in a country where memories of Algerian terrorist attacks on the Paris metro have not faded (Joffé, 2008 a). The difficulties of cooperating closely with a government that is also a target for reform has not escaped the French President. Perhaps even more problematic are strategies for pursuing France's economic interests in the region. Whereas the French

[37] *The National Interest* and *Politique Internationale*, interview with President Nicolas Sarkozy, 17 April 2007.

political elite, energy companies and the financial industry have close ties with Middle East and North African countries, the French farming industry considers itself threatened by the prospect of greater liberalisation of the region's agricultural markets. The prospect of using greater access for south Mediterranean agriculture as both a development tool and a carrot for reform has long been undermined by France's conundrum over deepening EU-Mediterranean cooperation while protecting French farmers.

Spain

The Spanish government has, along with France, played a leading role in European policies towards the Mediterranean as a means of pursuing national interests and for the purposes of lifting its profile in international affairs. The Spanish government regards itself, together with Turkey, as a key player in facilitating dialogue between the West and the Arab world (Florensa, 2005). Whereas France led the way in mobilising the EU's Global Mediterranean Policy in the 1970s, Spain was the driving force behind the launch of the Barcelona Process in the mid-1990s (Bicchi, 2003). France has taken the lead again with the Union for the Mediterranean, but Spain – after voicing initial scepticism – has contributed ideas and lent enthusiastic support to the new framework, culminating in the diplomatic achievement of hosting the UPM Secretariat in Barcelona. Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero has stated that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in food supplies, education and literature, energy and climate change are among his government's highest priorities, and has called for 'significant' increases in the EU's Mediterranean budget.[38]

For the Spanish political elite the difficulties of seeking long-term stability in the Mediterranean while protecting against immediate threats and looking after key domestic constituencies present a similar conundrum to that in France. In geopolitical terms, long-term stability in the Mediterranean is of key concern to the Spanish government, especially in light of Moroccan claims to the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla.

[38] José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, speech to the Elcano Institute, 2 July 2008.

According to Gillespie, neither NATO nor EU membership, nor the bilateral defence relationship with the US, meet Spain's 'most pressing needs' in the security field, as the NATO Treaty does not include a commitment to come to Spain's aid in the event of a crisis over the territories, while European military capacity is insufficient (Gillespie, 2001). Aside from the Gulf wars in 1991 and 2003, the only time that European and MENA governments have come close to violent conflict was when Morocco and Spain took turns to occupy Parsley Island, a rock near the Moroccan shore of the Straits of Gibraltar, in the summer of 2002 (Gillespie, 2006). Even though this dispute was eventually resolved following American intervention, the Spanish government view the Barcelona Process as a further means of protecting territorial interests in the Mediterranean.

Spain is prepared to take unilateral steps to protect both its short-term security and its broader strategic preferences regarding Morocco. Spanish-Moroccan cooperation on terrorism has deepened since Spanish voters threw out the Aznar government two days after the devastating attacks on the Madrid public transport system in March 2004. Spain and Morocco have appointed judges to provide information on terrorist groups and have stepped up joint patrols in the Straits of Gibraltar.[39] In Gillespie's view, this bilateral cooperation is in Spain's best interest, since 'the best deterrent against any future Moroccan aggressiveness over Ceuta/Melilla lies in attaining such a level of interdependence through cooperation that the costs to Morocco itself would be prohibitive' (Gillespie 2001, p. 24).

Italy

Some EU member states feel the pressure of illegal migration in the Mediterranean more than others. Southern EU member states, where most trans-Mediterranean migrants enter the EU, unsurprisingly have stronger preferences on the issue. Spain, Italy and Malta have long emphasised the need for joint action on illegal immigration and border control,

[39] BBC News, 30 September 2004.

which would allow for a more effective burden-sharing mechanism among EU members.[40] For Spain and Italy, the need to work closely with the security services of two south Mediterranean countries – Morocco and Libya respectively – is an important priority in securing their borders.

Influenced by internal political developments and the pressure exerted by the electorate, Italy has entered into cooperation with Libya under a framework of numerous bilateral agreements for curbing illegal migration and the joint patrol of the Libyan coastline. Libya and Italy signed an agreement to fight terrorism, organised crime, and illegal migration in 2000, and established a permanent liaison in 2003. The Italian government has reportedly provided substantial financial support to a Libyan migrant detention camp and has proposed creating more Libyan holding centres (Hamood, 2006) In return, Libya has tightened its border controls in recent years, arresting and deporting thousands of would-be migrants to Europe (Trucco, 2005). The partnership has been credited with a number of successes, such as the prevention of approximately 40,000 undocumented people leaving from Libya in 2005 and 2006.[41]

Italy/Libya cooperation has attracted the attention of human rights groups. Human Rights Watch has raised concerns about Libya's record in upholding international human rights standards in border management. Libyan authorities have been accused of arbitrary arrests, physical abuse, lengthy and arbitrary detention in poor conditions, and forced deportations without the opportunity to seek asylum, all of which violate Libyan and international law (Human Rights Watch, 2006). More recently, Human Rights Watch has warned that Italy may be guilty of violating the fundamental principles of international refugee law, because would-be asylum seekers detained at sea by joint coastal patrols have been subsequently deported from Libya (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Similar incidents of human rights violations have been noted in other bilateral partnerships fighting illegal migration.

[40] See Zapatero and his Greek counterpart ask EU for support in migration issues, Website of the Spanish Government, 10 July 2008, www.la-moncloa.es.
[41] 'Incontro a Sirte (Libia) tra il Ministro dell'Interno Giuseppe Pisanu e il leader della Rivoluzione Muhammar Gheddafi,' Italian Ministry of the Interior press release, 17 January 2006.

Northern Europe

Germany

Despite initial misgivings about the east/south balance of European foreign policy, the German government has come to regard the Euro-Mediterranean partnership as an increasingly important arena for German diplomacy. In the early 1990s German policymakers considered French and Spanish-led efforts to build cooperation between Europe and its southern neighbours as a special interest of the EU's southern member states, and an unnecessary distraction from the EU's priorities in Eastern and Central Europe. This perception changed rapidly as European integration deepened and internal borders disappeared, raising the possibility that the security problems experienced by France in the 1990s could manifest themselves in Germany as well, especially as Germany has relatively large populations of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants (Gallina, 2006). On balance, German preferences are for greater EU attention on the EU's eastern neighbours and Russia (Lippert, 2007 a). Nevertheless, so long as resources are available, the German government favours closer engagement with the south Mediterranean as well.

German policymakers have long sought to balance their country's stronger geopolitical interests for close relations with Russia and Europe's neighbours to the East with southern concerns. Germany regards Spain, France and Italy as the logical leaders for Euro-Mediterranean policy due to their geographical proximity and historic ties to the south (Masala, 2003). Following Spanish and French proposals, German diplomats played an instrumental role in intra-EU negotiations on the objectives and institutional structure of the EMP in the months leading up to the launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995 (Schumacher, 2008). Nevertheless, the German government is not prepared to let its Latin colleagues get carried away, especially on budgetary matters. Repeated German interventions to stymie French and Spanish proposals to divert EU funds to the southern neighbourhood have been a recurring feature of Berlin's balancing act. Nor is the German government prepared to allow France to use Mediterranean policy as a means of dominating the CFSP. This pattern was repeated in the winter of 2007/2008 when

German intervention shaped the course of intra-EU negotiations that preceded the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean

Germany does not have particularly significant economic interests in the south Mediterranean – aside from Israel and Turkey, German exports to MPCs are minimal (BDI, 2008). Perthes notes that German industry has never lobbied the government for greater involvement in the Mediterranean. Economic development in the south Mediterranean only affects Germany insofar as the region's poverty does not cause political instability. Although Germany has greater interests in protecting energy supplies, especially from Libya and Algeria, the political and security partnership has long been of greater importance to the German political elite than economic and financial relations with Mediterranean countries. Arab reluctance to proceed with negotiations on arms control, hard security, human rights and political reform in the absence of a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians has raised particular difficulties for Germany, as the German government has been extremely reluctant to criticise or pressure Israel (Perthes, 1998). As progress in the political and security basket has atrophied, German policymakers have been content to participate in dialogue and exchange in the multilateral context, while dealing with issues of major importance on a bilateral basis (Schumacher, 2008).

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership itself has raised the region's profile in Germany. German investment in Mediterranean partner countries increased by over 140% between 2000 and 2006, to a total of € 3.4 billion (BDI, 2008). Business organisations such as the German-Arab Chamber of Commerce and the Confederation of Egyptian European Business Associations have become more prominent. Germany has increasing scientific and research cooperation with the south Mediterranean, especially with Egypt, Jordan and Israel. During Germany's EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2007, the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Egyptian Ministry for Higher Education and Scientific Research jointly organized the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research, which took place in

Cairo.[42] This meeting produced the Cairo Declaration calling for a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area. Educational ties between German and Egyptian universities are strong – several prominent Egyptian scholars have PhDs from German universities and there is a German University in Cairo. Several German universities and think tanks are prominent in the Euro-Mediterranean research community through their membership of the EuroMeSCo and FEMISE research networks and coordination of Euro-Mediterranean research projects. Germany's political party foundations are active throughout the south and east Mediterranean and hold frequent events in Cairo, Beirut, Amman and Tunis as well as in German cities. Germany's media covers Euro-Mediterranean issues frequently – indeed, Germany was the only northern European country in which the media expressed any interest in the debate over the form and function of the Mediterranean Union in early 2008 (Schumacher, 2008).

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's strong reaction to French President Sarkozy's initial proposal to create a union of countries bordering the Mediterranean was only partly due to the increasing German interest in the south Mediterranean. Of far greater importance to Germany was the need to prevent France from eroding German power in European foreign policymaking by setting up a new, French-dominated organisation that would have signalled the effective end of the Barcelona Process had it been allowed to take shape as originally conceived. Schumacher underlines the point that according to the terms of the Elysée Treaty and the Franco-German alliance, any major foreign policy initiative should be preceded by joint discussions and agreement (Schumacher, 2008). These principles are held strongly right across the German political spectrum, and Sarkozy's efforts to build a coalition of Mediterranean rim countries were not highly regarded in Berlin.

Despite this growing interest, Germany is unlikely to invest more political and economic capital in fostering Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. The cornerstone of Germany's security policy remains the transatlantic alliance and NATO. Since the end of

[42] See German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, http://www.bmbf.de/en/1563.php. Accessed 9 January 2009.

the Cold War, bilateral relations with the United States have retained their importance but have increasingly been complemented by multilateral initiatives with other partners. In this context, the development of the EU CFSP/ESDP has become a high priority for Germany, even more so following the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 (Zöpel, 2003). It has been suggested that ordinary Germans are in favour of security and possibly military initiatives carried out under the ESDP banner, rather than that of NATO. German voters grudgingly accept their country's participation in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, despite misgivings about German soldiers engaging in combat operations in a foreign country. For many, the EU's emphasis on collective action and force as a last resort confers an added legitimacy to EU-led operations. The German government has stressed the EU dimension – rather than NATO – as it has moved tentatively towards greater international military involvement (Youngs, 2004). However, while the German government would certainly support formal, multilateral and comprehensive security cooperation under the EMP, it is not prepared to risk higher priorities in order to make this happen.

Great Britain

British political elites have a preference for independent foreign policy and a prominent global role dating back to the days of the British Empire. During the twentieth century the British government found itself increasingly constrained by changes in the global balance of power and the relative decline of the UK in comparison to the United States and the Soviet Union. The 1956 Suez Crisis forced the British government to accept that its ability to act unilaterally as a global power was lost, and the UK found a new role as the 'privileged interlocutor' between the United States and Europe (Hood 2008, p. 184). This role enabled Whitehall to maintain its global leadership position and its economic and political interests in the Commonwealth even as former colonial possessions in South and East Asia and Africa increased their political and economic clout.

The transatlantic alliance is the cornerstone of British foreign and security policy – British political elites share their American cousins' ideological commitment to spreading

democracy and the rule of law worldwide, and the UK and US have been the two biggest contributors to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. Both governments believe strongly that their national interests are affected by unfriendly regimes that support terrorist groups. Tony Blair's unswerving support for the American-led 'global war on terrorism' has not abated since Gordon Brown moved into 10 Downing Street. Prominent British political leaders and opinion-formers received John McCain's 'League of Democracies' proposal enthusiastically, and, even though the new American President Barack Obama is likely to pursue a wider consensus, it is likely that the Anglo-US axis will influence the security policy options available to other governments for some time to come. Britain retains a global leadership role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and Whitehall's centrality to EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East is maintained in the E3-EU grouping on Iran and former Prime Minister Tony Blair's position as the envoy for the Middle East Quartet.

Britain's European strategy has long been to maintain a degree of distance from the German/French axis while maintaining an influence over the continental balance of power. It has been able to achieve this since the Second World War through its economic strength, it prominent role in the NATO alliance, its more recent its engagement with the CFSP and ESDP, its strong support for EU enlargement, and its support for the institutional reforms proposed by the Lisbon Treaty, especially the EU External Action Service. British preferences on key soft security issues like climate change and international development are closer to the European norm than they are to Washington (Hood 2008, p 184). Nevertheless, while British Euro-scepticism has softened in recent years – the Conservative party's anti-Europe message failed to swing voters in two successive elections – elite and popular sentiment for keeping Brussels at arm's length remains high (Grant, 2008).

The British government's arm's-length position in Europe makes stepping outside the Euro-Mediterranean framework easier. In August 2005 the UK government signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' with the Jordanian government on the treatment of deported individuals believed to pose a threat to public order. In October and December

2005 similar agreements were signed with Libya and Lebanon, with both Mediterranean countries pledging that they would respect international human rights norms in their treatment of suspected terrorists deported from the UK.[43] A diplomatic 'exchange of letters' with Algeria provides similar assurances. However, the British government is finding itself constrained by the EU framework, as its bilateral deals with Mediterranean partner governments have turned out to be questionable under EU and British law. The legal wrangle in Britain over the deportation of the radical Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada and two Libyans suspected of terrorist activities is a case in point. The UK Court of Appeal blocked the deportation of Qatada despite the memorandum of understanding between the UK and Jordan, as well as an earlier ruling by the special immigration appeals commission that the UK government could rely on Jordanian assurances that he would not be ill-treated.[44] The Court of Appeal ruled that the British government, which is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, could not deport an individual to a country where that that person would suffer conduct that if committed by an EU member state would be in breach of the Convention.[45] As a result, to date the UK government has been unable to deport any suspected terrorists to Jordan, Libya or Lebanon since the memoranda were signed, and will have to release them if they cannot be charged.

The British attitude towards the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is a good example of the country's ambiguous position on common EU foreign and security policy. In 2005 the British EU Presidency organised the ill-fated 10th Anniversary Summit for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, held in Barcelona. The decision of most of the leaders of Europe's Arab Mediterranean partners to stay away from the summit was due to many factors, not least of which was Britain's reluctant leadership – the contrast with the success of French President Sarkozy's July 2008 summit could not be greater.

British preferences regarding European security policy in the Mediterranean are different from those of France, Spain and (arguably) Germany, due largely to Britain's non-

[43] See www.fco.gov.uk. Accessed 17 April 2008.
[44] *Guardian*, 10 April 2008.
[45] *The Times*, 15 April 2008.

membership in the Schengen area. Whitehall's main strategic focus is on the broader Middle East rather than the Mediterranean Basin. Indeed, it was only after British accession to the EEC in 1973 that European policies towards eastern Mediterranean countries began to take shape (Edis, 1998). British interests in the Mashreq have become an even more central element in its foreign policy, especially since its active participation in the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. In keeping with its European strategy, the British government is happy to participate in Euro-Mediterranean initiatives, even if only to ensure that they do not negatively affect wider British interests in the region. The British government has not opposed efforts to encourage multilateral security cooperation in the Mediterranean, and it would certainly sign up to a formal agreement if one were forthcoming. However, it has shown few signs of willingness to expend political capital on the Euro-Mediterranean relations in the same way as France and Germany have done. Britain was noticeably absent from the intra-EU debates on the Union for the Mediterranean in early 2008.

The role of the European Commission

The Commission (and the other EU-level institutions), are agents of the EU's member states, invested with some independent decision-making ability but ultimately constrained by what the member states consider desirable and possible. The Commission is able to take advantage of a limited degree of 'agency slippage' in foreign policy: it dies this by marking out policymaking responsibilities for which it alone has the capability of implementing. In internal EU negotiations an independent causal role can be attributed to the Commission and other European supranational actors. The Commission's independence is derived from 'cleavages among member states' preferences, from its own role as agenda-setter, and from the loopholes in the oversight mechanisms established by the member states… which vary by issue area' (Meunier 2005, p. 15). The main goal of the Commission is to receive a broad mandate from the General Affairs and External Relations Council, as this is likely to include greater room for autonomous behaviour (Nugent and Saurugger, 2002).

As a bureaucratic actor, the Commission can be expected to work to maximise its decision-making powers and executive mandates in all policy areas, of which the Mediterranean is just one. The Commission has certain advantages: Scharpf considers the European Commission to be a key player in facilitating negotiations between European Union member states because of its ability to reduce the transaction costs of bargaining between the parties. 'Relying on extensive consultations with interest groups, national and sub-national officials and independent experts,' writes Scharpf, 'the Commission may be able to assess the hardness or pliability of the interests and constraints defended by all member governments, and to develop win-win situations which – though departing from the initial policy preferences of some or all veto players – may still be preferred to the status quo' (Scharpf 2006, p. 850).

The Commission has been an important player in the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It has had the task of coordinating and shaping the Barcelona Process, and was responsible for designing the 'three basket' approach (Gomez 2003). The Commission's administration of the MEDA programme and the ENPI has meant that it has controlled the EMP's budget since 1995. In effect, the Commission has acted as the permanent secretariat for the EMP through its responsibility for undertaking 'appropriate preparatory and follow-up work for the meetings resulting from the Barcelona work programme and from the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process.'[46] More recently the task of working out a detailed implementation plan for the Union for the Mediterranean was given to the Commission.

The Commission has also had opportunities to shape the bilateral dimension of the EMP. The European Council has mandated the Commission to negotiate and agree jointly with Mediterranean Partner governments on bilateral Association Agreements. The Council is charged with concluding Association Agreements by unanimity, and as all Agreements must be ratified by member state legislatures the Commission's scope to push its own preferences with regard to the partner countries themselves is limited. Within the EMP

[46] Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27 – 28 November 1995. Available at www.ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm.

institutional framework the Association Council, the highest political body, surveys the implementation of the Association Agreements and takes binding decisions upon particular policy measures (Dodini and Krause, 2005). Representatives of the Commission, the MPCs and all 27 EU members attending the meetings and it is the Commission that formulates policy positions which take the policy preferences of potentially pivotal swing members into consideration. The Commission initiated the European Neighbourhood Policy and has had responsibility for negotiating bilateral ENP Action Plans with Mediterranean partner governments. This enabled the Commission to bring its experience in managing the political and economic transformation of central and east European countries to the neighbourhood, 'strategically [enhancing] enlargement policies to expand its foreign policy domain' (Kelley 2006, p. 29).

Nevertheless, the Commission's independence is extremely limited. Because EU foreign policy initiatives require unanimity, all EU member states are potential veto-players. The Commission must take care when designing policies to take the preferences of member states into account. In order to avoid embarrassing and politically costly rejections Commission staff canvas likely member state reactions before it publishes a Communication on a foreign policy issue. The institutional framework leaves the European Council with tools to monitor and control political and technical aspects of projects initiated by the Commission.

The Commission is especially constrained by member state preferences when issues concerning the redistribution of costs shift from the 'technical' to the 'political' level in terms of the prerogatives of EU member governments (Gomez, 2003). The EU's member states retain control over many of the incentives (agriculture, visas, potential membership) and the conditions (political and economic sanctions, withdrawal of financial assistance, potential military action) that may affect the ordering of the preferences of the ruling elites in Mediterranean partner countries. The Commission's role in security institution-building has not proceeded much beyond organising meetings for EU member and Mediterranean partner government officials and trying to facilitate their dialogue as much as possible. The Commission has been wary of pressing too hard

for political and security cooperation in the south Mediterranean because of the member states' preferences for short term stability.

Implications: the ambiguity of EU 'security governance' in the Mediterranean

The literature on EU foreign policy is still debating several important questions, such as whether the EU has preferences of its own, and whether the choice of soft power is due to a genuine belief in its efficacy or to the fact that EU institutions do not yet have stronger coercive means available. However, the EU should not – as Cavatorta and his colleagues claim – be classified as 'an international actor that makes rationalistic assumptions about its material interests as well as its normative ones' (Cavatorta et al 2006, p. 2). The EU is a political actor with certain characteristics that stem from its nature as a multilateral organisation that has been empowered to act on behalf of its members, but within certain limits. The EU is not a monolithic actor, and its institutions (the European Council, Commission and Parliament) must account for member state sensibilities when designing the implementation of initiatives.

It has been commonplace to argue that competing EU member state interests have resulted in a common foreign and security policy that is weak and divided. One leading EU foreign policy scholar recently noted that the almost exclusively national focus of EU member state defence policy, reflected in national defence industries, duplication, and armies of young conscripts that cannot be deployed, have led to major efficiency problems in NATO as well as the ESDP (Biscop, 2008). However, despite the considerable scepticism of many observers since the early 1990s, the EU has been able to reach a common position on many areas of foreign and defence policy (Ojanjen 2006). Often, the policy choices that emerge are perceived as being weightier due to the additional clout given by Brussels. Given the right combination of member state preferences and external conditions, EU foreign and security policy can add up to more than the sum of its member state parts (Stetter 2004).

Neither individual member state policy positions, nor the common policies that emerge from the intra-EU bargaining process, can be considered uncertain despite the ambiguity with which they are sometimes characterised. From the perspective of EU member governments policy ambiguity is not a sign of weakness – rather, it gives actors options, including to claim credit when policy programmes appear to work, and to take advantage of the EU's scale and reputation as a 'normative power' on issues where there are benefits in doing so. The ambiguous language of the Barcelona Declaration, the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, and most statements by high-ranking officials concerning Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation can therefore be seen as the deliberate ploy of actors that are aware of what they want, rather than an outcome of uncertainty or incompetence. Ambiguity serves the interests of EU member governments because it gives them room to manoeuvre, both at the domestic level and at the international level in a two-level game. This space is needed by governments which must constantly balance the preferences of domestic actors and the pressures of the international system. Ambiguity also enables EU member states to take action outside the Barcelona Process framework in policy areas where they believe their interests will be better served by doing so.

An EU policy for Mediterranean security that proposed explicit objectives to be measured against clear benchmarks in a discrete time-frame would not necessarily serve the core interests of EU member governments, or those of the European Commission. Clear policy objectives are difficult to agree upon in a controversial issue-area where cooperation among at times hostile actors is required. Broad principles are much easier, as nobody can disagree with the sentiment that 'peace, stability and prosperity' are desirable. The devil is in the details: clear benchmarks are problematic, because in an issue-area in which process is important, it is easy to fail to measure up to standards which may be reasonable to some actors at certain times but may become untenable as circumstances change. Similarly, setting deadlines for the progress of negotiations or for the implementation of agreements can actually undermine long-term goals when recriminations follow missed targets.

The equilibration of national security preferences has never been easy for EU member governments. Operational cooperation among EU militaries is slowly deepening under the ESDP and at the political level groups of EU member governments work together on wider security issues with relevance to the EMP, such as the French, British and German cooperation with the EU's High Representative for CFSP in the 'E3-EU' negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme. EU member states have opted in or out of engagement on specific issues with clear boundaries, such as cooperation under the UN banner in southern Lebanon. During the 2006 summer war between Israel and Hezbollah there was little Brussels could do other than issue statements, launch a humanitarian mission and prepare funds for the aftermath. Javier Solana travelled to Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian Territories, but could not use EMP instruments to defuse the crisis (Youngs, 2006). Like other areas of foreign, security and defence policy, the EU's Mediterranean policy represents an intra-EU bargain on issues where member states do not have preferences that they consider better pursued unilaterally, or in other arena such as NATO or the UNSC.

The wide distribution of preferences among EU member states does not mean that they do not have a genuine interest in working towards the goal of a formal, multilateral and comprehensive security agreement for the Mediterranean. Like other areas of foreign, security and defence policy, the EU's Mediterranean policy represents a bargain on preferences that member states consider best pursued through EU-level institutions, which are attributed limited competencies to pursue policy objectives member states consider appropriate. EU member governments have to balance their preference for a formal, multilateral and comprehensive outcome to Euro-Mediterranean bargaining against other concerns.

The EU's foreign policy is often described as 'normative' because of its high-minded objectives and use of 'soft power,' including economic incentives and socialisation. Reality is somewhat more complex: the expectations placed on the EU by media commentators and scholarly analysts are considerably higher than those of policymakers in Paris, London, Berlin and Madrid. Governments have different expectations of the EU

as a foreign policy actor, particularly with regard to a region in which national interests remain strong. The EU is an important vehicle for pursuing certain preferences, such as those for multilateralism and political reform in south Mediterranean countries. The EU provides a buffer zone for European governments to pursue long-term interests in these areas, insulating them both from partner governments and their own citizens. The EU is also a useful vehicle for facilitating complex technical tasks like border control and intelligence sharing. But the EU is not a vehicle for conducting the bilateral, intergovernmental relationships which several EU member states consider essential in protecting vital national interests in areas like terrorism, migration and energy policy.

Most liberal international relations theorists would argue that the 'most preferred' outcome for Europeans would be long-term stability based on a comprehensive bargain that addressed the economic, human rights and military dimensions of security, formalised into a binding institutional framework. Such a framework would rely on transparency to reinforce human rights protection, and eventually on institutional similarities if efficiency is to be improved in fostering economic development and pooling military resources. In addition to ensuring the rule of law through an independent judiciary, partner countries would need to move towards ensuring civilian oversight of the military and security services, for reasons of transparency as well as reducing the risk that military actors might seek to reverse cooperative outcomes.

That this is clearly not the bargain that has been struck in the Mediterranean suggests that European actors recognise that investing resources into encouraging the political and economic reforms necessary for more open institutions in Arab countries is not worth the risk to their ability to pursue more immediate priorities. The prosperity gap would take many years to close, and would not ease migration pressures in the short term. Political reform carries the risks of instability and of replacing a known devil with an unknown one. Creating incentives by offering visas to MPC citizens and access to the EU's agricultural market would likely by electorally costly, and there are no guarantees that Arab leaders would change their behaviour. Furthermore, European policymakers are aware that Arab elites are interested in maintaining their hold on power and are unlikely

to change their behaviour voluntarily, particularly with regard to their control over the military and security services in their own countries.

European governments are aware that a formal, comprehensive multilateral security agreement for the countries of the Mediterranean basin is a necessary step in satisfying their interest in long-term stability in the neighbourhood. They are prepared to work towards this kind agreement when circumstances raise it to the top of a list of competing priorities. While they have repeatedly declared their intention to work in this direction, they are aware of the magnitude of the task. Not only do voters' reactions to security threats perceived as immediate – such as illegal migration and terrorism – distract attention from formal regime-building, but the competing demands of alliance partners and other international commitments also compete with the Mediterranean for attention from time to time. Nevertheless, the main factor influencing the European decision to prioritise their preference for long-term stability in the Mediterranean is the sheer difficulty of the job, given the preferences and restrictions faced by Mediterranean partner governments. The next chapter deals with Mediterranean partner preferences in more detail. South Mediterranean intransigence raises the costs of comprehensive security for Europeans, consequently raising the prospects of opposition from groups asked to bear the costs. Cooperation is restricted to areas where common interests and discrete objectives yield tangible results.

Given European capabilities, the achievement of both short-term and long-term stability in the Mediterranean basin requires cooperative relations with Mediterranean partner governments – EU member states can no longer invade a third country and force its political elite to submit to French, Spanish, Italian or British will. It may be the case that the 'most preferred outcome' for Europeans is short-term stability based on cooperation with MPC governments on migration and terrorism. The fact that the EU and its members deal closely with ruling elites does not necessarily indicate that Europeans are not interested in political reform in the Arab world. Nor does the channelling of EU funds through Mediterranean partner government agencies represent a deliberate effort to strengthen the incumbents' positions. A bottom-up strategy that attempts to bypass the

incumbent government is unlikely to succeed and is likely to have destabilising effects. A top-down strategy that includes the incumbents is more likely to address the interests of all parties in the process. The next chapter discusses the interests of the Mediterranean partner governments with Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is conducted.

Chapter V

Mediterranean partner government preferences for security cooperation with Europe

As discussed earlier in this thesis, the Barcelona Process is a European initiative, and its ambitions to build regional political, economic and security institutions based on a Mediterranean geo-strategic space reflect the interests of European governments much more than they do the governments of Middle Eastern and North African states. In geo-strategic terms, the Mashreq MPCs Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and the Palestinian Authority regard security relations among themselves, Iran, Iraq, the Gulf monarchies and the United States as far more important than security relations with European countries or the EU. North African MPCs Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and observer Libya are more distant from the geopolitical turmoil that is currently reshaping the Middle East. Nevertheless, the strategic priorities for Maghreb governments are to strengthen bilateral relations with the EU and with individual European countries rather than to work on multilateral partnerships. To the extent that there is an interest in multilateralism in North Africa, this is limited to arrangements such as the 5+5 initiative that have carefully defined boundaries and membership that does not include the entire European Union.

Given that south Mediterranean security preferences have not changed much since 1995 the fact that Mediterranean partner governments signed up to the political and security commitments of the EMP would seem to require an explanation. Some analysts have taken a positive view of this decision, attributing it to the goodwill and positive expectations that surrounded the 1993 Oslo agreement and the aftermath of the first Gulf War (Edis, 1998). However, as had already become apparent during the ill-fated Arms Control and Regional Security talks which took place as part of the Madrid Peace Process between 1992 and 1995, multilateral security cooperation was far from the minds of Middle Eastern governments in the mid 1990s (Landau, 2008). With the possible

exceptions of Israel and Turkey it is unlikely that any Mediterranean partner government viewed the EMP's political and security partnership with much enthusiasm.

South Mediterranean governments signed the Barcelona Declaration anyway. As the Barcelona Declaration represented the common position of the EU's (then 15) member states, relative power asymmetry and the hub-and-spokes nature of the bargaining process meant that there were few opportunities for Mediterranean partners to influence the wording and objectives of the Barcelona Declaration. The Barcelona Declaration was indivisible – a 'take it or leave it' offer from the EU. For the Arab MPCs especially, the Barcelona Declaration meant the prospect of increased EU aid, receiving EU assistance with necessary economic reforms, and potentially growing market access to the EU in the future. Signing a declaration that included an ambiguous promise to work towards political reform and comprehensive regional security was a small price to pay for potentially large economic gains – especially as Arab governments had absolutely no intention of engaging on security cooperation on Europe's terms anyway.

The rest of this chapter is arranged in three parts. First, some general patterns in the distribution and ordering of Arab governments' preferences for security cooperation are discussed. These preferences are strongly associated with the interests of narrow Arab political elites, and are mostly directed towards international institutional outcomes that foster the preservation of the regional political status quo and the elite's ability to act unilaterally when deemed necessary. A more detailed picture of the security interests of selected Mashreq (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority) and Maghreb (Algeria and Libya) governments follows. Israeli preferences for Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation are also discussed, along with the views of a key regional player that is not part of the EMP – Iran. The final part of the chapter concludes.

The ordering of preferences in the Arab world

The highest priority for Arab Mediterranean partner governments is maintaining the hold of the political elite on power. In the Arab world elite rule takes different forms:

monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, single-party governments in Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, a military government in Algeria, personalised dictatorship in Libya, and quasi-democracies divided along sectarian and ideological lines in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. With the possible exceptions of Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority, the regime and the state are closely identified in the Arab Mediterranean. The security of the state is the paramount concern, and the country's resources are allocated to ensure this goal before any other. From Morocco in the Western Mediterranean to Syria in the East, all of the Arab regimes have been careful to avoid the loss of political power by the small elites that control the executive branch of government. This primary objective has shaped their international behaviour, both towards each other, towards Israel, and towards the European Union and its members.

Analysing the precise channels of influence of domestic power clubs is difficult due to opaque decision-making procedures and different systems across the region. Nevertheless, it is likely that all Arab power clubs regard security as a zero-sum game. Strategies for maintaining their hold on power include the maintenance of tight control of the military and security services, the building of bureaucracies with a stake in the status quo, the harsh repression of domestic opposition, the careful management of political, social and economic reform processes, and the exploitation of external actors where possible. These tactics have tended to obstruct, rather than facilitate, cooperation on regional security.

To a greater or lesser extent, all of the Arab ruling elites have protected their domestic position by distributing strategic rents to co-opt politically powerful groups and individuals in their countries. (Ottaway and Choucair-Vizoso, 2008) Rentierism has reinforced an inward-looking regional political economy in the south Mediterranean with few incentives for change as beneficiaries have become dependent on state patronage. The military and security services have been among the greatest beneficiaries in many Arab countries, state bureaucracies have proved resistant to change and the development of a strong private sector has been discouraged as a potential wellspring of political opposition (Saif, 2007).

Global economic pressures have prompted many inward-looking authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa to seek economic opportunities outside the region, while seeking to maintain the political control upon which their domestic power is based (Ottaway and Dunne, 2007). Economic upheaval during the 1980s and early 1990s forced Egypt, Jordan and Turkey to lessen their reliance on import substitution and rentierism as the organising principles for their societies and to reduce the size of their militaries (Solingen, 2007). But change (when it came at all) had limits: although south Mediterranean governments no longer rely on the military for political control as much as they once did, they still spend around 5.5 per cent of their GDP on defence, compared to a global average of around 2.5 per cent. Three Mediterranean partner countries – Jordan, Israel and Syria – are among the top dozen military spenders in the world in per capita terms, and in several Arab countries the military is also an important economic actor.[47]

The Middle Eastern development model has had a detrimental affect on regional peace and stability. Elite rule has not fostered long-term economic growth and has not facilitated a middle class expansion that can lift people out of poverty. Solingen contends that 'much of the Arab world had embraced statist-nationalist variants by the late 1950s and 1960s with import-substitution, state entrepreneurship, and national populism as their political-economic pillars. 'These coalitions succeeded in suppressing private entrepreneurs throughout the Arab world,' she writes, 'and inhibiting the development of an independent bourgeoisie that might threaten the coalitions' hold on power by demanding economic liberalism. Private entrepreneurs were thus sapped of their strength by their own statist rulers' (1998, pp. 166 – 167).

Heller (2008) considers that notion that the 'Arab World' is a coherent political entity is more relevant in the 20th century context of Nasserism and Baathism than in the 21st century. For many years, Arab ruling elites tried to reduce the potential for domestic instability stemming from underdevelopment by espousing nationalism and external conflict – especially resistance to Zionism – as focal points for their popular support. In recent years this strategy has started to backfire: in the absence of a strong private sector,

[47] CIA World Factbook. See www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.txt.

western-oriented civil society actors are weak and there are few alternatives to the ruling elite and their agencies, which are often tainted by corruption and questionable human rights records. Islamist groups have stepped into the vacuum between the ruling elites and the disenfranchised poor, and elite reactions to this development have led to violent conflict in several Arab countries. Some Arab governments have been able to cooperate more closely with each other and with the West than others, but this cooperation is yet to extend to a formal, multilateral commitment to uphold comprehensive regional security. With regard to the EU, bilateral rivalries have thus far prevented Arab governments from reaching agreement on a common position on what should be the European contribution to regional security.

Israel and Turkey share their Arab neighbours' preoccupation with state security, albeit from a different perspective. The Israeli government is concerned with protecting the survival of the Jewish state, which many consider has been under constant threat since its founding in 1948. Its preferences are closely tied to this goal. The Turkish government has long been concerned with maintaining a strong, secular and Western-oriented state against domestic opposition, and is currently going through a thus far peaceful domestic process that will define the role of Islam in Turkish politics and influence Turkey's regional security preferences for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, Arab elites (and sometimes even Israeli government agencies) are prepared to work together bilaterally and multilaterally when necessary, informally or even secretly if need be.[48] Turkey has recently assumed a central role as a mediator between Israel and Syria. However these ad-hoc initiatives do not extend to committing formally to regional security initiatives that may develop in ways that curb incumbent governments' unilateral options.

[48] Wieland, C., The Syria-Israel talks: old themes, new setting, *Open Democracy*, 27 May 2008. www.opendemocracy.net (accessed 29 May 2008).

Mashreq government preferences

Egypt

Egypt has long maintained a military, political, economic, cultural and ideological position at the heart of the Arab world, befitting its large population, central geographic location and illustrious history. In the 1950s and 1960s the Nasser government made a concerted bid to unite the Arab world against Western hegemony in the Middle East – a bid which effectively ended with defeats to Israel in 1967 and 1973 (Salem, 2008 a). Egyptian influence in the Arab world has declined somewhat since then, perhaps as a consequence of lethargy and inefficiencies in the Egyptian domestic political economy rather than a shift in the regional balance of power to the Gulf monarchies (Heller, 2008). Certainly there has been very little movement towards political reform in Egypt. As the ruling National Democratic Party headed by President Hosni Mubarak has consolidated its grip on politics since the 1980s, the domination of the economy and the state by the ruling elite has become more entrenched. A brief opening in 2004 and 2005, when the country held its first-ever Presidential election and opposition parties made dramatic gains in parliamentary elections, was marked by bolder demands from political dissidents. Most of these voices have subsequently faded, and the way that political power is exercised in Egypt has not changed. And yet, Egypt has again emerged as a key state in Euro-Mediterranean relations, taking the first southern presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean and thereby assuming a central institutional role in channelling Arab interests towards Europe (Furness, Gándara and Kern, 2008).

Egypt faces severe economic and social challenges. Job creation and social security are the main concerns of the electorate, and despite recent annual GDP growth rates of around 7% poverty remains widespread. Informal groups with close ties to the centres of power have benefited from liberalisation of the economy and wealth has not filtered down, despite the pressures posed by unemployment rates of around 10% and the absence of formal contracts that protect workers, especially in the private sector (Saif and Leone, 2008). Economic pressures have led to social unrest in several parts of Egypt, which –

although it has remained at a low level thus far – is significantly worrying for the Egyptian government (Heller, 2008). The challenge for the ruling NDP is to satisfy the economic and social demands of large sections of the population while maintaining the grip of the ruling elite on power. The internal reform process, and the terms under which the NDP cooperates with external actors, are firmly centred on maintaining this balance.

Egyptian security interests are firmly focussed on the protection of the state from internal and external threats. Internally, conservative Islamist organisations, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood, exert strong influences on the population at large and thus form a substantial threat to the ruling regime. The Egyptian government has not been slow to use the security forces to suppress Islamist opposition, even during the political opening of 2004 – 2005 (Dunne, 2006). The Egyptian government has proved adept at stressing its importance to the West as a bulwark against radical Islamist political forces, and has been successful in diverting attention away from its democratic deficit by raising the spectre of an Islamist government in Cairo. Accordingly, European policy has been to gently encourage political reform in Egypt without attempting to pressurise the NDP regime. In recent years it has become clear that even when Western leaders criticise Egypt for its treatment of opposition figures – such as imprisoned former Presidential candidate Ayman Nour – that no action is likely to follow.[49]

Externally, Egyptian security interests remain focussed on Israel despite the long-standing peace treaty between the two countries. Peter Jones notes that progress in multilateral arms control and regional security negotiations among Arab states and Israel in the 1990s broke down because of the Egyptian governments' refusal to talk about a regional arms control agreement unless Israel put its nuclear weapons on the table (Jones 2003). Egypt is wary of Israeli economic and diplomatic initiatives with other Arab states, which it fears will undermine Egypt's historic leadership role in the Middle East (Gerges, 1995). Egypt's second major external security focus is on the Persian Gulf, which it regards as the Eastern gateway to the Arab world and a zone of confrontation with Iran (Khadry-Said, 2004). Unsurprisingly, in both of these areas Egyptian security

[49] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Egypt Country Report*, 2008.

strategies are closely tied to the country's relations with the United States, from which it receives USD 1.3 billion annually in military aid.[50]

Egypt's border with the Gaza Strip is a constant source of concern for the Egyptian government. Hamas' control of Gaza is considered a national security problem in Cairo because of the close association between Hamas and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Since closing its border crossings with Gaza, the Mubarak regime has had to weather Arab media and public outrage and accusations that it is complicit in Israeli actions.[51] The situation on the ground is, of course, more complicated – local Egyptian officials often turn a blind eye to the smuggling of weapons through tunnels built by Hamas fighters. President Mubarak reportedly told a delegation from the European Union that Hamas 'must not be allowed to win in Gaza.' The Egyptian government would clearly prefer a solution in Gaza that restored the power of the Palestinian Authority, closed the tunnels and secured the Rafah border crossing without requiring Egypt to take unpopular steps that would spark protests and may necessitate repressive measures (Dunne, 2009). As Gaza stumbles from crisis to crisis, the challenges for the Mubarak regime are significant.

The Egyptian government sees its relations with Europe primarily in economic terms, and knows that it needs European support if it is to successfully implement economic reforms while avoiding social instability. The EU is a key actor in supporting the ongoing reform process in Egypt and in facilitating Egypt's political and economic integration outside the Arab world. However Egypt insists on dealing with Europeans as an equal partner and rejects clumsy initiatives aimed at political reform and language it considers implies a 'master-servant' relationship (Demmelhuber 2007, p. 13). The EU is also regarded as an important security actor by Egypt, but in a secondary role supporting regional security through institution-building and economic assistance (Khadry-Said, 2004). The Egyptian government have shown little interest in EU-led regional security initiatives that do not

[50] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Egypt Country Report*, December 2008.
[51] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace E-News, 31 December 2008.

include the United States, and regard European concerns with 'soft security' as out of touch with the realities that their country faces (Soltan, 2004).

Egyptians are reportedly preparing for an event that is likely to 'rock the world, at least briefly' – the end of the long presidency of Hosni Mubarak (Dunne, 2008). It appears likely that President Mubarak's son Gamal is being groomed as his successor despite official denials. Since 2000, the ruling NDP has experienced a degree of generational change, with members of Gamal Mubarak's circle taking several key positions in the cabinet and introducing Western-style campaigning and media savvy. Michelle Dunne has described these changes as 'an overhaul aimed at making the NDP look and function more like a modern political party rather than an engine for recruiting support for the regime in exchange for government patronage (Dunne 2006, p. 5). And yet, as in Syria, Jordan and Morocco – countries where generational change at the top was not accompanied by genuine reform – it appears that changes in Egypt are cosmetic rather than substantial, and have actually served to maintain the ruling elite's hold on power through a mixture of cooption and repression of opposition groups (Ottaway and Dunne, 2007).

Syria

Syria's relations with the EU and the West have long been difficult, although signs of change have recently become evident. To date, the EU-Syria Association Agreement is not in force, although President Basher al-Assad has chafed at Syria's international isolation and has tried to form closer relations with the EU as a means of ending it. Barriers to negotiations between the EU and Syria are significant and cannot easily be bargained away – several EU member states have drawn lines in the sand on key issues including Syria's involvement in Lebanese politics and alleged assassination of anti-Syrian figures, especially former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri; its material support for Hezbollah; and the relationship between Damascus and Tehran.

The Shi'a Alawi minority forms Syria's political elite, and the Syrian government is stable as opposition is minimal. Under the institutional umbrella of the Baath-Party, often described as a 'regime of minorities,' the Alawis have created a long-lasting alliance with the Sunni-business-class-majority. It is highly unlikely that powerful figures close to President Assad would risk a 'palace coup,' as this would endanger the Alawi hold on power.[52] However, there are frictions between the president and Sunnis, making change risky and favouring status quo policies. Ethnic conflicts are relatively rare in Syria due to the effectiveness of the internal security services (Heller, 2008). However, the implication of greater political openness for relations among the country's ethnic groups is unclear and it is unlikely that any Baathist government would risk reforms that empower the Sunni majority.

Wider Syrian society is largely depoliticised due to the effectiveness of authoritarian rule. Political debate exists, but is tightly controlled. One third of Syrian GDP consists of agriculture, giving the peasant union a strong lobbing influence. However, its influence has been countered by state control of the country's most important resource – crude oil. The distribution of oil revenues has incentivised the maintenance of the status quo, giving Syria's economy rentier-state properties. The redistribution of agrarian property, public employment measures and social transfers are popular items for discussion among ordinary people, although most are well aware of the limits of public debate on policy issues. Public expectations of greater openness have faded after the reversal of most of the personal liberties allowed by Bashar al Assad when he came to power. Nevertheless, some observers have detected a more relaxed atmosphere in Syria, where 'the police behave a bit more politely towards the population, and there is some sense that civil society has been revived.'[53]

Syrian domestic politics is heavily authoritarian even by the standards of the region. Mystery continues to shroud many aspects of Syrian politics, as witnessed by the confused statements that followed the Israeli destruction of an alleged Syrian nuclear

[52] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Syria Country Report*, December 2008.
[53] John Casey 'Syria: conversations in a pariah state,' *Open Democracy*, 9 June 2008.

reactor in September 2007.[54] Nevertheless, change is in the air. The Syrian government have shown preparedness to engage with Western and neighbouring governments on some previously taboo issues, including relations with Israel. Detecting the real reasons behind these changes is difficult, but they have coincided with a 'changing of the guard' in Damascus, as central figures in the government of late president Hafeez al-Assad have been replaced by new leaders loyal to his son.

Since coming to power in 2000, President Bashar al-Assad has replaced of most of his father's long-serving advisors with his own close allies. The replacement of the old with the new has enhanced President al-Assad's hold on power, but has been unpopular and accompanied by increased corruption (Perthes, 2006). While no causal relationship is immediately obvious, generational change in Damascus has accompanied a greater effort on Syria's part to engage with its neighbours and the wider world. The 'pan-Arab Baathists' who ran the country under Hafeez al-Assad were highly suspicious not only of the West but of Turkey, which ruled Syria for nearly 400 years (Altunişuk and Tür, 2006, p. 244). Since 2003 Damascus and Ankara have become closer as Turkish interests in greater participation in regional and Arab affairs and the Syrian government's desire to develop international ties have coincided. In May 2008 Syria and Israel commenced indirect negotiations over several issues related to their bilateral conflict and Israel's problems with Syrian-supported Hezbollah and Hamas, conducted through Turkish emissaries. These talks, suspended in response to Israel's assault on Gaza in December 2008, have the potential to alter the regional strategic alignment significantly, moving Syria from the Iran-Hamas-Hezbollah axis into the orbit of 'pragmatic powers' Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.[55]

A peace deal between Syria and Israel would have several positive externalities for regional stability and for the prospects of a wider agreement under the auspices of the Barcelona Process. Peace between Syria and Israel would curb Iran's influence in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, thereby weakening Hezbollah and increasing the prospects for

[54] *The Economist* 'Oh, what a tangled web they weave' 1 May, 2008.
[55] *The Economist*, 'Syria: Where shall I go next?' 13 December, 2008.

political stability in Lebanon. Most importantly, the prospect of formal peace between Syria and Israel has increased in recent months because it has become clearer to the Assad regime that it is in their interests. As one prominent regional expert has recently pointed out, there are at least five recent developments that have pushed the Syrian government closer to peace with Israel, leading to indirect talks under Turkish mediation. First, the American overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was accompanied by musings about other regimes in the region that the US would also like to overthrow, which frightened the Syrian leadership. Second, sectarian violence in Iraq and tension in Lebanon has not yet threatened to undermine the minority Alawite regime, but it does not help their position. Third, Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq has raised fears in Damascus that Syria's two million Kurds may also become more ambitious about their own future. Fourth, the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel did not end in victory for Hezbollah, as loudly proclaimed. Rather, it ended Hezbollah's ability to pose a constant threat of low-level harassment to Israel, robbing Damascus of an important bargaining chip. Paul Salem argues that 'for all of these reasons, Basher Assad is potentially more in need of a breakthrough with Israel than his father was' (Salem 2008, pp. 2 – 3).

Syria's price for signing a peace deal with Israel would be the return of the Golan Heights. It would also gain considerably from an end to its international isolation, both from the West and from the rest of the Arab world. These benefits would be a boon to the al-Assad government and would strengthen its position internally. As Salem (2008) points out, the Egyptian and Jordanian governments, which have made peace with Israel, and the Saudi government, which has not, enjoy the protection of the United States (p. 3). The warm welcome al-Assad received in Paris when he attended the July 13th Union for the Mediterranean summit, followed the next day by his guest of honour attendance at the Bastille Day celebrations, is indicative that a similar reaction from Europe is likely. Certainly, President al-Assad's appearance in Paris appears to mark a major step towards ending Syria's international isolation. In the weeks following the Paris summit, President al-Assad visited Iran and Turkey, announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Lebanon during a visit by Lebanon's new president, Michel Sleiman, and then travelled

to the Black Sea resort of Sochi for talks with the Russian president, Dimitry Medvedev. In early September Syria received a state visit from French President Sarkozy.[56]

The wider implications of a Syria-Israel peace deal have potentially indirect benefits for Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. Just as reduced tensions in the early 1990s created an environment where the Barcelona Declaration became possible, so could a settlement between the two main state protagonists in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Europeans would need to play a central role in helping Syria secure World Trade Organisation accession and in facilitating foreign direct investment – both carrots that would need to follow any Syrian/Israeli peace deal (Lust-Okar, 2008). The implementation of the Syrian/EU Association Agreement would be an important signal of commitment by both parties (Zorob, 2008). However, deeper security cooperation with Europe is not a given. There is little likelihood that international openness will be accompanied by political reform in Syria, and, as any one of several distinctly plausible scenarios for political tension involving Hezbollah, Hamas or Iran could escalate, it is unlikely that Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is high on the Syrian government's agenda. Syria will remain focussed on its relationships with Israel, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States for the foreseeable future.

Divided government: the Palestinian Authority and Lebanon

The Palestinian Authority headed by President Mahmoud Abbas is dominated by the small and wealthy West Bank elite. The Palestinian authority has two main priorities – first, to end the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and to establish a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, which the West Bank elite would dominate; and second, to defeat Hamas, a popular Islamist organisation with a base among the urban poor of the Gaza Strip and the larger West Bank towns. President Abbas' government has shown strong signs of wanting to enlist European assistance in the

[56] Economist Intelligence Unit, Another Boost for Syria, Briefing August 18, 2008.

internal Palestinian conflict with Hamas. President Abbas was the only Arab leader to attend the 2005 10th Anniversary Summit for the EMP in Barcelona.

In November 2005 the European Union established a police mission in the Palestinian Territories under the auspices of the ESDP. The EUPOL-EUCOPPS mission was aimed at supporting the Palestinian Authority in improving its police force and at contributing to long-term reform of the Palestinian security sector. Based at the Jericho Police Training Centre, the EUPOL-EUCOPPS mission has tried to improve the capacity of the Palestinian Civil Police, given the resources and basic facilities available. According to one report, the Civil Police are the most neutral of all of the Palestinian security services and have resisted the sectarian divisions that have plagued the National Security Forces, the Presidential Guard, and the General Intelligence.[57] International donors have been slow to recognize this, and yet the Civil Police showed remarkable commitment while working without salaries for over a year after the election of Hamas in January 2006. The international community appear to have recognised the value of the EUCOPPS programme. A conference organised by the foreign ministries of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands was held in Berlin on 24 June 2008, and delegates pledged a total of $ US 242 million to improving the capacity of the Palestinian security services and the rule of law in the Palestinian Territories. Despite this external support it is highly unlikely that any Palestinian government will be capable of playing a constructive role in regional security cooperation while the civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah – which has been skilfully exploited by the Israelis – continues.

In Lebanon, the security preferences of three social groups have not been reconciled, to the extent to which it is difficult to speak of 'state preferences' for national or international security outcomes. The Christian, Sunni and Shi'a minorities are all concerned with maintaining their autonomy and have carved out political and economic fiefdoms within Lebanon – there are at least two and possibly three 'independent' societies co-existing uneasily within the territory of Lebanon. This volatile mix is complicated further by external actors – especially Syria and Iran, but also the United

[57] Colin Smith 'High Noon for Palestinian Police' *Haaretz* 20 June 2008.

States – which use Lebanese actors as proxies for pursuing their own goals in the Middle East. The Lebanese government's ability to act on the international stage is compromised by this complicated domestic political situation – managing the 'two level game' is more difficult for Lebanese negotiators than for most.

Lebanon's government rests on a sectarian compact between the Sunni-Muslim, Shi'a Muslim, Maronite Christian and Druze communities. In this situation of distributed power, Syria tries to exert influence on internal decision making through its support of Hezbollah. The Lebanese government and its security services do not have an effective monopoly over the coercive use of force throughout the country – a basic building-block of statehood. Hezbollah is also strongly supported by Iran and has an effective veto over government policy following the May 2008 political settlement that saw head of the Lebanese army Michel Sleiman assume the presidency. Southern Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut (which includes Lebanon's only international airport), and most of the Bekaa Valley are under Hezbollah control.

Lebanese domestic politics is often portrayed by western media and the public statements of French and American leaders as a black and white struggle between Lebanese democrats, represented by the March 14th coalition, and religious extremists backed by the reactionary governments of Syria and Iran, represented by Hezbollah. As with any cliché, while this characterisation carries a grain of truth there are several shades of grey that complicate the picture. Hezbollah is certainly supported financially and militarily by the governments of Iran and Syria, and Hezbollah fighters receive training and equipment from both. These relationships have seemingly grown stronger in recent years, perhaps as a consequence of the increased international isolation of Iran and Syria and Hezbollah's usefulness as a destabilising force in Lebanese politics and a proxy against Israel.

The March 14th coalition is not necessarily comprised of the open-minded and transparent democrats that the Bush Administration has held them up to be.[58] As a recent report from

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[58] George W. Bush, 'Ask the White House: Trip notes from the Middle East,' 16 January 2008, www.whitehouse.gov.

the Beirut-based Carnegie Middle East Program points out, the Sunni-centred coalition is comprised of sectarian politicians, some of whom have 'warlord' attributes, who are committed to securing their own and their communities' interests in the chaotic Lebanese political scene (Ottaway et al., 2008). The 'Cedar Revolution' that brought the March 14th Coalition to power in 2005 did not herald political reform and good governance. Rather, economic and administrative reforms begun under assassinated Prime Minister Rafik Hariri have come under strain, as internally the delicate balance between the now trans-sectarian movement in power and the Shi'a Hezbollah has been unhinged. A string of assassinations and bombings blamed on Syrian security services have forced Lebanese political actors to take sides and the country appears more sharply divided into pro- and anti- Syrian camps than at any time since the end of the Lebanese civil war.

The Lebanese government's policy towards the EMP is generally positive, yet dominated by sectarian struggles, residual Syrian influence and continued political instability. The EMP's importance pales compared to the day-to-day challenges of governance in a country where sovereignty is heavily disputed. Bilateral relationships – Hezbollah with Syria and Iran, the March 14th coalition with France and the USA – that serve immediate political ends are far more important than multilateral institution-building for the main domestic actors in Lebanese politics. Nevertheless, international engagements are seen as ways of building international support for the country and its institutions, and new Lebanese President Michel Sleiman was among the leaders present at the July 13 Union for the Mediterranean summit hosted by French President Nicholas Sarkozy in Paris on 13 July 2008.

Maghreb government preferences

Algeria

The Algerian government's relationship with Europe is somewhat ambiguous. Algeria has embraced the EMP while preferring bilateral engagement with the EU and some of its

members, and yet has rejected the bilateral ENP and its emphasis on political reform. Algeria's interests regarding cooperation with Europe are predominately bilateral. Europeans want Algerian oil and gas, and Algeria does not have to cooperate with its neighbours to secure European markets. Darbouche notes that 'Algeria's intentions are to consolidate its position as *the* alternative source of energy (gas) to Western Europe.' He argues that in return, Algeria wants the EU to develop a comprehensive regional security partnership that provides assistance for political reforms on Algerian terms, an economic and financial partnership that transfers technological and technical know-how and increases FDI, and an energy partnership that grants access to Algeria's state-controlled gas giant Sonatrach to the European market (Darbouche 2007, p. 14). And yet, the Algerian government does not see the necessity for a broader, multilateral approach to regional security, preferring to work on bilateral relations with Europe hinged on the latter's dependency on Algerian hydrocarbons. To date Algeria's interest in multilateral security has been confined to the 5+5 initiative and informal dialogue with other Western Mediterranean governments (Gillespie, 2004).

The 1989 Algerian Constitution reduced the role of the military in government and paved the way for the 1991 election of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) on a platform of establishing an Islamic state. Following the January 1992 military coup power was vested in the five-member High Council of State dominated by military officers. The state 'became a military autocracy with an ongoing state of emergency' (Güney and Çelenk 2007, p. 113). During much of the 1990s Algeria experienced a vicious civil war disputed by a multitude of distinct Islamist groups on one side and a military regime beset by factional divisions on the other (Roberts, 2008). The Algerian war provided a number of lessons for Arab and Western governments alike: despite the widespread lack of legitimacy enjoyed by most Arab governments, the risks of Islamist victory in free elections placed an effective brake on reform throughout the Middle East. The choice between the election of Islamists and civil war has been described as 'the Algerian scenario' – an experience to be avoided at all costs (Cavatorta, 2008).

President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, in power since 1999, has embarked on a steady political and economic transformation of Algeria and worked to bring the country out of the international isolation it experienced during the worst days of the civil conflict. Once a leader of the global non-aligned movement, Algeria has become a privileged partner of the United States and the EU. President Bouteflika has taken steps to sideline the senior military old guard, concentrating power in the President's office.[59] He has also taken steps to co-opt Islamist political parties in the political system but has been unable to eliminate Salafist terrorism from the Algerian political landscape (Boubekeur, 2008). Concentration of power in the hands of one individual has led to concerns about the succession, given that the military remains split along factional lines and corruption remains a major weakness.

In recent years the Algerian government has embarked on a programme that has been termed 'developmental dictatorship' – lack of political opposition has facilitated economic policies that might otherwise have been fiercely resisted (Testas 2005, p. 44). Socialism has been replaced by market capitalism based on hydrocarbon rents distributed through networks of patronage (Cavatorta, 2008). As is the case elsewhere in the MENA, this wealth has not filtered down to the population at large although the Algerian government has taken steps to address these concerns through massive investments in infrastructure designed to encourage FDI in sectors other than hydrocarbons.[60] Like other MENA countries, Algeria has 'zones of poverty', high unemployment rates especially among young male adults, together with feelings of helplessness regarding the powers that be, have contributed to the appeal of Islamists.

Algeria's core external security interests are centred on its relations with Morocco. The Algerian-Moroccan border remains closed due to tensions over Morocco's annexation of Western Sahara. Plans to reopen the border in 1999 were abandoned after a GIA attack which the Algerian government alleged was launched from a base in Morocco.[61] Algeria has long harboured ambitions to gain access to an Atlantic port in Western Sahara, a

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[59] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Algeria Country Report*, December 2008.
[60] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Algeria Country Report*, December 2008.
[61] *North Africa Times*, 16 – 22 December 2007.

concession that Morocco has been unprepared to grant (Gillespie, 2004). Rivalry between Algeria and Morocco has undermined the Arab-Maghreb Union and prevented sub-regional economic integration in North Africa, although this may be changing given the ambitious infrastructure projects foreseen under the Union for the Mediterranean.

Libya

The emergence from international isolation of the Libyan government has been one of the most remarkable processes in international politics over the last decade. Europeans have played a major role in each step that Libya has taken back into the international fold – and yet the Libyan government has been careful to ensure that its relations with the EU and its members are conducted on Libyan, rather than European terms. Libya has two major bargaining chips: its considerable oil and gas resources; and the fact that the country is a major jumping-off point for illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe. Libya has exploited European interests in these two key issue-areas, and has been successful in holding the EU at arm's length while engaging in bilateral cooperation with individual member states, especially France, Spain and former colonial power Italy. Although Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has not ceased espousing anti-Western rhetoric, Europeans and Libyans are increasingly focussed on commercial opportunities.

Libya's relations with Europe are first and foremost economic. Libya exports almost all of its hydrocarbons to Europe, and over 80% of its imports are sourced from three EU member countries – Italy, Germany and Spain. Libya's oil and gas has long been coveted by Europeans and was a major reason for the gradual breakdown of sanctions in the years following the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie in 1988 (Joffé, 2001). Moreover, as hydrocarbon exports are not subject to tariffs, Libya essentially enjoys all of the benefits of a free trade agreement with Europe (St. John, 2008). Defence ties are becoming more important: EADS reportedly signed a deal with the Libyan government to supply arms and nuclear technology to Libya shortly after the high-profile release in July

2007 of six medics accused of infecting Libyan children with the HIV virus.[62] Cooperation on preventing illegal migration to Europe has been stepped up in recent years as well, and Libya has changed its policy of visa-free entry for citizens of sub-Saharan African countries (Hamood, 2008).

Libya's decision to remain outside the Barcelona Process is officially that as the EMP is dedicated to peace, and yet includes two countries effectively at war – Israel and the Palestinian Authority – Libya cannot join unless both are expelled (Joffé, 2001). Libyan officials have stated that their governments is interested in closer relations with the EU and with individual EU member states on a bilateral basis, and does not want to be part of the Union for the Mediterranean. The recently appointed Libyan ambassador to Germany, Dr. Jamal Ali El-Barag, has said that the reason for this is that the experience of the international embargo has made Libya wary of putting all of its eggs in one basket.[63] Libya was initially in favour of President Sarkozy's original proposal for a Union for the Mediterranean comprised only of Mediterranean rim countries, similar to the 5 + 5 grouping that Libya is already a part of but focussing on economic relations. Once the northern EU member states became involved and the Commission was given the task of preparing the paperwork, the Libyan leadership felt that their voice was no longer being listened to, and their interests no longer served. One astute observer has written that Libya has been able to 'achieve most of what it wanted from Europe while keeping its hands free' (St. John 2008, p. 101).

As the Economist Intelligence Unit wryly observed, 'the most significant concern over Libya's future stability will remain the leader's health.'[64] Speculation about the process by which Muammar Qaddafi, 'Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution' since seizing power in 1969, will be succeeded, is rife among Libya watchers. Media reports have suggested that Qaddafi's second son, Saif al-Islam, has been groomed for the succession. Saif has taken part in negotiations with Italy over compensation for the 1911

[62] *Africa Research Bulletin*, 1 – 31 October 2007. President Sarkozy insisted that there was no connection between the nurses' release and the EADS deal.
[63] Deutsch-Maghrebinische Gesellschaft/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Veranstaltung, Berlin 11 November 2008.
[64] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profile: Libya*, December 2008.

– 1943 compensation period, and with the United States over compensation for the 1988 destruction of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie. In late August 2008, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi agreed to pay $200 million per year over ten years in investments and compensation.[65] But on 20 August 2008 Saif shocked many observers inside and outside Libya by announcing his decision to step back from politics. He also dismissed suggestions that he had ever been in line to succeed his father and criticised the 'forest of dictatorships' in the Arab world and the tendency of sons to take over their fathers' offices, like 'a farm to inherit.'[66] Owing to the opaque nature of Libyan politics, it is difficult to determine what lies behind Saif's declaration, or indeed whether it is in earnest or not. Whatever the truth is, it is clear that the small elite around the Qaddafi family will continue to shape Libya's relations with the EU and its members for the foreseeable future.

Israeli security preferences

Israeli society is permeated by a profound sense of insecurity fed by its conflict with the Palestinian people with whom Israel shares the strip of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This conflict has been ongoing for around 100 years and has expanded beyond ancient Palestine into a series of international wars after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. The first task of any Israeli government is to protect its citizens against real and potential threats, whether local (such as Hamas or Hezbollah guerrillas armed with rockets, or Palestinian suicide bombers targeting citizens in Israeli cities) or national (such as Iranian, Syrian or Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programmes). The Israeli government's second task is to satisfy the demands of domestic groups with wide spectrum of views on how best to protect, develop and grow the state of Israel. Managing these two very difficult tasks has proved an almost impossible task for successive Israeli governments.

[65] Gulf News, 30 August, 2008.
[66] *International Herald Tribune*, 22 August 2008; *The Economist*, 30 August 2008.

The Israeli government's security preferences are fundamentally influenced by the need to protect Israeli citizens from the existential threats that many believe their country faces. Many Israelis consider their country and their Jewish culture to be under threat from the far more populous Arab communities in the region, and they feel constantly vulnerable to attack from the hostile neighbours that surround them. The perception of vulnerability has grown since the beginning of the second *Intifada* in 2000, a series of events that have left deep psychological scars in Israeli society. Many Israelis feel threatened by non-state groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah which are committed to the destruction of the state of Israel. The preparedness of these groups to kill Israeli civilians and of their members to martyr themselves in the process has created a deep sense of unease in Israel. The Israeli government's response has been to build a powerful military and defence infrastructure capable of inflicting such destruction on neighbouring countries and the Palestinians that enemies fear the consequences of attacking.[67]

Suicide bombings have been less frequent since the building of the 'separation fence' (known as 'racial segregation wall to many Palestinians), the unilateral withdrawal from and blockade of the Gaza Strip, and increased targeting of Palestinian militants by the Israeli military. Although Hezbollah loudly claimed victory in the wake of the summer war of 2006, the Lebanese group has been wary of launching its Iranian rockets at northern Israel ever since. Since 2004 Qassam rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip have become more frequent. Rocket attacks and suicide bombings do not always cause casualties – the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reported that at the height of the *Intifada* in 2002, 450 Israelis were killed by terrorists, the same number as died in road accidents.[68] Of course, terrorist attacks are not accidents, and these attacks strengthen Israeli resolve and prompt calls for military action ranging from targeted attacks on Palestinian leaders to a full-scale invasion and re-occupation of Gaza.[69] Israeli military efforts to destroy Hamas' offensive capabilities – operation 'cast lead' – resulted in over 1000 Palestinian

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[67] *The Economist*, 10 January 2009.
[68] See Amos Harel 'Shin Bet: Palestinian truce main cause for reduced terror', *Haaretz*, 2 January 2006. The article notes that in 2005 the number of Israelis killed by terrorists was one tenth the number killed in road accidents.
[69] Address by Dr. Uzi Rubin, former Senior Director for Proliferation and Technology, Israeli National Security Council, Hessische Landesvertretung, Berlin 25 June 2008.

deaths, severe destruction in Gaza and international consternation (if not condemnation) in December and January 2008 – 2009.

There are no easy options for an Israeli government and military fully aware of the domestic and international implications of causing civilian casualties, but faced with an imperative to defend against the missiles and guerrillas embedded in Palestinian towns. As a recent study by the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) concludes:

> 'The basic problems are how to win a war against a non-state actor whose main purpose is to survive and retain some fighting capabilities, and how to prevent harassment of the population by enemy rockets. The IDF lacks a good solution for the short-range rocket attacks other than occupation of the densely populated launch areas' (Shapir and Brom, 2008, p. 48)

Despite these tactical difficulties, the fight against Hezbollah and Hamas is supported by the majority of Israeli citizens. The Israeli Institute for National Security Studies reports that more than two thirds of Israel's Jewish population supported the decision to go to war against Hezbollah in the summer of 2006, and that most believed that the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) should have continued the war until its main goals – the return of the abducted soldiers and ending Hezbollah's capability to attack Israel – were achieved.

Protecting Israel against national security threats is a less difficult issue for the Israeli government. Israel's position is based on the IDF's ability to deter an attack by any or a combination of the country's Arab neighbours, backed by the nuclear option should conventional deterrence fail. For Israel, this deterrent is necessary because of its immediate neighbours only Jordan and Egypt acknowledge its right to exist. This places the state of Israel in a precarious position – during the Cold War nuclear standoff, the United States and the Soviet Union backed deterrence with diplomacy, well-staffed embassies, and even a direct hotline between the White House and the Kremlin. Israel does not have these safeguards in place, and its leaders do not believe that they can trust hostile governments such as that in Tehran not to launch an attack. The perception of an

existential threat from actors with whom no diplomatic relations are maintained tends to push the Israeli government towards unilateral and alliance-based security policies, rather than negotiations with neighbours or with the European Union. Unlike the United States, the European Union is not in an alliance relationship with Israel and has few levers with which to exert sufficient pressure to push Jerusalem into serious negotiations with Palestinians and other Arab neighbours.

Domestic political institutions in Israel do not ease elected representatives' task of turning preferences into policy. Under the proportional Israeli electoral system, parties that receive 2% of the vote are elected to the Knesset. This has resulted in a large number of parties with a voice in national affairs representing a wide range of views and interests.[70] Mainstream political parties must form coalitions with smaller parties, necessitating the incorporation of policies favoured by social or religious minorities into the overall programme, despite the costs they impose on Palestinians. As a recent report in *The Economist* put it, 'religion, nationalism and hunger for the Palestinian's land have fused to create a powerful constituency in Israel… Israel's system of proportional voting has given the settlers and zealots a chokehold over politics.'[71] Considering the centrality of the Palestine-Israel conflict to Israeli politics, it is not surprising that domestic political coalitions have not been able to agree on a strategy for its final resolution. Accordingly, Israeli policy is oriented towards conflict management rather than long-term peace. While this remains the case there appears little prospect that Israelis with an interest in comprehensive security based on formal, multilateral cooperation with the Arabs and Europe will be able to push the Israeli government in this direction.

'Standing on the outside looking in': Iranian security preferences

Iran's position as arguably the most important geo-strategic actor in the Middle East means that the interests of its government inevitably impact on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. Iran's shadow is especially long in the Mashreq countries: Israel,

[70] See www.knesset.gov.il.
[71] *The Economist*, 10 January 2009.

the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Lebanon, where Tehran exerts its influence on regional security in a number of ways. One prominent scholar has noted that Iran's military support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza has given it a military presence on the Mediterranean 'for the first time since the Achaemenid empire (c 550-350 BCE).'[72] Iran's alignment with less easily deterred non-state actors is a cause of concern for governments throughout the Middle East (Heller, 2008). The Iranian government's relationship with post-invasion Iraq is one of the key dynamics in that conflict and has had a direct impact on Mediterranean partners Syria and Jordan that host millions of Iraqi refugees from sectarian fighting.

Perhaps most significantly for regional security cooperation, Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programme is having a major impact on security relations in the Mediterranean basin and the broader Middle East. Influential voices in Israel and the United States have vowed to prevent Tehran from joining the nuclear armed club by any means necessary, a prospect that threatens unpredictable – but most likely negative – externalities for Iran's Turkish and Arab neighbours. Alarmed Western politicians and commentators have voiced fears that an Iranian bomb would lead to an arms race in the Middle East as Egypt and Saudi Arabia would be tempted to develop nuclear weapons as well (CDU/CSU, 2008; Gause, 2007). The Israeli government has reportedly resigned itself to the likelihood that Iran will develop nuclear weapons unless the United States is prepared to use force to prevent this.[73] The prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon has also had a direct impact on European security as plans have proceeded to build a missile defence system based in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russian objections that this would upset east-west deterrence notwithstanding.

Identifying the key domestic actors whose preferences are pursued by the political elite and state institutions is difficult in the Iranian case. There is some debate over who the real decision-makers in Iranian politics are. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who represents poor conservative rural voters, is often portrayed in Western media as the

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[72] See Fred Halliday 'The matter with Iran,' *Open Democracy*, 1 March 2007, www.opendemocracy.org, accessed 3 March 2007.
[73] See *Jerusalem Post* 'US won't order preemptive Iran strike' 5 December 2006.

ultimate Iranian power-broker. His statements calling for the destruction of Israel have been widely reported and discussed. But President Ahmedinejad is not the final decision-maker in Iranian security politics. Aside from the gift that his words present to Western and Israeli figures who favour military action against Iran, it is highly doubtful whether the Iranian president has the authority to realise his cherished hope, as the Iranian military is firmly controlled by the Guardian Council and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei has the constitutional authority to make appointments to the central institutions in Iran's power-structure, including the Revolutionary Guards, the Guardian Council, the President's office and the Parliament. No candidate can stand for election without the approval of the Guardian Council, and no major decision can be taken without Khamenei's consent.[74] At lower levels stifling authoritarianism makes political engagement among normal citizens risky and difficult. As one recent report on Iran notes, this has led to public apathy compounded by resignation following former president Mohammed Khatami's failure to make good on promises of democratic change (Rahimi and Gheytanchi, 2008).

Like many revolutionary international actors, Iranian foreign policy is directed primarily towards consolidating the revolution at home and as a secondary objective towards spreading revolutionary ideology in other countries. Historical examples include revolutionary France, which attempted to conquer Europe between 1789 and the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815; Bolshevik Russia, which conquered the Tsarist empire after 1917 and offered rhetorical support for the Comintern before resorting to statist foreign policy under Stalin; the United States, revolutionary in 1776, isolationist until the First World War and universalist after the Second; and (arguably) the European Communities whose *raison d'être* of 'ever closer integration' since the Treaty of Rome has involved cyclical periods of internal consolidation followed by geographical expansion. The Iranian revolution has also followed this pattern of consolidation at home followed by expansion – its strategy is to support non-state groups in neighbouring countries with the purpose of further strengthening the revolution and in spreading its ideology, especially among Shi'a Muslims. Tehran has long provided material support

[74] 'Iran: Who Runs It? *The Economist*, 24 July, 2008.

for Shi'a political parties in Iraq, which has grown as these groups have stepped into the power vacuum following the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The Iranian government's support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Shi'a Alawite minority government in Syria are also of long standing.

Iran's position on Israel is that the Jewish State project has failed for 60 years, and that Jews, Christians and Muslims should live together in one country. Iran does not consider itself to be a threat to Israel, but rather that the Jewish state is threatened by inherent internal tensions resulting from the expulsion of millions of Palestinian Arabs.[75] Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas are in part calculated to act as a deterrent to Israel contemplation of a military strike on Iranian military or economic infrastructure. The Iranian government has rejected criticism of its nuclear programme by the same Western governments that maintain good relations with Israel despite the latter's nuclear arsenal.[76]

Iran's preferences on international and domestic security are difficult to determine due to the complex and often opaque politics of the country. Nevertheless, the one that stands out is the need to protect Iran as an Islamic revolutionary state from the threats posed by other regional and extra-regional actors. The United States has repeatedly called for the removal from power of the Shi'a Mullahs in Tehran, a call that has been repeated with greater or lesser degrees of conviction by the governments of Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies since 1979.[77] The rhetoric has at times been heated – in 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini famously referred to the United States as 'the great Satan,' a quip matched somewhat less elegaically by US President George W. Bush's inclusion of Iran in his 'Axis of Evil' in 2002. Strong words aside, the Iranian government would be remiss if it did not feel threatened militarily. Since late 2001 American-led coalitions including several EU member states have invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's neighbours to the east and the west, and public statements have left no doubt that 'regime

[75] Address by Dr. Mohammed Larijani, Hessische Landesvertretung, Berlin 25 June 2008.
[76] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Iran Country Report*, December 2008.
[77] 'A Middle East Arms Race,' *Wall Street Journal*, 20 December 2008.

change' in Tehran is just as desirable in Washington and London as in Baghdad and Kabul. This view of Iran is not shared by Israel or the Arab states.[78]

Implications: a preference for the regional security status quo

Proximity and economic weight mean that relations with Europe – and the Barcelona Process – are a high priority for Middle East and North African governments. Europe's south Mediterranean partners have preferences that they consider best pursued through relations with Europe and participation in the EMP serves their purposes, especially economically and in terms of conferring added legitimacy to ruling elites. In general, however, the core security interests of southern and eastern Mediterranean governments can only be partially served by cooperating with the EU. As has been noted by many analysts of the EMP, Europe is regarded in the Middle East and North Africa primarily as an economic, rather than a security actor. Mediterranean partner governments want to benefit economically from their relations with the EU, and for Europeans to refrain from interfering in domestic, bilateral and regional security issues that they do not have the capability to resolve.

Generally speaking, while the whole Mediterranean region would clearly benefit from the long-term stability that would accompany a formal, comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean security agreement, no MPC government is prepared to take the steps that would be required to implement such an agreement. A multilateral promise to settle disputes peacefully would have to be at the heart of such an accord, and the governments of Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Lebanon and Syria are not prepared to take that step with regard to regional conflicts. More difficult is the proviso that any comprehensive security agreement would need to incorporate a step-by-step process of verifiable confidence-building measures. This is where the impossibility of building a comprehensive security agreement among the region's governments arises: aside from the lack of mutual trust

[78] 'Israel's Worst Fears,' *Newsweek*, 12 January 2009.

that undermines relations among the region's ruling elites, the poor quality of domestic institutions in many MPCs makes verifiability extremely difficult.

The processes of executive governance are similarly opaque in several MPCs, and the tie-ups between military, political, legal and economic institutions are often unclear. Security services that lack transparency and civilian oversight are unlikely to be capable of engaging in verifiable confidence-building. As these institutions form the levers of power in authoritarian countries, MPC governments have been reluctant to introduce reforms that would favour greater transparency. The outcome is a classic catch-22: comprehensive security cooperation among the region's governments is impossible without institutional reforms, and institutional reforms cannot take place until the security of the state is guaranteed. In a dangerous region, no Mediterranean partner government is prepared to take steps on a reform path that they might lose control of, leading to their removal from power. No MPC government is prepared to encourage its neighbours to take similar steps because of the fear of uncertain consequences. The known knowns are infinitely preferable to the known unknowns.

Many Arab analysts have noted the rising importance of Islamist political parties in the politics in the Arab world. Islamist political parties have successfully discovered a strategic niche – providing social services that Arab ruling elites have failed to provide – that is the basis of their widespread support (Boubekeur, 2008). As Menendez-Gonzalez notes, 'western policy in the last decades has been based on the assumption that religious political parties and opposition groups throughout the Arab world were inherently authoritarian and anti-western,' an assumption she dismisses as 'blatantly simplistic' (Menendez-Gonzales 2005, p. 10). All the same, Islamist actors pose the most widespread internal threat to the political status quo in the Arab world. For most Arab governments the threat posed by liberal political and economic reforms amplifies the threat posed by Islamism, since Islamist parties would win free and fair elections in Egypt and Algeria and possibly in Palestine and Tunisia as well. Incumbent south Mediterranean governments have skilfully exploited the uncertainty that this prospect raises in Europe.

The state's domination of the economy, with all of its patrimonial practices, favouritism and corruption, has effectively stifled private sector actors who do not actively support the political status quo. Arab economies are divided into fiefdoms, and outsiders are not given the chance to get rich for fear that they might also develop political ambitions. Furthermore, the weight of political influence in the Arab Middle East has shifted from the Levant to the Gulf monarchies, further undermining the ability of autocratic Arab rulers to divert the attention of ordinary people away from the chronic underdevelopment of their own countries (Heller, 2008).

Where MPC ruling elite preferences favour security cooperation with Europe, this tends to be in issue areas where interests are best served through bilateral cooperation, such as anti-terrorism where cooperation can proceed without strings attached. The same cannot be said for multilateral cooperation on comprehensive security, which for Arab Mediterranean partner governments especially involves potential costs that are prohibitively high. While the institutional reforms that would be required to improve regional transparency and build trust would not necessarily represent a change in the ruling status quo, they would involve relinquishing control over some of the key institutions of governance, and thus control over the reform process. In the absence of an exogenous shock that would force changes, this equilibrium is likely to remain in place.

The Barcelona Process' grand vision of building a formal, comprehensive and multilateral regional security partnership has never reflected the political and security interests of the EU's Mediterranean partner governments. South Mediterranean Arab regimes are interested first and foremost in political survival in the face of an array of (real and imagined) domestic and international threats. Their actions at the international negotiating table are usually calculated to protect and strengthen the hold on power of the incumbent political elites. Israel, on the other hand, is a democracy that would benefit in the long term from formal peace and cooperation with its neighbours. However its domestic political institutions are configured in a way that empowers minority social groups that do not perceive an interest in multilateral engagement with Israel's Arab neighbours or with the EU. Turkey is the one Mediterranean partner country with the

interest and the will to engage in comprehensive security cooperation. Turkey is a democracy, a NATO member and a candidate for membership of the EU. Long focussed primarily on Europe, Turkey in recent times has been drawn more deeply into the crises of the former Ottoman Empire. The contrast between Turkey and the rest of Europe's Mediterranean partners is clear. No formal, multilateral and comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is likely while the preferences that the Arab states and Israel bring to the international table favour maintaining the regional security status quo.

Chapter VI

The Euro-Mediterranean security bargaining process

As the analytical framework developed in Chapter 3 explains, the design of the bargaining framework is often a major factor in shaping the outcome of international negotiations among governments. Institutionalised bargaining offers a way of overcoming obstacles posed by conflicts of interest, mistrust and poor information. Sometimes, changing or adjusting the rules of the game under which international actors negotiate deals can offer a way of breaking deadlocks and reaching solutions previously seen as impossible. Although institutions – especially at the international level – cannot be changed easily, they are normally easier to change than the preferences of governments. Where preferences are deadlocked, changes to the rules may raise the prospect of introducing new elements that offer actors a way out. However, the keys to introducing change remain in the hands of the actors themselves, and whether they perceive an interest in working within a new set of rules. Making adjustments to the bargaining framework is only likely to produce a different outcome as long as the political will to introduce changes can be found.

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership presents an interesting case-study of the fraught relationship between preferences, bargaining and institutions in international politics. The EMP has since 1995 been characterised by a complex bargaining framework comprised of several formal and informal forums where negotiations take place on several levels. Several analysts have pointed out that this framework has proved inadequate for improving the efficiency of outcomes in the EMP's three 'baskets,' especially in the area of political and security cooperation where deadlocks are clear and present (see Furness, Gándara and Kern, 2008). In recent months French President Nicholas Sarkozy has made it clear that he shares this view, and that he believes that institutional change is required if governments on both sides are to gain more from Euro-Mediterranean relations. In proposing the 'Union for the Mediterranean' the French government provided political impetus to the debate about the EMP's future.

On the surface, the Euro-Mediterranean bargaining process is highly asymmetric and heavily weighted in Europe's favour. On the EU side, member states reach a decision among themselves about what a formal institutional setting for security cooperation should look like, and the resources that they are prepared to invest in realising such an outcome. Although the preferences of EU member governments are distributed widely, they are able to reach a common European position through the EU foreign policy making process. Member state preferences and the rules of European decision-making determine the goals that are included in Euro-Mediterranean policy and the means by which these will be pursued. Just as importantly, objectives that member states consider better pursued unilaterally or by institutions other than the EU are left out of the deal. EU members often use foreign policy debates for strengthening their position within Europe and third countries are often a secondary consideration. The EU's position is presented to south Mediterranean governments as a *fait accompli*, because they cannot influence the intra-EU bargaining process. Specifically, south Mediterranean governments have no say about the incentives that are on the table – these are decided by Europeans.

On the southern side, given the disagreements and power struggles among south Mediterranean elites, it is not surprising that a common position regarding security cooperation with Europe has not been forthcoming. No southern partner is strong enough to influence Europe's position on its own, and in the absence of a common bargaining position that mirrors Europe's, Mediterranean partner governments are unable to equilibrate their preferences in the same way that EU member governments can. The end result is that MPCs are essentially presented with a 'take it or leave it' choice when it comes to cooperation with the EU. As it happens, most south Mediterranean governments have chosen to 'take it' because they consider that cooperation with Europe – at least on economic and social matters – will serve their interests better than remaining outside the EMP. Nevertheless, they take this decision grudgingly and on an individual, rather than collective, basis. On security cooperation, however, Mediterranean partner governments have chosen to 'leave it,' agreeing only in the most general terms to the desirability of a formal regional security pact while offering no cooperation on anything substantial.

The resulting deadlock is a considerable source of frustration for EU member and Mediterranean partner governments. President Sarkozy's proposal therefore raises several questions. Firstly, does the proposed UPM framework represent a genuine effort to overcome conflicts of interest among European and Mediterranean partner governments? Secondly, are the technical changes to the Barcelona Process framework under the UPM an improvement on the EMP in terms of its potential to facilitate bargaining and help governments reach more efficient (defined in terms of their interests) outcomes? Third, does the UPM increase the likelihood that a formal, comprehensive security agreement for the Mediterranean region will be signed and implemented?

This argument of this chapter is that, unfortunately, the answer to all three of these questions is 'no'. The UPM framework represents an acknowledgement that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is important to governments on both sides, but there has been little to suggest that these actors have decided to make a major new effort to resolve the issues that divide them. On the contrary, the UPM is explicitly directed towards making progress in clearly defined areas where common interests already exist. The potential for institutional changes to improve the efficiency of Euro-Mediterranean bargaining outcomes remains secondary to the interplay of preferences over outcomes. Some of the institutional changes proposed seem set to increase the likelihood for deadlocks in more controversial areas, rather than easing them. No new search for workable solutions in the political and security field is evident despite the Paris Declaration's re-iteration of the original Barcelona goal of working towards a regional security pact.

Analysing Euro-Mediterranean security negotiations: a Euro-centric setting

The Barcelona Process was designed with the intention of facilitating agreements among EU member and Mediterranean partner governments that would contribute to political and economic stabilisation – a public good – in the Mediterranean basin. Since 1995 the EMP has had the aim of achieving socio-economic and political goals through coordination and cooperation among the region's governments and the EU. Essentially, the framework was intended to provide a series of formal bargaining tables to which

governments could bring their interests on a range of issues, and walk away with solutions that suit everyone. The EU and its members are interested in preventing political and economic instability at Europe's periphery. For Mediterranean partner governments, the EMP represents an external anchor for governments to implement a reform programme according to an agreed set of rules, with backing from an international partner (Tovias and Ugur, 2004). Specific benefits emerge in terms of access to development aid and technical assistance in the short term and increased prospects for successful economic catch-up in the long term, thus fostering political stability.

In this regard, the Barcelona Process conveys two distinct advantages to participating governments: first, the negotiation framework facilitates policy reform coordination between MPCs and Europe, providing a stable environment for bargaining. Second, dialogue and exchange in the context of the Barcelona Process may help to create windows of opportunity for mutually beneficial agreements, particularly as exogenous changes in political or market circumstances influence the ordering and intensity of government preferences and the restrictions they face. In the long run, the Barcelona Process may contribute to lifting measurable benchmark indicators for prosperity, social development and stability. In the shorter term, the EMP combines several governance sectors and progress can be expected to be uneven as internal conditions and external shocks influence the process, while transition periods are worked through.

The main feature of the EMP bargaining framework in place since 1995 is that it is highly asymmetrical. The procedure of the EMP negotiation framework is shaped by the political preferences of national governments interacting supra-nationally (see Figure 2). On the EU side, political decisions are made by the European Council, where national interests are equilibrated through intergovernmental negotiations within a two level system. However, on the MPC side no such equilibrating mechanism exists. The Barcelona Process framework therefore reflects the bargaining power of Europe much more than it reflects the national or collective interests of the Mediterranean partners. Political decision making is dominated by the EU and its intergovernmental bargaining process.

The EMP has often been described as a 'hub and spokes' type of framework, with the EU at the centre and the Mediterranean partner countries arranged around (Calleya and Heller, 2002; Solingen, 2003). The EMP's principle target is formal institution-building following MPC political and economic reform, raising inevitable conflicts of interest with authoritarian governments unwilling to relinquish control of the reform processes in their countries. The EMP is a European policy, paid for by European taxpayers, administered by the European Commission, and designed to produce outcomes that, on balance, serve the interests of the EU and its member states. This asymmetry has made institutional outcomes that leave all partners better off in terms of their preferences very difficult to achieve.

Figure 2: The EMP decision-making process



Source: GO-EuroMed Consortium, 2008

When we consider the EMP as a simple bargaining structure with two groups of actors – European countries on one side and Mediterranean partner countries on the other – the weaknesses in the institutional setting quickly become apparent. European countries have diverse interests and different priorities regarding the Mediterranean, but are able to use the EU as a mechanism to reach a common bargaining position. The EMP, with its objectives, budget and organisational structure, is the outcome of this intra-EU process. On the south Mediterranean side governments also have diverse interests and priorities towards the EU. But as no equivalent equilibrating mechanism exists, each country tries

to pursue its interests independently and competitively. Outcomes depend on the MPCs' abilities to arrange for side payments, package deals and other trade-offs to counter the EU's collective bargaining power. This creates problems for Mediterranean partner governments faced with the prospect of negotiating with a huge bloc. It also creates problems for the EU, which is faced with 10 negotiating partners with diverse preferences, all of which it must try to satisfy at the same time.

The European Neighbourhood Policy has further deepened the Euro-centrality of the bargaining process. Since 2004, bilateral ENP Action Plans have been signed with all Mediterranean neighbours except Algeria, Libya and Syria.[79] According to the Commission, the Action Plans, negotiated under a principle of 'joint ownership' and based on the strategy of 'differentiation' propose benchmarks for reform that take into account 'the specificities of each neighbour, its national reform processes and its relations with the EU' (EC, 2004 a). This development has been welcomed by many Mediterranean partner governments as an opportunity to deepen ties with the EU without waiting for others (K. Smith, 2005). The ENP's potential for helping Europe and MPC governments reach more efficient bargaining outcomes has been sharply questioned by several analysts, most of whom are sceptical about the EU's ability to convince south Mediterranean partners of the mutual benefits of implementing agreements, over which they have had little influence on the terms (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005).

As a result, Euro-Mediterranean bargains do not feature (in)formal unanimity on the south Mediterranean side – the EMP is shaped by the distributional nature of the common pool provided by the EU. Policy outcomes have tended to aimed at individual country reforms rather than multilateral institution-building. The vast majority of funding for the EMP under the MEDA and ENPI programmes is allocated bilaterally – for 2007 – 2010, only € 343 million has been earmarked for multilateral activities in the three EMP baskets out of a total ENPI budget for southern partners of € 3.3 billion for the period (EC, 2006 a; EC, 2006 b). While these funds are complemented by loans from the European

[79] Libya and Syria have not signed Association Agreements and are therefore ineligible for an ENP Action Plan. Algeria welcomed the Barcelona Process but has rejected the ENP on the grounds that it 'interferes' with the former.

Investment Bank, they are pre-allocated in the EU budget and constitute a closed pool within which MPCs must compete if they want to increase their share.

There are of course caveats to the portrayal of the EMP as an EU-dominated framework: there are other actors and stakeholders in the Mediterranean region, including governments (the USA, Russia, China and the Gulf states), as well as the IMF and the World Bank. The Barcelona Process framework is not immune to these external influences and some MPC governments have successfully played external actors off against each other. Moreover, the EU has to be careful to design a policy that MPCs will not reject out of hand, logically implying that Europe does not have an absolute supply-side monopoly. The EU cannot dominate the process totally and has not been able to impose strict conditions on MPC governments.

The threat of a possible failure of the Barcelona Process affects the choice of issues that make it on to the table. Given the aforementioned self-constrained set of bargaining issues in Euro-Mediterranean relations, agreements are achieved in policy areas that, firstly, serve the interests of particular groups within the participating states, including power clubs and the general public; and, secondly, do not upset powerful groups in the other side's society. This is reinforced by the fact that there are no enforcement capacities on either side. Neither the EU nor any MPC can actually force the other to implement policy reforms.

Assessing bargaining outcomes: south Mediterranean political reform

The European strategy for improving the political and economic stabilisation of the Mediterranean basin has been to encourage reform in the south. In the absence of an intrinsic interest in reform-based security cooperation on the part of Mediterranean partner governments, Europeans have had to use incentives to foster the changes they desire. As it turns out, the level of incentives that EU member governments have been prepared to invest in the EMP's security objectives indicate that they do not desire change enough. It is, of course, highly questionable whether Europe could ever offer

Mediterranean partners sufficient incentives to risk their power – but it is clear that the incentives on offer to date have been insufficient to push south Mediterranean engagement with formal, comprehensive security institution-building.

The Barcelona Process is a good example of a principal–agent relationship in EU foreign policy. The EMP is based on a set of bilateral Association Agreements between the European Commission (the principal) and Mediterranean partner country governments (the agents). The EU asks for policy reform by MPC governments, which make their contribution to political and economic stabilisation in exchange for pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation from Europe. Following the EU's 2004 enlargement, the EMP's bilateral dimension has been incorporated in ENP scheme to create a 'ring of friends' around the EU by promoting political and administrative reform, economic liberalisation and human rights protection. The EMP / ENP's key elements are close dialogue, cooperation and monitoring of reforms in a number of political, economic and socio-cultural areas, with a 'stake in the internal market' the major incentive for countries that implement an agreed reform programme (EC, 2004 a).

Table 3: Democracy in south Mediterranean neighbours 1995 – 2003

	EU-15	**Algeria**	**Egypt**	**Jordan**	**Morocco**	**Syria**	**Tunisia**
Polity 2003	9.9	-3	-6	-2	-6	-7	-4
Change 1995-2003	0	0	0	0	+1	+2	-1
Xconst 2003	6.7	3	3	3	3	3	2
Change 1995-2003	0	0	0	0	0	+2	-1

Source: Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004)

The progress that has been made in implementing political reform in the south Mediterranean is indicative of the success of the EMP bargaining framework. The implementation of deep reforms would indicate south Mediterranean engagement with the Barcelona Process and its objectives. Slow and fitful reforms would indicate a lack of commitment on the part of MPC governments. Table 3 provides an indication of the

difference between selected Mediterranean partner countries and the EU-15 average on political openness and the level of constraints on the ability of the executive branch of government to act with impunity. Table 3 gives an indication of the progress of south Mediterranean political reform based on data from the World Bank's Governance Matters database.

Table 3 shows virtually no change in the level of democracy in either the EU-15 or south Mediterranean countries between 1995 and 2003. The average Polity score for EU-15 countries between 1995 and 2003 was +9.9. This figure is in stark contrast to the average score for six Mediterranean neighbours. In 1995 this was -5, which had improved marginally to -4.67 in 2003. The worst performing south Mediterranean country in 2003 was Syria with -7, while Jordan was the best performer at -2 on a -10 to +10 scale. Executive constraint scores are similarly poor, averaging around 3 compared with the EU's 6.7 on a 0 – 10 scale. Xconst scores also show few signs of improvement over the period, suggesting that there were few measures taken to increase institutional constraints on governments anywhere in the south Mediterranean.

The Polity scores clearly show that Mediterranean neighbours have not managed to improve their democratic records under the EMP. Algeria, Egypt and Jordan did not improve at all and Tunisia took a step backwards. Morocco's improvement was barely noticeable. Interestingly, the country to make the most improvement in both democratic reform and reducing the freedom of the executive branch was Syria. However Syria started from well behind the other MPCs in 1995, while its steps towards democracy were insignificant on a -10 to 10 scale. These figures suggest that political reform has not been pursued seriously in any south Mediterranean country since 1995.

Table 4 indicates that political reform in the south Mediterranean has hardly proceeded beyond the cosmetic there are major issues with the incentive structure of the Euro-Mediterranean bargaining process. The Commission's strategy of providing tailored solutions to partner countries through bilateral action plans is based on the programme that worked well in preparing Central and Eastern European countries for EU

membership in the 1990s (Kelley, 2006). But, as Mediterranean partner governments do not intend to become members of the EU, the promise of closer economic and political engagement with the EU at an unspecified later date essentially constitutes a 'one size fits all' offer that has not proved successful in fostering reform (Bodenstein and Furness, 2009).

Table 4: MPC governance indicators 1996 - 2007

Country	Diff. 1996 –2007	1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Jordan	0.04	0.20	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.14	0.23
Tunisia	0.04	0.18	0.20	0.20	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.13	0.27	0.22
Morocco	–0.19	–0.03	0.07	–0.01	–0.13	–0.15	–0.15	–0.25	–0.18	–0.22
Egypt	–0.30	–0.15	–0.32	–0.27	–0.40	–0.43	–0.43	–0.44	–0.52	–0.45
Lebanon	–0.70	–0.15	–0.30	–0.30	–0.39	–0.40	–0.43	–0.49	–0.78	–0.84
Turkey	0.16	–0.22	–0.19	–0.20	–0.30	–0.17	–0.16	–0.03	–0.06	–0.05
Syria	–0.19	–0.63	–0.65	–0.74	–0.55	–0.60	–0.73	–0.87	–0.89	–0.83
Algeria	0.36	–1.07	–1.30	–1.09	–0.93	–0.85	–0.77	–0.65	–0.64	–0.71
Libya	0.82	–1.43	–1.22	–1.05	–0.95	–0.87	–0.66	–0.73	–0.69	–0.61
Mean		–0.37	–0.39	–0.38	–0.38	–0.34	–0.32	–0.35	–0.37	–0.36

Source: World Bank Aggregated Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2008); The index comprises the dimensions voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.

This offer has not proved effective in fostering reform, but it has not increased the likelihood that individual MPCs will default or defect, weakening the policy as a whole. Some MPCs have chosen to take the limited amount of EU funding on offer and to take advantage of the EU's technical expertise where it suits them to do so, while implementing the bare minimum of reform. This appears to have been most apparent in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and (to a lesser extent) Morocco. In most cases reforms implemented in MPCs since 1995 have not diminished the power of powerful elites and individuals over key political and economic institutions in their countries. Libya, Syria and more recently Algeria have resisted EU calls for reform more openly.

The provision of incentives is made doubly difficult by the fact that the EU is confronted with asymmetric information as regards MPC reform capabilities. While Europeans may believe that in the long run partner countries will benefit from reform in terms of economic growth and political stability, the EU remains unclear about the real trade-off partner governments face when embarking upon reform. Opaque domestic decision-making processes, a lack of civilian control over the legislative or judicial arms of government, and the absence of a free press render the information that emerges from many MPCs questionable.

Since 1995 the Barcelona Process has resembled an incomplete contract with uncertain costs, and consequently a high degree of reluctance on the part of governments on both sides of the Mediterranean to commit to paying them (Tovias and Ugur, 2004). For Europe, the costs of providing political and economic stability in the Mediterranean are unclear – if the EU believes that long-term stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean can only come about as a consequence of political and economic transformation in the region, should Europeans compensate MPCs for the short-term costs of transition? For MPC governments, the costs of implementing the reforms that the EU asks for are in some ways clearer – a weakening of their current control of their countries. Most consider that any weakening of control could lead to an end to their rule, an outcome which the EU is unlikely to be able to compensate.

Assessing bargaining outcomes: EMP political and security cooperation

The EMP framework is not designed to resolve regional conflicts on its own. Rather, it is meant to help with the management of interdependence by facilitating the convergence of national security policies. The EMP's political and security basket is intended to provide partner governments with a stable forum for general confidence-building, enabling them to take advantage of opportunities for cooperation where security preferences converge. As discussed in Chapter 2, the EU's efforts to encourage its Mediterranean partners to adopt 'comprehensive' regional security cooperation reliant on multilateralism, rules and

‘shared values’ have been in vain. EU and MPC governments stepped back from efforts to build formal security cooperation long before the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was quietly shelved in 2000. Since then, intergovernmental priorities have been redrawn to reflect more immediate concerns, and a compromise bargain on short-term priorities has been reached. These include firstly the interest of most south Mediterranean governments in domestic regime stability; secondly European fears of regional instability and uncontrolled migration; and thirdly a shared interest fighting terrorism at the operational level.

The implications for regional security institution-building of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on terrorism are mixed. It is somewhat pointless to speculate over whether the global war on terrorism has undermined the Barcelona Declaration’s comprehensive security objectives – as the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was suspended nearly a year before 9/11, it is clear that formal security cooperation was in trouble even without the Global War on Terror. Common interests have led to increased cooperation between EU agencies (such as Frontex), EU member state governments, and individual Mediterranean partners. However, as some Islamist groups enjoy popularity among the general populations in most Arab countries, the focus on Islamist terrorism has alienated many non-governmental actors in the region. This has presented an essential problem for the EU, its members and the West more generally: in reacting to what some Islamist terrorist organisations promote as a universalist ideology in a universalist manner, proponents of the ‘global war on terror’ have been unable to dispel the perception in much of the Muslim world that ‘the West’ is at war with ‘Islam’.

Bilateral cooperation between EU members and Mediterranean neighbours is regarded as providing the backbone of the fight against illegal migration, to be stiffened with Community resources where necessary (Khasabova and Furness, 2008). Specifically, within the overall framework for cooperation with Mediterranean partner countries, the EU emphasises developmental projects and policies as long-term solutions to mounting migration pressures (Joffé, 2008 b). The aim is to facilitate dialogue and integration among the relevant parties, while granting the EU as position of an overseeing

transnational actor. Within the Barcelona Process framework the EU endeavours to provide for an area of cooperation, zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood through promotion of political and economic reform, sustainable development and trade liberalisation. Targeting root causes of emigration in origin and transit countries is regarded as the long-term solution for illegal migration and emphasis is put on reducing immigration into Europe through development support for partner countries. Since 11 September 2001, security concerns have risen to the fore and the view that illegal migrants are a security problem has been a major influence on the implementation of European policies. EU member states less affected by the problem have not objected to southern EU members' renewed focus on securing their borders, so long as the link between migration flows and political and economic reform in Mediterranean partner countries is clearly acknowledged.[80] This rhetorical link has in practice been ignored by European and Mediterranean partner governments, which have focussed on securing their borders in the short term (Schumacher, 2008).

A 1999 EuroMeSCo report on the progress of negotiations on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability noted that a central problem with reaching agreement stemmed from the view of Arab governments that the EMP addressed EU security concerns only. The report called for more inclusive decision-making processes and procedures, particularly on specific issues such as confidence-building and conflict prevention measures (Aliboni, 1999). Actual political and security cooperation under the EMP regional programme has been limited to comparatively minor initiatives in police and judicial capacity-building, foreign policy and migration research, training diplomats and supporting the Arab-Israeli peace process. While these efforts focus on the right areas for building more robust and transparent MPC institutions, they are comparatively poorly funded and have struggled to make an impact at the policy level.

Accordingly, negotiations on rules governing hard security cooperation in the Mediterranean have reached a Nash equilibrium-type situation, where no government can

[80] See, for example, the Five Year Work Programme agreed at the EMP 10th Anniversary Summit, Barcelona, 2005.

see advantages in changing its position while the positions of the other governments remain unchanged. The impasse became clear in 2000 when the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability was shelved amid the violence of the second Intifada. No progress on the Charter appears likely without exogenous shocks. The maintenance of the status quo will favour intergovernmental cooperation that is bilateral and ad-hoc in nature, with certain issues – such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, regional arms control and security sector reform – left well alone. Most of the region's governments are content with this situation for the time being, and there is no reason to believe that the arrangement will collapse anytime soon.

Changing the framework? The Union for the Mediterranean

In July 2008 the Barcelona Process' multilateral dimension was re-launched as the 'Union for the Mediterranean' at the Euro-Mediterranean Summit in Paris. Unlike the EMP/ENP framework, the UPM is not a principle-agent relationship based on bilateral agreements but rather an intergovernmental setting where the objective is not MPC reform but progress towards mutually beneficial outcomes on specific bargaining issues.[81] The UPM does not have a transformational agenda: the EU's policy of fostering south Mediterranean political and economic reform through the provision of incentives remains in place under the ENP. The Union for the Mediterranean is essentially a proposal to change the framework for Euro-Mediterranean bargaining, so that Mediterranean partner countries have a greater say in the decision-making process.

The Union for the Mediterranean proposal could, if implemented as the Joint Declaration of the July 2008 Paris Summit suggests it should be, radically change the Euro-Mediterranean setting for negotiations. The idea of the UPM's architects was to provide Mediterranean partner governments with a greater say in the decision-making process on specific issues where positive-sum outcomes are likely, and costs are easy to distribute. Initially, the UPM will focus on relatively uncontroversial projects, but – like most

[81] Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, Paris, 13 July 2008.

European agreements – the UPM has the heuristic characteristics of a negotiated framework that can be expanded into more sensitive issue areas over time.

Figure 3: Potential UPM decision-making process



Source: Furness, Gándara and Kern, 2008

The UPM proposal appears to address two of the EMP's greatest weakness: first, the lack of south Mediterranean influence over decision-making; and second, the tendency of political deadlocks in certain issue-areas to overshadow progress on issues where common interests exist. By introducing biennial Euro-Mediterranean summits, a joint permanent committee and a joint secretariat, the proposed UPM proposal provides non-EU countries with – at least in theory – an equal say in decision-making regarding projects carried out under its mandate. These institutions will propose, discuss and implement specific projects, enabling progress on discrete issues of common interest and leaving aside more sensitive issues.

Mediterranean partner governments may be able to use this institutional setting as an umbrella for inter-MPC negotiations on a given project, enabling them to reach a common position towards the EU. If they are able to take advantage of this opportunity, the Arab MPCs especially may be able to strengthening their collective weight in negotiations with the EU. MPCs should also be able to initiate projects, enabling them to

set the agenda for fresh rounds of bargaining. Furthermore, the new framework may enable EU and non-EU governments to form common positions with each other, lessening the divide between insiders and outsiders. While taking advantage of these opportunities will not be easy, the impression that MPCs are being handed a *fait accompli* may be more easily avoided.

Perhaps less obviously, encouraging more collective bargaining among MPCs has important potential benefits for the EU as well. It resolves the EU's dilemma over the hub and spoke pattern of relations under the EMP, a problem that has become even more apparent under the ENP. A common Mediterranean partner country position towards Europe reduces the need for the EU and its members to deal with ten or more neighbouring countries, each with different interests and demands. Instead, the EU could negotiate with one, collective partner representing a common MPC position. Bargaining over the distribution of costs is also likely to be more likely to result in mutual agreement when two supranational positions are on the table, since restrictions for governments on both sides are likely to have been overcome in the process of forming a joint position.

Two further innovations proposed under the UPM are also likely to prove significant in shaping mutually beneficial bargaining outcomes. First, the UPM has the potential for encouraging greater inclusion of non-governmental actors in the Euro-Mediterranean bargaining process. NGOs, civil society organisations and firms are likely to be involved in proposing, planning, funding and implementing projects carried out under the UPM. Second, the requirement that the UPM secretariat arrange funding for projects reduces the influence of the European Commission in major strategic decisions and the day-to-day implementation of projects. This means that projects will not be funded unless public or private sector finance is found, and that they will be implemented in accordance with the interests of the actors that fund them.

Finally, 'variable integration' is a core principle of the UPM proposal, enabling actors that do not have an interest in participating in a given project to step back, and for projects to proceed without universal approval (although probably not when faced by

outright opposition). However, as time passes, and governments become involved in projects of deepening complexity and interconnectivity, the costs of exit are likely to rise. The new institutional setting therefore has the potential to enmesh Mediterranean partner governments in a framework from which it would become ever more difficult to escape. This increases the potential for tit-for-tat bargaining and issue linkage, as repeated interaction among the region's governments becomes more common.

Taken together, these innovations suggest that the UPM proposal is a departure from the EMP bargaining framework in several significant ways. Despite its genesis in the French election campaign, the subsequent intra-EU debate over its form and detailed preparation carried out by the European Commission, the UPM appears – at least on paper – a less Euro-centric and more Mediterranean bargaining framework. It remains to be seen whether the UPM will emerge from negotiations currently underway among the European Council, the Commission and partner governments with these features intact.

The Union for the Mediterranean provides a higher profile for declarations on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation – including on security – and it strengthens the institutional framework within which dialogue and exchange can take place, including discussion of security issues. However, as the main focus of the UPM is on uncontroversial projects, it is unlikely that it will make any difference in progressing towards a comprehensive, formal regional security agreement. The main security issues in the Euro-Mediterranean region manifest themselves at the preference, rather than the bargaining level – essentially, south Mediterranean and European governments do not have strong enough preferences for formal, multilateral security cooperation. The EMP bargaining framework reflects this, and, high-profile summitry notwithstanding, the UPM has not introduced significant changes in the arena of Euro-Mediterranean political and security cooperation.

The bargaining outcome: a stable equilibrium

Negotiations on Mediterranean security since 1995 appear to have followed the logic of the distribution of gains. Autocratic Arab governments do not stand to gain very much

from a comprehensive agreement that promotes the public good of regional peace and stability as an outcome of political openness and domestic transparency. Rather, the reforms that are implicit in a comprehensive security deal threaten incumbents' control over their military and security services and ultimately their position of power in their countries. Arab governments have therefore offered few concessions in the bargaining process, instead repeatedly refusing to work towards a common agreement while the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved. No alternative to Europe's proposal has been forthcoming from the Arab governments, which have in any case been unwilling or unable to settle on a common position towards the EU. Similarly, Israel has not felt the need to offer concessions as its government does not feel that a European-led agreement on regional security for the Mediterranean would enable it to maintain security as readily as American protection does.

It should, therefore, surprise no-one that bargaining on Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation quickly reached a state of impasse following the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The situation is similar to the equilibrium famously described by the mathematician John Nash. EU and Mediterranean partner governments cannot see how they can improve their position while the positions of other governments remain unchanged.

As discussed in chapters 4 and 5, preferences over formal, comprehensive security cooperation remain widely distributed among European and Mediterranean partner governments. Meanwhile, the preferences of several Euro-Mediterranean governments for informal and bilateral cooperation on short-term security issues remain close, and these actors are not prepared to put this cooperation at risk for grand schemes. Behind the high-minded rhetoric and scholarly hand-wringing, a critical mass of European and Mediterranean partner governments appear quite satisfied with the level of Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation as it stands. As long as this remains the case, no substantially different outcomes to bargaining over security cooperation in the Mediterranean can be expected.

Dialogue and exchange in the context of the Barcelona process may help create windows of opportunity for mutually beneficial agreements in specific issue-areas. Different issues come into play as changes in political or market circumstances influence the ordering of government preferences, essentially by altering the costs and benefits of alternate strategies for pursuing preferences. However, security cooperation is the one area where windows of opportunity have been few and far between. The main problem facing Euro-Mediterranean security relations is that south Mediterranean governments consider that the EMP framework does not provide them with an adequate institutional setting in which to pursue their interests, and yet they have been unable or unwilling to offer an alternative. Although the EU's 'take it or leave it' offer sits uneasily with Arab governments protective of their sovereignty, there has been no counter proposal based on south Mediterranean security interests. As a result, although most south Mediterranean Arab governments consider that remaining part of the Barcelona Process is more beneficial than stepping out, they have made only vague commitments to implement reforms and have progressed little against common indicators.

The real reason for the Barcelona Process' lack of progress towards a formal security agreement may be quite mundane. Although the realisation of the public good of political and economic stability is in all actors' interests, precise costs and the actors' willingness to pay them are unclear. On the European side, governments face potential costs accruing from voters' concerns about the externalities of regional instability. These are balanced by concerns about the potential costs to key constituencies of EU investments in incentives for changing MPC government behaviour. On the south Mediterranean side, costs are foreseen mostly as accruing to the status quo in terms of ruling elites' hold on power, and their ability to make unilateral domestic and foreign policy decisions. Some analysts have pointed out that the marginal costs of reforms for MPCs rise as reforms deepen. Inability or unwillingness to shoulder actual or potential costs has left the EMP's promise unfulfilled.

While many experts have argued that issue deadlocks have brought the whole Barcelona process to a grinding halt, this does not appear to be the case. European and south

Mediterranean governments have shown a clear desire for ongoing cooperation – both in principle and in discrete areas where interests converge. French President Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean can be seen both as an official recognition of this problem at the highest level, and as a plan to do something about it. While the UPM initiative no longer resembles President Sarkozy's original idea for a Union comprised only of countries bordering the Mediterranean, the French government has nonetheless succeeded in returning Mediterranean issues to the top of the EU foreign policy agenda. With their attendance at the UPM's Paris launch party, Mediterranean partner governments sent a strong signal to Europe of the importance they attach to multilateral relations with European countries – provided they are able to have a greater influence on negotiations.

The initial focus of the UPM is on uncontroversial projects where cooperation is already strong – the practical intention is to embark on initiatives where successful implementation can be lauded, leading to increased mutual confidence and the possibility of branching into new areas where mutual benefits may appear in time. Repeated interaction builds ever stronger ties, especially where bargaining is difficult (Axelrod, 1981). While there is no reason why deeper cooperation cannot build on initial successes, it is unlikely that the UPM will raise the chances that a comprehensive, formal regional security agreement will be signed – let alone implemented – in the foreseeable future.

Addressing the asymmetries that characterise the EMP bargaining process is a necessary step and the UPM promises some progress in this direction. But the UPM has not escaped a heavy weighting towards European interests entirely, while the complex and somewhat unwieldy institutional structure has increased the number of potential veto players, making deadlocks even more likely. Most importantly, it remains up to the governments of the EU and the south Mediterranean to make the most of the new UPM framework. Given that the main security issues in the region resonate at the preference, rather than the bargaining level, it is unlikely that changing the bargaining framework will make much difference. Essentially, south Mediterranean and European governments do not have strong enough preferences for formal, multilateral security cooperation – the EMP

bargaining framework has long reflected this, and this has not changed much under the UPM.

It is important for analysts assessing the progress of cooperation under the Barcelona Process to remember that the proposed UPM is not designed to foster political reform in Mediterranean partner countries. Rather, it is a proposal to improve the efficiency of bargaining on specific issues where mutually beneficial outcomes are likely, based on the equal relationship of sovereign governments in a multilateral framework. Over time, this framework has the potential to expand into more controversial policy areas, including those where negotiations have reached effective deadlock. The expectation may be that by encouraging commitment to a framework in which MPCs have a real stake, the improved political and economic stability may, in time, create windows of opportunity for policy changes in other areas.

It is highly unlikely that the UPM will make a major difference in the way Euro-Mediterranean governments pursue domestic and international security objectives. This does not mean that the UPM is not a positive development that potentially signals a new era in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Institutional changes are more effective at improving the likelihood of efficient outcomes in some policy areas more than others. This is likely to become apparent in the issue-areas that UPM projects will be implemented – de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea; maritime and land transport infrastructure; civil protection against natural disasters; alternative energies, especially solar; a Euro-Mediterranean university in Slovenia; and support for small and medium enterprises. In these areas positive-sum outcomes are likely and negative externalities that impinge upon the vital interests of one or more member governments are unlikely. This is not the case for security cooperation, where member state preferences do not favour deeper cooperation under the Barcelona Process framework – and the EMP's member governments are quite happy with things the way that they are.

Chapter VII

Conclusions and outlook

One of the central goals that EU member states and Mediterranean partner governments expressed in launching the Barcelona Process in 1995 was to work cooperatively and multilaterally towards a formal, comprehensive regional security agreement based on the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability (Edis, 1998; Attina, 2004; Balfour, 2004; Perthes, 2004 a). This goal was re-iterated in the July 2008 Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. Its non-fulfilment after 13 years has been the cause of much disappointment and criticism among analysts working on EU foreign policy, Euro-Mediterranean relations and security politics in the Middle East and North Africa.

Why has this objective not been fulfilled? The explanations that analysts have offered have tended to fit into three categories: first, that unresolved regional conflicts have undermined security cooperation, especially the three-way tensions between Europeans, the Arab states and Israel; second, that external actors pursuing their own geo-strategic goals have deepened the south Mediterranean's divisions rather than encouraging cooperation; and third, that the domestic political economy of the Middle East and North Africa, characterised as it is by authoritarianism and rentierism, has offered few incentives for the region's governments to cooperate with each other and with Europe.

This thesis has argued that all of these explanations tell part of the story, but none is able to convince on its own. Regional security institution-building does not necessarily have to wait until conflicts are resolved – in fact, part of the *raison d'être* of international institutions is to help actors overcome the conflicts between them (Jones, 1998). Bumbling or self interested external actors cannot be solely responsible for the region's problems and their solution – there is only so much the EU, its members, or the United States can do without the active engagement of local actors (Ottaway and Dunne, 2007). The region's lack of democracy does not preclude cooperation – the ASEAN case shows that, given the right combination of external encouragement and intra-regional interests,

international cooperation among autocratic governments can be quite successful, even if it is unlikely to extend to the comprehensive security agreement envisaged in the Barcelona Declaration (Solingen, 2007).

The position taken in this thesis is that a more complete explanation of the state of security cooperation between the EU, its members and Mediterranean partner governments can be developed by viewing this institutional outcome through the lens of an actor-oriented analytical framework focussing on preferences, restrictions and bargaining. The aim has been to present an analytic narrative combining tools borrowed from political economy with a descriptive, anecdotal narrative that provides context to questions about Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation (Bates et al 2000). A second aim has been to argue the case for consistent use of a theoretical approach to international political questions based on clear assumptions and logical consistency.

From the actors' perspective, three questions are central to explaining Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation: first, why did EU member governments propose to build formal, multilateral and comprehensive security institutions in 1995? Second, why did Mediterranean partner governments sign up to this framework? Third, why have both sets of governments settled for an outcome that is much less ambitious than originally envisaged? By considering the preferences of the governments (and the European Commission) that are involved in the process, taking note of the domestic and international restrictions these actors face, and studying the dynamics of the bargaining framework they use to manage their relations with each other, answers to these three pertinent questions emerge.

The analytical framework developed in chapter 3 of this thesis rests on three core assumptions: that *domestic politics matters* - governments pursue domestically pre-defined preferences at the international level; that the quality and openness of *domestic institutions also matter* as they shape the nature and ordering of a government's preferences; and that *international institutions are sets of rules that states use to further their goals,* and they design these institutions accordingly. These core assumptions are

the starting point for this thesis' exploration of what EU member and Mediterranean partners governments want to achieve, what they consider are the factors that might prevent them realising their desired outcomes, and how they deal with each other when they meet at the international table. Based on these assumptions and on theoretical approaches common to liberal, rationalist views of international politics, the analytical framework suggests that the answers to the above questions are likely to be relatively simple.

The EU proposed a comprehensive security agenda for the Mediterranean because it reflects liberal internationalist preferences that are grounded in key domestic political constituencies in the big EU member states. However, the ability to pursue these preferences is restricted by other priorities that EU governments have, as well as by the interests of south Mediterranean governments. Some member governments, together with liberal lobbies, political parties and parliamentary factions, liberal intelligentsia and members of the press really do believe that the security of the Mediterranean is indivisible, that the Arab-Israeli conflict can be resolved, and that the appropriate role for the EU is to promote political and economic reform in order to transform the Arab Mediterranean partners. Other European actors, including elements of governments and business groups concerned primarily with economic interests in south Mediterranean countries, consider ongoing dialogue and exchange with MPCs as necessary for maintaining an acceptable level of stability. Groups with specific concerns about issues such as migration, terrorism and energy supply insist that security cooperation is pursued on an ad-hoc basis when core interests are at stake. Rhetorical references to comprehensive security in the Barcelona Declaration do not undermine these interests. To exclude such references would be impossible in a Europe where liberal internationalist tendencies are strong.

The Mediterranean partners, on the whole, are not interested in EU-led formal, comprehensive security cooperation for a number of reasons. Especially important are factors related to domestic politics in the Arab states – comprehensive security cooperation does not serve the interests of incumbent elites, while opaque, poor quality

domestic institutions do not enable alternative preferences to be brought to the international table. Rather, south Mediterranean governments signed up to the Barcelona Declaration because they are interested in the potential economic and political gains associated with engaging more closely with Europe. Few had any intention of fulfilling their promises on security cooperation. This has not changed under the Union for the Mediterranean, despite the re-iteration of the intention to work towards a Mediterranean security pact.

Mediterranean partner governments nevertheless consider that there is more to be gained from engaging in cooperation with Europe than remaining outside the process. If the wealthy European Union is prepared to pay for cooperation, then south Mediterranean governments would be remiss not to accept the EU's assistance. Moreover, as the Barcelona Process rests on free trade agreements, future trade concessions to Europe are in the offing – especially for economically more open countries like Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Israel. A third general incentive has been the support that cooperation with Europe has given to the managed reform process in the Arab MPCs. However, no MPC government – with the possible exception of Turkey – has any intention of engaging in comprehensive security cooperation with Europe based on reform and openness. If rhetorical acceptance of references to a liberal regional political and security order is required in order to maintain and grow economic ties with Europe, then this is a small price to pay to keep the aid flowing.

Both sets of governments have agreed to cooperate on an ad-hoc basis in the multilateral setting and to pursue concrete security goals related to terrorism and illegal migration mostly bilaterally (Joffé, 2008 a). This is a sub-optimal bargain when compared with the potential gains that could accrue from the implementation of a comprehensive security agreement (Furness, 2008). Nevertheless, it represents an outcome that EU member and Mediterranean partner governments are satisfied with – there is no gain to be had by any Mediterranean government in changing its position while the positions of other governments remain unchanged. Somewhat perversely, this satisfaction is reflected in the low level of incentives that the EU's members are prepared to provide Mediterranean

partner governments to implement reforms, despite the relatively greater interest of Europe in greater political and economic openness in the south Mediterranean (Bodenstein and Furness, 2009). The UPM – ostensibly a new bargaining framework designed to enable more efficient outcomes – is unlikely to lead to any major changes in regional security cooperation. While adjustments to the institutional setting can lead to changed outcomes, the interests of the actors involved are more important. On balance, both sets of governments have an interest in maintaining the regional security status quo.

The institutional outcomes of the Euro-Mediterranean security bargaining are highly ambiguous – specific goals, benchmarks and timelines are avoided. Such policy ambiguity is not accidental, or a sign of weakness – rather, it is an indication that Euro-Mediterranean governments are satisfied with the level of cooperation as it stands. Ambiguity leaves governments with options, including the ability to claim credit when policy programmes appear successful. Furthermore, like many international agreements the EMP incorporates a degree of ambiguity since few governments are willing to commit to restrictions on their ability to act unilaterally in future. Euro-Mediterranean governments are aware that exogenous changes, such as to the international balance of power, may open windows of opportunity for negotiations on issues not yet on the table. Ambiguity also enables governments to take action outside the EMP framework in policy areas where they believe their interests will be better served by doing so.

European preferences for Mediterranean security cooperation

The very term 'Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' is something of a misnomer. The EMP is not a partnership between equals. It is a European initiative designed to project European influence in the south and east Mediterranean. The design of the policy framework itself has emerged as the outcome of an intra-EU bargaining process that Mediterranean partner governments have had very little opportunity to influence. The EMP's political and security component – which aims to develop formal, multilateral cooperation among the governments of the Mediterranean Basin – reflects the European interest in defining the Mediterranean as a geo-strategic space from which threats to

Europe, especially in terms of illegal migration, Islamist terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other potential negative externalities of state failure – emanate.

Cavatorta and his colleagues correctly point out that most analysts that lament the EMP's performance share the implicit assumption that the EU is genuinely interested in fostering multilateral political, economic and security cooperation based on transparency and confidence-building in the Mediterranean (Cavatorta et al, 2006). This observation is in most cases correct. However this thesis does not share Cavatorta and his colleagues' rejection of this assumption. Rather, the analysis undertaken here suggests that the EU and its member governments are genuinely interested in building comprehensive security institutions for the Mediterranean basin, for both normative and positive reasons. Influential individuals and groups in European politics at national and European levels believe that it is right and appropriate for the EU to promote a liberal internationalist agenda, because a world comprised of stable, accountable and rights-respecting governments would be a better and more peaceful place to live. These preferences are expressed by national leaders and by powerful European-level figures including the President of the Commission and the Council's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. They are also pursued regularly by the European Parliament and the OSCE.

For many European policymakers the liberal internationalist agenda is more than just hot air – its success in the wake of the Cold War in Eastern Europe is a reminder that, given the right circumstances, comprehensive multilateral institution building brings valuable gains in terms of public good provision and political and economic stability – conditions under which European investors and exporters can prosper. It should surprise no-one that European political elites consider that this formula may work in neighbouring regions as well. Above all, the preference for formal, comprehensive and multilateral security institutions in the Mediterranean is genuine – no EU member government would admit that it is not interested in this outcome because of the widespread support for internationalist goals among key European constituencies, especially in the business,

professional and academic communities. These groups express the desire to see their governments and the EU pursue internationalist goals in both moral and pragmatic terms. Many policymakers see comprehensive international institution-building as a vital part of any stability and growth strategy. Liberal internationalism is not simply a normative cloak for material interests (cf. Youngs, 2004).

Moreover, although government preferences for comprehensive regional security cooperation are based on liberal philosophies that elicit activity from individuals and groups at the domestic level, EU member states have often passed the task of pursuing these interests internationally to the European Council, Commission and Parliament. As these institutions are themselves an expression of EU member state liberal internationalism, they are the logical actors to empower with pursuing similar goals in the neighbourhood and globally. Furthermore, the greater political and financial resources that Europe can bring to the international table improve the likelihood that goals will be achieved. Of course, national leaders have been ready to step in and claim the credit when the EU does well – French President Sarkozy is only the most recent example. On the other hand the EU can also be a convenient fall-guy when things do not go so well, especially when the high-mindedness of Brussels meets the pragmatism and suspicion of the Middle East.

All this liberal internationalism does not mean that the EU either is or considers itself to be a normative actor, reliant only on 'soft power' to change prospective members, neighbours and the rest of the world in its own image (cf. Adler and Crawford, 2004). Indeed, claims that the EU 'perceives itself as being wholly normative' would not meet the agreement of most EU foreign policy officials, who argue that while the EU pursues normative goals it does this for good practical reasons. The velvet glove is exemplified by the 2003 European Security Strategy, which frames policy goals in terms of explicit European interests (Quille, 2004). Normative, internationalist outcomes are not the only preferences that EU member governments try to pursue internationally. Nor are they necessarily the most important – they merely number among several concerns that governments have to prioritise.

Several other political, economic and security preferences arise when EU member governments consider the outcomes they would like to realise from Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Further preferences that have been considered in this thesis include the protection of member states from short-term security threats – especially Islamist terrorism – which affects the way in which member states citizens vote in national elections. Similarly, government responses to migration (legal and illegal) across the Mediterranean have an electoral consequence, especially in southern EU member states. A fourth preference is to protect powerful national lobbies – especially in the agricultural industry – from concentrated costs that may accrue as a result of deeper cooperation with south Mediterranean countries. A fifth preference is that of political elites at the national and European levels for greater influence over the process and objectives of the EU's common foreign policy. In this game, institutional outcomes in the Mediterranean can become pawns rather than preferences in their own right.

Preferences for outcomes at the EU and international level on these five central interests are widely distributed among European governments. Generally speaking, Europe's liberal internationalist coalition is led by the Nordic countries and the European Commission but also includes Great Britain, France, and Germany. These are Europe's strongest actors and they are interested in building a comprehensive security partnership based on formal regional multilateralism, so long as this can be achieved at acceptable cost. In general, northern European countries are more prepared than southern EU members to put pressure on Arab governments to reform, most likely because they have no direct borders with the Arab world that can be easily crossed by migrants, and their MENA immigrant communities are smaller.

At present this 'big three' consensus is one of principle only – if the process of building Mediterranean security cooperation were ever to actually get underway, differences between Britain, France and Germany about the precise objectives and membership of a regional security regime would quickly become apparent. The role of the United States and other external actors such as Russia and Iran would certainly become a key issue. The interests of German and British political elites in EU-Mediterranean policies are also

partly shaped by their interest in influencing the EU's common foreign and security policies, especially concerning the balance of their influence with that of France over the CFSP. Britain is more interested than France and Germany in maintaining the role of NATO as Europe's – and by extension the Mediterranean's – provider of hard security, and a stronger role for the EU in providing funds, institutional expertise and economic carrots in support of security goals.

Spain and France are the strongest supporters of the diplomatic and economic aspects of the Barcelona Process, but among the most fearful of the potential costs of transition. France and Spain certainly support comprehensive security cooperation but their proximity to the region and large North African immigrant communities makes them wary of the direct implications that south Mediterranean instability may have for them. This wariness and fear of costs manifests itself especially in French and Spanish reluctance to offer incentives to south Mediterranean countries in the form of agricultural trade liberalisation or greater visa access for MPC citizens.

Along with Italy, France and Spain are the EU members most prepared to work with incumbent MPC governments and their security services. This partly stems from the long-established ties between southern European and North African political elites. The complex legacy of colonialism, the perceived necessity of working with south Mediterranean governments to protect against short-term security threats and the desire to maintain influence are all factors that contribute to continued close cooperation between the political elites of the Mediterranean rim. Economic ties are important as well: Italy, Spain and France (and also Germany) would all be significantly worse off if energy contracts with the Libyan and Algerian governments were not honoured, although this is unlikely in the absence of a wider conflagration. The need to work closely with incumbents does not necessarily undermine the EU's reform agenda, but it certainly does not help in the hypothetical case that sanctions were needed to produce liberal internationalist outcomes.

All of the major EU member governments are prepared to step outside the EMP framework and make bilateral arrangements with south Mediterranean governments for operational cooperation on illegal migration and terrorism. They are also prepared to push the EU into steps that do not necessarily favour deepening comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation, such as tightening border controls, promoting trade agreements that exclude agriculture, and keeping its distance during regional security crises. This selective engagement suggests that the EU and its members are reasonably happy with the state of security cooperation as it stands: a bargaining framework that facilitates dialogue but does not challenge vested interests directly, space for governments to pursue the short-term strategy of engaging in cooperative initiatives that address immediate priorities: illegal migration and terrorism, and the status quo of 'managed reform' in the Arab world. The ambiguity of these arrangements gives European and south Mediterranean governments an exit option.

MPC government preferences for cooperation with Europe

South Mediterranean government preferences for deepening multilateral security cooperation with Europe are also widely distributed, although not to the same extent as in Europe. While Turkey also has some difficulties with the European concept of a Mediterranean geo-strategic region its preferences for liberal internationalism are similar to those of most European governments. Turkey's domestic political institutions are ready for this kind of cooperation, and its recent moves into Middle Eastern diplomacy are an indication of its desire for greater influence on regional politics. Israel is happy with its bilateral ties with Europe and, as its security is guaranteed by the United States, it does not have more than a general interest in regional stability backed by Europe. For Israel, the EU brings added value both as a policy anchor and as a provider of technical expertise and assistance with capacity-building. The Israeli government remains highly sceptical about greater European involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and would never cooperate fully with a regional security agreement that did not include the United States or address Iran. However, without reforms to the domestic political system,

engagement between Israel and its Arab neighbours will continue to be liable to hijack by groups at the extreme end of the Israeli political spectrum.

Of the Arab governments, Morocco and Jordan are the most receptive to European-led regional security initiatives. The Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies are geographically distant but politically quite similar – both are interested in promoting greater cooperation among MENA governments, including Israel, and both maintain close ties with the EU and with individual member states. Both recognise the importance of their relations with the EU for the economic and social development of their countries. Both, however, have disagreements with their neighbours – Jordan with Syria and Morocco with Algeria. In neither case does multilateral cooperation and/or mediation led by the EU appear to be the most promising response to these disagreements. Although Jordan and Morocco recognise Israel, domestic objections mean that neither government is enthusiastic about formal political and security cooperation with the Israeli government while the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved. Furthermore, neither the Jordanian nor the Moroccan monarchies are interested in European-style reforms of their political systems, or in greater openness in their internal security apparatuses. It is, however, highly likely that Europeans would be prepared to engage more formally with Jordan and Morocco given current circumstances despite rumours that the security services in both countries occasionally resort to practices that contravene EU human rights law.

The governments of North African neighbours Algeria, Libya and Tunisia are all strongly influenced by the central role of their militaries in the executive branch of government. Algeria is the least stable of the three and the most threatened by Islamist political forces, which have been strongly suppressed in Libya and Tunisia. All three countries are interested primarily in developing bilateral economic ties with Europe and with individual member states. Energy is especially important in Algeria and Libya, while general FDI and tourism are important for Tunisia. Like Morocco and Jordan, the Maghreb autocracies do not share the European view that comprehensive security cooperation based on openness that can only come as the result of deep reforms to domestic political, legal and security institutions. The interests of Algeria, Libya and

Tunisia in security cooperation with Europe are based on the 5 + 5 agreement which does not include the Brussels institutions or the big countries of northern Europe, and does not call for political reform. Rather, for Maghreb governments, multilateral cooperation based on the ASEAN model that explicitly respects sovereignty and concentrates on building economic ties would fit much more comfortably with their preferences.

The Mashreq governments of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon are also highly sceptical about formal multilateral security cooperation involving Europe, but for different reasons. The Lebanese government and society are divided – although Lebanon has the most liberal society and free media in the Middle East, the Iranian-supported Hezbollah movement exercises a major constraint on any liberal internationalist tendencies that the government in Beirut may have. Syria is generally interested in emerging from international isolation and has received European overtures enthusiastically, but the willingness of Damascus to reform is highly questionable. The likelihood that the Iranian government will continue to defy Western pressures places Syria in a difficult position, as it is unlikely that the Assad government is prepared to choose between Iran and the West. Syrian engagement in a multilateral security regime that includes Israel is virtually unthinkable until the two protagonists have struck a deal over the Golan Heights.

Egypt is in a complex situation at the heart of the EMP and the Middle East more generally. Its relationship with Israel is also a difficult one: Israel is a geopolitical ally in balancing Iran's growing power, a fact that does not endear the sclerotic Egyptian government to its own people. Egypt's maintenance of the blockade on the southern border of the Gaza strip is a source of criticism throughout the Muslim world. President Mubarak is supported by American aid, and yet is under pressure to reform from inside and out. The Egyptian government is aware that it must offer more to its people and is seeking European assistance in this. However the Egyptian elite is unlikely to favour reforms that weaken central power over the judiciary, the military or the media – especially as the Presidential succession is drawing nearer. Egypt's influence in Middle Eastern affairs has declined in recent years, and the Egyptian government has seized the opportunity provided by the Union for the Mediterranean to take a leading role. But

Egypt is likely to want to maintain the UPM's focus on uncontroversial projects where progress supports its economic goals. Egypt is not ready for openness, transparency and comprehensive security cooperation with Europe just yet.

The one preference that all Mediterranean partner governments share is the desire to retain control over their unilateral options in foreign policy. This desire stems partly from the domestic political organisation of the Arab world, where the preference of ruling elites to retain political power lies behind virtually every decision they take. Israel and Turkey also share this preference for different reasons – Israel because it cannot trust its neighbours and Turkey because of the Kurdish issue and the not totally resolved questions of the military's role in the country's politics. The strong, shared preference for retaining unilateral options prevents serious engagement with EU-led initiatives designed to introduce binding commitments in foreign and security policy. For Arab governments especially, the Barcelona Process' underlying theme of building comprehensive security out of political reform simply reduces the likelihood that they will engage in such cooperation from 'highly improbable' to 'out of the question.'

On balance, Mediterranean partner governments are satisfied with the level of security cooperation with Europe that they currently enjoy. European offers to support the strengthening of domestic institutions are politely accepted as long as they do not threaten any vested interests, and Europeans do not protest too loudly when they are declined. The fact that the EMP is an EU-sponsored institution helps as well, especially in getting Israel and its Arab neighbours around the same table. European aid continues to flow, while the Barcelona Process provides a useful (and non-binding) international arena for dialogue and exchange.

A lack of interest: the Barcelona Process' incentive structure

The Barcelona Process does not contain any enforcement mechanisms – the EU and its members cannot force Mediterranean partner governments to behave in a certain manner. Nor does the Barcelona Process rely on 'socialisation,' as some scholars have suggested.

The EU cannot induce its Arab and Israeli partners to undertake a certain course of action through peer pressure or moral suasion, and in reality it does not try particularly hard to do so beyond rhetorical efforts aimed more at pleasing European public opinion than MPC governments. The EMP relies entirely on the interests of its member governments in implementing its provisions, be they economic reform, political reform, formal security cooperation, or cooperation in any one of the many sectors covered by the Barcelona Declaration and subsequent agreements.

The lack of interest of governments on both sides in comprehensive regional security cooperation manifests itself most clearly in the incentive structure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As discussed in chapter 3, actors that stand to gain the most from a cooperative outcome are likely to offer the most significant compromises, linkages with other issues or side payments to compensate costs (Koremenos et al, 2004). Actors that stand to gain the least from a cooperative outcome are less prepared to compromise, uninterested in new ideas that may revive the process and less keen on linking progress in security cooperation to progress on other political and economic issues. The EU and its members stand to gain benefits that are closer to their preferences than do south Mediterranean governments. For this reason it is Europe that should be expected to offer incentives – constructive and punitive – to convince MPCs to come into the fold.

The main sticking point in Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation is over the distribution of costs, both between European and Mediterranean partner countries and among EU members. Incumbent south Mediterranean partner governments have much higher costs than European governments do. These include facing the risk that they will lose power – or in Israel's case the risk (perceived by key domestic constituencies) that cooperation will lead to the loss of the state of Israel. Given the lack of intrinsic interest in reform on the MPC side, the EU's ability to convince south Mediterranean partners to implement reforms comes down to a question of incentives. The EU has not been able to offer south Mediterranean ruling elites the sort of incentives that would make reform

attractive to them. Nor has the EU been able to use sufficient conditions to increase the pain felt by ruling elites should reform not proceed as the EU would like.

The key factors behind the lack of incentive compatibility of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership are domestic interests on both sides of the Mediterranean. The costs are of course prohibitively high – for political as well as economic reasons Europe simply cannot compensate Arab elites for risking their power. Although it is very difficult for Europeans to know what these costs are, they are certain to be very high both politically and economically. These costs have to be met by the Arab MPCs themselves, and they are not interested in this simply because the potential payoff is not great enough. What could Europe possibly offer that could compensate an elite for giving up their power over a country?

Specifically, Arab governments have requested four kinds of compensation for the costs of reform: more financial assistance, more visas – especially for business people and students, greater access for south Mediterranean agricultural producers to European markets, and more European engagement in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Europeans have not been able to provide the greater compensation that Arabs are demanding, largely because of intra-EU conflicts of interest between groups that would have to bear the costs providing this compensation.

Aside from budgetary constraints and competition from within Europe for access to the EU's coffers, there are issues for Europe in giving more money to incumbent MPC governments because there are no guarantees that it will be spent on supporting reform. Visas for MPC citizens upset anti-immigration groups in Europe, which have been successful in influencing the policies of some EU member governments. Greater access for south Mediterranean agricultural produce scares the farming lobbies in France and Spain especially. Arab calls for the EU to engage itself more with a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict have similarly met with unwillingness on the part of EU members to bear the costs that would likely accrue from increasing pressure on Israel to grant more power to Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Measures such as opening European agricultural markets to more south Mediterranean imports and issuing more visas for south Mediterranean citizens would represent costly signals of commitment to the Barcelona Process' objectives. In both of these cases the signal that the EU and its members are serious about change in the south Mediterranean would be sent not only to the region's governments but would also filter down to the ordinary people that would benefit in rural communities and in the middle classes. The threat that this signal may be reversed unless south Mediterranean governments send a costly signal of their own through reform could increase the pressure for change. Providing such benefits could also give the EU greater leverage in the region, because they could be reversed if cooperation did not proceed as expected.

In reality agricultural trade liberalisation, although rhetorically on the agenda, is off limits to EU foreign policymakers. Similarly, opening the EU's labour market to workers from labour-rich countries south of the Mediterranean is not possible in the current European political environment. Nevertheless, the EU cannot be blamed for the slow pace of economic reform and the lack of political reform in the Arab Mediterranean partner countries. While European offers to lower barriers to trade in agricultural products have not been sufficient, Mediterranean partners do not have to wait for the EU before implementing reforms unilaterally, should their governments decide that their interest in doing so is strong enough and outweighs other concerns. Moreover, given the entrenched domestic political structures of the region, there can be no guarantees that costly offers would achieve the comprehensive goals Europeans desire.

The incentive structure of EU foreign policy agreements represents a promising area for further theoretical and empirical research. In cases where the EU acts as principle in a principle-agent relationship the effectiveness or otherwise of the EU's carrots and sticks is crucial to the agent's decision to carry out its end of the bargain (Bodenstein and Furness, 2009). Research into incentives needs to focus on both the demand and the supply side of the relationship. On the demand side, the attractiveness of targeted incentives to tempt third parties to change their behaviour should be a core concern of policy design. On the supply side, the moral hazard issue of whether the EU can actually

deliver on its promises weighs not only on the provision of incentives but also on the willingness of third parties to accept an offer. On both sides, on the absence of enforcement capabilities tit-for-tat bargaining and costly signals of commitment are likely to determine the success of incentive-based policy initiatives.

Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation: a stable, yet sub-optimal bargain

The individual right to make decisions, protection from the vicissitudes of others, and the ability to engage in inclusive bargaining and economic exchange are part and parcel of human social interaction everywhere in the world. The EU has taken the formal and legal institutionalisation of these basic human activities to levels that are arguably greater than in any other part of the world, and – crucially – has sought to bind sovereign governments into a legal framework facilitating these activities across borders. Quite reasonably, Europeans cite the long period of peace and prosperity among formerly bitter enemies as evidence that embedding interaction in binding institutions is a formula that works, for good old fashioned positivist, cost-benefit reasons as well as for normative ones. Europeans have regarded their success as a blueprint for other regions and countries, particularly in the southern neighbourhood where governance is weaker than in the EU and instability directly threatens European security.

Efforts to build regional cooperation between EU and neighbouring countries have focussed on strengthening the domestic capacity and accountability of neighbouring governments and encouraging them to build cooperative ties with each other. By offering access to the EU's internal market as both an institution-building mechanism and as a means of compensating the costs of transition, Europeans have attempted to offer Mediterranean partner governments with sufficient incentives to encourage their engagement in building regional cooperation.

In assessing the performance of the EMP, there is little to be gained from attempting to use the Barcelona Declaration's stated objectives 'peace', 'stability' and 'prosperity' as benchmarks. These abstract nouns do not establish concrete, measurable goals, but rather

signify that cooperation among European and south Mediterranean governments is taking place in a cordial atmosphere, with positive intentions. By declaring the aim of building a peaceful, stable and prosperous Euro-Mediterranean region, the EMP's member governments are essentially sending each other a signal – 'let's cooperate'. Most analysts would agree that the Mediterranean Basin could be more peaceful, stable and prosperous than currently, and that the political and economic situation of the states and peoples who there would be better if this were the case. Most would also agree that real progress towards a formal security agreement along the lines of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability would yield long-term benefits in terms of comprehensive security in the region. And yet, given the preferences of the governments involved and the restrictions they face, there seems – ceterus paribus – little prospect of getting ink on the paper of a formal Euro-Mediterranean security agreement in the next ten to twelve years.

From the region's governments' perspective a different set of criteria is relevant. Essentially, intergovernmental cooperation on security in the Mediterranean has reached a relatively stable equilibrium. Since 1995 cooperation under the Barcelona Process framework has continued unbroken and new agreements have been signed periodically. Aside from the 2002 Parsley Island dispute between Morocco and Spain (which seems minor in hindsight) there has been no armed conflict between Europeans and Mediterranean partner countries since the Barcelona Declaration was signed. The Barcelona Process acts as a convenient platform for grand declarations on security issues including WMD proliferation, the Code of Conduct on countering terrorism, and natural disasters. The established bargaining framework, with its regular meetings and activities, provides member countries with a valuable diplomatic channel that can be used in the right circumstances.

On the other hand, Barcelona Process commitments do not prevent governments from entering into bilateral arrangements on matters which they consider to be vital to their security, but that they consider cannot be addressed in the multilateral EMP setting. Several of the EMP's member governments have done exactly that on the issues of terrorism and policing illegal migration in the Mediterranean. These agreements may or

may not have been in the spirit of the Barcelona Declaration, but they have not weakened Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

EU member governments stand to gain more from regional peace and stability based on the formal, comprehensive security agreement envisaged by the Barcelona Declaration than do MPC governments, with the exception of Turkey. There are several reasons for this. First, as a strategic region the Mediterranean reflects the interest of a united Europe with no internal border controls in defining a hinterland of bordering countries. In contrast, the Arab countries and Israel regard the broader Middle East as a strategic region and not the Mediterranean. Iran, Iraq, the Gulf States and the United States are all key actors in the security of the Arab MPCs and Israel.

Secondly, the costs of comprehensive security cooperation are not as high for European governments. Comprehensive multilateral security cooperation needs to be based on trust, and this requires member governments to take steps to ease the security dilemma. Respect for the rule of law based on judicial independence, civilian control of military and security services, and improving the transparency of governance are all important signals of commitment to regional partners. The political and security sector reforms needed for these basic standards to improve would threaten incumbent Arab MPC governments' ability to control their domestic reform processes, possibly threatening their hold on power. European state institutions are not as threatened by these reforms in the same way.

Thirdly, formal, multilateral and comprehensive security reflects liberal internationalist characteristics that many Europeans like to see their governments and the EU embody. The normative desire for transparent, rights-respecting and peaceful international behaviour by governments is not exclusively a European trait – liberal internationalists are also prominent in the Arab countries and Israel. But the democratic political institutions of Europe make it much more likely that these preferences will also be expressed by governments at the international table.

Finally, the official position of most Arab MPCs is that undertaking political reform in the Arab world is risky due to the presence of Islamist opposition groups. It is likely that most of these groups do not pose a violent threat to Europe or the interests of its member governments. Nevertheless, the fear that some Islamists are bent on violence against European interests has been skilfully exploited by Arab governments to enlist European support in preserving the domestic political status quo in the Arab world.

To greater and lesser degrees south Mediterranean governments have expressed their strong interest in benefiting from closer economic association with Europe, and are happy to accept European leadership and technical support in trade and finance as long as this does not threaten the existing political and social order in their countries. In the political and security sphere there is less south Mediterranean interest in accepting European leadership. National security is closely tied to the hierarchical political order in all MPCs – the Arab states ruled by authoritarian elites, and Israel governed by unstable coalitions dominated by concerns over the survival of the Jewish state. No MPC government is interested in deepening formal security cooperation with Europe because they do not believe that this will help them deal with the existing and potential threats to regional and domestic political order.

For European governments, the choices are less straightforward. Most Europeans are aware that formal, multilateral cooperation can bring about comprehensive security in the long run, to the benefit of everyone. They are also aware that comprehensive security cooperation should be approached as a process of incremental steps, rather than a discrete objective than can be achieved immediately. More generally, while many Europeans would celebrate a comprehensive regional security deal, there is reluctance to invest political capital in this process.

The outcome is a reasonably stable regional security equilibrium which, while sub-optimal in terms of comprehensive security, serves the interests of its member governments given the preferences of other actors and the restrictions that they face. Although most analysts and many policymakers would like to see more progress towards

a Mediterranean security agreement modelled on the OSCE, the current arrangements under the EMP's first basket are acceptable to European and south Mediterranean governments. Maintaining cooperative dialogue and exchange while cooperating bilaterally on specific common interest issues maintains a reasonable level of stability at a cost acceptable to governments on both sides. Given the enthusiasm with which Euro-Mediterranean leaders launched the Union for the Mediterranean in July 2008, it is highly unlikely that their governments will attempt to deepen multilateral security cooperation anytime soon.

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