

2 Literature Review

Following the layout of work presented in the Introduction, in the literature review I will first discuss negotiation theories, subsequently turn to the treatment of intrastate wars, and finally describe the international context in which contemporary humanitarian interventions are active.

2.1 Negotiation and Mediation

Negotiation, as the prime activity of international officials for achieving their tasks, both on the state level as well as in the field, deserves detailed attention. Since international engagement in negotiations frequently also includes mediation, this topic will also be briefly discussed. Scientific literature on the topic of negotiations is vast and can be grouped in roughly three schools or approaches: game theoretic modeling, the WW negotiation technique developed at the Harvard Negotiation Project, and, finally empirical studies and psychological experiments of negotiations.

Before continuing with the description of the various approaches a few key concepts need to be clarified. The act of negotiation can be defined as the primary mode of conflict management by which social actors settle their disputes. The prevalence of negotiation when compared with other forms of conflict management, such as unilateral action (open conflict, avoidance or withdrawal) or adjudication by a third party can be explained by its relatively low costs and risks (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993). Mediation is usually defined as “assistance or some form of interaction by a third party” (Wall, Stark and Standifer 2001) in a negotiation context. There is some disagreement among scholars whether the mediator can have the power to impose solutions. Some researchers prefer the term *intravenor* for such powerful mediators (Conlon, Carnavale and Murningham 1994).

Turning to some key determinants of negotiating situations, the first fundamental question concerns the possibility of a negotiated agreement. Usually, it is assumed that individuals enter negotiations with certain expectations, which would have to be met for a hypothetical deal to be acceptable. Thus, a potential buyer of a given item will consider how much he or she can pay for the purchase, while the seller will also think about his or her minimal expectations concerning the transaction. Only if these two expectations overlap, i.e., are within the zone of agreement, according to the terminology of Raiffa (1982), can a positive negotiation result be expected. Interestingly, however, the mere existence of a zone of agreement neither guarantees a successful completion of negotiations nor does it allow for precise predictions as to where the agreement will be. These outcomes depend on the negotiating talents of the negotiators. From a somewhat different theoretical perspective Fisher and Ury (1981) speak of the BATNA – the best alternative to a negotiated settlement. In the case of a simple business transaction this means the maintenance of the status quo, i.e., no sale or purchase.

Negotiating situations are further determined by certain contextual aspects. It is thus crucially important whether one or more issues are negotiated. Negotiations at which more than one issue is being treated are, by nature, more complicated but offer trade offs and linkages between the various areas of the negotiations. Another important determinant of negotiations is whether one party or more parties are simultaneously negotiating. Usually, it is assumed that negotiation contexts with more than one party significantly complicate the reaching of an agreement.

Equally important are questions concerning the nature of the negotiating parties: Are they unitary or are there divisions within the group? Clearly, negotiating with factious groups make agreements more difficult since possible agreements have, in one form or another, to be renegotiated between the various factions of the party.

Another important aspect is whether the negotiator is also a decision maker or if he / she has to ratify possible results with superiors or constituencies. Possible time limits or the lack of such deadlines can have also profound implications for the process of

negotiations. A final crucial aspect of negotiations relates to the nature of the agreement: Is it binding? Can it be enforced?

With regard to mediation – a frequent form of international intervention into local conflicts – various classifications exist,⁵ which usually follow the different levels of intensity of mediator involvement. The least intense form of mediation is usually termed facilitation and includes no more than merely conveying messages, bringing the disputants together and offering facilities for the negotiations. A more intense level of mediator involvement – and one that is most in line with the common sense understanding of the term – is non-directive mediation (Kresser 1972). A non-directive mediator introduces procedures and rules for the negotiations, directs the talks and tries to create empathy and understanding for the position of the respective other party. Raiffa (1982) calls this mediator type also a “rules manipulator”.

Directive mediation describes a yet more intense form of involvement, in which the mediator, in addition to defining rules and procedures, also engages in the search for solutions. The upper end of the mediation intensity spectrum is occupied by what is usually called power mediation, though, as has been mentioned, some scholars prefer to call such mediators intravenors. Besides the previously mentioned activities intravenors or power mediators also apply positive and negative incentives to achieve mediation success and can dictate solutions. In a sense, they become parties to the dispute themselves with a vested interest in a solution.

A brief record of classical mediator activities, i.e., excluding the coercive ones of power mediation, clearly shows the more psychological, cognitive and interpersonal slant of the role. Raiffa mentions the following tasks (1982, pp. 108-109):

- Bringing parties together
- Establishing a constructive ambiance for negotiations
- Collecting and judiciously communicating selected confidential material
- Helping the parties to clarify their values and to derive responsible reservation prices

⁵ See, for instance, Raiffa 1982, Kressel 1972, etc.

- Deflating unreasonable claims and loosening commitments
- Seeking joint gains
- Keeping negotiations going
- Articulating the rationale for agreement.

2.1.1 Game Theory and Negotiations

Turning to the approaches of the various theoretical schools, game theoretic negotiation models usually focus on hostile, antagonistic negotiation contexts. Since game theoretic models, as a rule, try to describe most efficient strategies for all participants, Raiffa (1982) calls the recommendations of this school the “symmetrically prescriptive”. Since these models see the negotiation or bargaining process as part of a conflict, their first recommendation is to look forward (i.e., calculate the final outcome of a conflict) and reason backward (i.e., find a non-conflictual solution based on the final outcome of the hypothetical conflict) avoiding the mutual losses that would have occurred if the conflict had taken place (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991).

More specifically, a difference has to be made between the costs of maintaining the status quo (i.e., non-agreement) for the parties and the costs of possible sanctions, (i.e. of an open conflict between the negotiating parties). A simple non-agreement can, but must not, incur costs for one or all of the negotiating parties. For instance, if somebody urgently needs money and thus tries to sell property, non-agreement on the sale would incur costs for him. Should this same person not be under time pressure, non-agreement would be virtually cost free.

In addition to the simple maintenance of the status quo, non-agreement, negotiators can also try to impose sanctions on their counterparts thus changing their cost-benefit calculations. Sanctions are, however, a tricky issue. On the one hand, sanctions can be costly also to the side that imposes them and, on the other hand, sanctions are likely to be answered with counter-sanctions. The recommendation of the game theoretic school for negotiators is to impose sanctions that “will hurt you more than me”. In a perfectly rational world, between perfectly rational partners the

actual imposition of sanctions would still not be necessary. One could just calculate the possible mutual damage of imposing sanctions on each other, reason backwards, i.e. to the beginning of the conflict and come to an agreement reflecting the expected outcome of a conflict, but without having suffered the costs of actually carrying out the fight.

However, as game theoreticians cleverly observe human interaction is usually characterized by imperfect information. Lacking precise knowledge of a negotiator, his or her threat to impose sanctions is not automatically credible. The threatened sanctions might be too costly for the negotiator to implement or not even within his or her capabilities. An empty threat is of course worthless.

Game theory thus devised a number of strategies to improve the credibility of a threat. One possibility is “burning your bridges behind you”. When Cortez invaded Mexico in the 16th century he burned the ships that carried his troops from Cuba to Mexico. With this act he made it clear to his entire army that there would be no withdrawal.

Another strategy is “brinkmanship”, meaning the creation of an explosive situation, in which a conflict might flare up by chance. This way a threat that might have seemed exaggerated gains more credibility. It sends the message that “you are right, I don’t want an overall confrontation, but I have placed myself in a situation in which I might be compelled to fully escalate – so you better give in!” President Kennedy’s decision to station US battle ships around Cuba is frequently cited as a successful exercise in brinkmanship. He did not want trigger a third world war, and he did not threaten one. But he positioned his fleet in such a way that an escalation, even if unwanted, could not be ruled out – unless, of course, the Soviet Union stepped back from its plans to station nuclear warheads on Cuba.

A possible strategy, according to game theorists, to give more credibility to threats and promises is to build a reputation, i.e., that in consecutive interactions promised threats and incentives are always adhered to. Schelling (1960) thus pointed out that the reputation for resolve of a negotiator influenced how counterparts evaluated the

credibility of his or her threats independent of the material context of the negotiations. Note that these key game theoretical concepts, credibility and resolve, are in essence social constructs (Schoppa 1999).

These considerations already give a first answer why in the “real world” thinking forward and reasoning backward do not always work and conflicts do break out. The reasons are (1) imperfect information with regard to the capability of the counterparts to inflict sanctions or punishment, (2) imperfect information about the credibility of threats, and (3), an inherent unpredictability of certain types of conflicts – an aspect usually not mentioned in game theoretic literature. In other words, according to game theory, when a conflict breaks out, it is because of a misunderstanding about the other side’s capabilities and resolve (Dixit and Nalebuff 1991). Such an intrinsic relation between bargaining and open conflict or war was already expressed by the first game theoreticians, like T.C. Schelling (1960). In this version, while adversaries can choose to negotiate without fighting, if they fight it is because each sees fighting as a way to influence the outcome of negotiations.

Though not a game theoretician, the military historian Blainey (1973) shares this view with regard to wars. In this sense, peace becomes possible once the warring parties reach a joint understanding concerning their relative strength.

Regarding threat-based interaction two concepts need to be specifically mentioned: deterrence and coercion. By way of threatening with sanctions or military retaliation, deterrence seeks to discourage an opponent from changing a given status quo. Coercion, on the other hand, tries to alter the behavior of an opponent by using power. Deterrence is widely accepted to be easier than coercion, or as Pape (1966, p. 6) puts it “threats that deter may not coerce”. An explanation from the military field argues with the “aggressor’s handicap”, meaning the technical difficulties associated with the offensive, but also the usually greater attachment of a defender to his homeland.

A higher risk-acceptance when defending the status quo or a lower risk-acceptance when fighting for a gain outside of the status quo is equally compatible with the

predictions of the prospect theory to be discussed later (see p.33). Applied to the deterrence/ coercion threat interaction concepts, the deterring side protects the status quo against the potential gain of an aggressor. Since the deterring side protects or in other words tries to prevent a loss with regard to the status quo we can expect a risk-acceptant behavior. With regard to coercion, the coercing side is operating in the field of possible gains against a status quo already established by the opponent at the receiving end of the threat. Shifting the status quo in order to achieve a possible gain should suggest a more risk-averse behavior. A last argument explaining the easier success of deterrence, when compared to coercion is that deterrence places the onus of the first fully hostile move on the opponent, coercion, in contrast, on the threatening side.

Concerning the field of threat-based military-political interaction a number of studies have confirmed the assumptions regarding deterrence and coercion. Huth (1988) concluded that

“the adoption by the defender of a firm-but-flexible position in negotiations and a policy of tit for tat in military escalation contributed substantially to the success of deterrence” (p. 200).

Regarding coercion the threat level necessary for success is significantly higher. In his analysis of coercion by air power Pape (1996) examined the two main social scientific theories of coercion: “punishment” and “denial”.

“Punishment threatens to inflict costs heavier than the value of anything the challenger could gain, and denial threatens to defeat the adventure, so that the challenger gains nothing but must still suffer the costs of the conflict” (ibid. p. 7).

The analysis showed that it was only a credible denial type threat that could achieve any coercive success. Punishment, in terms of military planners damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure, could rarely, if at all, reach the levels of destruction necessary for forcing concessions from opponents. Being already at war, such losses were usually discounted by the threatened side as unavoidable costs of war. In case of an international peace enforcement mission denial could be conceptualized as a

credible threat to prevent one or more of the conflict parties to achieve their war aims.

2.1.2 WW Negotiations and Conflict Transformation

The second main approach to negotiations is represented by the WW negotiation technique of the Harvard School and the related conflict transformation literature of peace studies. The posited goal of the school is to overcome conflicts and the associated hostile, threat-based negotiations, polarizations and zero-sum perceptions through a cooperative approach and WW solutions. According to Weber (2000) this brand of negotiation literature has its origins in the industrial relations literature of the 1960s where more cooperative interaction between the parties was expected to yield higher production results. John Burton, a pioneer of this cooperative conflict resolution approach, held already in the mid-1960s the first international problem-solving workshops.

In a related development, a group of peace activists initiated the “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) movement. Third party involvement in resolving conflicts and focus on human needs played a major role in the ideology of the movement. Common to all these approaches was a rejection of power bargaining. Conflicts were supposed to be “truly ‘resolved’, rather than creating a situation where merely the manifest dispute is settled” (Weber 2000:509). In subsequent years the movement thrived in offering mediation services for community and neighborhood disputes. Certain branches of the alternative dispute resolution movement shifted even further to what has come to be known as transformative mediation. Conflict is seen in this context as a chance “for moral growth and transformation” (ibid. p.309). Individuals and, through them, society should change in the course of the transformative mediation process. Weber points out that this ideology, though never explicitly acknowledged, carries several remarkable similarities to Gandhian thinking on conflicts – of course without its most esoteric elements.

With a growing number of publications on community negotiation and mediation projects, the non-coercive bargaining schools have gradually gained acceptance also

in the thinking of the mainstream society. It seems that the “phenomenally successful” (ibid. p.311) book of Roger Fisher and William Ury “Getting to Yes” (1987) – a US National Bestseller – played a significant role in popularizing the method. Fisher, a Harvard Professor of international law, was a facilitator in one of the first workshops organized by Richard Burton back in the 1960s. Fisher and Ury’s, “Getting to Yes” and a second follow-up written by Ury alone, “Getting Past No”, are not scientific works but rather self-help manuals. This orientation towards workshops, seminars and practical dissemination seems to have been and continues to be a characteristic of the entire movement.

During the Carter Administration Fisher and Ury’s WW problem resolution method gained access to the field of international relations (Ropers 1995). Since then negotiation classes and seminars based on cooperative WW negotiations have been included in the curricula of several diplomatic schools and international organizations dealing with conflict. Supported by NGOs and taught in diplomatic schools, the WW cooperative negotiation technique of the Harvard School has also become “a widespread model for dealing with ethnopolitical conflicts” (Ropers 1995, p. 66). Though much of the literature is not exactly scientific, because of its widespread practical application, the approach of the Harvard School and of the transformative mediation movement will be briefly described here.

As already mentioned, the main aim of this stream of thought is to improve the perceived deficiencies of the rational choice and game theoretic bargaining modus with its heavy emphasis on threats, pressures and zero-sum perceptions. The empirical basis for this criticism is also rooted in the already quoted observations that threats can create antagonistic negotiation situations characterized by polarization, escalation and a reduced perception of the opponent’s moves as mainly hostile. Apart from the aim of some representatives of the conflict resolution movement to transform society, more down-to-earth practitioners simply point to the fact that negotiations, led in such hostile contexts, produce less efficient negotiation results than those reached in the cooperative style of the WW or conflict transformation schools.

Fisher and Ury (1987) come with four main proposals for how to overcome negotiation impasses. Their first recommendation is to separate people from the problem – in essence an advice not to personalize conflicts, which, as we know, can lead to irrational escalations in negotiations. Their second recommendation urges not to concentrate on (fixed negotiating) positions, but on interests – on how certain given interests, upon which basic positions are actually formulated, can be satisfied. Not concentrating on a fixed position can lead to innovative solutions that satisfy the underlying interests, while also being compatible with the negotiating counterparts agenda. In line with this reasoning the third recommendation of the authors is to invent options for mutual gain, that is, reframe the negotiation from a zero-sum to a mutual gain situation – a WW solution. The final advice of the authors refers to the usage of objective criteria. In the words of the authors:

“You look for mutual gains wherever possible, and where your interests conflict, you should insist that the result be based on some fair standards independent of the will of either side. The method of principled negotiation is hard on the merits, soft on the people” (p.xii).

Admittedly, a follow-up publication written by Ury (1993) alone, “Getting Past No” recommends negotiators to “educate the other side” about the consequences of no agreement. This offers the possibility to conclude negotiations by reference to the underlying power structure, but clothes the threat in a more diplomatic language – in effect a veiled threat. Nevertheless, the main thrust or ideology of the school, at least as taught in seminars and workshops, rejects power-based negotiation.

Even if the work is commonsensical, the suggested systematic collection and evaluation of various strategies is important. Unfortunately, however, a differentiation or proper appreciation of the context, in which the negotiations take place, is missing. More specifically, there is no specification as to the efficiency of the proposed strategies depending on different contexts or a reference whether in some contexts a search for WW solutions is feasible at all. However, according to the already cited empirical findings, the context can have profound implications on negotiation outcomes.

Turning to the resolution of and intervention in ethnopolitical conflicts the Harvard School has offered certain contributions. In addition to the now increasingly common training of diplomats and international officials in the methods of the school, a special mediation technique, running under the term of “Interactive Conflict Resolution” (ICR), has also been developed. The ICR movement focuses on seminars and workshops with multiplier personalities, local individuals who are expected to carry the workshop knowledge into society suffering from ethnic strife and to popularize it there. Since the beginning of the 1990s the toolbox of the ICR movement has been further broadened to include various new initiatives within the domain of “track-2” diplomacy. These include fact-finding missions, training seminars with round-tables and consulting and organizational development support of newly founded NGOs, PR work as well as political education. Fisher, already in 1993, mentions some 19 such projects. Ropers (1995) remarks, however, that

“only little information exists about the majority of these projects. On the one hand, this can be explained by the usually agreed confidentiality of the workshops; on the other hand also because, so far in this field, only very few systematic efforts on follow-up and evaluative research have been undertaken. It is thus difficult to answer the question about the effectiveness of these efforts” (p. 76-77).

To my knowledge up to now there has been no evaluative knowledge concerning the WW negotiation and mediation style in the context of international interventions – either with regard to the state or the field level of the intervention. Even Ropers, himself a supporter of the alternative dispute resolution and ICR, admits that consultative ICR projects have little to offer concerning the short-term reduction of violence levels in internal wars. Power-based interventions to achieve such aims are, however, regarded by ICR scholars and practitioners as offering only short-term solutions. Their intentions go further: To profoundly change the societal structures underlying the conflict.

2.1.3 Empirical and Experimental Studies

Empirical and experimental studies of threat-based bargaining show ambivalent results. It has been widely commented that a person using threats has to observe a

fine balance between demonstrating resolve and thereby still not provoking a conflict it actually seeks to avoid (Huth 1988, Lebow 1981). The aim of a threat is precisely to reach a goal by way of negotiation and not by the use of force.

Social psychological studies have confirmed that threats can also have a negative escalatory impact on negotiations. The already mentioned study of Peterson, Winter and Doty (1994) observed that following hostile acts of a negotiating counterpart even cooperative gestures are less likely to be perceived. Other researchers observed that in some cases negotiators can become so incensed at each other that “henceforth [they] strive to maximize their opponent’s displeasure rather than [their] own satisfaction” (Siegel and Fouraker 1960:100). Weiss-Wik (1983) is equally negative about the chances of threat-based negotiations:

“An overwhelming amount of experimental literature shows that threats tend to elicit counterthreats, which then draw in competitive pressure, concern over restoring face, and hostility. The conflict spirals” (p.727).

Besides the escalatory psychological and cognitive processes that the use of threats can trigger, a rational choice consideration might also motivate actors to toughen their stance under threat. The importance of a reputation has already been mentioned. The moment a threat is spelled out, a new issue in addition to the original topic of dispute is opened up, namely the reputation of the threatened side. Should he or she give in, his or her loss will be double: a loss regarding the original topic of the dispute and an additional loss of reputation for resolve.

Nevertheless, certain research results suggest that threats and a tough stance can be successful. A relatively recent negotiation manual recommends to its readers “not to give in to threats, unless [one] has no choice” (Hodgson 1998, p. 113) - a clear indication that threats can, in fact, work. Bartos (1970) observed that in experiments tough negotiators frequently reached better results than “soft” ones. Only in cases, in which toughness degenerated to the formulation of positional demands did negotiations tend to break down. The WW school warns that formulating rigid positions and defending them in the course of negotiations can easily cloud the perception of the real underlying interests and intentions a party tries to achieve, as

the negotiators get bogged down in arguments over a single position. A non-positional approach to negotiations instead formulates a need, like the need of a state for security, and communicates this to the negotiating partner. The interesting observation is that toughness does not necessarily exclude a certain flexibility in negotiations.

An empirical study of negotiated settlements to civil wars might support both arguments, i.e., the pro- and contra-threat positions. The statistical analysis of some 171 international violent disputes that involved bilateral negotiations⁶ (Jackson 2000) showed a clear correlation between a clear, but not large power disparity between the warring sides and a negotiated solution. This is a rather straightforward confirmation of the efficiency of the power-based approaches. In this sense, the power difference between the warring sides can be interpreted as the coercive or deterrent leverage of the stronger over the weaker party. The weaker side is, however, sufficiently strong to impose high costs on the stronger party in a continued conflict. Interestingly, a large power gap between the parties to the conflict is not conducive to negotiated settlements, the reason being that the costs and risks of unilateral action, i.e., violent suppression, seem very low. The strong side perceives no need to negotiate. Jackson (ibid.), however, found that power parity also endangers a negotiated settlement because it invites attempts to upset the balance and provokes competition (Kleiboer 1996).

As an additional possibility, I would like to propose endostrategic mechanisms as defined by Elwert (2001). As will be described in the next section, “Intrastate Wars” or conflicts can, in fact, stabilize political systems. A power parity between the parties to the conflict would invite such a misuse and, from the point of national interest, irrational war due to the equal distribution of capabilities the status quo is not threatened. With no defeat in sight, internally mobilizing elites can prolong conflicts indefinitely and reap the harvest of strengthened regime stability.

Another finding of the same investigation delivers, however, some support to the opponents of power based bargaining: with a rising number of war-related casualties

⁶ Violent conflicts that experienced mediation by a third party were not counted.

a negotiated solution becomes less likely. Negotiated settlements are most likely (65%), when the number of casualties ranges between and 500 and 1000. With casualties mounting above 10,000, negotiation success drops to 41% (Jackson 2000). This might indicate hardening positions and polarization (Jackson 2000, Kleiboer 1996, Kressel and Pruitt 1989), but could also be a result of other conflict characteristics such as power disparity. In such a case, the conflict would be bloody precisely because one side feels strong enough to impose its will by force and sees no need for negotiation. In his article, Jackson (2000) does not mention any control for such intervening variables.

Another interesting finding of social psychological research refers to the normative embedding of negotiations that defines the range of legitimate bargaining tactics. Even concerning coercive threats some strategies are regarded as more acceptable by the normative context than others (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, Tedeschi and Lindskold 1976). Coercive bargaining strategies that fall outside normative boundaries can “cause a backlash that limits the gains that might have been expected based on a rational calculation of the material stakes” (Schoppa 1999:308). One interesting reason for this, according to Schoppa, is that even in the case of negotiations in which coercion is applied, trust is a necessary ingredient. The coerced party needs to trust the coercer that the agreement will not be renegotiated later demanding further concessions.

The question arises whether there are negotiating contexts in which there are no or only very little normative rules defining legitimate and non-legitimate bargaining strategies. However, a lack of agreement regarding legitimate and illegitimate bargaining strategies does not necessarily preclude reaching an agreement. Schoppa speculates that the Cold War was such a case. “When a state is threatening to invade or rain nuclear missiles on your country, legitimacy and trust are not likely to be an important part of the story”⁹ (ibid. p.312). War, or overt and protracted hostility, could thus be a context, in which almost anything is allowed.

Indeed, comparing different topical negotiation contexts, it becomes apparent that security related negotiations, i.e., also wars, differ from other types of negotiations such as trade or environmental negotiations. Druckman (2001) speculates about a

“difference in the way that governments approach security issues as compared with the way they deal with trade, environmental, or other political issues. Security issues have been negotiated in the context of adversarial relationships between nations. [...] Security talks (including arms control) are often protracted, difficult, increasingly antagonistic, marked by mutual distrust, and seem to contain elements of false rather than genuine bargaining. [...] Governments are risk averse when dealing with their own security and reluctant to alter the status quo or take bold initiatives” (p. 521).

Equally interesting is the result of Druckman’s (2001) analysis that the turning points in his sample of international security negotiations that led talks to a successful conclusion occurred almost exclusively as a result of events external to the negotiating process. In contrast, in international trade, environmental or other negotiations turning points were frequently process-internal events, such as procedural improvements, new ideas, a new working group, etc. Jackson’s (2000) bleak observation regarding negotiations in violent international disputes seems to confirm the assessment that security related issues are intrinsically more difficult to negotiate than other topics:

“By far the most common outcome of any individual negotiation is to have no discernible effect on the conflict behavior of the parties. Negotiations rarely result in ceasefire and even more rarely result in a full and complete settlement to the conflict” (p.331).

A few brief words are still necessary with regard to the empirical assessment of mediation initiatives. Unfortunately, there are not many empirical studies that evaluate the impact of the various parameters of a mediation effort on mediation success (Wall, Stark and Standifer 2001). There is general agreement that high activity levels of the mediator result in better mediation outcomes (Henderson 1996, Kelly 1996). Another commonly held finding is that it is more efficient for mediators to try to improve the relationship between the disputants than to push them for settlement or even to focus on facts (Kressel et al. 1994, Pruitt 1995). However, the results of these few evaluative studies originate from areas (e.g., family disputes,

community mediation) which have very little to do with internationally sponsored negotiations in internal war situations. Furthermore, negotiations in security contexts seem to be substantially different from other negotiating contexts. The question thus is whether these results can be applied to civil war contexts.

A few other interesting observations concern disputant motivations. Committed and receptive disputants achieve higher rates at mediation success. Another factor in relation to positive mediation results is the rank of the mediator. The higher the rank of the mediator, the better mediation outcomes can be expected (Bercovitch and Houston 1993). With regard to power, Nickles and Hedgespeth (1991) note that mediation is more likely to lead to an agreement when the disputants' power is balanced. Unfortunately, the study is on divorce mediation, its finding would otherwise fit neatly with Jackson's (2000) observation that military conflicts with a power parity are less likely to be solved in bilateral negotiations than with clear but not overwhelming power gap.

2.2 Intrastate Wars

Following the discussion of the different theoretical approaches to negotiations I now turn to the discussion of the negotiating parties, first treating warring parties in civil wars. The reason for such a separate treatment of the civil war context is thus twofold. On the one hand, empirical negotiation literature suggests that the type of the conflict and nature of the parties to the conflict both significantly influence negotiation outcomes and the success of the applied strategies. On the other, the two main approaches to negotiations, the rational choice and the more psychological approach of the Harvard school, correspond to similar assumptions on the behavior of warring groups involved in civil strife. It should thus be possible to control the efficiency evaluation of the propositions of the two negotiation approaches by referring to the observed behavior of the warring parties.

Thus, as the next factor, determining the success of the international intervention in the local context of internal wars will now be treated. With regard to evaluating the chances of international intervention, two aspects of civil wars are important: the dynamics of ongoing civil wars and how civil wars end. Surprisingly, there is relatively

little work on the ongoing dynamics of internal wars. Scientific studies either concentrate on the outbreak or on the ending of wars. Since many civil wars last for decades, such a lack of thinking on civil war dynamics is somewhat surprising. Notable exceptions are Waldmann (1995) and Elwert (2002). Based on the literature, usually mentioned under these two headings, one can identify rational, non-rational, i.e. norm-based and cognitive and organizational incentives as factors determining the dynamics of internal conflicts.

2.2.1 Rational Factors

Rational factors determining the course and dynamics of war mostly refer to military strategic issues such as the geography and terrain, quality and size of troops in conflict, equipment, economic variables and the so-called portfolio of allies. The importance of rational, strategically relevant factors is well documented for international conflicts (see Bueno de Mesquita 1981, Huth 1988, Pape 1996, Horowitz and Reiter 2001, etc.). Such a connection is less well documented for intrastate wars. One possible reason is that reliable data necessary for large-scale statistical research on civil war processes are not readily available for rebel groups. In their research Mason and Fett (1996) for instance only use government forces size as a variable for determining the end of internal conflicts and omit rebel forces, the reason being that reliable data on the size of such forces is simply not available.

Conducting and reviewing qualitative research on internal wars Elwert (1995, 2001) and Waldmann (1995) strongly argue in favor of a rational behavior of warring groups in internal wars, especially regarding their strategies of economic reproduction. A crucial aspect of present day internal conflicts in this respect is their strong external dependency and need for military and technical supplies and financial and political support. Frequently it is diaspora groups that organize these logistics of the struggle and do the political lobby work in their countries of exile (Angoustures and Pascal 1996).

To consider strategic and economic reproductive factors as relevant in a military conflict should not be surprising. As a system, war creates very strong evolutionary

pressures on the involved parties to either adapt and rationalize their ways or lose and perish. Accordingly, parties in civil wars are known to make tactical withdrawals, trying to negotiate or to seek allies when losing, etc.

2.2.2 Value-based, Cognitive and Psychological Factors

Though the rational consideration of strategic factors is crucial, several non-rational factors, i.e. normative / ideational, cognitive and psychological factors, also decisively influence the course of internal wars and the negotiations to end them. Normative / ideational factors in a secessionist conflict refer to the special brand of nationalism / ethnic mobilization on the state and rebel side. Some aspects of normative / ideational factors are treated in the literature, others, however, have not yet been dealt with.

Gurr (1995) mentions a deep-rooted ideological and political principle of *state officials*, who want to uphold the territorial integrity of the state and continue their policy of assimilation at the cost of the minority. Besides this more ideological preference, two more or less rational perceptions of state officials are also usually cited regarding the unwillingness to make compromises towards secessionist movements. Gurr (ibid. p.12) calls these the *domino* and the *camel's nose* theory. The first describes a situation in which compromises towards one rebellious minority causes other similar minorities to imitate the rebellion of the successful minority group. That such fears are not unfounded was demonstrated through the break-up of the Soviet Union. Serbs expressed similar concerns with regard to Kosovo: Should they give in to the Albanians, soon Montenegro, the Sandžak and Vojvodina might also come up with similar demands.

Other normative / ideational aspects of international wars are not treated in a theoretical sense though they are regularly mentioned in monographs on civil wars: highly salient ideology issues in state and rebel ideology. These can either facilitate or hinder an agreement. The extraordinary symbolic importance of Jerusalem in both Israeli and Palestinian / Arab ideology makes a peaceful settlement of the conflict difficult. On the other hand, in the more fortunate case of Czechoslovak separation

there were very few contentious symbolic or ideational issues. This is not just the result of a relatively cooperative handling of the secessionist negotiations, but also due to the simple lack of overlapping claims.

Cognitive issues influencing and distorting rational action are even more interesting. Rebel or state ideologies, but also lesser “theories” about the attitudes of the opponent can profoundly influence the understanding of a given situation, even leading to what could be considered an irrational action by an outside observer. An example on the level of state or rebel ideologies is the belief in the historically determined success of national movements to achieve their aims. I have encountered very similar versions of the ideologeme “history shows us that all oppressed nations eventually succeed in achieving their independence” among both Bosnian Croat separatists and Tamil Tiger rebels. Such an ideology gives enormous - on occasion – seemingly irrational resolve to such separatist fighters and politicians. I would assume that lacking such ideologies, political goals set in peace negotiations or attitudes towards mediators would be entirely different.

Another interesting example is the discussion among the communist Vietnamese leadership about determining in which of the three phases of the Maoist revolutionary theory Vietnamese resistance was when the US entered the war (Wirtz 1994). Mao outlines three phases of resistance in a progressive order: initial terrorist action that turns into guerrilla warfare, which, as the revolution progresses, turns into conventional fighting. Even though conventional warfare favored US troops, it took years and heavy casualties for the communists to modify their strategy. The problem was the strong belief that modifying the communist strategy would also redefine the stage of the whole Vietnamese communist movement.

Other cognitive issues that also distort rational action are located on the level of small “theories” about an opponent. The Têt offensive (Wirtz 1994), shows how US beliefs about the strategic situation of northern Vietnamese and Vietcong forces, formulated months prior to the offensive, had led to a complete misinterpretation of communist goals. Resulting from inflated body counts US military analysts believed that the Vietnamese were in a more desperate state than was actually the case. Accordingly,

they expected a Vietnamese attempt to humiliate US troops in a Diên Biên Phú style manner. Most analysts now agree that the French defeat at Diên Biên Phú was not decisive in military terms, but it delivered a decisive blow against French resolve at home. Based on the Diên Biên Phú analogy, abundant information on the real goals of the offensive, among others a clandestine Vietcong broadcast outlining the precise course of a “general uprising” and accurate analyses by low-level US analysts, were discarded as propaganda or irrelevant.

Thus, in spite of the US army possessing all the necessary information the Vietcong and North Vietnamese attack achieved an almost complete surprise. Even though in the end the Tết offensive did not achieve its stated goals – Vietcong and North Vietnamese losses were exceedingly high and also the expected uprising of the south Vietnamese people did not materialize – the attack had a profound impact on US domestic moral. In fact most analysts blame the shock of the Tết for leading to US withdrawal from the conflict.

Finally, psychological factors are also important in determining the dynamics of internal wars. Wars and conflicts cannot remain without deep personal animosities and hatreds. The personal hatred, between for instance Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon is well known. It is thus not unreasonable to assume that such animosities would not further aggravate the conflict and increase the difficulty of finding a solution. In laboratory tests of conflict escalation Peterson, Winter and Doty (1994) observed that after hostile openings to negotiations, cooperative or even de-escalatory items in later offers were not perceived properly. Thus, in conflict situations the attitudes and perceptions of the opponents are frequently narrowed down to the tit-for-tat of the conflict itself, not adequately perceiving alternative courses to the dispute.

Another relevant psychological factor for conflict situations goes by the term *framing* or *prospect theory* and was initially described by the authors Quatrone and Tversky (1988) and applied to intrastate conflicts by Berejikian (1992) and Gosztanyi (1998). Prospect theory is derived from psychological experiments in which individuals demonstrated very different attitudes towards perceived losses as compared to

perceived gains. They were risk acceptant in their behavior to avoid losses, but risk-averse in achieving gains of the same objective value (e.g. a \$10 loss or gain). Since the concepts of "loss" and "gain" are subjective, the existence of an individual reference point must be assumed. Based on that individual and subjective reference, personal losses and gains are determined. As long as the reference point remains stable, it introduces a factor of stability into social relations. Individuals protect what they have with determination, but are not willing to invest similar efforts to increase their position or property. This stabilizing effect is called the *status quo bias*. However, as changes in possessions or status occur, people show different attitudes as to how they accommodate themselves to such changes depending on whether a change is considered to be a gain or a loss. Whereas after a short time people usually accept gains as their new status quo (*instant endowment effect*) they adapt only slowly to a new, lower status after a loss. Often, by applying risky strategies, they seek to reverse such a perceived loss.

Prospect theory has several implications for sociological studies. The idea of differential behavior as a consequence of the subjective, individual judgment of what is a loss and what is a gain contradicts the traditional assumptions of expected utility theory. As long as a relative loss or gain has the same externally given value, e.g. a monetary value of a given amount, expected utility theory would assume indifference in behavior towards the object. A further implication concerns the application of prospect theory. The subjectivity and "fluidity" of the reference point makes it extremely difficult to apply it to real world situations (Levy 1996). On the other hand, there are still hopes for a useful application of the theory. The fact that the reference points usually seem to refer to relatively few focal points might facilitate its application.

In secessionist conflicts a few simple focal points emerge: from the point of view of the government, the sanctity of its territorial sovereignty is a clearly distinguishable reference point. This coincides also with the empirically observed preference of state officials, as mentioned by Gurr (1994), to maintain state borders. From the perspective of a rebelling minority it is twofold.

Originally, minorities seem to rebel when they are deprived of certain rights they previously enjoyed (e.g., restrictions on native language use, known to have frequently triggered minority rebellion). They rebel out of a sense of “relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970, 1993, 1994). Their reference point thus might be a state of greater equality, when compared to the current increased discrimination. Due to the already mentioned instant endowment effect, the reference point of the rebel group can easily shift if they manage to establish themselves successfully in certain regions of the country of conflict. Their new reference point thus becomes their semi-autonomous region. A return to the pre-conflict status quo would be perceived as a loss and would thus be resisted in a risk-acceptant manner. On the side of the rebels an additional, not prospect theory-related factor also suggests high risk-acceptance. The personalities that initiate rebel resistance movements against a government can be assumed to be highly risk-acceptant – as a personal character trait.

2.2.3 Organizational Aspects

So far groups engaged in internal fighting have been treated as unitary actors, whose actions are based on rational and normative factors. Normative and military rational factors, however, do not suffice to account for the prolonged fighting of most internal wars. For prolonged violence needs organization (Elwert 2001). Thus, similar to the national interest of states in international relations, internal factors also shape the behavior of warring factions in intrastate conflicts. Elwert directs attention to the economic reproductive needs of warring parties in civil wars. Securing the economic resources necessary for perpetuating the armed struggle introduces a logic of action often unrelated to the initial and publicly stated goals of the fighting groups. In engaging in these economic activities warring groups take recourse to the activity they are most professional in, i.e. violence. Elwert coined the term “markets of violence” to describe such conflict situations.

The pattern is familiar: communist FARC rebels in Colombia engage in the drug trade. Without their expertise in violence the rebels would not be able to protect their niche in the trade (Waldmann 1995, Krauthausen 1997, Krauthausen and Sarmiento 1997). Other armed groups fight for the possession of valuable resources such as

diamonds or siphon off international humanitarian aid to finance their movements. An again different strategy refers to the manipulation of diaspora populations that support the struggle. Satisfying the needs and expectations of the diaspora becomes a key determinant of action. The Tamil Tigers, for instance, who strongly depend in their financing on their overseas networks, maintain a well-managed website and even produce videos of their military exploits that are distributed among the Tamil diaspora throughout the world. In many internal conflict-contexts the border between violence-supported economic activities to finance a struggle and war as a mode of economic production becomes completely blurred. In such situations individual or group incentive structures can develop that promote the perpetuation of a conflict. The strategic interest of the actors then become neither to lose nor to win. This is in essence warlordism.

Holding on to political power can similarly perpetuate conflicts, as peace will lead either to the downfall or just to a gradual loss of importance of wartime elites. Contrary to commonly held scientific beliefs, it is not only warlords that can have an interest in the indefinite prolongation of a conflict, but also the ruling elites of (democratic) states. From the perspective of a ruling elite in a multi-party system an ongoing conflict can justify emergency legislation, create national cohesion making huge military expenditure necessary that can feed whole patron-client networks. All these factors of course clearly favor incumbent presidents and parties. Peace, on the other hand, would rob ruling elites of these instruments of preserving power. This, in essence, is “endostrategic mobilization” (Elwert 2001, see also Gosztanyi 1993) – the use of conflict by self-serving and determined elites or individuals to gain or retain power. The formative motivational factors of the conflict can thus be entirely different than the stated goals of the warring parties or eventual structurally given tensions between the larger groups in the conflict (e.g. resource conflict). The interest of ruling parties can, similar to warlords, become “not to lose, not to win” (Elwert 2002).

A final internal organizational aspect that affects the dynamics of civil conflicts are factions within the warring parties and societies themselves. If even the national interest of established and stable democratic states has been shown to be influenced by the particular interests of domestic groupings, how much more will civil war

factions suffer under internal divisions. These groupings can be regional, economic, ideological or religious. They nevertheless introduce their own unpredictable dynamics to internal conflicts. In the context of the Bosnian war it was the regional lobby of Hercegovinian Croats that was able to impress its particular interests on Croatian and Bosnian Croat politics. There can be little doubt that the territory of the Posavina Croats was “sold” by Croatian President Franjo Tuđman to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević, who in turn withdrew Yugoslav troops from Croatian Hercegovina. Unlike the Hercegovinians, the Posavina Croats had no strong lobby in Zagreb (Silber and Little 1996, Glenny 1996, Rathfelder 1998).

2.3 The International Context

The main interest or dispute regarding humanitarian interventions as state action on the level of international relations is where the motivational causes for the intervention lie with hidden and unstated national interests of states? Noam Chomsky for instance suggests that the use of force for humanitarian purposes in Kosovo was nothing but an expression of US imperialism (1999). An author (Adelman 1992), more from the mainstream of the discipline, locates states’ national interests in humanitarian intervention in avoiding refugee flows.

Opposed to the top-down motivated participation in humanitarian interventions is the assumption of a creative role of the actors in the field: the media and international organizations. Can they make a difference? In the following section, first state level motivators of state action in the post-Cold War context will be discussed. Subsequently, I shall turn to the media and international organizations in the field.

2.3.1 The Post-Cold War Era

The main characteristics and tendencies of the new era are easier to judge some ten years after the fall of communism and the realignments in the international system. Probably the most important formative feature of the period after 1991 is the shift

from the bipolar global power constellation of the cold war to a system dominated by one superpower only, the USA, or as the neorealists of international relations prefer to call it: “a unipolar system” (Krauthammer 1990/1991, Wohlforth 1999).

Neorealism (Waltz 1959, 1986, Ruggie 1986, Grieco 1993, Mearsheimer 1994 etc.) is a reductionist, rational choice based school of thought in international relations. Realists assume states to be the only relevant actors, trying to survive in a world dominated by anarchy (there is no institutional hierarchy among states). In this strongly competitive neorealist world cooperation between states is extremely limited. Conditioned by the anarchic system, states are believed to be more concerned about the distribution of gains (relative gains) derived from cooperation than by possible absolute gains. Realists justify states' preoccupation with relative gains by a view of the world in which a state can use its gains to turn against his partner. An unequal distribution of gains could upset the interstate balance of power. States receiving relatively less from the joint effort would thus refrain from cooperation because it would weaken them relative to their partner (Baldwin 1993b, Grieco 1993 etc.).

Thus the neorealist answer to post-Cold War cooperation is the absolute preponderance of power of the US in the new global order – a relative concentration of power so far unprecedented in history. This absolute dominance makes it futile for any state or coalition of states to contest US hegemony. The only choice open for weaker states (i.e. the rest of the world) is to cooperate or “bandwagon” with the US on important issues.

The critics of realism, the neoliberal and constructivist schools of IR, contest several realist conclusions. The basic outlook of realists is rational – and it is exactly on these grounds that neoliberals contest their conclusions. Neoliberalism, as a school of thought, is strongly influenced by the rational choice-based economic theories of the 1980s. Accordingly, they view behavior as self-interested and utility maximizing and the nature of the international system as anarchic. In spite of sharing many basic assumptions with realists, neoliberals come to markedly different conclusions regarding the functioning of the international system.

Snidal (1993) points out that neorealist conclusions about the significance of relative gains do not hold true in iterated games⁷ if the number of states is more than three. Instead of relative gains, states in such models (more than three player iterated games) are more interested in absolute gains, meaning that there should be a net profit in the cooperation. In this respect, it is particularly the prospect of joint future profits that enhances cooperation in the present.

Keohane (1993) adds that in deciding whether to consider absolute or relative gains in a cooperative arrangement, states' expectations of another state's future behavior are also crucial. Should a state view future cooperation also in the interest of its counterpart it is more likely to take into account the absolute profits of joint action rather than its relative distribution. Economic interdependence is a crucial factor in this respect – it stabilizes cooperation through the long-term prospects of future gains.

The last and most sociological school of IR, the constructivists (Wendt 1992, 1994, Barnett 1995, Weldes 1996, Klotz 1995, Price 1995 etc.), go even further. They see not just state interests, but also the entire international environment as social constructs (Weldes 1996). In this sense the end of the Cold War also brought them ideologically closer. While neoliberals still view cooperation as basically rational and self-interested, constructivists have a more bounded view of rationality and also consider not entirely self-interested motives for state action and cooperation. Constructivists, nevertheless, usually agree with the neoliberals and neorealists on certain key assumptions: on the anarchic nature of the world system within which states are the main actors.

With regard to cooperation, Wendt (1992, 1994) introduced the concept of identity. According to Wendt states might choose to cooperate for more than just the rational reasons of joint benefits. They might consider each other to be “friends”, to share

⁷ Iterated games in game theory are games that last over several rounds. In such long-term interactions current behaviour is significantly influenced by expectations for the future. E.g., in a one- round game, in which defection (cheating) an adversary would deliver a gain of \$5 and cooperation only \$1 dollar, the incentive for defection is naturally very high. An iterated version of the game lasting over 20 rounds would, however, create a completely different incentive structure: continued cooperation would deliver \$20 profit while defection until the 14th round only less. In fact, a profit maximizing player would cooperate until the 19th round and defect in the 20th bringing his/her profits to a maximum of \$24.

common values, interests and ideology. Using insights of both, the neoliberal and the constructivist schools, Deng (2000) re-evaluates the post-Cold War unipolar international system:

“In gauging the US power, one must consider the reality that under the US leadership, there is now a rough congruence of economic, political, military, and normative frameworks shared by a cluster of great powers in Europe, North America, and Japan. From this perspective, one appreciates better the nature and robustness of US hegemony and why there has been little balancing to US power” (ibid. <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/papers/deng00.pdf>).

Other authors like James Goldgeier and Michael MacFaul (1992) even speak of a “great power society” with an “in-group mentality” that coalesces around democratic values and a liberal economic outlook. Moreover, these states are economically strongly interdependent and connected to each other through a dense network of international organizations.

Finally, there is also a more recent version of this world view, according to which on a number of issues, ranging from global warming to the establishment of an International Criminal Court, the two great power blocks, the US and the EU, are increasingly in conflict (Mathews 2001). In fact, Mathews claims that through the uncooperative attitude of the US on several global issues, e.g. CO2 emissions, the US is even endangering its global leadership position. At the same time continuing European integration is further enhancing the EU’s power. Nevertheless, on important issues the US and the EU are still believed to stand together.

2.3.2 State Action

2.3.2.1 National Interest

Traditional realist and neoliberal thinking usually assumes externally given material – usually economic and security – factors as constituting the national interest. Realists add to this the security-derived concern over the relative position of other states vis-à-vis one’s own state. In realist terms, states either have to adapt to the perceived evolutionary selection-like laws of the state system or perish. Waltz (1979) states that

states “at a minimum, seek their own preservation, and at a maximum, drive for universal domination” (p.118). According to neorealists these assumptions about basic state interest drive states to behave in a twofold manner: the survival goal should lead states to balance against more powerful opponents through alliances with other states. Thus by forming alliances with other states weaker states try to avoid domination by stronger states. This behavior is assumed to lead again and again to stable balance of power structures in world politics. The observation by Waltz himself (ibid. p.137) that “the death rate for states is remarkably low” is understood by critics of neorealism as a grave contradiction in neorealist thinking (Keohane 1986).

The other assumed state objective, power maximization, refers to resources that can be used to induce other states to do what they would otherwise not do. Neorealist understanding of power is thus related to Weber’s definition of power as “possibility, within a social relationship to impose one’s own will against resistance, irrespective of what this possibility is based on⁸” (1980:28). Interestingly Keohane (1986) remarks that power maximization and self-preservation might impose conflicting needs regarding state behavior: “States concerned with self-preservation [...] recognize a trade-off between aggrandizement and self-preservation” (p. 174).

National interest is thus derived from the quest of states to survive and maximize their power. Any engagement wasting resources needed for survival or power maximization cannot thus be in the national interests of states as framed by neorealists.

Critics of the rationalist schools claim that all national interests are social constructs. One aspect of social construction thus refers to the “latent normative element that derives from neorealist theory” (Cox 1986:212). Neorealist theory claims to be value free. However, as some of its critics claim, since in neorealist thought

“security within the postulated interstate system depends upon each of the major actors understanding this system in the same way [...] the theory also

⁸ Own translation; The original reads as follows: „Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegen Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht“.

performs a proselytising function as the advocate of this form of rationality” (pp.212-213).

Wendt (1999) thus observes that

“since the social process is how we get structure [...] the more that states think like ‘Realists’ the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p.368).

There can be no doubt that the traditional “hard” issues of geopolitics, security and economy, indeed form hard interests that cannot be easily ignored. Even considering “hard interests”, there is a crucial aspect of social construction involved: political situations have to be perceived, interpreted and acted upon. In other words, first one has to understand a given a situation and then, based upon this understanding, design a feasible response. In this sense, something has fundamentally changed with the end of the Cold War. Larson (1996) describes for the US what is, in fact, a more widespread phenomenon:

“While the Cold War provided a coherent framework for evaluating the importance of threats to the nation, the current environment is characterized by disagreement and conceptual confusion over the proper U.S. role and purpose in the post–Cold War world, readily apparent from the debates that erupt with each new prospective U.S. military intervention” (p. 5).

Another mechanism assumed to influence the construction of national interest is that of international cooperation and identity. The argument follows very much the line of the “great power society”-concept and that of cooperation through IOs. According to Wendt (1994), shared identity can, but must not, reshape perceptions of goals and aims of states. In the field of IR, shared identity would refer to a “feeling” or perception among states of belonging to a joint group, the argument being reminiscent of sociological and anthropological theories of nation and group building.⁹ In the course of international interaction state interests can thus be generated endogenously (Wendt 1994). This assumption is contrary to the neorealist and to some extent also to the neoliberal thinking that usually assumes externally given

⁹ See Anderson (1991) on “imagined communities” and Elwert (1989, 1995) on “we groups”.

state interests. Developments in the European Union, e.g. the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFS), point in this direction. Another example refers to the US intervention in the Bosnian war. Bymann et al. (2000) state that

“the decision resulted from a complex series of events during the final years of the Balkan wars, which drew the United States ever deeper into a contingency it had initially tried to avoid. In the final analysis, U.S. decision-makers chose to act because its allies could neither ignore the problem nor solve it without American leadership” (p. 21).

Clearly, conventional methods of determining the national interest do not apply any more. However, there is more to the end of the Cold War. Referring to the already discussed nature of the New World Order, the hegemonic situation of the US and its allies (“the great power society”) lessened the threat for states of being “annihilated” in the process of global evolution. In addition, the already discussed mechanisms of interdependence, mutual gains through cooperation and normative preference also play a significant role in stabilizing the international system and reducing competitive behavior. An aspect of living in a less hostile environment is that there are few compelling security interests left to determine the imperatives of the national interest. As a result ad hoc needs and interests and public pressures can more readily find their way into international politics than previously. Or as Deng (2000) puts it for the US, the availability of so many choices is “a luxury of [...] hegemonic power” (<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/papers/deng00.pdf>).

2.3.2.2 Values and Norms

Another proposal as to what motivates states’ behavior regards values and norms. Opinion as to the nature and importance of values and norms once again differ between the three schools of IR. For realists, norms are little more than convenient justifications for rational action in maximizing a state’s material and security interests.¹⁰ For Neoliberals norms are important regulatory tools making state

¹⁰ It is interesting to note that early realists in fact appropriated importance to norms and values (Carr 1946). These writers living around the beginning of the Cold War and in the phase of decolonisation clearly saw both processes to have strong ideational aspects. It seems that later realist scholars, lacking this personal experience, completely blended out the aspect of norms and values from their analyses. Another explanation of this “blind spot” is that it was the obsession with measurement in the 1970s and 1980s that led scientists to disregard such

behavior more transparent and predictable in interaction with other states. For both schools norms can also just codify what is in the material interest of states.

Predictably, for constructivists, norms are also social constructs in the state system. In this sense norms are not just the result of self-seeking, utility-maximizing interaction with other states to which states conform because they calculate them to be in their interest but a structure that shapes the perception of what constitutes an “interest”. In conclusion, the constructivist contribution to norms is that, in addition to the view of norms as merely justifying or at best legitimizing state action (realists) or just easing and facilitating cooperation between states, norms do have their own, “independent” and thus not easily disentangleable connection with interests influencing state action.

Of key interest with regard to the present work is, however, not just the theoretical possibility of norm-based, norm-motivated action, but to find out if there is a change in the international system after the end of the Cold War. Globalization theorists and IR constructivists strongly endorse the idea of global norm convergence. Authors refer to these carriers of this new phenomenon as the “global civil society” (Macdonald 1994), transnational communities (Rosenau 1990, 1993) or a “zweite Welt” (Czempiel 1992). This global civil society is comprised of NGOs, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International (AI), Greenpeace and other organizations working in the field of environmental protection, women’s rights, etc. who help to establish international norms and raise sensitivity and awareness of abuses. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) summarize the mechanisms listed by scholars as stimulating global norm convergence:

“World historical events such as wars or major depressions in the international system can lead to a search for new ideas and norms. [...] This kind of explanation would suggest that the end of the Cold War would be such a period of major normative growth and consolidation, based on the principles of the winning coalition in the “war.” Notions of “world time” are also present in the arguments [...] Although norms have always been a part of international life, changes in communication and transportation technologies and increasing

difficulties to measure concepts as values and norms (see Lowi 1992; Simon 1993a; Lowi 1993a,b; and Simon 1993b).

global interdependence have led to increased connectedness and, in a way, are leading to the homogenization of global norms” (p.909).

In this respect, it is especially interesting how new norms are created and gradually internalized by social actors. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) borrow the concept “norms cascade” from legal scholars to describe the emergence and acceptance of new norms and apply it to IR:

“The characteristic mechanism of the first stage, norm emergence, is persuasion by norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms. The second stage is characterized more by a dynamic of imitation as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. The exact motivation for this second stage where the norm ‘cascades’ through the rest of the population (in this case, of states) may vary, but we argue that a combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimacy, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem facilitate norm cascades. At the far end of the norm cascade, norm internalization occurs; norms acquire a taken-for-granted quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate” (p.895).

In the field of IR, norm change has resulted in an “ideational convergence” (Flynn and Farrell 1999) around democratic values and a heightened salience of human rights and humanitarian issues to the detriment of classical state sovereignty. International organizations and also states are thus increasingly willing to disregard state sovereignty and intervene in internal affairs if grave human rights violations are taking place. This changing norm or habit to globally extend human rights and democratic norms is, in fact, in many respects the precondition of humanitarian interventions.

Already in the mid 1990s, Jack Donnelly (1995) noted that “genocide/ politicide [...] was almost completely ignored by the United Nations during the Cold War” (p. 67). The author also observed a greater willingness of other interstate organizations to intervene in internal affairs when political rights were being disregarded. When Alberto Fujimori suspended parliamentary government in 1992 in Peru, the OAS (Organization of American States) reacted with “greater vigilance and significantly diminished organizational self-restraint” (ibid.). The OAS, previously always reluctant to intrude in the internal affairs of its member states, imposed sanctions on Peru.

Lastly, also concerning humanitarian assistance Donnelly noted that “the United Nations is pushing aggressively at the limits of its existing humanitarian authority” (p. 68).

Later in the decade, scholars already began to speak about “humanitarian interventionism” and that “the use of force for humanitarian purposes has become a familiar pattern in post-Cold War international politics” (Wheeler and Dunne 2001:805). A related and fascinating area in this respect is the strengthening of international law as represented by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. There can thus be little doubt that since the end of the Cold War a significant norm change has indeed taken place, allowing states and international organizations to promote human rights and humanitarian issues more actively.

So far the question has been whether reasons other than the rational utility maximization of the national interest can shape the action of states. The theoretical conclusion of constructivists is that, in a variety of ways, and increasingly since the end of the Cold War, normative concerns do influence state action. Such a development is of course open to “normative” criticism by realists. Wheeler and Dunne (2001) report how, disappointed by Australia’s human rights-motivated handling of the Timor crisis,

“realists [...] condemned the Howard government for allowing ‘its policy towards Indonesia and the region to become hostage to its [humanitarian] policy towards East Timor’. What they [i.e. the realists] failed to understand is that the national interest is not a given that can be read off from fixed geopolitical coordinates. Rather, the crisis in East Timor led the international community to challenge the traditional interpretations of the major players in the unfolding drama” (p. 827).

Clearly, norms find their way into the formulation of the national interest.

Rational vs. Norm-Based Action

The strongly differing positions of neorealists, neoliberals and constructivists on the role of norms in international politics just highlights a basic difficulty in properly assessing the influence of norms – not just in IR but in the social sciences in general.

It is from the field of values and norms that the rationality assumption is being contested. However, differentiating rational from norm/ value based action is very difficult, since the two concepts are intricately linked. Was the action of Western states in the Former Yugoslavia motivated by self-seeking security interests favoring stability or moral prerogatives? A discussion of rational choice versus norm-based action theory is necessary.

Rational choice theory sees the behavior of individuals as strategic action aiming to maximize utility according to a clear preference structure. Usually material preference structures are preferred, but, in principle, immaterial benefits, such as honor or moral satisfaction could also be considered. According to rational choice theory, the main question an actor would ask himself is: "how do I achieve what I want?"

In principle rational choice theory presumes a completely utilitarian, norm-free action of individuals. In its extreme formulations, e.g., by realists, norms and values are nothing but a smokescreen: individuals and states conform to rules and norms only to maximize their utility.

It is, however, difficult to deny that norms and moral prerogatives do play a role in determining human conduct. An alternative approach concentrating on norm-based behavior is March's and Olsen's (1989) "logic of appropriateness". According to this point of view, people organize their behavior to conform to internalized roles and rules, which they believe to be "good", to be "one's obligation or duty" or simply out of habit. Subsequent authors examined how such rules could override utility maximizing choices (Fiske and Taylor 1994, Gilovich 1991, etc.). Following this norm-based approach, the questions an actor asks oneself is "what kind of a situation is this?" and "what is the right behavior for me in this situation?" In its extreme formulations theories of norm-based behavior can sound almost deterministic. Some scholars argue that certain norms become so internalized that individuals do not even question them.

The rules of appropriateness are, however, rarely clear. More often they are contradictory, like in a debate as to whether to send troops to stop a civil war causing

great human suffering, but thereby endangering the lives of one's own soldiers. The debate is complex including both moral and pragmatic material considerations. This dilemma points to the basic difficulty of integrating the two approaches. To my knowledge, a comprehensive theoretical proposal integrating the two approaches in complex decision-making processes does not yet exist.¹¹

Four areas can be mentioned that try to integrate rational vs. norm-based behavioral approaches.

1. Norms can become a part of rational choice calculations. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that the game theoretical concept of "common knowledge" could provide an opening for conversation between rational choice scholars and constructivists" (p. 910). Common knowledge describes social facts that enter the calculations of a strategically acting individual. When test persons were given the task to meet an acquaintance in New York on a specified date but a location that would have to be guessed, most individuals chose the Grand Central Station. The station is a well-known and central spot in New York. By the same token certain moral considerations can similarly enter calculations, as excluding certain otherwise, rational conceivable choices or simply as knowledge regarding the behavior of counterparts.

2. Morally set goals can constitute the preference that strategic, utilitarian behavior tries to maximize. In other words, people can behave in a perfectly rational and strategic way, when seeking moral objectives, such as the protection of human rights. Regarding the questions asked by the present work, this aspect of moral/rational action is very important: Are states willing to engage in materially non self-seeking actions, like ending a civil war? A number of empirical studies have answered the question with a tentative yes. A psychological survey (Herrmann and Shannon 2001), for instance, conducted among the US elite, came to the conclusion that

¹¹ Unclear or precisely unpredictable outcomes in a situation of strategic choice would also have to be considered. Another aspect left out of the discussion include cognitive considerations – the "theories" people form about the complex realities, in which they have to make strategic choices.

“Leaders in the United States clearly do defend international norms sometimes. They are most likely to do so when US economic and security interests are at stake. Felt normative obligation motivates some action, but not nearly as much as material interests do” (p. 651).

This statement explains many of the difficulties scholars have in differentiating norm and interest motivated behavior: the motivation to protect norms is stronger if the required action also coincides with self-interested goals.

3. Norms are not a rigid set of rules. They are constantly being contested and changed. In this respect empirical research in IR has identified so-called transnational norm entrepreneurs (see Klotz 1995, Price 1995; Sikkink 1993). The activity of norm entrepreneurs in creating new norms is usually referred to as persuasion in the literature. The concept will later still be important when analyzing the international intervention in Bosnia. In their actions these norm entrepreneurs, though attempting to change the prevailing norms (i.e. the preferences and framework of action), are highly rational and strategic.

4. Norms and the moral values of society, whether international or local, are, also from an instrumental perspective, constantly under debate. Just as Bourdieu (1977) describes the Kabyle society without questioning its values, so actors can strategically interpret a given situation to fit and justify their preferred choice.

2.3.2.3 Institutional Theory

Institutional theory offers an alternative explanation for state action (Pierson 1993, Altfeld and Miller 1984, Moe 1990, Avant 1994 etc.). Other than treating states as unitary actors – as the previous neorealist or norm-based approaches did – institutional theory concentrates on the various pressures, constraints and incentives that political-decision makers are exposed to. Mayhew (1974) describes how politicians have to fulfil multiple goals in order to be successful: they have to be re-elected, they have to attain power in their institution and they have to execute a good policy. Frequently these three motivations compete with and contradict each other. The influence of the electoral mechanism on political behavior is relatively clear. It

can induce politicians to pay greater attention to the wishes of their constituencies than to what would be considered “the public good”. In neorealist terms the national interest of state survival and power maximization would constitute the public good.

However, the relationship between political decision-makers and their bureaucracies is not cloudless either. Being more familiar with the issues they have to deal with than the “monitoring” politicians, bureaucracies can impose their policy preferences – a so-called agency problem. On the other hand, there is the tasked agencies problem: Bureaucracies can devote more time to satisfying the perceived achievement indicators of political leaders than fulfilling their substantial tasks (Altfeld and Miller 1984), thus once again not performing in the interest of the public good.

In its most cynical formulation the concept of electoral influence on politics includes the opportunistic engagement of a government in a conflict only in order to raise its public approval. It is a widely accepted fact among political scientists that governments do manipulate macroeconomic policy as a campaign tool (Rogoff 1990; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Tufte 1978; etc.). Analogously, it has been proposed that governments might also manipulate so-called “rally events” in order to boost their ratings. “Rally events” as defined by John Mueller (1970) are international incidents that involve the United States and particularly the president directly and are specific, dramatic, and sharply focused. Mueller found that such events boosted the approval rating of incumbent presidents. Analyses of more recent rally events, such as the Iranian hostage crisis and the Gulf conflict have confirmed these findings (Callahan and Virtanen 1993).

Whether rally events are consciously created by governments is a matter of heated debate. Gartner (1997), for instance, observed a connection in timing between the failed attempt to rescue hostages in the US embassy in Teheran and the approval ratings of President Jimmy Carter. Gowa (1998), on the other hand, claims that for rally cases until 1992 such connection did not exist. Other authors (Gaubatz 1991) see a reluctance to engage in a violent conflict during the election period.

Another version of the domestic political agenda impacting on the formulation of the national interest simply states that politicians bow to the pressure of public opinion or of lobby groups. Klotz (1995), for instance, observes how under the pressure of public opinion, the abolition of apartheid in South Africa was declared to be in the national interest of the United States. The subsequently imposed sanctions significantly contributed to the peaceful transformation of the South African regime.

Concerning public support for humanitarian interventions, Larson (1996) shows that the US public can be supportive of humanitarian action if the goals of the intervention are perceived to be achievable. However, if no other than humanitarian interests motivate the intervention, support for it is not very robust. Even relatively small casualties can significantly reduce its popularity. However, casualty sensitivity of the US action in Panama, where real national interests were felt to be at stake, was not significantly different from that of Somalia.

Thus, generalizing the somewhat contradictory observations about post-Cold War interventions, the report of the RAND Corporation in effect summarizes constructivist conclusions about the non-externally given factors influencing the making of national interest:

“In deciding to conduct operations, U.S. decision-makers are driven as much by domestic opinion and allied concerns as humanitarian motives. Both are varied and unpredictable. Fundamental decisions—when and where to conduct operations, what goals to set, how many resources to invest, when to terminate operations—are made with domestic and allied audiences in mind” (Bymann et.al. 2001, p. 22).

2.3.3 The Actors in the Field: IOs and the Media

In contrast to a top-down engagement of states in the humanitarian crisis situations of intrastate wars, bottom-to-top suggestions also exist, claiming that international media and activist effort can compel states to act. The proposal is theoretically relevant and is also a matter of debate among international actors on the ground in crisis missions. One mechanism of influencing policy is assumed to be mediated

through public opinion. Two dynamics are widely accepted to have a significant impact on public opinion: so-called opinion leaders and the media. The relation of opinion leaders to public opinion is twofold and includes an odd feedback mechanism:

“Members of the public rely extensively upon opinion leaders (the president, congressional and other leaders, and experts) to interpret and clarify events and choices and to inform their own opinions on the intervention. The president, on the other hand, gauges the attitudes of the public and Congress to determine what policies are politically feasible. Members of Congress (and the media) may gauge the receptiveness of the public to opposition arguments” (Larson 1996, p. 12).

The influence of the media on public opinion is even more complex. Early in the 1990s the term CNN factor (or CNN effect) has been coined to describe the impact of the media on political decision-making. In its early, naïve versions, the assumption basically was that the media dictated the political agenda. These exaggerated claims have been credibly refuted. Larson (1996), for instance, shows that the US decision brought on 26 November 1992 to upgrade involvement in Somalia to a humanitarian intervention occurred after a four-week period of declining CNN coverage of the crisis.

The influence of the media on the political process through the intermediate factor of the public opinion is nevertheless profound. Surprisingly, however, theoretical IR literature on the subject is relatively scant. Oneal, Lian, and Joyner (1996) raised an interesting aspect of the issue. The authors observed that the effect of a rally event, i.e., of a spectacular foreign policy event, on the popularity rating of a president is dependent on its purpose, timing, and press coverage.

A main, and to my knowledge not adequately treated, effect of press coverage could be the simple focusing of attention of the public on certain – usually spectacular – events. Reinterpreting Larson’s data on the circumstances of US intervention in Somalia – Larson himself denies the existence of a CNN effect – would be as follows: the more than 300 CNN contributions on the situation in Somalia raised

public awareness of the grave humanitarian crisis there. In addition, the task seemed relatively easy:

“Somalia was an intervention that promised vast humanitarian benefits and high prospects for success at little or no cost in U.S. lives and, accordingly, benefited from bipartisan congressional support. It was also an intervention in which U.S. combat and other forces were engaged for over a year” (Larson 1996, p. 43).

Thus through the awareness, raised by media reporting, US decision-makers ought to have sensed a “cheap” possibility to raise their public approval. Accordingly, and

“although very few perceived a vital interest in Somalia, three out of four initially supported the operation because of the vast humanitarian benefits of saving hundreds of thousands of Somali lives” (ibid., p. 43).

This should not negate the impact of other factors, such as moral imperatives probably felt by politicians, etc., that could have also contributed to the decision. In summary, without the focusing and awareness raising work, done by the media, incentive for US decision-makers to intensify their engagement in Somalia would have been considerably less.

A number of studies also suggest that political decision-makers, humanitarian activists and the military all take the media very seriously: In certain contexts politicians perceive the media as an instrument of pressure and activists as a tool. The relation of the military is ambivalent. Their “instinctive” reaction seems to be hostile. However, as a high-ranking US army officer states: “Some people say the media is the enemy, but in fact the media is a battlefield and you have to win on it” (quoted in: Black 1996, <http://www.pitt.edu/~rcss/VIEWPOINTS/BLACK1/black1.html>).

While all the above research confirms the assumption of a strong impact of the media on policy decisions, it does not specify how and under what circumstances this influence becomes effective. Starting point of a serious analysis of media impact on politics has to be the press-state relations framework proposed by Hallin (1986) or Bennett (1990). The scholars observe a link between US media contents and elite

concerns with issues. As long as elite opinion on an issue is consensual, media coverage also tends to be relatively uncritical. In contrast, when there is elite dissent on an issue, such a dissent is likely to be mirrored by media coverage with certain contributions being critical, others supportive of government positions.

Robinson (2001) further develops this model and applies it to reactions regarding humanitarian emergencies. The author suggests that when there is controversy among executive decision-makers on policy course, critical media reporting can determine the political agenda. However, when the executive is united and resolute on a foreign policy issue, even critical media coverage is unlikely to set the agenda.

2.3.3.1 International Organizations

Another central topic regarding humanitarian interventions concerns international organizations. They can be conceptualized as either a tool states use to contain or solve humanitarian crises or as actors in their own right. The realist view of international organizations is that they are mere shells or frames used by states to forward their interests and to be discarded once they have served their purpose. Thus initially neorealists expected the demise of many international organizations, among others also of NATO, perceiving that they have fulfilled their purpose.

In contrast to realists, neoliberals assign a prominent catalytic role to international organizations making them a crucial tool in facilitating international cooperation: They provide information to member states. Given the assumed condition of uncertainty in the anarchic and intransparent international system, the provision of information is of crucial value that, in effect, reduces transaction costs. Another important role attributed to international organizations by neoliberals is the establishment of norms that regulate the interaction of states – this way also reducing transaction costs. By establishing a common set of rules and norms they "constrain activity, and shape expectations" (Keohane 1988, p. 383) as well as reduce transaction costs and the possibility of conflict through misunderstandings.

Lastly, institutions also establish linkages over different issue areas. This can motivate cooperation, since difficulties in one field of cooperation (e.g., defection of

one side) would invariably lead to repercussions in other areas. Keohane goes even further in arguing that if institutions function properly they can contribute to a "benign environment" that can "alter the standard operating procedures and sense of identity of the actors themselves" (Keohane 1986, p. 194). This last thought, by the way, is almost constructivist in nature.

An important constructivist contribution to the theory of international organizations is the application of the sociological, Weberian concept of bureaucracies to the analysis of international organizations. Thus, contrary to neoliberals who view international institutions as mere catalysts or facilitators of state cooperation, constructivists perceive IOs as actors in their own right, though constrained by states. Barnett and Finnemore (1999) argue that

"the rational-legal authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies, by definition, make rules, but in so doing they also create social knowledge. They define shared international tasks (like 'development'), create and define new categories of actors (like 'refugee'), create new interests for actors (like 'promoting human rights'), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy)" (p. 699).

Turning to the empirical facts, the end of the cold war confirmed some key neoliberal assumptions. In an article, published in 1993, Keohane predicted a further increasing importance of already existing international organizations and that states would use and, if necessary, modify already existing international organizations to deal with the challenges of the new era. The continuing integration of the European Union is a favorite example for neoliberals in this respect. From the viewpoint of the International organizations were also assigned to deal with the security challenges of the post-cold war period. Flynn and Farrel (1999) observe that

"States' efforts to shape and control this new security environment have resulted in a unique hybrid arrangement containing elements of traditional alliances, great power concerts, state and community building, and collective security" (p. 505).

In addition to the promise of integration into the European institutional structure (NATO and EC/ EU), the authors describe “three collective institutional responses” that were developed to deal with instability and substate conflict within Europe.

One is a forum of six major states with interests in Europe called the Contact Group, including Britain, France, US, Germany, Italy, and Russia but lacking a formal structure. The contact group was originally established to coordinate states’ responses to the crisis in the Balkans. However, according to the authors, the primary focus of the Contact Group soon shifted “to prevent local instabilities from provoking renewed geostrategic posturing among the major powers” (ibid. p.506).

The second pillar of the new European security architecture is NATO. The change in the security context prompted a gradual transformation of the tasks and identity of NATO from a strictly collective defense pact to an alliance incorporating also aspects of a collective security arrangement. There are significant differences between the two concepts. A collective security arrangement

“(at least in the traditional sense of the term as exemplified in the thought and writing of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson) involves a pact against war; the threat is aggression by a currently unidentified party to the pact, which should ideally include all the states in the state system. In contrast, a collective defence pact binds together an alliance of states to deter and, if necessary, defend against one or more identifiable external threats, a state or a group of states outside the alliance” (Yost 1998, p. 7).

E.g. the UN as collective security arrangement attempts to maintain peace among *its* members. In contrast, NATO during the Cold War was a collective defense pact aiming at protecting its members from possible aggression from Warsaw Pact countries. It has to be mentioned that many analysts are not very happy with this transformation of NATO. Yost (1998), for example, fears a loss of internal cohesion within NATO and a subsequent weakening of the institution through the watering down of NATO’s core mandate of collective defense. Other scholars, almost

exclusively from the realist tradition, frequently turn to historical experiences, claiming that throughout history collective security arrangements have always failed.¹²

The final pillar of the new European security architecture is the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) later OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). CSCE/ OSCE mechanisms include tools of preventive diplomacy: mediation, democratization, institution building, human rights monitoring and support and monitoring of democratic elections. An equally important aspect of CSCE / OSCE activity is the provision of “a normative framework within which the [above mentioned] mechanisms of intervention detailed earlier have all been legitimated” (Flynn and Farrel, *ibid.*, p. 509).

“There is a very interesting and historically unprecedented aspect to the CSCE / OSCE conflict management instruments in dealing with substate conflict: The long-term strategy for the ‘pacification’ of the continent is to create systems of governance that will possess sufficient legitimacy to defuse or resolve conflicts before they erupt” (ibid., p. 505).

In other words, the traditional respect in international politics for state sovereignty is to a significant extent ignored in favor of establishing sustainable democratic institutions in transitional states. Without doubt there is a pragmatic aspect, from both the perspective of Western European and of transitional states, to this behavior. For Western European states supporting the establishment of functioning democratic structures, it is a question of regional stability. Strengthening international human rights institutions at the expense of state sovereignty can, however, also be in the interest of “newly established democracies”. In an interesting article Moravcsik (2000) observes that

“creating a quasi-independent judicial body is a tactic used by governments to ‘lock in’ and consolidate democratic institutions, thereby enhancing their credibility and stability vis-à-vis nondemocratic political threats” (p. 220).

¹² Yost, for instance, refers to a book of Martin Wight (1977), in which the author describes the failure of what he sees as the first collective security pacts of European and probably world history: the Most Holy League of Venice (1454), the “Treaty of London” (1518) and the Association of the Hague (1681-83) and the Quadruple Alliance (1718).

Thus the rationalistic benefits offered by international institutions and organizations to their members, even to the detriment of their sovereignty, are fully compatible with neoliberal thinking. Nevertheless, focusing just on the utilitarian aspects of Europe's new security architecture would be misleading.

“Where neoliberalism falls short, however, is on the substance of the bargaining: European states have been pursuing far more than efficiency; they seek a philosophy of international order that links their relations with one another to a specific form of domestic rule. At issue is not how states can agree to constrain themselves, or even how they can agree to alter their domestic practices, in order to gain from reduced transaction costs or enhanced information and predictability. At issue is the nature of the states themselves and how states use a convergence of internal structural preferences to organize their participation in a particular society of states” (Flynn and Farell 1999, p. 530).

The increase in UN or OSCE missions after the end of the Cold War is not just an institutional issue but also an ideological, since the decisions in these institutions have to be consensual. This ideational aspect is simply the end of the superpower rivalry. Thus understanding the functioning and, as Fynn and Farell point out, even the existence of international organizations is not possible without considering ideational aspects and norms.

To show the possible effectiveness of IOs, it is worthwhile mentioning the empirical work of Russett, Oneal and Davis (1998) who examined the occurrence of war between states in relation to IO density and economic interdependence from 1950 to 1985. They observed an independent effect of IO density and economic interdependence on peacefulness between states.

“The East–West rivalry may have encouraged states to form IGOs with allies and to minimize contacts with states in the other bloc. Yet inclusion of a control for alliances suggests that the pacific benefit of shared IGO membership cannot be attributed solely to states' common security interests” (p. 463).