List of Acronyms

ABiH - Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Bosniac dominated government troops) (Armija republike Bosne i Hercegovine)

Bosniac - the term used to refer to Bosnian (or Slavic) Muslims

HDZ - Croatian Democratic Community (the ruling party of Croatia; the party of president Tudjman) (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica)

HDZ BiH - The Bosnian branch of HDZ (this party rules in the Bosnian Croat areas)

HOS – Hrvatske ombrambene snage (Croatian Defence Froces)

HV – Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska)

HVO - Croat Defense Council (the Bosnian Croat Army) (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane)

HZ HB - Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosne)

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

IO – International Organization

NGO – Non-Government Organization

PB – power-based negotiations

RRF – Rapid Reaction Force

RS – The Serb Republic (Republika srpska)

SDA – Party of Democratic Action (The Bosniac nationalist party. The party of President Izetbegović) (Stranka demokratske akcije)

SDS – Serb Democratic Party (The main Serb nationalist party. The party of Radovan Karadžić) (Srpska demokratska stranka)

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force

VRS – Army of the Serb Republic (Vojska republike srpske)

1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War (CW) in 1989-1991 – the collapse of communist regimes throughout Eastern and Central Europe, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union – have led to the emergence of an entirely new international system frequently referred to as "the new world order". The thaw in the bipolar freeze of the Cold War allowed for an, until then, unprecedented level of cooperation between the world powers. Thus, as Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1991, a worldwide coalition of states, led by the US and backed by a UN mandate, formed to combat the troops of the Iraqi dictator. Original reactions to this global cooperation were enthusiastic. It seemed that a new era of peace, international cooperation and respect for human rights was on the rise.

President Bush (23 September 1991) in an address to the General Assembly of the United Nations described this new order in such positive terms as

> *"an order in which no nation must surrender one iota of its own sovereignty; an order characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force; the cooperative settlement of disputes, rather than anarchy and bloodshed, and an unstinting belief in human rights" (Bush, 23 September 1991, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91092301.html).*

The crises in the former Yugoslavia and debacles, e.g. Somalia, soon dampened these optimistic expectations – international interventions in the post-Cold War period were usually not well executed, indecisive and in many respects not very successful. Moreover, it also clearly showed that states were not willing to take significant risks if their "traditional" national interests were not threatened. The withdrawal of the US mission after initial losses or the long-lasting reluctance of Western states to forcefully engage in the ex-Yugoslav crises illustrate this point. In spite of the ambiguity of these operations and the criticism they have received even after Bosnia

and Somalia, states of the international community (IC) was repeatedly forced to engage in similar humanitarian operations as in East Timor or Kosovo. A crucial feature of these interventions and one of the reasons for their relative unpopularity among IC states is that national interest in the classical and mostly material sense can only partially account for the engagement of the intervening states. Instead, the reasons for the intervention are mostly humanitarian and moral. The term "humanitarian intervention" (Wheeler and Dunne 2001, or Dunne, Hill and Hanson 2001, etc.), meaning the use of force for humanitarian purposes, has been coined to describe these new, typically post-Cold War interventions.

The notion of moral and humanitarian interventions is not entirely unprecedented in world history. The intervention of European states, notably of Britain, France and of Russia, in 1827 in the Greek war of independence supporting the freedom fighters against Turkey had strong moral and humanitarian aspects. Similarly, after the defeat of the Hungarian revolution against the Habsburg dominance in 1849 emigrant Hungarian revolutionaries were conducting a "public relations" campaign in France and in Britain for political support. Even though the revolutionaries were received with much sympathy, ultimately they failed. The sympathy did not translate into political action. Similar efforts were also undertaken by Polish revolutionaries of the same period. Even certain interventions in the Lebanese civil war in the 1980s show elements of humanitarian motivation (Preisler 1995).

Post-cold war humanitarian interventions are nevertheless markedly different from previous interventions regarding the general political context they operate in, their aims, the instruments available to them and the international legal background of the operations themselves. Global technical, political and social developments following the end of the Cold War have opened up new possibilities of action for organizations and officials participating in humanitarian interventions. The scale and efficiency of the increased power or chance of action available to intervening organizations and officials participating in the intervention are currently not well understood (Zimmermann 1996).

In this dissertation, I will thus investigate one such operation, the international humanitarian intervention into the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina between the years 1992 to 1995. The intention is to analyse and offer an evaluation of the activities intervening international organizations are involved in while operating in a civil war environment. The criteria of the evaluation are (a) whether the stated humanitarian objectives of the various interventions were achieved, e.g. attaining the release of prisoners, and (b) whether the conflict was contained and/or ended.

In order to achieve such an overall evaluation of the mission, I will combine investigation and analysis on a macro-political level – an approach usually associated with political science and international relations – and on the micro-level – an ethnographic account of the situation in a Bosnian-Hercegovinian town, Mostar. Such a micro-level description of events is usually associated with Social Anthropology.

So far there has been a lack in research focusing equally on the state and field levels of interventions. Scholarly works usually either concentrate on the macro-level of civil wars and international interventions (Esman and Telhami 1996, Byman et al. 2000) or almost exclusively on the local events of a conflict (Bringa 1993). The key questions, whether implementation techniques matter and whether the field levels of missions can send crucial inputs to state level officials remain unanswered.

The starting point of my analysis will be the main activity of international officials in achieving their goals – negotiations. Negotiation is a basic human activity for dealing with conflicts and resolving conflicting interests. The alternative to negotiation in a conflict situation is either avoidance (ignoring a conflict) or unilateral action. Unilateral action can be understood as either "brute force" (Schelling 1966) or enforcement (*Erzwingung*) in the sense of Weber (1980) if legitimate. Weber's concept of enforcement is closely linked to associations (*Verband*), which he defines as closed social relationships, in which the adherence to its regulations is guaranteed by a head or president (*Leiter*), even if appointed only on a temporary basis, and possibly also administrative staff. Enforcement in this context is the use of force to guarantee action based on or derived from the statute of the association (p.26). Should the UN

system be viewed as an association in a Weberian sense, actions sanctioned by its resolution would fall into the category of enforcement. With the international system lacking a permanent and legitimate enforcement system, negotiations appear as the "cheapest" way of achieving objectives in humanitarian interventions, in the sense of both limited humanitarian goals and of ending conflicts.

Two mutually exclusive negotiation theories dominate the contemporary dispute, both among officials of international organizations on field missions and on the level of scientific discourse. One is a power-based approach to negotiations that is based mostly on rational choice considerations and related game theoretic models. Within the field of international relations (IR) it is predominantly the neorealists who embrace such negotiation techniques. The other main approach to negotiations is derived from the Harvard School of negotiation, peace research and alternative conflict resolution. This school of thought strongly rejects the use of power in negotiation situations, arguing that it can lead to escalations and inefficient outcomes. Instead it propagates the exploration of mutually beneficial solutions – WW (WW) solutions. In the following, I will refer to this school as the WW negotiation school as opposed to power-based (PB) negotiations. Probably because the WW approach claims to be successful without the risks and costs attached to power-based bargaining situations, it has become immensely popular. Negotiation training in several peacekeeping centers and diplomatic schools follow this method.

Based on negotiation interactions between international officials and warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both on the state- and field levels, I shall argue that a combination of power-based strategies combined with WW style approaches were most successful in achieving humanitarian mission objectives, including peace agreements. However, comparing pure PB or WW cases, power-based approaches proved far more successful than negotiation interactions in which only WW negotiation strategies were applied.

Evaluating PB or WW type approaches directly links into another debate discussed both by scientists and practitioners on international missions: Are warring parties in civil wars rational or are they so blinded by nationalist hatreds, traditional values or

motivated by the parochial interests of criminal warlords that they cannot act in a rational, utility maximizing way regarding their national interests?

I shall argue that the rational choice assumption regarding the behavior of warring parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina offers a good estimation of their reactions when faced with demands originating from international organizations to respect international law or to end the civil strife. Organizational and social psychological factors, however, do interfere and distort adaptations to external challenges in line with the self-defined national interests of the warring parties. These findings, derived from the interaction of international agencies with local warring parties, further confirm and explain the success and occasional failures of PB negotiation techniques in achieving humanitarian objectives.

Further following the perspective of international officials and international organizations on a mission in an intrastate war, the last group of questions refers to how the resources necessary for PB negotiation success are mobilized. The dispute has once again both theoretical and practical implications. In a general sense, the questions refer to the entire nature of the post-Cold War international system. What motivates state action – states being the major source of resources (financial and military) relevant from the perspective of humanitarian missions?

The classic explanation of state action in international relations is provided by the national interest, usually understood as maximizing the security through which nations thus ensure their survival. However, with the notable exception of Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" approach, the post-Cold War world is usually perceived as one with a relatively reduced threat level to states[2]. The lack of overriding external challenges to security, and here the 11 September might have caused far-reaching changes (probably more on the level of perceptions than regarding actual intensity of threat), resulted in consequent difficulties regarding the definition of national interest in terms of security maximization.

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[2] Even the terrorist attack of the 11 September on the United States does not seem to contradict this general assessment since few people argue that global annihilation, as during the Cold War, is to be feared.

Competing explanations in the field of international relations (IR) theory consider also cooperative regimes among states and / or normative values and related discourses as capable of motivating state action. Some globalization theorists even see an erosion of traditional state sovereignty and a worldwide proliferation of democratic values and human rights norms. In this context especially the concept of transnational communities[3] as proposed by James Rosenau (1990, 1993) should be mentioned. Institutional theory finally introduces parochial internal domestic electoral and bureaucratic processes as another possible source capable of determining state action.

Against the backdrop of the international arena two local institutional agents can be considered to send inputs motivating the release the necessary coercive resources: international organizations (IOs) and the international media. Concerning the influence of both on international events a heated debate is taking place. International organizations are perceived by the neorealist school of IR as mere puppets at the disposal of states (Baldwin 1993b). The strongly competing view of certain IR (Barnett and Finnemore 1999) views, however, IOs as independent actors in their own right, similar to the Weberian concept of bureaucracy. Regarding the influence of the media on international politics, a similar debate is being waged under the catchy phrase of the "CNN effect".

Since most analysts admit that humanitarian interventions run counter to traditional interpretations (in terms of security maximization) of the national interest this line of thought can be discarded as playing a decisive role in international humanitarian interventions. Contrary to the top-down conceptualization of the national interest by realists, other theories of state action allow for greater inputs from "outside" of the halls and corridors of "foreign offices" and "presidential palaces".

Based upon the timing of escalation moments of international intervention in the Bosnian war, I shall argue that both IOs and the international media have an effect on international policy decisions. In this sense IOs and their officials can be conceived as actors in the intervention, or, in other words, can be credited with

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[3] See also Steve Vertovec (2001), Ulf Hannerz (1996) and Mike Featherstone (1990).

playing a role independent of member state attitudes. The target audiences or social spheres that mediate the normatively grounded (international law, human rights) requests of IOs, international officials and the media for coercive state capabilities to be activated are the public opinion of the transnational community (see Rosenau 1993 etc.) and political decision-makers themselves.

In this sense the media plays a threefold role: it can be conceptualized as an independent actor taking sides in a conflict, as a tool used by proactive, "unruly"[4] IOs and their officials, and finally as a vehicle simply transmitting news of grave abuses of international norms and human rights. Especially outrageous events in the context of these norms thus communicated to the world outside the intrastate war can serve as rallying events for politicians and state officials to converting public outrage into intensified coercive action within a civil strife context. Such an assumption would be reminiscent of mechanism suggested by institutional theory (Pierson 1993, Altfeld and Miller 1984, Moe 1990, Avant 1994 etc.), namely that through parochial electoral or lobby group interests the formulation of the national interest can be influenced in a sense contradicting the security based national interest.

1.1 Methodology and Layout of the Dissertation

Methodologically the research is based mainly on prolonged field study (1995-2002), which due its historical nature, relied mostly on interviews. In the reconstruction of the historical developments at the state level, variuos kinds of press reports, official documents and other publicly available material have been used.

Turning to the structure of the book, the next chapter will examine the literature on the above-discussed three fields: negotiations, intrastate wars and the international context of these intrastate wars. Subsequently, I will describe the state level of the Bosnian War, describing the military developments in the country from the outbreak of the war in 1992 until its end in late 1995. Following this historical description, state level international intervention will be treated in detail, analyzing and evaluating international-local interactions in the period of interest.

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[4] See Gamson (1997) on the success of "unruly" social movements.

Attention will then shift to the field level of Mostar. Here, too, I shall first describe the wartime developments in the town and then turn to the analysis of international intervention actions. I shall close the work with a summary and conclusions referring back to the theoretical fields of inquiry mentioned in the introduction.