Grand Strategy and the Northwest Frontier:

Roman Rule in Lower Germany from Augustus to Hadrian

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Table of Contents

Introduction		1-15
I.	Indirect Rule and Ethnogenesis: 39 BC-17 AD	16-35
II.	16 BC-37 AD: Marching Camps and the Basis of a Linear Frontier	36-58
III.	Emperor Gaius and his German Campaign	59-68
IV.	Claudius and Nero: The Completion of a Linear Frontier and the German Legions as King Makers	69-88
V.	The Batavian Revolt: Its Causes and Consequences	89-102
VI.	The Flavian Period	103-125
VII.	Trajan	126-140
VIII.	Hadrian	141-162
IX.	Conclusion	163-171
	Works Cited	172-191

Introduction

The Birth of Strategy

For the ancient Greeks, strategy was the art of the general. It was only in the modern period— in the 18th century— that military authors began to use the word "strategy" in a wider sense.[1] In the 19th century, Karl von Clausewitz famously redefined strategy as "the art of the use of battles to gain the object of the war."[2] In the 20th century, B.H. Liddell Hart criticized Clausewitz's definition for intruding "in the sphere of policy," which belonged to the state's political and not its military leadership, and for narrowing the meaning of strategy "to the pure utilization of battle." This, he wrote, conveyed the wrong and even dangerous idea "that battle is the only means to the strategical end."[3]

As an alternative, Liddell Hart argued that strategy, properly defined, is "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the aims of policy."[4] Those formulating policy are not limited to the choice of absolute victory in battle; they can opt, for instance, for a "strategy of limited aim," which allows them to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy and to gain piecemeal yet important advantages against a foe of superior military strength.[5]

Liddell Hart emphasized one crucial point: strategy subordinates the military chiefs to the state's political leaders, who delineate the war policy that the generals carry out. This implies that commanders must use the means offered to them in the most prolific manner possible, acting within the framework of the war that the political decision-makers determine. A commander misuses his authority if he makes demands concerning the means that should be placed at his disposal. Conversely, the government should refrain from hindering the head of the armed forces as long as the nature of his duty is made clear.[6]

Grand Strategy

Liddell Hart also described a higher form of strategy, which he labelled grand strategy. He wrote that grand strategy coordinates and directs all of a nation's resources—or those of a group of nations— "towards the attainment of the political object of the war."[7] Military means is only one of the many instruments that constitute grand strategy, which also applies financial, diplomatic, commercial, and even ethical pressure against the enemy. Also, whereas strategy concerns itself purely with war, grand strategy must look "beyond the war to the subsequent peace."[8] Hence,

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[1] See the discussion in Wheeler 1993a, 21-22
[2] As opposed to tactics. Von Clausewitz, II.1. "*Es ist also nach unserer Einteilung die Taktik die Lehre vom Gebrauch der Streitkräfte im Gefecht, die Strategie die Lehre vom Gebrauch der Gefechte zum Zweck des Krieges*."
[3] Liddell Hart, 319. He writes that it wasn't Clausewitz's intention to limit strategy to the battlefield, but that it was "an easy step" for "his less profound disciples to confuse the means with the ends." Liddell Hart also mentions the exceptions in which the political and military wings of the state are united under one person, such as Bonaparte or Friedrich the Great.
[4] Liddell Hart, 321
[5] Ibidem
[6] Ibidem, 320
[7] Ibidem, 322
[8] Ibidem

grand strategy must ensure that the peace that follows the military operations enhances the state's standing militarily, economically, and diplomatically.

The principal aim of a war, Liddell Hart argued, must be to bring about a better peace after victory.[9] Leaders must avoid Pyrrhic victories, which leave states "too exhausted to profit by the peace." The same applies to a bad peace, which inevitably contains "the germs of another war."[10] A good peace, on the other hand, can be reached through stalemate, which is "at least preferable to peace through common exhaustion—and has provided a better foundation for lasting peace."[11] Grand strategy is therefore the art of ensuring that a state's efforts, or the aims of those efforts, are proportional to its available means.

Although Liddell Hart recognized that the study of grand strategy was a "*terra incognita*—still awaiting exploration, and understanding,"[12] his ideas concerning "higher strategy" were influential. As P. Kennedy notes, Liddell Hart and E. M. Earle broadened the definition of the term "strategy" and succeeded in showing the complex, multi-layered nature of grand strategy.[13] Above all, Liddell Hart's ideas shed light upon the notion that grand strategy is "concerned with peace as much as (perhaps even more than) with war."[14] Indeed, grand strategy is formulated and implemented within a time period which, unlike most wars, can span decades and even centuries. Grand strategy, Kennedy writes, does not "cease at a war's end, nor commence at its beginning."[15]

The essence of grand strategy, Liddell Hart emphasized, is balancing means and ends. He strove to determine whether fighting a particular war was worthwhile, and whether a particular victory could have been achieved at a lower cost. This approach influenced the field of military history, which, for the most part, had previously ignored the essential component of economics and the leaders' duty of husbanding national resources in order to meet strategic ends. Military history had also neglected the realm of diplomacy, where—both during a war and in times of peace— a state can gain allies, assure the support of neutral powers, and reduce the number of real or potential enemies.[16] Finally, military history, unlike grand strategy, had not fully reckoned with a nation's morale and its "political culture." This is important not only in terms of the recruitment of soldiers, but also with respect to the people's readiness "to support the purposes and the burdens of the war," or to pay large costs of defense during times of peace.[17]

Kennedy concludes that grand strategy's crux is policy, whereby leaders can use all of the elements at their disposal, "both military and nonmilitary," to preserve and enhance "the nation's long-term best interests."[18] For statesmen, the challenge is to develop and carry out a grand strategy in a world of constant flux, where, often, the "anarchic" international order produces great danger as it

[9] Ibidem, 357
[10] Ibidem, 353. This, Liddell Hart argues, is "the truth underlying Clausewitz' definition of war as 'a continuation of policy by other means.'" See Clausewitz, I.24. "*Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln*."
[11] Liddell Hart 1991, 357
[12] Ibidem, 322
[13] Kennedy, 4; *cf*. Earle, 217 ff.
[14] Kennedy, 4
[15] Ibidem
[16] Ibidem, 4-5
[17] Ibidem
[18] Ibidem, 5

"oscillates between peace and war."[19] Thus, grand strategy is no exact science; it relies rather on the "wisdom and judgment of the nation's leaders," qualities that their experience forms and refines. This includes "the study of historical experiences."[20]

Luttwak and Roman Grand Strategy: The Julio-Claudians

Roman commanders, like their Greek counterparts and other ancient military leaders, clearly engaged in strategy according to the word's original, Hellenic meaning of generalship.[21] Also, in the Clausewitzian sense of using battles to define wars, the Romans not only engaged in strategy, but also excelled in it. They understood and practiced strategy in Liddell Hart's use of the term; during the Republic, the senate assigned specific military tasks to its commanders, who were expected to fulfill them with the means at their disposal. During the Principate, stable emperors often exercised the same authority and expected their generals to obey. At different points in their history, Roman and Byzantine commanders such as Fabius Maximus and Belisarius employed strategies of limited aim. A different question altogether is whether the Romans practiced grand strategy.

The debate arose in earnest with Edward Luttwak's publication of *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: from the First Century A.D to the Third*" (1976). Luttwak's work was groundbreaking since it applied modern theories of strategic analysis to the study of Rome's control over its border regions. Its principal thesis is that the Romans established three different defense systems within clearly defined time periods, spanning from the Julio-Claudian era until the third century. Each of these systems was designed to fulfil a particular goal, something which involved a particular use of the armed forces, diplomacy, administrative methods, and infrastructure projects such as road networks and fortresses. Each system, moreover, "reflected a different Roman worldview and self-image."[22] Each had its own priorities, which in turn revealed the empire's changing circumstances.[23]

Luttwak argues that, in essence, the Julio-Claudian defense system was the same as that of the late Republic. This grand strategy's "most striking feature" was its "economy of force."[24] The empire's previous expansion, which had resulted from military victories, was "hegemonic rather than territorial."[25] The Republic, Luttwak argues, attempted not to govern large areas of territory directly, but rather to exert indirect control over them by relying on satellite states that could be ruled by means of diplomatic and military pressure.[26] Augustus and his successors decided to defend the empire from external threats primarily through "indirect and nonmilitary means."[27] To a significant degree, this was due to the small number of available troops vis-à-vis the size of the empire: after the Varian disaster in 9 AD, there were around 150,000 men in the 25 remaining

[19] Ibidem, 6
[20] Ibidem
[21] See Liddell Hart, 10
[22] Luttwak, 5
[23] Ibidem, 4
[24] Ibidem, 13
[25] Ibidem, 49
[26] Ibidem, 30-31
[27] Ibidem, 19

legions, plus, eventually, around 150,000 men in the auxiliary contingents.[28] Another key factor was the lack of an established system of "perimeter defense."

The vassal states feared Rome due to their perception of its military superiority. They remained mostly loyal and placed their troops at the empire's disposal. Their territory "absorbed" low intensity attacks from beyond the frontier, thus allowing the legions "to keep their striking power concentrated."[29] Hence, the legions, which were not "committed to the territorial defense of their segment of the perimeter," could react to a threat with sufficient time and meet it head-on before Roman territory could be transgressed.[30] As a result, the Romans could secure the border areas without having either to defend or administer the client states directly. Naturally, this spared the empire much energy as well as financial and military expenditures.

Although Augustus did launch offensive campaigns and expanded the empire's territory, such expansion, Luttwak writes, was limited to the overdue conquest of territories such as Moesia, Noricum, and Raetia.[31] In general, Augustus preferred not to annex "manageable and efficient client states… except as a last resort."[32] The system's "economy of force," Luttwak maintains, allowed the Roman military both to defend the empire *and* expand its domains, as when Claudius invaded Britain in 43 AD. When necessary, the Romans could launch a war of conquest by assembling "large troop concentrations… (and) drawing down the forces deployed on the line, albeit at some risk."[33] Despite the offensive wars and the subsequent annexation of territories, Rome's grand strategy until 68 AD consisted of its "armed suasion" over the client states, which absorbed "the security burdens resulting from past expansion."[34]

Flavian Grand Strategy

Roman grand strategy changed under the Flavian dynasty, Luttwak argues. Vespasian and his successors decided to annex vassal states outright and define the empire's borders clearly, especially in those areas where no natural barriers formed a frontier. Where clear, visible frontiers were lacking, the Romans used their "subjective political judgment" in order to define "just where the sphere of imperial control finally came to an end."[35] Moreover, after annexing the former vassal kingdoms, Rome had to administer their territory and supply troops for their active defense. This system, Luttwak writes, developed until it culminated "under Hadrian and his successors."[36] By then, the empire's limits were "demarcated very precisely, on the ground, so that all could tell exactly what was Roman and what was not." The empire absorbed the reliable client states and, for the most part, "perimeters that complemented the natural barriers of rivers and ocean" defended the land borders.[37]

[28] Ibidem, 15-16
[29] Ibidem, 47
[30] Ibidem
[31] Ibidem, 49-50
[32] Ibidem, 50
[33] Ibidem
[34] Ibidem
[35] Ibidem, 59-60
[36] Ibidem, 57
[37] Ibidem, 60

The new physical defenses that replaced the older, invisible frontiers included Hadrian's Wall in the north of the province Britannia; the *limes* between the Rhine and the Danube in present day Germany; the *fossatum Africae* in the province of Numidia in North Africa; the defense system "in the Dobruja (in modern Romania)," where "a continuous wall… formed a short perimeter from Axiopolis (Rasova) on the Danube to the sea at Tomis (near Constanta)."[38] In the East, a complex network of roads formed the long frontier "from the Black Sea to the Red." They formed a link between the frontier garrisons and between the frontier zone and the interior.[39] Across all frontiers, roads provided "axes of penetration beyond the border," and "rearward routes for communication, reinforcement, troop circulation, and supply."[40]

The second system of defense depended also on the construction of outpost forts and watchtowers on the borders. These provided surveillance against the enemy's approach "and early warnings of impending large-scale attacks." Thus, the legionaries and auxiliaries stationed in guard posts, forts, and fortresses in the sector could be made aware of potential danger at any particular point.[41] The ability to move troops toward any point where an emergency presented itself was imperative. As a whole, the network of border defense did not serve as a total barrier, "but rather as the one fixed element in a mobile strategy of imperial defense."[42] Thus, Luttwak compares this system to the "characteristically Roman institution of the marching camp," which was fixed in structure and, at the same time, highly mobile.[43]

Defense in Depth

After the reign of Septimius Severus and his sons, the empire entered a crisis that lasted during the greater part of the third century (ca. 211 to 284 / 285 AD). The frontier defenses collapsed, mainly as a result of the newly acquired ability of Rome's enemies to form grand coalitions. Also, from Severus's reign onward, emperors had the need to lead large armies not only against external enemies, but also against pretenders.[44] Emperors sought a new grand strategy, Luttwak argues, and opted for "defense in-depth." Rather than guard the frontiers at the perimeter, the border defenses were mostly abandoned. The Romans adopted "a combination of *self-contained* strongholds" inside the empire "with mobile forces deployed between or behind them."[45]

Enemy incursions into Roman territory were necessarily allowed, since the frontier garrisons were "thinned out." Inside the empire, however, "the enemy would find itself in a peripheral combat zone of varying depth." The population and its resources were shielded from attack by strongholds and city walls, by farmhouses, granaries, and refuges that were fortified to withstand the onslaught of enemies without siege capacity. The empire's armed forces operated both within this zone and

[38] Ibidem. The wall in the Dobruja "is a typical 'scientific' frontier and may have been the first continuous perimeter of imperial times- if it was indeed built under Domitian." *Cf.* note no. 15. For a definition of *limes, cf.* Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 9
[39] Ibidem
[40] Ibidem, 66
[41] Ibidem, 66-67
[42] Ibidem, 57
[43] Ibidem
[44] Ibidem, 190
[45] Ibidem, 131

beyond it; they were "deployed to fight in the open but with the support of the fortified places."[46] The centralized armies also could attempt—with varying success— to ensure the security of the *Soldatenkaiser* on the Roman throne.

During this third stage of imperial grand strategy, the security of the border provinces ceased to be a priority of the first order. The constant enemy incursions into Roman territory interrupted the continuous development of peaceful life within the empire's borders. Thus, the Roman citizens who inhabited the most dangerous frontier zones came to be at the mercy of invading armies, plunderers, and marauders. In the long term, emperors were unable to protect what used to be their territory, leading to relentless attacks on "private lives and private property." This "eroded the logistic base of the empire" and, what was worse, "diminished the worth of the imperial structure to its subjects."[47] Even if effective, therefore, the very nature of defense in depth as a grand strategy would lead to the empire's disintegration. The very notion of a unified Roman Empire faded as the people's allegiance to the emperor gradually weakened.

The Debate after Luttwak

Luttwak's work, which was based on his expertise in modern security studies, unleashed a strenuous debate among ancient historians. As K. Kagan points out, subsequent work has shed doubt on several of his assumptions, for instance the ideas that the Flavian frontiers were always "fixed and identifiable;" that the Romans put in place "a single, cogent system of defense that was relatively uniform across the empire in a given period;" that the three grand strategies were constant during the phases he assigns to them, and that they necessarily "evolved from one phase to the next."[48]

Nevertheless, the debate concerning Luttwak's theory of Roman grand strategy did not limit itself to specific critiques of his paradigm. Rather, the discussion split its participants into two groups that F. Naiden and I label "minimalists" and "maximalists."[49] The minimalist or anti-strategy school maintains that any discussion of Greco-Roman grand strategy involves the anachronistic imposition of modern views, mentalities, and methods on the ancients, whose culture, worldviews, traditions, and even thought processes precluded the formulation or development of any recognizable grand strategy as it is understood today. For its part, the maximalist or pro-strategy school holds that ancient and modern statecraft, while certainly different in many respects, are nonetheless similar enough for the Romans to have been able to elaborate and carry out grand strategic— and hence rational— plans in terms of warfare, imperial security, and diplomacy. Such plans, the maximalists argue, are clearly recognizable to us in modernity.

The debate encompasses several fields of inquiry. Regarding time and space, did the Romans' ill-conceived notions of geography, evident in their lack of accurate scaled maps and in their failure to develop coherent geographical theories, impede any serious formulation of military policy on a

[46] Ibidem, 132
[47] Ibidem, 190
[48] Kagan, 338
[49] Naiden and Raisbeck, 13 ff.

grand scale?[50] On the other hand, the Romans obtained practical knowledge through extensive and sophisticated military campaigns, widespread road-building, and missions of exploration, all of which developed the use of cadastral maps and itineraries, a practice that reveals the tendency to think of geography in terms of the routes that led to a particular place.[51] Did this knowledge of place and time allow Roman commanders not only to operate logistically, but to think strategically and geo-strategically as well?[52]

Concerning literature, does a lack of formal treatises on Roman grand strategy written by Roman authors provide decisive proof of its absence?[53] Or did the *commentarii* of campaigning generals, only one of which survives, contain valuable grand strategic reflections and insights?[54] This points to the question of terminology: since the Romans did not explicitly formulate grand strategy and did not even have an equivalent term, were they even aware of its basic principles?[55] Or did the circumlocutions of ancient authors who associated particular commanders—Themistocles, Pericles, Fabius Cunctator, Diocletian, Constantine— with specific military policies (or strategies) present straightforward discussions and reflections on strategic thought?[56]

In terms of decision-making, were Roman emperors essentially passive figures who spent most of their time responding to local petitions of minor importance, thus governing in a fully ad hoc manner that impeded long-term, rational planning and the careful analysis of crucial information in areas like imperial defense?[57] Or was the scope of imperial activity much broader, as emperors took the initiative to build infrastructure, solve large-scale problems affecting their subjects, and distribute troops in a manner that clearly involved grand strategic plans and actions?[58] Then there is the issue of the information available to Roman emperors and commanders: did the lack of official archives such as those of modern states deny them the necessary data to take grand strategic decisions?[59] Or do the numerous instances in which ancient sources refer to the emperors or senators who had a thorough, detailed grasp of military and financial figures dispel this concern?[60]

Regarding professionalization, could emperors implement strategic decisions while relying on an amateur elite instead of a professional, technocratic bureaucracy of the modern kind?[61] Or were emperors able to develop a system broadly recognizable as a centralized, bureaucratic apparatus?[62] Alternatively, is complete bureaucratization necessarily a prerequisite for

[50] Mattern, 33; 41; 53. Isaac, 401-402. See also Woolf 2014, 66-67 for the argument that the Roman armies made no use of the scientific knowledge of Greek geographers and ethnographers. See Geus, 2018 for a general discussion on Greek and Greco-Roman geography.
[51] Goldsworthy 1996, 126; 128; 130; idem 2004, 282-283; Eichen and Todd; Syme 1988a, 229; 238; 248; Wheeler 1993b, 237
[52] Greatrex, 130; Wheeler 1993b, 239; Syme 1988a, 230
[53] Millar 1982, 21
[54] Harl, 23
[55] Millar 1982, 1 ff.; 15 ff. stresses the Romans' "conceptual framework." See also Whittaker 1994, 33
[56] Wheeler 1993b, 217; Ferrill, 82-83; Greatrex, 128
[57] Millar 1982, 21-22; idem 1992, 268. This theme is consistent in *The Emperor and The Roman World.*
[58] Wiemer, 6; Buraselis, 54; Jördens, 105
[59] Millar 1982, 22; idem 1992, 210; 260; 264; 266-267
[60] Greatrex, 129. For a review of the ancient sources, see Raisbeck, 91-94.
[61] Millar 1982, 5-6; Mattern, 2-3; 15
[62] Bleicken 1978, 23; 127 ff.; idem 1982, 183 ff.

operational competence or strategic leadership?[63] With regards to Rome's imperial frontiers, were these merely open zones and lines of communication for an army that acted as a colonial force of occupation?[64] Or were the frontiers concrete lines of defense and military or physical *termini*, which clearly divided Romans and barbarians while demarcating the territories where Roman law was applied?[65]

The debate between maximalists and minimalists is broad, ongoing, and unlikely to be settled through the sudden emergence of a consensus. Bridging the gap between both sides is certainly not the aim of this dissertation. Rather, its arguments presuppose the possibility and, indeed, the reality of Roman grand strategy. I argue from the maximalist camp in each of these areas, and I do so for reasons discussed at length in a recent publication.[66] Besides the issues of time and space, strategic literature, terminology, decision-making, information, professionalization, and the imperial frontiers, I argue that the crucial question is that of balancing means and ends.

The Matter of Ends and Means

The fact is that Roman emperors had limited means at their disposal, being as restricted in this sense as any modern head of state or decision-maker. Militarily, this meant that there were no more than 33 legions available during the first two centuries AD, with an average of 29 or 30 during the reign of most emperors.[67] On the one hand, the immense costs of the army's upkeep—including the payment of pensions to veterans after 6 AD— required husbanding scarce resources, managing complex disbursement logistics, and keeping extensive records. On the other hand, the precise ways in which emperors decided to use, deploy, and station these troops were concrete expressions of their grand strategic priorities.

Whether such priorities were explicitly formulated or not is of little importance. As B. Posen writes in the case of modern states, "a grand strategy is not a rule book, but rather a set of concepts and arguments that need to be revisited." Modern nations can "write their grand strategies down in one place," but "sometimes they do not."[68] This is relevant to the debate on ancient strategy and grand strategy because these terms are relatively new, but they describe far older and indeed timeless principles.[69] Such principles were certainly at work in the politically complex civilizations of antiquity.

The pro-strategy argument, however, is not *ex silentio*, for extant ancient texts provide examples of clear strategic deliberations. The most relevant in my view are the rare statements of a Roman emperor found in Pliny the Younger's *Epistulae*,[70] for they reveal—in private correspondence—exactly how the empire's top decision-maker thought and acted in matters of grand strategy. When Pliny, acting as governor of the province of Bithynia-Pontus ca. 110 AD, asked Trajan for

[63] Raisbeck, 95-97
[64] Isaac, 2-3; 5; 26-27; 128; 132; 146; 395-398; Whittaker 1994, 7-9
[65] Lehmann, 90; Wheeler 1993b, 228-229; Greatrex, 106-107; Maxfield, 5; Olshausen, 191-192; Zuckerman, 115-116
[66] Raisbeck, 79 ff.
[67] Kagan, 334
[68] Posen, 1
[69] See Wheeler 1993a, 21-22
[70] Pliny. *Epistulae* X.77

a legionary centurion to be posted at the frontier town of Juliopolis, the emperor denied his request. Other towns across the empire, Trajan explained, "will expect similar help" from him, a situation he clearly wants to avoid. Unlike Juliopolis, Trajan adds in his letter, the town of Byzantium in the province of Moesia Inferior does require "a garrison under a legionary centurion" due to its "exceptional position." Besides, Trajan maintains, his decision is to continue "the practice of previous reigns," which had posted such a garrison in Byzantium.

The brief exchange between Pliny and Trajan reveals that the emperor was well aware of the scarcity of military resources at his disposal; since there were only about 1,800 legionary centurions available for the entire empire, each one had to be assigned with utmost scrutiny to a place where he was truly needed in the emperor's opinion. Moreover, the decision to transfer a single legionary centurion—let alone entire auxiliary units or legions— was in the sole hands of the emperor, who was clearly aware of his geostrategic priorities despite his lack of access to scaled maps. In this case, the need to provide a proper garrison for Byzantium, with its key position on the Hellespont, clearly outranked that of Juliopolis, for the same reason that Moesia Inferior outranked Bithynia as a military province. The emperor was also aware of the competing demands of governors and legates in the provinces, and of his inability to satisfy them all. Although he did depend on these men for the information with which he would take decisions and for their execution, he was not a passive figure in the decision-making process. Rather, the emperor was fully involved in the details of grand strategy's ends and means, which he distributed himself.

As Trajan's reference to the practice of previous emperors proves, taking grand strategic decisions involved revisiting the concepts and arguments that Posen identifies. While an emperor had room to innovate in terms of grand strategy—as in the case of Trajan's campaigns in Dacia and Parthia— he could not do so in a vacuum. He was constrained not only by the limited means at his disposal, but also by the grand strategic decisions of his predecessors, whose freedom to act was in turn limited by numerous factors outside their control. These included the challenges and realities of geography, the strength of a particular enemy, the resources available at a given moment, and the emergence of unforeseen military crises.

It is valid to speak of the grand strategy of a particular emperor, especially when it comes to those who took meaningful initiatives and whose reigns spanned longer periods. Over time, Roman grand strategy proper is revealed through the continuum or discontinuation of the most important arrangements of troop distribution, structures of imperial defense, and diplomacy. Given the availability of epigraphical evidence for the location of particular legions and auxiliary units at particular times, the analysis of troop movements is of central importance to the study of Roman grand strategy.[71] There is no purer expression of emperors' strategic priorities and how these changed with the passage of time than their concentration, withdrawal, or maintenance of troops at specific garrisons throughout the empire.

Primat der Innenpolitik and Competition for the Principate

The Roman army, however, was not a rigid, uniform machine; its flexibility was striking, as was its capacity to adapt to local circumstances across the empire. Likewise, in its grand strategic

[71] See Kagan, 354-356, and the reference to Ritterling's *Legio* as a model.

functions, the army was not only an instrument of imperial defense vis-à-vis the outside world. Emperors often chose—or were compelled— to deploy the army according to the dynamics of internal politics, which were shaped by Roman history, culture, and values. For instance, Tiberius had ample experience as a commander before he assumed the principate, and thus had no political need to expand the imperial frontiers. On the other hand, Claudius, who had no military credentials, likely decided to conquer Britain—in part at least— since a major triumph would legitimize his rule. For his part, Hadrian felt the need to compensate for evacuating Trajan's conquests in the East with strenuous military efforts at the opposite ends of the empire, even if the nature of such efforts was purely defensive. Hadrian's philhellenism also helped to spark the bloody Bar Kochba rebellion, which was only quelled with a significant, eastward shift of troops from the western provinces and a new political settlement in the East. This proves that an emperor's cultural policies could have profound consequences in terms of grand strategy.

The grand strategic implications of internal politics and policies point to a concept known as the *Primat der Innenpolitik*, a theory in the study of international affairs that regards internal political factors as decisive for a state's military and foreign policy. According to this view, policymakers are "always political actors," who "in critical moments look at the dual field of domestic and international politics."[72] Not all Roman foreign and defense policy depended on internal matters, but it was still the case that internal politics could determine military decisions and, ultimately, grand strategy. Particularly relevant in this respect was the instability of the emperor's position in light of the designs of actual or potential rivals. This concerns the political, legal, and constitutional nature of the principate itself, questions that are perhaps as contentious as that of ancient grand strategy.

At the end of the 18th century, E. Gibbon memorably referred to the Augustan system as "an absolute monarchy disguised by the forms of a commonwealth."[73] Towards the end of the following century, T. Mommsen espoused an altogether different view in his landmark work on Roman constitutional law, which grapples at length with the issue of the *princeps*'s standing with respect to the republican constitution. Augustus's settlement was paradoxical, Mommsen argued, because he decided to renounce to the constitutional changes necessary to officialize and renew the unlimited monarchy he actually exercised.[74] Instead, he established a principate that, in Mommsen's view, was neither a monarchy nor limited. Mommsen considers Augustus's rule to be not the end of the constitutional republic, but rather its fulfillment.[75]

The sole rule of the *princeps* through an office of extraordinary origin, which had to be renewed with the death of each holder, was not the only feature of the new system. Mommsen also emphasized the overlooked, continuous, and uninterrupted role of a legitimate and permanent senate. He stressed the senate's *Jurisdictions und Administrationscompetenz*, which was both shared and coordinated with that of the *princeps*. Mommsen even argued that the proper description of the Augustan system, which broadly remained in place until Diocletian founded a

[72] Mayer, 291-93
[73] Gibbon, 109
[74] Mommsen, 719-720. "…*im Gegensatz zu der caesarischen Dictatur und dem Triumvirat rei publicae constituendae*." Mommsen considers the dictatorships of Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Gaius Julius Caesar to have been temporary monarchies, and as such, episodes in Rome's republican history.
[75] Ibidem, 724-725

true monarchy, was that of a dyarchy with a legal division of power between emperor and senate.[76] Certainly, the latter was much diminished and, as a body, did not stand in the way of the emperor's autocracy, but it did maintain a degree of sovereignty, among other reasons due to its continued role in administering the provinces.[77]

In another seminal work, *The Roman Revolution* of 1939, R. Syme treated the subject tangentially. He stresses Augustus's avoidance of "the fatal name of monarch or dictator," while recognizing the paradox of his constitutional settlement. "The Principate," he wrote, "baffles definition."[78] Nonetheless, Syme presents two important arguments that could be seen to buttress Mommsen's view of shared sovereignty. First, he observes that the *princeps*'s position "was by no means secure and unequivocal as official acts and official history sought to demonstrate."[79] His internal enemies were the *nobiles*, "consulars with armies" who could be "rivals to the Princeps in power as well as in military glory."[80] Hence his reliance on "the interested loyalty of partisans of lower standing,"[81] namely the *novi homines* who, Syme argues, provided the revolutionary core of the Augustan arrangement. Second, Syme makes the critical point that Augustus's fear of consular rivals led not only to a preference for provincial legates of praetorian rank, but also to "a multiplication of small provinces."[82] This was a means to avoid the risk "of a singular consular proconsul" in command of all the legions and resources of, say, Spain. Better to have "two or three legates, inferior in rank and power."[83] That is, to dilute the senate's sovereignty, a political solution with significant grand strategic consequences.

In the late 20th century, influential scholarly works approached the imperial constitution with a greater emphasis on social history. In his *Verfassungs und Sozialgeschichte des Römischen Kaiserreiches*, J. Bleicken described the principate as a de facto *monarchische Herrschaft* and considered Caesar to have been the first monarch, although he declares that there were no legal grounds for monarchy.[84] He stresses the compromise between Octavian / Augustus and the old, senatorial aristocracy as a means to harmonize one-man rule over the army—the essence of the new imperial power— with the Republic's legal and constitutional framework.[85] This was necessary for Octavian to unwind his politically inexpedient military despotism and to rule the imperial territories in the absence of a bureaucratic apparatus.[86] However, the senate's character as a many-headed political corporation, Bleicken argues, left it unable to administer effectively even the consular provinces that were nominally under its control.[87] Since the emperor's factual power was far greater than his legal power, the consular legates came under thorough control from the *Reichszentrale*.[88] The senate's areas of competence shrank gradually until the end of the

[76] Ibidem, 725
[77] Cf. Hardy, 60
[78] Syme 1939, 338
[79] Ibidem, 328
[80] Ibidem
[81] Ibidem
[82] Ibidem, 327
[83] Ibidem
[84] Bleicken 1978, 22; 24
[85] Ibidem, 23
[86] Ibidem, 27-28; 23
[87] Ibidem, 38
[88] Ibidem, 27-28

2nd century BC, when all power was firmly in the hands of the emperor, who ruled by means of a fully established, meritocratic—and hence non-aristocratic— *Verwaltungbürokratie*.[89]

Bleicken's interpretation of imperial power concentrates on the new, bureaucratic, centralized administrative system. According to one critique, this tends toward the portrayal of a stable, well-ordered monarchy akin to those of the Early Modern period.[90] Although this approximation of the ancient to the modern is most consistent with a maximalist stance of Roman grand strategy, it nevertheless underplays the inherent instability of the office of the principate and the frequent, violent competition for imperial power. A late 20th century perspective that did take this into account is that of E. Flaig's *Den Kaiser Herausfordern: Usurpation im Roemischen Reich*.[91] Flaig considers that a Roman emperor's power was even greater than that of an absolute monarch, but he rejects the constitutional approach to the question since he argues that the principate was by nature illegitimate; that is, there was no question of legitimacy according to the traditional, republican framework.[92] It was legally impossible, Flaig maintains, both to validate an emperor's power and to wrest that power away from him.[93]

The principate, he argues, was not a constitutional system but rather an "*Akzeptanz-System*" in which the three leading sectors—the urban *plebs* in Rome, the aristocracy, and the army—consented to the emperor's rule according to the specific dynamics of an intense, bilateral communication between the *princeps* and each group.[94] Thus, the emperor had to uphold a *consensus universorum*: he had to appear as a benevolent monarch to a politically active *plebs*, as a *primus inter pares* to a subservient senate, and as a capable *imperator* to a highly professional, honor-bound army.[95] The pact between these sectors and the emperor made the principate a stable institution, although a solid dynastic principle was absent and the difficulty of satisfying all claims at once made the office itself inherently unstable for the holder.[96] Attempts at usurpation, Flaig writes, were an inherent part of the system since an emperor's overthrow was just as "legitimate" as his elevation to the principate.[97]

Flaig's theses came under criticism for their reliance on theoretical constructions at the expense of the historical accounts found in the ancient sources.[98] In a recent analysis, A. Winterling includes Flaig among the 20th century scholars who equate the Roman principate with an unambiguous monarchy.[99] Winterling argues against this notion and in favor of Mommsen's concept of an imperial dyarchy, emphasizing the ceaseless rivalry between the emperor and the senatorial upper class. He points to the paradox of an autocracy's co-existence with—and legitimization by— republican institutions. This, he argues, made an emperor very much unlike

[89] Ibidem 42; 23
[90] Winterling 2017, 418
[91] Flaig 1992
[92] Flaig 1991, 372; 375; 378
[93] Ibidem, 378
[94] Ibidem, 372; 379
[95] Ibidem, 373-376; 379; 382. Flaig equates the emperor's granting of a *congiarium* to the urban *plebs* to his gift of a donative to the soldiers.
[96] Ibidem, 377-378; 380
[97] Ibidem, 379
[98] See Baltrusch 1994, 455
[99] Winterling 2017, 418

an absolute monarch in Early Modern Europe. Emperors did exert a full monopoly of violence in the Weberian sense of the term and had full control of the empire's financial resources; these were the elements that allowed them to carry out grand strategies. But the illegitimate origin of an emperor's position restrained his seemingly unbounded power.[100]

Since the senate legalized his position, he could not disband it, nor could he do away with the old institutions of the aristocratic republic that granted him his official authority. Despite his full control of the army, he had to rely on senators to command legions and govern military provinces, thus handing them the tools with which they could—and often did— overthrow him. Despite the factual acceptance of the hereditary principle—the soldiers, praetorians, and senators tended to accept the imperial power of surviving sons, whether biological or adopted— there were no clear principles of succession. Nor was there a royal family set clearly above the rest of the aristocracy, especially after the extinction of the Julio-Claudian line. It was rather the case that any capable senator was *capax imperii*.[101]

Beyond the issue of the emperor's precise constitutional role, which is not the object of study of this dissertation, the inescapable state of affairs was that a sitting emperor faced constant danger from internal rivals. This agonistic feature created fertile ground for armed, intra-Roman struggles for imperial power. In terms of strategy, the reality of imperial politics made guarding against usurpation an additional factor to consider for any emperor. This was especially the case when assigning commanders to—or removing them from— the key military provinces.

Grand Strategy and Lower Germany

One such province was Lower Germany. Located at the northwest extremity of the continental empire, its borders were the Meuse and the Rhine delta to the west, the Rhine to the north and east and the Vinxtbach, the northern Eifel and eventually Tongeren to the south.[102] This region, a considerable part of which was covered with forests, included the part of the Middle Rhine Valley around Remagen, which offered only limited space for large settlements, as well as the region's settlement centre on the fertile Lower German lowlands, which stretch from the Drachenfels in the east to the foot of the Eifel in the west until reaching the Lower Rhine Plain north of the Erft and the Ruhr.[103] Further west are the plains of the Middle Rhine and the area around Xanten, beyond which lie the sandy and much less fertile flatlands that surround the territory of Nijmegen, which constitutes the gateway into the marshes and lowlands of the Rhine-Meuse delta further to the west, where the more elevated areas were inhabited in Roman times despite hostile natural conditions.[104] Finally there are the coastal sand dunes and the tributaries in the North Sea of the Schelde, the Waal, the Meuse and the Rhine, which in Roman times had three distributaries.[105] The Roman frontier was marked by that of the Oude Rijn, which, continuing its western course from Woerden, passes through the moorland of Midden-Holland

[100] Ibidem, 413-419. Winterling argues that the emperors whom the ancient sources—that is, aristocratic writers—consider "*wahnsinnig*" were those who, like Caligula, Nero, Domitian, and Commodus, attempted to take the monarchical element to an extreme.
[101] Ibidem
[102] Bechert 2001, 2
[103] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 11-12
[104] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 11-12; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89; Pliny. *NH* XVI.2
[105] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 12; Tacitus. *Annales* II.6

with a maximum width of two kilometres until Leiden, thereafter widening gradually under the ocean's influence, reaching a width of ten kilometres as its now briny waters break the coastal barrier of sand dunes and flow into the North Sea.[106]

As a Roman province, Germania Inferior was relatively small in size—the territory comprised 20,000 square kilometers, or ca. 1 / 250th at the time of its greatest extension under Trajan— but it concentrated as many as four legions at particular points in time, or about 13 percent of the total legionary forces available on average. Constantly, significant numbers of auxiliary troops were also stationed in Lower Germany. Its military importance lay not only in the fact that, as a frontier province, it presented "an actual or potential administrative and military problem with the people who lie beyond,"[107] which in this case included the Frisii, Chauci, and Chatti, spirited enemies whom diplomacy did not always placate. For both emperors and legates, ruling Lower Germany also involved the complex issue of incorporating the allied, native Batavians into the Roman imperial structure.

The extraordinary status of this remarkable, warrior people—at once fiercely loyal to the emperor as the core of his personal bodyguard and partially independent from Rome in their distant domains— sheds light on the Romans' practice of grand strategy, beginning with the fact that they did not apply the precise framework that Luttwak identified. The intermittent use of garrisons to station troops on Batavian territory suggests that, even within a single province, emperors could alternate between direct and indirect rule depending on different factors, some of which were local and had clear effects on the region's economy. Moreover, Lower Germany's military power, coupled with that of the neighboring province of Germania Superior, made the Rhine armies formidable weapons in the frequent and deadly struggles for the principate itself. The Rhine commanders were often involved in these struggles, at times as failed conspirators, at times as emperors' paladins, even as future emperors. As Syme wrote, "the history of the Rhine armies is a large part of the history of the first century."[108]

Germania Inferior's geographical, military, and political importance offers a good opportunity to study grand strategy in terms of how it was applied in a particular province. With this narrow approach, we can concentrate on the details of troop distribution, frontier defense, diplomacy, punitive campaigns, economic development, and imperial politics during a period spanning two centuries. This can allow us to contrast our findings with an empire-wide, systematic framework such as that of Luttwak, which remains the most methodical, comprehensive study of Roman grand strategy and its practicalities. My aim is to demonstrate that Luttwak's model of Julio-Claudian indirect rule, followed by a Flavian policy of annexation and direct frontier defense, is inexact for Lower Germany, where aspects of both methods were applied simultaneously—and intermittently— by both dynasties and their successors until the time of Hadrian. Additionally, I try to emphasize the strategic importance of the political component, which receives scant attention from Luttwak.

The purpose is not to refute for the sake of rebuttal, let alone to deny the practice of Roman grand strategy. Rather, I hope that this dissertation can lead to clearer insights of emperors'

[106] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89
[107] Maxfield, 2
[108] Syme and Collingwood, 787-788

grand strategic decisions at a micro, provincial level, but only so as to gain a better understanding of grand strategy in the broadest terms. As Hessing writes, the Dutch Low Countries were an imperial outpost, but

> "events within this region should never be detached from the more widespread idea of *Romanitas* and the 'Grand Strategy' of the Roman Empire. Periods of intense activity and strong influence, primarily instigated by the central authorities in Rome and strategic military considerations, were interspersed with opportunities for regional economic and cultural growth."[109]

Indeed, the creation of two German provinces in the military zones along the Rhine was, as Woolf argues, the most important adjustment in the process of incorporating Gaul into the Roman sphere, a process that "exemplifies the development of Rome from a conquest state, to head of a loosely controlled Mediterranean hegemony and finally to a fully institutionalized empire."[110]

The periods of most intense Roman military activity in Lower Germany are the object of this study. As such, I devote two chapters to the early period under Julius Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, another five to the reigns of particular, subsequent emperors—Gaius, Claudius, Nero, Trajan, and Hadrian—, another to the policies of the Flavian dynasty, and another to the great Batavian revolt of 68 / 69 AD. This last episode is of central importance not only because its hostilities caused the partial collapse of the northwest frontier at a moment of maximum danger, but also since it involves crucial questions about the soundness of indirect rule, the elasticity and inter-connectedness of the imperial military system, and the recruitment of allied troops as auxiliaries into the Roman army. The events leading to the revolt underline how, as Woolf argues, Roman power created "new kinds of differences between social classes, between regions, and between individuals," and also how "the creation of an empire always transforms the metropole as well as the periphery."[111]

Clearly, not all of Roman grand strategy can be deduced from this book. Arbitrarily, both the geographical scope and the timeframe—from the outset of the Julio-Claudian era to the reign of Hadrian— are limited so as to allow sufficient yet concise scrutiny. Despite its shortcomings—to name one, certain parts of the literature broadly reflect the state of scholarship in 2014, the original submission date— I hope the dissertation can provide some fodder for a discussion about the experience of Roman grand strategy that transcends the abstract debate between maximalists and minimalists.

[109] Hessing 1999, 149
[110] Woolf 1997, 345
[111] Ibidem, 347

I. Indirect Rule and Ethnogenesis: 39 B.C. - 17 A.D.

Caesar on the Lower Rhine

Gaius Julius Caesar, while campaigning in Gaul, marched into the lands between the Rhine and the Meuse, the Eifel and the North Sea, and became the first Roman commander to encounter the tribes living in the area later known as Germania Inferior.[1] His *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* is the first written source to provide information about the "ethno-political landscape" of the Lower Rhine and northern Gaul. Despite Caesar's description of the Rhine as an ethnic frontier, he did not find a series of tribes settled long before, nor did the river form a clear boundary between Gallia and Germania.[2] Celtic and Germanic peoples each belonged to a different civilization and *Kulturraum*, but they had long come into contact with each other in Lower Germany. There was no ethnic uniformity in the region, but rather a plethora of "small and politicized ethnicities" susceptible to natural disasters, wars, internal strife, famine, and forced exile on a massive scale. Under such disruptions, the power hierarchy in both Germany and Gaul could change suddenly.[3]

Caesar himself relates numerous instances in which, prior to his arrival in Gaul, entire Germanic tribes had crossed the Rhine under compulsion:[4] the Helvetii, Usipetii, Tencterii, Cimbri, and Teutones had migrated in large numbers as they searched for farmland where they could settle permanently.[5] He labels certain tribes living west of the Rhine as *Germani cisrhenani*, whom he distinguishes from the *Belgae*,[6] who likely reached Gaul before the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones at the end of the second century BC.[7] Caesar identified parallels between these tribes' invasion of Roman-controlled areas and the mass migrations of his own day, thus justifying his presence and power in Gaul. The marauding Germans, he argued, could threaten Rome itself.[8]

The Germano-Gallic culture of the north, which was found on both sides of the Rhine, was poorer than the more advanced cultures of the Mittelgebirge region and the Latène culture further to the south.[9] Under the northern peoples' tribal structure, bands of families and clans cultivated individual farms or hamlets, surviving under a subsistence economy with a roughly equal ownership of fields and herds.[10] Although Caesar portrays the Germans as nomads, the archaeological evidence suggests that they engaged in agriculture on small settlements even before the mid-first century BC.[11]

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[1] Bechert 2001, 2-3
[2] Roymans, 23; Wolters 2001, 146-147; Grünewald and Schalles, 566
[3] Roymans, 23; 26; 28; Wolters 2001, 156; Bechert 2001, 2-3. For the view, based on sociological studies, that Caesar created the concepts of *Germania* and *Germani* as an ethnic category, *cf.* Lund; Grünewald and Schalles, 566
[4] Caesar. *BG* II.2.4.2; 3.4; 4.10; 29; VI.2.3; 32.1; Roymans, 25-26
[5] Wolters 2001, 153; 156
[6] Bechert 2001, 2-3; Caesar. *BG* I.1; II.4.2; VI.32.1; Wolters 2001, 147 with note no. 6; Tacitus *Germania* 28.4 assigns Germanic origins to the Nervi and Treveri; *cf.* V. Petrikovits 1986, 90; 104
[7] Caesar. *BG* I.1; II.4; Wolters 2001, 147
[8] Wolters 2001, 149; Caesar. *BG* I.40.5 ff.
[9] Wolters 2001, 146
[10] Bechert 2001, 3
[11] Wolters 2001, 151; 153; Timpe 1979, 35 f. See Tacitus. *Germania*, 46. Compare the case of the warrior Chatti: *Germania* 31.2

Caesar was no passive observer of the tribal landscape; his Gallic wars caused momentous changes to the ethnic constitution of the Lower Rhine area, even if his conquest of the area remained incomplete. As the Roman Republic descended into civil war, the Rhine territories and northern Gaul were not priorities for Rome's leaders. Nevertheless, bands of plundering Germans continued to assault Gaul and, occasionally, rebellious Gallic tribes sought the aid of individual Germanic war chiefs against Rome.[12] Thus, the problem of securing the occupied Gallic province from threats emanating from Germania remained unsolved.[13]

Indirect Control and Forced Migrations

By the beginning of Augustus's reign, Rome had settled on a strategy of indirect control. The Romans secured the territory south and west of the Lower Rhine, which enemies used to launch attacks on the Gallic province, by relying on the allied Ubii, Batavi, and other friendly tribes.[14] These people, however, were not the original settlers of the areas they came to inhabit under Roman protection. Hence, Rome's early strategy on the Lower Rhine involved more than the mere granting of client status to existing kingdoms. Rather, Caesar's successors carried out an active security policy, reflected in the literary sources, which consisted of settling friendly tribes in northwest Gaul in order to consolidate their control over that region.[15] In several cases, however, it was Caesar himself who first established Rome's contacts with said tribes.

The Ubii originally lived in a fertile area between the Lahn and the Taunus.[16] Before the middle of the first century B.C., they came under pressure from the Suebi.[17] The harried Ubii saw a potential safeguard in the Roman state as it established itself in Gaul.[18] Thus, they sent embassies to Caesar asking for his protection. According to Caesar, the plea was sent due to the "the renown and reputation of his army."[19] Above all, the Ubii asked for the presence of Roman troops beyond the Rhine.[20] Hence, in 55 BC, an alliance emerged. From Caesar's perspective, establishing links with tribes settled east of the Rhine was advantageous not only politically and diplomatically, but also strategically and militarily.[21] Since the Ubii's land "touched the Rhine,"[22] Caesar was able to launch his campaigns into Germany in 55 and 53 BC from their territory on the Neuwieder Basin.[23]

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[12] Wolters 2001, 155. The fear that Germanic tribes would aid rebellions in Gaul lingered. See the case of the Treveri's rebellion in 21 AD. *Cf.* Tacitus. *Annales* III.44.1

[13] Galsterer, 19-20

[14] Alliances with other tribes such as the Baetasii, Marsaci, Frisiavones also played a role, although to a lesser extent. See Speidel 1994, 40; 82; Grünewald and Schalles, 567

[15] Wolters 2001, 148. He points out that this idea was first developed by Timpe (1975)

[16] Wiegels. "Ubier," in *DNP* 12 / 1 (2002), 961. Wolters 2001, 159 with note no. 65. "Der Stammesname selbst scheint auf das gotsiche ‚Überfluss' zurückzugehen..." For the Ubii's settlement on the Dünsberg, see Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 88-92

[17] Caesar. *BG*. IV.3

[18] Wolters 2001, 160

[19] Caesar. *B.G*. IV.16; 19

[20] Caesar. *B.G*. IV.16; See also IV.8 and Speidel 1994, 13. He argues that the Ubii were among the Germanic tribes which, as early as 57 BC, sent embassies to Caesar offering to join his cause in exchange for protection.

[21] Caesar. *B.G*. IV.7. "… *si suam gratiam Romani velint, posse eis utiles esse amicos*."

[22] Ibidem IV.3

[23] Ibidem IV.16; VI.9-10. Wiegels. "Ubier," in *DNP* 12 / 1 (2002), 962

The alliance with the Ubii, moreover, was advantageous due to their great ability as horsemen.[24] Also, forming a bond with the Ubii and other Germanic tribes living along the Rhine was personally beneficial to Caesar, who gained allies whose warrior culture hinged on the ideal of loyalty.[25]

The *Comitatus* Tradition

Caesar himself describes the Germans' custom of raiding their neighbors' territory so as to drive them away. This led them to maintain "areas of wilderness as wide as possible around them" so as to protect their own lands from invasion.[26] Plundering expeditions, in fact, formed the essence of the tribal youth's military training. Underpinning the martial code was a pledge of loyalty to the leader willing to assume command, a vow made openly during an assembly.[27] Armed young men of the first rank (*dignatio principis*), composed of youths of noble or at least distinguished birth, swore an oath of loyalty (*sacramentum*) to follow and protect a tribal chief (*princeps*). Tacitus called it a *comitatus*.[28] Under its dictates, young warriors competed against each other for the chief's favor. Meanwhile, the number of the *princeps*'s adherents and their bravery determined his honor in relation to his social equals, both within his tribe and outside it.[29] As Tacitus writes, a large body of picked youths (*magno electorum iuvenum globo*) in his entourage gave a leader the most sought-after advantages in society: *in pace decus, in bello praesidium*.[30] Concerning the role of chief and soldier in warfare, Tacitus adds succinctly: *principes pro victoria pugnant, comites pro principe*. He further explains that a soldier should never survive his chief if he is killed in battle; the underlings' brave deeds, meanwhile, must be ascribed to the chief's own glory.[31]

Caesar would have understood the essence of such relations perfectly well, for the loyalty underpinning the *comitatus* tradition had its equivalent in "the Roman ideal of *fides*."[32] Thus, Caesar appreciated the military and social value to be gained by "adopting a German institution" and becoming the chief of a band of brave and loyal German warriors, young men who were conditioned to offer protection and maintain a steadfast, nearly unbreakable faith to their benefactor or leader.[33] Caesar's outsider status did not prevent such an alliance; even if a *comitatus* was formed within a Germanic tribe's inner core, the leader's private character made him mostly independent of the tribe's political structure and hierarchy.[34] In certain cases, a war chief and his entourage could oppose and unbind themselves from a majority decision taken through a tribe's traditional political channels.[35] Thus, in terms of foreign policy, the tribe itself could not be held

[24] Speidel 1994, 81-82. "Troopers from the frontier tribes were much better horsemen than Romans from the inner provinces, for they trained from boyhood on, and in horsemanship training matters more than anything else. In the first and early second century, therefore, the guardsmen came from the warlike, horse-breeding tribes along the lower Rhine." See Tacitus. *Germania* 32
[25] Tacitus. *Germania* 13; Van Driel-Murray, 202-203
[26] Caesar. *BG* VI.23
[27] Ibidem
[28] Tacitus. *Germania* 13; Speidel 1994, 14
[29] Tacitus. *Germania* 13
[30] Ibidem
[31] Ibidem, 14
[32] Speidel 1994, 40
[33] Ibidem, 14; 40
[34] Wolters 2001, 154
[35] Ibidem; Livy XXXIX.55.1

responsible for a splinter group's actions.[36] Hence, Caesar would have needed the support of only a few nobles of standing within a tribe in order to gain for himself a significant following.

Caesar turned his Germanic followers into a personal horse guard, which was not only the commander's escort but also "a crack unit" reserved for crucial moments in battle, for instance at Noviodunum and other battlefields.[37] The formation of Caesar's bodyguard, moreover, represented another type of movement of Germanic people, that of mercenaries or warrior groups that attached themselves to a nobleman and left their land in search of plunder and rapine, upon which the economy of the *comitatus* groups largely depended.[38] From a political perspective, Caesar's establishment of this personal guard of foreign horsemen, which Augustus kept and used in the civil wars that brought him to power under the name of *Germani corporis custodes*, owed to the style of an eastern potentate and it marked, of course, "one of the foundations" of the principate.[39] As Speidel points out, Tacitus may have had in mind the Germanic horse guard, "the *comitatus* he knew best," when describing the Germans' traditions of loyalty to a war leader.[40] Under the Julio-Claudians, the Ubii probably were second only to the Batavians in supplying horsemen to the emperor's personal guard.[41]

The Destruction of the Eburones

Not all of Caesar's relations with Germanic tribes were carried out under similar terms of friendship. A case in point is that of the Eburones, a people of *Germani cisrhenani* who were clients of the Treveri.[42] They lived east of the Menapii in an area rich in loess soils.[43] Initially, the Eburones were Caesar's allies. Their two kings led "a somewhat loose tribal federation"[44] of mostly independent districts or *pagi inter Mosam ac Rhenum*,[45] primarily in the northern Ardennes, on the Eifel and in the neighboring areas[46] of "the present-day southeast Netherlands, northeast Belgium and the neighboring German Rhineland" to the north of Bonn.[47] However, they revolted in 54 BC and dealt a Roman legion a serious defeat.[48] Caesar thus chose to massacre the entire tribe— or at least the name-bearing, traditional core— and take over its territory.[49] As Roymans notes, Caesar's brand of "Roman imperialism at its harshest" included "large-scale plundering,

[36] Wolters 2001, 154
[37] Speidel 1994, 15; Roymans, 57; Wolters 2001, 155
[38] Wolters 2001, 153-154. "(Ein Phänomen), das in der Forschung unter dem Begriff ‚Gefolgschaft' diskutiert wird." *Cf*. Timpe 1998; Caesar. *BG* VI.23; for the economy, *cf*. Tacitus. *Germania* 14
[39] Speidel 1994, 15; *cf*. Wolters 2001, 155
[40] Speidel 1994, 40. Hence, Tacitus used as a model for his description "the terms of the emperor's court, the oath of the emperor's guardsmen and the ethics of Roman officers."
[41] Ibidem, 13
[42] Roymans, 23. The Menapii occupied "modern Belgium and the southwest Netherlands as far as the Rhine." Caesar. *BG* IV.4.
[43] Roymans, 23; Bechert 2001, 2-3
[44] Roymans, 23; Caesar. *BG* VI.31.5
[45] Galsterer, 21 with note no. 10
[46] F. Schön. "Eburones," in *DNP* 3 (1997), 864
[47] Roymans, 23; Caesar. *BG* V.24.4; VI.5.4
[48] Caesar. *BG* V.24-52; Dio XL.5-11
[49] Caesar. *BG* VIII.24; Galsterer, 21 with note no. 10

mass enslavement and even genocide."[50] The Eburones thus disappeared as a political entity, even though parts of the tribe might have been absorbed into the Atatucii,[51] who, according to Caesar, had composed the rearguard of the Cimbri and Teutones and had settled in north-eastern Gaul after their defeat by the Romans.[52] In turn, these people and other, smaller tribes migrated south to the territory of the Tungri, whose first settlement at Tongeren— created by the Roman military in the last decade B.C. at a strategic point on the road stretching eastward from Bavay— was called Atuatuca Tungrorum. During the first decades AD, these natives incorporated themselves fully to Rome's imperial structure.[53]

Even if Caesar made an example of the Eburones in the eyes of other allied tribes considering rebellion, their destruction created a significant problem: a large area west of the Rhine—from the fertile area of the Cologne lowland to the North Sea coast— was left unoccupied and, hence, unguarded.[54] Thus, there emerged a threat to the occupied Gallic provinces: Roman enemies living beyond the Rhine—among them the Sugambri, Bructeri, Cherusci, or splinter groups from these tribes— could launch attacks from across the river and proceed toward Roman-controlled territory virtually unchecked.[55] Ideally, therefore, Rome should exert control over this area—beginning with the territory around modern Cologne— to the greatest degree possible. Nonetheless, hardly any manpower could be spared for that purpose while parts of Gaul remained in turmoil and while civil war raged across the empire.

Roman commanders chose to settle tribes of *Germani transrhenani* in the Eburones' former territory, a practice similar to that applied on the Upper Rhine.[56] The Romans usually reached agreements with tribal or factional leaders ready to flee their homeland due to political strife or civil war, attacks launched by other Germanic tribes such as the Suebi or the strains of excessive population growth.[57] In fact, great migrations of entire tribes such as those of the Helvetii, Cimbres or Teutones were the exception rather than the norm. On the other hand, there was a certain similarity between the migrations of people seeking land in which to settle and the warrior groups pursuing plunder, namely the fact that in both cases there was normally a strong chief leading a group of adherents—in some cases comprising members of different tribes— outside the framework of a particular tribe's governing structure.[58] The Romans, however, did not recur solely to encouraging such migrations in order to secure northern Gaul. When circumstances demanded it, they created new tribes deliberately, often by amalgamating splinter groups of existing ones.[59]

[50] Roymans, 23-24. He suggests that there may have not been genocide in this case, but possibly a *damnatio memoriae*. *Cf.* Schön. "Eburones," in *DNP* 3 (1997), 864: "…eine komplete Ausrottung ist aber unwahrscheinlich." *Cf.* Wolters 1990,63-65
[51] Bechert 2001, 2-3
[52] Caesar. *BG* II.29.4; Wolters 2001, 147
[53] Galsterer, 32
[54] Wolters 2001, 159 with note no. 64; Schalles, 432 with note no. 3
[55] Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 88
[56] Roymans, 25; Wolters 1990. 141 ff.; 150 ff. In Upper Germany, the tribes in question were the Vangiones, Nemetes and Triboci.
[57] Roymans, 25-26
[58] Wolters 2001, 158
[59] Roymans, 25

Agrippa's Lower Rhine Policy

Caesar set the precedent, but the architect of Roman frontier policy on the Lower Rhine appears to have been Agrippa, Octavian's close ally. Agrippa governed Gaul on two occasions: in 39 / 38 B.C. and 20 / 10 B.C. Possibly during his first governorship, the Ubii, whom the Suebi had finally forced out of their country, came into Roman territory. They either asked Agrippa for permission to settle west of the Rhine or accepted his initial offer.[60] If a plea was made, it did not fall on deaf ears due to the tribe's good standing with Rome. According to Tacitus, the Ubii had "given proof of their allegiance" (*experimento fidei*).[61] They had offered Caesar their territory during his campaigns and distinguished themselves in the horse guard.[62] For his part, Agrippa would have welcomed the chance to secure the still unprotected area of the Rhine valley by allowing a friendly tribe to settle there, particularly when the garrison in Gaul was being considerably reduced.[63]

Agrippa thus granted the Ubii the legal permission to dwell on the Rhine's left bank (*ut arcerent, non ut custodirentur*).[64] They settled in Bonn and in Neuss before proceeding to the Cologne area more than a decade later,[65] when they founded the *oppidum Ubiorum*, the center of the future *civitas Ubiorum*.[66] Since the Ubii are not attested east of the Rhine after Tiberius's reign, it appears that the entire tribe or at least a majority settled in Roman territory.[67] Even if a portion of the Ubii remained behind and joined other tribes, the fact that they kept the same name that they had used when living beyond the Rhine is telling.[68] In both respects— the entire tribe's relocation to Roman territory and the continued use of its old name— the Ubii's migration was different from that of the other tribes that settled in Lower Germany with Roman permission.[69]

The Ubii's new territory in the Rhine valley, which they may have reached via the east-west path over the Nutscheid,[70] and in the left bank region of the Cologne lowlands was fertile due to its loess soil. It also had broad access to networks of trade.[71] Indeed, it was no coincidence that, during Caesar's time, the Usipetes and Tencteri, whom the Suebi also expelled from their homeland, had sought to settle in the same territory.[72] Strategically, the area was significant insofar as it allowed control over a broad, scarcely inhabited area that was constantly under the threat of the Suebi. A

[60] Wolters 2001, 160; Strabo IV.3.4. *Cf.* Tacitus. *Germania* 28.4; *Annales* XII.27.1. Gechter 2003, 147 argues that the Ubii once formed a part of a larger Germanic tribe. *Cf.* ibidem 1991, 158. The date of the Ubii's plea and that of their settlement is matter of controversy. *Cf.* Wiegels. "Ubier," in *DNP* 12 / 1 (2002), 962; Wolters 1990, 150; 138; 148. "...so scheintauch die allgemeine politische Lage eine Datierung in die erste Statthalterschaft des Agrippa nahezulegen…" Idem 2001, 159; Heinrichs, 289; Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 88

[61] Tacitus. *Germania* 28

[62] Speidel 1994, 16 with note no. 6

[63] Wolters 1990, 138; 148

[64] Tacitus. *Germania* 28.4

[65] Galsterer, 23

[66] Tacitus. *Germania* 28; *Annales*.XIII.57.3; Eck. "Köln" in *RGA* (17), 2001, 88; Galsterer, 21; Precht in *DNL* (1974), 160: "Auf dem Gebiet des heutigen Stadtkernes zwischen Dom (Norden) und Maria im Kapitol (Süden) sowie Rathaus (Osten) undRichmodstraße (Westen)..."

[67] Wolters 2001, 159 with notes no. 61-63

[68] Ibidem

[69] Ibidem, 165

[70] Gechter 2003, 149

[71] Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 90.

[72] Wolters 2001, 159 with notes no. 61-63; Caesar. *BG* IV.1 ff.; VI.35

buffer zone of some type was necessary since Gaul, despite the troop reductions, was not yet fully pacified.[73] The Ubii's migration, however, took place in different stages until Tiberius's reign.[74]

Migrations such as those of the Ubii point to the Romans' attempt to secure part of the northern entry into Gaul by an indirect method, thus sparing great military and financial expenditures. Surely, the Ubii were required, as part of the *foedus* established with the Romans, "to secure the Rhine frontier from Germanic attacks"[75] in a way similar to Luttwak's Julio-Claudian system of border control through reliance on vassal states. The first Ubii settlers on the Rhine's west bank might have been native military leaders and their followers, who served as auxiliaries in the Roman army and were paid with local, Celtic coins.[76] Ubian troops, in fact, were present in Bonn and perhaps also in Neuss as early as 30 B.C.[77] Several inscriptions attest that armed units of the Ubii were soon integrated into the Roman military.[78]

During the reign of Augustus, the Lower German army already counted with at least one regular *cohors equitata* whose soldiers were recruited from the *civitas Ubiorum*.[79] The unit was stationed in the *oppidum Ubiorum* and it took part in the German campaigns of the early first century, during which it was led by Italic *praefecti*.[80] At least one additional infantry unit of the Ubii arose before 70 AD,[81] for Tacitus mentions *cohortes Ubiorum* in the context of the Batavian Revolt.[82]

The Ubii's provision of troops for the Roman army benefitted both sides: the Romans integrated skilled Germanic warriors into their forces, while individual tribesmen gained access to Roman training and equipment. This could help them be recruited into other, permanent auxiliary units.[83] Not least important for the Ubii were the benefits of a salary and their integration into the Roman money economy, thus partaking in the general welfare of Roman Gaul.[84] Members of the pro-Roman Ubian aristocracy, who may have become Roman citizens already under Augustus, probably led local auxiliary units and were involved in "the earliest urbanization of the Germanic frontier."[85] This would have taken place according to the Roman *civitas* model that replaced the tribes' earlier political organization, which was usually based on the authority of individual leaders.[86] By the end of Augustus's reign and the beginning of that of Tiberius, the *oppidum Ubiorum* had grown into a regionally important, Roman-style town of the type that usually functioned as the pillar of a *municipium*.[87]

[73] Wolters 2001, 160
[74] Galsterer, 21; Gechter 2003, 147; Lenz, 158; Roymans, 24
[75] Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 88
[76] Galsterer, 22
[77] Galsterer, 22 with note no. 16; Gechter 1990; idem 1989
[78] *CIL* X 4862; *ILS* 2703; Alföldy 1968 a, 73-74
[79] Alföldy 1968 a, 73
[80] Alföldy 1968 a, 74
[81] Alföldy 1968 a, 73-74
[82] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.18
[83] Wolters 2001, 160 with note no. 70; Alföldy 1968 a, 73 f.; Heinrichs, 289
[84] Wolters 2001, 161
[85] Roymans, 200
[86] Ibidem; Wolters 2001, 165; Rüger 1968, 27 ff.
[87] Roymans, 197 with note no. 407; 199; Carroll, 123 ff.

Agrippa built a great road network in Gaul that, "radiating from Lugdunum, opened up (that) country."[88] This infrastructure was necessary for Gaul's defense because Caesar had obliterated the Eburones' settlements and with them the Lower Rhine's agricultural and political base. Thus, no single legion, comprised of thousands of soldiers, could be fully supplied if stationed in that territory. Instead, Roman commanders posted their forces mostly along the major roads that connected southern Gaul to Belgica, also along the route that would lead from Boulogne to Cologne.[89] During the first half of Augustus's reign, the northernmost army camps that could hold troops temporarily were Augusta Treverorum (Trier) on the Moselle, built around 40 BC, and Aduatuca Tungrorum (Tongeren), built *ca*. 20 B.C.[90] The new road infrastructure, which was likely not finished by the end of Agrippa's second governorship,[91] facilitated the strategic movement of Roman troops within Gaul, enabling them to reach the Rhine if the allies' armed force failed to resist an invasion launched from beyond the river.

After the Eburones' destruction, the other tribes that settled in their former territory included the Cugerni, who occupied the area around Xanten, and the Tungri in Tongeren and the surrounding region. It appears as if the Romans took the initiative to form the Cugerni as a single tribe from scattered indigenous peoples and splinter groups—possibly military units— of the Sugambri. These were brought together in a clear case of ethnogenesis and settled in a place that may have been originally called Cibernodurum.[92] The Sugambri were a warlike tribe that lived beyond the Rhine between the Lahn and the Lippe, and their relations with Caesar had been neither those of permanent allies nor enemies, something which may point to an internal split between pro and anti-Roman factions.[93] Before 17 BC, the Sugambri seem to have been subjected as tribute-paying Roman clients.[94] In 8 B.C., they settled west of the Rhine under Roman consent or compulsion,[95] and probably around this time cohorts of Sugambri were first integrated into the Roman army.[96]

The regular auxiliary troops kept the name Sugambri as did the portion of the tribe that remained east of the Rhine.[97] Since the group that settled in Roman territory were no longer called Sugambri, it is possible that they were absorbed into the tribe of the Cugerni or the Baetasii.[98] If Sugambri tribesmen indeed formed a part of the Cugerni, then the formation of the *cohortes Sugambrorum* was linked to the process of settling part of the Cugerni in Roman territory.[99] According to the literary sources, other tribes of the Lower German hinterland such as the Baetasii and Sunuci had Germanic origins, and they also might have descended from the Sugambri.[100] Alternatively, the Cugerni may have formed either part of another tribe dwelling beyond the Rhine's right bank or the surviving portion of the Eburones massacred by Caesar. The Romans established the Cugerni's

[88] Syme 1934, 359; Strabo. IV.6.11
[89] Gechter 2003, 145-146; 147
[90] Ibidem, 145; Thoen, 50
[91] Gechter 2003, 146
[92] Schalles, 432 with note no. 4; 446-447 with note no. 14; Bogaers 1989, 77 ff.; Grünewald and Schalles, 567
[93] Roymans, 23-24; Wolters 2001, 163-164 with notes no. 91 and 92; Caesar. *BG*. IV.16.2 ff.; 18 ff.; VI.34
[94] Wolters 2001, 163 with note no. 84; Timpe 1975, 136
[95] Roymans, 23-24; Wolters 2001, 147
[96] Wolters 2001, 164; Alföldy 1968 a, 84 f.
[97] Strabo VII.1.3; Wolters 2001, 164
[98] Suetonius. *Tiberius* 9; Tacitus. *Annales* XII.39; Wolters 2001, 164; Spickermann, 213; Rüger 1968, 8 f.; 97; v. Petrikovits 1980, 114
[99] Galsterer, 27; Alföldy 1968 a, 84 ff.
[100] Wolters 2001, 147

civitas in the territory between the Rhine and the Meuse to the west of Ubian lands and to the east and southeast of the Rhine delta.[101] The Tungri, on the other hand, were "a new ethnic formation" that "probably evolved entirely from indigenous groups" and was settled in eastern Belgium.[102]

The Batavian Alliance

It was the Batavians, however**,** who, along with the Ubii, became the most important Roman allies in Lower Germany. This was due, on the one hand, to their role in the Roman military and their personal service to the emperor; their conception of *fides* was ingrained in their culture as strongly as in the case of the Ubii.[103] On the other hand, the Batavians came to occupy an area of great strategic importance, namely the territory between the Rhine and the Meuse that became known as the *insula Batavorum*[104] as well as the Batavians' main settlement—the *oppidum Batavorum* according to Tacitus[105]— in Betuwe in the present Dutch province of Zuid-Holland.[106] Batavian territory also included parts of the modern Noord-Brabant province.[107] The Batavians homeland, all of which used to belong to the Eburonean kingdom,[108] formed the end of a road that stretched from the interior of Gaul, thus connecting the Rhine with the Mediterranean. It was also an ideal point of access to the North Sea and to the region inhabited by the coastal tribes.[109] In the Augustan era, however, there was still no road connecting the Lower Rhine valley with the area of the middle Rhine to the south, where the Ubii were settled.[110] Therefore, it was necessary to populate the Rhine delta with a friendly tribe and to make its territory correspond to Rome's imperial frontier.[111] According to Tacitus, the Batavi originally formed a part of the Chatti,[112] a tribe allied with Rome at an early period that inhabited the woods and mountains north of the Taunus in the area of Kassel and Fritzlar in modern Hessen.[113] Upon the Ubii's migration west of the Rhine, probably around the second decade B.C., the Romans allowed the Chatti to occupy their former lands, which were also highly fertile.[114] Thereafter, the Romans, whose alliance with the Chatti broke down in 10

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[101] Galsterer, 27
[102] Roymans, 24 with note no. 92
[103] Speidel 1994, 40
[104] Wolters 1990, 143-144; Pliny. *Historia Naturalis*. IV.101. "*In Rheno autem ipso, prope in longitudinem, nobilissima Batavorum insula et Cannenefatium*…" Tacitus. *Germania*. 29.1; *Annales* II.6.3; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 11-12
[105] Tacitus, *Historiae* V.19; 20; Bechert 2007, 49; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 76-79; Tab. Peut., Segm. II 4: Noviomagi, at thebeginning of the road from north to south through Batavia.
[106] Stolte. "Cananefaten," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 329-330. See also Dietz. "Batavi," in *DNP* 2 (1997), 491-492. For the territory of the Batavi in general, see VanSoesbergen, 238; Caesar. *BG* IV.10.12; Plutarch. *Life of Otho* 12.4; Pliny. *Historia Naturalis* IV.101; IV.106; Tacitus. *Annales* II.6.4-5; *Germania* 29; *Historiae* IV.12.2; Dio LIV.32.2; LV.24.7; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.9
[107] Van Enckevort, 364
[108] Roymans, 23
[109] Wolters 1990, 144; Tacitus. *Annales* II.6.3
[110] Gechter 2003, 145
[111] Haalebos and Willems, 247 with fig. 1.
[112] Tacitus. *Germania* 29
[113] Tacitus. *Agricola* 6.1; *Germania* 30.3; Dio LXVII.4.1; Southern, 82; Bennett, 28; Strobel 1987 b, 427-428. For a discussion of the time of the Chatti's migration from north-western Germany to Hessen, *cf*. Roymans, 57 with note no. 175; Timpe 1975, 134-135; Becker, 97; Baatz 1997, 38-39. Roymans agrees with Timpe's explanation for Caesar's failure to mention the Chatti: they must have been "a client tribe of the Suebi during Caesar's conquests."
[114] Dio LIV.33; 36. Caesar (*BG*. IV.8.3) considered allowing the Tencteri and Usipetes to inhabit the area. Wiegels. "Ubier," in *DNP* 12 / 1 (2002), 962; Timpe 1975, 135; Becker, 97; Wolters 2001, 159; idem 1990, 143: "Im rechtsrheinischen Gebiet hätte nicht nur die Ansiedlung der Chatten für einen vorgezogenen Grenzschutz gesorgt,

B.C.,[115] struggled when fighting against the tribe's infantry. This was due mainly to the Chatti's use of disciplined foot soldiers and to the tribe's expertise in guerrilla tactics. Thus, the Romans considered the Chatti the fiercest warriors among the western Germans.[116]

The etymology of the Batavians' name—the root of which is "the good" in Gothic— might prove that they once constituted the Chatti aristocracy, namely the royal line and the horsemen who were expelled by priests and infantrymen in a successful *jacquerie,*[117] in Tacitus's words a *seditio domestica*.[118] More likely, however, the Batavians formed a faction within the Chatti elite that was exiled for its pro-Roman sympathies before migrating to the Lower Rhine with Roman consent.[119] It also may be that the Batavians originally comprised the leading element of a larger group within the Chatti, including the Batavi's own *clientes* and people from other tribes. Their origins aside, the fact that the Batavians negotiated their entry into the Roman Empire as independent political partners was essential to their future role as allies and soldiers in the Roman army. The Romans were willing to enter into a contractual commitment that granted the right of settlement and certain privileges—namely the exemption from the taxes and tribute to which the other Lower Rhine tribes were liable— in exchange for the military service of the highly skilled Batavian cavalrymen. Roman commanders would have become aware of the Batavians' military value particularly due to their performance in the civil wars that ensued after Caesar's murder.[120]

Although Tacitus claims that the Batavians settled in an area that was *vacua cultoribus*,[121] the archaeology of the Rhine and Meuse delta suggests that there was no "large-scale discontinuity of habitation" in the second half of the first century BC.[122] Hence, Roymans argues that the Batavians were assimilated "with former Eburonean subgroups" in the delta of the Rhine and Meuse.[123] This amalgamation of people was meant to establish tribal unity, not equality. Indeed, the Batavians were likely warriors who formed the retinue- in the *comitatus* tradition- of "a prominent, pro-Roman Chattian leader," most likely the *dux* (Chariovalda) who commanded the tribes' forces during Germanicus's campaigns.[124] This would have been precisely the type of ruler the Romans sought to impose as a client king upon a newly created tribe that consisted of foreign and native groups,[125] the former being meant to rule over the latter.[126] Even if social cohesion and integration took place by means of joint military service and intermarriage, there was clearly a powerful Batavian ruling class. As Roymans suggests, Tacitus's statement that the Batavians simply

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sondern auch die Sugambrer hätten sich mit Rom auf einen Frieden geeinigt, bei dem sie möglicherweise sogar tributpflichtig wurden."

[115] Roymans, 58

[116] Southern, 82; Bennett, 28

[117] Wolters 1990, 143-144; idem 2001, 162; *cf.* Wenskus 1977, 423; Neumann. "Bataver, Sprachliches," in *RGA* 2 (1976), 91; Rübekeil, 1338

[118] Tacitus. *Germania* 29; *Historiae* IV.12

[119] Roymans, 58. See discussion on whether the Batavians brought their name with them as a "Chattan immigrant group" or "whether it arose in the Rhine delta."

[120] Wolters 2001, 161-162

[121] Tacitus. *Germania* 29.2; *Historiae* IV.12

[122] Roymans, 27; 49; Wolters 2001, 162

[123] Roymans, 27

[124] Ibidem, 55; 58; 64: Roymans suggests that Chariovalda, whose name indicates that he did not belong to the *stirps regia*, was a client of the royal family. *Cf.* Wolters 2001, 165; Alföldy 1968 a, 13; 45; Tacitus. *Annales* II.11. For the campaigns, *cf.* Tacitus. *Annales* II. II.8; *Historiae* IV.12

[125] Slofstra, 25-26; Roymans, 62

[126] Roymans, 24

migrated to an empty Rhine delta could reflect the self-image of the Batavian "political core" and, by extension, the tribe's "internal power relationships."[127]

Tacitus, in his narration of the Batavian revolt, mentions a *stirps regia*, a Batavian royal family whose members' names—Julius Civilis, Julius Briganticus, Claudius Victor— indicate that they were Roman citizens. Roymans suggests that the kingship was formed during the Batavian polity's "formative phase," so that an ancestor of Civilis may have been named an official client king as a personal *cliens* of the Julian house due to the Batavians' early treaty with Rome. This would have assured the empire indirect control of the Rhine delta and a steady flow of Batavian troops.[128] The treaty also might have resulted in Roman citizenship for that part of the Batavian upper class whose members had served early on in the Roman military,[129] with Roman citizenship and the *nomen gentilicium* bequeathed "through the male line only," as was the norm across the empire.[130] Moreover, a strong Batavian nobility enjoying Roman citizenship, granted by the Julian house, would have been beneficial for Rome insofar as its members "would have advocated Roman-style civic government."[131] The plan was to have a fully integrated aristocracy ruling over the commoners, with the leading figures of old exerting their influence under Roman civil and military titulature.[132] Subsequent events, however, would suggest that the Batavian nobles viewed themselves as privileged allies of Rome, not as mere subjects. In this sense, the integration of the Batavians was different to that of the Gallic *Iulii*, noblemen sympathetic to Rome who became Roman citizens before Augustus provincialized Gaul.[133]

The Batavians could forge a special alliance with Rome because, of all the tribes of the Lower Rhine, they were evidently the best horsemen.[134] Ancient authors depict their extraordinary skill as cavalrymen; particularly impressive from the Roman viewpoint was their ability to cross rivers on horseback while in formation and fully armed.[135] It might have been after witnessing such horsemen in action that Caesar decided to incorporate into his army the four hundred *equites Germani* who composed his personal horse guard and also fought alongside his troops—clearly as auxiliaries— during the Gallic wars and later on the Nile.[136] Lucan, incidentally, also lists Batavians among Caesar's auxiliaries in his account of the Civil War against Pompey.[137] Thus, Speidel argues that Caesar's horse guard, which formed the basis of the Julio-Claudian imperial

[127] Ibidem, 61; 65
[128] Ibidem, 63; 65; Slofstra, 25
[129] Roymans, 63
[130] Ibidem. Therefore, it must have been Claudius who granted Roman citizenship to Claudius Victor, Julius Civilis's nephew.
[131] Ibidem, 200
[132] Van Enckevort, 364
[133] Roymans, 63 stresses the similarity.
[134] Dio. LV.24. Another interpretation of the etymology of their name rests on this quality of the Batavians. See Dietz. "Batavi," in *DNP* 2 (1997), 491-492
[135] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.12; Speidel 1994, 28; 46. "As shock troops, all horse guards, German, Roman or Parthian, excelled in contested river crossings. Once the shallows of the far bank were reached, the fight might be first against enemy archers, hence the emperors' horse guard needed to take its own bowmen across in the first line…" Wolters 1990, 144
[136] Caesar *BG* I.83.5; VII.13.1; *BA* 29.2; Speidel 1994, 12-13; Roymans, 56; 57; Wolters 2001, 161; Tausend, 491 ff.
[137] Lucan. *Pharsalia* I.431: "*Batavique truces, quos aere recurvo stridentes acuere tubae…*" Wolters 1990, 146; Roymans, 56. "…this statement, often regarded as an anachronism, may well have been correct."

horse guard, was composed mainly of Batavian, and also Ubian, cavalrymen.[138] Therefore, it was probably Caesar who, while on the Rhine frontier during his Gallic campaigns, when he established alliances with *Germani transrhenani*,[139] first came into contact with Batavian horsemen and created bonds with them while they still formed a part of the Chatti.[140] This would have been one of the treaties established with tribes inhabiting the areas east of the Middle Rhine that had been freed from Ariovistus's control.[141] Also, it would explain Tacitus's description of the Batavian-Roman alliance, still prevalent in the second century AD, as an *antiqua societas*.[142]

After Caesar's death, the Romans and Batavians likely cemented further treaties.[143] Batavian cavalry troops certainly took part in the civil wars after Caesar's murder. They also formed a part of Octavian's *Germani corporis custodes*—also known later simply as *Batavi*[144]— already in 36 B.C.[145] Numismatic evidence for the Batavians' early service in the Roman army includes silver coins from central and eastern Gaul dating to the decades after Caesar's conquest. Found at Empel, these coins may be seen "as payment for the first generation of Batavian cavalry in Roman service."[146] Moreover, there is evidence for the production of Batavian *triquetrum* coins from around 50 to 15 BC, a period that coincides with the creation of the Batavian tribe.[147]

The Batavians' relocation to the Rhine delta likely occurred at some time between the end of Caesar's stay in Gaul in 51 BC and the first of Drusus's German campaigns in 15 BC.[148] The Batavians' early military service for Rome,[149] however, suggests that the tribe may have settled on the Rhine delta around the time of Agrippa's first governorship in Gaul.[150] As in the case of the Ubii and Cugerni, the Batavians likely settled in the Rhine delta with Rome's specific permission, especially given the strategic importance of the Dutch river area. Thus, the Batavian migration most likely resulted from an explicit, grand strategic decision[151] to exert effective control over that territory.[152] Moreover, after the Batavians' settlement, Roman commanders such as Drusus, who apparently renewed the alliance, used their territory both to recruit troops and to launch expeditions to the north.[153] Indeed, Batavian troops took part in the campaigns against the Germans beyond the Rhine under Augustus and Tiberius, probably as special cavalry troops.[154] The alliance

[138] Speidel 1994, 13; 16. *Cf*. Roymans, 57- 58 suggests that Caesar's original bodyguard could have included pro-Roman Chatti, something that "could explain the large number of Batavians in the later bodyguard."
[139] Roymans, 56
[140] Ibidem; 58
[141] Ibidem, 57; Caesar. *BG* II.35
[142] Tacitus. *Germania* 29. "*Manet honos et antiquae societatis insigne*…" *Historiae* IV.12; *Cf*. Roymans, 56; Wolters 1990, 247
[143] Roymans, 58
[144] *AE* 1990, 990; Speidel 1994, 10-11; 16
[145] Wolters 1990, 246; idem 2001, 161; Appian. *BC* V.117; *cf*. Bellen, 19
[146] Roymans, 60
[147] Ibidem, 96
[148] Ibidem, 24; 55
[149] Ibidem, 56-57
[150] Wolters 1990, 145. The Batavi are mentioned in the literary sources for the first time on the *insula Batavorum* in 12 B.C. Dio. LIV.32.2. *Cf*. Wolters 1990 143-144 with note 54
[151] Willems 1984b, 206-207; Wolters 1990, 144; Roymans, 55
[152] Roymans, 58
[153] Ibidem
[154] Wolters 1990, 146 with note no. 62. "was... nicht zuletzt das Ausbleiben einer materiellen Ablösung der Wehrpflicht, wie sie bei den gallischen Verbündeten zu erkennen war, eklärt."

benefitted both sides. The Romans extended indirect territorial control over the Lower Rhine and incorporated elite troops into their army. The Batavians gained autonomy from the Chatti and settled in a region where Roman influence brought stability under civic institutions.[155] These circumstances increased the degree to which Rome depended on the Batavians and vice versa.

The Economy of the Lower Rhine

The Rhine delta, due to the poverty of its soil, was a convenient location for a tribe of *socii* whose main responsibility was to supply a steady stream of troops for the Roman army and whose income was gained primarily from military service.[156] Indeed, while land cultivation and animal husbandry were the predominant economic activities in Lower Germany, with more than 80 % of the population employed in these fields,[157] Roman administration provided a systematic development of the region's economy but especially in the southern, loess-rich sector of Germania Inferior. These were the territories in which the Ubii were settled and where, due to the intensive cultivation of grain, there appeared numerous *villae rusticae* with a large estate administered from a large manor.[158] The north, however, was different. Unlike the area of the Mittelgebirge to the southwest between Aachen and the middle Rhine valley, where there were ore and stone deposits, or the fertile lands of loess soil stretching from Tongeren in northern Gaul until Cologne, the Lower Rhine lowlands, the soil of which contained much clay, gravel and sand, and the river delta, composed of the marshes formed by the sea, the Meuse, the Waal and the Rhine, were conducive mainly to a pastoral economy based on cattle breeding.[159]

The lower level of economic development in northern and north-western Lower Germany, which corresponds mainly to the lands in which the Cugerni and Batavi were settled, is reflected in the byre-dwellings that, in the absence of a mature *villa* economy, are most common to the area.[160] Despite the introduction of Roman agricultural techniques, the river area's farming potential remained severely limited as the population grew steadily. The amount of arable land was scarce—intensive manuring was necessary to make agriculture in the Rhine delta and the vicinity's sandy areas possible— while flooding in spring and winter restricted cattle grazing.[161] Farmers, therefore, mainly sought to satisfy their own family's needs by cultivating "the small, high yielding plots which surrounded the houses."[162] There was thus no question of the land being able to support a *villa* economy.[163] Any surplus of horticultural products such as eggs, cheese and vegetables would have been sold—perhaps mostly by Batavian women— to soldiers stationed in the nearby forts either directly or at weekly markets.[164] Nonetheless, achieving agricultural self-sufficiency must have become more difficult as the population continued to grow during the first and second

[155] Wolters 2001, 162
[156] Ibidem; idem 1990, 144-145. (Die Truppenhilfe war) "ja auch schon bei Caesar das wesentliche Mittel... um eine freundschaftliche Beziehung aufzubauen und zu festigen." See also Bellen, 39
[157] Bechert 2001, 4
[158] Ibidem, 5; Grünewald and Schalles, 566
[159] Bechert 2001, 2;
[160] Ibidem, 5; Grünewald and Schalles, 566
[161] Van Driel-Murray, 205; Willems 1984 b, 237 ff.
[162] Ibidem
[163] Derks and Roymans, 242-243
[164] Van Driel-Murray, 206; Wierschowski, 417

centuries AD.[165] The mainstay of the Batavian economy until the end of the second century, therefore, was soldiers' pay, and this partly explains the very high rate of recruitment of Batavian soldiers into the Roman army.[166] Van Driel-Murray argues that, even if auxiliaries could accrue a respectable amount of savings, a good portion of Batavians' military salaries was spent on food, clothing and the payment of debt.[167] These conditions, however, probably facilitated the Romans' choice not to charge the Batavians direct taxes, which consisted mostly of a levy on agricultural produce for the army's supply.[168]

The Batavian Contingents

Since the late Republic and early Principate, the Batavians' military duties entailed not only the important and exceptional task of supplying the backbone of the emperor's horse guard,[169] but also that of fighting alongside Roman troops.[170] Alföldy describes the participation of Batavian horsemen in the early campaigns in Germany as an irregular levy (*Volksangebot*).[171] However, during the initial phase of Claudius's reign at the latest, the Roman army counted with regular Lower German auxiliary units comprising between six and seven thousand soldiers, whose recruitment strengthened the cohesiveness of tribes originally composed of different ethnic groups.[172] The heavy burden of recruitment impacted Batavian society. The tribe's political structure, which was based mainly on the warriors' unflinching loyalty toward their leaders, facilitated recruitment. This allowed Roman commanders who counted with the native leaders' support not only to count with Batavian troops, but also to expect their utmost discipline.[173]

The number of soldiers required to supply eight or nine cohorts and one *ala* for the Roman army, in addition to the horsemen for the imperial guard, meant that virtually every Batavian family, whether aristocratic or plebeian, had to supply at least one of its members to the auxiliary units.[174] Moreover, the early professionalization of Batavian soldiers and their regular, 25-year period of service brought an end to the traditional, tribal military system of free farmers deployed in warrior bands for a single season.[175] This confirms that, once a tribe formed an integral part of the Roman military system, there came sweeping changes to its ancestral way of life. According to one interpretation, the extreme onus of military service for so-called ethnic soldiers—the Batavians being perhaps the prime example— proves that such tribes were not privileged groups within the Roman imperial system of alliances, but rather poor and vulnerable frontier peoples dependent on the Roman state for their livelihood and ceaselessly "manipulated by the military authorities for the strategic purposes of Empire." The concept of "martial race," this view maintains, was created

[165] Van Driel-Murray, 205
[166] Ibidem, 208; Wolters 2001, 162
[167] Van Driel-Murray, 208; 213; *cf*. Alston 1995, 104 f.; 108
[168] Wolters 2001, 162; 166. *Cf*. the example of the Frisii: Tacitus. *Annales* IV.72.1
[169] Speidel 1994, 16
[170] Alföldy 1968 a, 13
[171] Ibidem
[172] Roymans, 253-254; for the figure of six or seven thousand men for the units of Batavians, Cananefates and Frisiavones, *cf*. Alföldy 1968 a, 13-14; Van Driel-Murray, 200
[173] Van Driel-Murray, 202-203
[174] Aarts, 169-170; Willems 1984 b, 395; Roymans, 256-257 with note no. 648. "It is probably no coincidence that it is precisely among the Batavians that we learn- from both literary and epigraphic sources- of seven instances of two brothers serving in the army."
[175] Roymans, 256-257 with note no. 650. This "no doubt had an impact on female marriage patterns as well."

intentionally to perpetuate their subservience.[176] Whether manipulated or not, the Batavians' efficiency in combat proves that their martial character was not concocted.

A Privileged *Societas*

Under the Julio-Claudian emperors, the Batavian auxiliaries were paid regularly,[177] organized according to the Roman military model and stationed not only in the Batavian homeland, but also in Britain as well as in Germania Superior.[178] This suggests that the Batavians constituted fully regular *auxilia* within the Roman army. Nonetheless, they provided military service under unique circumstances. In the first place, the Batavians were spared from paying tax and tribute,[179] and were obliged to supply the Romans only with men and arms, as Tacitus notes.[180] This was a significant exemption, even if the Batavian populace remained subject to rents and other dues owed to a ruling class and to other charges related to the establishment of Roman administration.[181] Second, the Batavian nobles' command over their native troops until at least 70 AD was exceptional.[182] Elsewhere, Augustus discontinued this practice, which created strong bonds between aristocrats and commoners. Thus, the Caesarian auxiliary units, which were composed of irregular troops led by native commanders, were replaced with a system of regular auxiliaries "led by non-local prefects."[183] Third, the recruitment of Batavian troops did not take place under the Roman system of conscription (*dilectus*). Rather, the Batavians themselves chose the troops for the *auxilia* in an independent manner,[184] and it appears that this involved recruiting at least some troops from neighboring tribes, so that the Batavian units were "less ethnically homogeneous than their name implies."[185] Foreign merchants and artisans—among them perhaps Romans citizens—also seem to have been present in pre-Flavian Noviomagus.[186] Fourth, most likely due to their particular fighting technique, which the Romans highly valued, the Batavian auxiliary units were composed principally of national troops even after Hadrian's reign.[187] This ceased to be the rule among other *auxilia* much earlier.[188]

These qualities of the Batavians' alliance with Rome, combined with their role as the main source of the emperor's guard, a cause of immense pride for them, point to a privileged status based on mutual trust.[189] Due to the Batavians' position of privilege, scholars have debated whether or not

[176] Van Driel-Murray, 200; 201. On the Batavians' poverty: "Throughout the region, there is little indication of wealth accumulation, few imports, rather egalitarian settlement structures and a lack of wealthy graves."
[177] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.19, Alföldy 1968 a, 47
[178] Wolters 1990, 247. See also Alföldy 1968 a, 47; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.17 (*militaris disciplina in castris Romanorum*)
[179] Tacitus. *Germania*. 29.
[180] Tacitus. *Historiae*. IV.12. See IV 17; V.25
[181] Van Driel-Murray, 205
[182] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.12
[183] Roymans, 223; 255
[184] Wolters 1990, 247-248
[185] Roymans, 207. By the 2nd century, "the label 'Batavians' was sometimes used in a general sense for units of a more heterogenous composition." Roymans, 223 with note no. 512; *cf.* Speidel 1991; ibidem 1994, 46-47; Van-Driel Murray, 2003. Contrast Alföldy 1968 a, 51
[186] Roymans, 256
[187] Wolters 1990, 249 with note no. 54. See also Dio LXIX.9.6; CIL III 3676; Strobel, 1987 a, 290 ff.
[188] Wolters 1990, 146
[189] Ibidem, 143-145. For the Batavians' pride in their service to Rome, see Speidel 1994, 40.

they can be considered traditional Roman allies and whether their territory indeed formed a part of the empire.[190] In fact, Tacitus's description of the Batavians as *socii* might suggest that they were external allies and that their lands were not imperial territory.[191] The truth, as Wolters argues, lies probably somewhere in between: the Batavians were neither an independent vassal state in the sense that Luttwak suggests, nor was their territory at this time an occupied and administered part of what became the Roman province of Germania Inferior. The Batavians' exceptional position within the Roman imperial system, which had grand strategic consequences, arose from their strong links to the Julio-Claudian line.

It appears that the Romans established a Batavian *municipium* under Augustus while respecting the terms of a previous treaty, namely the agreement stipulating that the Batavians were only to supply Rome with troops led by native commanders.[192] Thus, Batavian cohorts were integrated into the Roman army from early on while the tribe retained independence with respect to the recruiting, leadership, and composition of its units.[193] This agreement was probably reached early on, especially since Caesar was in urgent need of troops for the Civil War.[194] However, what perhaps most closely linked the Batavians' fate to that of Rome, or rather to that of the emperor, was their status as the backbone of the imperial horse guard. Possibly as a reward for the loyalty of these outstanding horsemen, with whom the emperor's personal connections were bound to be strong, the Batavians were allowed to retain a significant amount of political independence. Also, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the first *principes* at least were reluctant to station troops on Batavian territory unless absolutely necessary. Possibly, this revealed a fear of the tribe's armed might. In fact, the Batavi were sufficiently independent of direct Roman rule for some to argue that the Batavian War of 70 AD was a *bellum externum* rather than part of a civil war.[195]

Despite the Batavians' relative independence, their political structure did develop along Roman lines. In the first place, the creation of a royal house privileged with direct links to Rome's own imperial family raised the political and social status of its members above the rest of the Batavian aristocracy.[196] Another clear sign of integration into Rome's imperial structure was the soldiers' inevitable acquisition of Latin during their military service, when they wrote letters to friends and relatives at home. Upon returning to the Batavian homeland, they brought with them their acquired language.[197] It was therefore due to the Roman army that Latin literacy became widespread among the Lower Rhine's population, including the rustic population.[198] Due to the clear advantages, both commercial and social, that a tribesman could accrue from speaking Latin, the language became as important, if not more so, in the Lower Rhine area than in Gaul's interior; it appears that a vulgar Latin strongly influenced by military jargon replaced the Batavians' native tongue during the first two centuries AD.[199] The Batavians' service in the Roman army also brought about the conditions that eventually led to the Batavian hinterland's monetization, since soldiers stationed in Batavian

[190] Wolters 1990, 151 with note no. 82.
[191] Tacitus. *Germania* 29; *Historiae* IV.12.2; 17.2; V.25.2; Wolters 1990. 144-145; 248-249
[192] Roymans, 201; Raepsaet-Charlier 1999, 278
[193] Wolters 2001, 161
[194] Roymans, 58; Wolters 2001, 162 with note no. 77
[195] See Hose, 299-300, based on Tacitus, *Historiae* IV. *Cf.* also Wolters 1990, 248
[196] Roymans, 63
[197] Derks and Roymans, 261-262
[198] Ibidem, 260-261; Van Driel-Murray, 207-208. *Cf.* Alston 1999; 181 f.
[199] Derks and Roymans, 262 with note no. 39

territory from the reign of Augustus until that of Claudius frequently brought to their families both Roman coins and a knowledge of the basic workings of the empire's monetized economy as it functioned in army camps and the neighboring *vici*.[200]

The Batavians' early embrace of Roman culture also involved the adoption of a cult of Hercules, a deity probably associated with the tribe's myth of origin. His early worship at different pre-Roman sanctuaries likely integrated various small groups into a single community. Moreover, the elite's contact with Roman civilization inspired the tribe's leaders to display Roman-type public monuments and inscriptions both in the urban settlement and in the countryside. These monuments' political and religious symbolism required a fairly high degree of acquaintance with Roman civilization to be understood.[201] The evidence for the early foundation of a Batavian *civitas*, in which the local elite sought "to secure a respectable place for their community in the Roman world," includes a marble head of Julius Caesar, possibly set up to emphasize the power and connections of the Batavian *Iulii*, and the Tiberius Column. Both were unearthed at Nijmegen. There is also a fragmentary, bronze *tabula patronatus* from the Claudian era found at Escharen.[202] The latter is a rare official document proclaiming the establishment of *hospitium* between a powerful Roman patron, in this case the emperor, and a dependent, client community; it is thus a unique inscription for the north-western frontier—they were usually issued in *coloniae* or *civitates*— that provides further proof of a patron-client relationship between the Julio-Claudian house and the Batavians dating back to Caesar's time.[203]

The Cananefates

Among the Batavians' neighbors were the Cananefates, a tribe that, according to Tacitus, were "equal to the Batavians in origin, speech, and courage, but inferior to them in number."[204] Their settlements lay along pathways on the more elevated portions of the Meuse's banks and along other, smaller rivers, also along the sand dunes of the North Sea coast, and in areas that were relatively dry due to the accumulation of marine clay sediment.[205] Tacitus seems to suggest that at least a part of the Cananefates also descended from the Chatti,[206] but scholars have suggested that the bulk of the Cananefates' population came from northern Holland.[207] It is thus possible that there was an amalgamation of existing tribes, as was the case with the Batavians, and that only the Cananefates' upper class professed that it shared filial bonds with the Batavi.[208] Tacitus also writes that the north-western portion of the *insula Batavorum*, where the Cananefates were settled, included the North Sea coast.[209] Roymans interprets this as meaning that, during the Julio-Claudian era, the Cananefates were incorporated into the *civitas Batavorum* as a client tribe subjected to the Batavians by means of *attributio*, a practice whereby the Romans could exert indirect control over "smaller, more isolated tribes, often with no urban center," by subsuming them into a neighboring

[200] Aaarts, 170-171
[201] Roymans, 219-220; 249; 255; Derks and Roymans, 244
[202] Roymans, 212-219 figures 9.1, 9.2, 9.3; 252; Bogaers 1981, 6
[203] Roymans, 219; Bogaers 1981, 6
[204] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.15
[205] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89
[206] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.15; Wolters 2001, 146-147
[207] Roymans, 206 with note no. 448
[208] Ibidem
[209] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.12; Stolte. "Cananefaten" in *RGA* 4 (1981), 329-330

civitas.[210] The fact that Tacitus often refers to the Batavi and Cananefates simply as Batavi seems to confirm the hierarchical relationship between these two tribes. [211]

The Cananefates were probably the Batavians' main clients in the Rhine delta. The other, smaller client tribes that were liable for military service—thus alleviating the Batavians' heavy burden of supplying the 5,000 soldiers that formed their auxiliary units—[212] may have been the Sturii, Marsaci, Frisiavones, and, what is less certain, the Texuandri and Cugerni. These were lesser clients without access to Roman citizenship or command of native units, but they nonetheless would have benefitted from the terms of the Batavians' alliance with Rome and, as such, would have not been subject to direct taxation.[213] The fact that Batavodurum was apparently the only Julio-Claudian urban settlement in the area—the initial settlement of the future *Forum Hadriani*, the central settlement of the Cananefates, was founded after the time of Tiberius— further supports the idea of the Batavians overseeing a series of subordinate tribes as the principal Roman clients on the Rhine delta.[214]

The Cananefates likely settled on the Rhine delta with Agrippa's permission at the same time as the Batavians.[215] This would have meant that the Cananefates were allied with Rome from early on. Like the Batavians, they served in the imperial guard, and their skill as horsemen made them valuable allies.[216] The tribe also contributed a cavalry unit already under Tiberius, namely an *ala* that took part in the campaign against the Frisii in 28 AD.[217] The *ala Canninefatium* (or *ala I Canninefatium*) was recruited and stationed in the tribe's territory,[218] A *cohors Canninefatium* also arose during the early Principate, and was likewise recruited and stationed in their homeland.[219] These troops, however, might have been merged with the Batavian units at a later date.[220] Alföldy refers to the units of the Cananefates as regular auxiliary troops.[221] Nonetheless, there is no evidence of native command over auxiliaries and, as Roymans points out, the known names of Cananefatian leaders- Gannascus and Brinno- suggest that they acquired neither Roman citizenship nor officer rank within the Roman army.[222] There is also little evidence of Latin inscriptions in the Cananefates' territory when compared to the much more prevalent use of Latin to commemorate monuments in the Batavian homeland.[223] Nonetheless, the Cananefates enjoyed

[210] Roymans, 205 with note no. 445; 206; *cf.* Ptolemy. *Geogr.* II.9; Whittaker 1995, 24; Chastagnol, 107; 123; 125 ff.
[211] Van Soesbergen, 239 with note no. 8; *cf.* Wolters 1990, 146-147 with note no. 66; 151; 250; *CIL* XVI 20; 28; 36; *CIL* XIII 11740
[212] Roymans, 208; Willems 1984 b, 235; Vossen, 414 ff.
[213] Roymans, 208
[214] Ibidem with note no. 463; for the "prehistoric" state of the Batavian countryside despite intermarriage, "militarisation, monetisation and even Latinisation," *cf.* 252-253 with note no. 636; 256. See Derks, 2003
[215] Wolters, 146-147 with note no. 63
[216] Speidel 1994, 81-82
[217] Tacitus. *Annales* IV. 73; Alföldy 1968 a, 14
[218] Alföldy 1968, 14
[219] Ibidem, 51-52. The cohort is mentioned by Tacitus (*Historiae* IV.19; see also IV.15) in the context of the Batavian rebellion.
[220] There is no mention of an *ala Canninefatium* in Tacitus' narration of the Batavian revolt, during which *Batavorum et Canninefatium cohortes* were deployed jointly. See Roymans, 207; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.19; Alföldy 1968 a, 51-52
[221] Alföldy 1968 a, 54
[222] Roymans, 207; Tacitus. *Annales* XI.18; *Historiae* IV.15
[223] Derks and Roymans, 244

good relations with Rome, even if these were carried out through the Batavians, at least until the time of Caligula.

Conclusion

According to Luttwak's theory of Roman grand strategy, the Romans exerted indirect control over the empire's periphery through vassal states. Recent research on the Lower Rhine suggests that this argument proves simplistic, especially because it assumes the previous existence of states whose rulers the Romans could turn into clients. This, however, was not the case in Lower Germany at the outset of Augustus's reign, for Caesar's destruction of the Eburones had left an immense power vacuum in the area stretching from the Cologne Lowlands to the North Sea coast. Hence, the process of establishing indirect control over this territory was far more complex than Luttwak's model suggests.

The Romans had to solve the problem of securing Gaul from the *Germani transrhenani* by different means. On the one hand, they encouraged the migration of an old allied tribe, the Ubii, from beyond the Rhine to the area of Cologne, a particularly fertile territory on the river's west bank. On the other hand, the Romans, in order to establish indirect rule over the lands further to the west and north, not only encouraged Germanic migration into the Rhine delta but also partook in the deliberate creation of new tribes. The Batavian *ethnogenesis* was the prime example. Moreover, the Romans allowed the Chatti to settle in the Ubii's former territory. Thus, Rome shaped the course of events even in the unconquered Germania, mainly through diplomacy and land distribution. As the Romans settled different peoples on the Lower Rhine, they set tribal boundaries[224] within the larger context of inter-German relations. Each of the allies, in fact, sought a pact with Rome in order to protect themselves from powerful and hostile German tribes beyond the Rhine.[225] One result of Roman policy was that, by the middle of the Augustan era, the Lower Rhine's ethnic landscape had changed thoroughly in comparison to that of fifty years before.[226]

The many migrations that took place were by no means uniform, but they did share some common characteristics. [227] The Germanic tribes or tribal groups that moved to areas west of the Rhine received a legal privilege from the Romans, who also specified the lands in which each people should settle. Often, the newcomers would come into contact with an already settled population with a similar ethnic composition and social structure.[228] The general propensity was for an ever-greater assimilation into the Roman imperial system and a distancing from the Germanic groups that remained east of the Rhine. Two drivers of this tendency were the high rate of recruitment of Lower Germans into the Roman army and the acceptance, with the crucial exception of the Batavians, of Roman political hegemony.[229]

The Roman alliance with the Batavian was extraordinary insofar as the tribe remained politically independent to a significant degree. Its *civitas* on the Rhine delta was also municipalized very

[224] Van Driel-Murray, 204
[225] *Cf.* Wolters 1990, 150
[226] Roymans, 24
[227] Ibidem
[228] Wolters 2001, 164-165; Strabo IV.3.4; 4.2
[229] Wolters 2001, 166

gradually.[230] By contrast, the Ubii's territory in the Cologne area developed its urban character very rapidly. Evidently, the ever-pragmatic Romans acted with considerable flexibility in order to secure dangerous border areas, even when a broad strategy of indirect control was indeed applied. The Batavians, the evidence suggests, received a client king, a ruler surely chosen from the local nobility.[231] The Romans, however, preferred to control other tribes in the area by different means, for instance by imposing a military prefect as a *de facto* ruler.[232] The case of the Lower Rhine therefore shows that, contrary to Luttwak's assumptions, no single system was imposed throughout a single province, let alone across the entire empire during the reign of Augustus. Rome handled each instance differently depending on the land and circumstances of the tribes or peoples involved, conditions that surely were well known to the Romans familiar with the area.

Agrippa's Gallic road network, which provided a transport link from the Mediterranean to the banks of the Rhine, was another vital part of the Augustan defense system. It enabled troops stationed within the Roman province to reach the outlying allied territory in case of an emergency.[233] Here, allied tribes had settled beyond the sphere of directly controlled territory. They received a certain degree of independence in return for loyalty. The allies' armed forces were supposed either to repel an attack launched from beyond the Rhine or at least to "absorb" it, thus allowing the legions stationed in Gaul sufficient time to react and meet the invading force head on. In this respect, Augustus's Lower Rhine policy as carried out mainly by Agrippa[234] does correspond broadly to Luttwak's grand-strategic system of "vassal states and mobile armies."[235] Such a policy of defense, however, proved to be efficient on the Lower Rhine for little over a decade.

[230] Roymans, 208
[231] Ibidem, 200
[232] Ibidem
[233] Syme 1934, 358. "Detachments of auxiliary troops were stationed at points of strategic importance. The Rhine, however, was lightly held- in the main by the militia of the native tribes."
[234] For the role of Agrippa, see Timpe 1975, 132 ff.; Wolters 1990, 140
[235] Luttwak, 7-50. Compare Wolters 1990, 148 with note no. 71.

II: 16 BC-37 AD: Marching Camps and the Basis of a Linear Frontier

The Camps at Neuss and Nijmegen

During Augustus's early reign, a prospering Roman Gaul offered the warrior groups of *Germania transrhenana* a target for plunder.[1] By raiding neighboring lands, Germanic warriors also gained great honor within their communities. Certainly, Roman forces would have been alert in order to repel such attacks.[2] However, in 17 BC, M. Lollius, consul and governor of Gaul, suffered a humiliating defeat against the invading Sugambri and their Germanic allies. The hostile tribes entered Roman territory from the areas east of the Rhine across from modern Xanten, Neuss, Cologne and Bonn, a territory stretching from the Lippe in the north to the Lahn in the south.[3] The breakthrough took place precisely in the area that the Ubii were supposed to protect as Roman allies. The so-called *clades Lolliana*, in which fifth legion was destroyed and its eagle captured, signaled the clear failure of the system of indirect control in the area of modern Cologne. Ancient authors and modern scholars have disagreed as to the defeat's significance,[4] and whether or not it motivated Augustus to campaign subsequently beyond the Rhine.[5] The emperor, whose armies had recently pacified the Iberian Peninsula, did take a number of decisive measures after the defeat. In a clear break with past policy, he prioritized the stationing of troops directly on the Lower Rhine.[6] At first, his objectives were fully offensive.

At first, the *princeps* proceeded immediately to Gaul, where he remained for three years.[7] There, around 16 BC, he must have overseen the completion of the road network connecting Gaul's interior to Neuss (Novaesium) on the Rhine via Trier. Neuss was chosen as *caput viae* since it connected the Lower Rhine area to inner Gaul and further to the Mediterranean via Lyons (Lugdunum) to Marseilles, and also by means of the Erft waterway. Neuss also controlled the entry into fertile lowlands,[8] standing at a halfway point between Cologne and the Lower Rhine plain.[9] Moreover, it was the site of an Ubian settlement just north of the Erft's confluence with the Rhine.[10] This connection with the empire's interior was crucial in terms of logistics. If any legions were to be stationed permanently on the Rhine, an economically backward region at the time, they

[1] Wolters 2001, 155-156
[2] Gechter 2003, 146
[3] For the date of the *clades Lolliana*, see Dio LIV 20; Julius Obsequens 71; Velleius Paterculus II.97; Suetonius. *Augustus*, 23. Syme 1934, 360: The date of 17 BC "is to be preferred to 16 B.C., that of Dio, who includes in one chapter the events of several years." Schön 1986, 25 ff.; Wolters 1990, 156-157. For Lollius, see Horace. *Odes* IV.9.
[4] See Velleius Paterculus. II.97.1. *Cf.* Suetonius. *Augustus* 23: *maioris infamiae quam detrimenti*... See Syme 1934, 360: "'the disaster' does not appear to have been as grave as Velleius would have his readers believe. The fact that Tiberius and Lollius were bitter rivals explains his version." See Syme 1933, 17
[5] Gechter 2003, 146; Rüger 1984, 10 f.; Lehman, 86. *Cf.* Wolters 2001, 155: idem 1990, 154-155;157; 240 f. on the debate concerning the *clades Lolliana* and also its connection with the campaigns on the Alps.
[6] Wolters 1990, 154-155. *Cf.* Galsterer, 19-20
[7] Velleius Paterculus. II.97.1; Dio LIV.20.44
[8] Bechert 1982, 44; Schönberger 1985, 330
[9] Schönberger 1985, 330
[10] Bechert 2007, 42; G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 139

would have to receive steady supplies of grain from Gaul.[11] In fact, the Romans could supply the legions in Lower Germany for long time periods only after the route from Gaul to Neuss was in full use around 15 BC.[12]

Around 16 BC, Neuss (A1) became the first Roman camp set up directly on the Rhine. Drusus, Augustus's stepson, would begin his campaigns in Germany several years later, in 12 BC.[13] The camp's position— it was built north of the river— points to Augustus's initial offensive aims in Germany.[14] Originally, its main purpose would have been to allow Roman troops to gather military intelligence and geographic information about the largely unknown land stretching from the Rhine to the Elbe.[15] Significantly, troops arrived on the Rhine while, to the south, Drusus and Tiberius campaigned to control the Alpine passes.[16]

Before 13 B.C., Augustus created an independent command for the *Exercitus Inferior Apud Ripam Rheni*.[17] This was a necessary measure since, apart from Neuss, the Romans built another outpost at Nijmegen (Noviomagus), on the Batavians' territory.[18] This 42-hectare camp, built at Nijmegen-Hunerberg, was meant to hold two legions at a place reachable from Neuss or, alternatively, from Tongeren along the Meuse valley route.[19] Its accessibility from the south, along with its construction atop a high moraine, made the camp strategically important.[20] Crucially, it allowed entry into the swamps formed by the Rhine and the Meuse and into the Rhine delta, either through the Waal or through the area of the Neder-Rijn, Kromme-Rijn, and Oude-Rijn. Therefore, Nijmegen constituted the entry into the North Sea and into the areas then inhabited by the coastal tribes such as the Chauci and the Frisii.[21]

Unlike the case of Neuss and the other camps soon to be established on the Rhine, however, Nijmegen's location was not ideal for an invasion of Germany from west to east. Nonetheless, the base did have offensive uses beyond the Lower Rhine area.[22] Under Augustus and Tiberius, several expeditions reached the North Sea coast from Nijmegen. Once there, troops could arrive at the tributary of the Weser and, thus, strike at "the heart of Germany."[23] Moreover, Roman troops built an early civil settlement in Nijmegen, where they also cleared the surrounding forest in order to make the territory suitable for agriculture.[24]

Rome's military footprint on the Lower Rhine was initially light. During the initial period of exploration, the Romans would have valued the help of the Ubii, Batavians, and other German

[11] Haalebos 2001, 470
[12] Gechter 2003, 147 with note no. 13; *cf.* Schönberger 1969, 145; G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 140
[13] Schönberger 1969, 144; See also Rüger 1996, 525
[14] See Schönberger 1985, 330
[15] Gechter 2003, 147; Bechert 2007, 42
[16] Galsterer, 23 with note no. 20. He dates the foundation of the camps at Nijmegen and Bonn also at this time.
[17] *Legati Augusti Pro Praetore Exercitus Germanici Inferioris*. Bechert 1982, 39
[18] Gechter 2003, 147. It was built likely before 12 BC, perhaps at the same time as Neuss-A1. See Van Enckevort, 363-364; Van der Vin, 397; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[19] Gechter 2003, 147; Bechert, Van Enckevort and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[20] Bechert, Van Enckevort and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[21] Schönberger 1985, 330; Rüger 1996, 525. For the supplying of troops, *cf.* Erdrich, 309; Alföldy 1968 a, 14; 51-52
[22] Bechert, Van Enckevort and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[23] Tacitus. *Annales*. II.5; 15; Rüger 1996, 525
[24] Haalebos 2001, 470

allies who knew the terrain well.[25] Such help would have been useful during Drusus's campaigns beyond the Rhine, which lasted until 9 BC. At this time, there is evidence of considerable building activity in Lower Germany, both to consolidate Rome's offensive stance and to integrate the area into Rome's imperial structure. Around 11 BC, Drusus abandoned the first camp at Nijmegen and had a new, smaller camp for cohorts built on the Kops Plateau on the southern bank of the Waal. This camp, which became the only early stone fort on the Lower Rhine,[26] allowed Romans troops to exert more direct military control over the Batavian territories.[27] Here, there is evidence for the presence of at least a part of the thirteenth legion (*Gemina*) in the Augustan or early Tiberian period.[28] While on the Rhine delta, Drusus also began to build a canal, the *fossa Drusiana*, which enabled the navigation of ships on the Vecht northwards into the lakes of Holland.[29] Also, a dike began to be built in order to prevent the Rhine's flooding,[30] but the project was not completed.[31]

The Camps at Xanten, Moers-Asberg, Bonn, and Mainz

By 12 BC, Drusus had built a series of camps at strategic locations on the Rhine. They controlled access to rivers that lead eastward and northward into Germany's interior. On the Lippe tributary, he built the first camp at Xanten, whose fortifications Tacitus would call *Castra Vetera*. On the Ruhr tributary, Drusus set up the camp at Moers-Asberg (Asciburgium). On the Sieg tributary, he built the camp at Bonn (Bonna). Finally, on the Main tributary on the Upper Rhine, he built the first camp at Mainz (Mogontiacum).[32] Besides providing water transport for troops and supplies, the chosen locations could be used as lines of attack into Germany, namely by means of the Lippe Valley, the Nutscheidstraße, and the Hellweg, an east-west route leading into the Rhine valley in the area of the Ruhr tributary.[33] The arrangement was meant to be temporary; the camps were built for soldiers on the march, who lived in tents rather than in concrete structures, even if they were stationed there during long time periods. Soon, a *via militaris*— the future *limes* road-—would link these marching camps to one another and enable troop movement on the Lower Rhine and beyond.[34] However, the stretch from Bonn to Mainz on the Upper Rhine, the remaining portion of the future Rheintalstraße, was not completed until Claudius's reign.[35]

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[25] Galsterer, 22

[26] Bechert, Van Enckevort and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 66; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 76; 78; Gechter 2003, 153; Van Enckevort., 363-364; Van der Vin, 397

[27] Alföldy 1968 a, 158

[28] Bechert, Van Enckevort and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 66; 74

[29] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 64. Tacitus, *Annales*, II.8; Suetonius. *Claudius* I.2, mentions several canals: "*transque Rhenumfossas navi et immensi operis effecit, quae nunc adhuc Drusinae vocantur..."* Syme 1934, 362; Weiss. "Fossa, Fossae," in *PRcA* VII.1 (1910), 75

[30] Heller, 855-856; Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.53

[31] Syme 1934, 362

[32] Gechter 2003, 149; Bechert 1982, 84

[33] Gechter 2003, 149-150; Dietz. "Asciburgium," in *DNP* 2 (1997), 76; *CIL* XIII. 2.2. 8588-8597; von Petrikovits. "Asciburgium," in *RGA* 1 (1973), 453; idem in *DNL* (1974), 128; Tacitus, *Germania* III; *Historiae* IV.33; Ptolemy *Geogr*. II, XI, XIII; Tab. Peut., Segm. II, 5: "Asciburgio…" Düwell. "Asciburgium," in *RGA* 1 (1973), 452

[34] Gechter 2003, 147; 150; 153; Bechert 1982, 44; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 9; Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 38

[35] Gechter 2003, 153

The Roman camp at Xanten was built on the southern end of a moraine.[36] The Fürstenberg controlled the tributary of the Lippe;[37] in Roman times, it was situated much to the west of its current location.[38] Roman troops departing from Xanten—and also from Mainz in Upper Germany— could reach the edge of the North German Plain with relative ease, whence they could launch a campaign up to the Elbe via Minden and Magdeburg, or via Cassel and Halle.[39] The push toward Germany's unconquered woodlands is evident from the row of legionary camps built on the Lippe between 12 BC and 16 AD, the largest of which was Oberaden.[40] Roman forces winteredon the Lippe as early as 11 / 10 B.C but remained on the Rhine during the following years.

Southeast of Xanten, the camp at Moers-Asberg (Asciburgium) was built along the Hellweg. The earth and soil fort, which Tacitus mentions, served as a pier at the edge of a now silted-up sinuous winding of the Rhine, where it protected the Ruhr tributary.[41] Asciburgium became an important stage between Xanten and Neuss until the end of the first century AD, when the fort was abandoned.[42] Legionary *vexillationes* and auxiliary units, both cohorts and *alae,* are attested there from the time of Tiberius until that of Domitian.[43] There are also the remains of a *vicus* near the camp, where legionary and auxiliary veterans could settle.

To the southeast of Moers-Asberg and Neuss lay the *oppidum Ubiorum* itself. An early Augustan civil settlement, it stood where the road from Trier to Neuss reached the Rhine.[44] Here, an early camp was built, possibly under Drusus, along a road that branched from the main *limes* road south of the city center in Köln-Alteburg, where the headquarters of the *classis Germanica* would be established later.[45] It's possible that Cologne was originally founded as an ideal base for Rome's military administration of the Lower Rhine territories, as major roads connected the new camps on the Rhine to each other, to the interior of Gaul, and to the Mediterranean.[46] Cologne, in fact, was not one of the locations used as a marching camp for the Romans' excursions into Germany.

Bonn became the southernmost of the original Roman outposts on the Lower Rhine. By 12 BC, Drusus had stationed the first Roman soldiers at or near an Ubian civil settlement that dated from the 30's BC.[47] The site was ideal for protection against attack since it lay on a scarcely accessible peninsula between the Rhine and some swampland, even though there was access to a natural path

[36] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 49; *Castra vetera*: "es ist unsicher, ob diese Namengebung nicht auf eine einheimische Benennung zurückgeht."
[37] Schönberger 1985, 330; Gechter in *DNL* (1974), 106-108. See also Tacitus, *Annales* I.45; *Historiae* IV.18, 21, 23, 35, 36, 57, 58, 62; V.14
[38] Bechert, Gechter and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 49; 11 ff.; Galsterer, 26; Schönberger 1969, 144; 147
[39] Syme 1934, 361-362
[40] Bechert 1982, 79; Gechter 1979, 114f.; *DNL* (1974), 76 ff., 106 ff., 128 ff., 139 ff., 62 ff., 196 ff., 160 ff., 114 ff., 116 ff., 119 f.; von Schnurbein 1981, 5ff.
[41] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 47; Tacitus. *Germania* 3
[42] Tacitus (*Germania* 3) writes that Odysseus founded Asciburgium, but no pre-Roman site is attested. See von Petrikovits in *DNL* (1974), 128; idem. "Asciburgium," in *RGA* 1 (1973), 453; (*CIL* 13, 8590 F; 8593); Dietz. "Asciburgium" in *DNP* 2 (1997), 76
[43] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 47. The units in question are *cohors Silaucensium, ala Tungrorum Frontoniana* and *ala Moesica*. The latter left Asciburgium under Domitian. See also von Petrikovits in *DNL* (1974), 128; idem. "Asciburgium," in *RGA* 1 (1973), 453; Alföldy 1968 a, 145
[44] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 34; Galsterer, 23 writes that the Ubian population followed the Roman military to Cologne.
[45] Gechter 2003, 153; 157; Alföldy 1968 a, 144. This took place still during the reign of Augustus.
[46] Galsterer, 23
[47] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31

that led eastward over the crest of the Nutscheid.[48] However, the first signs of a permanent fortress, probably built for one or two auxiliary units, are from the beginning of the Common Era.[49] The camp was raised on the left bank of the Rhine on the fluvial terrace, in the vicinity of the Altes Rathaus.[50] The fortress's strategic aim was to control the tributary of the Sieg, which allowed movement eastward into Germany through the Siegerland and the settlement zone east of the Rhine, and it was particularly important to keep guard over the hills in this area.[51] The fortress at Bonn also served as a link "with the units stationed further upstream."[52] Indeed, Bonn was eventually linked with the road that led from Cologne to Trier as well as with the provincial road leading to the Eifel.[53]

The camp at Mainz (Mogontiacum), also built around 12 BC, played a crucial role during Drusus's campaigns since it allowed entry into Germany through the Wetterau. During the initial Roman campaigns into Germany, one of the routes to the Lippe led northward from Mainz via modern Siegen. This was the route along which the Roman camps at Waldgirmes and Dorlar were built in the first years of the first decade AD.[54] Thus, although Mainz stood in Upper Germany and eventually became the capital of the province Germania Superior, its original strategic purpose was to function as the easternmost link of Augustus's chain of marching camps on the Rhine. They were to remain occupied long after Rome's ambition to establish control over the whole of Germany were extinguished.[55]

Drusus's German Campaigns

The initial military occupation of the Rhine under Augusts consisted of a series of carefully chosen outposts on the Lower Rhine and on the Rhine delta. Rather than a line of defense, there was a series of marching camps in strategic points whence Roman troops could be supplied from the empire's interior and march easily into the unconquered Germania.[56] The marching camps were thus made for a mobile field-army and they reflected Augustus's initial grand strategy, which foresaw the conquest and annexation into the empire of the lands beyond the Rhine, a decision that had consequences beyond Germany.[57] For instance, Augustus's resolution to subdue Germany likely determined his choice to settle political matters in Britain through diplomacy and not by force, even though Horace proclaimed the need for its annexation.[58]

In Germany, however, Rome's enemies posed a more direct threat. The Sugambri had sued for peace and surrendered hostages to Rome soon after defeating Lollius, but they plundered Roman

[48] Gechter 2003, 149; Bechert 2007, 42; Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31
[49] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31
[50] Bechert 2007, 42; idem 1982, 84; Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 224; Rüger. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225; Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 196-199; Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.19, 20, 25, 62, 70; V.22; Ptolemy, *Geogr*. II, IX, VIII; Florus II.30; *Itinerarium Antonini*.254.3: Bonna; *Tabula Peutingeriana*. Segm. III: Ammianus Marcellinus. XVIII, 2
[51] Rüger. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225; Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31; Schönberger 1985, 321-497. 331; Bechert 1982, 44
[52] Schönberger 1985, 331
[53] Rüger. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225
[54] Gechter 2003, 149-150; 154
[55] Florus. II. 30
[56] Gechter 2003, 147; Wolters 1990, 154-155
[57] Maxfield, 20-21
[58] Barrett, 127; Frere, 55-77; Salway 1981, 40-61. Horace. *Odes* I.21.15; 35.30; III.5.3; IV.14.48; *Epodes* VII.7

territory again in 12 B.C. The event either led Augustus to launch the subsequent campaigns across the Rhine or at least provided him with the pretext for military action.[59] The expeditions, led by Drusus, yielded considerable achievements. In 12 BC, Drusus set out from Nijmegen and became the first Roman commander to sail on the North Sea before heading southward by means of the Ems. He then formalized Rome's alliances with the Chauci and Frisii and defeated the Bructeri. The following year, Drusus departed from Xanten and, marching along the Lippe, defeated the Tencteri, Usipetes, and Cherusci. In 10 BC, he repelled the Chatti and Sugambri's attack against Xanten. In 9 BC, he reached and crossed the Elbe, another landmark feat for a Roman general.

Drusus's operations involved not only legionary troops, but also auxiliaries and especially the allied infantry units that would reconnoiter territory before the arrival of an invading force and, in some cases, attack the enemy independently. Already in the early Julio-Claudian period, therefore, several *cohortes* and *alae* were stationed on the Rhine next to the legions or in their close proximity. Their role was to operate either alongside the legions or independently.[60] At this point in time, however, there was little or no distinction between legionary and auxiliary camps.[61] Drusus's campaigns also involved considerable building activity on the Rhine. Around 10 BC, the large camp on the Hunerberg at Nijmegen was abandoned. It was replaced by a new fortification on the Kops Plateau that was, at the most, 4.5 hectares in size; its *praetorium* might have been built as Drusus's headquarters.[62]

Tiberius's Command on the Rhine

After Drusus's death in 9 BC, Tiberius took over the command of the Rhine armies. His initial measures were diplomatic rather than military; as Tiberius himself said according to Tacitus, he enjoyed more success in Germany through persuasion than through force (*plura consilium quam vi*).[63] This likely refers to his settlement of 40,000 Germans—likely Sugambri who had surrendered to him as prisoners (*deditici*) according to Suetonius— west of the Rhine.[64] Other evidence points to the scarcely populated area between the Mosel and the Meuse.[65] Although the later sources especially portray the Sugambri as having migrated under Roman compulsion, the scale of the migration suggests that it was voluntary.[66]

Possibly, the Sugambri, or a pro-Roman faction of the tribe, decided to emigrate after an irreconcilable split with other groups. There were likely other Germans involved, such as elements of the Bructeri.[67] If there was indeed pressure from the Romans, it may have been a reaction to the earlier, Sugambri-led invasions of Gaul. The Sugambri aristocracy either remained behind or was

[59] Dio LIV.32; Wolters 2001, 163; idem 1990, 140 ff.; 158 ff.
[60] Alföldy 1968 a, 146-147
[61] Gechter 2003, 154-156
[62] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 66
[63] Wolters 2001, 162; 162-163; Tacitus. *Annales* II.26.3
[64] Suetonius. *Tiberius*.9.2
[65] Spickerman, 213
[66] Wolters 2001, 164; *cf*. Orosius VI.21.24
[67] Galsterer, 26-27; *cf*. Velleius Paterculus. II.97.4; Wolters 2001, 163-164. He suggests that Suetonius's (*Augustus* 21.1) mention of a migration of Sugambri and Suebi might point to a movement of groups from different tribes. For the matter of the hostages. *Cf*. Dio. LV.6

overthrown, perhaps even annihilated.[68] The movement probably occurred as part of a large displacement of peoples that began around 8 B.C. The Romans may have settled the migrants in mass at Xanten, a measure that marks the beginning of the site's urbanization. This would have reduced the Sugambri's pressure against Rome's allies remaining beyond the Rhine and on the Roman-controlled areas between Bonn and Xanten.[69]

From around 7 BC, Roman troops were stationed only on the Rhine and not on the Lippe, something that might point the preference of Tiberius, who gave up his German command in 8 BC, for a political settlement in Germany. From that time until 1 AD, the road system connecting northern Gaul to the Rhine was completed. This project linked the Boulogne-Tongeren and the Trier-Neuss roads. The latter had a branch that led to Bonn.[70] Meanwhile, the Romans built a parallel road from Neuss to Venlo-Blerick (*Blariacum*), where they erected a bridge over the Meuse.[71] This infrastructure made it easier to supply the troops on the Rhine. Perhaps as a result, a large new camp was built at Neuss (B1).[72] In Nijmegen's Traianusplein, a civil settlement with strong Roman influence (as is evident from the graves and the methodical parceling) arose at around the time of Christ's birth. Most likely, it is the future *oppidum Batavorum*, where Roman soldiers, officials, craftsmen, and other immigrants soon outnumbered the natives.[73]

The next known commander on the Rhine, where he is attested from 4 BC to 1 AD, is Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, former proconsul in Africa and commander in Illyricum. His activity suggests that Augustus assumed a more aggressive stance toward Germany. Ahenobarbus not only campaigned beyond that river, but also "crossed the Elbe with an army, penetrating deeper into Germany than any of his predecessors," a feat for which he gained the *triumphalia ornamenta* according to Tacitus.[74] He also built military infrastructure in German territory, including the *pontes longi* in the unknown location where, in 15 AD, four legions under Aelius Caecina Severus would face Arminius's troops. This structure was "a narrow causeway, running through a wilderness of marshes."[75] In 1 AD, Marcus Vinicius, who had governed Gallia Comata and Illyricum, replaced Ahenobarbus as commander of the Rhine armies. That same year, an *immensum bellum* arose in Germany, apparently due to resistance to Rome's advance beyond the Rhine. Little is known of this war besides the fact that Vinicius fought a series of hostile tribes, apparently with varying success, until Tiberius once again assumed the command of the Rhine armies in 4 AD.[76]

Tiberius marched into Germany once more, crossed the Weser, and became the first Roman commander to winter beyond the Rhine. According to Velleius Paterculus, who took part in the campaign, he subdued (*subacti*) the Canninefates, Attuari, and Bructeri, who inhabited the middle

[68] Spickerman, 213
[69] Galsterer, 26-27
[70] Gechter 2003, 149; 153; Thoen, 49 ff.
[71] Gechter 2003, 153; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 73-74
[72] Gechter 2003, 152; 153
[73] Galsterer, 30; Van Enckevort, 364 with note no. 68
[74] Tacitus, *Annales* IV.44
[75] Ibidem I.63
[76] Velleius Paterculus II.104

and upper regions of the Lippe valley.[77] He also subjected (*recepti*) the Cherusci. This activity involved stationing troops once more on the Lippe. Tiberius even built what appears to have been an administrative center for Rome's *transrhenum* territories at Haltern.[78] The strategic aim of the Lippe camps was not only to allow the Romans access into Germany, but also to exert control over the Bructeri's territory.[79] Ever since their clash with Drusus's forces in 12 B.C., the Bructeri, who were probably ruled by kings and most likely fought against Varus's legions some years later,[80] became one of Rome's most dangerous Germanic enemies along with the Chatti and Cherusci.[81] In 5 AD, Tiberius subdued the Chauci and Langobardi.[82] His campaign that year involved the famous feat by which the infantry and navy met at the mouth of the Elbe. Only the Marcomanni, whom Maroboduus had led into Bohemia, remained unconquered, Velleius Paterculus writes.[83] The following year, Tiberius campaigned against the Marcomanni. Tiberius's occupation of the newly won territory across the Rhine was meant to be permanent. Notably, the forts built east of the Rhine, both in the direction of Oberaden and Haltern, but with the exception of Holsterhausen, were meant to be standing camps and hence were built of stone, unlike the forts on the Rhine aside from Nijmegen. Meanwhile, the troops stationed on the Rhine appear to have remained mostly at Bonn and Nijmegen, where the camp was reoccupied after being abandoned for several years. The stationing of forces in the Rhine camps suggests that the Romans still acted with caution.[84]

Many of the soldiers left in the Rhine garrisons, where they still slept in tents during short deployments, would have completed infrastructure projects, namely the Neuss-Venlo and Cologne-Maastricht roads, both of which linked the Rhine to the Meuse. The troops also would have built the branch roads from Trier to Cologne and Maastricht to Nijmegen.[85] Thus, the Romans facilitated mobility within the frontier region. To the northwest of Nijmegen, a large camp was built on the southern bank of a silted-up branch of the Rhine at Vechten (Fectio) in 4 / 5 AD.[86] The fort likely served as a supply camp and launching point for the campaigns beyond the Rhine, possibly also as a stronghold for the Roman fleet.[87] Its location south of the Kromme Rijn, which in Roman times flowed northwards until it reached the Ijsselmeer, allowed troop movement westward from Nijmegen. Since the site controlled the tributary of the Utrechter Vecht,[88] Roman troops departing from Vechten easily could reach the Flevosee and the Oer-Ij and from there the North Sea Coast, the lands of the Frisii, and the regions of the Elbe and Weser.[89] The fort's location

[77] Von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 584. See Tacitus, *Annales* I.51; I.60; *Germania* 33; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.11; Strabo VII.1. See van Soesbergen, 242 with note 31.
[78] Gechter 2003, 149 with note no. 18; 154
[79] For Holsterhausen and Haltern, see von Schnurbein in *DNL* (1974), 114; 116. For the Bructeri, see von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 585
[80] Pliny. *Epistulae* II.7.2; XXIII.306; 420; Tacitus *Annales* I.60; von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 584-585
[81] Von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 584-585; Syme 1991, 543. *Cf.* Velleius Paterculus II.105; Tacitus. *Annales* I.50; 51; 59-60; II.17; XIII. 56; Strabo VII.1.4
[82] Velleius Paterculus II.106
[83] Ibidem, 108
[84] Galsterer, 23; Gechter 2003, 150; 152
[85] Ibidem, 154-156
[86] Van der Vin, 397 with note no. 3; Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 81; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 62. Fectio. *Tab. Peut.*,Segm. II 3: Fletione (=Fectione, *CIL* XIII 8815)
[87] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 82; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 62; 64. Tacitus, *Annales* II, 6-8. "*insula Batavorum in quamconvenirent praedicta*…"
[88] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 64
[89] Van der Vin, 397

on a river branch also offered commercial advantages; the unusually expansive *vicus* that emerged east of Vechten developed into a regional trade center.[90] The fort, where three auxiliary units stood during the first two centuries AD, remained occupied until the late third century.[91]

The *Clades Variana* and Its Consequences

In 7 AD, Augustus named Publius Quinctilius Varus *legatus Augusti pro praetore* in Germania. A nobleman with close ties to the imperial family, Varus had been consul in 13 BC with Tiberius and thereafter governor of Africa and Syria. According to Dio, Varus governed the Germans as if they were "subject nations" until, in 9 AD, he suffered a calamitous defeat beyond the Rhine against the Cherusci and their German allies.[92] Three Roman legions— XVII, previously stationed in Vetera, XVIII and XIX, one or both of which may have been stationed in Neuss— were obliterated in Teutoberger Wald along with three *alae* and six cohorts.[93] The consequences were felt across the Empire; as Suetonius writes:

> *…Varianam (cladem) paene exitibialem cum duce legatisque et auxiliis ombnibus caesis. Hac nuntiata excubias per urbem indixit, ne quis tumultus existeret, et prasidibus provinciarum propagavit imperium, ut a peritis et assuetis socii coninerentur*.
>
> "the Varian (disaster) was almost fatal, since three legions were cut to pieces with their general, his lieutenants and all the auxiliaries. When the news of this came, (Augustus) ordered that watch be kept by night throughout the city, to prevent any outbreak, and he prolonged the terms of the governors of the provinces, that the allies might be held to their allegiance by experienced men with whom they were acquainted."[94]

In Germany, the Romans were compelled to return to the Rhine outposts and abandon the Lippe fortresses at Haltern, Anreppen and Holsterhausen.[95] A direct consequence of the Varian disaster was the permanent occupation of the Rhine, which was suddenly turned into a line of defense.[96] As Florus later wrote:

> *Hac clade factum, ut imperium, quod in litore Oceani non steterat, in ripa Rheni fluminis staret.*
>
> "The result of this disaster was that the empire, which had not stopped on the shores of the Ocean, was checked on the banks of the Rhine."[97]

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[90] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 83
[91] Van der Vin, 398; Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 83. The units in question: *cohors II Brittonum* / *Brittanorum milliaria equitata*; *cohors I Flavia (Hispanorum equitata)*; *ala I Thracum*
[92] *Clades variana*: Dio LVI.18-22; Suetonius. *Augustus* 23. Tacitus. *Annales* I.60-62; Velleius Paterculus II.117-119; Strabo VII.1
[93] For the two legions possibly stationed in Neuss, *cf*. Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 42
[94] Suetonious. *Augustus* 23
[95] Gechter 2003, 156; Lehmann, 85 ff.
[96] Maxfield, 3
[97] Florus II.30.38

It was at this time that the old camp at Neuss was replaced by a larger construction with solid structures (Neuss-B2).[98] Tacitus mentions four legions- I, V, XX, and XXI- stationed on the Rhine alongside *auxilia* in 14 AD, some of which stood in a summer camp (*in aestivis*) in Ubian territory, likely the new camp built at Neuss (C),[99] where the fifth legion stood.[100]

After Varus's defeat, the Romans built new outposts at Xanten, Vechten, and Nijmegen-Kops Plateau. Auxiliary units are attested between 10 and 20 AD.[101] Also, after the *clades variana*, troops were first stationed permanently at Cologne's *oppidum Ubiorum*, which became a walled town after 9 A.D.[102] Between then and 14 AD, the Romans built a double legionary camp *apud aram Ubiorum*. It was there that two legions— *I Germanica* and *XX Valeria Victrix*, each with a supporting *ala*— would revolt against Tiberius in 14 AD and proclaim Germanicus emperor.[103] [104] The construction of this type of double legionary fortress implied the maintenance of a mobile-field army, a type of force that "does not greatly fragment even in its winter bases."[105] Moreover, in the late Augustan period, a second military facility was added to the existing camp at Bonn, where several auxiliary units are attested, in order to deploy *vexillationes* of *legio XXI Rapax* and perhaps also of *I Germanica*.[106]

The permanent stationing of legions near the Ubii's main settlement and in Bonn signaled the final annexation of that tribe's territory. Hence, the stage in which Ubian land could be considered a vassal state under indirect Roman control came to an end. This meant that, on the one hand, Roman legionary troops offered the Ubian settlers direct and permanent protection for the first time; on the other hand, the settlers were obliged to supply the Roman camps with the surplus of their agricultural production.[107] In general terms, the tribe benefited greatly from the Roman occupation. By 14 AD, the *oppidum Ubiorum* was firmly in place as the administrative center of the Ubii's territory and as the headquarters of the Lower German commander, who was in charge of the *Exercitus Inferior Apud Ripam Rheni*.[108] In effect, all of Roman-controlled Germany was administered from the Ubian main settlement until Domitian created two separate provinces.[109] The Ubii's homeland, secured from external attack, began to bloom economically.[110] Before 9 AD, the *oppidum Ubiorum* had become a place of worship of regional importance: the *ara Ubiorum* that Tacitus mentions.[111] Already in Augustan times, therefore, the Ubii's territory became a

[98] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 42
[99] Tacitus. *Annales* I.37; Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 42
[100] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 42
[101] Gechter 2003, 157; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 66-67
[102] Gechter 2003, 153
[103] Tacitus, *Annales*, I. 31.3; I.37; 39
[104] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 35; Alföldy 1968 a, 145; Precht in *DNL* (1974), 160
[105] Maxfield, 20
[106] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31. Under Tiberius, *cohors Silaucensium*, *cohors I Thracum* (*CIL* XIII 8099) and *ala Frontoniana* (*AE* 1963, 49) are attested at Bonn, although they were probably not stationed there at the same time.
[107] Wolters 2001, 160
[108] Galsterer, 23 with note no. 24; Bechert 1982, 39
[109] Bechert 1982, 39. For the *oppidum Ubiorum* / Cologne as administrative center, see Eck 2004, 94-95
[110] Bechert 1982, 39
[111] See Tacitus (*Annales* I.57) on the *ara Ubiorum*'s political and religious importance: "*anno, quo Germaniae desciuere, sacerdos apud aram Ubiorum creatus, ruperat vittas, profugus ad rebelles...*") Eck. *RGA* 17 (2001), 89 argues the altar served as a place of worship for tribes living across the entire Lower German region, as well as the seat of a *concilium provinciae*. (Eck 2004, 86) Therefore, the individual German tribes sent their representatives to

military, political and religious center with an administrative apparatus comparable to that which already existed in other provinces. The achievement was significant; the Romans had found no significant urban center along the Rhine comparable to those already in place in Gaul and other lands that became provinces.[112]

The *oppidum Ubiorum* was at first no city in the Mediterranean sense of the term, but rather a military strongpoint where a local aristocracy, dwelling in *domus*, lived under Roman influence. Roman veterans, however, settled there as well, especially while the double legionary fortress remained occupied and there were few colonies near the empire's northern frontier.[113] Both upper-class Ubians and auxiliary soldiers were among the new citizens enfranchised before the foundation of a colony in 50 AD, as is evident from the Julian names that appear on inscriptions.[114] Also, Gauls migrated to the area in large numbers from Tiberius's reign until that of Claudius.[115] The Ubii's territory then stretched from the Ruhr in the west to Neuss in the north and, in the south, to the Vinxtbach, which met the Rhine seven kilometers south of the Ahr and formed the border (*ad fines*) with Upper Germany.[116]

The Commands of Tiberius and Germanicus in Germany

As a consequence of Varus's defeat, Augustus returned the command of the Rhine armies to Tiberius, who had quelled the great rebellion in Pannonia. Between 10 and 12 AD, Tiberius led a series of punitive expeditions beyond the Rhine, whose reach and impact vary in the ancient accounts.[117] During the operations, the two double-legionary fortresses on the Rhine—Xanten and Cologne— housed the four Lower German legions. After Tiberius's departure for Rome in 14 AD, his nephew, Germanicus, took over the command of the German armies. Tiberius would become emperor soon thereafter.

Germanicus launched his own series of campaigns beyond the Rhine. In 14 AD, he gathered the four Lower German legions in Neuss, had them build a bridge over the Rhine, and attacked the Marsi during a religious festival. As the army returned to the Rhine, the troops fought the Bructeri, Usipeti, and other Germans.[118] The following year, Germanicus marched from Mainz and attacked the Chatti and Bructeri. His troops managed to recover *legio XIX*'s eagle, lost to the enemy at Teutoburger Wald, and buried the remains of Roman soldiers killed there.[119] After an indecisive battle against Arminius, Germanicus led the Upper German troops back to Mainz while the Lower German army, led by Caecina, repelled Arminius in a hard-fought battle at the *pontes longi*.

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the *ara Ubiorum* in order to elect a priest (*sacerdos apud aram Ubiorum*) who, during the course of a year, would be responsible for administering the cult to Roma and Augustus, the main symbol of the tribes' allegiance to the empire. The Romans exported this model around 7 B.C. to other provinces, mainly to the East as well as to Gaul and Hispania citerior. (Eck 2004, 86-87). *Cf.* Galsterer, 25

[112] Eck 2004, 93; Galsterer, 25

[113] Galsterer, 24-26

[114] Ibidem

[115] As was the case with the *agri decumates*: Galsterer, 25; Tacitus. *Germania* 29.3

[116] Bechert 2007, 12-13; Wolters 2001, 147; Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 29; *CIL* XIII 7731; 7732; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.9.8

[117] Velleius Paterculus (II.120-121) is the most enthusiastic.

[118] Dio LVII.6; Tacitus *Annales* I.49

[119] Tacitus. *Annales* I.62

Besides campaigning beyond the Rhine, Germanicus also ordered the construction of auxiliary forts on the Rhine delta.[120] At Arnhem-Meinerswijk (*Castra-Herculis*), the new fort guarded the Ijssel tributary to the west of Looward, where the Rhine bends westward. The fort, which was perhaps occupied early on by troops from *V Alaudae*, was either a launching point for Germanicus's campaigns or a center of supply. Some 3.5 kilometres west of Meinerswijk, the new fort at Driel, where an elevated sand dune covered by water on three sides created a useful, north-south connection through the river area, was built in the second decade of the first century AD at the latest.[121] Possibly, around this time the auxiliary fort in Looward southwest of Duiven was built, the first location on the Lower German *limes* on the Rhine west of the Waal tributary.

The new fort at Velsen stood north of what became the Lower German *limes* on the Oude Rijn, in present day Velsen-Zuid, Noord-Holland.[122] The fort and its harbor were located on a branch of the Oer-IJ that could be reached by means of the Utrechtse Vecht. As such, Velsen was an excellent base for launching attacks along the North Sea coast.[123] With a capacity for around 450 troops, the fort controlled the Frisii's territory, which corresponds roughly to the Dutch provinces of Noord-Holland and Friesland.[124] Thus, Velsen, which could be reached from Vechten through the Flevosee route, constituted the north-westernmost link of what became the Lower Rhine *limes*, securing the route from Nijmegen to the North Sea.[125] Velsen might be the fort Tacitus refers to as Flevum, where, under Tiberius, "a by no means contemptible force of Romans and allies kept guard over the shores of the ocean."[126]

During his campaigns, Germanicus stationed *legiones I* and *XX* at Cologne, *V Alaudae* and *XXI Rapax* at Xanten, where the large group of people settled by Tiberius needed military supervision.[127] This meant that there was no legion stationed in Nijmegen, whose fortress was abandoned after 16 AD.[128] Presumably, this took place under Tiberius, who must have had good relations with the Batavians since he renewed the recruitment of the imperial horse-guard from the Lower German tribes after Augustus, suspecting the Germans' loyalty following the *clades variana*, had released the Batavians from their service.[129]

With its fortress abandoned, Nijmegen lost its military importance; its troop level was reduced from more than 10,000 to one tenth of that number at best. Thus, the Batavians regained their relative independence, with only native troops stationed in their territory. By 14 AD, near the legionary fortress at the Kops Plateau stood a civilian settlement, the *Oppidum Batavorum* or *Batavodurum*. There is evidence there for a "municipalized Roman *civitas*" in the Augustan-Tiberian era: namely, a statue of Caesar, the so-called Tiberius column, and a Roman-type public

[120] Gechter 2003, 157; Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77
[121] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77-78
[122] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 31-32; Rüger 1996, 525
[123] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 99
[124] Erdrich, 309; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 99
[125] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 81-82; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 31-32; Rüger 1996, 525
[126] Dietz. "Flevum," in *DNP* 4 (1998), 456. According to Bogaers, the fort Flevum should not be regarded as identical as Fectio: Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 31; Tacitus. *Annales*. IV.72-73; Compare Mela III 24: *lacus Flevo*; Plinius *Naturalis Historia*IV.101: *Flevum ostium*; Ptolemy II.11.12.
[127] Gechter 2003, 157-158; idem in *DNL* (1974), 107; Schönberger 1969, 145; 150 ff.; Spickerman, 213; Bechert, Gechter,and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50. *Legio XIIX* may have been stationed early on at Vetera: *CIL* XIII 8648
[128] See Haalebos and Willems 1999, 247. *Cf.* Schönberger 1969, 151
[129] Speidel 1994, 18

cult to Hercules Magusanus, which was "built on the foundation of an older native cult" and administered by the Batavian's chief magistrate.[130] The *oppidum Batavorum* remained an administrative center for the tribe's territory.[131]

The area to the west and north of Nijmegen, however, was possibly not wholly free of Roman troops after 16 AD, for units remained stationed at the auxiliary forts at Vechten, Velsen, and Arnhem-Meinerswijk. Xanten remained the north-westernmost legionary fortress on the European mainland. The troops stationed there defended the Rhine border's flank up to the North Sea coast.[132] Meanwhile auxiliaries still occupied Neuss and Moers-Asberg.[133]

The Rhine as a Frontier

In 16 AD, Tiberius recalled Germanicus from the Rhine, using the famous phrase about having achieved *plura consilio quam vi* in Germany as a general. This constituted a grand strategic decision of great magnitude; officially, the Rhine would become the empire's frontier in the northwest.[134] Thereafter, the Lippe fortresses were permanently abandoned while both the strategy of defense and the troop distribution on the Lower Rhine changed considerably.[135] Beyond the Rhine, Roman troops remained stationed only at the naval fort at Velsen in Frisian territory.[136] Certain auxiliary forts on the Rhine such as Arnhem-Meinerswijk were also abandoned.[137] For the first time, permanent, standing camps on the Lower Rhine. Four legions were to remain there instead of the six of the previous period.

The legionary fortresses were built in the polygonal fashion of Republican-era marching camps.[138] This facilitated their defense from the expected attacks coming from beyond the empire's northern frontier.[139] The legionary *castra* had an area of between 18 to 25 hectares in size and could thus house an entire legion. Auxiliary *vexillationes*, it is assumed, were often deployed outside the legionary fortresses. Meanwhile, the auxiliary forts also began to be built as permanent structures, usually as fortified harbors on the Rhine's branches or backwaters. They had an area of between 1.2 and 3.5 hectares.[140]

Clearly, the Romans no longer thought of the militarized sites on the Rhine as a series of launching points into a soon-to-be-conquered province. Rather, they realized the advantages of limiting the Lower German troops' scope of action and of turning the Lower Rhine into a river *limes*, stretching from the Vinxtbach to Katwijk on the North Sea coast. The river could be turned into an effective

[130] Roymans, 200-202; Tacitus. *Historiae* V.19; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.8
[131] Haalebos 2001, 464
[132] Rüger 2000, 497
[133] Gechter 2003, 157-158
[134] Tacitus. *Annales* II.26
[135] Gechter 2003, 158; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 24; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 67
[136] Erdrich, 309
[137] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77
[138] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15-17; 20
[139] Gechter 2003, 158
[140] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15

system of border defense,[141] but it was also the most convenient bureaucratically.[142] Rivers, in fact, are the clearest natural boundary due to their "very precise, obvious physical features," which "(mark) out a very specific stretch of terrain," plainly visible even if dried up or frozen over.[143] The Lower Rhine was no "scientific" or "natural" border, but it did offer defensive advantages.[144] On the one hand, the Germans beyond the river were not skilled at building ships that could transport large numbers of troops to invade Roman territory. On the other, the Rhine itself, after breaking through the Rhenish Massif, forms an exceptional obstacle to approach since it follows a winding course on a broad, forked riverbed with countless branches and backwaters. Thus, the Romans had little need to build ditches or walls. They could defend the area by means of a road network linking a series of military forts to each other and to the empire's interior.[145]

After 20 AD, there were still two legions—*V Alaudae* and *XXI Rapax*— stationed in Xanten. They remained there during the Julio-Claudian period.[146] *Legio XX* was in a large fortress in Neuss (F) alongside auxiliary troops.[147] A legionary *vexillatio* could have been stationed at the fort built under Tiberius at Dormagen (Durnomagus).[148] In Batavian territory, native auxiliary units occupied the camp at Nijmegen Kops-Plateau. The *ala Batavorum*, which formed the backbone of the Batavians' cavalry, may have been among them.[149] Further west, the fort at Vechten apparently remained occupied after 16 AD, certainly under Caligula,[150] although no particular unit is attested there.[151] A Roman naval unit occupied the fortified port at Velsen. A cohort (*Silaucensium*) was stationed at the old camp at Moers-Aberg (Asciburgium). Other, unknown auxiliary units occupied the forts at Vechten and Arnhem-Meinerswijk. A cohort (*I Thracum*) and an *ala* (*Frontoniana*) occupied the camp at Bonn, which had previously held legionary troops.[152]

Around 25 AD, the double legionary fort in the *oppidum Ubiorum* was abandoned, as *legio I Germanica* was transferred to Bonn,[153] where a legionary camp was built of earth and wood. Auxiliary troops remained stationed in the vicinity.[154] Ca. 30 AD, *legio XX Valeria Victrix* went from Cologne to Neuss, where there likely had been no legions since 9 AD.[155] Under Tiberius, auxiliary units, including an *ala*, are also attested in Neuss, as was the case in Bonn, Xanten, and

[141] Ibidem, 9; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[142] See Mann. "The Frontiers of the Principate," in *ANRW* II.1 (1974). 513-514
[143] Maxfield, 5
[144] Luttwak, 89; Mann. "The Frontiers of the Principate," in *ANRW* II.1 (1974). 513
[145] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 9; Caesar. *BG* I.12
[146] Alföldy 1968 a, 66; 144;146
[147] Gechter 2003, 158 with note no. 36; compare Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 42. The auxiliary units attested at Neuss are *ala Parthorum veterana* und *cohors III Lusitanorum*
[148] Gechter 2003, 158 with note no. 38.
[149] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 67
[150] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 252-253
[151] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 64. See, however, *CIL* XIII 12086 a
[152] Gechter 2003, 158
[153] Bechert 2007, 39; *cf.* Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 198: "Verlegung der *legio I (Germanica)* von Köln nach Bonn und Bau derLegionsfestung um 35 n. Chr." *Cf.* Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 35. They argue that the fortress at Cologne may have been abandoned under Claudius before the veteran colony's foundation.
[154] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31; Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225. *CIL* XIII 8062; Tacitus. *Historiae* I.57; Alföldy 1968 a, 144; Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 196. The troops in question are *ala Pomponiani (Gallorum)* and *ala (I Tungrorum) Frontoniana* before the middle of the first century AD; the *cohortes I Thracum* and *V Asturum* as wellas *ala Longiniana* in the Claudian-Neronian period.
[155] Schönberger 1969, 145; 151

Moers-Asberg.[156] The double legionary base at Cologne had served Augustus's offensive aims. The new tendency was to station smaller units evenly along the Rhine— ideally at an interval of seven to eight kilometers— in order for them to patrol the frontier. Large concentrations of legions and auxiliaries were now to be avoided. Though "essential in time of war, (they) constituted a potential danger in a time of peace."[157]

After the withdrawal of the first and twentieth legions from Cologne, an auxiliary fort was built there in order to compensate for their departure.[158] Cologne, however, was to serve primarily as an administrative center. Between 30 and 35 AD, the first fort of stone and earth was built at Köln-Alteburg on a cut bank that lay approximately 18 meters above the Rhine. The fort was 3.5 hectares in size and it was to become the headquarters of the German fleet at a later date.[159] The fleet would maintain the Rhine's navigability; the river was the region's principal transportation artery given the much lower costs of shipping goods on the fleets' barges and rafts than by land. Its sailors were mostly free men from Greece or elsewhere in the Eastern Empire. They kept guard over the valleys on the river's right bank with fast Illyrian-style *biremes* (*liburnae*).[160]

Under Tiberius, other forts arose along the Rhine. The auxiliary fort Burginatium was built in Kalkar, Kreis Kleve northwest of Xanten, at the site of an early Roman watch post.[161] It guarded an important point in the road connecting Lyons (Lugdunum) with Straßburg (Argentorate).[162] The unit stationed there under the Julio-Claudians remains unknown, but three *alae* are attested there from the Flavian era until that of Hadrian. Troops remained there until the fifth century.[163]

Another fort was built around 35 AD southeast of Neuss, on the Rhine's left bank in the centre of present-day Dormagen (Durnomagus). Its principal aim was to secure the way between Neuss and Cologne.[164] Since the fort at Durnomagus was not far from the tributary of the Wupper, the troop stationed there could potentially control this access point into Germany. However, since the fortress was built well after 16 AD, it was apparently not meant to be a launching point for a planned campaign into Germany. Indeed, aside from being a station between two larger fortresses, Dormagen was primarily used as the brickworks of *legio I Germanica*, which was stationed at first in Cologne and then in Bonn, where it remained until the time of the Batavian revolt.[165]

Under Tiberius, the focal points of the Rhine system of defense were the legionary fortresses at Xanten, Neuss and Bonn. The complementary, Tiberian-era forts and fortresses attested on the Lower Rhine stood at Velsen, Vechten, Driel, Arnhem-Meinerswijk (*Castra Herculis*?),

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[156] Alföldy 1968 a, 144; G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 140. The units in question are *ala Parthorum veterana*, *ala GallorumPicentiana* after 35 AD and *cohors III Lusitanorum*.
[157] Maxfield, 3
[158] It is not clear when this fort became the headquarters of the *classis Germanica*. See La Baume in *DNL* (1974), 166-169; Schönberger 1969, 151. Bechert 1982, 70.
[159] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 34
[160] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 17; 23-24; *CIL* XIII 8036
[161] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 63; Wegner in *DNL* (1974), 101; *Tab. Peut*., Segm. II 4 / 5, ColoTraiana – Burginatio; *Itin.Anton*. 256.2: Burginacio.
[162] Ihm. "Burginatium," in *PRcA* III.1 (1897), 1062-1063
[163] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 63. *Alae Noricorum, Afrorum, Vocontiorum*. See Wegner in *DNL* (1974), 101; Alföldy 1968 a, 144; 146
[164] G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 151; *Itin. Anton.* 254.5: Durnomago
[165] Bechert, Gechter and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 38; G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 151

Nijmegen, Burginatium (Altkalkar), Moers-Asberg (Asciburgium), Dormagen (Durnomagus), and Cologne (*oppidum Ubiorum* / Köln-Alteburg). By the time of Gaius's accession, the line of defense stretched from the North Sea coast to Altkalkar (Burginatium) and further on to Bonn and Mainz. Significantly, auxiliary troops stationed in a few forts defended the Rhine delta and the North Sea coast, while the Batavian units defended their own territory. This distribution of camps and troops was built upon the basic Augustan arrangement. However, no legion stood now west of Xanten, and the new auxiliary forts at Arnhem-Meinerswijk, Burginatium, and Dormagen made up a line of defense of at least thirteen such structures. Therefore, there is evidence under Tiberius for the beginnings of a linear frontier, which was to be completed under Claudius.[166] In the middle of the first century AD, the line of defense was properly denominated a *limes*.[167]

The Cugerni, Frisii, and Chauci

By the late Tiberian period, the *oppidum Cugernorum* was in place in Xanten. The settlement, which contained a strong military presence and immigrants from inner Gaul, probably did not emerge spontaneously. Rather, Roman authorities planned its development as a strategic location along the *limes* road, Lower Germany's main axis of land transport. The *limes* road, in fact, served as the main road of the Cugerni's *vicus*.[168] Moreover, under Augustus and Tiberius, several forts and settlements were built in the hinterland between the Rhine and the Meuse, for instance *Aquae Granni* in modern Aachen / Aix-la-Chapelle, which a road connected to Xanten. The baths there served as a resting place for Roman soldiers since at least Tiberian times.[169] Additionally, either under Augustus or Tiberius the fort Coriovallum was built in modern Heerlen to secure the junction between two roads: that from Tongeren to Cologne and that from Aachen to Xanten.[170] Finally, the *vicus* Iuliacum was built around 40 Km west of Cologne, also on the road to Tongeren.[171]

During the first three decades AD, the reliance on the Batavians to uphold the Rhine delta's security proved to be strategically sound. However, towards the end of Tiberius's reign, the Romans suffered setbacks at the hands of the Frisii and Chauci. This proved that Rome's authority was tenuous beyond the territory of the Batavians and the Cananefates. The Frisii's territory stretched from the ocean to the Rhine and bordered on the waters through which Drusus and Germanicus carried their troops.[172] Drusus, who had been rescued by the Frisii after a shipwreck, forced them to pay a tribute and to raise a levy for his campaign against the Chauci.[173] Despite these measures, they remained friendly towards Rome, taking part neither in the uprising against Varus nor in the Germans' struggles against Germanicus.[174] They appear to have been a vassal state along traditional lines. The alliance with the Frisii, however, came to an end in 28 AD, when the Romans attempted to impose upon them a heavier burden than originally agreed. Hostilies ensued with heavy Roman losses.

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[166] Gechter 2003, 158
[167] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15
[168] Galsterer, 27-29
[169] Tholen in *DNL* (1974), 190-192
[170] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 173-175. Perhaps the fort was used as a post for *beneficiarii* during the 2nd and 3rd centuries.
[171] Tholen in *DNL* (1974), 170
[172] Tacitus. *Germania*, 34. See also Pliny. *Naturalis Historia* IV.101; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.11.7; Dio LIV.32. See van Soesbergen, 241 with note no. 24
[173] Dio LIV 32; Tacitus. *Annales*. IV.72; Dio. LIV. 32
[174] Springer, 109-111; Florus, II.30

The Chauci, who lived east of the Frisii in the territory between the Ems and the Elbe,[175] were originally hostile to Rome. In 12 BC, Drusus launched an unsuccessful campaign against them.[176] Tiberius, however, forced the tribe into Rome's network of clients.[177] The Chauci thus rejected an alliance with Arminius before 9 AD. Afterwards, they fought under Germanicus's command against the leader of the Cherusci,[178] although Tacitus reports that they allowed the nearly subdued Arminius to flee at Idistaviso.[179] After Germanicus's departure, the Chauci proved to be hardly trustworthy Roman allies. Under Claudius, they plundered the coast of Gaul and, before long, they had expanded their territory until it bordered with that of the Chatti.[180]

The New Legates: Apronius and Gaetulicus

A grand strategy, even if soundly formulated, is difficult to execute and maintain if a state lacks an active leadership. Beginning in 26 AD, Tiberius, for all practical purposes, abandoned his duties as emperor by withdrawing permanently to Capreae.[181] Frontier defense suffered across the empire.[182] On both the Lower and Upper Rhine, proper defense became increasingly neglected despite the new line of forts and the Batavians' and Cananefates' semi-autonomous protection of the Rhine delta. The main cause of decline was the German armies' poor leadership. The men named as legates of Lower and Upper Germany owed their position, primarily, to their friendship with the powerful equestrian L. Aelius Sejanus, who, following Agrippina the Elder's downfall, strengthened his position of influence until he achieved a short-lived supremacy.[183] From 28 AD at the latest, the Lower German legate was Lucius Apronius, a man from a non-senatorial family[184] and the father of Lucius Apronius Caesianus, Sejanus's friend. Apronius's son-in-law, the aristocrat Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, who "had betrothed his daughter to Sejanus's son," received the command of Upper Germany in 29 AD.[185] Under their lax rule, martial discipline waned and the Romans suffered several defeats.[186]

Under Apronius's command, Rome's alliance with the recently subdued Frisii was sundered due to his neglect or unwise diplomacy. As Tacitus writes, the Frisian rebellion was caused more by Roman greed than by the Frisii's "impatience of subjection" (*nostra magis avaritia quam obsequii*

[175] Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395; See Tacitus. *Germania*, 35; Pliny. *Naturalis Historia* IV.101; XVI.2; XVI.5; DioLIV.32; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.11; Strabo. VIII.1. See van Soesbergen, 241 with note no. 25

[176] Dio. LIV.32; Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395

[177] Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395

[178] Tacitus. *Annales* I.60. *Chauci cum auxilia pollicerentur, in commilitium adsciti sunt.* Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395

[179] Tacitus. *Annales* II.17

[180] Ibidem XIII 55; *Germania* XXX. In the *Germania* (XXXV), Tacitus writes that the Chauci were a *populus inter Germanos nobilissimus* which refrained from waging war against other Germans. See Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 396 for the theory that the Romans permitted the Chauci to carry out their conquests.

[181] Tacitus. *Annales* IV.57. See Seager, 170

[182] See Suetonius. *Tiberius* 41

[183] Barrett, 102; for Sejanus's career, see Seager, 151-180. For Tiberius's "extreme sensitivity to the acclamation of Agrippina as the sole descendant of Augustus and to Agrippina's own constant harping on her birth," see Seager, 147-150. For Sejanus's supremacy and fall, see Seager, 171-188

[184] Eck 1985, 112. "Von senatorischen Vorfahren ist nichts bekannt."

[185] Barrett 101 ff.; Dio. LIX.22.5; Tacitus. *Annales* VI.30.3. Gaetulicus and Apronius: Eck 1985, 10-11;112-113

[186] Barrett, 103; 130

inpatientes).[187] In 28 AD, the *primipilaris* Olennius, who was put in charge of administering the tribe's affairs, raised its tribute.[188] Olennius's charge is an example of Roman military administration by means of a prefect or a lesser official; whereby a *primipilaris* would be put in charge of small tribes.[189] The Frisii, unwilling to accept the newly imposed burden, revolted and dealt a significant blow to the Romans by plundering Flevum / Velsen, the fort to which Olennius had fled. Apronius, unable to use his own forces to counter the attack, called for reinforcements—legionary veterans and auxiliaries— to be sent from the Upper Rhine. In the ensuing punitive campaign, in which Apronius deployed an *ala Canninefas*, many commanders of troops were killed. The fifth legion, however, managed to repel the enemy, who had enjoyed success against the cavalry and some cohorts. Nonetheless, 900 Roman troops were slaughtered the next day in a wood, after which 400 additional soldiers took their own life in fear of being betrayed. According to Tacitus, the Frisii acquired fame in Germany following this encounter, a small disaster for Rome which Tiberius kept silent.[190] Already in 47 AD, the Frisii "were no longer *socii* but an *externa gens*."[191] As for Velsen, the fort was rebuilt, enlarged and reoccupied, perhaps by the troops sent as reinforcements, yet it was abandoned soon thereafter.[192]

Trouble at this time brewed on the Upper Rhine as well. The new legate, Gaetulicus, a poet of some note who had been praetor in 23 AD and consul in 26 AD,[193] possibly succeeded Cossus Cornelius Lentulus, his brother and consul in 25 AD.[194] This meant that the Rhine armies became accustomed to the command of a single family, one of old Roman stock. Gaetulicus, moreover, was ambitious to increase this power even further. He gained popularity among the troops by easing the traditional, severe camp discipline and treating his men leniently, perhaps excessively so.[195] As Tacitus writes, Gaetulicus sought a disproportionate amount of esteem, so that he was *effusae clementiae modicus severitate*.[196]

Likely due to its poor training and lack of fighting form, the Upper German army failed to uphold the border against external attacks. German raids launched from the Rhine's eastern bank managed to penetrate into Gaul for the first time since the defeat of Lollius, as can be deduced from two passages of Suetonius.[197] Gaetulicus, however, remained in his post even after Sejanus's execution

[187] Tacitus. *Annales* IV.72
[188] Ibidem: "*Tributum iis Drusus iusserat modicum pro angustia rerum, ut in usus militaris coria boum penderent*…" See Haalebos and Willems 1999, 249; Dobson, 176; 20
[189] Slofstra, 27; 36; *CIL* V 7231; Roymans, 197
[190] Tacitus. *Annales*. IV.72-73; Alföldy 1968 a, 140; van Soesbergen, 241
[191] Van Soesbergen, 241
[192] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 99; *cf.* Erdrich, 309
[193] Barrett, 101. Gaetulicus, "legate of Upper Germany, was the son of Cossus Cornelius, the consul of 1 BC, who added the element Gaetulicus to the family name by a victory over the Gaetulians in Africa in AD 6, and passed it on to his son, whom Velleius describes as an example of an *adulescens in omnium virtutum exempla genitus*. (Velleius II.116.2; see also Dio LV.28.4; Florus II.40) For his literary activities, see Pliny. *Epistulae* V.3.5; Martial. *Praef.* For the consulship of 26 AD, see Barrett, 101; Tacitus. *Annales* IV.46
[194] Eck 1985, 10-11
[195] Barrett, 101; 103; 130
[196] Tacitus. *Annales* VI.30.3. See Dio LIX.22, who describes Gaetulicus as an honorable man who is "acceptable" to the troops.
[197] Suetonius. *Tiberius* 41: *…Hispaniam et Syriam per aliquot annos sine consularibus legatis habuerit, Armeniam a Parthis occupari, Moesiam a Dacis Sarmatisque, Gallias a Germanis vastari neglexerit: magno dedecore imperii nec minore discrimine*. Suetonius's *Life of Galba* (6) also suggests incursions through the Upper German border had become frequent. He explains how Galba, while new as Upper German legate, disciplined the troops and frustrated a

in 31 AD. According to Tacitus, Gaetulicus threatened Tiberius that he would not tolerate a successor, but only ratify an agreement by which the emperor would reign elsewhere while he kept command of his province. This remarkable tale gains credence, Tacitus writes, because, of all of Sejanus's relatives, Gaetulicus alone survived. Tiberius was aware of his own impopularity, and that he ruled more through prestige than true strength (*magisque fama quam vi*). For his part, Gaetulicus not only controlled the four Upper German legions, but was also *non ingratus* among the Lower German troops commanded by his father-in-law Apronius.[198] Tiberius would have remembered the danger he had incurred during the Lower Rhine legions' failed rebellion in favor of Germanicus in 14 AD. At the time of Tiberius's death in 37 AD, Gaetulicus was still in command of Upper Germany and exerting influence over the Lower German army, where the defenses, carefully ordered during the previous decades, were in somewhat of a disarray.

Conclusion

Luttwak argues that the Julio-Claudians applied a grand strategy of "vassal states and mobile armies." However, on the Lower Rhine, this was the case only until around 17 BC. After the *clades Lolliana*, Roman troops occupied the Lower Rhine— including the Rhine delta— with a series of temporary, marching camps that permitted the entry into Germania. Since Augustus's grand strategic aim was this region's thorough conquest, permanent fortresses were built on the Lippe. These, however, were fully abandoned in the years following the Varian disaster of 9 AD, after which the camps built on the Rhine began to be fortified so that they gained a permanent character. This was a necessary measure since the paths that the Romans took into Germany also permitted the enemy access to the Rhine, whence attacks on Roman territory could be unleashed. Under Tiberius, several new auxiliary forts were built so that troops could be placed in the gaps between the original camps. Thus, by the end of his reign, a series of at least thirteen forts and fortresses protected Lower Germany from the North Sea coast to the eventual provincial border on the Vinxtbach and on to Mainz. Clearly, this constituted the beginnings of the linear frontier that was later consolidated. Already under Tiberius, moreover, the Romans had annexed the Ubii's territory on the Lower Rhine, which their troops controlled directly. Moreover, the *oppidum Ubiorum* in Cologne was already functioning as an administrative center according to the Roman model. Clearly, the era of indirect rule through client states on the Lower Rhine had passed.

Direct military occupation meant that, legally, the territory of the Lower Rhine had become *ager publicus populi Romani*, and the imperial authorities thus began to administer the area as a military zone. Under this system, the auxiliary units and the Rhine fleet, even if assigned their own spheres of command, were probably subject to the authority of the legions and of the imperial legate, who exerted the right of ownership over Lower Germany in the name of the Roman people. The only exceptions to military rule were the city territories of Cologne, Xanten and Nijmegen.[199] The latter, however, presented a particular case.

Under Tiberius, legionary troops left Nijmegen, the core of the Batavians' territory. Thereafter,

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barbarian invasion of Gaul: …*Veteranum ac tironem militem opere assiduo corroboravit matureque barbaris, qui iam in Galliam usque proruperant, coercitis…* See Barrett, 130: "The archaeological record seems to confirm that the army of Upper Germany was unable to control the movements of German tribes…"

[198] Tacitus. *Annales*. VI.30.3; Barrett, 101

[199] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 14-15

only Batavian units commanded by local nobles were stationed in the tribe's homeland. The Batavians maintained their special status under the Roman system of tribal alliances: they paid neither taxes nor tribute and were allowed to recruit and command troops independently. Among other reasons, this was due to the tribal elite's connections with the emperor. They retained, therefore, a degree of independence,[200] even while their territory came under Roman cultural influence and Roman troops were stationed in certain forts in neighboring areas. Direct military control was applied much more concretely in the area stretching from Kreis Kleve (Burginatium) and Xanten to the southeast until Remagen than in the Rhine delta. Hence, the Batavians can be considered to have been a vassal state of a particular sort from the reign of Tiberius onward, even if their relative independence did not stop the Romans from considering their territory a part of the empire. As Maxfield notes, the Empire's frontiers were "co-extensive with the lands of those people who had submitted to Roman arms or diplomacy," not with the location of the most remote military outposts.[201]

The Batavians' relative freedom after Germanicus's recall confirms that, during the early Principate, the Roman army was "not advancing on a single front against a single united enemy."[202] In the East, for instance, Rome's rule by direct and indirect means "alternated flexibly under Augustus and Tiberius… The Roman military presence increased gradually, and in response to different stimuli…"[203] Rome's control of the Rhine delta during the same period can lead to a similar conclusion. In Lower Germany, no single, comprehensive method of control was applied during the entirety of the Augustan-Tiberian period. Rather, different combinations of direct and indirect rule were applied simultaneously as the conditions on the ground, often influenced by grand strategic decisions, fluctuated.

Even after 16 AD, the Rhine frontier was by no means a static border despite the series of forts built along the river bank. Already in 28 AD, Roman troops—both from Lower and Upper Germany— carried out a punitive expedition beyond the Rhine against the Frisii. This would be a constant practice during the Julio-Claudian era and thereafter. By the end of Tiberius's reign, it was also evident that the defense system could function properly only if the troops maintained the utmost discipline and the legates were men whom the emperor trusted fully. Ambitious legates, in fact, could attain considerable power by gaining the Rhine legions' loyalty. Hence, the emperor had to determine Rhine frontier policy, which was essential to grand strategy, in the knowledge that he could not allow a potential rival to amass political and military power in Germany.

The initial occupation of the Rhine frontier was not only a military event, but also a social and economic one.[204] The Lower Rhine's socioeconomic structure had changed little since 50 BC despite the politically motivated mass migrations into the region. The tribal structure common to the Ubii, Cugerni, Batavi, and Cananefates was very similar to that of the earlier inhabitants.[205] These tribes were at best only marginally influenced by *oppidum* culture and lacked the centralization of Gallia Narbonensis and even central Gaul. In comparison, Lower Germany, where no *urbs* in the political, religious, and commercial sense had appeared, was considerably

[200] *Cf.* Galsterer, 31
[201] Maxfield, 3
[202] Ibidem
[203] Kagan, 344
[204] Wierschowski, 409
[205] Bechert 2001, 4; *cf.* Wolters 2001, 148

backward.[206] Production-wise, Lower Germany had a subsistence economy with common land ownership. Cattle farming was the main economic activity; there was no surplus production and trade took place mostly in pre-monetary form. Thus, the arrival of permanently stationed Roman troops and the consequent appearance of *canabae* and *vici* confronted this northern, tribal civilization with the Romans' radically different political, social, and economic model, where a strong state fomented urbanization, collected taxes, imposed markedly stratified relations of life and work— as exemplified by the army's own hierarchy of command— and regulated the fulfilment of social norms.[207] Mostly, the latter system prevailed upon the former.

One consequence was that, as Germanic warrior groups were incorporated into the Roman army and began to be influenced by the settler civilizations of Romans and Celts, the type of plundering expeditions they had traditionally carried out in Gaul were less frequent.[208] Moreover, during the second decade AD, the Roman military, for fiscal, administrative, and strategic reasons, created *civitates* around urban centers where they settled *pagi* of Eburones, immigrants from both east and west, and other groups.[209] At first, these were administrative districts with a determined territory and created in the image of Roman civic entities.[210] Thus, Roman military oversight ensured that the newly formed tribes developed socially and politically to the point that they could administer their own *civitates*. Hence, their political structure began to resemble that of the more advanced peoples of interior Gaul and, consequently, they could be further integrated into the empire.[211]

From the middle of the first century AD, the *civitates* began to gain the status of *coloniae* and *municipia*.[212] Mediterranean-style architecture emerged early on where Roman troops remained permanently. The foundation of colonies without native resistance, however, didn't bring the immediate and comprehensive settlement of the indigenous population in cities until the Flavian period.[213] On the other hand, the *civitates* and their central settlements, which were usually built on key locations such as along the banks of a major river, were linked to Agrippa's road system and designed as centers for the army's supply. This was part of the Romans' efforts to integrate Lower Germany into the imperial economy.[214]

Economically, Roman *téchne*—based on the clearing of forests, the wheeled plough, the *vallus*, paid and seasonal laborers, paths of access, field borders— replaced a subsistence economy with one in which there was a constant demand for a surplus of agricultural goods.[215] Initially, however, the economy of Lower Germany, a territory poor in resources that had until recently been scarcely inhabited, could not feed thousands of salaried Roman troops— four legions as well as *ca*. 30 cohorts and 8 *alae* under Tiberius, approximately 42,000 soldiers, roughly one sixth of the Roman army, who did not produce the foodstuffs they consumed— as well as the thousands of men and

[206] Galsterer, 32; Schalles, 432
[207] Bechert 2001, 4; 12; Wolters 2001, 148; Schalles, 432-433; Schneider, 657
[208] Wolters 2001, 156
[209] Galsterer, 32
[210] Schalles, 446-447; Heimberg, 413 ff
[211] Grünewald and Schalles, 567
[212] Bechert 2001, 13
[213] Galsterer, 32-33; Grünewald and Schalles, 567
[214] Schalles, 434; Strobel 1991, 52
[215] Bechert 2001, 5

women not active in agriculture and yet economically dependent on the Roman military.[216] The sudden demand for food and supplies could not be met locally, among other reasons because the tribesmen recently settled in Lower Germany had neither capital nor significant experience with trade nor an innate mercantile mentality. They were oriented either to military service or to subsistence agriculture with an emphasis on livestock handling.[217] Nor could the farms and businesses of the legionary *prata*, which in Lower Germany included broad strips of land on the Rhine's right bank, fulfil the needs of the entire Lower German army.[218]

In order to supply the troops stationed on the Rhine, there was at first massive importation of practically all foodstuffs and other supplies from the Mediterranean region, which exported tableware, spices, African dates, and amphorae with wine, olives and Spanish *garum* to Nijmegen. Imports also flowed from other, less distant areas such as the Channel coast, which provided salt to Lower Germany.[219] The Lower German legionary camps, far from being isolated, were integrated into the empire's economic and commercial structure. Thus, the men stationed along the Lower Rhine's swamps and forests enjoyed a lifestyle vaguely resembling that of the Mediterranean.[220] Lower German tax revenue, however, did not suffice to finance the soldiers' upkeep during the first century AD. Expenses were consistently high compared to the relatively low number of taxpayers. Hence, interior provinces such as Gaul that had smaller garrisons and produced a surplus of tax revenue had to subsidize the Lower German military's pay.[221]

Despite the continuous arrival of imported goods, the economic conditions in Lower Germany itself were significantly altered by the presence of Roman troops and their dependents. There were great incentives to supply the constant demand for surplus agricultural goods— grain and livestock, for instance, could not be transported across great distances for logistical reasons— for services and for the handmade products that began to be manufactured.[222] Moreover, the funds transferred from other provinces provided an economic boost since soldiers' pay created a ready market for foodstuffs and armament that local production could supply.[223] Hence, as local trade increased in Lower Germany, the money that circulated permanently raised the area's general prosperity.[224] In the Roman northwest, slavery was not as common as in Italy, for instance. The region's greater abundance of wealth, however, did lead to the emergence of a ruling class of native aristocrats, landowners, merchants, and money-lenders. According to the dictates of the Roman provincial system, they were responsible for the local, civil administration and collected taxes among other dues. Those inhabitants of the Lower Rhine who were able to adapt to and benefit from the Roman imperial structure and the possibilities it offered gained the upper hand over those who remained tied to the previous system.[225]

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[216] Van Enckevort, 365; Wierschowski, 409-410; Schalles, 433; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 22-23 calculate that there were approximately 38,000 troops in Lower Germany under Tiberius.
[217] Wierschowski, 417-419
[218] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15; Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.54
[219] Van Enckevort, 365; 367; Van der Vin, 402; Schalles, 433
[220] Van der Vin, 402 with note no. 13
[221] Wierschowski, 410-411
[222] Wolters 2001, 166; van der Vin, 402; Bridger, 198; Wierschowski, 410-411
[223] Wierschowski, 410-411
[224] Bridger, 198 with note no. 35
[225] Bechert 2001, 4; 13; Grünewald and Schalles, 569

This deliberate creation in the empire's periphery of a society whose economy was linked to that of other provinces and whose structure mirrored Rome's own— something reflected in Nijmegen's role as northwest Lower Germany's economic and administrative center[226]— was an integral component of Roman grand strategy. Nonetheless, the inhabitants of the region's rural areas, especially those of the less fertile northwest, were far more resistant to Rome's influence during the imperial era. Hence, there existed in Lower Germany, next to the money-driven economies of the commercially active cities and military camps with their surrounding regions, a more primitive rural economy where trade did not transcend local boundaries.[227] Parts of Lower Germany retained this primitive economy throughout the period in question.

[226] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[227] Grünewald and Schalles, 567-568; 571

III. Emperor Gaius and his German Campaign

The Ancient Sources

Upon Gaius's accession to the principate in 37 AD, the state of security along the Rhine was precarious. His short reign, however, saw strenuous activity in the German provinces. The new emperor installed new legates, launched a punitive campaign against enemy territory, built up the frontier defenses, and oversaw a considerable inflow of troops into the area. Many of these movements were related to his aborted invasion of Britain, a bizarre episode which the ancient sources use to depict Gaius as a dissolute despot, a lunatic at the helm of legions whose ludicrous military adventure was utterly devoid of purpose.[1] In recent decades, however, scholars have emphasized the ancient sources' uniform hostility to Gaius.[2] Although absent in the literary accounts, there was also an apparent, strategic logic behind his military endeavors in the northwest.

The accounts of Suetonius and Dio, besides a few comments from Tacitus, are the only sources for Gaius's German campaign.[3] Dio and Suetonius, neither of whom was the emperor's contemporary, present contradictory versions, particularly with respect to his motivations for the campaign and the chronology of events.[4] Suetonius writes that Gaius was visiting the river Clitumnus and its sacred grove in Mevania, where "he was reminded of the necessity of recruiting his body-guard of Batavians and was seized with the idea of an expedition to Germany."[5] Thereafter, maintains Suetonius, Gaius hastily (*festinanter et rapide*) prepared the expedition and set out for the north, being "carried in a litter by eight bearers" due to his laziness and luxury, while "requiring the inhabitants of the towns through which he passed to sweep the roads for him and sprinkle them to lay the dust."[6] Dio, on the other hand, claims that Gaius pretended that the Germans were causing trouble, but that his real intention was to exploit the wealth of Gaul and Spain. Proceeding hurriedly to the northern frontier, Gaius was accompanied by actors, women, and gladiators.[7]

The Matter of Britain

The sources point to Gaius's frivolity, but the emperor's German campaign contained the elements of strategy. If he intended to invade Britain, he required a secure frontier on the Rhine. An enemy incursion into the German provinces and Gaul while Roman troops remained across the ocean was to be avoided at all costs. This would endanger the Roman supply lines and could leave a large army isolated in a mostly hostile island.[8] Thus the necessity of solving the problems along the Rhine frontier— problems that had to be solved regardless—before embarking for Britain, whose

[1] Scullard, 240-241; Barrett, 125
[2] See Witterling 2003, 100. He regards the pro-aristocratic sources' stance against Gaius a result of his unabashed turn towards pure monarchy. Gaius' granting of the consulate to the horse Incitatus would have exposed the unspoken truth about Roman society, in which the emperor determined any nobleman's position.
[3] See Wilkinson, 38
[4] Barrett, 103; 125; 129; 132; 134
[5] Suetonius. *Caligula*, 43
[6] Ibidem
[7] Dio LIX.21.2; Wilkinson, 39-40
[8] Barrett, 129

invasion would fulfil two strategic objectives. In the first place, there was a matter of internal politics and perceptions. Gaius was a military neophyte who, unlike Tiberius or Augustus, needed to showcase martial competence to consolidate his grip on imperial power.[9] Certainly, his attempts to present himself as a new Alexander the Great revealed his desire to be seen as a conquering general.[10] Moreover, as the son of Germanicus and grandson of Drusus, Gaius sought to live up to his ancestors' fame as brilliant commanders.[11] The conquest of Britain, a feat that had eluded Julius Caesar himself, would not only fulfil his immediate political needs; it also would grant him undying glory.

On the other hand, by the time of Gaius's accession in 39 AD, Roman interests in southeast England were under threat. Under Augustus, the Catuvellauni, a people based in Hertfordshire around St. Albans, had begun to expand their realm. Their former king, Cassivellanus, had opposed Caesar's presence in Britain but had paid tribute to Rome in the following decades.[12] Around 20 BC, however, the new king, Tasciovanus, expanded his territory so that it reached Northamptonshire to the north, the middle Thames valley and parts of Kent in the south, and, to the east, possibly Essex, the land of the Trinovantes. The latter, whose capital was at Colchester (Camulodunum), had been Roman allies since Caesar's time.[13] Augustus likely sought to halt the Catuvellauni's advance by means of an agreement with Tincommius, the king of the Belgic Atrebates, former allies of the Nervi. Their territory stretched south of the Thames, primarily in Surrey, Kent and Sussex. Their capital stood at Silchester (Calleva Atrebatum).[14] Augustus's presence in Gaul also may have persuaded Tasciovanus to abandon the Trinovantes' territory.[15] The emperor's preference to deal with Britain primarily by diplomatic means echoes the view of Strabo, who argues that the island is not worth the troubles of conquest.[16]

Augustus had relied on the client kingdom of the Atrebates, a people settled in the areas south of the Thames, to check the power of the Catuvellauni, who lived north of the Thames.[17] However, internal strife among the Atrebates weakened their position. Sometime before 7 AD, Augustus received their king, Tincomarus, after he had fled Britain. After the Varian disaster of 9 AD, Cunobelinus, who had assumed the kingship of the Catuvellauni from his father, Tasciovanus, sensed an opportunity due to Rome's weakness and took over Camulodunum (Colchester), the old capital of the pro-Roman Trinovantes.[18] Thereafter, Augustus was apparently compelled to reach an agreement with Cunobelinus, as can be deduced from evidence of trade carried out after 9 AD between his kingdom and Rome on the Thames, along the northern bank of which the trading-post

[9] Suetonius. *Caligula*, 43; 45. See Wilkinson, 45; Malloch, 553-554
[10] Suetonius. *Caligula*, 52. Barrett, 125
[11] Suetonius. *Caligula* 19.2; 52; Dio LIX.7.1; LIX.17.3
[12] Scullard, 252
[13] Barrett, 127. Tasciovanus was "the first British king to mint coins inscribed with his name."
[14] Scullard, 252; Barrett, 127. Tincommius, though sympathetic to Rome, was the son of Commius, who had been made king of the Atrebates by Caesar after their conquest and sent to Britain (Caesar. *BG*. IV. 21) but had later turned on the Romans, swearing never again to come within the sight of one: *ne in cospectum veniat cuiusquam* (*BG*. VIII. 23; 47-48). The accord between Augustus and Tincommius appears to be confirmed by the considerable amount of Roman pottery, dating from 16 BC onward, found at Silchester.
[15] Barrett, 127
[16] Strabo II.5.8; Barrett, 127
[17] In the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 32, Augustus mentions two British kings whom he received in Rome.
[18] Barrett, 128; Scullard, 252-253

Londinium began to develop.[19] By 25 AD, Tincomarus's brother, Verica, the Atrebates' new king, had lost the stronghold of Silchester (Calleva) to Epaticcus of the Catuvellauni.[20]

Little is known of Tiberius's policies toward Britain, although relations with the island's "petty kings" (*reguli*) were sufficiently cordial for them to send back the Roman survivors of Germanicus's sea wreck who had reached British shores.[21] Towards the end of Tiberius's reign, however, Cunobelinus, king of the Catuvellauni, whose sons and heirs, Togodumnus and Caratacus, were notably anti-Roman, was intent on conquering the rest of the Atrebates' territory. Nonetheless, Cunobelinus banished another of his sons, Amminius, who would proceed to deliver himself to Gaius along with a small band of troops. The prospect of installing this new ally on a hostile throne provided the emperor another compelling reason to send an expedition to Britain.[22] The immediate threat provided opportunity, but the strategic issue of Britain was longstanding.[23] Since the days of Caesar's campaigns in Gaul, Britain had provided Rome's enemies with a safe haven from imperial control and a base of operations from which to launch attacks against the Gallic coast. During Gaius's reign, a Catuvellauni advance across southeast England would have granted Cunobelinus and his sons the ability to assault Roman Gaul with ease, disrupt trade, and thereby unsettle Rome's western-most provinces. If the traditional Roman practice of buttressing weak allies at the expense of strong enemies had failed, then either indirect control over Britain by means of a new client king or direct control of the island had to be considered. Hence, imperial grand strategy certainly could warrant a military intervention in Britain.

New Legates and a New Conspiracy

Gaius had to settle the German question first and foremost. He departed from Italy probably not much later than early September, 39 AD towards Lugdunum (Lyons) in Gaul. His priority was to replace the legates of both Lower and Upper Germany, whose military negligence had become a liability. Besides, the Rhine commanders posed a political problem to the new *princeps*, even if it is unclear whether this amounted to an imminent threat. Lucius Apronius, in charge of *Germania Inferior*, and Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus Gaetulicus, commander of Upper Germany, were related through marriage, and Gaetulicus's daughter had married a son of Sejanus. After the latter's downfall in 31 AD, Gaetulicus had kept his post by threatening Tiberius, who failed to act against the Upper German commander. If he joined forces with his kinsman Apronius, moreover, Gaetulicus could hold sway over the entire Rhine army. Thus, Gaius faced a complex challenge: for the sake of frontier security, he had no choice but to remove Apronius and Gaetulicus from their provinces. At the same time, he had to ensure that the removal of these legates, who were popular among their troops, did not bring about his own downfall. It was in this context that Gaetulicus's alleged conspiracy played out.

The details remain obscure. Gaetulicus, a poet, had written that Gaius was born in Tibur.[24] This might have been an attempt to gain the emperor's favor by associating him with a city sacred to

[19] Scullard, 252-253; Barrett, 128
[20] Barrett, 128
[21] Tacitus. *Annales* II.24
[22] Suetonius. *Caligula* 44
[23] Barrett, 129
[24] Suetonius. *Caligula* 8

Heracles.[25] On the other hand, his previous threat to Tiberius shows that, if he did not harbor imperial ambitions, he did have a clear desire to be left alone, sovereign-like in Upper Germany. Gaius's sudden advance to the north would have alarmed Gaetulicus and given him a clear incentive to aid M. Aemilius Lepidus, who, along with the emperor's sisters, Agrippina and Livilla, planned to assassinate Gaius.[26] While Gaetulicus needed protection, Lepidus, the emperor's old friend, former brother-in-law (before Drusilla's death), and one-time chosen successor, needed military support to usurp the principate. The aid of Gaetulicus's German legions would have been ideal. However, Suetonius— in his *Life of Claudius*— is the only source that mentions a partnership between Gaetulicus and Lepidus (*Lepidi et Gaetulici coniuratio*), so that it is uncertain whether they acted in unison.[27]

From Gaius's perspective, a conspiracy that involved Gaetulicus— whether true or not— provided an expedient motive to remove his command, eradicate any threat he could pose, and regain control of the frontier.[28] Gaius himself travelled to the Rhine, but it appears that Gaetulicus was executed before the emperor's arrival.[29] The only fact known with certainty is that, by 27 October, 39 AD, Gaetulicus had been killed, for the legate's execution appears on that day's Arval record.[30] With Lepidus's ensuing downfall, Gaius had eliminated the perceived threats to his power. As a result, he secured his status as *princeps* and was left free to appoint two new, trusted, and competent men as legates of Lower and Upper Germany, a shrewd move for which the sources give him no credit.

In the case of Germania Superior, Servius Sulpicius Galba was a more than adequate choice.[31] *Nobilissimus magnaque et vetere prosapia*, Galba had governed the difficult province of Aquitania, an imperial procuratorial post, and waged successful campaigns there.[32] Moreover, Gaius named P. Gabinius Secundus, another skilled and experienced military man, as legate of the Lower German army, probably at the same time as Galba.[33] Once installed, it was his mission to secure the frontier area, a challenging task after so many years of laxity under the previous legate. Galba wasted no time in disciplining the troops, who soon realized the difference between their new commander and his predecessor: *Disce miles militare; Galba est, non Gaetulicus*, they commented wryly. Galba imposed hard work on both veterans and new recruits, denied furlough requests, and even forbade the troops from applauding at a festival.[34] Tacitus writes that Galba punished the Treveri, Lingones, and others with "harsh edicts or loss of territory" (*quasque alias civitates atrocibus edictis aut damno finium Galba perculerat*).[35] The new legate appears to have reorganized the province thoroughly, thus affecting not only the Upper German soldiers, but also the tribes inhabiting the territory close to the legionary quarters. By the time Gaius arrived to the Rhine frontier—probably in early 40 AD— the province was in order and the Upper German army

[25] Barrett, 102; See also Hassall, 133-134
[26] Dio LIX.21-22. Regarding the conspiracy, see Winterling 2003, 103 ff. and Barrett, 103 ff.
[27] Suetonius. *Claudius* 9; *Caligula* 43-49; *Galba* 6. Cf. Dio LIX.22
[28] Barrett, 103
[29] Suetonius. *Galba*, 6. Scullard, 240-241
[30] For the Arval entry, see Henzen, Xlix 6-8
[31] Barrett, 129: "Now while the overriding necessity of securing the German frontier before invading Britain might, arguably, have been beyond Caligula's grasp of military strategy, it would certainly have been evident to the man he appointed to be his commander of the German operations..."
[32] Suetonius. *Galba* 2; 6. Eck 1985, 14
[33] Eck 1985, 114; Barrett, 129
[34] Suetonius. *Galba* 6
[35] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.53

was in impressive form, as Galba himself set the highest example.[36] He led military maneuvers "shield in hand, by actually running for twenty miles close behind the emperor's chariot."[37] Similar military measures can be expected of Gabinius, the new Lower German legate. According to Suetonius, Gaius himself took a disciplinarian approach when preparing his northern expedition, when he "held levies with the utmost strictness, collected provisions of every kind on an unprecedented scale," and culled the legions of the unfit soldiery.[38] A new game of martial rigor was afoot.

The Punitive Expedition

The freshly disciplined army was ready to campaign across the Rhine. There is little doubt that an incursion took place, but both the scope and the outcome of the operations remain matters of debate. Clearly, there was a large concentration of troops in northern Gaul and the German provinces. Suetonius describes Gaius's levy of "legionaries and auxiliaries from all quarters (*undique*) and without delay."[39] He adds that Galba disciplined troops *ex omnibus provinciis*.[40] Tacitus mentions the emperor's "immense efforts against Germany" (*ingentes adversus Germaniam conatus*).[41] Dio presents figures: Gaius assembled between 200,000 and 250,000 troops at Lugdunum, he states.[42] That is, far more than double the Rhine's usual garrison strength.[43] The epigraphical and archaeological evidence also points to a large troop concentration in the German provinces under Gaius. The troops assembled on the Rhine at this time included *vexillationes* from the Spanish legion *IV Macedonica* and from the Egyptian legions *III Cyrenaica* and *XXII Deioterana*.[44] Also, brandmarks from Valkenburg and Vechten on the Lower Rhine that date from Gaius's reign imply "military activities and the supplying of the troops" for a large campaign, even to the emperor's presence in the area.[45]

Tacitus bears this out. He writes of "Gaius's expeditions" (*Gaianarum expeditionum*) on the Lower Rhine, and refers specifically to punitive actions against the Cananefates, old allies from the Augustan period. A powerful nobleman of this tribe, whose son Brinno would wage a future war on Rome, had ventured "on many acts of hostility" against the Romans.[46] Given the Cananefates' allegiance to the Batavians and, hence, to the emperor, what produced such antagonism? The *comitatus* tradition might provide a clue: a noble and his followers could make war against an enemy privately and outside the main tribe's political structure. Gaius's punitive attack against the Cananefates might have been aimed at an anti-Roman faction led by a war chief, who acted independently from the rest of the tribe. Certainly, such attacks against Roman troops or territory would have made a show of force necessary.

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[36] Suetonius. *Galba* 6; Barrett, 130-132
[37] Suetonius. *Galba* 6
[38] Suetonius. *Caligula*, 43. Suetonius's comments about Gaius's stunningly rapid march to the north are at odds with the remarks about the emperor's leisurely activities on the journey.
[39] Suetonius. *Caligula* 43
[40] Suetonius. *Galba* 6
[41] Tacitus. *Agricola* 13
[42] Dio LIX.22
[43] Barrett, 125
[44] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1508; 1551; 1798
[45] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 252-253. See also Wynia, 145-147
[46] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.15.2; Barrett, 131-132

Despite the expeditions' unknown details, it is evident that the military build-up on the Rhine was a complex muster that had to be well planned, well organized, and well executed. It involved military action from both the Lower and Upper German armies. Approvingly, Suetonius writes that Galba "speedily checked the barbarians, who had already made inroads even into Gaul." The event seems to have preceded Gaius's arrival in Mogontiacum.[47] Unanimously, however, the ancient sources refer to Gaius's German campaign with contempt and derision.

In the *Histories*, Tacitus writes that Brinno's father "scorned with impunity the absurdity of Gaius's expeditions," thus gaining glory among his countrymen.[48] In the *Germania*, he ridicules Gaius's "grave threats against the Germans," which "ended in mockery" (*ingentes Gaii Caesaris minae in ludibrium versae*).[49] Suetonius claims that Gaius used members of his German bodyguard and some hostages from a *ludus litterarius* to create farcical enemies, whom he could defeat in bogus battles.[50] In their less colorful accounts, Dio and Eutropius write that Gaius merely crossed the Rhine and returned without much achievement.[51]

Certainly, the grandiose claims of Gaius's imperial propaganda, in which the emperor appeared as a victor in the lands beyond the Rhine, exaggerated the scope of his achievements in Germany.[52] Nonetheless, Augustus and Tiberius had set a strategic precedent; it dictated that there was no need to march deep into Germany, much less conquer and hold territory there permanently. The evidence suggests that Gaius's expedition, which was large and well organized, was one of limited aim. Its purpose was to overawe Rome's enemies, carry out quick and damaging attacks against specific foes, and dissuade them from launching renewed raids across the Rhine.[53] Gaius himself appears to have crossed the Rhine along with his troops.[54] This allowed him to gain military experience and win the soldiers' esteem in a key military province, thus bolstering his grip on the principate.[55] It was a limited, defensive campaign.[56] Regardless, the emperor could exploit it in Rome for political purposes.

New Legions and *Auxilia*, New Forts, New Victories

The plan to invade Britain had significant grand strategic effects. The island's conquest required the deployment of at least three legions, but withdrawing them from the armies of the Rhine and Danube would leave those garrisons insufficiently manned. Transferring legions from elsewhere to remedy this imbalance would leave other areas exposed to attack. Since the *princeps* had to maintain the empire-wide troop distribution in a careful equilibrium, a proper British campaign entailed the creation of two entirely new legions.[57] These were the *XV et XXII Primigeniae*, which

[47] Suetonius. *Galba* 6; *Caligula*, 45
[48] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.15.2
[49] Tacitus. *Germania* 37
[50] Suetonius. *Caligula* … Winterling (2003, 109) argues this might have been a military exercise.
[51] Dio LIX.21.3; Eutropius. VII.12.2; Barrett, 131; 134. Modern scholarship reflects the view that Gaius's German campaign was small in scale, insignificant and a result of the emperor's impulsive decision. See, for instance, Balsdon, 79-81; Hassall, 133-134; Bicknell, 496 ff.
[52] Suetonius. *Caligula* 19.3; Dio LIX.21.1-2; Philo. *De Legatione ad Gaium*, 356. Barrett, 134
[53] Barrett, 131; Suetonius. *Galba* 6.3; Dio LIX.22.2
[54] Dio LIX.21.3; see also Eutropius. VII.12.2; Barrett, 131
[55] Barrett, 134. See Campbell, 40-41
[56] A point made both by Winterling (2003, 109) and Barrett, 134.
[57] See Mann 1963, 483

are absent on the list of 25 total legions for 23 AD, but do appear in Tacitus's narration of the civil war that ensued after Nero's death.[58] Ritterling argues that the twin legions were created in 39 AD, in the context of the extensive preparations for Gaius's campaigns in Germany and Britain. At first, the twenty second *Primigenia* would have reinforced the Lower German garrison at Vetera / Xanten, whereas the fifteenth would have gone to Mainz in Upper Germany.**[59]** Soon, however, both legions would find themselves at the Mainz garrison, which was expanded to make room for more troops and reinforced with a series of forts in the area.[60] The presence there of large numbers of fresh recruits might coincide with Suetonius's reference to the *tironem militem* whom Galba disciplined so sternly as soon as he became the Upper German legate.[61]

Lower Germany was also in need of a military rearrangement due to the growing power of the tribes living beyond the Lower Rhine, particularly that of the Chauci.[62] Gaius's German campaign brought the arrival of auxiliary units to the area and, accordingly, the construction of military infrastructure on the Rhine delta. [63] Near the North Sea coast, the auxiliary fort at Valkenburg, which stood on the left bank of the Oude-Rijn in the center of the modern village of Dorpheuvel, dates from around 40 AD.[64] Originally, the fort was manned by part of an equestrian cohort (*cohors III Gallorum equitata*), whose duty was to guard the coastal area, the north-south paths that led across the sand dunes,[65] and the points to the east, where two streams, the Mare and Lede, met the Rhine.[66] This set a precedent given that, exceptionally for the northwest section of the Lower German *limes*, the area was suited for cavalry: from 42 AD until the outbreak of the Batavian revolt, Valkenburg probably held a part of an *ala quingenaria*.[67]

Also, Gaius's German expedition may have led to the reoccupation of two additional forts on the Lower Rhine. To the north of the eventual *limes* itself, the coastal fort at Velsen, which had been abandoned shortly after 28 AD, was rebuilt perhaps around 39 AD.[68] North of Nijmegen, the fort at Arnhem-Meinerswijk, apparently abandoned after 16 AD, also appears to have been occupied again under Gaius. Finally, there is evidence for the construction of smaller fortifications along the future Lower German *limes* line southeast of Valkenburg, namely at Vleuten-De Meern and Alphen aan den Rijn. Under Gaius, moreover, "a first road may have been built to connect the forts along the Rhine."[69] Such activity entailed the Lower Rhine's broader development. One kilometer south of Valkenburg, for instance, the *vicus* of Woerd-Marktveld, appeared along the river path. The area's scattered native settlements were incorporated into the *vicus*, where both *horrea* and a

[58] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.55. See Barrett, 126: "…the absence of any reference to their formation in Tacitus's *Annals* suggests that they were raised in the period 37-47 (missing from the *Annals*)."
[59] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1758-1759; 1797-1800; *CIL* X 4723. See also Balsdon, 13-16
[60] Barrett, 126; *CIL* XIII 11853-56. See Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1758; 1799
[61] Suetonius, *Galba* 6.3; Barrett, 126
[62] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 95-96; Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 40; Alföldy 1968 a, 145
[63] Alföldy 1968 a, 142; see Davies, 124 ff
[64] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 24; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 95-96; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 40-42; see also Haalebos and Willems 1999, 252 with notes no. 22 and 23; see Wynia, 145-147
[65] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89; 95-96
[66] Verhagen, Joyce, and Groenhuijzen, 6
[67] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 96
[68] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77. The fort was reoccupied under Claudius at the latest. Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 99. Velsen may also have been rebuilt under Claudius
[69] See Verhagen, Joyce, and Groenhuijzen, 6

castellum are attested. It grew until it reached the fort's immediate vicinity.[70] As recent *limes* studies have shown, the presence of soldiers on the Lower Rhine offered local inhabitants new market opportunities, which they seized in civilian market centers that spurred economic growth.[71] Both Suetonius and Dio end their narratives of Gaius's German campaign with the emperor's outlandish show of force on a beach, where he arranged the troops in battle order before forcing them to collect seashells, after which he aborted his expedition to Britain.[72] Scholars have long assumed that this event took place on the Channel coast. Haalebos and Willems, however, point to the "antiquarian tradition in the Netherlands which sees Caligula's expedition against Britain as ending not on the channel coast, but at Katwijk on the North Sea."[73] In fact, the Roman fort of Katwijk-De Brittenburg, which remained the outermost fortification on the Lower German *limes* until the late 2nd century AD, is of particular interest since it was visible until the middle of the 18th century, when the sea abruptly engulfed it. It probably lies underwater very near Katwijk.[74]

Gaius's presence there is not improbable given the many hints of his activity on the Lower Rhine. Regarding the event itself, Balsdon and Winterling point to the attempted mutiny in 43 AD against Claudius's legate Aulus Plautius, whose troops initially refused to embark to Britain since "the soldiers were indignant at the thought of carrying out a campaign outside the limits of the known world."[75] The mutiny, which required Claudius's intervention through his freedman Narcissus, took weeks or months to resolve, and delayed Britain's invasion until late in the season according to Dio.[76] In the case of a similar mutiny against Gaius, Winterling argues, the emperor would have ordered the troops to gather molluscs and, subsequently, display them as spoils in a Roman triumph so as to ridicule their cravenness. There is also the matter of Gaius's alleged attempt to decimate two legions, the first and the twentieth, in an act of unspeakable cruelty. Suetonius writes that Gaius sought revenge for these legions' previous mutiny against his father, Germanicus, in 14 AD.[77] Winterling suggests that the troops' refusal to invade Britain is a more plausible explanation. A final similarity between Claudius's successful campaign in Britain and Gaius's aborted attempt was the involvement of a royal ally. Whereas Gaius pushed the claims of Amminius, the exiled prince of the Catuvellauni, Claudius launched his invasion of Britain in the alleged defense of Verica, the defeated and exiled king of the Atrebates.[78]

It is apparent that Claudius followed his nephew not only in terms of the imperial succession, but also in terms of policy towards the German provinces and Britain. In the particular case of Lower Germany, Gaius's rule was transformative, something that is generally accepted in studies on the Lower German *limes*. In fact, Verhagen et al. consider that "the development of the *limes* as a frontier zone" began during Gaius's reign, in 39 AD, the year that marked the transition from the previous period of "early Roman involvement" in the area, which had begun in 20 BCE.[79]

[70] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 94-95
[71] Weaverdyck, 166; 184
[72] Suetonius. *Caligula* 44-47; Dio LIX.21; 25; Barrett, 135 ff.; Bicknell, 496 ff.; Malloch, 551 ff.
[73] Verhagen, Joyce, and Groenhuijzen, 6
[74] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 96 ff.
[75] Dio LX.19; Winterling 2003, 112-113. See also Scullard, 241
[76] Dio LX.19
[77] Suetonius, *Caligula*
[78] Dio LX.19. Dio writes that "Berikos" convinced Claudius to send a force to the island.
[79] Verhagen, Joyce, and Groenhuijzen, 5-6

The intense military activity of both Galba in Upper Germany and Gabinius in Germania Inferior did not result from an emperor's whimsical foray. Rather, it was part of a coordinated, systematic effort to strengthen the army's fighting capability and build military infrastructure along difficult frontier areas. Such efforts were vindicated shortly after Gaius's death in 41 AD, when Gabinius defeated the Chauci, Galba the Chatti. The latter were an ever more threatening enemy, as Domitian's future *Chattenkrieg* attests, while the former possessed the last of the legionary eagles lost by Varus, which Gabinius recovered. This set of victories, apparently coordinated punitive campaigns, won Claudius the title of *imperator*, which was a genuine achievement according to Dio.[80] Gaius, however, had lain the groundwork.

Despite his lack of a major victory[81] and the sources' claims that Gaius's campaign was little more than a banal exercise,[82] the emperor achieved much along the Rhine frontier. The Romans suffered few casualties if any,[83] but they did capture prisoners, whom they executed.[84] Crucially, Gaius left behind a secure frontier, certainly more so than had been the case before 39 AD. The troops were well trained, disciplined, and under the command of able and loyal legates. Forts had been built. The Germans, former allies included, had been made aware that, after a period of passivity under Tiberius, Rome would launch punitive campaigns across the Rhine once again in order to ensure the empire's inviolability. These may not have been reasons to celebrate a triumph, as Gaius had hoped, but they nevertheless constituted sound strategic actions to regain control of a volatile frontier area.[85] The lack of action against the Catuvellauni in Britain, on the other hand, only could have emboldened Rome's enemies.

Conclusion

In Luttwak's first security system of vassal states and mobile armies in the Julio-Claudian period, client kingdoms on the Roman Empire's periphery absorbed foreign attacks while the legions stationed in the Empire's interior were summoned to eliminate such threats. This was clearly not the case on the Lower Rhine under the Julio-Claudians. During the reigns of Augustus and Tiberius, the Romans built the basis of an occupied, linear frontier from Bonn to Xanten, in the eastern portion of *Germania Inferior*. For his part, Gaius took preliminary steps toward the construction of a fixed frontier in the northwest, coastal areas. Such frontier structures, however, did not keep the Roman army constrained, as punitive expeditions— both large and small— periodically assailed enemy territory. Gaius followed his predecessors' example of launching punitive campaigns beyond the Rhine under certain circumstances.

In part, this was due to the purely military necessity to march into enemy territory. Gaius's forces had to punish previous attacks and to secure the Lower German frontier before a planned expedition to Britain. Gaius's German campaign, however, shows that punitive campaigns also

[80] Dio LX.8; Barrett, 135
[81] See Wilkinson, 44
[82] Barrett, 134. Further proof of Gaius's presence on the Rhine and of his campaign there is provided by "locally produced glass medallions of the period, thought to bear the emperor's image," as well as by a relief from Koula in Lydia, which is dedicated to Gaius Germanicus Caesar and "depicts a Roman cavalryman with couched spear facing a woman, Germania, whose hands are tied behind her back." See Boschung, 208-209; 229; *ILS* 8791
[83] Wilkinson, 44
[84] Dio LIX.22
[85] For the claims of a great victory, see Suetonius. *Caligula* 45; 47-49; *Vespasian*, 2; Persius. *Satire* VI.4-7; 43-44

could benefit a sitting emperor politically. With his German campaign, Gaius was able to exert military authority and thereby tighten his grip in power when under threat. Luttwak's model, however, emphasizes neither the regularity of punitive campaigns under the Julio-Claudians nor the internal, political rationale for taking military action.

Roman punitive expeditions beyond the Rhine—campaigns that Claudius and Nero also carried out—were responses to particular problems. They aimed to make a swift and massive demonstration of armed force in order to cow the foe. By the same token, the generals and, ultimately, the emperor sought to avoid prolonged campaigns in Germany. Nor did they seek to occupy large amounts of enemy territory. This strategy was altogether successful within the context of imperial grand strategy. With respect to the Rhine frontier in Lower Germany, its aim was to secure the territory already held.

In order to secure the Rhine and carry out punitive expeditions beyond the river if necessary, the emperor needed able, trustworthy men as legates of Upper and Lower Germany. They had to impose discipline upon the troops, build or maintain the defensive military infrastructure, and check barbarian raids into Roman territory. These responsibilities, whose fulfilment required large amounts of troops, made the legates of the German provinces powerful men militarily and, hence, politically. As the experience of Tiberius and Gaius demonstrates, emperors had to heed this power, since the Rhine commanders could use the German armies to usurp the principate. Gaius set an example— not always followed— to future emperors by removing a pair of inefficient and lax governors, one of whom may have been plotting against the *princeps*, with a pair of more reliable, capable men as legates of Lower and Upper Germany.

IV. Claudius and Nero: The Completion of a Linear Frontier and the German Legions as King Makers

Under Gaius, the Rhine's troop distribution still concentrated on the defense of the area between Nijmegen and Neuss, just as during the Augustan-Tiberian era.[1] However, under Claudius, who became emperor in 41 AD, the Romans completed the Lower Rhine's linear frontier, primarily by building the last phase of the Lower German *limes* along the border's Dutch portion. Once the area stretching from Xanten to the North Sea was defended by a line comprised of about twenty *castella*, the Rhine frontier became a fully linear system of defense,[2] with a series of forts that, built at a certain distance from each other, stretched from Remagen on the Ahr tributary to the North Sea at Katwijk. While the Romans built the Rhine's linear frontier, they adapted the existing legionary fortresses to better fulfil the tasks of regional administration; this reflects the heightened sense of security in Lower Germany.[3]

Around the middle of the first century AD, the Rhine legionary fortresses began to lose their polygonal form, being rebuilt instead in the standard fashion, with the *principia* or military and administrative headquarters in the center. The fortresses thus acquired a rectangular shape and rounded off corners; their construction was based on a grid in which the main streets, the *via principalis* and the *via praetoriana* or *decumana*, served as the principal axes. The fortress at Bonn, for instance, was rebuilt— still from wood and earth— to the north of the original camp during the early years of Claudius's reign. Aside from a legion, this fortress held up to two auxiliary units.[4] To the south, the important auxiliary fort Rigomagus, built of wood in modern Remagen, is first attested under Claudius. It was located approximately 10 kilometers north of the Vinxtbach where the *limes* road, having crossed the Ahr, reached a valley. The fort, which was manned by a cohort (*VIII Breucorum*) until around 70 AD, guarded the road as well as the tributary of the Ahr in the Rhine. Thus, it controlled the northwest end of the fertile plain that stretches across that territory.[5] Moreover, the site allowed access to the east by means of natural routes, namely the *Nutscheidstraße* and the *Hellweg*, and also southward over the Eifel.[6]

Campaigns against the Chauci and Chatti

The new auxiliary forts on the Rhine delta were built after at least two campaigns beyond the river. Claudius, like his predecessors, did not hesitate to launch punitive expeditions across the Rhine.

[1] Gechter 2003, 158
[2] Van der Vin, 397-398; Gechter 2003, 158; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 8 (*limes* map)
[3] Gechter 2003, 158-159
[4] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15-17; 31; 33; Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225. See also Bechert 1982, 44
[5] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 29; Alföldy 1968 a, 144 mentions *cohors I Thracum* in the first half of the first century AD and *cohors VIII Breucorum* for the Claudian-Neronian period. For the strategic significance and unconventional location, *cf.* Haupt in *DNL* (1974), 212.
[6] Gechter 2003, 145

The presence of an auxiliary fort at Valkenburg, built under Gaius, suggests that tension with the Chauci was increasing. In 41 AD, Publius Gabinius, who is attested as Lower German legate in 40 / 41 AD,[7] achieved a victory against the Chauci.[8] The campaign, which was likely a response to a border raid or another form of aggression,[9] resulted in Gabinius's recovery of the last of the legionary eagles seized from Varus's army.[10] As a result, Claudius granted Gabinius the honorary cognomen *Cauchius*,[11] probably after awarding him with the *ornamenta triumphalia*.[12]

The second expedition of 41 AD was that of Galba, the Upper German legate, against the Chatti, a campaign that also resulted in a Roman victory.[13] The Chatti's defeat was important since the Upper German frontier had been neglected under Tiberius, during whose reign the Germans had raided Gaul. Moreover, by the early 40's AD, the Chatti had replaced the Cherusci as Rome's principal foe east of the Rhine.[14] Claudius, Suetonius writes, appreciated Galba to such an extent that, on his becoming ill, he postponed the invasion of Britain for one year. He adds that, after his successes as proconsul in Africa, the post to which he proceeded from Upper Germany, Claudius granted him the *ornamenta triumphalia* among other honors.[15] The reason for honoring Galba and Gabinius was clear: the victories over the Germans in 41 AD had allowed Claudius to be hailed for the first time as *imperator*.[16]

Galba departed from the Upper Rhine in 41 / 42 AD. His replacement as legate was C. Vibius Rufinus, *consul suffectus* in 21 or 22 AD and proconsul in Asia in 36 / 37 AD.[17] Claudius thus continued the practice of leaving Upper Germany in the hands of an able man with ample administrative and military experience. In part, the legate's task was to facilitate the movement of troops and goods along the frontier zone. In fact, the Romans under Claudius completed the Lower German *Limesstraße*, which connected the Middle and Lower Rhine valleys and allowed transport along previously non-accessible areas such as the basalt reefs around Unkel in Rheinland-Pfalz.[18]

The Invasion of Britain

Claudius was the son of Drusus Nero, the nephew of Tiberius, and the brother of Germanicus. Due to his lameness, he had been unable to exercise the basic military duties expected of a Roman aristocrat, let alone match his relatives' martial glory. Much like his predecessor, Gaius, Claudius had to consider his lack of military experience and prestige in formulating a frontier and foreign

[7] Eck 1985, 115
[8] Dio LX.8; see also Suetonius. *Claudius* 24; Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395
[9] Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395
[10] Dio. LX.8; Florus II.30.38
[11] Suetonius. *Claudius* 24
[12] Eck 1985, 115-116. Tacitus. *Annales* XI.18. The next known Lower German legate is the city prefect of 39 AD, Q. Sanquinius Maximus, who died while carrying out his duties on the Lower Rhine, probably in 46 AD.
[13] Dio. LX.8
[14] Levick, 152
[15] Suetonius. *Galba* 7-8
[16] Dio LX.8; Suetonius. *Galba* 7; *Claudius* 24; Barrett, 135
[17] Eck 1985, 15-16
[18] Gechter 2003, 145-146

policy. It would not suffice to adopt the title of Caesar.[19] Expanding the empire, on the other hand, would allow him both to display military ability and to gain legitimacy as *princeps*.[20]

Claudius's invasion of Britain, which was likely planned soon after his accession, may well have been based on Gaius's designs. Like Gaius, Claudius must have recognized that it would be far easier to gain glory with a British campaign rather than a German one. Not only would the new emperor emulate Julius Caesar's British adventure; for the first time, the island would be brought under permanent Roman control.[21] On the other hand, there were strategic reasons to take action, chief among them preventing the hostile takeover of southern England. By 43 AD, Cunobelinus had died and his kingdom had been divided between his sons Togodumnus and Caratacus, who had managed to extend the Catuvellauni's power to the southern periphery of the Atrebates' realm.[22] Hence, King Verica, who styled himself *rex* in his coinage and thus probably had had contact with Rome during his reign of around 30 years, fled to Italy and appealed to Claudius.[23] For the emperor, this was a good pretext to invade Britain, particularly against the backdrop of Gaius's aborted attempt and the subsequent humiliation for Rome.[24]

Britain's conquest required the use of the German armies.[25] The invasion force departed in 43 AD under the command of A. Plautius, suffect consul in 29 AD and former governor of Pannonia. Of the four legions involved, three were removed from the Rhine garrisons. One of them, *legio XX Valeria victrix*, had previously been stationed in Neuss in Lower Germany since about 30 AD.[26] The two Upper German legions sent to Britain, *II Augusta* and *XIV Gemina*, had previously stood in Strassburg (Argentorate) and Mainz respectively. The legate in charge of the second legion, moreover, was the future emperor Titus Flavius Vespasianus, a *homo novus* who had attained the praetorship and, thereafter, his post in Strassburg due to the protection of the Plautii and Vitellii families, his experience in the army and, according to Suetonius, the influence of Claudius's freedman Narcissus.[27] It was in Britain, moreover, that Vespasian made his name as a commander, receiving "the triumphal regalia, and shortly after two priesthoods, besides the consulship, which he held for the last two months of the year (51 AD)."[28]

The fourth legion that took part in the British campaign, *IX Hispana*, had been garrisoned in Pannonia.[29] Additionally, the invading force included eight Batavian cohorts, which most likely served as auxiliary troops to *legio XIV Gemina*.[30] Apparently, these units remained stationed in Britain until they were transferred to Mainz in 67 AD along with *legio XIV Gemina*. Other auxiliary

[19] Thomas, 425-426
[20] See Mann 1979, 178
[21] Thomas, 426; 431. A. Plautius: Levick, 15. Plautius had helped suppress the conspiracy led by Camillus Scribonianus, governor of Dalmatia.
[22] Scullard, 252-253; Barrett, 124-139
[23] Dio. LX.19; Suetonius. *Claudius* 27; Scullard, 253
[24] Scullard, 253
[25] Thomas, 426
[26] Keppie, 303 with note no. 24
[27] Levick, 15; Suetonius. *Vespasian* 4. See Tacitus. *Historiae* III.66.3
[28] Suetonius. *Vespasian* 4. See Levick. 19. The priesthoods, "with their social chachet, would be particularly significant for a new man."
[29] Seager, 138-147 with note no. 150; Tacitus. *Annales* IV.5
[30] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.12

troops from the Lower Rhine also went to Britain with the original invasion force. Thereafter, few new auxiliaries were transferred to Lower Germany.[31]

Imperial Troop Distribution under Claudius

Claudius's annexation of Britain had consequences for the empire's legionary distribution. For instance, the transfer of *legio IV Macedonica* from Spain to Mainz meant the permanent reduction of the Spanish garrison.[32] In terms of the Rhine garrisons, both German armies underwent significant changes after the large troop movements during Gaius's reign.[33] The removal of three legions had to be compensated.[34] The task fell to Rufinus and to his Lower German counterpart.[35] They stationed two new legions on the Rhine: *XV* and *XXII Primigeniae*, which were probably raised under Gaius when he first planned the British campaign due to a shortage of manpower.[36] Certainly, however, the *legiones primigeniae* were created between 37 and 43 AD.[37] They were the first new legions to be raised since Augustus's arrangement of the empire's defenses.[38]

At first, both new legions were stationed at Mainz or in the vicinity.[39] Probably around the time of the invasion, *legio XV Primigenia* was transferred to Neuss in Lower Germany, where it replaced *legio XX*.[40] For its part, *XXII Primigenia*, which was already in Mainz around 40 / 42 AD,[41] remained stationed at the double legionary fortress—along with *IV Macedonica*— as a replacement for *XIV Gemina*. It is thus fairly clear that the new legions, whose recruits would hardly have been experienced soldiers, were not raised in order to participate in the invasion, but rather to replace the veteran legions that were sent to Britain.[42]

Around 46 AD at the latest, *legio XXI Rapax*, which was stationed in the double legionary fortress at Xanten since around 10 AD, went to Mainz. [43] The legion may have been replaced in Xanten briefly by *legio XXII Primigenia* before it proceeded to Upper Germany.[44] For its part, *XV Primigenia* went from Neuss to Xanten, where *V Alaudae* had stood since Augustan times.[45] A

[31] Alföldy 1968 a, 21; 46; 142; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1731
[32] Kagan, 359; The transfer may have taken place under Gaius. See Syme, 1964. 142-149; see also Ritterling, *Legio* 1362-1366
[33] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1783. This also affected *XXI Rapax*. See Suetonius. *Caligula* 43: "*legionibus et auxiliis undiqueexcitis*."
[34] Barrett, 126
[35] Eck 1985, 16
[36] Barrett, 126; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1798. See the erroneous reference to this legion by Dio LV 23.6. See Thomas, 431
[37] For the view that the legions may have been raised under Claudius, see Thomas, 431.
[38] Thomas, 430; Mann 1963, 483
[39] Thomas, 431. *XV Primigenia* originally stood at Weisenau.
[40] Thomas, 431; Mann 1963, 484
[41] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1799. See *CIL* XIII 6975
[42] Thomas, 431; Mann 1963, 484
[43] Bechert, Gechter and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1782-1783; Tacitus. *Annales* I.31; 37; 45. Ritterling points out that vexillations of the legion fought in Gaul in 21 AD: Tacitus. *Annales* III.41; *CIL* XIV 3602.(In Vetera) "10 etwa 41 oder 44 n. Chr." The transfer may have taken place under Gaius. In Upper Germany, it wasstationed either in Argentorate or Vindonissa.
[44] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1799
[45] Tacitus. *Annales* I.45; see also I.31

new legionary camp was then built at Xanten.[46] Only this double legionary fortress, near which auxiliaries also stood, held a large concentration of troops reminiscent of the previous era.[47]

The fortress at Neuss was soon occupied once more by *legio XVI Gallica*, which had been in Mainz since the time of Augustus. The legion soon built the first rectangular fortress at Neuss (K), which was reinforced in stone around the middle of the first century AD.[48] Bonn, meanwhile, remained garrisoned by *legio I Germanica*, which had stood at that fortress since around 30 AD.[49] Thus, during the first half of Claudius's reign, four legions defended the Lower Rhine while three stood in Upper Germany.[50] This settlement guaranteed the defenses of Roman territory east and south of the Rhine delta. Trouble soon arose, however, on the coastal area.

Corbulo on the Lower Rhine

Despite Gabinius's success against the Chauci in 41 AD, the tribe remained undaunted. In 47 AD, their fleet, led by a Gannascus of the Cananefates, who "had served long as (a Roman) auxiliary," plundered the "wealthy and unwarlike" coast of Gaul.[51] The raid again points to the *comitatus* tradition of a war chief leading his followers, in this case from another tribe, on expeditions of plunder. Some of the forts on the Rhine Delta would have been exposed at this time, for the Lower German garrison had been reduced when eight Batavian cohorts stationed on home soil had been sent to Britain.[52]

Order was restored with the arrival of the brilliant and ambitious Gn. Domitius Corbulo, a general from a senatorial family whose father had been praetor and whose mother, Vistilia, was related to several families of high rank.[53] Corbulo, under whose command Pliny served as the officer in charge of an *ala* in Lower Germany, was the half-brother of Emperor Gaius's wife.[54] He had been suffect consul in 39 AD and his command in 47 AD over Lower Germany, where he replaced Sanquinius Maximus, who had died in office the previous year, was his first post of military importance known to scholars.[55] Having defeated the Chauci, Corbulo restored peace and, as Tacitus writes, he disciplined the Roman troops stationed in the area using the stern code of old (*veterem ad morem*).[56]

Corbulo's initial victory and his reforms to the Lower German army, whose discipline had decayed before the new legate's arrival, managed to make a strong enough impression on the Frisii, who had been "hostile or disaffected since the rebellion" of 28 AD, for them to submit once more to

[46] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50; Gechter in *DNL* (1974), 107
[47] Gechter 2003, 159
[48] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 42; Keppie, 37
[49] Keppie, 303 with note no. 24
[50] See Shotter, 33
[51] Tacitus. *Annales* XI.18
[52] Schönberger 1969, 152; von Petrikovits 1960, 54 ff.
[53] Tacitus. *Annales*. XI.18; Eck 1985, 117
[54] Pliny. *Historia Naturalis*, XVI.2; van Soesbergen, 242 with note no. 27; Levick, 153
[55] Tacitus. *Annales*. XI.18; Eck 1985, 116: "Ob er die Nachfolge des Gabinius Secundus antrat, muss offenbleiben. Wenn er schon 21 oder 22 zum Suffektkonsulat gelangte, sollte er sich im J. 46 zumindest dem 60. Lebensjahr genähert haben." See also 117-118.
[56] Tacitus. *Annales*. XI.18-19; See also Plinius. *Historia Naturalis*, XVI.203; Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 395

Roman authority.[57] As Tacitus writes, the Frisii "gave hostages and settled in the reservation marked out by Corbulo, who also imposed on them a senate, a magistracy and laws." The Lower German legate even went as far as stationing Roman troops in a fort built on their land "to guard against neglect of his orders," and he also sent envoys "to persuade the Greater Chauci to surrender, and to attempt the life of Gannascus by ruse."[58] Corbulo's actions could have led either to rebellion against Rome or to a war, fought near the imperial frontier, between the Chauci's two branches.[59] Thus, Claudius immediately repealed the legate's measures, ordering him to give up the *praesidia* in enemy territory and to transfer them *cis Rhenum*.[60] Apparently, the emperor not only feared that the coastal tribes, resenting the death of Gannascus and the renewed Roman intrusions in their affairs, might yet again launch attacks against the empire in reprisal. Tacitus suggests that Claudius was also alarmed by the energetic Corbulo's sudden acquisition of fame and power.[61]

Thus Corbulo, who was preparing to cross the Rhine with troops when he received the emperor's dispatch, was forced to restrain his ambitions. *Beatos quondam duces Romanos,* he said according to Tacitus.[62] He then evacuated the troops he had stationed in German territory, although a *glacis* beyond the Rhine remained occupied by Roman troops.[63] One consequence of this measure was that forts such as Fectio / Vechten, which had served primarily an offensive purpose until that date, were integrated into the linear system of defense on the Rhine.[64] On the other hand, the fort at Velsen, which had been rebuilt some years before, was likely abandoned.[65]

It was likely at this time that Corbulo, compelled to direct his endeavors elsewhere, ordered a row of auxiliary forts to be built west of Nijmegen on the southern bank of the Oude Rijn and the Kromme Rijn. These were the forts built around 47 AD at Utrecht (Traiectum), Vleuten-De Meern, Woerden (Laurum), Zwammerdam (Nigrum Pullum), Alphen aan de Rijn (Albaniana) and Leiden-Roomburg (Matilo). This activity was important in grand strategic terms since it marked the fortification and the permanent stationing of troops on the Rhine delta. It also resulted from Claudius's own decision not to advance beyond the Rhine.

The fort at Traiectum was built *ca.* 47 AD some 5 kilometers to the northwest of Vechten. It stood in the medieval center of Utrecht at an elevated spot on the southern bank of the Kromme-Rijn, in the vicinity of the ford that gave the fort its name. With its size of around 1.2 hectares, this was one of the smallest forts on the Lower German *limes*. Five kilometers to the west of Traiectum, the fort at Vleuten-De Meern was built south of the Rhine, at an elevated point on the east bank of a watercourse, later called Mare, which flowed into the Oude Rijn and was possibly also connected to the Hollandse Ijssel further south. The next fort built to the west was Laur(i)um, which was situated some 35 kilometres from the North Sea coast and, according to the *Tabula Peutingeriana*, 12 *leugae* from Fectio. Although the fort's remains have not been found, it is assumed that it was built on the highest point of Woerden's center near De Hoge Woerd, north of which several

[57] Tacitus. *Annales*. XI.18-19
[58] Ibidem
[59] Levick, 153
[60] Tacitus. *Annales* XI.19; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 100
[61] Tacitus. *Annales*. XI.19; 20
[62] Ibidem
[63] Eck 1985, 119; von Petrikovits 1978, 66
[64] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 82
[65] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 100

fortifications on the riverbank dating from the middle of the first century AD and later have been discovered. Laur(i)um lay on the edge of the expansive Dutch moorland that, stretching north of the Oude Rijn, offered a natural barrier against attacks from the north. The fort's strategic function was to control a stream that flowed north into the swampland as well as several paths leading into Lower Germany's interior.[66]

Along the stretch of the Oude Rijn river frontier as it advances westward from Woerden, the construction of large structures was possible only in a few places. Thus, Roman military engineers built auxiliary forts where watercourses and streams that flowed into the Rhine allowed incursions into Roman territory. The path built along the river's southern bank to connect these forts to one another had to take a serpentine shape. Along this section of the frontier, a military station was likely built at Bodegraven, a place exposed to attack since it was perhaps the only site between Woerden and Zwammerdam where a series of streams that flowed from north to south met the Rhine. Moreover, it would have been necessary to defend the river crossing so that the *limes* road could continue its westward path through this spot, where traces of Roman troops— perhaps *cohors II Asturum* or a part of that unit was present here in Flavian times— have been found.[67]

West of Bodegraven, the *limes* road led to the fort Nigrum Pullum, which was located at Zwammerdam some ten kilometers from Woerden. The space between the two forts was scarcely inhabited by natives and, as such, probably lightly defended.[68] Nigrum Pullum, however, was built in an apparently inhabited area that controlled the tributary in the Oude Rijn of the Meije, a stream that granted access to the northern moorland and possibly also to the Mijdrecht, the Vecht, and the Oer-IJ. Due to the site's importance, the bank of the Rhine to the north of Nigrum Pullum was strongly fortified in order to defend the harbor, where there was a good deal of naval activity.[69] The fort, which was one of the smaller military constructions along the Lower German *limes*, was likely manned from its foundation until the time of the Batavian revolt by small legionary vexillations and parts of auxiliary units; the latter may have included horsemen since Zwammerdam was perhaps the only place along the moorland portion of the frontier where cavalry action was possible.[70]

Less than five kilometers west of Nigrum Pullum, the fort Albaniana was built in the center of Alphen aan de Rijn, where the Aar, which also permits access into the moors to the north, flows into the Rhine. Since this watercourse permitted the approach to the Roman frontier, the military authorities decided that it should be fortified. Albaniana was built around 50 AD even though there is evidence for troops there some ten years earlier. Between Albaniana and Matilo, built as the next fort on the frontier in Liden-Roomburg, 10 kilometers west of Alphen aan de Rijn, both banks of the Rhine seem to have held native settlements.[71] Matilo, which held regular auxiliary troops and units from the Rhine fleet, guarded the area where the Zijl and the Leithe, a pair of streams with a north-south course, reached the Rhine from the north. Meanwhile, the *fossa corbulonis* also

[66] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 85-87; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 53; 55; 58; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89-90. *Tab. Peut.*, II.3
[67] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89-90
[68] Ibidem; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 44. *Tab. Peut.* II.2/3: Nigropullo
[69] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 91
[70] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89; 91-93
[71] Ibidem; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 44**.** Tabula Peut. II.2

met the Rhine, albeit from the south, in the area guarded by Matilo. The fort defended the entry into the canal.[72]

Built with fortified banks and possibly a dam under Corbulo's supervision, the *fossa*, which was 12 to 14 meters wide on average and 2 meters deep, stretched 37 kilometers and connected the Rhine to the Meuse, thus allowing the Romans to "evade the hazards of the North Sea," as Tacitus explains.[73] Hence, the canal, which ran from Leiden on the Rhine to Voorburg on the Meuse along a course that corresponds mostly to that of the Vliet canal in Zuid-Holland, became one of the German fleet's chief places of deployment.[74] It appears that, in building the canal, the Romans made use of several natural bodies of water, so that the *fossa*'s construction required digging merely a portion of its entire length.[75]

By building the *fossa*, Corbulo also could keep the Lower German soldiers "free from sloth," even if the Emperor had forbidden further campaigns in enemy territory.[76] Presumably, the building of the forts on the Rhine delta also served this aim. Through these actions, Corbulo "spelt out for Claudius the message that mischief might arise from idleness, as it had under Gaetulicus."[77] The emperor apparently appreciated the general's efforts: Corbulo received the *ornamenta triumphalia* for his building activity.[78] Indeed, west of Matilo, the last forts were those of the coast, Valkenburg and Katwijk, so that Corbulo's efforts signified the completion of a linear frontier on the Rhine delta up to the Rhine's tributary in the North Sea.

At around the time of Gannascus's attack in 47 AD, Claudius placed a Roman citizen on the throne of the Cherusci. Once inner strife had decimated the Cherusci nobility, they were reduced to the position of having to ask Rome for a king. The one remaining royal scion was Italicus, who descended from Arminius's brother Flavus; he lived *apud urbem* as a citizen. Claudius granted him money and an escort "and encouraged him to enter on his family honors with a high heart," remarking that "he was the first man born at Rome, and not a hostage but a citizen, to leave for a foreign throne." Eventually, Italicus became the subject of enmity due to factional strife and was accused among the Cherusci's neighbours of serving Rome's interests. Following a *magno inter barbaros proelio*, Italicus emerged as *victor rex*, after which he, according to Tacitus, was afflicted by *superbia* and again dethroned before being restored to power by the *Langobardorum opibus*. Thereafter, he remained, *per laeta per adversa*, "the scourge of the Cheruscan nation."[79]

[72] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 93
[73] Tacitus, *Annales* XI.20. See Dio. LX.30; Weiss. Fossa, Fossae," in *PRcA* VII.1 (1910), 75; Eck 1985, 119; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89
[74] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 20; Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 93
[75] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 93-94
[76] Tacitus, *Annales* XI.20: "*ut tamen miles otium exueret*..."
[77] Levick, 153
[78] Eck 1985, 119; Around the same time, Q. Curtius Rufus, Upper German legate, received the *ornamenta triumphalia* for exploiting a silver mine in the land of the allied Mattiaci. Tacitus, *Annales* XI.20; See Eck 1985, 17-18; Levick, 153-154
[79] Tacitus, *Annales* XI.16-18

The Completion of a Linear Frontier

Corbulo is only attested as Lower German legate in 47 AD,[80] and his next known successor is the *eques* and previous *consul suffectus* A. Pompeius Paulinus, who held command from 54 at the latest until 56 AD.[81] Around 50 AD, probably prior to Paulinus's arrival, the new line of defense on the Rhine Delta was reinforced. The fort Albaniana was built on the southern bank of the Oude Rijn between Mattilo and Nigrum Pullum.[82] Meanwhile, the fort Levefanum was erected some 16 *leugae* to the southeast of Vechten at Rijswijk on the west bank of the Kromme-Rijn, where a *cohors civium Romanorum* might have been stationed.[83] There may have been a sanctuary of some importance in the vicinity; the name Levefanum is a possible misspelling of *Haevae fanum*— a temple of the Germanic goddess Haeva— that appeared on the *Tabula Peutingeriana*.[84] Also under Claudius, the fort Ceuclum arose on the western bank of the Meuse at modern Cuijk, some six *leugae* from Nijmegen.[85] This fort secured the Roman road from Tongern to Nijmegen.[86] Also Claudian, at the latest, is the military road along the Rhine between *Batavodurum* in Nijmegen and Confluentes (Koblenz). It linked the Lower German fortresses to each other.[87] The *limes* road not only served as a means of transportation; it was filled continuously with gravel and hence raised above the flat ground of the Lower Rhine, being used as a river dam.[88]

Once in his post, Paulinus oversaw the reinforcement in stone of the legionary fortress in Bonn and probably also that of Neuss.[89] P. Pomponius Secundus, suffect consul in 44 AD and Upper German legate since 50 AD at the latest— perhaps he assumed the post in 48 / 49 AD—, did the same in the fortress of Windisch.[90] This marks a policy— dictated by the emperor[91]— of direct frontier defense along the Rhine frontier, a policy based on the earlier decision not to advance permanently into Germany. On the Rhine Delta and the coastal area, meanwhile, Claudius's removal of the Batavians' main infantry force from their native land left only a single national cohort and a cavalry unit stationed in Batavian territory.

The Rhine Delta, however, also came under direct control, as is evident from the six new auxiliary forts stretching from the North Sea coast to a point just west of Nijmegen. Thus, the Cananefates and the Batavians, the majority of whose infantry units had been removed from their territory, were no longer exempt from having Roman troops permanently stationed close to their territory. Already during the first half of Claudius's reign, therefore, Rome was no longer relying on these

[80] Eck 1985, 117-119. See Syme 1988 b, 518. Corbulo was "put in charge" of Galatia in 55, and he "embarked in active warfare" in 58.
[81] Eck 1985, 120-122. He notes that Paulinus was Seneca's brother-in-law, a relationship which surely played a part in his being named Lower German legate.
[82] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 47. Tab. Peut. II.2
[83] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 81; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 67. Tab. Peut. II.3: Levefano
[84] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 81
[85] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 72; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 84. Tab. Peut. II. 4: Ceuclum.According to the Tabula Peutingeriana, the fort is only three *leugae* from Nijmegen.
[86] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 84
[87] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 9-11; *CIL* XIII, 9145
[88] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 11
[89] Eck 1985, 122 with note no. 11; Bechert 2007, 43
[90] Eck 1985, 21. The work at Vindonissa may have been begun by the Upper German legate Q. Curtius Rufus (46 / 47-49 AD). See Eck 1985, 17-18
[91] Eck 1985, 21-22

tribes to control the last portion of the empire's continental northwest frontier as independent vassal states. Although the Batavians and their neighbors to the west retained political independence as well as the freedom to recruit their own troops and lead them in battle, their territory— or at least their immediate sphere of influence— now came under Roman occupation. From the Batavians' perspective, their loss of independence from direct Roman military control was aggravated by the permanent removal of native troops from their homeland. One should also consider the possibility that Roman soldiers stationed on the Rhine delta probably married Batavian women.[92] It is indeed probable that at least a portion of the Batavian population resented these measures, and thus one could interpret the "Rhine Delta policy" carried out under Claudius, and executed mostly by Corbulo, as one source of the antipathy towards Roman hegemony that seethed until it erupted in 69 / 70 AD with the great Batavian revolt.

At first, however, the measures effectively fulfilled the aim of securing the northwest portion of the Lower Rhine and the coastal areas. Under the reigning peace, Roman influence increased in the Batavians' territory. In the mid-first century AD, a large stone temple was built in Elst, an area not particularly near any stone quarries.[93] As for the literary sources, Tacitus describes the calmness prevalent in Germany after Corbulo's departure, when the generals, "now that triumphal emblems were staled, expected greater distinction from the maintenance of peace."[94] He mentions two examples of the duties that the Rhine commanders imposed on their men in order to maintain a satisfactory degree of discipline. The patrician L. Antitius Vetus, who had become Upper German legate in 55 AD in place of Pomponius Secundus, attempted to build a canal to ease ship transports in the northwest:

> *Ut copiae per mare, dein Rhodano et Arare subvectae per eam fossam, mox fluvio Mosella in Rhenum, exim Oceanum decurrerent, sublatisque itinieris difficultatibus navigabilia inter se Occidentis Septentrionisque litora fierent.*
>
> "so that goods shipped by sea and then up the Rhone and Arar could make their way by the canal, and subsequently by the Moselle, into the Rhine, and in due course into the ocean: a method which would reduce the natural difficulties of the route and create a navigable highway between the shores of the West and North."[95]

Aelius Gracilis, governor of Belgica, frustrated this effort, alarmed by the presence of troops from Upper Germany in his province.[96] Vetus abandoned the project before being replaced in 56 AD as Upper German legate by T. Curtilius Mancia.[97]

For his part, Paulinus, the Lower German legate, succeeded in 55 AD in completing Drusus' embankment, begun 63 years earlier, with the latter's canal in the tributary of the Waal in the Old Rhine. Its purpose was to lead more water into both the canal and the Rhine (*coercendo Rheno*).[98]

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[92] Roymans, 256 with note no. 650
[93] Galsterer, 31
[94] Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.53
[95] Ibidem; Eck 1985, 23-24
[96] Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.53
[97] Eck 1985, 25-26
[98] Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.53; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 64-65; Eck 1985, 122. See also Heller, 855-856

The *limes* road probably crossed the Waal at the point where it met the embankment, thereafter leading directly to Nijmegen. In order to guard both the embankment and the *fossa Drusiana*, which has been identified with the upper course of the Ijssel, the auxiliary fort Carvium, the first fort of the Lower German *limes* in the territory of modern Holland, was built around the middle of the first century AD or possibly earlier. It stood on the left bank of the Rhine in Over-Betuwe in modern Herven en Aerdt- De Bijland, some 35 Km east of the current Waal tributary into the Rhine. Carvium, which was possibly occupied until the fourth century AD, was garrisoned by *cohors II civium Romanorum* until the late third century.[99] The strategic importance of the dyke begun by Drusus and finished by Pompeius became evident during the war against the Batavians in 70 AD, when Iulius Civilis, the rebel leader, ordered its destruction to hinder access to the *insula Batavorum* and to sabotage Roman communications in the area.[100]

The Lower Rhine remained calm after Corbulo's departure, but fear arose in Upper Germany around 49 or 50 AD due to "an incursion of Chattan marauders" (*adventu Chattorum latrocinia agitantium*). Hence, the legate Pomponius took action against the raiding party. Using the Upper German legions and two cavalry columns, including the allied Vangiones and Nemetes as well as auxiliary units, he placed his infantry on top of Mount Taunus, forcing the invading Chatti to capitulate and "send envoys and hostages to Rome." [101] Pomponius's victory may have involved the construction of the bridge over the Rhine in Koblenz.[102] He successfully hemmed in the Chatti between his own troops and those of the neighboring Cherusci, with whom the Chatti were "eternally at feud." The emperor granted Pomponius the *honos triumphalis* for this exploit, which also led to the recovery of Roman prisoners taken from Varus's army 40 years earlier.[103]

Colonia Claudia Agrippinensis

While the Roman army fortified the Lower Rhine frontier, a veteran colony was founded in the *oppidum Ubiorum*. The settlement had become an increasingly important outpost during the first half of the first century AD, as Roman goods and a Roman lifestyle were spreading along the Lower Rhine.[104] By 50 AD at the latest, Cologne had become "the largest and surely also the most Romanized city in Lower Germany."[105] High-ranking Romans, including members of the Julian dynasty, stayed there regularly.[106] The future empress, Agrippina, had been born in the *oppidum Ubiorum* while her father, Germanicus, waged his northern campaigns. Hence, in 50 AD, soon after Agrippina's marriage to Claudius, the *oppidum Ubiorum* became the *Colonia Claudia Agrippinensis* in her honor.[107] According to Tacitus, this was a means for Agrippina "to show her power even to the allied nations."[108] Under the Principate, however, the creation of colonies in

[99] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 64-65; see Willems 1984, 97-98; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 90; *AE* 1939, 107 and 130
[100] Tacitus. *Historiae* V.19
[101] Tacitus. *Annales* XII.27; for the year, see Eck 1985, 20-21.
[102] Eck 1985, 21
[103] Tacitus. *Annales* XII.27-28; Eck 1985, 21; Strobel 1987 b, 424-425
[104] Haalebos 2001, 464
[105] Galsterer, 26
[106] Roymans, 254
[107] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 35
[108] Tacitus. *Annales* XII.27. See Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 89. "Vermutlich war dies ein Schritt auf dem Weg zu der von ihrangestrebten gleichberechtigten Teilhabe an der Herrschaft."

places where legions had stood was a regular practice. Thus, the Claudian colonies at Colchester and Aequum were founded at around the same time, while Lincoln and Gloucester were established under either Domitian or Nerva.[109]

The colony's foundation was a considerable enterprise; it involved the massive migration of veteran citizens from the Mediterranean to the Rhine. They would have arrived at a place where the Ubii, who had acquired Roman citizenship, enjoyed the privileges of tax discounts and legal security. Lower Germany's imperial legate resided in their city, thus enhancing their prestige. Already, the *oppidum Ubiorum* had acquired a sufficiently Roman character for army veterans to be lured to settle there.[110] The former soldiers supplanted the Ubii elite at the top of the community's hierarchy.[111] Nonetheless, intermarriage soon took place. Before long, the Ubii, who were well integrated into the empire's political structure, were calling themselves Agrippinenses.[112] Colonial status allowed a tribe, and especially its elite, the opportunity "to redefine itself as a community of Roman citizens, whereby old tribal identities were relegated to the background or consciously 'forgotten.'"[113]

Strategically, veteran colonies were settlements that "could not substitute… field units," but nonetheless "helped to organize local government and elites."[114] They were founded to foster the development— and particularly the economic development— of Roman-style cities across the empire.[115] Militarily, the aim of *Colonia Claudia Agrippinensis*, which apparently stood where the double legionary fortress had been built,[116] was to reinforce the security of an area that, for 20 years, had been without legions or auxiliaries; the *cohortes Ubiorum* had apparently stood in Xanten during the Claudio-Neronian period.[117] The legionary veterans would have integrated with the Ubii, who had been settled in the area for decades, so that the tribe's upper class received the right to Roman citizenship.[118] Tacitus, for instance, mentions marriages between Romans and Ubii.[119] Eventually, the colony received the *ius Italicum* and the corresponding fiscal benefits.[120] Due to their excellent relationship with Rome, the Ubii, along with the Batavi or at least "their towns of *Ulpia Noviomagus* and *Claudia Ara*," continued to supply "the lion's share" of horsemen for the imperial guard under Claudius and Nero, as they did during the second century AD.[121]

Ubian territory, which held most of Lower Germany's natural resources, became a production center for ceramic, glass, metal, and building materials. Thus, Cologne became the regional center of trade. Within the military zone, goods moved from there to the northwest rather than in the

[109] Galsterer, 29
[110] Grünewald and Schalles, 565
[111] Roymans, 254; Tacitus. *Annales* XII.24
[112] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.28; 65; *cf*. van Soesbergen, 244 with note no. 51
[113] Roymans, 253-254; "it is relevant… that the name Ubii and the tribal affiliation *natione Ubius* were no longer in use after the end of the 1st century." *Cf.* Carroll, 128
[114] Kagan, 339; Isaac, 311-332
[115] Haalebos 2001, 464
[116] Tacitus, *Annales*, XII. 27.1; Precht in *DNL* (1974), 160; Schönberger 1969, 159-160; Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 89
[117] Alföldy 1968 a, 73-74; Tacitus. *Historiae*. IV.28
[118] Eck. Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 89
[119] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.65
[120] Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 89
[121] Speidel 1994, 39-40

opposite direction.[122] Lower Germany's trade with other provinces, including maritime trade with Britain, also proceeded from Cologne. The general region's economic activity, however, was not limited to Cologne and the surrounding area on the west bank of the Rhine. Indeed, the Bergisches Land across the Rhine had become the primary source of raw materials for Lower Germany. The Romans exploited the area's stone quarries, brickworks (*tegularia transrhenana*) and mines, where they apparently used German labor, and the army also produced tiles. This economic contact with the Romans and their army allowed the Germans, who were mostly paid in currency, to develop a money economy based on the independent exploitation of raw materials, primarily charcoal, on the production and sale of certain products, and on the delivery of services. Hence, the German inhabitants of the Bergisches Land achieved a certain degree of prosperity that allowed them to buy Roman goods such as ceramics, jewelry and equipment.[123] This was all predicated, however, on Cologne's economic importance.

As the Lower Rhine region's administrative center, Cologne also became the region's financial hub as the center for large payments to the army.[124] As money circulated, the considerably urbanized Cologne also became a dynamic center for production and commerce.[125] This contrasted with Lower Germany's more peripheral, northern settlements. Xanten and Nijmegen stood at the end of supply chains controlled in Gaul, so that merchants there concentrated on local and regional commerce and on supplying fluvial trading posts along the Rhine. Industry— with the possible exception of leather goods produced for export— fulfilled the special needs of a local and fairly small market for tools, instruments, ceramic, and textiles.[126] In agriculture, the area's population worked mostly to fulfill its own needs, while any surplus production was sold in the immediate vicinity— in local markets that, in the Roman economy, were not necessarily competing with each other— and to members of the military. Nonetheless, the soldiers probably spent most of their pay on imported Mediterranean goods, so that the northern outposts would have had little participation in the lion's share of long-distance trade.[127]

For the rest of Claudius's reign, the Rhine frontier remained peaceful, surely as a consequence of the emperor's measures and those of his predecessor. The increase in the use of coins in the native economy increased after the Claudian era would be a sign of peace.[128] Also, at the start of Nero's reign at the latest, the fort at Velsen was abandoned due to the Ur-Ij tributary's erosion. This meant that Rome no longer exerted direct control over the Frisii, who were henceforward considered a barbarian people even if they maintained contractual ties with the empire. Thus, the Roman *Imperium*'s northwest frontier became the Alter Rhein's southern bank in the area of the river's tributary into the North Sea around Katwijk; the Cananefates, meanwhile, were the most remote subjected people on the Continent.[129]

[122] Wierschowski, 420; Grünewald and Schalles, 566
[123] Gechter 2001, 542; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15
[124] Wierschowski, 421
[125] Grünewald and Schalles, 566
[126] Wierschowski, 421; Schalles, 446-447; Schneider 1998, 669
[127] Schalles, 446-447 with note no. 76
[128] Aarts, 165
[129] Erdrich, 309

Claudius's Military Reforms

From the beginning of his reign, Claudius introduced a series of military reforms that affected the Roman army's tactics, strategy, organization, and technology. Improvements were necessary since the army had changed little since the time of Augustus, who had largely maintained the late Republic's military framework in spite of increasing professionalization, in part to conceal his *de facto* autocracy. Claudius, a historian interested in military matters, would have been aware of the need to overhaul the army. On the other hand, overdue army reforms allowed him to exert his executive and military authority.[130]

The reforms affected Lower Germany, especially those concerning the *auxilia*. Claudius made the command of auxiliary troops available only to equestrians as part of the *cursus honorum*'s structured career pattern. Previously, senators, equestrians, and *primipilares* had held the posts haphazardly. Hence, Claudius created a clear "path of promotion" for the *equites* and thus managed to channel positively the talents of ambitious men of that class; as a result, the army could be led more efficiently and the frontiers better secured. Also, Claudius implemented a regular, thirty-year length of service for auxiliaries. Finally, the emperor granted auxiliaries who had served at least 25 years the right to become Roman citizens (*civitas*) and to marry legitimately (*conubium*). This measure was particularly significant since men who joined the auxiliary forces had the prospect of citizenship not only for themselves, but also for their offspring and descendants.[131] Overall, Claudius's changes to the auxiliaries' terms of service allowed the *auxilia* to play an ever more important role within the army.[132] In terms of the empire as a whole, the heightened importance of the auxiliary *alae* and *cohorts* was "one of the greatest contrasts between the army of Augustus and the imperial army of the second century AD."[133]

The foundation of the German fleet— plausibly under Claudius—was another key military reform.[134] Inscriptions and stamped tiles from the middle of the first century AD identify the large military camp at Köln-Alteburg in Marienburg, a Cologne district, as the headquarters of the *Classis Germanica*. It was built on a fluvial terrace over the Rhine some 3 kilometers south of the veteran colony.[135] The headquarters' construction was likely tied to the conquest of Britain; its maintenance as a province required a constant, fluvial transport of troops and, as such, "a revamping of the naval arrangements for the whole North Sea, Channel and Lower Rhine."[136] It is certain, however, that Claudius reformed the Roman fleet's command structure.[137] The camp at Köln-Alteburg might have housed over a thousand men, many of whom came from the East, but

[130] Thomas, 424-426; 427-428. He maintains that Claudius was regarded by the army as a 'military' emperor, "officially at least… well into the third century."
[131] Ibidem, 429; 437; Dio. LX.24.3
[132] It is hardly surprising that the first known military diploma was issued under Claudius. See Thomas, 437; *CIL* XVI 3. On the Rhine frontier, the Upper German legate P. Sulpicius Scribonius Proculus issued a military diploma on June 17th, 65 AD granting citizenship to soldiers from three auxiliary cohorts. See *AE* 1978, 658; Eck 1985, 27
[133] Thomas, 432; 429
[134] Ibidem, 435
[135] Fischer, 547; Thomas, 435. Claudius, however, very likely did found the *classis Britannica*. For the fort's reinforcement in stone, *cf.* Bechert 2007, 43; La Baume in *DNL* (1974), 166
[136]Thomas, 435
[137] Ibidem, 435-436

the entire fleet was likely not stationed here. Considerable numbers were garrisoned in other military harbors along the Rhine.[138]

Brief Incursions across the Rhine under Nero

In the years after Nero's accession, strife returned to the Lower German frontier. In 58 or 57 AD, Paulinus was replaced as Lower German legate by a *consul suffectus* of 56 AD, L. Duvius Avitus, a *homo novus* who most likely originated from Vasio Vocontiorum in Narbonensis and was thus connected to the family of Afranius Burrus, Nero's praetorian prefect and adviser.[139] Before 58 AD, the Frisii, despite their earlier agreement with Corbulo, attempted to occupy a Roman military zone beyond the Rhine.[140] The Roman army seems to have tolerated a Germanic presence in a small scale in the area, but not the permanent settlement of entire tribes.[141] "The continuous inaction of the armies," Tacitus writes, led the Frisii to believe that Roman commanders "had been divested of the authority to lead (the troops) against an enemy."[142] The Frisii defied Nero's order for them to abandon Roman land. Thus, the emperor unleashed against them an "unexpected dispatch of a body of auxiliary horse, which captured or killed" those who resisted.[143] This is yet another example of Roman military activity beyond the Rhine in the Julio-Claudian period.

Also during Nero's early reign, shortly before 58 AD, the Chauci defeated the Amsivarii and expelled them from the area of the Ems.[144] Sometime later, they also gained territory to the south, so that their lands bordered with those of the Chatti on the edge of the Mittelgebirge.[145] After their expulsion, the Amsivarii, a tribe "more powerful" than the Frisii "not only from their numbers, but from having the sympathy of the neighboring peoples," occupied the territory that the Frisii had recently evacuated. They claimed they should be allowed to settle on the unproductive land across the Rhine which had been set aside for the Roman army.[146]

At first, Avitus insisted that the decision to allow the tribe to settle on the land in question rested with the Romans. He sought, however, to reach a settlement with Boiocalus, a Roman ally who was well known among the Germans. The negotiations failed, and the Amsivarii requested military assistance from the Bructeri, the Tencteri, and other tribes. Avitus responded with yet another Roman campaign in German territory, leading the Lower German legions against the Tencteri. He also asked Curtilius Mancia, the Upper German legate since 56 AD, to cross the Rhine and march against the enemy's rear. Under threat, the Tencteri stood aloof. The Bructeri were also deterred. Thus, the Amsivarii were compelled to retreat. They received no refuge and had their meandering youth slaughtered.[147] A powerful tribe and potential enemy had failed to settle near the frontier.

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[138] Fischer, 547
[139] Eck 1985, 122; 123-124 with note no. 3
[140] Tacitus. *Annales*. XIII 54: "…*ripae agrosque vacuos et militum usui sepositos insedere…*" 56; von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 583. *CIL* XIII, 8036=*ILS* 2907
[141] Von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 583
[142] Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.54
[143] Tacitus. *Annales* XIII.54. Nero had already attempted to appease the Frisii by granting Roman citizenship to the Frisian leaders Verritus and Malorix.
[144] Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 396; Tacitus. *Annales*. XIII 55
[145] Wenskus. "Chauken," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 396; Tacitus. *Germania* 30; 35
[146] Tacitus. *Annales*. XIII.54-56
[147] Ibidem

Once again, a rapid display of military force beyond the Rhine was effective in fulfilling Rome's grand strategic aims.

Amid such threats, Nero's legates reinforced the Lower Rhine's military infrastructure. Around 60 AD, the fifth and fifteenth legions built a new, double legionary fortress at Xanten. They remained stationed there alongside an *ala* and possibly other auxiliary units.[148] Meanwhile, *legio I Germanica* still occupied the legionary fortress at Bonn next to contingents of auxiliary troops, including an *ala*.[149] Further south, the earth and wood fort at Remagen, which had been built under Tiberius, was rebuilt in stone during the Claudian-Neronian period.[150] Under Nero, few new auxiliary troops, if any, arrived in Lower Germany, although some units stationed on the Rhine were transferred to the East.[151]

The German Legates under Nero

Toward the end of Nero's reign, the German legates fell under the Emperor's suspicion. Since around 63 AD, P. Sulpicius Scribonius Proculus had been in command of Upper Germany. His brother, P. Sulpicius Scribonius Rufus, governed Lower Germany. Both served terms that were longer than usual.[152] Nero ordered both men to meet him in Greece, where they were forced to commit suicide. Corbulo, the former Lower German legate, had suffered the same fate.[153] In 67 / 68 AD, the command of Lower Germany fell to Fonteius Capito, *consul ordinarius* in 67.[154] L. Verginius Rufus, an equestrian who had reached the Senate under Claudius and served as *consul ordinarius* in 63 AD, became Upper German legate.[155]

These men were instrumental in the suppression of the revolt headed by Iulius Vindex, the *(legatus) pro praetore* of an unarmed Gallic province, most likely Gallia Lugdunensis.[156] In March of 68 AD, Vindex, who descended from the royal family of Aquitania and had been made a Roman senator, stirred his countrymen, who resented Nero's tributary exploitation of Gaul, against the emperor.[157] Vindex's province, however, had no legions; Lugdunum merely held an urban cohort of proven loyalty.[158] Nero may have ignored the uprising for eight days. Suppressing rebellions arising in Gaul, however, was "the principal responsibility of the governor of Upper Germany."[159] Hence, Rufus led the entire Upper German army, including auxiliaries from the Treveri and

[148] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50
[149] Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 196. The units in question are *ala Longiniana* and the *cohortes I Thracum* and *V Asturum*.
[150] Haupt in *DNL* (1974), 212; Gechter 2003, 145; Alföldy 1968 a, 48. *Cohors VIII Breucorum* was stationed here frombefore 50 AD until the time of the Batavian revolt.
[151] Alföldy 1968 a, 142; Tacitus. *Historiae* I. 6
[152] Eck 1985, 27; 125-128; Dio LXIII.17
[153] Dio LXIII.17; Eck 1985, 127-128
[154] Eck 1985, 129-130; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.13
[155] Eck 1985, 27-29. P. Sulpicius Scribonius Proculus was legate of Upper Germany at least from 63 to 67 AD. L. Verginius Rufus reached the Senate under Claudius. See Tacitus. *Historiae* I.52
[156] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.16; Plutarch. *Life of Galba* IV; Griffin, 180 with note no. 87
[157] Dio. LXIII.22; Suetonius. *Nero* 40; Griffin, 181 with note no. 88
[158] Griffin, 181
[159] Suetonius. *Nero* 40; Dio. LXIII.26; Griffin, 181

Lingones, as well as reinforcements from Lower Germany, against Vindex and his allies, whom he defeated in front of Vesontio.[160]

As Eck writes, Rufus's victory was of "the highest political significance,"[161] not least because Vindex had offered Galba the throne. The then legate of Spain accepted the offer, "half hopefully, half fearfully, but without much delay, having accidentally come across Nero's secret orders (sent to his agents) for his own assassination."[162] Complications arose when the Upper German army, far more powerful than Galba's Spanish forces, saluted its own legate, Verginius Rufus, as emperor. Rufus refused to accept the proclamation since he insisted that only the Roman Senate had the authority to appoint the *princeps*.[163] Circumstances changed once the Lower German legionary legates Fabius Valens and Cornelius Aquinus killed the provincial legate Fonteius Capito,[164] who, at least after his death, was held in favor by his army.[165] Incited by Valens, the Lower German army swore allegiance to Galba,[166] wh appointed as legate for the Lower Rhine A. Vitellius,[167] consul in 48 AD and proconsul in Africa in 60 / 61 AD.[168]

Once Lower Germany and the Roman Senate had adopted Galba's cause, Rufus persuaded the Upper German army, with much difficulty, to swear allegiance to the new emperor.[169] There was a peaceful transition of power once Galba's new Upper German legate, Hordeonius Flaccus, arrived in the province in 68 AD, after which Rufus proceeded to enjoy the peace of private life.[170] Under Gaius, Galba had become legate of Upper Germany. He replaced a lax governor who, holding sway over his troops and those of the Lower Rhine, had ambitions of becoming emperor. Although Galba saved Gaius's principate, at least temporarily, he clearly overlooked the importance of placing able and trustworthy men at the head of the German legions. Above all, it was essential to avoid the appointment of German legates inclined to combine their efforts and armies in order to oust the emperor.[171] Galba's legates on the Rhine took exactly this course of action. Hordeonius Flaccus, the Upper German legate, proved to be a weak and indecisive commander[172] who was despised and eventually killed by his revolting troops. For his part,

[160] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.51; 53; IV.69. Among the Lower German reinforcements was surely the *ala Batavorum*: Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.17. For Vindex' defeat, see Dio LXIII.23-24. Dio maintains that Rufus and Vindex reached an agreement against Nero before Vindex took his own life after many of his men were slaughtered. Rufus' soldiers did not keep their end of the bargain.
[161] Eck 1985, 29
[162] Suetonius. *Galba*, 9
[163] Plutarch. *Life of Galba* 6; 10; Dio. LXIII.25; Pliny. *Epistulae* IX.19 (Verginius Rufus's epitaph: *Hic situs est Rufus, pulso qui Vindice quondam, / imperium asseruit non sibi sed patriae*); Tacitus, *Historiae* I.9; 53. For whether or not Rufus was offered the purple before or after his defeat of Vindex, see Griffin 181-182.
[164] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.7 writes that Valens and Aquinus acted *antequam iuberentur*, and that Galba did not punish them out of fear and self interest. Plutarch. *Galba* 15 maintains that Valens acted under Galba's orders. See Eck 1985, 130.
[165] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.58. Tacitus (I.52) describes Capito receiving bribes in order to distribute posts.
[166] Ibidem I.53
[167] Ibidem I.9; 52. Tacitus (I.9) writes that Vitellius' only virtue was being the son of a three-time consul. According to Suetonius (*Life of Vitellius* 7), Galba's appointment of the impecunious Vitellius was made out of spite for a potential rival.
[168] Eck 1985, 132-133
[169] Plutarch. *Galba* 10
[170] Ibidem
[171] See, for instance, Tacitus. *Historiae* I.51
[172] At least as portrayed by Tacitus. *Historiae* I.9; 56; IV.19; Plutarch. *Galba* 18; see Eck 1985, 32 with note no. 7

Vitellius, who was excessively generous with his men, took advantage of Flaccus's weakness and of the troops' resentment toward the strict Galba.[173] Vitellius thus gained the allegiance of the united German forces and marched on Rome, where he took power before being defeated and killed by Vespasian's forces.[174] Once the Batavian Revolt shook Roman power in the northwest to its very foundations, it fell to the founder of the Flavian dynasty and his generals to restore order along the Rhine frontier.

Conclusion

According to Luttwak's thesis, the Flavians first established linear frontiers along the empire's borders. However, in the case of Lower Germany, the line of forts and fortresses that already stretched from Remagen to Xanten and Burginatium was completed under Claudius, who checked Corbulo's efforts to establish permanent footholds beyond the Rhine, although some land beyond the river was kept in place for the army's use. The Claudian linear frontier also included a series of auxiliary fortresses west of Nijmegen that, built along the Oude Rijn, led up to the North Sea coast. The new, "close-spaced disposition of forts" along the Rhine's left bank, which reflected the emperor's decision to halt further expansion, required a new kind of deployment across the *limes*. Further elements were added to Lower Germany's security structure with the completion of the military road from *Batavodurum* to Koblenz and the foundation of the *classis Germanica*.

The linear frontier enabled a much more static Lower German army, whereas previous arrangements had required a mobile-field army composed of large concentrations of troops ready to campaign at a moment's notice. The troops were stationed in smaller bases, which are adequate both for policing and provisioning, so as to patrol regularly a "potentially hostile border region."[175] As Maxfield explains, once campaigns cease, "substantial battle groups" are no longer necessary. Instead, "the most effective way to control a linear frontier for bureaucratic purposes and against small-scale local threats is to spread the army out along it, concentrating on weak spots, on crossing points, on existing routeways, for example."[176]

Claudius's security measures had significant grand strategic effects. The occupation of the Dutch river area meant that the Batavians' territory, which had remained a semi-independent vassal state up to that point, was now under direct Roman control. This took place not long after the Batavians' main infantry force had been removed from their native land and sent to Britain. Hence, even if the Batavians were able to maintain some political independence and the freedom both to recruit their own troops and lead them in battle, the era of client states controlling their own territory independently came to an end. This took place in Lower Germany during Claudius's reign, not in the Flavian period as Luttwak suggests. Elsewhere, the time of the transition "varied from province to province."[177]

Another feature of Julio-Claudian frontier policy, clearly evident during the reigns of Claudius and Nero, were the punitive expeditions or preventive wars that were waged regularly against

[173] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.52-53
[174] Ibidem I.51-90; III.49-86
[175] Maxfield, 3; 20-21
[176] Ibidem, 3
[177] Ibidem

Germanic enemies beyond the Rhine frontier. These were limited campaigns; both Claudius and Nero followed their predecessors' post-Varian example of avoiding the dangers of prolonged German campaigns and the permanent occupation of German territory. Rather, the aim was to project Roman strength along the Rhine. This was particularly important at the outset of Claudius's reign since a secure Lower German frontier was a prerequisite for the invasion and conquest of Britain, a feat which Claudius finally achieved in 43 AD. The campaign was probably based on Gaius's plans. Aside from the strategic need to stop the Catuvellauni's advance in southern Britain, it served to afford the emperor military prestige. Thus, Claudius's grand strategy as seen in the northwest portion of the empire was very similar to that of Gaius.

The conquest and annexation of Britain, carried out by an invading force that included three Rhine legions and eight Batavian cohorts, led to the fundamental reorganization of both German armies. By the middle of Claudius's reign, seven legions, two of which were newly formed, guarded the Rhine; four were stationed in Lower Germany, three in Upper Germany. These legions played a central role in the struggle for the Principate that arose as Nero's regime began to crumble. Amid the chaos, the coherent frontier policy of the previous three decades was abandoned abruptly, not least due to the execution of two German legates. Soon, the Batavian Revolt would cause the collapse of the entire defenses on the Lower Rhine, this at the hands of one of Rome's closest allies since the time of Augustus.

The successful defense of the Lower German frontier under the Julio-Claudians allowed the region's economy to develop considerably, even if the Lower Rhine never became a particularly rich part of the empire. Even in the most fertile zone of loess soils, where *villae rusticae* did appear, land ownership on a grand scale was not the norm.[178] The appearance of the *villa* economy, however, did lead to surplus agricultural production for the first time in Lower Germany, even when the number of troops stationed on the Lower Rhine was halved.[179] Meanwhile, numerous other industries arose and expanded. Fishing, the production of *sarda* and *salsamentum*, and the exploitation of salt increased along the North Sea coast, although these activities are attested primarily in Gallia Belgica.[180]

Wood production increased along with construction. Stone, however, gradually replaced wood as Lower Germany's primary building material. The legions extracted stone from the quarries of the Brohl valley and the upper Mosel. It was then transported on the rivers. Lead was extracted in the ore deposits east of Aachen and in the northern Eifel, where the *fiscus* also administered mines as an imperial domain. Meanwhile, manufacturing began to play an increasingly important role in the Lower German economy, as the ceramics industry displayed a considerable degree of sophistication based on a division of labor, specialization, and mass production. Otherwise, Germania Inferior produced glass. Cologne was the main manufacturing center as well as processed metal and limestone, ships, wagons, casks, barrels, furniture, carpentry work, wooden tools and utensils, and leather as well as textile goods.[181]

[178] Bechert 2001, 15
[179] Wierschowski, 418
[180] Bechert 2001, 6
[181] Ibidem, 6-10

A sophisticated road network and the river transport system along the Rhine, the Meuse, and their tributaries facilitated the effective distribution of these products in both urban and rural markets. Due to the high costs of shipping goods by land, water transport was used far more for purposes of trade and even civilian mobility. The *classis Augusta Germanica* played a particularly important role. Fluvial and maritime trade also enabled commerce with Britain. This was based on the sale of salt, *salsamentum*, wine, and ceramic goods. The Roman monetary system allowed trade with goods and services, simplifying their purchase and sale with a reliable price mechanism.[182] Thus, Lower German cities, towns, and hamlets came to be linked commercially not only to each other, but also with Britain, especially through Cologne's commercial networks.[183] Trade also grew with the neighboring provinces of the empire's interior, especially Gallia Belgica, which produced much of the material needed to supply the ca. 40,000 men stationed on the Rhine.[184] This economic activity produced a class of wholesale merchants (*negotiatores*) who acted jointly in corporate bodies. Their commercial reach often surpassed Lower Germany's borders.[185]

Roman infrastructure projects and the greater security on the Rhine allowed Lower Germany's inhabitants a greater degree of mobility, both for civil and commercial reasons. Nonetheless, the Lower German economy did not become an export powerhouse within the empire; rather, the Lower Rhine and especially its northern sector remained a peripheral region both geographically and economically. As such, the area's traders were not generally involved in the original purchase of Mediterranean products nor in their transport. The evidence suggests that the Lower German merchants, who were dominantly Italians and Roman Gauls even if Gauls and recent Germanic settlers without citizenship also took part, acted merely as local distributors for the imported products found at Nijmegen and Xanten. Thus, they composed the last link of a chain of supply originating in the Mediterranean.[186]

[182] Ibidem, 10-11
[183] Wierschowski, 420 with note no. 32
[184] Bechert 2001, 34; for the figure (under Tiberius), *cf.* Alföldy 1968 a, 141
[185] Bechert 2001, 10
[186] Wierschowski, 415-418

V. The Batavian Revolt: Its Causes and Some Strategic Aspects

The Events

Since Caesar's time, Batavian warriors had distinguished themselves for their bravery in battle, their skill as horsemen, and their loyalty to the emperors. Among them were the soldiers of the eight Batavian cohorts that fought in Britain, units that were transferred to Mainz in 67 AD.[1] As usurpers struggled for the principate in January of 69 AD, the Rhine armies proclaimed Vitellius, the Lower German commander, as emperor. The Vitellian general Fabius Valens led these troops toward Rome along with the Batavian auxiliary units.[2] The Batavian troops fought in Gaul and Italy, but they brawled with legionary soldiers loyal to Vitellius,[3] who ordered them to return to Mainz *ne quid truculentius auderent*.[4] Vitellius, however, recalled the Batavians to Italy when he faced Vespasian's challenge for the principate.

The Batavian units disobeyed Vitellius after demanding a donative, a duplication of their pay, and an increased number of cavalrymen in their units.[5] They maintained their northward march toward their homeland, where Julius Civilis, a Batavian nobleman, had sparked a rebellion against Roman rule. Initially, the Batavian troops swore allegiance to Vespasian and dealt the remaining legions on the Rhine, nominally loyal to Vitellius, a series of defeats. Nonetheless, the Batavians maintained their hostility to Rome even after Vespasian's final victory over Vitellius. The chaos on the Rhine frontier, in which all legionary camps fell to the enemy, led to the creation of a short-lived Gallic empire in Trier, to which even two Roman legions declared their loyalty. The Batavian revolt ended only after Vespasian, once established as the new emperor, sent an expeditionary army to the northwest in 70 AD.

On the eve of the revolt, there were at least 5,000 Batavians serving in the Roman army, since 500 men apiece formed a part of the eight cohorts, the single cavalry unit (*ala Batavorum*) and the emperor's horse guard.[6] Their rebellion sundered a good portion of Roman territory on the north-west, continental frontier. This destroyed the sense of imperial unity that had persisted since the Augustan era. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the Batavian revolt, Tacitus's report of which is seen as "his military writing at its best."[7] This chapter discusses its causes and certain aspects of its events as they pertain to strategy.

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[1] Along with *legio XIV* Gemina. See Alföldy 1968 a, 46; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1731. These units, however, were not inMainz at the outset of the civil war, but rather in the land of the Lingones, for they had withdrawn from *legio XIV Gemina* amid dissension. See Tacitus. *Historiae* I.59

[2] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.64; II.27; Alföldy 1968 a, 46

[3] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.64; II.27

[4] Ibidem II.69; IV.15; Alföldy 1968 a, 46

[5] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.19. See Flaig 1995, 55-56

[6] Vossen, 418-420

[7] See Flaig 1995, 51-52 for the two main interpretations on the revolt. Brunt, Dyson, and others regard it as an ethnical movement with separatist aims. Walser argues against Tacitus (as does Urban) and portrays it as a struggle in favor of Vespasian. See also Sage. "Tacitus' Historical Works," in *ANRW* II 33.2 (1990). 933.

The Revolt's Causes

The revolt arose due to Rome's sudden breach of its old alliance with the Batavians, who, as Flaig argues, were not a subjected people, but rather enjoyed a particularly privileged partnership as *socii liberi*.[8] On the other hand, the early existence of a Batavian *civitas* would explain why the Romans long considered the Batavian heartland to be a part of the empire.[9] Whether by coincidence or not, the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty brought a change in the Romans' understanding of the Batavians' role in the imperial system. In 69 AD, Galba abruptly disbanded the Batavian horse guard, thus breaking one pillar of the Batavian-Roman alliance. Claiming that the *Germani* had backed Cnaius Dolabella's imperial bid, he sent the Batavians to Germany *sine commodo ullo*.[10] This was likely a means to save much-needed funds. In the end, Galba paid with his life for lacking an elite horse guard.[11] Strategically, the slight also would prove costly.

Vitellius counted with the Rhine legions' support in his own bid for empire. As he sought to strengthen his forces to the fullest, he ordered the conscription of Batavian soldiers into the army in 69 AD.[12] This uprooted another pillar of Rome's old agreement with the Batavians, namely the tribe's ability to recruit its own troops, which Batavian nobles then led independently.[13] The infringement was blatant. In Tacitus's view, the conscription inflamed the Batavians' indignation, for it was "a thing naturally vexatious… which the officials made yet even more burdensome by their rapacity and profligacy."[14] Previous strategic measures on the Rhine Delta facilitated Vitellius's forced levy. Under Claudius, the Romans had built a line of forts on the Dutch river area. Thus, Roman troops had stood in the immediate vicinity of Batavian territory after a long period of relative independence. The stone structures built in the *oppidum Batavorum* during the previous decades also reveal a bolstered Roman presence in the Batavian homeland.[15] A greater direct control over Batavian territory was tolerable, it seems, as long as Rome respected the main terms of the alliance.

Rome's abuses fueled the rage of Julius Civilis, a Batavian of royal stock who had long served in the Roman army—possibly as a commander in the emperor's horse guard— before being accused of treason.[16] Fonteius Capito, Nero's legate in Lower Germany after the execution of 67 AD, made a false charge of rebellion against Civilis and another royal scion, Iulius Paullus. The latter was executed, the former was sent to the emperor in chains.[17] Though acquitted by Galba, Civilis, who had a wife and children in Cologne, again stood in peril with Vitellius as emperor, when the army demanded his execution.[18] Nonetheless, Civilis survived, determined to exact retribution from Rome for his ill treatment.

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[8] Flaig 1995, 49; 53
[9] Roymans, 200-202; Tacitus. *Historiae* V.19; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.8
[10] Suetonius. *Galba* 12; Speidel 1994, 29
[11] Speidel 1994, 29-30; Suetonius. *Galba* XIX
[12] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.14
[13] Suetonius. *Vitellius* VIII; IX
[14] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.14.
[15] Van Enckevort, 365
[16] For Civilis' posible service in the imperial guard, *cf*. Bellen 1981, 98; Van Driel-Murray, 213. C*f*. also Hassall, 133-134. See also Hose, 300.
[17] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.13
[18] Ibidem, IV.61; 79; Van Driel-Murray, 213

At first, Civilis convinced the *primores gentis et promptissimos vulgi* to join his uprising.[19] The support of the weakened nobles would have been crucial.[20] As Flaig argues, only a local or regional upper class could organize and lead a rebellion against Rome, while aristocrats' willingness to do so depended on their degree of integration into the empire's power structures. A fully integrated nobility, perceived as supported from the outside, would have faced pressure from commoners who maintained most of their customs and traditions. In the Batavians' case, however, the tribe's leaders considered themselves Rome's partners under the privileges of an exceptional *societas*, not its provincial subjects. Although Roman citizens, they remained Batavians first and foremost. The cohorts refused to obey Vitellius and renounced their military service—an extraordinary step—because they considered the "ancient alliance" to have been broken. Its reestablishment under the original terms was a potent call to arms, especially if this was Vespasian's perceived offer.[21]

The prospects of immediate success would have provided additional persuasion. Surely, the Batavians were aware of a significant reduction to Rome's Lower German garrison during the course of the civil war. At the outset of 69 AD, Fabius Valens, the pro-Vitellian general, led an army of 40,000 men from the Lower Rhine to Italy[22] This force would have included soldiers from *legio V Alaudae* and the other three Lower German legions. There were also the 4,000 infantrymen of the Batavian cohorts previously stationed in Britain, which likely included troops from the Cananefates, plus the Batavians recently conscripted. Additionally, there were thousands of soldiers from other auxiliary units as well as new recruits.[23] Vitellius also "loaded with arms a crowd of idlers from the neighboring villages of the Nervii and the Germans."[24] Hence, the weakened Lower Rhine defenses provided Civilis with an extraordinary chance to deal the Romans a string of heavy defeats.

The Anti-Roman Coalition

Largely, Civilis's success was due to the broad coalition that he forged around his Batavian forces. Initially, he commanded the ninth Batavian cohort, which had remained stationed in the tribe's homeland.[25] The Batavian rowers of the *classis Germanica*, who at first feigned loyalty to Rome, joined the uprising early on. The Romans lost 24 ships, their entire Lower German fleet.[26] Similarly, the horsemen of the Batavian cavalry unit (*ala Batavorum*) led by Claudius Labeo, Civilis's internal rival, feigned allegiance before turning against Roman troops.[27] Brinno, leaderof the Cananefates, also joined the uprising. In fact, Brinno, whose family had opposed Roman rule since the time of Gaius's reign,[28] took part in a Batavian assembly and persuaded the tribal

[19] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.14; Van Soesbergen, 238
[20] Van Enckevort, 365. Cf. Haalebos and Willems 1999, 257
[21] Flaig 1995, 49; 53-54; 56-57; 59
[22] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.61
[23] Roymans, 207; contrast Alföldy 1968 a, 51; 94; 143. Badian, 28 ff. See also Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925). 1569; Stein andRitterling, 97 Tacitus. *Historiae* II.14; 97; III.15; IV.15
[24] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.15
[25] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.16; 19; 32; Alföldy 1968 a, 46
[26] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.16; van Soesbergen, 238
[27] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.18. Labeo, who remained loyal to Rome, was sent away from the main theatre of action into the land of the Frisii.
[28] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.14; 15; Stolte. "Cananefaten," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 330; For Civilis' dealings with the Cananefates while pretending toremain a Roman ally, see van Soesbergen, 239

leaders to rebel. Civilis, Roymans argues, used the Cananefates "as a lightning rod," a tactic that appears to confirm the latter's submission to the Batavians as clients.[29] Once the legions refused to support Vespasian's imperial bid, which Civilis at first claimed to espouse, the rebel leader was able to hurl "the whole Batavian nation into open war."[30]

Once the revolt was underway, the Frisii and a *cohors Tungrorum* joined what van Soesbergen calls "the small coalition" of rebel tribes.[31] Although Tacitus does not mention the Chauci among the enemy forces, they may have joined Civilis's war effort at the same time as the Frisii.[32] Likewise the Marsaci, who probably lived immediately south of the Cananefates and may have formed a part of the *Civitas Batavorum*.[33] Civilis then added to his coalition the forces of the Bructeri and Tencteri, Rome's traditional Germanic foes across the Rhine, who sought *praedam famamque*.[34] The Bructeri's seer, the famed Veleda, "had foretold the Germans' success and the legions' destruction," so that she soon stood at the height of her prestige, probably also among other Germanic tribes.[35]

The Tencteri, who lived across the Rhine from the Ubii, attacked the latter's territory.[36] Indeed, the Ubii, whom Civilis had commanded, attracted hatred due to their thorough integration into the Roman system and a perceived disregard for their German origin.[37] During the revolt, the rebels destroyed several *cohortes Ubiorum* at Merken (Marcodurum,) "where they operated carelessly, being far from the banks of the Rhine."[38] Other Roman allies suffered a similar fate. When Civilis's forces were besieging Xanten, they compelled the Cugerni, whose settlement in the area had already acquired an orderly, urban character, to join the rebellion.[39] Thus, the rebels were able to enlarge their coalition considerably so as to include the Bructeri, Tencteri, Chatti, Usipi, Mattiaci, and Cugerni.[40]

Among the closest Roman allies in northern Gaul were the Treveri, Celtic speakers who lived south of the Vinxtbach.[41] Civilis ordered their land to be plundered. The perpetrators were likely the Chatti, old enemies of Rome, as well as the Usipi and Mattiaci, the Treveri's neighbors.[42] The Treveri, who had built "a breastwork and a rampart across their territory," resisted fiercely.[43] Eventually, however, Civilis convinced Iulius Classicus, a scion of the Treveri royal family whom

[29] Roymans, 206-207 with note no. 452
[30] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.21; van Soesbergen, 242
[31] Van Soesbergen, 238; Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.15; 16
[32] Van Soesbergen, 242. Tacitus mentions the Chauci as loyal allies of Civilis during the later stages of the rebellion: *Historiae* IV.79; V.19.
[33] Van Soesbergen, 240-241
[34] Tacitus. *Historia* IV.21. See van Soesbergen, 243. Tacitus refers to the Tencteri as *equestris disciplinae arte praecellunt* in *Germania*, 32; Alföldy 1968 a, 159
[35] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.61. See van Soesbergen, 255
[36] Van Soesbergen, 242. Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.64. See also *Germania* 32; 33; Caesar. *De Bello Gallico* IV.1; 4; 16; Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.11.
[37] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.28. See also IV.63
[38] Ibidem IV.28; *Germania* 28. See van Soesbergen, 246
[39] For the *oppidum* Cugernorum, see Galsterer, 28; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.22.1. For the Cugerni within the rebel coalition, *cf*. Tacitus. *Historiae*. IV.26; van Soesbergen, 244; Pliny. *Naturalis Historia* IV.106
[40] Van Soesbergen, 242 refers to "the extension of the coalition up to the area of the Ubii."
[41] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.28; van Soesbergen, 246
[42] Van Soesbergen, 244; Tacitus, *Historiae* IV; 32; 37
[43] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.37. See van Soesbergen, 243

Tacitus describes as *nobilitate opibusque ante alios*, to wage war against the Romans.[44] Civilis also gained the allegiance of Iulius Tutor, a leader of the Treveri whom Vitellius had made *praefectus ripae Rheni*, as well as that of Iulius Sabinus, a commander of the Lingones who had been an ally of Rome.[45] These were great diplomatic and strategic victories. Once more, it was leading aristocrats who dented Rome's authority.

During the revolt, the Ubii suffered numerous reverses, but remained loyal to Rome even if some tribesmen took part in a conspiracy in Cologne.[46] Once the rebels conquered the entirety of the Lower Rhine, they spared Cologne from destruction, but they compelled the Ubii to swear allegiance to the new Gallic Empire and seal an alliance with Civilis's coalition.[47] The rebel leader's strength increased tremendously due to the size of Cologne's territory and its strategic importance.[48] With the Ubii's capitulation, Civilis exerted pressure on other neighboring tribes,[49] thus coercing the Sunuci, Tungri, Baetasii, and Nervii to join the rebel forces. Civilis then stood at "the zenith of his power."[50] Van Soesbergen explains that the rebel coalition's territory

> "extended east of the Rhine unto the river Main towards the south, the Mattiaci being the most southern tribe within Civilis's sphere of influence; the eastern border of his territory was formed by the Chauci in the north and the Chatti in the south, while west of the Rhine the Ubii, Sunuci, Tungri and Nervii were the most southern tribes within his territory. In the west his power reached unto the North Sea and the swamps of the Menapii and Morini. Though their territory belonged to the military district of Germania Superior, the Vangiones, Caeracates and Triboci were within the sphere of influence of the Treveri, which appears from the fact that Tutor raised levies from among them (Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.7.3)."[51]

Civilis's hegemony, however, lasted only until the arrival of the seven legions under the command of Gallus Annius and Petillius Cerialis, the generals whom Vespasian put in charge of recovering the Lower Rhine territories.[52] Clearly, breaking the exceptional Batavian alliance had unleashed unforeseen consequences for Rome's imperial structure far beyond the Rhine Delta. Once again, an emperor would have to rely on trustworthy, experienced commanders—the former had distinguished himself among Otho's generals, the latter had served in Britain during Boudicca's revolt— to restore order in Lower Germany.

The Collapse of the *Limes* on the Dutch River Area

Militarily, the revolt exposed the true state of the Lower Rhine's security structure. Civilis gained early momentum when his "small coalition" destroyed the Roman defenses in the Dutch river area, the Rhine delta, and the North Sea coast. Since the forts in or near the Batavian

[44] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.55
[45] Ibidem IV.55
[46] Ibidem. See van Soesbergen, 245
[47] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.59; 63; 65. See van Soesbergen, 245
[48] Van Soesbergen, 246; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.66: *Civilis societate Agrippinensium auctus*…
[49] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.66
[50] Van Soesbergen, 248; Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.66
[51] Van Soesbergen, 248-249
[52] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.68

homeland were not built to withstand large-scale attacks, they capitulated almost without resistance.[53] This was certainly the case of the winter quarters of two cohorts that Tacitus mentions— perhaps Velsen and Valkenburg— which the Cananefates and Frisii stormed, captured, and plundered. The prefects in charge had no choice but to set the forts on fire.[54] The paltry Roman forces withdrew eastward into the Over-Betuwe, *in superiorem insulae partem*, under the leadership of a *primipilaris*.[55] It was a bitter defeat for Rome; *trepidi nuntii* gave news of captured camps, destroyed cohorts, and "the expulsion of the Roman name from the Batavians' island."[56] Archaeological evidence confirms the destruction at this time of the Lower German forts at Valkenburg, Albaniana, Nigrum Pullum, Laurum, Vleuten-de-Meern, Traiectum and Fectio, perhaps also Mattilo and Levefanum. East of Nijmegen, Carvium was also destroyed. During this initial stage of hostilities, practically the entire defense system collapsed from the North Sea Coast up to the area bordering on Burginatium / Altkalkar in the Düsseldorf area.[57]

This breakdown points to a previous strategic mistake. Rome's military presence in the Batavian area was limited to auxiliary units, apparently of low quality, stationed in a row of vulnerable forts. No legion, however, complemented this line of defense at Nijmegen. The nearest legion, stationed at Xanten, stood at a considerable distance. It could not react promptly to trouble emerging near the coast, especially if occupied with other matters. The Batavians, moreover, were a force to be reckoned with, especially after decades of operating under Roman military discipline. Also, at a time of discontent in the Batavian homeland, it had been far from prudent to station the eight veteran *cohortes Batavorum* in Upper Germany. On the Rhine frontier between Xanten and Mainz, however, things took a different course.

The Rhine Frontier between Xanten and Mainz

Tacitus's account of how the revolt unfolded at Mainz, Bonn, Neuss, and Xanten is not altogether clear, but it is evident that this line of defense was better secured despite its weaknesses.[58] Initially, Xanten served as a point of retreat and safe-haven for the legionary soldiers who managed to escape the suddenly hostile Batavian cavalry amid the flight of the Ubii and Treveri allies.[59] In Mainz, the legionary fortress resisted the initial siege of the Chatti, Usipii, and Mattiaci.[60] Reinforcements from the northwest helped, namely those under Dillius Vocula, legate of the 18th legion, who led his own force and soldiers of the first and fourth legions from Neuss. This well-secured fortress, in fact, proved crucial for the relief both of Mainz and Xanten.[61] Vocula erected a base of operations northwest of Neuss at Gelduba, a civil settlement near the Baggersee in modern Krefeld. This was the border between Ubian territory and that of the Cugerni.[62] The site

[53] Van Soesbergen, 241 refers to the Romans' "indefensible castella."
[54] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.15
[55] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.15. See van Soesbergen, 241 for a discussion of the Marsaci's role in the revolt. For Aquilius, see Haalebos and Willems 1999, 247; 249.
[56] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.18
[57] See van Soesbergen, 242
[58] Tacitus (*Historiae* IV.23) does note that Augustus had believed that the defenses sufficed to maintain control over the military zones on the Rhine, and little had been done to strengthen Xanten's position since his time.
[59] See Alföldy 1968 a, 73-74; Tacitus. *Historiae*. IV.18; 28
[60] Ibidem IV.37
[61] Ibidem IV.37
[62] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.26; Reichmann, 480-481; Paar in *DNL* (1974), 135-136

offered a good spot to build a harbor as well as access to the Hellweg, an important east-west pathway east of the Rhine.[63]

Xanten itself came under siege and eventually a full blockade. The Batavians and their allies, however, struggled to capture the camp despite its relative proximity to their own territory.[64] This was due to their inability to conduct a proper siege. Despite their Roman training, they remained suited for "individual massed battles and not protracted campaigns."[65] Vocula also relieved Xanten with some success, marching from Neuss with a force of picked legionaries, including men from the sixteenth legion.[66]

One significant, early failure occurred at Bonn, where the Batavian cohorts that had defied Vitellius's orders to return to Italy attempted to cross the Rhine and join Civilis's troops. They clashed with Roman forces under unexpected circumstances: the Lower German defense system was designed to prevent external, barbarian attacks launched from beyond the Rhine. In this case, however, the onslaught came from the interior of Gaul and the enemy, although of Germanic origins, had been a fully integrated part of the Roman army for decades. In the event, the Batavian troops— along with the Cannanefates in their midst— routed "three thousand legionaries, some raw Belgian cohorts, and a mob of rustics and camp followers."[67] The insurgents managed to fight their way across the Rhine and attach themselves to the rest of Civilis's army, which gained much in strength. The fact that Bonn did not fall immediately after this defeat, however, points to the defense system's resilience. In fact, the rebels were fortunate to get across the Rhine. Civilis's army, Tacitus writes, avoided Cologne and "did not venture on any other hostile act during the remainder of their march."[68] Thus, they avoided the fortress at Neuss and the besieged camp at Xanten.

Civilis's forces also benefitted from the Romans' tactical mistakes. Hordeonius Flaccus, the Upper German legate, facilitated the Batavians' breakthrough across the Rhine at Bonn since he failed to approach from Xanten. He also ordered Herennius Gallus, the legate of the first legion stationed at Bonn, "not to threaten the departing foe."[69] Tacitus states that the rebels "might have been crushed if Hordeonius, moving from one side, and Gallus from the other, had enclosed them between their armies."[70] Such a joint maneuver would have changed the course of the war. This was precisely the way in which the Lower Rhine's system of defence was supposed to function. Vocula also failed to deliver killer blows to a weakened enemy. After he had disciplined new recruits at Gelduba,[71] he hesitated and allowed Civilis enough time to attack both Asciburgium, a

[63] Reichmann, 480-481
[64] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.36
[65] Goldworthy 1996, 51. "German armies were clumsy forces, incapable of subtle manoeuvre. Their logistical organization was rudimentary, which ensured that they were unable to stay together and operate for any length of time."
[66] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.24; 57. See Carbone, 298: "Tacitus' account of the march (the first relief of Castra Vetera) can be misleading if not carefully read…"
[67] Tacitus. *Historiae*. IV.19-20. See Stolte. "Cananefaten," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 330.
[68] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.20
[69] Ibidem IV.19
[70] Ibidem
[71] Ibidem IV.26

fort south of Xanten which held a Roman cavalry unit, and Gelduba itself.[72] The Romans were massacred due to their lack of battle experience and Vocula's failures of reconnaissance.[73]

However, Vascon infantry units recruited by Galba arrived as reinforcements. Although they killed the enemy's "very best troops," Vocula once again hesitated to deal a *coup de grâce*. He allowed the beleaguered enemy to flee and strengthened the camp's defenses "as if another siege were imminent."[74] Subsequently, when supplies were scarce at Neuss, Vocula ordered some of his men to lead the baggage train there from Gelduba. Since the troops marched as if during "a time of profound peace," Civilis was able to launch a deadly attack once more.[75] As a result, Vocula was forced to retreat to Neuss and surrender Gelduba to the enemy. After the Romans suffered another defeat in a cavalry battle near Neuss, the Lower Rhine legions mutinied. They murdered Hordeonius Flaccus and attempted to kill Vocula, who escaped dressed as a slave.[76]

Despite such setbacks, Vocula was able to regroup as the legionaries regretted their insubordination.[77] He attempted again to relieve the besieged fortress of Xanten. It was then, however, that Civilis's diplomatic efforts paid off fully. Both the Treveri under Tutor and the Lingones under Sabinus betrayed Vocula as he approached Xanten, separating their forces from the legions and forming "a camp of their own, with a separate line of entrenchment."[78] After the Treveri had joined the rebels, the entire Lower German line of defence collapsed.[79] The Gauls were encouraged among rumors that the Dacians and Sarmatians were invading Roman territory, and that Britain was seceding from the empire.[80] Vocula was slain at Neuss, which Classicus then laid to waste before announcing the foundation of the Gallic Empire.[81] From Civilis's perspective, this was to be a mere buffer state between his own realm and Roman territory.[82] In Mainz, Tutor executed the legionary tribunes, and thereafter took Cologne.[83] The troops under siege in Xanten finally surrendered to Civilis, who plundered the fortress.[84] All winter camps and legionary quarters on the Rhine except Mainz and Windisch were "pulled down and burnt."[85] The rebels won with diplomacy what they had failed to win with their own military force.

Strategic Aspects of Cerialis's Campaign

Cerialis's campaign was successful due to sound generalship, but also to Rome's strategic advantages. In the first place, the rebels failed to extend their power into Upper Germany. They controlled neither Vindonissa / Windisch nor the *Alpenvorland*, so they could not block the alpine passes. Hence, five legions— *II, VIII, XI, XIII*, and *XXI*— were able to march through the Pennine,

[72] Ibidem IV.33
[73] Ibidem IV.34
[74] Ibidem IV.33-35
[75] Ibidem IV.35
[76] Ibidem IV.36
[77] Ibidem IV.37
[78] Ibidem IV.57
[79] Ibidem IV.37
[80] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.54.1; Levick, 155
[81] Ibidem IV.59. See also IV.55. See van Soesbergen, 246
[82] Van Soesbergen, 246. See note no. 67; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.61. See also IV.17; 75
[83] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.59
[84] Ibidem IV.60
[85] Ibidem IV.61

Cottian, and Grecian Alps into Gaul.[86] The upstart Gallic Empire, in fact, had weak foundations and "no chance to become a real power," particularly after the loyal Sequani defeated Sabinus and the Lingones.[87] As two additional legions summoned from Spain, the sixth and first, marched through Gaul and toward the Rhine, mutinous Roman troops and rebel tribes—among them the Triboci, Vangiones, and Caeracates— declared their loyalty to Vespasian.[88] Before long, Cerialis captured the Colonia Treverorum, which he did not allow his troops to plunder.[89] Soon thereafter, the Romans gained a decisive victory near the Moselle. The Sunuci and Baetasii then exited Civilis's coalition, as did the Chatti, Usipi and Mattiaci. As the rebels' southern stronghold in Gaul collapsed,[90] the *transrhenani* Germans lost their hopes of plundering imperial lands.[91]

Marching from the southeast, troops from the Danube armies also entered the rebels' territory unopposed, as loyal auxiliary cohorts and the *equites singulares*, troops that Vitellius had raised, reached the Lower Rhine from Raetia.[92] In fact, a remarkably large auxiliary force, consisting of at least six *alae* and 18 cohorts,[93] played a crucial role in the campaign.[94] This is evident from the extraordinary command granted to senators Cn. Domitius Lucanus and Cn. Domitius Tullus, each of whom led troops against Civilis as *praefectus auxiliorum omnium adversus Germanos*.[95] When such large numbers of both legionary and auxiliary forces entered the fray, the rebels' chances of prolonged success diminished severely.

Another factor in the Romans' favor was political. According to Tacitus, the Ubii had been *per omne id bellum meliore usi fide quam fortuna*.[96] Though compelled to join the rebellion, the Ubii used a stratagem to destroy a cohort of Chauci and Frisii soldiers stationed in Tobiacum.[97] This facilitated the Romans' subsequent capture of Cologne, which forced Civilis to retreat to Xanten.[98] Thus, the Roman alliance with the Ubii, first established under Caesar and strengthened by Agrippa, was vindicated in a time of great peril.

Finally, the island province of Britain played a key role insofar as it served as a launching point for the fourteenth legion, which was sent against the rebels on the mainland. This amounted to an attack against the rear of Civilis's forces. Surprised, Civilis brought his war efforts to a standstill, for he feared that the fourteenth, "supported by the fleet from Britain, might do mischief to the

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[86] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.68
[87] Van Soesbergen, 250. For Tacitus (*Historiae* IV.67), this meant that *Fortuna melioribus adfuit.*
[88] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.68; 70. He writes of panic-stricken plebeians and fleeing rebel leaders.
[89] Ibidem IV.72
[90] Van Soesbergen, 250; 252 with note no. 94; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.77: *medius Mosellae pons*…
[91] Van Soesbergen, 251-252
[92] Ibidem IV.70
[93] *Alae* (*Afrorum, Moesica, Noricorum, Siliana, singularium, Sulpicia*); *cohortes*: (*II* und *VI Asturum, I classica, III Dalmatarum, I Flavia hispanorum, I Latobicorum et Varcianorum, I Lucensium, III Lusitanorum, I Raetorum, I, II, IV* und *VI Thracum, II Varcianorum, I* und *II Vasconum, I Vindelicorum, XV voluntariorum, I Pannonicorum et Delmatarum*), Alföldy 1968 a, 149
[94] Some of these troops were stationed in Neuss with *legio XVI*. Alföldy 1968 a, 101-102; 132;144; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.62; 70
[95] These siblings had served under Nero as tribunes of the fifth legion in Xanten and were raised to patrician status by Vespasian in 73 or 74 AD. Alföldy 1968 a, 131-132; *CIL* XI 5210; *IRT* 527; *CIL* XI 5211; *IRT* 528
[96] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.28
[97] Ibidem IV.79
[98] Ibidem V.14

Batavi along their line of the coast." While Civilis hesitated, the legion was able to land, but it did not attack the rebels' strongholds on the coast as expected. Rather the legion marched toward the territory of the Nervi and Tungri, who "were allowed to capitulate."[99] This marked a serious setback to Civilis in the south-west. The fourteenth then marched from Boulogne to Cologne, where Cerialis also arrived by forced marches.[100]

The War's End

Despite all their strategic advantages, Roman troops still suffered setbacks[101] as they fought in inhospitable territory amid Civilis's acts of sabotage.[102] At the definitive battle at Vetera, the Batavians' allies were reduced to the Cananefates, Cugerni, Frisii, Chauci, Bructeri, and Tencteri.[103] The Romans gained the upper hand despite conditions that were "more like a naval contest than a land battle," which suited the Batavians given their custom of fighting in rivers.[104] Thereafter, Civilis fled to his island homeland and abandoned the *oppidum Batavorum*, which was set to flames. The *oppidum*, after all, was not the seat of the Batavian aristocracy, but rather a town of merchants, craftsmen, Gallic immigrants, and people dependant on the Roman military.[105] Despite this loss, Civilis, the Bructeri, and Tencteri still launched attacks against Roman troops and fought an *acies navalis* on the Helinium.[106] The naval element had become critical as Cerialis sought to end the war before the onset of winter.

In fact, once Cerialis assembled a fleet of experienced crews, skilled pilots, and large vessels, Civilis was left hopeless of victory. He retired *trans Rhenum*, to the Frisii's land,[107] where it was impossible to continue the fight in full force.[108] Cerialis was able to reach the *insula Batavorum*, which he plundered and flooded.[109] These actions separated the Batavians from their remaining allies. The Marsaci probably capitulated at this point. The Bructeri and Tencteri also ceased their war efforts, likely due to Veleda's injunction.[110] Cerialis then received Civilis's surrender, probably according to the generous terms he had offered on a bridge over the Nabalia in September or October, 70 AD.[111] After the invasion of their country, Batavian noblemen and commoners

[99] Ibidem
[100] Van Soesbergen, 250-251 with note 92; Tacitus. *Historia* IV.79; V.I
[101] Tacitus, *Historiae* IV.79. The Cananefates "sunk or captured" the greater part of the Roman fleet and routed some pro-Roman Nervii. Classicus gained a cavalry victory near Neuss. In Tacitus' words: *famam victoriae nuper partae lacerabant.*
[102] Ibidem V.14-15. Before the battle of Vetera, Civilis threw "a dam obliquely across the Rhine, so that the stream, diverted by this obstacle, might overflow the adjacent country. There were "hidden perils from the varying depth of the fords," which made the terrain unfavourable to the heavily armed Roman troops.
[103] Ibidem V.18. For the Cugerni, see van Soesbergen, 252-254
[104] Ibidem V.18-19. Likewise, when Civilis fled to the *insula* Batavorum, Civilis hindered the Roman approach by demolishing the dike (*moles*) built by Drusus, thus sending "the river flowing down a steep channel on the side of Gaul."
[105] Galsterer, 30-31. He mentions the discovery in Wijchen of graves for rich Batavians, an indication of an upper class that is absent in Nijmegen.
[106] Van Soesbergen, 254; Tacitus. *Historiae* V.20-21; 23
[107] Tacitus. *Historiae* V.23; van Soesbergen, 254
[108] Van Soesbergen, 255. Tacitus. *Historiae* V. 24
[109] Tacitus. *Historiae* V.23
[110] Van Soesbergen, 251; 254-255. See Strobel 1987 a, 283-284
[111] Tacitus. *Historiae* V.23-26. For Cerialis's peace offer, see V.26.

began to question the wisdom of their armed struggle against Rome.[112] Capitulation was their only choice, presumably also for the Cananefates.[113] Notably, however, Cerialis released the loyal Gallic tribes from military service against the Batavians since "the legions were sufficient to sustain the empire."[114] This reflected a willingness to rely less on ethnic contingents.[115]

Cerialis strengthened the Gauls' loyalty and subsequently restored the balance of power along the Rhine.[116] Most Gallic tribes, it turned out, had as much to fear from a Germanic victory as the Romans themselves. The tension between Gauls and Germans, which once served as a justification for Caesar's campaigns beyond the Alps, had not dissipated. Yet the restoration of peace on the old Rhine frontier was not only in the interest of the Gauls, but also of the Germanic Ubii, who once again benefitted from Roman rule on the Lower Rhine.

Conclusion

The history of Julio-Claudian rule in Lower Germany determined the course of the Batavian revolt. The relative ease with which the Batavians and their allies took control over the river area, the Rhine delta, and the North Sea coast reflects earlier Roman policy. Mostly, Rome ruled these zones indirectly until the reign of Claudius, who occupied them, but only lightly and without the presence of a legion. On the other hand, the Romans, despite significant disadvantages, were able to hold on to the Lower German territory that they had controlled directly since Augustan-Tiberian times, namely the area to the east and south of Xanten. This was significant since dangerous Germanic foes such as the Chatti joined the rebellion and proceeded to besiege Mainz, but failed in their early endeavors. Despite the Romans' tactical mistakes, it was mainly Civilis's diplomatic victory in persuading the Treveri to join his coalition that caused the Xanten-Mainz portion of the frontier to fall. The frontier was not designed to withstand an attack from the interior of Gaul. The same dynamic, however, facilitated the Roman reconquest.

The Romans' ultimate success against Civilis's coalition was due to the elasticity of the empire-wide military system. Despite the defeat of several legions and the breakdown of the entire Lower German *limes*, Vespasian was able to spare eight legions—including one that landed on the North Sea coast from Britain— in order to restore peace along the Rhine. No coalition of rebel tribes, no matter how formidable and versed in Roman warfare, could hope to defeat such a force. As a general rule, legions stationed in the empire's interior or in peaceful border areas would move to suppress grave threats to imperial unity. Britain's garrison, for instance, which stood "on the very edge of the known world," could be spared if an emergency arose elsewhere. Its security "had a low claim… in imperial affairs."[117] Naturally, an emperor could transfer legions to troubled areas, an option of last resort, as long as multiple rebellions did not break out simultaneously across the empire.

[112] Tacitus. *Historiae* V.25
[113] Van Soesbergen, 255
[114] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.71
[115] See Alföldy 1968 a, 149
[116] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.71
[117] Maxfield, 4

After the Batavian war, Vespasian likely did not reinstate the Batavi as his personal horse guards. The literary sources—namely Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio— do not mention a horse guard for the Flavian period, nor does the epigraphical record from gravestones. What Speidel calls the "argument from silence" tends to confirm the theory that the *Germani corporis custodies* were disbanded from 69 to 98 AD.[118] Moreover, the Flavians restored the *limes* on the Rhine delta and the river area. They rebuilt the destroyed forts, maintained those erected during the war, and built new ones, most of which remained occupied permanently. Batavian troops, however, were not disbanded, but rather fought for Rome outside of Lower Germany under the Flavians. Meanwhile, the Romans accelerated the Batavians' integration into the municipal system.[119]

From the Batavians' perspective, the revolt's repercussions were not as drastic as they could have been. Tacitus's language in the *Germania* (29.1) and the *Histories* (V.25.2) suggests that the old treaty relations between Romans and Batavians were largely restored. Civilis would have preserved elements of the tribe's *Sonderstellung* due to his previous friendship with Vespasian and his initial support for the Flavians in the Civil War. Thus, the Batavian cohorts would have rejoined the Roman army as elite units. Under the dictates of the old alliance, they were still recruited locally and commanded by native prefects, not tribunes, until the third century.[120]

Nonetheless, changes were made to the structure of the Batavian cohorts: the nine *cohortes quingenariae equitatae* were turned into four *cohortes milliariae (equitatae)*, which are known as I, II, III and IX, the latter digit being used instead of IV due to the ninth Batavian cohort's proud tradition of service. Each of these milliary units was likely assigned to one of the four British legions as an auxiliary unit.[121] Meanwhile only *cohors I Batavorum equitata* remained unchanged.[122] Cerialis proceeded to send the Batavian cohorts back to Britain, where they had been stationed before the Civil War, together with *legio II Adiutrix*. These troops arrived in the island province either immediately after the war or in the spring of 71 AD at the latest. The two Batavian *alae* attested before 69 AD, meanwhile, were turned into a single unit, the *ala Batavorum*, which probably also included elements of Civilis's horse guard.[123] Surprisingly, this unit is attested in Batavian territory at the end of the first century AD.[124] Altogether, the Batavian units that served after the Batavian revolt were composed of some 5,500 men including 2,000 cavalrymen. Clearly, the Romans continued to make full use of the Batavians' reserve.[125]

The recruitment of Batavian auxiliaries, however, would not have been easy. Many tribesmen born as Roman citizens chose to serve in the legions rather than in the *alae* and cohorts. Nonetheless, these remained manned mostly by Batavians until at least the beginning of the second century

[118] Speidel 1994, 30. "Vitellius had inflated the number of praetorian cohorts which Vespasian had then cut… from 16 to 9." Still "for personal protection and pomp he, like all emperors, needed horse guardsmen."
[119] See Hassall, 135 for Batavian cohorts under Agricola in Britain. For the Batavians' integration, see Roymans, 208
[120] Strobel 1987 a, 283-284; 286; 291. Tacitus. *Historiae* V.26. Urban 90-97 argues that the Batavians no longer enjoyed privileges and that their cohorts continued to exist in name only. *Cf.* Wierschowski, 419; Will, 15 ff.
[121] Strobel 1987 a, 285-286. He points out that the legions would be able to check the Batavians' armed might.
[122] Van Driel-Murray, 212; Galsterer, 31; Strobel 1987 a, 285; *CIL* XVI 69, 70, 82
[123] Strobel 1987 a, 285-286
[124] Haalebos 2000, 32 ff.; van Driel-Murray, 213. For a different view, *cf.* Wierschowski, 419 with note no. 28
[125] Strobel 1987 a, 286

AD.[126] Given that the tribe's former clients—the Cananefates, Frisiavones and Marsaci— began to provide troops independently, the continued Batavian recruitment into the auxiliary units can be seen as a clear punitive measure.[127]

A political consequence of the Batavians' defeat was the hereditary *stirps regia*'s political downfall.[128] After the revolt, the *stirps regia* no longer enjoyed kingly status, even if its members remained the tribes' most powerful political leaders due to, *inter alia*, their personal contacts with Rome.[129] Such methods of dealing with wayward royal clients were not limited to the Lower Rhine. In Judaea, Claudius brought Jerusalem under Roman control after the death of Herodes the Great's heir, Herod Agrippa I, who had attempted to fortify Jerusalem and to summon a meeting of potentates. As Baltrusch mentions, such initiatives transcended the boundaries of client kingship.[130] In 66 AD, Herod Agrippa II's failure to prevent the great Jewish uprising further paved the way for Trajan to annex Judaea to the Roman province of Syria in 100 AD, thus bringing the Herodian dynasty to an end.[131] Despite the disorderly appearance of an *imperium* consisting of a multitude of client kingdoms as decentralized substructures,[132] clients who failed to follow a clear set of rules or to uphold order soon would come under the far less ambiguous order of direct Roman rule. This policy was applied—strategically— across the empire.

In place of the abolished Batavian kingship, there came into being an annually elected magistrature, an institution that points to the earlier creation of a peregrine *civitas* in Batavian territory governed by a few Roman citizens under the emperor's patronage.[133] The magistrature, along with a law code and public priesthoods, was an essential part of municipalization according to the Roman model of civic government.[134] The Batavians' elected official was called *summus magistratus*, as is known from an inscription from the first half of the first century AD which, incidentally, proves that Batavian leaders consciously endorsed the Roman *civitas* system of administration.[135] Nevertheless, magistrates in Roman *civitates* usually exerted their duties according to "the principle of collegiality," so that the single post of *summus magistratus* among the Batavians deviates from the norm.[136] Roymans interprets the office of *summus magistratus* as "a Latinisation of an indigenous office within the context of a *civitas* structure that had not yet been fully municipalised."[137] He further suggests that the post was deliberately created by the *stirps regia* since they could more easily control the election of an individual than that of "a collegiate

[126] Roymans, 257
[127] Van Driel-Murray, 212. "…it is perhaps significant that in the second century Cananefates, Frisiavones and Marsaci form a greater proportion of the Imperial Guard, as recorded by surviving memorials than do the Batavians and this despite the smaller population of their swampy marginal homelands." *Cf.* Speidel 1994
[128] Ibidem
[129] Ibidem; Roymans, 61-62; 251; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.13; 32. For Julius Civilis' nephews, see V.20: Verax; II.22; IV.70: Julius Briganticus; IV.33: Claudius Victor
[130] Baltrusch 2012, 343-344
[131] Ibidem
[132] Ibidem, 94
[133] Roymans, 63; 65; For a definition of *civitas*, *cf*. 195 with note no. 396. Dondin-Payre 1999. 132 ff.
[134] Roymans, 63; 195
[135] *CIL* XIII 8771; *AE* 1994, no. 1281; Roymans, 64
[136] Roymans, 64; 201: "Recent epigraphic research reveals that a monocratic magistrature is not necessarily inconsistent with a Roman-style *civitas* structure… Rome… allowed ample scope- certainly in the peregrine civitates- for local interpretations and appropriations of that system."
[137] Ibidem, 64

body of magistrates."[138] This would explain the fact that Flavus, the *summus magistratus* mentioned on the aforementioned inscription, was a *peregrinus* "of secondary rank" and most likely a *cliens* of the royal family.[139]

It is clear that the Roman authorities held the old ruling class responsible for the troubles and took steps to replace it. Possibly, the Romans forced large landowners and merchants to pay reparations. They also may have imposed upon them economic sanctions of some type.[140] The old elite's subsequent lack of capital for investment would have aggravated the economic stagnation in the north of Lower Germany, where the war had destroyed the Roman-built infrastructure, which had allowed commerce to develop.[141]

From the Batavian revolt's end until the second century, a new Batavian elite was in place.[142] The new ruling class was a meritocracy composed of former auxiliaries who had become citizens upon discharge, thus being able to bequeath citizenship to their sons and advance their careers both in the military and in the *civitas* administration.[143] Such changes suggest that, contrary to Tacitus's portrayal of the revolt as a movement of national independence, the Roman authorities considered that the war had been caused by the discontent of a few powerful individuals.[144] Apparently, the new Batavian elite was granted the same benefits as the old, namely the exemption from direct taxation in exchange for the constant supply of recruits for the army.[145] Nonetheless, direct military control over Nijmegen brought a greater degree of political domination over the Batavians.

Also, the Romans replaced the *oppidum Batavorum*, the tribe's main settlement until the time of the revolt, with a new population center at Batavodurum in the west of Nijmegen, around which the initial Batavian migration had been concentrated.[146] The new center acquired the character of a chief city to a greater extent than the old, as is evident from the presence of craftsmen's businesses along the settlement's southern periphery.[147] Even so, the Batavian homeland during the Flavian period was chiefly a territory under direct military administration. How the relations between the military authorities—namely the legionary command— and those of the *civitas Batavorum* were carried out remains unclear.[148]

[138] Ibidem
[139] Ibidem
[140] Van Driel-Murray, 213; Wierschowski, 419-420
[141] Wierschowski, 419-420
[142] Roymans, 257
[143] Van Driel-Murray, 212; Roymans, 257. "Flavius Cerialis, commander of the Batavian cohort stationed at Vindolanda, may be a typical example."
[144] Van Driel-Murray, 213
[145] Van Enckevort, 373
[146] Ibidem
[147] Ibidem
[148] Haalebos 2001, 477

VI. The Flavian Period

The Aftermath of the Batavian Revolt

Once Vespasian had consolidated his position as *princeps*, he faced considerable challenges in upholding the empire's security, among them the task of re-establishing control over the Rhine and disciplining the German armies. The new emperor, however, knew the Rhine frontier well. During his early career, he had commanded *legio II Augusta* in Strasbourg (Argentorate) on account of his influential friends. Parts of the second legion took part in Claudius's early campaigns against the Chauci and Chatti.[1] Josephus writes that Vespasian "restored peace to the west when the Germans were disturbing it." Silius Italicus reports that Vespasian checked the flow of the Rhine by means of banks (*compescet ripis Rhenum*), Levick argues that the legate, arriving after the campaigns in 42 AD, either stopped the Rhine from flooding or "strengthened fortifications that kept down rebellious Rhine tribes."[2]

As emperor, Vespasian took the immediate measure of disbanding four legions involved in the Batavian revolt: *I Germanica, IV Macedonica, XV Primigenia,* and *XVI Gallica*. Thus, he left 29 legions in total, one more than had been the case before the "emergency recruitments" of the civil war.[3] Vespasian also established direct control over the homeland of the Batavians, who remained "reviled" during the entire Flavian period. Additionally, he ordered the reconstruction of the Lower German *limes* after its destruction in the revolt.[4] Practically every auxiliary and legionary fort was rebuilt and occupied, while new forts were also constructed. In order to complete these tasks, also to prevent the possibility of a new rebellion, Vespasian ensured that the commanders of the Lower and Upper German armies were able, experienced, and trustworthy.[5]

Soon after his victory over Civilis and the Batavians, Petilius Cerialis went to Britannia and took over the post of governor, possibly in early 71 AD.[6] Cerialis had served already in the island province as legate of the ninth legion in the early 60's. He was now sent to campaign against the Brigantes.[7] He was replaced as commander of the Lower German army by A. Marius Celsus, a former legate of *legio XV Apollinaris* who had fought under Galba and then under Otho during the civil war. In 69 AD, he was made suffect consul by Vitellius. According to Eck, Celsus likely ended the Batavians' resistance since a victory monument near Xanten was dedicated to him during his governorship.[8] L. Acilius Strabo, if identical with the consul for 71 AD, may have succeeded Celsus. The next governor of Lower Germany who is attested with certainty is Rutilius Gallicus, who was in charge of Germania Inferior from around 76 to 78 AD. The son of a senator, Gallicus had been legate of *legio XV Apollinaris* in Pannonia under Claudius and thereafter praetor, legate of Galatia, consul around 71 AD ,and *legatus Augusti pro praetore* in Africa. He was

[1] Levick, 152; 15
[2] Ibidem, 16; Josephus. *Jewish War* III.4; Silius Italicus. III.599; Statius. *Silvaeid* I.4.89; Eutropius VII.19
[3] Levick, 152 with note no. 2
[4] Speidel 1994, 39 with note no. 45; Juvenal VIII.51
[5] Levick, 155
[6] Eck 1985, 135
[7] Levick, 158 with note no. 18
[8] Eck 1985, 137-138; *AE* 1979, 413

replaced in Lower Germany by D. Iunius Novius Priscus, a man from a senatorial family who had been *consul ordinarius* in 78 AD.[9] He apparently took up the post in 79 AD; he is attested on a military diploma of the following year.[10] The main task of these men was to reconstruct the *limes*, reorganize the Lower German army, and prevent another rebellion on the Rhine.

The Occupation of Nijmegen

Very few of the troops stationed in Lower and Upper Germany remained in the same forts or fortresses which they had manned prior to the war.[11] Vespasian also stationed a legion permanently in Nijmegen, where a new camp was built on the Hunerberg, the site of the old Augustan fortress. This was the emperor's most important decision concerning Lower Germany. The new camp replaced the one on the Kops Plateau, which was abandoned in 70 AD. The new fortress, 17 hectares in size, was built with roof tiles from Xanten and Neuss given the scarcity of building material in north-western Lower Germany.[12] At first, *legio II Adiutrix*—previously stationed at Harenatium— occupied the fortress. Around 71 AD, this legion was sent to Britain, being replaced at Nijmegen by *legio X Gemina*, which had arrived on the Rhine from Spain in the late stages of the Batavian revolt. Its soldiers were mostly Spaniards, northern Italians, and Gauls.[13] New recruits for the Rhine legions after the Batavian Revolt, however, came primarily "from north of the Alps, including the Rhineland itself; and it was there that the veterans were settling."[14]

In part, *X Gemina* was responsible for the reconstruction of Lower Germany after the war; some of its cohorts were active in stone quarries and building projects across Germania Inferior.[15] Primarily, however, the legion stationed at Nijmegen exerted direct control over the Batavian homeland and thus prevented another uprising. It also supported the auxiliary troops that garrisoned the rebuilt forts on the Dutch river area and the Rhine delta in case of renewed hostilities emanating from beyond the frontier.[16] Clearly, Vespasian did not intend to run the risk of leaving Nijmegen and the territory to the west up to the North Sea coast only partially occupied, even if the Batavians were still referred to as *socii* and *liberi*.[17] The lesson had been learned and, as Juvenal implied, the Roman eagles now had to guard the Batavians, the emperors' former guards.[18]

The legion's presence in Nijmegen stimulated the local economy. In the fortress's immediate vicinity, there arose a *canaba* with businesses, workshops, hostels, and brothels.[19] It was not only the five to six thousand legionary soldiers stationed at Nijmegen who maintained a constant demand for foodstuffs, goods, and services, but also the approximately 4,000 auxiliary personnel,

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[9] Eck 1985, 139-140; 144-145; 146-147
[10] *CIL* XVI 158; Eck 1985, 146
[11] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 21
[12] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65: 67-68; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 78; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1440;Tacitus. *Historiae* V.20
[13] *Legio II*: Tacitus. *Historiae* V. 19-20; van der Vin, 397-398; Van Enckevort, 373; Haalebos 2001, 465; Levick, 158; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 76-78; Alföldy 1968 a, 163. *X Gemina*: Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995),68; Bechert 2007, 40. For the legion's arrival, see Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1681
[14] Levick, 153-154 with note no. 5
[15] Haalebos 2001, 465
[16] Dietz. "Batavi" in *DNP* 2 (1997), 491-492; Alföldy 1968 a, 158
[17] Wierschowski, 419; Haalebos 2001, 465
[18] Juvenal VIII.51 "…*domiti Batavi…custodes aguilas*…" Speidel 1994, 30
[19] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65

relatives, veterans, and mostly non-native civilian merchants and craftsmen. Hailing from Italy, Spain, and Gaul, they sensed economic opportunity and came to inhabit makeshift shelters around the military camp and the harbor settlement along the Waal. They paid taxes in either supplies or services.[20] Soldiers and civilians, who otherwise lived in two wholly different spheres, mostly came into contact with each other in this type of settlement and in the region's cities.[21]

The Flavian settlement at Nijmegen, which counted with around 10,000 or more inhabitants, was small by imperial standards. Nonetheless, it was the largest in the area of modern-day Holland. To cover the troops' consumer needs, local production had to supply foodstuffs for the soldiers and their dependents. Demand for products from the Mediterranean and other regions, however, also reached massive levels despite the scarce consumption of imported goods by locals. As with any subsidized economy, funds were transferred from outside; tax revenue from the Gallic provinces that continued to finance the Lower German soldiers' pay. For the Batavians, meanwhile, military service still provided the main source of income. Their involvement in regional trade and agriculture, which came to be dominated by army veterans, was apparently negligible.[22]

The Rhine Legions under Vespasian

Vespasian stationed a second legion on the Lower Rhine, *XXII Primigenia*. Raised under Gaius, the legion had stood in the double legionary fortress at Mainz in Upper Germany since around 40 or 41 AD. After Nero's death, *XXII Primigenia* fought for Vitellius against Galba in the civil war, and then against Vespasian. After its defeat at Cremona, it was sent to Pannonia. In 71 AD at the latest, however, the legion was transferred to the new fortress at Xanten. It likely filled the gap in the Lower Rhine's defenses left by *legio II Adiutrix*' transfer to Britain.[23] Since the legionary fortress on the Fürstenberg had been destroyed during a siege in 70 AD, it fell to *II Adiutrix* to build a new one.[24] Instead of using the old site, however, the Romans constructed a new fort for a single legion at Xanten / Birten (Vetera II) around 1.5 kilometers east of the old fortress, in the vicinity of the Bislicher Insel.[25] This new fortress stood until the late third century AD.[26]

Also present in Lower Germany during Vespasian's reign was *legio VI victrix*. Previously, the legion had been stationed in Spain. It arrived to the Rhine area along with *legio I Adiutrix* in 70 AD to fight against the Batavians.[27] After the revolt, *VI victrix* went to Neuss, where it replaced the disbanded *XVI Gallica* and rebuilt the fortress burnt down during the rebellion.[28] Meanwhile, Vespasian stationed another legion, *XXI Rapax*, in Lower Germany. From about 10 AD to 41 or

[20] Haalebos 2001, 464; 466-467; 469; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15
[21] Grünewald and Schalles, 569
[22] Haalebos 2001, 466; 469; 476-477
[23] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1798-1800; 1802; *CIL* XIII 6975
[24] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50; Schönberger 1969, 152; von Petrikovits 1960, 54 ff.
[25] Bechert 2007, 39; Schönberger 1969, 154; See also Gechter in *DNL* (1974), 108; Ptolemy. *Geographia*, II, IX, VIII; *Tabula Peutingeriana*, Segm. II.5 (Veteribus); *Itinerarium Antonini*, 255.5 (Veteris); 370.3 (Veteribus)
[26] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50
[27] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1599; Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.68: "*sexta et prima ex Hispania accitae*." For the legion´s participation in the Battle of Vetera, see Tacitus. *Historiae* V. 16. "*...principem Galbam sextae legionis auctoritatefactum*." G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 151; Rüger 2000, 497; Gechter 1979, 100
[28] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 43; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1602-1603; Tacitus. *Historiae* V.22; *CIL* XIII 8550; 8551; Rüger 2000, 497; Gechter 1979, 100; G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 140; Schönberger 1969, 152; von Petrikovits 1960, 54 ff.

44 AD, the twenty-first had stood at Xanten, but had gone to Windisch under Claudius.[29] In 69 AD, the legion fought for Vitellius and, after his defeat, was sent again to Windisch. It proceeded to the Lower Rhine to play a prominent role in the war against the Batavian rebels.[30] In 70 / 71 AD, *XXI Rapax* arrived in Bonn, where the disbanded *I Germanica* had previously stood, and rebuilt the fortress completely. The task was completed in about a decade.[31] Thus, four legions—*X Gemina* at Nijmegen, *XXII Primigenia* at Xanten, *VI victrix* at Neuss, and *XXI Rapax* at Bonn—were stationed in Lower Germany at the outset of Vespasian's reign. They were to remain in place until Domitian's accession.

An Influx of Auxiliary Troops

Vespasian's strengthened Lower Germany's legionary garrison with auxiliary reinforcements. Under Tiberius, the Lower German army had counted with around 8 *alae* and 30 cohorts, a number that was reduced in the ensuing decades.[32] In the Claudian-Neronian period, there were eleven or twelve auxiliary infantry cohorts stationed on the Lower Rhine. This number was increased considerably during or shortly after the Batavian Revolt of 70 AD, when several cohorts arrived in Lower Germany from other regions, including Upper Germany, Britain, Gaul, Pannonia, Africa, and Spain. Additionally, under Vespasian, new auxiliary units raised in Lower Germany and Britain were stationed on the Lower Rhine.[33] Thus, the early Flavian military diplomas attest at least 17 cohorts in Lower Germany, although there may well have been several other infantry units of auxiliaries, for a total of around 20 stationed in Lower Germany.[34] In terms of *alae*, Vespasian maintained six or seven auxiliary cavalry units in Lower Germany, as is evident from a military diploma issued in 78 AD found at Wiesbaden.[35] Concerning the Batavian units, Tacitus (*Historiae* IV.12.3) implies that, after the revolt, native leaders no longer commanded the Batavian auxiliaries. However, the presence in Vindolanda of Flavius Cerialis, a Batavian cohort commander, proves that this was not necessarily the case.[36]

The Construction of New Forts

The legion stationed in Nijmegen was reinforced by a number of auxiliary units that occupied the forts rebuilt on the Rhine delta. Cohorts are attested soon after the Batavian war at Valkenburg,

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[29] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1781-1783. It built a garrison at Vindonissa: *CIL* XIII 5200; 5201. Tacitus.*Annales* I.31; 37; 45; 51; 64; III.41. *Vexillationes* in Gaul in 21 AD: *CIL* XIV 3602

[30] Tacitus. *Historiae* I.61; IV.70; 78; V.16; Ritterling, *Legio* 1785-1786

[31] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 31; *CIL* XIII 8064; Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 198; Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225.
Tacitus. *Historiae* V. 22; *CIL* 8046; Alföldy 1965 b, 177-181; Bechert 1982, 67; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1786; Schönberger 1969, 152; von Petrikovits 1960, 54 ff.

[32] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 23

[33] Alföldy 1968 a, 142

[34] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 258. "(There appear) 20 units (on) the diploma recently found in Glava (Bulgaria)." See Eck and Paunov, 335 ff.

[35] *CIL* XVI 23 (78 AD) lists six Lower German *alae*: *Noricorum, Singularium, Moesica, Afrorum veterana, Siliana* and *Sulpicia*. *Ala I Batavorum*, likely formed immediately after the Batavian revolt, may have been present under Vespasian, but first appears on the Elst diploma of 98 AD (Haalebos 2000, 42). Since it is absent from the Wiesbaden diploma (78 AD), it could have left Lower Germany early on under Vespasian. This interpretation is particularly plausible if one takes into account the number of cavalry forts available on the Lower Rhine.

[36] Levick, 154; Bowman and Thomas, 218; 154; Brunt, 33 ff.; A.R. Birley 1991, 95 ff.

Mattilo (Leiden-Roomburg), Albaniana, Nigrum Pullum, Laurum, Vleuten-De-Meern, Traiectum, Fectio, and Levefanum.[37] East of Levefanum, at least three new auxiliary forts were built on the Neder-Rijn. Mannaricium was constructed in Maurik around 70 AD on the southern bank of a bend of the Rhine. It was likely occupied by two cohorts at the same time.[38] Mannaricium and Levefanum were the last occupied forts before a swampland that, in Roman times, was inaccessible.[39] East of Mannaricium and west of Driel, the Romans built the fort Carvo in modern Kesteren on the Nedereindsestraat after 70 AD. It served either as an auxiliary fort or as a *beneficiarii* station until the third century.[40] The fort, possibly located on the southern bank of a bight of the Rhine, would have guarded the point where the Utrechste Heuvelrug meets the river.[41] Since the distance between Driel and Kesteren / Carvo is unusually long, a fort might have been built between these two places at Randwijk, a site that offered access both to a path leading southward and to the moraines of the southern Veluwe.[42] The fort at Huissen was also built around 70 AD on this portion of the frontier, namely on the left bank of the Rhine in Over-Betuwe northeast of Nijmegen.[43]

On the portion of the frontier stretching from Nijmegen to Xanten, a new fort, Carvium, was built after 70 AD in Over-Betuwe, east of the Waal-Rhine tributary.[44] It was occupied by a cohort. Southeast of Carvium, Harenatium was used as an auxiliary fort although it is not certain whether this was already the case under the Flavians.[45] Southeast of Harenatium, the fort Burginatium was manned by an *ala*.[46] The portion of the frontier stretching from Xanten to Remagen was also rebuilt while a few new forts were added. Although this area corresponds roughly to the territory of the loyal Ubii, an increased number of troops allowed the Romans to exert a greater degree of direct control over the local population.[47]

Between Xanten and Neuss, a wooden fort was built between 71 and 75 AD in Gelduba (Krefeld-Gellep). It stood to the right side of an older military road, at a site that, according to Pliny, was *Rheno impositum*.[48] It was here that, according to Tacitus, Vocula had established his base of operations during the Batavian war in order to raise the siege of Xanten.[49] Presumably, the Flavian fort was fit for a cavalry unit.[50] Gelduba, in fact, was one of the few Roman military strongpoints on the Rhine that was built where a civilian settlement— founded after the German campaigns of Augustus and Tiberius for commercial rather than military reasons— had already existed. It was

[37] For Nigrum Pullum and Laur(i)um, the units are unknown: Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 52-53. The reconstruction of the fortat Albaniana is presumed.
[38] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 68, *Itin. Anton*. 369, 3: Mannaricio (Mannaritio)
[39] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77
[40] Ibidem; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 70; Tab. Peut. II 3/4
[41] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77
[42] Ibidem, 78-79
[43] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 73
[44] Ibidem, 90; *AE* 1939, 107, 130. According to Bogaers, there may have been a Roman military settlement there prior to the Batavian war.
[45] *Itinerarium Antonini*. 256, 3; B. Follman in *DNL* (1974), 93; *CIL* XIII 8702; 8703
[46] Wegner in *DNL* (1974), 101-102
[47] Alföldy 1968 a, 158
[48] Pliny. *NH* XIX 90; Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 44
[49] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.26; Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 45; Paar in *DNL* (1974), 135-136
[50] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 45 mention *ala Sulpicia c(ivium) R(omanorum)*, which was replaced under Domitian by *cohors II Varcianorum equitata.* Compare I. Paar in *DNL* (1974), 135-136

the northernmost Ubian settlement before one reached the territory of the Cugerni. The fort, which was likely linked to a river harbor that was in use until the early medieval period, was situated quite close to the Hellweg, which was already an important trade route in the Roman period. Thus, Gelduba became a terminal for goods produced in Germany and a commercial center for trade between the Rhine and the German interior. Nearby Duisburg would play a similar role in the Middle Ages. The Roman fort at Gelduba remained garrisoned until the third century AD.[51]

On the same portion of the frontier, an *ala* was stationed in Moers-Asberg (Asciburgium) under Vespasian.[52] Around 83 to 85 AD, the fort was abandoned and levelled, for the silted-up harbor on which both fort and *vicus* were built was no longer usable.[53] Nonetheless, the fort was replaced by a *castellum* built at Duisberg-Rheinhauen. Indeed, under the Flavians, the gaps between legionary camps and auxiliary forts began to be filled by a greater number of watchtowers and *castella*.[54] Near Moers-Asberg, a civilian settlement linked to the *limes* road rather than to the river was also left in place, while a *beneficiarii* station that stood in close proximity to the fortress continued to keep guard over the road and its traffic.[55] The *castellum* at Werthausen, built toward the end of the first century AD immediately on the Rhine to the southeast of Asciburgium, guarded the Ruhr tributary.[56]

Between Neuss and Cologne, the fort at Dormagen (Durnomagus) had served as the brickworks for *legio I Germanica*. Vespasian disbanded the latter, after which a cavalry fort was built for an *ala* at Dormagen in 83 AD at the latest. [57] Between Cologne and Bonn, the fort at Wesseling was built around 70 AD. It stood at the juncture of two imperial roads:leading to Cologne: one from Trier (Treverorum), the other from Mainz. An *ala* was stationed here from around 70 to 83 AD, after which the fort was perhaps manned by a cohort.[58] South of Bonn and north of the Vinxtbach, the auxiliary fort at Remagen (Rigomagus) was also destroyed by Civilis's forces. After the rebellion, a new fortress was built here in stone, where two cohorts are attested.[59] Around 70 AD, a *beneficiarii* station was built in the *vicus* Iuliacum, which was situated around 40 km west of Cologne on the Roman road from the Rhine (Colonia) to Tongeren and Bavai**.**[60]

Punitive Campaigns

With his building activity and other military measures, Vespasian managed to restore calm along the Lower German frontier relatively quickly. Unlike Gaius, Claudius or Nero, the new emperor, an experienced soldier, had no political need to establish his reputation as an able commander by campaigning beyond Roman frontiers.[61] Nonetheless, Vespasian launched the first of several

[51] Reichmann 2001, 480-481; 509
[52] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 47
[53] Reichmann 2001, 481 with note no. 7; Bechert 1989, 38; 153 ff.; Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 47-49
[54] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 18; 25; von Petrikovits. "Asciburgium," in *RGA* 1 (1973), 453; Compare Dietz. "Asciburgium" in *DNP* 2 (1997), 76
[55] Reichmann 2001, 481; Bridger 2001, 198; Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 63; von Petrikovits in *DNL* (1974), 128
[56] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 47-49; Röhring in *DNL* (1974), 132
[57] G. Müller in *DNL*, 151
[58] Horn in *DNL* (1974), 183-185; Alföldy 1968 a, 164-165
[59] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 29; Haupt in *DNL* (1974), 208 ff.
[60] Tholen in *DNL* (1974), 170-172
[61] Levick, 155

Flavian campaigns beyond the Rhine and Danube. On the one hand, Vespasian and his sons carried out punitive expeditions in order to retaliate against hostile Germanic tribes living beyond the Rhine. On the other, campaigns were set in motion in order to establish a new frontier between Rhine and Danube in Upper Germany, one that could be defended more economically. Although these latter expeditions, which Luttwak calls "frontier rectification campaigns," concern mainly the history of Germania Superior, Lower German troops played a vital role.[62]

The Flavian campaigns in Germany were of limited aim, as had been the case during the Julio-Claudian era. Simultaneously, the Romans advanced in Britain, where Nero had left a province that was far from fully conquered.[63] Indeed, as Maxfield notes, the "stop-go" nature of Roman operations in Britain—Claudius's invasion, Nero's "equivocal" treatment of the province, Vespasian's vigorous campaigns— illustrate well how imperial grand strategy and military dispositions were largely determined by "the attitudes of individual emperors, by where their particular interests lay, as also by the military situation elsewhere in the empire."[64] The Flavians were aware that the civil war and the Batavian Revolt had shown the empire's vulnerability. Thus, Roman power had to be projected once more. It became a priority to prove to actual enemies and potential foes alike that the Roman army had the capacity to strike beyond the empire's borders and actively campaign in enemy territory. On the Rhine, however, this can be interpreted as a continuation of Julio-Claudian policy. On the other hand, new threats against the empire, particularly in the Danube region, did call for stringent defensive measures.[65]

In 77 or 78 AD, the Romans advanced against the Bructeri, who had waged war on Rome as the Batavian Revolt unfolded and remained unpunished. Moreover, the Bructeri still harbored Veleda, the seer whose divinations had inflamed the Germans' hopes of victory.[66] Hence, C. Rutilius Gallicus, legate of the Lower German army from 76 to 78 AD, led his troops across the Rhine, attacked the Bructeri, and captured Veleda.[67] This was a punitive campaign of limited scope. Only a portion of Lower Germany's troops likely participated— several *alae* are attested as having taken part— although precautions were taken and experienced officers put in charge of units.[68] Auxiliary troops and commanders obtained rewards for their service: *ala Siliana* received the titles *torquata armillata*[69] and Pompeius Faventinus, the commander of *ala Sulpicia*, the *dona militaria*.[70]

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[62] Luttwak, 89
[63] Levick, 156
[64] Maxfield, 4
[65] Levick, 155
[66] Tacitus. *Historiae* IV.21; 61; 65; Levick, 160
[67] See Syme 1988 b, 514 ff.; Statius. *Silvaeid*. I.4.89 f.; *CIL* XVI 23, Lower German diploma of 78 AD; *AE* 66, 187; Rüger 2000, 499; Levick, 160
[68] The units in question are *alae Moesica*, *singularium*, *Sulpicia* and perhaps *Siliana*. Perhaps the inscription *CIL* V 875 pertains to this war. See Haalebos 2000, 53. Alföldy 1968 a, 35; 122; 132; 155, 159. *Alae*: idem 1965, 105 ff. The officers in charge of these units (T. Staberius Secundus, C. Minicius Italus and Pompeius Faventinus) had already had a second *militia* as legionary tribunes in Lower or Upper Germany. *CIL* II 2637; Alföldy 1968 a, 32 with note no. 156; *AE* 1930, 92
[69] *AE* 1930, 92; Alföldy 1968 a, 32 with note no. 156 and 158
[70] Alföldy 1968 a, 35; "Pompeius Faventinus aus Spanien begann um 70 seine militärische Laufbahn als *praefectus* der *cohors VI Asturum* in Niedergermanien, (*CIL* II 2637) war später *tribunus* der *legio VI victrix* in Novaesium und kommandierte die *ala Sulpicia* um das Jahr 77, unter anderem im Bruktererkrieg, in der er auch die *dona militaria* erhielt." See also 122; idem 1965, 105 ff.

Agri Decumates

Vespasian devoted much attention to Upper Germany and its environs. A road and forts were built—or reinforced— along the Neckar as it stretches until reaching the Main. This strengthened the line of defense that stretched until Strasbourg.[71] The emperor granted Avenches (Aventicum) colonial status and reinforced the legionary bases of Windisch and Augst (Augusta Raurica). These were likely preliminary measures for the campaign of Cn. Pinarius Cornelius Clemens, the Upper German legate— from around 72 to 74 AD— who likely replaced Annius Gallus and took over certain areas beyond the Rhine between Basel and Strasbourg known as the *Agri Decumates*. Tacitus describes these ten cantons, which lay beyond the Rhine and Danube, as being "of questionable ownership," originally held by "reckless adventurers from Gaul, emboldened by want."[72] Clemens, likely a first-generation senator from Spain who served as consul in 70 AD,[73] took advantage of Rome's hold over Raetia, leading a force from Strasbourg along the Kinzig into the area of the Neckar valley, the Black Forest, and certain parts of the Upper Rhine and Danube.[74] As Levick writes, the campaign resulted in a "modest advance… across a re-entrant angle that called for uneconomical deployment of Roman forces."[75] It was one of the Flavians' "engineering offensives" involving the construction of roads, forts and watchtowers,[76] a gradual onslaught that "achieved measurable and permanent results, not precluding further gains."[77]

Even though the area of operations was limited, a considerable number of troops from the German armies took part in this expedition,[78] possibly to eradicate "every trace of (Civilis's) ominous Gallic Empire" and to "insure against future troubles."[79] Luttwak points to the fundamental defect of the pre-Flavian frontier:

> "the L-shaped Rhine-Danube line that hinged on Vindonissa (Windisch) formed a wedge roughly 180 miles long at the base (Mainz-Regensburg), and 170 miles long to the apex, cutting a deep apex into imperial territory. As a result, the imperial perimeter between Castra Regina (Regensburg) and Mogontiacum (Mainz) was lengthened by more than 250 miles, not counting the twists and turns of the two rivers. This added ten days or so to the time needed for strategic redeployments between the German and Pannonian frontiers on the shortest route by way of Augusta Vindelicorum (Augsburg). Worse, the deep wedge of the Neckar valley and Black Forest formed a ready-made invasion axis, which endangered lateral communications north of the Alps and was only a week's march away from the northern edge of Italy."[80]

[71] Levick, 161 with note no. 26. For a general treatment of this part of the frontier, see Klee.
[72] Tacitus. *Germania*, 29; Eck 1985, 36; Levick, 160; Lund. "Kritischer Forschungsbericht zur Germania des Tacitus," in *ANRW* II.33.2 (1991), 2,109-2,124; Mattingly 1970, 33
[73] Eck 1985, 33; 35-36
[74] Alföldy 1968 a, 132 with note no. 611
[75] Levick, 161
[76] Luttwak, 89
[77] Levick, 161. "Vespasian's move also had the secondary advantage of giving additional cover to the Belfort Gap, where the Doubs leads to the Saône valley."
[78] Alföldy 1968 a, 132
[79] Mattingly 1970, 33
[80] Luttwak, 89; Levick, 160

Hence the Flavians' goal of establishing a *limes* that could be protected more easily. In essence, this meant extending the area under direct Roman control, which included much of the Lower Rhine since the annexation of Ubian territory. The aim was fulfilled with the seizure of the *Agri Decumates* and the construction there of forts and roads connecting the area to territory already held by the Romans. This allowed the newly founded settlement of *Arae Flaviae* (Rottweil) to become an imperial cult center.[81]

By constructing "a line of forts from Mainz-Kastel to Friedberg," Vespasian also took the initial steps to establish control over the Wetterau line to the north and north-east of Mainz.[82] This was a necessary measure given the Chatti's attack against Mainz during the Batavian revolt. Indeed, Vespasian's undertakings in Upper Germany— his takeover of the *Agri Decumates* and his activity around Mainz— allowed Domitian to advance into the Wetterau and complete there a new portion of the *limes*, which stretched from north to south until the Main and Neckar. This frustrated the ability of enemy tribes—and particularly the Chatti— from reaching the Rhine from the north.[83] Vespasian also began the gradual but steady drift of troops from the Rhine to the Danube region.

War against the Bructeri

During Titus's short reign and during that of Domitian, the Lower German line of defense was further strengthened. The fort at Köln-Alteburg was reinforced in stone by 85 AD; it would stand until the end of the third century.[84] Around 89 AD, stone structures also replaced wooden ones at the legionary fortress at Nijmegen.[85] In part, such efforts were a response to the gradual transfer of troops out of Lower Germany that began at this time in order to fulfil the military needs elsewhere in the empire. Early on in Domitian's reign, however, approximately in 83 AD, there may have been yet another war against the Bructeri, a campaign that probably took place beyond the Rhine in the area of the Lippe.[86] It may be, however, that the expedition took place under Nerva or Trajan. Certainly, the expedition was led by the Lower German governor Vestricius Spurinna, who was "consul for the second time in 98" AD even though the date of his governorship remains a matter of controversy.[87] As Syme writes,

> "Spurinna's brief tenure of Germania Inferior tangles with intricate problems: when he went there, whom he succeeded, who was the colleague in the other command before Ulpius Traianus turned up. Finally, the vexatious nexus that embraces Licinius Sura."[88]

[81] Levick, 161
[82] Southern, 82; Strobel 1987 b, 424-425; Levick, 161; "The claim that there were pre-Flavian forts on the right bank of the Rhine south of the Main has been controverted; the Romans had controlled it since the early Principate, but perhaps through friendly tribes. Now there was a definitive occupation."
[83] Levick, 161-162 with note no. 29; Schönberger 1969, 155-157; 176
[84] Bechert and Gechter in *DRR* (1995), 34; *CIL* XIII 8528; 8529
[85] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 67-68
[86] Alföldy 1968 a, 150-151 with note no. 702; 159; Ritterling, Groag, and Stein, 61 ff.
[87] Syme 1991, 543 For his first consulate, Syme suggests ca. 82 AD, "when he was in his middle fifties." Other scholars propose 84 AD at the earliest and 93 at the latest. See also Eck 1983, 196
[88] Syme 1991, 548; *cf*. Eck 1985, 152-154. For Lucinius Sura, see below.

Like Rutillius Gallicus's earlier campaign, this expedition had punitive aims; the war barely interrupted the peace of the Lower Rhine. Pliny the Younger writes that Spurinna, with a bloodless victory, forced upon the Bructeri a king who was acceptable to Rome.[89] A part of the northern Bructeri was slaughtered, while the rest migrated to the Rhine. As for Spurinna, he received a triumphal statue *principe auctore* as a reward for his actions.[90] Pliny's account, scholars have argued, describes the same event as Tacitus (*Germania* 33). The Bructeri were defeated, the latter writes, in a large battle against neighboring tribes under the leadership of the Angrivarii and the Chamavi, who themselves were under pressure from the Chauci. The Bructerii were expelled from their homes and exterminated,

> *seu superbiae odio seu pradae dulcedine seu favore quodam erga nos deorum*.
>
> "whether from disgust at their arrogance or from the attractions of plunder, or because Heaven leans to the side of Rome." [91]

Like Pliny, Tacitus rejoices since more than 60,000 Bructeri were slain by fellow Germans as Roman troops observed safely from a distance.[92] However, since Tacitus refers merely to the Bructeri's recent expulsion, while Pliny does not mention the emperor who bestowed the triumphal honor on Spurinna, both the date of the Bructeri's defeat and of Spurinna's time as governor remain unclear.[93] Syme, however, suggests that the Senate voted to approve the *statua triumphalis* upon Nerva's proposal.[94] Some scholars date the battle to 98 AD, either at the end of Domitian's reign or at the beginning of Nerva's.[95] Others argue that the Bructeri were expelled from their land at the very beginning of Trajan's reign, in 98 AD.[96] Possibly, however, the campaign took place years earlier under Domitian, perhaps at some point between 81 and 86 AD. Spurinna's honor could have been granted as "delayed recognition for a general whom Domitian had passed over."[97]

Following their expulsion from their homeland, that part of the Bructeri who lived in the area of the Ems probably settled next to the Bructeri who lived along the Lippe, on the right side of the Rhine between Cologne and Koblenz, where they appear on the Tabula Peutingeriana.[98] The Bructeri's migration and settlement appears not to have disturbed the peace on the Lower German border, although it may have influenced the decision to complete Vespasian's frontier defenses. Also, the brutal suppression of the Batavian revolt was still fresh in the memory of Rome's

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[89] Pliny, *Epistulae* II.7.1-2. *ostentation bello… ferocissimam gentem terrore perdomuit*. Syme 1991, 548; von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 582

[90] Pliny. *Epistulae* II.7.1-2; von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 584

[91] Tacitus. *Germania* 33.1; See Syme 1991, 545

[92] Tacitus. *Germania* 33. Haalebos and Willems, 258; Levick, 160 calls the number of 60,000 "a Roman exaggeration." Von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 582; Ritterling, Groag, and Stein, 61-63; Syme 1958 (vol. 1), 46

[93] Haalebos and Willems, 258

[94] Syme 1991, 543

[95] Von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 582

[96] See Dietz. "Angrivarii," in *DNP* 1 (1996), 702; idem. "Chamavi," in *DNP* 2 (1997), 1092-1093

[97] Syme 1991, 543. "The clear parallel was to hand. Vespasian awarded *ornamenta triumphalia* to Plautius Aelianus, legate of Moesia under Nero." *ILS* 986. Levick, 160

[98] Original homeland: Tacitus. *Germania*. XXXIII. Dietz. "Angrivarii," in *DNP* 1 (1996), 702; idem. "Chamavi," in *DNP* 2 (1997), 1092-1093. Lippe Bructeri: von Petrikovits. "Brukterer," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 582. "...zwischen Bergischem Land und Westerwald im Osten und dem Rhein im Westen." See Dietz. "Bructeri," in *DNP* 2 (1997), 795. For the areas in which the Bructeri possibly settled after their defeat, see von Petrikovits in *RGA* 3 (1978), 583.

enemies; there probably was little desire to challenge Roman supremacy. It may have been, however, that the peace in Rome's German territories largely depended on the animosity that still persisted among German tribes. As Tacitus writes:

> *Maneat, quaeso, duretque gentibus, si non amor nostril, at certe odium sui, quando urgentibus imperii fatis nihil iam praestare fortuna maius potest quam hostium discordiam*.
>
> "Long may it last, I pray, and persist among the nations, this—if not love for us—at least hatred for each other: since now that the destinies of the empire drive it on, Fortune can guarantee us nothing better than discord among our foes."[99]

Spurinna's campaign across the Rhine is significant even if the Romans refrained from battle. In the 80's or 90's AD, strategy still justified punitive or preventative expeditions.

War against the Chatti

Lower German troops certainly took part in Domitian's other wars along the northern frontier, namely against the Chatti and Upper Germany's rebel legate, Antonius Saturninus. The details and the exact dates of the first campaign against the Chatti are unclear.[100] It was, however, a well-planned offensive that included the construction of military infrastructure. Apparently, Domitian aimed not only to reach farther into enemy territory than Vespasian, but also to occupy certain areas permanently.[101]

The danger was clear: the Chatti's culture hinged upon warrior rituals, and their fighting force was to be respected. As Tacitus notes, their entire army consisted of well-armed infantry.
He adds that they had "hardier bodies than the others, close-knit limbs, a forbidding expression, and more strength of intellect." They also acted with much method and shrewdness, "for Germans at least" (*multum, ut inter Germanos, rationis ac solertiae*).[102] Tacitus was particularly impressed with their ability to discipline themselves, obey orders. and fight under a general almost as if they were Romans:

> *Praeponere electos, audire praepositos, nosse ordines, intelligere occasiones, differre impetus, disponere diem, vallare noctem… quodque rarissimum nec nisi ratione disciplinae concessum, plus reponere in duce, quam exercitu*.
>
> "they promote to office men of their own choice, and listen to the men so promoted; know their place in the ranks and recognize opportunities; reserve their attack; plan out their day; entrench at night; distrust luck, but rely on courage; and— the rarest thing of all, which only Roman discipline has been permitted to attain— depend on the initiative of the general rather than on that of the soldier."[103]

[99] Tacitus. *Germania*, 33;
[100] Southern, 79
[101] Bennett, 28; Tacitus. *Germania* 30-31; Strobel 1987 b, 427-428
[102] Tacitus. *Germania* 30
[103] Ibidem

Exceptional also in waging war rather than raids of plunder— *alios ad proelium ire videas, Chattos ad bellum*— the Chatti distinguished themselves particularly when their forces operated in the tribe's own wooded and mountainous territory, the type of terrain in which the Roman army often fought at a disadvantage against guerrilla-type tactics.[104] Above all, the Chatti posed a military challenge to Rome since, unlike other German armies, they were able "to remain in the field for a long campaign."[105]

Tacitus's respect for the Chatti is juxtaposed to his disdain for Domitian's war against the tribe. He describes a *falsum e Germania triumphum* in which slaves were displayed as captives to a general disdain.[106] Pliny, meanwhile, refers mockingly to the same event in the Panegyricus, contrasting Trajan's true victories to Domitian's staged military successes:

> *Accipiet ergo aliquando Capitolium non mimicos currus, nec falsae simulacra victoria, sed imperatorem veram ac solidam victoria reportantem pacem tranquillitatem et tam confessa hostium obsequia, ut vicendus nemo fuerit.*
>
> "And so, the day will come when the Capitol shall see no masquerade of triumph, the chariots and sham trappings of false victory, but an emperor coming home with true and genuine honor, bringing peace and the end of strife, and the submission of his enemies so evident that none shall be left to conquer."[107]

Dio claims that Domitian took no part in the operations,[108] and Suetonius states that there was no need to wage war on the Chatti.[109] Such phrases, inspired by the ancient authors' low opinion of Domitian, overlook the emperor's strategic objective in the war, even if he also had the need to bolster his reputation as a general.[110] Domitian himself, in fact, led efforts during the first Chattan war, which likely took place in 83 AD, although he made sure to have Sextus Iulius Frontinus, a talented general, as a subordinate. Frontinus, an equestrian from Gallia Narbonensis, was one of the two "most respected citizens of the day" (*quos tunc civitas nostra spectatissimos habuit*) according to Pliny.[111] Frontinus gained Vespasian's trust and obtained a command in Gaul during Civilis's revolt, when he forced 70,000 Lingones to surrender.[112] He rose to the consulship in 72 or 73 AD and governed Britain thereafter (from 73 / 74 to 77 or 78 AD), where he achieved the initial conquest of Wales.[113]

Frontinus provides much of the limited information concerning the Chattan War in his work, *Strategemata*.[114] The Lower German diploma of around 80 to 85 AD serves as proof of Frontinus's

[104] Bennett, 28
[105] Goldsworthy 1996, 52; 47
[106] Tacitus. *Agricola*, 39
[107] Pliny. *Panegyricus* 16.3
[108] Dio LXVII.4.1
[109] Suetonius. *Domitian* 6.1
[110] Bennett, 28; Strobel 1987 b, 427-428
[111] Pliny. *Epistulae* V.1.5. Origin: Eck 1985, 141 with notes no. 1 and 2
[112] Frontinus. *Strategemata* IV.3.14; Eck 1985, 141
[113] Eck 1985, 141; Levick, 158 with note no. 19
[114] Frontinus. *Strategemata*. I.1.8; II;10; II; 3.23; 10,7; Eck and Pangerl 2003, 210. "... beruhen die Informationen mit größter Wahrscheinlichkeit auf konkreter Anschauung eines Teilnehmers."

term as legate of Germania Inferior between 81 and 83 / 84 AD,[115] when he commanded his troops against the Chatti as a consular general.[116] While Domitian and the Upper German troops attacked from the south, Frontinus could lead his men against the Chatti's northwest flank.[117] As in other occasions, the two German armies worked together.

Frontinus's report is that of a well-planned campaign. Domitian, he writes, "wished to crush the Germans," and he travelled to the Rhine "under the pretext of taking a census of the Gallic provinces."[118] The emperor might have suspected the Chatti's intention to gain revenge for Vespasian's occupation of the Wetterau and sought to prevent such an assault.[119] Besides its preventative aims, the campaign also had an underlying strategic objective: to gain control over the lands across the Rhine that extend "up to the crest of the Taunus mountains, which dominate— and could now protect— the fertile Wetterau."[120] This was the territory of the Mattiaci, who, according to Tacitus, were subjected to Rome in the same liberal manner as the Batavians. They were free from taxes and levies and were "set apart for (Rome's) fighting purposes."[121] The Chatti, however, posed too grave a threat to this allied tribe of Rome, so that Domitian decided to incorporate their territories into the Empire.[122]

Under the guise of the Gallic census, Domitian assembled large troop numbers and sent a surprise attack across the Rhine, possibly in the spring or even the winter of 83 AD.[123] Mainz was the likely main base of operations.[124] This was likely the context for that year's transfer of *legio XXI Rapax* from Bonn to Mainz, where it stood next to *XIIII Gemina*.[125] The fortress at Bonn was then occupied by *legio I Minervia*, which Domitian himself had raised, possibly around 82 AD and certainly before 88 AD.[126] *I Minervia* extended the military farmland more than 3 kilometers east

[115] Eck and Pangerl 2003. 209-210. Es "besteht nun kein Zweifel mehr, dass Frontin als konsularer Heereskommandeur am Rhein amtiert hat…" See Ritterling, Groag, and Stein 1932, 57 ff.
[116] Eck and Pangerl 2003, 209
[117] Ibidem, 210. "Frontin konnte mit seinen Truppen gegen die nordwestliche Flanke der Chatten vorrücken, während das obergermanische Heer, bei dem auch Domitian selbst sich befand, von Süden her gegen den germanischen Stamm vorging."
[118] Frontinus. *Strategemata*. I.1.8; *cf.* Dio. LXVII.3.5
[119] Southern, 79; 82
[120] Luttwak, 92. Cf. Schönbeger 1969, 158
[121] Tacitus. *Germania*, 29
[122] Syme 1936, 165; Luttwak, 89
[123] Frontinus, *Strategemata* I.1.8; Dio. LXVII.4.1. For a discussion of the controversy over the exact dates of the Chattan war, see Southern, 80. "winter would be a most advantageous time to begin a war against an enemy such as the Chatti, whose territory lent itself to guerrilla warfare. Native food supplies could be low, and constant harrassment and destruction of food stocks and refuges would be all that was necessary to wear the enemy down..."
[124] Southern, 83
[125] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1786-1788. Thereafter, the legion remained stationed in Mogontiacum until it took part in Saturninus' revolt in 89 AD, after which it was defeated along with the other Upper German legions. See Ritterling,*Legio* 1789 for a discussion of the possible fate of the legion after the revolt of Saturninus. See also Schönberger 1969, 158
[126] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1420-1421: "Auch beweist schon die Versetzung der bis Jahr 83 in Bonn lagernden *XXI Rapax*zum oberrheinischen Heere, daß für ihr bisheriges Lager eine andere Besatzung vorgesehen und zur Stelle war, da die drei übrigen niederrheinischen Legionen an ihrem Standort verblieben... Der ursprüngliche Name der Legion scheint gewesen zu sein: *legio I Flavia* und vollständiger *legio I Flavia Minervia*..." Dio. LV 24.3; Suetonius. *Domitian*, 15; Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 198; Schönberger 1969, 154. There was also a marching camp from the late Flavianperiod in Bonn-Legensdorf. See Rüger in *DNL* (1974), 200

of the Rhine at Bonn, where the legion remained until the end of the third century AD.[127] The Chattan War was large in scale: some 30,000 men from the four Upper German legions and at least one from Lower Germany took part, alongside 20,000 to 30,000 auxiliaries.[128] Amid the considerable troop movement, at least one Lower German cohort and an *ala* were transferred before 84 AD to the Danube, where there was an increasing need for reinforcements; these were likely the first auxiliary units to leave the Lower Rhine since the Batavian revolt.[129]

How long Domitian remained at the front is uncertain, but the campaign seems to have involved slow advances, not large, pitched battles.[130] Possibly, the gradual, hardly glorious nature of a campaign culminating with a line of frontier forts allowed Domitian's critics to portray the war as a failure and his triumph as a sham.[131] Domitian, however, felt pride in his achievement: *laurea… tota tua est*, wrote the poet Martial in his honor, and Statius offered similar praise for his success against the Chatti.[132] Domitian celebrated a triumph in Rome in 83 AD although the war continued for another two years. Domitian's generals might have launched a separate campaign, or the war could have lasted for several seasons.[133] On account of his actions against the Chatti, Domitian adopted the only title referring to a victory which he was to hold as emperor: *Germanicus*.[134] Perhaps controversially, the name evoked Julio-Claudian family history although Germania was far from subdued.[135]

The war's consequences were important. With their victory, the Romans consolidated Vespasian's conquests east of the Rhine. As in Augustan times, four legions came to be stationed in Upper Germany: *XIIII Gemina* and *XXI Rapax* in Mainz, *VIII Augusta* in Strasbourg, and *XI Claudia* in Windisch. The new auxiliary forts protected strategic roads leading to Mainz and into the Wetterau; most did not stand directly on a frontier yet to be fully demarcated. Meanwhile, other forts were built in the Wetterau, in Wiesbaden's vicinity, and in the Suebi's territories, which came under direct Roman control. Many of these forts were built in stone; the new defense arrangement in Upper Germany was meant to be permanent.[136] The legionary presence was later reduced, but Domitian's Upper German *limes*, only slightly altered after his time, remained in place until the late third century. The frontier, Southern argues, was Domitian's "enduring achievement."[137]

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[127] Bechert 2007, 39; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 15; Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225; Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 198;Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1421. The legion did campaign outside of Germany after its arrival at Bonn.

[128] Strobel 1987 b, 441; Southern, 83

[129] *Cohors VI Thracum* and *ala Siliana*, which was transferred to Pannonia: *CIL* XVI 30; *CIL* XVI 31; Alföldy 1968 a, 32; Southern, 80

[130] Southern, 79-80; Strobel 1987 b, 427

[131] Southern, 80. See also 90 for the difficulty of dating the frontier line forts.

[132] Martial II.2; XIV.170; Statius. *Silvae* I.1.5; III.3.165; Southern, 82-83

[133] Southern, 80; see 81-83 for the question of Domitian's wars in Germany, Britain, and Africa in relation to his acclamations as *Imperator*.

[134] Statius. *Silvae* I.1.5; 4.4; III.3.165; 4.49; Bennett, 28

[135] Southern, 82-83 with notes no. 5 and 7

[136] Baatz 2000, 112-114

[137] Southern, 90; see also Filtzinger and Alföldy-Thomas, 52-54; Baatz and Herrmann, 71-76; Schönberger 1985, 383

The Need for Troop Movements

Around 85 AD, the Dacians, enemies of Rome since the early Principate, conducted a raid across the Danube and killed Oppinus Sabinus, governor of Moesia.[138] This forced Domitian to turn his attention to the Danube region, possibly before the end of the Chattan War on the Rhine.[139] Thus began the chain of events leading to Domitian's presence on the Danube, the subsequent defeat and death of the praetorian prefect Cornelius Fuscus, and Rome's final victory at the Battle of Tapae ca. 88 AD.[140] Domitian's Dacian War and the subsequent campaigns on the Danube brought about changes in the Romans' strategic conception of the empire.[141] The military repercussions were felt in the provinces further to the west.

In Britain, Titus apparently had favored a northern frontier, but Domitian continued Vespasian's forward movement.[142] Due to the military emergency in Dacia, however, Scotland, recently subdued by Agricola, was evacuated due to the need for troops on the Continent; *Legio II Adiutrix* went to the Danube along with auxiliary units.[143] *Legio I Adiutrix*, stationed in Upper Germany, also went to the Danube, where the garrisons were permanently strengthened; the Moesian provinces alone received three additional legions, leaving six legions stationed along that portion of the Danube frontier.[144] Several auxiliary units also went from the Rhine to the Danube provinces; several *alae* attested in Lower Germany under Vespasian but not in 89 AD may have gone to the Danube to fight Dacians, perhaps around 88 AD.[145] This would have further reduced Lower Germany's auxiliary garrison after the removal of two units— an *ala* and a cohort— some years earlier.

The Revolt of Saturninus

The Dacians were defeated at Tapae. Domitian's ultimate aims on the Danube, however, are difficult to determine, for the emperor was compelled to return to the Rhine in order to suppress a rebellion. Antonius Saturninus, the Upper German commander, rose up in arms on the first day of 89 AD for reasons that are not entirely clear.[146] His possible motives include resentment against Domitian, who allegedly accused Saturninus of homosexuality, as well as the incitement of a rebellious legion, *XXI Rapax*, whose men may have tried to resist their imminent transfer to the Danube.[147] A man of equestrian origin whom Vespasian had raised to the Senate, Saturninus might have been proconsul of Macedonia around 76 AD.[148] Thereafter, he served as legate for several

[138] Southern, 95
[139] Bennett, 28
[140] Southern, 82; see 95 for the difficulty of establishing the war's precise dates. Holder 1999, 247.
[141] Galsterer, 28
[142] Maxfield, 4; Tacitus. *Agricola* 23
[143] Maxfield, 4
[144] Southern, 99
[145] Holder 1999, 247. The units in question: *Alae Sulpicia, I Noricorum*, *Afrorum veterana*, and *Augusta Vocontiorum cR.*
[146] Suetonius. Domitian, 6; *Epitome de Caesaribus* XI.9; Dio LXVII.11.1; Southern, 101; for Saturninus's possible motives, see 105 and Syme 1978, 19-21; Strobel 1989, 77; 81; Eck 1985, 40-41
[147] Domitian's accusation: *Epitome de Caesaribus* XI.9; see Eck 1985, 41 with note no. 8. "Doch scheint der Vorwurf der Homosexualität von seiten Domitians gegen Saturninus… nicht völlig ohne Grund gewesen zu sein." Rebellious legion: Southern, 105
[148] *PIR*2 A 874; Eck 1985, 40

years in Judaea, a province garrisoned by a single legion.[149] Having been *consul suffectus* in 82 AD, Saturninus probably held another consular post before Domitian entrusted him with the important command of Upper Germany. He went to the Rhine at an unspecified date before the winter of 88 / 89 AD.[150]

Around 87 AD, Aulus Buccius Lappius Maximus was put in charge of Germania Inferior.[151] Lappius, who may have replaced an unknown governor who had been on the Lower Rhine since before 85 AD, was possibly another *novus homo* who had obtained senatorial status under Vespasian. During the latter's reign, Lappius had gained experience in Germany, serving as legate of *legio VIII Augusta* in Strasbourg.[152] Subsequently, under Domitian, Lappius governed the joint province of Pontus and Bithynia as proconsul before being suffect consul during the second half of 86 AD.[153] Both Lappius and Saturninus were men of experience. In theory, they also owed loyalty the Flavian house for their advancement. Seemingly, the Rhine frontier was in safe hands. With his Upper German command, Saturninus controlled the four legions stationed at that time on the Upper Rhine, at least two of which joined his rebellion— *XXI Rapax* and *XIV Gemina*, both stationed in Mainz— possibly alongside auxiliaries.[154] Saturninus aimed for absolute power, and his prospects of success were not to be underestimated; his position in Mainz enabled a "relatively easy and rapid access" to Italy and the imperial capital, as Vitellius's example had already shown.[155] Apparently, the rebel leader also counted with the support of the dangerous Chatti, who had recently toppled Chariomerus, the pro-Roman king of the Cherusci, a recipient of Domitian's subsidies.[156] Saturninus may have offered the Chatti an alliance given their fighting prowess and his need for reinforcements; certainly Saturninus was aware that Domitian would launch the full force of the empire's might against him once the rebellion was underway.[157]

Domitian's response was prompt. Since he and the praetorians left Rome for Mainz— perhaps via Windisch— on January 12th, scholars have speculated as to how news of the revolt reached Rome so quickly.[158] Other forces were summoned. M. Ulpius Traianus, legate of *VII Gemina*, stationed in Hispania Tarraconensis, was ordered to lead his men to Germany and take the field against the usurper. Trajan, Pliny writes, acted as Domitian's *validissimum praesidium*.[159] Trajan's father had been raised to the patriciate by Vespasian, served as consul in 70 AD, and thereafter as governor of Syria, where he had won the triumphal insignia.[160] The son also received triumphal honors from Vespasian for his service in the East.[161] Trajan's march toward the German frontier, however, is

[149] Eck 1985, 40; *AE* 1978, 825
[150] Consul suffectus: *CIL* IX 5420. Post in Upper Germany: Eck 1985, 40-41
[151] Eck 1985, 150
[152] Unknown governor: *AE* 1976, 511; Eck 1985, 148. Lappius' career: ibidem, 150 with note no. 4
[153] Pontus and Bithynia: Pliny. *Epistulae* X.58.6; Eck 1985, 150. Suffect consul: AE 1949, 23
[154] Southern, 101-102 with note no. 4. The four legions were: *XXI Rapax* and *XIV Gemina* (Mainz); *XI Claudia* (Vindonissa); *VIII Augusta* (Argentorate)
[155] Southern, 101
[156] Support of the Chatti: Suetonius. *Domitian*, 6. Chariomerus: Dio. LXVII.10.5
[157] As Syme 1936, 174-175 suggests, based on Statius. *Silvae* III.3.168: *victis parcentia foedera Chattis*; I.1.22. See Southern, 103: "the facts are obscure."
[158] Southern, 101 with note no. 3
[159] Pliny. *Panegyricus* 14; Southern, 102
[160] Eck 1985, 45
[161] Levick, 155

"the first independently dated episode" in the future emperor's life.[162] Raetian auxiliaries also moved in from the west under the command of Norbanus, that province's procurator and also praetorian prefect, whom Martial describes as notably faithful to the emperor.[163] It was the Lower German legions and *auxilia*, however, mustered *en masse* under Lappius's command, that delivered the fatal blow to Saturninus and his rebel army. Hostilities arose at an unknown site even before forces arrived from other provinces, with the possible exception of the Raetian troops.[164]

The Lower German army's instrumental role in Saturninus's defeat is evident from the honorary epithets of *pia fidelis*, "a significant and important honor seldom handed out, especially to *auxilia*,"[165] that were granted to 22 Lower Rhine cohorts, three of them *cohortes milliariae*, as well as to legions *I Minervia*, *XXII Primigenia*, and *VI Victrix*,[166] most likely for their loyalty and service in 89 AD.[167] The evidence on military diplomas,[168] in fact, suggests that Domitian bestowed on the entire army of Lower Germany— legions, auxiliaries and fleet— the title of *pia fidelis*.[169] Since the diploma of 127 AD, which was handed out to a soldier of *cohors IIII Thracum*,[170] mentions the Lower German *exercitus pius fidelis*, W. Eck and E. Pangerl argue that several infantry units aside from the 22 attested ones were present on the Lower Rhine in 89 AD.[171] Thus, other cohorts may have taken part in the revolt's suppression even if they are not individually attested with the titles *pia fidelis*.[172] Hence, as many as 28 cohorts may have been in Lower

[162] Bennett, 43
[163] Southern, 102. Procurator of Raetia: *PIR*2 N 162; *Epitome de Caesaribus* XI.9-10, with a mistaken reference to "Norbanus Lappius." Martial: IX.84
[164] Southern, 102
[165] Holder 1999, 237; 241: "The evidence for the bestowal of *pia fidelis* on legions shows that they were given for loyalty to the emperor and not very often in the early years of the principate. Therefore, when he recovered from the shock of the revolt of Saturninus, Domitian decided that the part played by the army of Lower Germany in its suppression deserved recognition by awarding the titles *pia fidelis Domitiana* to each unit. "
[166] *Pia fidelis*: *CIL* XIII 8071 from 89-96 AD: *I F(lavia) M(inervia) p(ia) f(idelis) D(omitiana)*; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1420-1421. "Die an den mit *damnatio memoriae* belegten Kaiser erinnernden Bestandteile dieser Benennung, Flaviaund Domitiana, wurden nach Domitians Sturz im Jahr 96 unterdrückt." See also Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225. *XXII Primigenia*: Ritterling, *Legio* 1802-1803. *VI Victrix*: ibidem, 1603-1604
[167] Holder 1999, 249. "…a possible garrison in Germania Inferior of… 22 cohorts of which 3 were milliary."
[168] These are the diplomas of 95 and 127 AD. Roxan and Holder, 421. "The army of Germania Inferior was almost certainly given the title *exercitus pius fidelis* at the same time since it appears on diplomas not only in 127 (*RMD* IV 239) but also in 95 / 96 (Eck and Pangerl 2003)..." See Eck and Paunov 1997, 335 ff.; Holder 1999, 237: The diploma of 127 AD contains the "highly unusual phrase *equitibus et peditibus exercitus pii fidelis qui militaverunt*… instead of the expected *equitibus et peditibus qui militaverunt*…" See *RMD IV*, 468 (with note no. 2). "The use of the word *exercitus* (in the diploma of 127) implies the strong probability that each unit listed had the honourary *p.f.* attached to its name but here, in the main body of the diploma, it would be unnecessary to repeat this fact."
[169] Holder 1999, 237; 241
[170] Eck and Paunov 1997, 338; Haalebos, 58
[171] Eck and Pangerl 2003, 208. "Doch davon unabhängig ist nunmehr die *cohors III Breucorum* schon zu Beginn der domitianischen Zeit am Niederrhein bezeugt, was auch die vermutete späte Versetzung der anderen Kohorten zusätzlich unwahrscheinlich macht. Dass bisher bei diesen Einheiten die Beinamen *pia fidelis* nicht dokumentiert sind, heißt noch nicht, dass sie ihn getragen haben; vielmehr zeigt... das bekannte Diplom aus dem Jahr 127 deutlich, dass diese Beinamen nicht (nur) den einzelnen Einheiten zukamen, sondern den gesamten *exercitus*." See note no. 20: "Man könnte vermuten, dass sie nicht an den Kämpfen gegen den Usurpator beteiligt waren; doch befriedigt diese Erklärung nicht recht, da später auch vom *exercitus pius fidelis* Niedergermaniens gesprochen wird, also ohne jeden Unterschied zwischen den Einheiten."
[172] For instance *cohortes III Breucorum*, *VI Asturum* and *VI ingenuorum c.R.* See Eck and Pangerl 2003, 208. "Man hatte auch angenommen, einige Einheiten, die zumeist auch in dem Diplom von Elst aus dem Jahr 98 erscheinen, für die jedoch später die Beinamen *pia fidelis* nicht belegt sind, seien erst nach 88 / 89, dem Jahr des

Germany at the time of Saturninus's revolt.[173] Moreover, at least seven *alae* were surely rewarded with the epithets *pia fidelis*, most likely for their loyalty to Domitian during the revolt. Since four of these units are not attested on the Lower Rhine before 89 AD, it appears that they were added to the Lower German army either shortly before the rebellion or during its course.[174] The influx of *alae* into Lower Germany at a time of emergency would have been crucial, in fact, to compensate for a lack of cavalry troops, especially if certain *alae* had been transferred to the Danube.[175]

Lappius Maximus did not have to fight the full rebel force since, according to Suetonius, the Rhine suddenly thawed and prevented Saturninus's German allies from coming to his aid.[176] They may have been able to destroy part of the *limes*, however, thus motivating the Romans to launch an apparently short, punitive campaign— deemed by some to be a second Chattan war— under Lappius Maximus's command; he is named on an inscription as *confector belli Germanici*.[177] An additional reason for this campaign, in which Trajan may also have taken part, would have been the Chatti's action against the king of the Cherusci.[178] This new campaign to intimidate or punish German foes would provide yet another example of a punitive expedition undertaken beyond the Rhine,[179] with the Flavians continuing an old Julio-Claudian practice.

Both honors and punishments, although not too severe ones, were granted accordingly.[180] Domitian himself received two imperial salutations.[181] Lappius, as a victorious commander, likely received the *ornamenta triumphalia* or at the very least *dona militaria*.[182] Dio, however, considers Lappius's actions against Saturninus to have been hardly praiseworthy, implying that his victory was not spectacular. Nonetheless, he does praise Lappius's decision to burn Saturninus's correspondence in order to prevent false accusations.[183] This raises the question of whether Saturninus acted alone or whether he had active backing, possibly from senators in Rome. Given the state of the evidence, there can be no clear answer. Eck argues that the destroyed letters may have contained information linking Lappius himself to the revolt, so that his actions should not be

Saturninusaufstandes in Obergermanien, in die niedergermanische Provinz versetzt worden, und zwar von Nerva oder Trajan... (Haalebos-Willems, 258) Diese Vorstellung ist schon in sich unwahrscheinlich, weil eine vermutbare prodomitianische Einstellung sicher nicht auf niedergermanische Einheiten beschränkt gewesen wäre, sondern auch bei anderen bestanden hätte."

[173] If one adds to the 22 units attested *cohortes VI Ingenuorum, I Latobicorum et Varcianorum, III Breucorum, VI Raetorum, VI Breucorum*, and *I Pannoniorum et Delmatarum*.

[174] The *alae* in question are *Indiana Gallorum, II Flavia Gemina Milliaria, III Asturum civium Romanorum*, and *II Thracum Augusta*.

[175] See above. On the other hand, if the cavalry units thought to have left for the Danube *ca*. 88 AD (*alae Sulpicia, Afrorum veterana, (I) Noricorum*) actually remained in Lower Germany, then a total of ten *alae* might have taken part in the war against Saturninus.

[176] *Domitian* 6.2; Southern, 102

[177] *CIL* VI 1347; Eck 1985, 149. Second Chattan War: Southern, 102; Strobel 1986, 204-207; idem 1989, 78; 83

[178] Bennett, 43

[179] As Southern, 102 suggests.

[180] Ibidem, 103 with note no. 8

[181] Ibidem, 103; Strobel 1986, 219

[182] Eck 1985, 150

[183] Dio LXVII.11

viewed as purely disinterested.[184] Yet Lappius served as governor of Syria from 89 to 92 AD and served as consul for a second time in 95 AD. Clearly, he maintained Domitian's confidence.[185]

In the aftermath of Saturninus's failed revolt, Domitian ended the practice of stationing two legions in a single fortress of double capacity such as Mainz. This would prevent a single commander with imperial ambitions from gaining the backing of ten thousand men with relatively little effort. The emperor also banned soldiers from keeping savings of over 1,000 sesterces *ad signa*.[186] The rebellion had imperial-wide consequences.

The rebellious legions, *XXI Rapax* and *XIV Gemina*, were both transferred from Mainz to the Danube, a region that steadily began to gain in military importance at the expense of the Rhine armies.[187] The former legion left immediately after the revolt, the latter in the spring of 97 AD, when it fought in Domitian's war against the Suebi.[188] The fortress in Mainz—from now on to be occupied by a single legion— received *legio XXII Primigenia*, which was transferred from Xanten before 96 AD (probably around 92 or 93 AD).[189] Xanten, however, came to be occupied in the early 90's AD by *legio VI victrix*, which had stood previously at Neuss, which held no legions from this point onward.[190] Thus, the German provinces' garrison was left with a strength of three legions apiece. Meanwhile, certain cohorts and *alae* left Lower Germany in order to strengthen the Upper German and Danube garrisons.[191] Domitian thus inaugurated the process— continued under Trajan and Hadrian— of transferring auxiliary troops out of Germania Inferior and sending them, above all, to the Danube provinces.[192]

In Upper Germany, the occupied fortresses were Mainz (*XXII Primigenia*), Strasbourg (*VIII Augusta*) and Windisch (*XI Claudia*); in Lower Germany, legions remained at Nijmegen (*X Gemina*), Neuss (*VI Victrix*) and Bonn (*I Minervia*). The Rhine legions thus stood at nearly equidistant intervals. The relatively short distance from Xanten to both Nijmegen and Neuss might have motivated the Roman authorities to leave the latter fortress permanently without a legion. On the other hand, the Romans must have perceived no immediate threat emanating from the valley of the Lippe since the area of that river's confluence with the Rhine was left without a legion.[193]

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[184] Eck 1985, 150

[185] Governor in Syria: Eck 1985, 150 with note no. 7. Second consulate: *PIR* 2 L 84. Southern, 102, notes that Lappius's second consulship was held much earlier tan usual under Domitian. See note no. 5.

[186] Suetonius. Domitian 7.3; Southern, 105-106

[187] Baatz 2000, 114; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1803-1804. *Legio XXII Primigenia* remained in Mogontiacum until the lateimperial period.

[188] Southern, 105-106 with note no. 15; Strobel 1988, 448

[189] Baatz 2000, 114; Galsterer, 28; Schönberger 1969, 154; 160; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1803; *CIL* XIII 6357; *CIL* III 550

[190] Galsterer, 28 with note no. 55; Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50

[191] *Cohortes III Delmatarum* and *I Batavorum Milliaria*. *Ala I Singularium* was in Upper Germany by October, 90 AD. *Alae III Asturum cR* and *II Thracum (Augusta)*, which are attested with the titles *pia fidelis* and, according to Holder (1999, 247-248), were possibly sent to the Lower Rhine around 88 AD, would have returned to their provinces after Saturninus' revolt and before 98 AD since they are not mentioned on the Elst diploma (Holder writes that it is "feasible that the award to *ala III Asturum* was made prior to AD 89…") It is nonethelesss possible that *ala Augusta Vocontiorum* arrived in Lower Germany after 89 AD and before 98 AD.

[192] Alföldy 1968 a, 149; Stein and Ritterling, 100 ff.

[193] Strobel 1988, 448-449; Tacitus. *Germania* 33; Pliny. *Epistulae* II.7.2

Around 90 AD, once the revolt was in the past, auxiliary fortresses began to be built directly on the Upper German *limes*. The frontier's first occupied portion was the Wetteraulimes.[194]

The Creation of the German Provinces

Domitian was himself in Mainz immediately after the revolt. Possibly while still there in 89 AD, he named L. Iavolenus Priscus as Saturninus's replacement as Upper German legate.[195] The former was another *homo novus* who had reached the Senate due to Vespasian's favor, acquiring ample experience thereafter as legate of two legions. While in charge of *legio VIII Augusta*, he acted as *de facto* as governor of Numidia. He was also *iuridicus* in Britain.[196] In 86 AD, he served as suffect consul alongside Lappius Maximus.[197] His governorship of Upper Germany, which he probably administered from 89 to 92 AD, may have resulted from Domitian's decision to turn the old military zones into two new provinces, Germania Superior and Germania Inferior.[198] This measure, in turn, may have been tied to the emperor's efforts against the Chatti and to his plan to control the Wetterau. It was Domitian's most important administrative verdict in the Rhine territories.[199]

Since Priscus was no victorious general, but rather a legal expert and former *iuridicus* in Britain, scholars have regarded him a sound choice for the task of incorporating the military zones into the empire's public and private legal framework.[200] Another view maintains that Priscus mainly knew civil law, which would not have been particularly useful at the time of constituting a new province.[201] Clearly, however, Priscus's task did not include further conquests; rather, his duty was to oversee the *limes*'s fortification and to consolidate the new province's administrative apparatus. Priscus's administrative work even might have facilitated the future foundation of new *civitates* in the Upper German frontier zone under Trajan.[202] Rutilius Gallicus, Domitian's right-hand man, may have aided Priscus in his task; Gallicus had already commanded the Lower German army from around 76 to 79 AD; he had a very good knowledge of the area, its troops, and its politics.[203]

There is doubt as to when exactly the provinces came into existence. Official documents issued in 82 AD mention the Province Germania, which was administered from the Colonia Claudia Ara Agripinnensis. Some years later there is evidence of two German provinces (*duae Germaniae*).[204] Germania Inferior, therefore, was likely ruled as a single province from around 83 / 84 AD under the legal provision of the *Lex Provinciae*, which regulated "all questions of justice, tax, and administration."[205] Thereafter, the strictly military territory in Lower Germany may have included

[194] Baatz 2000, 115; 121
[195] Southern, 106
[196] Rise under Vespasian: Eck 1985, 42 with note no. 3; Syme 1958 (Volume II), 761. Legate of *VIII Augusta*: Southern, 106. *Iuriducus* in Britain: *CIL* III 9960
[197] Eck 1985, 42; *AE* 1949, 23
[198] Eck 1985, 43; *CIL* 9960; *CIL* XVI 36
[199] Southern, 85
[200] Frere, 183; Baatz 2000, 114; Rüger 2000, 498; *CIL* III 9960
[201] Eck 1985, 43 with note no. 7
[202] Baatz 2000, 114
[203] Rüger 2000, 499
[204] *Legatus Augusti Pro Praetore Germaniae Inferioris*. Bechert 1982, 40; *CIL* XVI 28; *CIL* XI 5744
[205] Bechert 1982, 39-40

but little land west of the Rhine, and possibly more on the river's eastern bank.[206] By 90 AD, however, the two Germanies were regarded as provinces, not merely as distinct military zones.[207]

Once the provinces were established, Mainz became the capital of Germania Superior, while Cologne, which flourished economically under the Flavians as the spread of *villae rusticae* attests, retained its administrative functions as the capital of Germania Inferior.[208] In due time, associations such as *coloniae*, *municipia*, and *civitates* were founded in both German provinces.[209] In the late Flavian period, a Roman-style city was built with stone structures in the recently destroyed (during Civilis's revolt) *civitas Tungrorum*, to which the lands of the more primitive Textuandri to the north might even have been attached. The Flavians' construction of stone edifices in place of the wooden houses prevalent in the Julio-Claudian period reflects a much greater Roman cultural influence in Lower German cities.[210]

The *legati Augusti propraetore* who had commanded the German armies since the time of Augustus[211] were former consuls and, as such, members of the senatorial aristocracy and experienced administrators. The same credentials were required for the new governorship of the German provinces. As before, the commander was in charge of both the legions and the auxiliary troops stationed in the province. There was, however, an equestrian *procurator provinciae Belgicae utriusque Germaniae* who resided in Trier (Augusta Treverorum) and administered the finances of both German provinces.[212] The governorship of either Germania Inferior or Germania Superior became one of the most important posts that a Roman politician could hold. After his time as governor in one of the Germanies, a senator generally obtained the command over one of the *provinciae armatae*—Syria, Asia or Britannia— or one of the most important positions in Rome, for instance the city praefecture.[213]

By announcing the foundation of two German provinces, scholars tend to agree, Domitian sought a propaganda *coup*.[214] In fact, the new provinces' names, *Germania Superior* and *Germania Inferior*, merely reflected the names of the old territories under military control. The areas in question, however, were generally regarded to be part of Germany given the Germanic origin of many of the tribes settled there.[215] This allowed the imperial authorities to maintain that Germany had been conquered after Domitian's defeat of the Chatti (*Germania capta*).[216] By means of semantic innovation, therefore, Germany officially became a part of the empire; Domitian could claim that the Rhine area was fully pacified after its post-Neronian turmoil, and that he had completed a task left unfinished since the time of Augustus.[217] Additionally, however, Domitian

[206] Bridger, 198
[207] Rüger 2000, 498; Southern, 90 with note no. 14; *CIL* XVI 36
[208] Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 90
[209] Wiegels. "Germani, Germania," in *DNP* 4 (1998). 959
[210] Galsterer, 32-33
[211] Rüger 2000, 499
[212] Wiegels. "Germani, Germania," in *DNP* 4 (1998), 959
[213] Rüger 2000, 499; Eck, 1985, 135-186
[214] Rüger 2000, 498
[215] Wolters 2001, 147; Dio.LIII.12.5; Pliny. *Naturalis Historia.* IV.106; Tacitus *Germania* 28.4
[216] *RIC* II 252, 278, 312, 341; a.d 85-87; Rüger 2000, 499
[217] Rüger 2000, 499

had the need to portray events in Germany as successful in 89 AD, when he prepared for a war against the Marcomanni and Quadi, former Roman allies beyond the Pannonian frontier.

Not all of Domitian's subjects were convinced that Germany had finally been subdued. Tacitus, for one, still wrote of the future day when the whole of Germany finally would be conquered, *tam diu in Germania vincitur*.[218] This was a partly reactionary, partly utopian opinion. The German frontier was settled for the foreseeable future, even if emperors, whose attention was now fixed on the Danube provinces, retained the old option of launching punitive campaigns beyond the Rhine if need be.

Conclusion

According to Luttwak, the Flavians founded the empire-wide security system whereby Rome annexed, protected, and administered vassal states and clearly demarcated the imperial borders, particularly where no natural barriers formed a frontier. This process, Luttwak argues, required "subjective political judgment" to determine what was Roman and what not. In an imperial setting, the description largely fits the takeover of the *Agri Decumates* and the changes to the Upper German frontier. In Britain, Agricola's subjective judgment, which must have reflected that of Vespasian, determined that the entire island should come under Rome's dominion. The conquest of Wales and Scotland, however, can be seen in the light of Augustus's earlier policy in Spain, where, as Mann argues, only full control over the Iberian Peninsula solved "the frontier problem."[219] Domitian's likely surrender of Agricola's conquests in Scotland, which built on the earlier efforts of Petilius Cerialis and Frontinus, points to a deviation from his father's strategic vision.[220] Certain scholars have remarked, in fact, that the case for a purely Flavian strategy that breaks clearly with earlier policy is overstated. Levick, for instance, writes that "Luttwak's view exaggerates the contrast with the period before 68."[221] In Lower Germany, however, the Flavians did implement a largely uniform policy, which hinged on rebuilding the defense system that the Batavian Revolt had destroyed.

Especially on the portion of the frontier from the Vinxtbach to Xanten, the line of defense at the end of Domitian's reign was scarcely different to that which had existed before 69 AD. The Ubii's land had been annexed long before, and the legionary fortresses at Bonn, Neuss, and Xanten still formed the core of the area's border defenses. Cologne, which became a provincial capital under Domitian, remained the Lower German fleet's headquarters. On that portion of the border, the auxiliary forts that had been destroyed during the war were rebuilt and occupied mostly by new units. Only a few new forts were built during the Flavian period in order to reinforce the existing line. Hence, Flavian strategy hardly differed from that carried out under the Julio-Claudians on this sector of the *limes*.

The permanent stationing of a legion at a new camp at Nijmegen did bring a significant change compared to the previous decades. A legion had stood at Nijmegen, however, under Augustus and during a part of Tiberius's reign; the measure was no innovation. As before, the legion kept the

[218] Tacitus. *Germania*, 37
[219] Mann. "The Frontiers of the Principate," in *ANRW* II.1 (1974). 510-511
[220] See Pryce and Birley, 151-152
[221] Levick, 156

peace in the Batavian homeland and defended the territory west of Nijmegen up to the North Sea coast. In this stretch of the frontier, the Flavians also oversaw the reconstruction of the line of defense built mostly under Claudius. Only east of Levefanum and Nijmegen were new forts erected, and troops occupied those built on the Waal after the Batavian Revolt. The Flavians, therefore, extended the type of frontier defense that had been in place for decades, while the *limes* from the coast to Levefanum remained practically unchanged. Nonetheless, given the presence of a legion at Nijmegen and of auxiliaries in both new and reconstructed forts, the north-western segment of the Lower German frontier was never as heavily defended as under the Flavians. The increase in manpower under Domitian, however, took place not as a result of a new, imperial strategy of defense. Rather, it was a reaction against two different enemies who threatened the security of the entire Rhine area: the Chatti on the one hand and, on the other, the rebellious governor of Upper Germany, Antonius Saturninus. Large numbers of auxiliary troops arrived in Lower Germany due to the rebellion. Troop levels, however, would be gradually reduced in the subsequent decades. The Flavian arrangement would remain in place only until Trajan's reign.

In Flavian times, Roman armies still marched constantly beyond the Rhine into enemy territory. Punitive expeditions were launched to retaliate against hostile Germanic tribes. As in Julio-Claudian times, the principal aim was to send a clear message: despite the construction of the *limes* and the clear delineation of a frontier, the empire's arms were by no means confined to artificially imposed borders. Thus, Domitian's wars against the Chatti can be viewed as having both a punitive aim— to retaliate against that tribe for previous attacks on Roman territory— and a greater strategic aim: to gain control over the Wetterau and aid the allied Mattiaci, a tribe threatened by the Chatti.

Yet again, Saturninus's revolt exposed the danger that a rebellious governor in Germany could pose to the emperor. Nonetheless, Lappius's suppression of the insurrection also proved the wisdom of the decision to split the command of the Rhine armies between two men. This made it unlikely that the seven or eight legions stationed on the Rhine at one time would unite under a single leader in order to attempt to overthrow the regime in Rome. At the same time, it meant that, were a rebellion to break out in one of the German provinces, then the other governor and his army would be at hand to quell the unrest. It had become a function of the Rhine armies— as those of other frontier zones— to check the rise of usurpers intent on taking the throne with the emperor's own troops. Hence, the frontier armies were not involved solely with tasks of frontier defense.

Under the Flavians, the peaceful conditions along the Rhine frontier allowed trade and commerce to flourish to a greater degree than before. The growth of imported wares, which "only from Flavian times onward… seem to have really hit the native market,"[222] reflects the greater abundance of wealth in Lower Germany. Moreover, the Flavian-era objects found at Köln-Alteburg suggest that the *Classis Germanica* fulfilled peacetime duties above all, namely guarding the Rhine, producing hand-made goods, and procuring as well as transporting stone and other building material, which was altogether scarce in Lower Germany.[223] As such, the base of the Rhine fleet became not only an important garrison, but also a key center for the production and delivery of supplies in Lower Germany.[224]

[222] Aarts, 175-176
[223] Fischer, 561
[224] Fischer, 562

VII. Trajan

Trajan's experience in Germania was considerable before he became emperor. At the time of Saturninus's revolt in 89 AD, he led a legion from Spain to the Rhine frontier, where he likely remained for some time. Possibly, he met Domitian in Mainz, where he would have ingratiated himself with the emperor.[1] Thereafter, he was entrusted with other expeditions, including actions to discipline the surviving rebels.[2] In 91 AD, Trajan became *consul ordinarius* although he had not governed a praetorian province, as was the norm.[3] Under Nerva's rule, Trajan may have served as governor of Upper Germany from around the fall of 96 AD until October, 97 AD, when he was adopted by the emperor.[4]

While in Upper Germany, Trajan accelerated Domitian's reorganization of the Upper German defenses, received the tribunician power, and became co-emperor. On the latter occasion, his closest male relative, P. Aelius Hadrianus, the son of senator Aelius Hadrianus Afer and then tribune of *legio V Macedonica*, congratulated him on behalf of the Lower Moesian army.[5] Trajan's adoption, which might have been motivated by his control of the powerful Upper German army,[6] prompted his replacement as governor of Germania Superior. The new man in charge was L. Iulius Ursus Servianus. Since before 97 AD, the latter was married—possibly for the second time— to Hadrian's sister. His adoptive father was L. Iulius Ursus, consul in 100 AD. He was suffect consul in 90 AD and was in charge of Pannonia before governing Germania Superior. Due to his links to the new imperial family, Servianus was a sound choice as Upper German legate.[7]

Trajan and Lower Germany

In 97-98 AD, Trajan wintered at Cologne, the Lower German capital. It was there that Hadrian, who had been made tribune of *legio XXII Primigenia* in Mainz and thus confirmed as a figure of the highest social and political rank, delivered to him the news of Nerva's death, which had taken place on January 25th, 98 AD. Trajan's accession to the throne was official.[8] At the time, Trajan may have enjoyed "overall command of the German provinces with full consular *imperium*" as a result of his adoption.[9] On February 20th of 98 AD, a military diploma from Elst was issued "to a discharged Batavian horseman (*gregalis*)" from the Lower German army's *ala Batavorum*. It was dedicated to *imperator Traianus Augustus*.[10] The title suggests that Germania Inferior might have

[1] Bennett, 43; Walser, 455
[2] Pliny. *Panegyricus*. 14.5; Bennett, 43
[3] Bennett, 43-44; Eck 1985, 46
[4] Pliny. *Panegyricus* IX, 2-4; Cassius Dio LXVIII, 3; Eck. 1985, 45; Haalebos 2000, 59-60; Bennett, 43-46 argues that Trajan's governorship in Upper Germany cannot necessarily be adduced from the written sources.
[5] Co-emperor: Baatz 2000, 115; Roxan and Holder, 421. Hadrian's congratulations: *Historia Augusta, Vita Hadriani* II.5.
[6] Speidel 1994, 38; Eck 1985, 46
[7] Eck 1985, 47-48; Strobel 1988, 447
[8] Hadrian as tribune: Strobel 1988, 447; *CIL* III 550. Nerva's death and Hadrian's message: *Historia Augusta, Vita Hadriani*. II.6; Haalebos 2000, 59; Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 90; *Epitome de Caesaribus*, XIII.3; Eutropius. VIII.2.1
[9] Bennett, 49
[10] *SUB IMP(ERATORE) TRAIANO AUG(USTO)…* Haalebos 2000, 60: "(Das beste) Argument dafür, dass es im Februar 98 keinen niedergermanischen Provinzlegaten unter Traian gegeben hat, kann man schließlich darin finden,

been without a governor at the beginning of 98 AD.[11] Since it is unclear when exactly the subsequent Lower German legates, T. Vestricius Spurinna and L. Licinius Sura, held their posts,[12] Trajan might have "taken over the functions of the provincial legate" due to the *imperiium maius* which he held as the emperor's adoptive son. This right gave him "absolute authority" in any province where he might have been present and, in this case, made him commander of both Rhine armies.[13] Trajan's exceptional status on the Elst diploma, in fact, can only be compared "to that of the imperial princes Drusus, Tiberius, and Germanicus at the time of the conquests."[14]

A New Batavian Horse Guard

Trajan may have visited the Lower Rhine in order to restore the imperial horse guard, a body of troops once again composed mostly of Batavians and now named *equites singulares Augusti*.[15]

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dass einerseits die *auxilia* nur dem Kaiser unterstehen und andererseits die *Classici* von ihrem eigenen Flottenpräfekten (Lucius Calpurnius Sabino) geführt werden. Da der *praefectus classis* normalerweise nicht erwähnt wird, fällt das Fehlen des Namens des Provinzlegaten umso mehr auf." See Haalebos and Willems 1999, 255-257. *Ala* Batavorum: this was a milliary unit, the only known to have stood in Lower Germany, yet only after 98 AD (Roxan and Holder, *RMD* IV, 422; Haalebos 2000, 42-43: Es könnte "zwei verschiedene Abteilungen gegeben haben oder eine *ala quingenaria* ist später zu einer tausend Mann starken Einheit vergrößert worden." This cavalry unit was formed after the Batavian War, apparently early in Vespasian's reign, and the recruits may have been the horsemen of the old *ala Batavorum*. (Alföldy 1968 a, 13-14) If new, none of its horsemen would have been eligible for citizenship only seven or eight years later; this would explain why the unit does not appear on the diploma of 78 AD from Wiesbaden, although the unit appears to have been in the province in 89 AD during Saturninus's revolt. (Haalebos 2000, 43. Diploma of 78 AD: *CIL* XVI 23) Thus, the Batavian horseman who received the Elst diploma in 98 would have been one of the first men recruited in the *ala* at the beginning of the 70's AD. (Haalebos 2000, 43) It is possible, therefore, that the *ala* remained in Lower Germany during the entire Flavian period without any horseman being discharged before 98 AD. (Haalebos 2000, 43) Alternatively, the unit could have been sent to another province at the beginning of Vespasian's reign before it returned to Lower Germany after 78 and before 89 AD, possibly in the context of the war against the Chatti in 83 AD or in 89 AD during the war againt Saturninus. (Haalebos 2000, 42. "Mögliche Standorte wären Brittania (Strobel 1987 a, 286), Raetia, Noricum (see Spaul, 63), oder Pannonia (Strobel 1984, 106)..." *Pia fidelis*: Haalebos 2000, 42. "... nach einem neuen Diplom aus der Pannonia Superior im Jahre 112 n. Chr." Possible return to Lower Germany after transfer: Roxan and Holder, 422: Only after 98 AD did *ala I Batavorum* become an *ala milliaria*.

[11] See Haalebos and Willems 1999, 259. "It remains unclear if there was even a governor present in Germania Inferior. Was Spurinna still in office, or had Trajan taken over the function?"

[12] Servianus: Eck 1985, 47-48; Haalebos 2000, 60. Spurinna and Sura: ibidem; Eck 1985, 152-156

[13] Absolute authority: Haalebos and Willems 1999, 259. Commander of the Rhine armies: Haalebos 2000, 60. *Cf.* A.R. Birley 1997, 37; Eck 1985, 45 ff. Another possibility is that Trajan exerted control over Germania Inferior as *legio X Gemina*'s legate after handing over his *imperium* over Germania Superior.

[14] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 259

[15] Speidel 1994, 39 "From Caesar to Galba, for over 125 years, the *Germani corporis custodies* had served as the emperors' horse guard… Now, in 98, less than thirty years after their fall, Trajan raised his guard again from the same tribes and with the same tasks of serving as a bodyguard and as a crack fighting unit." See also 41: Trajan "raised most of his *equites singulares Augusti* in 98 in Lower Germany, even though they cannot be shown by documentary sources to have been fully constituted under a tribune before 110." Batavians: A.R. Birley 1997, 39. For the horse guard's name, see Speidel 1994, 38-39: Trajan's "guardsmen became *equites singulares Augusti*. On military diplomas they are called *equites domini nostri* which shows that *singularis Augusti* must be understood as 'the emperor's own.' The other, more common meaning of *singularis*, 'matchless' or 'outstanding' was perhaps also understood all along and welcomed by troopers and emperors alike." See ibidem, 44. "The new guard also came to be called *Batavi*, like the *Germani corporis custodes* of old. *Batavi* as a name for the horse guard was still in use a hundred years later, under the Severan emperors, and fittingly, among the *equites singulares Augusti* in Rome the traditions of Lower Germany outweighed those of all other nations…" Concerning the name: "Augustus had stressed the civilian side of his reign with the title *Augustus*, while the more military term *imperator* was the popular

The guard protected the emperor and also acted as a counterweight to the Praetorians.[16] Trajan would have been acquainted with the *equites singulares consularis*, a 500-strong mounted guard assigned to the Lower German governor.[17] This unit was recruited from the Lower German *alae* and was composed of Batavians, Ubians, and "men of other tribes that had contributed to the Julio-Claudian *Germani corporis custodes*."[18] This personal guard likely impressed the new emperor at a time when he urgently needed a trusted corps of men to protect him. After all, Domitian's unknown guard had failed to prevent his murder. Hence, Trajan would have sought to hire a bodyguard of able, trustworthy horsemen, a corps based on the *Germani corporis custodes* of Julio-Claudian times.[19]

The ideal place to raise such a force was Germania Inferior, particularly Batavian territory, where Trajan could find the best and most devoted cavalrymen. It was around this time, in fact, that Tacitus described the Batavians as "foremost among all the nations (dwelling west of the Rhine) in valor."[20] By renewing the Batavians' recruitment into the horse guard, Trajan also would have gained the support of the Batavian auxiliaries. This was particularly important in the initial stages of his reign, when the emperor was still consolidating his power. Possibly, Trajan made his new guard into a body of one thousand men, the optimal strength for elite cavalry units, some of whom may have originated from the Danube.[21]

As in earlier times, Trajan's horse guard was trained by *exercitatores*, four centurions of high rank. It was stationed in a fort of its own built on Rome's Caelian Hill, "away from the praetorians" and close to the palace, whereas the *Germani*'s former fort had stood across the Tiber.[22] Also, like the Julio-Claudians' horse guard, Trajan's *equites singulares Augusti* were able to act as a crack unit in battle. The horse guard, in fact, was active in Trajan's Parthian War, particularly during the siege of Hatra. The unit also appears in Hyginus's treatise on the layout of an imperial field-army camp, which was possibly composed for the Parthian campaign.[23] Moreover, the horse guard appears at least seven times on Trajan's column, where auxiliaries are depicted as the main fighting units, with the legions and praetorians acting as backup forces.[24] However, unlike the Julio-

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title for the emperor from Trajan's time onward. Trajan, however, named his guard *equites singulares Augusti*, not *equites singulares Imperatoris*. He may have followed a tradition, but he may also have wished not to ruffle the feathers of dreamers who hankered after the old days when the Senate ruled and the city was free of soldiers… The horse guard's name thereafter mirrors the emperors' ever-growing high-handedness. Soon the title *imperator* replaced *Augustus*, and under Commodus the title *dominus noster* in turn replaced *imperator*, heralding the absolute monarchy. Minor variations aside, the name of the units thus changed as follows." First Century: *Germani Corporis custodes*; Second Century: *equites singulares Augusti*; Later Second Century: *equites singulares imperatoris nostri*; Third Century: *equites singulares domini nostri.*

[16] A.R. Birley 1997, 39; Speidel 1994, 15 ff; 38 ff.

[17] Speidel 1994, 42. "In the provinces the institution of a double horse guard had survived: governors kept *equites singulares* as well as *equites legionis* about themselves. Trajan restored this twin aspect to the emperor's guard…"

[18] Ibidem, 38

[19] Ibidem 37; 40; Suetonius. *Domitian* 16 ff.; *Galba*, 43; Dio LXVII.14 ff

[20] Speidel 1994, 39-40; Tacitus. *Germania*, 29.1. *Omnium harum gentium virtute praecipui, Batavi.*

[21] Speidel 1994, 38-41

[22] Ibidem, 42-43. Here, the guards "established a graveyard of their own and, unlike the *Germani*, had their gravestones carved in the Lower German manner."

[23] Ibidem, 44-45; Strobel 1984, 105 f.; Dio LXVIII.31; *De munibus castrorum* 7 and 29 in Gilliver

[24] Speidel 1994, 42-44. "Their ranks included the essential cavalry under-officers of decurion, *duplicarius* and *sesplicarius*, and their commander was a tribune of the guard… The unit was called a *numerus* (*numerus Batovurm*:

Claudian *Germani corporis custodes*, the new unit consisted of regular soldiers, with "fully Roman names," possible citizenship, a cavalry command structure, and a traditional unit name: *numerus*.[25] Thus, Trajan's horse guard was an official part of the Roman army.

Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum

Trajan introduced changes to the Lower German civil administration.[26] In the Batavians' main settlement of Batavodurum, some four kilometers west of the Hunerberg legionary fortress, he founded Ulpia Noviomagus Batavorum. This was a recognition of the Batavians' old position within the system of allied tribes.[27] The emperor granted Ulpia Noviomagus the *ius nundinarum*. Possibly around 100 AD, the community became the *municipium Batavorum*. The name likely points to the settlement of Batavian veterans in their homeland,[28] so that Ulpia Noviomagus's "ethnic composition" was not as varied as that of Cologne or Xanten.[29] Especially between 95 and 100 AD, a growing number of Roman citizens settled in the Batavian homeland. In good measure, these were former auxiliaries with newly acquired citizenship such as those mentioned on the Elst diploma of 98 AD. The horseman of the *ala Batavorum* who received the diploma, for instance, "must have entered the army shortly after the Batavian revolt."[30] Like him, other Batavians recruited after the revolt would have returned from strategic locations like Britain or Pannonia.[31]

In terms of civil government, the greater number of Roman citizens settled on Batavian territory likely involved the replacement of the *summus magistratus* with a collegiate body of magistrates. Religious activity flourished, with the construction of striking monuments in the sanctuaries of Hercules at Empel, Elst, and Kessel around 100 AD.[32] Militarily, Ulpia Noviomagus, along with the Ubian main settlement in the Cologne area, provided "the lion's share" of the emperor's horse guard during the second century,[33] when individual Batavians increasingly mention their

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Suetonius. *Caligula* 43) not because it was unroman, but because that was the traditional title for the *Batavi* as well as for the units of provincial *equites singulares* from which Trajan had raised his guard." See Tacitus. *Agricola*, 35

[25] Speidel 1994, 42-44

[26] Van Enckevort, 374

[27] Speidel 1994, 39 with note no. 45; Haalebos 2001, 465

[28] Haalebos, 2000, 38; idem 2001, 465; Roymans, 257. *Cf.* Bechert 2007, 49. *AE* 1975, 646; Haalebos and Willems 1999, 250. "The first dated reference to the Municipium Batavorum appears only in 227." Van Enckevort, 374

[29] Roymans, 257

[30] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 255-257. "When considering the 25 or more years of service mentioned in the diploma, this could even have happened immediately after the conflict. Where he had been stationed remains unknown, but he returned with his family to the *Insula Batavorum* (today known as Betuwe) with Elst at its centre… This *ala* could possibly be the same unit as the *ala Batavorum milliaria pia fidelis* which is later recorded in diplomas from Pannonia and Dacia (after 113). Both the men's nationality and the name of the unit are surprising as one would hardly have expected to find a Batavian unit in Lower Germany after the Batavian revolt, especially one with Batavians in its ranks… If this cavalry regiment can be identified with the *ala Batavorum milliaria pia fidelis*, known at a later date from Pannonia and Dacia, then it must have been in Germania Inferior before 89…" See note no. 31. See also Haalebos 2000, 42: "Früher war man unter dem Eindruck, dass die *ala Batavorum* nach dem Bataveraufstand aufgelöst wurde. Jedenfalls dachte man, dass nach dem Bataveraufstand am Niederrhein keine Auxiliartruppen aus den germanischen Provinzen mehr eingesetzt wurden, da sie sich während des Aufstands als sehr unzuverlässig erwiesen hatten." *Cf.* Alföldy 1968 a, 148

[31] Roymans, 257; Haalebos 2000, 32 ff.

[32] Roymans, 202; 257

[33] Speidel 1994, 39. "Tungrian guardsmen are missing in both periods, which suggests that in the second century the tribe belonged to Gallia Belgica rather than to Lower Germany, or that the Tungrians were not seen as Germans." For the Tungri's territory as part of Belgica, see Bogaers 1972, 310 ff.; Will, 24 ff.

birthplace of Noviomagus or Ulpia Noviomagus in inscriptions. During the previous century, the sole use of the name "Batavian" was common. Clearly, many Batavians began to think of themselves primarily as Romans.[34]

The Bructeri's Banishment and the Auxiliary Garrison

Another reason for Trajan's early presence in Germania Inferior, perhaps also for his special command, may have been the recent banishment of the Bructeri, which Tacitus mentions.[35] The event led to Vestricius Spurinna's military expedition, an "almost bloodless" campaign about which we know little.[36] It is unknown whether the Bructeri's exile occurred under Domitian, Nerva, or Trajan. During the latter's reign, there are hints of military activity, though not on a large scale, in Lower Germany.[37] The surviving Bructeri probably settled east of the Rhine between Koblenz and Cologne, which remained a prosperous center of administration under Trajan and Hadrian. Its population exceeded 35,000.[38] Due to the Bructeri's presence nearby, the Romans had to keep a constant watch on this part of the frontier.

The Elst diploma, which was issued 23 days after Nerva's death, proves that Trajan remained on the Rhine for some time after his accession. Other military diplomas issued in Britain and in Pannonia on the same day— February 20th, 98 AD— suggest that Trajan was reviewing the available auxiliary forces. In Lower Germany, they were stationed in the 30 or so known forts and fortresses. Due to the looming war with Dacia, the Elst diploma likely presents "a fairly complete list" of the Lower German army "to which only a few units need to be added."[39] Besides the 25 cohorts and six *alae* it attests in Lower Germany,[40] one may count with two additional citizen infantry units there at the outset of Trajan's reign. These would not have appeared on a diploma commemorating a soldier's newly attained Roman citizenship.[41] With 27 cohorts stationed in Germania Inferior,[42] there would have been around 15,000 or more auxiliary infantrymen in Germania Inferior in 98 AD, a maximum troop level for the Lower Rhine in the post-Julio-

[34] Roymans, 254; 257-258
[35] Hessing 1999, 153; Tacitus. *Germania* 33
[36] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1426; Haalebos and Willems 1999, 258; Tacitus. *Germania* 33.1; Plinius. *Epistulae* II
[37] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 258. Aside from the concentration of troops, "not only the well-known coins portraying Germania demand our attention but also the honourary inscription for Q. Geminius Sabinus. (Dobson, 222 no. 103) He was a centurion of the *legio X Gemina pia fidelis* and achieved high positions; he probably took part in Trajan's German campaigns as *princeps peregrinorum* and thereby earned himself military decorations."
[38] Dietz. "Bructeri" in *DNP* 2 (1997), 795. Cologne: Eck. "Köln," in *RGA* 17 (2001), 90
[39] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 258-259. "Soldiers who had been recruited into the army in 71 or 72 would have first expected their discharge by the time of Nerva at the earliest." *Cf.* Hessing 1999, 153 with note no. 23
[40] Haalebos 2000 (*RMD* IV 216). *Cohortes VI Thracum (eq.), III Delmatarum* and *I Batavorum milliaria* had left the province before 98. The history of *cohors VI Asturum* is unknown, but the unit was probably no longer in the province after 98 and may have been transferred before Trajan's visit. Moreover, the diploma of 98 AD mentions a *cohors I...* whose full name cannot be read. *Cf.* Haalebos 2000, 46. ''Alle anderen bekannten *cohortes I*, die in flavischer Zeit am Niederrhein standen, sind im Elster Diplom aufgelistet. Man bräuchte also einen Neufund, um diese Lücke zu ergänzen.'' *Cf.* Alföldy 1968 a, 151. *Alae* listed on Elst diploma: *I Batavorum, Sulpicia, Indiana, Noricorum*, either *Moesica* or *Vocontiorum* and *Afrorum veterana*). This means that if *alae Sulpicia, Afrorum, Noricorum*, and *Augusta Vocontiorum* had indeed left for the Danube around 88 AD, they must have returned to Germania Inferior before 98 AD: Holder 1999, 249-250
[41] Holder 1999, 250. "…the two citizen cohorts *VI ingenuorum cR* and *XV voluntariorum cR* would not have been recorded on the diploma."
[42] Holder supposes that there were 28 cohorts in the province.

Claudian period.[43] This was also "significantly more than the 17 units of the early Flavian diplomata, or the 20 units of the diploma" from Bulgaria (Glava).[44] Many of the units in question, namely those with the titles *pia fidelis*, presumably "had already been in Lower Germany for some 10 years," so that there is no indication of troop concentration "for a specific event in 98."[45] As to which garrisons were manned by which units, the available information is scarce.

Troop Movements under Trajan

Trajan's reasons to wage war against Dacia were several. Tensions were rising and, as Dio writes, the emperor was dissatisfied with the steady supply of Roman subsidies and engineering expertise that Domitian had granted Decebalus, the Dacian king.[46] He also feared that Dacia's growing power and the neighboring tribes' restlessness threatened the empire.[47] Trajan had to consider that Dacia was hardly a trustworthy client: on the one hand, Decebalus was forming alliances with warrior tribes such as the Roxolani; on the other, his kingdom was granting refuge to deserters from the Roman provinces.[48] The emperor likely had decided to undertake his Dacian campaign already when he visited Lower Germany, whose army was to play a substantial role in the war.[49] A significant number of Lower German troops—both legionary and auxiliary— were deployed either to the Danube or to Upper Germany, the garrison of which was also reduced in order to strengthen the Danube provinces.[50] *Ala I Batavorum* left Lower Germany for the Danube perhaps as early as 103 AD, but certainly by 112.[51] Also, by the end of Trajan's reign, eight cohorts, including two *cohortes milliariae* (*II Brittonum* and *I Vindelicorum*), had left Germania Inferior for either Upper Germany or the Danube provinces; several units were transferred between 98 and 100 AD. Since no new cohorts are attested on the Lower Rhine during the period in question, one can estimate that some 19 cohorts and six *alae* remained in Germania Inferior at the time of Trajan's death.[52]

[43] This is contrary to Alföldy's suggestion that the Lower German troop level reached its apogee with around 15,500 auxiliaries in the years immediately following the Batavian revolt, after which it was reduced in a piecemeal fashion to about 13,000 auxiliaries. See Haalebos and Willems 1999, 259.
[44] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 258; Eck and Paunov, 341
[45] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 258
[46] Dio. LXVIII.6.1. Rising tension: Bennett, 52; Pliny. *Panegyricus* 12; 16.2
[47] Dio. LXVIII.6.1; Bennett, 51
[48] Bennett, 86-87
[49] Diplomas of Britain and Pannonia: *CIL* XVI 42-43; Roxan and Holder, 421; Roxan 1985, 80 and 81. Van Driel-Murray, 214; Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 25
[50] Perhaps this was due not only to the military necessities on the Danube. *Cf.* Van Driel-Murray, 215. "If part of Roman recruitment strategy was to remove potential troublemakers from native communities, the continued stationing of Batavians on the Danube and Thracians on the Lower Rhine made excellent sense, preserving ethnic cohesion and loyalty in the units while lessening communal tensions in the home region."
[51] Holder 1999 247; 250. "There seems little doubt that" *ala I Batavorum pf* was "withdrawn for Trajan's First Dacian War never to return to Lower Germany." The *ala* appears on a diploma from Pannonia Superior of 112 AD with the honourary titles *pia fidelis*: Roxan and Holder, 223; 421; Roxan 1997, 161 ff. *Ala I Batavorum milliaria cR pf.* During the reign of Hadrian, *ala I Batavorum milliaria* went from Pannonia Superior to Dacia, (Roxan and Holder, 422) where it appears on a diploma issued in 158 AD: *CIL* XVI, 108; Haalebos 2000, 42-43.
[52] Alföldy 1968 a, 161. "Am Ende der traianischen Zeit standen am Niederrhein sechs Reitertruppen: *alae Afrorum, Moesica, Noricorum, Sulpicia,* ferner die *alae Indiana* und *Vocontiorum*."

While in Lower Germany, Trajan sought to organize and stabilize the province in order to transfer troops to the Danube.[53] The Rhine garrisons could be reduced, at least temporarily, since the Flavians' measures on the German frontiers had taken effect and there was a general sense of calm along the *limites*. Trajan, in fact, further integrated the Upper German frontier zone into the Roman system by founding the *Civitas Ulpia Sueborum Nicretum* and possibly the *civitates* of the Mattiaci and the Taunenses.[54] The emperor would have needed help to oversee his measures on the Rhine. Possibly, one of the men assigned to do so as Lower German legate—either in 98 or 99 AD— was L. Neratius Priscus. His eponymous father, a *homo novus*, had been suffect consul in 87 AD; his brother, L. Neratius Marcellus, had held the same post in 95 AD. By 100 AD, however, Neratius Priscus, had been replaced by an unknown Lower German legate whose mandate did not last beyond the following year.[55]

Already in 98 AD, Trajan transferred *legio XI Claudia* from Windisch in Upper Germany to the Danube. Thus, *Germania Superior* was left with two legions: *XXII Primigenia* in Mainz and *VIII Augusta* in Strasbourg. These were the positions of highest strategic importance in the province. Upper German auxiliary units were also sent to the Danube. By 100 AD, many auxiliary units previously stationed in the Upper German hinterland to control the natives were moved to the frontier, where they formed a thin line of defense that was not meant to withstand large-scale attack. The threat of invasion, however, was not great; the nearest centers of Germanic settlement, where large armies could be assembled, were very distant; the territory immediately beyond the *limes* consisted mostly of uninhabited forests. The auxiliary commanders would have patrolled the *limes* area, now clearly a part of the Roman province, controlled entry and exit at certain specified locations, and protected the frontier from small bands of plunderers. These remained the main threat to peace and prosperity after Domitian's Chattan wars. Watchtowers played an important role in the system of frontier defense. Naturally, the men posted there would have been able to spot large concentrations of enemy troops if they did pretend to invade. In this case, it would have been the duty of the legions, backed perhaps by *vexillationes* and auxiliaries from other provinces, to meet the threat head on. The auxiliaries posted on the frontier, therefore, were mainly responsible for preventing low-scale attacks. The building activity carried out along the Upper German *limes* under Trajan altered the system of defense so that it could serve its new function. Once complete, it would remain in place until the third century.[56]

New Infrastructure in Lower Germany

With fewer men defending the Rhine frontier, it was necessary to improve Lower Germany's border defenses.[57] Rapid maneuvers became essential to achieve "an adequate tactical coverage of the same area with a smaller military force."[58] Thus, bridges and waterways were built to improve the road network. Trajan's presence in Lower Germany, in fact, had significant consequences for the province's infrastructure, for both he and Hadrian oversaw a considerable amount of

[53] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 259; Roxan and Holder, 421; *CIL* XVI 42 and 43; Roxan 1985, 80 and 81
[54] Baatz 2000, 115
[55] Eck 1985, 157-159; 160; *AE* 1949, 23
[56] Baatz 2000, 115; 117; 119-120; Tacitus. *Germania* 29
[57] Haalebos 2000, 60; Hessing 1999, 153; Roxan and Holder, 421; Bennett, 51; Alföldy 1968 a, 159; Stein and Ritterling, 107
[58] Hessing 1999, 153

engineering work along the *limes*, particularly in western *Germania Inferior*.[59] The project's mainstay was the military road built on the Rhine's bank and along "a silted-up side branch of the river running parallel to the main channel."[60] The road ran from the *vicus* at Valkenburg to Vleuten-De-Meern, passing through both heavily and scarcely populated areas at some distance from auxiliary posts.[61]

This *limes* road was built in at least three phases, the first of which likely fell under Domitian.[62] The second phase took place in late 99 and early 100 AD, as is evident from the dating of the "pointed oak posts" used to "strengthen and protect a *c.* 4.5 m wide dike on which the road surface had been laid."[63] Alongside the road's construction, additional work was carried out on the Lower German *limes*, certainly at Woerden, Nijmegen, Xanten, and Elst.[64] Flavian-era timber forts, for instance, were reinforced with stone under Trajan or Hadrian at the latest.[65] Given Trajan's proven presence in Germania Inferior, he presumably engaged in these projects himself.[66]

The work done on the road alone under Trajan, which changed the Lower German *limes*'s appearance considerably, was the last phase of a "grand scheme" to secure the Lower Rhine frontier ahead of the Dacian campaign.[67] Simultaneously, the Upper German *limes* was being completed, for there is evidence for construction along the portion of the frontier stretching from the Main to the Neckar—the Odenwaldlimes— under Trajan. Thus, the strengthening of the Rhine defenses was tied to Trajan's grand strategic shift to the Danube region and the consequent, gradual reduction of the Rhine garrisons.[68]

The completion of the Lower German line of defense involved the reinforcement of certain forts of earth and soil with stone. This was the case, for instance, in Alt-Kalkar (Burginatium), where a stone fort dates from the first half of the second century AD. To the north, in the village of Qualburg, either a *beneficiarii* station or a *castellum* is attested in the early second century AD.[69] In Matilo (Leiden-Roomburg), where a cohort was stationed from around 103 AD, construction work was carried out under Trajan.[70] Around the same time, however, at least two of the province's auxiliary forts were abandoned as troops exited Lower Germany. Between Nijmegen and Xanten,

[59] Van Enckevort, 374; Hessing 1999, 152
[60] Hessing 1999, 150
[61] Ibidem, 151; Haalebos and Willems 1999, 252: South of Valkenburg, for instance, "the various elements- military structure, buildings of the *vicus*, native farmsteads, and graves- were all dependent on the main *limes* road."
[62] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 252; Hessing 1999, 149-151. "the existence of a regular road of an even older date (than 89 or 92 D) is also possible…"
[63] Hessing 1999,151-152
[64] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 253-254; Hessing 1999, 152
[65] Southern, 90
[66] Haalebos and Willems 1999, 252; 258. "The oldest milestones from Germania Inferior date from this period. The stone from Beek near Nijmegen is dated to the years 98-102 by what survives of the emperor's titles, which can be completed on the basis of *CIL* XVII 574 found at Koblenz in exactly the same manner as the milestone fragment from Xanten so that the date falls within Trajan´s second consulate of 98-99. One can probably connect the milestone with improvements of the *limes* road, as is confirmed by the new dendrochronological data from the wood of this road near Valkenburg, Woerden and Vleuten-De Meern…"
[67] Hessing 1999, 153
[68] Bennett, 49; Schallmayer, 19; see Eutropius. VIII.2.7
[69] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 63; *CIL* XIII 8700
[70] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 93

the fort Ceuclum was abandoned around 100 AD. Here, a *vicus* as well as a possible *beneficiarii* station are attested during the second century AD.[71]

The Dacian Wars and the Lower German Legionary Garrison

Trajan also would have imposed discipline on the German legions as part of his efforts to bring order to the Roman army at large. According to Pliny, the troops had been commanded with excessive leniency in the previous years.[72] Trajan's subsequent tour of the Danube provinces, in which he was accompanied by his *consilium*, would have allowed him "to acquaint himself with the legates and the prevailing situation in the other northern provinces" prior to the first Dacian campaign.[73] Besides ensuring that the border was secure, the emperor had to secure the supply lines for the troops stationed on the Danube prior to the invasion.[74]

Only after the inspection of the Danube armies and frontier did Trajan arrive in Rome for the first time as emperor. He entered the capital in the summer of 99 AD: "*iam hoc ipsum, quod ingressus es, quam mirum laetumque*," Pliny wrote.[75] By early 101 AD, however, the emperor had embarked on the first Dacian campaign.[76] At this time, a new legate in Germania Inferior, Q. Acutius Nerva, a man from a senatorial family who had been suffect consul in 100 AD, had replaced the previous, unknown Lower German legate.[77] His mission involved overseeing the transfer of troops from the Lower Rhine to the Danube.

The large numbers of Lower German troops that fought in Dacia simply reflected the war's proportions. At first, the emperor merely sought to break Decebalus's power. The mobilized army, however, was large, consisting of nine legions and around 90 auxiliary units.[78] After the first, successful phase of the campaign and Decebalus's plea for peace, Trajan summoned further troops from across the empire to the Danube region.[79] Clearly, more men were needed to occupy, fortify, and permanently hold territory beyond the Danube while a *limes* that fulfilled the empire's security needs was completed.[80] The new troops included two legions—one being *legio Claudia pia fidelis* from Windisch in Upper Germany— as well as eastern *vexillationes* and western auxiliaries, among them the British governor's personal guard.[81]

Trajan returned to Rome at the end of 102 AD, after which Decebalus rearmed, expanded his power into the Hungarian Plain, and formed new, anti-Roman alliances, all in violation of the peace treaty.[82] Dacian guerrilla forces also attacked Roman troops regularly, so that Trajan felt compelled to leave for the Danube once more in June of 105 AD and lead a full-scale campaign,

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[71] Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 84
[72] Pliny. *Panegyricus* 18.1; 10.1-2; *Epistulae* VIII.14.7; X.29; Bennett, 51
[73] Bennett, 51; Smallwood, 434
[74] Bennett, 52; 87; Smallwood, 413; *AE* 1973, 475; Šašel, 80-81; Pliny. *Epistulae* X.41-42
[75] Pliny. *Panegyricus* 22; see also Martial X.6; Bennett, 52; Roxan and Holder, 421
[76] Trajan left Rome on the 25th of March. Bennett, 88; Smallwood, 1
[77] Eck 1985, 161-162. *CIL* XIII 7697; 7715; 7716
[78] Bennett, 87; 89; Strobel 1984, 81 ff.; Lepper and Frere, 289-295
[79] Dio. LXVIII.9; Bennett, 94
[80] Bennett, 94
[81] Ibidem; Smallwood, 214
[82] Bennett, 97; Dio.LXVIII.10; Pliny. *Epistulae* X.74

considerably larger than the first, against the enemy. He intended to solve the Dacian problem once and for all by annexing that kingdom and incorporating it into the empire as a Roman province, which was to be ruled by a propraetor. The task required securing as many allies as possible and raising two entirely new legions prior to the campaign.[83] Since these preparations took time, the expedition was only launched in the spring of 106 AD.[84] By September of that year, the Dacian capital, Sarmizegethusa Regia, was in Roman hands and Decebalus had been killed.[85] Roman troops faced further, difficult campaigning in northern Dacia well into 107 AD. Hadrian took part in the operations as praetorian legate of Pannonia Inferior.[86] Once conquered, the new province formed "a marked extension north of the Lower Danube marches,"[87] a territory whose upkeep required a substantial number of troops on the ground. Thus, the creation of Roman Dacia permanently increased the Danube region's military importance at the expense of the Lower Rhine.

Already at the outset of Trajan's reign, only three legions stood in Lower Germany: *X Gemina* in Nijmegen, *VI Victrix* in Neuss, and *I Minervia* in Bonn.[88] *XXII Primigenia*, previously stationed in Xanten, had left the province before 96 AD and was certainly in Mainz in Upper Germany by the beginning of 98 AD.[89] Due to the Dacian Wars, *I Minervia*, a legion Trajan knew well,[90] went from Bonn for the Danube in 101 AD.[91] Thereafter, *X Gemina*, whose vexillations are still attested on the Brohltal stone quarries in 101 and 102 AD, left Nijmegen for Aquincum (Budapest) ca. 105 AD, the date in which the series of coins found on the Kops-Plateau comes to an end. [92] *X Gemina*'s transfer from Nijmegen meant that, little over thirty years after the great revolt, no legion was stationed in the land of the Batavians. Hence, the Roman authorities considered that the Lower

[83] Diplomacy: Dio.LXVIII.11 The legions were *II Traiana fortis* and *XXX Ulpia victrix*. Bennett, 99; Mann 1963, 483-489; Mann 1983, 55
[84] Bennett, 97; Smallwood, 3; 19
[85] Bennett, 100; Strobel 1984, 45-46; Lepper and Frere, 242; Dio. LXVIII.14; Pliny. *Epistulae* VIII.4.2
[86] Bennett, 101; *Historia Augusta, Vita Hadriani* 3.9; Eutropius.VIII.6.2
[87] Bennett, 163
[88] Compare Haalebos 2000, 66: "Das niedergermanische Heer zählte damals vier Legionen."
[89] Strobel 1988, 447; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1803
[90] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1426. "Die Legion (erhielt) zum ersten Mal außerhalb ihrer Standprovinz militärische Verwendung durch Traian, der sie von seiner Tätigkeit am Niederrhein als Caesar her, vielleicht schon seit seinermilitärischen Laufbahn als Privatmann persönlich geschätzt zu haben scheint und jetzt von ihm begonnenen schweren Ringen an der Donau heranzog."
[91] Ibidem. "Den Marschbefehl erhielt sie wohl erst im Laufe des Jahres 101... (*CIL* XIII 7697) NachBeendigung des ersten Krieges im Jahr 102 gehörte die Legion zu den im eroberten Gebiet zurückgelassenen Truppen und hat dann auch den zweiten Krieg in den Jahren 105-107 mitgemacht (*CIL* VI 3584; *Historia Augusta* 3.6), jetzt unter Führung des späteren Kaisers Hadrianus (*CIL* III 550) Die hervorragenden Waffentaten der Legionwurden anerkannt durch Verleihung von *Dona militaria* an ihren Führer (*donis militaribus ab eo (Traiano) donatobis*; Hadrian hatte schon den ersten Krieg mitgemacht als *comes imperatoris*) sowie an andere Offiziere (*CIL* II 2424; *CIL* VI 3584 zwei Centurionen)..." For *vexillationes* sent to the Danube: Dahlheim. "Bonn," in *RGA* 3 (1978), 225. Bechert 2007, 39; Bakker in *DNL* (1974), 198
[92] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1683. "(Die) geweihten Altäre können nur aus der Zeit unmittelbar vor und nach dem Abmarsch der *I Minervia* im zweiten Jahr des ersten Dakerkrieges stammen." *CIL* XIII 7697, 7715, 7716. "Wenn die geringen Spuren der Legion in Aquincum mit Recht als ihre frühesten in Pannonia (abgesehen von den oben besprochenen aus Carnuntum) angesehen werden, so werden sie noch vor die Teilung der Provinz Panonnien angesetzt werden müssen, welche zwischen den Jahren 103 und 107, wahrscheinlich vor 105, erfolgt zu sein scheint. Demnach wird *Xgemina* an die Donau versetzt worden sein und nur wenige Jahre in Aquincum gelagert haben. In welchem Jahre die*X gemina* das Standlager von Vindobona bezog, ist mit Bestimmtheit noch nicht zu ermitteln, sicher aber noch unterTraian nach dem Jahr 107..." See also Rüger 2000, 497; Bogaers in *DNL* (1974), 78; Strobel 1988, 449; Galsterer, 29. Coins: Van der Vin, 398

German *limes*'s north-western flank was secure for the time being, with Neuss as the Continent's north-westernmost legionary fortress and *VI Victrix* as the only legion left in Lower Germany.[93]

Colonia Ulpia Traiana

Although Xanten was left without a legion, Trajan did not intend to leave its strategic position undefended nor its fertile land unused. Before 101 / 102 AD, Trajan turned the territories of the Cugerni and Baetasii into *ager coloniae* and founded there a veteran colony, the *Colonia Ulpia Traiana*. The plan, possibly devised under Domitian, also might have fulfilled a promise to the Lower German troops made before Trajan became emperor.[94] Situated to the north of the legionary fortress, Colonia Ulpia Traiana became the northernmost Roman colony in continental Europe. This was due, in large part, to considerations of defense. [95]

The colony's construction was a large economic endeavor, which involved exploiting the Brohl valley stone quarries to obtain building material. Around 100 AD, work there increased significantly.[96] Before its transfer from Nijmegen to the Danube, *Legio X Gemina* took part in the building efforts, as did *Legio I Minervia* after its return to Bonn from the Danube in 107 AD.[97] The colony's construction also required the partial redirection of the *limes* road.[98] The original colonists would have been mostly veterans from the tenth legion, but the dwellers of existing settlements would have remained there as well. The Cugerni's original village, in fact, was left mostly untouched, and its people might have received the right of *connubium* due to the colonists' need for wives, just as had been the case with the Ubii at Cologne after 50 AD.[99] Trajan might have inaugurated the colony in 99 AD, when he had secured his position as Princeps, established peace with the Middle Danube Suebi, and fully prepared the war against Dacia.[100] A legion, however, would return to Xanten in due time.

Auxilia and the Lower German Legions

Trajan made other efforts to secure the Lower German frontier after the prompt reduction of the province's manpower. Along the portion of the frontier between Cologne and Neuss, a new fort of earth and wood was built in Dormagen, where an *ala* was stationed.[101] Moreover, a vexillation of *legio XXII Primigenia*, which was then stationed in Mainz, is attested around 101 to 106 / 107 AD in Bonn, most likely as a result of *legio I Minervia*'s absence from that fortress.[102] From 101 AD,

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[93] Strobel 1988, 449-450; Galsterer, 29. Soldiers of the *VI victrix* worked the stone quarries in the Brohltal around 100 AD. See Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1603; *CIL* XIII 7695; 7696; 7697; 7715; 7716

[94] Galsterer, 29-30; *AE* 1929, 223; *cf.* Rüger 2000, 499. *CIL* XIII 7697; 7715; for the theory of Trajan's promise to the Lower German troops, *cf.* Strobel 1988, 449; Bridger, 197

[95] *CIL* VII, 924 = *RIB* 946. For a summary of the archaeological details, see Bechert 1982, 84. Intention of the Roman authorities: Strobel 1988, 447. *Cf.* Galsterer, 29; Schalles, 447

[96] Galsterer, 29; Strobel 1988, 443

[97] Strobel 1988, 446

[98] Galsterer, 29

[99] Ibidem, 128-30

[100] Strobel 1988, 447

[101] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 38; *CIL* XIII 8523; 8524

[102] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1803-804. "Wohl aber ist während der Dakerkriege eine Vexillation der *XXII Primigenia* zur Besatzung des durch den Abmarsch der *I Minervia*, Ende des Jahres 101, enblößten Lagers zu Bonn herangezogenworden." *CIL* XIII 8082; *CIL* XIII 7715: the latter inscription was found on an Altar from the Brohltal on which *vexillationes* of legions *VI* , *X*, and *XXII* are mentioned. See ibidem, 1803-804.

vexillations from the 22nd legion were also present elsewhere on the Lower Rhine, where they worked the Brohl valley stone quarries. That legion's partial presence in Germania Inferior meant that it and the other Upper German legion, *VIII Augusta* stationed in Strasbourg, were responsible in part for the defense of the Lower Rhine.[103]

On the Rhine delta, meanwhile, there was an attempt to uphold troop levels after *X Gemina*'s removal from Nijmegen. Under Trajan, Nijmegen held a *vexillatio Britannica*. It was composed of British auxiliaries and perhaps also legionary troops, possibly soldiers from *II Augusta* stationed in Caerleon, from *XX Valeria Victrix* in Chester, and from one of the York legions, either *legio IX Hispana* or *VI Victrix*.[104] The *vexillatio*'s main task was likely to aid the tenth legion with the construction of Ulpia Noviomagus and of certain buildings such as a granary (*horreum*) and the *forum*. It may have reached Nijmegen upon returning from the Dacian front.[105] In fact, two Batavian milliary cohorts previously stationed in Britain, *IX* and *III Batavorum*, had gone to the Danube for the First Dacian War.[106] Inscriptions suggest that other troops probably arrived in Nijmegen soon after *legio X Gemina*'s departure and remained there until around 121 AD.[107]
The legionary fortress at Neuss was abandoned and possibly burned after *VI Victrix*'s transfer.[108] As a replacement for the departed legion, an auxiliary unit (an *ala* according to the *Itinerarium Antonini*) was stationed in a fort, three hectares in size, which was built where the legionary camp had stood.[109] Also, the auxiliary fort Neuss-Grimmlinghausen-Reckberg was built on the Rhine's fluvial terrace at the beginning of the second century AD.[110] The duty of the unknown unit stationed there was to guard the route between Bonn and Xanten.[111]

There is also evidence for the remainder of marching and training camps ("Marsch und Übungslagern") of the first and second century AD nearthe legionary fortress at Bonn. See Bechert 1982, 45; Strobel 1988, 443-445

[103] Strobel 1988, 445; 449-450

[104] Bogaers 1967, 66

[105] For the construction efforts, *cf.* Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 68. See also Strobel 1987a, 275; 276-277; *CIL* XVI 42; *RMD* 86

[106] Strobel 1987a, 275; *CIL* XVI 55

[107] Bogaers 1967, 65; 68. He suggests that the troops arrived at Nijmegen in 104 AD. For the theory of the *vexillatio Britannica*'s participation in the Dacian Wars, *cf.* Strobel 1988, 451-453. He also suggests that the *vexillatio* remained in Nijmegen only until around 106 / 107 AD, the date of *legio I Minervia*'s return to Bonn. See also Bogaers 1967, 66. Based on *CIL* III 4466, an inscription from Carnuntum, Pannonia that mentions T. Flavius Crensces, a cavalryman of *ala I (Pannoniorum) Tampiana vex. Brit.* (*vexillationis Britannicae*), he supposes that another *vexillatio Britannica* was sent to the Danube: "mit einem besonderen Aufrag an die Donau geschickt." See Jarrett, 43: a cavalryman "died in Carnuntum while serving in a vex Brit, almost certainly late in the reign of Domitian." It is therefore possible that there existed two different *vexillationes Britannicae*, one during the reign of Domitian, the other during that of Trajan. Another possibility is that the *vexillatio Britannica* accompanied *X Gemina* to the Danube. The British troops' absence from Nijmegen would have meant that the fortress remained mostly empty from ca. 104 to 121 or 122 AD. See Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 68. For the theory that the *vexillatio Britannica* first reached Nijmegen in the early Hadrianic period, see Pferdehirt, 266 ff.

[108] Bechert 1982, 66; see also Schönberger 1969, 165; Bechert 1982, 66; Strobel 1988, 450. Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 43 argue that the fortress was burnt around 95 AD, and that this was the reason for the sixth legion's departure.

[109] Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 43; Alföldy 1968 a, 163; von Petrikovits, 1957. 27 ff.

[110] G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 145

[111] Rüger 2000, 497; From the middle of the 2nd century AD until the 4th century AD, there was also an auxiliary fort in Novaesium. See G. Müller in *DNL* (1974), 140; 145

The withdrawal of three legions from Germania Inferior, however, was a temporary measure; Rome's authorities were clearly aware that at least two legions at full strength were needed in order to defend the Lower Rhine properly. Certainly, guarding the southern Lower German *limes* adequately required the permanent presence of a legion. Thus, once the Second Dacian War had ended, *legio I Minervia*, which Hadrian commanded against the Dacians, reoccupied its old fortress at Bonn. This probably took place immediately after 107 AD; certainly the legion is attested at Bonn in 112 AD and it remained in place for centuries.[112]

It was logical to station the second Lower German legion not at Neuss, but rather at Xanten, whose fortress stood about halfway between Neuss and Nijmegen. Once Nijmegen had been permanently abandoned, Xanten's location gained in strategic importance.[113] Thus, in 103 AD, *legio VI victrix* was transferred from Neuss to Xanten, which had remained without a legion since *XXII Primigenia*'s departure more than a decade earlier.[114] From 107 AD onward, however, *VI Victrix*'s soldiers were also present on the Hunerberg at Nijmegen, where there was a partial yet continuous occupation of the camp under both Trajan and Hadrian.[115] Apparently, Trajan's trust of the Batavians, whom he had reinstated as his personal horse guards, was not strong enough so as to empty their main settlement of Roman troops permanently once the tenth legion had left.

In Upper Germany, an unknown legate is attested in 110 / 111 AD, while Kanus Iunius Niger obtained command of the province in 116 or 117. [116] The province counted also with only two legions: *XXII Primigenia* in Mainz and *VIII Augusta* in Strasbourg. Trajan may have decided to reduce the garrison of the two German provinces permanently to two legions apiece at the start of the Second Dacian War, when it became evident that the defense of the future Danube frontier would require a long-term increase in troops.[117] This alone justifies the emperor's time spent on the Lower Rhine overseeing the frontier defenses before departing for the Danube. It may also justify the special command over the Germanies that he received under Nerva.[118] The inevitable removal of troops also created the need to build infrastructure and to change the civil administration. These measures further integrated the tribal areas to the south and west of the Rhine into the empire.[119]

Conclusion

Trajan's adoption by Nerva suggests that, yet again, a senator's control over one of the Rhine armies became a factor at the highest level of imperial politics. As emperor, however, Trajan would aim his attention elsewhere. He annexed Dacia, conquered new eastern provinces, and advanced in North Africa. These enormous efforts in terms of manpower and financial resources in the war

[112] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1426-1427; *CIL* III 6819. See Ritterling, *Legio* 1427 for the legion's participation in the wars ofAntoninus Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Lucius Verus.
[113] Strobel 1988, 450-451
[114] Ibidem, 450; Schönberger 1969, 165 gives the date of 105 AD. Gechter argues that the legion was transferred between 92 and 96 AD, perhaps also in 100 AD: Gechter in *DNL* (1974), 108; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1603; *CIL* XIII 8645
[115] Strobel 1988, 452-453
[116] Eck 1985, 50-51
[117] Strobel 1988, 450
[118] Hessing 1999, 153
[119] Van Enckevort, 374; Haalebos 1999, 200-201

zones came at the expense of other fronts, especially the north-western provinces.[120] In Britain, Roman troops would be posted no further than the Tyne-Solway / Stanegate line in northern England.[121] Lower Germany saw an outflow of troops, with the legionary garrison halved to a bare minimum of two legions and a drastic reduction in the number of auxiliary troops stationed in the province. To compensate, Trajan founded a veteran colony at Xanten and ordered the construction of military infrastructure, which allowed the frontier's defense with a smaller force.

There is little reason to think of a Lower German defense system founded by Vespasian that reached its culmination under Trajan and Hadrian, as Luttwak argues. In fact, Trajan's Lower German frontier was very similar to that completed under Claudius, except for the Flavian additions, the improvements in infrastructure, and the foundation of a new veteran colony. The reduced legionary garrison reflected the grand strategic shift toward the Danube and the East. In fact, at the end of Trajan's reign, the military exigencies of the emperor's monumental war against Parthia may have left both German provinces under a single legate, M. Atilius Metilius Bradua. As Eck writes, the emperor would have called all senators with military experience to the East when he invaded Armenia, Mesopotamia, and possibly Assyria in 114 A.D.[122]

Trajan's probable reinstatement of the Batavian horse guard, his foundation of a colony— in part for reasons of defense— and his transfer of the legion stationed at Nijmegen are examples of his adoption of Julio-Claudian policies in Germania Inferior. By maintaining some non-native troops in the Batavian homeland, however, Trajan acted with considerable prudence in view of the events of 70 AD. Such judicious measures, however, merely enabled a somewhat reckless adventure in the East, where, Fronto relates that Trajan held his own glory above his soldiers' blood, "for he often sent back disappointed the ambassadors of the Parthian king when they prayed for peace."[123] For his part, Dio writes that Trajan lamented his inability to emulate Alexander's journey to India after reaching the Tigris.[124] These passages suggest that the empire's frontiers were not fixed, and that an emperor's desire for martial glory continued to have grand strategic consequences.[125] As Harl argues, however, such statements should not be taken at face value, since authors such as Dio "wrote for a learned readership expecting such comparisons," whereas imperial policy "is better surmised by imperial actions."[126]

The Lower Rhine remained peaceful during Trajan's reign and in the subsequent decades. In part, the permanent presence of veterans with purchasing power near Xanten compensated for the economic effects of sending several thousand troops to the Danube.[127] The colony had elaborate public buildings, wide streets, and was larger than other cities founded by Trajan. Its planners would have expected great economic growth, but the colony's foundation did not turn Xanten into

[120] Maxfield, 3
[121] Maxfield, 4
[122] Eck 1985, 234
[123] Fronto, *Correspondence* (volume II), 212-213
[124] Dio, LXVIII.30
[125] Bowersock, 84-85 suggests that the annexation of Arabia as a province was a mere preparation for Trajan's future campaign against the Parthians, an argument that implies that the emperor, in hopes of re-enacting Alexander's exploits, began preparations to cross the Euphrates as early as 6 A.D.
[126] Harl 2007, 217
[127] Bridger, 197; Schalles, 447

a trading center of sufficient importance to rival Cologne or Trier.[128] This was due to geographical and historical reasons. Also, the veterans who made up the lion's share of the new settlers were not large-scale, long distance merchants by trade. Nonetheless, some residents of the colony, of Nijmegen, and of the neighboring areas did trade regionally and with Britain during the second century AD.[129]

Unlike the Colonia Claudia Agripinnensis, which traded regularly with the Germans of the Bergisches Land, there was little commercial contact between the Colonia Ulpia Traiana and the nearby Germanic settlements across the Rhine.[130] Also, the influx of country-dwellers into the newly founded colony weakened the surrounding territory's agricultural production. To the southwest of Xanten, however, an economy based on *villae rusticae* did develop during the second century AD, thus permanently replacing the old Germanic social structure with a Roman, *patron-cliens* hierarchy, to which the rural population had to adapt or face isolation.[131] Thus, areas with a more advanced economy and long-distance trade centers continued to exist alongside local markets, which did not compete with one another and where the profit motive might have been minimal. As Haalebos points out, this coexistence of different forms of economic organization in the same province or region was not an uncommon feature of the Roman world, particularly in the imperial periphery.[132]

[128] Schalles, 447; 451
[129] Wierschowski, 416; 420-421
[130] Grünewald and Schalles, 570
[131] Schalles, 452
[132] Haalebos 2001, 477

VIII. Hadrian

Like his predecessor and adoptive father, Hadrian was familiar with the German provinces before he became emperor. In 97 AD, after he had congratulated Trajan, then governor in Germania Superior, for his adoption by Nerva, Hadrian remained in Mainz as *legio XXII Primigenia*'s military tribune, a post he filled for an exceptional third time.[1] During his service under legate Iulius Servianus, Hadrian surely became well acquainted with the border area's military situation. Since the route of correspondence from Rome to the Lower Rhine passed through Mainz, Hadrian learned of Nerva's death before Trajan, who was staying in Cologne, and delivered to his kinsman the news of his accession to the Principate, this despite the wishes of his superior Servianus, who sought to prevent Hadrian from being the harbinger of good news.[2] Thereafter, Hadrian probably remained at Trajan's side on the Rhine as he made the necessary preparations for the first Dacian war.[3] Hadrian returned to Rome perhaps in 99 AD with the imperial entourage.[4]

The Lower Rhine Garrison

Soon after his own accession to the Principate, Hadrian strengthened Lower Germany's defenses by transferring *legio XXX Ulpia Victrix* from the Danube to the Lower Rhine. The legion's arrival in Xanten may have taken place as early as 118 AD, but certainly by 122 AD at the latest. Xanten, however, was occupied by *legio VI Victrix* from the outset of Hadrian's reign until its departure for Britain in 122 AD, so that there arises the question of *XXX Ulpia Victrix*'s location until the time of *VI Victrix*'s transfer. *XXX Ulpia Victrix* may have been stationed in Nijmegen from 118 AD, when its old fortress in Brigetio was occupied by another legion, before it went Xanten in the early 120's.[5] This would explain the presence of troops from *XXX Ulpia Victrix*—attested by stamped tiles— at the Hunerberg camp in Nijmegen before 125 AD.[6] Moreover, stamped tiles from the second century confirm *XXX Ulpia victrix*'s activity on the right bank of the Meuse across from Venlo and also south of that location, at Belfeld-Witfeld.[7] Further west, *XXX Ulpia victrix* built a *beneficiarii* station east of Zwammerdam.[8] Therefore, during Hadrian's early years as emperor, Lower Germany may have counted with the presence of three legions at full strength, one stationed at Bonn (*I Minervia*), the others at Xanten (*VI Victrix*) and Nijmegen (*XXX Ulpia Victrix*). The latter fortress's occupation could suggest that, in Hadrian's view, the Rhine delta should not be left without the presence of a legion. It is more probable, however, that *XXX Ulpia Victrix* arrived due to the emperor's plan to transfer a legion permanently to Britain, a province beset by rebellion at the outset of his reign.[9]

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[1] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 2.5. *Traiano a Nerva adoptato ad gratulationem exercitus missus in Germaniam superiorem translatus est*. A.R. Birley 1997, 37: "Hadrian's third military tribunate is unparalleled- only one other case is attested, some twenty five years later."
[2] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 2.6; Strobel 1988, 447-448
[3] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 2.7
[4] A.R. Birley 1997, 40
[5] Strobel 1988, 452-453
[6] Ibidem
[7] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 74
[8] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 89; Haalebos 1977, 78
[9] Strobel 1988, 451; A.R. Birley 1981, 95 ff.

Hadrian's Inspection of the Frontier

Hadrian did not intend to take strategic decisions of great magnitude while remaining in Rome. Rather, his aim was to secure the empire's frontiers in Britain, Germany, and elsewhere after inspecting the border zones personally. Thus, he travelled from Gaul to the Rhine provinces in 121 AD.[10] He possibly took the route from Massilia through the valley of the Rhône, and, upon arrival, he likely wintered near the Rhine,[11] as Dio's statement concerning Hadrian's endurance under German snow suggests:

> οὐδὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν οὐκ ἐν θάλπει, οὐκ ἐν ῥίγει ἐκαλύφθη, ἀλλὰ κὰι ἐν ταῖς χιόσι ταῖς Κελτικαῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς καύμασι τοῖς Αἰγυπτιακοῖς γυμνῇ αὐτῇ περιήει.
>
> "He covered his head neither in hot weather nor cold, but alike amid German snows and under scorching Egyptian suns he went about with his head bare."[12]

Since Dio's description of Hadrian's military activities during his provincial tour and his visit in Germania corresponds almost exactly to the narration in the *Historia Augusta*,[13] Birley supposes that Dio as well as the *auctor Historiae Augustae* obtained their information about Hadrian's military measures on the frontiers from the emperor's lost autobiography.[14] Both narrations mention Germany first, so that, presumably, Hadrian inaugurated his frontier policy in the Germanies, the first border provinces he visited as emperor.[15]

Just as Hadrian was familiar with the northern frontier zone, so were some of the men who likely formed a part of his entourage. Probably, he was accompanied by M. Attilius Bradua, Hadrian's *comes* who governed one or both of the Geman provinces either at the end of Trajan's reign or at the beginning of Hadrian's.[16] Priscus Neratius, the governor of Germania Inferior in 98 or 99 AD, and his brother Marcellus Neratius, governor of Britain around 100 AD, also could have been present.[17] As early as 121 AD, Hadrian named C. Quinctius Certus Poblicius Marcellus, consul in 120, Upper German legate.[18] Flavius Arrianus, Hadrian's close friend, may also have been among

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[10] A.R. Birley 1997, 113

[11] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 10.1. *Post haec profectus in Gallias omnes civitates variis liberalitatibus sublevavit. inde in Germaniam transiit*. Rhône valley: A.R. Birley 1997, 113: "Germany was no doubt his real goal— and Britain. He wanted to settle the north-western provinces in person, and had plans for the frontiers. He was to spend some months in Gaul on his return from Britain in the following year, hence there is no particular reason to suppose that he wintered at Lugdunum and only went on north to the Rhine in the spring of 122. He had spent a winter at Moguntiacum and then at Colonia Agrippinens (Cologne) as a young man 23 years earlier. The odds are that he wintered on the frontier in 121-122."

[12] Dio. LIX, 9.4; A.R. Birley 1997, 114; Weber, 106; 108. Compare Halfmann, 197; Chevallier. "Gallia Lugdunensis," in *ANRW* 2.3 (1975), 921 f., 926.

[13] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani, 10-11

[14] A.R. Birley 1997,119. Hadrian's composition of an autobiography is mentioned by the Historia Augusta: "...*si quidem Hadria ortos maiores suos apud Italicam Scipionum temporibus resedisse in libris vitae suae Hadrianus ipse commemorat*." Vita Hadriani 1.1

[15] A.R. Birley 1997, 119

[16] Ibidem, 115; *ILS* 8820; A.R. Birley1981, 92 ff.; Eck 1985, 233-235

[17] A.R. Birley 1997, 115; Eck 1985, 157-158

[18] Eck 1985, 52-53; *AE* 1934, 231. He governed Germania Superior certainly before 130 AD.

the emperor's entourage at this time.[19] Given Hadrian's familiarity with the Rhine provinces and the experience of his likely companions, there is good reason to suppose that the measures taken in Upper and Lower Germany under Hadrian were the emperor's own.

We know from Dio's history that Hadrian personally inspected the empire's defenses in the frontier provinces, where he abolished some forts, removed others to more advantageous locations, and had new ones built, a practice that, as Birley comments, was characteristic of a good general.[20] Dio writes further of Hadrian's meticulous inspection of frontier posts and of his military reforms:

> καὶ πάντα τὰ φρούρια καὶ τὰ τείχη περισκοπῶν τὰ μὲν ἐς ἐπικαιροτέρους τόπους μεθίστη, τὰ δὲ ἔπαυε, τὰ δὲ προσκαθίστατο, αὐτὸς πάντα ἁπλῶς, οὐχ ὅπως τὰ κοινὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων, ὅπλα λέγω καὶ μηχανὰς καὶ τάφρους καὶ περιβόλους καὶ χαρακώματα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ τεταγμένῳ στρατευομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῶν, τοὺς βίους τὰς οἰκήσεις τοὺς τρόπους, καὶ ἐφορῶν καὶ ἐξετάζων: καὶ πολλά γε ἐς τὸ ἁβρότερον ἐκδεδιητημένα καὶ κατεσκευασμένα καὶ μετερρύθμισε.
>
> "He personally viewed and investigated absolutely everything, not merely the usual appurtenances of camps, such as weapons, engines, trenches, ramparts and palisades, but also the private affairs of every one, but of the men serving in the ranks and of the officers themselves, — their lives, their quarters and their habits, — and he reformed and corrected in many cases practices and arrangements for living that had become too luxurious."[21]

Both Dio's account and the *Historia Augusta*'s statement that Hadrian "trained soldiers as if war were imminent" (*militem, quasi bellum immineret, exercuit*)[22] are confirmed by the contents of Hadrian's speech pronounced in 125 AD in front of the troops at Lambaesis, the new fortress occupied— and still being built at that time— by *legio III Augusta* in Africa, the text of which has been preserved in an inscription written on the base of the great column erected to commemorate the emperor's visit.[23] Having witnessed the troops' drills and maneuvers, Hadrian addressed the third legion's senior centurions and cavalrymen as well as three auxiliary units, extolling the troops for having performed their duties *per ordinem* and describing details of their exercises and

[19] A.R. Birley 1997, 121. "There is just a hint that Arrian might have been with (Hadrian). In one of his works Arrian reveals that he had seen the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, close to the fort which was to become known as Batava Castra (Passau), on the borders of Raetia and Noricum. (Arrian, *Indike* 4. 15-16) Arrian might, of course, have been there earlier in his career, perhaps as an equestrian officer, before he became a senator. But it is an attractive possibility to suppose that Hadrian might have had at least one Greek intellectual in his retinue during his tour of the Celtic west." *Cf.* Grassl, 250 ff.

[20] Dio. LXIX. 9; A.R. Birley 1997, 119. Tacitus (*Agricola* 20) praises Agricola for selecting the camping-ground himself (*loca castris ipse capere*) while campaigning in Britain.

[21] Dio. LXIX. 9; see Schönberger 1985, 393

[22] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 10

[23] A.R. Birley 1997, 210-211; Smallwood, 328

construction efforts.[24] Clearly, Hadrian's grand strategic priorities dictated that the frontier armies remained in peak condition. It is likely, therefore, that the emperor became personally acquainted with the troops stationed along the Rhine in order to instill discipline on the soldiers.[25] Indeed, Hadrian was probably concerned about the German and Raetian armies' battle readiness after a long period of peace.

The Upper German *Limes*

During his stay along the German frontier, Hadrian likely used *legio XXII Primigenia*'s fortress in Mainz as his headquarters.[26] Mainz was an ideal location since Hadrian intended to carry out an inspection not only of the Upper and Lower Rhine *limes*, but also of the provinces Raetia and Noricum.[27] Hadrian, in fact, first directed his attention to the Upper German frontier, where he mainly continued his predecessors' policies.[28] Scholars have argued that Hadrian reorganized Upper Germany's defenses by moving the auxiliary forts from the hinterland to the border itself. This, however, took place mostly under Domitian and Trajan, during whose reigns most auxiliary forts on the frontier were built. In fact, there is evidence for only a single fort on the Upper German *limes* being built under Hadrian (Saalburg on the Taunus), so that the emperor clearly limited his efforts in the region to maintaining and completing the work begun under Domitian and continued under Trajan.[29] In essence, this consisted of militarizing the frontier line and handing control of the lands to the rear to the *civitates Mattiacorum* and *Taunensium*.[30] Hadrian, however, did leave his personal mark on the Upper German *limes* by having a palisade constructed.

As the *Historia Augusta* reports, the emperor on many occasions decided to build a palisade "where the barbarians are held back not by rivers but by artificial barriers."[31] Archaeological evidence confirms that, during Hadrian's reign, a palisade and a continuous wall were erected on the Odenwaldlimes between the Danube, the Upper Rhine, and on other parts of the frontier where the military road that connected the forts and watch towers had not been thoroughly defended.[32] In building the palisade, an addition to an already established border, Hadrian's model might have been the "wooden revetments" with which the *Fossa Corbulonis* was reinforced under Trajan.[33] The Upper German / Raetian palisade, which had a height of three to four meters and was built with oak timbers approximately 30 centimeters in diameter, was an intermittent rather than a continuous frontier. It alternated with the Main and Neckar for considerable lengths along the border's course, something which indicates that both river and artificial barrier were "designed to

[24] A.R Birley 1997, 210; Smallwood, 328. For Hadrian's eloquence, *cf.* Eutropius VIII.7. *Facundissimus Latino sermone, Graeco eruditissimus fuit.* See also Fronto II, p. 206-207
[25] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 10
[26] A.R. Birley 1997, 115
[27] Hessing 1999, 153-154
[28] Maxfield, 3-4
[29] Baatz 1974, 112; 117. "...es handelt sich um das Kohortenskastell Saalburg. Allerdings war der Limes an dieser Stelle schon seit 90 durch ein kleineres Kastell besetzt." 119
[30] Maxfield, 14
[31] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 12.6. "*Per ea tempora et alias frequenter in plurimis locis, in quibus barbari non fluminibus sed limitibus dividuntur, stipitibus magnis in modum muralis saepis funditus iactis atque conexis barbaros separavit*." This refers to his visit in Spain, after his stay in Britain, therefore in 122 / 123 AD.
[32] Hessing 1999, 154; Schönberger 1985, 395; Baatz 2000, 281; Maxfield, 14. "10 metres or so was the reasonable height for a watch tower."
[33] Already established border: Baatz 1974, 112-124. Wooden revetments: Haalebos and Willems 1999, 253-254

perform the self-same task."[34] Nor did the palisade constitute an insurmountable obstacle for a foe intent on reaching imperial territory.[35] Its construction marked a mere technical improvement to the existing frontier defense.[36] The palisade simply "snaked around the existing installations," so that Hadrian's efforts amounted to the completion of the "controlled albeit open frontier" built in Upper Germany under Domitian and upheld under Trajan. It consisted of a *limes* road observed from watch-towers and protected by troops stationed in base-camps. The legionary fortresses were "disposed in close-spaced linear fashion along the frontier," and fortlets were built "at regular but not set intervals," both on the frontier line and behind it.[37] Thus, the palisade represented no fundamental innovation to the Roman system of border control in Upper Germany.[38] Even so, A.R. Birley argues, the device was useful for two reasons.

First, building the palisade, which measured three meters in height according to some estimates, involved the felling of thousands of trees that had to be transported to the border and erected. The work, which must have taken years to complete, must have constituted "a major undertaking for the armies of Germania Superior and Raetia."[39] By forcing the soldiers to conduct heavy labor, the palisade's construction served to restore among the troops the *disciplina maiorum* that Hadrian sought to reinstate across the empire. Hence, this building project, which also involved the reinforcement of wooden forts and watchtowers with stone, was in line with Hadrian's policy of imposing discipline on the imperial armies.[40]

Second, although the palisade's military use was limited, it nonetheless had a "symbolic significance."[41] The palisade was meant to impress the barbarians and Rome's potential enemies through a visible display of Roman technique, organization, and discipline that delineated the empire's borders with far more clarity than in the past.[42] Thus, potential attacks against Roman territory could be discouraged through psychological means. Hadrian's Wall in Britain also served these functions. Since it was built after the palisade in order to cover a frontier 120 kilometers in length (Britain's garrison consisted of some 50,000 soldiers, 15,000 legionaries and 35,000 auxiliaries), Hadrian may have applied the Upper Rhine *limes*'s system of defense along other portions of the imperial frontiers.[43] Surely, the palisade was not as imposing as Hadrian's Wall, which measured around five meters in height along its course. It stood out as "the most physically extravagant and superficially the strongest" frontier line of the Roman Empire, while presenting the only example of an artificial barrier that marks a frontier along its entire length.[44] Nonetheless,

[34] Maxfield, 8; 9-10; 12; 14. The palisade formed the frontier from the Rhine to the Main, then east of Wörth until the Neckar and also on the Swabian Alps until the Danube near Eining.
[35] See Luttwak, 122; Schleiermacher, 215-217
[36] Baatz 1974, 112; 117
[37] Maxfield, 13-14. "The towers were placed as close as 120 m or as distant as 700 m, their positioning determined by topography rather than a regular pre-determined pattern." See also 20. The stationing of troops in fortlets and towers is a main characteristic of an army fragmented in order to carry out frontier duties.
[38] Baatz 1974, 112; 117
[39] A.R. Birley 1997, 116. "It was formed by great oak posts, split through the middle, with the flat side facing outwards, strengthened by cross beams."
[40] Ibidem, 117
[41] Ibidem, 116
[42] Ibidem, 116-117
[43] Baatz 1974, 119; Maxfield, 22
[44] Maxfield, 1; 8; 14. Also, the palisade had "none of the close physical integration of independent elements- linear barrier, watchtowers, and controlled gateways- seen on Hadrian's Wall."

both Hadrian's Wall and the palisade are concrete manifestations of Hadrian's frontier policy, which consisted of consolidating the existing borders and renouncing the expansionism that, in Dacia and in the East, characterized Trajan's reign.[45] Hence, with respect to internal politics, both the palisade and the wall in Britain delivered a clear message to Roman critics of the emperor's border policy: the *imperium sine fine* once described by Virgil was to remain unfulfilled; as Birley writes, this was "a clear signal to any surviving admirers of Trajan's expansionist policies that the empire was indeed precisely defined: thus and no further."[46]

Hadrian's Use of the Batavian Force

From Raetia, Hadrian went to Noricum.[47] In one of these two provinces, the emperor was compelled to fend off an attack against imperial territory, and the Batavians, who once again served in the emperor's personal guard since Trajan's reign, played an essential role in his success. Dio relates how an alliance of barbarians had gathered across the Ister, that is, the Danube, in order to launch a raid in Roman lands before being awed by the Batavians' skill and discipline:

> οὕτω γὰρ καλῶς ἤσκητο τὸ στρατιωτικὸν αὐτῷ ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἱππικὸν τῶν καλουμένων Βατάουων τὸν Ἴστρον μετὰ τῶν ὅπλων διενήξαντο.
>
> "so excellently, indeed, had his soldiery been trained that the cavalry of the Batavians, as they were called, swam the Ister with their arms."[48]

This incident mirrors an event narrated in a poem found on an inscription of 118 AD that may have been composed by the emperor. The poem is written in praise of a horseman, Soranus from Syria, "brave and foremost among a thousand Batavi," who swam across the Danube fully armed in the emperor's presence.[49] Since the imperial horse guard was known simply as *Batavi*, Speidel argues that the one thousand *Batavi* were the *equites singulares Augusti* on their return from the Parthian War, a theory strengthened by Dio's description of the swimmers as horsemen.[50]

The efficiency of Hadrian's deployment of Batavian warriors is evident from Dio's narration:

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[45] Maxfield, 1

[46] A.R. Birley 1997, 116. He points out that Tacitus's comment about Tiberius, *princeps proferendi imperii incuriosus*, "could readily have applied to Hadrian…" *Cf.* Maxfield, 2 on Aelius Aristides's *Roman Oration*: "He was accepting, not grudgingly but as a matter of policy, as the true order of things, the fact that limits had been put upon the area of Rome's ascendancy… The age of optimistic expansion is over."

[47] A.R. Birley 1997, 120; Toynbee, 126. Hadrian's *adventus* in Noricum is portrayed on coins: Mattingly, 501 ff.; 496. His visit to the iron ore pits in the south of the province is also attested numismatically: Mattingly, 533. The same applies to his inspection of the army. Moreover, Ovilava (Wels) and Cetium (St. Pölten) became *municipii* under Hadrian: Alföldy 1974, 82. As A.R. Birley writes, Hadrian may have arrived in Noricum from Pannonia in 118 AD. Nonetheless, it is more probable that he visited Germania Superior, Raetia, and Noricumin 121 / 122 AD.

[48] Dio. LXIX. 9; see Schönberger 1985, 393

[49] Speidel 1994, 46; *CIL* III 3676

[50] Speidel 1994, 46: "…even if the horseman belonged to the local *ala I Batavorum milliaria*, known from a diploma in Pannonia in 112, the tactics and strategy were the same in the horse guard…" Dio, LXIX.9

ἃ ὁρῶντες οἱ βάρβαροι τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους κατεπλήττοντο, τρεπόμενοι δὲ ἐπὶ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ διαιτητῇ τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορῶν.

"Seeing all this, the barbarians stood in terror of the Romans, and turning their attention to their own affairs, they employed Hadrian as an arbitrator of their differences."[51]

That a unit of 1000 horsemen could so unnerve the enemy that it submitted to Rome's wishes may be far-fetched. However, since enemy field armies often counted with no more than "a few thousand men," then the 1000 skilled and highly trained horsemen did have the ability to "outmaneuver and overwhelm" an enemy with numerical superiority.[52]

The event mentioned by Dio may be the same that appears in the *Historia Augusta*, where we learn that Hadrian "gave a king to the Germans" (*Germanis regem constituit*), for which he "won from the Senate the usual ceremonies of thanksgiving."[53] Hadrian's appointment of a king for a Germanic tribe may be reconciled with Dio's statement concerning the emperor's role as arbiter between two hostile German peoples, especially if it was the case that all feuding parties accepted Hadrian's decision. Hadrian also may have appointed the leader of a tribe within an alliance or the head of a faction within a tribe in order to foster internal discord and weaken a potential enemy, thus reducing the possibility of attacks against Roman territory being planned and executed. The use of highly skilled cavalrymen from Lower Germany proved to be fundamental to the emperor's frontier policy, which, like that of his Julio-Claudian and Flavian predecessors, did not preclude sending troops on punitive campaigns beyond the imperial borders of the Rhine and Danube.

Foreign Subsidies

Dio also mentions the alternative methods to which Hadrian resorted in order to establish peace in case the awe-inspiring appearance of his Batavian guard and other troops did not suffice, namely the systematic use of bribes:

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ μάλιστα ἐν εἰρήνῃ τὸ πλεῖστον πρὸς τοὺς ἀλλοφύλους διεγένετο: τήν τε γὰρ παρασκευὴν αὐτοῦ ὁρῶντες, καὶ μήτε τι ἀδικούμενοι καὶ προσέτι καὶ χρήματα λαμβάνοντες, οὐδὲν ἐνεόχμωσαν.

"this best explains why he lived for the most part at peace with foreign nations; for as they saw his state of preparation and were themselves not only free from aggression but received money besides, they made no uprising."[54]

The *Historia Augusta* also describes this aspect of Hadrian's foreign policy:

[51] Dio. LXIX. 9. See Schönberger 1985, 393
[52] Speidel 1994, 46
[53] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 12.7. The emperor was honored also for having "suppressed revolts among the Moors" (*motus Maurorum compressit*).
[54] Dio. LIX.9

> *regibus multis plurimum detulit, a plerisque vero etiem pacem redemit, a nonnullis contemptus est.*
>
> "he showed a multitude of favors to many kings, but from a number he even purchased peace, and by some he was treated with scorn."[55]

The ancient sources mention Hadrian's systematic bribing of foreign leaders. One was Pharasmanes, King of the Iberi, who received from the Roman emperor "an elephant and a band of fifty men in addition to magnificent presents." [56] Hadrian's aim was to persuade potential allies to submit to Rome, a policy that was surely criticized by a hard-line element in Roman politics. Opposition is evident from the *Historia Augusta*'s reference to kings who scorned the emperor and from the fourth century *Epitome de Caesaribus*'s reproach of Hadrian for attempting to establish peace through dubious means.[57] However, given the emperor's stern measures toward the frontier armies, which were trained to be at the height of preparedness for war, it can be assumed that, for the allies, the alternative to cooperation with Rome was to be on the receiving end of a military campaign. At least this was the threat they were supposed to perceive. Thus, Hadrian's policy consisted of subsidizing and bribing certain tribes and kingdoms on the one hand and, on the other, of threatening them constantly with attack in case of disloyalty. This course of action was certainly put into use in the area of the Black Sea, but possibly also along the Rhine frontier.[58]

Hadrian on the Lower Rhine

Hadrian's arrival on the Lower Rhine followed his tour of the provinces further to the east and south. Around the beginning of the summer of 122 AD, he turned from Noricum toward Germania Superior and continued westward until he reached Lower Germany. The emperor, protected by his mostly Batavian guard, led his entourage and army along the Rhine and the Waal to the North Sea Coast before embarking for Britain. Hadrian thus reached Nijmegen and thereafter the territory of the Batavians and Cananefates. Here, at a site that lay "only one day's march away from the embarkation harbor,"[59] he laid the groundwork for a new Lower German city either by founding a

[55] Historia Augusta. *Vita Hadriani* 17.12-13

[56] Ibidem. "*...multis ingentia dedit munera, sed nulli maiora quam Hiberorum, cui et elephantum et quinquagenariam cohortem post magnifica dedit dona*." However, Hadrian´s attempt to appease Pharasmanes by means of gifts, bribes, and even a body of troops was not entirely successful according to the author of the Historia Augusta, since Pharasmanes behaved better toward Antoninus Pius. "Farasmanes rex ad eum Romam venit plusque illi quam Hadriano detulit." Historia Augusta. Vita Antonii 9.6. The *Historia Augusta* also narrates that Hadrian was initially scorned by the Albani: "Albanos et Hiberos amicissimos habuit, quod reges eorum largitionibus prosecutus est, cum ad illum venire contempsissent." Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 21.13. Contact with these kingdoms was possibly established in 123 / 124 AD. Due to this policy, the Bactrians sent an embassy to Hadrian with the aim of establishing *amicitia*: "*Reges Bactrianorum legatos ad eum amicitiae petendae causa supplices miserunt*." Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 21.14. These alliances were nonetheless established, and Hadrian secured other allies such as Cotys, king of the Cimmerian Bosporus, to whom he gave a diadem. See A.R. Birley 1997, 156

[57] Epitome de Caesaribus, XIV. "… *a regibus multis pace occultius muneribus impetrate, iactabat palam plus se otio adeptum quam armis ceteros*."

[58] Hadrian clearly understood the strategic importance of the Black Sea region and of the passes of the Caucasus. He who held the access routes to the Caucasus also controlled the mobility of the dangerous Nomadic tribes of the north. See Bosworth, 226

[59] Hessing 1999, 155; A.R. Birley 1997, 121

market or granting the *ius nundinarum* to a settlement of the mid-first century AD or the Flavian era, as can be assumed from the evidence of the *Tabula Peutingeriana*.[60] *Forum Hadriani* or *Forum Aelium Cananefatium* stood in modern Voorburg between the Rhine and the Meuse and west of the Batavian homeland, near the fort where the *classis Germanica* guarded the *Fossa Corbulonis*.[61] As such it was the northernmost *municipium* in continental Europe when it received this status, being named *Municipium Aelium Cananefat(i)um* no later than 162 AD.[62] It is logical to suppose that Hadrian rather than Antoninus Pius granted *Forum Hadriani* the title of *municipium* since he took similar measures in other provinces.[63] The foundation of the *forum Hadriani* can only strengthen the impression that the Romans' relations with their old allies, the Cananefates and the Batavi, had drastically improved by the time Hadrian became emperor, and that the Rhine delta was fully pacified. Hadrian's presence in Voorburg, moreover, suggests that he also may have visited the famed *Insula Batavorum*, the home of the horse guards whom Trajan had reinstated.[64]

In order to reach Britain, Hadrian took either the most direct route to the Channel by means of Tongeren and Boulogne or, alternatively, he followed the Lower Rhine and crossed the North Sea from *Lugdunum* (Katwijk).[65] During his stay in Germania Inferior, Hadrian met his close friend Aulus Platorius Nepos, governor of the Lower German province from 119 until 122 AD, probably in Colonia Agrippinensis.[66] Nepos, the first known legate of Germania Inferior following an *ignotus* who held the post at the beginning of the second century AD, was most likely a *homo novus* from Baetica who had governed Thrace under Trajan before becoming Hadrian's colleague as consul in 119 AD; this points to their close personal relationship.[67] Hence, Hadrian, as certain emperors before him, prudently chose an experienced, trusted man as Lower German legate. It may also have been at this point in time that Hadrian, having inspected the defenses along the Dutch River area, ordered the construction of the third phase of the *limes* road in Lower Germany, which was carried out in the winter of 124-125 AD.[68] Improvements were necessary since the river's erosion had damaged the work undertaken during Trajan's reign along the Lower German *limes*, as is apparent from evidence of flooding found in Valkenburg and De Meern. The road's poor state impeded the fluid movement of Hadrian's army, which consisted of significant numbers of infantry and cavalry.[69] Thus, the emperor ordered a new phase of construction.

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[60] Stolte. "Cananefaten," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 329; Roymans, 208 with note no. 463; Hessing 1999, 155

[61] A.R. Birley 1997, 121; *Tab. Peut.*; *CIL* III 4279; *cf.* Hessing 1999, 155. "Elements of the fleet, the *Classis Germanica*, might have been stationed at the mouth of the Rhine, as well as at *Forum Hadriani* itself." Cf. Van Es, 137

[62] Stolte. "Cananefaten," in *RGA* 4 (1981), 329; *CIL* XIII 9165. For the question of the *municipium* in question being named *Aelium* or*Aurelium Cananefatium*, see Hessing 1999, 155: "Since the discovery in 1997 of four new milestones in Wateringen, 5 km south of *Forum Hadriani*, we know for certain that the abbreviation stands for *Municipium Aelium Cananefatium*. The oldest milestone… had already been erected at the time of Antoninus Pius."

[63] Hessing 1999, 155. Hadrian also bestowed the rank of *municipium* on the *civitas Tungrorum* (Tongeren), which was located either in the southern portion of Germania Inferior or in Belgica. See A.R. Birley 1997, 121

[64] A.R. Birley 1997, 121

[65] Ibidem, 124; Hessing 1999, 155; Van Es, 137

[66] A.R. Birley 1997, 115; 121-122; Eck 1985, 164-165

[67] Eck 1985, 164-165. *Ignotus*: ibidem, 163; *CIL* III 10804. For the possible Hadrianic date of M. Atilius Metilius Bradua's mandate as Lower German legate, *cf.* Eck 1985, 233-235

[68] Hessing 1999, 152; 155; Haalebos and Willems, 252

[69] Hessing 1999, 155

The endeavor involved improving the existing road, building bridges over creeks and rivers and placing "more rows of posts, tieback braces and planking" along the frontier.[70] There is evidence that this was part of a larger, well organized infrastructure project "of high technical quality" on the Lower Rhine, for a Hadrianic building phase of considerably large scale has been identified at Woerden, Valkenburg, De Meern, Zwammerdam, Utrecht, Vechten, and further east at Arnhem-Meinerswikj (*castra Herculis*) as well as along the *fossa Corbulonis*, "at the junction where the *Limes* road would have crossed the canal near the fort at Leiden-Roomburg (*Matilo*)."[71] Near Valkenburg, the path leading to the *vicus* Woerd-Marktveld had been largely destroyed by flooding, and it was rebuilt in 124 AD even if the settlement's military importance was on the wane due to the area's increased dampness.[72]

The project was tied to Hadrian's program of imposing military discipline on the troops by employing them in the construction of infrastructure, and there is proof that *legio XXX* took part in such work along the Rhine after being transferred to Xanten.[73] This merely reflects the vastness of the project's scale; once complete, the road was "raised on a dike,"[74] which was built in order to carry "the *limes* road on the S bank of the Rhine" and perhaps further to the east.[75] The frontier defenses were thus left in a sufficiently solid state so as "to function for at least a century," with "only limited repairs and maintenance work… on the road and the dike."[76] Given the degree of investment required, it is highly unlikely that the building program's costs were met with the funds available to the provincial governor.[77] Rather, it must have been the case that Hadrian himself took the decision to carry out the building program and that the central government was directly involved in its execution.[78] The project, in other words, points to the conscious design and implementation of imperial grand strategy on the Lower Rhine frontier.

Much like Trajan, Hadrian took measures to defend the Lower Rhine frontier with a significantly reduced number of troops.[79] His alterations to the Lower German *limes*, however, were meant to impress the enemy with a palpable display of Roman power. As was the case with the Upper German / Raetian palisade and Hadrian's Wall in Britain, the raised road, which stretched for at least 40 kilometers, was visible from a distance, especially since it was built along Germania Inferior's low and mostly deforested landscape.[80] Although it was not as imposing as Hadrian's other systems of frontier defense, the Lower German *limes* could still astound Rome's actual and potential enemies outside the empire's territory. In this sense, the road's construction was part of Hadrian's efforts to secure and delineate the empire's frontiers in a way that would result striking to the barbarians living beyond them.[81]

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[70] Ibidem, 151-153
[71] Ibidem; Haalebos and Willems, 253-254
[72] Hessing in *DRR* (1995), 94-95
[73] Hessing 1999, 154-155
[74] Ibidem
[75] Haalebos and Willems, 253-254
[76] Hessing 1999, 152; 155
[77] Ibidem, 153; *cf*. Reuter, 189-194
[78] Hessing 1999, 153
[79] For the possibility of *numeri* units, which were smaller than a cohort, receiving a new organisation under Hadrian, see Baatz 1974, 119. See also Maxfield, 23; E. Birley 1932, 211-212
[80] Hessing 1999, 155. "60 km would be the distance from Katwijk to Utrecht…"
[81] Ibidem

Troop Movements under Hadrian

Nepos might have accompanied Hadrian on his voyage to Britain. The former certainly replaced Pompeius Falco as British governor before the 17th July 122 AD, the day in which Nepos issued a diploma to an auxiliary soldier.[82] Since only months would have passed between the diploma's discharge and the copy's certification, Nepos certainly arrived in Britain a short time before 17 July 122.[83] His move from Germania Inferior corresponded to an established practice: especially during the second century, the Lower German governor would move on to hold the post of British *proconsul*.[84] Moreover, Hadrian and Nepos likely led *legio VI victrix*, previously stationed in Xanten, to Britain.[85] Apparently, the legion was accompanied by a *vexillatio* of *legio I Minervia*, stationed in Bonn, as well as by thousand-man *vexillationes* from the Upper German legions *VIII Augusta* and *XXII Primigenia*.[86] A new legion's arrival to the island province would have added prestige to Hadrian's visit.[87]

VI Victrix, whose tribune was P. Tullius Varro, soon found itself in the north of the British province, where it dedicated an altar to Neptune and Oceanus on the Tyne.[88] It then moved to replace the ninth legion at the fortress at York (Eboracum), where it remained for centuries.[89] The presence of Hadrian, Nepos, and the sixth legion in Britain at the same time must have been connected with the emperor's decision to secure that province's northern border. Clearly, Nepos's principal duty in Britain, aside from keeping the peace, was to oversee the completion of Hadrian's Wall, which the emperor himself probably decided to build after his inspection of the frontier.[90]

The Case of the Ninth Legion

After *legio VI victrix*'s departure from Germania Inferior, the Lower Rhine garrison counted once again with two legions: *I Minervia* at Bonn and *legio XXX ulpia victrix* at Xanten.[91] Nonetheless, it is possible that, around 121 AD, the enigmatic ninth legion or a part of it was sent from the trouble-stricken province of Britain to Germania Inferior in order to strengthen the Lower German garrison. Hence, there might have been a total of three legions stationed in the province once again. *Legio IX Hispana* stood at York from 71 AD until at least the beginning of Trajan's reign. For several reasons, it is particularly difficult to locate this legion from Trajan's reign onward. As Eck

[82] A.R. Birley 1997, 121-122; *CIL* XVI 69; A.R. Birley 1981, 100 ff.; Eck 1985, 164-165
[83] Breeze and Dobson, 64
[84] Alföldy 1968 a, 130 with note 606; see also Alföldy 1968 b, 28; 38; E. Birley 1958, 12
[85] Eck 1985, 165; Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1605-1606. "Für den Abmarsch der *legio VI victrix* vom Rhein, liegt, ein seltenerFall, ein ausdrückliches inschriftliches Zeugnis vor, in dem *cursus honorum* eines Senators, dessen Name leider nicht erhalten ist (*CIL* VI 1549). Unter Marc Aurel vestorben und wegen seiner Verdienste um den Staat mit einer *statua habitu civili* auf dem Traiansforum geehrt, war er in seiner Jugend zur Zeit Hadrians *trib. mil. leg. VI victr.* gewesen, *cum qua ex Germ(ania) in Britann(iam) transiit*."
[86] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1427; *CIL* X 5829
[87] Hessing 1999, 155
[88] A.R. Birley 1997, 124; 130-131
[89] Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1606. Ptolemy. *Geographia* II.3.10
[90] Breeze and Dobson, 63-66; This is the same argument put forth by Ritterling. "*Legio*," in *PRcA* 12.1-2 (1924-1925), 1605-1606
[91] XXX Ulpia Victrix: Bechert, Gechter, and Reichmann in *DRR* (1995), 50

writes: "*Eines der am heftigsten umstrittenen Probleme der Militärgeschichte der römischen Provinz Britannien ist das Ende der* Legio IX Hispana."[92]

The last piece of evidence for the Ninth Legion's presence at York dates from 108 AD.[93] Significantly, its name does not appear among the thirty legions listed in an inscription from 162 AD found in Rome, nor do we have any further evidence of its existence after this date.[94] Therefore, scholars assumed during the first half of the twentieth century that *IX Hispana* (*VIIII Hispanica*) was destroyed in Britain at some point during the reign of Trajan or early on in that of Hadrian. This was mainly because of its confirmed presence at York in 108/109 and the military troubles which the Romans experienced in Britain during the following decade.[95] Nevertheless, several inscriptions relating to the careers of officers associated with the ninth legion make the theory of *VIIII Hispanica*'s destruction under Trajan or Hadrian "highly implausible," as A.R Birley notes.[96]

In the first place, two consuls who served as *tribunes laticlavii* with the ninth legion could not have served with the legion in question before the mid 120's;[97] this was especially the case of L. Aemilius Karus, consul in 144 and also *quaestor Augusti* under Hadrian.[98] Moreover, an inscription shows that L. Aninius Sextius Florentinus, proconsul of Gallia Narbonensis and then of Arabia in 127 AD, had served as legate of the ninth legion.[99] Given the normal ascendancy of command, Florentinus is unlikely to have given up his post with *VIIII Hispanica* before 124 AD. Finally, Q. Camurius Numisius Junior, consul in 161 AD, was formerly a *legatus laticlavius* with the VIIII Hispanica, which means that he should have held this position around the year 140, and he certainly could not have been born before 120 AD.[100] There is also the matter of two finds at Nijmegen, which prove that the legion or at least one of its *vexillationes* was present there in the early 120's AD.[101]

The discovery of part of a *tegula* and of the rim of a *mortarium* with the ninth legion's inscriptions led Professor J.E Bogaers, the excavator at Nijmegen, to conclude that troops of *legio IX Hispana* manufactured ceramic and seals in De Holdeurn, a modern village near the fortress at Nijmegen where tens of thousands of tiles and ducts produced by soldiers from the tenth legion have been found.[102] Therefore, Bogaers concludes that the legion in its entirety was stationed shortly in Nijmegen, where its soldiers were active in the brickworks and pottery works.[103] He suggests that *legio IX Hispana* was transferred to Nijmegen ca. 121 AD, after it had suffered heavy losses in

[92] Eck 1972, 459
[93] *CIL* VII 24; *RIB* 665 from York
[94] *ILS* 2288; *CIL* VI 3492
[95] The inscription is from York: *RIB* 665
[96] A.R Birley 1981, 219
[97] L. Aemilius Karus (cos. 144), *ILS* 1028 . L. Novius Crispinus (*cos.* 150), *ILS* 1077
[98] A.R. Birley 1981, 220
[99] *IGR* III 87 and 14148, from Petra
[100] A.R. Birley 1981, 220; 255; *CIL* XI 5670
[101] Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 68; Schönberger 1985, 392
[102] For De Holdeurn, *cf.* Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 65
[103] Bogaers 1967, 72. "Soldaten der Legio IX Hispana (haben) in de Holdeurn Keramik und Ziegel hergestellt." Therefore, he concludes: "dass diese Legion kurze Zeit in ihrer Gesamtheit im Lager von Nijmegen gelegen hat und dass Soldaten dieser Legion in den Ziegeleien und Töpfereien von de Holdeurn gearbeitet haben."

northern Britain.[104] It was, of course, in this context that *legio VI Gemina* was transferred from Xanten to York in 122 AD. According to Bogaers, however, the ninth legion spent only a relatively short period of time in Lower Germany.[105]

Bogaers's theory seems to have been confirmed by the discovery of a bronze attachment to a *phalera* that shows an inscription of *legio IX Hispana*.[106] The piece constitutes a fourth piece of evidence for the ninth legion's presence in Nijmegen. It is noteworthy that the inscription shows the numeral IX, while the three other pieces of evidence show the numeral VIIII. This suggests that the *phalera*'s owner was transferred to Nijmegen from England,[107] for tile stamps with the ninth legion's inscriptions with the numeral "added by subtraction" have also been found at York and its surroundings.[108]

Other tile stamps of the ninth legion were found in Carlisle (Luguvalium), surely an important military post in northern England while the Stanegate frontier was being established under Trajan, and at Scalesceugh, "the legionary tilery (located) five miles south-east of Carlisle beside the Roman road to Old Penrith."[109] These finds, which show the numeral VIIII as do the other three

[104] Ibidem; *cf.* Strobel 1988, 451. For a different view, *cf.* A.R. Birley 1981, 221 f.

[105] Bogaers 1967, 72. "Es hat weiter den Anschein, dass die Legio IX Hispana, die sehr wahrscheinlich aus den Kämpfen im Norden Britannien mit schweren Verlust hervorging, um 121 auf das Fastland, eben in das Lager zu Nijmegen, verlegt wurde...Die *Legio IX Hispana* hat jedoch anscheinend nur eine verhältnismäßig kurze Zeit in Nijmegen zugebracht." A.R Birley 1981, 221-222 suggests that the evidence cited by Bogaers is insufficient to attest for the presence of an entire legion at Nijmegen. He argues instead that the discoveries should be interpreted as evidence of a vexillation of the Ninth Legion in Germania Inferior. He points to the fact that a vexillation from this legion was sent as reinforcement during either the second Dacian War (104-106) or during the Parthian War (113-118), or possibly both. He adds that it is unlikely that IX Hispana was already in Nijmegen in 122, for he suggests that, if that had been the case, Hadrian would have taken it to York in Britain, a province with which it was already familiar, rather than sending the VI Victrix, as he in fact did when more troops were required in Britain. He argues that the VIIII Hispana remained in Britain "ten or eleven years" after the arrival of Legio VI Victrix in 122 AD, which would mean that it was probably taken east in 133 AD by Julius Severus, the island's governor called to Judaea to help quell Bar Kochba's revolt. With regards to the potential presence of both VI Victrix and VIIII Hispana in Britain from 122 until ca. 133 AD, A.R. Birley proposes that VI Victrix replaced VIIII Hispana at York while the latter legion was stationed at a "new, incomplete base" at Carlisle, which became "superfluous" once Hadrian's Wall was complete. Nevertheless, Dobson, 233-234 argues that, if both the VI Victrix and the VIIII Hispana were stationed in Britain at the same time after 122, then it would have been more logical for the former to be transferred to the east since it had arrived in Britain more recently. A.R. Birley 1981, 222 (note no. 27) maintains that, "if the transfer did not take place before Julius Severus' departure c. 133 and VI Victrix by then had occupied York for some years while IX Hispana was in a new but incomplete base (at Carlisle?) which was by then regarded as superfluous, the choice of the IX is perfectly intelligible."

[106] Sijpejsteijn, 281. "... ein bronzenes Anhängsel mit einem Haken," das "ursprünglich mittels des Hakens mit einer Phalera verbunden" war." Das Haken "war versilbert; es zeigt auf der einen Seite noch vage Spuren von Verzierungen und trägt auf der anderen Seite eine zweiseilige Inschrift," die lautet: leg(io) IX Hisp(ana).

[107] Ibidem. Das Stück "ist also ein weiteres, viertes Zeugnis für die Anwesenheit der *legio nona Hispana* in Nimwegen... (Wie Bogaers überzeugend gezeigt hat, lagerte die Legio IX Hispana vermutlich von 121, als sie von Britannia nach Nimwegen versetzt wurde, bis 130, als sie nach Osten geschickt wurde, in Nimwegen). Beachtet werden soll, dass das neue Zeugnis das Zahlzeichen IX hat, während die drei schon bekannte Objekte das Zahlzeichen VIIII haben... Es sieht so aus, als ob der Besitzer dieses Anhängsels das Stück aus England mitgebracht und in Nimwegen verloren hat."

[108] Bogaers 1967, 68. "Es war eine überraschende Feststellung, dass aus dem Lager der Legio IX Hispana in Eburacum (York) und aus deren nächsten Umgebung nur Stempel dieser Legion mit dem Ziffer IX bekannt sind. Nur an zwei Orten in England sind von dieser Legion Stempel gefunden worden, deren Zahlreichen das gleiche ist wie auf dem Ziegelfragment aus Nijmegen, nämlich VIIII."

[109] Wright, 380

pieces of evidence from Nijmegen,[110] seem to date from before 122 AD, that is, from the end of the legion's stay in Britain.[111] In this respect, it is significant that there is no evidence for *VIIII Hispana*'s participation in the construction of Hadrian's Wall, which makes the theory, espoused mainly by A.R Birley, of the legion's permanence in Britain until the 130's AD problematic, except of course if it built the turf portion on the Wall, which bears no inscriptions. The evidence, however, suggests that the ninth legion or a substantial portion of it stood at or near Carlisle prior to its departure from Britain.

The ninth legion's activity after its stay at Nijmegen, if it indeed was stationed there in its entirety, is also a matter of controversy. Given its certain existence in the 130's AD, E. Birley proposed that the ninth was the legion destroyed in a war against the Parthians at Elegeia in Armenia in 161 AD, an event narrated by Dio in his history.[112] Most scholars, including Eck, accept this supposition, although Eck admits the possibility of the legion ceasing to exist at some other point in time towards the end of Antoninus Pius's reign (138-161 AD).[113] The legion's destruction almost certainly seems to have taken place in the East. It has also been argued that, in 133 / 134 AD, Julius Severus, the governor of Britain whom Hadrian summoned to Judaea, took the *VIIII Hispana* to the east, where it was disbanded after incurring significant losses at the hand of the rebels fighting under Shimon Bar Kochba.[114]

Nevertheless, M. Mor points out that, since Severus arrived to Judaea in 134 AD, when the revolt had been mostly subdued, the insurgents were likely no longer strong enough to annihilate a legion in its entirety.[115] This, however, does not mean that Severus did not take the legion eastward, which is a very plausible alternative. Mor further maintains that, as is apparent from the aforementioned evidence, *IX Hispana* still existed in the 120's AD, and it is plausible that it indeed was the legion destroyed by the Parthians at Elegeia in 161. However, lack of hard evidence for its precise removal from Britain, and even for its final destruction, leaves any discussion of the matter "within the framework of conjecture."[116]

Although one has to agree with Mor's statement, it is reasonable to accept Bogaers's claim that the entire legion was indeed stationed at Nijmegen during the 120's AD due to the finds he has cited. Given its possible destruction in the East in 161 AD and also the desperate need for troops in Judaea during the Bar Kochba revolt, the theory of the legion's transfer eastward under the command of Julius Severus also seems acceptable. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that the transfer to Nijmegen took place during Trajan's reign; this would have left Britain, a province of key military importance, with only two legions at a time of relatively high tension. After *legio IX Hispana*'s departure, which may have taken place around 131 AD, there is no evidence for the

[110] Ibidem. Tile stamps of the ninth legion have (potentially) also been found at Lincoln, Templeborough, Old Winteringham, Malton, Aldborough and mainly York."
[111] Bogaers 1967, 69. "Carlisle muss von militärischer Bedeutung gewesen sein, bevor unter der Regierung des Hadrianus die bekannte Mauer gebaut wurde. Es sind Überreste eines Kastells gefunden worden, das im Anfang der flavischen Zeit gebaut wurde." 73-74. "Die Stempel der Legio IX Hispana auf den Ziegeln von Carlisle und Scalesceugh, die dem Typ nach mit dem Nijmegener Exemplar zusammengehören, stammen dann wohl aus der letzten Periode des Aufenthalts dieser Legion in Britannien..." See also Wright, 380
[112] Dio. LXX, 2.1
[113] Eck 1972, 459; *cf*. Bechert, Van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 68
[114] E. Birley 1961, 28 ff.
[115] Mor, 269. 134 AD: Atkinson, 66
[116] Mor, 269

presence of an entire legion at Nijmegen, although a *vexillatio* from *XXX Ulpia Victrix* may have been present there.[117] The Lower German garrison was then left with two legions until the third century. These were *legio XXX ulpia victrix* in Xanten and *legio I Minervia* in Bonn. Under Trajan and Hadrian, however, it was not only the Lower German legionary garrison that was reduced, for a significant number of auxiliary units were also transferred out of the province.

The Lower German *Auxilia*

Although Hadrian maintained two legions stationed on the Lower Rhine, several auxiliary units left Lower Germany during his reign. In 122 AD or shortly before, one *ala* was transferred from Germania Inferior to Britain, probably in order to take part in the British war fought in the north of the province during the first years of Hadrian's reign.[118] The *ala*'s transfer also can be seen in the context of the construction of Hadrian's Wall, which created a constant need for cavalry in the border area. By 129 / 130 AD, at least one additional *ala*—but perhaps two— had gone from Germania Inferior to Upper Germany.[119] These transfers, however, were compensated between 124 and 127 with the arrival in Germania Inferior of two new *alae* from Britain, units which may have arrived at the same time.[120] The Lower German diploma of 127 AD lists five *alae* and it can be assumed that no further units were stationed in the province at this time.[121] As Holder notes, "the number of *alae* remained constant" since the Flavian period, yet the aforementioned transfers prove that the individual units were sent to other provinces before being replaced by others.[122] In the post-Hadrianic period, however, one of the cavalry units that had arrived in Germania Inferior from Britain under Hadrian (*ala Gallorum et Thracum Classiana*) was sent back to Britain by 178 AD. Since no new *ala* is attested in Germania Inferior after Hadrian, the Lower German garrison may have included only four *alae* at the end of the reign of Marcus Aurelius, as the close of the second century approached. This would have meant not only a return to a pre-Flavian troop level, as in the case of the cohorts, but also a decrease in comparison to the cavalry units stationed in Lower Germany in the Claudian-Neronian period.[123]

Unlike the case of the Lower German *alae*, no infantry units are attested as being transferred to Britain around 120 AD in order to take part in Hadrian's British wars.[124] Hadrian, however, did

[117] Bechert, van Enckevort, and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 69
[118] *Ala Augusta Vocontiorum*
[119] *Ala Indiana* went to Germania Superior between 117 and 127 or 129 / 130 AD. *Ala Moesica* was in Germania Superior perhaps before 127 AD since it does not appear on that year's Lower German diploma. However, the unit is attested in Upper Germany for the first time in 184 / 186 AD.
[120] *Alae I Thracum* and *Gallorum et Thracum Classiana*. Holder 1999, 250. "The shortfall in *alae* brought about by transfers out of the province had been made good by the transfer of *ala I Thracum* and *ala Gallorum et Thracum Classiana cR* from Britain." *Cf.* Roxan and Holder, 468: "There is more than a strong probability that this new diploma is evidence for the transfer of these two *alae* (*I Thracum* and *Gallorum et Thracum Classiana*) from Britain to Germany." For the possibility of a simultaneous transfer, see Holder 2003, 110. See Roxan and Holder, 468 for problems relating to the name *I Thracum et Gallorum classiana*.
[121] Eck and Paunov, 343 ff. *Alae Afrorum veterana, I Thracum, Gallorum et Thracum Classiana, I Noricorum, Sulpicia*
[122] Holder 2003, 110-111
[123] Compare Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 23: "Während des 2. Jahrhunderts sank die Zahl- entsprechend der Verringung der Legionen- auf sechs Alen und etwa 13 Kohorten ab." Also Alföldy 1968 a, 161**,** who counts with four *alae* in the late Hadrianic period and with five under Antoninus Pius and his successors. The slightly different sequence is based on information that has come to light in the last decades.
[124] Alföldy 1968 a, 150

continue the process whereby Lower German cohorts were transferred to the Danube provinces or Upper Germany. At least one cohort was transferred from Germania Inferior to Pannonia between 127 and 135 AD, and several others may have left the Lower Rhine during Hadrian's reign.[125] This troop reduction is apparently reflected in the evidence presented by the military diplomas; whereas 25 cohorts appear on the Elst diploma of 98 AD, the Lower German diploma issued in 127 AD mentions 15 cohorts,[126] each of which was in the province since at least 98 AD. Nonetheless, one can assume that additional units were stationed in Germania Inferior at the time.[127] Although little is known about the history of the Lower German cohorts after 127 AD,[128] it is apparent that, after that year, additional cohorts were transferred from Germania Inferior to Britain and Upper Germany. It is not clear, however, whether these units left Lower Germany under Hadrian, during whose reign no new cohorts appear to have arrived in Germania Inferior.[129] Presumably, only around 13 cohorts were stationed in Lower Germany towards the end of the second century AD.[130] This would constitute a significant reduction in troop level compared to the Flavian period. Indeed, the constant transfer of cohorts from Germania Inferior to other provinces under Trajan, Hadrian, and their successors amounted to a policy of troop reduction that left the late second century Lower German garrison with what was basically a late Julio-Claudian auxiliary troop level.[131] Some of the cohorts transferred out of Germania Inferior went to Britain or Upper Germany, yet the majority were sent to the Danube provinces.[132] As Holder writes, "this is a useful demonstration that the balance of power had shifted to the latter area."[133]

New Governors in Germania Inferior

The last known governors of Germania Inferior under Hadrian are two *homines novi*, M. Valerius Propinquus Granius Fabianus Grattius Cerialis Geminius Restitutus, the name being reconstructed from a fragmentary inscription by Eck, attained senatorial rank either under Trajan or Hadrian, thereafter serving as suffect consul in 126 AD. After holding the post of *curator alvei Tiberis et Cloacarum urbis* in Rome, his task being the oversight— for a period of up to four years— of the channel and banks of the Tiber and the city's sewers, he was named Lower German legate, perhaps

[125] *Cohors II Asturum* left Lower Germany for Pannonia under Hadrian. *Cohors II Thracum equitata* left to Noricum after 98 AD and before 127 AD. For the other units in question, see below.
[126] Roxan and Holder, 239; Holder 2003, 110; Schönberger 1985, 385; Alföldy 1968 a, 160 ff.; Bogaers 1974, 445 ff. Idem 1977, 601 ff.
[127] Holder 2003, 110-111. These are the *cohortes XV voluntariorum c.R.; VI ingenuorum c.R. milliaria*; *cohors I...*
[128] Ibidem. "What happened later to cohorts on diploma of 127 is not so clear as there are only fragmentary issues from the reign of Antoninus Pius which preserve only partial unit lists." See Eck, MacDonald, and Pangerl, 227 ff.
[129] Ibidem. *Cohors VI Raetorum* went to Britain after 127 AD and before 166 / 169 AD, and *cohors II Hispanorum (peditata)* was transferred to the same province between 127 and 178 AD. Also, *Cohors I Lucensium* left Lower Germany after 127 AD, and *cohors II Hispanorum (peditata)* was transferred after 127 AD and before 178 AD.
[130] Bechert and Willems in *DRR* (1995), 23. Alföldy 1968 a, 162. "Schwieriger ist die Frage der Zahl der Infanteriekohorten nach Hadrian. Für das 2. Jahrhundert sind etwa 13 Kohorten am Niederrhein nachweisbar oder aus guten Gründen hier zu suchen..."
[131] Alföldy 1968 a, 142
[132] In contrast, only two Lower German *alae* were transferred to the Danube between 70 and 138 AD: *ala Siliana* between 78 and 84 AD and *ala I Batavorum* between 98 and 112 AD in the context of Trajan's Dacian wars. Nonetheless, the transfer of Upper German and Raetian troops to the Danube probably caused the relocation of Lower German cavalry units to those provinces. Thus, one *ala* (*II Flavia Gemina*) went to Raetia (by 107 AD) and three to Upper Germany (*ala singularium* around 90 AD, *ala Indiana* by 129 / 130 AD and *ala Moesica* by 185 AD).
[133] Holder 1999, 250; Alföldy 1968 a, 152

in 130 AD but possibly also later.[134] Thereafter, he served as governor of the province of Asia.[135] Between 135 and 139 AD, Lower Germany was governed by Q. Lollius Urbicus, who, having begun his *cursus honorum* under Hadrian, became consul *ca*. 135 and legate of Britain in 139 and 140 AD. Having served as Lower German legate between the consulship and the governorship of Britain, Lollius possibly remained on the Lower Rhine for several years and, like some of his predecessors, went directly from there to Britain.[136] As for Germania Superior, the province was governed in 130 AD by a (…)ius Celer, who may have been succeeded by Ti. Claudius Quartinus, an *eques* who attained senatorial rank under Trajan and thereafter gained ample military and administrative experience across the empire before becoming suffect consul in 130.[137] Quartinus, the last known Upper German legate under Hadrian, is attested in this post in 134 AD, the year in which he issued a military diploma granting citizenship to auxiliary soldiers from his province.[138] From Germania Superior, Quartinus appears to have gone to Britain, where he potentially served as governor from 135 until 138 / 139 AD.[139] These were the men responsible for implementing Hadrian's policies in the Rhine provinces.

Conclusion

Hadrian's grand strategy and foreign policy were formulated in the midst of the crisis the emperor found on the frontiers upon his accession to the Principate. As the *Historia Augusta* reports:

> *nam deficientibus iis nationibus quas Traianus subegerat, Mauri lacessabant, Sarmatae bellum inferebant, Britanni teneri sub dicione Romana non poterant, Aegyptus seditionibus urgebatur, Libya denique ac Palaestina rebelles animos efferebant.*
>
> "the nations which Trajan had conquered began to revolt; the Moors, moreover, began to make attacks, and the Sarmatians to make war, the Britons could not be kept under Roman sway, Egypt was thrown into disorder by riots, and finally Libya and Palestine showed the spirit of rebellion."[140]

Hadrian thus inherited a serious predicament, for the instability of Egypt alone posed a grave threat to the city of Rome's grain supply, while an enemy incursion across the Danube could have been disastrous if the East remained in turmoil. The emperor thus concentrated his energies on implementing a "broadly consistent empire-wide policy" that involved abandoning certain newly conquered areas on the one hand and, on the other, strengthening and delineating the existing borders.[141] In the East, where the recently subjected peoples were in revolt, Hadrian retired all troops from the three provinces created by Trajan—Assyria, Mesopotamia and Armenia— and re-established the Euphrates as the limit between the Roman Empire and the Parthian.[142] In south-

[134] Eck 1985, 166-167; *CIL* 6084. See Aldrete, 199 (Trajan's curators of the Tiber); 167-176 (Rome's sewers).
[135] *CIL* 6084
[136] Eck 1985, 168; *CIL* VIII 6706
[137] Eck 1985, 54-57
[138] *CIL* XVI 80
[139] Eck 1985, 57; Birley 1981, 110 ff.
[140] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani. 5
[141] Maxfield, 4; Baatz 1974, 112. For the danger of an invasion across the Danube, *cf.* A.R. Birley 1997, 84-85
[142] Eutropius VIII.6; Fronto II, p. 208-209

eastern Europe, Hadrian surrendered to the Sarmatian Roxolani a significant amount of the territory conquered by Trajan north of the Lower Danube during the first Dacian war. Namely, this corresponded to "the great plains of Oltenia and Muntenia, the south-eastern flank of the Carpathians and southern Moldavia," all of which Trajan had incorporated into the province of Moesia Inferior.[143] In other areas of the imperial periphery, Hadrian left behind his personal mark by building artificial frontiers where there were no natural barriers that appropriately demarcated Roman territory. This was the case in Britain, certain portions of the Upper German-Raetian *limes*, and the southern frontier in North Africa.[144]

Although Hadrian's Wall, the Upper German palisade, and the *fossatum Africae* were new barriers built along the empire's borders, Hadrian's frontier policy did not necessarily bring sweeping innovation. Those frontiers, as Maxfield notes, had already been established when previous emperors—including Trajan— had determined the outermost reaches of Roman advance in Britain, Germania Superior, and Africa.[145] Moreover, the Romans had traditionally used "linear obstacles" such as banks, ditches and walls in order to control the movement of peoples, and this was precisely the aim that Hadrian's artificial frontier defenses were supposed to fulfil.[146] The symbolic significance of Hadrian's man-made borders, however, was quite clear, and it certainly marked a change with the traditional Roman perception of the empire's destiny.

Augustus, aware of the impossibility of establishing a Roman *imperium sine fine*, had supposedly ordered Tiberius to maintain the empire within its natural limits (*consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii*).[147] Hadrian, through his fortification projects, confirmed the frontiers as *termini* in what has been interpreted as an admission of "abdication and failure" in view of the original goal, which was the conquest of the earth in its entirety.[148] However, as Maxfield points out, acceptance of this failure was "due in part to a more realistic appreciation of the extent of (the) world."[149] This implies that Hadrian made a careful, grand strategic calculation of means and ends, deciding that the goal of further conquest—even if it wasn't world conquest— could not be achieved with the available manpower and financial resources. He thus chose to exert power over these territories to the extent possible by means of indirect pressure and diplomacy.[150]

Since Rome faced no large-scale threats along the British, German or African *limites* at this time, the best choice available for both military and administrative purposes was to delimit the linear frontiers and "spread the army out along (them)," concentrating troops on weak spots, on crossing points (usually controlled by fortlets, mile-castles, watchtowers or turrets) and on the "existing routeways" which, since they connected the *limes* zones with the lands beyond, were normally defended by forts; thus, the troops could frustrate small-scale raiding expeditions and control

[143] A.R. Birley 1997, 84; Fronto II, p. 208-209
[144] Maxfield, 8. Eutropius VIII. 7. *Orbem Romanum circumiit; multa aedificavit.* A.R. Birley 1997, 209. "The new frontier (in Africa), 240 km south (of Lambaesis), beyond Mons Aurasius (the Aurès Mountains)."
[145] Maxfield, 2-3; 4: Hadrian's Wall "represented… the acceptance of what Trajan had probably not consciously accepted: the frontier of Britain was to remain where it was for the foreseeable future."
[146] Ibidem, 8; 14. *Cf*. Caesar *BG* I.8
[147] Tacitus. *Annales* I.11
[148] Mann. "The Frontiers of the Principate," in *ANRW* II.1 (1974). 508; Maxfield, 2
[149] Maxfield, 2
[150] Ibidem, 4

access into and out of imperial territory.[151] An army's duties on a linear frontier require a considerable amount of manpower, especially along borders such as those of the Rhine and Danube, which together stretched for more than 3,000 kilometers and, throughout this distance, gave enemies ample opportunities for crossing into the empire; hence it was but natural to have the *ca*. 170,000 men serving in the Rhine and Danube armies under Hadrian (70,000 legionaries, 100,000 auxiliaries) stationed at intervals "on the frontier line itself."[152] It is above all the consistency with which Hadrian applied this single specific policy across the imperial frontiers that distinguishes his grand strategy from that of previous emperors, and this remains the case even if its precise implementation was not uniform across all regions given the drastic variation in the geographic, political, and demographic conditions across the empire's border regions.[153]

Hadrian's general policy had proponents such as Appian of Alexandria, who argued that Rome already controlled "the best part of the earth and sea."[154] Despite such justifications and the grand strategic necessity for well-defended linear frontiers, the old Roman tradition that determined that an *imperator*—in keeping with the word's original meaning— must be a victorious and conquering general could not easily be discarded. Hadrian also had to consider that, from the perspective of Trajan's proponents and, in general, conservatives such as the orator Marcus Cornelius Fronto who believed that continued Roman expansion was both possible and desirable, he had willfully abandoned provinces won with enormous effort that merely required organization (*quin provincias manu Traiani captas variis bellis ac nunc constituendas omittere maluit quam exercitu retinere*).[155] Indeed, to many Romans, Hadrian's relinquishment of previously conquered territories—first in the East and soon thereafter in the Danube region— was "shocking and demeaning,"[156] particularly since it involved such symbolic actions as the destruction—due to fear of imminent invasion— of the formidable stone bridge that Trajan's chief architect Apollodorus had built over the Danube below the Iron Gates, a superstructure Dio describes as Trajan's most brilliant achievement and as a triumph of human ingenuity.[157] On the other hand, Hadrian apparently had considered

[151] Ibidem, 3; 12. *Cf.* A.R. Birley 1997, 210 for the way the Gemellae sector of the border in Africa "was designed to control access to the empire."
[152] Maxfield, 20; 22
[153] Ibidem, 4-5; 21-22. Hadrian's Wall was protected by fortlets spaced at much closer intervals (1 mile) from each other than had been the case on the Stanegate frontier during Trajan's reign, so that the frontier in Britain shows a "trend towards a thin linear disposition on the frontier line itself" similar to that seen on the northern European mainland. Nonetheless, the defence of Britain was different from that of the Rhine and Danube since the hinterland of both the Tyne-Solway and Forth-Clyde frontiers remained militarized with troops stationed in a network of forts built behind the artificial borders; this was due to Britain's "unusual geographic situation." For the African frontier, *cf.* A.R. Birley 1997, 209. "It would no doubt have been absurd to attempt to erect a continuous artificial *limes* in Africa, as was being done in Britain in stone, and in Germania Superior and Raetia with timber. Neither the materials nor the labour-force were available in Africa to demarcate the whole vast distance from the Atlantic to the borders of Egypt. Nor was a continuous barrier right across the land necessary. A desert frontier can be controlled by blocking the routes past the oases. All the same, several long stretches were constructed, which show a close resemblance in conception to the Wall in Britain."
[154] Appian. *Preface* 7; Maxfield, 2
[155] Fronto II, p. 206-207
[156] A.R. Birley 1997, 84
[157] Dio. LXVIII.13. Trajan had built the bridge in order not to leave the Roman citizens in Dacia isolated in case the Danube froze, whereas Hadrian feared that, if enemies defeated the guard stationed at the bridge, they would be able to invade the province of Moesia. According to Birley, Hadrian decided to destroy the bridge upon receiving the advice of Q. Pompeius Falco, consul in 108 AD and governor of Lower Moesia *ca*. 117 AD (after governing Judaea and before put in charge of Britain in 122). He adds: "probably it was only an emergency measure, taken because an

surrendering Dacia in its entirety—Fronto exaggerates by accusing him of doing just that— before being persuaded by his advisers to maintain the trans-Danubian province so as not to leave Roman citizens living beyond the Danube unprotected.[158] According to some of his enemies, Hadrian's measures in the East and in Dacia were inspired by his envy of Trajan's glory (*qui Traiani gloriae invidens*), as Eutropius wrote in the fourth century.[159]

In part, such opposition to his grand strategy explains Hadrian's exertions, evident from his speech at Lambaesis and his emphasis on re-establishing traditional *disciplina*, to inspect personally the most remote of the empire's garrisons—he was the first emperor to visit Africa and the first since Claudius to set foot in Britain[160]— to endure the common soldier's privations, and to institute reforms that would keep the army at the height of preparedness.[161] On the other hand, it appears that Hadrian also strove to compare himself to the great conquerors of the past. According to A.R. Birley, the altar dedicated by the sixth legion to the gods Neptune and Oceanus on the Tyne in northern England, where Hadrian himself was probably present, represents the emperor's attempt to measure up to Alexander the Great, another ruler of the known world who "had once sacrificed to the same deities in the Far East, at the River Hydaspes."[162] Thus, Hadrian, by reaching the empire's limits in the northwest, may have portrayed himself as "a western counterpart to Alexander at the Indus."[163] That Hadrian's foreign policy was in no way similar to that of Alexander, whose eastern expansionism was imitated by Trajan,[164] was irrelevant; in the face of an angered and perhaps outspoken opposition whose ultimate aim was to bring about the emperor's downfall,[165] political necessity required propagating the image of a conquering emperor even if this was far removed from reality.

Hadrian's policy of delineating the empire's frontiers with man-made barriers involved incorporating artificial obstacles with natural ones such as the Rhine, the Taunus mountain range in Upper Germany, and the Sahara Desert in Africa.[166] Hessing's investigations have proved that a similar practice was put in place in Lower Germany, where Hadrian used a vast amount of resources and manpower in a new phase of construction of the *limes* road. The result was a structure raised above the riverbank that, although not as daunting from the barbarian population's perspective as Hadrian's Wall, was nonetheless visible from a distance and certainly striking.

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enemy breakthrough westwards across the River Alutus (Aluta or Olt) or, in the case of the Jazyges, southwards from a point between the legionary base Berzovia and Trajan's Dacian *colonia*, was a real threat." A.R. Birley 1997, 84-85; 117

[158] Eutropius VIII.6. *Idem de Dacia facere conatum amici deterruerunt, ne multi cives Romani barbaris traderentur, propterea quia Traianus victa Dacia ex toto orbe Romano infinitas eo copias hominum transtulerat ad agros et urbes colendas. Dacia enim diuturno bello Decibali viris fuerat exhausta*. Fronto II, p. 208-209. Fronto claims that Hadrian abandoned all of Dacia: *Has omnes provincias, Daciam et Parthiis amissas partes, ultro restituit Cf.* A.R. Birley 1997, 85. "Hadrian could with some plausibility be alleged to have contemplated giving up Dacia itself."

[159] Eutropius VIII.6

[160] A.R. Birley 1997, 203. *Disciplina*: Eutropius VIII 7: …*diligentissimus tamen circa aerarium et militum disciplinam.*

[161] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 10. Despite such efforts, Hadrian was still accused of leaving the army "destitute of military training" and of allowing a "great decay in military discipline" to set in: Fronto II, p. 206-209

[162] A.R. Birley 1997, 130-131; Arrian. *Indica* 18.11

[163] A.R. Birley 1997, 130-131. "Allusion to Hadrian's presence at this place has even been detected on the imperial coinage, which shows Oceanus and a river god identified as the Tyne." *Cf. BMC* III Hadrian no. 129

[164] A.R. Birley 1997, 130-131

[165] Ibidem, 85

[166] Maxfield, 8

Hence, also in Lower Germany, Hadrian implemented a policy of delineating the frontier with an artificial structure, in this case a road, that both facilitated border defense and inspired awe in enemies both actual and potential. Beyond this, however, Hadrian did not institute drastic innovations to the frontier defenses in Germania Inferior; the Lower German *limes* road, in fact, already existed and had undergone repair under Trajan, after which it had fallen into disuse. In general, therefore, Hadrian continued his predecessor's policy on the Lower Rhine.

Hadrian also resumed Trajan's Lower German policy in terms of the transfer of Lower German troops to other provinces. This was due not only to the need to continue strengthening the Danube garrisons, but also to the military emergency in Britain, a province that also saw an influx of Lower German legionary and auxiliary troops under Hadrian. By 138 AD, after several decades of continuous transfers out of Germania Inferior, the Lower Rhine garrison's troop numbers had been reduced to a pre-Flavian level. Thus, Hadrian reinstated Julio-Claudian arrangements on the Lower Rhine even if his construction of artificial borders in Britain, Upper Germany, and Africa does coincide with Luttwak's model of a Flavian system of linear frontiers consolidated under Hadrian. Indeed, in terms of troop distribution and the location of legionary and auxiliary forts—perhaps the best indicators of grand strategy— the Lower German frontier at the conclusion of Hadrian's reign was not very different from that already established by the end of Claudius's time in power.

The troops were evenly stationed along the *limes* and "only the occasional fort remained in the rear of the frontier line."[167] If anything, the Lower Rhine was not as well defended in 138 AD as in the middle of the previous century, when legions had stood at Bonn, Neuss, and Xanten, for Trajan had permanently removed from the province the third legion, which had been stationed at Nijmegen after the Batavian revolt and may have been replaced under Hadrian, albeit only temporarily. Hence, as the middle of the second century AD approached, only two legions—stationed at Xanten and Bonn— and a reduced line of auxiliaries spread across the *limes* defended the Lower German frontier. Moreover, under Hadrian as during most of the Julio-Claudian period no legion stood permanently in Batavian territory. Hence, the legion stationed at Xanten was once again responsible for the defense of the entire north-western part of the province up to the North Sea coast. In this respect, therefore, there can be no question of a radical difference between Julio-Claudian and post-Flavian policy on the Lower Rhine.

In terms of grand strategy, Hadrian's systematic use of bribes as an instrument of foreign policy points to yet another problem with Luttwak's theory, according to which the Julio-Claudian system of defense was characterized by the Romans' exertion of power over vassal states by means of constant military pressure, coupled with the distribution of bribes and subventions.[168] However, Hadrian's practice of presenting gifts and subsidies to client kings and tribes in order to guarantee peace in the frontier regions proves that, well after the Flavian era, the Romans continued both to hand out payoffs and use satellite states of sorts to exert indirect control over certain areas of strategic importance. Moreover, Hadrian, whom the literary sources portray as devoted to peace and even compare to King Numa Pompilius, apparently had a greater propensity to bribe client

[167] Ibidem, 21
[168] Luttwak, 37

kings than some of his predecessors.[169] Grand strategy, therefore, also depended on emperors' personal inclinations.

Finally, there is the fact that, even after Hadrian's clear delineation of the frontiers, these did not become fixed lines beyond which Roman troops could not advance. Apart from the known punitive expedition across the Danube, in which the Batavian horse guard probably took part, there is evidence for the occupation in the second century AD of a marching camp far north of the Lower German *limes*, in Ermelo, a site that controlled a route leading from the Rhine to the Flevosee.[170] This suggests that punitive campaigns beyond the Rhine still could be launched even after the frontier's delineation and the significant troop reductions made to Lower Germany's garrison under Trajan and Hadrian. In this respect also there appears to have been more of a continuation than a sudden halt in policy between the Julio-Claudian period and the subsequent eras.

[169] Historia Augusta. Vita Hadriani 10. *Pacisque magis quam belli cupidus*... Eutropius VIII**.** 7. *Pacem tamen omni imperii sui tempore habuit, semel tantum per praesidem dimicavit.* This last phrase refers to command of Roman forces in the war against Bar Kochba. Numa: Fronto II, p. 208-209. *A rebus- pari studio pacis- sane iustis retinuisse se fertur, plane vana apstinendo uni omnium Romanorum principuum Numae* ***reqi*** *aequiparandus*.
[170] Van Dockum in *DRR* (1995), 77. It is unclear if Ermelo was in use before or after the second century AD.

Conclusion

Grand strategy refers to a state's leaders' endeavors—both in peacetime and in the midst of wars—to enhance their nation's standing militarily, economically, and diplomatically. Necessarily, the leaders' goals must correspond to the means at their disposal, which are always limited. I have tried to better understand Roman grand strategy from the reign of Augustus to that of Hadrian by analyzing imperial policy in a single province: Lower Germany. Despite the local—and, hence, limited— approach, this method lends itself to broader conclusions. On the one hand, examining closely the development and defense of this area— the Roman Empire's last military territory on the European continent's northwest— helps one to compare and contrast policies carried out in other frontier provinces. Hence, one can scrutinize, confirm, or modify broad, general theses of imperial defense and grand strategy, such as that of Luttwak. On the other hand, Germania Inferior's military and strategic importance was such that emperors often visited the province, while its troops played crucial roles in the conquest and upkeep of Britain and in the later reinforcement of the Danube garrisons. As such, an analysis of Lower German defense—and of troop movements in and out of the province— is inevitably linked with the broader study of Roman grand strategy proper.

Roman Lower Germany was heavily militarized, so that the key, purely military component of grand strategy became intertwined with a political component. In part, this was because the area was governed mostly through the army. On the other hand, the Rhine armies and its commanders became essential players in the dangerous game of imperial politics. The diplomatic component played a role insofar as there were alliances—often shifting, sometimes broken— with tribes and kingdoms beyond the empire's borders. And, as Lower Germany became further integrated into the Roman imperial structure over time, the area's economy developed considerably, even if it remained mostly a peripheral province. During the time in question (ca. 31 BC to 138 AD), Roman rule in Germania Inferior can lead to the following considerations on Roman grand strategy.

Troop Levels

Lower Germany's military importance to the central Roman authorities is evident from the number of troops stationed on the Lower Rhine. From the outset of Augustus's reign, there were large concentrations of constantly moving troops. Until 9 AD, the grand strategic aim was the conquest of Germany, and camps were built at those locations that allowed the troops access into the unconquered Germania. This changed after the Varian disaster. Tiberius confirmed the late Augustan settlement and permanently stationed three legions in Lower Germany—at the strategic locations of Bonn, Neuss, and Xanten— together with a considerable number of auxiliary troops—around 30 cohorts and eight *alae*. After Germanicus's recall, these troops were officially entrusted with the defense of Lower Germany from the attacks of hostile tribes living north and east of the Rhine.

During the remainder of the Julio-Claudian period, the number of Lower German legions and the places where they stood remained constant. Auxiliary troop numbers, however, were gradually reduced. At the end of Nero's reign, there stood around 12 cohorts and six *alae* in Germania Inferior. Following the civil war that brought Vespasian to power and the devastating Batavian

revolt, both the legionary and the auxiliary garrisons of the Lower Rhine were considerably increased. The Flavian dynasty's founder posted four legions and around 20 cohorts and six or seven *alae* in Germania Inferior.

Domitian returned to pre-Flavian arrangements by transferring one legion out of Lower Germany, thus leaving three legions stationed in the province. However, his reign, despite the initial transfer of troops to the Danube, saw yet another increase in auxiliary troops. Mainly as a result of the war against Antonius Saturninus, the Lower German auxiliary garrison may have counted with some 28 cohorts and seven *alae* in 89 AD. At the outset of Trajan's reign, at least 25—possibly 27— cohorts and six *alae* stood in the province, which was soon left with only two legions due to the need for manpower on the Danube. Trajan also oversaw the gradual transfer of Lower German *auxilia,* mainly to the Danube and Upper Germany. Upon his accession, Hadrian found a reduced auxiliary garrison consisting of some 19 cohorts and six *alae*. Hadrian maintained only two legions on the Lower Rhine and further reduced the province's auxiliary units. In 127 AD, some 17 or 18 cohorts and five *alae* were present in Germania Inferior, a number that was reduced to around 13 cohorts and 4 *alae* by the end of Marcus Aurelius's reign.

In terms of troop levels on the Lower Rhine, there was no perceivable break between the grand strategy of the Julio-Claudians and that of the Flavians and their successors. Rather, the significant troop increase under Vespasian, which was due to a military emergency, was gradually phased out. Under Trajan, the Lower German legions were permanently reduced to two, a level inferior to that sustained in Julio-Claudian times. With respect to the *auxilia,* the dramatic increase in units seen under Vespasian and Domitian gave way to a policy of transferring auxiliaries out of the province. Towards the end of the second century, the Lower German garrison had been reduced to what was in essence a late Julio-Claudian level.

The relatively low level of troops seen both at the end of the Julio-Claudian era and at the close of the second century suggest that, in general, Roman emperors preferred to have a minimum of two legions stationed on the Lower Rhine, though preferably three if conditions elsewhere in the empire allowed it, alongside at least 12 or 13 cohorts and five or six *alae*. From the time of Tiberius onward, significant increases to these numbers were seen only under Vespasian and Domitian as a result of military crises. Trajan and Hadrian, however, gradually re-established the situation whereby Lower Germany was defended by the minimum of troops specified above.

Limited Campaigns

Regardless of the number of men stationed at any given time in Germania Inferior, Lower German troops were expected to march into enemy territory occasionally and carry out limited expeditions, the aims of which could be punitive, pre-emptive, or political. Punitive campaigns carried out beyond the Rhine in retribution for enemy attacks are recorded under Tiberius,[1] Claudius,[2] Nero,[3]

[1] Against the Frisii in 28 AD.
[2] In 41 AD against the Chauci and Chatti, in 47 AD against the Chauci and their leader Gannascus of the Cananefates, and in 49 / 50 AD against the Chatti.
[3] In 58 AD against the Frisii and Amsivarii, Tencteri, Bructeri and other allies.

Vespasian,[4] Domitian,[5] and possibly under Nerva or Trajan.[6] Strictly pre-emptive campaigns beyond the empire's frontiers took place under Domitian[7] and under Hadrian, when Lower German troops, namely the emperor's Batavian horse guard, crossed the Danube carrying arms and in formation in order to cow a Germanic foe. Campaigns launched for reasons of internal Roman politics, meanwhile, did not preclude the punitive or pre-emptive element, yet their main purpose was to grant military legitimacy to an inexperienced emperor who wished to present himself as a conqueror by waging war beyond the empire's borders.

The primary example of this type of campaign is that led by Emperor Gaius, a military neophyte, in 40 AD against the Cananefates' Brinno and possibly other tribes (although this campaign also fulfilled the strategic objective of securing the Rhine frontier prior to a planned invasion of Britain). Due to their recurrence, it is evident that the aforementioned campaigns of limited aim were an essential component of Roman grand strategy during the period in question, as were the expeditions (examined by Luttwak) launched to establish a more effective frontier, for instance the operations carried out under Vespasian and Domitian in order to gain control over the *Agri Decumates* and the Wetterau. Therefore, the Lower German army was used as an instrument of both permanent defense and limited attack during the Julio-Claudian and Flavian periods, and also during the first half of the second century AD. By extension, the Rhine did not constitute a static border either after 16 AD or under the Flavians and their successors.

Direct and Indirect Rule

In Lower Germany, the Rhine functioned as a natural barrier. As Maxfield notes, rivers are "very convenient" borders in the bureaucratic sense, for they allow a clear demarcation of territory.[8] Rivers also thwart movement but, since they can be crossed in numerous ways, they cannot function as impenetrable frontiers "unless they are set in steep and inaccessible gorges," which, for the most part, is not the case of the Rhine.[9] Moreover, the Rhine is a "major European highway" used extensively for trade and, as a result, its banks have attracted settlers throughout history.[10] In the Roman period, populations settled on or near the Rhine could be either friendly or hostile to Rome, while enemies living at a distance could use the Rhine tributaries as routes of access into the empire. Hence, it was necessary for Roman troops to patrol the Rhine "for much of (its) length for much of the time."[11] The precise way in which the Roman authorities stationed troops along the Lower German frontier reveals how they chose to govern the area.

The basis of the linear frontier established on the Rhine were the Augustan marching camps built after 17 BC. After the Varian disaster, the Rhine was turned into a permanent frontier with fortified outposts. By the end of the reign of Tiberius, who built auxiliary forts between the original legionary fortresses, a basic linear frontier consisting of at least 13 outposts was in place. Nonetheless, the occupied portions of the Lower Rhine were mainly those where the allied Ubii

[4] In 77 / 78 AD against the Bructeri.
[5] Against the Chatti in 89 / 90 AD in revenge for their participation in Saturninus' revolt.
[6] The campaign of unknown date against the Bructeri, which may have taken place under Domitian.
[7] Possibly in 83 AD against the Chatti.
[8] Maxfield, 6
[9] Ibidem
[10] Ibidem
[11] Ibidem

had been settled in the middle and south-eastern segment of the frontier, in the area stretching more or less from Xanten to the Vinxtbach. This signified the early annexation of the Ubii's territory, which was controlled directly by the Roman military as *ager publicus populi Romani*. Meanwhile, the *Oppidum Ubiorum* was becoming a Roman-style administrative center under the army's oversight. In time, the ruling class of the newly formed tribes gained the social and political capability to govern their own *civitates*, as was the case in other provinces.

In the northwest, meanwhile, a different method of control was applied. Tiberius removed the legion which had stood in Nijmegen, the territory inhabited by the partially independent Batavians. Due to their role as the imperial horse guards, the Batavians, who were initially ruled by a client king and, paid neither taxes nor tribute. They recruited and commanded their troops independently within the Roman army. Hence, with the core of their territory free of Roman troops, the Batavians, despite their obligations to Rome and the partial integration of the tribe's upper class into the Roman political system (the Batavian *civitas* became municipalized only very gradually), retained a certain degree of sovereignty. This saved the Romans the effort and resources necessary for the occupation of Nijmegen, the Rhine delta, and the coastal areas. Under Augustus and Tiberius, therefore, the Romans, did not exert political power in Germania Inferior through a single method. Rather, they exerted direct control over central and south-eastern Lower Germany while mostly exerting indirect control over the area's north-western portion.

Once Claudius invaded Britain, in part to fulfill his need for military glory, the main component of the Batavians' military force was removed from the Lower Rhine and transferred to the new island province. Soon thereafter, the Lower German linear frontier was completed with the construction of a series of auxiliary forts that stretched west of Nijmegen up to the North Sea coast. These measures were significant; already under Claudius, Roman troops, assisted by the newly founded *classis Germanica*, were permanently occupying Batavian territory and, hence, exerting direct control over the whole of Lower Germany. Although the infrastructure of the Lower Rhine frontier was mostly destroyed during the Batavian revolt, which, I argue, was caused in part by Claudius's measures, Flavian policy consisted primarily in the reconstruction of the late Julio-Claudian *limes*. After the Batavian war, however, Vespasian instituted a surge in Lower German troop levels that included the stationing of a legion at Nijmegen along with three others in Germania Inferior. Thus, he reinstated the Augustan and early Tiberian policy of having a fourth legion control Batavian territory directly and defend the Dutch river area up to the North Sea.

Nonetheless, after Domitian had transferred one legion out of Lower Germany, Trajan permanently removed the legion posted at Nijmegen and left Batavian territory occupied only by auxiliaries. Hence, the only significant and permanent changes to the late Julio-Claudian frontier from the Flavian period onward were Trajan's foundation of a veteran colony at Xanten (built in order to compensate for the absence of troops sent to the Danube), Hadrian's creation of the *Forum Adriani* at Voorburg, and the latter emperor's construction (after a phase built under Trajan) of a *limes* road. Raised above the riverbank and visible from a distance, the road was part of Hadrian's empire-wide policy of delineating the imperial frontiers with artificial structures that both facilitated frontier defense and inspired respect in actual and would-be enemies. In terms of the direct or indirect control over portions or the whole of Lower Germany, therefore, there is no discernible difference between Julio-Claudian policy and that applied by the Flavians and future emperors. Rather, Tiberius, who inherited the Rhine outposts occupied under Augustus, consolidated the Romans' direct control over the south-eastern and central portions of the Lower

Rhine. Thereafter, Claudius completed the Lower German linear frontier by extending it to the west of Nijmegen until the North Sea. The policy of future emperors brought only slight variations to this system of defense, which was still in place at the end of the second century AD.

The Diplomatic Component

Caesar first established Rome's contacts with the Ubii and the would-be Batavians. Understanding the basis of the *comitatus* tradition, he incorporated these tribesmen into his personal horse guard. This was of great significance since Caesar's Germanic horse guard formed a pillar of the new Julio-Claudian system.[12] Since then, diplomacy became an important element in Roman policy on the Lower Rhine and beyond. Augustus maintained friendly relations with the aforementioned tribes and, during one of Agrippa's terms as governor in Gaul, used diplomacy in order to arrange their migration to the Roman side of the Lower Rhine. This measure was essential since, at the time, Rome was unable to station troops permanently in Lower Germany, a mostly uninhabited zone due to Caesar's prior annihilation of the Eburones. Augustus therefore chose to settle allied peoples on the frontier area. Around 8 BC, there appears to have been a large movement, arranged by Roman diplomacy, of a splinter group of Sugambri, who took the name of Cugerni and settled at Xanten. Hence, Roman grand strategy included the premeditated settlement of allied tribes in frontier territories in order to exert indirect control over border zones.

Rome maintained diplomatic contact with the *Germani transrhenani* even after the initial phase of encouraged migrations and after the permanent occupation of the Rhine. In 47 AD, for instance, Claudius placed a Roman subject upon the throne of the Cherusci upon the latter's specific request. Due to the strife between Germanic tribes or even within the same tribe, Roman emperors could influence events beyond the Rhine even if they did not control this territory directly. Elsewhere, Roman emperors gave bribes and subsidies to foreign kings in order to guarantee their submission to Rome, a policy Luttwak associates with Julio-Claudian grand strategy. Nonetheless, Hadrian's systematic use of gifts and subsidies as a foreign policy instrument, a practice mentioned by various ancient authors, proves that the practice of buying the loyalty of satellite states through largesse was maintained even after the Flavian area.[13]

The Political Component

The German armies had to defend the frontier against enemy raids and occasionally march into hostile territory beyond the Rhine. It was thus indispensable for the troops to be disciplined and prepared to engage in combat at a moment's notice. Hence, Roman emperors had to choose able and experienced commanders as legates of both Upper and Lower Germany, the combined armies of which counted with as many as eight legions during the Julio-Claudian era. However, a German legate who was able to gain the loyalty of the troops at his command could pose a serious threat to the emperor, especially if he could unite forces with his colleague in charge of the other German military zone and then march towards Italy. Hence, an emperor had to prevent men with imperial ambitions from acquiring excessive political and military power in Germany. Certain emperors fared better at this than others.

[12] Speidel 1994, 15; *cf.* Wolters 2001, 155
[13] *Cf.* Maxfield, 24-25

Tiberius, who faced a rebellion on the Lower Rhine in 14 AD, weakened his position significantly during the middle of his reign by allowing the members of a single family to command the troops of both Lower and Upper Germany. Gaetulicus, the ambitious Upper German legate, gained popularity among his soldiers by slackening their discipline. This allowed Rome's Germanic foes to conduct several successful raids against Roman territory. Nonetheless, the emperor was too weak to replace the emboldened German governors even after the fall of Sejanus, their ally. Hence, Gaius, upon becoming emperor, inherited ill-disciplined troops, a badly defended frontier, and potentially hostile legates on the Rhine. The new *princeps* addressed these problems by executing Gaetulicus and placing trusted and militarily able men in charge of both the Rhine provinces. In fact, Galba's success in imposing discipline upon the Upper German army paved the way for Gaius's apparently large and successful campaign across the Rhine.

Claudius also faced trouble in Lower Germany due to the ambitions of his legate, Corbulo, who marched into enemy territory and left troops stationed there. Nonetheless, the emperor, whose grand strategy did not involve plans to advance into the unconquered portions of Germany, firmly ordered Corbulo, whom he presumably feared as a rival, to remove the troops he had stationed beyond the Rhine. Nor did Claudius allow Corbulo to remain on the Rhine frontier for long. Nero, following Gaius's example, executed the legates of both Lower and Upper Germany, whom he had suspected of treachery. Nonetheless, the German armies played a significant role in Nero's downfall, for the Upper German troops proclaimed their legate, L. Verginius Rufus, as emperor after the suppression of Vindex's revolt in 68 AD. Thereafter, Galba gained the throne with the support of the Lower and eventually the Upper German army. Galba's own demise, however, sprung from the Rhine frontier as well: Vitellius, whom the new emperor had named Lower German legate, was able to march on Rome and take power since he had gained the allegiance of both German armies after the assassination of Hordeonius Flaccus, whom Galba had named governor of Upper Germany. Ultimately, the joint forces of the Flavians' eastern and Danubian legions prevailed against the Vitellians at Cremona.

In the Flavian period, trouble arose on the Rhine frontier once again when Antonius Saturninus, Domitian's Upper German legate, rose up in arms in 89 AD. Once more, an uprising led by a rebel governor in Germany, in this case allied with the Germanic Chatti, exposed the emperor himself to great danger. Nonetheless, the Lower German governor Lappius Maximus defeated Saturninus, whose rebellion failed due to his inability to unite both German armies under his banner. Domitian thus benefitted from the loyalty of at least one of the German governors. A German legate, therefore, had the responsibility to lead his army against that of his colleague in case of rebellion. Thus, frontier defense was but one of his duties.

As emperor, Trajan faced no rebellion in the German provinces. He had been careful, in fact, to choose as legates loyal and capable men such as L. Iulius Ursus Servianus, a former governor in Pannonia who was connected to Trajan's family by marriage. Still, Trajan's position as legate of Upper Germany, where he had been posted in late 96 AD under special circumstances—he may have not held a praetorian post prior to the consular governorship as was usual— and his power as commander of the Upper German army likely played an important role in Emperor Nerva's decision to adopt him in 97 AD. Moreover, after his adoption, Trajan may have commanded both German armies for some time due to the *imperium maius* he received as Nerva's official heir. The military and political support of the Rhine legions was therefore crucial both in Trajan's selection

as future emperor and in the early stages of his reign. Hadrian, during whose time in power the Rhine frontier remained calm, also placed reliable men such as Aulus Platorius Nepos in charge of the German provinces. Still, Hadrian's reduction of the Rhine garrisons to four legions meant that the German legates were considerably less powerful than before. As such, they did not pose as great a threat to the emperor as they did during the first century AD.

The Economic Component

Once Augustus stationed troops permanently on the Lower Rhine, there ensued the construction of fortresses, *canabae,* and *vici*. Thus, the Roman state began to impose its hierarchical, urban, and tax-dependent political model on a Germanic, tribal civilization that, politically, was neither state-based, centralized nor urban-based. Lower Germany, in fact, still had a subsistence economy based on common land ownership, cattle farming, and mostly pre-monetary trade. Hence, the Lower German economy could not supply the ca. 42,000 Roman troops initially stationed on the Rhine and their dependents. Foodstuffs and other supplies had to be imported from the Mediterranean region and elsewhere. The Romans thus built legionary camps in Lower Germany—around which the *civitates* and central settlements arose— at the locations where they could be integrated into the empire's economic and commercial structure by means of rivers and roads. Despite the vast importation of supplies into the Lower Rhine area, the mere presence of the Roman military colossus created numerous conditions for the region's economic development.

In the first place, salaried soldiers introduced into Lower Germany the Roman monetary system, which facilitated the determination of prices and trade while it simplified the purchase and sale of goods and services. On the other hand, the soldiers' purchasing power provided tremendous incentives for the local population to supply their constant demand for services, handmade products, and agricultural goods such as grain. After the introduction of Roman agricultural techniques and the creation of the *villa* economy in certain parts of the military zone, grain could be produced in surplus. The Roman road network and river transport system— water transport was far cheaper than transport by land— facilitated trade and the distribution of products in both rural markets and urban centers. Thus, Lower German cities, towns, and hamlets became linked commercially to each other, to Gallia Belgica, and other neighboring provinces of the empire's interior. Eventually, the Lower German economy developed close links with that of Britain. This led to the rise of Lower German industries, including the production of *sarda* and *salsamentum* (exported to Britain) and the manufacture of glass, leather, and textile goods. Thus, as the circulation of money increased, so too did trade and the general level of prosperity. Trade and commerce flourished especially during the Flavian era, as the greater abundance of imports in the native market attests.

The economic development of a territory in the imperial periphery had a strong political component, especially as Lower Germany's societal structure began to mirror Rome's own.[14] This involved the formation of a ruling class that replaced the old tribal leadership and was integrated with the Roman political system. The new elite included landowners and wholesale merchants (*negotiatores*) who formed corporate bodies, and their duties under the Roman system included the collection of taxes. Even so, Lower German tax revenue could not cover the costs of the military occupation. Hence, during the first century AD, the Lower German army was financed

[14] Maxfield, 2

mostly with funds transferred from provinces in the empire's interior that, like Gaul, had a surplus of tax revenue and smaller garrisons to maintain. Thus, it was other provinces' subsidy of the Lower German army that boosted the region's economy, which never reached levels of prosperity or of export output comparable to those of the empire's rich provinces. The manner in which the subsidy of "backward" economic regions such as Lower Germany affected the finances of productive provinces should be the subject for further study.

The army's local food supplies came overwhelmingly from Lower Germany's most fertile zone of loess soils, where *villae rusticae* did appear even if large-scale land ownership was not the rule. Meanwhile, the remote rural areas, especially in less fertile northwest, were more resistant both to Roman cultural influence and to the Roman system of production. Hence, a predominately rural, Lower German economy in which trade neither transcended local boundaries nor was carried out for profit, and where coins were used often for their value as metals, not for their purchasing power, continued to exist into the second century AD. Alongside this primitive system of production there developed the more advanced, money-driven economies of military camps with their surrounding regions and the cities involved in long distance commerce such as Cologne, which became Lower Germany's administrative center. Cologne was also the base of the *classis Germanica* and a key center for the production and fluvial delivery of supplies, including stone and building material. As Haalebos explains, this synchrony in a single region of opposite types of economic systems was a common quality of the Roman economy in the empire's peripheral regions.[15]

The removal of a legion from Xanten during Trajan's Danube wars led to the foundation there of a veteran colony. Apart from the element of defense, it appears as if the permanent presence in Xanten of veterans with purchasing power was supposed to compensate for the economic effects of the removal of several thousand troops from the area. During the second century AD, the Lower German economy continued to reflect earlier military policy. Thus, the areas that were first occupied and controlled directly also remained more prosperous and were further integrated into the imperial economy than north-western Germania Inferior. Although the *villa* system of production arose in the areas southwest of Xanten, the city itself remained an occupied outpost on the fringe of the developed Lower German economy and, hence, it did not become a significant, trans-regional trade center. Nonetheless, the richer and commercially vigorous areas of Germania Inferior did develop to the point where they became alluring to the much poorer barbarians living beyond the Rhine. As Maxfield writes, this type of economically advanced frontier "peopled with soldiers and cities contain(s) the seeds of (its) own destruction," for its wealth tends to lure masses of armed and destitute outsiders.[16] This was the case along the Lower German frontier already in the first century AD, yet it was only from the late third century onward that the Romans began to experience serious difficulties in preventing devastating attacks.[17]

Morale and political culture

The modern study of grand strategy includes "the issue of national morale and political culture," which is important not only with view to the recruitment of soldiers, but also with respect to "a population's willingness to support the purposes and the burdens of the war— or the cost of large

[15] Haalebos 2001, 477
[16] Maxfield, 2
[17] Ibidem

defense forces in peacetime."[18] In Lower Germany, the Romans' breach of their agreement with the Batavians, privileged allies who supplied troops independently to the Roman army and maintained a certain degree of autonomy, led to the great revolt of 69 and 70 AD. This was caused by Vitellius's unwise decision to recruit Batavian soldiers by force as he strove for power, a measure that likely exacerbated the Batavians' discontent after the transfer of their troops to Britain and the Roman occupation of the Rhine delta. Over a span of several decades, Roman policy injured Batavian honor sufficiently for their loyalty to emperor and army to shatter. Thus, even in the furthermost reaches of their domains, an emperor's failure to uphold the conditions under which their troops served the Roman army with pride and honor could have ruinous political and military consequences.

This work was possible due to the research of scholars who, during the previous decades, have greatly advanced the knowledge of Lower Germany under Roman rule. Recent evidence and publications, I have argued, suggest that Roman policy on the Lower Rhine from the time of Augustus until that of Hadrian was not conducted in the manner proposed by previous works, particularly that of Luttwak. I would suggest further that, in order to gain a more precise understanding of how Roman grand strategy was formulated and implemented across the empire during the first two centuries AD and beyond, it is necessary to conduct studies similar to this one that concentrate on other frontier zones.

[18] Kennedy, 5

Works Cited

Abbreviations

AE: *L'Année épigraphique*

ANRW: *Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt*

BMC: *A Catalogue of the Greek Coins in the British Museum*

CIL: *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*

DNL: *Der niedergermanische Limes: Materialien zu seiner Geschichte*

DNP: *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike*

DRR: *Die römische Reichsgrenze von der Mosel bis zur Nordseeküste*

JRS: *The Journal of Roman Studies*

PIR: *Prosopographia Imperii Romani*

PRcA: *Paulys Realenzyklopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*

RGA: *Reallexikon der Germanischen Altertumskunde*

RIC: *Roman Imperial Coinage*

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Declaration of Authorship

Daniel Raisbeck:

I hereby declare that I have completed the submitted dissertation independently and without the use of sources and aids other than those indicated. I have marked as such all statements that are taken literally or in content from other writings. This dissertation has not yet been presented to any other examination authority in the same or a similar form and has not yet been published.

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