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Differences of National Identification with the Home Country among the Highly Educated Youngster of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany:

A Comparative Study over the Case of German Turks and the "New-Wave" Turks

Submitted by
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To all migrants who build their home within.

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1. Introduction

"so, here you are
too foreign for home
too foreign for here.
never enough for both."
Ijeoma Umebinyuo*, Diaspora Blues*

Migration from Turkey to Germany has a long history, beginning in 1961 with the migration of guest workers under a bilateral recruitment agreement. Emigration to Germany has been the hallmark of contemporary Turkish immigration in contemporary Europe considering its scope and volume (Toktas, 2012, p. 5). Although the primary reason for the migration from Turkey to Germany was economic for a time following the recruitment agreement, political and social factors have formed other types of migration. Increasing political repression, notably against leftist and Kurdish opposition, led to an increase of asylum seekers and political exiles from Turkey, particularly during the 1980 coup d'état and throughout the 1990s. (Adar, 2019, p. 7). A large trend of "sporadic movement" of highly skilled laborers and students started around the same period and persisted for decades. (ibid.). Following the Gezi protests in 2013 and especially the aftermath of the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, the unprecedented flow started a new chapter in the history of political and economic migration from Turkey to Germany (ibid.). This recent migration trend, "the new wave" –which was named after a Facebook group called "New Wave in Berlin" created in 2016 reaches over 4.2 thousands of members by June 2022– , refers to the group mainly consisting of highly skilled workers and students who have migrated to Germany for better living conditions after the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government's regime has started to become extremely authoritarian.

Turkish diaspora in Germany has become increasingly diverse from 1961 onwards in various aspects such as the motives of migration; the educational, sociocultural, and political background; the residency time and conditions; and the acculturation. Although in this study they are referred as the Turkish diaspora, the migrants coming from Turkey represent an ethnically and religiously diverse group including mostly Kurds, and Alevis, each of which has a distinct cultural identity (Aydin, 2016, p. 6). The new-wave migrants are seemingly fairly

homogeneous in their political views, whereas the existing diaspora is perceived as mixed (Oldac and Fancourt, 2021, p. 630). Namely the new-wave migrants who are considered to be a group of young people with identical needs and motivations appalled by Turkey's political situation and Erdogan's authoritarianism, and thus prefer to "live in exile" rather than returning to their homeland, where they see little future for themselves (Pearson, cited in Okumus, 2020, p. 4). The study of Oldac and Fancourt that focuses on perceived differences among the Turkish diaspora demonstrates that the interviewees consisting of the new-wave migrants have referred to the unease that they have experienced while having conversations about politics with the existing Turkish diaspora since they cannot know whether they are pro-AKP or not (ibid.). Meanwhile, they have stated that they feel more comfortable interacting and having any political conversation with the other new-wave members (ibid.).

While the politics of the AKP government has been the initial reason for the new wave to immigrate, a strong sense of pride arises out of the perception of a "strong Turkey" under the leadership of president Erdoğan for the majority of German Turks (Adar, 2019, p. 20). Apart from the emotional reasons, material reasons such as Turkey's economic growth[1], socio-economic changes, and improvements in the quality of services at various state organizations have garnered sympathy and support towards the AKP government, especially for the older generations (Adar, 2019, p. 21). After the Turkish citizens abroad were granted the right to vote, in the 2014 Turkish presidential election nearly 2.8 million Turkish citizens were entitled to vote and a little over half a million went to the polls (Aydin, 2016, p. 6). 68 percent of the diaspora members voted for now-President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (ibid.). In the later elections, AKP gained 53.65 percent of the votes in June 2015, and 56.3 in June 2018 in Germany (Adar, 2018). Seemingly clashing stances regarding the politics in Turkey and the image of Turkey under the rule of AKP give rise to the question of "why would you leave Turkey to come to Germany", which is directed at the new wave. As older generations compare the old Turkey that they left around the 1960s with the one that has been under the rule of the AKP from 2003 onwards, they tend to evaluate the changes from a distance by overly focusing on the increased service provision that effectively improves the lives of German Turks both in Turkey and Germany. Additionally, the AKP running successful initiatives to gain support from the diaspora has had a significant impact on the establishment of this support. Hence, why so many

[1] "The AKP rose to power in 2002 after one of the worst economic crises had hit the country, in 2001. After that, up until 2016, gross domestic product per capita increased from $9,090 to $25,655" (Adar, 2019, p. 20).

young people have decided to leave Turkey in increasing numbers has become a question for them. This study has evolved around the curiosity whether the educated descendants of the first-generation migrants would raise the same question to the newcomers who receive the aforementioned question daily in social interactions with the existing Turkish diaspora. Does the AKP government help the younger German Turks to repair an existing frustration –which is common among migrants– regarding their social standing within Germany and ultimately strengthen their national identification and belonging to Turkey (Adar, 2019, p. 24)? What is their image of current Turkey in comparison to the new-wave migrants? What are the differences and similarities regarding the national identification of these two groups?

Surely, there are great numbers of studies that tackle the acculturation that the Turkish diaspora has experienced in Germany and their dual identities on varied dimensions such as the challenges and opportunities of migrant integration, transnational practices, and local attachments or political attitudes of the migrants (Clark, 2011; Ehrkamp, 2005; Adar, 2019). While there is an apparent focus within the literature on low-skilled migrants, educated and highly skilled migrants, especially newcomers seem to fall short in studies (Oldac and Fancourt, 2021, p. 623). The literature offers diverse comparative research focusing on generational differences among German Turks such as their diversified naturalization practices (Anil, 2007) and different challenges that they have experienced regarding citizenship and belonging (Mandel, 2008). However, the comparative studies between youngsters of German Turks and the new wave constitute a huge gap in the literature. This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the differences between the two groups regarding their national identification with Turkey. The study is based on a qualitative data analysis carried out through semi-structured interviews with ten persons, five of whom are German Turks and five of whom are new-wave Turks[2]. The interviewees are persons between the ages of 20 and 40 who completed their bachelors or are still undergraduates. The members of both groups are determined through the snowball method. Variety in terms of occupation, gender, and arrival date for the new-wave participants was taken into consideration during the selection of the participants. The study is conducted in Berlin as the new wave migration looks to be a visible phenomenon in particular for Germany's capital city, Berlin due to an international scene,

[2] Even though migrants recently coming from Turkey are ethnically diverse, they are referred to as the new-wave Turks at times in this study.

relatively low rents, cheap food, availability of non-commercial activities, and already existent Turkish cultural life (Bader and Scharenberg; Lehmann, cited in Okumus, 2020, p. 3).

Although different migration waves from Turkey to Germany have been largely studied before, the new wave has not constituted a popular debate in the academic sphere yet. However, it surely is a huge source of public debate. The Berlin-based Turkish artist Işıl Eğrikavuk reacts to the frequency of the comment "but you don't look Turkish!" through her photo-performance series (Türkmen, 2019). Eğrikavuk's project is just an example of how the new wave sheds light on the diversity of the Turkish diaspora in Germany that now has had to come forward maybe more than ever. The reason for that is seemingly the new-wave migrants often distinguish themselves from the existing diaspora due to their perceived social, political, and educational differences as well as the uncomfortable relationship with the majority of the Turkish diaspora (Oldac and Fancourt, 2021, p. 635). The importance of this public debate and its necessity of transforming into the academic sphere essentially comes from the significance of diversifying migration policies for the distinct needs of different diaspora groups (Okumus, 2020, p. 2). Because systematic overgeneralization and seeing a diverse group as one big whole have the potential of increasing discrimination and prejudices. Also, highly skilled labor and graduate students that constitute the new-wave migrants are no longer regarded as a temporary phenomenon, owing to an increasing number of opportunities for long-term and permanent settlements for those who can successfully integrate into the labor market, particularly in sectors where labor shortages are currently occurring or are expected to occur in the future in developed countries such as Germany (Faist et al., cited in Okumus, 2020, p. 3). Thus, this new migration flow necessitates a greater interest from academics, and policymakers at local, regional, and national levels.

The research question of the study is how national identification with Turkey for the educated youth of German Turks and the new-wave Turks differs. Over the comparative analysis of the aforementioned two groups, the study aims to enrich our understanding of how national identification might alter with the factor of perhaps maintaining a loaded diaspora experience and a dual identity in comparison to being just recently emigrated from the home country.

So far, the introduction presented the main objectives of the study, the study's place within the academic and public sphere, and lastly the research question. The study continues by providing background knowledge that expands on the migration history from Turkey to Germany. This

section will help the reader to grasp the relevance of the topic and its broader context. In the third section, the theoretical framework will be introduced in order to help analyze the data and finally answer the research question. This section places the research question within the theoretical context as well. Then, the section that presents the methods and the design of the research follows. Here, the reader will have the chance to go through the justification of the choices regarding sampling, formulation of the questionnaire, and the method of analysis along with the potential shortcomings and the limitations that the analysis carries. The fifth section contains the empirical findings that present the analysis of the interviews in the light of the research question and the theories that the questions refer to. Therefore, the results section consists of the interpretation of the data examined through the methodological and theoretical toolsets. Finally, summary of the empirical results and conclusion will follow. Under these sections, it is intended to shortly summarize the research question, the main results, and the contribution of the study to the current state of the art. Also, the conclusion will critically reflect upon the study's limitations and will indicate the potential further research areas.

2. Background Knowledge

Turkey's labor migration to Europe began in 1961, with temporary bilateral agreements, since European industries needed labor for postwar reconstruction operations (Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 208). Germany became one of the world's largest, most competitive, most dynamic economies as a result of the contributions of the guest workers and has risen to the top of the list of most developed nations. (Toktas, 2012, p. 7). The guestworker agreement was highly beneficial to Turkey due to the increased foreign-exchange reserves through remittances and decreased unemployment rates (Sayari, cited in Aydin, 2016, p. 3). Recruitment is also seen as a type of development aid to Turkey, with the goal of socially and politically stabilizing the country (a NATO member) by reducing the pressure caused by high unemployment rates (Aydin, 2016, p. 3). In addition, the Turkish government believed that after a few years of working in Germany, Turkish labor migrants would return with new professional skills and knowledge, reducing labor shortages in Turkey's industries (ibid.). The agreement only allowed for temporary migration through work permits valid for a few years. However, as the family unification was allowed in the following years, the temporary stay has turned into a permanent settlement. The official labor recruitment program ended in 1974 as a result of the oil crisis, although migration continued through family reunification, asylum-seeking, and illegal ways (Schnapper, cited in Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 208). The Foreigners Repatriation Incentives Law (Gesetzs zur Förderung der Rückkehrbereitschaft von Ausländern) was introduced by Germany's ruling coalition in 1983 to encourage immigrant workers and their families to return to their home countries (Aydin, 2016, p. 5). The new strategy was a reaction to increased unemployment, rising rates of family reunification, and mounting evidence of immigrant population integration issues (ibid.). Around 250.000 Turks returned to Turkey as a result of the financial incentives (ibid.). Despite the resistance to the settlement of the Turkish migrants and encouraging programs aiming at the return of guest workers from Germany to their homeland, today migrants from Turkey represent the largest minority group in Germany (in the whole of Europe as well) with the numbers amounting to approximately 2.8 million (Mediendienst Integration, 2022). By 2002, only one-third of Turks in Germany had arrived as guest workers, while around 53 percent of Turkish residents had immigrated to Germany on family reunification visas, and 17 percent were their descendants born in Germany (Anil, 2007, p. 1365).

Based on Aksel's classification of major emigration waves from Turkey (2014, p. 201), I classify the migration from Turkey to Germany under four categories: (1) *mass labor and family migration* from the 1960s until the mid-1970s, (2) *political migration* resulting from political oppression in Turkey during 1980s and 1990s, (3) *diverging patterns of more sporadic migration*, especially after the 1990s including highly skilled labor and student migration, (4) *the new wave of political and economic migration* following the authoritarian tendencies of the AKP government increased after the Gezi protests in 2013.

Back in the 1960s, the solution for the flourishing German economy that was experiencing a labor shortage had been the recruitment of mostly unskilled workers as cheap labor. The educational level of the migrants has stayed low for decades. By 2007, approximately 65 percent of Turkish migrants, even those who obtained German citizenship, did not receive any schooling in Germany (Diehl and Blohm, cited in Anil, 2007, p. 1365). Only 15 percent of people who earned their education in Germany had been qualified to attend a German university (Sen, cited in Anil, 2007, p. 1365). While the guest workers could barely speak German and were less educated, the second- and third-generations play an active role in society, shaping political, cultural, and economic life today (Tecmen, 2020, p. 11). The Turkish diaspora has diversified socially, politically, and culturally through the characteristics and motives of the new migration flows as well. After the era of mass labor and family migration, political turmoil in Turkey in the late 1970s prompted many individuals to seek refuge in Germany; a military coup in 1980 accelerated this politically motivated migration (Aydin, 2016, p. 4). Political figures and highly qualified individuals were among those requesting refuge, most of whom were unable to access the labor market owing to disregarded qualifications or a lack of legal status (ibid.). During the 1990s, the armed conflict between the Kurdish rebel organization PKK (Kurdistan's Workers Party) and the Turkish government hasled to the arrival of the Kurdish people and further fragmentation within the Turkish diaspora in Germany (Aydin, 2016, p. 5). On the other hand, the need for skilled labor for Germany has started to alter the characteristics of the diaspora as well. In 2000, a shortage of qualified IT workers revived a debate about revising German migration policy, regulating migration, and Germany as an "immigrant country" (Tecmen, 2020, p. 27). During Hannover's computer expo CEBIT held in March 2000, then-chancellor Schröeder announced the introduction of a so-called "Green Card" for the recruitment of foreign information technology experts (Currle, cited in Tecmen, 2020, p. 27). The need for skilled labor has compelled Germany to finally accept that it is an immigration country rather than a labor recruiting

country. The changes in approaching the migration throughout time has let the authorities revise political discourse, implement new immigration legislations, and constitute migration commissions. For high-skilled laborers, for example, the annual wage requirement for a residence and work permit was decreased from 66.000 euros to 49.600 euros (Aydin, 2016, p. 12). After graduation, foreign students are now permitted to stay in Germany for eighteen months to look for work (ibid.). Although presenting the history of improvements regarding legislation and public discourse towards migrants goes beyond the scope of this study's objectives, it should be noted that legal inferences have resulted in the immigration of more skilled labor throughout time. Hence, this alteration has created more diversity among the Turkish diaspora living in Germany in educational, political, economic, and sociocultural terms.

In the beginning of 2012, the number of people with a migration background in Germany increased significantly as a result of liberalized migration policies, the global economic crisis, and conflicts in neighboring regions (Tecmen, 2020, p. 35). During the same period, Erdogan's government's neoliberal populism, which combines neoliberal austerity policies with political Islam, has exacerbated Turkey's political and economic instability, particularly after 2013 (Akcay, cited in Okumus, 2020, p. 3). During the early summer 2013, thousands of protesters from all around the nation joined together to oppose Erdogan's administration and politics of the Islamic-conservative AKP government (Hahn, 2018). The movement started with the protests against Erdogan's plans for the reconstruction of an Ottoman barracks that had been destroyed in 1940 which included a mall in Gezi Park which is a tiny green space on Taksim Square's edge (ibid.). The initial opposition to Erdogan's plans for the Gezi Park served as the fuel for further protests, which grew into one of the most significant social movements in Turkey's modern history (ibid.). Diverse groups, including left-leaning liberals, nationalists, football fans, Kurds, and women wearing headscarves, filled the streets (ibid.). The developments that have occurred after the Gezi protests have been the main detectable motive of the so-called "new wave" of skilled emigration from Turkey. After the AKP government lost its parliamentary majority for the first time in thirteen years in 2015, terror attacks had kept occuring for months in Turkey's biggest cities. The insecure social environment worsened through growing anxieties stemming from the terror attacks and the 15 July 2016 coup d'état attempt (Kulkul, 2019). Later, Turkey's 98-year parliamentary system came to an end with the constitutional referendum of April 16, 2017, and the presidential system was established. Although Turkish politics appeared to enter a relatively quiet and seemingly stable phase with

the rise of the AKP to power as a single-party government in 2002, in the late 2000s, socio-political conflicts revived, and ultimately resulted in what would turn out to be the most oppressive governance in the country's modern history (Adar, 2019, p. 8).

In this study, the new wave migration is specified as an ongoing migration trend that started in 2013. This precise assessment is required to define sample group of the study more accurately although it is hard to make a sharp distinction within the period in which the political and economic atmosphere started to become a solid push factor. However, the survey research that Okumus has conducted reveals a significant difference between those who arrived in Berlin before the Gezi Protests that occured in 2013 and those who arrived after the protests, indicating that the need for freedom has been particularly high recently, owing to neoliberal populism in Turkey, which has hampered individuals' economic, social, and political capabilities (Okumus, 2020, p. 21).

3. Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, the main concepts, definitions, and theories that help us understand how the national identification of the young educated German Turks and the new-wave Turks with Turkey differ will be introduced. (1.) Firstly, we will look at the prevailing perspectives towards the term “diaspora”, (2.) and some important definitions of “national identity”. (3.) Later, we will be discussing how national identification is reformed within the diaspora experience by utilizing the term “transnationalism”. (4.) Followingly, theories of “dual identity” and (5.) some approaches that are helpful to understand belonging to the homeland will be reviewed. (6.) Then comes the literature on the status of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, and lastly (7.) the literature review regarding a few conditions such as education and language that are impactful on the formation of national identification of the Turkish diaspora will be shared.

Two groups of people are chosen to be examined in this study to examine their national identification. The main binding point of these groups is that they belong to the same diaspora, namely the Turkish diaspora in Germany. The next sub-chapter seeks to clarify what is meant by the general word "diaspora" and assess if it is actually useful in understanding the varied experiences of these groups.

3.1. Diaspora Experience

Diaspora was coined to indicate “religious or national groups living outside of a (imagined) homeland” (Faist, cited in Aksel, 2014, p. 196). The term was frequently applied to Jewish, Armenian, and Greek communities, implying that they were "victimized" (Aksel, 2014, p. 196). William Safran introduces a definition based upon the Jewish diaspora in six points as follows: diasporas are (1.) dispersed from an original center, (2.) maintain a shared memory, vision, or history of their homeland, (3.) feel an inevitable alienation from their host countries, (4.) imagine an inevitable return to the ancestral homeland, (5.) maintain some relationship to it, and (6.) carries group solidarity (Safran, cited in Maxwell and Davis, 2016. p. 5). Until the late 1990s, the term and its indication haven’t been subjected to a great change. After some attempts to typologize the concept, different nation examples with different migration histories have revealed that categorizing some nations under certain diaspora subheadings was not possible,

and that the term could not be linked to any particular form of community or entirety of time span of a particular diaspora community (ibid.). Brubaker draws attention to how the term has found its meaning in semantic, conceptual, and disciplinary spaces through time (Brubaker, 2005, p. 1). In other words, the term diaspora has broadened to include any category of the namable population that is somehow dispersed in space such as the gay diaspora, the labor diaspora, the white diaspora, and so forth. Despite the disparities in semantic and conceptual space, three essential characteristics of diaspora remain commonly recognized (Brubaker, 2005, p. 5). These are as follows: (1.) dispersion in space including the dispersion crossing state borders and within the state border, (2.) orientation to a homeland as a reliable source of value, identity, and loyalty, and lastly (3.) boundary-maintenance meaning the maintenance of a differentiated identity in relation to a host society (ibid.). Many migrant groups have been defined as diasporas since they have pursued some emotional and social ties with their home countries that produce transnational solidarity among the members of the diaspora everywhere[3]. In contrast to the old perspective suggesting that immigrants made a sharp break with their homeland and migration inevitably led to assimilation, the new perspective within the literature of diaspora argues that pre-migration networks, cultures, and capital remain salient (ibid.). Rather than approaching immigration in a singular form, scholars now detail the diversity of "immigration circumstances, class backgrounds, gendered transitions, and the sheer multitude of migration experiences" (Lie, cited in Brubaker, 2005, p. 8). Clifford draws attention to an oxymoron called “changing same” that can be utilized here to approach the diaspora situation: it is “something endlessly hybridized and, in the process, but persistently there” (Clifford, cited in Brubaker, 2005, p. 7). Although there are commonly recognized criteria that define diaspora, the boundaries of diaspora as a category are unclear. Sheffer distinguishes between "core," "marginal," and "dormant" diaspora members, but also counts the number of diaspora members without providing any evidence that those included actually identify as diaspora members (Sheffer, cited in Brubaker, 2005, p. 11). Also, Brubaker emphasizes that the concept of “dormant member” of a diaspora is problematic since it is vague as to what extent one should be assimilated or fully integrated in order to be regarded as a member of the diaspora (2005, p. 11).

[3] It should be noted that diaspora does not simply refer to communities who migrated over borders; it also results from the migration of borders over communities as in the case of Hungarians, Russians, and other ethnonational communities separated by political borders (Brubaker, 2005, p. 3).

On the other hand, as Nieswand highlights, the migrants are not considered as diasporas only because they live outside of the homeland, but rather that diaspora is a particular political and social form which carries ideological implications (2012, p. 1875). According to several authors, the term diaspora brings the danger of devaluing the internal heterogeneity of a population and concealing the political agendas that are suggested by it (Anthias; Brubaker, cited in Nieswand, 2012, p. 1875).

Considering how loaded, vague, and open to political manipulation the diaspora term has become, to the extent that makes the analysis challenging, Brubaker's suggestion to perceive diaspora not as a bounded entity but as an idiom, a stance, and a claim is taken into consideration while analyzing the Turkish diaspora in Germany in this study (2005, p. 12). Therefore, it is not conceptualized as a constant identity but rather as an identification; "not an essence but a positioning" (Hall, 2007, p. 132). The attempt to understand the national identification of the migrants in question is firmly tied to grasping their diasporic stance.

3.2. National Identity/Identification

The origins of nations and national identity can be found in ethnic identity as a pre-modern form of collective cultural identity (Guibernau, 2004). Collective identity refers to a sense of connection and shared destiny that is embedded in situational identities. As in the way Brubaker puts forth, a collective identity is a "category of practice" that is, as historical actors imagined and experienced it (Maxwell and Davis, 2016); and they are implemented within situations that evoke them (Owens et al., 2010). Social Identity Theory (SIT) approaches community members as social actors having multiple identities that get activated by different social contexts. Unlike personal, internalized identity theories assuming that stable social identities move with the actors from one situation to the next, the situational identity theories such as SIT focus on how consensual cultural meanings that are attached to identities are imported by actors into local interactions and on how situational environments build the localized meanings of the relevant identities (Owens et al., 2010).

Scholars of nationalism and nationalist activists mostly define the term national identity as a collective identity referring to belonging to a nation or having an ethnic identity that offers shared memories, myths, symbols, traditions, and notions entertained by each generation about

the collective destiny of that community and its culture (Smith, cited in Guibernau, 2004). However, it is only one part of the picture (Triandafyllidou, 2006). Surely, national identity has an inward-looking characteristic, and involves some degree of commonality founded on a set of shared features that connect the nation's citizens together (ibid.). However, it also implies difference which entails both collective self-consciousness and knowledge of "others" from whom the nation seeks to differentiate itself (ibid.). The other might be a threatening nation, an inspiring nation, similar or dissimilar out-groups, or immigrants. Therefore, national identity, in broad terms, is defined as "a person's attachment to a nation and is both defined from within –through imagined commonalities– and from outside the group" (Triandafyllidou, cited in van der Zwet, 2015, p. 64).

That being said, some aspects of national identities may be absent in diaspora groups or difficult to pursue when living away from the homeland. Smith argues that "nations must have a measure of common culture and a civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas, that bind the population together in their homeland" (Smith, cited in Guibernau, 2004). This approach to the concept of nation highlights the necessity of nation borders and a collective identity within it. Then, a crucial and valid question that has challenged the limits or the extent of national identity arises: when the element of coexistence in space is extracted, how does national identity transform? Could we still talk about a vibrant national identity that diaspora communities maintain with the homeland?

3.3. National Identification within the Diaspora Experience

The research on transnationalism investigates how national identity might be restored within diaspora experience. The prevailing theories of transnationalism concentrate on theories of borderless "transnational social spaces" with imagined and hybridized qualities (Aksel, 2014, p. 197). Transnational migrants have been building new social spaces, networks, and identities, according to these studies (ibid.). In other words, migrant collectives structure their social and symbolic networks across national borders (Amelina and Faist, 2008). Later the new findings brought new remarks to the research field. It is revealed that increased communications and networks foster a sense of belonging that comprises more active kinds of belonging such as transnational political involvement as well as more fixed terms such as belonging in the sense of adopting multiple social and cultural identities (ibid.). The new forms of transnationalism

and globalization did not eliminate the non-cosmopolitan values by any means. On the contrary, they have strengthened ethnicity, nationalism, and ethnonationalism (Sheffer, cited in Aksel, 2014, p. 197). Certain groups of dispersed people would attribute enduring traits to their collective identities, allowing for more cohesion and solidarity (ibid.). The transnational approach proposes that migrants are capable of maintaining transnational ties while also acquiring the essential information (economic, political, educational, etc.) to achieve integration with the organizations and institutions of the "majority society" (Amelina and Faist, 2008). The very possibility of transnationalism does not approach the migration process as unidirectional or sees assimilation of migrants as inevitable (Lie, 2001, p. 356). Instead, the idea of diaspora is intertwined with the idea of transnationalism, suggesting the possibility of many identities and interconnected networks (ibid.).

Lie emphasizes the necessity of demolishing the privileged position of nation as a unit of analysis and identity (2001, p. 358). To him, the main achievement of diaspora and nationalism studies is its ability to give the set of tools to go beyond presuming the national homogeneity of migrants and to actually start analyzing their existing heterogeneity (2001, p. 359). In line with this perspective, I approach national identification as an *action* that is "subject to the continuous play of history, culture, and power" (Hall, 2007, p. 131). Thanks to the acknowledgment of the shifting world in the context of globalism, migration literature has updated the definition of migrant identity in a sense that highlights people being in flux and having a continuing reciprocal relationship with their environment. Migrants, in particular, do not define themselves solely in terms of their current place of residency, but also in terms of distant places and communities (e.g., the home country left behind or the place their parents came from) (Vlasta, 2016, p. 223). Furthermore, while these communities are diverse, they are all aware of having their own, shared heritage as a group (Appadurai, cited in Vlasta, 2016, p. 223). Diaspora studies are not marginal, something of interest only to the small number of people who left their country and their descendants, but rather an integral part of homeland history and culture (Lie, 2001, p. 359). Despite the vast emigrations in history, the conventional, nationalist view portrays the evolution of national identification as endogenous and sees diasporic outflow solely as dispersal of a small minority outside of national borders (ibid.). Territoriality and peoplehood are closely linked in this perspective, which sees national identification as entailing the history of a specific, well-defined region and the people who inhabit it (ibid.). Lie points out the possible limitations of the conventional perspective in the following words:

> "Such an autochthonous view of national history is problematic because popular national identity is a belated achievement of the modern nation-state. The presentist bias should be clear if we shift our historical starting point beyond the purview of the nationalist myth. In one sense –if we believe in the contemporary wisdom on human origins– we are all Africans (or African Americans, for those living in the United States). More proximately, the vision of the homogeneous nation dispersing people at the margins fundamentally distorts the past and present."

In light of Lie's words, I approach diaspora experience and national identification as a couple of highly intertwined matters in a continuous reciprocal relationship that have the power of being impactful in the history of the development of national identification with both host and home countries. Although fluidity is one of the very characteristics of these identifications, it does not mean that "there are no relatively stable communities and networks of kinship, friendship, work, and leisure, as well as of birth, residence, and other filial forms" (Appadurai, cited in Vlasta, 2016, p. 224). Also, the narrative of fluid identification of migrants might carry the risk of disregarding the power of the host country to place migrants on the margin where they are trapped in this fluid identification and cannot enjoy the benefits of being an accepted member of the society (Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 205). In other words, the alternative model of fluid identity might function as a strategy for the nation-state to empose its power on the migrants' lives through constrained rights and limited paths to legal membership of the society (ibid.).

However, as more people or communities want to move around the globe, the stabilities everywhere become in vain. In other words, traditional units such as territoriality are being replaced by a global network characterized by migration and mass media (Appadurai, cited in Vlasta, 2016, p. 224) in a way that the naturalization processes cannot make the migrants traditionally embody the host country's national identity as the ethnic members do due to migrants' varied experience of transnationalism. Access to full membership through citizenship does not guarantee a strong belonging or national identification with the host society from the migrants' side and strong acceptance from the host society's side as well (Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 205). Belonging is determined by both the formal context (legal citizenship) and emotions (sense of belonging), which are tied to perceptions of inclusion or exclusion, or a "need for attachment" (Yuval-Davis, cited in Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 206). Thus, a

contemporary understanding of national identification that transcends the borders with the varied tools globalization has provided is required to approach migrant identities in order to understand their multiplicity as well as to design more customized integration and naturalization strategies according to their varied features and needs.

3.4. Dual Identity

As previously noted, migrant groups often have strong symbolic and material links to their "mother nations," which they utilize to re-establish their national identification within the diaspora experience (Triandafyllidou, 2006). The migrants and the host society are viewed as two distinct entities forced to coexist that are both seen to be yearning for national and cultural "authenticity" and "purity", which can only be attained through the return of the minority to their homeland (ibid.). However, diaspora experience leads to the emergence of multiple transnational identities.

As an attempt to reify this multiplicity of diaspora experience, the term “dual identity” is coined in order to refer to a sense of national commitment and belonging towards the country of residence without distancing oneself from one’s ethnocultural in-group. Since migrants’ capacity or tendency to identify with the host society are considered to have an inverse correlation with their national identification with the home country (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, p. 84), discovering the other side of the coin, namely the host national identification, is important in terms of the objectives of this study. The research shows that individuals would withdraw themselves from the national community more strongly than they associated with their own minority group, and vice versa (ibid.). However, people do not always employ this dichotomous scheme of group identifications in situations where they are free to describe themselves (ibid.). For many Turks residing in Germany, for example, it is often not an issue of whether they are Turkish or German, but of how much they feel Turkish and how much they feel German (ibid.). Considering numerous criticisms towards “thinking with ethnicity” including “over-objectification of groups” (Canter and Fenton, 2010), it should be noted that considering dual identity as a solid binary concept that might attribute essentialist characteristics to “ethnicities”[4] has the potential risk of defining communities in a

[4] Despite the fact that ethnicity as a stable factor is problematic in terms of its categorizing nature, ethnic categories can be found in all social systems and are used as "practical categories" by actors. The sociologist's goal is to

homogeneous way and attempting to revive the cultural memory based on the idea of a unified nation (Vlasta, 2016, p. 227). Thus, migrants' own individual definitions of *feeling* German or Turkish and their unique formation of national identity with the host and home countries is an integral element to the approach of this study towards the concept of dual identity. Because the formal institutionalization and codification of ethnic and national categories tell nothing about their depth, resonance, or influence in the lives of those who are categorized (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 54).

That being said, how migrants choose to identify or disidentify with the host community plays a role in sharpening the categories of "us" and "them". It might be hard for pursuing a national identification and belonging to the country of residence for many reasons such as discrimination, bureaucratic hardship, contradicting cultural values and norms, and so on. Thus, the diaspora experience might lead to the emergence of a reactive identity that consciously differentiates itself from the national identity of the majority. Disidentification can be beneficial in terms of developing a distinct, secure, and positive ethnic minority identity, but it can also be detrimental to sociocultural adjustment and societal involvement (Ogbu, cited in Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, p. 89). Acculturation research demonstrates that legal, structural, cultural, and social factors are highly influential in immigrants' national identification with the host country (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, p. 92). For example, being of a later generation, having the host country citizenship, a longer residence in the country, higher education, better labor market position, higher language proficiency and use, and more social contacts with majority group members have all been found to predict stronger national identification (ibid.). However, are these factors might be considered as influential in weakening national identification with the home country? Social Identity Theory offers an answer to this question as follows:

> "Depending on the nature of the social structure, ethnic minority members adopt different strategies to achieve a more positive social identity. The most basic way in which this can be done is to follow an individualistic social mobility path and dissociate oneself psychologically from one's devalued ethnic minority group and identify more strongly with the majority group and nation" (Tajfel and Turner, cited in Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, p. 93).

comprehend the key features of the social system in which ethnic categories play a role. This necessitates the reintroduction of "ethnicity" into the broader idea of social activity and structure (Canter and Fenton, 2010).

However, multicultural and diverse societies might be offering an alternative way of contradicting this dichotomy that directly correlates weak national identification regarding the home country with strong host national identification. As long as the processes of migrants' formation of national identification within diaspora experience are recognized and not repressed through assimilative politics or culture, migrants seem to create a hybrid and myriad belonging on their own terms. Although the majority has all sorts of power to homogenize minorities into monolithic units, when seen through the eyes of these ethnicized subjects, a completely different picture emerges, one of contestation, complexity, and diversity (Mandel, 2008, p. 2).

Until this point, we have covered the relevant literature that helps us to understand the diaspora situation and how it contains national identification both with the host and home countries, and lastly how the terms transnationalism and dual identity might be useful in detailing the characteristics of migrant identity. The next subchapter aims to present the respective literature on the image of the homeland, and migrants' belonging to the "home" that is far.

3.5. Belonging to the Homeland

There is no doubt that homeland and diaspora are inextricably linked as the concept of homeland occupies a special place in the diasporic imagination (Ziemer, 2010, p. 292). The concept of home is possible through imagination and history; it is both phantasmal and loaded with the memory of the past. Hall's mere definition of cultural identity, I believe, is beneficial here to approach to the image of homeland for a migrant:

> "It is *something* – not a mere trick of the imagination. It has its histories – and histories have their real, material, and symbolic effects. The past continues to speak to us. But it no longer addresses us as a simple, factual 'past', since our relation to it, like the child's relation to the mother, is always-already 'after the break'. It is always constructed through memory, fantasy, narrative, and myth" (Hall, 2007, p. 132).

As we have witnessed throughout the literature review presented so far, contemporary literature envisions physical territory as an inseparable element of neither the concept of diaspora nor the nation, nationalism, ethnicity, and culture. This inference has been mainly influenced by Anderson's famous work "Imagined Communities" (1991). Anderson highlights that

diasporas, like nations, are imagined communities and indicates members of a nation feel solidarity through a sense of shared past, present, and future. Migrants use the past as a resource in their search for meaning and community (Cohen, cited in Ziemer, 2010, p. 297). Maintaining the past, collective culture, and national identification with the country of origin away from home requires the reconceptualization of “home”. Because memory isn't just a resource about the past that needs to be accessed; it is a "reconstruction of the past" that is always being created and reconstructed in the present (Halbwachs, cited in Sobral, 2018, p. 56-57). In other words, social memory is concerned with both consistency and change, referring to a continuity with the past while also reinterpreting the past to create justification for current needs (McAuley, cited in Sobral, 2018, p. 57).

Besides, recent formal and informal developments, changing living standards, everyday life, and public agenda in the country of origin continues to contribute to the reformation of a distant home for migrants through mass media and social media. The current setting of intensive communications and socio-economic globalization is largely analyzed by cosmopolitanism theories (Triandafyllidou, 2006). The scholars emphasize the characteristics of post-industrial societies, such as vastly improved global communications, better, faster, and less expensive long-distance transportation, global media that select and cover events, and the resulting compression of time and space: geographical distance becomes less important as people from all over the world are constantly "connected" through new technologies (ibid.). In such a context, "home" refers to a place where migrants regularly communicate to and sustain linkages.

However, a sense of a place takes a long time to acquire compared to knowledge about a place: it is a unique mixture of the experiences accumulated in time along with the harmony of unique sounds, sights, smells, tastes, and so on (Tuan, cited in Sobral, 2018, p. 58). The feeling of home is the embodiment of all of these sensual, memorial, experience-oriented, and imaginary elements regarding one’s own understanding of culture.

Furthermore, since the descendants of first-generation migrants who are born and raised in the host country did not live in the home country, the country where their parents immigrate from, their first-hand experiences with the home country mainly consist of their visits there. These visits which commonly happened at early ages for longer periods are often remembered with warm feelings derived from "warm weather, swimming and sunbathing at the seaside, good

food and hospitable relatives, and the general atmosphere of fun, friendliness and relaxation" (King and Kilinc, 2014, p. 128). This imagination of holiday-like life has the tendency to continue in their adult lives and shape their image of homeland accordingly.

3.6. The Status of the Turkish Diaspora in Germany

The integration of Turkish society living in Germany has been a public debate for a long time. However, the common understanding towards integration in the host society is the expectation of erosure in migrants' own cultural orientation and adaptation of German and European values and norms. The Turkish population looks to be structurally separated from mainstream German society, and in such conditions, integration would be highly difficult (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008, p. 4). Brubaker calls policies which hold such structural obstacles "differentialist", meaning while immigrants are incorporated into the labor market to some extent –usually at the lowest level–, there are considerable cultural and social barriers that prevent them from fully integrating into the larger social system (ibid.). Today migrants mostly encounter with a veiled form of racism called "cultural racism", which is based on cultural supremacy rather than racial superiority, which allows (and is natural) for nation states to construct closed communities and label populations as "culturally distinct," as Others, and so excludable (Barker, cited in Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 205).

The concept of integration is largely understood by scholars as "a continuum with assimilation at one end and acculturation on the other" (Baker et al., cited in Verdugo and Mueller, 2008, p. 10). Unlike assimilation, acculturation offers a space for preservation of cultural orientation of migrants while developing a sense of belonging to the host country. The emerging literature in the era of globalization suggests that the old concept of a singular ethnonational identity is fading while dual/multiple identities become the new norm (Banks, cited in Verdugo and Mueller, 2008, p. 10).

While developing their own unique understanding of belonging to the host country, each migrant goes through some institutional and everyday life challenges along with the challenges coming from contradicting cultural values and lifestyles with the host society. Although the challenges that acculturation processes have had to encounter go beyond this study's objectives, it is important to mention the representation of the Turkish migrants in the public

sphere that might cause these challenges to understand the factors that are decisive on migrants' formation of national identity. The host country may perceive migrants' values, norms, and practices as a threat to its perceived cultural or ethnic purity (Triandafyllidou, 2006). The national majority is likely to go through a process of reaffirming its identity, attempting to redefine it in order to distinguish itself from the migrants (ibid.). Othering the migrant is necessary for the formation of national identity as well as the attainment or enhancement of national unity (ibid.).

To some scholars, another salient reason for the expectations towards the integration of the Turkish diaspora to the German society to fail, to a large extent, is the existence of "parallel societies" (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008, p. 6). The term refers to "the existence of two social systems each with its own social structure and both coexisting within a given geographical area" (ibid.). Living in parallel societies can be seen in the following examples: living in isolated districts, in-group marriages, maintaining traditional values and norms as those of their parents, working only in particular jobs (e.g., due to lack of access to adequate education or vocational training), Islamic values that might be contradicting Christian or European values, radical nationalism, socialization within the community through their own businesses, locally produced media, mass media and social media from Turkey and so forth.

It should be noted that this phenomenon carries a risk to obscure the institutional problems that create segregation between two societies through economic, social, and political inequalities restraining migrants from becoming an equal member of the society. The Turkish diaspora encounter various barriers, formal and informal, to their full participation in many of Germany's major social organizations (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008, p. 19). Even though migrants possess citizenship of the host country by birth or naturalization, citizenship rights and privileges are still largely related to and expressed in terms of nation-state boundaries (Skey, cited in Sobral, 2018, p. 59). Furthermore, boundaries lead to the separation of in and out groups and provide dominant groups with social privileges (ibid.).

Also, the positioning of the minority in the eyes of the majority recreates the minority's self-presentation. In other words, migrants tend to embody the roles that they are institutionally and socially trapped within and reproduce them. Mandel, in her book "Cosmopolitan Anxieties" that investigates the challenges of the Turkish diaspora towards developing a certain belonging to the host society, addresses this reciprocative relationship as follows:

> “On the one hand, common projections of Turks, often reducing them to tropes of abjection, do not do justice to the myriad alternatives lived out in practice. On the other hand, the processes of self-creation and cultural renewal that are taking place among different segments of the diasporic population are not totally unrelated to the mechanism of projections of Turkishness available in the German public sphere” (2008, p. 3).

I find one social integration theory, namely the contact theory, as utilizable in the case of the Turkish diaspora in Germany. The basic tenet of the contact theory is that in order to dissolve any existing group barriers, contacts between groups or between people from different groups are required (Allport, cited in Becker, 2022). Contact enables people to view one another as unique people rather than merely as members of another, standardized group (Brewer and Miller, cited in Becker, 2022). This process of individualization results in formation of more positive sentiments about individuals and their groups (ibid.). Based on this theory, the members of the Turkish diaspora who engage with ethnic Germans more in diverse spheres of life are expected to feel a stronger connection and belonging to the larger German society, hence, to develop a stronger national identification with Germany.

The status of the Turkish diaspora in Germany has been highly controversial in the public sphere. At least three factors contribute to this debate: Germany's perception that the Turkish population is not fully "integrated" into German society, Germany's perception that it is not an immigrant country, and the subtle and not so subtle negotiations between German society and the Turkish community about "integration" (Verdugo and Mueller, 2008, p. 19).

Drawing from the many aspects presented in the previous subchapters to demonstrate the elements that form national identification, the study moves forward to narrowing down the literature to present prominent factors that are impactful on the formation of national identification specifically for the young educated German Turks and the new-wave Turkish migrants.

3.7. Key Factors that are Impactful on Turkish Migrants' National Identification

Reviewing the existing literature that attempts to analyze the factors which are impactful on the integration of the existing migrants and motivations for the high-skilled migration (Tecmen, 2020; Zorkociova and Ďuranová, 2017; Verdugo and Mueller, 2008), I come to the conclusion of that a few important elements are specifically worth further mentioning as they influence the formation of national identification of the two groups this study focuses on. Therefore, this subchapter focuses on the literature on (1.) education and relatedly labor-market opportunities, (2.) language, (3.) citizenship and residency, and (4.) religion, to understand the possible implications of the migrants' conditions and characteristics related to these matters on their belonging and national identification both with host and home countries.

3.7.1. Education and labor-market opportunities

Access to education and the labor market are highly interrelated and success in these areas affect integration opportunities in the host country. First-generation Turkish migrants, namely the guest workers, have migrated from the poorest, least developed rural areas of Turkey. The criterias for recruiting these low-skilled laborers only were age, health, and physical condition; language skills and educational background were not among the criterias (Zorkociova and Ďuranová, 2017, p. 478). Because guest workers were viewed merely as a cheap labor force, German society did not encourage the integration of Turkish immigrants (ibid.). Compared to their parents, descendants of the first-generation migrants have made significant progress even though they still face a variety of educational shortcomings and labor market disadvantages (Heath et al., cited in Hartmann, 2016, p. 369). Especially third-generation Turks are gradually catching up to their German counterparts (Zorkociova and Ďuranová, 2017, p. 479). However, the findings indicate that the young German Turks still face a great risk of unemployment and labor market disadvantages (Hartmann, 2016, p. 369). Among all the ethnicities, they have been found to have the greatest difficulties finding jobs, and to earn less (Algan et al., cited in Hartmann, 2016, p. 369). According to Hartmann's empirical study on the subject, German Turks still face significant barriers to a steady middle-class career, due to more frequent and longer periods of unemployment (2016, p. 371). Lower education levels and language skills appear as the major causes of these disadvantages (ibid.).

As education constitutes different access to wider societal systems, knowledge, and experience, migrants' national identification with the host country and hence, with the distant homeland might vary according to their educational background as well. Although the study does not suggest a comparison across migrants with different educational levels and its impact on their national identification, I believe it is important to introduce the impact of higher education on diaspora experience in order to understand the possible implications of it in terms of the results of the study.

According to the results of Verdugo and Mueller's survey research focusing on the integration of the Turkish community through education starting from elementary school until the end of high school, the migrants are more likely to identify with the country (Germany or Turkey) where they received education (2008). Another research focusing on the determinants of national identification suggests that the separation from the dominant group and lower national identification with the host community is not restricted to lower educated and economically less successful immigrants, but it may be more prevalent among the higher educated and prosperous (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, p. 94). Hence, experiences and perceptions of nonacceptance and discrimination, despite their efforts and effective integration into society, would make them lean toward their own minority group and turn away from the host society (ibid., 95). It is argued that the more migrants socialize with the majority group through education and through the pathways that education opens for them the more they develop positive attitudes towards the host community. However, through education it is likely that migrants become more aware and concerned about the less advantaged and vulnerable position of ethnic minorities and migrants in society (ibid.). In sum, the literature suggests that although there are some detectable impacts of education on national identification with the host country, there is no direct clear correlation between receiving education in the host country and developing strong national identification with it.

As stated in the chapter of background knowledge, the new-wave Turks consist of highly skilled professionals or students who are mainly moving to Germany for their Master's or Doctoral degrees. Therefore, the educational background consisting of at least a Bachelor's degree appears as a tool for migrating to Germany. The highly educated are more likely to participate in international movement across emigration countries (Dao et al., cited in Boad and Busto, 2017, p. 2). They are the ones who belong to the middle-upper class and have the most potential of possessing the required economic and cultural capital to move abroad across

emigration countries as well. Also, the highly educated migrants are the most desired by national public opinion across the world (Helbling and Kriesi, cited in Boad and Busto, 2017, p. 2).

According to the data of Konda Research and Consultancy, an anonymous company specialized in public opinion polling in Turkey, by 2017, only 10 percent of AKP voters have a university degree, 23 percent have a high school diploma, and 66 percent have a secondary education or below (Uncu, 2018). The majority of AKP voters come from families with low educational capital (ibid.). The rate of AKP voters whose fathers had less than high school education was 89 percent in 2017 (ibid.). In addition, according to 2017 data, the distribution of employment status of AKP voters is as follows: 12 percent senior employees; 27 percent farmers, artisans, and workers; 14 percent retired; 37 percent housewives; 5 percent students (ibid.). Since the smallest category who votes for AKP consists of educated and highly skilled laborers and students, it is not surprising that the new-wave Turks who have avoided living under the rule of AKP and choose to move abroad consist of professionals and students.

Since highly skilled migrants' incomes do not often increase significantly when they migrate compared to their initial standards (Kaczmarczyk and Tyrowicz, cited in Boad and Busto, 2017, p. 4), it can be stated that the constellation of economic, social and political reasons as push factors (Ozcurumez and Aker, 2016, p. 68) and improving the living standards and overall social wellbeing as pull factors come forward as a set of solid motivations for them. Most of the highly skilled and business migrants have not been able to establish their businesses or find jobs in Germany that fit their qualifications (ibid., 64). Usually, they work in lower positions than their positions in Turkey which were fitting their qualifications better. However, mainly benefiting from a welfare state, such as economical and high-quality healthcare, daycare, elder care, and unemployment insurance impact their migration decisions (ibid., 69).

In the case of motives behind student migration from Turkey to Germany, it is important to note that education is free in public German universities and the students are obliged only to pay a small fee around 310 euros to cover administration and other costs per semester. This constitutes a valid pull factor for students who look for receiving high quality and affordable higher education in order to advance in their careers (ibid., 69). Possessing a Bachelor’s degree and professional background in Turkey is an important key to achieving these prospects in Germany.

3.7.2. Language

Young educated German Turks who constitute the research matter for this study, consider German language as their first language. Although their parents mostly speak Turkish in the household, through channels of socialization and education, they have mastered the German language at the native level. Their competence in the Turkish language is not even close to the new-wave Turks' competence who naturally possess the Turkish language as their first language.

German children appear to gain specific talents and information through family socialization that non-German children can only achieve in kindergarten, particularly language acquisition (Söhn and Özcan, 2006). The difference of language competence between German and the children of the migrants is related to the segregation in the education system meaning that these two groups of children tend to go to different schools. Radtke highlights in his case study that it is not migrant parents that pick segregated schools, but rather German middle-class parents who make decisions that lead to further segregation (Radtke, cited in Söhn and Özcan, 2006). Furthermore, in his study focusing on how schools themselves initiate and reinforce ethnic segregation, he discovered that (primary) schools tend to specialize as schools with a certain profile favored by German middle-class parents (e.g., focus on music, early learning of English, alternative pedagogical approaches) or as schools allegedly suitable for migrant children (extra language tuition, social workers) (ibid.). These types of specialities tend to result in more ethnically, linguistically, and socioeconomically homogeneous classes, which provide a more or less favorable learning environment for the students enrolled (ibid.). Since learning the language is highly tied to access to equal education as exemplified in this study, the children of the first-generation migrants are disadvantaged in terms of the privileges that ethnic German children will likely have in regard to professional and social life.

When it comes to the experiences of the new-wave Turks, different conditions affect the language competence. The new-wave Turks mostly migrate to Germany with none or limited knowledge of German language. Since there are varied Master's or Doctoral programs in English especially in Berlin, the majority of the migrants choosing Berlin as a destination due to its multicultural structure do not feel obliged to learn the German language beforehand. Also, there are other factors such as that they cannot provide the sufficient amount of time or money to go to a private course to learn German during their life in Turkey. However, the role of

speaking the language of the host country is vital in entering the labor market, creating professional and social networks, dealing with everyday life problems, for instance, such as talking to the local customer service of a company to resolve their issue –if it is not a big company, they mostly do not offer assistance in English–, or to the seller in a local shop, and so forth.

The major impact of lacking or having a limited knowledge of the host country's language is mostly socializing online with their social networks from Turkey or engaging in their network consisting of fellow new-wave migrants only, and hence maintaining a stronger national identification with the home country. In the case of Berlin, the English language paves the way for social or professional relationships as well. However, learning formal or informal norms regarding how the society they live in functions mostly comes from socializing with the local people or institutions. Language competency is a cultural capital that is embedded into an individual as a consequence of long-term socialization processes in formal educational institutions, the family, political organizations, and clubs, among other places (Bourdieu, cited in Föbker and Imani, 2017, p. 2723). Competencies, value orientations, and cognitive and behavioral schemata are all part of incorporated cultural capital, which constitute a standard for cultural competency that provides the holder with a permanent and legally guaranteed value (ibid.).

3.7.3. Citizenship and residency

The potential of obtaining German citizenship posed, and continues to pose, a substantial difficulty for those with no German ancestors (Zorkociova and Ďuranová, 2017, p. 479). Naturalization, which is a legal requirement for acquiring political rights and employment in the public sector, is a critical component of a successful integration process (ibid.). It becomes challenging for migrants to identify themselves with the host country when their access to legal citizenship and its opportunities are obstructed.

Since guest workers were regarded as a temporary workforce, during the time of mass immigration of low-skilled workers, naturalization policy (the granting of citizenship) was not regarded as a priority area of immigration and integration policy (ibid.). Only following the adoption of new citizenship legislation in 1993 it became possible for Turkish migrants to earn German citizenship after a 15-year stay in Germany (ibid.). Germany updated its Citizenship

Law in 1999 to provide children of immigrants temporary dual citizenship status until they reach the age of 23 (Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 209). After the age of 23, the migrants had been expected to make a choice between receiving Turkish or German citizenship. Citizenship could not be granted to children of migrants born and raised in Germany unless one of the parents is not German until the amended Nationality Act was implemented in January 2000 (Kaya, 2012). Through the amended Act, a child of foreign parents raised in Germany would receive German citizenship if one parent had been lawfully resident in Germany for eight years and had been granted a permanent right of residency (Tecmen, 2020, p. 28).

Most of the new-wave Turks do not obtain German citizenship. To be eligible for naturalization, a person must have resided lawfully in Germany for at least eight years and have the necessary residence permit, in addition to demonstrating German language competency of at least B1 and being a law-abiding citizen with no criminal record (Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, 2022). Also, one must pass a citizenship test and must renounce any previous citizenships. Foreigners who have completed an integration course are eligible for citizenship after seven years.

The new-wave Turks have settled in Germany through diverse types of residence permit during the last ten years. Before moving to Germany, they must obtain a visa since they are non-EU citizens. Once they are in Germany, they must obtain a residence permit allowing them to work or study. As a skilled worker with vocational training or a university degree, migrants have the opportunity to receive a residence permit for job search for a maximum duration of six months (European Commission, 2022). They must provide proof of a health insurance, an accomodation and sufficient financial resources to obtain it. Also, it is possible to receive a residence permit to work in Germany through an employment contract that was organized before moving in Germany or a sustainable business plan to be able to work as a freelancer.

Through the 2004 Act on the Residence, Economic Activity, and Integration of Foreigners, three important regulations were introduced to simplify the high-skilled immigration (Ellermann, 2021, p. 186): First, any highly skilled worker with a suitable job offer in any area can apply, and if approved, will be put on a path to permanent residency. In addition, dependent spouses now have the right to work without a waiting period. Second, if a self-employed person's company is deemed advantageous to the regional economy, they may be eligible for a temporary residence permit. After three years, if their business thrives, they will be eligible for

permanent residence. Third, and perhaps the most novel aspect of the new law, foreign graduates of German universities could have their residency permits extended for one year in order to find employment. Currently, it is possible to extend it for 18 months.

In response to policy developments at the European level, the admission of high-skilled immigrants to Germany has undergone some legal updating since the 2004 Immigration Act (Ellermann, 2021, p. 188). The first shift happened in 2007, through the Act to Implement Migration and Asylum Directives of the European Union, which facilitated self-employment immigration by decreasing both minimum investment and job creation restrictions (ibid.). Later, the Blue Card was created as a substitute for the Immigration Act's highly skilled immigration category by the 2012 Act to Implement the Highly Qualified Professionals Directive of the EU (ibid.). The EU Blue Card is particularly significant since it is the European Union's first directive on third-country labor immigration (Cerna, cited in Ellermann, 2021, p. 188). Unlike the 2004 Immigration Act, which restricted high-skilled immigration to in-demand occupations, the Blue Card has allowed any high-skilled migrant with a job offer exceeding a specified income level to enter the country (Ellermann, 2021, p. 188). Prior to the Blue Card program, yearly admissions of high-skilled workers stayed at 370, but with the Blue Card program, admissions rose to 6,800 by 2015, showing an eighteen-fold increase in high-skilled admissions in four years (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, cited in Ellermann, 2021, p. 188). Since then, Germany's focus on prioritizing skilled immigration has continued through facilitative regulations. All these liberalizations have increasingly manifested their impact and created a solid pull factor for the new-wave migrants when it is combined with the unpleasant living standards in Turkey.

Citizenship appears to be an effective tool for developing a certain kind of belonging to the host country for migrants. Migrants acquire full political rights, along with social, civic, and cultural rights, when they become citizens of their country of settlement (ibid.). Traditional citizenship rhetoric is prone to serve the interests of the dominant national group at the expense of migrants, and hence immigrant groups who feel alienated from the wider national and religious identity are likely to feel equally alienated from the political arena (ibid.). How states differentiate between foreigners and citizens might be observed through regulations such as bureaucratic paperwork and waiting times, as well as the complexity and length of the naturalization process; and these regulations emphasize the significance of citizenship status in an era of ever restrictive immigration rules (Menjívar; Coutin, cited in Kilic and Menjívar,

2013, p. 206). These tools of limiting access to legal membership and making belonging and national identity difficult are critical for nation-states to regulate the Other and redefine the nation's borders, which are threatened by the conditions and characteristics of the global era.

3.7.4. Religion

Religion has a vital impact in relation to identification and integration since it is one of the most important cultural components (Zorkociova and Ďuranová, 2017, p. 480). Many second- and third-generation Turks continue to practice their ancestral religion, Islam, which has a negative impact on their perceived social integration (ibid.). Because cultural differences show itself through religion to a large extent and lead to the Turkish migrants, as a non-Christian minority group, to be seen as culturally inferior in public discourse (Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 207).

As a consequence of the nearly 4 million Muslim immigrants in Germany, Islam has become the country's largest minority religion (ibid.). There are two prominent groups among German Turks: the first emphasizes religious education and adaptation of Islam's key pillars and values, whereas the second group does not place a strong emphasis on religious values, and the descendants of Turkish migrants are raised in a "liberal atmosphere" (Zorkociova and Ďuranová, 2017, p. 480).

The greatest religious minority in Germany, known as Muslim communities, or more often referred to as the "Association of Mosques," which are officially recognized as organizations in Germany, has a significant impact on the integration process of Turkish migrants (ibid.). Muslim organizations have aided migrants' engagement not just in the religious sphere, but also in other areas such as the labor market and education system, therefore assisting their social and economic integration (ibid.). Especially for the early migrants, mosques functioned as a larger umbrella organization for getting legal issues sorted out, supporting each other during hard times, finding accommodation and job, and for many other needs to be met (Sirseloudi, 2012). Religion still functions as a tool to cope with the shared feeling of being a foreigner for many Turkish migrants. The worry of losing one's religious foundation goes hand in hand with the wider dread of losing one's identity (Alacacioglu, cited in Sirseloudi, 2012).

As stated in the background knowledge, the new-wave Turks largely comprise of secular, middle-upper class professionals and students who have experienced political Islam and neo-liberal policies of the AKP government, and hence decided to "live in exile instead of living in their home country where they see little future for themselves" (Pearson, cited in Okumus, 2020, p. 4). Therefore, their decision to migrate mainly concentrates on economic and life-style related factors. The latter refers to being marginalized because of living a non-religious life or a secular lifestyle along with other motivations such as improving general quality of life, need for a more democratic environment, access to justice and freedom of speech, and so forth. Islamist oppression and the conservative direction that AKP has accelerated over time, play an important role in the formation of the new wave migration to developed countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Germany. Considering these characteristics, living a religious life or utilizing religion as means for unity and belonging has the very potential of appearing as a difference between the majority of the existing Turkish diaspora and the new-wave Turks.

4. Methodology

In this chapter, the purpose is to demonstrate the methods and research design of the study. To do so, first I would like to clarify what qualitative data and qualitative approach is, and why I chose working with it. Later, I will briefly introduce what exactly semi-structured interviews serve as a method of qualitative analysis. Then, the design of the interview questions will be introduced. Lastly, the methods of sample selection, data collection, and data analysis will be explained in detail respectively.

4.1. Qualitative Approach

While numerical data or numbers is considered as quantitative data, qualitative data is more diverse and might contain texts, images, movies, audio recordings, cultural artifacts, and more (Kuckartz, 2014, p. 2). Qualitative research consists of the systematic collection, organization, and analysis of the qualitative data (Pope et al., 2002, p. 148). Qualitative method is based on interpretive perspectives found in the humanities and social sciences, which emphasize the importance of understanding how individuals and groups interpret, experience, and make meaning of social processes from the perspective of the people involved (ibid.). Qualitative researchers examine phenomena and occurrences in their natural environments, interpreting them in terms of the individual's subjective meanings (ibid.). Various methods can be used to obtain data such as interviews, observation, analysis of documents (ibid.). The most common method for collecting data, however, is conducting interviews.

As the research question is about how different Turkish diaspora groups form their national identification and belonging with Turkey, the individuals' perspectives are placed in the very center of the study. Their identification and belonging become accessible to the researcher to a certain degree when their experiences and narratives are collected and interpreted. The study aims to investigate meanings, stories, and experiences derived from unique forms of identification in detail that might be only brought to the surface through qualitative approach. Since the spoken narrative, more specifically the articulation of subjective meanings attached to the phenomena by the individuals constitutes the core of the research intent of this study, conducting interviews appears as the most eligible method for data collection.

4.1.1. Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews are usually based on a flexible content guide with open-ended questions to examine experiences and attitudes (Pope et al., 2002, p. 148). It provides flexibility for both the interviewee and the interviewer along with some structure. Because of this flexibility, it is common for the questions to reshape within themselves in terms of articulation or order during the interviews. Also, there is room for the interviewer to add follow-up questions that they come to find useful for the analysis during the interview. Similarly, interviewees might change the direction of the questions to add some comments on the aspects they find worth mentioning. Interview questions should provide a focused structure for conversation during interviews, although they should not be rigorously followed (Kallio et al., 2016). Instead, the goal is to gain a better understanding of the research topic by gathering comparable sorts of data from each participant (ibid.).

4.2. Design of the Interview Questions

The interview questions are prepared with the aim of acquiring a rich understanding of the study topics. The interview questions comprise two sections (see Annexes). The first section consists of questions aiming to understand how the interviewees perceive themselves as diasporic individuals and their belonging to both countries. The section starts with some demographic questions on their age, occupation, and place of birth, and follows with more personal questions such as when they feel Turkish/German the most or what their answer is to the question of where they are from. The second section focuses on their image of current Turkey that has been shaped under the rule of AKP and how they reflect on Turkey's conditions as a country. Here, the aim is to grasp their perceptions towards living in Turkey or having roots there through economy, politics, social life, and culture-related questions. The reason why there is such a focus within the questionnaire is that the current image of Turkey for the participants is an important element in their national identity formation. The relationship between diaspora experience, national identification, and the image of homeland, as demonstrated in detail within the theoretical framework, is very intertwined. The questionnaire consists of 32 main questions (14 under the first and 18 under the second section). Some questions are directed along with follow-up questions. Follow-up questions are used to help participants comprehend the major themes and to guide the conversation towards the research topic better (Baumbusch; Turner, cited in Kallio et al., 2016). The number of questions changes

in some interviews because I considered them to be more coherent when some questions are combined into one during the interview when the conversation had directed it that way.

4.3. Sampling

	Age	**Gender**	**Occupation**	**Arrival Date** (for the new-wave participants)
Leyla	26	Woman	Corporate Adviser	-
Ekin	24	Woman	Student in the department of Law	-
Ceren	29	Woman	Social Worker (Sozialpädagogische Assistentin)	-
Serhat	36	Man	Industrial Engineer	-
Bora	25	Man	Graduate of the department of Media and Political Communication	-
Cihan	38	Man	Playwright and director	2016
Harun	32	Man	Mechanical Engineer	2018
Merve	35	Woman	Yoga Instructor	2022
Engin	27	Man	Student in the department of American Culture and Literature	2019
Öykü	28	Woman	Photographer	2021

Table 1: It demonstrates the demographic information regarding the German-Turk (first five names) and the new-wave Turk participants (second five names).

Keeping the participants as diverse as possible regarding their age, gender, and occupation was the primary concern during the sampling process (see Table 1). The suitable age gap for the study has been determined as between the ages of 20 and 40, in order to match the age average of the new-wave Turks. The snowball sampling method was used to find the eligible

interviewees. In snowball sampling, study participants recommend people who have had comparable experiences or have similar features that the researcher is interested in (Seetharaman, 2016). To avoid bias, I, as the interviewer and a member of the new-wave Turks, did not conduct interviews with anyone I personally know or who is directly connected to my network. However, I utilized my network to reach people who might be compatible with the sampling criteria. Then the interviewees helped me to connect with other people who they thought might meet the sampling criteria. The criteria for sampling can be summarized as living in Berlin, obtaining higher education, defined as having attained at least a Bachelor's degree (only one participant is still a Bachelor's degree student), being born and raised in Germany for the first group that is the German Turks, and being moved to Germany within the last nine years for the second group, namely the new-wave Turks.

As previously stated in the study, I opted to conduct my research in Berlin since it is a popular destination for immigrants such as new-wave Turks. Also, as a multicultural big city, Berlin offers a certain amount of representativeness so the researcher might not need to consider expanding their research to other cities in Germany if the research topic allows narrowing it down to one city. Since the study focuses on educated youngsters of German Turks and the new-wave Turks, Berlin offers a varied catalog to select from for the topic. However, the primary purpose of qualitative research is to comprehend a phenomenon rather than to represent a group, or to draw population-wide generalizations based on study samples (Seetharaman, 2016). Therefore, representativeness is not in the center of this research design.

In qualitative research, unlike quantitative studies, the sample size is not calculated statistically, and there are no fixed standards for determining the sample size (Patton, cited in Seetharaman, 2016). However, it's important to remember that the sample size should be high enough to allow for significant comparisons with the research objectives (Seetharaman, 2016). I have chosen to interview 10 people as it is common for the researchers studying lived experiences of people to choose 10 or less than 10 participants who have experienced the phenomenon (ibid.).

4.4. Data Collection

Semi-structured interviews with ten participants, five German Turks and five new-wave Turks, were conducted for this study. The interviews were held in Turkish as it is the native language of half of the participants as well as the interviewer. Since I, as an interviewer, cannot speak the German language, the participants who were born and raised in Germany and consider German as their first language were offered to switch to English if they needed to. The interviews were conducted largely online via Zoom meeting (only three of them were held as in-person meetings at a cafe). Online meeting was considered as an alternative to face-to-face meeting mainly for two reasons: first, to record the interview in a relatively quiet setting to receive accurate transcriptions afterwards; and second, to not claim so much of the participants' time. Also, online interviews are considered as an option to make the participants feel relaxed in their own surroundings. However, the choice was left to them regarding whether we should meet online or in-person. The interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. The participants were informed partly before and partly during the interviews about (1.) the topic of the research very briefly, (2.) the approximate time of the interview process, (3.) the approximate number of questions, and lastly, about (4.) the interview questions being categorized under two sections with different focus points. The aim of this introduction was to make them knowledgeable and comfortable about the upcoming interview process.

The “rules of engagement,” such as establishing and maintaining a warm and non-judgmental attitude towards the participants; and asking questions in a balanced, unbiased, non-threatening, sensitive, and clear manner should all be established early on (ibid., 129). During the interview, nodding, smiling, seeming engaged, and making encouraging sounds were all given attention (Gill et al., 2008). I was partly an active participant during the interviews and reacting with mild exclamations such as “ah”, “okay”, “mhm”; but cautious about showing subjective reactions that might affect their further narration such as “amazing!”, “interesting!”. Some participants stated that the questions were thought-provoking and interesting, and they did learn some things about themselves during the interviews. Some stated they enjoyed talking about “these stuff” and found it therapeutic.

4.5. Data Analysis

The method of data analysis of this study is built on a guideline of Kuckartz on Qualitative Text Analysis which fruitfully assists in dealing with the ambiguity that is often mentioned while explaining the fundamental features of qualitative data analysis (2014). This guideline is built on some common analysis steps that the main methods of qualitative analysis contain such as Grounded Theory, hermeneutics, thematic analysis, qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, and so on. Except classical hermeneutics, they are all based on working with codes and categories (ibid.). However, they all have different center points for the analysis. The most prominent difference among all is that Grounded Theory intends to establish middle-range theories (ibid.). This study does not intend to build a theory. However, the method of analysis still carries the same fundamentals with the main qualitative analysis methods in regards to focusing on revealing subtle concepts embedded in the text and analyzing the data through the categories derived from those concepts.

It has come to my realization that many researchers choose to mention that their method of analysis is *based on* Grounded Theory, yet neither utilize the structured coding system of Grounded Theory nor produce theoretical explanations through analysis. Therefore, I strongly believe that the Grounded Theory is mostly referred as a method of analysis in studies since it is a well-recognized representation of a structured qualitative analysis method. Instead of mentioning that the method is based on Grounded Theory and yet, not really applying its criteria in the analysis, the characteristics of systematic evaluation might be recruited in a customized way compatible with the research intents. In this study, the goal is to create a system that incorporates the strengths of the main qualitative methods; a method that is rule-based and intersubjective while still being interpretative and creative (ibid.). Adapting the guide of Kuckartz (2014), the analytical process of the qualitative text analysis utilized in this study takes place in the following order: (1.) transcription of the interviews, (2.) individual text analysis highlighting important passages, (3.) general analysis examining similarities and differences among the texts, (4.) detection of the important concepts in each text, (5.) formation of the categories[5] of analysis based on the prominent concepts, (6.) collecting the relevant parts in each text which corresponds to the categories, and lastly (7.) the comparative analysis of the

[5] The term "category" is frequently used in the meaning of "class" in social sciences, implying that a category is the product of some form of classification. People, ideas, institutions, processes, discourses, objects, arguments, and a variety of other elements might be categorized (Kuckartz, 2014.).

relevant text parts that belong to the two groups of migrants in accordance with the categories. All these steps are designed to be in response to the given research question (ibid).

4.5.1. Categories of analysis

Categories are formed through the activity of abstracting the prominent concepts derived from deep reading of the interviews. For instance, the answers of the participants around citizenship, naturalization challenges or residency formed the category of legal dimension of national identification whereas their diverse expressions regarding the feeling of closeness to the members of Turkish society has led me to build emotional dimension. It should be noted that the theoretical framework, and the attempts of some scholars to define an analytical criterion for national identification (Guibernau, 2004; van der Zwet, 2015) have helped me form the categories of analysis.

As discussed in the chapter of theoretical frameworks, national identification with the home country is closely linked with host national identification for diasporic stance. Therefore, even though categories are built to assess the participants' national identification with Turkey, they cover how the participants identify with Germany as well. This matter reflects on the formation of the analysis chapter. For instance, as they mostly show up in a context of comparison and affect each other's evolution, the participants' references to common values both in Germany and Turkey are analyzed under the same category named "cultural dimension".

The final version of the categories of analysis comprises of four headings:

1. Legal dimension: This category aims to examine the replies of the participants related to their citizenship, residence, naturalization processes, and civic rights.

2. Structural dimension: Here, their perception towards laws, rules, norms as well as institutions of Turkey and of Germany are analyzed.

3. Cultural dimension: Within this category, their perception regarding the following matters is evaluated: language, religion, and references to common values, traditions and customs, historical/public figures, social movements/events.

4. Emotional dimension: This category comprises of the analysis of the statements that give off a sense of emotional attachment to both countries and their members, and a sense of feeling at home there.

4.6. Ethical Considerations and Reflections

Maintaining or fostering mutual relationships is an ethical conduct that is frequently regarded as a necessity for developing trust with research participants, which will help the researcher receive more honest replies and richer findings (Kang and Hwang, 2021, p. 7). To meet with the main ethical criteria, the consent was established clearly by informing the participants about what the study entails and what exactly the participants will be involved in (ibid.). For ensuring privacy and confidentiality, how and where the data will be used was explained to the participants. Followingly, real names of the participants were changed with random names during the transcription process. Before audio-recording the interview, their consent was asked.

During the interview process, I have come to the realization of myself not knowing the German language constituted a challenge for the German-Turk participants. Some of them were very comfortable with conducting the interview in Turkish. However, some participants' competence in Turkish was not advanced enough to freely express themselves without interrupting their communication to think of a plausible word for articulating their thoughts on the matter. This problem could have been solved through the participation of a translator. However, it would require a certain budget that I did not have. Also, the involvement of the translator could have led to the interruption of an atmosphere of a comfortable, one-on-one interview for the participant.

Another matter I have realized during the interview process is that new-wave Turk participants were reluctant to elaborate on some of the questions as they know that I am also a member of the new wave. Therefore, they did not want to repeat what they assumed I already knew. This reaction mostly concentrated on their answers to the questions regarding the political and economic situation of Turkey. As they assumed that I decided to migrate mainly because of the economic recession and the hostile political environment as well, they mostly used phrases such as "no need to mention" and "as you know" and cut their answers short. However, I, through follow-up questions, tried to direct them to elaborate more when I thought their answers were too brief.

5. Results

In this chapter, the empirical analysis of the research will be introduced under four subchapters that are formed in line with the categories of analysis. Under each subchapter, the results regarding the national identification of German Turks and the new-wave Turks will be discussed comparatively over the legal, structural, cultural, and emotional dimensions respectively.

I would like to re-mention my research question once again for the readers to remind them that each analysis category is created in an attempt to answer the research question more precisely. The main research question of the study is as follows: how do young educated German Turks and the new-wave Turks form their national identification with Turkey differently?

5.1. Legal Dimension

The goal of this subchapter is to analyze the participants' responses connected to their citizenship, residency, naturalization processes, and civic rights.

Among German-Turk participants, while two of the participants obtain dual citizenship, one person obtains only German and the other two people obtain only Turkish citizenship (see Table 2).

	German Citizenship	**Turkish Citizenship**
Leyla	X	X
Ekin	X	
Ceren		X
Serhat	X	X
Bora		X

Table 2: It demonstrates the distribution of citizenship across the German-Turk participants.

Participants who have dual citizenship were not sure that they still obtained Turkish citizenship when first asked. They were unsure if it is “legally allowed” but they said that they have the Turkish ID. Leyla acquired German citizenship at birth while Serhat obtained it when he was a child, but he does not remember the exact time. It appears as they are not knowledgeable about their Turkish citizenship status due to ever-changing legislation in Germany regarding dual citizenship[6], lack of need for Turkish citizenship, and having it being disadvantageous in diverse areas of life in Germany. They both commented that maintaining bureaucratic work is a lot easier when you are a German citizen, and all the weight of paperwork is considerably lessened compared to being a Turkish citizen. Also, they both stated it is advantageous to travel as a German citizen since a visa is mostly not required. Leyla states that she has realized “how lucky she is” as a naturalized person in terms of traveling freely and experiencing less bureaucratic hardship when she talks to her friends who only possess Turkish citizenship.

While Ceren has already done so, Bora is still considering starting his naturalization process which is renouncing Turkish citizenship and acquiring German citizenship. The long processing time around one year, and application cost amounting to 255 euros appeared as the primary reasons that they did not start the process earlier. Ekin, at the age of 18, gained her German citizenship and had to renounce her Turkish citizenship. The participants who lived with Turkish citizenship for a long time stated that it was frustrating mainly because of the traveling restrictions as a lot of countries require visas from Turkish citizens to enter their borders. Another prominent answer was about the discriminative aspect of being a Turkish citizen in Germany as Ceren stated as follows:

> “When I applied to government offices for jobs, no one responded positively to me. I mean, I didn't really consider that, but my friends who are working in government offices said something, they said, it could be because my surname is Erdoğan[7] and I am a Turkish citizen, you know? So, I said, maybe. So now, I believe in everything.”

[6] Currently, the voluntary acquisition of another citizenship results in the automatic loss of citizenship under German law (§ 25 StAG) (Falcke and Vink, 2020). However, the "domestic clause" (Inlandsklausel) permitted German citizens residing in Germany to obtain foreign citizenship without losing their German citizenship prior to January 1, 2000 (ibid.). This, in practice, allowed migrants to naturalize in Germany, renounce their previous citizenship to meet the renunciation requirement for German naturalization, and then re-acquire it (ibid.). Dual citizenship via regaining the citizenship of origin was no longer possible after the domestic clause was eliminated by the reform of 2000 (ibid.).

[7] The permission to use her surname was received by the participant.

Ekin also shares a similar observation of hers through the following words:

> "On the other side, the Germans would never... You kind of have to fight your way through to become fully accepted. Like, if you really want to be accepted as a German, you can never get that title. It doesn't mean that I want that title, but it's like you can never be German for them, in their eyes. So, especially when you have Turkish citizenship, they're like, yeah so, like, 'you don't really want to'. 'You're like all of the other Turkish people'. 'You don't want to integrate, you don't want to let go of your culture, of your heritage'. Um, yeah, that's always a little bit on both sides, really judgmental, but also really like, um, how do you say it's like a status symbol."

Being born in Germany but living as a Turkish citizen has contributed to discrimination more both in social life and professional life compared to the experiences of the naturalized German Turks. As Ekin states, being naturalized appears as a status symbol that should be gained to be fully accepted by German society. Also obtaining German citizenship is perceived as a sign of migrants' commitment to the host nation. Ekin states that some citizenships, like Turkish, are less prestigious, and are categorized as "second-class" in the public eye; and there is a certain way of treatment towards them that she says is sad to observe. Therefore, apart from them being born and raised in Germany, German citizenship being more respected is an important factor in choosing to acquire it as well. As stated within the theoretical framework, the state's tool of marking the national borders and hence, making a differentiation between who is involved and who is not through restrictions to gaining the right of citizenship is negatively impactful on migrants' integration and feeling whether they are accepted or not.[8]

On the other hand, none of the new-wave participants possess German citizenship. Therefore, their integration processes are primarily affected by the legislation on residence permits binding on skilled migrants and students. All the new-wave participants have limited residence permits in Germany (see Table 3). They all only possess Turkish citizenship.

[8] Since all of the participants were born before the amended Act of 2000, they could not gain German citizenship by birth if one of the parents was not a German citizen then. Therefore, it should be noted that the implications of the old legislation on access to national citizenship in terms of migrants' integration and belonging are presented in this study.

	Types of Residence Permits
Cihan	EU Blue Card
Harun	Temporary residence permit for employment purposes
Merve	Temporary residence permit for employment purposes
Engin	Temporary residence permit for studying purposes
Öykü	Temporary residence permit for studying purposes

Table 3: It shows the distribution of the type of residence permit across the new wave participants.

When the new-wave participants were asked about the advantages or disadvantages of their citizenship in Germany, all of them mentioned some issues related to being a non-EU migrant in Germany such as bureaucratic hardship that refers to the long and stressful process of extending residence permit, gathering the required documents, and limitations of certain residence permits. Additionally, Cihan mentions one of his experiences regarding a veiled discrimination towards him in a state institution as follows:

> "I don't know, a few years ago, the theater I worked for wanted to do a project through me. So, I was eligible normally anyway, I was working with them. They wanted to do it with support from the state. We've done all the work. We researched so much. But they persisted in prolonging the process. In fact, it was like we didn't do anything, the person in charge of this job was like... I mean, how can I say that? Despite dozens of paperwork that we had struggled with and filled out for months, he tried to make us start over. What if we hadn't known… We said, 'this is this'; they said, 'Oh, okay' and they did the job there."

Stating he experienced a lot of similar incidents that he felt discriminated against or that Germans assumed he was ignorant about how things work in Germany, he mentioned that this kind of behavior stems from prejudices towards certain societies (referring mainly to Turkish and Arabic people). Also, he added that he sometimes grants their right regarding being prejudiced as he believes that some migrants abuse the system and its services and opportunities. Since prejudice towards non-EU citizens, and mostly towards Middle Eastern

people might be very prominent in various spheres of life, some people like Cihan tend to differentiate themselves or their perceived group from the rest of the discriminated migrants. Throughout the interview, separating himself from other migrants (mostly the Middle Eastern migrants), he appears to apply creative strategies in order to fix misrecognition and promote positive group identities (Tajfel, cited in Andreouli and Howarth, 2013, p. 364).

While another new-wave participant, Engin, was referring to the limitations of his residence permit as a student, he mentioned that the state assumes every migrant coming from so-called third world countries is the same and hence, it develops standardized rules. Turkish citizens living in Germany with a residence permit for studying cannot work more than 240 half days or 120 full days per year and cannot be self-employed while the students from the EU or EEA countries can work unlimited hours and work as a freelancer. He pointed out that the reason for this is that the state regulates the residence permits based on some observations. He mentioned that since a lot of Turks come here with a student visa and start working full-time instead of studying, the state regulates the rules and limits all non-EU and non-EEA students even though “he personally would not act as they expect”. Here, Engin refers to how Turkish citizenship lacks privileges and how it causes him to be treated based on the regulations stemming from systematic assumptions that people coming from certain societies tend to cheat the system and are noncompatible with the way of living in Germany. The statements of Engin constitute an example of how the state homogenizes minorities into monolithic units by ethnicizing subjects, although there is a completely different picture for these subjects, one of contestation, complexity, and diversity (Mandel, 2008, p. 2). Accordingly, they seem to need a more diverse representation in the legal, political, and social spheres. States’ attempts to sustain a “vanishing homogeneity” (Tecmen, 2020, p. 22) are another example of their way of strengthening the ethno-national identity and maintaining cultural hegemony.

While new-wave participants feel like they have a lot to "prove" in order to completely dwell in Germany and have access to all civic rights, it is observed that German Turks who only hold Turkish citizenship consider getting German citizenship as the sole remaining piece of the puzzle of integration. However, the apparent weight of the remaining piece within their perceived integration has been observed throughout the interviews. Although most German-Turk participants mention that citizenship does not mean anything to them other than their advantages or disadvantages, their further statements indicate that the legal right to citizenship is a symbol of their host national identification both for German Turks and German society.

For instance, for Ekin, renouncing Turkish citizenship and obtaining German citizenship was a freeing experience. She explains the reasons as follows:

> "For me, it was like an identity question, and I felt so sorry for such a long time. But today, I don't feel sorry because I just can proudly say that I don't feel Turkish. And I didn't want Turkish citizenship anymore because also, like my father was really patriotic and was like, 'Turkey is like the best country' and I hate people that are patriotic because I think it's always so exaggerated and unnecessary because there's no such thing as my country is the best country. (...) So when we were born, my brother and I, he was like, 'My children are Turkish. They get Turkish citizenship, not German. I'm not discussing this', but he really puts stones in our way with that decision just because he had the selfish decision. So, I think choosing German citizenship was also a sign of freedom for me, that I can make decisions without anyone deciding for me."

Through this expression, we see that being forced to choose between citizenships might become a question of national identity for second-generation migrants. German-Turk participants who hold only Turkish citizenship implied that it makes their lives more challenging in Germany and does not really positively impact their bonding with Turkey either. Bora, for instance, states that he lives the disadvantage of being a Turkish citizen as not having the right of voting in Germany. He says that he can, and he does vote in Turkey but it does not really mean anything to him since he is not affected by the results of elections in Turkey. Additionally, he states that he waits for the legislation allowing dual citizenship but since it did not happen, he considers making a transition to German citizenship now. Bora mentioned that keeping Turkish citizenship was not important to him but was important to his family. So, he said he was influenced by them. He stated that "some might think being Turkish is their heritage, they are Turk, they were born as Turkish, they construct it as a national view for themselves, but it is not the case for me". Ekin also mentioned that keeping her Turkish citizenship was important to her grandparents living in Turkey as it constitutes a bridge with them by implying that she did not give up her Turkish roots.

It might be concluded that the German Turks either evaluate Turkish citizenship as a legal obstacle (since they cannot benefit from civic rights) and a social obstacle (in terms of their perceived integration by the larger society) in their lives in Germany or as a symbolic attachment to their families and roots. As several social psychologists have empirically

demonstrated, recognition of identity by the majority of society is deeply impactful in everyday interactions between individuals and groups (Andreouli and Howarth, 2013, p. 364). The representations of otherness deepen the projection of "us" and "them" (ibid.). Being a symbol of recognition, the lack of German citizenship isolates German Turks and contributes to emphasizing their "otherness" within the larger society. On the other hand, by only obtaining Turkish citizenship, German Turks are legally identified under a category that they might not feel attached to or only feel a symbolic attachment that they inherited from their parents and further roots located in Turkey. Also, it does not strengthen the actual bond with Turkey, it has the potential to cause frustration or hostility towards the Turkish identity since the migrants feel trapped within it due to legal or social obstacles to acquiring German citizenship at an early age. Meanwhile, the participants who possess dual citizenship for a long time do not show signs of similar problems. Since they did not have to choose between two citizenships, they seem to have not questioned their national identity, at least on the civic dimension.

Being closely acquainted with the benefits of German citizenship, it appears that a Turkish citizen does not assure security, care, and prestige to German Turks. Leyla and Ceren, for example, stress that they do not feel safe entering Turkey with the Turkish ID since "the state behaves you as its own citizen" and it might prevent you from leaving the country in case of political events if you do not have German citizenship, for instance. "Then", Leyla says, "Germany cannot legally protect you at that point". Additionally, she shares an experience of her friend with dual citizenship: as her friend's name was "too left-wing", the Turkish authorities "caused problems" at the Turkish airport and took her to the police station. Leyla stated that she does not enter Turkey with her Turkish citizenship and does not want the authorities to identify her as "Turkish" since she is afraid of being in a vulnerable position. Therefore, it might be stated that German Turks do not feel a strong national identification with Turkey when evaluated on a legal basis. Independent of whether they possess German citizenship or not, they appear to not feel like a Turkish citizen.

Meanwhile, the new-wave Turks seem to feel like Turkish citizens. Even though they do not find it beneficial, they seem to naturally accept it. In line with the discussion within the theoretical framework, transnational ties of the new-wave Turks have become observable throughout the interviews as the new-wave Turks acknowledge that they are not and cannot easily be German citizens. Also, the close network of the new-wave Turks consists of other new-wave Turks. The emergence of this "bubble" can be explained by many reasons related to

sharing a similar experience of migration. However, in terms of legal dimension, being treated the same by the German government, having the same legal limitations within society due to their types of residence permits, and sharing similar hardships regarding the bureaucratic work that they have to handle appear to unite them together. It contributes to the solidarity that members of a nation who share similar migration patterns feel through a sense of shared vision towards the *past* that was built in Turkey, the *present* that is being shaped by the current migration policies of Germany, and the *future* that they imagine going through together. When considered in line with one of the common definitions of national identity, namely sharing the same vision towards the past, present, and future; the legal aspect of new wave migration strengthens their national identification with the other new-wave members within the diaspora experience.

5.2. Structural Dimension

The comparative analysis of perspectives of the two diaspora groups on Turkish and German laws, rules, norms, and characteristics of institutions such as education, media, and government departments are presented under this subchapter.

Throughout the interviews, all the participants referred to the "structure" and the "system" of Germany, and how Germans are "strictly rule-oriented and disciplined". While most of the German Turks mentioned that they have adopted and embodied the way how social order and institutions function in Germany, the new wave participants are found to be distant to the structure of German society.

When asked when she feels German the most, the German-Turk participant Leyla answered with some examples that describe her encounters with people from Eastern or Southern countries such as Mexico, India, and Turkey. One of her statements regarding the matter is as follows:

> "When I work with international cultures, that is, with Europeans, I feel the same. Be it from Belgium, the Netherlands, or Sweden it's the same with those countries. But, for example, when I work with Turks, Indians, and Mexicans I feel very German, probably because their education systems are a little different. Because I work with a very structured approach. Yes, then I mean, I feel weirdly German about working. At work, some of my colleagues say 'oh let's see this

later' or sometimes I go over the documents they made. They don't pay much attention to detail. A lot… It has problems, it has many mistakes. I feel very uncomfortable there and feel like a real German. But that's how we learned. (...) Sometimes when I see that the system of other countries does not work... For example, in England, they always throw garbage on the streets. There the garbage men come and collect the garbage. Same thing in Turkey. I miss this system terribly when I see it. And I say, 'Oh how German I am'. So how can we summarize it… I feel how German I am when I see how I got used to the structure of this place and when I see how other people or cultures, or countries are… then I feel German."

Besides emphasizing that she has embodied the work ethic and discipline of Germany, this narrative also indicates that Leyla finds the way of functioning of Eastern or Southern people is rather unstructured and imprecise. As stated within the theoretical framework, national identification also develops through an outward gaze, which means that drawing distinctions between one's own nation and a chosen Other that exhibits distinctive characteristics is a means of strengthening the particular asset that one's country allegedly possesses (Triandafyllidou, 2006).

The discipline and work ethic that German Turks have gained mainly through the education system shows itself in their business life, and social life when it is about the social order. As an example of functioning according to social codes, Ceren mentioned that she cannot cut in line or go to the doctor without arranging an appointment beforehand. She remarked that if one person must wait, the other person must also wait. She points out that Germany has some standards to maintain "equality".

On the other hand, all the German-Turk participants appeared to draw a line between operating according to these societal norms in the aforementioned areas of life and their personal lives. All the characteristics that Leyla attached to Eastern and Southern people regarding their working style become an asset that German Turks differentiate themselves from the ethnic Germans when the context is changed. For instance, with the following words, Leyla draws a bold line with "them" and the Other:

"For example, when Germans or Turks in Germany talk about Germans with negative connotations or the attitudes of Germans, they say something: 'Oh, how *Alman* you are'. (...) They say that when you are a rule-follower. When you are so overly prescriptive. For example, I don't know, Turks are very comfortable people. You know, if you don't have money, a penny

> or two... They say, 'Oh, nothing will happen'. If you go to Turkish grocery stores here, if you don't have 20 cents, they say, 'Oh, take it.' Germans never, ever say okay. Or, or... That everything is so perfectly straight. How can I explain? Down to the extreme detail and even when that detail is not important at the moment… Could I explain?"

Most of the participants called ethnic Germans individualistic, and normative. In our interview, Leyla shared a word that is used to define these features: "Alman". It is the literal translation of the word "German" in the Turkish language. Apparently, in their personal life, while forming relationships with friends, and family, being "Alman" is something that they proudly differentiate themselves from. These perceived features appear also as the main reasons that they feel Turkish at times and that they miss Turkey.

In line with the theories emphasizing that migrants experience fluid, heterogeneous, multiple, and unique versions of dual identity (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012; Vlasta, 2016), the participants' experiences do not support the theory of dichotomy that one withdraws themselves from the host society if one identifies more with the home society (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012). Rather, there are areas in which German Turks identify more with Germany and in other areas they feel closer to Turkey. These areas seem to be determined through their interaction with society. Through interacting with the larger national society as well as German institutions, they have adopted some features that are attributed to ethnic Germans such as being just, systematic, and structured while through their interactions within the close network of them that mostly consists of German Turks, they have adopted the so-called Turkish features such as being laid-back, generous, and warm.

All these traits that are seemingly positive constitute an example of Tajfel and Turner's Social Identity Theory regarding the strategy of migrants to achieve a more positive identity through dissociating from the devalued group identity (Verkuyten and Martinovic, 2012, p. 93). This dissociation is mainly emphasized when members of a nation fully differentiate themselves from another nation's members. However, it is partly apparent among migrant groups with dual identity as we see the examples in the quotations above. German Turks, on occasions, when it is favorable to possess, are not hesitant to embody the "Alman" traits, for instance, in a workplace or in a doctor's office. The descendants of first-generation migrants do have dynamic dual identities that possess some features derived from both home and host countries.

These features get activated in appropriate contexts in a way that they feel positive about their identities.

German Turks seem to almost differentiate between “inside” and “outside”, which refers to how they easily adopt the “German way of functioning” outside such as in a workplace, in a supermarket, or at school while they do not employ this rule-oriented approach in their private life inside such as in their house, at their gatherings with friends. On the other hand, new-wave Turks do not seem to have such differentiation. They mostly appear to not feel any engagement with the “German way of functioning” both in professional and social life.

One new-wave participant, Cihan, gave an example of how Germans are strict followers of rules and are hesitant to take initiative, especially in bureaucracy through a comparison between Turkey and Germany as follows:

> “Let me make a comparison here. For example, when I called the Ministry of Culture in Turkey and said, ‘Well, there is a problem with your online system, but I have to do this job, and I wonder how we can solve it’, I like when someone comes forward and say, ‘Wait, I will help you and figure it out for you’ and make a phone call and solve it. For example, it doesn't happen here. I experienced this one here. I'll tell you that, too. Since the letter came to us late, this may be because of us, but we had to make it in two days. They want the paper from AOK. We're going to AOK, and they say, ‘ten days, at least ten days’. I ran into someone there. Someone from Turkey. We said, ‘Things went wrong, this and that happened’. He went to handle it, and that paper came to us in five minutes.”

New-wave participants appear to find the way of functioning of institutions in Germany “needlessly” complicated and challenging since they get used to how things work in government offices in Turkey. This matter seems to be closely related to perceived cultural differences as well. For Merve, the “rule-follower characteristic of Germans” that impacts social life and social order is hard to get used to. She shares one of her experiences regarding the matter as follows:

> “The state of being critical in people, or this normativeness, challenges me a little bit. This much of ‘let's accept the rules and let's be the enforcers of the rules on the street’... When I was going by bicycle, that is, twenty meters, I went in the opposite direction. The last short distance of 20 meters, I was going in the opposite direction, but I did not use the bike path in the opposite

> direction. I don't understand why five people warned me. I mean, the old people may be okay, but the fact that people of our age embrace these rules and laws and teach them with a superior language... It's something I don't want to get used to, and something I don't think I can get used to."

For Cihan, the structure of the institutions in Germany has a reciprocal relationship with "the mentality of German people" as well. He gives an example of this interrelation as follows:

> "So, I don't like that thing here. That everything is subjected to so many laws and rules. Rules are also good for facilitating social life. Being robotic is sometimes very troublesome. Could I explain? What I just mentioned is what I'm saying, like if I call the Ministry of Culture, they can help me legally, within the limits of the state institutions and bureaucracy. It's a beautiful thing, we do not have it here. In other words, this is one aspect of being human, the law makes our job easier, but we are also human, and we should not forget this. You are obsessed with the law here. For example, there are always letters coming. Letter, letter, letter, you answer. Letter, letter, letter. So you answer again. In fact, some things are very simple but take a long time. They're stretching it out. That is, they do not take initiative there (...) This prescriptiveness is not good either. If you follow so many rules, one day someone will come out. Like the government in Turkey, 'I have such an opinion', it says, 'this is the rule'. They would say 'ok, that's the rule'. (...) There is a line. Turkey is very free in terms of rules, this is very negative, but there should be a balance. (...) I mean, we have that thing of being human, we have the condition of being a child or an animal inside, you know, sometimes it seems to me that it doesn't exist here, I want to feel it."

He considers this much dependence on the rules as a discrepancy from human nature which can be child- and animal-like to some degree. It is a strong reference showing how he is reluctant both to adopt such a structure and an identity that complies with this structure.

When asked when she feels like a German the least, another new-wave participant, Öykü, refers to the German discipline and lack of flexibility. These are the main perceived traits that Öykü does not feel an attachment to, and hence cannot develop a strong national identification with Germany when it comes to its structure. The only participant who felt close to the aforementioned traits of Germans and Germany was Harun. Since he also feels disciplined and punctual, he mentioned that he feels "like a German" in that sense. Additionally, he added that

the lack of these traits in Turkish people and social life in Turkey push him away from feeling belonging to Turkey. He gives an example of this feeling as follows:

> "I feel that thing every time I set foot in Turkey, every time I land at the airport. (...) It's the crowd of people, the noise, you know... Let me say it's a little less regular. If you are waiting for the shuttle, let me say that there is no queue in front of the shuttle, or that people are more irregular, that they do not follow the rules of society. This is how it manifests itself all the time. I liken it to something like this: (...) You forget the sound of the aspirator that is on, you can chat like this, two hours pass in the kitchen. When you turn it off, you say, 'Oh, how loud it was here'. Coming to Germany is exactly like that for me. Actually, when I was in Turkey, I was one of those voices. But when I come here and go to Turkey again, I realize that particular difference."

For Harun, having a structured and regular social order is a binding trait between him and Germany. Through that, he feels disconnected from Turkey and a stronger identification with Germany. Since adapting to the laws, norms, and structure of a nation's institutions is related to adapting the shared values, the structure appears a significant indicator of national identity. As mentioned above, four of the new-wave participants show a weaker connection and identification with Germany when it is about the allegedly normative characteristics of the social order and the institutions of Germany.

On the other hand, Turkey's institutions are considered to be corrupted by all of the participants. Especially political institutions, education, and media. These are the same institutions that the participants find to be well-functioning in Germany. One new-wave participant, Engin, mentioned that "AKP demolished any structure that helps society to function". Anti-democracy, injustice, and inequality were the main issues that all participants indicated regarding the dysfunction of the state institutions of Turkey. Two of the new-wave participants pointed out that all the ethical values such as merit, freedom of speech, democracy, justice, equality, and the principle of transparency of the state are abandoned for the sake of the profit of a "small mafiatic group". Most of the participants pointed out that they do not feel safe living in Turkey. For the new-wave participants, the main reason for this is that they do not trust the government and state institutions to protect their rights. Since they cannot see an opportunity to fulfill one's self and live freely without being threatened within this atmosphere, Germany offering freedom, along with opportunities that are derived from being a strong

welfare state with state aid, employment opportunities, and social services has given reliance to them. This matter appears as a strong motivation for the new wave to migrate to Germany in the first place. Also, it appears as the main obstacle for the new wave to develop a strong national identification with Turkey.

Meanwhile, the most commonly mentioned reason as to why German Turks cannot live in Turkey seems to be the perception that Turkey having undeveloped institutions such as media, education, and political institutions along with a weak social system that cannot maintain an acceptable equality and social order. Leyla mentions that they grew up in a secure and pristine environment and that is why they, namely German Turks, cannot live in Turkey. Ceren approaches this difference from another perspective by mentioning that Turkey is exciting since people start to learn about life and stand on their own feet at a young age by moving out to big cities to study and sharing apartments with strangers. Implying that she was raised in a bubble-like environment within her German-Turk network, Ceren indicates that she envies people like me who move to Germany to study and that she finds it courageous. She also wanted to move to Turkey, but her network did not "allow" by asserting that she cannot adapt to living in Turkey. The instability and precarity that are attributed to Turkey appear to evoke either fear or excitement among German Turks. The feeling of the homeland, as stated in the theoretical framework, has an element of reconstruction of the past, which is regulated in line with the present needs. As Ceren had spent her two-months-long summer vacations in Turkey by staying at her relatives' house throughout her childhood, she accumulated warm feelings derived from the warm weather, delicious food, playing by the sea, close relationship with her family in Turkey, and general relaxing feeling of summertime spent in a small town that she felt welcomed. These feelings appear to create a solid foundation for Ceren in strengthening her national identification with Turkey and her interest in Turkey.

Furthermore, two of the German-Turk participants, Ekin and Bora, pointed out that in terms of social services, activities, and facilities, Germany is richer than Turkey. People have more opportunities for leisure-time activities, such as sports facilities. Since Ekin visited Turkey only a few times when she was a kid, her image of Turkey is based on the conditions of Turkey many years ago when the opportunities were more limited. Bora recently lived in Istanbul for a year to work there. He mentions that despite many opportunities for social activities, as people have to work for long hours to earn a living and spend their time in the traffic before and after work, they cannot enjoy social life. Also, based on his experience from his childhood vacations

that took place in a small village of their parents in Turkey, he points out the difference between urban-rural cities' opportunities. He mentions that people can enjoy similar social activities as those who live in urban places even though they live in rural areas in Germany. However, "it is not the case in Turkey", he says.

German Turks do not feel close to Turkey when it comes to the structure of institutions, social order, and the opportunities that Ekin and Bora mentioned above. Thus, the criteria of common destiny and shared future of traditional understanding of national identity (Guibernau, 2004) become unfulfilled for them. Based on that, it might be stated that the participants indicating that they cannot imagine themselves living in Turkey due to its structure shows a sign of weak national identification. Although they still feel outsiders to some degree in Germany, it does not lead them to share the perceived destiny of Turkey. On the contrary, the fact that they feel more comfortable living within "the functioning structure" of Germany appears as an element that strengthens their host national identification.

One other important observation is regarding the experience of discrimination and racism that the participants have gone through within the insitutions of Germany and social order. Compared to German Turks, the new-wave participants appeared to give more examples of veiled forms of discrimination that they have encountered mostly in the state institutions. Cihan touches upon the issue as follows:

> "I would like the prejudices of the people in bureaucracy to change. There is a project of integration, but there is an idea of a society that will not be integrated. Even if the real sociological background of this is indeed true, if that doesn't change, then they shouldn't be chasing tails. Because there are automatic reactions when a person, in quotation marks, who is not like that goes to an institution as well. They say, even in the best case, 'Look now, you, you don't know.' You read this in the subtext. 'You are Turkish'. The attitude that says 'You say that you know, but I'll tell you from the beginning' needs to change. I've seen this a lot."

Additionally, another new-wave participant, Engin, referrs to that there is a different type of racism or xenophobia that is not based on race in Germany. This definition of racism is compatible with the notion of "cultural racism". As Barker highlights, cultural racism is based on the belief in cultural supremacy rather than racial superiority, and allows labeling migrant populations as "culturally distinct," and hence excludable (Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 205).

Engin was not really giving a solid example of racism that he has experienced. Rather, he was implying that he has been feeling that the perceived cultural differences between German and Turkish or any Eastern culture have a negative impact in his daily life. Cultural racism that might manifest itself in veiled forms presumes that the presence and cultural differences of certain groups lead to conflict in society (Wren, cited in Kilic and Menjívar, 2013, p. 206).

All participants indicated the existence of discrimination and mostly cultural racism in Germany. While German Turks were referring to a "state strategy of creating psychological pressure on migrants' lives" and social and institutional segregation, the new wave pointed out veiled forms of discrimination in state institutions. Nevertheless, all participants appear to agree that Germany creates trust in its effort of maintaining justice, merit, and equality across society. They mostly feel free and safe in their daily lives, believing that their civil and human rights are protected by the German state. This creates a boost in their host national identification while causing a void in terms of their identification with Turkey.

It is observed that when national identification with both countries is weak in terms of some elements such as shared values and common destiny, the participants' identification with Berlin becomes prominent. For instance, Bora was critical of discrimination, racism, and classism which are embedded mainly across media (through lack of cultural representation), education, and relatedly, the academy (through providing limited access to higher education and academy for migrants) throughout the interview. Also, he stated that he experienced police brutality due to his migrant identity in Germany. Possessing Turkish citizenship solely, he was able to observe how the government departments' way of functioning is problematic towards migrants. The amount of paperwork in bureaucracy, and the complexity of it as "it has its own world" make Bora feel like an outsider within German society. Experiencing these "structural problems", Bora feels a distance from "feeling like a German". However, as Berlin offers multiculturalism and diverse representation in social life, he feels like he belongs in Berlin. He answered the interview question of "how do you answer when you are asked where you come from?" by mentioning that he says, "he is based in Berlin or from Berlin". He appears to feel more comfortable with identifying as "Berliner", rather than as German or German Turk. As Verdugo and Mueller mention, as the Turkish population is structurally separated from mainstream German society, their integration becomes challenging (2008, p. 4). In such cases, migrants might turn towards their in-group of their own definition or a more local attachment such as an attachment to the city that offers acceptance.

Lastly, it should be stressed that many of the participants implied that they could finally understand how badly society and system behave against migrants as they learn more about systematic discrimination, mainly through gaining the power of naming (phenomena) thanks to education. As Verkuyten and Martinovic suggest, migrants become more aware and concerned about the less advantaged and vulnerable position of minorities, and migrants in society through education (2012). In this sense, they become more critical and distant towards the host country.

5.3. Cultural Dimension

Under this subchapter, it is aimed to present the analysis of the cultural dimension of both diaspora groups that covers their references to the following matters: language, religion, common values, customs and traditions, historical/public figures, and social movements/events.

While all the German-Turk participants' first language is German, and hence they feel the most comfortable and competent when speaking German, none of the new-wave participants have an advanced level of German. While three of the new-wave participants have advanced knowledge of English, the other two stated that their English is in the intermediate level. With the exception of one participant, all German-Turk participants can speak Turkish despite not being at the native level.

Language appears as an important signifier of national identification throughout all the interviews. While new-wave participants mostly struggle with developing their connection to Germany due to the lack of German knowledge, the German Turks who do not have competence in Turkish language appeared to feel distant to Turkey.

Two of the new-wave participants were clear about lacking German language limits their social interaction. Engin mentioned that he feels the most foreigner when a person approaches him to have a daily conversation in German. He said that he loves these random interactions with strangers and thinks that stating he does not know German and maybe asking for switching to

English takes away the element of sincerity that was about to be built within the initiated conversation.

All the new-wave participants have a close network consisting of firstly the new-wave members and secondly international migrants. Only one new-wave participant, Merve, mentioned that her friends are mostly German whom she met through her German partner when she moved to Berlin to live with him. Since the new-wave members mostly are students or working as a freelancer, or in international companies, they are surrounded by English or Turkish speakers. Öykü mentioned that she feels like she lives in a small version of Istanbul as she has a lot of friends or familiar faces from Istanbul in Berlin.

Language appears as a huge barrier for engaging with the larger society. Being able to speak only Turkish and English creates a bubble, and the participants are well-aware of that. While some of them, like Engin, are bothered by it, others like Öykü are happy to be surrounded by mostly Turkish people. Language also appears as a carrier of cultural practices as it might be spotted in the following words of Merve:

> "I mean, because of the language and culture, of course you start out as a foreigner, naturally you start out as the Other. Or I felt like I was starting. As I said, my boyfriend is German, and my circle of friends is a little more German. It makes me feel like a foreigner when I make a joke that I found very funny, and it's not laughed at."

By this statement, she appears to either indicate that as she communicates in English with Germans, some nuances get lost in translation or one's humor is closely related to their language, and without the knowledge of that language one misses out on that unique culture as well. In this example, we see that language functions as a cultural capital, which is a carrier of cultural orientation (Bourdieu, cited in Föbker and Imani, 2017). Not knowing the nation's language, migrants struggle both in national institutions and in social interactions that they get involved outside of their close network. This surely reflects on their identification with Germany and integration as a limiting factor. Öykü mentioned that she felt the most foreign in Germany when her purse was stolen, and she had to deal with it in the police station; or when she had to apply to urgent care in hospital without knowing German. When the new-wave migrants have to communicate with people who do not speak English or Turkish especially in

case of emergency, they feel extremely vulnerable and stressed. Knowing the language of a nation seems vital both in practical and social terms.

Meanwhile, it is observed how competence in Turkish language is closely linked with national identification with Turkey. One German-Turk participant, Ekin, mentioned that she wanted to distance herself from Turkey, the Turkish culture, and anything related to it such as cultural values, traditions, and language since her childhood times. She attributed her inability to speak Turkish to her negative perception towards Turkey. On the other hand, Ceren, who has repeatedly implied that she feels close to Turkey and Turkish culture, and hence who has wanted to live in Turkey as well, has a very good command of the Turkish language. Also, she has implied, throughout the interview, that she is proud of her competence in Turkish. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, since not speaking the language before their schooling puts migrants in a disadvantaged position, they tend to cut off their relationship with the Turkish language in order to meet "the criteria of integration" stronger and earlier. This constructs the core reason of why the participants' Turkish is mostly not good enough to speak without thinking and struggling to find the correct word even though they all have parents whose native languages are Turkish and communicate in Turkish at home. Even though, as a small kid, their Turkish was at a native level; the second-generation migrants are likely to be reluctant to keep their knowledge of Turkish in order to demolish the barriers that they encounter and that they think they will encounter in future both in their social and professional lives.

As covered in the theoretical framework, religion appears as an important factor impacting most of the German-Turk participants' national identification as well. While one participant shares being Muslim as his prominent identity, the other two participants practice a more "liberal" version of Islam. Although all the participants' parents practice Islam, the descendants' distance to an Islamic lifestyle varies.

For instance, Bora who mentioned that he is on a path to define his religious identity in a way that differs from his families' perception and the perception of the organized Islamic education he took until the age of 16 at the mosques of Berlin. He, as a politically minded person, mentioned that because he has seen how religious organizations can be extremely conservative and racist, he has decided to cut his relationship off with these institutions over time. Since the age of 24, he mentioned, he has been "discovering his understanding of Islam". Also, he has

mentioned, for several times, how society is manipulated through religion in Turkey. The AKP government, he stated, campaigns in a way that uses religion to gather the votes of the Turkish diaspora such as by promoting the ideal image of Turkey in which they can freely practice their religion. Therefore, in Bora's perception, religion appears as a factor that has the potential of driving people to Turkey more while leading them to dissociate from Germany. That is also mainly why his parents, as committed Muslims, wait for their retirement to finally move back to Turkey.

Also, as a committed Muslim himself, Serhat's response to the question of whether he would think of living in Turkey at some point was that he might think mainly based on the motivation of living his religion "in the best possible way comfortably". Throughout the interview, it has become apparent that his biggest connection to Turkey is based on his religion. He also mentioned that, with AKP it became easy for one "to live their religion freely" and gave the example of freeing of the use of headscarves in schools legislated by the AKP government. This supports Bora's point. Religion appears as a strengthening element for national identification with Turkey for Muslim people and the AKP's effective campaigns continue to enforce this identification. On the other hand, the dominance of religion within a society creates a distance towards that society for non-religious or secular people. For Leyla, the instrumentalization of religion and organization of social order and of the national institutions in accordance with religious values create "lack of freedom and of neutrality". This appears as a reason for her to dissociate herself from Turkey.

Meanwhile, none of the new-wave participants defined themselves as religious. They also mentioned that either they have secular family members; or their family has a moderate understanding of religion meaning that they do not practice Islam or practice it loosely and very rarely yet still believe in it. Religion appears as not a valuable factor in their identification with Turkey. However, the manipulation of religion by politics is highly impactful in formation of national identity with Turkey as a negative factor.

The participants' references to perceived values of both Germany and Turkey manifest another important factor in formation of their national identity. In this study, the notion of cultural values, meaning shared ideals of a culture, also refers to "cultural practices", meaning shared perceptions of how people routinely behave in a culture (Frese, 2015, p. 1327). As stated under the subchapter of structural dimension above, the perceived prominent values of German

culture for German-Turk participants mostly revolves around justice, equality, strict work ethic, discipline, and competence with the rules and laws. Apart from these, references to individualism, valuing a certain amount of emotional distance among society members, and structured daily routines were detected throughout the interviews. As an example of being discreet about private life, Leyla mentioned that she does not witness that Germans talk about their private lives explicitly as much as Turkish people do. Also, she gives an example of how she thinks Germans are stick to their routines as follows:

> "... and those who are overly sensitive about rules, for example, most Germans go to bed at ten o'clock. They don't do it after ten. I have a cousin. She is married to a German. When they come to visit us, they get going at exactly seven. Or when she comes to a wedding, she leaves exactly at seven o'clock. She never pins gold on the bride. She says 'you, you pin on behalf of me'. Because that bedtime system or routine is so important to them. She doesn't see other things, social things at all, and that's for me... a German trait. And these times I don't feel close to that. Could I explain?"

The most related answers regarding the factor of shared values were received when the question of when they feel the most and the least German was directed to the participants. Not relating to the perceived values or cultural practices such as prioritizing their routines might lead migrants to develop a weak identification with German society and the nation itself.

However, as contact theory suggests, contact between different groups might dissolve existing group barriers (Allport, cited in Becker, 2022). Contact enables people to view one another as unique individuals rather than as representative members of a whole group (Brewer and Miller, cited in Becker, 2022). For instance, while Leyla is critical about how Germans do not share their money, belongings, food, and so on, Ekin mentions that this perceived trait of Germans is "not true for every German". Since Ekin's best friend and partner are ethnic Germans, through close contact, Ekin appears to evaluate Germans as more unique individuals when compared to Leyla whose close network mostly consists of German Turks.

In the interviews, the most referred cultural values regarding Turkey or Turkishness are as follows: strong family relationships, humanitarianism, friendliness, hospitality, sincerity, and being laid-back. Some examples of these perceived values can be seen in the following quote deducted from Leyla's answer to the question of what she thinks about social life in Turkey:

> “I mean, I think it's a very social environment. I think the environment is a very chirpy. People are very active, and talkative. For example, the Turks tell me about their whole life when I go there. You know, their secrets, problems; ‘I broke up with him’, ‘my life is so bad because of this’ and so on... They are very open, that is, they speak their minds. You won't find anything like that in Germany. Here people don't tell you about their problems in life. First, you have to be friends for years.”

In addition to the perceived cultural values mentioned above, not being strict followers of rules and laws, imprecise and irregular operation regarding work, and procrastination were some of the cultural practices that the German-Turk participants attributed to the Turkish nation. Also, some conservative values such as adaptation and implementation of gender roles, and obedience to the elderly were attributed to Turkish culture by Ekin, while responding to the question of when she feels the least Turkish with the following words:

> “(...) This old lady was like, ‘Oh, one day you'll serve your husband like that, hopefully soon’. And I was like, ‘Oh, he's going to serve me or himself’. ‘I'm not going to do shit’. And she was like, ‘I cannot believe you just said that’ (...) And then, I went to the kitchen, to my grandma. And my grandma said, ‘Don't mind her, she's stupid. You don't have to serve anyone’. And I love this about my grandma. She's so progressive. And these are some moments that I don't feel so Turkish also when I feel all these old structures. Yeah, like gender roles... But also, uh, that's a really tough one. It is. Sometimes, I would argue with my mother, for example, because I don't fully agree with what she's saying, and she feels like I'm being highly disrespectful towards her and the way I speak to her is unacceptable because you are not supposed to speak to older people like that. She acts like, ``I kind of have to obey her because she is my mother.”

Ekin also highlighted that her mother finds her “too Germanized” when she acts the way she describes above. The educated second- or third-generation German Turks who have parents with conservative values that aim to protect traditional roles often appear to differentiate themselves from their parents, and Turkish culture in regard to the element of shared values. As Verdugo and Mueller’s research demonstrates, the diaspora members who receive education starting from elementary school at least until the end of high school, are more likely to identify with the country where they received education. Formal education is a sphere for the diaspora members to adopt some of the dominant cultures’ values even though they differ from the values and norms of their parents.

Similar to German Turks, new-wave participants attributed cultural practices to Germans that derive from valuing individualism. This becomes evident with the examples in the following: caring about their personal space, the ability to say no without experiencing challenges, everyone paying for themselves in social gatherings, and so forth. Also being sportive, organized, and disciplined were mentioned by the participants as other examples of the values attributed to German culture. The emotional and social outcome of these perceived traits are pointed out as not showing so much emotion, being cold, and discreet. Meanwhile Turkish people are mostly defined as generous, and charitable. Harun mentioned that these habits or traits are closely linked with the culture itself with the following words:

> "Well, I don't know, there is such a thing called *Alman hesabi* here. In fact, it's like everyone is paying the cost of what they actually did. But in Turkey, you know, one day he pays, another day the other. This is actually an example of that intertwining in social life. But when I looked at it in general, for example, this seemed very strange to me at first. But when you look at the social life here from that perspective, it actually makes more sense. I wouldn't say it's more logical, but I started to think that it is a system that does less harm to the social environment and friendship. Because what's going on in Turkey is that people fight each other more in social life because I don't know, I think they are too intertwined. For example, I prefer the social life here than the social life there in this respect."

As Social Identity Theory emphasizes, individuals categorize themselves into groups based on perceived similarity (Tajfel and Turner, cited in Becker, 2022). As Harun feels comfortable with aforementioned social distance among society members, he tends to create a stronger host national identification.

Also, building close relationships with friends, caring about being inclusive and open-armed within social gatherings were among perceived cultural practices regarding Turkish culture. As Merve, for example, is interested in building close contact with friends, she feels a stronger connection to Turkey compared to Germany.

While examples of the new-wave participants were more about cultural practices of Turkish people, German Turks mostly mentioned cultural values that they attributed to Turkish society. In terms of shared values of Turkish culture, there is not any apparent pattern that is valid for

all new-wave participants. This difference also demonstrates that closer contact to society provides the ability to see the members of society as unique individuals rather than believing certain values to be shared by the whole society (Allport, cited in Becker, 2022).

Having discussed participants' references to language, religion, and cultural values/practices, moving forward I intend to introduce the analysis regarding the other elements of the cultural dimension, namely customs and traditions, historical/public figures, and social movements/events of Turkey.

The German-Turk participants' answers to the question of what the customs and traditions they like the most in Turkey showed a lot of variety. While some answers indicated cultural treasures or cultural heritage such as art, language, food, and natural environment, the others referred to cultural traditions or practices such as Turkish wedding traditions, kissing an elderly's hand as a sign of greeting and respect, not wearing shoes in house, and having a big breakfast. Also, Bora mentioned some perceived cultural values and assets to be an answer to the aforementioned question: hospitality, and diversity of socio-cultural life. Serhat pointed out religion and hearing the voice of *Ezan* (Adhan[9]). All these customs/traditions and cultural assets that they mentioned indicate what they love or miss about Turkey. These practices, values or assets are maintained and revived in migrants' lives in Germany. Even though they portray a weak national identification with Turkey in general, as Ekin does, they still practice habits, which are derived from Turkish customs and traditions. These habits strike as significant binding elements between the descendants of the first-generation migrants and the Turkish culture.

Most German-Turk participants seemingly have little knowledge of historical/public figures of Turkey as well as the social movements/events happening in Turkey. These two elements of national identification demonstrate to which degree participants are interested in what happens in Turkey, and what they know about the important or well-known figures in Turkey's history, or today's Turkey.

[9] Adhan (Arabic) or Ezan (Turkish) refers to "the Muslim call to Friday public worship (jumʿah) and to the five daily hours of prayer. It is proclaimed by the *muezzin*, a servant of the mosque." (Available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/adhan)

The most prominent answers were the president Erdogan, and the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk. Some other political figures that become well-known specifically during the times of Gezi protests[10] were mentioned by Ceren, who seemingly has a strong national identification with Turkey. Some famous names from pop culture who are mostly musicians were mentioned as well. Except Ceren, the German-Turk participants recalled the public figures who are either among the most important political figures in Turkey or who became famous in the past. It demonstrates that the German-Turk participants mostly do not get to know Turkish public figures through their own engagement with the current agenda of Turkey. They know these figures through their parents or their childhood times when they were spending more time in Turkey. It might be evaluated as a sign of weak national identification with the home country as cultural assets occupy an important place in the collective memory and the feeling of shared destiny.

Information regarding the last matter within the cultural dimension was accumulated through the question of what the social movements/events the participants remember from Turkey are. The Gezi protests and the 15 July 2016 coup d'état attempt were the two main answers of the German-Turk participants. Bora, as a politically engaged person, pointed out Turkey's military operations in Iraq, and the elections as well. In addition, Ceren mentioned a big election meeting organized by the main opposition party CHP and the Suruç massacre on the Turkish border, allegedly organized by ISIS, in which 30 people were killed. It appears that the participants who are more politically engaged or maintain closer relationships with Turkey demonstrate a better knowledge of Turkish history in terms of social events and movements. The other participants seem to only know the big events/movements that has become a large public debate on international news as well, and what the government has chosen to highlight to be seen in international political arena such as the coup attempt on July 15[11].

[10] She mentioned some figures who might be defined as opposing intellectuals, artists, and leftist individuals, who are critical about and resist against the politics and implementations of the AKP government and conservatism in general: Baris Atay, Tarik Akan, Yilmaz Güney, Deniz Gezmis, and Ahmet Kaya.

[11] The July 15 coup attempt is an important incident in terms of modern Turkish history. The AKP government has established a common understanding that the events of July 15 should be seen in the context of a liberation struggle against Western imperialists and the Gülen movement (Tas, 2018, p. 10). This framing has allowed the administration to portray any opposition to Erdogan and itself as an attack on the entire nation (ibid.). Anyone who values their nation is expected to stand firmly in their camp against the enemies (ibid.). Also, AKP has reframed the Gezi protests as a "civilian coup" and hence the Gezi protestors are represented as one of the enemies to the country and the people (ibid.).

On the other hand, it is observed that the knowledge of the new-wave participants regarding customs and traditions, public figures, and social movements of Turkey is in great amount. They were very specific when they were asked what they enjoy about Turkey's traditions and their collective memory was advanced regarding public figures and social movements from all times in Turkey. Four of the five participants pointed out national and religious festivals and how they enjoy the notion of people getting together on these special days and feeling a sense of collectiveness. Also, two participants gave an example to cultural practices in Turkey over friend gatherings. Engin mentioned how he enjoys *Fasil*[12] gatherings with friends a few times a year to sing, dance, eat and drink with euphoric feelings.

Regarding the public figures of Turkey, the participants were able to recall a lot of names from diverse areas such as politics, activism, and different art forms from different historical periods. These names include the following: important activist figures from the time of Turkey's 1980 coup such as Deniz Gezmis; political figures such as ministers or prime ministers of the old eras such as Kenan Evren; names of artists whose art has established political debates such as Ahmet Kaya, and Cem Karaca; the painters, actors, musicians and poets loved by the public such as Edip Cansever, who is considered to be a national treasure in Turkey; morning show hosts such as Seda Sayan, and finally pop music icons such as Ajda Pekkan. Since shared memories, symbols, traditions, and notions regarding that culture entertained by the society members indicate a strong collective identity (Smith, cited in Guibernau, 2004), the richness and diversity embedded in all the new-wave participants' collective memory regarding public figures demonstrates the strength of their national identification with Turkey.

Lastly, new-wave participants recalled some social movements and events that occurred in Turkey, which they either emotionally engaged with or physically participated in. They shared their first-hand experiences with me and showed signs of strong emotions related to these social movements. Gezi protests and incidents such as attacks and interventions of the police forces as well as attacks perpetuated by the terrorist groups such as the Islamic State were among the main social events that all of them mentioned. The examples of these incidents are as follows: the young protestors who were killed during the Gezi protests by the police; 2015 Ankara bombings; and 2015 Suruc Massacre.

[12] Fasil refers to musical performance nights that occur at meyhanes in which the mix of classical Ottoman and Turkish music is performed for the crowd of diners to sing and dance throughout the night (Scott, 2012).

Also, the euphoric feelings were often mentioned regarding the collective act of defending human rights, resisting and protesting against oppressive politics of the government, and uniting as diverse groups who have diverse political views. Merve's words give a convenient example to the emotions derived from the collective action:

> "The biggest is Gezi events, of course. Because we were included, I was there, too. From beginning to end. I witnessed, lived, and experienced the rise of tension before, and after that, people's organization, gathering in neighborhoods, etc. It was a tremendously powerful experience for me. And then, if you look at it, we got all politicized. It was an example of how, when something a little is forbidden, it explodes with greater force when it's tried to be suppressed. I was pretty happy back then, of course. It was all good that the nationalists embraced LGBTI+, I don't know, the marches afterward, that it was so crowded at the pride parades, and the fact that all of these exploded after the Gezi. So, these came to mind. Like the Gezi, and beyond."

In addition to these specific incidents, a great deal of what they pointed out was the unlawfulness they have witnessed such as the results of corruption investigations targeting statesmen, mass arrests of journalists, activists being forced to seek political asylum, failure to initiate a proper investigation about the loss of lives as a result of the negligence of state or holdings such as the Soma mine disaster, and the Gezi trials that are either still pending or had resulted in unfairly. Following the Gezi, the most prominent answers were related to the era of the 1980 Turkish military coup d'état. All the statements regarding social movements or events that they could recall were full of details, and signs of strong emotions such as euphoria, frustration, and sadness. One participant, Harun, after struggling to come up with an example to social events/movements, stated that "every day was full of incidents for us". It has been easily observable that the new-wave participants still carry strong emotions and current knowledge in terms of the collective memory of Turkey even though they follow the Turkish news much less now in Germany. So much so that these movements and incidents constitute their main motivation to emigrate from Turkey. Since signs of collective memory are important in terms of assessing national identification of migrants, it appears as the new-wave migrants have a strong national identification with Turkey that they have built over time through emotional and political participation in Turkey's agenda.

5.4. Emotional Dimension

Under this category, the participants' emotional attachment to a nation or its members, and the homely feelings towards that nation are comparatively analyzed.

The participants were asked about their usual answer to the question of "where are you from". It was observed that the question of where they are from evokes so many emotions including anger and frustration for all the German-Turk participants. Mostly because they receive the follow-up question of where they are "actually" from. Ekin mentioned that she hates the question as the person who is asking is mostly German and wants to hear that she does not really belong here. Her following statement constitutes an example to how loaded the aforementioned question is for German Turks:

> "I bet when I say this, I'm not the only one that gave you this answer. But I hate this question because it's... I hate when people ask me where I come from, especially in Germany. When I'm on vacation, I don't care. But in Germany, I hate it because I think you're stigmatizing me. You absolutely know that I don't have blue eyes and blond hair. You just want to categorize me. It's always like, 'and what do you identify as?' I hate this question. I would always say, of course, my roots are from Turkey, but I try not to say that because I don't want to give the person what they want to hear."

Their dual identity and dual attachment to both nations are diverse for so many reasons. As in Ekin's case, although some participants feel "like a German", they nonetheless feel that they are obliged to reveal their migration history in social occasions. Two of the participants, Ekin and Bora, appeared as they are more attached to the German nation than they are to the Turkish nation. Their statements highlighted that if there would not be a further investigation during their interactions with German people, they would not be bothered to mention their Turkish roots. Also, Bora mentioned that he identified as Turk until the late adolescence as he had a close circle of friends consisting of ethnic Germans and they made him feel like he did not belong. As Mandel highlighted migrants tend to embody the roles that they are institutionally and socially trapped within and reproduce them (2008). Therefore, it should be noted that migrants' emotional attachment to Germany has been largely formed by how society perceives them. This is why second-generation migrants commonly start to identify themselves as

German after their adolescence years at the earliest as they then become able to recognize the power of stigmatization.

For the other two participants, the situation is reversed. Serhat and Ceren pointed out that their answer to the question of where they are from is Turkey. While Serhat, as a commited Muslim, constitutes his emotional attachment to Turkey mainly over the element of religion, Ceren who was raised in a household that is relatively more culturally reserved and who spent her summer vacations in Turkey as a kid with her Turkish relatives, feels strong cultural attachment to Turkey. Lastly, Leyla highlighted that she feels that she is "Turkish German" who was not raised in a culturally reserved household and feels more like an "international person". Additionally, three of the participants mentioning that they feel like a Berliner, exemplifies a narrow category of emotional attachment rather than feeling closer to the whole nation.

On the other hand, all the new-wave participants stated that they mention that they are from Turkey when they were asked about where they come from. On the contrary to German Turks, there were not any signs of strong emotions attached to the question of where they come from. This is likely because the new-wave Turks do not feel they belong to Germany as German Turks do. Therefore, they do not have mixed feelings that signal an existence of dual identity. Rather, they seem to welcome the question at ease and answer with the details such as which city they were born in or which city they spent the most time in. A similar pattern that German Turks employ regarding being Berliner to develop an identification with a narrow category that offers more representation for them is detected with the new-wave participants who spent the most of their life in Istanbul as well. They mentioned that they specifically say that they are from Istanbul following their answer stating that they come from Turkey.

The other main question that intends to inquire participants' homely feelings was the question of what does home mean to them, and do they feel at home at the current state. The answers were similar among all the participants in a way that underlines the notion of home cannot be reserved within a place. Rather home was defined as a feeling that awakens when one is surrounded by people they trust, peace, and love. The other prominent remarks were about that home is where one is able to develop themselves, to be truly themselves, to feel safe, and respected. The German-Turk participants all mentioned that they currently feel at home in Berlin or in Germany. While they give certain structural reasons as to why they cannot feel at

home in Turkey, they also mentioned that they wish certain cultural practices would change in Germany for them to feel more at home.

Contrary to the German Turks, the four of the five new-wave participants easily stated that they do not feel at home currently. Except Harun, who shows signs of sharing similar perceived values with the larger host society throughout the interview, all the participants indicated that they do not feel truly belong to Germany *yet*. Although most of the participants do not consider moving back to Turkey, even though the situation would change in Turkey; they indicated that the feeling of home is hard to acquire. Even though they feel safe and at peace in Berlin, they signaled that adopting a place as one's home is a complex process.

As presented within the theoretical framework, the feeling of home derives from the embodiment of all the sensual, memorial, experience-oriented, and imaginary elements regarding one's own understanding of culture. In line with this understanding, the German-Turk participants appear to both carry warmness and sympathy towards the Turkish culture and people as well as the sense of peace and order that they have built around their identity through living in Germany. Therefore, they demonstrate emotional attachment to both countries based on diverse drivers. While they tend to be emotionally drawn to Germany due to peace provided by the structure of the nation, they also appear to have developed a strong emotional attachment to Turkey based on cultural similarities.

Meanwhile, the new-wave participants demonstrate a stronger emotional attachment to Turkey compared to both their attachment to Germany, and German Turks' emotional attachment to Turkey. So much so that common positive feelings towards living within the German structure cannot infiltrate their processes of emotional attachment. It is observed that emotional dimension is a strong category in assessing national identification. Although the migrants relatively easily connect with the host country's legal and social structure, different cultural practices of the host nation along with the emotional closeness derived from growing up within the home country restrain newcomers from developing a strong emotional attachment to the host nation in a relatively short time, amounting a few years.

Additionally, compared to German Turks' feelings towards Turkey, the new-wave participants appear to have a lot stronger and loaded emotions towards both Turkey and its members. Most of them mentioned that they feel extremely sorry about the huge potential of individuals, which

they believe to have been wasted for years now under the oppressive rule of the current government. Some of the participants mention that they sometimes feel guilty since they chose to leave their homeland and dissociate themselves emotionally from Turkey whereas their loved ones are still going through tough times due to the economic and political conditions of Turkey. One can see the sorrow regarding the "wasted potential" of the people and the country in the following words of Cihan:

> "It's a really beautiful country when you actually think about it. For example, when we travel the Mediterranean, the Aegean, etc., I say, 'God, did I live here?' It's really beautiful. For example, there is the thing used by the government, the AKP, you know, the 'they are jealous of us' narrative, it's classic. Really true in the sense of… I mean, the coasts are enviably beautiful. (...) I think there is a very serious potential in Turkey. Despite all this. To see how it is destroyed... for example, I think the artistic background is very strong, I think the accumulation of knowledge is strong. I can either tell through the theater, for example, or, I don't know, I can tell it through music as a listener. I think they are hidden somewhere."

The diaspora experience, as Lie argues, is a crucial component of national history and culture (Lie, 2001, p. 359). The participants showed that even though each participant's experience with the diaspora experience was unique, diaspora groups do not identify themselves only with the host nation, but they also identify themselves with faraway locations and communities to varying degrees (Vlasta, 2016, p. 223). In fact, they are all conscious of the fact that they have a common ancestry (Appadurai, cited in Vlasta, 2016, p. 223).

6. Summary and Discussion of Empirical Results

Under this subchapter, what is aimed is a brief summary of the results of the analysis. In this study, how youth of educated German Turks and the new-wave Turks form their national identification with Turkey are discussed and empirically analyzed through four dimensions: legal, structural, cultural, and emotional dimension.

The results indicate that for the diaspora groups, national identification with homeland cannot be evaluated separately from the host national identification. The participants mostly reflect on their national identification with Turkey through a comparison of their national identification with Germany. Although the analysis section presented the differences and similarities between the two migrant groups at hand regarding their formation of national identification in detail, I believe that the greatest outcome might be summarized as follows: while characteristics of dual identity has been more prominent for German Turks, the transnational ties of the new-wave participants has come forward as a more determinant factor in their migrant identity.

In terms of legal dimension, it appears that the power of the host country to limit civic rights for migrants causes great frustration for German Turks as it proves to migrants that even though they feel they belong to Germany, they still are not accepted as equal citizens. Also they show no interest in being a Turkish citizen or the legal rights that it brings, which indicates a weak national identification based on legal dimension. On the other hand, the German State surveilling high-skilled migration through limited residence permits results in strengthening the transnational identity of the new-wave Turks. They feel a sense of belonging to their own migrant networks transcending borders. Thus, when it comes to residency and citizenship, they do not feel strong identification neither with Turkey nor with Germany. It is rather the legal dimension that fosters their transnational identity and belonging to the new-wave diaspora.

Structural dimension that assesses migrants' perception towards laws, rules, norms, and characteristics of institutions of both Turkey and Germany demonstrated that both German Turks and the new-wave Turks foster their host national identification mainly based on Germany's structure that prioritizes justice, and equality. However, veiled form of discrimination become apparent within mainly the new-wave's engagement with the German institutions as a discouraging force to adopt host national identification. Moreover, the new-

wave migrants appeared to feel more distant to the rule-oriented structure of German institutions and social order compared to German Turks. Meanwhile, both groups similarly possess weak national identification with Turkey when it comes to how society and societal institutions function.

It comes forward that while new-wave Turks have first-hand experience and knowledge regarding cultural dimension with all its components such as cultural practices, historical figures and moments of the nation and so on, German Turks seem to possess an indirect or a limited experience regarding those components. Contrary to German Turks, the richness and diversity of the experiences of the new wave lead them to have a strong national identification with Turkey. This dimension among all four emerged as the one that gives the most insight into both culture and collective memory, hence as the most important component of national identification.

Lastly, in terms of emotional attachment and the feeling of belonging, the two groups showed a lot of differences. Even though German Turks carry warmth and closeness towards Turkey and its members, they feel like they certainly belong more to Germany. Meanwhile, the strong and diverse emotions of the new wave towards Turkey and its members along with their statements regarding how they still cannot feel at home in Germany demonstrated that they have a strong emotional attachment, hence strong national identification with Turkey in that sense.

Findings highlight the multiplicity of diaspora identities. Even though the two groups have similar political perceptions and similar values regarding justice, equality, and freedom in general, and insofar their current image of Turkey as a place to live is similar; their national identification with Turkey highly differs. While German Turks identify themselves more with Germany and German society on the four of the dimensions that have been analyzed, the new-wave Turks largely identify with Turkey, especially based on cultural and emotional dimensions. While the legal dimension functions as a binding asset among the new-wave bubble, the structural dimension is the main aspect that they feel connected to Germany and feel a void in their belonging to Turkey.

7. Conclusion

This study investigated how educated youth of German Turks and the new-wave Turks form their national identification with Turkey through qualitative text analysis that has been based on the semi-structured interviews that were conducted with ten people. Findings contribute to the literature in the following ways: (1.) transnational identity of the new-wave Turkish migrants, which haven't attracted a lot of scholarly attention yet is expected to be grasped more, and (2.) the core feeling of belonging to a nation is expected to be understood in detail through the comparative study over direct experiences (being born, raised, and socialized in a country) and indirect experiences (getting to know the ancestral home mainly through stories of parents, and touristic activities that took place mainly in childhood times) of diaspora members with a nation.

In this study, although the interview questions that were designed based on the research intent revealed more about national identification, I could only cover the main elements of it by focusing on the four dimensions that seem to be the most significant within the scope of this study. The image of Turkey required more space to be explored throughout this study. Although the analysis categories of the research mostly cover the perception of the participants towards current Turkey, the statements of the participants regarding the future image of Turkey could not be analyzed, and the political, cultural, and socio-economic images could only be briefly discussed. By keeping the number of interview questions many, I have created a great deal of data to work with. However, I have come to the realization that the core of the research question, which asks for more elaboration on the feeling of "home" might be demanding fewer questions and more interpretive work on these open-ended questions.

A more comprehensive picture might be gained through more extensive qualitative studies on these two groups of young diaspora members. I believe that further studies might utilize this research by drawing from this point and further conducting hermeneutic analysis including discourse and narrative analysis. Because it has come to my attention that the matter of belonging arouses lots of emotions, hence it constitutes perfect material to be analyzed by reading the subtext and the sub-meaning of the participants' narration in depth. I believe that unique and diverse formations of national identities can be best grasped by diving into the meaning of home for the migrants over a greater sample group with more interpretation-

oriented techniques. A radically different picture –one of contestation, complexity, and diversity– emerges when seen through the subjects that the national majority or the state ethnicizes (Mandel, 2008, p. 2). We, as scholars, luckily have one-of-a-kind tools to reveal this constellation and explore the heterogeneity that migrant identities hold. Hence, we can create an intellectual foundation for challenging the supremacy of nation states' agendas on national identification and contribute to the formation of more successful migration policies that promote diversity and inclusiveness.

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9. Annexes

Interview Questions

Questions related to how the interviewees identify themselves and how they feel belonged in both countries:

1. How old are you? What is your occupation? Where do you and your parents live?
2. Where were you born? Where did you grow up?
3. Where were your parents born? When did they come to Germany? Do they have any connection to guest workers? / For the new wave: When did you come to Berlin? For what purpose did you come? (What is your visa type?)
4. Which languages do you speak?
5. Where did you go to school/university?
6. Which citizenships do you have? When did you receive them? Have you ever experienced any advantages and disadvantages of having these citizenships in Germany?
7. What is your answer to the question of "where are you from"?
8. Does your friend group mostly consist of Germans, German Turks, new-wave Turks, or international people?
9. Would you tell me about a time you felt belonged here?
10. Would you tell me about a time you felt foreign here?
11. Would you tell me about a time you felt the most/least German?
12. Would you tell me about a time you felt the most/least Turkish?
13. How religious are you and your family?
14. What has been the hardest thing to get used to about living in Germany?

Questions related to the image of Turkey:

1. Do you visit Turkey often?
2. Tell me about your visits. How do you feel when you are in Turkey?
3. Would you tell me about a time you felt belonged in Turkey?
4. Would you tell me about a time you felt foreign in Turkey?

5. What do you think about social life in Turkey?
6. What do you think about living conditions in Turkey?
7. How do you see economic conditions in Turkey?
8. What do you think about politics in Turkey?
9. Do you follow the news in Turkey?
10. What do you think changed with the AKP government?
11. Do you have any customs/traditions of Turkey that you like?
12. Who are the figures/people/celebrities that come to your mind when you think of Turkey?
13. What social events/movements do you remember happened in Turkey?
14. What do you think about the future of Turkey? What about the upcoming elections?
15. Would you consider living in Turkey at some point? Or would you consider staying in Berlin or in Germany? Why? / For German Turks: Does your family consider moving to Turkey?
16. Is there anything you miss about Turkey in Germany?
17. Where or what is home for you? What does home mean to you? Do you feel at home currently?
18. Is there anything here that you would like to change or improve?