

HERBERT MARCUSE'S ROLE IN SHAPING THE NEW LEFT:

**The Reception of the
Notions of Repressive Tolerance and
Alternative Revolutionary Forces in
West Germany (1963-1974) and
their Contemporary Legacy**

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Introduction

Why this Matters

Historians are often motivated to engage in the study and reconstruction of the past by a sense of intellectual curiosity. That was also one of the motivating factors that drew me to this topic in intellectual history. Furthermore, my interest in Herbert Marcuse was strengthened by the perception that there are links between his ideas and contemporary political concepts. At the same time, I observed that the topic of Marcusean, Frankfurt School or Neo-Marxist ideational influences in politics has become heavily politicized, perhaps even mythologized, without necessarily receiving an equivalent level of academic attention. These considerations encouraged me to engage precisely with the topic of Herbert Marcuse's role in shaping the New Left, with the reception of his notions of Repressive Tolerance and Alternative Revolutionary Forces, looking specifically at West Germany between 1963 and 1974, as well as to engage with the contemporary legacy of these notions.

The claim of this topic's divisiveness and significance may come across as exaggerated, but in fact Herbert Marcuse has been a contested figure, disliked by different people for different reasons, ever since he became a household name in the 1960s: "Almost overnight the unknown dialectician became, in *Fortune's* phrase, the 'improbable guru of surrealistic politics', [uniting] California's right wing elders, Pravda, liberals such as Irving Howe and Nathan Glazer, the French Communist Party, and, most recently, the Pope in a single chorus of reprobation against the supposed pied piper who has corrupted the minds, morals, and manners of the young."¹ This is how Paul Breines described Marcuse in what was one of the earliest academic publications about him and his connections to the New Left published in 1970, nearly a decade before Marcuse's death in 1979.

An academic since the 1923 when he completed his doctoral studies at the University of Freiburg, Marcuse had left Germany and settled in America in 1934 to escape the rising National-Socialist regime in his home country. In the United States he lived in relative

¹ Breines, Paul (Ed.), Critical Interruptions: New Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse. Herder and Herder, New York City: 1972, ix.

obscurity from the public eye during the first two decades of his life across the Atlantic. Marcuse worked for the Institute of Social Research (Frankfurt School), which had found a safe haven to New York City, for a few US universities, and even – like many other émigrés – for the wartime predecessor of the CIA.²

Marcuse published his first book that could be considered popular, *Eros and Civilization*, in 1955. Nevertheless, his global fame came around the time of the publication of *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (1965), co-authored with Robert Paul Wolff and Barrington Moore Jr., which included his essay *Repressive Tolerance*.

But was it these publications alone that made Marcuse “leap from the hinterlands of heretical and *avant-garde* Marxian theory to celebrity status as the primal father of the global revolt of students and youth”³? Unlikely. These writings became hits with what may loosely be called the “1968 generation”; they were widely read and discussed, as was Marcuse himself. It seems improbable, however, that these books alone had propelled Marcuse to his star-like status – either simply due to the virtues of their content and style or as a result of *giving rise* to the new movements of the 1960s.

Instead, Marcuse’s works were an excellent fit for the spirit of the times and certainly gave intellectual ammunition to the proponents of the burgeoning New Left – those who rejected the established capitalist and liberal democratic ways of Western societies⁴, but did not wish to replace that social order with Soviet communism, which they viewed as more or at least as similarly oppressive. Together with the value of his writings, Marcuse’s star status was also due to his personality, his willingness to speak with and before radical student audiences, to support their movements with intellectual arguments, and to back causes they found important – such as campaigning against the Vietnam War in the late 1960s and early 70s or against Angela Davis’ imprisonment in 1970.

All this may have even turned Marcuse into a kind of fad with many of his “fans” not bothering to fully understand Marcuse’s arguments: Lucien Goldmann in his 1969 article *La Pensée de*

² For more on Marcuse’s biography and some of the specific examples mentioned here, see Chapter 1.

³ Breines, Paul (Edt.), ix.

⁴ “Western societies” or “the West” will be used as a term of convenience to refer to the majority of developed states, aligned with the United States during the Cold War.

Herbert Marcuse went as far as to declare it “obvious that most students who cite or proclaim Marcuse ignore the bulk of his writings and thought.”⁵ The importance of Marcuse-the-person, as opposed to Marcuse-the-academic, is highlighted by the vastly different reception of his fellow Frankfurt School colleagues like Horkheimer and Adorno, who were also active in the 1960s and early 1970s⁶, but did not enjoy a comparable cult status among the New Left or the “1968 generation” in general. Jokingly, Richard Vinen explains Marcuse’s continuing good relations with the radical students in Germany “perhaps, at least in part, because he was living several thousand miles away from them in California.”⁷ Of course, that joke does not actually hold true: Unlike Adorno who called the police on students “occupying” the Frankfurt Institute, Marcuse was supportive of student protests even, on occasion, when they broke the law.

Marcuse’s disappearance from the public imagination was as swift as his emergence. After his death in 1979 the public quickly lost much of its interest in his work and academic inquiries into his work were far from what might be expected in relation to an academic whose name had made newspaper headlines and had even been turned into a slogan along with the names of Marx and Mao. Perhaps this, too, demonstrates that Marcuse’s fame also had to do with his personality and current-political commentary, in addition to his academic work.

Perhaps the decreased interest in Marcuse was also caused by the decline of the movements that he had been associated with. The Vietnam War ended in 1975 leading to the end of the protest movement against it. The decline of the Hippie Movement and the splintering of the New Left were also likely factors. Some leading protest figures had taken a step back from the public eye, some like Martin Luther King (1929-1968) in the United States and Rudi Dutschke in Germany (1940-1979) were no longer alive. In the United States, the 1970s were marked by an increased “identitarian” emphasis with prominent Black, Women’s, and Gay rights movements taking the center stage, while in West Germany the decline of the protest movement coincided with a wave of far-Left terrorism⁸. Perhaps the spirit of *Détente* and the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 also contributed to an increased acceptance of the global status-quo as some of the potential for mutually assured nuclear destruction between the two global ideological rivals was significantly reduced. A new emphasis on human rights, accepted at least

⁵ Goldmann, Lucien, *La Pensee de Herbert Marcuse*. In: *Le Nef*, No. 36: January 1969, 56.

⁶ Adorno passed away in 1969, Horkheimer in 1973, and Marcuse in 1979.

⁷ Vinen, Richard, *The Long '68: Radical Protest and its Enemies*. Penguin Books, London: 2018, 185.

⁸ *Rote Armee Fraktion*, for example, had existed since the late 1960s, but its terrorist acts grew more frequent and significantly more gruesome during the 1970s.

on paper by both opposing blocs, further contributed to marginalizing some sections of the “old New Left.”

With all that in mind, was Marcuse’s fame just a fleeting publicity stunt or did his intellectual legacy leave a lasting mark on the political systems in Western countries? While Marcuse was popular, along with other intellectuals, in a number of states, this dissertation’s research focuses on his influence within West Germany, specifically on the Left. Where appropriate or necessary, however, examples from the United States are also used. This has to do with the fact that Marcuse spent much of his career in the US and interacted with the radical movements that developed there, but also because the US was (and perhaps remains) an ideological trend-setter among Western countries.

This dissertation is based on the hypothesis that Marcuse did influence politics in Western countries like (West) Germany and the United States. Before expanding on the hypothesis, however, I would like to briefly discuss the issue of the myths and exaggerations surrounding Marcuse’s name. Marcuse had been blamed as providing the intellectual arsenal for problematic aspects of Left-wing radicalism even while he was still alive. His intellectual “ghost”, however, was probably summoned once again around the end of the Cold War when the United States was undergoing a form of *culture war*. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the seemingly ultimate triumph of the market economy and liberal democracy, the new intellectual and political battle between the American Left and Right had been re-focused around “cultural” or “social” issues. Under-researched and weaponized as an element of simplified political battles, Marcuse’s intellectual legacy has been deprived of the opportunity to be calmly and impartially analyzed – with all its constructive and problematic elements mapped out in terms of their real-life political manifestations.

Radically conservative or Paleoconservative think-tanks like the *Free Congress Foundation*, commentators and scholars such as Pat Buchanan and David Horowitz, as well as other voices of the evangelical and culturally-conservative Right in America, argued after the end of the Cold War that counterculture had become mainstream, that the evolution of society toward greater equality for ethnic minorities, LGBT people, as well as the availability of abortion had been “forced” on the majority by an allegedly unaccountable elite. This was often blamed on the intellectual matrix of “Cultural Marxism”, often explained as a quasi-conspiracy and attributed to scholars like Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukacs, but also and perhaps

predominantly to the Frankfurt School, also to Marcuse.⁹ Since this dissertation project began in 2013, conspiratorial claims have intensified and gained traction, while the Left's defense has been to almost deny that Marxism could deal with aspects of culture. Neither of these narratives tells the story that an unbiased analysis would and the scarcity of proper research on Marcuse's brand of Neo-Marxism dealing with aspects of culture, personal liberation, and the quality of life has contributed to the political polarization; the deficit of scholarly narratives on this subject has aided the rise of the Alt Right and populist leaders in Europe and the Americas who rely on oversimplifications, exaggerations, and an overall atmosphere of intellectual confusion about the world and the intellectual origins of various phenomena.

Martin Jay dates the conspiratorial rhetoric about "Cultural Marxism" to a publication from 1992.¹⁰ I would argue that the roots of the conspiracy theories addressing the Frankfurt School's role in the social changes that took place in the West after the 1960s might even lie earlier – in the 1980s and specifically in a 1984 interview with Soviet defector Yuri Bezmenov taken by G. Edward Griffin of the John Birch Society. While the phrase "Cultural Marxism" was not used there, Bezmenov describes an alleged Soviet long-term plan to demoralize the United States by encouraging the liberal Left.¹¹ While many of Bezmenov's points about the Soviet Union and its intelligence activities ring true, some of his unsubstantiated claims about America being on the verge of collapse could be seen a precursor to the conspiratorial rendition of "Cultural Marxism" (as opposed to an objective analysis of change of left-wing priorities and their interplay with changes in society).

Jay also points to the anti-Semitic overtones within the conspiratorial approach to "Cultural Marxism." He compares the claims that "Cultural Marxism" is a kind of plan to deliberately undermine the United States to the interwar notion of "cultural Bolshevism"¹², which criticized artistic Modernists and which was even discussed at length by Adolf Hitler in his book *Mein Kampf*. A recent publication by another scholar, Joan Braune, entitled *Who's Afraid of the Frankfurt School? "Cultural Marxism" as an Antisemitic Conspiracy Theory* also deals with

⁹ Mirrlees, Tanner, [The Alt-Right's Discourse of "Cultural Marxism": A Political Instrument of Intersectional Hate](#). In: *Atlantis Journal*, Issue 39.1, 2018, 54.

¹⁰ Jay, Martin, [Dialectic of Counter-Enlightenment: The Frankfurt School as Scapegoat of the Lunatic Fringe](#). In: *Salmagundi*, No. 168-169: Fall 2010-Winter 2011

¹¹ Griffin, G. Edward, [Soviet Subversion of the Free World Press: Interview with Yuri Bezmenov](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFPtkey9kEk&t=676s), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFPtkey9kEk&t=676s>, (last accessed: January 12, 2021)

¹² Jay, Martin, [Dialectic of Counter-Enlightenment: The Frankfurt School as Scapegoat of the Lunatic Fringe](#). In: *Salmagundi*, No. 168-169: Fall 2010-Winter 2011

this issue, but focuses on an even broader dimension of why this matters: she looks at the way this theory has been promoted by “white nationalist Kevin MacDonald and self-titled paleo-conservatives William S. Lind and Paul Gottfried”, highlighting its “usage” by individuals holding positions of varying radicalism. More importantly, however, her paper shows how misconceptions about Marcuse and the Frankfurt School have seeped into mainstream conservative politics, thus illustrating the relevance of properly analyzing the legacy of Herbert Marcuse’s ideas. As Braune points out, the theory of “Cultural Marxism” has been picked up by a wide swathe of individuals, ranging from terrorist Anders Breivik to Andrew Breitbart, “the founder of *Breitbart News*, which was later taken over by Steve Bannon,”¹³ Donald Trump’s right hand man at the beginning of his presidential term. Braune lists a substantial number of influential individuals in politics and the media who adhere to this theory and the fact that in some cases their influence reaches to the summit of political power serves as an undeniable argument for the relevance of establishing Marcuse’s actual influence:

[The] founder of Turning Point USA Charlie Kirk, young right-wing pundit Ben Shapiro, Washington State Representative Matt Shea, Alex Jones’s outlet *Infowars*, and members of the Brazilian far-right President Jair Bolsonaro’s administration, including Bolsonaro’s son, who enthusiastically described Steve Bannon as an opponent of Cultural Marxism. A former aide to Trump, Rich Higgin, even wrote a famous memo framing Trump’s presidential campaign as a war on Cultural Marxism [...].¹⁴

Braune outlines further influential connections that one of the subjects of her research, William S. Lind, has through Paul Weyrich who was influential within the American Right:

[Weyrich] strategically used school integration fights in the South to make the white evangelical vote a formidable force, leading to the election of Reagan and eventually Trump; he helped to found a number of powerful think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council), and Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority [as well as] the Free Congress Foundation.¹⁵

A Free Congress Foundation video about “Cultural Marxism” featuring William S. Lind himself and including an interview with scholar Martin Jay shows just how central this notion was to the development of a new populist Right during the 1990s that would eventually gain strength in the new millennium.¹⁶

Far from being a US phenomenon, the emergence of a populist far-Right as a force capable of inserting itself into mainstream politics through varying levels of electoral success can be

¹³ Braune, Joan, Who’s Afraid of the Frankfurt School? “Cultural Marxism” as an Antisemitic Conspiracy Theory. In: *Journal of Social Justice*, Vol. 9: 2019, 4.

¹⁴ Braune, 4-5.

¹⁵ Braune, 9-10.

¹⁶ Free Congress Foundation, [The Origins of Cultural Marxism](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VY33e0GQj7Q), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VY33e0GQj7Q> (last accessed: January 7, 2021)

observed throughout all of Europe as well. Often attempting to mimicry as “conservative” movements, this new breed of the far-Right relies on exaggerating the scope of an otherwise obvious shift toward more liberal values in Western societies that gradually took place since the 1960s. In order to further discredit these changes such populists often frame them not as natural developments, but as the result of nefarious political decisions orchestrated by behind-the-scene influences.

Naturally the presence of such anti-systemic discourse has increased the popularity of conspiracy theories and has contributed to heightened social division in Western societies. A parallel expansion of the far-Left at the expense of a firm and wide-reaching political center has brought about increased potential for societal destabilization in the West. The extent to which myths and conspiracy theories have become a scourge for democratic societies is illustrated by the decision of the European Commission to include a section on “Identifying Conspiracy Theories” as part of its online resources in the context of fighting the 2020-2021 Coronavirus pandemic.¹⁷ The importance of tackling conspiracy theories is also the topic of one of Martin Jay’s recent essays: “What had previously been spread by informal rumor-mongering and the vagaries of interpersonal contagion is disseminated with exponential effects through an unregulated internet that compresses the time and collapses the distance it takes for ideas, however unverified and implausible, to gain credence.”¹⁸

These examples of historical myths and conspiracies and their practical political consequences illuminate some of the real-life relevance of this particular topic – analyzing the influence of Marcuse’s ideational legacy, which has not received as much academic attention as it deserves. Turning more of academia’s attention toward examining Marcuse’s ideational legacies will contribute to neutralizing these harmful tendencies by filling vacuums, currently occupied with speculation and myth, with objective academic research. Of course this dissertation’s primary relevance is not negative, but positive: not in disproving false claims as a first order of business, but in establishing the connections that can be reached by analyzing relevant texts and sources, and expanding our understanding of Herbert Marcuse’s role in processes that have left a mark on the world we know today.

¹⁷ European Commission, *Identifying Conspiracy Theories*, https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/fighting-disinformation/identifying-conspiracy-theories_en (last accessed: January 19, 2021)

¹⁸ Jay, Martin, *Force Fields On The Spectrum: Conspiracy Theories and Explanations*. In: *Salmagundi*, No. 206-207: Spring-Summer 2020.

Hypothesis

This dissertation opens with Herbert Marcuse's intellectual biography and looks at his primary influences. Based on that and with the help of methodological insights from the historiography of ideas, an analysis of Marcuse's notions *Alternative Revolutionary Forces* and *Repressive Tolerance*, proposed in *One-Dimensional Man* and in his essay also bearing the title *Repressive Tolerance* follows. These "mini unit-ideas" – a concept based on Arthur Lovejoy's methodology, but more limited in scope as will be explained later – are then examined along with an analysis of the evolution of the Left, specifically the Left in Germany during the period 1963-1974. The dissertation looks at the New Left radical youth movements in the Federal Republic and the SPD, the relations, often multifaceted and tense, between the two, and the role of left-leaning media in term of its reception/coverage of these events and the new ideas and priorities that accompanied them.

The dissertation's core hypothesis is that an ideational connection can be established between Marcuse's two notions and the gradual shift away from the (old) Left's traditional economic and class-oriented focus and toward new ideas, policies, and priorities, shifting the balance more toward quality of life, individual liberation and human rights, protection of minorities, environmental protection, as well as an increased interest in and solidarity with the Third World. While the label "Cultural Marxism" may sound like a reasonable way to highlight the shift away from economic issues and problems of class relations, I will abstain from using that term, because of its association with problematic notions implying malign intent and behind-the-scenes concerted action, but also because the new priorities reach beyond the scope of culture (even in its broadest sense) and address issues having to do with the individual, the environment, relations between ethno-racial groups, gender equality, as well as economic issues like productivity, obsolescence, and others.¹⁹ Therefore, this new brand of Marxism will be labeled simply as "Neo-Marxism."

The aforementioned ideational connection is, however, by no means a matter of direct or programmatic influence. Marcuse's ideas were not transplanted into the party programs of mainstream center-left parties like the SPD. They were not even directly employed in creating

¹⁹ Bearing that in mind, as well as the fact that Marxism as developed by Marx and Engels dealt not only with economics, but also with historiography and philosophical anthropology, the terms "Nondogmatic Marxism" and "Neo-Marxism" will be used here to describe Marcuse's version of Marxism.

a coherent “Marcusean” political program among the radical youth movements. Nor could this be said about the Frankfurt School as a whole or about any other individual thinker. The hypothesis that will be tested here is, rather, that Marcuse made an intellectual contribution to the establishment of new intellectual assumptions that were in dialogue with and also influenced the intellectual mood among progressives during the 1960s and 70s. Together with the “external” influences of evolving technology, social norms, economic conditions, and demographic realities, Marcuse’s ideas were gradually embedded into the Left’s ideological patterns and contributed to their evolution.

Contrary to the sweeping claims of the quasi-conspiracy theories mentioned earlier, these changes were part of the gradual and “spontaneous” evolution of Western societies and politics rather than the result of any elite “program” of “social engineering”. They gained influence in politics as they gained popularity among more people, as they became part of the intellectual mood of their time. That being said, the aim here is to trace the ideational connections between two specific notions proposed by Marcuse – *alternative revolutionary forces* and *repressive tolerance* – and later policies that illustrated the evolution of the Left. These ideas can be connected, as belonging to single mini unit-ideas, to the contemporary concepts of Multiculturalism and Political Correctness. The present-day significance of these concepts will be examined within a multidisciplinary political analysis in the last, fifth chapter.

Multiculturalism will be defined to mean a society that is more open not only to foreign cultures and peoples, but also prioritizes the equal rights of other minority groups such as women and LGBT people over traditional gender roles and social mores, a society that values the environment at least as much as economic growth, and one that emphasizes quality of life and personal liberation.

Political Correctness will be discussed in all its complexity as a predominantly negative term – typically an accusation against opponents and far less often a stated policy. In the German context, it will be examined within the attitudes of the youth radical Left (for example in their attitude toward the Springer publishing house), among the SPD in a few contexts including the Party’s stance toward far-right political forces like NPD, as well as among the media, where both of these cases will be looked at along with the ways of combatting other intolerance, nationalism, and the attitude toward the expellees, whose demands seemed more out of place as time went on and the new *Ostpolitik* prevailed. While the term “political correctness” was

coined later, these examples from the 1960s and 70s will be examined as early manifestations of an approach formulated by Marcuse that stretches into the present.

The hypothesis is that these changes are connected to Marcuse indirectly. With his idea of alternative revolutionary forces, for example, he gave agency to groups that had previously been overlooked by the Left. Similarly, with his notion of repressive tolerance Marcuse contributed to a growing rejection among the Left of the post-war consensus on tolerating a very broad spectrum of political positions including “reactionary” ones.

In order to examine all these connections, this dissertation employs a multidisciplinary approach that combines methodological insights from intellectual history and the history of ideas with empirical historical analysis, complemented by an excursus of political analysis.

Structure, Sources, and Methodology

The dissertation consists of five main chapters, following this introduction. They can be differentiated not only thematically, but also by the methodology and main types of sources that they are built around: While all use some archival material and secondary sources, the first chapter is based primarily on an analysis of secondary sources, the second, on textual analysis of two of Marcuse’s texts, and the third and fourth, on archival materials. The first two could be labeled as being more theoretical, while the next two are rather empirical. The fifth chapter is an excursus into political analysis that finalizes the dissertation in a multidisciplinary fashion. While that chapter is not purely historical, it is based on the insights from the rest of this research and helps shed light on its contemporary and future relevance.

The first chapter, *Herbert Marcuse, the Frankfurt School, and the New Left*, is a brief intellectual biography of Herbert Marcuse. Based predominantly on secondary sources, the chapter paints a detailed biographical account of Marcuse’s life with a focus on his work and influences. The chapter begins with an account of Marcuse’s youth and early political leanings, then discusses the question of whether his Jewish background could be read as an intellectual influence, and finally traces his main philosophical influences. The chapter includes an overview of the Frankfurt School with a focus on Marcuse’s role in it before and after its move to the US, as well as a further biographical map of Marcuse’s work for the US government during World War Two and his work in academia after the War. This is followed by an account

of the differences that emerged between Marcuse and his former Frankfurt School colleagues. This is especially relevant as it highlights the political differences between leading Frankfurt School figures, illuminating the divergent intellectual and political vectors that emerged between Frankfurt School intellectuals particularly after the War. The first chapter also includes an analysis of Marcuse's role in the New Left and the Left's ideological transformation – its attitudes toward developments in the Third World, its shift in priorities, the Student Movement and the new modes of protest that came to be associated with 1960s radicalism.

The second chapter, *Repressive Tolerance and Alternative Revolutionary Forces: Two Marcusean Notions and their Intellectual Legacy*, is based on methodological insight drawn from the History of Ideas or Intellectual History (used interchangeably). It is built as a textual analysis of Marcuse's texts, framed in the socio-political context of the time when they were published. It also refers to secondary sources and to primary archival sources from the Marcuse Archive (*Nachlass Herbert Marcuse*), located at Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main, where this author spent time examining relevant documents. This chapter is divided into two main sections and analyzes Marcuse's Critique of „Pure Tolerance”, as well as his notion of “Alternative Revolutionary Forces”. Both notions are discussed from the perspective of “micro-unit ideas”, looking at their relationships with older ideas, based on Arthur Lovejoy's concept of unit ideas and on an analysis of critiques of Lovejoy and their applicability to this research. The key methodological insights, used in Chapter 2, are laid out in detail later on in this introduction.

The third chapter, *Repressive Tolerance, Alternative Revolutionary Forces, and the Evolution of the German Left*, is based primarily on an empirical survey of archival material from the Archive of German Social Democracy in Bonn (*Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung*) and also from the Archive of the Extra-parliamentary Opposition (*APO-Archiv*) at the Free University of Berlin. The chapter examines the ideological transformation of the Youth Left as part of the New Left and APO, as well as the changing relationship between SPD and youth left-wing organizations like SDS, Jusos, SHB, Die Falken, and others. The analysis is thematically divided into two main sections: the first, which is primarily based on materials from the APO Archive, covers the evolving attitudes of the youth left itself toward foreigners in Germany and the Third World, toward attitudes that could be defined as political correctness,

toward Feminism and Women's Rights, as well as LGBT issues²⁰. Since materials that went beyond this dissertation's timeframe (1964-1973) were available and help cast light on the trends described here, I have used some of these materials as well. The second section, primarily based on materials from the SPD Archive in Bonn, focus on that party's evolution under pressure from its associated youth organizations, primarily Jusos, and the beginning of what might be called Multiculturalism in Germany. It includes topics like the ongoing conflict between the SPD's identity as *Volkspartei* and the socialist students who often had dual membership in youth organizations and SPD and who tried to push the SPD to the left. The section includes a detailed account of the 1970s war with the Jusos and the case of the foreign guest workers, whose presence became the basis for future Multiculturalism in Germany, as well as the evolving relations with the Eastern Bloc and attitudes toward tolerance.

The fourth chapter, *Repressive Tolerance, Alternative Revolutionary Forces, and the Left-leaning Media*, is also based on an empirical investigation of archival materials: in this case on two left-leaning periodicals. One of them that stood further to the left than the other, was the newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* and the other was more of a liberal-centrist publication, the magazine *Der Spiegel*. Research on the latter was facilitated by the availability of an accessible online archive, which made searches with key words rather straightforward. However, reviewing all issues of *Frankfurter Rundschau* between 1963 and 1974 was a more complicated process, which started with months of work with microfilm at the Newspaper Archive of the Berlin State Library (*StaBi Zeitungsbibliothek*). One first "filtering" was conducted by reading through the pages while still on microfilm. Where any titles of potential interest were spotted, the entire page was photographed. This produced about 4000 photographs, which were later analyzed with the help of a simple computer code, assisting me in separating photographs of newspaper pages containing key words of interest. The periodicals were analyzed both for their coverage and changes in their attitudes, and for the information, which they provide as a way to complement the information in Chapter 3. Issues like the Left-Right conflicts within the SPD, far-left tendencies within youth organizations and on campus, the Emergency Acts (*Notstandsgesetze*) as an example of the Left's mistrust in the "establishment", anti-militarism and anti-patriotism, as well as attitudes toward the Vietnam War were reviewed as a way to

²⁰ I use the terms "LGBT issues" or "LGBT rights" interchangeably with gay and lesbian rights/issues both for the sake of brevity and also as this is the currently accepted term, even though during the historical period that this research focuses on the term was not yet in use and the focus was predominantly on the rights of gay men and lesbians.

gauge the Left's evolution in a more radical direction. A separate section analyzes the attitudes toward foreigners in Germany and attitudes toward the Third World. Specific components of this analysis include the issue of living and working conditions vs. the assessment of the usefulness of foreign workers to the German economy; discrimination against and extremism among foreigners; early efforts at integration; the attitudes of Germans; political approaches to limiting the number of foreigners; anti-racism and the overall evolution of attitudes toward the Third World. Entire sections in this chapter are devoted to Feminism and Women's Rights in the Media, as well as to Gay Rights, the Left, and the media. Finally, this chapter looks at tolerance, the media, and political correctness, using as examples the case of the expellees, the campaign against Axel Springer, attitudes toward NPD and the far-right, as well as the attempts to combat other intolerance and the emergence of anti-nationalist sentiments.

A brief fifth chapter, *Multiculturalism and Political Correctness: Marcuse's Legacy in Contemporary Open Societies*, comprises a multidisciplinary excursus, looking at the real-existing and possible consequences of Marcuse's notions in contemporary society. This analysis leaves the confines of historiography as it reaches chronologically into the present day and offers an analysis of the outcomes from the developments of the issues that Marcuse dealt with in his two notions, discussed throughout this dissertation. This chapter also offers a hypothesis of the validity of some of Marcuse's notions in contemporary societies and speculates about the *new* alternative revolutionary forces that might challenge the stability of 21st century open societies.

Lovejoy's Methodology and later Critiques as a Methodological Basis

As mentioned earlier, this dissertation employs both empirical research based on analyzing archival documents, secondary sources, and interviews, as well as textual analyses and other tools based on insights from the history of ideas. While the former group of methods is self-explanatory, it is necessary to look at the relevant methodological developments within the history of ideas/intellectual history²¹ and to explain which of them would be applicable in analyzing Marcuse's two notions and tracing their influence on – and relationship with – contemporary concepts.

²¹ While there is a shade of difference between the two terms – history of ideas referring more closely to analyses focused on concepts and intellectual history generally pertaining to research focused on their authors (i.e. intellectual biographies) – they are used interchangeably when discussing this aspect of historiography.

The history of ideas or intellectual history may be said to stretch as far back as ancient Greece with the first sparks of inspiration for its modern-day incarnation reignited by Voltaire who proclaimed “the history of the human mind to be the historian’s real subject.”²² Over a century later, it was Wilhelm Dilthey during the second half of the 19th century who could be called “the father of the modern history of ideas.”²³ Other prominent scholars of the past who left a mark on the discipline were Jacob Burckhardt, Aby Warburg, and Friedrich Meinecke “who offered new models for understanding the history of major intellectual formations like historicism.”²⁴

Starting, in its contemporary form, with Arthur O. Lovejoy during the interwar period of the 20th century, the discipline gained immense popularity during the 1950s and early 60s only to begin giving way to other more fashionable fields like Social History after the late 1960s and 70s and into the first decade of the new millennium.²⁵ In his overview of these developments, Anthony Grafton points out the close relations and interdisciplinary nature of intellectual history stretching into or overlapping with cultural and social history, as well as with the history of philosophy. He recalls Robert Darnton’s thought that intellectual history was becoming “a basically social and cultural history of ideas and their bearers.”²⁶ Intellectual history thus did not disappear, but was integrated into the emerging multidisciplinary approaches in historiography, making a “comeback” in varieties of the new Cultural History that followed the new Social History of the 1960s. Furthermore, this development built upon attitudes already present in Lovejoy’s work,²⁷ affording this evolution a degree of continuity.

As both Philip P. Wiener and Quentin Skinner emphasized, language plays a very important role in understanding ideas, so the field’s interdisciplinary discussions eventually attracted literary scholars.²⁸ In the 1960s and 70s, J.G.A. Pocock pioneered the history of political

²² Holborn, Hajo, The History of Ideas. In: *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 73, No. 3: 1968, 685.

²³ Holborn, 688.

²⁴ Grafton, Anthony, The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950-2000 and Beyond. In: *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 67, No. 1: 2006, 14.

²⁵ Grafton, 1-3.

²⁶ Grafton, 4-5.

²⁷ Mandelbaum points out that already according to Lovejoy history of ideas was supposed to be interdisciplinary and to cross national and linguistic boundaries.

Mandelbaum, Maurice, The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy. In: *History and Theory*, Vol. 5, *Beiheft 5: The Historiography of the History of Philosophy*, 1965, 34.

²⁸ Grafton, 8-9.

thought, introducing the idea of *languages of political thought*, together with Skinner²⁹, who focused on the author's intention in "uttering an utterance." Needless to say, the history of ideas also attracted historians of philosophy. For example, Grafton labels Martin Jay's research on the Frankfurt School, which this dissertation draws much inspiration from, as "what would until recently have seemed a border zone between history and philosophy."³⁰

The 1980s and 90s saw intellectual historians take widely varying methodological approaches and looking at "how humans make meaning in their environment",³¹ also migrating (more recently) from studying only texts to also analyzing physical things and their significance.³² The new millennium has witnessed "greater attention to the circulation and reception of ideas, as these are taken up and translated across multiple discursive contexts", not least by zooming in on "noncanonical texts and actors".³³ Often overlapping with social history and drawing inspiration from it, intellectual history has started looking for aspects of context that may not have seemed obvious or relevant until recently. Hence, the analysis of ideas has been enriched by "close attention to their literary and material forms, their cultural and intellectual contexts, and their assumptions about race and gender."³⁴ Nevertheless, some of the established names like Lovejoy and Skinner continue to provide a basic methodological framework that remains sustainably relevant to analyzing any given idea.

Arthur Lovejoy defines "his" niche within historiography – the history of ideas – as "the study of the (so far as possible) total life-history of individual ideas, in which the many parts that any one of them plays upon the historic scene, the different facets which it exhibits, its interplay conflicts and alliances with other ideas, and the diverse human reactions to it, are traced out with adequate and critical documentation."³⁵ He proposes making this analysis by identifying unit ideas including thoughts and types of categories "concerning particular aspects of common experience, implicit or explicit presuppositions, sacred formulas and catchwords, specific philosophic theorems, or the larger hypotheses, generalizations or methodological assumptions

²⁹ Grafton, Anthony, *The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950-2000 and Beyond*, 25.

³⁰ Grafton, 20.

³¹ Grafton, 24.

³² Grafton, 26.

³³ Jewett, Andrew. *On the Politics of Knowledge: Science, Conflict, Power*. In: Haberski Jr., Raymond and Andrew Hartman (Edt.), *American Labyrinth: Intellectual History for Complicated Times*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London: 2018, 285–304.

³⁴ Grafton, 30.

³⁵ Lovejoy, Arthur O, *Essays in the History of Ideas*. Capricorn Books, New York: 1960, 1-13.

of various sciences”.³⁶ As this list of examples suggests, the kind of unit-ideas that Lovejoy proposed should be studied within the history of ideas are larger ideational complexes, as opposed to singular “ideas” such as, say, the policy idea to recycle waste. Lovejoy points out that the history of ideas is concerned with a wider survey of ideas and their effects.

He defines as a central focus of inquiry the level of interconnectedness between notions, ideas, attitudes, and presuppositions that ought to be analyzed. As he, himself, put it, “many separate parts of the history have, indeed, been told before, and are therefore presumably more or less familiar; it is their relation to a single pervasive complex of ideas – and thereby, often, to one another – that still seems to need to be set forth.”³⁷ This analysis of Marcuse’s two notions will employ this approach and attempt to define them as belonging to an ideational unit, a “mini-unit idea” of sorts. That would open a multidisciplinary gateway, allowing us to trace aspects of Marcuse’s ideas in real politics during the 1960s and 70s, as well as making a political comparison to possible present-day manifestations or reverberations of these ideational units.

The issue of a unit-idea’s “size” was a key point for Lovejoy and casting a glance at his thoughts about that sheds light on why it would make sense to analyze Marcuse’s notions as scaled-down unit ideas or “mini-unit ideas”. While a complex of ideas is desirable, Lovejoy believed that categories that are too large cannot be studied as unit-ideas. An analysis of an “-ism” or whole school of thought would be appropriate for a philosopher’s analysis; it would, however, be too large, not specific enough, and not historical enough to be analyzed within the history of ideas. Instead, the focus ought to be not on “‘systems’ or ‘-isms’ but [... on] their elemental components, namely the unit-ideas which are to be found within them.”³⁸

Another key aspect of Lovejoy’s analysis lies in recognizing that most philosophical systems offer something new as far as their patterns go, but their components are often modernized and altered in appearance while remaining old in substance.³⁹ Of course, each features a new application, a rearrangement, and a redefinition, but all use the basic assumptions and ideational building blocks of the same unit ideas:

³⁶ Lovejoy, Arthur O, *Essays in the History of Ideas*. Capricorn Books, New York: 1960, 9.

³⁷ Lovejoy, Arthur O, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1964, vii.

³⁸ Mandelbaum, Maurice, *The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy*. In: *History and Theory*, Vol. 5, *Beiheft 5: The Historiography of the History of Philosophy*, 1965, 35.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

Each age seems to evolve new species of reasonings and conclusions, even though upon the same old problems. [...] The seeming novelty of many a system is due solely to the novelty of application or arrangement of the old elements which enter into it.⁴⁰

This idea will be explored in the analysis of the two Marcusean concepts later in this chapter.

In addition to warning against people's impression that they are confronted with "new ideas", Lovejoy also pointed out that some concepts are too general and multifaceted to be analyzed as unit ideas. One such example is the notion of "God".⁴¹ On the other hand, some concepts are too specific to be considered a full-fledged unit idea. Marcuse's two notions belong to an intermediate category of ideas: they are neither as broad as the idea "God", nor confined to a specific policy proposal like "the need to recycle". They are complex enough to be thought of as unit ideas, but too specific to be analyzed in the same way as Lovejoy traced the development of the Great Chain of Being.

Lovejoy is not among the scholars who offered detailed explanations of methodology along with his analyses. He relied on the self-evident nature of his methods being visible behind his analysis. However, taking a look at some of the examples that he offered in his landmark work, "The Great Chain of Being", could provide clearer insight into the type of elements and units that he is searching for. Lovejoy stresses the heterogeneous nature of the elements behind a unit-idea, points out the importance of focusing on more definite ideas, and provides the following examples: assumptions, dialectical motives, metaphysical pathos, and philosophical semantics.

To illustrate the type of **assumptions or unconscious mental habits** that he finds relevant, Lovejoy points out the "presumption of simplicity", the "ostentatious modesty in the recognition of the disproportion between man's intellect and the universe", and "an extreme presumption of the simplicity of the truths" as characteristic of the "representatives of the Enlightenment".⁴² Secondly, Lovejoy is interested in the **dialectical motives** typical of or even dominating "much of the thinking of an individual, a school, or even a generation." That could be "one or another turn of reasoning, trick of logic, methodological assumption, which if explicit would amount to a large and important and perhaps highly debatable proposition in

⁴⁰ Lovejoy, Arthur O, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1964, 4.

⁴¹ Lovejoy, 4-5.

⁴² Lovejoy, 7-9.

logic or metaphysics.”⁴³ In other words, Lovejoy’s “dialectical motives” refer to wide-reaching presuppositions, which may well be false (as in the Kantian sense of dialectic ideas being illusory ones).

A third element Lovejoy finds significant is what he calls “**metaphysical pathos**,” a factor analyzed in his work in terms of the “susceptibilities” to it.⁴⁴ He underlines the significance of this susceptibility “both in the formation of philosophical systems by subtly guiding many a philosopher’s logic, and in partially causing the vogue and influence of different philosophies among groups or generations which they have affected.”⁴⁵ The task of the historian of ideas is therefore to find these and formulate how they “help shape a system or to give an idea plausibility and currency”.⁴⁶ The fourth analytical method Lovejoy suggests is what he terms **philosophical semantics**: “a study of the sacred words and phrases of a period or a movement”. Lovejoy points out that it is the ambiguity of words that allows them to be transformed into “independent [...] forces in history” in accordance with the following process:

A term, a phrase, a formula, which gains currency or acceptance because of one of its meanings, or of the thoughts which it suggests, [...] may help to alter beliefs, standards of value, and tastes, because other meanings or suggested implications, not clearly distinguished by those who employ it, gradually become the dominant elements of its signification.⁴⁷

An example of this is the word ‘nature’. Lovejoy’s ideas of philosophical semantic and specifically that there are “sacred words” is echoed in Roger Scruton’s book “Thinkers of the New Left”, where Scruton refers to these words as “incantations.”⁴⁸ There seems hardly to be a better label to describe phrases and terms that seem to have almost magical meanings to certain audiences. These are words that seem to wield such power that they replace the need for argumentation – a need apparent to “non-believers”. Possible examples include the term “social justice” or “Neocolonialism”, which are both relatively new variations of older concepts and which are both devoid of specific meaning and add credibility to a number of arguments in the minds of Marxists or Leftists.

⁴³ Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 10.

⁴⁴ Lovejoy, 10-11.

⁴⁵ Lovejoy, 13-14.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Lovejoy, 14.

⁴⁸ Scruton, Roger, Thinkers of the New Left. Longman, London: 1985, 140.

Lovejoy's fifth and final point in his quasi-guideline is that the ideas historians should look into are those that are "more **definite and explicit**, and therefore easier to isolate and identify with confidence". Such unit-ideas, once isolated, Lovejoy adds, need to be traced in all the facets of life where they exist: "philosophy, science, literature, art, religion, or politics".⁴⁹ Lovejoy particularly stressed the importance of analyzing the presence of the ideas of interest in the literature of a given period, arguing that when tracing the history of an idea one should focus on "[...] ideas which attain a wide diffusion, which become a part of the stock of many minds."⁵⁰

In his discussion of Lovejoy's methodology, Maurice Mandelbaum pointed out that according to Lovejoy's "general theory of historiography", a historian of ideas should aim to demonstrate "the processes by which influences pass over from one province [of the intellectual world] to another."⁵¹ Mandelbaum added that even where establishing historical connections is impossible, it is nevertheless "immensely valuable" to indicate historical parallels.⁵² In the same vein, the American intellectual historian John C. Greene wrote in his essay "Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History" that it is quite valuable to have "a keen eye for the recurrence of the telltale words or phrases [...] of a bygone age."⁵³ Skinner also dealt with the issue of influence. While finding it "extremely elusive", he thought it is possible to look for the influence of an earlier work on a later one – an undertaking that is "far from being empty of explanatory force."⁵⁴ Similarly, Philip P. Wiener briefly discusses the possibility to trace *influences* or "action at a distance"⁵⁵ in the history of ideas. He points out that influence can exist over a long period of time, offering the example of Plato's ideas continuing to influence students "separated by more than two millennia from his writings."⁵⁶ Wiener argues that "direct contact with even the writings of a thinker is not always necessary for it is possible to find that there are other persons whose minds and talk or writings form a chain of influence traceable,

⁴⁹ Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 14-16.

⁵⁰ Lovejoy, 19.

⁵¹ Lovejoy, 16.

⁵² Mandelbaum, Maurice, The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy. In: *History and Theory*, Vol. 5, *Beiheft 5: The Historiography of the History of Philosophy*, 1965, 40-41.

⁵³ Greene, John C., Objectives and Methods in Intellectual History. In: *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Vol. 44, No. 1: June 1957, 65.

⁵⁴ Skinner, Quentin, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas. In: *History and Theory*, Vol. 8, No. 1: 1969, 25.

⁵⁵ Wiener, Philip P., Some Problems and Methods in the History of Ideas. In: *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 22, No. 4: 1961, 537.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

however, by some historian or recorder of the ideas.”⁵⁷ Wiener furthermore states that “not all pupils are disciples” and that it is interesting to inquire whether “a climate of opinion” may be an influence.⁵⁸

A challenge faced by historians of ideas is that sometimes the name of an idea may persist, while its meaning may evolve or change; alternatively, an idea may persist, but it may be known under different names, it may be on the agenda of people with differing aims, and it may occupy either a revolutionary or a mainstream position in society: “heritages from the past (even within a continuing society) would necessarily change in their nature and modes of functioning as the other elements within a society undergo change.”⁵⁹ As Lovejoy himself pointed out, “potent and persistent presuppositions” are able to “predetermine current ideas on many other matters”.⁶⁰ Mandelbaum’s critique of Lovejoy is important, because of his accent on recurrent and continuing ideas, as well as his concession on the value of finding historical parallels – two very significant points in defining the framework of analyses dealing with more recent ideas.

Aside of Mandelbaum’s critique and Lovejoy himself, another relevant element to consider in formulating a system for analyzing Marcuse’s notions is Quentin Skinner’s critique of the prevalent methodologies he observed in the field. Specifically, his paper “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” offers fundamental insight into the issues Skinner identified within many research projects in intellectual history. Skinner points out that during the latter half of the 20th century some intellectual historians still insisted “on the autonomy of the *text* itself as the sole necessary key to its own meaning” while others were increasingly looking to the context that the text had been written in.⁶¹ While he welcomed the shift toward context, he thought neither approach eliminated the risk of leading to inaccurate conclusions as both approaches could lead to a historian unconsciously applying essentially anachronistic “paradigms whose familiarity to the historian disguises an essential inapplicability to the past.”⁶²

⁵⁷ Wiener, Philip P., *Some Problems and Methods in the History of Ideas*, 537.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Mandelbaum, *The History of Ideas, Intellectual History, and the History of Philosophy*, 48.

⁶⁰ Lovejoy, Arthur O. *The Great Chain of Being*, vii.

⁶¹ Skinner, Quentin, *Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas*. In: *History and Theory*, Vol. 8, No. 1: 1969, 3.

⁶² Skinner, 7.

For instance, an issue he identifies as quite common were the attempts to force authors from the distant past into intellectual molds fitting contemporary interests and priorities. He criticized overambitious conclusions claiming that historical authors had contributed to topics that were not part of the discourse of their time. An example of that is Skinner's critique of A. Gewirth's claim that Marsilius of Padua had a "'doctrine' of the separation of powers."⁶³ Skinner also generally criticized the attempts to reconstruct a "doctrine" where one hadn't been apparent in the original texts, the critiques of ancient or Enlightenment authors who supposedly "omitted" 20th century issues from their "doctrines", as well as the debates on when a given idea "really emerged."⁶⁴ As a "second type of mythology" Skinner criticized the attempts to find consistency, "coherence and an air generally of a closed system, which they may never have attained or even been meant to attain."⁶⁵ Offering the example of the way Marx's works were studied, Skinner complained that intellectual historians did not permit Marx "simply to have developed and changed his views."⁶⁶ Ultimately Skinner is against the attempt to find grand narratives and to discover timeless lessons instead of focusing on finding the original meaning for the actual historical agent.⁶⁷

The primary issues with both concepts that Skinner critiques, both when it comes to intellectual biographies and histories of ideas, are closely connected with the presence of a long period of time between the object of analysis and the original texts or historical agents.⁶⁸ Therefore with the choice of relatively recent ideas to analyze we have removed much of the risk of faulty anachronistic interpretations. Skinner highlights the importance of looking not for the "essential meaning" of an idea or a word, but of a word's usage.⁶⁹ That overlaps with an attempt at analyzing Marcuse's ideas as he could almost be considered our contemporary. The shades of meaning of words as they were used by Marcuse are still very much understandable, if not to absolutely everyone, perhaps to most.

Moving on from Skinner's critiques to his own suggestions on how to improve the field's methodology, he highlighted the importance of finding the intention behind "[making] a

⁶³ Skinner, *Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas*, 8.

⁶⁴ Skinner, 12-16.

⁶⁵ Skinner, 17.

⁶⁶ Skinner, 20.

⁶⁷ Skinner, 22.

⁶⁸ Skinner, 31-35.

⁶⁹ Skinner, 37.

particular *statement*.”⁷⁰ While looking at context is important it ought to not only be the economical, religious or political context; rather, Skinner suggests we should be looking at what kind of society the author of a text may be trying to convince.⁷¹ This is still insufficient: Skinner believes that social context may “serve to explain them”, but explaining is not equivalent to understanding them.⁷² In addition to analyzing what an author is not saying – compared to other likeminded contemporaries – “the further point which must still be grasped for any given statement is *how* what was said was meant, and this what *relations* there may have been between various different statements even within the same general context.”⁷³ Therefore, in order to understand the meaning of the “utterances themselves”, the historian needs to “[...] recover this complex intention on the part of the author”⁷⁴. Skinner rejected searching for “perennial problems” and “universal truths”⁷⁵ and outlined the following methodological principle:

And it follows from this that the appropriate methodology for the history of ideas must be concerned, first of all, to delineate the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance, and, next, to trace the relations between the given utterance and this wider *linguistic* context as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer.⁷⁶

The overview of Arthur Lovejoy’s concept of “unit ideas” and the more recent critiques of the methodology suggest how it could be adapted – scaled down – to analyze Herbert Marcuse’s notions. Taking into account the most recent methodologies discussed by Antony Grafton and especially the critique of Lovejoy’s methodology, formulated by Quentin Skinner, perhaps the most prominent contemporary historian of ideas, I will look at the social and political context in which Marcuse developed his notions, as well as his “complex intention.”⁷⁷ Skinner’s critique of Lovejoy’s method is mentioned here in detail even though the recent nature of Marcuse’s texts makes it less applicable to this research, because it is a fundamental point to make in any review of the methodological approaches to history of ideas/intellectual history, but also to highlight the fact that this problem is eliminated or at least strongly reduced by the choice of the subject of analysis. The added value of Skinner’s critique stems primarily from

⁷⁰ Skinner, *Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas*, 37.

⁷¹ Skinner, 40.

⁷² Skinner, 46.

⁷³ Skinner, 47.

⁷⁴ Skinner, 49.

⁷⁵ Skinner, 50-52.

⁷⁶ Skinner, 49.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

its benefits in avoiding the type of confusion associated with analyzing ancient, medieval or even enlightenment-period texts; this confusion is unlikely to occur in working with texts that are approximately a generation older than the researcher.

The analysis will, furthermore, ask whom Marcuse was addressing and what his goals may have been. The question whether Marcuse's notion gave rise to action or served to legitimize action will also be considered along with the hypothetical social and political consequences of his notions. As this analysis is also about 'influence' of one notion on another, it will consider Philip P. Wiener's points on that subject, namely the importance of the "climate of opinion." Finally, there will be a comparative analysis of the overlaps and differences between Marcuse's two notions and the newer concepts of Political Correctness and Multiculturalism to establish whether the two Marcusean notions and the two contemporary phenomena could be regarded as aspects of the same "micro unit-idea". This will be an important part of the dissertation's argument as it will set a theoretical framework, which will underpin the two empirical chapters – three and four. These chapters will then trace the elements of these micro unit-ideas, leading up to the dissertation's last chapter, which will finalize the discussion of Marcuse's ideational influence on today's open societies with an excursus into political analysis of the outcomes from the developments of the issues that Marcuse dealt with in his two notions.

Chapter 1

Herbert Marcuse, the Frankfurt School and the New Left

1.1. Marcuse's life, work, and intellectual influences (Marx, Heidegger, Hegel)

Young Marcuse – until the National-Socialist Takeover (1898-1932)

„Proletarier *aller Länder, vereinigt euch!*“ This widely-known slogan, this battle cry, from the ending of the Communist Manifesto, published in 1848, and written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels contains the core idea of Marxist thought and politics – namely, that the working class will unite and overthrow the capitalist system. This notion, however, was flatly refuted by history. Already by the beginning of the 20th century, a debate had begun between proponents of a communist revolution and Social Democrats, like Eduard Bernstein, who claimed that capitalist societies will gradually evolve into socialist societies without the need for a revolution, which according to his diagnosis was not wanted by the working class.⁷⁸ In Germany, where the conditions for a Communist revolution were rife, according to Marx's description, the working classes did not fulfill their historical role or at least, the historical role assigned to them by Marx and Engels and their followers. Instead, in Germany and elsewhere, while there were attempted proletarian revolutions, the majority of “the masses” were more willing to support the so-called bourgeois parties, or alternatively fascist ideas. During the time after World War One, during the 1920s and 30s, it became obvious that “the specter haunting Europe” is not wearing a red gown, but was instead dressed in maroon. While Social Democrats rejected the notion of revolution and were instead looking for ways for society to evolve toward Socialism – working within a parliamentary democratic and capitalist framework – most Communists remained what would later be called Orthodox Marxists. At that time some critical minds began questioning the idea that the working classes will bring about the coveted revolution. One of these critical minds belonged to Herbert Marcuse. In the 1950s Marcuse was going to point out that from a purely theoretical Marxist perspective “the failure of the proletariat to act as the revolutionary class and the defeat of a proletarian revolution are anticipated in Marxian theory” and do not “per se [...] constitute events which must refute the theory.”⁷⁹ Nevertheless he believed that the Marxist understanding of the imminent historical

⁷⁸ Wolin, Richard, Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse. Princeton University Press, Princeton: 2001, 137-138.

⁷⁹ Marcuse, Herbert, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis. Columbia University Press, New York: 1958, 18.

progress toward socialism was anchored in a certain “growth of the revolutionary proletariat” which “in the long term *defines* the irreversible direction of capitalist development.” Therefore if the trend was reversed and mature capitalist societies witnessed, instead, a trend toward long-term class collaboration at the national level and international conflict (rather than national class struggle and international class solidarity), then “a new historical period begins, characterized by a change in the basic class relations.” That would mean that Marxism would have to redefine its “conception of the transition to Socialism” and would have to come up with a new strategy.⁸⁰ One could argue that Marcuse’s academic work constituted a search for such a strategy.

Martin Jay, Rolf Wiggershaus, Alasdair MacIntyre, Paul A. Robinson, and Richard Wolin provide in their excellent books on the Frankfurt School and on Marcuse the most important pieces of information about Herbert Marcuse’s origins, professional life, and intellectual influences. (Perhaps the only weak aspect of these works, with the exception of MacIntyre’s, is the reverence toward the Frankfurt School and to some extent toward Marcuse personally that the reader senses between the lines.) Henceforth we shall review those accents from Marcuse’s biography that pertain to the formation of his worldview and will try to see whether anything about his personal experience – family background, class, ethnic minority status or his early political experience influenced his thinking in a discernable way.

Little Herbert was born in 1898 in the *Reichshauptstadt* Berlin. His parents were “prosperous assimilated Jews”⁸¹ originating from Pomerania. (Whether Marcuse’s ethno-religious origins affected his thought will be discussed a little later.) Marcuse’s father had moved to Berlin with his brothers and had been involved in a couple of different businesses before finally starting a construction company together with an architect as his partner – a venture that allowed Marcuse Sr. to bring up his family in an upper-class environment.⁸²

Marcuse was involved in World War One only in its final stage since the early months of 1918 as an airship reservist.⁸³ After his demobilization, young Marcuse, who was just starting his studies and who had been an inactive member of the SPD, was voted to become part of the

⁸⁰ Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*, 18-19.

⁸¹ Jay, Martin, *The Dialectical Imagination*. Little, Brown & Company, Boston: 1973, 28.

⁸² Wiggershaus, Rolf, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*. Polity Press, Cambridge: 1995, 95.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

Soldiers' Council of Reinickendorf in Berlin.⁸⁴ A detail that the authors, writing about Marcuse, have failed to mention when briefly marking the fact of Marcuse's revolutionary activities is that the German Soldiers' *Soviets* ("soviet" means council in Slavonic languages) were inspired by their Russian counterparts from the 1905 Russian Revolution and more recently from the then ongoing revolution that had started in 1917. "In 1919 Marcuse quit the Social Democratic Party, which he had joined two years earlier, in protest against its betrayal of the proletariat."⁸⁵ Specifically, the SPD had taken a moderate stance and wanted to avoid the civil war scenario that had already caused much destruction and suffering in Russia and was, at that time, continuing to rage in Russia. Instead of supporting the various councils that had sprung up in Germany, SPD worked together with the traditional authorities in order to achieve a peaceful transition into a parliamentary democracy – the future Weimar Republic. This was done at the expense of the far-left and resulted in casualties, including icons of the revolutionary Left like Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. With the SPD on their side, the army and the *Freikorps* quelled the *Spartakist* uprising of 1919 and elections for a constitutional assembly were organized about a week later – on January 19th, 1919. The SPD's otherwise responsible approach toward Germany thus led to Herbert Marcuse's break with his party.⁸⁶ As Martin Jay summarizes, Marcuse also left party politics for academia:

After the subsequent failure of the German revolution, he left politics altogether to study philosophy at Berlin and Freiburg, receiving his doctorate at the latter university in 1923 with a dissertation on the *Künstlerroman* (novels in which artists played key roles).⁸⁷

Perhaps his temporary focus on a literary topic was to awaken his openness toward interdisciplinary approaches. Wiggershaus points out that Marcuse's dissertation was seriously indebted to major works by two authors that would come to influence his thought – George Lukacs (a philosopher, but also a literary scholar) and G.W.F. Hegel. The works were "Soul and Form" and "Theory of the Novel" by Lukacs and "Aesthetics" by Hegel. Not wanting to diverge from the subject at hand, it might be pointed out as an anecdotal "proof" of the interconnectedness of *ideas* within academia that Hegel's notion of the end of art has found reception in the thought of authors such as George Lukacs, Theodor W. Adorno, and Martin Heidegger – all intellectually connected to Marcuse.

⁸⁴ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 95.

⁸⁵ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 28.

⁸⁶ Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*, 135-136.

⁸⁷ Jay, 28.

At this time Marcuse retained his close connection to his family, which made it easier for him and his wife to settle comfortably in Berlin.

After taking his doctorate, Marcuse, who had been married since 1924, returned to live in Berlin. His father provided him with an apartment and a share in a publishing and antiquarian book business, and Marcuse sponsored a kind of left-wing literary salon in which Marxist theory, *Gestalt psychology*, abstract painting and current tendencies in bourgeois philosophy were discussed.⁸⁸

Coming across and reading Heidegger's "Being and Time" after it was published in 1927, Marcuse immediately found an element he valued, which would come to influence his own work and which would be used to support the argument that Marcuse was a sort of Heideggerian Marxist – namely the "existential element, the way that the book took everyday forms of alienation as its starting point, and its clarification of the question of authentic human existence."⁸⁹ Heidegger's most famous work, which as was pointed out earlier had attracted the attention of the young Herbert Marcuse, was "Being and Time". "Appropriating the influences of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Dilthey (not to mention literary sources as diverse as Tolstoy, Dostoyevski, and Rilke), Heidegger had in *Being and Time* fundamentally recast the terms of philosophical thought. In comparison with his inassimilable neologisms and theoretical daring, all previous paradigms and precepts appeared hopelessly outmoded."⁹⁰

Four years as a small business owner were enough for Marcuse and in 1928 he heeded academia's call and moved to Freiburg where he became Heidegger's assistant.

During this period Marcuse broke into print with a number of articles in Maximilian Beck's *Philosophische Hefte* and Rudolf Hilferding's *Die Gesellschaft*. The first book he wrote after his dissertation – "*Hegel's Ontology and the Foundation of a Theory of Historicity*", appeared in 1932, bearing the marks of his mentor Heidegger, for whom it had been prepared as a *Habilitationsschrift*.⁹¹

Here follows a factual issue on which the available literature is divided, based on a divergence between Marcuse's claims and the preserved records. Martin Jay accepts Marcuse's version of the events that "before Heidegger could accept Marcuse as an assistant [...] their relations became strained; the political differences between the Marxist-oriented student and the increasingly right-wing teacher were doubtless part of the cause."⁹² Since Martin Jay interviewed Marcuse while working on his own doctoral dissertation (later expanded into "*The Dialectical Imagination*"), I would speculate that this rendition of the situation may partially

⁸⁸ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 96.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*, 16.

⁹¹ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 28.

⁹² Ibid.

have reflected Marcuse's own recollections at that point in time – the end of the 1960s when Heidegger's accusers were still quite loud and the accusations sounded serious enough to make some people uneasy about admitting their past “with” Heidegger.

Wiggershaus, whose book on the Frankfurt School is written later and – not being a pioneering work – offers more detailed information, claims that Marcuse **had been Heidegger's assistant** and had then *decided* not to pursue a habilitation, as this was supposed to happen in 1932 by which time Marcuse did not see a future for a Jew and a Marxist in German academia.

On the evidence of a letter from Husserl to (Kurt) Riezler⁹³, we can deduce that Marcuse's *Habilitation* was in reality, or in addition, blocked by Heidegger. On the basis of that same letter Marcuse was later accepted to the West German restitution procedure as someone who would in the normal course of events have taken his *Habilitation* and become a professor. Husserl appealed to Riezler on his behalf, and Riezler appealed to Horkheimer. At first these efforts were in vain. It was only in 1933, after a conversation with Leo Lowenthal, who spoke to Horkheimer on Marcuse's behalf, that Marcuse joined the Institute for Social Research in exile in Geneva.⁹⁴

Therefore, it seems that the cooling in relations between Marcuse and Heidegger, potentially combined with both men's desire to distance themselves from the other in the context of their opposing attitudes toward the advancing NSDAP, turned out to be lucky for Marcuse. It gave him the impetus to leave Germany when it was still safe to do so, it allowed him to join the Institute for Social Research while it was still willing to hire new members, and it also shielded him from later accusations of being tainted by holding an important academic position during the early stages of the Nazi regime.

Marcuse went on to become one of the most renowned members of the Institute for Social Research, known as the Frankfurt School and “one of the principal architects of Critical Theory”⁹⁵. He was a pioneer in the wave of disappointed leftist academics who sought to reinterpret Marx, to find out why Scientific Marxism's predictions were wrong, but nevertheless – how Marx's concept of a new society could be alternatively realized. It is accepted that already with his doctoral dissertation on *Hegel's Ontology and Theory of Historicity* (1932) he sought to explore Marx from different angles, including using Heidegger's approaches. His second major step in the same direction of reinterpreting Marx

⁹³ Kurt Riezler was the *Kurator* of the University of Frankfurt.

⁹⁴ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 104.

⁹⁵ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 28.

was his first major book review (1933), titled (Marx's) *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*.

Before moving forward to discuss the next stages of Marcuse's intellectual career as part of the Frankfurt School, two questions will be discussed. The first is whether his Jewish origins played an important role on his development as a scholar, as Richard Wolin insists in *Heidegger's Children*. The second is to briefly review and analyze Marcuse's primary intellectual influences proposed in the core texts on Marcuse.

Marcuse's Jewish Background as an Intellectual Influence

As Martin Jay writes, "if one seeks a common thread running through individual biographies of the [Frankfurt School's] inner circle, the one that immediately comes to mind is their birth into families of middle or upper-middle class Jews (in Adorno's case, only one parent was Jewish.)"⁹⁶ Jay furthermore notes that one of the arguments used to convince Felix Weil's father to provide the funds for the Frankfurt School's founding was that the Institute for Social Research would study anti-Semitism in Germany.

The fact that just about all members of the Institute for Social Research were by one or another definition Jewish and that the Institute owes its biggest grant to the promise of intellectually disproving anti-Semitism is certainly too intriguing to ignore. The issue where authors like Richard Wolin on the one hand and Martin Jay, Wiggershaus, and Fienberg on the other hand disagree is whether and to what extent "Jewishness" affected the thought of Marcuse and his Frankfurt School colleagues.

Before delving into the issue on the personal level it ought to be pointed out that studying Anti-Semitism was not only not a focus, but was not dealt with until later in the Institute's history – in the USA. In fact, the Institute's members were more interested in dealing with social oppression, not oppression of Jews – a fact confirmed by their indifference to Zionism.⁹⁷ Studying Martin Jay's research, one feels convinced that it was not due to tactical considerations that the Institute members denied that Jewishness had importance to their personal identities or to the selection of cadre for the institute. A convincing argument to that

⁹⁶ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 31.

⁹⁷ Jay, 32.

effect is that most prominent Institute figures did not deal with Jewish issues. They did not see themselves as victims of anti-Semitism. Felix Weil, for example, claimed in his correspondence with Martin Jay that there was no noticeable discrimination against Jews in Weimar Germany.⁹⁸ As for Herbert Marcuse, Andrew Feenberg, who knew him personally as his doctoral student, recalls a story that Marcuse had shared about the level of assimilation of German Jews in the beginning of the 20th century: “the assimilation was so complete that Marcuse once told me that in the evenings on Friday, he could hear mothers in his neighborhood calling out: ‘Brunhilde, Siegfried! Shabat!’”⁹⁹ While retaining their religion, Germany’s Jews had nevertheless opted for universal German names, which were conveniently non-Christian (of pagan origin) and quite fashionable in the age of nationalism.

Richard Wolin, in his book “Heidegger’s Children”, which treats four of Heidegger’s doctoral students, one being Herbert Marcuse, has an entirely different take on the importance of his Jewishness. In Wolin’s analysis, at the time of Herbert Marcuse’s birth and early childhood, the hope of integrating by assimilating had been proven chimerical by repeated peaks of anti-Semitism and Jews in Central Europe had been forced to turn to Zionism or Socialism.

Thus, at a time when hopes for assimilation dwindled, the only possibilities seemed to lie either in political radicalism or the pursuit of an authentic Jewish identity elsewhere. [...] The classical representatives of [this] sensibility were Ernst Bloch and Walter Benjamin, and it was largely via their influence that themes of Jewish political Messianism surfaced in Marcuse’s work. [...] Marcuse’s unbending revolutionary longings and sweeping critique of the inadequacies of modern industrial civilization make them a direct heir to the aforementioned group [Bloch, Benjamin, Adorno], even though his Messianic inclinations were always tempered by other intellectual influences and traditions—above all, a rather unmessianic, Hegelian belief in the power of “reason in history”.¹⁰⁰

As pointed out elsewhere in this text, Marcuse himself denied and even rejected the idea that Jewishness played a role in his thinking. That *leitmotif* can be observed throughout most works on the subject, not least due to the absence of Jewish themes. People, especially intellectuals – prominent writers and speakers like Marcuse – usually do not shy away from the subjects they find important. In fact, in making his claims of Jewish messianism as an intellectual force that had influenced Marcuse, Wolin partly contradicts himself – he is forced to admit that his

⁹⁸ The exact phrase being that “discrimination against Jews had retreated completely to the ‘social club level’”, 32.

⁹⁹ Feenberg, Andrew, Presentation of a collection of essays by Marcuse: “The Essential Marcuse”, University of California Television, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nFbypIr4RmQ> (last accessed: 5 May, 2015)

¹⁰⁰ Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, 15-16.

“messianic inclinations” are actually not so messianic in light of the “Hegelian belief in the power of ‘reason in history’.

Studying Marcuse’s texts, it is constantly the radical Marxist-Socialist that comes into the limelight – not the Jewish messianic intellectual. Wolin himself admits this fact, even though he makes other claims about Marcuse, in that he cites Socialism as the other alternative for disappointed Jews. Whether Marcuse and his colleagues – mostly of middle and upper class origins – were disappointed and felt discriminated prior to 1932 can be answered with a definite “no”.

Nevertheless, as was noted earlier, almost all members of the Frankfurt School were Jewish by one classification or another; and everyone is aware that a very high number of notable members of the Marxist-Communist movement were Jewish or of Jewish descent, starting with Karl Marx himself (interestingly enough, mostly of Ashkenazi and not Sephardic descent!). This fact has been used by anti-Semitic propaganda not only in National-Socialist Germany, but also in the Soviet Union, and even today, especially in certain Islamic countries. The claim of a conspiracy is so discredited that it is not even worth disproving, but it should be noted that Jews were purged by Stalin both in the 1930s and after the war; furthermore, the USSR and the National-Socialist regime were cooperating in some of their anti-Jewish activities.¹⁰¹

A rather simple and intuitive explanation for the presence of Jews on the Left is that (whether this was alluring on a conscious or subconscious level) the promise of a future where everyone is equal, where one’s ethnic background does not matter, and where religion will be removed from political life is understandably attractive to minorities who may feel “left out” due to their differences. In the first half of the 20th century Jews were the main minority in Europe; now that Europe is more multicultural we see a much richer tapestry of minority identities once again predominantly on the left. Similarly, one may wonder and wish to analyze the motives that drove individuals from a variety of demographics such as people raised in wealthy circumstances like Che Guevara or Friedrich Engels, toward the left and far-left.

¹⁰¹ Snore, Edvins, *The Soviet Story*, 2008, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XO6-nuk0UhA> (last accessed: September 5, 2015)

Marcuse's Intellectual Influences – Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, and Freud

When dealing with such a prolific and multifaceted intellectual as Herbert Marcuse, it is close to impossible to produce a definitive analysis of all intellectual influences ever exerted upon him, order their precedence and importance, and prove all this in a way that will counter all accusations of “philosophizing”. In this section, I will present a brief overview of the four influences that the main scholars of Marcuse's philosophical heritage have formulated. In order not to focus on the obvious, I will dwell the least on Marcuse's biggest, clearest, and self-declared influence – Karl Marx.

Richard Wolin in his book about “Heidegger's Children” makes a very important point: Marcuse, unlike other Marxists, used Heideggerian ontology and by influencing the New Left he transformed the Left from being purely Marxist into also being existentialist. Therefore left wing ideas after Marcuse became distinct and distinguishable from those before.

That can easily be seen if we think about the Left before Marcuse – both Social-Democracy and Communism – and the Left as it began to take shape in the late 1960s and continued to evolve over the following decades. While in the past the left was primarily concerned with social rights and what one may call the labor union agenda such as regulating wages, working hours, providing affordable quality housing, medical care, education, improving public transportation, and other such issues that can be summed up in such rational-sounding words as “organization”, “improvement”, “development”, “productive labor”, today's Left has other primary concerns. Reading contemporary left-wing publications, one sees that the emphasis has shifted in an “identitarian” direction: toward gender and sexual orientation, ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants or fringe groups. In a society that is increasingly meritocratic and where a basic social safety net is taken for granted, the Left directs much of its attention toward less obvious injustices and toward more specific disadvantaged groups – the unemployed, illegal immigrants and people applying for refugee status (in Europe), prisoners, the justice system, “non-violent drug offenders” (in the USA). With overt discrimination close to eliminated in the “West”, the Left has reprioritized a higher tier of minority rights: to be recognized, respected, affirmed, “equitably” represented, taken into account, to marry, to not be offended– and most recently – for the broad population not to be psychologically burdened by unpleasant information (“microaggressions”, trigger warnings). When economic issues are

addressed, they are often in the context of belonging to a specific ‘underprivileged’ group (i.e. the gender pay gap).

Some of these developments are determined by social, economic, technological and demographic factors. For instance, the unemployed were not an issue during times of high employment while fighting for equal pay between men and women is only topical once women have succeeded in acquiring other rights like abortion or access to all occupations decades earlier. Some of these changes, however, can be attributed – at least partially - to an ideological shift, associated with the Left’s transformation and those intellectuals whose thought influenced that transformation.

Of course one has to mention that others have also attempted to fuse Marxism and existentialism – namely, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Karel Kosik, and Enzo Paci.¹⁰² Similarities to Foucault and Derrida could also be drawn and in fact the former had been accused of being part of “Marcuse’s ideology”. I will return to this alternative view later, but nevertheless it is a fact that Marcuse’s Marxism is existentialist regardless of whether that influence came from Heidegger or from Sartre. Therefore, let us first take a look at Wolin’s thesis.

Heidegger and Marcuse have issues with modernity (in the sense of the state of contemporary “Western” societies during their lifetimes), which would mean that “Heideggerian Marxism”, if one may call Marcuse’s brand of Marxism that way, is very different from traditional Marxism. In fact Heideggerian Marxism is perhaps the key to the transformation of the Left, since its highlight – the critique of modernity – had previously been a right-wing or conservative domain.¹⁰³ One of the reasons for Marcuse’s rejection of the “Advanced Industrial Society” is his concern for the individual who is misled and thus lured into a state of “voluntary

¹⁰² Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, 137.

¹⁰³ “The Frankfurt School’s critique of bourgeois culture had to be inspired by a figure other than Marx. The critique of mass culture did not, until the work of Georg Lukacs and of the Frankfurt School itself, come from the Left. The Left was either indifferent to high culture or actually hostile.... It was the Right, the Right being understood as the denial of equality, that criticized the mass. Men like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Spengler were the great critics of the mass.”

In: Friedman, George, The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London: 1981, 30.

servitude”¹⁰⁴ by advertisements, pop-culture, and rising living standards to believe that he is happy and content while these feelings are merely an instance of “false conscience”, preserving and perpetuating the status quo and to keeping people in a state of exploitation. “[...] One of the main reasons for his interest in *Being and Time* [is that] Marcuse recognized in Heidegger’s existential analysis of *Dasein* a path-breaking attempt to move beyond the abstract concepts of subjectivity that had dominated Western philosophy and to re-establish the concrete individual as the proper agent of history.”¹⁰⁵ It has to be noted that Marcuse’s individual is not the individual as one would understand the word colloquially (i.e. I, you, John...). Marcuse’s individual is one that would be created in the future once the changes he is proposing are realized. As he puts it in a later interview for Panorama in 1964: “It would be necessary for a new kind of human to emerge, one with a new spectrum of values (Wertskala), one with a new way of assessing the world and with new goals.”¹⁰⁶

Before discussing other influences it is important to clarify one reason why Heideggerian influences are a hot topic and why Marcuse always rejected the assertion of having allowed them into his thought. A question asked about Heidegger, which concerns everyone, influenced by his philosophy, is whether “there was something integral to *Existenzphilosophie* that triggered” Heidegger’s decision to publicly declare support for the National-Socialist Party.¹⁰⁷ The relevance of that question to this text stems from the conclusion that National Socialism is ultimately a totalitarian ideology, which at least in that aspect is comparable to other totalitarian ideologies like Communism in its different variants. Thus, admitting to having Heideggerian influences must have been equivalent to admitting that one’s own thought is somehow tainted with what in the eyes of the average man would have been “Nazi philosophy”. Perhaps additionally problematic for Marcuse would have been that Marxism was branded a “Soviet ideology” (and therefore totalitarian), while in Marcuse’s view, his version of Marxism was in fact an ideology of liberation.

¹⁰⁴ The Containment of Social Change in Industrial Society, transcript of lecture held at Stanford on May 4, 1965, *Herbert Marcuse*, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0265.00 (copy); This paper was published for the first time in 2001.

¹⁰⁵ Abromeit, John and W. Mark Cobb (Edt.), Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader. Routledge, New York: 2004, 133.

¹⁰⁶ Panorama, Nr. 186, 23 October 1964, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0263.02.

¹⁰⁷ Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, 12.

Wolin answers the question about Heidegger and his support for NSDAP by concluding that Heidegger's former students thought that his philosophical radicalism was partially responsible for his political radicalism. He writes that "his students realized that when uncompromising intellectual radicalism is transposed to the realm of politics and society, the results can be calamitous."¹⁰⁸ Leaving National-Socialism aside, history also remembers many instances of Marxist ideas causing calamity when directly applied to societies. "A demand for 'radical action' was a position that Marx and Heidegger shared. While Heidegger recognized the figure of the almighty *Führer* as an incarnation of his idea of 'radical action' during the initial moments of the NS-regime, for Marx, it took the form of "praxis," "revolutionary, practical-critical activity."¹⁰⁹

Analyzing the development of Marcuse's philosophical thought, Wolin concludes that "Heideggerian leanings and influences" are present in Marcuse's later philosophical work, even after he had officially broken with his early mentor. The Heideggerian "...dimension...sits in uneasy juxtaposition with the predominant Marxist focus", which produces a conflict between Marxist historicism and "philosophy's search for timeless first principles."¹¹⁰ One example of Marcuse's totalitarian bend, which Wolin points out as a similarity to Heidegger, is his political elitism, comparable to Heidegger's ontological elitism.

Marcuse's political elitism can be observed in *Eros and Civilization* (1955), where Marcuse supports the idea of an educated dictatorship¹¹¹ and in *Repressive Tolerance* (1965), where the term used is "dictatorship of intellectuals" (as opposed to a "representative government by a non-intellectual minority of politicians, generals, and businessmen).¹¹² In a way, pure Marxism also includes strong elements of elitism in that it sees a necessity for a revolutionary vanguard to clear up people's "misconceptions", "reeducate" them and fix their "false consciousness." "Marcuse believed that philosophy is a form of practical criticism, whose primary aim was the defetishization of false consciousness."¹¹³ According to Adorno, however, Marx's and

¹⁰⁸ Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse*, 13.

¹⁰⁹ Wolin, 146.

¹¹⁰ Wolin, 167.

¹¹¹ Wolin, 172.

¹¹² Marcuse, Herbert. *Repressive Tolerance*, in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, jr., and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, 100.

¹¹³ Wolin, 156.

Heidegger's ideas could not be reconciled, as Marcuse had attempted to do, due to the severe opposition between historicity and real history in Heidegger's work.¹¹⁴

Here is how Wolin characterizes Marcuse (in comparison with Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, and Hans Jonas):

Among our four protagonists, Herbert Marcuse stands out as something of an exception. Whereas Arendt, Jonas, and Löwith remained more or less within a Heideggerian philosophical trajectory, Marcuse's commitment to critical Marxism and the political left produced a significantly different intellectual orientation. Hence, whereas Arendt, Jonas, and Löwith frequently took their normative and political bearings from classical antiquity (as did Heidegger, who endowed the "Greek beginning" with unmatched historical significance), Marcuse, under the influence of Marx and Hegel, projected his Golden Age into the future in the form of a classless society. At the same time, given his strong Hegelian influences, Marcuse's Marxism was distinctly heterodox: he corresponded with the surrealists (from whom he derived his notion of "the Great Refusal"), published widely on Freud, and wrote an important critical study of Soviet Marxism. In light of these nonconformist interests, it is perhaps no great surprise that during the late 1920s he was preoccupied with the ideas of a "Marx-Heidegger" synthesis and wrote a habilitation thesis on "historicity" under Heidegger's direction.¹¹⁵

As one can see from this description, Marcuse's thought was so eclectic that it allows sometimes wild claims to be made about its influences. Wolin does just that as he adds another ingredient, discussed earlier in detail, which I find least convincing considering Marcuse's personal biography and ideological commitments: The claim is that as soon as one digs beneath the surface, one discovers "a palpable indebtedness to the tradition of Jewish messianism", which according to Wolin was characteristic of all European Jewish intellectuals coming to age around the end of World War One. It has to be noted that Marcuse, as well as most other members of the Frankfurt School, while Jewish, were brought up in assimilated well-to-do families and generally deny the idea that Jewishness may have played a significant role in their intellectual and professional development.

Wolin may well be wrong in categorically placing Marcuse in the Heideggerian family – a claim made more convincing by the biographical proximity of Marcuse to Heidegger and a necessity to make Wolin's book work. However, Heidegger had moved from Husserlian phenomenology to existentialism¹¹⁶ and it is precisely the existentialist strain that one sees in much of Marcuse's work. That, however, was not unique to Heidegger – Marcuse had received existentialist influences from Jean Paul Sartre as well.

¹¹⁴ Wolin, Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, 150.

¹¹⁵ Wolin, 14.

¹¹⁶ MacIntyre, Alasdair, Herbert Marcuse. Fontana/Collins, London: 1972, 9.

As Paul A. Robinson aptly analyzes, Marcuse's "crusade" to revive Marxism over a period marked by a failure of Marx's historical predictions, fascism and totalitarian communism, and an "affluent society" in the West, postulating the "end of ideology", led him to look at Freud, but also at Sartre: "Clearly the intellectual tradition which most attracted him was existentialism. In the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, existentialism had achieved that union of metaphysics and critical politics which Marcuse found so irresistible in Hegel."¹¹⁷ Robinson additionally weakens Wolin's claim of Marcuse being Heideggerian by pointing out that in his book on Hegel's Ontology, Marcuse had praised Heidegger for his contributions to the study of Hegel, thus demonstrating that this appreciation was what motivated Marcuse's appreciation of Heidegger. That said, Marcuse quickly lost his excitement for Sartre who claimed that one can be free in spirit, even when enslaved. That attitude, regardless of Sartre's clear political engagement, was not revolutionary enough.¹¹⁸

In addition to his attempt to combine Marxism and Heideggerianism, Marcuse brings Freud very strongly into his ideological "potion" – particularly during his American period, after his (real or semi-real) break with Heidegger¹¹⁹. That is noted in detail in McIntyre's famous book on Marcuse and cited by Cobb, who as a Marcusean addresses much of McIntyre's criticism angrily.¹²⁰ Marcuse, however, together with Wilhelm Reich, had been among the first to "wed" Marx and Freud in the 1930s¹²¹ yet another aspect setting them apart from Orthodox Marxists who had since 1923 "excommunicated" Freud – a scholar incidentally viewed in left-wing circles as conservative – and turned to Pavlov's theories. Once he saw the effects of the Spanish civil war and the Bolshevik show trials under Stalin, Marcuse turned more seriously to Freud.¹²² However, unlike Marcuse's Heideggerian bend, the interest in Freud and the desire to shape a new Marxist Critical Theory with the help of Psychoanalysis was almost universally shared by all members of the Frankfurt School. In light of the political events of the 1930s that were associated with Communism, "a growing dissatisfaction with Marxism, even in its Hegelianized form, led him as it had Horkheimer and Adorno to examine the psychological obstacles in the path of meaningful social change. Whereas in their cases it strengthened a

¹¹⁷ Robinson, Paul A., The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse. Harper & Row, New York City: 1969, 192.

¹¹⁸ Robinson, 192-194.

¹¹⁹ Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, 91.

¹²⁰ Abromeit, John and W. Mark Cobb (Edt.), Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader. Routledge, New York: 2004, 172. Cobb, however, makes the important point that revolt is central to Freudo-Marxism as he refers to Marcuse's ideology, page 178.

¹²¹ Jay, 86.

¹²² Robinson, 179.

deepening pessimism and helped foster a retreat from political activism, in his, it led to a reaffirmation of the utopian dimensions of his radicalism.”¹²³

In his books *Reason and Revolution* (1941) and *Eros and Civilization* (1955), the amalgamation of Freudian and Marxist thought was already visible. Of course, to put it bluntly, this “mixture” is much more of a Marcusean creation since Freud’s terminology is used, but its logic is turned upside down. As Cobb puts it: “In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse imaginatively interrogates Freud’s pessimistic and absolutist conclusion that civilization always requires a high degree of instinctual repression. In suggesting an alternative to Freud’s conclusion, Marcuse is also at odds with a vast amount of conventional “political wisdom” [...].¹²⁴ What Cobb puts so generously is stated in a considerably clearer and therefore unfavorable light for Marcuse in MacIntyre’s text about him, namely that Marcuse had chosen precisely those parts of Freud’s theory that had “moved from more or less empirically controlled theorizing to what was necessarily almost pure speculation.” In redefining theses that were speculative to begin with, assessing Marcuse’s statements is a difficulty “of the first order”¹²⁵.

Nevertheless, outside of the Frankfurt School, Freud was regarded as incompatible to Marxism due to his ideas about the way human nature works and was rejected both by Western leftists who initially considered him conservative as well as, later, by Soviet scholars, who saw him as a bourgeois reactionary:

For Marx, the past is pregnant with the future, with the proletariat as the midwife of history. For Freud, the future is pregnant with the past, a burden of which only the physician, and luck can deliver us [...] Revolution could only repeat the prototypical rebellion against the father, and in every case, like it, be doomed to failure.¹²⁶

On the other hand, within the Frankfurt School, using Freud to enhance Marx seemed quite logical as it provided a tool to “radicalize” Marxism and give the need for revolution a natural, almost physiological or even a “scientific” foundation: “The turn to Freud is motivated by the School’s understanding that a purely Marxist analysis of the world does not go deep enough and that a singularly Marxist revolution is not radical enough.”¹²⁷ In addition to that, adding Freud allowed Marcuse to reformulate the agents of historical change and “appoint” the

¹²³ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 107.

¹²⁴ Abromeit and Cobb, *Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader*, 171.

¹²⁵ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 42.

¹²⁶ Rieff, Philip, *Freud: The Mind of the Moralizer*. Viking Press, New York: 1959, 237-239.

¹²⁷ Friedman, George, *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London: 1981, 87.

“individual”, characterized by his unconditional negation of society, in place of the working class.

Having mentioned MacIntyre’s take on Marcuse and Freud, it should be noted that his core thesis is that Marcuse is much more of a Young Hegelian than a true Marxist. As is it widely known, Hegel, being a rather complicated philosopher whose work developed considerably over time, has been assigned both left and right wing political positions. His followers, moreover, were split between these two worldviews and interpreted his work differently. Therefore, even if it may seem strange that a philosopher often associated with the Prussian statehood and the defense of its establishment could be an intellectual influence on the revolutionary Herbert Marcuse, MacIntyre demonstrates just that.

He points out that it was the abstract quality of Hegel’s thought that Marcuse found intellectually exciting and politically useful: “It is the detachment of philosophy from what is concrete and immediate which gives it its power. Just because philosophy is concerned with concepts, with the structure of what *can* be thought, it confronts the realm of actuality with that of possibility.”¹²⁸ That is what Marcuse needed as a tool to further his political agenda. That tool was missing in Phenomenology, which according to Marcuse was simply descriptive and failed to highlight the difference between what is and what could be¹²⁹ - a dichotomy central to Marcuse.

In his quest to disprove what he sees as MacIntyre’s attacks against Marcuse, Cobb provides further useful insight about Hegel’s influence on Marcuse’s thought:

Much of the Marxism of the 1930s had become doctrinaire and scientific, and Marcuse wanted to reinvigorate Marxism by emphasizing the centrality of a more supple dialectical method that had its origins in Hegel. Thus, *contra* MacIntyre, Hegel is an extremely important thinker for Marcuse not because Marcuse is a pre-Marxist Young Hegelian, but because Marcuse helps recover Hegelian aspects of Marx that had been lost during Marxism’s vulgarization.¹³⁰

While that is a point that Communist-oriented academia has denied due to its political awkwardness, it is known that Marx, while criticizing Hegel, knew his work in depth and had been influenced by his thought. Moreover Marx’s early writings were more holistically philosophical, also discussing issues like overcoming alienation, rather than being focused on

¹²⁸ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 11.

¹²⁹ MacIntyre, 12.

¹³⁰ Abromeit and Cobb, Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, 169.

economic matters as was the case with his later work. From that perspective, Marcuse does not need to have been a “pre-Marxist Young Hegelian” to overlapping elements of thought with Hegel and with the young Marx. Either way, regardless of the interpretation of how it came to that, we see a confirmation of the immense role of Hegel’s thought in shaping the way Marcuse understood Marxism.

Unlike Wolin who sees Marcuse as a Heideggerian and others who see him a Marxist, MacIntyre’s central point is that Marcuse was not a proper Marxist or post-Marxist but a pre-Marxist, committed to “criticism” – a word that MacIntyre points out was typical to the Young Hegelians and was attacked by Marx.¹³¹

It is already however strikingly clear that Marcuse’s attitude to Hegel and to Hegelian theory is not the attitude of Hegel himself nor is it that of Marx. The hypothesis that it is with the Left or Young Hegelians that Marcuse has to be classified is reinforced by the way in which he treats Hegelian theory and even its Marxist version as providing us with a standard of rationality against which the actual world must be judged. Marx in *The German Ideology* described the intellectual fate of those who did this. Marcuse’s subsequent writings confirm Marx’s diagnosis.¹³²

Of course there is Marx – it seems almost unnecessary to say that a self-proclaimed Marxist was influenced by Marx. That is self-evident. It should be said, however, as was mentioned throughout this chapter already, that Marcuse appreciated the “young Marx” considerably more than his later works, used as the basis for Scientific Communism. As Douglas Kellner points out, Marcuse could finally discard Heidegger’s anthropology and phenomenology once he could rely on the early Marx as the anchor to hold his own theories into place.¹³³

It should also be noted that in being a “Neo-Marxist” Marcuse essentially reinterpreted Marx the way he did Hegel, Freud and Heidegger – by selecting those elements that he found useful to formulate ideas that are much more Marcusean than anything else. There are also notable difference between Marcuse’s thought and Marxism – whether one speaks of the young Marx or of his later work. As MacIntyre summarizes, Marcuse, in addition to often asserting claims rather than proving them, selectively chooses those Marxian ideas that he finds useful and not others. One major difference is his fondness for abstraction, as opposed to the Marxist sociological pseudo-scientific love for concreteness – instead of talking about “men”, Marcuse

¹³¹ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 22.

¹³² MacIntyre, 40.

¹³³ Kellner, Douglas, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism. Palgrave, London: 1984, 169.

talks of “man” – something that Marx had clearly assaulted in his day. MacIntyre who did not share Marcuse’s approach to philosophy sourly, but accurately retorts that “if he identifies himself as a Marxist, we must be careful to understand what *he* means by ‘Marxism’.”¹³⁴

Whether one wishes to speak of Marcuse’s “Freudo-Marxism”, label him a Heideggerian or a young Hegelian, or point out that Hegel’s influence and Dilthey’s influence could be considered to overlap with Marx and Heidegger respectively, it is legitimate to say that all these thinkers left a mark on Herbert Marcuse’s worldview. Of course, his worldview was also shaped by his life experience, by what he perceived as unjust or wrong in his own time, by his political preferences and his reading of the political and economic events that he witnessed – from his youth in and after World War One to the 1930s when Stalin finally discredited Orthodox Marxism and when the success of the National Socialist in one of the world’s most advanced societies discredited the notion of reaching a civilizational point of no return for basic human rights. Part of Marcuse’s direction of analysis – his focus on culture and lifestyle, was partially determined by his joining the Frankfurt School, as will be demonstrated in the following section. Finally Marcuse’s experience with American capitalism during the war and especially later, during the Vietnam War, made helped him identify problematic aspects of what was to become the world’s model for social and economic development. And while he called himself a Marxist, Marcuse had in fact created a philosophy of his own that was as separate, perhaps at times, as opposed to Marx as it was to Heidegger, Freud and Hegel.

1.2. The Frankfurt School and Herbert Marcuse

The Frankfurt School before the War

In 1923, Felix Weil, a Marxist and millionaire’s son, used some of the family’s wealth to fund the creation of the Institute for Social Research (*Institut für Sozialforschung*). The Institute was founded in Frankfurt by Prof. Carl Grünberg as an institution seeking to find alternative means for the fulfillment of Marxist aspirations. “Although independence, both financial and intellectual, was the goal of the founders, they thought it prudent to seek some affiliation with the University of Frankfurt, itself only recently established in 1914.” Not long after the Institute’s creation, it received the approval of the Ministry of Education and was formally

¹³⁴ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 21.

recognized as part of the University of Frankfurt. The name was chosen as a less provocative, “Aesopian” alternative to an original idea – Institute for Marxism.¹³⁵ This “Aesopian” approach proved successful and the Institute’s leadership continued employing especially during their years in the USA.

The Frankfurt School had, as Martin Jay puts it, a “dictatorial” structure, where the director could individually decide what the focus of the Institute’s employees would be; it has also been described as a “cliquish” institution,¹³⁶ which included faculty such as Max Horkheimer, Frederick Pollock, Leo Lowenthal, Erich Fromm, Franz Neumann, and Theodor Adorno. All were more or less equally committed to the same world view, which resulted in a “thoroughly Marxian” if not dogmatic climate.¹³⁷

“If it can be said that in the early years of its history the Institute concerned itself primarily with an analysis of bourgeois society’s socio-economic substructure, in the years after 1930 its prime interest lay in its cultural superstructure.”¹³⁸ With that change in focus – working to critique the cultural rudiments of Western capitalist democracies and centralized state-capitalist regimes, the physiognomy of the Institute that is best known today – as the New Left “think tank” whose task included undermining bourgeois society and the Old Left with it¹³⁹, was beginning to emerge. It is this cultural focus that became a major influence on what was later defined as Neo-Marxism and the New Left, and it is due to it that non-left critics came to refer to a number of ideas and policies, favored by the New Left, as *Cultural Marxism* – perhaps the critical label most despised by New Left sympathizers. In tune with the Institute’s change of focus, as Grünberg resigned due to health issues in 1929 and was replaced as director by Horkheimer (1931), the official publication of the Institute changed its title, along with its focus and approach (it became more sociological than before), *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* (1932) replacing the previous *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*.

Having a clear understanding of the political direction in which Germany was heading, the Frankfurt School’s leadership started looking for ways to secure the functioning of the Institute and its trust fund. The first step in that direction was to officially incorporate a branch in Geneva

¹³⁵ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 8.

¹³⁶ Jay, 23.

¹³⁷ Robinson, *The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse*, 151.

¹³⁸ Jay, 21.

¹³⁹ Friedman, *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*, 18-19.

in February 1933¹⁴⁰ – a step, taken before the Institute’s evacuation out of Germany in 1933 (to Geneva) and eventually into the USA in 1935.

With the replacement of Grünberg by Horkheimer, the Institute had slightly distanced itself from politics, Marxism, and the USSR. Nevertheless, Martin Jay comments that “symptomatic of its position [during the 1920s] were the close ties it maintained with the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow under the direction of David Ryazanov.”¹⁴¹ That was hardly a reputation that could simply be forgotten. Furthermore, the Institute, far from being “free of any party affiliation”, had during the 20s served as a link between the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Marx-Engels Institute, employed the Soviet spy Richard “Ika” Sorge, while some assistants (Karl August Wittfogel, Franz Borkeu, Julian Gumperz) were members of KPD. With these facts in mind it is easy to imagine why the Frankfurt School was so quick to prepare and carry out its evacuation.

Figures like KPD politician Karl Korsch were also affiliated, without being offered full membership. It is speculated that the Institute’s director – Max Horkheimer – was also a KPD member, a claim that according to Martin Jay, he denied.¹⁴² Another of the Institute’s members – Henryk Grossman – had been a member of the Polish Communist Party and “did not experience a later disillusionment with communism, even during his decade or so of exile in America.”¹⁴³ At the same time, Jay points out that “at no time [...] whether under Grünberg or Horkheimer, was the *Institut* to ally itself with a specific party or faction on the left.”¹⁴⁴ This is, of course, understandable, considering the primary focus of the Institute and the fact that its members were always careful to remain on the mainstream – in the sense of being affiliated to major academic institutions – with the academic respectability and perhaps financial security that comes with that. That would not have been possible had they been outspoken about their sympathies. Identifying Pollock as having the coldest attitude toward Stalin’s version of communism and Grossman as the most pro-Bolshevik, Martin Jay concludes that “it would be wrong to characterize the general attitude of *Institut* members in 1927 towards the Soviet experiment as closer to Pollocks’s skepticism than to Grossmann’s enthusiasm.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 30.

¹⁴¹ Jay, 12-13.

¹⁴² Jay, 12-14.

¹⁴³ Jay, 17.

¹⁴⁴ Jay, 14.

¹⁴⁵ Jay, 19

Jay points out that between 1927 and Stalin's purges, the institute maintained "almost complete official silence" regarding what was happening in the USSR. Then, "a decade later, after the Moscow purge trials, [...] Horkheimer and the others, with the sole exception of the obdurate Grossmann, completely abandoned their hope for the Soviet Union. Even then, [...] they never focused the attention of Critical Theory on the left-wing authoritarianism of Stalin's Russia. The lack of available data certainly was one reason, but one ought not to ignore the difficulties involved with a Marxist analysis, however heterodox, of communism's failures."¹⁴⁶

The Frankfurt School was an intriguing platform for young radical leftists at that time and it managed to attract "outsiders" like Wilhelm Reich to publish in its journal¹⁴⁷ during the late 1920s. As an illustration of how interconnected the left-wing scene was (and that is still valid of most political scenes), it could be pointed out that Reich had also convinced the young Willy Brandt, at that time a young member of the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP)¹⁴⁸, to take part in a psychological sexual experiment.¹⁴⁹

Scholars affiliated with the Frankfurt School can be credited with academic contributions that have remained overlooked by the contemporary discourse on the Institute's legacy. For example, in "*The Dialectical Imagination*", Martin Jay mentions a contribution that Pollock, one of the Institute's leading economists, made regarding the significance of the service industry:

Stressing the inadequacy of Marx's concept of productive labor because of its neglect of non-manual labor, Pollock pointed to the service industries, which were becoming increasingly important in the twentieth century. Surplus value might be extracted from workers in these industries as well as from those producing commodities, he argued, which would prolong the life of the system.¹⁵⁰

If that was true to some extent when Pollock wrote in the 1920s, it became a prominent feature of Western economies in the latter half of the 20th century, characterized by moving industry

¹⁴⁶ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 20.

¹⁴⁷ Jay, 27.

¹⁴⁸ Kohnen, Peter, *Deutschland, deine SPD: Die Frustrierten und die Manipulierten*. VPA, München: 1972, 146-147.

¹⁴⁹ Christopher Turner writes in his book *Adventures in the Orgasmatron* that in 1935 Reich had bought an oscillograph and attached it to friends and students, who volunteered to carry out various sexual activities alone and with one another while Reich deciphered the readings. Young Willy Brandt (1913–1992), the future German Chancellor, was among those who volunteered. He knew Reich as he was his secretary's boyfriend. Reich described these experiments in his book *Experimentelle Ergebnisse Über Die Elektrische Funktion von Sexualität und Angst* (1937).

Turner, Christopher, *Adventures in the Orgasmatron*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York: 2011, 173-175.

¹⁵⁰ Jay, 18.

into developing countries with cheaper labor, while developing the service sectors, high-tech and research, as well as financial services.

Precisely during the few years when the Institute found itself under Horkheimer's leadership and started undergoing the transformation of its focus, together with a rather wise physical and financial transition away from the future Third Reich, Marcuse became part of the organization. As mentioned earlier, this was the time of Marcuse's personal and political break with Heidegger which resulted in his decision not to habilitate at the University of Freiburg and the necessity to find a new means of supporting himself.

By the time of Adolf Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30th, 1933, the March elections, and the Enabling Act of March 24th, most Institute members were already evacuated abroad. Lowenthal was "the last full-time associate to have stayed on" and he left on March 2nd.¹⁵¹

In the meantime, as Wiggerhaus notes, by May 1933, the premises of the Institute in Frankfurt had already been seized and closed down. Horkheimer had been suspended as a university professor by the Ministry of Education. He was successful, however, in managing to export a large part of his belongings and financial assets. "In February 1933 the Society for Social Research had already been replaced by the *Société Internationale de Recherches Sociales*, which had its headquarters in Geneva. The Geneva branch thus became the official administrative headquarters."¹⁵² Choosing Switzerland as a permanent seat of the "Frankfurt School" was not a real option as only the Institute's head had a perfectly settled legal status in the country, while all other members, including Marcuse relied on tourist visas. In addition to that, as Wiggerhaus explains, the circle around Horkheimer believed that Fascism, as they referred to National-Socialism, would sooner or later engulf all of Europe, so moving across the Atlantic would be safer. The Institute probed the situation in Paris and London, received certain offers and carried out some activities there, but these were marginal compared to the overall history of the Frankfurt School. Moreover, Marcuse's role during that period was still uninteresting; hence, we shall fast-forward to the Institute's new home in New York City as part of Columbia University.

¹⁵¹ Wiggerhaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance, 127-128.

¹⁵² Wiggerhaus, 132.

With the help of one of the Institute's members – Gumperz, who had established connections in US academic circles, and with the help of a left-wing Sociology professor at Columbia University – Prof. Robert S. Lynd, who in turn enlisted the help of Prof. Robert MacIver, chairman of the Department of Sociology, Horkheimer was immediately given an excellent offer for the Institute by the University president Nicholas Murray Butler. Wiggershaus points out in his book that Horkheimer was so perplexed by the generous and speedy nature of the offer that he felt compelled to double-check whether the university president was acquainted with the Institute's prior work. It turned out that with few people fluent in German at Columbia, what the faculty had seen were mostly article abstracts in English, along with the full German texts, they could only “skim” over. In that context Wiggershaus concludes that Horkheimer's Aesopian “strategy of avoiding Marxist names and provocative terminology fully proved its value” by making it easier for the Institute to “pass” as less Marxist than it was and to fit in more easily in mainstream US academia.¹⁵³

This is in fact a strategy that Marcuse pursued as well. In the Cold War context that was to coincide with Marcuse's peak of fame, a clearly stated disapproval of “the other side” and camouflaged terms to express those ideas that overlapped with the Marxist-Communist agenda were a necessity – one whose fabrication one sees in some of the manuscripts that Marcuse worked on before producing final versions of speeches and texts. Furthermore, reviewing his archival material, one realizes that Marcuse's ideas are often much clearer in the transcripts of speeches, not intended for publication.

The initial concept of the partnership between the Institute and Columbia was to establish “a very loose affiliation with the University, with the possible appointment of one or two members of our [Columbia] Faculty of Political Science to their governing board, and complete autonomy for them.” This is how Robert S. Lynd formulated the situation in a letter of his to Fackenthal (June 25, 1934).¹⁵⁴ The University was also to provide a typical New York five-story building right next to its downtown campus – across the Morningside Park at 429 West 117th Street.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵³ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 144-145.

¹⁵⁴ Feuer, Lewis, *The Frankfurt Marxists and the Columbia Liberals*. In: *Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (112): Summer 1980, 145-146.

¹⁵⁵ Wiggershaus, 146.

Marcuse in America

In July of the same year, Marcuse arrived from Geneva and became the first institute member to join Horkheimer, albeit in a junior role as well as slightly ideologically suspect to the others. In addition to having a “Heideggerian past” and needing to “prove himself [...] and learn the correct theory, [...] in the eyes of the directors of the Institute, Marcuse was a specialist in philosophical literature and of limited competence.”¹⁵⁶ The latter being an easily understandable sentiment among sociologists, considering Marcuse’s doctoral dissertation had been on an essentially literary topic.

In the first year of their work in the United States, the Institute created two publications – the issue of their magazine *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung (ZfS)*, which came out between 1932 and 1941, and a report on their research project titled “Studies on Authority and the Family”. The first issue that came out in 1932 was published in Leipzig by the “Verlag C. L. Hirschfeld”. The remaining issues 2-7 that came out from 1933–1938 were published in Paris by the “Librairie Felix Alcan”, while the last two series 8-9 (1939/40 and 1941/42) were already published by the Institute itself in New York and under the title *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*. The 1934 issue of *ZfS* included an article by Herbert Marcuse titled “Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staats-Auffassung” in which he made the rather extreme claim (employed by other New Left authors as well) – one that would reappear in his better known writings – that the totalitarian state “is only a self-transformation of the liberalistic state [*liberalistischer Staat*].”¹⁵⁷

In 1936 Marcuse published his book – the last one to be published first in German – *A Study on Authority*. In it, he analyzed and responded to a number of European thinkers from Luther, Calvin, Kant and Burke to Hegel, Bergson, Popper and Sartre. Perhaps this work’s central idea is that there are aspects of authority and liberty that run through time, showing themselves in different forms, like a sort of red thread.

Nevertheless, his work during the “American” half of the 1930s and until Marcuse’s effective departure from the Institute after joining the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – a precursor

¹⁵⁶ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 147.

¹⁵⁷ Horkheimer, Max (im Auftrag des Institut für Sozialforschung), *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Year 3, Band III, Librairie Felix Alcan, Paris: 1934, 195.

of the CIA – in 1942 is not what he is best known for. In addition to his contributions on the “Studies on Authority and the Family” and his book on Authority, Marcuse published the following articles in the Institute’s *Zeitschrift* until starting to work for the US government:

- Der Kampf gegen den Liberalismus in der totalitären Staatsauffassung. Band III, 161
- Zum Begriff des Wesens. Band VI, 1
- Über den affirmativen Charakter der Kultur. Band VI, 54
- Horkheimer und Marcuse: Philosophie und kritische Theorie. Band VI, 625
- Zur Kritik des Hedonismus. Band VII, 55
- An Introduction to Hegel’s Philosophy. Band VIII, 394
- Some Social Implications of Modern Technology. Band IX, 414

One of the above articles is perhaps the most significant to the Frankfurt School – *Philosophie und kritische Theorie* (1937) for it was Horkheimer’s attempt, together with Marcuse, to clarify the formulation of one of the best known contributions of the Institute and its most characteristic feature – Critical Theory, which Horkheimer had formulated in another article, published earlier in 1937.

Critical Theory received its first publicized formulation in 1937 with Horkheimer’s essay “Traditional and Critical Theory” in which the author explained that “The term is used here less in the sense it has in the idealist critique of pure reason than in the sense it has in the dialectical critique of political economy. It points to an essential aspect of the dialectical theory of society.”¹⁵⁸ In other words, unlike “traditional theory” which sought to explain and understand the world, critical theory sought to find ways to change it as well.

Ambitiously, critical theory sought to combine all social sciences (perhaps the birth of one concept of interdisciplinary scholarship!) and to explain the world in its totality. Seeking to provide a clear normative basis to criticize society’s shortcomings and to identify workable practical ways to make amends, Critical Theory called into question the traditional Marxist view on the relationship between “bourgeois society” and its “socio-economic substructure”¹⁵⁹ - a concept that had been refused by history in Western Europe after World War One. While it was “upgraded” Marxist deconstruction techniques, Critical Theory – unlike traditional Marxism - did not offer a clear alternative to the social structures it wanted to “deconstruct”.

¹⁵⁸ Horkheimer, Max, *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*. Continuum, New York: 1975, 206.

¹⁵⁹ Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination*, 21.

Its “practical” nature meant that this new approach, standard for just about all Frankfurt School scholars from the moment it was published, could easily win a committed “fan base”. Unlike his colleague, George Friedman is considerably more convinced about the Frankfurt School’s direct influence on the New Left: “This (the Institute’s) critique served as a basis for much of the student movement of the 1960s and thus had consequences beyond academe, where the Frankfurt School’s brilliance and erudition made a lasting and powerful impression.”¹⁶⁰ Hence, when Marcuse and Adorno would in the end of the 1960s bicker regarding Adorno’s decision to call up the police on the protesting students, Marcuse was not fully wrong when he told Adorno that the students were in fact only taking the next logical step, following from the Institute’s earlier theory.

In 1940 Marcuse became a US citizen. His last monograph, published before joining the Office of Strategic Services, was *Reason and Revolution* (1940), a dialectical work on Hegel and Marx that attempted to show that Hegel was in fact “revolutionary” as opposed to a proto-totalitarian. That leitmotif, it should be highlighted, is in full agreement with MacIntyre’s analysis of Marcuse’s understanding of Hegel as a progressive thinker.

Marcuse during World War Two

So did Marcuse make any academic contributions during his time with the OSS? And what did the Institute focus on during the wartime years? In *The Freudian Left*, Paul A. Robinson addresses a core point pertaining to Marcuse’s intellectual biography, namely that his scholarly career can be viewed as divided in two phases, punctured by the years he worked for the OSS and the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR). During that academic drought, from 1942 till 1950, Marcuse only published one single article.¹⁶¹

After the end of the War on all fronts, President Truman ordered that the OSS be shut down in September 1945. It was not until 1947 that the CIA was to be created and until then the former OSS units were divided up and distributed between the US Department of State and the Department of War, possibly assigned to one or the other department depending on whether their work was closer to what might be called political or military intelligence.

Marcuse thus transferred in 1945 to the State Department where he worked until 1951 as head of the Central Europe desk. His work for the OSS/OIR/State Department and CIA, which lies

¹⁶⁰ Friedman, *The Political Philosophy of the Frankfurt School*, 13.

¹⁶¹ Robinson, *The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse*, 150.

outside the scope of this research, together with the reports prepared by his Frankfurt School colleagues Franz Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, are reflected in detail in an insightful book edited by Raffaele Laudani and titled *Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort* (Princeton University Press, 2013). Examining whether Marcuse's analyses, prepared for the US government, are in tune with Critical Theory, whether they were objective or contained political bias, could be the subject of a separate academic investigation.

Of course the Institute had other prominent members in addition to Horkheimer and Marcuse. One must mention Adorno who arrived in the United States shortly after Marcuse, joining his colleagues after spending some time at Oxford. Once he was at the Institute in New York City, Adorno published the *Dialektik der Aufklärung (Dialectic of Enlightenment)* together with Horkheimer. The book was initially published in German in the United States in 1944 under a different title and again in the Netherlands, after the war, in 1947. An English translation did not appear in print until the 1970s.

Regardless of the academically interesting work the Institute had completed in the USA, the fact that they continued to publish in German kept them relatively unknown and even quite isolated from the students at Columbia University where "the seminars were virtually discussion groups for the Institute's associates, and American students only rarely took part in them."¹⁶² In addition to feeling somewhat isolated, as the Institute's funds began to decrease the small inner circle that commanded the funds began to worry about maintaining their own financial stability in the coming years regardless of the Institute's fate. Some of their immediate decisions were to decrease the associates' salaries and to think about closing down the Institute in order to secure long-term funding for Horkheimer's own work and for a couple of other members of the Institute without breaking the contract, signed with the donor of the funds.¹⁶³

With people like Kirchheimer, Neumann, and Marcuse working for the government and others having found other jobs in academia and research, the Frankfurt School's role as an institution decreased and gave way to its members' individual academic activities. This was combined with a gradual physical movement of the Institute's associates across the United States. In 1941, for example, Max Horkheimer moved to Pacific Palisades in California, which had

¹⁶² Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 251.

¹⁶³ Wiggershaus, 261-263.

established itself as a popular area for exiled German intellectuals like Thomas Mann and Bertolt Brecht.¹⁶⁴

At this point the Institute finally addressed the issue of Anti-Semitism, promised to Felix Weil's father before the Institute's founding. Pollock led this research project that culminated in the *Studies in Anti-Semitism*, a massive work in four volumes, accompanied by an international conference, held in 1944. Unlike Pollock, who had remained in New York, the "West Coast" wing of the Institute comprised of Horkheimer and Adorno focused on more theoretical subjects (such as the different kinds of reason and the destructive aspects of progress). Thus in 1947 Horkheimer published *The Eclipse of Reason* and Adorno – his *Philosophical Fragments*, the basis for *Dialectic of the Enlightenment*.

After World War Two

Reaching the War's end in a divided state, but nevertheless surviving as an academic institution with shining credentials, the Frankfurt School was invited in 1946 to return to its mother university on the Main. While the research on the Frankfurt School does not mention this explicitly, it seems likely that many German academics who had survived the hardships of war in their home country were less than excited about returning émigrés, sometimes suspiciously to the left, being parachuted into influential academic positions. Political Science as a separate subject has not been taught at German universities and attempts to introduce it had been blocked during the National Socialist regime, whose worldview collided with the idea of a "political science." Nevertheless, the return of professors who had taught prior to 1933 "served the function of a bridge between Weimar Germany and the Federal Republic."¹⁶⁵ Just like the fields of Sociology and Political Science, which were viewed by some as "forced" upon German universities¹⁶⁶, one may guess that Horkheimer's rapid post-war career in Germany may have also been seen as a somewhat artificial development aided by the political status quo.

Considering the economically critical and politically uncertain situation in Germany, the Institute's members were not in a hurry to return home. The "Frankfurt School" remained at

¹⁶⁴ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 292.

¹⁶⁵ Bleek, Wilhelm, *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland*, Verlag C.H. Beck, München: 2001, 445.

¹⁶⁶ Fichter, Tilman and Siegwand Loennendonker, *Kleine Geschichte des SDS. Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund von 1946 bis zur Selbstaufloesung*, Rotbuch Verlag, Berlin: 1977, 23.

Columbia University until 1950¹⁶⁷ at which point some of its members started seriously planning their return to Germany. In addition to the studies on authority and the family, the Institute published the famous work *The Authoritarian Personality* in 1950 – long after Marcuse had left the Institute.¹⁶⁸ Already using the Institute’s new tool – Critical Theory – as an updated version to replace the disproven aspects of Orthodox Marxism, *The Authoritarian Personality* was “an uncompromising indictment of bourgeois civilization, with the twist that what was considered merely old-fashioned by previous critics was now declared both fascistic and psychologically warped.”¹⁶⁹ This line of critiquing society would later supplement the critique of the affluent society in post-war Germany where the “schein ohne sein” and the well-to-do provincial patriarchal attitude toward society were quickly declared “crypto-fascist” by left-wing radicals.

In 1951 the Institute for Social Research not only returned to Germany, but its head also became the new rector of the Frankfurt University. Horkheimer was accompanied by Adorno, who initially split his time between Frankfurt and California, before returning to Germany in August 1953 and taking over as director of the Institute for Social Research in 1955.

Horkheimer also attempted to “bring” Marcuse back to Frankfurt by offering him a department chair position, but Marcuse preferred to remain in the USA where he accepted a full-time position at Brandeis University. In 1956 Horkheimer retired while Marcuse’s – once again in academia - published *Eros and Civilization*.¹⁷⁰

Friction between Old Friends

The Frankfurt School and Marcuse are often associated with each other as, subjectively speaking, Marcuse together with Adorno and Walter Benjamin are its top three most famous members¹⁷¹ (Habermas, perhaps because he belongs to a different generation seems to be associated much more with himself than with an institution). Therefore many among the

¹⁶⁷ Robinson, *The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse*, 151.

¹⁶⁸ Robinson, 152.

¹⁶⁹ Sykes, Charles J., *A Nation of Victims*. St. Martin’s Press, New York: 1992, 54.

¹⁷⁰ Corradetti, Claudio, *The Frankfurt School and Critical Theory*, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/frankfur/> (last accessed: June 10, 2015)

¹⁷¹ While there can hardly be a solid ranking of the relative prominence of Frankfurt School academics, if we look at the choice of the authors of Encyclopedia Britannica in which academics they list in their first paragraph, together with the director Max Horkheimer, they list T.W. Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin in that order.

general public assume that what they know about Marcuse's ideas is more or less reflective of the Frankfurt School as a whole. It must be said, however, that the Institute went through at least three distinct phases during Marcuse's lifetime: Horkheimer opted for a restrained "Aesopian" strategy both before the Institute's relocation and later in the United States; he and Adorno continued more or less along the same line upon re-establishing the Frankfurt School in Germany after the War. However, in the new, much more liberal atmosphere of the 1960s, Marcuse found the Institute's stance too timid and not living up to its old reputation as cutting-edge.

Therefore Marcuse drifted away from his former colleagues over the 1960s even though he maintained close contacts with them. The now-older Adorno and Horkheimer were continuing to work on their radical intellectual projects, but as had been the case during the 1930s, their form of cutting edge thought was more theoretical and seemingly removed from the burgeoning political and lifestyle radicalism of that period. One can only speculate about the motivations and sensibilities behind these different approaches, but based on letters between Marcuse and Adorno as early 1960, one notices that Marcuse is already accusing Adorno **and** Horkheimer of having betrayed the principle that "our critique of the East must be connected to that of the West" and that "some people say that some of what you write and say appears to support the Cold War Ideology." Marcuse ends the letter by hinting that everything Adorno and Horkheimer write reflects on him and expresses his hope that he will not have to distance himself from Adorno and Horkheimer.¹⁷² Marcuse's though, on the other hand – perhaps as someone who enjoyed looking for new solutions and was open to personal communication with young radical minds¹⁷³ was seemingly becoming more radical, which led to tensions between him and his former colleagues as the rebellious students "targeted" the Frankfurt School itself. An illustration of these tensions is contained in a letter exchange between Adorno, Habermas, and Marcuse after the episode when Adorno had called the police on the protesting students in Frankfurt.

¹⁷² Letter from Marcuse to Adorno, *Herbert Marcuse*, 24 January 1960, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1004.1-68 (copy)

¹⁷³ It is well known that Marcuse maintained friendly personal communication with activists such as Angela Davis and Rudi Dutschke; he was willing to hold lectures and speak to radical students in settings that were not entirely academic and where Adorno or Horkheimer would have felt out of place. Even on a purely lifestyle level, the as of yet uncatalogued Marcuse Archive at the University of Frankfurt includes newspaper and magazine cut-outs demonstrating an avid interest on the part of Marcuse in new approaches to human happiness, holistic mental and physical wellbeing, sexuality, technology – even as he was in his 70s.

The aforementioned tensions were mainly based on Marcuse's clear support for the New Left student movement and their new modes of protest. In a letter from Marcuse to "Dear Teddy" Adorno, dated June 4, 1969, and sent from London¹⁷⁴, Marcuse accused Adorno of not having understood the reasons for the *Feindschaft* of the students toward the Institute. He rejected Adorno's appeal to support the interests of "their old Institute" by stating that the current work of the Institute has nothing to do with their work in the 1930s and implied that the Institute has sold out: "Die qualitative Differenz ist nicht eine aus der Entwicklung der Theorie selbst stammende: Die von dir sehr beiläufig erwähnten "Zuschüsse" – sind sie wirklich so beiläufig?¹⁷⁵" (*The qualitative difference does not stem alone from the development of the theory: those grants, mentioned so casually by you – are they so insignificant indeed?*) He went on to state that their old theory presupposes having a "konkrete politische Position", while at the same time he angrily rejected Adorno's claim, made in an interview before *Der Spiegel*, that Marcuse had been giving the students "practical advice". He furthermore rejected Adorno's claim that the protesting students were representatives of a "left-wing Fascism" and their being labelled as the "Chinese [Red Guards] on the Rhein". Marcuse believes that the core difference between Fascism and "bürgerliche Demokratie" is that the latter gives rights also to people like them, but states that the only way to overcome the status quo is through the "ausserparlamentarische Opposition" – through civil disobedience and "direkte Aktion". This letter was written as a reply to a message, sent to him a month earlier by Habermas¹⁷⁶, wherein Habermas impatiently explained Marcuse how unreasonable the protesting students had been (threatening to throw out all library books onto the street and to destroy the Institute's heating installation), after they had been tolerated for months.

1.3. "Marx, Mao, Marcuse" – Marcuse's Role in the Left's Transformation

A Utopia where Every Day is a Holiday

Among the noticeable differences between "classical" Marxists and Marcuse is the fact of his issue with the role of labor in the orthodox Marxist tradition. Unlike those on the Left who

¹⁷⁴ Letter from Marcuse to Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, 4 June 1969, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0376.07 (copy)

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ Letter from Marcuse to Habermas, Herbert Marcuse, 4 June 1969, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0376.05 (copy)

extolled its virtues, Marcuse disapproved of what he felt was its “burdensome character” – since labor was a compensation for a lack, he concluded it could never be entirely free.¹⁷⁷ That position ran counter to Marx himself, who in *Das Kapital* contended that labor was necessary. As for self-improvement and play, Marx proposed that one could devote himself to such activities in one’s spare time.¹⁷⁸

That was the so-called “late” Marx however. In his early works – those that Marcuse valued the most – Marx also focused on the holistic wellbeing of the individual:

The philosophical ideal of human fulfillment – the idea of self-formation or *Bildung* that the young Marx had inherited from German idealism – no longer stood at the center of Marxism. Instead, Marxism’s sole concern seemed to be the rational mastery of nature.¹⁷⁹

Marcuse had chosen to adhere to the early Marx, characterized by a very large degree of idealism. In this way his approach clearly illustrates and overlaps with the nature of the change that was due to take place within the Left in the early 1960s: a transition from the Old Left – be it social-democratic or Bolshevik – to the New Left in all its varieties.

What makes it so worthwhile to look at Marcuse in the context of the New Left is that he is cited in virtually all books about the New Left and the Student movements in Germany and the USA as **the** principal influence¹⁸⁰. That can also be seen in texts written by New Left protagonists, such as in the book “*Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition*”, written by Bergmann, Dutschke (with whom Marcuse was close and maintained personal correspondence), Lefevre, and Rabehl and published in 1968. In that book, for example, we see Marcuse’s idea of *Repressive Tolerance* – the notion that extending tolerance to capitalism and conservative ideas is actually intolerant, while real tolerance should be limited to the voices of the left – cited as a major inspiration.¹⁸¹ (Repressive Tolerance is analyzed in detail in Ch. 2) Together with Marcuse, we see his Frankfurt School colleagues Horkheimer and Adorno, who were nevertheless theoretically more distant and practically rather cold to the radical

¹⁷⁷ Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, 159

¹⁷⁸ Wolin, 161

¹⁷⁹ Wolin, 159

¹⁸⁰ For example, Wolfgang Kraushaar, in his book “1968: Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat” writes: “Nobody had identified so strongly with the international student rebellion and had attempted to give them a theoretical framework, as Herbert Marcuse [...] Aside of his two main works “Eros and Civilization” and “One-Dimensional Man”, his smaller works “Kultur und Gesellschaft”, “A Critique of Pure Tolerance”, “An Essay on Liberation” were above all of importance to the students.”

Kraushaar, Wolfgang, 1968: Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat. Piper Verlag, München: 1998, 141.

¹⁸¹ Bergmann, Uwe and Rudi Dutschke, Wolfgang Lefevre, Bernd Rabehl, Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition. Rowohlt, Hamburg: 1968, 73, 89.

students, Sartre, Fanon, Malcolm X, and Mao¹⁸² – not a very promising list from a non-Marxist democratic perspective.

On May 6th, 1968, on the occasion of Marx's 150th birthday and incidentally at the height of the student riots, UNESCO organized an academic conference on the contemporary significance of Karl Marx's thought¹⁸³. Marcuse participated¹⁸⁴ at the Paris event with a report, titled *Re-examination of the Concept of Revolution*, which is particularly important to defining the New Left as it was written, in a way, in their name. To be precise, Marcuse talks **about** the New Left, thus acknowledging their existence; he also mentions how the New Left sees certain issues and there is an **overlap** between his assessment of the situation and how, in his words, the New Left sees it. In his lecture Marcuse pointed out that while Marx sees it as necessary that the "technical apparatus of productivity [...] extend (freed from capitalist abuse) to the socialist society", a change in the Left's concept of revolution (that he formulates as necessary) would be a break with this technical apparatus¹⁸⁵. He furthermore saw the "New Left" as consisting of two polar opposites – minority ghetto dwellers and middle class intelligentsia (students) – united by their "radical negation" and "the total character of the refusal and rebellion". Marcuse thought these groups were also united by their shared insistence on "new needs and values in new institutions", as well as a "break with the continuity of domination and exploitation – no matter in what name."¹⁸⁶ Marcuse saw that as a "second phase" of revolution and opposed this to an "indefinitely extended first phase" of the Communist revolution – something Marcuse saw as typifying the Eastern Block.

Most would consider it obvious that that burdensome labor (i.e. having to work for a living) is an unchangeable fact of life – unchangeable due to the finite resources and finite time that characterize human life and our environment. Nevertheless, Marcuse's thesis in *One-Dimensional Man*, which had come out four years before the lecture in Paris – in 1964, lays out a vision of a future, defined by such technological advancement that man can devote his freed time to self-improvement and play – an unlikely scenario without the development of a

¹⁸² Bergman et al., *Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition*, 88-89, 92.

¹⁸³ According to Kraushaar (p. 140-141), there were two events on May 5th in Trier – Marx's home town – one official, organized by UNESCO and attended by Willy Brandt and another one, organized by the communist Prof. Wolfgang Abendroth and attended by the Soviet ambassador Zarpkin. Marcuse attended a third event the next day in Paris.

¹⁸⁴ Kraushaar, Wolfgang, *1968: Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat*. Piper Verlag, München: 1998, 140-141.

¹⁸⁵ *Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution*, 1968, *Herbert Marcuse*, p. 13, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0313.04

¹⁸⁶ *Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution*, 7.

source of endless free energy and a *perpetuum mobile*. (In fact Marx, himself, in his day, had imagined this “ideal machine”...) ¹⁸⁷

In Marcuse’s leisurely utopia, machines do all the work, so people’s working hours would be reduced to a minimum. Even if that were to ever become technologically possible, in a market economy full automation of industry and services would drastically increase unemployment; therefore, even though Marcuse criticized the Soviet economic model, his vision could ultimately only be achieved in a planned economy. Such an economy, we are now sure, is bound to decay due to the lack of incentive. Yet such arguments were taken into account neither by Marcuse, nor by other New Left activists.

As was already pointed out, the Soviet system was not what Marcuse hoped would come to dominate in the West – particularly after the Stalinist purges during the 1930s. That sentiment is documented in an obvious way in the second book – *Soviet Marxism—A Critical Analysis* (1958), published after Marcuse left the State Department/CIA in 1951/2. For instance, on page 1 of the introduction, Marcuse mentions the “extreme poverty and even dishonesty of Soviet theory”. ¹⁸⁸ In other words, if Marcuse (and adherents of the New Left who supported his ideas) truthfully rejected a planned economy and yet believed there could have a society, characterized by full automation, then Marcuse was making an economic claim that was axiomatically unrealistic. This leads to the conclusion that the New Left had an even less practically applicable approach to the economy (and a solid understanding of human psychology and technological realities) than the radical branches of the Old Left.

The Father and Godfather of the New Left

After leaving his government employment in 1951, the following year Herbert Marcuse returned to Columbia University, now *sans Institut für Sozialforschung*. According to the official Marcuse website, run by his family, he was also to later work at Brandeis University (1958-1965), Harvard, and at the University of California (UCLA) – San Diego. ¹⁸⁹; we know

¹⁸⁷ Mason, Paul, *The End of Capitalism has Begun*. In: *The Guardian*. Accessed on:

http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/17/postcapitalism-end-of-capitalism-begun?CMP=fb_gu

¹⁸⁸ Marcuse, Herbert, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*. Columbia University Press, New York: 1958, 1.

¹⁸⁹ Marcuse Family official website, *Biography of Herbert Marcuse*, <https://www.marcuse.org/herbert/#biography> (last accessed: February 8, 2021)

he also taught at UCLA's Berkeley campus for which there is also archival evidence¹⁹⁰ and it is also known that he remained emeritus professor at UCLA – San Diego until his death in 1979.¹⁹¹ (Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book *Marcuse*, provides slightly different dating: early 1950s to 1954 he worked at both Columbia's Russian Institute and Harvard's Russian Research Center, whereas from 1954 to 1967 he was at Brandeis. From 1967, after having reached retirement age, Marcuse taught at the University of California.¹⁹²)

At Columbia Marcuse befriended his colleague C. Wright Mills – also a left-oriented intellectual and political sociologist, whose name gained traction with his 1951 book *White Collar: The American Middle Classes*. (Mills either knew or knew of Adorno since the two men had both previously worked at Paul Lazarsfeld's Princeton Radio Research Project.¹⁹³ Mills was later to gain popularity among student activists with his famous *Letter to the New Left* (1960). One could say that while Marcuse is often viewed as the “Father” of the New Left it was perhaps Mills who might be called the “godfather” as he popularized the term.

The importance of the *Letter to the New Left* must not be exaggerated, but it must also be granted that Mills framed some of the main messages that would become characteristic of the New Left. The text gained popularity among Neo-Marxists in the Anglo-Saxon world – the letter had been written in America but was published in the (British) *New Left Review*.¹⁹⁴ Before Mills' Letter was published in 1960, Marcuse had already attempted to postulate a liberated libidinal utopia, with the help of Marx and Freud, in his *Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud* (1955) and he had published the already-mentioned book openly criticizing the USSR – *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis* (1958). Marcuse's, subjectively speaking, more radical and more famous monographs *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* (1965) – the works central to this research – were still several years away from completion. Mills died young, in 1962, so we will never be able to know how his thinking and his friendship with Marcuse could have evolved, nor how he would

¹⁹⁰ The Marcuse archive in Frankfurt contains various documents which demonstrate Marcuse was at UCLA during the period 1968-1969.

Documents (two separate ones) demonstrating that Marcuse was at UCLA during the period 1968-1969, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 266.01; no reference code (my reference - 03607)

¹⁹¹ Hawkins, Helen, *Interview with Herbert Marcuse*, 1979,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XhzKyyvLbY8M> (last accessed: March 7, 2016)

¹⁹² MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 93.

¹⁹³ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 243.

¹⁹⁴ Mills, C. Wright, *Letter to the New Left*. In: *New Left Review*, No. 5, September-October 1960, no page number.

have reacted to Marcuse's subsequent monographs and other writings. It seems, however, that the positions evident in Marcuse's correspondence with Adorno, for example, are not far removed from Mills' sentiments regarding the Cold War – specifically an irritation with former socialists who have taken a more decisively pro-Western and non-ideological position. Perhaps Mills' work, including this text, influenced Marcuse's thinking in the later works he wrote.

In C. Wright Mills' *Letter* one discerns several major New Left traits. Mills opens his essay by expressing his frustration with the “end-of-ideology” argument, popular since the late 1950s and typical in his words, of “NATO intellectuals” in the West. (The “end-of-ideology” argument's wide circulation is confirmed by the fact that there were other publications about it – one being Daniel Bell's anthology, including an essay by Mills, entitled *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, also published in 1960; Bell criticizes ideology as a way of turning “ideas into social levers” (p. 370). Mills implies that the “end-of-ideology” is really an end of the socialist commitment of formerly pronounced left-wingers and summarizes the logical core of this approach as follows:

Underneath this style of observation and comment there is the assumption that in the West there are not more real issues or even problems of great seriousness. The mixed economy plus the welfare state plus prosperity — that is the formula. US capitalism will continue to be workable, the welfare state will continue along the road to ever greater justice. In the meantime, things everywhere are very complex, let us not be careless, there are great risks. This posture — one of “false consciousness” if there ever was one — stands in the way, I think, of considering with any chances of success what may be happening in the world.¹⁹⁵

The “end-of-ideology” worldview was probably one of the catalysts that forced the Left's transformation by undermining the Old Left's *raison d'être*: with the idea that the ideology of the (Old) Left had become irrelevant and superfluous by the end of the 1950s in the West, those who were unsatisfied with the status quo and wished for a socialist future were in a way forced to rephrase their critique and redefine their goals, creating a revisionist Left. Throughout the text, Mills' manner assumes a seemingly Marcusean style – complaining about the fake freedom of speech in the West that is really there to stifle debate. Upon considering the years of publication one realizes that, in fact, Marcuse's *Critique of Pure Tolerance*, published five years later, is actually the one that echoes Mills' sentiments rather than vice versa:

Its common disposition [of the concept of the “end-of-ideology”] is not liberalism as a political philosophy, but the liberal rhetoric become formal and sophisticated and used as an uncriticised weapon with which to attack Marxism. In the approved style, various of the elements of this rhetoric appear simply as snobbish assumptions. Its sophistication is one of tone rather than of ideas; in it, the *New Yorker* style of reportage has become politically triumphant. The disclosure of fact — set forth in a bright-faced or in a dead-pan manner — is the rule. The facts are duly weighed, carefully balanced, always hedged. Their power to outrage, their power to truly

¹⁹⁵ Mills. [Letter to the New Left](#).

enlighten in a political way; their power to aid decision, even their power to clarify some situation — all that is blunted or destroyed.¹⁹⁶

How similar a worldview one detects in these words to what one reads in Marcuse's text on *Repressive Tolerance!* Mills complains that the reigning discourse prevents people from understanding society's "structural realities" and says that in the end "the real questions are not even raised". He points out that the assumption behind this mode of thinking is that all serious problems have been resolved and that welfare plus economic growth in the US equals a society that will only improve in the future. Calling this "false consciousness" and "provincialism", the author compares the freedom of speech in the US to what in his opinion existed in the USSR. (The belief that the two blocks were more or less equivalent industrial societies featuring a number of similarities was typical of a wide range of liberal to left-oriented intellectuals; The theory of "Convergence", postulating that industrialized capitalist and communist societies will be forced by technology to converge into very similar societies was much discussed in the West and eventually made its way into the Eastern Block, being echoed by Andrei Sakharov in the late 1960s in the USSR¹⁹⁷, also by Bulgarian dissident in London Georgi Markov in a letter from 1977.¹⁹⁸ The categorical insistence of equivalence in the scope of free speech, however, seems to have been more typical of left-wing intellectuals and that was a point that Marcuse brought to an extreme).

Mills then goes on to formulate the agenda of the Left as it should be: Connecting cultural and political criticism and addressing problems in every country around the world. Like Marcuse was to later stress in *One-Dimensional Man*, Mills states that the working class and the peasantry in developed countries can no longer be regarded as the agents of structural/historical change and that "ought not to be bypassed (as it is by many Soviet scholars and publicists, who in their reflections upon the course of advanced capitalist societies simply refuse to admit the political condition and attitudes of the working class)". Without being categorical about this, he points out intellectuals, including "negro and white students" in the US and around the world, as a possible agency of change.

¹⁹⁶ Mills. *Letter to the New Left*.

¹⁹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *The Theory of "Convergence" and/or "Futurology"*, 1970, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01194A000400140001-7.pdf>, (last accessed: May 7, 2019)

¹⁹⁸ Марков, Любен, *Аз бях той - 121 документа за и от Георги Марков*. Камя, София: 1999 (Markov, Lyuben, *Az byah toy – 121 dokumenta za i ot Georgi Markov*. Kameya, Sofia: 1999, document № 93.

As we can see, some of the seeds of the ideas developed further by Marcuse in the two later texts that this dissertation focuses on (and associated with the New Left) were already formulated here in 1960 (notwithstanding that they themselves are closely linked to even older concepts already existing by the Interwar period). The New Left Review was also founded in 1960 after a merger of two left-wing journals at Oxford “that had emerged out of the political repercussions of Suez and Hungary in 1956, reflecting respective rejections of the dominant 'revisionist' orthodoxy within the Labor Party and of the legacy of Stalinism in the Communist Party of Great Britain.”¹⁹⁹ Very likely the magazine’s name contributed to popularizing the label that the intellectual and political movement came to be known by. (Comparing the Suez crisis to the invasion of Hungary in 1956 is indicative of very strong left-wing political bias). The new journal explored subjects unorthodox by Soviet standards, but also too radical and somehow bypassing the socialist and social-democratic/labor debate in the West – “classlessness”, nuclear disarmament, “Marxist Humanism”, etc. This was to become the Marxism of the new Boomer generation in the West, characterized by enjoying a better and rapidly increasing standard of living by the early 1960s. This generation was more idealist and more likely to question authority than that of their parents; as universities were expanded and admission was democratized, those belonging to the Boomer generation were more likely to attend than ever before. Universities were thus going to become hotbeds of a new radicalism that, unlike the older Left radicalism of workers, was going to expand into concern with conditions abroad, into a desire for greater freedom of sexual expression and gender equality, into a quest for a new lifestyle.

New Left Weaknesses, Revealed by a Left-wing Critic

An article by Jack Newfield²⁰⁰ published in 1971 gives us a good perspective to understand how the New Left was changing or had changed the Left within the decade since C. Wright Mills had “mailed” his *Letter*.²⁰¹ Writing from a position sympathetic to the participatory

¹⁹⁹ New Left Review, *A Brief History of New Left Review (1960-2010)*, <http://newleftreview.org/history> (last accessed: May 3, 2015)

²⁰⁰ Jack Newfield was a prominent journalist, covering the New Left and the Civil Rights Movements, as well as author of books about the American SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), the Civil Rights and anti-war movements, and a book on Martin Luther King Jr.

²⁰¹ Newfield, Jack and Jeff Greenfield, *A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority*. Praeger, New York: 1971

democracy of the (also associated with the changing face of the Left) *Port Huron Statement*²⁰², Newfield criticized both the “consensus liberals” and “problem-solvers” who he views as having become indistinguishable from Nixonian conservatives in their cold-war mentality and support for the “Vietnam holocaust”. Simultaneously, the author criticized New Left politics as being too intellectual and suffering from “issue nymphomania” – jumping around between radical theoretical issues, instead of focusing on long-term issues, affecting millions of working Americans. The excessive “intellectualism” – the author claimed – often mutated into a willingness to support anti-democratic positions and even highly controversial groups like the Black Panthers, sometimes seem as criminal or even terrorist.

“Badly disconnected from everyday reality”, since 1952 the Democratic Party had started to forget about its white working-class base and had abandoned most economic issues in favor of “essentially sociological and cultural questions like affluence, suburbia, status anxiety and the role of art in a mass culture.”²⁰³ Together with that the Democratic Party during in the 1960s had started to look at problems involving the Black minority as an issue of color instead of a class issue²⁰⁴:

Instead of fashioning agencies and programs that helped everyone, black and white, programs like national health insurance, or a \$2.50 minimum wage law, or income guarantees, or tax reform that benefitted blue-collar families, or creating more jobs... instead liberals put their energy into marginal programs aimed at blacks and paid for by the middle class; programs like school busing, and civilian review boards, and something LBJ called an “unconditional war to abolish poverty. But it turned out to be something less. It turned out to be a patronage hustle for sociologists and consultants and a few black political operators. And it did not touch, much less fundamentally change, the lives of the black underclass.”²⁰⁵

On one hand this critique appears to have been vindicated by the realities of sharp racial inequality in American cities during the following decade – the 1980s. Perhaps even more importantly from the perspective of mapping the evolution of the Left, it highlights trends that have more or less remained characteristic of the transformed Left since the early 1960s to this day. Dealing with minority economic and integration problems, by redefining them through the prism of identity as opposed to class is perhaps the most typical example of New Left

²⁰² The 1962 *Port Huron Statement* was an SDS manifesto, written by Tom Hayden and other SDS members. The text, calling for participatory democracy, was completed just two years before the SDS drifted away from its pro-labor union positions.

²⁰³ Newfield, *A Populist Manifesto: The Making of a New Majority*, 40.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

politics that have persevered until today and have been partially adopted by moderate parties such as the Democratic Party in the US and similar center-left parties in Western Europe.

Practical political echoes of Marcuse's two formulations, which became popular among the American and German young New Left activists – the notion of Repressive Tolerance and the idea that the working class is no longer an agent of historical change in the West – can also be spotted among the policies that Newfield's opinion piece, cited above, reacts against. One key example is the ideological shift away from the Old Left priorities like the working class majority and their labor unions and its replacement with an ethnicized/racialized emphasis on economic inequality. The notion of **Repressive Tolerance** was introduced in an essay with the same name, published in 1965 and the notion that the proletariat in developed capitalist countries has low revolutionary potential and that **Alternative Revolutionary Forces** are needed was proposed in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). Both concepts will be discussed in-depth in Ch. 2, but a very brief summary could be formulated as follows: in Western societies "tolerance is *de facto* limited on the dual ground of legalized violence or suppression (police, armed forces, guards of all sorts) and of the privileged position held by the predominant interests and their 'connections'."²⁰⁶ Marcuse adds that, people living in liberal democracies like the United States are dominated by subtle invisible repression, which remains unnoticeable to most, leading them to even identify with its aspects. Therefore, classical freedom of expression is repressive and should instead be replaced with tolerance only for the left, even its radical violent strains, while the conservative/right, equated by Marcuse with the established institutions, should be subjected to a climate of intolerance:

The conclusion reached is that the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed. In other words, today tolerance appears again as what it was in its origins, at the beginning of the modern period--a partisan goal, a subversive liberating notion and practice. Conversely, what is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression.²⁰⁷

The idea of Alternative Revolutionary Forces, in brief, is that the working class – the traditional Marxist agent of history – is politically impotent and needs to be replaced with something else. Marcuse sees minorities – racial, but also women (viewed as a minority), marginalized groups, uneducated people, outsiders, but also third world peoples – waging wars of national liberation – as the new replacements for the revolutionary proletariat. Marcuse also formulated a

²⁰⁶ Marcuse, Herbert. *Repressive Tolerance*, in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, jr., and Herbert Marcuse, *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, 85.

²⁰⁷ Marcuse, 81.

connection between Third World national-liberation movements and protesting students in the West, as well as the hippies and beatniks, although according to Wiggershaus, he disappointed many of them by rejecting the notion that they, themselves, could be regarded as the direct new agent of historical change.²⁰⁸ In his monograph *One-Dimensional Man* where the concept is introduced Marcuse critiques Western societies in parallel with communist ones and claims that they are both essentially “totalitarian” due in large part to the “technology” and the “productive apparatus.” Essentially reiterating his earlier concept of Repressive Tolerance, Marcuse also blames the unfree state of society on one-dimensional man’s stifled thinking whose “subversive imagination” has been choked by having their needs satisfied. It is the white working class in the US that falls in this category, hence it has been incapacitated as an agent of change. It is minorities who “are kept in line by a brutality which revives medieval and early modern practices”; they along with radicals and third world peoples can be the new agents of change. And change “presupposes the repression of much that is now free and that perpetuates a repressive society.” Therefore Marcuse envisages a battle for liberty that requires “repression of much that is now free” and, more importantly in terms of Alternative Revolutionary Forces, that shift’s the radical’s figure of hope from that of the average worker to that of the minority. Hence, Marcuse’s concept elevates minorities and third world peoples thus increasing the interest of the New Left in “social justice” and the “empowerment” of marginal groups, minorities, and Leftist groups; similarly on the international scene, Marcuse increases the interest in solidarity with peaceful, but also with violent decolonization movements. It is these two key notions, whose political echoes are visible in the evolution of the Left after the 1960s that could be viewed at least partially as a Marcusean legacy on real politics.

Toward a Diverse Marxism

In his lecture to UNESCO on the occasion of Marx’s anniversary in May 1968, *Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution*, Marcuse echoed his point made in *One-Dimensional Man* and argued that one of the key changes in the potential for revolution was that the key theoretical and subversive practical framework had become global. He elaborated why that was different from before, considering “it may be objected that Marxian theory has always been ‘international’”, not least considering the international coordination of the socialist movement.

True, but this “internationalism” was oriented on the industrial working classes; counterforce within the framework of capitalism; today, they are, in the most

²⁰⁸ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 622-623.

advanced areas of corporate capitalism, not a subverting force. And, when subsequently attention was paid to the peoples in colonial and backward areas, they appeared mainly as adjunct, ally, “reservoir” (Lenin’s term) for the primary historical agent of revolution.²⁰⁹

Thus it becomes clear that the earlier “Old” Left internationalism was one generally confined up the end of the 1950s to the working class in industrialized or semi-industrialized independent countries, i.e. not a truly international movement covering mostly “white countries”, as well as some exceptions like Japan.

During the 19th century, Western Europe had been in the midst of a new modern era, arriving after the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Western societies had come to a stage where leaps in science, expanding educational opportunities, new ideas, and increasing material wellbeing coexisted with inherited social stratification, exploitation, and glaring material inequality. While the Classical Liberal school of thought exemplified by John Stuart Mill argued in favor of equal opportunities and on replacing privilege, guaranteed by birth, with a system of meritocracy, Karl Marx made a bold and unintuitive argument: instead of the established elites, Marx glorified not those who were more able, but the Proletarian – mostly destitute, usually illiterate or poorly educated and of no particular distinction. To traditional Marxists it was not the bright or the more able, but the “great unwashed” masses who were elevated into the prime collective agent of history, into a creature collectively superior to everyone else, including the educated and the successful. Lenin had attempted to make up for the obvious weakness of this premise with his doctrine of revolutionary vanguardism,²¹⁰ which interestingly enough returned some agency to the individual. Nevertheless, even if we were to ignore Stalin’s murderous rule, the record of communism time and again was one of repression and of unsuccessful attempts to catch up with the West. Yet by the late 1960s, even for those who had refused to see the obvious, it was clear that a system built by and for the proletariat was not one to bring about anything positive. As Wolin points out – rather mildly – after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 it became clear that the Eastern Block’s depressing record was pre-programmed: “[after 1968] Eastern European communism could no longer be explained as merely a historical “deformation” of Marxism; instead, it revealed something about the essence of Marxism itself.”²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 1968, *Herbert Marcuse*, p. 5, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0313.04

²¹⁰ Wolin, Heidegger’s Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse, 139.

²¹¹ Wolin, 137.

Whereas Lenin had attempted to alter the Marxist theory into something that could be applied to govern Russia – a country which was not the kind of industrialized society Marx had envisaged as most appropriate for a revolution – Marcuse seems to return to the original Marxist idea of a global revolution. While the proletariat may be uneducated and often incredibly cruel in its vengeful revolutionary zeal, it is at least part of the same ethno-cultural paradigm as its home-society. It denies the socio-economic order, but not the broad cultural order. Its aspirations may be international, but only insofar as the end goal of toppling capitalism around the world. Therefore, as Marcuse explained in his 1968 lecture in Paris, Marxist internationalism was neither truly global (as it focused on industrialized nations), nor multinational/multicultural as it focused on class and its international solidarity did not go further than the interest in world-round system change.²¹² Marcuse on the other hand, redefined the agent of change: since “industrial working classes” were no longer “a subverting force”, Marcuse looked toward “peoples in colonial and backward areas.”²¹³ Thus he made the bold move of granting agency and ultimately legitimizing, at first in the eyes of the Left, the Third World populations in addition to people standing at the margins of their home societies in developed countries. In addition to the idea that a single class could no longer bring about social transformation,²¹⁴ Marcuse thus gave agency not only to groups that had previously been unappreciated, but he also lent theoretical legitimacy to a new idea – that a plurality of people with different identities, as opposed to one single class, could bring about the coveted revolution. In this way, it could be argued, Marcuse contributed to the later popularity of the concepts of diversity and multiculturalism as something positive.

In his 1968 Paris lecture, where Marcuse was very specific about his alternative forces of revolution and their connection with the New Left, he clearly stated that there was a third alternative force to Communism and Capitalism – the New Left. He pointed out that the “theoretical framework (for a revolution) has become a global one”²¹⁵ with national liberation movements abroad and internal opposition from the student and Black Power movements “in the imperial metropole” being significant as forces that could undermine the system from within and from the outside.²¹⁶

²¹² Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 1968, *Herbert Marcuse*, p. 5, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 0313.04

²¹³ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 5.

²¹⁴ Abromeit and Cobb, Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader, 180-181.

²¹⁵ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 4.

²¹⁶ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 4-5.

The Marxian concept is geared to the development in the advanced capitalist countries, and in spite of the apparent evidence to the contrary, the fate of the revolution (as global revolution) may well be decided in the metropolises. Only if the strongest link in the chain becomes the weaker link can the Liberation Movements gain the momentum of a global revolutionary force, and the potential alternative become reality.²¹⁷

In addition to their potential to destabilize, Marcuse believed they could contribute to a true qualitative revolution because they also rejected the values of the status quo, thus making them instrumental in avoiding a repeat of the Soviet mistakes:

There appears [...] an alternative to the capitalist as well as the old (advanced) socialist societies: the struggle for a different way of socialist construction; namely, construction “from below”, but from a “new below”, not integrated into the value system of the old societies – a socialism of cooperation and self-determination, by the individuals, collective determination of their needs and goals, of the priorities, and of the method and pace of “modernization”.²¹⁸

Furthermore, Marcuse pointed out that while neither the ethnic minorities and the intelligentsia in developed countries, nor the National Liberation movements are exactly **the** singular new agent of revolution, the historical agent of change must be a collection of people who “reject the pseudo-democratic process”²¹⁹ negate the standard way of life in Western industrialized societies:

The ‘definite negation’ also in the sense that he belongs to a social class which is free from, that is, not infested with the exploitative needs and interests of man under capitalism, that he is the bearer, the Subject of essentially different, “humanistic” needs and values.²²⁰

While Multiculturalism was generally argued in favor of using constructive arguments, fitting within a more mainstream concept of Western democracies, Marcuse’s revolutionary formulations share one overlap: the fact that diverse peoples, including those from “backward” regions as well as people traditionally seen as occupying positions on the margins of Western society are given agency and respect. Both ideas share a disapproval of traditional societies with their rigid structures and normal and more or less uniform populations shaped by centuries of capitalism and the national state. Both of these ideas share the approach of placing the underdog on the pedestal of hope and change.

An additional characteristic of the New Left was that it retained a romantic sympathy and greater openness for the Eastern Bloc, even though it took a critical stance against Soviet

²¹⁷ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 6-7.

²¹⁸ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 6.

²¹⁹ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 8.

²²⁰ Reexamination of the Concept of Revolution, 12-13.

communism and the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet bloc also criticized the New Left: Marcuse, for instance, was criticized not only by non-Marxist democrats and conservatives, but his philosophy was also severely denounced by the representatives of Orthodox Marxism. To provide just one typical example out of many, at a conference in East Berlin in 1968, Prof. Kurt Hager, SED *Politbüro* member, denounced the Prague Spring and in that context people like Ernst Fischer and Herbert Marcuse.²²¹ Hager viewed Marcuse's theory as "solidification of the intelligentsia's isolation from the working class and therefore the solidification of its powerlessness."²²² In many Eastern Bloc nations, Frankfurt School authors were generally ignored and when they were mentioned, they were slammed as revisionist.

The duality in the New Left's attitude toward Communism is also evident in Marcuse's defense of his student and friend, the US Communist and Black rights activists Angela Davis, who was only too keen to meet with Erich Honecker in East Berlin in 1972. At the same time, while not distancing himself from Davis' decision to lend legitimacy to the GDR, in the late 1970s Marcuse also supported the GDR-dissident Rudolf Bahro, who had criticized the "real existing Socialism" in East Germany and had postulated a Marxist reform agenda; Marcuse even authored a text in 1979 analyzing and supporting Bahro's book *Die Alternative* (1977). His nuanced attitude, freed Marcuse (and the same could be said of the New Left as whole) of negative associations with the East, while they continued to pursue a radical left-wing agenda.

Support for Third World Dictators

Being critically inclined toward their own societies, but also critical (if from a generous sympathetic standpoint) of the Soviet system, another marker of the New Left was its support for Third World far-left movements, including those responsible for atrocities and the resulting dictatorships in newly independent colonies. As Wiggershaus points out, Marcuse's "theory of practical commitment" was only hinted at in *One-Dimensional Man*, but became evident in his text on repressive tolerance. A few years before publishing it, he had already stated his position:

Marcuse took sides with Sartre, who in 1961 had written an introduction to Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* expressing unreserved solidarity with it and describing the book as 'the Communist Manifesto of the anti-colonial revolution.' The German versions of Fanon's book and Marcuse's 'Repressive Tolerance' were

²²¹ Kraushaar, Wolfgang, 1968: *Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat*. Piper Verlag, München: 1998, 90.

²²² Peiter, Hermann. Wissenschaft in Würgegriff von SED und DDR-Zensur. Lit Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, Berlin: 2006, 89.

both published in 1966 – a literary symbol of what had begun to take place in West Germany among intellectuals and students.²²³

Wiggershaus goes on to point out that dedicating his essay to his students at Brandeis, Marcuse was essentially expressing his solidarity with the students who had become politically active, who were for example trying to end segregation and who did this, employing new tactics such as sit-ins and “go-ins”. While opposition to segregation was a broadly liberal cause, uniting a wide part of the political spectrum, in *Repressive Tolerance* Marcuse gave arguments to those students and activists who were willing to support violent anti-establishment and anti-colonial action:

But to refrain from violence in the face of vastly superior violence is one thing, to renounce a priori violence against violence, on ethical or psychological grounds (because it may antagonize sympathizers) is another. Non-violence is normally not only preached to but exacted from the weak--it is a necessity rather than a virtue, and normally it does not seriously harm the case of the strong. [...] In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary and reactionary violence, between violence practiced by the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, both forms of violence are inhuman and evil--but since when is history made in accordance with ethical standards? To start applying them at the point where the oppressed rebel against the oppressors, the have-nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by weakening the protest against it.²²⁴

This quotation, including the context leading to it, shows that while Marcuse “hedged” his thesis, he was quite clear in condoning violence against what he viewed as a repressive order. And perhaps from a communist anti-colonial perspective (even from the universal emotional perspective of siding with the underdog) he was correct, but from the perspective of morality and of ensuring orderly change his thesis is dangerous and has broad antidemocratic implications. This, in fact, coincides with Sartre whose preface to Fanon’s radical book was equally drastic. In the same text one sees positive mention of the Chinese and Cuban revolutions, together with the English civil war and the French Revolution – in other words, one can see that in addition to violence in theory, Marcuse also speaks approvingly of the violent regimes that had come to power in China and Cuba:

With all the qualifications of a hypothesis based on an 'open' historical record, it seems that the violence emanating from the rebellion of the oppressed classes broke the historical continuum of injustice, cruelty, and silence for a brief moment, brief but explosive enough to achieve an increase in the scope of freedom and justice, and a better and more equitable distribution of misery and oppression in a new social system--in one word: progress in civilization. The English civil wars, the French Revolution, the Chinese and the Cuban Revolutions may illustrate the hypothesis.²²⁵

Marcuse’s tacit toleration for Maoism was yet another legitimating factor for Chinese Stalinism - an overlap with the New Left radicals of the Student movement whose texts abound in

²²³ Wiggershaus, *The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theory and Political Significance*, 611.

²²⁴ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 104.

²²⁵ Marcuse, 106.

references to Mao and his “cultural revolution”. In fact the radical left-wing student activist and Marcuse’s friend Rudi Dutschke talked about the “long march through the institutions”²²⁶. While that envisaged a very different method of gaining influence, the allusion highlighted a positive attitude toward Maoism.

The Push toward Political Correctness

Just like C. Wright Mills, Marcuse writes about the end of ideology concept as the symbol of false consciousness that pervades all layers of society, whose veil of darkness can only be removed – in the interest of progress and of minorities – by an enlightened dictatorship of radical-left intellectuals:

In this society, for which the ideologists have proclaimed the 'end of ideology', the false consciousness has become the general consciousness--from the government down to its last objects. The small and powerless minorities which struggle against the false consciousness and its beneficiaries must be helped: their continued existence is more important than the preservation of abused rights and liberties which grant constitutional powers to those who oppress these minorities. It should be evident by now that the exercise of civil rights by those who don't have them presupposes the withdrawal of civil rights from those who prevent their exercise, and that liberation of the Damned of the Earth presupposes suppression not only of their old but also of their new masters.²²⁷

In a 1968 postscript to his essay on Repressive Tolerance, Marcuse also adds: “Part of this struggle is the fight against an ideology of tolerance which, in reality, favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination. For this struggle, I proposed the practice of discriminating tolerance.”²²⁸ In not so many sentences Marcuse equates the “end of ideology” argument, the preservation of rights and liberties, and the constitutional order to “false consciousness” and oppression. He therefore argues in favor of “discriminating tolerance”, removing rights and liberties, as a tool of liberation for minorities. It is a challenge not to see the overlapping reasoning between Marcuse’s argumentation and the notion of “political correctness” that would the New Left (and many social liberals) would later come to support.

The New Left vanguards were a wide array of multifaceted organizations such as the US Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) or the rather more liberal and less socialist Student Nonviolent Coordination Committee, which focused on reaching out to minorities, to smaller

²²⁶ Bergman, Dutschke, Lefevre and Rabehl, Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition, 89.

²²⁷ Marcuse. Repressive Tolerance, 107.

²²⁸ Marcuse, 110.

organizations and hippy communes. Anti-War organizations and anti-nuclear movements such as the Nuclear Disarmament Campaign in the United Kingdom also played a role. SDS issued in 1962 the *Port Huron Statement*, which in non-ideological terms problematized issues such as the racial oppression in the Jim Crow South, as well as the Cold War, calling for disarmament as a means of preventing nuclear war. This inclusion of liberal causes and moving away from strictly socialist aims expanded the New Left's appeal to a broad group of liberals.

It was roughly around that period – in 1965 – that Marcuse moved to the West Coast. Brandeis University refused to renew Marcuse's teaching contract due to his demand for tenure and in 1965 he moved to the West Coast and started teaching at the University of California San Diego where he was able to secure a better contract.²²⁹ Marcuse's move to the West Coast coincided with the period of rapid expansion of the protest movement, tied to the Vietnam War. Perhaps finding inspiration in the atmosphere and wishing to support it, Marcuse became more vigorous in his political activism. (A few years later, in 1967, Marcuse was to invite Rudi Dutschke to study with him in California. These plans were disrupted by the attempt on Dutschke's life in Germany. When they were leaked to the press, it caused an energetic reaction against "Red Rudi" and Marcuse by a local newspaper, *The San Diego Union*. Soon after UCSD was swamped with angry letter from local citizens while the American Legion campaigned against both Dutschke and Marcuse. In the end, after having his US visa delayed till the autumn of 1968, Dutschke ended up moving to the UK.)²³⁰

Marcuse's Students

In the Federal Republic of Germany, the New Left vanguard organizations were youth and student left-wing organizations, most of which had started their existence as associated with the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). As will be discussed in detail in later chapters, organizations such as SDS and SHB were eventually removed from the SPD family although there continued to be a connection through individual overlapping memberships – either with SPD (when that was not banned), between SDS and SHB, while the latter was still associated with SPD or with the Jusos. The latter organization was to become perhaps the biggest New Left organization in Germany to have preserved its connection to SPD until now. In the German

²²⁹ Theiler, Hendrik, *Systemkritik und Widerstand*. Tectum Verlag, Marburg: 2013, 85.

²³⁰ Klimke, Martin, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties*. Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford: 2010, 97-99.

cases, the conflict between the radical youth and the “mother party” started with the *Godesberg Program* and the SPD’s ideological break with Marxism. SPD wished to become a *Volkspartei* or a party open to all social classes and backgrounds – a source of constant tension with much of the Party’s youth, which was further exacerbated by the SPD’s subsequent decision to join a CDU-led grand coalition in 1966.

In some cases, like the Socialist German Student Union (SDS), the organization had started off with positions loyal to the party leadership, but had drifted away during the 1950s and 60s. The SDS was founded in 1947 as a socialist organization which was not problematic until the adoption of the Godesberg Program in 1959. Therefore SPD figures like the practical (and later boogeyman of the Party’s Left wing) Helmut Schmidt had been among its leaders. While the SPD moved to the right, SDS moved to the left with its Mannheim convention in 1958.²³¹ Among the other main catalysts for the alienation between SPD and SDS was the rearmament of West Germany within NATO, followed by disputes over the SDS’s pronounced Marxism and the SPD’s center-left non-Marxist direction. All this resulted in a decision by the SPD leadership in 1961 to make SPD and SDS membership mutually exclusive (*Unvereinbarkeitsbeschluss*).²³²

SHB, the Socialist University Alliance, was founded in 1960 as an SPD-loyal organization, intended to replace SDS, which the party had decided to disassociate from due to its increasing radicalism.²³³ With the decline and eventual disbanding of SDS in 1970²³⁴, the importance of other youth organizations like SHB increased. That did not last long, however, and SHB-membership was also eventually pronounced incompatible with membership in the SPD.

The Young Socialists (JUSOS) – the youth organization of the SPD – had a “right” wing that initially kept the organization close to the SPD-line. That changed, however, when the JUSOS federal congress in 1969 removed the moderate JUSOS chairman Corterier and replaced him with the fiery socialist Karsten Voigt. The same congress of the “SPD of the 1980s” approved demands ranging from preparing for the future socialist society and dismantling capitalism to

²³¹ Vinen, Richard, *The Long '68: Radical Protest and its Enemies*. Penguin Books, London: 2018, 173.

²³² Aly, Goetz, *Unser Kampf. 1968 – ein irritierter Blick zurück*. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.: 2008, 40.

²³³ Farik, Nora, *Interview with Klaus Meschkat: “Germany 1968 – SDS, urban guerrillas and visions of Räterepublik”*, 1968 Revisited: 40 Years of Protest Movements, Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2008, https://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/1968_revisited.pdf, (last accessed: 5 March, 2021), 40.

²³⁴ Vinen, 185.

nationalizing all large banks, capital-gathering enterprises, and key industries, and applauding all countries that recognize East Germany.²³⁵ A new leadership comprised entirely of the Juso's left wing demanded that the SPD change its direction toward socialism and system change.²³⁶ Nevertheless, an *Unvereinbarkeit Beschluss* was not imposed and the SPD had to go on dealing with their embarrassing youth branch throughout the 1960s and subsequently until today.

In the following chapters I analyze Marcuse's two key notions as "micro unit-ideas" and will trace their ideational connections to the current concepts of "political correctness" and "multiculturalism" (in Chapter 2). I also examine how policy projections of Marcuse's ideas were received and employed within radical youth left organizations (in Chapter 3). More specifically, this chapter examines the ideational evolution of SDS, SHB, Jusos, and Falken toward issues like foreign workers, political correctness, feminism and women's rights, and LGBT issues. In its second half, Chapter 3 examines the evolution of the SPD under pressure from its youth organizations, perhaps most decisively from the Jusos, looking at issues like: the dilemma between being a *Volkspartei* and maintaining the dialogue with the socialist students, relations with the East, the attitudes toward tolerance and foreign workers. In Chapter 4, these issues will be analyzed through the lens of the left-leaning media, primarily *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel*. Additional topics such as the Emergency Act, anti-militarism, and anti-patriotism, and Vietnam are also reviewed in addition to issues pertaining to foreigners and multiculturalism, women's and LGBT rights. Lastly, the attitude toward German expellees, the Axel Springer publishing house, the far-right, and combatting intolerance are reviewed and analyzed.

It may be generalized that it was precisely these youth left organizations where ideas, such as the ones that we are concerned with here, found the warmest reception. Therefore, the following chapters demonstrate with specific examples that it was these organizations that, together with the extra-parliamentary opposition (APO), were the vanguards of the New Left in Germany. Unlike APO, the youth left and especially Jusos (which were the only ones to survive the SPD leaderships attempts to maintain a direct line of communication and support from the radical youth without compromising the public image or *Godesberg* values of the

²³⁵ 14 December 1969, Nr. 51 – *Der Spiegel*: [Title not legible].

²³⁶ Braunthal, Gerard, *The German Social Democrats since 1969. A Party in Power and Opposition*. Routledge, New York: 2019, 27.

Party) put pressure on the SPD from within and contributed to the gradual adoption of some of these ideas, mindsets, or approaches.

Third World Liberation, Vietnam, and the Emergency Laws as Precursors to a Wave of Protests

Marcuse was the right man at the right time as far as gaining prominence and influencing with his ideas the thoughts of the rebellious youths of the Baby Boomer generation. Marcuse's critiques of Western capitalism and constitutional democracy, his utopian projects and apologisms for virulent protest at home and violence against colonialism abroad struck a chord with the generation of 1960s and 70s students. Growing up in relative post-war affluence, experiencing upward mobility, and often attending universities for the first time in their families, the youth of the 1960s had attained many of the goals of previous generations and had hit the glass ceiling of patriarchal social morality, the compulsion of fighting in the unconvincingly just Vietnam War, and was shocked by the threat of nuclear armageddon. Marcuse's ideas found excellent reception with this generation, because they – like the Baby Boomers – were interested issues beyond property, the means of production, putting bread on the table – priorities of the previous generation. Marcuse's ideas fit into a bigger move of reforming the Left, informed partially by geopolitical, technological, and social realities. His vague utopian ideas, promoting sexual liberation and overall pleasure resonated with the desires of the youth; his focus on minorities and Third World peoples seemed convincing to those who already thought about Vietnam as an injustice. Unlike other left-oriented intellectuals (including many from the Frankfurt School) Marcuse was willing to attend and speak at rallies, organized by radical students. Among the students influenced by Marcuse were the black rights activist Angela Davis and the Green Party proto-founder Rudi Dutschke. Marcuse continued to develop a radical line. His 1969 work, *An Essay on Liberation*, discussed in very positive light the communist national-liberation movements in Vietnam and other Third-World countries. In 1972 Marcuse published *Counterrevolution and Revolt*, where he claimed that the Left's aspirations formulated during the 1960s were being met by a "counterrevolution" from the right.

At this time, both in the USA and in West Germany, some of the youth were developing very negative attitudes toward the Vietnam War, which additionally fed the flames of protest.

Although the German student movement is considered to have begun in 1964²³⁷, it became increasingly prominent and visible around 1966. That probably had to do with the escalation of the Vietnam War: in 1965 the US sent its first ground troops and this led to increased media coverage in the West, some of which did not portray the US army in noble light. For Germany, the Vietnam War represented the first time since the end of World War Two when Germany was asked to send troops abroad, to Vietnam. The government of Chancellor Ludwig Erhard made the decision to support the American war effort symbolically – by sending, in 1966, a hospital ship to treat wounded American soldiers.²³⁸ Nevertheless, this stirred sentiments among the German Left.

Of course, while the Vietnam War awakened emotions in many hearts and minds, the topic of Third World liberation was intimately connected by the radical left with subjects such as media monopolies and with capitalism overall.²³⁹ Issues ranging from decolonization, conflicts with those governments that did not wish to allow black majority rule in Africa or even the situation in European countries ruled by military juntas were grounds for petitions, activism, and protests.

Later that year the formation of a CDU/CSU-SPD coalition headed by Kurt Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor and Willy Brandt as his deputy and foreign minister deeply offended those, whose political positions were to the left of the SPD leadership. Not only was Kiesinger accused of having been a member of the NSDAP, but (to put it in very broad strokes) many on the Left accused the government of creating a de facto one-party coalition state with no real opposition and of trying to legislate the so-called *Notstandsgesetze* or emergency laws, which would allow the government to restrict civil rights under certain circumstances like natural disasters or war²⁴⁰ (passed on May 30, 1968). All this contributed slowly but surely to the student protests in 1967 and 1968.²⁴¹

²³⁷ Becker, Thomas P. and Ute Schröder (Edt.), *Die Studentenproteste der 60er Jahre: Archivführer-Chronik-Bibliographie*. Böhlau Verlag, Vienna and Munich: 2000. In this work, we see that the initial activities took place as early as 1964.

²³⁸ von Lüpke-Schwarz, Marc, *German hospital ship saved thousands during Vietnam War*. In: *Deutsche Welle*. Accessed on: <http://www.dw.com/en/german-hospital-ship-saved-thousands-during-vietnam-war/a-17012714>

²³⁹ Theiler, *Systemkritik und Widerstand*, 87.

²⁴⁰ Theiler, 88.

²⁴¹ Bergman et al. The emergency laws, the Grand coalition, the “militarization and fascization” of society, “the exploitation” of poor countries by the rich ones, “America’s genocidal war in Vietnam”, the dictatorship of the Shah of Persia, and the monopoly of the Axel Springer media were some of the main reasons for the “student rebellion”, provided in the introduction to Bergman, Dutschke, Lefevre, and Rabehl’s book with the same name.

“1968”: When the New Left and Marcuse became Household Names

1968 is the year that most people associate with the student protests and the “explosion” of the New Left in Europe – the events that also made Marcuse a real household name. 1966, however, can be viewed as a symbolic starting year for the student movement as that was the year when the first university “sit-in” in Germany took place, only to be followed by the largest waves of student demonstrations in 1967-68 and by subsequent, somewhat smaller, protests throughout the following years after that.

On May 10, 1966, the SDS distributed leaflets at the Free University and Technical University, titled *“Informationen über Vietnam und Länder der Dritten Welt”*. This action highlighted the divisions within the SDS by causing a wave of internal discussions on the appropriateness of the formulations; it also highlights the Left’s newfound focus on “The Third World”.²⁴² It is also clear that the SDS leadership was well aware of Marcuse, because days later, on May 21st, it hosted a congress on Vietnam with Marcuse as the main speaker. The event took place in Frankfurt under the name “Vietnam – An Analysis of an Example” and ended with student demonstrations. The participants shouted “Ho-Ho-Ho-Chi-Min” together with representatives of the Cuban Communist Youth. Realizing how far-left the event would be, illustrating the internal divisions within the SHB, the organization’s group at Frankfurt University had distributed leaflets on May 16th against SHB’s federal leadership’s decision to participate, thus indirectly involving SPD in an event with Cuban communists where Mao’s Little Red Book was available for purchase. Marcuse’s position on Vietnam was pro-Vietcong and thus overlapping with that of the Soviet Bloc, as was that of the demonstrating students; Marcuse went as far as to call opposition to the Vietnam War a “moral duty”.²⁴³

Showing the complex relationships, the potential for conflict, and the gradient of radicalism among the youth Left organizations, a little over a week later, on May 26-27th, SHB chairman Christian Zöpel (FU) spoke in Hanover and criticized SDS’s “extra-parliamentary strategy”, declaring his support for a line of loyalty to the SPD. This move also illustrated the fact that while some young leftists were radical, they did not wish to break ranks with the respectable “mother party”, which could serve as a “launch pad” for political careers.

²⁴² Becker and Schröder, *Die Studentenproteste der 60er Jahre: Archivführer-Chronik-Bibliographie*.

²⁴³ Gilcher-Holtey, Ingrid, *Die 68er Bewegung*. C.H.Beck, Munich: 2001, 39.

In mid-June 1966 Berlin became the scene of large “Teach-ins” against Germany’s Emergency Laws. *Die Falken*, also associated with SPD, protested simultaneously against the Berlin opening of the movie “*Africa Addio*”; SDS issued a press-release acclaiming that the film relativizes colonialism and racism, thus making the protest against this film perhaps the first one comparable to modern protests demanding “political correctness”. The protests continued over the following months with the African Student Union also taking part thus highlighting the growing political role of foreigners in countries in like Germany, a development that Marcuse had called for. To place the events in Germany in a global context, August 1966 was when the Communist Party of China announced the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”. SDS decided to support this policy at its regular congress in Frankfurt, held a month later.

On September 9th 1966, the Hamburg daily *Die Zeit* published an article by Karl Heinz Janssen titled “*Neue Linke – Aufbruch in die Sackgasse? Der SDS, die aktivste und stärkste Studentengruppe in der Bundesrepublik*“. The article was interesting as it clearly defined the SDS as belonging to the „New Left“. Marcuse’s essay on Repressive tolerance came out in German in October of that same year. “The text strongly influenced the theoretical discussion within the SDS regional section in Berlin.”²⁴⁴ Even before that, however, it seems SDS and other New Left organizations had been acquainted with Marcuse’s work since they had invited him to speak at their Vietnam event.

Illustrating the “cracks” that had formed between Marcuse and some of his former Frankfurt School colleagues like Adorno was the attitude of the radical students toward them. On July 7th, 1967 Prof. Theodor Adorno held an academic lecture at the Free University’s largest auditorium – the Audimax. His talk was interrupted by SDS and Commune I members after refusing to support Fritz Teufel, who had been put on trial the previous day over leaflets that had supposedly encouraged an arson. This led to a conflict between Adorno supporters and protesters, 200 out of 1000 present leaving in protest. Three days later, on July 10th, Herbert Marcuse also spoke at the Free University’s Audimax before 2,500 students on the subject “The End of Utopia”; the following day he made another lecture in front of an even bigger audience of students on the subject of “The problem of violence within Opposition” and on July 13th, he spoke on the subject “Vietnam – the Third World and the opposition in the

²⁴⁴ Becker and Schröder, *Die Studentenproteste der 60er Jahre: Archivführer-Chronik-Bibliographie*, 113.

Metropolises”. Rudi Dutschke also took part in the latter two meetings²⁴⁵ highlighting how “at home” Marcuse was with the students and their leaders. Meanwhile in the United States, July 1967 was a time of race riots in Newark and other cities. With the number of casualties rising to 45 dead these tragic events highlighted the deadly potential of strife along one of the vectors identified by Marcuse as potentially ‘revolutionary’.

The following year on May 11th 1968, the “*Kuratorium Notstand der Demokratie*” organized a march with 40,000 participants in Bonn, supported by Heinrich Böll, FDP politician Wolfram Dorn, and others. During the same time, the student protests reached their most high-pitched point; a few days later, 800,000 labor union members organized a general strike in support of the students. Two days later, on May 13th Prof. Herbert Marcuse delivered another lecture before students at the Free University of Berlin on the subject “History, Transcendence, and Social Change”. 4,000 students were present at the Audimax and in other halls, where they could hear his voice through loudspeakers. Unlike his former colleague Adorno, Marcuse was welcomed by the student protesters as a messiah.

Highlighting the international potential of the New Left, a joint Franco-German joint demonstration took place in Saarbrücken on the same day. It was against the violence of the French police. Over the course of the following days, a number of demonstrations and events against the *Notstandsgesetze* took place.

Marcuse did not only attract crowds on his own, but his ideas were popular enough to attract the interest of fellow academics. For example, on February 11th 1969 in Saarbrücken the political scientist Prof. Dr. Konrad Schoen spoke at the Peter Wust University on the subject “Herbert Marcuse – Toward an Ideology of the New Left.”

In addition to their different priorities – for instance Daniel Cohn-Bendit found the German labor union demands – co-decision (*Mitbestimmung*), minimum wage, and a reduction of working hours “laughable”²⁴⁶ – the New Left had a different style as well. For the first time in history, protests were organized in such a way that they would be a source of fun and entertainment for those taking part in them.²⁴⁷ (While this dissertation does not examine the

²⁴⁵ Becker and Schröder, *Die Studentenproteste der 60er Jahre: Archivführer-Chronik-Bibliographie*, 149.

²⁴⁶ Kraushaar, *1968: Das Jahr, das alles verändert hat*, 163.

²⁴⁷ Aly, *Unser Kampf. 1968 – ein irritierter Blick zurück*, 39.

possible connection between the idea of having fun while protesting, it does to some degree match Marcuse's calls against the repression of human instincts developed in *Eros and Civilization* (1955).

These were new often in style – rather than only going on marches and rallies, the 1968 generation often opted for discussions, but also “sit-ins”, “go-ins”, “teach-ins”, discussions, but also for disrupting lectures organized by political opponents such as the “RCDS lackeys”. These modes of protest did not only express a position, but also prevented the other side from expressing its positions or prevented an organization from operating – a mode of action inspired by or coinciding with Marcuse's calls for intolerance to non-left ideas.²⁴⁸ The New Left, unlike the Social-Democrats, regarded its opponents as “enemies” and the list of opponents included people on the center and left: “former fascists and certain kinds of resistance fighters, the state-societal bureaucracy, the liberal bourgeoisie, representatives of monopolistic companies, the worker's traitors of the labor unions, [...] the centers of manipulation – Augstein and Springer.”²⁴⁹

Conclusion

This chapter looked at Marcuse's personal and academic biography, starting with his youth, his years with the Institute for Social Research, most of which in emigration, as well as his life and work after that – working for the US government, then in academia in the US, and finally as “the guru” of the New Left. This chapter also briefly identified aspects of the Left's evolution during the 1960s and 70s, and their connection to Marcuse's ideas – the core topic of this dissertation which is developed in chapters 2 through 4.

Herbert Marcuse started his philosophical journey as a young upper-class Marxist, looking for theoretical tools to explain the failures of Marxist political prognostication and for tools to criticize and subvert the “oppressive” capitalist society. Migrating from Heidegger to the Marxist-oriented Frankfurt School, moving from Germany to the USA, “mixing” Freud and Marx together with, perhaps, Heidegger or Sartre, and with Hegel, Marcuse took part in the creation of Critical Theory and was instrumental in preparing the scholastic rudiments of the New Left. During this whole time it was Karl Marx's philosophy that Marcuse remained

²⁴⁸ Bergman, Dutschke, Lefevre and Rabehl, Rebellion der Studenten oder Die neue Opposition, 73.

²⁴⁹ Bergmann et al., 88.

lastingly attached to, but he was quick to build up his own reading of it, enriched with ideas from other philosophers and with the multidisciplinary addition of psychology. The two main Marcusean concepts that this dissertation focuses on and their ideational relationship with the modern concepts of Multiculturalism and Political Correctness will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

Becoming prominent during the early 1960s outside of his narrow field, Marcuse did not shy away from speaking at student rallies and from “giving practical advice” to the radical students like Rudi Dutschke. Thus it is not merely Marcuse’s thought, but also him as a person that became intertwined with the story of the Left’s transformation. Marcuse’s books and articles may have been universally read on university campuses during the 1960s, but his influence on the Left would not have been nearly as big (the opposite being exemplified by his former colleagues like Adorno) if he had not been willing to speak at rallies, if he had not become a friend, adviser and confidante of prominent radicals like Angela Davis in the US and Rudi Dutschke in Germany.

Understanding the Left’s transformation and its lasting legacies in the case of Germany is tied not only to a theoretical analysis of Marcuse’s ideas and their ideational relationship to Multiculturalism and Political Correctness, but also requires a detailed review of how the radical youth Left organizations in West Germany evolved during the 1960s and 70s and how this affected their relationship to SPD. It is also necessary to examine the left-leaning press’ coverage of these organizations and events. In chapters 3 and 4 we will do just that by examining in detail the relationship between Marcuse’s two core notions of Repressive Tolerance and Alternative revolutionary forces in the context of Germany’s New Left youth organizations – SDS, JUSOS, and SHB.

Chapter 2

Repressive Tolerance and Alternative Revolutionary Forces: Two Marcusean Notions and their Intellectual Legacy

2.1. The Socio-Political Context


The socio-political context of Marcuse's 1965 essay on repressive tolerance, as well as his book *One-Dimensional Man*, published during the previous year - 1964, could be summarized with the phrase *Cold War*. The end of the 1950s and first years of the 1960s when Marcuse was likely developing some of the ideas that were to be laid out in his two texts was a complicated period of geopolitical and ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective aligned blocs. A conflict that remained cold due to the threat of nuclear war, some of its pressure was redirected toward the former colonies, many of which were engaged in protracted national-liberation wars – often proxy wars where one side was supported by the USSR and its Eastern European allies.

Because of their struggles, the Third World peoples were attracting increased attention – as fighters, victims, heroes, and martyrs. They were also to attract Marcuse's attention when formulating one of his ideas discussed here – that of alternative revolutionary forces. In addition to that, the Third World captivated the imagination of those who were critical of both the West and the East, usually people on the left. While some Western communists remained committed believers, many radical leftists and idealistic socialists grew more skeptical of Soviet communism after the bloody 1956 military intervention in Hungary.

The US, on the other hand, could easily be criticized for its double standard in being willing to prop up juntas and authoritarian regimes as long as they remained capitalist and aligned with the West. The Korean war of the early 1950s, the gradual intensification of US involvement in Vietnam, the Cuban civil war dragging on throughout the 1950s, the looming nuclear threat were all events that informed the worldview of critical minds like Marcuse's. These events created an impression of escalating tensions that, nevertheless, seemed to go along with an ever-increasing standard of living in the West. The start of the 1960s was thus marked by domestic stability and surface harmony, a contrast to horrors abroad that probably influenced Marcuse's perception of one-dimensionality.

Narrowing down the period to the immediate few years before publication, the time when Marcuse worked on his texts was the time of John F. Kennedy’s presidential term cut short by his assassination in November 1963. Judging by *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse was hardly impressed and regarded Democrats and Republicans as two sides of the same coin. Marcuse’s skepticism was likely increased by the initial and still relatively minor escalation of US involvement in the Vietnam War that took place after 1961 under Kennedy’s watch. While the US had been involved in the war prior to 1961, President Kennedy’s wish to bring about a faster resolution to the conflict required an increase in the number of troops on the ground, therefore intensifying the draft – a process that became even more visible as Lyndon Johnson took over as president.

This war effort brought the war to more and more American families whose sons received “invitations to the war”²⁵⁰ (conscription had remained in place consistently since World War Two even though the laws by which it had been regulated were changed a number of times and conscription numbers fell to four-digit figures in the years before the Korean War). Simultaneously, advances in media technology allowed the increased media attention to translate into televising the war and into an importation of the horrors of war into American living rooms. The moral doubt whether the US was indeed “doing the right thing” in Vietnam was further exacerbated by an array of popular protest songs like Bob Dylan’s “Blowin’ in the



Wind” (1962/63) and Phil Ochs’ “What Are You Fighting For” (1963). Left: Phil Ochs’ album from 1965/ Songs that came out after Marcuse’s texts as America got more bogged down in the War, such as Barry McGuire’s “Eve of Destruction” (1965), Tom Paxton, “Lyndon Told the Nation” (1965), Pete Seeger’s “Bring Em’ Home” (1966), and many others, also exemplify a societal mood that had been brewing in the years prior to their creation. This mood was also

²⁵⁰ A line from Lee Hazlewood’s song *No Train to Stockholm*. Even though the album that the song was a part of was released in 1970s, it could be viewed as reflecting the rising anti-war sentiments already visible in the first half of the 1960s: “Received your invitation to the war / I sent it back so please don't send no more / I'd rather rot in some jail all alone / Singin' 'freedom is where you think it is / But there ain't no train to Stockholm' / If I have to ride this train a hundred years / And all I drink is my own tears / I'll not kill for you or on my own / Singin' 'freedom is where you think it is / But there ain't no train to Stockholm”

present in other arts, such as literature, with novels like Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* (1961), Kurt Vonnegut's *Cat's Cradle* (1963), and Norman Mailer's *Why are We in Vietnam?* (1967) making American youth question their society. In addition to popular culture, critical sociological examinations of US society, dealing with the power of advertising, social class, and planned obsolescence, such as David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd* (1950), Vance Packard's *The Hidden Persuaders* (1957), and *The Status Seekers* (1959) also set the stage for the increased interest in an analysis of society's deficits. Herbert Marcuse's own essay on repressive tolerance and his book *One-Dimensional Man* thus attracted increased interest as they fit into the spirit of the times, while also encouraging it further.

The early 1960s were also a period when the Civil Rights Movement was already in full swing – another lasting issue in the United States that contributed to the idea that minorities could, by default, be considered more likely to reject a system that discriminated against them. The Civil Rights Movement also undermined confidence in America's moral superiority as it highlighted the country's democratic and normative deficits. Yet people on the left, like Marcuse, were growing impatient with the seemingly endless amount of criticism and protest that the US was able to absorb without becoming politically unstable – a likely source of inspiration for both texts discussed in this dissertation.

The erection of the Berlin Wall in the summer of 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crisis in the autumn of 1962 both contributed to a feeling of uneasy peace, perhaps for some, a feeling of imminent nuclear war. Realizing the outcome of such a war, many – surely Marcuse being one of them – regarded the West's strategies of Containment and Deterrence as dangerous, perhaps even madness. Yet the growing affluence in the West seemed to lead to increasing social stability regardless of the global risks.

The early 1960s were a time when the last cohorts of the so-called Silent Generation (1928-1945) and first cohorts of the post-war generation, the Baby boomers, were nearing or reaching adulthood. The Silent Generation, scarred by the poverty of the Great Depression, by the trauma of losing fathers in the War, and by the McCarthy years is regarded as contrasted with the following generation as being obedient and oriented toward wealth creation. Nevertheless

some social changes, for example in the field of divorce law, took place by 1942.²⁵¹ Many academics like Tom Hayden, author of the Port Huron Statement discussed here, Civil Rights leaders, and others belonged to the older generation that set the stage for those who came next. Baby boomers received an unprecedented access to higher education, attained a higher standard of living than ever before, and enjoyed greater freedom in the post-McCarthyist years (after 1954). All this created the conditions for social developments like the Sexual Revolution and the Hippie Movement, which was on one hand a reaction to growing affluence and on the other made possible by the greater freedoms enjoyed by individuals in the US.²⁵² Broadening horizons, increasing questioning of authority, and higher personal expectations all combined with the popularity of pacifist thinking, contributing to an increasing willingness among young men to reject the state's decision to send them off to fight.

All these stimuli, together with “the greatest antiwar movement the nation had ever experienced”²⁵³, created an intriguing, tense and romantic atmosphere of protest and hope. This was a social and political atmosphere which raised questions about the nature and limits of democracy and tolerance. Western societies like the US and West Germany tolerated the dissemination of critical texts, declarations (like C. Wright Mills' Letter to the New Left), and other publications reviewed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, as the common man enjoyed more comforts and personal freedoms within the system, dissenting voices within academia and culture seemed unable to sway more than a radical minority of radical youth, university students, and minorities, leading some like Marcuse to question whether merely allowing opposing voices was enough for the West to be considered tolerant.

It was within that period when young people were looking for answers and meaning – often for radical solutions – that Marcuse offered a number of his works and quickly gained popularity. Together with his willingness to speak before radical students in Berkeley, Berlin, Frankfurt and elsewhere, this helped elevate him to the position of one of the leading “gurus”²⁵⁴ or perhaps “cool grandfather” of the protest generation.

²⁵¹ The US Supreme Court ruled that all states had to recognize divorce rulings from the state of Nevada, which had become known for granting these rulings, unlike most other states, to any couple wishing to divorce.

²⁵² Unlike the earlier *Beatniks*, “named” by Jack Kerouac in 1948 and later made popular in his autobiographical novel *On the Road* (1957), hippies could form communes and live their lifestyle in a more sustained way. *On the Road* shows that this hadn't been possible for earlier *Beatniks* in quite the same way.

²⁵³ Zinn, Howard, *A People's History of the United States*. Harper Collins, New York: 2003, 469.

²⁵⁴ Writing about Marcuse and publishing a brief interview on the occasion of his 75th birthday in 1973, the Los Angeles Times writes that Marcuse was “proclaimed a guru by college demonstrators” in 1968. [Interview with](#)

2.2. Marcuse's Notion of "Alternative Revolutionary Forces" as a "Micro Unit-Idea" and its Consequences

2.2.1. The Common Understanding of Revolutionary Forces and Society's Mainstream as part of the Socio-Political Context

The broad socio-political context of *One-Dimensional Man* overlaps with that of Marcuse's essay on *Repressive Tolerance* described later in this chapter. The reason for that overlap is that both texts were published only a year apart – in 1964 and 1965 – and even though the book (published in 1964) certainly took longer to write than the essay, they could be seen as belonging to and reflecting the same historical period. (In fact, *One-Dimensional Man* contains some of the policy proposals that Marcuse expressed more clearly in his subsequent essay on tolerance.) Therefore, this section will expand on the description of the socio-political context in Ch.2.2.1 with a focus on society's understanding of what was mainstream and what was revolutionary.

Considering that the first half of the 1960s—when Marcuse worked on *One-Dimensional Man*—was the height of the Cold War, the global rivalry between the US and USSR and their political and economic systems was a major determining factor in what was considered mainstream and what was viewed as "revolutionary." Ideas seen as broadly "communist" were considered potentially threatening to the established system in the US. Traditionally, in Marxist thought, it was the working class that was viewed as revolutionary by default. This notion was coined by Marx and Engels who in their 1848 Communist Manifesto wrote that "the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains."²⁵⁵ That point may have been accurate in the middle of the 19th century when workers usually owned no property, made barely enough money to sustain themselves, were exploited in terms of working hours and conditions, were unable to rely on a social safety net, and were in many cases barred from voting by existing

Herbert Marcuse on the occasion of his 75th birthday, *The Los Angeles Times*, 1973, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2004.07-27

Already in January 1969, Newsweek had referred to Marcuse as "the reigning philosopher and one of the major heroes of the rebellious movement known as the New Left."

Article about Herbert Marcuse, *Newsweek*, January 1969, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2020.??

²⁵⁵ Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party. 1848, accessed on: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf>

property qualifications.²⁵⁶ That situation, however, had clearly changed – especially in the United States – by the time World War Two ended. According to Robert Paul Wolff, American pluralism mandated that “every genuine social group had a right to a voice in the making of policy and a share in the benefits.”²⁵⁷ By the time the United States joined World War Two, the country’s economy was booming. By the time the War ended, the US had become the world’s undisputed global power – militarily and economically – but also in terms of social and democratic inclusion of much of its population that enjoyed unprecedented levels of upward mobility. Wolff goes on to add in his analysis of American pluralism that becoming recognized as a genuine social group was “the most important battle waged by any group in American politics.”²⁵⁸ By the beginning of the 1960s there was little doubt that the American working class was not only enjoying an unprecedented high standard of living, but also that it had, generally speaking, successfully achieved this recognition as labor unions, too, had become an established as part of the legitimate mainstream.²⁵⁹ In other words, the working class in 1960s America was nothing like the exploited proletarian class described in the Communist Manifesto, because – simply put – it had acquired political rights, property and amenities, as well as the promise of upward mobility, resulting in a vested interest to maintain the status quo.

As far as organized labor, in exchange for being admitted to the mainstream (and as a result of McCarthyist pressures), labor unions had by the onset of the 1960s distanced themselves from far-left and pro-Soviet forces such as the Communist Party USA and had – like most workers themselves – embraced the idea of working within the existing system.²⁶⁰ Anticommunist pressures of the Cold War, the comparatively high and steadily improving standard of living, as well as the opportunities to achieve greater social rights had brought the working class into the fold of the American mainstream.²⁶¹ Furthermore, as Marcuse points out, automation had

²⁵⁶ In the United States, for example, it was in 1828 when white men who did not own property gained the right to vote. In the United Kingdom, a series of voting reform acts gradually increased the number of men who could vote throughout the 19th century, but it was not until 1918 that men could finally vote regardless of their economic class and many women could also vote.

²⁵⁷ Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance, 45.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ The situation in countries like West Germany was not dissimilar as the country was enjoying its *Wirtschaftswunder* and the working class was politically represented by legal labor unions and the SPD (the party altered its political direction, removing the last truly Marxist positions, with the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959).

²⁶⁰ Schrecker, Ellen, McCarthyism's Ghosts: Anticommunism and American Labor. In: *New Labor Forum*, No. 4, 1999, 14.

²⁶¹ This point is somewhat relativized in an interview with Isaac Deutscher in 1967 where he argues against the New Left idea that workers are no longer a historical force of revolution, stating that labor union leaders and older workers are not indicative of overall worker sentiments. Simultaneously highlighting the importance of the

made many jobs less physically strenuous and cleaner – if not necessarily less repetitive. Marcuse followed a broad range of academics, critical journalists, and popular sociologists, so he was well aware of developments described already in the 1950s by sociologists such as C. Wright Mills or Vance Packard (more on those influence in the following section). The number of white-collar positions within the working class increased relative to blue-collar positions – a phenomenon described by C. Wright Mills in his book *White Collar: The American Middle Classes* (1951). Workers were becoming more integrated into the “life” of the businesses that employed them and these businesses were increasingly responsive to the specific needs of workers.²⁶² This is not to say that workers were always happy and had no demands. On the contrary: media articles, such as one about Ford workers from 1970 point out that younger workers were more and more demanding than their older colleagues.²⁶³ This, however, was met by willingness on the part of American capital to improve conditions and increase wages, which, as subsequent history demonstrates, kept this social class within the “system”.

In other words, while some workers held radical Marxist positions, the majority had been (for the time being) successfully integrated into the American socio-economic mainstream. That is an important aspect of the socio-political context of the late 1950s and early 1960s that explains the desperation of left-oriented thinkers like Marcuse when considering the applicability of the Marxian notion of workers as a revolutionary force to 1960s America. That apparent lack of structurally-determined opposition to the market economy – contrary to both Marx and the positions of orthodox Marxists-Leninists – was the intellectual starting point of Marcuse’s analysis. As will be expanded in following section, Marcuse, furthermore, did not view the Soviet system as one offering a genuine alternative to the American model. His analysis went beyond the dichotomy “democracy vs. totalitarianism”, which he viewed as “bad political science”. Instead, he saw a convergence (arguable, not unlike many non-Marxists at that time, too.) between these opposing Cold War actors, determined by the industrialization of their economies and making them similarly unfree while, apparently, offering very different levels of freedom.

increasing economic wellbeing, he argues that older workers are biased in supporting the system by their memories of the Great Depression: “They remember how desperately badly off they were in the 1930s. Now they are a little better off, so they gaze at their televisions and ride in their cars. But these crumbs from the table of the affluent society do not satisfy you and they do not satisfy the young workers.”

In: Deutscher, Isaac, *Marxism and the New Left*, In: *Marxism in Our Time*, The Ramparts Press, Berkeley, 1971, <https://www.marxists.org/archive/deutscher/1967/marxism-newleft.htm>, (last accessed on April 10, 2021)

²⁶² Marcuse, Herbert, *One-Dimensional Man*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, Oxon: 1964, 26-36.

²⁶³ *Young Workers Raising Voices for Factory and Union Changes*, Agis Salpukas, In: *The New York Times*, 6.1.1970, In: *Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität*, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2000.33

2.2.2. The Relationship to Older Ideas

The notion that Marcuse's critique offered or at least seemed to offer a progressive "third way", based on this critique of both the capitalist West and the communist East, is closely linked to the idea of Marcuse as an intellectual "guru" of the New Left. Douglas Kellner opens his introduction to the second edition of *One-Dimensional Man* with that point, arguing that the book was "taken up by the emergent New Left as a damning indictment of contemporary Western societies, capitalist and communist."²⁶⁴ As the weight of the New Left shifted toward young and educated people, Marcuse's work found an audience hungry for his ideas: "Perhaps its primary effect was to give privileged students a sense that they too were the victims of a system that had more obviously oppressed minorities and poor people. It gave them a vocabulary to articulate the discontent that they felt couldn't be described in traditional Marxist class categories."²⁶⁵ Unsurprisingly, this new reinvented version of the Left, which Marcuse strengthened, looked back at a richer ideological palette than, both, its orthodox communist counterpart and the less ideological (and more pragmatic) social-democratic political vector.

In attempting to define his intellectual background, Kellner labels Marcuse a "Hegelian-Marxist" and points out that his work articulated that "concept of philosophy and critique of dominant philosophical and intellectual currents: positivism, analytic philosophy, technological rationality, and a variety of modes of conformist thinking."²⁶⁶ The influence of Hegel and Marx (who is himself influenced by Hegel) was already visible in Marcuse's earlier works like *Reason and Revolution (1941)* and he tried to absolve Hegel "of responsibility for

²⁶⁴ Kellner, Douglas, Introduction to the Second Edition. In: Marcuse, Herbert, One-Dimensional Man. Beacon Press, Boston: 1991, xi.

Note: Since Kellner classifies both communist and capitalist societies as "Western" it could be assumed that he is using the term as a synonym for "developed", "advanced", "industrialized".

²⁶⁵ Interview with Martin Jay conducted as part of this research project. Full question and answer: Q: "How would you assess the degree of influence that Herbert Marcuse exerted on the political life in West Germany and the United States during the 1960s and 70s?"

A: "I can only speak about the American context, where Marcuse was an increasingly significant intellectual presence in the nascent New Left after One-Dimensional Man was published in 1964. The book's impact, however, was not immediate, but only picked up steam when the student movement grew in scope and ambition around 1968. Perhaps its primary effect was to give privileged students a sense that they too were the victims of a system that had more obviously oppressed minorities and poor people. It gave them a vocabulary to articulate the discontent that they felt couldn't be described in traditional Marxist class categories. In tactical terms, some factions of the New Left also seemed to draw on the lessons of his 1965 essay on "repressive tolerance" to shout down speakers with whom they disagreed, especially over the justification for the Vietnam War. By the end of the decade, Marcuse's general impact was already being assessed in collections such as Critical Interruptions, edited by Paul Breines, and at meetings of the Socialist Scholars Conference, where I participated on a panel with Breines and Ronald Aronsohn in 1969."

²⁶⁶ Kellner, xiii.

the totalitarian states”, which many thought his philosophy had given rise to.²⁶⁷ This critique of Hegel was also levelled against Marx, most notably by Karl Popper in his monumental work *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945) where he traces the two philosophers’ ideational legacy to Aristotle.²⁶⁸ (German Idealists are often connected to both Plato and Aristotle, but many authors emphasize that Platonic influences aren’t direct, but through an Aristotelian reading of his teacher). Aside of attempting to absolve Hegel and Marx of their “sins”, as MacIntyre points out in his book on Marcuse, the latter also stands apart from Hegelianism in rejecting the teleological interpretation of history²⁶⁹, which reflects the presence of further influences.

These influences can be found in Marcuse’s thought, both in general and specifically in his ideas articulated in *One-Dimensional Man*. As was elaborated in greater detail earlier in this dissertation, a further influence on Marcuse came from Heidegger’s critique of Western philosophy and his attempts to develop a new philosophy,²⁷⁰ as well as from Heidegger’s views on authentic and inauthentic existence as the core aspect of being (*Dasein*). Perhaps this side of the German philosopher provided some of the inspiration for Marcuse to aim toward the formulation of a new rendition of Marxist thought.

Heidegger and Existentialism inspired Marcuse, according to Kellner, because of their novel focus on “concrete problems of existing individuals” rather than abstract theoretical ideas.²⁷¹ Marcuse’s rejection of positivism and rationality (as substitute for ideology), which the philosopher accuses of redefining fundamental human problems into status-quo-affirming resolvable issues, perhaps lies in the adoption of the Heideggerian approach to thinking about the world. In fact, Marcuse’s leaning toward Heidegger’s pattern of tackling social problems (itself building upon Husserl’s Phenomenology) and his attempt to merge that mode of analysis with Marxism are characteristic of his entire intellectual output:

In his early works, Marcuse himself attempted to synthesize Heidegger’s phenomenological existentialism with Marxism, and in *One-Dimensional Man* one recognizes Husserlian and Heideggerian motifs in Marcuse’s critiques of scientific civilization and modes of thought. In particular, Marcuse develops a conception of a

²⁶⁷ Kellner, *Introduction to the Second Edition*, xvi.

²⁶⁸ According to Popper, Hegel’s state’s “might must permeate and control the whole life of the people in all its functions” rendering it totalitarian.

Popper, Karl, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. Vol. 2, *The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*. London, Routledge: 1945, 258.

²⁶⁹ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 55.

²⁷⁰ Kellner, xiii.

²⁷¹ Kellner, xiii-xiv.

technological world, similar in some respects to that developed by Heidegger, and, like Husserl and Heidegger, sees technological rationality colonizing everyday life, robbing individuals of freedom and individuality by imposing technological imperatives, rules, and structures upon their thought and behavior.²⁷²

In addition to taking both of these philosophers' skepticism of technological society further and merging it with the Marxist understanding of subjugation, Marcuse also looks at the role of culture and speech on people's consciousness – a topic that Husserl worked on as early as his *Logical Investigations* published in the early 20th century.

Lastly, a brief review of Marcuse's intellectual influences, especially in the context of *One-Dimensional Man*, would be incomplete without Freud. It is a matter of discussion whether Freud could be classified fully as a philosopher and it is known that he hardly identified that way. Nevertheless works such as *Civilization and its Discontents* (1930), which significantly influenced Marcuse, could certainly be read as works of philosophy. While Marcuse had dealt with Freud since his days at the Frankfurt School, Paul Robinson, in his book *The Freudian Left*, argues that Marcuse really "discovered" him while working on his book about him – *Eros and Civilization* – during the 1950s.²⁷³ Freud's influence could be observed both in *Repressive Tolerance* and also in *One-Dimensional Man* that came out the previous year. Marcuse agreed with Freud's idea of the death instinct as part of his interest in negation and destruction as instruments of improvement: "Marcuse plunged into the depths of negation only in order to ascend to a loftier version of human affirmation."²⁷⁴ He also takes out from Freud a commitment to overcoming the societal repression of good human instincts as a goal for his desired society. At the same time, while he does discuss the issue of sexual repression and does adhere to the post-Freudian vision of society, elaborated in *Eros and Civilization*, "in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) he has reverted to the political, the explicitly Marxian, preoccupations of his early writings."²⁷⁵

In addition to the ideational ties between Marcuse's thought and that of earlier philosophers (and Freud), Marcuse was also influenced by some of the leading current sociologists of his day whom he trusted with data-based descriptions of his contemporary society. Kellner points out that Marcuse drew on a wide range of academic sources for his critique of industrial society—ranging from "French theories of the technological society and the new working

²⁷² Kellner, Douglas. *Introduction to the Second Edition*, xiv.

²⁷³ Robinson, *The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse*, 150.

²⁷⁴ Robinson, 186.

²⁷⁵ Robinson, 234.

class” to C. Wright Mills, Daniel Bell, Vance Packard, “and critical journalists like Fred Cook for examples of the trends that he sees in contemporary U.S. society.”²⁷⁶ Kellner also points out that Marcuse looked at trends in communist societies, too, which were also part of his analysis of industrialized society—even if as an illustration of the similarities to the West. Finally, Marcuse’s archive at Frankfurt University reveals that Marcuse relied for information and was likely influenced by the periodicals of his time: perhaps rather typical for an intellectual of that era, his archive contains a very large amount of newspaper and magazine clippings on topics like the Vietnam war and the military-industrial complex, workers’ rights and the civil rights struggle, changing social mores, the role of advertising, etc.

These intellectual ties between Marcuse and earlier as well as contemporary thinkers and scholars demonstrate the embeddedness of this thought within an ideational continuum. While the Marxian connection is most undeniable – Marcuse was perfectly open about being a Marxist and a Socialist²⁷⁷ –, he also built upon Heidegger’s critique of modernity and his quest for a new philosophy, Husserl’s focus on the meaning of language and its role in shaping perception, as well as Freud’s analysis of the battle between instincts and civilization. At the same time, Marcuse’s interest in popular contemporary academics show that he followed and was, likely, influenced by contemporary US critiques analyzing the developments within American society and the risks and illnesses of advanced industrial society. This made his critique intellectually rich, but also accessible to the average university student. It also meant that his critique was directly relevant to American society and also those Western societies, such as West Germany’s, that had been directly influenced by American culture, politics, and free market capitalism.

²⁷⁶ Kellner, Douglas. Introduction to the Second Edition, xxiv.

²⁷⁷ A very clear example of that was his written address to the Socialist Scholars Conference in New York City in September 1966, which has been preserved at the Marcuse Nachlass at UB-Frankfurt under archival number 1438.1, p. 8-10/10 (photos 05218-05220). The text is Marcuse’s formulation of the “task of the socialist scholar today” reflecting his own self-identification with that label.

2.2.3. Analyzing “Alternative Revolutionary Forces” as a Micro Unit-Idea

One-Dimensional Society and One-Dimensional Thought

Herbert Marcuse developed his notion of alternative revolutionary forces in one of his most well-known works, *One-Dimensional Man* (1964). The book, which according to MacIntyre is unusually pessimistic and, compared to Marcuse’s previous works, is insufficiently Marxist (“relinquishing of any distinctively Marxist—as against Hegelian—categories”),²⁷⁸ is divided into three parts entitled “One-Dimensional Society”, “One-Dimensional Thought”, and “The Chance of the Alternatives”. As the title suggests, the first part is essentially a portrait of the society that Marcuse criticizes, while the second focuses on the intellectual components that he sees as “anchors” keeping the status quo stable. The third part of the book is the shortest, but perhaps the most relevant from the perspective of the new notion of alternative revolutionary forces. It is really only within the conclusion that Marcuse clearly outlines his vision of change and its alternative agents, so while the previous two chapters and more descriptive and analytical, the third one is more prescriptive.

While the book’s first two sections do not directly deal with the idea of alternative revolutionary forces (or more broadly with Marcuse’s vision for an alternative), it is important not to ignore that part of the book, because it provides a window into Marcuse’s perception of the problem and its genesis, and also shows why he sees the problem as almost unsolvable. Being able to “see into” Marcuse’s perception of the problem also sheds light on his intention in “uttering his utterance” (Skinner) when it comes to his formulation about *alternative revolutionary forces* – one of the book’s essential points. Knowing how he sees the nature of the problem allows us to gain a clearer perspective of why he is motivated to propose precisely the solution that he proposes.

Marcuse’s argument about the state of then-contemporary industrial society could be summarized as follows: He opens with the statement that “a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress.”²⁷⁹ He argues that freedom of thought, speech, and conscience, as well as free

²⁷⁸ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 62.

²⁷⁹ Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 3.

enterprise, were originally “critical ideas”, but have “[lost] their former content.”²⁸⁰ The reason lies in the fact that “freedom from want [...] is becoming a real possibility” and society is more and more able to satisfy people’s needs, making it reasonable to shrink the scope of the opposition to discussing alternatives within a materially and organizationally successful status quo.²⁸¹ Nevertheless, society retains significant irrational aspects, which according to Marcuse means that civilization is rational in its irrationality.²⁸² This analysis, while it is logically stated, refers to philosophical concepts and offers anecdotal examples is, as MacIntyre notes critically, “very loosely” supported by evidence.²⁸³

Marcuse goes further and labels his contemporary society “totalitarian.” He associates that label with “industrial society” and replies to the obvious counter-arguments by stressing that “‘totalitarian’ is not only a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical coordination, which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests.”²⁸⁴ Marcuse explains, furthermore, that unlike the USSR, which he also describes as totalitarian, the totalitarian nature of American society is caused by “a specific system of production and distribution which may well be compatible with a ‘pluralism’ of parties, newspapers [...]”²⁸⁵ In other words, Marcuse sees this society as one manipulating people into voluntarily supporting this “totalitarianism”. He claims this is a society that wages “warfare on liberation” by “implanting of material and intellectual needs that perpetuate obsolete forms of the struggle for existence.”²⁸⁶ Therefore, this society allegedly becomes deaf to destabilizing critiques. In that context MacIntyre points out that if that were truly the case, then the fact the book has been written and has any readers would invalidate its thesis. This not so, as Marcuse explains, because “there are forces and tendencies in society which now run counter to the tendency that his book describes”.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁰ Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 4.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Marcuse, 11.

²⁸³ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 63.

²⁸⁴ Marcuse, 5.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Marcuse, 6.

²⁸⁷ MacIntyre, 63.

False Needs and Marcuse's Target Group

According to Marcuse, needs going beyond the basic biological ones have “always been preconditioned.”²⁸⁸ Therefore he is less interested in formulating a list of authentic human needs to oppose to those that he sees as borne by people's false consciousness. Instead he focuses on the nature of these false needs and asserts that they have been “superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression” and are therefore “the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice.”²⁸⁹ Marcuse's point about false needs is one of the several elements in the book that offer some insight into Marcuse's target audience. When it comes to “false needs”, for example, he stresses that:

Their satisfaction might be most gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a condition which has to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is euphoria in unhappiness. Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this quality of false needs.²⁹⁰

This wholesale dismissal of the mass understanding of needs as “false needs” implies that Marcuse is addressing a minority—a fraction of his contemporaries, which perhaps enjoys some of the same things the average American likes, but one that is willing to entertain the idea of a different society without these “fake” comforts. In other words, Marcuse was addressing a minority willing to reject the “good way of life—much better than before,”²⁹¹ as Marcuse sums it up. MacIntyre criticizes Marcuse for his theses on false needs, arguing that they entail “inescapable elitist consequences” and also tracing this argument's ideational lineage to Feuerbach's pre-Marxist ideas of men being molded by circumstances.²⁹² Marcuse's elitist bend is certainly something that this author also detected throughout the book. In the context of *One-Dimensional Man's* likely target audience, this further reinforces the impression that the minority Marcuse was addressing consisted of relatively highly-educated and politically radical individuals seeking a new society.

This elitist streak appears to blend into a kind of Old World conservatism of tastes and manners – perhaps a form of *Kulturkritik* – that Marcuse, for all his progressive ideas, probably carried

²⁸⁸ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 6-7.

²⁸⁹ Marcuse, 7.

²⁹⁰ Marcuse, 7.

²⁹¹ Marcuse, 14.

²⁹² MacIntyre, *Marcuse*, 64.

due to his age and European origin. A notable example can be found in a passage where Marcuse laments that repressive society has compensated people for its unfree state by granting people more liberties, including a blank check to behave in ways that he does not consider stylish: “The degree to which the population is allowed to break the peace wherever there still is peace and silence, to be ugly and uglify things, to ooze familiarity, to offend against good form is frightening.”²⁹³ Marcuse argues that this is caused by a rejection of the Other and an invasion of the private sphere of existence, “[... compelling] the Other to partake of their sounds, sights, and smells.”²⁹⁴ While this argumentation is meant to support his core point about contemporary society, it comes across as not only surprisingly conservative, but also as seemingly directed against common people who do not live up to Marcuse’s aesthetic and behavioral standards. This reconfirms the notion that the common man is not part of Marcuse’s target audience.

Marcuse also addresses the question of defining true needs, but avoids offering a concrete prescription on how they could be determined. The only needs he lists as doubtlessly genuine are basic necessities for survival like shelter, food, and clothing.²⁹⁵ As far as any other real needs outside these categories, Marcuse states that “vital” needs will elucidate themselves once a new society is created – “if and when [people] are free to give their own answer”²⁹⁶. While warning against self-appointed groups making these decisions, he also reiterates the point that individuals live in a fake reality: “the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the individual does not establish autonomy.”²⁹⁷ This reformulation of his earlier point that the vast majority of people are unable to realize their true needs in the current society, which would arguably alienate anyone who values their increasing standard of living, is another indication of Marcuse’s limited target group.

MacIntyre addresses the point that in Marcuse’s earlier writings he had equated happiness with freedom; therefore, he asks whether, according to Marcuse in *One-Dimensional Man*, people no longer want to be free since society has made them happy.²⁹⁸ He answers that, in fact, this is not the case, because Marcuse “makes it clear that this happiness is not true happiness.”²⁹⁹

²⁹³ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 249.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

²⁹⁵ Marcuse, 8.

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Marcuse, 10.

²⁹⁸ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 65.

²⁹⁹ MacIntyre, 65.

One form of true happiness promoted by Marcuse is connected with reducing the amount of work people do rather than pursuing an increasing standard of living. This understanding can be traced back to Marx's notion of the "abolition of labor" or as Marcuse refers to it – the "pacification of existence."³⁰⁰ It can also be connected with Marx and Engels' idea of false consciousness as presented in *German Ideology* (1842). Going even further back, Marcuse also invokes Aristotle's principle that "all existence that spends itself in procuring the prerequisites of existence is [...] an 'untrue' and unfree existence."³⁰¹ That is not meant to imply that doing any kind of work automatically makes one unfree, but that if members of a social class have to spend most of their lives working to make a living, then they are still essentially enslaved even under mid-20th century conditions. Therefore, Marcuse opposes the existing situation to a hypothetical society where people are freed from necessity, thus making their existence *true*. He asserts that the technological progress of society has rendered radical change necessary and also achievable under a different social organization:

Advanced industrial society is approaching a stage where continued progress would demand the radical subversion of the prevailing direction and organization of progress. This stage would be reached when material production (including the necessary services) becomes automated to the extent that all vital needs can be satisfied while necessary labor time is reduced to marginal time. From this point on, technical progress would transcend the realm of necessity, where it served as the instrument of domination and exploitation which thereby limited its rationality; technology would become subject to the free play of faculties in the struggle for the pacification of nature and of society.³⁰²

In addition to criticizing modern industrial society with its focus on work, productivity, and an ever-increasing standard of living, Marcuse also criticizes the apparent pluralism and the media (in quotation marks) which contribute to an "equalization of class distinctions". This has the "ideological function" of spreading throughout society the (false) needs that "serve the preservation of the Establishment."³⁰³ Marcuse concludes that rather than being signs of a more free and more equal society, the convergence of needs and tastes "flattens out" society, not by robbing it of diversity, but by reducing opposition to it: "a pattern of *one-dimensional thought and behavior* in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms of this

³⁰⁰ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 18.

³⁰¹ Marcuse, 132.

³⁰² Marcuse, 18.

³⁰³ Marcuse, 10.

universe.”³⁰⁴ In other words, society needs not repress its citizens, because it can now control them through the new needs it creates and promulgates.³⁰⁵

The Notion of “Refusal” as a Weapon against “Alienation” and a “Closed” Society – Examples of Philosophical Semantics

Aside from analyzing some of Marcuse’s more structured arguments, we may gain a better understanding of *One-Dimensional Man* intellectual place by taking a closer look at some instances of philosophical semantics (Lovejoy) employed by Marcuse. Three examples are contained in his notions of refusal as way of defeating alienation and the closed society.

Marcuse returns to the notion of “refusal” on six separate pages throughout the book, and on five more he discusses the “Great Refusal” – “the protest against that which is.”³⁰⁶ He argues that even though it would actually be a rational decision, “the intellectual and emotional refusal ‘to go along’ appears neurotic and impotent”³⁰⁷ in a society that, on the surface, seems to be doing well enough. Aside from being a term borrowed from the philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, I would argue that using this relatively ambiguous term in the 1960s evoked a certain image of the then-burgeoning counter-culture of young people who *refused* military service, *refused* traditional roles and obligations, while searching for something new. Thus, Marcuse, perhaps subconsciously, gained credibility with young people and students by invoking this concept.

Another notion that Marcuse returns to throughout the book is “alienation”. This is another instance of philosophical semantics – originally a basic Marxian term, redefined by Marcuse, but one whose usage nevertheless reinforces Marcuse’s credentials as a “proper” Marxian thinker, even when redefining the original. Marcuse argued that people in contemporary society were still alienated even if no longer living under the conditions that Marx described; contemporary industrial society had now placed them in a “more progressive stage of alienation.”³⁰⁸ *Alienation*, like *refusal*, were terms whose ambiguity fit well with the *Zeitgeist* of the 1960s and were thus transformed into slogans by those who rejected that society. It could

³⁰⁴ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 14.

³⁰⁵ Marcuse, 11.

³⁰⁶ Marcuse, 66.

³⁰⁷ Marcuse, 12.

³⁰⁸ Marcuse, 13.

be speculated that the argument that contemporary people, leading free and affluent lives, could also be alienated gave Marcuse's contemporaries a further theme to express their discontent.

A third example of philosophical semantics in *One-Dimensional Man* is the idea of the "closed society". Marcuse argued that societal development at the time when his book was published was resulting in "the closing of the political universe", as the book's second chapter is also entitled. Marcuse speaks of a "marked unification or convergence of opposites" in politics,³⁰⁹ which amalgamates opposing forces into a single political line. (According to MacIntyre, that amounts to an acceptance of Daniel Bell's and S.M. Lipset's notions of the end of ideology doctrine.³¹⁰) Marcuse highlights the role of the Cold War in this process: "Bipartisanship in foreign policy overrides competitive group interests under the threat of international communism, and spreads to domestic policy, where the programs of the big parties become ever more undistinguishable [...]."³¹¹ What Marcuse finds most disturbing and as the ultimate hallmark of the "closed" political universe is that the political convergence also includes and neutralizes the working class: it "embraces [...] the very classes whose existence once embodied the opposition to the system as a whole."³¹² Marcuse goes on to point out that in the US organized labor now cooperates with business; he also laments that the British Labor Party has become too mainstream, while the SPD "having officially rejected its Marxist programs is convincingly proving its respectability."³¹³ This review of the situation of the Left yields similar conclusions about France and Italy, where the local communists have been transformed into non-revolutionary parties, not least due to the weakening of their social base.³¹⁴ Marcuse finally looks at the Communist bloc and concludes that it, too, is converging with the West. Moving away from its days of Stalinist iron-fist rule, Marcuse comments that the USSR is becoming more liberalized. He argues that "the gradual reduction of direct political controls testifies to the increasing reliance on the effectiveness of technological controls as instruments of domination,"³¹⁵ which are the same forces that have led to the situation in the West.

Marcuse puts the Soviet example, but also his observations about the changed historical position of the working class in Western states, into perspective by summarizing the "classical

³⁰⁹ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 22.

³¹⁰ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 66-67.

³¹¹ Marcuse, 22.

³¹² Marcuse, 22.

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Marcuse, 23.

³¹⁵ Ibid.

Marxian theory” about the revolutionary role of the proletariat and the preservation of the existing industrial infrastructure:

[It] envisages the transition from capitalism to socialism as a political revolution: the proletariat destroys the *political* apparatus of capitalism but retains the *technological* apparatus, subjecting it to socialization. There is continuity in the revolution: technological rationality, freed from irrational restrictions and destructions, sustains and consummates itself in the new society.³¹⁶

This perspective is taken away by the new conditions of the *closed society* whose “supreme promise is an ever-more-comfortable life for an ever-growing number of people.”³¹⁷ Here Marcuse first distinguishes between the no-longer-revolutionary masses, whose lives have been made easier by mechanization and automation,³¹⁸ and the “less underprivileged people” whose drive for liberation society neutralizes “by satisfying the needs which make servitude palatable and perhaps even unnoticeable”.³¹⁹ Furthermore, more workers are taking up white collar positions; thus by moving into the lower middle class, “the laborer is losing the professional autonomy which made him a member of a class set off from the other occupational groups”.³²⁰ Marcuse also notes, as a third change in the social behavior of the working class, that the workers are becoming more integrated with their plants³²¹ and are starting to identify with their success rather than view them antagonistically. Marcuse sees all these developments as contributing to the creation of a closed society, robbed of true opposition, because the motivating factors for antagonism have been dismantled.

Given the changed circumstances, the closed society can only be defeated by refusal, by new agents of opposition, by new means and goals of fighting against the established society, and not by the old notions of socialism. In his written address to the 1966 Socialist Scholars Conference, Marcuse elaborates on that, pointing out that “the Marxian idea of socialism corresponds to, and projects from, a stage of the productive forces which has been surpassed by the advanced industrial societies.”³²² In the same paragraph Marcuse also recognizes that “advanced capitalism” has both “negative and positive achievements”, which must be

³¹⁶ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 24.

³¹⁷ Marcuse, 26.

³¹⁸ Marcuse, 26-30.

³¹⁹ Marcuse, 26.

³²⁰ Marcuse, 31.

³²¹ Marcuse, 33.

³²² *Statement for Socialist Scholars Conference*, Herbert Marcuse, September 1966, p. 8-10, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

considered into order to redefine “the Marxian idea of socialism” in a more radical and utopian direction.³²³

The Cold War Climate of Opinion and its Contribution to Social Rigidity

In terms of the climate of opinion (Wiener), Marcuse notes that the Cold War and the threat of nuclear annihilation are partially responsible for the rigidity of societies on both sides of the Iron Curtain. “The situation of hostile coexistence may explain the terroristic features of Stalinist industrialization, but it also set in motion the forces which tend to perpetuate technical progress as the instrument of domination; the means prejudice the end.”³²⁴ In making his comparison between Western and Soviet society Marcuse also reaffirms his view that these societies are two sides of the one coin³²⁵ -- an idea harking back to Raymond Aron³²⁶ and one that would also be applied to the field of economics by John Kenneth Galbraith. While the notion that Western democracies are ultimately the same as the USSR delegitimizes the West, Marcuse makes it clear that the Soviet system is not what he is calling for.

He cautions that the Soviet system, even in its liberalized form does not point the way toward liberation: “There is no reason to assume that technical progress plus nationalization will make for “automatic” liberation and release of the negating forces.”³²⁷ In discussing this issue, Marcuse also expresses his reservations about investing excessive hope in the Third World and thus qualifies his view that Third World peoples were part of a new revolutionary force. The general interest in the Third World as a collective factor could also be attributed to the Cold War climate of opinion as the Non-Aligned movement attracted attention precisely due to its symbolic role as an alternative to the two opposing sides.

Marcuse, however, did not believe that the Third World necessarily held promise in terms of creating a third way. He concluded that “the backward areas are likely to succumb either to one

³²³ Ibid.

³²⁴ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 46.

³²⁵ Applying this stance to the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Marcuse writes in a letter to Professor Frank Munk that he will not sign a joint letter initiated by Munk, because while he finds the invasion to be “reprehensible” and “inexcusable”, he disagrees with the wording which appeals to the US President to pressure the East to adhere to the UN Charter. According to Marcuse the US President is pursuing the exact same policy in Vietnam. Letter from Marcuse to Frank Munk explaining his refusal to sign a joint letter about the invasion of Czechoslovakia, *Herbert Marcuse*, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2020.07

³²⁶ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 66.

³²⁷ Marcuse, 46.

of the various forms of neo-colonialism, or to a more or less terroristic system of primary accumulation.”³²⁸ He did, however, see an alternative for those parts of the world “if industrialization and the introduction of new technology [...] encounter strong resistance from the indigenous and traditional modes of life and labor [...]”³²⁹ Marcuse imagined that this resistance could be channeled in a constructive direction. He wrote about the notion of “indigenous progress” as presupposing a “planned policy which, instead of superimposing technology on the traditional modes of life and labor, would extend and improve them on their own grounds, eliminating the oppressive and exploitative forces (material and religious) which made them incapable of assuring the development of a human existence.”³³⁰ This perhaps rather idealistic concept could also be viewed as belonging to a climate of opinion that encouraged the search for a better alternative to the two dominant systems.

While he qualified the amount of hope that could be placed on the Third World, Marcuse nevertheless remained committed to the notion of its significance. In his 1966 address to the Socialist Scholars Conference, for example, Marcuse emphasized the need for socialist scholars to “elaborate the theory of the internal relation between the underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries, between the precapitalist national liberation movement in the former and the so-called New Left in the latter.” He also argued that scholars ought to reexamine the concept of revolution, which he wrote was “just as obsolete as the ideas of a gradual transformation from capitalism into socialism [because] both conceptions minimize the depth of the rupture between the established societies and their “determinate negation”, i.e. a free society.”³³¹

Marcuse opposed his alternative to the Cold War-era tandem of increasing living standards and constant sense of military mobilization that he labelled “the welfare and warfare state.” He pointed out that “rejection of the welfare state on behalf of abstract ideas of freedom is hardly convincing”³³², therefore this is “the rational and material ground [...] for one-dimensional political behavior”³³³ or social rigidity.

³²⁸ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 50.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Marcuse, 51.

³³¹ *Statement for Socialist Scholars Conference*, *Herbert Marcuse*, September 1966, p. 8-10, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

³³² Marcuse, 53.

³³³ Ibid.

The Removal of Higher Culture and Sexual Longing as Opposing Forces

In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse looks at two socio-cultural aspects of life that, in his analysis, stabilize the existing system – the democratization of high culture and the liberalization of sexual mores.

Addressing the former, Marcuse opens his analysis by making the point that in addition to stabilizing the political realm and conquering people's consciousness, "the progress of technological rationality is liquidating the oppositional and transcending elements in 'higher culture.'"³³⁴ Contrary to other critiques, Marcuse does not view the democratization of high culture as a "deterioration of higher culture into mass culture but the refutation of this culture by the reality."³³⁵ This happens in two ways: on one hand, modern man can do more than the cultural heroes in classic works of art, but he has also realized their ideals are unattainable.

Furthermore, the democratization of culture, the availability of paperback books, reproductions, and the loosening of festive traditions³³⁶, such as adhering a certain dress code at the opera, are making culture integrated into the reality, into "material culture."³³⁷ In other words, high culture becomes fully integrated into a society, which it can no longer critique by its existence outside of it, as Marcuse argues it had done previously.

Therefore, contemporary culture no longer offers an alternative. Even when its fictional characters differ from the every-day man, they no longer symbolize an alternative to established society. Turning to literature, Marcuse asserts that "[contemporary literary characters] are no longer images of another way of life but rather freaks or types of the same life serving as an affirmation rather than a negation of the established order."³³⁸ Modern society also "tends to invalidate not only certain 'styles' but also the very substance of art" by undermining "the very basis of artistic alienation," in other words – by seemingly resolving dramatic issues in art (i.e. *Romeo and Juliet*, *Madame Bovary*).³³⁹ Realizing that classical works have limited validity, topical only in a time past, viewing them as classics, "they are

³³⁴ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 59.

³³⁵ Marcuse, 60.

³³⁶ Marcuse, 67.

³³⁷ Marcuse, 61.

³³⁸ Marcuse, 62.

³³⁹ Marcuse, 65-66.

deprived of their antagonistic force [...]. If they once stood in contradiction to the status quo, this contradiction is now flattened out.”³⁴⁰ As the examples of *Romeo and Juliet* and *Madame Bovary* suggest, one of the key ways in which society is resolving classical themes is by liberalizing sexual mores, thus depriving contemporary society of one reason to oppose established society.

Marcuse highlights the importance of a more liberated approach to sexual expression, also in the context of modern technology and urbanization. He argues that these factors, which make sex accessible – like a commodity – are reducing “the erotic to sexual experience and satisfaction”, thus contributing to “the making of the authoritarian personality of our time.”³⁴¹ Recalling a time when true poverty was rampant in the West, Marcuse points out that the reduction of dirty labor, improvements in personal hygiene, and the availability of elegant and affordable clothes, as well as makeup, have made “the possession of suitable mistresses—once the prerogative of kings [...]”³⁴² quite commonplace.³⁴³ Sexuality is turned into a commodity and a resource.³⁴⁴ Marcuse admits all this has led to a “happy consciousness, which facilitates the acceptance of the misdeeds of this society.”³⁴⁵ While Marcuse supported sexual liberation, it was already evident in his 1955 book *Eros and Civilization* that he framed that within a utopian vision of an alternative organization of society rather than simply lifting sexual mores and stereotypes within the existing society. As MacIntyre summarizes why sexual desublimation is no longer formulated by Marcuse as key to liberation, “desublimation has already occurred in our society, but [...] the forms in which it occurs are as repressive as ever sublimation was [...], for the release of libido is so controlled that sexuality [...] satisfies men [without granting them] proper enjoyment.”³⁴⁶

Marcuse opposes this commodified enjoyment of pleasures – including sex – to classical true beauty, which “is experienced almost as a shock, perhaps due to the contrast-character of beauty, which breaks the circle of everyday experience and opens (for a short moment) another

³⁴⁰ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 67.

³⁴¹ Marcuse, 76-77.

³⁴² Marcuse, 78.

³⁴³ A Feminist critique might address the fact that Marcuse is building his case about sexual relations almost exclusively from a male perspective, but that is beside the point in this research project.

³⁴⁴ Marcuse, 81.

³⁴⁵ Marcuse, 79.

³⁴⁶ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 66.

reality [...].”³⁴⁷ In defining beauty he quotes Stendhal’s definition, which is “least exact”³⁴⁸ and which defines this notion simply as *promesse de bonheur* or the promise of happiness. In that context, Marcuse criticizes the *happy consciousness*, brought about – bluntly put – by the sudden abundance of clean, well-dressed, fit, and overall attractive people willing to engage in romance and sex. His line is that the satisfaction of this need blunts people’s critical attitudes toward society: “The result is the atrophy of the mental organs for grasping the contradictions and the alternatives [...].”³⁴⁹ Furthermore, Marcuse assesses this happiness as a thin layer over a deeper layer of unhappiness consisting of “fear, frustration, and disgust [which] lends itself too easily to political mobilization.”³⁵⁰ Therefore, Marcuse sees that layer of pent up negative emotions, placated by abundant, but shallow sexual experiences, as a potential mass psychological reservoir for a new fascist movement.

Contrary to *Eros and Civilization*, at first glance Marcuse appears pessimistic about the role of sexuality in *One-Dimensional Man*. As was explained earlier, this is because he seems to believe that sexuality has already been desublimated, but in a way that unarms it and adds it to the rest of the arsenal of one-dimensional society. So did Marcuse see sexual liberation as a closed avenue? As we can see in later texts the answer is “no”. In his written address to the 1966 Socialist Scholars Conference, for example, Marcuse lists among the tasks of the socialist scholar that he should “develop the radical political impact of the moral, sexual rebellion of the youth.” He adds that “we must recognize that here needs and values come to the fore which have found no home in the idea of socialism and which may well be decisive for its prospects.”³⁵¹ In other words, two years after publishing *One-Dimensional Man* Marcuse was clearly stating that the sexually liberated youth was also an element of the alternative revolutionary forces. Presumably Marcuse was referring to a “sexual rebellion” that went beyond the mainstream sexual liberalization of the early 1960s. While most likely he thought primarily of the free heterosexual experiences among hippies and members of communes, it may be speculated that by 1966 he also had women’s and (the nascent) gay liberation movements in mind as well.

³⁴⁷ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 214-215.

³⁴⁸ Marcuse, 215.

³⁴⁹ Marcuse, 82.

³⁵⁰ Marcuse, 80.

³⁵¹ *Statement for Socialist Scholars Conference*, Herbert Marcuse, September 1966, p. 8-10, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

Language as an Instrument of Social Control

An even more wide-reaching way in which, according to Marcuse, contemporary society is “flattening out” thought is by taking away the depth from the meanings of words and phrases. In other words, altering language leads to a change in thinking. Marcuse devotes an entire chapter, titled “The Closing of the Universe of Discourse”, to this topic. It begins with a quote by Roland Barthes which in itself illustrates the influence of post-War philosophy of language on Marcuse’s thought: “In the present state of history, all political writing can only confirm a police-universe, just as all intellectual writing can only produce para-literature which does not dare any longer to tell its name.”³⁵² Turning his critique to one of the primary carriers of language in society, Marcuse analyzes the role of the media.

“Foreshadowing” a component of his essay on *Repressive Tolerance*, Marcuse speaks of the “media” (in quotation marks) as the mediators “between the masters and their dependents.”³⁵³ The media fulfill their negative role by shaping communication in a way that promotes positive thinking and reduces critical thought: “The elements of autonomy, discovery, demonstration, and critique recede before designation, assertion, and imitation. Magical, authoritarian and ritual elements permeate speech and language.”³⁵⁴ What Marcuse means by “magical” and “ritual” elements are types of semantic and syntactic choices that appear to camouflage the true meaning, divert attention from the negative aspects of something or add sheen of positivity or optimism to something that would normally have morbid connotations.

Marcuse offers some specific examples where he demonstrates the almost subliminal nature of the way language can manipulate. One mode of manipulating through language is when “outspoken, blatant contradiction [...] is made into a device of speech and publicity” such as in “the syntax of abridgement [which] proclaims the reconciliation of opposites by welding them together in a firm and familiar structure.”³⁵⁵ Specific examples of that method include phrases like the “clean bomb” and the “harmless fall-out” or titles like “Labor is seeking missile harmony.”³⁵⁶ Marcuse argues that such linguistic constructs create a sort of black hole that

³⁵² Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 87.

³⁵³ Marcuse, 88.

³⁵⁴ Marcuse, 88-89.

³⁵⁵ Marcuse, 92.

³⁵⁶ Marcuse, 92-93.

syphons off any critique by appearing to be concrete, honest, exhaustive, and at the same time tolerant to critique:

In exhibiting its contradictions as the token of its truth, this universe of discourse closes itself against any other discourse which is not on its own terms. And, by its capacity to assimilate all other terms to its own, it offers the prospect of combining the greatest possible tolerance with the greatest possible unity. Nevertheless its language testifies to the repressive character of this unity. This language speaks in constructions which impose upon the recipient the slanted and abridged meaning, the blocked development of content, the acceptance of that which is offered in the form in which it is offered.³⁵⁷

Marcuse goes on to offer further examples. They included nouns that are frequently coupled with a certain type of adjectives, thus creating “hypnotic formulas” which mold certain lasting associations in the minds of readers.³⁵⁸ Marcuse sees this as belonging to the same mechanism as the language of “false familiarity” (i.e. “‘your’ congressman”)³⁵⁹ and argues that this technique is used both in advertising and as a tool of socio-political manipulation. Another instrument of manipulation is what Marcuse calls the “inflectional genitive” (i.e. Egypt’s Nasser), which fuses aspects of personalities into an “indivisible and immutable structure which, in its natural innocence and immediacy, overwhelms the reader’s mind.”³⁶⁰ Yet another technique of linguistic manipulation that is cited in *One-Dimensional Man* is the use of abbreviations to camouflage meanings and deflect “undesired questions.”³⁶¹ The example of NATO is given, which allegedly serves – unlike the Pact’s full name – to deflect questions about the inclusion of states in other regions far away from the North Atlantic shores. Marcuse also opposes language that invokes images and claims that that language „impedes conceptual thinking”³⁶² with its specificity.

Another form of linguistic – and intellectual – manipulation takes Marcuse identifies place through the usage of generalized catchwords or “universals”. This leads to a mode of thinking, a kind of reification, that imposes “roles and functions”³⁶³ on individuals while at the same time camouflaging individuals pulling the strings as “universals [like] the Nation, the Party, the Constitution, the Corporation, the Church—a reality which is not identical with any

³⁵⁷ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 94.

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Marcuse, 95.

³⁶⁰ Marcuse, 96.

³⁶¹ Marcuse, 97.

³⁶² Marcuse, 98.

³⁶³ Marcuse, 208.

particular identifiable entity [...].”³⁶⁴ Marcuse formulates this impersonal uncontrollable force that determines people’s lives as follows:

The real ghost is of a very forcible reality—that of the separate and independent power of the whole over the individuals. And this whole is not merely a perceived *Gestalt* (as in psychology), not a metaphysical absolute (as in Hegel), not a totalitarian state (as in poor political science)—it is the established state of affairs which determines the life of the individuals.³⁶⁵

Without getting into the discussion on universals, Marcuse unsurprisingly connects these issues to the problem of false consciousness.³⁶⁶ Nevertheless, he argues that this state of affairs, while dominating society, isn’t necessarily universally accepted.

In that context he comments that slang has become much richer than before and diagnoses that as a sign of the common man’s attempt – perhaps subconscious – to strike back at the system³⁶⁷ and its attempts to “close” discourse. In that context Marcuse argues that, both in the West and the East, people do not believe or care about the official discourse, yet “act accordingly.”³⁶⁸ Even though this flicker of optimism is finally labelled as another dead end, this example is notable, because it is one of the very few points in the book where the so-called “common man” is mentioned in positive light.

In developing his critique of the language of closed discourse, Marcuse also offers examples of non-Marxist scholars who use an “open” language, while also criticizing the way the Soviet Union suppresses discourse through language. He opposes open language to the Western and Soviet worlds of suppressed discourse and highlights the fundamental dangers of the latter:

A universe of discourse in which the categories of freedom have become interchangeable and even identical with their opposites is not only practicing Orwellian or Aesopian language but is repulsing and forgetting the historical reality—the horror of fascism; the idea of socialism; the preconditions of democracy; the content of freedom.³⁶⁹

In making the point that “critical, cognitive qualities are not exclusive characteristics of Marxian style”, Marcuse names Burke, Tocqueville, and John Stuart Mill as examples of conservative and liberal thinkers whose “‘open’ language [...] has not yet succumbed to the hypnotic-ritual formulas of present-day neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism.”³⁷⁰ Marcuse, similarly, problematizes the usage of language in communist states. He speaks of the

³⁶⁴ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 210.

³⁶⁵ Marcuse, 212.

³⁶⁶ Marcuse, 212-213.

³⁶⁷ Marcuse, 89.

³⁶⁸ Marcuse, 106.

³⁶⁹ Marcuse, 101.

³⁷⁰ Marcuse, 104.

“authoritarian ritualization of language”, referring to the Soviet bloc in its Stalinist and post-Stalinist variants, and concludes that the “requirements of competitive industrialization and the total subjection of man to the productive apparatus [...], as interpreted by the leadership which controls the apparatus, define what is right and wrong, true and false.”³⁷¹ This leaves no room for discourse. Essentially equating these Western and Eastern approaches to controlling language, Marcuse concludes that “the closed language does not demonstrate or explain—it communicates decision, dictum, command. Where it defines, the definition becomes ‘separation of good from evil’ [...].”³⁷² While Marcuse spells out differences in the way language is flattened in the Soviet bloc, he leads the reader to the already familiar conclusion that West and East have converged into essentially the same thing, neither being a real alternative to the other, regardless of the positive sides of the West that Marcuse does not deny.

False Reality in Academia and One-Dimensional Thought

Has this false “flattened out” reality created by closed language permeated academia? Or has it only taken over the realms of political and everyday discourse? Marcuse argues that it has, in fact, seeped into the realm of academic research where, he argues, it is “conducting a sweeping redefinition of thought itself.”³⁷³

The dominance of empiricism, which Marcuse argues is in fact ideological rather than ideologically neutral, as its proponents claim,³⁷⁴ is blamed for the “translat[ion of] universal concepts into terms with particular, objective referents.”³⁷⁵ Marcuse believes that this analytical approach leads to shallow academic thought: “Where these reduced concepts govern the analysis of the human reality, individual or social, mental or material, they arrive at false concreteness—a concreteness isolated from the conditions which constitute its reality.”³⁷⁶ Marcuse exemplifies this by returning to a study of the complaints made by factory workers, which he describes earlier in the book. According to the study, having asked workers to specify their complaints had stripped them of their power of general rejection and transformed them into specific problems that could easily be resolved within the existing system. Marcuse

³⁷¹ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 104.

³⁷² Marcuse, 105.

³⁷³ Marcuse, 107.

³⁷⁴ Marcuse, 117.

³⁷⁵ Marcuse, 110.

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

summarizes this process as “the methodological translation of the universal into the operational concept [which leads to the] repressive reduction of thought.”³⁷⁷ As these examples show, Marcuse believed specificity and the adherence to analytical thinking unarmed politically-charged situations. According to Paul A. Robertson, Marcuse furthermore disliked empiricism, because he saw it as being connected to conservatism.³⁷⁸

This set of issues receives additional attention in the book’s second part, titled “One-Dimensional Thought”, where Marcuse delves deeper into the way Western science has allegedly been methodologically disarmed and turned into an ideological supporter of the status quo. Along with empiricism, Marcuse attacks the ideas of *Reason* as a historical project that is, in his analysis, partially responsible for the problematic status quo: “The closed operational universe of advanced industrial civilization with its terrifying harmony of freedom and oppression, productivity and destruction, growth and regression is pre-designed in this idea of Reason as a specific historical project.”³⁷⁹ Since reason is supported by the idea of formal logic, it turns everything into an abstraction and thus creates a mode of thought leading to total control.³⁸⁰

Marcuse sees the idea of reason, with its insistence on empirical research as the only truly scientific road to arriving at the truth, as the root cause for the rejection of epistemology as an academic discipline. This, in turn, is also underscored as a primary cause leading to the situation Marcuse criticizes, because it ushers in a society without ethics:

Inasmuch as the struggle for truth “saves” reality from destruction, truth commits and engages human existence. It is the essentially human project. If man has learned to see and know what really is, he will act in accordance with truth. Epistemology is in itself ethics and ethics is epistemology.³⁸¹

Marcuse concedes that epistemology is not neutral, but based on a philosopher’s value judgement; nevertheless, he does not see a problem in that, arguing that philosophy contains certain good judgements from its inception as a discipline. In a similar vein, Marcuse also points a finger at contemporary analytic philosophy and its negative attitude toward abstract notions. He claims that they wish to “exorcise [...] metaphysical ‘ghosts’”³⁸² and replace the discussion of “universals” with “statements on particular identifiable operations, performances,

³⁷⁷ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 111.

³⁷⁸ Robinson, *The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse*, 180.

³⁷⁹ Marcuse, 128.

³⁸⁰ Marcuse, 140.

³⁸¹ Marcuse, 129.

³⁸² Marcuse, 207.

powers, dispositions, propensities, skills, etc.”³⁸³ which he sees as robbing intellectual thought of its ability to offer value-based critiques as a corrective of society.

Marcuse looks at other aspects of the genesis of the shift toward rationalization of thought and offers examples from fields as distant from humanities as mathematics, such as the “algebraization of geometry”.³⁸⁴ He also offers the example from the philosophy of physics to illustrate the shift of thinking from “what is” to “how”, which liberates academia from having to commit to values:

I do not suggest that the philosophy of contemporary physics denies or even questions the reality of the external world but that, in one way or another, it suspends judgement on what reality itself may be, or considers the very question meaningless and unanswerable. Made into a methodological principle, this suspension has a twofold consequence: (a) it strengthens the shift of theoretical emphasis from the metaphysical ‘What is ... ?’ (*τίέστιν*) to the functional ‘How ... ?’, and (b) it establishes a practical (though by no means absolute) certainty which, in its operations with matter, is with good conscience free from commitment to any substance outside the operational context.³⁸⁵

Returning to the points made earlier in the book and building on his thoughts about the negative role of exact science, Marcuse also argues that technology props up the status quo not least by demonstrating man’s “‘technical’ impossibility of being autonomous”³⁸⁶. Sciences “has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man [...]”³⁸⁷ Man is dependent on technology, which is associated with living as part of society. Therefore “the incessant dynamic of technical progress has become permeated with political content, and the Logos of technics has been made into the Logos of continued servitude.”³⁸⁸ Distilled into one short notion, Marcuse ironically calls the development toward positive thinking (in the sense of positivism) “the liberation from metaphysical spectres.”³⁸⁹

The neo-positivist critique still directs its main effort against metaphysical notions, and it is motivated by a notion of exactness which is either that of formal logic or empirical description. Whether exactness is sought in the analytic purity of logic and mathematics, or in conformity with ordinary language—on both poles of contemporary philosophy is the same rejection or devaluation of those elements of thought and speech which transcend the accepted system of validation. This hostility is most sweeping where it takes the form of toleration—that is, where a certain truth

³⁸³ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 208.

³⁸⁴ Marcuse, 151.

³⁸⁵ Marcuse, 155.

³⁸⁶ Marcuse, 162.

³⁸⁷ Marcuse, 170.

³⁸⁸ Marcuse, 163.

³⁸⁹ Marcuse, 175.

value is granted to the transcendent concepts is a separate dimension of meaning and significance (poetic truth, metaphysical truth). For precisely the setting aside of a special reservation in which thought and language are permitted to be legitimately inexact, vague, and even contradictory is the most effective way of protecting the normal universe of discourse from being seriously disturbed by unfitting ideas.³⁹⁰

In this way imposing positivism and relegating philosophical concepts to a separate realm separates science from philosophy, making it appear irrational and unrealistic. Marcuse offers the example of *the proletariat* – a concept that, he argues, has been turned into a “mythological concept.”³⁹¹

Similarly, ethics have not entirely disappeared from contemporary society, which allows this mode of thinking to exist in the form of “values”. Marcuse contends that while they may be considered positive and may be respected, “values” are also viewed as “separated from objective reality [therefore becoming] subjective,” which in turn makes them harmless to the system.³⁹² It may be noted that this argument is weakened by its reliance on the opposite logic to the one Marcuse employs in arguing about the decline of high culture as a critical force.

Still, Marcuse asserts that critical theory remains valid contrary to these developments. He argues that its power remains intact even though by the standards of analytic philosophy, by virtue of the requirement to be able to “translate” philosophical language,³⁹³ critical theory now appears “unscientific” and “speculative.”³⁹⁴

Marcuse’s Proposed Alternative

Throughout the first two and lengthiest sections of the book, Marcuse focuses on explaining his analysis of the status quo, its geopolitical and domestic political foundations, as well as its economic, intellectual, and linguistic basis. It is, finally, in the third part of *One-Dimensional Man*, entitled “The Chance of the Alternatives,” where Marcuse describes the characteristics and route toward the alternative society he envisages.

Marcuse remains somewhat ambivalent about the *method of radical change* he is supporting. He expresses his frustration with his contemporary society by commenting that it is based on

³⁹⁰ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 188-189.

³⁹¹ Marcuse, 193.

³⁹² Marcuse, 151.

³⁹³ Marcuse, 196.

³⁹⁴ Marcuse, 193.

the “belief that the real is rational, and that the established system, in spite of everything, delivers the goods.”³⁹⁵ That point contains a summary of a message that Marcuse seems to suggest: that what is rational isn’t necessarily real and might need to be achieved through a route that does not deliver the goods. In other words, Marcuse sees existing society as irreparable and is willing to see it erased if that holds the promise of something better. Marcuse comes closer to stating this point directly and also first hints at his novel idea of *alternative revolutionary forces* when he writes that “what appears unlovely and disorderly from the logical point of view, may well comprise the lovely elements of a different order, and may thus be an essential part of the material from which philosophic concepts are built.”³⁹⁶ He speaks more on this in the book’s brief conclusion. There he points out that “the advancing one-dimensional society alters the relation between the rational and the irrational. Contrasted with the fantastic and insane aspects of its irrationality, the realm of the irrational becomes the home of the really rational—of the ideas which may ‘promote the art of life’”.³⁹⁷ It is also there that he, in the same context, offers a prototype formulation of the idea of *liberating tolerance*, which he would developed as a notion in his work on repressive tolerance: “To liberate the imagination so that it can be given all its means of expression presupposes the repression of much that is now free and that perpetuates a repressive society.”³⁹⁸ While on one hand, he seems willing to give a blank check for repression and the destruction of the status quo without further guarantees, on the other, Marcuse provides a list of criteria that an alternative social project would need to satisfy to prove that its worth.

Among the criteria for determining the “truth value” of an alternative historical project, Marcuse lists prominently the requirement that the new project must be able to at least preserve the economic and technological infrastructure of real-existing society. In other words, Marcuse seems to hesitate in confirming the ultimate and destructive implication of his argument about what appears rational and good. Therefore he sets the following criteria for a new historical project to replace the current society:

- (1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real possibilities open at the attained level of material and intellectual culture.
- (2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the established totality, must demonstrate its own higher rationality in the threefold sense that
 - (a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the productive achievements of civilization;

³⁹⁵ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 82.

³⁹⁶ Marcuse, 221.

³⁹⁷ Marcuse, 251.

³⁹⁸ Marcuse, 255.

(b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic tendencies, and relations;

(c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of existence, within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance for the free development of human needs and faculties.

Obviously, this notion of rationality contains, especially in the last statements, a value judgement, and I reiterate what I stated before: I believe that the very concept of Reason originates in this value judgment, and that the concept of truth cannot be divorced from the value of Reason.³⁹⁹

It remains unclear how these criteria can be satisfied if the established social order is toppled with the help of irrational forces that are “unlovely” and “disorderly”. Marcuse does not reconcile this contradiction, so it is left to the reader to make an assumption about the practical implementation of both approaches simultaneously. It could be argued that the sweeping “disorderly” argument is symbolic and refers to Marcuse’s willingness to support forces that might destabilize society enough to serve as a catalyst for social transformation. In order to fully support that transformation, however, Marcuse would probably require the above criteria to be satisfied as he is ultimately aiming for a better (and still technological) society, not for a return to a pre-industrial form of societal organization.

Marcuse reiterates his contradictory message when commenting on the way science could change in a new society. He points out that he sees no avenues for further progress along the line of the status quo. Instead, he asserts that further progress would “mean the *break*, the turn of quantity into quality [that] would open the possibility of an essentially new human reality—namely, existence in free time on the basis of fulfilled vital needs. Under such conditions, the scientific project itself would be free for trans-utilitarian ends, and free for the “art of living” beyond the necessities and luxuries of domination.”⁴⁰⁰ While it is clear that Marcuse is against consumerism and an economic system that he sees as tied to a perpetuation of inequalities, these assertions sound like further instances of philosophical semantics – catchphrases that are ultimately unclear while at the same time being intelligible to readers who are friendly to Marcuse’s general line of thinking.

Where he is most concrete, Marcuse argues in favor of a “neutral” scientific method based on “formerly metaphysical ideas of liberation” becoming *the* subject of science.⁴⁰¹ In other words,

³⁹⁹ Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 224-225.

⁴⁰⁰ Marcuse, 235.

⁴⁰¹ Marcuse, 237.

he believes that scientific endeavors ought to have the ideas of liberation as their basic assumption. As part of that agenda, he favors employing dialectical logic which:

[...] undoes the abstractions of formal logic and of transcendental philosophy, but it also denies the concreteness of immediate experience. It attains its truth if it has freed itself from the deceptive objectivity which conceals the factors behind the facts—that is, if it understands its world as a *historical* universe, in which the established facts are the work of the historical practice of man.⁴⁰²

This is an essentially Hegelian-Marxist argument that Marcuse updates by adding a rejection of contemporary Western “deceptive objectivity” or the prevailing scientific method that is meant to be ideologically neutral, but that Marcuse views as shaped by the existing society. As Douglas Kellner puts it, Marcuse is developing a “reconstructed [...] theory of subjectivity” which would serve the cause of social and personal change.⁴⁰³

Among the few specific aspects of Marcuse’s future project are that the world would need to rid itself of national divisions, decrease its population growth, and reduce production and consumption. One aspect of the liberation Marcuse wishes to see is the liberation from national divisions. He sees this as a historical necessity and even a prerequisite for the society he wishes to see in the world: “This pacification would mean the emergence of a genuine world economy—the demise of the nation state, the national interest, national business together with their international alliances. And this is precisely the possibility against which the present world is mobilized.”⁴⁰⁴ A global rather than a national outlook is likely a prerequisite for Marcuse’s pacified society as it eliminates the threat from the outside, which Marcuse laments mobilizes people to the defense of their home society – be it capitalist or communist.

Surprisingly, however, for all his utopian notions of existence without the necessity for work and his rejection of both Soviet and Western industrial society, Marcuse states quite openly that he recognizes the natural character of inequality. He distances himself from a notion of total equality:

To be sure, a mature and free industrial society would continue to depend on a division of labor which involves inequality of functions. Such inequality is necessitated by genuine social needs, technical requirements, and the physical and mental differences among the individuals.⁴⁰⁵

Marcuse qualifies this by adding that inequality of function would be different from existing inequality, because it would not entail social control. This vision, which Marcuse mentions

⁴⁰² Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 145.

⁴⁰³ Kellner, Douglas, *Marcuse and the Quest for Radical Subjectivity*. In: *Counterpoints*, Vol. 168: 2003, 67–83.

⁴⁰⁴ Marcuse, 57.

⁴⁰⁵ Marcuse, 47-48.

would require a revolution, is not explained in greater detail and therefore its apparent contradictions do not receive further clarity and are left to the reader to interpret and think about.

An important aspect of the new society is that it would entail less production (elimination of waste), less work, and a decreased standard of living as false needs would no longer be satisfied. Marcuse attempts to provide a little more clarity on how he sees a values-based formulation of genuine needs: That involves “[...] the twofold process of (1) material satisfaction (materialization of freedom) and (2) the free development of needs on the basis of satisfaction (non-repressive sublimation).”⁴⁰⁶ Marcuse argues that this would lead to “pacified existence”, which would also depend on man pursuing a liberating mastery of nature.⁴⁰⁷ These developments would presuppose a “*quantitative* change in the advanced standard of living, namely, *reduction of overdevelopment*.”⁴⁰⁸ While this is phrased in a convoluted way, it seems to suggest a reduction in the standard of living is necessary. Marcuse clarifies that it is “not a suitable model of development if the aim is pacification.”⁴⁰⁹ He counters the conclusion one might draw by arguing the result of this would not mean a return to “healthy and robust poverty, moral cleanliness, and simplicity.”⁴¹⁰ Instead the aim would be to cut “profitable waste” and end “permanent mobilization” that would leave wealth for redistribution while also ending the “cult of fitness, strength, and regularity.”⁴¹¹ Marcuse also argues this new society would need a “reduction in the future population.”⁴¹² As far as governing this new society, Marcuse does not provide much detail, but points out that it would be administered by a “combination of centralized authority and direct democracy”⁴¹³ whose exact face would depend on the specific situation and level of development.

What is the Core Catalyst of Change and the Beacon of Marcuse’s New Society?

In sketching out the outlines of his new society, a core point Marcuse makes is that his contemporary societies lacked the proper kind of people for building such a society. Society,

⁴⁰⁶ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 239.

⁴⁰⁷ Marcuse, 240.

⁴⁰⁸ Marcuse, 246.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Marcuse, 247.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

⁴¹² Marcuse, 248.

⁴¹³ Marcuse, 256.

he argues, would need to be governed by “an essentially new historical Subject”, which is currently impossible⁴¹⁴ due to man’s one-dimensional nature. Marcuse points out that the proletariat was not only not a fitting subject for a new society, but that it was also no longer a revolutionary force, because it has, in industrialized countries, turned into “a prop of the established way of life.”⁴¹⁵ Cold-War-era Western societies, specifically the US, had invalidated the Marxist view of the role of the proletariat by essentially eliminating that concept. Therefore Marcuse compares the role of his contemporary working class to the role of Marx’s bourgeoisie:

This illusion [of popular sovereignty] contains some truth: “the people,” previously the ferment of social change, have “moved up” to become the ferment of social cohesion. Here rather than in the redistribution of wealth and equalization of classes is the new stratification characteristic of advanced industrial society.⁴¹⁶

The working classes lived well and ever-better, enjoyed easier work, the pleasures and freedoms of a liberal democratic society, and all these experiences had “flattened out” their willingness to rebel and overthrow the established order, turning them into a one-dimensional “conservative popular base.” Returning to the role of the working class two years later, in his written address to the 1966 Socialist Scholars Conference, Marcuse goes as far as to argue that attempting to radicalize the working class is not only useless, but potentially harmful: [the task of the socialist scholar today is] “to recognize the full extent of the separation of theory from practice, to refrain from any premature and ideological reunification (such as the socialist indoctrination of groups which, by virtue of their social position and interest, are essentially antisocialist); and to remain open to the fact that new potentially radical forces are at work which do not conform to the stipulations of socialist theory.”⁴¹⁷

In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse theorized that the only reservoir of rebellion was to be found underneath the former proletariat:

However underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. When they get together and go out into the streets, without arms, without protection, in order to ask for the most primitive civil rights, they know

⁴¹⁴ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 256.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

⁴¹⁶ Marcuse, 260.

⁴¹⁷ *Statement for Socialist Scholars Conference*, Herbert Marcuse, September 1966, p. 8-10, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

that they face dogs, stones, and bombs, jail, concentration camps, even death. Their force is behind every political demonstration for the victims of law and order. The fact that they start refusing to play the game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.⁴¹⁸

Marcuse, thus, redefines the diverse social stratum at the very bottom of 1960s American society as the *new proletariat*, the new force of revolution – the revolution toward the new society that Marcuse called for. This redefinition is interesting not only, because it constitutes an “edit” of Marx and Engels’ description of the *Lumpenproletariat* – a rough 19th century equivalent to at least some of the groups Marcuse envisions. It is also significant, because it grants agency to people who had previously been viewed either negatively or as passive victims, at best.

Contrary to his optimism in *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse’s conclusion of *One-Dimensional Man* does not offer much hope. He points out that even if a revolution takes place, there are no signs it will be “a good end”. Furthermore, he points out that developed societies have both the means to try and integrate the people who constitute alternative revolutionary forces and also to fight them off in “emergency situations.” Nevertheless, a new vector of liberation has reappeared: “the spectre is there again, inside and outside the frontiers of the advanced societies.”⁴¹⁹ Marcuse ends his book by pointing out that the critical theory could not predict the way this would play out, but citing Walter Benjamin, closes with the phrase that *it is only for the sake of those without hope that hope is given to us*. In other words, the apparent indecision on Marcuse’s part when oscillating between a sentiment in favor of total rejection of society and a careful assessment of any positive alternatives, seems to ultimately weight in toward the former. Marcuse seems to be making the emotional argument that it is moral to support change, to support the revolutionary potential of the final remaining underclass in hopes that it may lead to a new and better society.

⁴¹⁸ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 260-261.

⁴¹⁹ Marcuse, 261.

2.3. Marcuse's Critique of „Pure Tolerance” as a “Micro Unit-Idea” and its Consequences

2.3.1. The Common Understanding of Tolerance and its Restoration in Post-War West Germany

What is the common understanding of tolerance or toleration? According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the first meaning of the noun tolerance is the “willingness to accept feelings, habits, or beliefs that are different from your own”. The Oxford Dictionary explains the same word as “the ability or willingness to tolerate the existence of opinions or behavior that one dislikes or disagrees with”. The seemingly tautological definition of the noun is clarified in the definition of the verb *to tolerate*, which is defined as follows: “allow the existence, occurrence, or practice of (something that one dislikes or disagrees with) without interference; accept or endure (someone or something unpleasant or disliked) with forbearance.” I would argue that these two definitions cover most people’s interpretations of what tolerance means: from accepting diversity to enduring the problematic.

While tolerance may appear like a commonsensical notion today, that had not always been the case. The roots of the concept of tolerance lie in the European Confessional Wars that resulted from the conflict between Catholics and Protestants following the Protestant Reformation starting in the 16th century. Therefore, while it later expanded to cover political and cultural differences, tolerance was initially the result of a search for peaceful coexistence between adherents of different Christian denominations.⁴²⁰ As such, tolerance was an important virtue, but one that was limited in the scope of its generosity: it implied disapproval and even rejection rather than mere indifference.⁴²¹ That, in turn, implies that the object of toleration is distinguished by their otherness.⁴²² With the American and French revolutions in the 18th century, religious freedom and the freedom of thought were enshrined as rights, separating the role of the citizen as such from the position of the believer.⁴²³ This brief look at the initial development of the notion of tolerance and its evolution makes it clear how tolerance came to be associated with pluralism and the human rights. That was also the meaning that Marcuse

⁴²⁰ Forst, Rainer, *Toleranz: Philosophische und gesellschaftliche Praxis einer umstrittenen Tugend*. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt and New York: 2000, 10.

⁴²¹ Forst, 9.

⁴²² van Doorn, Marjoka, *The nature of tolerance and the social circumstances in which it emerges*. In: *Current Sociology*, October 2014, 905–927.

⁴²³ Forst, 13-14.

attributed to the kind of tolerance he described as “repressive.” A more detailed look at the philosophical evolution of the thinking on tolerance will follow in the following section, but for now let us return to the common understanding of that term during the latter half of the 20th century.

Tolerance had come to be seen as a feature of democratic societies of the kind we see in what are commonly referred to as Western countries, for example in the USA, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Norway, and the European Union. A certain level of tolerance became part of the political and social tradition of democratic countries, but more importantly, it is codified in their laws, guaranteeing certain rights and freedoms: the freedom to vote and run for office, freedom of conscience and speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, freedom to own property, academic freedom, freedom of the press, and so on – even for individuals society disapproves of.

Another basic tenet of tolerant democracy is the principle of choice and majority rule, while ensuring that the current majority would never be able to change that principle and deprive future majorities of the right to make their choice. Nevertheless, majority rule is conditional, because a truly tolerant democratic system does not impose a “tyranny of the majority” on minority groups that are—by definition—unable to rule by majority. The way this works in America has been well explained by Robert Paul Wolf in his essay *Beyond Tolerance*, published in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, the collection of three essays featuring Marcuse’s *Repressive Tolerance*. Wolf points out that in countries like the United Kingdom, “political society became in a sense a community of communities.”⁴²⁴ He then goes on to point out that the concept of *Pluralist Democracy* emerged from this European tradition and was shaped in America due to the country’s great ethnic and religious heterogeneity. While Wolf nevertheless critiques it from a Marxist’s perspective, he refers to it as the “highest stage in the political development of industrial capitalism”⁴²⁵.

Let us now look at the position of tolerance in West Germany during the period that is examined here, roughly a period, starting two decades after the end of World War II. It is not relevant to this analysis to examine in detail how tolerant the German *Kaiserreich* and the Weimar

⁴²⁴ Wolf, Robert Paul. *Beyond Tolerance*. In: *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*. Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, 12.

⁴²⁵ Wolf, 51.

Republic were, but it can be said that the histories of tolerance and that of Germany are closely intertwined. As mentioned earlier, it was the religious conflicts caused by the Reformation that created the necessity to tolerate and few other parts of Europe were as denominationally diverse as some of the territories that came to make up the German Reich after 1870. One may generalize that the former is often viewed as politically authoritarian and militaristic, but socially free – at least free enough to allow progressive individuals to challenge traditions in every corner of life, from dress and art to architecture and literature.⁴²⁶ The Weimar Republic emerged after the almost revolutionary social division and standoff between Left and Right that was brought about by the defeat of the Central Powers in World War One. Its existence coincided with a period of democratization in a number of European countries and it also democratized German political life – for instance by enacting universal suffrage in 1919. Once the political system and the economy had been stabilized Weimar German society allowed freedom of expression – in politics, the economy, and art. To the extent that art can be viewed as a litmus test for tolerance, the Weimar period brought about an explosion of new artistic forms and styles, often reaching a state of “deliberate decadence and sensationalism” all the while having a mood of cultural pessimism and alienation.⁴²⁷ In addition to that, the Weimar Constitution was progressive for its time and guaranteed what were then considered the basic human rights and liberties. All in all, Germany was a comparatively tolerant society, especially compared with what it became after 1933.

It goes without saying that Germany made a rapid transition away from tolerance with the advent of the National-Socialist regime. Both in its foreign policy and in domestic policies targeting minorities, such as the Jews, Jehovah’s witnesses, homosexuals, or Roma, the Third Reich demonstrated a fundamentalist belief in its one truth. The state knew what was right and wished to see its will triumph over all that did not overlap with it – be it ideas or people. This shift away from democracy and tolerance had a large social support base since, as Stephen G. Fritz points out, the NSDAP was Germany’s first *Volkspartei*, receiving support from just about all segments of the population and not just the lower middle classes or *Kleinbürgertum*, as some historians have speculated.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁶ Orlow, Dietrich, *A History of Modern Germany: 1871 to Present*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey: 2002, 42-43.

⁴²⁷ Orlow, 140-151.

⁴²⁸ Fritz, Stephen G., *The NSDAP as Volkspartei? A Look at the Social Basis of the Nazi Voter*. In: *The History Teacher*, Vol. 20, No. 3: 1987, 380.

Following the end of the war, the government in the Soviet occupation zone of Germany attempted to create a façade of partial democracy, much more so than in other Soviet-occupied states in Eastern and Central Europe. Nevertheless, by 1949 it became absolutely clear that democracy would only be present in the German Democratic Republic's (GDR) name, while the new East German state veered in a Stalinist direction⁴²⁹. Thus, compared with the Third Reich, East Germany remained more or less in a similar state of intolerance: governed with “dictatorial-bureaucratic methods”⁴³⁰, it remained a state with heavily limited freedom of speech and freedom of expression, with people persecuted for their beliefs and ideas, or for their wish to leave the country. The GDR system's lack of tolerance, pluralism, and democracy was even evident in officially used terminology: notions such as *Republikflucht* and *Kollektivbewusstsein / Kollektiverziehung* problematized and gave a criminal connotation to ordinary personal choices like emigrating or implied that individuals were—and had to think and function as—part of a whole (collective consciousness / education).

West Germany or the Federal Republic of Germany, on the other hand, embraced the American model of pluralist democracy. Of course, even though Germany had been deeply intolerant and illiberal during the time of the NSDAP dictatorship, the German people had a long tradition of liberal and democratic ideas stemming from the 1848 revolution, as well as a not-so-distant institutional tradition of democratic practice during the Weimar period. After the “Denazification” campaign in the Western-occupied sectors, the pre-National-Socialist media outlets, political parties and civic organizations were restored and new ones were allowed to be founded. That cultural and institutional familiarity with democracy and tolerance facilitated the three Western occupying powers in gradually laying the foundations of a democratic political system between 1945 and the formation of the Federal Republic in 1949.⁴³¹

The first German government came to power in 1949. Supported by the CDU/CSU, the Free Democrats and the German Party, Konrad Adenauer began rebuilding a new, democratic and tolerant country. While many Germans were affected by the Denazification process, the vast majority of citizens who had been implicated as National-Socialists could go on leading normal lives with all civil liberties. In the context of the Cold War communists were seen as unreliable,

⁴²⁹ Weber, Herman, *DDR: Grundriss der Geschichte*. Fackelträger, Hannover: 1991, 37-39.

⁴³⁰ Weber, 40.

⁴³¹ Dobbins, James, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, and Anga R. Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Arlington, Pittsburgh: 2003, 14-16.

being suspected of having Soviet connections, potentially even being Soviet spies, and therefore posing a security threat. Therefore communists, but not all leftists, faced some limitations in West Germany during parts of the Cold War.

Describing the traditions of liberalism, which he - later in his essay on *Repressive Tolerance* - goes on to claim have become meaningless, Marcuse summarized that: “in the firmly established liberal society of England and the United States, freedom of speech and assembly was granted even to the radical enemies of society, provided they did not make the transition from word to deed, from speech to action.”⁴³² That was generally the case in post-war Germany, although Germany’s specific situation meant that a lower degree of tolerance was afforded to both overtly neo-Nazi and Communist ideas, leading to the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) ban in 1952, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) ban in 1957,⁴³³ and to ongoing deliberations about doing the same to the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Communists were generally not persecuted in West Germany in the sense of being denied the rights of free speech or assembly, but there were limitations on their employment in the public sector. Concerned about being undermined from within, West Germany implemented a ban on extremists in the public sector starting in 1972, which effectively banned radical leftists from applying or keeping their jobs as teachers, policeman, postal workers, railway workers, etc. This could be particularly problematic for individuals whose professional training restricted them to public service occupations. Illustrating the duality of this relative tolerance, the Communist Party was allowed to be reestablished under the name DKP in 1968 and remained active in political life until the end of the Cold War.

Left-wing organizations operated unhindered during the Adenauer years: SDS (German Socialist Student Union), then the SPD’s youth branch, was the first student organization to be reestablished after the capitulation in 1945⁴³⁴ and they remained active even after their leftward shift and break with the SPD. During the SPD’s years of governing Germany, the political practice of full tolerance for opposing political ideas was preserved and perhaps expanded, except in cases where it seemed like they would result in threats to the constitutional order.

⁴³² Marcuse, Herbert, *Repressive Tolerance*. In: *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, Beacon Press, 1965, Boston, 85-86.

⁴³³ Meinel, Florian, *The constitutional miracle on the Rhine: Towards a history of West German constitutionalism and the Federal Constitutional Court*. In: *I-CON International Journal of Constitutional Law*, Oxford University Press, No. 14: 2016, 284.

⁴³⁴ Fichter, Tilman and Siegwald Loennendonker, *Kleine Geschichte des SDS. Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund von 1946 bis zur Selbstaufloesung*, Rotbuch Verlag, Berlin: 1977, 15.

While specific criticisms could be made, there is general consensus that during the Adenauer “Era” and thereafter, Germany became—and remained—a free and democratic society.⁴³⁵ As the first federal chancellor put it in his memoirs, “The democratic principles under which Great Britain and the other countries of Western Europe had been living, protection of human dignity, equality before the law, freedom of the individual and of faith, have found their place in the basic rights of the Basic Law [...] They have the immediate force of law.”⁴³⁶ The latter was, in fact, new and perhaps specific to Germany. The constitution even went beyond setting up a democratic framework and is seen by some constitutional scholars as being an “activist” one – attempting to impose new democratic values in order to reform and rebuild German society.⁴³⁷

The democratic model adopted by West Germany and stemming—among other influences—from John Locke’s concept of the Social Contract that had previously motivated the wording of the Declaration of Independence (“...all men are created equal... with certain unalienable Rights...”), included rights and liberties ranging from the freedom of thought, conscience, speech and movement to the economic freedoms afforded by capitalism. In other words, West Germany, during the early 1960s and later at the time of the Student Movement, when Marcuse’s ideas enjoyed their widest fame and support, bore similarity to other Western countries with regard to the practice of tolerance. This overlap may also be deduced by the fact that Marcuse did not single out West Germany in his criticisms,⁴³⁸ but rather included it in his generalized critique of “advanced industrialized society.”

⁴³⁵ European Commission, Konrad Adenauer: a pragmatic democrat and tireless unifier, http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/founding-fathers/pdf/konrad_adenauer_en.pdf, (last accessed: June 25, 2016)

⁴³⁶ Adenauer, Konrad, Memoirs: 1945-1953. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago: 1966, 392.

⁴³⁷ Meinel, The constitutional miracle on the Rhine: Towards a history of West German constitutionalism and the Federal Constitutional Court, 282.

Meinel reviews Michaela Hailbronner’s book Traditions and Transformations: The Rise of German Constitutionalism (OUP, Oxford: 2015) where she makes the “activist” argument.

⁴³⁸ For example, one of the few passages where Marcuse mentions Western Europe in *One-Dimensional Man* is on page 22 where he talks about the German SPD abandoning its Marxist principles to “prove its respectability”. He criticizes a similar perceived shift away from radical left-wing politics in the UK, France, and Italy. Otherwise, he differentiates between the Western and Soviet spheres within “advanced industrial society” and the Third World. While most of his examples having to do with the “West” are from the United States, it is understood that he sees these tendencies as also applying to Western Europe.

2.3.2. Analyzing Repressive Tolerance as a Micro Unit-Idea

Having in mind the dominant views and applications of tolerance in democratic societies and also considering the socio-political context of the 1960s, we can now turn to a closer and multifaceted analysis of Marcuse's critique of the *kind of tolerance* that he labeled as repressive, as well as his proposed solutions which he labels *liberating tolerance*. In analyzing Marcuse's notion, it is important to **set it off against the background of how tolerance was seen before Marcuse**. As mentioned earlier, the notion of tolerance was borne out of the confessional wars in Europe following the reformation and the necessity to find a way to peacefully coexist with ideas and individuals seen as heretical and therefore unacceptable. A valuable tool tracing the development of that concept is John Gray's book "Two Faces of Liberalism". While Gray ultimately proposes his own vision of liberal toleration, it will not be reviewed here as it is chronologically more recent than Marcuse's works. Gray, like Robert Paul Wolf however, offers an excellent review of the historical development of liberal toleration. He points out that "contemporary liberal regimes are late flowerings of a project of toleration that began in Europe in the sixteenth century."⁴³⁹ He sees two distinct intellectual lines that both argue in favor of liberal toleration: one of "rational consensus on the best way of life" and another based on the "belief that human beings can flourish in many ways of life."⁴⁴⁰ In terms of the philosophical contributions to these two competing views of tolerance, Gray assigns the thought of John Locke and Immanuel Kant, as well as the more recent Rawls and Hayek, to the former view. To the latter, Gray assigns the thought of Thomas Hobbes and David Hume, along with Isaiah Berlin and Michael Oakeshott.⁴⁴¹ Having this intellectual cleavage in mind, Marcuse's reader would probably ask himself which of these two traditions Marcuse could be assigned to. There is no simple answer as, on one hand, Marcuse argues in favor of the liberated human being free to find his own needs, pleasures, and truths, while on the other, Marcuse's argumentation belongs to rational-prescriptive school of thought.

Another aspect of Marcuse's argumentation that has much older roots concerns the question of what is the telos of tolerance. Marcuse claimed that the telos of tolerance is Truth – an idea opposed to MacIntyre's argument⁴⁴² that it is in fact rationality (discussed in greater detail later

⁴³⁹ Gray, John, Two Faces of Liberalism. The New Press, New York: 2000, 1.

⁴⁴⁰ Gray, 1.

⁴⁴¹ Gray, 2 (Gray's own vision could also be said to be based on Hobbes').

⁴⁴² MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 90-91.

on). In that context, it is interesting to note that this debate is much older than Marcuse and MacIntyre – it was John Locke who proposed “toleration as a means to truth”, Hobbes who thought it a “strategy of peace”, Voltaire who saw it as a platform for peace between fools and Plato saw reason as the path to agreement.⁴⁴³ Ultimately, according to MacIntyre, Marcuse’s insistence on truth being the telos of tolerance demonstrates his adherence to Marxism rather than Liberalism; Marcuse’s insistence on the essence of tolerance being (one) truth implies an ideological belief in historical determinism whose end goal is quite similar to Marx’s higher-stage communism.

In addition to that, Marcuse draws additional inspiration for his idea of *repressive tolerance* from Hegel⁴⁴⁴ who argued that our ideas and worldview were social constructs rather than based on rational and objective observations of the world⁴⁴⁵—therefore it was Hegel’s *Weltgeist* that seeps into Marcuse’s view of false consciousness. While Hegel saw society as progressing naturally, Marcuse concludes that advanced industrial society has reached a point when that is no longer possible. That was so, because advanced industrial society had managed to find ways to steer the existence of individuals, their thoughts and the choices they made, rather than repressing them in obvious ways. In order to shed light on this condition, Marcuse needed Heidegger’s approach to being, which zooms in on the individual in his existence and in his surroundings.

Heidegger had reinterpreted the Enlightenment-era approach to ontology of separating the subject and object of analysis from one another. He described human existence stretching beyond the conditionality of thought (Descartes), but had also connected it with one’s surroundings or “being in the world.” This phenomenological approach, inspired by Heidegger, can be seen in Marcuse’s attempts to analyze society by zooming in on the ways it has conditioned or predetermined individual patterns of consciousness. Specifically, Marcuse’s fixation with authentic human experience—as opposed to what he views as the actual repressed experience—appears to be inspired by Heideggerian thinking and specifically by the concept

⁴⁴³ Gray, *Two Faces of Liberalism*, 2-3.

⁴⁴⁴ An anecdotal example of Marcuse’s ongoing interest in Hegel is that in 1966 he took part in the International Hegel Congress in Prague and did not change his mind even though he received a number of letters urging him to participate in a Socialist Scholars Conference, which was to take place at the same time in New York City
Marcuse’s correspondence about his attendance at the International Hegel Congress in Prague, *Herbert Marcuse*, 1966, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

⁴⁴⁵ For example, Marcuse makes the argument that “it is the whole which determines the truth [...] in the sense that its structure and function determine every particular condition and relation.” (*Repressive Tolerance*, 83).

of authentic and inauthentic existence as the core aspect of being (*Dasein*). One key aspect of inauthentic experience according to Heidegger is “everydayness”:

Heidegger viewed everydayness primarily as a limitation of being, an inauthentic or fallen state in which the individual abdicates responsibility for choice in all but the most trivial matters, seeking refuge in the anonymous “they.” Heidegger’s descriptions of our insatiable appetites for distraction, our craving for the novel and the bizarre, and our fascination with idle talk resonate in many of the most unforgiving critiques of popular culture. For Heidegger, everydayness is omnivorous and oppressive, a barrier between human beings and their realization of self and world.⁴⁴⁶

A key reflection of this in Marcuse’s thought – specifically in *One-Dimensional Man* –were his attempts to expose the workings and effects of “everydayness” that he detected in order to help people escape their “fallenness” and point them in what he viewed as the correct path. He applied the same principle when looking at tolerance, which he felt had been rendered inauthentic and therefore repressive.

Let us now look at specific aspects of the argument Marcuse is making: He states that while tolerance in itself is a great achievement of the liberal age, its functioning has been “perverted” by the “totalitarian democracy” of the “post-fascist time”. The social and economic conditions have created a system where the established powers of the Right can no longer be threatened by indiscriminate tolerance. “What is proclaimed and practiced as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the cause of oppression.”⁴⁴⁷ Tolerance, according to Marcuse, should not be about tolerating everyone as a matter of principle, but ought to be “an end in itself,” i.e. it should not be extended to those Marcuse views as intolerant. Due to the Cold War political status-quo and the militarization and proxy wars, Marcuse sees progress toward a tolerant humane society “more than before arrested by violence and suppression”. Tolerance, therefore, is “loaded” or subverted to work for the stability of the system and instead of amounting to tolerance for opposition, “it is the people who tolerate the government, which in turn tolerates opposition within the framework determined by the constituted authorities.”⁴⁴⁸ He sees existing tolerance in the West as one of two kinds: passive tolerance of established ideas and attitudes, even when they are obviously harmful, and “active, official tolerance granted to the Right as well as to the Left [...]” which is non-partisan and which he calls

⁴⁴⁶ Thompson, Christine. Authenticity and Everydayness. In: *Marilyn Zumuehlen Working, Papers in Art Education*, Vol. 2, 1983, 68-69.

⁴⁴⁷ Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, 81.

⁴⁴⁸ Marcuse, 82.

“‘abstract’ or ‘pure’ inasmuch as it refrains from taking sides—but in doing so it actually protects the already established machinery of discrimination”⁴⁴⁹.

Unlike traditional Marxism where workers are said to be exploited, the system has developed and no longer exploits the masses in a way that is discernible to them. According to Marcuse, the majority has been manipulated into believing that everything is in order and has acquired a false consciousness making it feel content due to the increasing levels of material satisfaction. “Universal toleration becomes questionable when [...] tolerance is administered to manipulated and indoctrinated individuals who parrot, as their own, the opinion of their masters, for whom heteronomy has become autonomy.”⁴⁵⁰ The fact that the Left is tolerated only weakens and fragments it as an illusion of normalcy and democracy is created. Moreover, the social and economic order is rigged against the Left and the natural course of events will only worsen that. Harking back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the *general will*, Marcuse expresses skepticism that such a construction could be created under the then present conditions:

One might in theory construct a state in which a multitude of different pressures, interests, and authorities balance each other out and result in a truly general and rational interest [... but] such a construction badly fits a society in which powers are and remain unequal and even increase their unequal weight when they run their own course. It fits even worse when the variety of pressures unifies and coagulates into an overwhelming whole, integrating the particular countervailing powers by virtue of an increasing standard of living and an increasing concentration of power. [...] Those minorities which strive for change of the whole [...] will be left harmless and helpless in the face of an overwhelming majority [...] against qualitative social change [...] firmly grounded in the increasing satisfaction of needs [...] in a well-functioning social system.⁴⁵¹

However, Marcuse says, tolerance should really be about (re)creating a new man and a new society: “progress in freedom demands progress in the *consciousness* of freedom.”⁴⁵² This can only be achieved through taking away the rights or “the withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements” or in other words from the “political Right.”⁴⁵³

Marcuse addresses the criticism leveled against critics of the then-current system that they are “elitists” who are advocating for a “dictatorship of intellectuals.” He makes the point that even that would, in fact, be preferable to the “representative government by a non-intellectual

⁴⁴⁹ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 85.

⁴⁵⁰ Marcuse, 90.

⁴⁵¹ Marcuse, 93-94.

⁴⁵² Marcuse, 112.

⁴⁵³ Marcuse, 110.

minority of politicians, generals, and businessmen”⁴⁵⁴, which is Marcuse’s description of the US government. Nevertheless, that is not what Marcuse is offering: “The alternative to the established semi-democratic process is *not* a dictatorship or elite, no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for a real democracy.”⁴⁵⁵ Instead he argues that the real struggle should be against tolerance as it is generally understood or the “ideology of tolerance”, because it actually “favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination.”⁴⁵⁶ By clarifying that he is against a dictatorship of intellectuals, Marcuse makes sure that he remains within the accepted climate of opinion, while at the same time employing the dialectical pathos and semantics popular among the left.

Repressive tolerance is something of an oxymoron. One of Marcuse’s core points in making his argument, as the following citation exemplifies, is based on the assumption that many fundamental values that the West prides itself on are in fact fake: tolerance, truth, logic. All of these have been perverted by capitalism and the only way to reverse the trend would be to “reeducate” society.

If objectivity has anything to do with truth, and if truth is more than a matter of logic and science, then this kind of objectivity is false, and this kind of tolerance inhuman. And if it is necessary to break the established universe of meaning (and the practice enclosed in this universe) in order to enable man to find out what is true and false, this deceptive impartiality would have to be abandoned. The people exposed to this impartiality are no *tabulae rasae*, they are indoctrinated by the conditions under which they live and think and which they do not transcend. To enable them to become autonomous, to find by themselves what is true and what is false for man in the existing society, they would have to be freed from the prevailing indoctrination (which is no longer recognized as indoctrination). But this means that the trend would have to be reversed: they would have to get information slanted in the opposite direction.⁴⁵⁷

Referring to one of the questions Skinner suggests to be asked when analyzing elements of an idea, it could be speculated about what Marcuse is not saying here. He dares to argue in favor of individuals “getting” information “slanted” in the right direction, but what he really seems to mean is “reversing” the “prevailing indoctrination”, which implies coercive tactics.

Marcuse invokes John Stuart Mill in his assertion that tolerance could only apply to “human beings in the maturity of their faculties” and that despotism is a legitimate mode of governing barbarians, provided their improvement is the goal.⁴⁵⁸ As the contemporary homologue of

⁴⁵⁴ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 121.

⁴⁵⁵ Marcuse, 122.

⁴⁵⁶ Marcuse, 123.

⁴⁵⁷ Marcuse, 98-99.

⁴⁵⁸ Marcuse, 106.

Mill's mature human being, Marcuse presents the human being "who has learned to think rationally and autonomously". And as "the answer to Plato's educational dictatorship is the democratic educational dictatorship of free men."⁴⁵⁹ This is interesting for two reasons. Firstly, in drawing a connection to Mill, Marcuse is himself providing evidence of the ideational continuity typical of a form of unit-idea. Secondly it shows how fundamental Marcuse's rejection of his contemporary society was if he felt he could legitimately compare the majority of Americans to Mill's barbarians. As an extension of that point, by describing the people he is not addressing, he is indirectly defining his target group or the society of society he wishes to influence.

In a 1968 letter to The Los Angeles Times, Sherwood M. Nelson, professor of philosophy at San Diego State College, wrote that democracy must be studied in its concrete state, because it is never pure or perfect. Therefore, he explains Marcuse's seemingly radical statements on repressive tolerance arguing that "among the imperfections of concrete democracy Marcuse discusses is what he calls 'totalitarian democracy.' Such a 'democracy' has all the appearances of a democracy and yet it is essentially unfree. But what can be done in this sort of situation? To what extent can undemocratic (i.e., coercive) tactics be adopted by those who would procure or enhance democracy? [...] What morally defensible tactics can be employed by the unfree majority in a totalitarian democracy?"⁴⁶⁰

As Alasdair MacIntyre summarizes his categorical critique of *Repressive Tolerance*, "what Marcuse invites us to repeat is part of the experience of Stalinism."⁴⁶¹ (More on MacIntyre's critique in the following section.) One may reply that Marcuse was no Stalinist and that would be true. But while he is as critical of the USSR as he is of the USA (rather unfair to the US to compare the two and thus relativize totalitarianism in my opinion), Marcuse offers the Cuban and Chinese revolutions, together with the English Civil War and French Revolution, as illustration of his conviction that "violence emanating from the rebellion of the oppressed classes broke the historical continuum of injustice, cruelty, and silence for a brief moment, brief but explosive enough to achieve an increase in the scope of freedom and justice [...] in one word: progress in civilization."⁴⁶² While Marcuse may not be a Stalinist, he appears not to

⁴⁵⁹ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 106.

⁴⁶⁰ *Letter from Sherwood M. Nelson to the editor of the Los Angeles Times*, July 23 1968, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2020.74

⁴⁶¹ MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse*, 92.

⁴⁶² Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 107.

be too disturbed by the repressive nature of the regimes of Mao and Castro. Together with his refusal to condemn revolutionary violence, this seems to demonstrate that he accepts revolution as a legitimate method of social change—an understanding that perhaps ought to be borne in mind when interpreting other less direct passages that also seem to advocate in favor of progress through coercive means.

Marcuse points out that revolutionary violence should not be advised against. He begins his essay with the conclusion “that the realization of the objective of tolerance would call for intolerance toward prevailing policies, attitudes, opinions, and the extension of tolerance to policies, attitudes, and opinions which are outlawed or suppressed.”⁴⁶³ The philosopher repeats these sentiments in a number of places throughout the text and also in his 1968 postscript to “Repressive Tolerance”. They are quite disturbing, because he is in essence blessing the use of violence for the sake of peace – a type of argument that in fact resembles what he himself critiques as the establishment’s pseudo-logic. While other ideas proposed by Marcuse may be constructive and emancipatory, I would argue that this one constitutes an extremist argument:

But to refrain from violence in the face of vastly superior violence is one thing, to renounce a priori violence against violence, on ethical or psychological grounds (because it may antagonize sympathizers) is another. [...] In terms of historical function, there is a difference between revolutionary and reactionary violence, between violence practiced by the oppressed and by the oppressors. In terms of ethics, both forms of violence are inhuman and evil—but since when is history made in accordance with ethical standards? To start applying them at the point where the oppressed rebel against the oppressors, the have-nots against the haves is serving the cause of actual violence by weakening the protest against it.⁴⁶⁴

With this point, Marcuse detaches himself from the liberal pluralistic approach and highlights the fact that while his thought is influenced by other philosophical influence (as well as by academic thought in other fields like psychology), it is nevertheless a variation of Marxism – a variation that remains committed to the revolutionary rather than the social-democratic approach to social change. Furthermore, Marcuse argues that in addition to violence, the revolution requires an “extreme suspension of the right of free speech and free assembly.”⁴⁶⁵ As discussed earlier, he points out that this is “indeed justified only if the whole society is in extreme danger”⁴⁶⁶, which he believed to be the case.

⁴⁶³ Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, 81.

⁴⁶⁴ Marcuse, 102.

⁴⁶⁵ Marcuse, 109-110.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid.

Marcuse also makes references to his concept of “alternative revolutionary forces”, which will be discussed in detail later on in this chapter. He does this by clearly stating which groups within society he prioritizes. This shows that the two texts are closely linked and not just by their year of publication.

The small and powerless minorities which struggle against the false consciousness and its beneficiaries must be helped: their continued existence is more important than the preservation of abused rights and liberties which grant constitutional powers to those who oppress these minorities. It should be evident by now that the exercise of civil rights by those who don't have them presupposes the withdrawal of civil rights from those who prevent their exercise, and that liberation of the Damned of the Earth presupposes suppression not only of their old but also of their new masters.⁴⁶⁷

Marcuse claims that “when tolerance mainly serves the protection and preservation of a repressive society [and] render[s] men immune against other and better forms of life, then tolerance has been perverted.”⁴⁶⁸ He admits that his program of “de-perversion” of the individual amounts to censorship “even precensorship”. Nevertheless, Marcuse maintains that a break through people’s false consciousness may provide the “Archimedean point for a larger emancipation,” thus making the cause just regardless of the means.

Marcuse appears to be frustrated by the pacifying effects of economic wellbeing and democratic permissiveness in what is commonly seen as the West. These characteristics in his opinion blind the majority and dissuade it from fighting for better a better society. However, since by the time Marcuse created his post-war works, democratic tolerance as a principle had gained full acceptance, Marcuse was unable to make a legitimate argument outside the principle of tolerance. Therefore he had to turn it upside down. To that end, he employed Karl Popper’s Paradox of Tolerance, even though Popper is not cited or mentioned anywhere in Marcuse’s text. John Rawls also deals with the universality of tolerance and concludes that tolerance is, in fact, conditional: “an intolerant sect has no title to complain when it is denied an equal liberty.”⁴⁶⁹ Marcuse’s argument extends far beyond this reasonable point since he argues in favor of withdrawing tolerance a very wide array of political positions that *he views* as intolerant rather than political positions that are commonly seen as intolerant.

Drawing on Lovejoy and Skinner, as well as the other relevant later critiques of the methodology in the history of ideas covered in the first section of this chapter, we will now ask a number of multifaceted questions in order to analyze Marcuse’s argument. Perhaps an

⁴⁶⁷ Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, 109-110.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1999, 190.

appropriate start would be to think about whom Marcuse is addressing. He is quite clear about that. On the one hand, “Repressive Tolerance” is dedicated to his students at Brandeis University. That can be understood literally, but I would argue it also symbolizes all those who Marcuse sees as capable of free thought. He states that “it is the task and duty of the intellectual [...] to break the concreteness of oppression.”⁴⁷⁰ He makes it clear that a small number of “intelligentsia”, unaffected by “false consciousness”, are capable of clear objective and left-leaning thought.

The question, who is qualified to make all these distinctions, definitions, identifications for the society as a whole, has now one logical answer, namely, everyone ‘in the maturity of his faculties’ as a human being, everyone who has learned to think rationally and autonomously. The answer to Plato’s educational dictatorship is the democratic educational dictatorship of free men.⁴⁷¹

It may be concluded without much speculation that Marcuse sees a minority of “not necessarily [...] elected”, but “rational and autonomous” individuals as fit to lead society. While he does state he is against an intellectual dictatorship, his flirtation with the idea suggests that those of his readers who would consider themselves more enlightened in matters of progress are his target audience. This group conceivably includes both radical youth, students, and academics, sympathetic to the radical left. Of course, Marcuse is also concerned with poor disadvantaged people, discriminated minorities, and colonized Third World peoples. However, it is the former category of educated progressives who are his primary readers and who fit the classification of rational individuals, as he sees them. In Germany, that demographic is likely to have included many of left-oriented groups, especially those who were active within youth and student organizations that took part in the student protests of the 1960s.

Marcuse addressed this demographic again in 1968 by adding a postscript to a reprint of *Repressive Tolerance* during that year where he revisited the point about an educational dictatorship, argued that “the ideology of democracy hides its lack of substance”, and reasserted his idea that the record of the then current “non-intellectual minority” elite “is not very promising, and the political prerogatives for the intelligentsia may not necessarily be worse for the society as a whole.”⁴⁷² Since this postscript showed no real evolution in his ideas, but was ultimately a restatement of his original thesis, its main value lies in showing that Marcuse’s position on tolerance had remained unchanged during the four years between the first and second editions. Marcuse also used his 1968 postscript as a platform to defend his previous text

⁴⁷⁰ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 81.

⁴⁷¹ Marcuse, 106.

⁴⁷² Marcuse, 121.

against its critics. He compared his argumentation to that of John Stuart Mill – “not exactly an enemy of liberal and representative government”⁴⁷³, but also conceded that in fact the alternative to the system he was criticizing was not any form of dictatorship “no matter how intellectual and intelligent, but the struggle for real democracy.”⁴⁷⁴ While he ultimately repeated most of his arguments—going as far as labelling political majorities illegitimate due to the prevailing conditions—and suggested ways to overcome the existing society, Marcuse removed the anti-democratic labels that others were attaching to him by clearly stating that he is against any form of dictatorship.

What are Marcuse’s goals? Before coming to a conclusion, it is important to differentiate between his concrete immediate goal and his philosophical terminus. As far as his ultimate goal is concerned, Marcuse states that “[...] freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the existing societies. And the direction in which it must be sought, and the institutional and cultural changes which may help to attain the goal are, at least in developed civilization, *comprehensible*, that is to say, they can be identified and projected, on the basis of experience, by human reason.”⁴⁷⁵ In other words, Marcuse refuses to formulate a concrete political agenda. At the same time, he was not just criticizing society without proposing solutions and he was not merely a theoretician lacking a practical agenda. He explained that his proposals should not be viewed within the binary paradigm of democracy vs. dictatorship, because while he admitted dictatorship was much worse, he claimed 1960s democracies were “totalitarian” and thus a third alternative was needed. Marcuse goes on, stating that freedom “necessitates tolerance”, but immediately clarifies:

[...] This tolerance cannot be indiscriminate and equal with respect to the contents of expression, neither in word nor in deed; it cannot protect false words and wrong deeds which demonstrate that they contradict and counteract the possibilities of liberation. [...] But society cannot be indiscriminate where the pacification of existence, where freedom and happiness themselves are at stake: here, certain things cannot be said, certain ideas cannot be expressed, certain policies cannot be proposed, certain behavior cannot be permitted without making tolerance an instrument for the continuation of servitude.⁴⁷⁶

For the sake of the better future, a “real democracy”⁴⁷⁷ as he put it in his 1968 postscript, a single political line must be allowed and its opposition must be silenced. Marcuse calls this “*discriminating tolerance*” and explains that it is a “fight against an ideology of tolerance

⁴⁷³ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 121.

⁴⁷⁴ Marcuse, 122.

⁴⁷⁵ Marcuse, 87.

⁴⁷⁶ Marcuse, 88.

⁴⁷⁷ Marcuse, 122.

which, in reality, favors and fortifies the conservation of the status quo of inequality and discrimination.”⁴⁷⁸ Marcuse is very clear about which ideas must, in his opinion, be silenced and discriminated against. He argues that if the ways toward the development of a subversive majority are blocked, then

their reopening may require apparently undemocratic means. They would include the withdrawal of toleration of speech and assembly from groups and movements which promote aggressive politics, armament, chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc. Moreover, the restoration of freedom of thought may necessitate new and rigid restrictions on teachings and practices in the educational institutions which, by their very methods and concepts, serve to enclose the mind within the established universe of discourse and behavior—thereby precluding a priori a rational evaluation of the alternatives.⁴⁷⁹

One may reasonably suggest that Marcuse’s argument resonates with the contemporary supporter of a tolerant democratic society: the promotion of hate and discrimination is, in fact, limited by a number of contemporary democracies. I would, however, argue that Marcuse’s policy proposal extends considerably beyond that: Marcuse’s list of unacceptable policies include arguing in favor of a strong defense or against “the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc.” In other words, he is not only concerned with banning ideas that are intolerant, illiberal or a threat to national security and the democratic order, but basically a rather widely defined territory of conservative and centrist politics. This point is in fact stated by Marcuse:

Liberating tolerance, then, would mean intolerance against movements from the Right and toleration of movements from the Left. As to the scope of this tolerance and intolerance: ... it would extend to the stage of action as well as of discussion and propaganda, of deed as well as of word.⁴⁸⁰

It appears that Marcuse’s reasoning may stem from a “trauma of Fascism”. He expresses the view that wars, massacres, and the 20th century far-right totalitarian regimes “did not break, but rather tightened and streamlined the continuum of oppression”⁴⁸¹ – a point that reflects the well-known Marxist understanding of imperialism (and Fascism) as a stage in the development or “decay” of capitalism.⁴⁸² Marcuse believed that the tragedies of National Socialism could have been avoided if tolerance had been denied early enough.

⁴⁷⁸ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 123.

⁴⁷⁹ Marcuse, 100-101.

⁴⁸⁰ Marcuse, 109.

⁴⁸¹ Marcuse, 108.

⁴⁸² Dutt, R. Palme, *The Question of Fascism and Capitalist Decay*. In: *The Communist International*, Vol. XII, No. 14: July 20, 1935. Accessed on: https://www.marxists.org/archive/dutt/articles/1935/question_of_fascism.htm

The whole post-fascist period is one of clear and present danger. Consequently, true pacification requires the withdrawal of tolerance before the deed, at the stage of communication in word, print, and picture.⁴⁸³

Marcuse is absolutely clear that what he is talking about is, in fact, an “extreme suspension of the right of free speech and free assembly.”⁴⁸⁴ That, he points out, is justified by the “extreme danger” and “emergency situation”⁴⁸⁵ that he thought the United States were in at the time of writing his text. Therefore his solution was a withdrawal of tolerance from the entire non-left political spectrum:

Withdrawal of tolerance from regressive movements before they can become active; intolerance even toward thought, opinion, and word, and finally, intolerance in the opposite direction, that is, toward self-styled conservatives, to the political Right—these anti-democratic notions respond to the actual development of the democratic society which has destroyed the basis for universal tolerance.⁴⁸⁶

It is significant that Marcuse concludes that the “democratic society has destroyed the basis for universal tolerance.” He objects that “false consciousness has become the general consciousness.”⁴⁸⁷ Therefore free debates between different opinions “can no longer compete peacefully [...] on rational grounds.”⁴⁸⁸ While Marcuse’s argumentation was not groundless, it betrays a philosophical foundation that was still primarily grounded in revolutionary Marxism—enriched with existentialism and idealism—rather than in the liberal tradition.

It is practically impossible to answer whether Marcuse’s work only legitimized action or gave rise to it. The work discussed here was originally published in 1965 when the protest movement in the United States was active. Marcuse was already gaining popularity among radical students in the US at that time⁴⁸⁹ – with his lectures, but also by participating in demonstrations like one in October 1969 led by Angela Davis on the UCSD campus.⁴⁹⁰ Echoing his concerns about Marcuse’s ideology, Maurice Cranston commented on the small format and soft black covers

⁴⁸³ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 109.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁵ Marcuse, 110.

⁴⁸⁶ Marcuse, 110-111.

⁴⁸⁷ Marcuse, 110.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ According to a January 1970 article in the *La Jolla Light*, “not many people have read his books and articles, but the few who have include some of the leaders of student revolts – in Paris, West Berlin, Tokyo, Berkeley and New York. A recent opinion poll in *Fortune* magazine showed Marcuse more popular among 18 to 25 year olds in universities than Lyndon Johnson.

Article about Herbert Marcuse, *La Jolla Light* (periodical), January 1970, In: UB-Frankfurt, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2020.73

⁴⁹⁰ Fokos, Barabella, *The Bourgeois Marxist*. In: *The San Diego Reader*, August 23, 2007. Accessed on: <https://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2007/aug/23/bourgeois-marxist/>

A brief video excerpt from the demonstration, featuring both Davis and Marcuse, has survived and is accessible on the website of the Bay Area Television Archive. KPIX-TV, Davis & Marcuse Speak at UC Berkeley, October 24, 1969. Accessed on: <https://diva.sfsu.edu/collections/sfbatv/bundles/190435>

of the original edition that made it look “like a prayer book or missal and perhaps designed to compete with *The Thoughts of Chairman Mao* as devotional reading at student sit-ins.”⁴⁹¹ The text was clearly a success during the following years and it probably served both as an additional arsenal of arguments for young radicals and excited them, i.e. gave rise to new action. As Martin Jay points out in my questionnaire on Marcuse: “It gave them a vocabulary to articulate the discontent that they felt couldn’t be described in traditional Marxist class categories. In tactical terms, some factions of the New Left also seemed to draw on the lessons of his 1965 essay on “repressive tolerance” to shout down speakers with whom they disagreed, especially over the justification for the Vietnam War.”⁴⁹² The publication of *Repressive Tolerance* and *One-Dimensional Man* certainly preceded the most radical years associated with the so-called “protest generation”. Therefore, with the impossibility to trace direct causality, but knowing that these works enjoyed wide reception within the radical movement and among the educated youth, the most appropriate conclusion might be that his work was both an inspiration and a tool to legitimize actions, born of other motivation.

In both the USA and West Germany, the *Zeitgeist* was one where the radical opposition was fueled by the horror scenes reported from Vietnam and by the scare of impending nuclear holocaust: therefore, Marcuse’s thought fit quite well into an atmosphere of impatience and intolerance against political opponents. Therefore, to borrow Philip P. Wiener’s term, *Repressive Tolerance* certainly influenced the “climate of opinion”, but it also benefitted from its compatibility with it.

2.3.3. Hypothetical Consequences and Contemporary Overlaps: A Society Ossified by Political Correctness

What could be the hypothetical consequences of Marcuse’s notion of *repressive tolerance* and the application of his noble-sounding program of *liberating tolerance*? This question will be analyzed below in what could be labelled an interdisciplinary section within this text. Finally, this section will also speculate about the potential overlaps between Marcuse’s notion and the contemporary practices lumped together under the accusatory label of “political correctness.”

⁴⁹¹ Cranston, Maurice, *The New Left: Six Critical Essays*. The Bodley Head Ltd., London: 1970, 87.

⁴⁹² Jay, Martin. *Answers to Questionnaire for this dissertation*, 2014.

Marcuse's program of liberating tolerance envisages the "elimination of violence" through an array of measures amounting to the removal of what we commonly consider tolerance, which in Marcus's eyes is inauthentic and repressive. The most obvious and broadly-defined plausible consequence of Marcuse's program would be the effective abolition of liberal democracy as it is commonly understood. Based on pillars like majority rule and pluralism, human rights like the rights to freedom of thought and speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement, liberal democracy would be effectively dismantled if some sections of the population were deprived of some of these rights. While Marcuse wishes to create a "humane society", his proposed approach of taking away the freedoms of "Right (or Center)", which he essentially equates with fascism, will result in an unusual form of repressive society. While a polemical commentator, critical of Marcuse, may compare an imaginary Marcusean society to the 20th century communist or fascist regimes, I would argue that his vision may actually result in a situation closer to the discriminatory minority-rule quasi-democracy of Apartheid-era South Africa. While Marcuse is not arguing in favor of dismantling any democratic rights or mechanisms, he considers them meaningless and demands that they be withdrawn from a section of the population. Of course, this comparison is highly problematic in itself as political beliefs are neither inborn nor immutable, but nevertheless a form of *intellectual Apartheid* is the closest hypothetical comparison that could be made. That is the only political system that has actually existed where, unlike the primary forms of 20th century totalitarian regimes, which took away democratic rights *and* disenfranchised segments of the population, segments of the population were disenfranchised while others enjoyed elements of democracy that still existed. To the extent that certain democratic rights were also taken away from white South Africans, that was done with the idea of stabilizing the existing constitutional order and therefore arguably—without injuring the notion that the country was part of the democratic West.

In addition to taking away civil rights, another hypothetical aspect of Marcuse's program, if applied in practice, would have to include a reorganization of the economy. While the economy is not this particular essay's core topic, some of Marcuse's other works like *One-Dimensional Man* and *Eros and Civilization* address the economy. Among Marcuse's claims in those works are that a new society could be built upon the technological basis of the West (c. 1964), which would allow automation and a reduction of production to allow for people to focus on their true needs and wishes, including pleasurable activities or *play*, as Marcuse puts it. Echoing the old Marxist utopia, Marcuse wants to eliminate the need for work, which he believes could be achieved given the level of technological advancement attained in the West by the 1960s.

Marcuse is no economist and naturally providing details about *how* his idea would actually work is not a focus in his works. He is far more specific when it comes to describing the need for societal and psychological reform. Therefore, in *One-Dimensional Man* he provides an in-depth argument that contemporary man's needs are "false." He claims they have been inserted into people's consciousness by the media, advertising, and society. Even within the relatively brief essay on Repressive Tolerance Marcuse returns to this aspect of the then-contemporary economy: "[...] the impotent and benevolent tolerance toward outright deception in merchandizing, waste, and planned obsolescence are not distortions and aberrations, they are the essence of a system which fosters tolerance as a means for perpetuating the struggle for existence and suppressing the alternatives."⁴⁹³

It is unclear in specific consumer terms which products and services would be abolished and how the economic system would be reorganized. Removing obsolescence, eliminating advertising, and mandating which needs are fake presupposes—at least initially—a state-owned or centrally-planned economy like that of the Eastern Bloc. One may speculate that such an economic system would be plagued by deficits and inefficiencies like those experienced by Eastern Bloc states. From the consumer's perspective, outsourcing judgements regarding the validity of needs to a state committee, could potentially lead to a market where not only choice, but also many luxury goods have altogether been discontinued.

Perhaps the most pertinent economic consequence of Marcuse's approach to tolerance is that the Right would have to be deprived of control over not only the media, but also other economic enterprises that have an effect on the formation of public opinion and political life. Marcuse makes it clear that a core part of the problem, as he sees it, exceeds the issue of tolerating opposing political positions and advertisements creating "false needs." He points his finger toward those holding "economic power", who, as he points out, are the same as those who set the United States' overall political direction as well:

But with the concentration of economic and political power and the integration of opposites in a society which uses technology as an instrument of domination, effective dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge; in the formation of opinion, in information and communication, in speech and assembly. Under the rule of monopolistic media--themselves the mere instruments of economic and political

⁴⁹³ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 83.

power--a mentality is created for which right and wrong, true and false are predefined wherever they affect the vital interests of the society.⁴⁹⁴

This bleak picture does not seem to suggest that there would be peaceful ways of achieving change. This brings us to the next point that can be made about the hypothetical consequences of Marcuse's notion of *Repressive Tolerance*.

Marcuse qualifies those who share his ideas as "small and powerless minorities". They are the ones who "struggle against the false consciousness and its beneficiaries". Harking back to the Marxist notion of the revolutionary *avant-garde*, Marcuse asserts that these groups "must be helped: their continued existence is more important than the preservation of abused rights and liberties which grant constitutional powers to those who oppress these minorities."⁴⁹⁵ In other words, Marcuse's program is not one that could take place with the consent of the majority. In Marcuse's eyes the majority is misguided; it has been rendered a kind of modern-day equivalent to barbarians, and serves the interests of oppression.

Furthermore, he makes it clear that since he views 1960s Western societies as having been the first to oppress, violence against them cannot be condemned. Therefore, the violent removal of rights and liberties from the majority of the population, not just a right-of-center economic and political elite, would be a likely feature of the struggle for "their share of humanity":

But I believe that there is a "natural right" of resistance for oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate. Law and order are always and everywhere the law and order which protect the established hierarchy; it is nonsensical to invoke the absolute authority of this law and this order against those who suffer from it and struggle against it--not for personal advantages and revenge, but for their share of humanity. There is no other judge over them than the constituted authorities, the police, and their own conscience. If they use violence, they do not start a new chain of violence but try to break an established one. Since they will be punished, they know the risk, and when they are willing to take it, no third person, and least of all the educator and intellectual, has the right to preach them abstention.⁴⁹⁶

It seems likely that, just like in the aftermath of socialist revolutions, there would be widespread violence against dissenters. Such excesses seem by definition more likely to be committed by people convinced in the infallibility of their cause and the malevolent nature of the opposing side's "program". Still, that is only a hypothetical conclusion. What is evident is that Marcuse is encouraging oppressed minority groups to use violence regardless of the context.

⁴⁹⁴ Marcuse, *Repressive Tolerance*, 95.

⁴⁹⁵ Marcuse, 110.

⁴⁹⁶ Marcuse, 116.

In the hypothetical event that Marcuse's program would be carried into effect, the ideological petrification of that new system would ensue. Any society where a minority or board of select individuals is pursuing an ideological end goal as opposed to democratic politics of compromise and gradual evolution is bound to become rigid. Such societies seem likely to sink into an abyss of state-enforced control of speech and ideas. Marcuse makes it clear that in order to reeducate the majority, the correct ideological line would have to be imposed on all the media, within academia and the universities, and no form of opposition would be allowed, neither in writing, nor in person in the form of protests. Alasdair MacIntyre, in his book *Marcuse*, makes a convincing case for why this is also the logical outcome, stemming from the very notion (espoused by Marcuse) that the telos of tolerance is truth. MacIntyre enquires about the connections between tolerance, rationality and liberation and opposes Marcuse's claim about the telos of tolerance. He explains why—contrary to the Marxist belief—the telos of tolerance is in fact rationality:

Certainly we value rationality because it is by rational methods that we discover truth; but a man may be rational who holds many false beliefs and a man may have true beliefs and yet be irrational. What is crucial is that the former has the possibility of progressing towards truth, while the second not only has no grounds for asserting what he believes, even though it is true, but is continually liable to acquire false beliefs. What is it to be rational? It is a necessary condition of rationality that a man shall formulate his beliefs in such a way that it is clear what evidence would be evidence *against* them and that he shall lay himself open to criticism and refutation in the light of any possible objection. But to foreclose on tolerance is precisely to cut oneself off from such criticism and refutation. It is to gravely endanger one's own rationality by not admitting one's own fallibility.⁴⁹⁷

MacIntyre recognizes the benefits of rationalism, objectivity, and free debate in academia and society. He considers the institutionalization of rationality “one of the great achievements of bourgeois society” and worries that if applied in practice, Marcuse's critique could destroy the intellectual advantages that helped build “the West”.

Furthermore, MacIntyre believes that while rational criticism and rational enquiry in general are under threat from many quarters of mainstream society, this threat is perhaps smaller than the one coming from the adherents of Marcuse's ideas:

One of the most urgent of contemporary tasks is to insist on subjecting the social and political order to continuous rational criticism and to preserve the autonomy of rational enquiry in universities and elsewhere. [...] There is a continuous pressure upon universities and other institutions to make the practice of rational enquiry merely instrumental to the purposes of government. These assaults upon rational enquiry in the interests of the established social order have to be resisted. The new Marcusean radical case against tolerance makes those radicals who espouse it allies in this respect of the very forces which they claim to attack, and this is not just a matter of their theory, but also of their practice. The defence of the authority of the

⁴⁹⁷ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 90.

university to teach and to research as it will is in more danger immediately from Marcuse's student allies than from any other quarter—even although Marcuse himself has on one occasion exempted the university from his critique.⁴⁹⁸

Finally, MacIntyre addresses a side-issue – that of the “overenthusiastic followers” – in Marcuse's case his radical student and youth following that became active in staging protests on university campuses, interrupting lectures and causing problems for disliked professors.

As far as the hypothetical effects of applying Marcuse's brand of “political correctness” to society, MacIntyre makes the case that a similar war on rationality took place in the Soviet Union. /The fact that this was a matter of fundamental ideology is what makes this different from episodes of puritanical fervor in Western countries such as the McCarthy years that the United States was able to overcome through the continued functioning of its democratic institutions and civil society. MacIntyre contends that precisely that transition from Marxism as a rational school of thought to Marxism as orthodoxy ossified the intellectual climate in the USSR, and eventually, as we know today – the economy and the system as a whole.

My view that tolerance and rationality are intimately connected is not merely an *a priori* thesis. The transformation of Marxism from a rationally held into an irrationally held body of theory is a transformation which was the result of Marxists cutting themselves off from possibilities of criticism and refutation. The use of state power to defend Marxism as the one set of true beliefs in the Soviet Union produced the atrophy of Marxism and the irrationality of the Soviet Union. The use of state power was not only repressive in respect to tolerance; it was the instrument of a minority who took up towards the majority an attitude very similar to that which Marcuse advises his minority elite to take up against the majority. The majority was in the Soviet Union the passive object of re-education in the interests of their own liberation. What Marcuse invites us to repeat is part of the experience of Stalinism.⁴⁹⁹

The grave comparison at the end of this citation may sound exaggerated and it probably is. Marcuse was certainly not a Stalinist and rejected the Soviet totalitarian system.⁵⁰⁰ His goals were, in fact, meant to be the exact opposite. Unfortunately, in analyzing the hypothetical consequences of an actual application of Marcuse's program for a “struggle for a real democracy” it is difficult to avoid seeing the problematic consequences for the state of a Western-style liberal democracy, human rights, and the economy. An application of Marcuse's

⁴⁹⁸ MacIntyre, Herbert Marcuse, 91.

⁴⁹⁹ MacIntyre, 92.

⁵⁰⁰ The USSR also rejected Marcuse. According to a Newsweek article from January 1969, his condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia “earned him the Russian condemnation of ‘werewolf’”. Article about the USSR condemning Marcuse as a “werewolf” due his condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, *Newsweek*, January 1969, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2020.??

ideas may, in fact, lead both to violence and to the creating of an irrational, intellectually ossified, and economically crippled dictatorship, propped by a system of state control over the individual – the opposite of what Herbert Marcuse thought his utopia would look like.

Chapter 3

Repressive Tolerance, Alternative Revolutionary Forces, and the Evolution of the German Left

This chapter will trace and analyze the reception, as well as the indirect political incarnations of Herbert Marcuse's ideas of Repressive Tolerance and Alternative Revolutionary Forces within the youth left-wing organizations, associated with or gravitating around the Social Democratic Party of Germany. These are primarily the *Jungsozialisten in der SPD* or Jusos, but in some cases, also the *Falken*, the once-SPD-affiliated *Sozialistischer deutscher Studentenbund (SDS)*, and the *Sozialdemokratische Hochschulbund (SHB)*. It will then look at the SPD leadership's persistent struggle to moderate the youth organizations' political yearnings, but also the occasional and gradual adoption of positions originally proposed by the radical youth.

This chapter first looks at the youth organizations, analyzing them based mainly on archival materials from *Freie Universität Berlin's* Archive of the Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO), which preserves many documents pertaining to the Jusos, SDS, and others. As a point of comparison, New Left movements such as *Die Alternative Liste (AL)* and *Die Grüne* that emerged around the end of this dissertation's research period and that the Jusos viewed positively⁵⁰¹, are also mentioned. The second part of the chapter examines the protocols of the SPD *Parteiführung* or party leadership, searching for policy shifts and the application of policies, favored by the Jusos, and related to Marcuse's concepts of Repressive Tolerance and Alternative Revolutionary Forces. This is based on party programs, speeches, reports, and other documents from the Archive of German Social Democracy in Bonn, covering the period from 1963 to 1974.

The first part, focused on the Jusos, looks at the youth Left's evolution away from traditional class-based economic and domestic policies and toward prioritizing issues like international solidarity, the Third World, and later – the rights of foreign workers in Germany. These topics are selected based on their ideational relationship with Marcuse's notion of alternative

⁵⁰¹ Mühlbradt, Werner, Bindeglied Zwischen SPD Und Grünen? In: *Arbeit und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1987, 176.

revolutionary forces (*One Dimensional Man*). Dethroning the working class as the traditional Marxist agent of progress, Marcuse pivoted toward the Third World and oppressed minorities, giving them agency and encouraging the New Left's interest in the Third World and minorities. Marcuse's relativizing of Western liberal democracy and Soviet communism in *One Dimensional Man* and elsewhere likely encouraged segments of the left to seek out closer contacts with the East. Marcuse also gave an impulse to the politics of personal liberation with his encouragement for "develop[ing] the radical political impact of the moral, sexual rebellion of the youth" that he viewed as "decisive for [Socialism's] prospects."⁵⁰² While in *One Dimensional Man* Marcuse criticized the commodification of the erotic and its reduction to a source of stability-generating "satisfaction",⁵⁰³ Marcuse likely imagined a "sexual rebellion" that would transcend the mainstream sexual liberalization of the early 1960s and would extend beyond the stereotypes of traditional relationship formats, gender roles, and sexuality. This suggests that two other areas of interest ought to be the politics of personal liberation that came to be associated with a multicultural approach to politics – women's and gay rights advocacy.

Finally, this chapter traces the Jusos' record in dealing with freedom of speech and with their propensity to what may be read as a precursor to Political Correctness. Arguing that the functioning of tolerance had been "perverted" by the "totalitarian democracy" of the "post-fascist time", Marcuse explained that tolerance was subverted to work for the stability of the system.⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, Marcuse's problematization of "fun", advertising, and manipulative public discourse encouraged an attitude of restless rejection and suspicion of mass publications with a conservative slant like, for example, most Springer publications. Thus, the Jusos radical attitudes to free speech could be interpreted as a bridge between Marcuse's approach to liberating tolerance (the measures to address what Marcuse labelled repressive tolerance) and the contemporary practices known as Political Correctness.

This chapter's second half will, similarly, trace changes within the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) by reviewing the development of the ongoing conflict with the Jusos, and before that, with the SDS throughout the period 1963-1974. It will also review SPD's attitude toward tolerance by focusing on the party's positions regarding press freedom, as well as

⁵⁰² Statement for Socialist Scholars Conference, *Herbert Marcuse*, September 1966, p. 8-10, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

⁵⁰³ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 76-77.

⁵⁰⁴ Marcuse, 82.

toward a far-right party they regarded as a rogue extremist force – the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). Finally, since SPD was considerably less active on Feminist/Women’s issues and still had very little input on Gay rights activism during the research period (1963-1974),⁵⁰⁵ this chapter will only examine the beginning of SPD’s interest in supporting the rights of foreign workers.

The evolution of political ideas or changes in perceptions of the importance of various causes can be caused both by ideas and objective realities. The latter are easier to pinpoint chronologically, as they are tangibly connected to time periods, political or social events, and various quantitative changes reflected in statistical data. Ideational influences are more difficult to trace: By their nature, they are almost impossible to attach to a concrete moment in time, and it is difficult to demonstrate the direct transformation of an idea into a specific person or organization’s action or call to action. Nevertheless, the success of the reception of an idea can be estimated by the interest with which its author has been received. A politician will rarely quote his source of inspiration, but an idea, once received in the mind, will linger and evolve in conjunction with thoughts and changes in the objective social and economic realities. Thus, Marcuse’s ideas, examined in detail within the previous chapter, entered into the collective thinking of many educated Germans, especially left-oriented youths and university students, during the 1960s. Their impulses toward relativizing East and West, toward giving up on the working class and replacing it with the Third World and minorities in the West, toward encouraging politics of personal liberation, and increase hostility to problematic modes of free speech may have had additional inspiration, but certainly overlapped with Marcuse’s widely disseminated ideas. It took years and objective changes within society, such as the emergence of a sizeable foreign-born working class communities in West Germany, until these ideas could contribute to a transformation of the Left’s political attitudes toward policies that would today be labelled “multicultural” or “politically correct.”

Volker Grasnow aptly points out that the road to the transformation of youth left-wing politics into a New Left direction involved the split of the Student Movement and the simultaneous perception of failure of, as well as the disappointment with events that partially discredited socialist internationalism, such as the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. A further exacerbating

⁵⁰⁵ That would change, starting in the late 1980s, when SPD became more vocal in supporting women’s and gay rights.

factor was the “disinterest of the working class in left-wing politics”. Grasnow adds that “the common experience of frustration was accompanied by the emergence of new – more or less Left – movements.”⁵⁰⁶ These movements, focusing on the rights of foreign workers, often with foreigners participating in them as well, later on including the rights of women and gay people, grew within the youth Left scene and partially eclipsed preceding issues of interest. Perhaps even more noticeable was a politically correct attitude, starting in the late 1960s, that manifested itself in a hostility to the conservative and populist right-wing press and in demands to censor and boycott particular positions or events that youth Left organizations, such as the Jusos, found unacceptable.

3.1. The Transformation of the Youth Left

The history of the German Social Democratic Party is a history of relative continuity and tradition, but also a history of ideological shifts and internal conflicts. The German Social Democratic movement split with the beginning of World War One when the SPD, adhering to a traditional understanding of patriotism, decided to support the War. Political figures on the hard Left, such as Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who rejected the conflict, soon split off leading to the emergence of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) in 1918.

Nevertheless, the SPD remained a class-conscious political party throughout the Weimar period and it was as such that it was reestablished after the defeat of the National-Socialist regime.⁵⁰⁷ The Party’s ideological nature shifted with the Godesberg Program of 1959, which rejected Marxism in economics and postulated that the SPD will no longer strive to represent only the interests of the working class, but of all German citizens, becoming therefore a *Volkspartei* like its main political rival, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). SPD strictly adhered to that principle throughout the 1960s and 70s, both in opposition and in power. To Marcuse, the de-Marxization of left-wing parties, the “marked unification or convergence of opposites” in politics,⁵⁰⁸ the spread of bipartisanship into domestic policy,⁵⁰⁹ and the integration of the working class into mainstream politics⁵¹⁰ all signified a “closing” of the

⁵⁰⁶ Grasnow, Volker, The Problem of the Articulation of National Identity in the Recent West German Debate. In: *Journal of Area Studies*, Series 1, Vol. 3: 1982, 8-9.

⁵⁰⁷ SPD had been banned during the National-Socialist (NSDAP) regime.

⁵⁰⁸ Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 22.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid.

political universe. Addressing SPD post-Godesberg, he sarcastically remarked that “having officially rejected its Marxist programs [the party] is convincingly proving its respectability.”⁵¹¹ The Godesberg Program was superseded in 1989 by the Berlin Program, which reconfirmed the Party’s center-left position rather than bringing about a return to class-based politics, an obsolete concept by the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s and 70s, the *Volkspartei* nature of SPD was repeatedly attacked and undermined by the youth organizations in its political orbit.⁵¹²

This section focuses on the Jusos and the evolution of their positions throughout the 1960s and 70s that eventually led to a conflict with the “mother-party”. Eventually positioning themselves in the radical left camp, the Jusos gradually intensified their support for New Left ideas that became precursors of positions associated with multicultural and politically correct politics. This evolution is traced chronologically and is based on an analysis of brochures, leaflets, magazines, and programs associated with the Jusos.

The Jusos identified with the spirit that resulted in the 1968 protest wave⁵¹³ and felt betrayed due to the perception that SPD, once in power, was not pursuing radical ideas. In a thesis paper, published by the North Rhein-Westphalian Jusos after the end of this research period, in 1980, the authors lamented that “with its clearly stated and partially implied reform program which found its expression in the motto, associated with Willy Brandt, ‘Let’s dare more democracy!’, the Social-Liberal coalition at least claimed to accommodate the spirit of 1968; the outbreak of a critical-emancipatory youth and its extra-parliamentary opposition, as well as the demands and notions of a New Left. However, the Social-Liberal government did not honor its self-formulated claim.”⁵¹⁴ This feeling of disappointment⁵¹⁵, betrayal, and frustration contributed to the fragmentation of the youth Left scene and its opening up to new radical ideas, but also to its shift toward personal liberation, quality of life issues, environmental activism, and other new priorities. This new thinking meant that many Jusos came to see the Greens (as well as the far left) as partners. The relative decline of the Jusos’ influence after their leader’s expulsion

⁵¹¹ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 22.

⁵¹² Their members were often also members of the SPD.

⁵¹³ Krabbe, Wolfgang R., ‘Rekrutendepot’ oder politische Alternative? Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 299.

⁵¹⁴ *Thesenpapier zur Lage der Jugend vor den Wahlen 1980 und zu den Aufgaben, die deraus folgenden Situation der jungen Generation Jusos, Landesvorstand NRW*, 1980, p. 1, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 2 – Zeitungen, Broschueren, Mitteilungsblatt, Beschluesse, Arbeitshefte 1961-1984 – Signatur 443, no reference code

⁵¹⁵ Jaura, Ramesh, *Brandt’s Graceful Exit*. In: *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 9, No. 22, 1974, 862.

from SPD in 1977 also led to an exodus of members⁵¹⁶ some of whom turned to the Greens and other alternative movements emerging in the 1970s and 80s.

This evolution of the Jusos had become widely recognized within SPD by the early 1980s. SPD Secretary-General Peter Glotz, for example, pointed out in a 1980 interview that there had been Neo-Marxist influence in the party coming through the Jusos. While opposing this in its pure form, he argued that the alternative movements should be met with a tolerant attitude and their ideas ought to be transferred from the minority to the majority in compromise forms that could be made fruitful for society as a whole.⁵¹⁷ An example of these alternative movements was the Alternative List founded in October 1978 (*Alternative Liste für Demokratie und Umweltschutz*): “Initially, the new political organization fundamentally opposed the parliamentary system. Within three years, however, AL won a significant presence in the West Berlin Parliament, and in 1989, the party joined the Social Democrats in governing West Berlin.”⁵¹⁸ An AL document from 1985 shows the advanced stage in the transformation of the youth and radical (non-communist and non-SPD) Left by the end of the 1980s: it aimed to end the two-year mandatory rotation for foreign workers, used gender-sensitive language (“Hallo ALer/innen”), and its working groups ranged from Internationalism, Solidarity and Democracy, and “Imperialism and world hunger” to themes associated with a multicultural outlook, such as a committee on “women, foreigners, gay people, and the disabled”.⁵¹⁹ A quick look at the Juso magazine *Vorwärts* from that period shows that these topics, marginal in the 1960s and even in the early 70s, were already featured heavily by the late 1980s. For example the following issues could be found in issues published between 1987 and 1990:

6/90 (women’s rights, environment, rights of foreigners, abortions in the GDR), 1/90 (gender issues, squatters), 9/89 (multiculturalism), 5/89 (women’s activism), 4/89 (women’s rights), 3/89 (feminism), 2/89 (multicultural language), 1/89 (rights of foreigners, women’s rights), 7/88 (pornography and art), 6/88 (Antifa, sexual harassment), 5/88 (gay rights), 4/88 (women and university), 1/87 (abortions), 1/87 (rights of asylum seekers). The embracing of new priorities, having to do with identity, personal liberation, or the environment did not, however,

⁵¹⁶ Krabbe, Wolfgang R., ‘Rekrutendepot’ oder politische Alternative? Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 299.

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Peter Glotz, reprinted in *Schöne neue Welt* (magazine), Juso Landesvorstand – NRW, 1980, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 2 – Zeitungen, Broschüren, Mitteilungsblatt, Beschlüsse, Arbeitshefte 1961-1984 – Signatur 443, no reference code

⁵¹⁸ Keith, Alexander, *The Alternative Liste Westberlin and the Evolution of the West German Left*. In: *German Politics and Society* (Jeffrey J. Anderson, Edt.), Vol. 34, Issue 3: September 2016, 26-54.

⁵¹⁹ *Achtung Strukturdebatte*, *Alternative Liste Westberlin* (newsletter), December 1985, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Peter Brandt (SPD) collection, no reference code

mean that the Jusos had abandoned Old Left or at least traditional left-wing ideas. For example issues from the same period also included articles on 6/90 (*peace/pacifism*), 4/89 (*foreign students*), 8/88 (*the Apartheid regime in South Africa, the Israel-Palestine conflict*), 7/88 (*Nicaragua*), 6/88 (*press and freedom*), 5/88 (*fighting the right, student corporations*), 3/88 (*combating Neo-Nazis*), along with a number of class and economic issues.⁵²⁰ The fact that some Jusos regretted the German reunification that would eventually be achieved in 1990 and referred to it as an “annexation”⁵²¹ could also be read as faithfulness to an Old Left agenda.

The Early Years

Even after gaining greater autonomy in 1959 and becoming a *Bundesverband*, the Jusos often criticized SPD, but did not stray far from the party line until about 1965.⁵²² Archival documents, including publications such as the Juso-affiliated magazine *Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz*, show that in the beginning of the 1960s the Jusos were still focused on relatively traditional left issues. Some of the new ideas that would later come to be associated with politically correct or multicultural politics had not yet fully crystallized ideationally, others existed on the margins; either way, other more basic issues held relevance in the first one and a half post-war decades. In the early 1960s, the Jusos were already more radical than their mother-party, but their radicalism manifested itself primarily in a socialist Internationalism as well as a lenient attitude toward states east of the Iron Curtain, pacifist attitudes, and critiques of West Germany’s foreign relations with countries governed by right-wing regimes such as Portugal. A disapproval of the conservative and populist right-wing press, as well as calls for solidarity with the Third World were also standard staples.

Reading through the 1961-1962 issues of *Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz* one may get a better idea of the themes that the youth Left found relevant in the early 1960s, just before the start of this dissertation’s research period. An issue from late 1961 (Nr. 18, 7. Jhg, November-1, 1961), for example, criticized Konrad Adenauer’s fourth government and attacked SPD’s attempts to impose party discipline (“transform it into Willy Brandt’s SA”) on the Jusos who

⁵²⁰ Mühlbradt, Werner, *Bindeglied Zwischen SPD Und Grünen?* In: *Arbeit und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 1987, 176.

⁵²¹ *Deutschland marschiert – OHNE UNS!*, *Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin*, December 1990, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997– Signatur 435-437 Folder 435, no reference code

⁵²² Krabbe, Wolfgang R., ‘Rekrutendepot’ oder politische Alternative? *Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände*. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 298.

had just been given greater autonomy in 1959.⁵²³ They expressed concerns about the West's militarism and criticized Portugal's admission into NATO since it was an autocratic regime. They also covered Socialist International conventions and celebrated the new "left-wing direction" of the Japanese Socialists. In its next issue (Nr. 19, 7. Jhg, November-2, 1961), the magazine criticized the *Bundeswehr* and expressed hope for a favorable resolution of the negotiations with East Germany. The publication also covered the friction between the SPD leadership and *Die Falken*, the party's age 6-20 youth organization, because of their nuclear disarmament conference.

The magazine harshly criticized the SPD leadership's decision to declare membership in the Party incompatible with membership in SDS⁵²⁴ and the *Sozialistischen Förderergesellschaft*, demonstrating the close personal ties and ideological overlaps between the radical SDS and the Jusos (Nr. 20/21, 7. Jhg, December-1-2, 1961). Employing Old Left Marxist lingo, the magazine accused SPD's leadership of having "capitulated" to the bourgeoisie, and having shifted itself away from its working class positions. The Juso magazine expressed its disagreement with Herbert Wehner's position at Bad Godesberg in November 1961 that SPD ought to be the people's big democratic socialist party "with as little ideology as possible". *Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz* commented bitterly that a "workers' party without ideology has always been the dream of the ruling bourgeois class" and that people like Willy Brandt and Wehner were realizing that "dream".⁵²⁵

The same 1961 issue included a positive report about a Juso trip to communist Yugoslavia and a call for development aid by *Die Falken*, which indicated their increasing interest in the Third World. It also called for opposing military service and advised the reader on practical ways to take part in the *Ostermarsch*, the anti-nuclear demonstrations that were taking place in different Western European countries during that period. The Third World theme continued in the next issue (Nr. 1, 8. Jhg, January-1, 1962), with a report on the Pan-African youth conference in Conakry, mostly focused on anti-colonialism. Soon after the UN General Assembly had approved the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

⁵²³ Krabbe, Wolfgang R., 'Rekrutendepot' oder politische Alternative? Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 298.

⁵²⁴ The Socialist German Student Union, SPD's former youth/university organization founded in 1946.

⁵²⁵ *Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz*, Nr. 20/21, 7. Jhg, December-1-2, 1961, p. 3, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos – Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz, 1962-1973, Signatur 440, no reference code

and the Non-Aligned Movement had officially been created in 1961, the anti-colonial cause was propelled to a higher stage of popularity. Therefore, the magazine's subsequent issues from 1962-1963 gave it extensive coverage.

The magazine reported on a student protest against France's intervention in Algeria, as well as on the "Day of solidarity with the youth from colonial and newly independent countries." To the displeasure of the SPD leadership, however, the Juso magazine went further in issue Nr. 5, 8 Jhg, March-1, 1962, and called for improving relations with the USSR and for participation in the World Festival of Youth and Students in Helsinki, organized by the communist-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth. Ignoring the warning of Schleswig-Holstein's Minister-President against taking part in the 1962 Festival, which he argued would be used for propaganda, the Juso magazine described the games favorably and praised friendship between the peoples, peace, and anti-colonialism, which the text claimed were erroneously regarded in West Germany as "communist" (Issue Nr. 10, 8 Jhg, May-2, 1962). In the following issues from 1962 one could read about a number of internationally-themed topics that generally supported socialist causes, pacifism and non-alignment, "solidarity with the anti-colonial and anti-militarist struggle of the peoples" (Nr. 13/14, 8 Jhg, July-1-2, 1962). In later issues, the young socialists declared their solidarity with Cuba, accused Willy Brandt of a personality cult, and revealed in the refusal of African students to take part in an anti-communist event criticizing the Youth Festival (Nr. 17, 8. Jhg, October 1962). The following year, 1963, brought harshly critical articles about the "*Notstandsdictatur*," condemning the German Emergency Acts, which mandated limits in constitutional rights in case of natural disasters and wars. It also continued criticizing the Bundeswehr and covered other international issues (Nr. 1 – 9. Jhg., January 1963).⁵²⁶ Unfortunately this publication was discontinued after 1963, which makes a comparison stretching throughout the entire research period impossible. Nevertheless, it is a useful illustration of the topics that dominated the Young Socialists' agenda during the early 1960s, which will subsequently be compared to the ones that rose to prominence later on.

As these examples demonstrated, the "pre-1968" Jusos were already radical compared to SPD, but in a more classical left-wing way and without challenging the party leadership openly. While being far from the New Left issues that would come to the foreground later, the radical

⁵²⁶ Sozialistische Jugendkorrespondenz / Sozialistische Korrespondenz, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, 1962-1973 – Signatur 440-441, no reference code

left-wing attitudes were already setting the Jusos apart from SPD as a whole, which at the time was focused on proving its mainstream credentials in order to get a chance at governing. In his undelivered 1969 address to the Juso annual congress, former chairman Peter Corterier argued that the Godesberg Program, which the Jusos criticized heavily, was in fact a “positive relation to the state and a rational attitude to political power.”⁵²⁷ Corterier also criticized some Jusos for their willingness to cooperate with communists and warned against replacing “sterile anti-communism with naive anti-anti-communism”⁵²⁸ Nevertheless, a rejection of anti-communism would be the political course that both SDS and later on the Jusos would choose along the path of their political evolution leading to the Jusos’ transformation into a New Left movement.

While the Jusos began their open conflict with the party leadership in stages between 1965 and 1967, their 1969 congress is often viewed as the one that set them on a radical left-wing course.⁵²⁹ Moreover, a shift toward New Left priorities could already be discerned in some of the newly elected (1969) leader Karsten D. Voigt’s rhetoric. Voigt criticized SPD for accommodating the conservative “existing attitudes of the West German population” and argued that SPD should be working to “democratize all areas of society, be that in industry and economy, family and party, school and university, government and justice sector.”⁵³⁰ He believed that the future aim must be solidarity “between the widest societal layers through a socialist theory and practice, which are yet to be developed. Only in this way could the existing social system be overcome and only in this way could [West Germany] realize Socialism.”⁵³¹ Accentuating the need to develop new socialist theory and practice resonated with the New Left’s openness to new ideological formulations, as well as with Marcuse’s point in *One-Dimensional Man* that the existing society had to be replaced by a new alternative one whose theoretical framework had yet to be developed. Voigt did not mention Marcuse even though he was likely familiar with his work, but the above formulation, as well as his other point about solidarity between the widest societal layers as the necessary elements to achieve Socialism (reminiscent of Marcuse’s notion of the alternative revolutionary sources) indicate overlaps.

⁵²⁷ JS – Jahrbuch 69/70, *Jungsozialisten in der SPD*, Herausgeber: Bundessekretariat der Jungsozialisten in der SPD, Bonn, Jugendforum Verlag, Bonn, 54, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 2 – Zeitungen, Broschüren, Mitteilungsblatt, Beschlüsse, Arbeitshefte 1961-1984 – Signatur 443, no reference code

⁵²⁸ JS – Jahrbuch 69/70, 58.

⁵²⁹ Krabbe, Wolfgang R., ‘Rekrutendepot’ oder politische Alternative? Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 298-299.

⁵³⁰ JS – Jahrbuch 69/70, 69.

⁵³¹ JS – Jahrbuch 69/70, 70.

Attitudes toward Foreigners in Germany and the Third World

It is often assumed as something to be expected that the Left eventually came to support multicultural policies, especially in contrast to the Right, which has traditionally held patriotic or even nationalist political positions. After all, the Left has been an international movement since Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels called on the “workers of the world” to unite in the Communist Manifesto. Nevertheless, the Old Left, save for its solidarity with fellow leftist movements worldwide and comparatively less exclusionary attitudes toward traditional minorities (i.e. Jews or African-Americans), never actively advocated for cultural or racial diversity within a given country; perhaps that simply had not been a conceivable option in a world where each industrialized country had more than enough local workers and travel was out of reach to many poor people. Perhaps the Old Left’s class-based and economic outlook even made them hostile to immigration, understood as a way for “capital” to undercut wages. This was the case with West Germany’s largest labor union, which initially opposed the guest worker program.⁵³²

Basing their thinking on a broad internationalist basis, it was the later Neo-Marxists such as Herbert Marcuse in his book *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), along with other authors publishing in the post-war period, who first elevated Third World peoples, workers, and peasants struggling against colonialism to the level of a serious agent of revolution. It was through such writings that the Western Left gained a stronger interest in developments in the Third World and increased its solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Asia, Latin and South America, as well as the European South. This change in thinking, redefining these people from mere passive objects of oppression into potent agents of change, is likely to have provided the momentum not only for a greater interest in foreign peoples, states, and cultures, but also for increased solidarity with foreign workers at home. The latter could only happen once countries like West Germany had enough foreign workers for their presence to become a political phenomenon, which in turn would eventually lead to integrationist ideas. Therefore, the Left’s eventual interest in the rights of foreign workers would come about organically, but also a continuation of the Left’s traditional internationalism. Very likely, political opportunism also played a role along with an intellectual inspiration by works such as Marcuse’s, which

⁵³² Goeke, Simon, The Multinational Working Class? Political Activism and Labour Migration in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. In: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2014, 160–82.

redefined marginalized foreign workers as a potential anti-systemic force. The latter idea was pushed by Rudi Dutschke when, in a speech at the 1968 Vietnam congress, he suggested the radical left ought to stir up the guest workers in Germany.⁵³³

While the spirit of international solidarity was evident in Juso publications from the very beginning of the research period (1964), their interest in the situation of foreign workers in Germany was to come at a later stage. West Germany signed its first bilateral agreement for hiring workers from Italy in 1955, which after a five year hiatus was followed by similar agreements signed with one other European or Middle Eastern state approximately every year until the end of the 1960s. 14 million guest workers arrived in West Germany by the end of the program in 1973, 11 million of whom would leave the Federal Republic. Since the *rotation principle* (having to leave after a pre-determined period to be replaced by a new worker from the same state) was generally adhered to, there was a smaller cultural impact and a lower interest in people who were expected to leave. In fact the number of foreign workers fluctuated with a drop in the late 1960s, followed by an increase until the decision to end the guest worker program in 1973.

The number of foreign workers in the country largely determined the German Left's particular variety of internationalism, which can be separated into three periods, of which only the last may be considered "multicultural". The first stage was limited to an interest and concern for anti-colonial struggles and post-colonial claims of Western political intervention or ongoing economic domination. During this phase, until the end of the 1960s, there was also interest in foreign students in Germany, their rights, their safety from agents of their home countries who occasionally targeted their politically active compatriots in Germany⁵³⁴, as well as countering xenophobic stereotypes. For instance, the radical student Left successfully managed to keep the allegedly racist "shockumentary" *Africa Addio* off the cinematic screens in West Berlin in

⁵³³ Rudi Dutschke's speech at the International Vietnam Congress, February 1968, entitled „Die Geschichtlichen Bedingungen für den internationalen Emanzipationskampf“ In: Dutschke, Rudi, Geschichte ist machbar: Texte über das herrschende Falsche und die Radikalität des Friedens. Wagenbach, Berlin: 1991, 114.

⁵³⁴ Simon Goeke in his article on the political activism of guest workers in West Germany points out that guest workers from countries like Greece were politically active in protesting against their home countries' regimes, something that has often been overlooked and that also did not seem to have been actively recognized by the student Left.

Goeke, Simon, The Multinational Working Class? Political Activism and Labour Migration in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s. In: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2014, 160–82.

late 1966 and early 1967.⁵³⁵ Nevertheless, the Left's approach to foreigners was still under the Old Left banner of international solidarity, based on a clear distinction between domestic and foreign. That interest did not subside when the Left turned its attention toward foreign workers in the West, but it became less central.

The *Juso Strategiebeschluss* (strategic conclusions) from 1971-1972 attest to a concern with Neo-colonialism grounded in a Marxist interpretation of economics and geopolitics. The document argued that the working class was divided along "political, ideological, regional/national, work-specific (manual worker, office worker, civil servant)" lines, which "capital" was trying to use to weaken the advancement of "class progress", the only solution being solidarity.⁵³⁶ The young socialists also viewed the growing disparity between raw material exporters and industrialized states as evidence of the existence of a system of Neo-colonialism. They viewed the United States as the primary agent of this "post-colonial form of imperialism", but also believed that Western states such as Germany contributed to that phenomenon through their development aid and participation in trade, the global currency system, and military pacts. They predicted a trade war resulting from increasing opposition from developing countries and growing tensions between developed countries like Japan and Germany.⁵³⁷ The strategy paper concluded that an international movement was necessary to overcome national, confessional, and political divisions.⁵³⁸

The second and third stages of the Left's internationalism in Germany were kickstarted once an increasing number of Germany's foreign workers, contracted to work in its industries, started "falling out" of the rotation mechanism, remaining in Germany longer (often illegally), and bringing their families with them. After being brought up in 1968 by Marcuse's closest friend within the German New Left, Rudi Dutschke, the issue of foreign workers and their rights gradually started gaining wider attention among the youth Left after the 1960s. One of the earliest articles on this issue at the Juso archive was from the 11/12 1970 issue of SOKRIT, the monthly magazine of the Baden-Württemberg Jusos. The article mainly focused on the law for foreigners in Germany, highlighting the restrictions they faced. Still, at this earlier stage the

⁵³⁵ *Africa Addio Wertvoll?*, *AstA* (press release, 1 page), 10.2.1967, FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, AStA files: FU WS 1966/67, no reference code

⁵³⁶ *Berliner Strategiebeschluss*, *Jungsozialisten in der SPD, 1971-1972*, p. 9. In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

⁵³⁷ *Berliner Strategiebeschluss*, 24.

⁵³⁸ *Berliner Strategiebeschluss*, 54.

author's concern for the conditions faced by foreign workers in Germany quickly blended into the old leitmotif about capitalist exploitation and accusations of the West being only a step away from fascism. The author argued that the term *Gastarbeiter* was a euphemism, allegedly masking the fact that guest workers were not that much better off than the Third Reich's *Fremdarbeiter*.⁵³⁹ Thus, the article was as much about foreigners, as it was about problematizing the Federal Republic, its political and economic system, and comparing both to the Nazi regime.

Another important aspect in this context is the flow of ideas between various youth organizations on the Left. Many Jusos members were university students who communicated or moved within the same circles as other left-wing students, often more extreme radicals. Herbert Marcuse's multiple lectures and meetings with SDS at *Freie Universität* a month after the shooting of Benno Ohnesorg in June 1967⁵⁴⁰, his 1967 interview in *Kursbuch* "one of the most important periodicals of the German New Left"⁵⁴¹, his influence on Rudi Dutschke who expressed similar ideas within influential New Left organizations like *Subversive Aktion* and SDS, suggest how easily ideas could circulate within a single milieu. An example of this interconnectedness is Bjorn Patzöldt who was AStA president at the University of Hamburg in 1967, where he supported various student protest actions.⁵⁴² Through overlapping contacts he likely knew many Jusos on campus just like he knew Tilman Fichter, SDS member during the period 1963-1970, SDS leader in Berlin during part of that time, and future SPD referendary for education and science between 1986 and 2001. From the Fichter archive, we know that he took an interest in Patzöldt's book on the rights of Arabs in Germany, which contained severe exaggerations. The publication, titled "BRD Imperialism and Arab Pogrom", discussed a wide range of topics stretching from expulsions of Arabs to the political economy of foreign workers and, disturbingly, it seemed to even justify terrorism.⁵⁴³ This example demonstrates that while

⁵³⁹ Ausländerrecht und Fremdarbeiter, *SOKRIT – Sozialistische Kritik, Monatsschrift der Jungsozialisten in Baden-Württemberg* (periodical), November-December 1970. In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 438, no reference code, p. 19-36

⁵⁴⁰ Albrecht, Clemens, Günter C. Behrmann, Michael Bock, Harald Homann, Friedrich H. Tenbruck, Die intellektuelle Gründung der Bundesrepublik: Eine Wirkungsgeschichte der Frankfurter Schule. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/New York: 1999

⁵⁴¹ Sedlmaier, Alexander, Neo-Marxist Critiques of Affluent Society: 'Need to Break the Rules.' In: *Consumption and Violence: Radical Protest in Cold-War West Germany*, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor: 2014, 73.

⁵⁴² 18 December 1968, Nr. 52 – *Der Spiegel*: Irre geworden, 60.

⁵⁴³ BRD-Imperialismus und Araber-Pogrom: Vordergründe und Hintergründe der nacholympischen Araberverfolgung, Bjorn Patzöldt, Publisher and year unknown, p. 2, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Tilman Fichter Collection, no reference code

the Jusos were subjected to the SPD's moderating influence, they also faced the radicalizing influence of their more extreme peers who formed a network through university contacts, political activism, and friendships.

There are many examples of publications reflecting the spirit of 1970s "pre-multiculturalism" with its ongoing international solidarity and newfound interest in foreigners at home. In what appears to be the earliest instance of Juso attention to foreign workers, JUSO magazine's issue 1/2 1972 featured a lengthy article about the children of foreign workers in Germany arguing that *Gastarbeiter* were the country's "most underprivileged layer of society." The conclusions suggest that in addition to being motivated by socialist solidarity, the Jusos were mindful of the political benefits and risks stemming from their engagement with foreign workers. For instance, we read that due to resistance to one of their "hybrid" actions, combining activism in support of foreign workers with political self-promotion, "the political exertion should stay limited and it is questionable whether we may take part in actions having a direct political character."⁵⁴⁴ While the multicultural debates around identity and integration were yet to come, another article on foreigners from the early 70s in the same magazine criticized the expectation of "having to get accustomed to German norms" as a source of apathy among foreigners, thus setting the stage for policies on foreigners that avoid cultural assimilation.

The *Mai Zeitung*, published in April 1973 by „active labor union members, factory councils, youth representatives, BDP, DAG-Jugend, SHB und Jungsozialisten in der SPD" was the earliest left-wing document in the Juso archival collection to contain an article written in a foreign language.⁵⁴⁵ The text was in Turkish and its undoubted aim was to be inclusive to the non-German speaking "worker friends", as the title put it.⁵⁴⁶ A text from the following year already added gender to cultural identity: *Grundrisse der Juso Strategie*, published by the Hamburg Jusos (1974), included texts about foreign workers and female workers and argued that both groups formed a "reserve army" serving "big capital." Echoing Marcuse's notion of false needs and perceptions that stabilize the existing system, the articles suggested that letting

⁵⁴⁴ Kinder ausländischer Arbeiter in deutschen Schulen – eine Initiative, Friedemann Tiedt, In: JUSO Magazine, January-February, 1974, p. 5-7, p. 50-51, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 439, no reference code

⁵⁴⁵ Mai-Zeitung, April 1973, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁴⁶ Perhaps to ensure that Turkish workers, weary of making a wrong move while abroad, would not be scared off, the word *arkadaş* (friend) was used as opposed to *yoldaş* (comrade).

male German workers feel superior to others in the social hierarchy produced a system-stabilizing effect. Both groups, it was claimed, were viewed negatively due to the perception that they pushed wages down, which in turn hurt “class solidarity.” The quality of workers’ free time as opposed to simply its duration,⁵⁴⁷ another prominent Marcusean theme, was also included in the text. The “foreign/German” and “male/female” dichotomies in the context of Germany’s workforce marked a new line of thinking that would eventually develop into the contemporary notions of privilege based on race, ethnicity or gender. The appearance of these new ideas highlights the way the Left’s priorities evolved under the influence of new ideas and changing realities (i.e. more foreigners and females joining the workforce).

At their 1974 Munich congress, the Jusos made their earliest steps in demanding legal changes granting foreign workers in Germany greater rights. They urged the “mother party”, SPD, to work on changing the Law on Foreigners to allow foreign workers to decide how long and where in the Federal Republic they would live. The Jusos called for providing foreign workers with apartments along the same lines as they were offered to poor Germans, as well as for a one-time amnesty for illegal immigrants. The young socialists demanded an easier path to citizenship after an uninterrupted 5-year period of working in Germany; voting rights in local elections after two years and the right to run for office after living 3 years in Germany; measures to improve the education of foreign children and the professional training of teenagers. The Jusos also proposed allowing family-reunification for all foreigners residing in Germany longer than 3 months and obligating employers to provide appropriate lodging.⁵⁴⁸

In addition to their new focus on foreign workers in Germany, the 1974 congress also discussed solidarity with the Third World and created the first Juso Third World working group focusing on a strategy for “emancipatory non-imperialist” development and influencing the EC’s Third World policies.⁵⁴⁹ The new working group, as well discussing a host of international issues

⁵⁴⁷ Grundrisse der Juso Strategie, *Autorenkollektiv Hamburger Jungsozialisten*, 1974, p. 19-22, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 438, no reference code

⁵⁴⁸ Beschlüsse – München 1974, *Jungsozialisten in der SPD*, 1974, p. 42, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

⁵⁴⁹ Beschlüsse – ordentlicher Bundeskongress der Jungsozialisten in der SPD in München, 25. bis 27. Januar 1974, minority-related issues are mentioned: under point VII. Rechtspolitik (Ausländerrecht, however it pretty much concerns economic issues related to employment, housing, etc), under XII. Internationales (Verurteilung des weißen Minderheitsregimes in Südafrika, Entwicklungshilfesteuergesetz, Arbeitskreis Dritte Welt, Dir EG und die Dritte Welt, etc.)

(solidarity with Yugoslav Marxist academics; solidarity with Sahel; demanding Germany's recognition of Guinea-Bissau; condemnation of South Africa; demanding the reestablishing of diplomatic relations with communist Cuba) was yet another sign of the Jusos' evolving priorities. The working group also analyzed the "consequences of this advanced exploitation on the living standards, social achievements, and consciousness of the working classes in industrialized countries, particularly the BRD"; furthermore it set itself the task to study the consequences of a consistent anti-imperialist policy both for the "conditions of the working class in the metropolises" and for the consciousness, living conditions, and solidarity of workers in these countries with workers in the Third World.⁵⁵⁰ Referring to developed states as metropolises and qualifying exploitation as *advanced*, as well as asking how increased affluence in developed countries influenced the consciousness of workers were all markers of excellent familiarity with *One Dimensional Man* and Marcuse's later texts, as well as his public lectures in Germany.

The Jusos maintained their solidarity with foreign students in Germany, but their focus was shifting from supporting their activism directed at their home countries to their situation in Germany. Sometimes this included practical issues like financial aid, but as the Heidelberg Juso magazine did, these specific issues were sometimes given grand labels like the "common struggle of foreign and German students". To help their foreign classmates, the Heidelberg Jusos demanded a new Foreign Students' Office at the university and revoking all German laws that "discriminate and discipline" foreign students.⁵⁵¹ These demands seemed rather modest, but a changing focus in priorities around the middle of the 1970s would gradually lead to a more pronounced cultural focus in the Left's agenda on foreigners. This was evident in the program of the Socialist International, published in JUSO magazine (issue 1/1977), which stated that "socialists struggle for the removal of all legal, social, economic and political inequalities between men and women, between social classes, city and village, between religions and between races." It asserted that Socialism had been an international movement from the beginning, because "no people is able to, alone, find long-term solutions to all

⁵⁵⁰ Beschlüsse – München 1974, Jungsozialisten in der SPD, 1974, p.54, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

⁵⁵¹ JUSO Hochschulgruppe magazines from different universities, undated c. 1975-1977, p. 7, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997– Signatur 435-437, Folder 437, no reference code

economic and political problems.”⁵⁵² While much of this was not new, the formulations that socialism strives for the removal of *political* inequalities between the sexes and especially between religions were novel aspects. The Left had previously rejected religion, so its inclusion on the Socialist International’s list appeared to signal an increased openness to foreigners “in the metropole”, but also to the Third World where religious sentiments were stronger. While this was not a mainstream position among the Left, an undated edition of the Juso University Group magazine from around 1980 even praised Iran’s so-called “Islamic Revolution”,⁵⁵³ which is a stark example of the radical Left’s departure from the Old Left’s rejection of religion.

Another group of foreigners that gradually came to occupy the Left’s interest were asylum seekers. That issue became more prominent as easier travel led to more asylum applications in West Germany, but also as a result of the 1975 Helsinki Accords attracting attention to the concept of human rights. It was in that social atmosphere that the Green Party was founded in January 1980. That party contributed to the evolution toward New Left priorities within the realm of left-wing politics: the hard emphasis on capital and class seemed to be gradually replaced with a softer, more human emphasis on rights and marginalized groups, as well as a new emphasis on the environment and pacifism. This new emphasis was visible in the biographies of the Green Party’s founders, presented in a newspaper cutout from around 1980 that was found in the Tilman Fichter archive.⁵⁵⁴ Fichter’s decision to preserve this also demonstrates the radical left’s interest in the ideas and values of the Greens, as well as a potential interest in establishing interpersonal contacts.

By the mid-1980s the Multiculturalism that was to become a buzz word in the 1990s and would begin to be strongly criticized in the 2000s was starting to take shape. In an edition of *Sozialistische Praxis* (9 Jhg., 1/85), an article titled “*Ausländerfrauen und Mädchen in der BRD*” already indicated the presence of a multicultural angle as it bridged the issue of women and foreigners into a new focus on foreign women; it blamed the host society for the problems related to their integration, for instance the inability of many foreign women to receive work permits. The article’s rejection of the pressures of cultural assimilation lent it an authentically

⁵⁵² JUSO Magazine, January 1970, p. 50-51, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 439, no reference code

⁵⁵³ Miscellaneous Jusos brochures at FU, c. 1980, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Tilman Fichter Collection, no reference code

⁵⁵⁴ Miscellaneous Jusos brochures at FU, c. 1980, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Tilman Fichter Collection, no reference code

multicultural flavor: “Foreign girls were faced with big conflicts due to the differences in norms and values [...] but an increased alienation of children and youths from the family through ‘Germanization pressure’ cannot be the goal.”⁵⁵⁵ This shows that by the mid-1980s, the multicultural concept of integration without cultural assimilation was beginning to crystalize.

Unlike political correctness, which was never a declared goal – at least not under that name – Multiculturalism was, for a time, a professed goal and something that politicians publicly supported as a healthy course of social growth for diverse societies. Therefore it was important to date the first instance when the term appeared in a Juso publication. Unfortunately this was in an undated edition of *JUSO* magazine issued by the Jusos’ Dortmund University chapter, but one appears to be from c. 1987. In addition to the electoral campaign, the main topics of the magazine had to do with foreigners in Germany, specifically with Turks. It was in that context that the magazine first mentioned the notion of a “multicultural society” along with topics related to feminism and the problem of violence against women.⁵⁵⁶

A further example, indicating the multicultural shift in the 1980s can be seen in an article from 1989 about the voting rights of foreigners. There, they were no longer discussed in the context of simply residing in Germany, but for the first time were regarded as *Einwanderer* or immigrants who were there to stay. The article asked rhetorically whether Germans would continue talking of foreigners (*Ausländer*) as the 21st century was approaching; another curious aspect is that the article’s author represents a Turkish organization in Berlin, whose name is printed only in Turkish, rather than in German, perhaps also an unspoken symbolic rejection of the aim of integration through assimilation.⁵⁵⁷ At a time when the mainstream position throughout the political spectrum was that Germany was not an *Einwanderungsland* and the presence of a large number of foreigners was heavily problematized⁵⁵⁸ the Juso approach seemed very radical.

⁵⁵⁵ Ausländerfrauen und Mädchen in der BRD, *Heidemarie Pandey*, In: *Sozialistische Praxis*, 9 Jahrg, Heft 1/85, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 1 – Zeitungen, Beschlüsse, Broschüren, 1966-1981 – Signatur 442, no reference code

⁵⁵⁶ Als Türke in der SPD, *Aydin Sayilan*, In: JUSO Hochschulgruppe Dortmund, c. 1987, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 2 – Zeitungen, Broschüren, Mitteilungsblatt, Beschlüsse, Arbeitshefte 1961-1984 – Signatur 443, no reference code

⁵⁵⁷ Kommunales Wahlrecht für Ausländer, *Kenan Kolat*, In: *Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – Landesverband Berlin (West)*, December 1989, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, Folder 435, no reference code

⁵⁵⁸ Faul, Erwin, Das vereinigte Deutschland – Europäisch integrierte Nation oder diffuse „multikulturelle Gesellschaft“? In: *Zeitschrift Für Politik*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 1992, 404-410.

SPD had already been supportive of some ambitious ideas regarding the rights of foreigners since the 1970s. One reform that the party attempted, but failed to implement was to grant foreigners voting rights in local elections – a proposal that was struck down by the Constitutional Court. The Jusos were behind that proposal and in a 1990 article, the *Juso* magazine dramatized the development, claiming that Germany was turning into an “*Apartheidsstaat-BRD*”, where a “racist definition of the notion of *Volk*” was the underlying reasoning behind the Court’s decision.⁵⁵⁹ By 1991 Multiculturalism was already a new, but popular notion among young left-oriented people; supporting that understanding is the back cover of a 1991 edition of *JUSO* magazine discussing the reviving of an old GDR Festival of Political Music. The text lamented that a festival showcasing the GDR’s “open, solidary, politically engaged nature” had been lost and argued that it had been “multicultural, when in the West nobody knew that word.”⁵⁶⁰

The beginning of true Multiculturalism coincided with the fall of the Iron Curtain and a general liberalization of the West, aided in part by a decreased interest in both classical Marxism and the classical conservative anti-communism in the West. Contributing factors were also a belief in “the End of History”, wherein a general belief in liberalism translated into a merging of political ideologies. This forced the Left to grudgingly accept economic liberalism, while forcing the Right to gradually acquiesce to much of the Left-Liberal consensus on culture and personal liberation, as well as environmental and quality of life issues. Nevertheless, while aided and shaped by objective historical developments, the Multicultural experiment is unlikely to have had the shape we came to know, without the New Left’s activism throughout the 1960s-1980s, which was partially shaped by the elevation of the role of foreign peoples in Western left-wing minds by thinkers such as Herbert Marcuse.

⁵⁵⁹ Welcome to South Africa-BRD, *Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin*, November 1990, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, Folder 435, no reference code

⁵⁶⁰ Zwischen Weltfestival, *Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin*, April/May 1991, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, Folder 435, no reference code

Political Correctness

Unlike Multiculturalism, political correctness was rarely used positively as a term of affirmation or a platform that anyone really wanted to be identified with. It gained traction primarily as a critical label leveled against opponents, who were seen as silencing and censoring opposing positions and ideas, or alternatively, promoting their own. This happened during the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially in the context of speech codes that had been introduced on American campuses. Since the term “political correctness” was often employed by the Right to criticize the Left, it also became an umbrella term referring to the affirmation of positions, which are idealistically multicultural and supportive of progressive women’s rights and LGBT activism, as well as positions that problematized one’s native country and culture while being open to foreign cultures and protective of criticism against foreign people and cultures. Another difference between Multiculturalism and Political Correctness is that while the former evolved slowly into its contemporary form, a form of politically correct “praxis” already existed in the 1960s. There were differences in the types of political positions that were boycotted or protested against, but the practice of attempting to shut down unacceptable messages was already a feature of the 1960s German Student Movement.

The materials found in the Juso and APO collections at *the Freie Universität Berlin* Archive tell the story of a general dislike of the non-left press, which was accused of providing a platform to “reactionary” ideas and to furthering the “false consciousness” of the masses by allegedly slandering the Left. Even though radical political movements of all colors often demonstrate hostility toward the media they view as part of the status quo, it was the Student Movement and the Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) who were the first in Germany’s post-war history to boycott media, artists, and academics, often employing new modes of protest such as sit-ins, pickets, blockades, and occupations, which sometimes included forms of harassment or violence.⁵⁶¹ These modes of protest had already emerged in the United States, but were actively promoted by Marcuse such as during a lecture in London in July 1967.⁵⁶²

⁵⁶¹ Schmidtke, Michael A., Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany. In: *South Central Review*, Vol. 16/17, 1999, 87.

⁵⁶² Herbert Marcuse’s 1967 lecture in London on the “Liberation from the Affluent Society,” In: Cooper, David (Edt.), The Dialectics of Liberation. Penguin, Harmondsworth/Baltimore: 1968, 190.

Perhaps the first such large-scale boycott to take place outside of a university campus in Germany was in 1967. The radical student Left and African student organizations in Berlin carried out one of the first successful attempts at censoring content they rejected. Their protest was directed against the showing of an Italian documentary by Gualtiero Jacopetti, known as the father of the “shockumentary”. The film *Africa Addio* was a gruesome depiction of the post-colonial turmoil in Africa, of revolutions, poaching, and “small-scale” genocides. While the film did indeed contain shocking footage, the underlying motivation behind it does not appear to have been racist; on the contrary, it comes across as sympathetic with anti-colonialism. It did, however, also show the gruesome crimes of left-wing revolutionaries and depicted Black Africans in the full human complexity of individuals who can be both victims and perpetrators. For instance the film covered the post-colonial Arab genocide in Zanzibar, which had been perpetrated by Black Africans motivated by racial hatred. The left-controlled AStA at *Freie Universität Berlin* argued that the film was racist, that it could contribute to negative stereotypes against African students, and therefore opposed the decision of the German film industry’s rating organization⁵⁶³ to assess the film as “valuable”.⁵⁶⁴ After the Prosecutor’s office refused to ban the film, left-wing activists threatened cinemas advertising it and the first showing was interrupted by a student protest. This forced the remaining movie theaters in Berlin to take the decision not to show *Africa Addio* in order to avoid attacks by radicals.⁵⁶⁵

Echoing Marcuse’s “oppos[ition to] the violence of the established society and support [for the] violence to overthrow it” as well as his focus on consciousness,⁵⁶⁶ it comes as no surprise that also in 1967, Rudi Dutschke told *Der Spiegel* that violence could not be excluded from the process of societal change, but while it made sense in Third World dictatorships, in the Western metropole, “our chance at revolutionizing the existing order lies in making ever larger minorities conscious.”⁵⁶⁷ Dutschke’s unwillingness to condemn violence likely contributed to the stormy nature of the protests SDS was involved in. To further accentuate the similarities between Dutschke’s agenda and Herbert Marcuse’s ideas, in the same interview, Dutschke stated that he and his allies demanded the nationalization of the Axel Springer press

⁵⁶³ In German: *Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft*.

⁵⁶⁴ *Africa Addio Wertvoll?*, AStA (press release, 1 page), 10.2.1967, FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, AStA files: FU WS 1966/67, no reference code

⁵⁶⁵ 15 August 1966, Nr. 34 – *Der Spiegel*: *AFRICA ADDIO: Starker Spürsinn*, 86-89.

⁵⁶⁶ Kellner, Douglas (Edt.), *Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse*. In: *The New Left and the 1960s*, Vol. 3, Routledge, 2004, Accessed on: <https://pages.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/essays/newleftand1960s.pdf>

⁵⁶⁷ 9 July 1967, Nr. 29 – *Der Spiegel*: „Wir fordern die Enteignung Axel Springers“ (Interview with Rudi Dutschke), p. 32, <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/wir-fordern-die-enteignung-axel-springers-a-66c4499f-0002-0001-0000-000046225038?context=issue>

conglomerate. Since that was not about to happen, SDS undertook “direct action” against Springer. The organization’s stated goal was to “prevent the distribution procedure through acts of passive resistance.” As a countermeasure, Dutschke also envisaged distributing “critical and informative newspapers for all parts of the population,”⁵⁶⁸ something that was never implemented regularly.

The connection between Marcuse’s *Gedankengut* and the actions of the student Left was not something contemporaries overlooked, which encouraged *Der Spiegel* to directly question Marcuse about his positions on tolerance. He stated that while he did not wish to see censorship of the kind associated with East Berlin, “press freedom must not be absolute and unconditional, for everything and for everyone.”⁵⁶⁹ Offering an example of when he would have resorted to censorship, Marcuse pointed to the media that urged for escalation in Vietnam and that made the American public accustomed to brutality: “When the general tolerance tolerates a fascist or other oppressive movement, for example The White Citizens’ Council, that does not benefit the Liberals and the Negroes, but the other side.”⁵⁷⁰ Marcuse also pointed out that whether something threatened the existing order was not a criterion in deciding whether it should be repressed. He then went on to say that a real revolution would be one leading to the creation a new man with new needs, new goals and new ways.⁵⁷¹ This, however, required the “anti-formatting” of people’s existing “pre-formatting”. “You cannot expect a free development in people whose instincts and whose development has been stunted. That is why a therapeutic process is necessary,” Marcuse explained. He added that when treating a patient, a doctor “interferes, when necessary, with violence: the healing, improving violence against the destructive violence of the disease.”⁵⁷²

While Marcuse’s influence on the radical students was wide-reaching and affected the Left scene, including the Jusos, there was also “internal” criticism against it. Issue 2/1974 of the JUSO magazine included a column titled “*Marcuses Nachhut*”, which expressed concerns that Marcuse’s followers were becoming so radicalized and disassociated from the mainstream that

⁵⁶⁸ „Wir fordern die Enteignung Axel Springers“, 31.

⁵⁶⁹ 20 August 1967, Nr. 35 – *Der Spiegel*: „Professoren als Staats-Regenten?“ (Interview with Herbert Marcuse), p. 112, <https://www.spiegel.de/kultur/professoren-als-staats-regenten-a-74b739cb-0002-0001-0000-000046211747>

⁵⁷⁰ „Professoren als Staats-Regenten?“, 113.

⁵⁷¹ „Professoren als Staats-Regenten?“, 114-115.

⁵⁷² „Professoren als Staats-Regenten?“, 118.

they may turn into outsiders who would be unable to actually influence society.⁵⁷³ This offers indication not only of the level of awareness of Marcuse's ideas in left-wing circles, but also demonstrates the divisions that were emerged within youth Left circles around the mid-70s.

Returning to the *praxis* of censorship through boycotts, an article about the attempts by various student Left organizations to silence one another by preventing members of other organizations from attending events or distributing brochures, shows that by the 1970s, the radical student Left was already accustomed to silencing contrarian information. Even when highlighting their support for free speech, the radical Left often added conditionality: "freedom of information, like freedom of the press, is an achievement that should be protected, even if not in the sense of Springer's press."⁵⁷⁴



Sozialistische Praxis, Jhg.1, Nr.1, 5/1977. The cartoon showcases the Jusos' frustration with the German working class, which seemed uninterested in radical Socialism, preferring "bourgeois" pleasures such as the images of naked women on the pages of Springer's BILD newspaper. In 1972 Peter von Oertzen criticized the Jusos for their unsuccessful work with the base (*Basisarbeit*).

The attitude toward the Springer conglomerate, which controlled nearly 1/3 of the press circulation in Germany and 78% in West Berlin, was consistently negative not only because of its monopolistic position, but also because to many young leftists it "exposed the hidden authoritarianism of the culture industry."⁵⁷⁵ While SDS was most active in protesting against Springer in the late 1960s, the issue remained topical. In 1975, the Jusos organized a campaign "*Mehr Zeitung – weniger Springer*" (more newspapers, less Springer), which aimed at applying pressure on the publishing house and went on for at least two years. The Jusos demanded the government review the publisher's practices. They also called for new regulations guaranteeing the right of reply, as well as full co-decision (*Mitbestimmung*) for all employees including printers.⁵⁷⁶ These campaigns likely involved

⁵⁷³ *JUSO Magazine*, February 1974, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 1 – Zeitungen, Beschlüsse, Broschüren, 1966-1981 – Signatur 442, no reference code

⁵⁷⁴ *Im Sozialismus kann auch nicht jeder seine Meinung sagen*, Walter Reese, 19.11.1973, Jungsozialisten – Zu Problemen der Arbeit und Gesellschaft – Februar 1974, Wunstorf/Hannover, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 1 – Zeitungen, Beschlüsse, Broschüren, 1966-1981 – Signatur 442, no reference code

⁵⁷⁵ Schmidtke, Michael A., *Cultural Revolution or Cultural Shock? Student Radicalism and 1968 in Germany*. In: *South Central Review*, Vol. 16/17, 1999, 86

⁵⁷⁶ *Mehr Zeitung, weniger Springer*, Jusos, 1975, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

members of more radical organizations than the Jusos and went against the SPD leadership's wishes. The Jusos also urged SPD to work toward a "long term revocation of the paragraph for protection against tendentious statements" (§118 BetrVerfG).⁵⁷⁷

There were other examples of cooperation with radicals, such as a joint protest, organized by an SPD group in Siegmunds Hof (most likely a student group) and the SEW⁵⁷⁸ group at FU – Berlin. They came together to demonstrate against a speech by Kurt-Georg Kiessinger whom they accused of stirring up hate.⁵⁷⁹ Specifically, they claimed that a Soviet soldier had been murdered due to the reverberations of Kissinger's speeches against Détente. There were other initiatives in the late 70s, with the Jusos accusing CDU reactionary positions and working with Neo-Nazis.⁵⁸⁰ In 1978, another leaflet of the Berlin Jusos proclaimed that "hate speech" and Neo-Nazism were expanding in Germany and called for a ban on Neo-Nazi propaganda – a reasonable demand save for the Jusos' unclear criteria.⁵⁸¹ Aside of casting doubt on CDU, the Jusos also started problematizing the Junge Union (JU), the youth organization of the CDU. Even though JU evolved from standing to the right of the CDU leadership to taking a more progressive position after 1969,⁵⁸² the Jusos continued accusing them of right-wing extremism throughout the 70s and beyond. For example in c. 1983, the Jusos published a brochure entitled "*Rechts Wende: Die Unterwanderung der CDU-Jugendorganisationen durch rechtsradikale Gruppen.*"⁵⁸³ The alleged „shift to the right" and "the infiltration of CDU youth organizations by right-radical groups" were mostly based on a couple of isolated events, seen as contentious, such as a meeting of JU members with World War Two fighter ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

⁵⁷⁷ Beschlüsse – München 1974, Jungsozialisten in der SPD, 1974, p. 43, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

⁵⁷⁸ SEW was the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, the West Berlin branch of the ruling Communist party of East Germany.

⁵⁷⁹ An alle fortschrittlichen, antifaschistischen Kräfte Westberlins, SPD and SEW, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁸⁰ Stoppt Neonazis und Reaktionäre, Jusos, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁸¹ Der Schoß ist Fruchtbar noch, aus dem daskroch...!, *Berlin Jusos*, 7.12.1978, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁸² Krabbe, Wolfgang R., 'Rekrutendepot' oder politische Alternative? Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 297.

⁵⁸³ Rechts Wende: Die Unterwanderung der CDU-Jugendorganisationen durch rechtsradikale Gruppen, Berlin Jusos, c. 1983, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

These often exaggerated accusations tended to be accompanied by similarly exaggerated complaints of insufficient freedom for the Left. Thus an article entitled “*Diskussionspapier des Bezirks Hamburg der Jungsozialisten in der SPD (1977) – Zur Lage der Jungsozialisten*” lamented that the SPD-led coalition government had since 1974 “not expanded, but instead constantly limited and restricted civic freedoms and democratic rights.”⁵⁸⁴ Part of the issues the Hamburg Jusos had in mind were related to the structure of the media, which they believed helped perpetuate capitalism,⁵⁸⁵ a point that bore strong resemblance to Marcuse’s thesis in *Repressive Tolerance*. Furthermore, the Jusos felt that Left voices were underrepresented, while the conservative ones were supposedly omnipresent in the media. Therefore the Jusos demanded that “reactionary” voices be silenced, while their own be promoted as a way to combat false consciousness. According to a 1981 article, media needed to “incorporate the variety of struggles of the peoples against imperialism, racism, neo-colonialism, and Zionism.”⁵⁸⁶

A tool to silence disliked content that we are familiar with today is the outcry based on moral indignation. One of the first examples of that particular method can be found in an October 1983 issue of *Vorwärts*: In an article titled “*Witze ohne Witz*”, the author problematized “brutal” jokes about foreigners, specifically Turks, and pointed out that while these were never published – not even in far-right newspapers – they were universally told even among young, left-leaning people. According to the author, Turkish jokes were no different from Jewish jokes. I support of the view that foreigners in 1980s West Germany faced similar discrimination like the Jews did during the Third Reich, the author argued that the “bourgeois press” used the term “*Ausländerfrage*” in the same way that the “Jewish question” had been invoked earlier.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸⁴ Diskussionspapier des Bezirks Hamburg der Jungsozialisten in der SPD – Zur Lage der Jungsozialisten, *Hamburg Jusos*, 1977, p.15, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁸⁵ Diskussionspapier, 56.

⁵⁸⁶ Cherkit, Nadir and Peter Beierling, Entwicklungspolitik als Beitrag zur Internationalismus. In: *Arbeitshefte zur sozialistischen Theorie und Praxis*, Jhg. 5, Nr. 36: 1981, 40.

⁵⁸⁷ Witze ohne Witz, *Norbert Mappes*, *Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin*, 13. Jhg, 5 October 1983, p. 8-9, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 434, no reference code

Feminism and Women's Rights

Feminism, which is said to have begun in its modern form during the early part of the 19th century is generally seen as being divided in three waves, beginning with the first wave of the suffragettes. In the German Reich, these activists for women's equal voting rights succeeded in obtaining the ballot in 1919. Even though female suffrage was not reversed, the trend toward greater rights for women was short-lived: the National-Socialist regime brought about a reversal of many advancements women had succeeded in obtaining during the Weimar period. Women's issues were not an immediate priority in the aftermath of the war when an economic recovery and an international and moral "return" on the world stage were Germany's immediate goals, along with resisting Soviet pressure and provocations such as the Berlin Blockade. During the first post-war years, neither one of the two leading parties were active as platforms for women's activism. Perhaps surprisingly, it was the liberal Free Democrats, as well as the radical movements surrounding APO that were to become the political flag bearers of women's rights in West Germany during the 1960s. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) eventually came to support some of these proposals, for example for access to abortion, but in a rather cautious way as will be shown later.

After the first wave had secured women the ballot, the second wave of the Feminist movement that started during the 1960s focused on women's liberation. It was connected with the Sexual Revolution that was taking place in many Western countries since the early 1960s under the influence of the Hippie Movement and with the help of the oral contraceptive pill, which became available in both the United States and West Germany in 1961. It was in that context of liberalized social mores and a rising percentage of cohabiting couples⁵⁸⁸ that the debates on abortion generated steam and became the number one issue that would animate women's rights advocates and increasingly the radical student Left: "The newly beginning discussion [on abortion] took place in the context of APO's reverberations in the late 1960s. In the course of its splitting up, women's groups were formed: women's councils in Frankfurt and Munich, a Socialist Women's Union in West Berlin, which initially had almost no influence."⁵⁸⁹ During this initial period in the discussions, the Free Democrats or FPD became the first parliamentary party to propose increasing the abortion limit to up to 3 months from conception.

⁵⁸⁸ Rosenfeld, Alan, 'Anarchist Amazons': The Gendering of Radicalism in 1970s West Germany. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2010, 355.

⁵⁸⁹ Michalski, Bettina, §218. *Eine neu entfachte Diskussion*. DFK Verlag, Berlin (West): 1984, 25-26.

Illustrating the gradual nature of the radical youth Left's evolution from Old Left to New Left priorities, including on issues of personal liberation, abortion was hardly a subject of interest to the Jusos during the 1960s. It was to become a priority, but not until a later stage. Even during the early 1970s, that was still reserved for Feminist organizations, while to the extent that women were a political topic of interest to the Jusos, the focus was mainly on their rights as workers. The abortion issue began appearing increasingly more often in JUSO magazine starting in 1970, but was still not treated like a political priority. The 1973 *Mai Zeitung*, published in April of that year by „active labor union members, factory councils, youth representatives, BDP, DAG-Jugend, SHB und Jungsozialisten in der SPD” included articles about women being paid less than men and about traditional gender roles being a handicap for women.⁵⁹⁰ The issue of unequal pay continued being one of the frequent topics concerning women that the Jusos dealt with into the mid-1970s, as can be seen in a number of publications and documents such as the 5th issue of JUSO magazine from 1974.

The radical 1974 annual congress of the Jusos, which escalated the youth organization's conflict with the SPD party leadership was the first to seriously consider women's issues as a separate priority. The conclusions adopted by the congress read that “the missing discussion on the Women's Question reflects on the Jusos theoretical discussion as a whole.” The young socialists concluded that an analysis of the situation of women had previously been conducted only at a rudimentary level,⁵⁹¹ which had to be rectified. It was during the same year when the Jusos first demanded SPD's support for amending §218 StGB, the paragraph in the German Penal Code outlawing abortion. Their demand was that abortion be allowed until the third month of pregnancy. They reject SPD's position to legalize it during the first four weeks, as they believed most women would not yet be aware of being pregnant, rendering the reform useless.⁵⁹²

⁵⁹⁰ *Mai-Zeitung*, April 1973, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁹¹ *Beschlüsse – München 1974, Jungsozialisten in der SPD*, 1974, p. 8, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

⁵⁹² *Beschlüsse – München 1974, Jungsozialisten in der SPD*, 1974, p. 42, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

Perhaps this late shift among the Jusos was partially due to increased activity and internal critique on the part of female members: In a JUSO magazine article (2/1974), a feminist author criticized the organization for not having achieved any tangible progress for women regardless of its “emancipatory pretense”. She argued that the true liberation of women could only be theorized as part of a strategy for democratic socialism, which she admitted, might not be supported by “underprivileged groups like women and workers”, because many of them were influenced by the “anti-communist ideology”.⁵⁹³ The two points contained in this message were both in tune with the New Left transformation that the Jusos were undergoing and harked to Marcuse’s ideas about false consciousness and pacification. In addition to the influence of females within the Juso ranks, the increased interest in decriminalizing abortion probably had to do with the growing prominence of the issue in politics and the media, and also with East Germany having decriminalized the termination of pregnancies in 1972.

Another issue that is on today’s women’s activism agenda is sexual harassment. While that term was not used in the 1970s, the issue was brought up as a problem during the latter half of the 1970s, the first document in the Juso archive dealing with sexual harassment being from 1976. A collection of articles about the organizational life of *Die Falken*, issued in 1976, reveals that during the 1970s, women in *Die Falken* started rebelling against “male terror” and demanding equal treatment, also started rejecting activities that were sexually determined by the attraction of men and that led to their being relegated as sexual objects. A specific example was a game that was so orchestrated that beautiful girls always ended up being kissed by the boys. The article explains that girls eventually started boycotting the game by mixing up the order in a way that led to undesirable girls and other boys coming in line for a kiss. Eventually the game lost its popularity, but girls had to dismantle other perceived forms of sexism such as the expectation that they ought to cook while camping.⁵⁹⁴

By the last few years of the 1970s, women’s issues were becoming a constant priority topic for the Jusos as evidenced by the publication of a separate booklet c. 1977 on women’s activism, entitled “*Frauenarbeit – Materialsammlung*” (Juso Argumente, Problem 25). Nevertheless, as

⁵⁹³ *Für die Frauen Fehlanzeige?*, Ulrike Ries, In: JUSO magazine, issue 2, 1974, p. 50-51, p. 56-58, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 439, no reference code

⁵⁹⁴ *Frauen bei der Falken*, Hübner, Marianne, In: *Wir sind die junge Garde des Sekretariats*, Martin Henkel (Edt.), Egalite Verlag, Bochum: 1976, p. 88-91, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 2 – Zeitungen, Broschüren, Mitteilungsblatt, Beschlüsse, Arbeitshefte 1961-1984 – Signatur 443, no reference code

with foreigners and gay rights, it is evident that a more contemporary form of Feminist activism had not entered the Juso mindset until the start of the 1980s. At that point, gendered language and other contemporary manifestations of Feminism started appearing: for example, in a 1982 (Nr. 4) issue of *OSI-INFO* (the Juso magazine at the Otto-Suhr-Institute), many articles already employed gendered forms of German nouns, which were later to become standard at least in student publications. For example, the plural form of the noun *Student* would be spelled “*StudentINNen*”; while an earlier approach to inclusion had been to address both genders (i.e. *Studenten und Studentinnen*), the later form served as a constant reminder of the author’s commitment to Feminism. Nevertheless, even when issues like abortion came to the foreground, other issues of working conditions and access to education remained topical. For instance an undated magazine titled “*Hochschulgruppe der Jungsozialisten – Fachgruppe am Otto Suhr-Institut der FU Westberlin*”, most likely from c. 1983-84, had as its leading article a text about women’s participation in higher education and the persecution of women. Difficulties with financing, balancing pregnancy and studies, the unavailability of abortions, and the lack of quotas for women in some university courses were seen as forms of persecution.⁵⁹⁵

The January 1986 issue of *Der Lange Marsch*, the magazine of the Wilmersdorf Jusos, talked extensively about women’s quotas. According to it, the Jusos had had quotas for women since 1981 and were now calling upon the Berlin SPD to also introduce such quotas, after the party had rejected such demands at its November 1985 congress. In an April 1986 issue, women’s rights were still among the leading themes together with the environment and Détente. The magazine also offered Feminist poetry to its readership.⁵⁹⁶ Juso magazines such as a c. 1984 (unclearly dated) issue of *Arbeitshefte zur sozialistische Theorie und Praxis* discussed the issues women faced at universities, as well as having to do with scholarships. They also demanded that Feminism be included in academic research at universities.⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹⁵ Hochschulgruppe der Jungsozialisten – Fachgruppe am Otto Suhr-Institut der FU Westberlin, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland, Jusos, Diverses 2 – Zeitungen, Broschüren, Mitteilungsblatt, Beschlüsse, Arbeitshefte 1961-1984 – Signatur 443, no reference code

⁵⁹⁶ Die Quote Kommt! Bloss wann?, *Der lange Marsch – Jusos Wilmersdorf* (Author: Sabine Grünig), p. 18, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁹⁷ Jusos, Wissenschaft – für Frauenköpfe viel zu schwer?. *Arbeitshefte zur sozialistische Theorie und Praxis*, 1984, 20-23.

In 1985 the Berlin Jusos organized a *Frauenfest*, featuring various seminars such as one on “*Fraundiskriminierung – gestern Hexe, heute arbeitslos*” (Discrimination against women – Yesterday witches, today unemployed), as well as music, including by the Turkish-German singer Özay.⁵⁹⁸ There was also a women’s film week, which opened with a GDR film. It included a showing of the film *Die Kümmeltürkin Geht* (The weird Turkish woman leaves), which told the story of a Turkish woman who had lived in Berlin for 14 years, before deciding to move back to her homeland. The film was followed by a discussion on the subject of “There is no ‘foreigner problem’, but a problem that West Germans have with a minority.” This exemplified not only that the evolution from class-based politics to identity-politics was happening more or less simultaneously when it came to women’s and foreigner issues, but also that identity politics often explored overlapping identities. That, of course, did not mean that economic demands were dropped. They remained a priority, often merging with identitarian demands. For example, the following *Frauenfest* in 1986 was organized with more specific demands, such as guaranteeing women the right to work, as had been the case with German men.

It was in 1990 when the SPD had already adopted women’s rights as a central point to campaign with, specifically the final overturning of the abortion ban, paragraph §218.⁵⁹⁹ By the time this particular issue had made its way into the mainstream SPD, as with gay rights issues, the Jusos were already well ahead in their transformation into a more multicultural New Left movement. That is evident in from Juso magazines from the early 1990s, where the reader comes across the familiar multicultural vocabulary and topics: For example, in the context of the 1992 Student Government election at the Free University of Berlin, the Juso group had a long section on women’s rights, including the call to consider more Feminist critiques of science in academia. In order to grasp the full multicultural “flush”, in a section on foreigners, the Juso magazine declared that

The Federal Republic is a multicultural society even if that is not recognized by the federal government. We stand for the equality of male and female immigrants and refugees in this society. We demand double citizenship, the right to vote and the right

⁵⁹⁸ *Frauenfest, Jusos Berlin* (advertisement), In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁵⁹⁹ *Welcome to South Africa-BRD, Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin*, November 1990, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, Folder 435, no reference code

to reside in Germany. Instead of the discriminatory 'Foreigner Law', we demand a Law on the right to residence and a Law on Anti-Discrimination.⁶⁰⁰

The platform included proposals dealing with other minority groups, such as the rights of the disabled and made environmental proposal, such as banning plastic at the mensa. Instead, the Jusos proposed that students could simply wash their own dishes. The magazine presented a list of university-level parties running for Student Parliament. Among them were the Independent Gay List, which according to the Jusos worked very well on gay issues and were allied with the foreigner list and the Feminist list, which also covered lesbian issues. In addition to these groups, Antifa, various far-left, foreigner and anti-racist groups were also present and met with the Jusos' approval.



Vorwärts, February 1989. Left-wing protesters against Die Republikaner. Sexism has now been added as a term and features prominently on the banner, along with a

picture of two black and white people hugging (above). The picture can be contrasted with older visual symbols of international solidarity such as the logo of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (right), which shows the profiles of three stereotypically white, Asian, and black males in front of a globe. While such older symbols, associated with the Old Left, implied cooperation, the newer picture above implies friendship, love, and shared life in a single society.



⁶⁰⁰ *Zentrale Förderungen die vereinigte JUSO-Liste, Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin, January 1992, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, Folder 435, no reference code*

Gay Liberation and the Jusos

If one were to attempt to date the beginning of Gay rights activism in Germany, perhaps an objective assessment would be to consider 1867 the movement's founding year. That was when Karl Heinrich Ulrichs publicly "came out" to urge the Congress of German Jurists in Munich to repeal the laws that criminalized homosexuality. With the unification of Germany in 1871, however, homosexuality was criminalized throughout the whole territory of the Reich with the notorious paragraph §175 StGB (*StGB* is an abbreviation for the German Penal Code). Efforts continued in the beginning of the 20th century with two notable events being the founding of the Institute for Sex Research, shut down by the Nazi regime in 1933, and the preceding 1929 Reichstag decision to repeal paragraph 175 passed with SPD's support. This Reichstag decision was never implemented, however, and with the rise of the Third Reich homosexuality was criminalized even further by amending the Penal Code to make penalties harsher, culminating in the internment of gay men in concentration camps. Thus gay men, along with other groups, became victims of the Nazi persecution⁶⁰¹ of minorities that ran in parallel to the Holocaust. While this persecution ended after the War, it would not be until 1994 that §175 StGB would finally be repealed and not until 2017, nearly a quarter century later, that its surviving victims would be rehabilitated and compensated.⁶⁰²

It should come as no surprise that after more than a decade of Nazi rule and propaganda, amid the ruins of war, Germany was not among the first European countries to decriminalize homosexuality. No such pressure came from across the Atlantic either: during the late 1940s and 1950s, the United States was being shaken by the McCarthyist Red Scare, but also the so-called "Lavender Scare" – a homophobic witch hunt against gays and lesbians in the public administration, built upon the perception that homosexuals were hidden communist sympathizers or could be blackmailed into helping communists.⁶⁰³ Homosexuality was also a criminal offense in the Soviet Bloc, so initially its decriminalization was also not among the priorities of the Old Left parties in Germany – neither the hard left of the Stalinist DKP, nor the Social Democrats (SPD) – before or after Godesberg. The Juso and APO archival

⁶⁰¹ Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, Gay People, <https://www.hmd.org.uk/learn-about-the-holocaust-and-genocides/nazi-persecution/gay-people/> (last accessed on: May 25, 2021)

⁶⁰² Knight, Ben, Gay Nazi victim Wolfgang Lauinger dies without state compensation, In: Deutsche Welle, December 22, 2017, Accessed on: <https://www.dw.com/en/gay-nazi-victim-wolfgang-lauinger-dies-without-state-compensation/a-41908081>

⁶⁰³ Johnson, David K., The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London: 2004, 2-8.

collections do not yield any evidence of LGBT advocacy during the 1960s. To the extent that such a movement existed, the stigmatization and criminalization of homosexuality, meant that any movement was relatively scattered und underground; perhaps initially too marginal even for the youth Left. Research on the International Committee for Sexual Equality (ICSE) whose First International Congress on Sexual Equality (Amsterdam, 1951) sent an appeal to the UN demanding equal rights for homosexuals,⁶⁰⁴ indicates that Germany was among the 8 states represented. German homosexual activists were scattered between several different cities and did not appear to be centrally organized.⁶⁰⁵ The main organizations from that period known to historiography are: *Verein für humanitäre Lebensgestaltung e.V.* (Frankfurt a.M.), *Club Elysium* (Bremen), *Gesellschaft für Menschenrechte* (Hamburg), *Internationale Freundschaftsloge* (Bremen), *Reutlinger Kameradschaft* (Reutlingen), and *Gesellschaft für Reform des Sexualstrafrechts* (Berlin).⁶⁰⁶ While §175 StGB was not actively enforced during the first years of the Federal Republic and Frankfurt was known to have a few gay clubs,⁶⁰⁷ a wave of trials against alleged homosexuals were undertaken in 1950 and 1951 in Frankfurt which led to charges bring brought up against more than 200 men.⁶⁰⁸ With a few of the accused committing suicide and an international outcry, the German media gradually adopted a critical approach toward the trials; the city's prosecutor and the judge responsible for most of the sentences were promoted or moved,⁶⁰⁹ which ended the wave of judicial harassment. The trials inspired the play "The Right to Self" by Rolf Italiaander, which premiered in April 1952 at a private theater in Hamburg.⁶¹⁰ In the same year Frankfurt hosted the second ICSE congress,⁶¹¹ indicating that some of the post-War tolerance had been regained. Nevertheless, whatever hopes of further liberalization existed in the time after the trials, they were lost after the 1957 decision of the Constitutional Court confirming the validity of §175 StGB. This contributed to the relative quietness of the German gay rights scene during much of the 1960s.

⁶⁰⁴ Rupp, Leila J., The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement. In: *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 4, 2011, 1014.

⁶⁰⁵ Rupp, Leila J., The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement. In: *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 4, 2011, 1019.

⁶⁰⁶ Wolfert, Raimund, Gegen Einsamkeit und 'Einsiedelei'. Die Geschichte der Internationalen Homophilen Welt-Organisation (IHWÖ). Männerschwarm, Hamburg: 2009, 87.

⁶⁰⁷ Ridley, Hugh, Law in West German Democracy: Seventy Years of History as Seen Through German Courts. Brill, Leiden: 2019, 112.

⁶⁰⁸ Ridley, 113.

⁶⁰⁹ Ridley, 114.

⁶¹⁰ Elmar Kraushaar, „Unzucht vor Gericht“, In: Kraushaar, Elmar (Edt.), Hundert Jahre schwul. Eine Revue. Rowohlt, Berlin: 1997, 64.

⁶¹¹ Rupp, 1025.

Possibly one contributing factor for the start of a more visible gay activism toward the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s was the wave of decriminalizations of homosexuality throughout the 1960s. It was easier for people to come out in support of something that was still stigmatized and persecuted, but not actually illegal. Decriminalization had even taken place behind the Iron Curtain adding to an impression of global consensus against persecuting homosexuality. The atmosphere of the Sexual Revolution, which had mostly been confined to liberalizing heterosexual relations, as well as the increasing intensity of the Women's Liberation and Civil Rights Movements also encouraged gays and lesbians to demand equal rights. Not least, a major contributing factor for the beginning of the LGBT movement was the spread of literature, which analyzed human sexuality in the context of authoritarianism and the preservation of a repressive society, particularly Marcuse's 1955 book *Eros and Civilization*, and also literature, which also formulated a role for marginalized groups, including homosexuals, within the global socialist movement, as Herbert Marcuse did with his notion of the Alternative Revolutionary Forces in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964).⁶¹²

The oldest document on the issue of gay rights that I was able to discover in the APO and Juso collections at the *Freie Universität Berlin* Archive was a 1971 leaflet, announcing the founding of the "Homosexual Liberation Front Berlin". The leaflet's main purpose was to serve as an invitation to the inaugural meeting, which was to be held at the Technical University in West Berlin. The leaflet was found among Tilman Fichter's documents, who was involved with the SDS at that time, but is not known to have been an activist for gay rights. He was later to become the SPD leadership's referendary for education and science between 1986 and 2001. Illustrating the way Neo-Marxism was animating various minority liberation movements, the argumentation for gay rights in this earliest leaflet is not so much framed within the vocabulary of human rights, but is rather entirely class-based and even argues that being gay is a weapon against exploitation.⁶¹³ SDS, one of whose leaders Reimut Reiche completed his doctoral studies on the subject of homosexuality, is regarded as a force that influenced the budding gay activist movement in Germany. Cultural stereotypes were also challenged by Rosa von

⁶¹² While this is not a focus of this research, it must be pointed out that the Gay Liberation movement was not affected solely by sophisticated academic works and was not solely driven by the political left, but these forces played out in conjunction with the expanding post World War Two gay scene in Western countries and with the slow spread of gay-themed literature, which went beyond hints, such as Gore Vidal's 1948 novel *The City and the Pillar*.

⁶¹³ Zur Gründung der Homosexuellen Befreiungsfront Berlin, Brochure, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Tilman Fichter Collection, no reference code

Praunheim whose film *Nicht der Homosexuelle ist pervers, sondern die Situation, in der er lebt* (1971) received a good amount of public attention during the early 70s.⁶¹⁴

While the left-wing scene may have been more open to homosexuality, gay rights were not among the foci of the Jusos or other mass youth Left movements, loosely orbiting around the SPD throughout the 1970s. It is unknown how the Homosexual Liberation Front Berlin developed or whether much came out of this initial meeting, but it is known that also in 1971 another gay liberation organization was founded in Berlin. That was the *Homosexuelle Aktion Westberlin*, which cooperated with the West Berlin branch of the SED, the SEW, and also with the West German Communist Party (DKP). As a reaction to the strongly politicized far-left orientation of this first gay organization, the *Allgemeine Homosexuelle Arbeitsgemeinschaft* was founded in 1974 as a less ideological organization to fight for gay rights. Nevertheless, until the end of this dissertation's research period (1974), gay rights activism still took place outside of the main youth Left organizations.

It was four years later, in 1978, nine years after Paragraph 175 had been moderated in West Germany in 1969, that a gay working group within SPD was founded. Initially founded as *Arbeitskreis gegen die Diskriminierung Homosexueller*,⁶¹⁵ this organization was later named *Schwusos* – a play on words combining the German word for someone who is gay – *schwul* – with the name of the youth branch of the SPD – the Jusos. Therefore, it was a few years after the end of this dissertation's research period that SPD first officially dared associate itself with gay activism. That was still quite early compared to the other leading party in Germany: the conservative CDU followed suit 20 years after SPD, in 1998, with the creation of LSU or *Lesben und Schwule in der Union*.

While Schwusos operated in parallel to the Jusos and not as part of that organization, many of the former's members had overlapping membership in the Jusos. Nevertheless, the Schwusos did not receive much visibility throughout the general Juso publications. Whatever separate printed materials were issued by the Schwusos, they are not available at APO Archive; nevertheless it is telling that while women's issues began to be relatively omnipresent in Juso

⁶¹⁴ <https://mannschaft.com/schwulenbewegung-in-westdeutschland/>

⁶¹⁵ The name was later changed in 2016 to SPDQueer to be more inclusive of other identities. It took the organization until 2011 until it went from being an *Arbeitskreis* to an *Arbeitsgemeinschaft* – a higher tier of associated organization within the SPD.
SPDQueer, *Über uns. Wer wir sind. Was wir wollen*. Accessed on: <https://spdqueer.spd.de/ueber-uns/>

publications throughout the 1970s and became a topic of discussion at the Juso annual congresses, it took about another decade before gay rights were even mentioned. That was not too surprising considering the immense stigma and misconceptions about sexual orientation that persisted throughout the 1970s. A 1973 televised WDR discussion of von Praunheim's film illustrated the disconnect between the gay community and society overall: for instance SPD Bundestag member Wilderich Freiherr Ostman von der Leye, regarded as someone who was not open about his own sexual orientation,⁶¹⁶ argued against gay pride and claimed that "nobody is born with a thirst for beer, hunger for potato salad or a specific sexual orientation."⁶¹⁷

It was in the early 1980s when the topic first made it into Juso publications and started appearing relatively often, signifying a gradual shift toward the adoption of one of the important multicultural elements in evolving from an almost exclusively class-based agenda to one, revolving more and more around issues of human rights, identity, personal liberation or quality of life. An undated issue of *Der Roter Bär*, a publication of the Berlin Jusos, mentioned gay issues including an activist's recollection of how local SPD chapters initially showed reluctance about the SCHWUSOS joining their "neighborhood" events, but gradually came to accept it. Aside of the private recollections, the article reported that homosexual concentration camp victims were at that time receiving no compensation, but on a positive note, stated that more and more young gay people were willing to come out.⁶¹⁸ It took another 10 years before German society began actively discussing "the other victims of National-Socialism" such as homosexuals with Prof. Wolfgang Wipperman being one of the active supporters of founding an institute to work on interdisciplinary research, dealing with these other aspects of the Holocaust.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁶ Zinn, Alexander, Homosexuelle in Deutschland 1933-1969: Beiträge zu Alltag, Stigmatisierung und Verfolgung. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen: 2020, 149

⁶¹⁷ WDR, Publikumsdiskussion: Nicht der Homosexuelle ist pervers, sondern die Situation, in der er lebt. 1973, Accessed on: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wjm68UXXPmM&t=337s>

⁶¹⁸ Der Roter Bär, c. 1980, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁶¹⁹ Die Republikaner und die Aufgaben der Faschismusforschung, Wolfgang Wippermann, In: Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin, February 1989, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997– Signatur 435-437, folder 435, no reference code

Another issue of *Der Roter Bär* also from the 1980s (undated) included articles on New Left issues such as world peace, labor and educational issues, the environment, women (especially in the context of the abortion law, §218). It also included an interesting piece on LGBT rights, specifically pointing out that the Schwusos had succeeded in convincing the Berlin SPD to declare the party's support for the revocation of §175 StGB and to include in its program, for the first time, that SPD is "against every form of discrimination against homosexuals."⁶²⁰

Ironically, it was the advent of the AIDS epidemic in the mid-1980s and its disproportionate impact on gay men that seemed to force many Western societies to break some of the taboos on openly discussing homosexuality in mainstream media and politics. It is axiomatic that in matters pertaining to public health and safety, one needs open discussion and awareness raising in order to achieve success. Therefore, it is likely that the AIDS epidemic, in a tragic and ironic way, helped LGBT people move forward along the path to achieving equality in the West by forcing societies to hear out gay activists, address gay people as such, and making it impossible for mainstream politicians to ignore the gay community. Within Germany's political mainstream, it was SPD which, along with more left-wing movements like the Alternative List and the Greens, recognized the AIDS epidemic as an issue that required governmental and societal involvement and assistance. A leaflet from April 1986, for example, indicates that a discussion and information event took place that month under the title „AIDS – political dimensions of a disease.” The event was organized by *Deutscher Freidenker Verband, SPD-Arbeitskreis gegen die Diskriminierung Homosexueller (Schwusos), Jungsozialisten in der SPD – Neukölln*. Among the speakers was Raimund Bayer⁶²¹, SPD member of the Bundestag who later profiled himself as one of the party's leading experts on AIDS prevention. On the back of the same brochure one could read newspaper cutouts, demonstrating the hysteria around the new disease, as well as the discrimination that some gay men faced because of it. An example of that was a young gay McDonald's employee in Berlin who had been fired, because his handling of food was seen as a health hazard.

⁶²⁰ *Der Roter Bär*, c. 1980, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁶²¹ *AIDS – Politische Dimensionen einer Krankheit*, 1986, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

By the first half of 1989, the Berlin senate was already supporting a successful AIDS prevention program, funded with the approval of the SPD and the Alternative List. A multicultural slant was already visible in a news report about the campaign, as it included the information that the “[hitherto] middle class focus of the prevention campaign will be amended by producing information campaigns in different languages and ones intended for individuals who have attained different levels of education.” In the same report, published in the left-progressive *Die Tageszeitung* or TAZ, gay people were described using three terms as synonyms. This choice of vocabulary demonstrated the ongoing shift in society’s attitude toward gay people and the likely situation that even among TAZ readers attitudes were not always accepting: one of the terms used was simply objective: “*schwulen und bisexuellen*”, the other sounded judgmental as it implied choice – “*schwulen Subkultur*”, and the third could be seen as positive – it was the English “*gay community*”, which lent it a modern and fashionably American flavor.⁶²²

Returning to the youth socialist approach to gay rights, it may be concluded that it was not until the 1980s that individuals became willing to openly discuss LGBT rights and that the Left included this topic among their newer priorities. This transition gained momentum as time went on and by the last few years of the 1980s gay rights were increasingly established as part of the youth Left’s discourse. This can be seen in Juso publications from this period. For example, while the 1987 issue of the *Freie Universität Berlin Jusos Magazine* reported a Feminist list, but no Gay list in the student government election,⁶²³ by the following year such a list was mentioned favorably in the Juso publication. The same publication was also extensively covering large-scale demonstrations in Berlin against Margaret Thatcher’s 1988 homophobic discriminatory legislation introduced in the United Kingdom.⁶²⁴ These changes were an important element of the transition from class-based Old Left politics to the New Left personal liberation and quality of life priorities that came to be associated with multicultural open societies. In addition to intellectual influences and the experience of the 1960s and 70s, the

⁶²² 20 May 1989, Nr. 2811, TAZ: „Stop Aids,-Projekt für Berlin, <http://www.taz.de/11811753/>

⁶²³ *Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin*, January 1987, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, Folder 435, no reference code

⁶²⁴ *Clause 28 – Verbot der “Befürwortung“ von Homosexualität, Vorwärts – Sozialistisches Hochschulmagazin – FU Berlin*, May 1988, no page numbers, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos - Berlin Hochschulen 2: Vorwärts; Berlin FU Fachbereiche; Hochschulen: Zeitschriften, Broschüren, Flugblätter, 1976-1997 – Signatur 435-437, folder 435, no reference code

changes in this area were further enabled by the decriminalization of homosexuality and a *Zeitgeist* that challenged stereotypes on gender and sexuality.

Conclusion

The Jusos followed in SDS's footsteps in terms of evolving from a leftist youth movement, loyal to the official SPD line, into a much radical left-wing organization during the 1970s and 80s. While SPD distanced itself from SDS, which led to its ultimate dissolution, the Jusos who were also problematic for the SPD leadership succeeded in retaining their position as an SPD working group. Starting off as a youth organization that adhered to the party line, the Jusos gained more independence and by the late 1960s were radicalizing under the influence of the Student Movement and intellectuals like Herbert Marcuse. This led them toward a new political path, deviating far to the left from SPD. The Juso congress in 1969 marked a turning point in their radicalization, which continued throughout the 1970s, before the organization eventually embraced a more typically New Left agenda in the late 1970s and 80s including active support for multicultural attitudes toward foreigners in Germany, Women's and Gay rights. The leftward movement during the intermediate stage was evidenced by the desire to work together with communist organizations in the East and within West Germany, by their ambivalent attitude toward political violence (i.e. referring to arrested RAF members as "political prisoners")⁶²⁵, as well as by their lobbying to reverse the ban on SPD membership for SDS members.⁶²⁶ The Jusos rejected traditional patriotic positions and demonstrated an extremely critical attitude toward West Germany, even with SPD in government. The Jusos' distrust of the establishment often took on radical forms such as their support for the so-called Third Bertrand Russell Tribunal that examined Bonn's professional bans for radicals,⁶²⁷ but also cited

⁶²⁵ Russel-Tribunal, *Jungsozialisten Kreuzberg*, 1977, p. 7, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁶²⁶ For example SOKRIT summer issue from 1970 called for an end to the ban on the SDS. Untitled, *SOKRIT – Sozialistische Kritik, Monatsschrift der Jungsozialisten in Baden-Württemberg* (periodical), July-August 1970. In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 438, no reference code

⁶²⁷ Vincour, John, Rights Tribunal Opens in Frankfurt. In: New York Times, 30 March 1978, Accessed on: <https://www.nytimes.com/1978/03/30/archives/rights-tribunal-opens-in-frankfurt-radicals-decree-to-be-examined.html>

other types of “repression”⁶²⁸ – claims that were personally condemned by Willy Brandt as a propaganda campaign against Germany.⁶²⁹

The Jusos’ leftward shift was complemented by an increasing interest in promoting pacifism and by the start of the 1980s in their support for “new social movements.”⁶³⁰ The emergence of new movements such as “the anti-pollutionist and anti-nuke-movement, the women’s movement, and the new youth movement, especially the squatters’ movement [...] centered round the way of life, around the problems of the individual [...], gave the key-word “identity.”⁶³¹ This new orientation of the Jusos laid the groundwork for the true Multicultural politics that were to become more visible toward the 1990s and 2000s.

While SPD frequently distanced itself and castigated the Jusos for their radical statements and ideas during much of the research period, the party did eventually adopt or move closer to Juso positions such as those on foreign workers and abortion in the early 1970s. Later on, SPD became the first major German party to include a Gay Rights youth organization, the Schwusos (1978), and further after the end of this research period, it active in promoting women’s and LGBT rights. There were also some smaller overlaps in the attitude toward the press, which will be explored in the following section along with an in-depth look into the conflict between the Jusos and their mother party.

3.2. Juso Influence, SPD’s Evolution, and the Foundations for German Multiculturalism (1963-1974)

While the previous section traced the evolution of the youth Left, primarily the *Jungsozialisten in der SPD* and other left-wing organizations in SPD’s political and organizational orbit, this section focuses almost exclusively on the party leadership’s reactions and attitudes toward these developments. The SPD party leadership’s protocols have been studied in order to gauge the party’s evolution on the issues discussed earlier as indicators of tolerance, as well as issues having to do with personal liberation and quality of life, often associated with the New Left

⁶²⁸ Russel-Tribunal, *Jungsozialisten Kreuzberg*, 1977, p. 7, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – Berlin: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, Broschüren; Berlin Hochschulen 1: Zeitungen, Flugblätter, 1973-1986 – Signatur 433-434, Folder 433, no reference code

⁶²⁹ Russel-Tribunal, 13.

⁶³⁰ Grasnow, Volker, The Problem of the Articulation of National Identity in the Recent West German Debate. In: *Journal of Area Studies*, Series 1, Vol. 3: 1982, 7.

⁶³¹ Grasnow, 8-9.

and multicultural politics, such as women's and gay rights and the rights of foreigners. This section is based on an analysis of documents, selected after reviewing relevant files from the period 1963-1974. They include, among others, regulations, press releases, proposals for SPD political programs, as well as discussions of the party leadership on topical issues, including the affiliated youth organizations. These have been ordered chronologically in order to highlight SPD's evolution.

Volkspartei vs. Socialist Students

Das Archiv der sozialen Demokratie in Bonn stores much of SPD's history including evidence of the ongoing headache that the party leadership experienced due to the Young Socialists or Jusos. Before the Jusos became SPD's "problem child", the Social Democrats had been faced with another difficult youth organization, SDS or the Socialist German Student Union. Founded in 1946 as SPD's university organization, its growing radicalism eventually forced the party to reconsider the relationship. In late 1961 the party leadership discussed making membership in SDS and the so-called *Förderergemeinschaften* incompatible with SPD membership.⁶³² This was an issue that Wehner, Schmidt and Brandt all agreed. Brand argued that "one cannot be both inside and outside the party,"⁶³³ referring to SDS positions that contradicted the basic tenets of the SPD program.

To aid the discussions, the leadership reviewed an analysis of SDS, a document entitled "*Dokumentation zur Entwicklung des SDS*", which shed light on the organization's radicalism. According to this document, SDS had extremist tendencies, defended East Germany against the Federal Republic, argued for nuclear disarmament of the West, and maintained contacts with the East German regime's official youth organization FDJ, *Die Freie Deutsche Jugend*, together with whom they participated in the communist-run World Festival of Youth and Students. SPD's leadership believed that 25% of SDS members supported foreign policy positions overlapping with the USSR's, 40% belonged to the so-called wing of the federal leadership and supported the "Yugoslav line", spoke in favor of Trotsky and Lenin, rejecting "*Stalinistische Auswüchse*" and "*Ulbricht-Demokratie*", but not communism in general. They regarded Prof. Wolfgang Abendrot, a member of the SPD's anti-Godesberg Marxist wing as

⁶³² Verhältnis zum SDS und zu den Förderergemeinschaften, p. 12, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 16.10.1961

⁶³³ Verhältnis zum SDS und zu den Förderergemeinschaften, 12.

an important theoretician. Finally, there were also 30%, whom the SPD “elders” regarded as proper social democrats. The report noted, furthermore, that SDS referred to itself as “The New Left.”⁶³⁴ It was alleged that many SDS members believed they could work to increase the dissatisfaction after the 1961 election „and at a specific point in time [they could] lead a new organization,”⁶³⁵ in other words hijacking SPD as a whole.

After revisiting the issue during the following meeting, on November 26, 1961, the SPD leadership decided to make SDS and SPD membership incompatible,⁶³⁶ thus forcing SDS’s members to choose between the two. The party leadership had employed this tool since its reestablishment after the war to combat problematic influences and associations.⁶³⁷ This finalized a process that had already taken a clear direction with the founding of SHB (*Der sozialdemokratische Hochschulbund*), mostly by former SDS members loyal to the party line,⁶³⁸ preceded by an initial first punishment amounting to a freeze on SPD’s financial support for SDS.

After initially supporting, even practically co-organizing, the protests against nuclear weapons in Germany, SPD had changed its position and had withdrawn from the campaign for nuclear disarmament. Taking place during the Cold War, these protests were often seen as suspect. This was not acceptable to an SPD leadership committed to shedding ideology and broadening its voting base.⁶³⁹ The cause of these protests, *die Ostermärsche*, nevertheless remained popular

⁶³⁴ Verhältnis zum SDS und zu den Förderergemeinschaften, 18 (Der SDS nach den Bundestagswahlen 1961).

⁶³⁵ Verhältnis zum SDS und zu den Förderergemeinschaften, 22 (Die “Neue Linken”).

⁶³⁶ Sitzung 26.11.1961 – part II, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶³⁷ Sitzung 20.1.1967, 16 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, January – March 1967

This protocol includes three relevant documents: a collection of decision regarding the incompatibility of SPD membership with membership in other organisations made since the end of the World War Two, a research paper and policy proposal regarding the NPD, and another set of proposals regarding the treatment of far-right parties. The first document includes an introduction warning of the dangers to democracy of various democratically unaccountable organisations working in “different directions”. It points out that the party not only expects its members to stay away, but also to oppose them. Among the listed organisations are the Union of People Persecuted by the Nazi Regime (1946, used by communists) and other, VVN (Antifascist Union, 1948), as well as secessionist organizations. An interesting case is another organisation of people who fought against the Nazi regime, *Bund der Verfolgten des Naziregimes und Bund für Freiheit*. In this case, the latter organisation was close to the CDU and the FDP, so membership in it was forbidden for SPD members and they were requested to provide information regarding rallies and the content of speeches (1953). Participation in fencing fraternities had also been banned, but lifted in 1966.

⁶³⁸ Albrecht, Willy, Der Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum Repräsentanten der Neuen Linken. J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn: 1994, 373-375.

⁶³⁹ Lösche, Peter, The Evolution of the SPD: ‘Community of Solidarity’ -- Godesberg Social Democracy -- Irsee SPD. In: *German Politics & Society*, No. 14, 1988, 34.

among young activists and turned into an early source of tensions between the mainstream SPD leadership and the youth organizations. In early 1961, the party leadership banned members of the *Ausschuss KAMPF dem ATOMTOD*, an SPD sub-organization, from taking part in the 1961 Ostermarsch since these demonstrations were thought to be used by communists for the purposes of anti-NATO propaganda.⁶⁴⁰ Many, including members of the SPD student organization *Die Falken*, ignored the decision. The party leadership expelled SPD members who had taken part in the demonstration and debated whether to also expel *Falken* members who were children and teenagers between 6 and 20. At Erich Ollenhauer's suggestion, it was agreed that "the *Falken* [have taken] strict measures and it would be unbearable for them if expelled members were to show up in splinter groups as SPD members". Therefore he proposed a decision that any cooperation with or support for the splinter groups be pronounced incompatible with party membership.⁶⁴¹ This meant that expelled *Falken* would retain their SPD membership or right to join SPD unless they chose to join a splinter youth organization like SDS. The inner-party fights on participation in the Easter Marches would continue throughout the whole decade⁶⁴² with the left wing arguing that Willy Brandt held a "right wing" position on nuclear weapons.

There were a number of other initiatives that the leadership deemed too radical after the adoption of the Godesberg Program transforming the once Marxist party into a center-left *Volkspartei* or catch-all party. The World Union of Partner Cities was discussed by the leadership which concluded that the initiative had been hijacked by communists.⁶⁴³ Similarly SPD ignored calls for cooperation from organizations like the International of People Opposing War.⁶⁴⁴ The party's left wing disagreed with these decisions. Its adherents also criticized the party's stance on the status of Berlin and SPD's "border revisionism", as well as the lack of strong opposition against the so-called *Notsdtandsgesetze* or German Emergency Act, which had been discussed since the late 1950s until its eventual adoption in 1968. SPD not only

⁶⁴⁰ Sitzung 9-10.1.1961, p. 8, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁴¹ Sitzung 2.2.1963, 3 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Januar-Juni 1963

⁶⁴² Sitzung 28.3.1969 (SPD urges its members and friends not to participate in "Ostermärsche"), In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁴³ Sitzung 27.1.1961, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁴⁴ Sitzung 10.7.1962, Vorschläge und Beschlüsse des Präsidiums, letter (25.6.1962) from Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

adopted a tempered approach to the Emergency Act, but also agreed to the prolonging of conscription duty to 18 months.⁶⁴⁵

Another aspect of SPD's "physiognomy" in the early 1960s that the left disagreed with was the party's support for the ethnic Germans expelled from the lost German territories, the *Vertriebene*, and their right to return to their homes in what had become parts of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. At that time SPD leaders often received expellee representatives and criticized states like Czechoslovakia for their denationalization policies against the remaining ethnic Germans.⁶⁴⁶ Herbert Wehner, then-deputy chairman of the SPD Bundestag faction, argued that German politics could only be successful when it enjoyed the trust of the expelled compatriots. Only then could "the people work together as a nation."⁶⁴⁷ In addition to that, as late as 1965 SPD still viewed Germany's 1937 borders as a red line in negotiating treaties with countries to the east of Germany. Together with this traditionally patriotic position, SPD also demonstrated an ambition to make Germany a global player by proposing a ministry for international development – an idea focused not on decolonization, but on forging international business partnerships for Germany.⁶⁴⁸

SPD's political program from 1964, titled *Der Schritt nach vorn* or The Step Forward, is a good summary of its ideological position at the time.⁶⁴⁹ The text opened with the observation that it was nearly two decades since Germany's division and one constitutional requirement, attaining unity and freedom in accordance with the people's free will, remains unaccomplished. The party, which was still in opposition, recognized Germany's economic success, but attributed the success to "our people" rather than the CDU-led governments. The program focused on four core areas: inequality ("there are still second class citizens"), healthcare, transportation, and underdeveloped regions within Germany. It criticized Germany's governments for failing to "harmonize society" despite the strong economic potential. It was envisaged that reducing

⁶⁴⁵ Sitzung 17.3.1962, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁴⁶ Mitteilung für die Presse Nr. 14/61, Betr.: Tagung der Sudetendeutsche Landsmannschaft mit dem Präsidium der SPD, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 23.1.1961

⁶⁴⁷ Mitteilung für die Presse, Nr. 32/65, FB/RG, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 22.1.1965

⁶⁴⁸ Anlage V – "II. 5. Betr. Regierungsprogramm, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 14-15.4.1961

⁶⁴⁹ Sitzung 26.11.1964, 11 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, November-Dezember

social inequality could be achieved through measures improving education and the situation of retirees, as well as through addressing the cleavage between urban and rural areas. SPD promised to support the preservation of the German cultural heritage in the lost territories and to equalize the status of Germans from the Soviet occupation zone (GDR) with that of the expellees. The party also planned to introduce new legislation strengthening the independence of the press, radio, film, and television. Finally, the document assured voters that reunification would be actively pursued together with Germany's allies and that the status of West Berlin will remain guaranteed. SPD also pledged to work toward normalizing relations with East European states and to continue strengthening and democratizing the European Communities in the spirit of the United States of Europe as "pursued by Social democracy for 40 years".⁶⁵⁰

Another instance of SPD's moderate political stance in the mid-1960s was its attitude to student fraternities. In June 1965, Willy Brandt accepted an invitation to speak at the 150th anniversary of the German student corporations. Furthermore, at the suggestion of Gerhard Jahn und Ulrich Lohmar, the leadership gave Brandt the green light to announce that SPD will lift its 1954 membership ban for fraternity brothers.⁶⁵¹ This was balanced with the decision for Brandt to also speak at an event marking the German Day of Students, despite information that students were planning to protest the Emergency Acts, which they believed could be misused like in the Weimar Republic.⁶⁵² The decision not to distance the party from the protests was about to change with the coalition in 1966, pitting many idealistic students against their party.

While SPD maintained a centrist political line with many patriotic elements during the 1960s, attitudes among the youth were shifting and were increasingly negative toward German patriotism. That is why Willy Brandt commissioned then Jusos chairman Günter Müller and Peter Corterier to draft a report on the young generation's attitude toward the nation and political parties as a whole, as well regarding their political orientation.⁶⁵³

⁶⁵⁰ Sitzungen January – March 1967, (16 pages), In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁵¹ Sitzung 28.5.1965, p. 3, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁵² Sitzung 26-27.3.1965, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁵³ Sitzung 24-25.6.1966, p. 12, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

Relations with the East

A sensitive issue SPD had to deal with, both in the context of its ideological tensions with SDS and the Jusos, but also as far as setting a reasonable code of conduct for the rest of its members, was regulating the way contacts with the communist East could be carried out. An informative piece of archival documentation is the *Richtlinien für Ostkontakte, beschlossen vom Parteivorstand und Parteirat am 30. Januar 1960 und zusätzlicher Beschluß des Parteipräsidiums vom 1. Juli 1963*.⁶⁵⁴ This document consisted of a core instruction to SPD members and officials, divided into a political and an organizational segment, supplemented by a 1963 decision of the Party's presidium which further limited travel to Eastern bloc countries and especially East Germany. Illustrative the perception of East Germany as a puppet state, it was referred to as „GDR” in quotation marks. While an earlier guideline was based on the assumption that “the absolute abstinence from any contact to Eastern states prevented an effective debate against Communism”, the latter one issued after the Berlin Wall (1961) and after Willy Brandt's election as mayor of West Berlin (1963), was focused on defining the limits. Considering Willy Brandt's pre-election decision to cancel a meeting with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev under CDU pressure, it is likely that the rising tensions in the aftermath of the wall's construction, as well as SPD's increasing desire for federal success, influenced the hardening of the party's rules on *Ostkontakte*.

The document made it clear that SPD rejected any organizational or political connections to communist organizations, “especially SED”, the ruling East German communists, self-styled as the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The document recognized the necessity for information gathering trips, but these were only to be undertaken if the West German SPD traveler was able to maintain his independent position and “to affirm democracy [...] rather than destroy it in favor of a one-party dictatorship.” The content and wording indicated the SPD leadership's genuine commitment to democracy. In 1963 SPD decided that that due to individual security concerns and to prevent “possible disservice to the Party”, SPD employees would be banned from traveling to and through communist-controlled states with the exception of crossing GDR to reach West Berlin.

⁶⁵⁴ Protokolle August-Dezember 1963, 6 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

These decisions demonstrate the uneasy situation SPD found itself in. In the context of the Cold War and a divided Germany, the party was interested in improving relations with the East, but had to balance between a suspicious German public and occasional far-left party members whose willingness to accept communist propaganda was both an objective risk and a public relations liability for the SPD leadership.

Tolerance

This section will attempt to gauge SPD's level of political tolerance in the late 1960s and early 1970s by looking at the party's attitudes to media freedom, both in the context of the 1960s Emergency Acts (*Notstandsgesetzgebung*) and the limitations on the media they envisaged in case of emergency, as well as in the context of the push for co-decision (*Mitbestimmung*) in the 1970s. As a further way to assess whether SPD had tendencies toward suppression of objectionable political positions in the mold of Marcuse's proposals, set out in *Repressive Tolerance*, this section examines the party's degree of toleration toward the arguably Neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), which moved further into the far-right spectrum after 1967 under the leadership of Adolf von Thadden.

By 1965, the debates surrounding the proposed Emergency Laws, designed to regulate the governing of Germany in case of a state of emergency, were raging in Germany. As a result of a discussion of the party leadership, SPD issued a press release on behalf of Willy Brandt criticizing the CDU-led parliamentary majority for failing to include provisions to safeguard media freedom in the event of a state of emergency. This demonstration of SPD's commitment to the free press came in addition to criticism on the legislation related to posts and telecommunications. SPD's leadership argued that when the country was in danger, that was also a threat to individual citizens as well, "not merely to the state organs (institutions)."⁶⁵⁵ SPD's critical stance on these issues was not a coincidence since the Spiegel Affair, the state's heavy handed reaction to a *Spiegel* article revealing defense information, was then heavily criticized by intellectuals and opposition politicians including SPD.⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵⁵ *Sitzung 2.7.1965*, 2 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, July – August 1965

⁶⁵⁶ Gimbel, John, *The 'Spiegel Affair' in Perspective*. In: *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1965, 82-97.

By the late 1960s, the SPD leadership was growing weary about the speedy rise of the right-wing NPD founded in 1964.⁶⁵⁷ While its program adhered to German law,⁶⁵⁸ hints like the party's logo that appeared reminiscent of the oak wreath from the NSDAP emblem, but with the letters "NPD" replacing the swastika, as well as some of its rhetoric made many Germans worry that this was an anti-democratic party of covert Nazis. During a party leadership meeting in 1967, a report on NPD was discussed along with a proposal outlining ways to combat right-wing radicalism. According to that report, "a large share of the [NPD] supporters do not know, obviously, what really hides behind this party." It suggested that a party ban was not appropriate, but concluded that if the far-right party were to be threatened with one, its leadership would be forced to temper its political line, which, in turn, would demotivate its supporters by creating a feeling of hopelessness. Nevertheless, the SPD leadership still thought that NPD ought to be monitored by *Verfassungsschutz*. Concern with NPD also existed among the CDU leadership, which considered electoral reform as a way of eliminating the party.⁶⁵⁹ In 1968 the SPD leadership agreed to work toward preparing the case for a ban on the NPD as quickly as possible.⁶⁶⁰ They hoped a ban could be in place before the March 1969 federal presidential election. The party leadership also decided to employ some negative campaigning against CDU's candidate, Gerhard Schröder, alleging that he was in reality "NPD's candidate." They were to demonstrate that by bringing attention to an article Schröder had published in the NPD newspaper *Der National-Zeitung*.⁶⁶¹ NPD was ultimately not banned and by the latter half of 1969, polls indicated the party enjoyed 12% support,⁶⁶² a result that did not materialize on election day in September 1969. The party received under 5%, the Bundestag hurdle, and it never managed to surpass that result,⁶⁶³ remaining confined to local councils and provincial parliaments.

⁶⁵⁷ Berg, Anna, Electoral Strategy or Historical Legacy? The CDU's Reactions to Far-Right Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1964–1990. In: *Social Science History*, Nr. 46, 2022, 537.

⁶⁵⁸ Fichtner, Paula Sutter, NPD-NDP: Europe's New Nationalism in Germany and Austria. In: *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1968, 314.

⁶⁵⁹ Berg, 537-540.

⁶⁶⁰ Sitzung 26.11.1968, p. 3, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁶¹ The CDU candidate was, in fact, supported by NPD in the Bundestag vote. Even though NPD was never able to win Bundestag seats, they had Landtag representatives who also participated in the election.

⁶⁶² Sitzung 13.2.1969, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁶³ Berg, Anna, Electoral Strategy or Historical Legacy? The CDU's Reactions to Far-Right Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1964–1990. In: *Social Science History*, Nr. 46, 2022, 543.

Assessing SPD's attitude toward the far right as a gauge of this party's level of political tolerance comes with a degree of subjectivism: while the intense scrutiny against a political opponent deemed to hold unacceptable positions could be viewed as a sign of intolerance, it is also quite understandable that Germans, especially those on the left and victims of Nazi persecution like Willy Brandt, felt very worried by the re-emergence of a far-right political force after the War. Nevertheless, a comparison could be made between SPD's attitude toward NPD and the German communists who, in the context of the Cold War, could also be viewed as a threat to democracy. After KPD (Communist Party of Germany) had been banned in 1956, the far-left party was allowed to regroup and re-establish itself, albeit under a slightly different name – DKP (German Communist Party). This happened in 1968 with the agreement of SPD Minister of Justice and future federal president Gustav Heinemann.⁶⁶⁴ It could be argued that this reflected the spirit of *Ostpolitik* and the decision proved harmless as the party never attained electoral success.

In addition to having valid concerns about the risks for German democracy, SPD may also have been concerned that NPD was a competitor for its voter base – much more so than the Christian Democrats. SPD realized that NPD could be a competitor for the votes of disillusioned young and working-class voters which, in 1968, prompted the leadership to review an entire strategy focused on the approaches for dealing with NPD supporters at the local level. The document cautioned against “systematic sabotage maneuvers and fistfights”, because that only achieves false publicity and “will label us as undemocratic”. The document also expressed concern that the free and democratic order was being undermined by misuse of the freedom of the press: in that context it was suggested that “the principle of press freedom should be thought over again”, because “every excess of tolerance would be disastrous here”.⁶⁶⁵ A specific section of the press that the SPD leadership found problematic were nationalist and far-right publications, including the NPD's newspaper *Die National Zeitung*. Within the discussions of the report, Herbert Wehner expressed his dismay that nothing could be done about *Die National Zeitung*,⁶⁶⁶ evidently meaning that in his mind the state should have been able to shut it down.

⁶⁶⁴ Bilstein, Helmut (et al.), Organisierter Kommunismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Leske Verlag, Opladen: 1977, 16.

⁶⁶⁵ Sitzungen January – March 1967, (16 pages), In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁶⁶ Sitzung 26.11.1968, p. 3, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

This brings us to SPD's attitude toward the press at a time when German democracy, including the element of press freedom, were being affirmed in practice. As both the anti-Springer hysteria of the Jusos and CDU/CSU's role in the Spiegel Affair demonstrate, Germany experienced a few serious "stress tests" on its media freedom over a relatively short period between the early 1960s and mid-70s. Some of SPD's positions could also be viewed as problematic: in their 1970 program on freedom of the media, SPD stated that "the special constitutional-political task of those working in mass media contradicts their having smaller co-decision rights compared to other employees." In that context the party supported amending the so-called *Tendenzklausel* in the law governing the running of companies (*Betriebsverfassungsgesetz*)⁶⁶⁷ to allow a greater degree of co-decision on the part of media employees. That was a seemingly tolerant position favoring press freedom, which however meant that individual journalists, many of whom were left-leaning, could gain the ability to force a shift in a publication's editorial line. This SPD position partially overlapped with that of the Jusos. The issue was to become highly contested over the following years⁶⁶⁸ until the German Constitutional Court finally decided in the 1990s that the reform contradicts the Basic Law and was thus unacceptable.

Another aspect of SPD's positions that could be analyzed to gauge the party's level of tolerance during that period had to do with the attitudes toward the armed forces, education, and culture.

In the section on security policy within the SPD's 1970 program, the party affirmed the primacy of politics over the German military.⁶⁶⁹ The program called for free discussions within the armed forces, which would encourage soldiers to understand and appreciate the full diversity of individuals and opinions in German society. The Social Democrats also believed that it was a matter of priority for Germany to intensify its efforts, started by the then minister of foreign affairs in 1968, to turn NATO not only into an instrument of common defense, but along with that, into an instrument of Détente and armament limitation.⁶⁷⁰

⁶⁶⁷ Sitzung 10.5.1970, (Media), p. 3, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁶⁸ Mauersberger, Volker, Lohnschreiber oder Verschwörer. In: *Die Zeit*, 19.1.1973

⁶⁶⁹ Sitzung 10.5.1970, (Defense), p. 1, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁷⁰ Sitzung 10.5.1970, 2.

SPD also declared that it would work toward a more democratic educational model in Germany. Johannes Rau, who had written that section of the party program, stressed on the proposal to require the federal provinces to coordinate a common educational plan with the federal government.⁶⁷¹ All decisions about the organization, what was to be studied, as well as research topics at universities, were to be decided by taking into account the opinions of the teachers and students “in order for the educational system to finally respond to the needs of the democratic society”.⁶⁷² Critics now, as well as at the time, may remark that a centralized educational policy is hardly more democratic than one that is decentralized. A further critique could be that the involvement of individual teachers and students was also significant in the context of the goal to modernize and possibly to liberalize the curriculum. Aside of pushing for greater centralization in order to push through progressive changes to more conservative corners of West Germany, SPD set out an ambitious goal that everyone, regardless of economic circumstances, must have the opportunity to attend school. The party’s plan stated that “the German educational system must mirror the free culture of an open society [and] must raise the youth in a spirit of cooperative behavior in our diverse society.” The plan went on, underscoring that “every injury of the dignity of those who think differently must be excluded as an option.”⁶⁷³ These examples demonstrate that SPD proposed policies that seemed highly tolerant and inclusive. At the same time, they did not promote negative freedom of unconditional freedom of thought and freedom from imposed values and rules. While the party promoted a line of progressive change in Germany, it lacked overlaps with the underlying logic of Marcuse’s argumentation in his text on repressive tolerance as it did not envisage forcing ideas on society.

The 1970s War with the Jusos

In 1968, the SPD leadership held a confidential meeting, which resulted in the decision to support lowering the voting age to 18 and the age for political candidacy to 23 years.⁶⁷⁴ This could be read as a sign that the Social Democrats realized they needed to increase the party’s popularity among young Germans or perhaps that it recognized the politically active young

⁶⁷¹ Sitzung 10.5.1970, (Education), p. 1, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁷² Sitzung 10.5.1970, 5-6.

⁶⁷³ Parteitag Köln 1962, Entwurf einer EntschlieÙung zur Kulturpolitik, p. 1-2, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 24.5.1962

⁶⁷⁴ Sitzung 1-2.11.1968, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

people, who often lean to the left, as likely supporters. Of course, this decision could have been based on the value judgement that it was fair to allow all adults the full scope of democratic rights. The SPD leadership did not, however, seem to fully grasp the level of radicalization among the youth, as the student movement had not become a leading topic of discussion for the SPD leadership until late 1968.

It was during the months leading up to SPD's Second Youth Congress⁶⁷⁵ scheduled to take place toward the end of 1968 that the party leadership started appreciating the magnitude of the problems it would have with its young activists, mainly the Jusos. A long list of instructions prepared by the party leadership provides some indication of the leadership's concerns: the congress was to take place in a single location, the attending students were to be invited exclusively through the then-less radical and more loyal Student Senates or AStAs (*Allgemeiner Studierendenausschuss*), not VdS (*Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften*). VdS was Germany's federal-level student union, which by the late 60s had been subjected to a takeover attempt by radical-left groups. At least 100 prominent Social Democrats needed to be present and take part in discussions. Furthermore, the party leadership wanted to review all speeches by functionaries ahead of time. This extreme level of centralized control, very unusual by SPD standards, speaks of the fragility of the situation, which the party leadership recognized by late-1968.

As part of the SPD leadership's attempts to contain and steer the situation, avoiding an open conflict, the Jusos had been granted the right to maintain some contacts with Eastern Bloc states – something the youth organization had demanded. After Peter Corterier's announced that the Jusos were planning to take part in the 1968 Student Festival in Sofia, the SPD leadership reviewed its prior decisions on similar requests showing that the Jusos had been allowed to attend meetings in Yugoslavia and Romania. They had not, however, been allowed to take part in a conference in Budapest hosted by the National Hungarian Youth Council.⁶⁷⁶ This discrepancy was probably due to Romania's reputation of being, unlike Hungary in the 1960s, slightly more independent of Moscow under the early years of Nicolae Ceausescu.

⁶⁷⁵ *Sitzung 7.11.1968*, ("2. Kongress mit der Jugend"), p. 2, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁷⁶ *Sitzung 7.11.1968*, ("4. Ostkontakte der Jungsozialisten"), p. 4, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

As the wave of student protests was heating up, SPD clearly condemned the radical extra-parliamentary opposition (*Aussenparlamentarische Opposition*) known as APO for their aggressive behavior toward the police that included throwing objects at officers. “Such people no longer stand on the ground of the rule of law,”⁶⁷⁷ the SPD official position exclaimed. With many Jusos, some of them also direct SPD members, supporting or being part of the APO scene through personal friendships or participation in demonstrations, the party leadership was now pitted against the party youth. By 1968 radicalism had firmly made its way among the Juso ranks, although the organization’s leadership still remained true to the moderate party line. That would change in 1969 when Karsten Voigt took over at the helm of the Jusos. In that context, the SPD leadership declared that it accepted the young generation’s challenge, but would make “no concessions to anti-democratic radicalism.” As a way of combatting that radicalism, the Social Democratic elders considered setting a maximum threshold for Juso membership at 30 years of age.⁶⁷⁸ While that angered the Jusos and was ultimately dropped, the party entered a period of issuing consecutive statements distancing itself from the radical-left scene. Shortly before the 1969 Bundestag election, SPD issued a press release based on a report by SPD vice-chairman Helmut Schmidt, which labelled the unrest the result of an “ideologically gilded, but actually an emotionally based” anarchism in Germany. SPD offered voters to stand up for all the country’s achievements under the coalition government, while simultaneously pushing through socio-political reforms⁶⁷⁹ to reduce the existing dissatisfaction.

By the time the conflict with the Jusos began to escalate in 1970, SPD had already become a governing party with its first chancellor since the establishment of the Federal Republic. In January 1970, the party leadership reviewed a report on the Jusos’ 1969 federal congress regarded as the one that set them on a truly radical course.⁶⁸⁰ The report established a gaping ideological cleavage that had opened up. The report addressed *Heimatvertriebene*, social and economic policy, building up the Jusos at the federal level, youth and SPD, as well as the state and the role of SPD. It was concluded that the differences between the Jusos and SPD now

⁶⁷⁷ *Mitteilung für die Presse, Nr. 509/68c*, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 8.11.1968

⁶⁷⁸ *Sitzung 17.1.1968*, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁷⁹ *Sitzung 17.1.1969*, 1 page, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, January – March 1969

⁶⁸⁰ Krabbe, Wolfgang R., ‘Rekrutendepot’ oder politische Alternative? *Funktion und Selbstverständnis der Partei-Jugendverbände*. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2001, 298-299.

“concern[ed] not only tactical, but also fundamental issues,”⁶⁸¹ making the Jusos an internal quasi-opposition within the party.

While the Jusos were disappointed by what they perceived as a lack of left-wing reforms, the SPD leadership was proud of its record during the party’s first four-year term in government. In its 1972 election manifesto, SPD proudly referred to the 1969 election and the resulting “historic” election of Willy Brandt. The text spoke of the party’s politics of “peace and progress” and argued that Germany’s voice was now heard in Washington, Moscow, Paris, and London. Boasting of having “achieved much for this state and its citizens”, the text pointed out that the “economy is blossoming” and jobs were plentiful. There was more social security for retirees and war victims, and Germany had “come closer to the goal of social security for all.” The document also highlighted various risks due to technological and economic developments and declared it was already addressing these by “reform[ing] the social order,” as well as by investing in education, science and research. Work was underway on laws regulating businesses and protecting the environment. The election program also promised: an expansion of workers’ co-decision; more humanity in our cities; greater environmental protection; increased security against terrorism and political criminality. The document claimed that with Willy Brandt at the helm, Germany had already become a synonym for an active peace policy and would come to symbolize a democratic, free, and social society.⁶⁸²

This record of completed and planned reforms did not convince the Jusos. In the autumn of 1972, the SPD leadership discussed a new batch of problematic Juso statements, brochures, and leaflets urging protests. Seemingly unimpressed by the government’s achievements and priorities, the Jusos demanded recognition of the GDR (which SPD would later do), protests on the occasion of May Day, as well as participation, together with communists, in an event titled “8 Mai 1945 – Niederlage oder Befreiung des deutschen Volkes (Defeat or Liberation of the German People).“ The list included a discussion on Lenin’s teachings and his historical role, co-organized by the Kassel-Stadt Jusos and a far-left organization by the name of *Marxistischer Arbeitskreis* (Kassel). The Jusos in Kiel co-edited a far-left student newspaper with the labor union youth organizations DGB and DAG Jugend, but also with the DKP-

⁶⁸¹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 14.12.1970, (“Herbet Wehner’s report on the last meeting of the JUSOS, p. 5), Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn.

⁶⁸² *Sitzung 18.9.1972*, 5 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, June-September 1972

affiliated Socialist German Workers Youth (SDAJ). On top of all these issues that the SPD party elders already found highly problematic, the Juso federal chairman told *Die Welt* (December 1971) that the SPD youth saw Yugoslav Socialism as an example to be followed.⁶⁸³

While highly unhappy with the Jusos, the leadership attempted a conciliatory approach, arguing that many Juso positions affirmed at their 1969 Munich congress were unclear and mutually exclusive. Therefore, the party elders believed that the perceived differences should be discussed and clarified. It was suggested that part of the confusion stemmed from the Juso ideas being “determined by the language in which today’s students discuss when having theoretical discussions, which is however fully unintelligible to wide segments of society.” Some resolutions, on the other hand, were too clear and were found to contain “a revolutionary pathos that matche[d] neither SPD’s objectives, nor our people’s worldview.” The latter point was a euphemistic way to suggest that the Jusos were driving away potential centrist voters and the elders decided that some Jusos needed to be reminded that “SPD is a party of reforms and evolution, not of revolution.”⁶⁸⁴

The SPD leadership also “decisively rejected” the Juso demands of “returning to being a class party”. That was deemed a demand that did not match societal realities and that would also “remove all possibilities for the party to come to power and to implement its reform ideas.” SPD’s analysis also pointed out that using classical Marxism to analyze current economic realities, as the Jusos did, was unscientific and that one could not solve new problems with old formulas.

The party leadership felt that the Jusos addressed *Ostpolitik* emotionally and were trying to force their views on the SPD as a whole. This brought about comments highlighting the Jusos’ status as an SPD working group (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft*), which made SPD responsible for all Juso statements. The Jusos were therefore threatened with the hint that if they wish to oppose the party in public, they are free to create a separate youth organization. Until then, it was pointed out, the Jusos are requested not to embarrass SPD and to discuss differences of opinion

⁶⁸³ Sitzung 20.11.1972, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁸⁴ Herbert Wehner’s report on the last meeting of the JUSOS, p.5, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 14.12.1970

internally. Finally the youth organization was invited to choose one of these two options regarding their status, because “a mixing of the two is unbearable for both sides.”

The party leadership also discussed the Juso positions on expellees, which they qualified as “lacking political sense” since many voters were expellees. In addition to that, the elders noted that being an expellee often came with social disadvantages. The Jusos, on the other hand, felt that the expellee issue needed to be made less prominent and suggested merging the Ministry of Expellee Affairs (created by Konrad Adenauer’s government in 1949)⁶⁸⁵ with the Interior Ministry. Highlighting their anti-patriotic worldview, the Jusos also demanded that SPD should no longer address the expellees as a group in its publications and statements.

In the field of social and economic policy, the party leadership objected to the Juso demand of “changing the system”, which clearly referred to the market economy. Nevertheless, in their desire to keep the avenues of communication open, the SPD report on the subject claimed that the formulation was unclear. Rejecting the notion that SPD’s policies only made the existing order “more efficient”, the leadership asserted its goal of bringing about “real change in structures, which partially still exist today, and build a social rule of law state.” The Juso terminology includes terms like *Selbstentfremdung* (alienation) and *Sachzwänge* (constraints), in the context of their being imposed on the individual by the technological structure of society. While other scholars have also talked about alienation, the context in which these were used echo Marcuse’s *One Dimensional Man* and subsequent Marcusean lectures and texts. On the other hand, the official SPD line was that society could only be changed through the help of social regulations. In that context, SPD did have a narrow overlap with its youth branch as both called for expanded co-decision rights within businesses. The Jusos went even further, calling for the dissolution of the private ownership of the means of production – a demand that SPD clearly did not share. When faced with this extreme call, the party leadership once again chose to go around the problem arguing that this required clarification as “nothing concrete has been said.” The party leadership rejected the Juso call for a “socialist strategy for SPD” and again insisted on greater clarity and discussion. While SPD agreed with the Jusos on the need of “democratization of social life”, it may be speculated that the two organizations likely

⁶⁸⁵ Ahonen, Pertti, Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 31, No. 1/2, 1998, 43.

understood that in very different ways.⁶⁸⁶ The party leadership's list of grievances did not end here, but SPD seemed committed to an integrationist approach toward the youth left,⁶⁸⁷ one that would not allow them to drift to another party on election day.

Yet another low point in the relations between the Jusos and their mother party was reached mere months later, in the summer of 1970. A Juso delegation visited East Germany where they secretly met with Walter Ulbricht after asking the SPD leadership and being told to decline the invitation.⁶⁸⁸ To make things worse, the Jusos did not adhere to the SPD party line, but shared their own positions, which were precariously similar to SED's.⁶⁸⁹ All this was a PR nightmare for SPD, particularly in the context of the new coalition with FDP and *Ostpolitik* that had started in 1969. The party leadership decided to task Prof. Richard Löwenthal to draft a statement explaining that the party's position toward communism remained unchanged,⁶⁹⁰ but the "guilty" Jusos got away without further consequences.

During Willy Brandt's first year in office, the German government implemented a number of liberalizing and social reforms including a reform of the sexual offences (*Sexuelstraftat*) in the Penal Code, the marital laws, and the law for the protection of renters.⁶⁹¹ All these advances risked being discredited by the Jusos, whose radicalism and organizational association with SPD could easily be weaponized by media and opposition politicians trying to tarnish the party's reputation. Toward the end of 1970, Herbert Wehner submitted a report on the situation with the Jusos after their 1970 federal congress in Bremen. He cited Lucie Kurlbaum-Beyer, a fellow SPD politician and parliamentarian, who believed that the Juso congress would hurt SPD at the next election, because the party's only potential to win extra votes was among „societal circles that are skeptical about Juso aims.“ To make matters worse, the youth organization now not only expressed radical ideological positions, but had taken to openly criticizing SPD leaders like Helmut Schmidt and Hermann Schmitt-Vockenhausen. While

⁶⁸⁶ Sitzung 24.1.1970, 12 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, January – April 1970

⁶⁸⁷ Lösche, Peter, The Evolution of the SPD: 'Community of Solidarity' -- Godesberg Social Democracy -- Irsee SPD. In: *German Politics & Society*, No. 14, 1988, 35.

⁶⁸⁸ 28 June 1970, Nr. 27 – Der Spiegel: Teuer bezahlt

⁶⁸⁹ Sitzung 21.7.1970, p.7, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁹⁰ Letter from the SPD administrative head (Bundesgeschäftsführer) to members of the SPD Council, 9. November 1970,UJ/MF, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 13/14.11.1970

⁶⁹¹ Sitzung 13/14.11.1970, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

discussing this, Schmidt himself took the floor and argued that expulsions are not necessary. Instead, he suggested that someone ought to tell the Jusos that the Godesberg Program must be upheld, because new voters could only be found among former CDU/CSU voters, not among “circles and sects of Marxists.”⁶⁹²

The following year, 1971, the SPD leadership once again assessed various resolutions affirmed by the *Jungsozialisten*, among which one on co-decision within higher education, one on the situation of foreign employees, and others on a new law for foreigners and international development. SPD went on the defensive, having to explain the inaccuracy of Juso allegations of “reactionary tendencies” in SPD’s higher education policy. The party reiterated its criticism of the Jusos for their willingness to cooperate with communist organizations, underscoring that social democracy could only be convincing when clearly dissociating itself from the antidemocratic forces on the left. This message was part of a document addressing a specific case of the Maoist student organization Red Cells (Rote Zelle)⁶⁹³, which the SPD elders viewed as potentially anti-constitutional; in that context the party defended the city of Bremen’s decision not to employ individuals belonging to these radical circles.⁶⁹⁴

Aside of the long list of positions they did not share, SPD and the Jusos also had some overlaps. Aside of their relative agreement on foreign workers, SPD did not object to the 1971 Juso ideas for democratizing the educational system. In fact the party leadership qualified the proposed model as “remarkable” and discussed the possibility of adopting the Juso ideas with some minor changes. The Jusos also proposed decriminalizing abortion, which in early 1971 was rejected by the SPD leadership.⁶⁹⁵ Later that year, SPD’s position had evolved in support of using public funds to intensify the awareness-raising campaign on contraception and to make access to it easier (i.e. available at vending machines without a prescription).⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹² Herbert Wehner’s report on the last meeting of the JUSOS, p. 5, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 14.12.1970

⁶⁹³ The organization was connected to KPD (AO), a Maoist political party in West Germany.

⁶⁹⁴ Sitzung 2.1971, 7 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁹⁵ Stellungnahme zum Beschluss “Demokratisierung der Schule”, Sp. 1 ff., p. 27, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 15.2.1971

⁶⁹⁶ Sitzung 20.9.1971, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

The leadership's soft attitude toward the Jusos was attacked by some high-ranking SPD functionaries. The newly elected⁶⁹⁷ head of the party's Youth and Education Unit, Dr. Uwe Janssen, sent a letter to the leadership on February 24, 1971, asking whether the Jusos were still an SPD working group. He concluded sarcastically that they did not appear to be, as they adopted and publicized decisions contrary to the party line. Moreover, out of the 37 decisions adopted by the Jusos, only 3 concerned youth and a further 7 dealt with sport and education. Therefore, Uwe Janssen felt that Willy Brandt's warning about the Jusos falsely believing to be a direction-determining organization instead of a youth working group was validated in reality.⁶⁹⁸ This situation was also discussed at length by publications like *Die Welt*, which were critical of both SPD and the Jusos. In a 1971 article, *Die Welt* concluded that SPD and the Jusos had "broken with one another programmatically" and that the party leadership could not be any clearer in distancing itself from the „Neo-Marxist ideas of the left wing“. If the Bremen conclusions were the basis for Juso politics, then the SPD leadership felt there was no common basis with the party on the economy. *Die Welt* added that while the Bremen Theses of the Jusos were not the work of a minority and that the far-left (*linksaußen*) circle around Juso leader Karsten Voigt seemed to dominate in almost all provincial and local organizations, it was clear that transforming SPD into a left-socialist cadre party was a lost cause.⁶⁹⁹

This article in one of the leading newspapers read by the center-right in Germany marked a turning point: Hans-Jürgen Wischenwski wrote to the Jusos' federal leadership in early 1971 explaining that the party could not allow two completely different positions on local policy to exist within SPD. Wischenwski added that many of the Jusos' submissions were unusable and castigated them for proposing ideas that were opposed to the rule of law and Godesberg.⁷⁰⁰ In light of the similar issues the leadership was having with the SPD student organization SHB, the party's presidium a press-release, distancing the party from those SHB members who opposed the party line.

⁶⁹⁷ SPD Pressemitteilung Nr. 52/1971 vom 16.02.1971, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Accessed on: http://library.fes.de/cgi-bin/populo/spde.pl?t_dirlink=x&f_PER=janssen,%20uwe

⁶⁹⁸ Sitzung 26.2.1971, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁶⁹⁹ Abgrenzung nach links, *Die Welt*, 19.3.1971, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 29.3.1971

⁷⁰⁰ Letter from Hans-Jürgen Wischenwski to the Bundesvorstand der Jungsozialisten, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 19.3.1971

The intensifying quarrels with the youth organizations forced the SPD leadership to call for a meeting of all governing bodies in mid-1971 to discuss the challenges and approve conclusions. With only four votes against, these reconfirmed the nature of SPD as a *Volkspartei*, pointing out that the Godesberg Program is mandatory for all members. Contesting Godesberg was grounds for expulsion. It was stressed that the party needed to support the SPD-led government in the run-up to the 1973 election. Individuals wishing to divide the party or transform SPD into a “revolutionary cadre party” were not welcome. Furthermore, the party’s council, leadership, and control commission reiterated their “expectation” that SPD members “respect the unequivocal decision regarding the impossibility of working with communist organizations, regardless which stream they belong to.”⁷⁰¹

The SPD archive stores information on the Juso chapters’ reactions to the above conclusions, which were indicative of the problem the SPD leadership sought to resolve. The Juso reactions tell the rest of the story: While some Juso chapters greeted or reluctantly accepted the conclusions, the majority rejected them. For instance the Jusos in North Rhein-Westphalia found it unfair that a joint petition drive with the communists (DKP) had resulted in disciplinary reviews of Juso members. While the Jusos generally opposed the conclusions, the other youth organization SHB declared its support for the reaffirmation of SPD’s *Volkspartei* status. SHB was not ideologically moderate, but understood that a more radical party would not be able to “attain and keep governing functions.” While they agreed that SPD could not be transformed “into a class-based party in the mid-term,” they argued that “the right-wing majority needs a pacifying integration strategy.”⁷⁰² SHB thought that the then-governing SPD could provide that strategy if it adopted some of the proposals coming from the left.

SPD again tried to approach the Jusos gently in the hopes that they could be steered away from excessive PR damage while also not ejecting them from the party, which risked alienating 300 000 members as SPD voters.⁷⁰³ The Jusos did not shy away from discussing the disagreements in their main publication *Jungsozialisten*. A meeting of the SPD leadership in late 1972

⁷⁰¹ Informationsdienst der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands Beilage zu “intern” Nr. 4/71, 3. März 1971, Intern-dokumente Nr. 2, Betreff: Entschließung von Parteivorstand, Parteirat und Kontrollkommission anlässlich ihrer gemeinsamen Sitzung am 26. Februar 1971 in Bonn, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 20.6.1971

⁷⁰² *Thesen zur SPD und der Arbeit von Sozialisten, SHB*, (Antrag 7, Göttingen), In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 20.9.1971

⁷⁰³ Scholle, Thilo and Jan Schwarz, *„Wessen Welt ist die Welt?“ Geschichte der Jusos*, J.H.W. Dietz Nachfolger, Bonn: 2019, 163.

reviewed what that publication, as well as other media were reporting about the disagreements. According to *Jungsozialisten*, an internal opposition was forming inside the party, which the magazine argued was to be taken seriously. This opposition, led by Juso members, aimed for a “turn to the left”. The Juso conclusions from Munich, as well as a string of decisions of lower-tier chapters (*Bezirk/Unterbezirk*) demonstrated the young socialists’ resolve to influence SPD policies. The article also cited excerpts from other periodicals such as *Kölner Stadtanzeiger* (26.2.1970), which noted the return of the word *Socialism*, which the SPD leadership had rendered “a foreign word.” *Die Nürnberger Nachrichten* (17.3.1970) noted that the Jusos had taken hold of many SPD area committees such as in Dortmund where a 23 year-old law student had been elected to lead the party. Such hijacked committees held pacifist, anti-clerical and other radical left positions. Similarly, at the SPD party conference in Saarbrücken, the Jusos attempted to remove Helmut Schmidt from the speaker’s list since they viewed him as a representative of SPD’s “right wing”. In an interview with *Vorwärts*, Juso chairman Voigt pointed out that the youth opposed the “*Volkspartei* ideology” and wanted a return to class-based politics. Voigt also viewed the Munich conclusions as a first step for the theoretical setting up of a socialist Praxis, which would become the foundation the SPD of the 1980s would be able to build upon. The tensions had a less ideological dimension as well: Voigt admitted that the Jusos wished to dispose with their own bank account.

The SPD leadership reviewed a number of exotic positions of Juso organizations that illustrated the outlandish shape Juso radicalism sometimes took. In *Unterbezirk* Waiblingen, for example, the Jusos approved a resolution claiming that Germany’s defense policy contradicted the Godesberg Program. They demanded that Helmut Schmidt introduce a new one and distance himself from the “anti-constitutional” Schnez study.⁷⁰⁴ The Juso leadership in Baden-Württemberg demanded that Germany recognize the GDR, while in Mannheim, they welcomed Walter Ulbricht’s proposal for a treaty. The Jusos in Schleswig-Holstein initiated an internal disciplinary procedure against SPD politicians who had cooperated in the sale of large parts of Studio Hamburg to the Springer concern, which the Jusos believed would increase his influence. The re-elected *Unterbezirk* chairman Adolf Salzer declared that unlike the party leadership, the Jusos wanted to replace the capitalist system with socialism. He added that they

⁷⁰⁴ The Schnez Study was a document produced by senior officers of the Bundeswehr, ordered by Gen. Albert Schnez. “It was seen as the military’s manifesto – its challenge to internal reform.” Herspring, Dale R., *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four Nation Study*. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore: 2013, 96.

strove for a union with everyone who worked toward a socialist *Umgestaltung* and demanded that SPD not forget its promise to work toward an NPD ban. Support for the SPD candidate in the Landtag election was to be conditional on his open opposition to the NPD including a boycott on events where NPD representatives were to take part. They insisted on recognition of the GDR, expressed support for all proposed points in the bilateral treaty, and declared their support for both countries' disarmament.

The Jusos area conference in Hessen-South, the second biggest SPD organization in Germany, also demanded recognition of the GDR, the condemnation of the "US aggression in Vietnam", and insisted on a green light for contacts with the DKP youth organization SDAJ. The Jusos regarded themselves as a socialist faction within the SPD, having taken the best from the APO, but also having a long-term strategy. In March 1970, the Juso *Unterbezirk* committee in Hessen demanded that the SPD *Richtlinien für Ostkontakte* be declared invalid, because "they don't fit today's landscape." They argued that in the context of *Ostpolitik* social democrats interested in individual communication with Eastern bloc states should not be subjected to "discrimination". In Southern Bavaria, one of the SPD members of parliament Dr. Günther Müller (Munich) accused the local Jusos of working together with communists and opposing democracy. A leaked analysis by the ex-*Bundesgeschäftsführer* of the Jusos Ernst Eichengrün, to the SPD leadership, stated that after their shift to the left in 1965-1968, the Jusos had finally been transformed completely with their 1969 congress and that their goal thereafter was to thoroughly alter the party. The document warned that while the Juso-Left is composed of opportunists riding the left-wing wave and seeking positions, they really want to change the party and one can only wonder who will be in the majority tomorrow. Eichengrün saw extreme-left dogma and totalitarian implications in their positions.

Finally, Fritz Rene Allemann of the Swiss *Die Weltwoche* claimed that "the smarter, more realistic thinking heads" among the "neo-Marxists, neo-anarchists, Maoists or Orthodox Communists" of the SDS and its successor *Rote Zelle*, were using the *Jungsozialisten* to integrate into SPD. He added that "a young generation, demanding decisive steps toward a 'socialist' reorganization of society, was today wider and deeper than ever before." Allemann argued that the Jusos were "systematically" trying to take over the party leadership as they had done with SPD organizations. He alleged that when they did not have the majority, the Jusos

routinely dragged meetings on seemingly forever and then took decisions once most members had left.⁷⁰⁵

Not everyone within the party seemed worried about the Jusos. A 1973 article in the SPD magazine *Vorwärts* entitled “*Was hat die SPD falsch gemacht? Das helfen keine eisernen Besen*” (8.11.1973) argued that the perception of a threat actually came from the right-wing press, which presented everyone who “wants to change something about the market economy [...] at least as a potential enemy of the constitution.” The article did, however, recognize that there was a problem with elites wanting to impose themselves without standing for election. It is questionable whether most SPD members and leaders shared this lack of concern. Contrary to this optimistic outlook, even among SPD’s left wing, there were critical voices against the radicalism of the Jusos. In a lengthy report by Peter von Oertzen titled “*Thesen zur Strategie und Taktik des Demokratischen Sozialismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*”, which was primarily aimed at the Jusos and read at the sub-area committee congress in Frankfurt a.M. on 16-17 November, 1973,⁷⁰⁶ von Oertzen stated he was mainly addressing the party’s left wing. He emphasized that democracy is characterized by liberal and democratic rights and freedoms, which Socialism needs to expand rather than limit. Therefore, he insisted on the fundamental opposition between “dictatorial Socialism (Communism) and democratic Socialism. He pointed out that the party’s left wing must receive a clear rebuff against their “revolutionary romanticism, playing with the idea of a violent overthrow, verbal radicalism, ideological dogmatism, sentimental expressions of solidarity with antidemocratic/antisocialist forces, “antiimperialist” activities that are unrealistic from a foreign policy perspective, and purely emotional hostility toward the existing state apparatus etc.” He asked why the party leadership was not prepared to discipline and expel Jusos who clearly broke the internal rules and concluded that they were likely worried that imposing discipline may cost SPD votes.

On the requirements for SPD membership, von Oertzen pointed out that a member could even defend opinions that were at odds with the program and may work toward changing it, but he argued that the basic adherence to the principles of democracy and socialism was a member’s duty.⁷⁰⁷ He saw people who wished to change the party fundamentally as responsible for

⁷⁰⁵ *Sitzung 20.11.1972*, 10 pages, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁷⁰⁶ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), Protocol of the SPD leadership, November 20, 1972, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn.

⁷⁰⁷ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 25.

pushing it into a serious crisis and pointed out that the years leading up to 1973 witnessed a “re-enlivening” theoretically grounded Socialist tendency within SPD, which was partially an expression in the discussions and programs of the Young Socialists”. Nevertheless von Oertzen warned that questioning theses 34-39 of the Godesberg Program (the ones dealing with the economy) held risks for the left wing.⁷⁰⁸ While conceding that the left wing was not Leninist, Maoist or revolutionary, he pointed out that they have returned to classical Marxism and to a study of “exclusively Marxist authors”, which often leads to dogmatism.⁷⁰⁹ He criticized their “verbal radicalism” and “play with revolutionary phrases”, which creates the wrong impression of their aiming to transform SPD into a “cadre party of the revolutionary kind”.⁷¹⁰ Von Oertzen also addressed some of the reforms the Jusos demanded in their Strategic Theses such as co-decision “in the sense of controlling factory and company decisions” and reforming land ownership laws, which von Oertzen viewed as having no chance against the opposition of Capital unless the banking and crediting sectors were nationalized.⁷¹¹ Von Oertzen’s critique was in a way revealing, because in analyzing the Juso demands, he gave away the fact that they were not compatible with a market economy.

Von Oertzen also criticized the left wing’s inefficient practical work arguing that instead of actually generating support “small circles of completely passive left-wingers encourage one another in non-consequential theoretical discussions.”⁷¹² He also shared his disapproval of spontaneous work stoppages, house occupations, “the violence against objects”, occupation of university buildings, “active strikes”, direct attacks on political opponents among the student body or the professors.” While illegal activities had under some circumstances led to “clearing the road to necessary reform,”⁷¹³ he argued that illegal actions cannot be a legitimate part of SPD or Juso policy.⁷¹⁴ He found “the attempt to dismiss the unambiguous commitment to the principles of the rule of law [...] harmful” and explained that the rule of law was most helpful to minority groups and those who are socially and economically disadvantaged.⁷¹⁵ He opposed calling the police “pigs” (Bullen), encouraging military service objectors, the “emotional or individual-rights focused” approach to the *Radikalenerlass*.⁷¹⁶ Von Oertzen saw no grounds

⁷⁰⁸ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 29.

⁷⁰⁹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 30.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹¹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 31

⁷¹² PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 35.

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 37.

⁷¹⁵ Ibid.

⁷¹⁶ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 38.

for “sentimental solidarity with political hypocrites who complained about ‘*Berufsverbote*’ when they were mandated by ‘bourgeois courts’, but celebrated them when decided by the so-called “proletarian justice systems”. He reminded the Jusos that social democratic parties were forbidden and democratic socialists were persecuted in “Communist countries”.⁷¹⁷

Von Oertzen’s critique of the Jusos sounds even more objective, because he belonged to the party’s left wing. In fact, in his analysis, he echoed Marcuse’s point in saying that due to technological progress, “classless society had become really possible for the first time in human history.”⁷¹⁸ His critique, which contained positive elements, demonstrates the extent of the Jusos’ extremism; furthermore it shows that they had a greater influence on the party than its leadership was willing to admit. Perhaps that provides the only reasonable explanation for the fact that under Willy Brandt’s leadership, the Jusos were allowed to continue their far-left activity while remaining an organizational part of the SPD.

As the Jusos became more and more radical, the SPD leadership seemed to be coming to terms with some aspects of their politics. This also had to do with changing political realities. For instance, by 1973 the party did not object to the Jusos maintaining contacts with communist organizations in Eastern Europe. The leadership did not object to a 1973 agreement between the Jusos and the Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations (SCYO), urging the youth from both countries (BRD: Jusos, Falken) to cooperate and organize exchanges.⁷¹⁹ By not opposing this, the SPD leadership breached its own ban on SPD members cooperating with communists. Seven years later, Juso leader and future chancellor Gerhard Schröder travelled to Moscow in 1980 - months after the invasion of Afghanistan - in order to take part in a seminar on disarmament and Détente together with the SCYO.⁷²⁰

Regardless of the SPD’s accommodating approach, the conflict with the Jusos continued: In 1974 federal Juso leader Wolfgang Roth, also member of the SPD leadership since 1973, claimed that the imprisoned Baader-Meinhoff Gang (RAF) were political prisoners and that they had been tortured. Unsurprisingly, Dr. Diether Posser, Minister of Justice of North Rhein-

⁷¹⁷ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 39.

⁷¹⁸ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1973 (53 pages), 5.

⁷¹⁹ Sitzung 5.10.1973, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁷²⁰ Hauptabteilung Politik der CDU-Bundesgeschäftsstelle, Bericht über die Zusammenarbeit von demokratischem Sozialismus und Kommunismus, CDU-Dokumentation 21, 11 June 1980, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_26138-544-1-30.pdf?110902100811 (last accessed: July 9, 2016)

Westphalia (SPD), felt the need to write to Roth addressing these allegations.⁷²¹ The reverberations of this story in the press were another PR blow for SPD. While the vast majority of Germans regarded RAF as a terrorist organization, SPD's youth organization appeared to sympathize with them and to accuse an SPD-run federal province of torture.

In discussing the increasing number of terrorist acts in Germany, which had contributed to the passing of a law banning radicals from holding certain jobs (*Radikalenerlass*, approved in 1972⁷²²), SPD Council member Norbert Gansel pointed out during a meeting of the leadership that it was risky to connect terrorism with a potential SPD's electoral defeat. He also worried that the wrong formulation may create further internal conflicts and divisions, as well as the incorrect perception that "members of the DKP or extreme left-wing students who disrupt classes have something to do with a terrorist act perpetrated by a small group [...]"⁷²³ In that context, Helmut Schmidt pointed out that the Jusos hurt SPD's reputation with their statements. "That deepens the conflicts inside the SPD and surely generates interesting material for the Springer press." Schmidt also pointed out that there was a new trend of confrontation against foreign workers.⁷²⁴

With Helmut Schmidt taking over from Brandt as chancellor in the middle of the 7th Bundestag's term (1974), a new trend of decreasing activity among Juso members began. This possibly had to do with the party's increasing pushback against radicalism, as well as the new governments less reformist stance.⁷²⁵ Perhaps it was also the ideological excesses of certain Juso members and leaders that contributed to many students losing interest in the radical movements and becoming apolitical or even conservative as Vera Rüdiger, SPD politician from Hessen, complained to the Presidium.⁷²⁶ Rüdiger's concerns were anchored in concrete numbers: the second half of the 1970s marked the beginning of steady decline in SPD

⁷²¹ Sitzung 9.5.1974, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁷²² Dammann, Klaus, Occupational Bans for Left-Wing Political Activity: A Lesson from Germany. In: *Socialist Lawyer*, No. 80, 2018, 30.

⁷²³ Sitzung 9.12.1974, Gemeinsame Sitzung von Parteirat, Parteivorstand und Kontrollkommission am 11. November 1974 in Berlin, p. 20, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁷²⁴ Sitzung 9.12.1974, Gemeinsame Sitzung von Parteirat, Parteivorstand und Kontrollkommission am 11. November 1974 in Berlin, p. 86, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁷²⁵ Braunthal, Gerard, The German Social Democrats since 1969. A Party in Power and Opposition. Routledge, New York: 2019

⁷²⁶ Sitzung 8.3.1974, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

membership, as well as a decline in Juso membership from 300 000 in 1974 to 70 000 in 2015.⁷²⁷ It was during this period of declining interest in politics among the majority of youths that the shift of the youth Left toward New Left priorities took place, making personal liberation movements like Feminism and the Gay rights movement more prominent starting in the 1980s. The new trend of confrontation against foreign workers that Helmut Schmidt had observed likely contributed to making the attitude toward foreign workers a divisive factor, thus contributing to the eventual bourgeoning of multicultural political impulses.

Foreign Workers – the Basis for Future Multiculturalism

In 1973, two years before the 20th anniversary of the guest worker program, the SPD-led government stopped the program and banned further recruitment. The party announced that it had discussed the situation and declared its support for the government's decision, which was to take effect as of November. At a time when the world was suffering the effects of the Oil Crisis and Germany had about 2.5 million non-EC foreign workers, constituting over 11% of the workforce, the decision was framed in the context of concerns for unemployment. SPD was willing to support lifting the ban when there were no more "employment-political risks" to German workers. At the same time, the party rejected compulsory rotation and announced they would support the foreigners' integration "as far as possible and as far as they wish."

While integrating foreign workers and their families after the 1973 ban on recruiting guest workers was not considered a priority in German politics,⁷²⁸ the rights of foreign workers were among the few areas where the Jusos and the SPD leadership reached some level of agreement. In June 1974, a Commission for Issues of Foreign Workers was set up within the party leadership. In justifying the necessity for adding a new priority at a time of crisis, the party pointed out that "such measures must prove that SPD represents the interests of foreign workers together with the labor unions, also in times of crisis."⁷²⁹ At SPD's XII Federal Conference on Local Politics that took place in the autumn of 1974, the SPD leadership approved a resolution on cooperation in local politics for foreigners (*Resolution zur kommunalen Mitwirkung für*

⁷²⁷ ARD 1 Tagesschau, [Talentschmieden mit Nachwuchsproblem](https://web.archive.org/web/20150412222345/http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/parteiennachwuchs-101.html), 10.4.2015, <https://web.archive.org/web/20150412222345/http://www.tagesschau.de/inland/parteiennachwuchs-101.html> (last accessed: June 10, 2015)

⁷²⁸ Bither, Jessica and Astrid Ziebarth, [The Integration Picture in Germany. In It for the Long Run: Integration Lessons from a Changing Germany](#). German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2016, 8.

⁷²⁹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, March 1974 (4 pages), Protocol of the SPD leadership, March 8, 1974, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn, p. 3.

Ausländer). The Conference urged the party leadership to develop a solution to the problem of foreigners' voting rights in local elections that should be connected with a five-year residency requirement, in accordance with the communal policy program.⁷³⁰

On the issue of improving residential conditions for foreign workers, the party welcomed the spirit of the Juso proposals, but pointed out that such reforms could be expensive and difficult to organize if done hastily. Furthermore, they expressed the concern that German workers should not end up having worse conditions, which would be illegal. Finally it was suggested that the proposals in the social area be addressed to the *Länder* and municipalities, because the problems were different in various parts of Germany.⁷³¹ Regarding the Juso demand that foreigners be given active and passive right to vote, SPD's leadership pointed out that these issues were regulated by the European Communities and could not be decided at the national level. On a closely related topic, the party also reacted to the Juso demands for new legislation on foreigners in Germany. Similarly, as with the other issue, the leadership's reaction was to patiently explain why these demands were unnecessary, while not rejecting the positive nature of the cause.

The Party's proposed measures to aid the integration of foreigners included a gradual equalization of the residence status of foreign workers through a legal amendment without complicating the avenues toward citizenship. Foreign workers and their families were to be incentivized to learn German and the suitability of accommodations provided by the employers was to be reviewed with participation of guest worker representatives. The party envisaged support for better housing, informing foreigners about compulsory education and the German school system. Working on integrating foreign workers in political life as SPD members was also considered. Finally, the party thought it would be wise to raise awareness about within the party about the benefits that foreign workers brought to the German economy, as well as to exchange experience with fellow European left parties on how to secure "widened political rights" for foreign workers, to open up the possibility for dual citizenship or to create a

⁷³⁰ XII. Kommunalpolitische Bundeskonferenz vom 11-13. Oktober 1974 in Nürnberg, *Kommunal politischer Informationsdienst*, Ausgabe V/74, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 9.12.1974, Ausgabe V/74, p. 74

⁷³¹ An explicit housing policy for foreign workers was not established until after German Reunification. Bither, Jessica and Astrid Ziebarth, *The Integration Picture in Germany. In It for the Long Run: Integration Lessons from a Changing Germany*. German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2016, 15.

European citizenship law.⁷³² This suggests that other European countries were experiencing similar challenges during that time period and that the Left was consistently the political force advancing their rights.

SPD approached the issue with all the seriousness of a governing party and by the autumn of 1974, the Party's strategy on foreign workers was complete. The document was officially submitted to Willy Brandt who had already been advocating against a clear anti-immigration policy (i.e. enforcing compulsory repatriation).⁷³³ The Commission for issues related to foreign employees, tasked with the strategy⁷³⁴, had been created by the SPD party conference in 1973 with the aim to develop an "all-encompassing political concept for the acceptance of foreign employees in the legal and social order of the Federal Republic."⁷³⁵

The Commission identified a number of challenges. Many municipalities were unable to quickly build up the necessary social infrastructure to cope with an increase of foreign workers from 300 000 in 1960 to 2.5 million in 1973. This meant that it was harder to address issues like insufficient language skills, missing professional qualifications, and sub-par accommodation. It was already evident that these issues led to ghettoization. Moreover, the lack of certainty about their status was deemed to decrease integration efforts. The document concluded that resolving these issues would be complicated further if the number of foreigners were to increase. Such a scenario was also expected to lead to a slowing down of automation and to "hinder [improvements in] the pay rates and humani[zation of] the workplaces."⁷³⁶ Moreover, the text noted that one could not rely on the demand for jobs exceeding the local supply in the long run.⁷³⁷ While noting Germany's "political duty" to help developing neighboring countries employing an unlimited number of foreign workers was not feasible.⁷³⁸

⁷³² PV-Bestand, Protokolle, March 1974 (4 pages), Protocol of the SPD leadership, March 8, 1974, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn.

⁷³³ Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos and Karen Schönwälder, How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany's Guest Worker System. In: *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (80), 2006, 12.

⁷³⁴ The Commission was tasked with coming up with a program on the following topics: fundamental issues; foreign employees and SPD; housing situation/reuniting families; professional training/schools/kindergarten; immediate issues/counselling and support; integration as citizens/labour unions;

⁷³⁵ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), Protocol of the SPD leadership, December 9, 1974, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn, 2

⁷³⁶ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 3.

⁷³⁷ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 4.

⁷³⁸ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 5.

The text hinted at the problems of unsuccessful integration warning that “when an uncoordinated and non-managed employment of foreign workers [...] leads to the formation of a sub-proletariat, the existence of slums, which then leads to the dismissal of foreigners by locals as a ‘less worthy’ part of the population”, the state would be faced with a “disadvantage.” Furthermore, excessive employment of foreigners especially in cities leads to increasing friction, which can result in “discrimination of foreign workers” and can prepare “a fertile ground for reactionary and nationalist movements.”⁷³⁹ SPD’s program therefore concluded that foreign workers and their families needed to be integrated “as far as possible and as long as they wish”, allowing them to leave Germany if and when they wished. “A compulsory reintegration or forced rotation” were rejected.⁷⁴⁰

SPD’s proposed legal framework included amending the constitution to stipulate that foreign workers were not foreign, but *Mitbürger* (co-citizens) who contribute to the common wellbeing and should have the same fundamental rights as Germans do.⁷⁴¹ Foreigners were to be able to stay indefinitely, which required amending the law on foreigners. Obtaining citizenship was to be made easier by lowering fees and decreasing processing times.⁷⁴² Unless an expulsion was specifically mandated, SPD proposed granting unlimited residence permits after 5 years of residency and after 10 years – a pathway to citizenship.⁷⁴³ Family reunification was to be allowed after one year in Germany.⁷⁴⁴ Since expulsion was a “heavy blow”, it was to be allowed only in case of serious abuses or for long-term welfare recipients.⁷⁴⁵ Expulsions were also to be banned if an individual was politically persecuted or homeless, married to a German citizen or had children who were legal residents, or was stateless with permanent residency in Germany, so long as no other country would receive them.⁷⁴⁶

The paper proposed a number of social measures intended to facilitate the integration of foreign workers with a focus on providing them and their families with ample living space, along with social infrastructure, both of which “meet the objective of integration.” In addition to that it

⁷³⁹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 6.

⁷⁴⁰ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 7.

⁷⁴¹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 10.

⁷⁴² PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 11.

⁷⁴³ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 12.

⁷⁴⁴ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 16.

⁷⁴⁵ Residing without a passport or residence permit, endangering the free democratic order or the state’s security, receiving a prison sentence beyond a certain minimal scope.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid.

demanded that “rotation may not be forced through planned undersupply.”⁷⁴⁷ (Earlier plans to limit family reunifications had envisaged requiring foreigners to prove they had enough residential space, which they usually did not.⁷⁴⁸) It was proposed that factory councils should include a representative of its foreign workers, that a number of instruments be utilized to provide sufficient housing for immigrant families and that these be located in normal residential areas as opposed to badly serviced and isolated industrial zones. Foreigners were also to have equal rights in being considered for social and employer housing, as well as to have access to residential construction coops.⁷⁴⁹ According to the SPD plan, excessive concentration of foreigners was to be avoided in order to encourage contacts with ethnic Germans.⁷⁵⁰ These proposals indicate that at this stage, the notion that foreigners should be encouraged to integrate into the labor market, while retaining much of their culture was not on the table. Instead, the emphasis was on encouraging contacts with Germans and integrating the newcomers.

The document prioritized education and was based on the understanding that integration requires the ability to speak German. Specialized integration language courses were to be developed⁷⁵¹ and foreign children were to have access to kindergartens and day care centers where German kids were the majority.⁷⁵² The same principle was set for children of school age, who should not be isolated in special schools and should receive extra help. The option of leaving Germany was not removed and kids were supposed to also be taught their mother tongue to allow easier reintegration.⁷⁵³

SPD advocated that working abroad did not have to lead to workers losing their political rights, so the party envisaged encouraging foreign workers to be politically active both in Germany and at home. This was to happen without violating international law or compromising Germany’s constitutional order.⁷⁵⁴ The Social Democrats wanted to guarantee that “in all foreigner accommodations, the freedom of political and labor union work and visits at all times

⁷⁴⁷ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 14

⁷⁴⁸ Triadafilopoulos, Triadafilos and Karen Schönwälder, How the Federal Republic Became an Immigration Country: Norms, Politics and the Failure of West Germany’s Guest Worker System. In: *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (80), 2006, 9.

⁷⁴⁹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 17.

⁷⁵⁰ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 15.

⁷⁵¹ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 18.

⁷⁵² PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 19.

⁷⁵³ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 20.

⁷⁵⁴ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 22.

must be possible”.⁷⁵⁵ These suggestions demonstrate that the party thought of political involvement as a basic right and perhaps an instrument to aid integration. While conceding that foreigners could take part in German parliamentary and provincial elections only after obtaining citizenship, they argued in favor of counting foreigners in the delimitation of electoral districts. As a first step to political integration, foreigners were to be granted the right to participate in municipal consultative councils with an advising vote and vote for self-governing bodies in businesses. SPD proposed that “parties should [...] attract foreign workers to become their members [without setting] requirements [other than] agreeing with the aims of a given party.” The electoral law was to clarify the possibilities for a foreigner to hold positions within a party.⁷⁵⁶

SPD also proposed that the European Community should equalize the rights of all EC workers and those of third-country workers.⁷⁵⁷ All members and SPD officials were “called upon, together with the labor unions [...] to contribute to suitable awareness raising among the population.”⁷⁵⁸ The latter suggests that SPD’s integration model was far from the political consensus at that time in Germany: the population was to be made aware that they should embrace foreigners and that they should be integrated into political life. While the SPD made clear its goal to represent foreign workers in Germany’s political life, the measures, outlined above, could be interpreted to be based mostly on values and perhaps very little on political self-interest. The main opposition party at that time, CDU, seemed willing to support integration of foreigners who were already in Germany, but without discussing citizenship or voting rights.⁷⁵⁹

By the latter half of the 1980s, a decade after the end of this research period, SPD was already experiencing the loss of some of its traditional voter base. An article by Joachim Hirsch, published in the magazine *Links*, discussing the 1987 election losses in Hessen and elsewhere argued the 1970s economic crisis and the processes of automation had led to a shrinking of the traditional industrial sector and an increase in the number of employees in the services sector.

⁷⁵⁵ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 16.

⁷⁵⁶ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 23-24.

⁷⁵⁷ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), 24

⁷⁵⁸ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, December 1974 (27 pages), Protocol of the SPD leadership, December 9, 1974, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn.

⁷⁵⁹ Antrag der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag zur Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer Deutscher Bundestag, 7. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 7/2469 (1974), <http://library.kas.de/GetObject.ashx?GUID=59bd3fda-e6eb-e311-b482-005056b96343&IDUSER=NotAllowed>

This was accompanied by social fragmentation among wage laborers, as well as new social movements and conflicts. The author concluded that SPD had been pushed into a “political ghetto”, as a result of having to juggle between its traditional voter base and new diverse scenes that were mobile, affected by changing values, and were not guaranteed SPD voters.⁷⁶⁰ Perhaps that was the time when SPD started perceiving foreigners as an electoral resource pending the acquisition of voting rights. The same was possibly true of other political groups, who by the 1980s, were becoming shifting their focus away from simple class-based economic demands toward identity-based and personal liberation priorities.

With over 4 million foreigners in Germany by the early 1980s, visible frictions were beginning to emerge. This was the case even within SPD, which was supposed to be welcoming of foreign workers. For example, the election of a female Turkish “comrade” on the SPD leadership in Hannover, one of the first foreigners to hold such a position, caused uproar.⁷⁶¹ Throughout the early 1980s the number of foreigners began to increase as families were reunited. Foreign children were too often not attaining sufficient educational levels and were subject to high levels of unemployment after graduation. This was partially due to rules that limited employment of foreign family members for a certain number of years. CDU, which was in opposition until 1982, proposed to alleviate the pressure by repatriating foreigners, but the governing SPD rejected this despite chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s statement at a 1981 DGB-meeting that “we cannot digest any more foreigners – that will lead to blood and thunder.”⁷⁶²

While the number of foreigners was increasing, many of them were in fact integrating at least on a basic level. The 1973 cessation of hiring new foreign workers also granted those already in Germany a long-term perspective, encouraging them to join the labor unions and bring their families along from their home countries.⁷⁶³ Between 1972 and 1985, the number of foreign workers who were organized as members of German labor unions almost doubled, increasing from 20 to 36%.⁷⁶⁴ That period saw a massive widening of the rights of foreign workers, as envisaged by SPD, and efforts were made to foster contacts between foreign and German

⁷⁶⁰ Hirsch, Joachim, Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Zielgruppe, In: *Links*, May 1987, 14.

⁷⁶¹ Wagner, Konrad, Ausländer Raus: Der Fremdenhass breitet sich aus. In: *Deutsche Freidenker Verband – Rundbrief*, Year 2, Nr. 4: January 1982, 19-21.

⁷⁶² Jochen, Werner, Zurück in die Türkei?. In: *Express – Zeitung für sozialistische, Betriebs- und Gewerkschaftsarbeit*, January 1982, 3.

⁷⁶³ Kühne, Peter, Die Trennungslinien werden schärfer: Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in deutschen Gewerkschaften, In: *Express – Zeitung für sozialistische, Betriebs- und Gewerkschaftsarbeit*, June 1987, 12.

⁷⁶⁴ Kühne, Die Trennungslinien werden schärfer: Ausländische Arbeitnehmer in deutschen Gewerkschaften, 11.

workers.⁷⁶⁵ “Action committees against the hatred of foreigners” were founded and they connected various labor, human rights, youth, and foreigners’ organizations, as well as churches, in a way that allowed them to be “socially effective.” This contributed to the topic of the rights of foreigners to enter the public discourse.

1982 witnessed a long-term political change in Germany with the first of five consecutive CDU governments led by Helmut Kohl. The new German chancellor, like the old one, realized that integration was not going well and had set himself the goal of reducing the number of Turkish citizens residing in Germany by 50%, an intention he shared in meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1982.⁷⁶⁶ Unlike his predecessor Helmut Schmidt who was unable to get such reforms through his party, Kohl’s government immediately implemented the 1983 Return Assistance Act, encouraging foreigners to leave Germany through financial incentives.⁷⁶⁷ Nevertheless, this was not successful in achieving its aims, keeping the issue of foreigners, migration and integration high on the public agenda, and leading to tightening Germany’s lax asylum legislation in 1992. The Foreigners Act was also amended in 1990, but it was in 2005 when the immigration legislation was completely overhauled and significantly liberalized by the SPD parliamentary majority, led by former Juso leader Gerhard Schröder.

By the late 1980s the increasing number of foreigners in Germany had contributed to awakening fears and biases among segments of the population. Clear political divisions on that subject contributed to the reemergence of radical right-wing parties such as *Die Republikaner*, which entered the Berlin senate in 1989. Such parties relied on anti-immigration messages to attract voters who disapproved of the developments. On the other hand, parties like SPD, *Die Grünen*, and *Die Alternative Liste*, had evolved to promoting a liberal multicultural outlook, aimed both at their voters and perhaps at attracting foreign citizens as potential voters. This approach is evident in publications associated with these parties such as *Netzwerk Rundbrief* (Nr. 31/16.12.1985).

⁷⁶⁵ Kühne, 13.

⁷⁶⁶ BBC, Germany’s Helmut Kohl ‘wanted half of Turks sent back’, 2013, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23544311> (last accessed: June 17, 2017)

⁷⁶⁷ Gesley, Jenny, *Germany: The Development of Migration and Citizenship Law in Postwar Germany*, Library of Congress, 2017, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/migration-citizenship/germany.php> (last accessed: November 5, 2018)

Examining a report, issued by the Alternative List for their work at the Berlin House of representatives, we see that every imaginable aspect of the rights of foreigners, asylum seekers and every specific nationality is listed as a priority. The party had developed a truly multicultural face that focused on issues like securing quotas for women in education and the public sector,⁷⁶⁸ as well as stopping deportations of illegal immigrants.⁷⁶⁹

Conclusion

Faced with conflicting pressures in the beginning of the 1970s, SPD found itself in a difficult situation: On one hand, the party had serious responsibilities as a governing political force. With its center-left base secure, SPD's goal was to attract centrist voters who may earlier have supported the rival CDU. That was borne in mind by the party's leaders when they advocated in favor of having as little ideology as possible and reaffirming SPD's position as a *Volkspartei*. On the other hand, the Social Democrats were constantly attacked from within by their hard-left wing, initially student groups like SDS in the late 1960s, but then the initially-loyal Jusos, an SPD working group, who after 1969 had turned into a far-left faction within the party.

This difficult position forced the SPD leadership to try and balance between the contradicting internal pressures from the party's left wing and the external political pressures in the context of the Cold War. Many reforms carried out by the first SPD chancellor, Willy Brandt, were divisive within German society. Among the most contended was his *Ostpolitik*, which involved signing peace treaties with East European countries, including the USSR, thus de-facto recognizing West Germany's post-war borders. The Federal Republic also recognized GDR as a separate state, even if not a „foreign country”, thus retreating from the Basic Law's claim to representing all of Germany. In addition to implementing an array of progressive social and welfare reforms, SPD also adopted a left-wing vocabulary in relation to the Third World. While many viewed the Vietnam War as a battleground between Western Democracy and Communism, in 1970 SPD welcomed the declaration of the Bureau of the Social-democratic International, which “condemned the military activities of all those involved in Southeast Asia” and appealed to all sides to accept the UK's proposal for a reconvention of the Geneva

⁷⁶⁸ Erfahrungsbericht der Fraktion der Alternativen Liste im Abgeordnetenhaus, April 1985 – April 1987, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Peter Brandt Collection, no reference code

⁷⁶⁹ Letter from Heidemarie Bischoff-Pflanz and Wolfgang Wieland, 1 July 1987, In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, Peter Brandt Collection, no reference code

conference.⁷⁷⁰ In 1973, SPD's executive director Hans-Jürgen Wischniewski received a FRELIMO delegation (also received by FDP) and the party announced that "in their struggle against colonialism and racism, SPD sides with the peoples of the Third World." It urged the federal government to "use its influence in Europe to a greater degree [...] to impose the right of self-determination for affected peoples."⁷⁷¹ At about the same time, SPD was also becoming increasingly focused on the issue of integrating foreign workers and lent its support to scrapping the rotation principle while also providing a path to permanent immigration to Germany and emphasizing the need to integrate foreigners into Germany's political life.

Many SPD voters regarded these positions as too radical and suspected the Jusos of being behind them. Together with that, the slowing economy and growing unemployment caused by the Oil Crisis began to chip away at SPD's traditional voting base. After reaching its highest level of support in the 1972 elections (45.8%), support for the party began to erode continuing until the late 1990s. In the summer of 1973, SPD members began leaving the party. An angry letter from a disillusioned SPD member was discussed at the meeting of the leadership in August 1973. It sheds some light on typical issues that alienated centrists⁷⁷² such as "too much blind confidence in the East, no clear distancing from Communism, the statements of the Juso chairman Wolfgang Roth in East Berlin and on TV, the increasing influence of radical left elements in the party (i.e. Johanno Strasser⁷⁷³); unclear treaty rules on the Berlin Question. The letter's sender argued that the party was "developing in a regressive direction toward a class struggle and Marxism." Some members of the leadership, such as Helmut Bärwald, head of SPD's East Office, also resigned due to disagreeing with Ostpolitik in the early 1970s.

Even though both major parties were centrist people's parties, comparing SPD's positions with the language of a CDU political program from 1974 immediately shows serious differences. Solidarity with the Third World was not mentioned and neither was promoting the rights of foreign workers despite CDU agreeing with the general notion of allowing integration. Closer cooperation was not envisaged (even though in the 1980s Helmut Kohl's government would

⁷⁷⁰ PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 10.5.1970, Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Bonn.

⁷⁷¹ Mitteilung für die Presse, Nr. 237/73, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle, Sitzung 9.9.1973

⁷⁷² Sitzung 26.8.1973, In: Archiv der sozialen Demokratie der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) – Bonn, PV-Bestand, Protokolle

⁷⁷³ Strasser was vice-chairman of the Jusos from 1970 to 1975 and member of the SPD committee on Basic Values, the ideological body of the party.

go on to provide loans to GDR). While SPD called for transforming NATO into an organization for disarmament, CDU declared its support and loyalty to the West – “Trust and fairness to the Western protective forces, who are friends of Berlin and to whom the city owes its existence since the Blockade.” A perception that the Left was attempting to limit free expression must have been felt among CDU voters and politicians since one of their calls in 1974 was „a return to liberality for every citizen and every opinion; shift away from the endless playing field for extremists.” While SPD came to support decriminalizing abortion, CDU held on to a conservative position, informed by the church, and called for “strengthening the family as a nucleus of raising children.” In terms of the attitude toward the rest of the world, both parties displayed ambition for Germany to be an example. In CDU’s case, the phrase was that Germany needed “a culture open to the world, which would once again set the standards in Europe.”⁷⁷⁴

This comparison highlights obvious differences, which suggest that while SPD was by no means radically left in the 1970s, its youth organizations⁷⁷⁵ had contributed to pushing the party to adopt some (if not many) of their ideas, thus pushing it to the left. While *Ostpolitik* was a strategic necessity, it is possible that this process contributed to SPD’s increased openness to the Eastern bloc beyond *Ostpolitik*. It also contributed to intensifying its anti-colonial rhetoric, and even to the idea of introducing workers’ co-decision in media, thus violating the right of editors to decide their editorial lines. By the 1970s, the Jusos were gradually becoming more active in promoting women’s and gay rights; SPD followed suit and gradually dared to adopt a more progressive position on abortion legislation; in 1978 it became the first German party to approve the addition of a new working group advocating for the rights of gay people, the Schwusos, which contributed in the struggle for equal rights for LGBT people in Germany. The Social Democrats also pioneered a movement to end the rotation principle for guest workers and to provide a horizon for their permanent settlement in Germany. All of this laid the groundworks for the beginning of German Multiculturalism that would in the 1980s go on to become fully defined and propelled by the new political, economic, and social realities before becoming an undisputed “fact of life” in the decades after the end of the Cold War.

⁷⁷⁴ Das Programm der Berliner CDU, *Berliner Rundschau*, 14 November 1974 (Sonderausgabe), In: FU-Berlin Universitätsarchiv, APO-Archiv, S BRD und Ausland: Jusos – (SPD) Parteien u. Organisationen, Wahlen, Zeitungsausschnitte, Broschüren, Wahlergebnisse, 1972-1975 – Signatur 444, no reference code

⁷⁷⁵ The Jusos comprised 1/3 of all SPD members, which contributed to their influence.

Chapter 4

Repressive Tolerance, Alternative Revolutionary Forces, and the Left-leaning Media

The previous chapter looked at the political evolution of the German youth Left, as well as SPD, in the context of Marcuse's notions of Repressive Tolerance and Alternative Revolutionary Forces. As specific areas demonstrating the influence of these ideas on real political life, that chapter looked at the transformation of the youth Left and its conflicts with SPD. The chapter also looked at the Left's evolving attitudes toward foreigners in Germany (specifically the *Gastarbeiter*) and the Third World, the Left's handling of positions the Left viewed as unacceptable (i.e. an early form of Political Correctness), Feminism/Women's rights, as well as Gay rights activism. These were examined in the context of SPD's relationship with the Jusos characterized by increasing tensions, but also by the gradual shift of the party toward some Juso positions.

The current chapter mirrors that subject matter, but rather than being based on archival documents from the APO or SPD archives, it looks at these topics through the lens of the left-leaning press's news coverage. Since "mass media may be viewed as a socializing agent fostering ties to political parties as well as other political attitudes"⁷⁷⁶, the left-leaning press could be seen as a significant influence on the Left's evolution. Moreover, the 1960s are often seen as a period marked by an "evolution of the West German mass media – from an instrument of consensus into a forum of conflict and open discussion."⁷⁷⁷ Moving away from a generationally-determined culture of partial self-censorship and a desire to aid stability through depoliticized reporting, the German media shifted radically in favor of investigative and politicized content.⁷⁷⁸ This process led to the opening of a wider ideological rift and while by the late 1960s some media like *Der Spiegel* became "more leftist than ever", others like Springer's *Die Welt*, *Bild*, as well as *Christ und Welt*, were "pushed [...] to the nationalist right."⁷⁷⁹

⁷⁷⁶ Norpoth, Helmut and Kendall L. Baker, *Mass Media Use and Electoral Choice in West Germany*. In: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 1, 1980, 1–14.

⁷⁷⁷ von Hodenberg, Christina, *Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany's Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere*. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 371.

⁷⁷⁸ von Hodenberg, 372-284.

⁷⁷⁹ von Hodenberg, 385.

As its main source, this chapter is primarily built upon articles from *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR), a daily newspaper that openly leaned toward SPD while being independent of the party leadership and making autonomous editorial decisions. As a point of comparison, where appropriate, this chapter also refers to articles from *Der Spiegel*, a magazine characterized by a traditionally center-left and liberal editorial line, but one without a connection to SPD. While they were certainly different in their editorial lines, both publications were perceived by those critical of the Left as biased in its favor. In a 1975 article on the subject of the Left and the media, the radically conservative intellectual Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing listed FR among the newspapers that “served as a sympathizer backdrop for the APO” and cited Rudolf Augstein’s description of *Der Spiegel*’s editorial line as “liberal, if in doubt left”, remarking on the irony of some of his journalists attempting to “veto” his editorial line through *Mitbestimmung*.⁷⁸⁰

Both publications were largely shaped by their influential (co)founders and general editors. Karl Gerold, cofounder and after 1954 general editor and publisher of FR, was a value-oriented man. He was among the first West German general editors to condemn the US “involvement” in Vietnam, a position that was not initially popular. A “staunch Social Democrat” who had himself fled from the Nazis in 1933, he was known to focus on issues having to do with democracy and human dignity like the existence of political prisoners in totalitarian states.⁷⁸¹ Unlike Gerold who left SPD in the early 1950s to ensure his journalistic independence, *Der Spiegel*’s founder and general editor Rudolf Augstein remained an FDP member and was even briefly a member of the Bundestag. It is not unlikely that his attitudes toward the state and the center-right were additionally shaped by his 3 months in jail during the Spiegel Affair. In addition to Augstein, *Der Spiegel* was also marked by other heavyweights such as the colorful Conrad Ahlers,⁷⁸² author of the article that set off the Spiegel Affair. While Ahlers evolved from Junge Union co-founder to SPD member and political figure, other *Spiegel* journalists such as Claus Jacobi migrated to the Springer press in the early 1970s and became known for

⁷⁸⁰ von Schrenck-Notzing, Caspar, Linke und Massenmedien. In: *Zeitschrift Für Politik*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1975, 69.

A number of younger *Der Spiegel* editors attempted to introduce co-decision, thus effectively being able to veto Augstein, but they did not receive enough support from their colleagues and were eventually fired. See: Zeuner, Bodo, Veto gegen Augstein. Der Kampf in der „Spiegel“-Redaktion um Mitbestimmung. Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg: 1972

⁷⁸¹ 1 March 1973 – New York Times: Karl Gerold, 67, A German Editor. Accessed on: <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/03/01/archives/karl-gerold-67-a-german-editor-founder-of-the-frankfurter-rundschau.html>

⁷⁸² von Hodenberg, Christina, Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany’s Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 376.

his conservative commentary, perhaps illustrating the deepening of ideological divisions in the German media in the years around 1968.

The *Frankfurter Rundschau* articles have been selected by thoroughly reviewing a database of over 8600 digital copies taken at the State Library of Berlin's Newspaper Archive and examined chronologically for the period 1963-1974. *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, operates an open online media archive, which has been used to access articles from the period 1963-1974. Where necessary, these materials are discussed in the context of other sources.

Since FR was closely associated with SPD, tracing the shift in values and the changing territory of accepted positions and vocabulary provides greater clarity about the extent of changes in values, public political rhetoric, laws, and attitudes, going beyond the ideational clashes between the youth radicals and SPD that become evident in the archival materials and that were discussed in detail in the previous chapter. That is the main reason for selecting this particular publication as our focus despite there being other major media that “fueled the criticism and sympathized with the actions of the protesters”⁷⁸³ during the late 1960s and early 70s, including television channels.⁷⁸⁴ Among the topics whose press coverage is reviewed are the issue of contacts to the Eastern Bloc and Communist organizations, openly Marxist argumentation, traditions, the state, the nation, the Third World, decolonization, national-liberation movements, conscription, military intervention, immigration, integration, labor activism, law enforcement and justice, women's rights, gay rights, free speech and political correctness, defined in this context mainly in terms of attempts at censorship and boycotting organizations and individuals.

As in Chapter 3, these topics are grouped in four sections treating aspects of overall political radicalization, women's/Feminist activism, gay rights activism, the issue of foreigners and guest workers, as well as a fifth section on the freedom of the press and impulses toward Political Correctness.

⁷⁸³ von Hodenberg, Christina, Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany's Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 386.

⁷⁸⁴ von Bismarck, Klaus, Der gesellschaftliche Auftrag des Fernsehens für das Programm. In: *Fernseh-Kritik: Die gesellschaftliche Funktion des Fernsehens*, Dieter Stolte (Edt.), Hase und Köhler, Mainz:1970, 52.

4.1. Left Radicalization

This section examines the radicalization of the youth left-wing organizations orbiting around SPD and their attempts to push the Social Democrats to the left, leading to conflicts with the party leadership. Some specific topics, reviewed in this section, are the media reception and coverage of issues like the conflicts over contacts with East European countries, contacts with communist organizations in West Germany, as well as their support for far-left positions.



Frankfurter Rundschau, 1 January 1966. FR joked that the Jusos will have to join Wehner's "choir" in order to secure more votes for SPD (a play on words in German as "voices" also means "votes").

***Ostkontakte* and the 1968/1973 Youth Festivals in Sofia and East Berlin**

An important divisive issue of the 1960s within the broad center-left milieu that featured heavily in the left-leaning press was the issue of *Ostkontakte* or contacts with organizations in the Communist Bloc. Since these organizations were usually state-controlled, treating them like partners lent them and the East legitimacy. Such contacts also risked exposing young Western left-wingers to Soviet propaganda. Nevertheless, due to idealism or actual communist sympathies, some SPD-associated organizations and individuals wished to develop and maintain contacts with peers in communist states. An added vector of attraction was that the Communist Bloc also included a part of Germany. The press coverage of this issue helps us gain a better understanding of what happened, but it also betrays the press' attitudes toward the subject matter, their evolution, which in turn influenced the readers and history-makers.

Among the first articles in *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR) within the research period (1963-1974) on the subject of *Ostkontakte* was a 1963 report about the Union of German Students' (VDS) deciding to expand contacts with youth organizations in the East. These seemingly innocuous

exchanges of cultural and sports visits⁷⁸⁵ contradicted not only the CDU-led government's policy, but also SPD's *Richtlinien für Ostkontakte*.⁷⁸⁶ With the SPD-loyal *Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund* (SHB) and the CDU-affiliated Ring of Christian Democratic Students (RCDS) agreeing not to establish contact with *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the official East German youth organization,⁷⁸⁷ the fault line on that issue was established. FR articles did not include critical remarks about such contacts in their reporting of events like *Die Falken*'s first Moscow visit⁷⁸⁸, which was an early example of their editorial line being to the left of the SPD leadership.

A youth organization that had moved away from being the SPD's student wing to a position far to the left was the *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (SDS) whose members were expelled from SPD in 1961. At a time when West Germany did not recognize the Soviet-controlled GDR, SDS leaders traveled to East Berlin for a meeting with FDJ to discuss cooperation.⁷⁸⁹ Guests from the East also attended Rudi Dutschke's 1965 election on the SDS leadership.⁷⁹⁰ FR covered SDS extensively and while they pointed out it was not rigidly pro-Soviet, it was nevertheless radically left. At their 1966 federal congress in Frankfurt, SDS openly declared its support for the Chinese Cultural Revolution and formulated the necessity of "overcoming the dominance of the bourgeoisie."⁷⁹¹ The contrast between SDS and the mainstream, as well as the role of contacts with the East, could be well illustrated by a 1968 police search at SDS's federal office in Frankfurt that was intended to find correspondence with FDJ.⁷⁹²

The 1968 World Youth Festival held in Sofia, Bulgaria, exemplified the dilemma that left-leaning youth organizations in West Germany faced, forcing them to make the difficult choice whether to participate. The DBJR (German Federal Youth Ring) initially opposed the "Communist festival" while organizations like SDS reacted with the sarcastic suggestion that DBJR ought to avoid coming across like *the* "state youth organization."⁷⁹³ Similarly, while the CDU-affiliated *Junge Union* also opposed "celebrating a festival together with mandatory

⁷⁸⁵ 9 March 1963, Nr. 58, photo 07058 – FR: Studenten für Fortsetzung der Kontakte mit dem Ostblock.

⁷⁸⁶ Schleicher, Harry, Jugoslawien. In: *Osteuropa*, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1961, 10.

⁷⁸⁷ 16 March 1963, Nr. 64, photo 07082 – FR: Studentenverbände lehnen Kontakte mit der FDJ ab.

⁷⁸⁸ 1 November 1963, Nr. 254, photo 070352 – FR: Die „Falken“ besuchen Moskau.

⁷⁸⁹ 10 December 1964, Nr. 287, photo 07896 – FR: SDS-Vorsitzende nach Ost-Berlin.

⁷⁹⁰ 19 October 1965, Nr. 243, photo 08414 – FR: SDS-Vorstand wiedergewählt.

⁷⁹¹ 6 September 1966, Nr. 206, photo 09072 – FR: SDS hört weiter Mozart-Platten.

⁷⁹² 1 June 1968, Nr. 127, photo 00885 – FR: Polizei durchsucht SDS-Büro.

⁷⁹³ 14 November 1967, Nr. 265, photo 00140 – FR: Differenzen um Teilnahme an Weltjugendfestspiele.

youth organizations,”⁷⁹⁴ SDS, SHB, the FDP-affiliated *Junge Demokraten*, LSD, *Der Freigeistigen Jugend*, *Der Deutschen Jugendgemeinschaft*, DFU, and the *Aktionszentrum unabhängiger und sozialistischer Schüler* announced they wished to participate in the Festival and were therefore prepared to join the *Arbeitskreis Festival*. FR seemed supportive of participation in its coverage and reported uncritically that these organizations were united in their opposition to the Vietnam War, the arms race, were in favor of European security, and also supported friendship and youth solidarity.⁷⁹⁵ After much hesitation, these organizations were joined last-minute by not only VDS, but also the SPD-affiliated *Jusos* and *Falken*.⁷⁹⁶ In the end, a DBJR delegation also participated despite some of its member-organizations boycotting the trip.⁷⁹⁷ Throughout this preparatory stage, FR’s reporting adhered to a matter-of-fact style and refrained from much commentary.

Contrary to government concerns about communist influence on the German youth, the Festival turned out to be a reality check for some of the participants who maintained a more idealistic idea of the East. FR had a special correspondent at the Festival who reported on the participants’ complaints in detail, but also argued that even the limited opportunities for open communication with students from behind the Iron Curtain could be considered a success.⁷⁹⁸ Similarly, Juso leader Peter Corterier spoke of “positive experiences” and “open conversations” and argued that attendance had been worth it.⁷⁹⁹ Others felt that everything seemed staged and complained of the lack of opportunities for free speech.⁸⁰⁰ VDS expressed its regret that the Festival had mostly focused on sports and fireworks, while discussions were manipulated in the „orthodox Communist sense”. Nevertheless, *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported that in Sofia VDS had invited the East German FDJ to hold another meeting⁸⁰¹ after a VDS delegation’s visit in East Berlin.⁸⁰² FR also reported uncritically that one of the discussions with the state-run East German FDJ had been about the emerging anti-authoritarian movements. SDS was reported to have expelled 5 members of its “communist-wing” who had disobeyed the leadership’s line in Sofia and had joined the local police (*People’s Militia*)

⁷⁹⁴ 31 November 1967, Nr. 276, photo 00198 – FR: [Junge Union nicht nach Sofia](#).

⁷⁹⁵ 6 December 1967, Nr. 283, photo 00217 – FR: [Jungdemokraten zum Weltjugendfest](#).

⁷⁹⁶ 20 July 1968, Nr. 166, photo 00964 – FR: [IUSY nicht zum Jugendfestival](#).

⁷⁹⁷ Breßlein, Erwin, [Die Weltjugend und der Dogmatismus: Das IX. Festival in Sofia](#), 2003, Accessed on: <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/25246/das-ix-festival-in-sofia/>

⁷⁹⁸ 7 August 1968, Nr. 181, photo 00997 – FR: [Schließlich schalteten die Bulgaren das Licht aus](#).

⁷⁹⁹ 5 August 1968, Nr. 179, photo 00992 – FR: [Neuer Wirbel um den SDS in Sofia](#).

⁸⁰⁰ 3 August 1968, Nr. 178, photo 00988 – FR: [Diskussionen werden systematisch verhindert](#).

⁸⁰¹ 9 August 1968, Nr. 183, photo 01000 – FR: [VDS lud die FDJ nach Bonn ein](#).

⁸⁰² 26 June 1968, Nr. 145, photo 00932 – FR: [VDS spricht mit FDJ in Ost-Berlin](#).

against anti-authoritarians who had tried to stage an improvised protest in front of the US Embassy.⁸⁰³ *Der Spiegel's* coverage of the festival also mentioned this event and emphasized the way the West German and Czechoslovak delegations had supported Dubcek, even angering Bulgaria's dictator Todor Zhivkov during the Festival's opening ceremony.⁸⁰⁴ While FR produced considerably more reporting from the Festival, both media took a balanced approach that was critical of some aspects, but simultaneously supportive of the anti-authoritarian German participants' attempts to interact freely with youth from behind the Iron curtain and to openly discuss issues that clashed with the organizers' agenda. The Springer-owned *Die Welt*, on the other hand, adhered to a condescending and sarcastic approach in their reporting of the German participants at the Festival who were labelled "*Linksextremisten*" and who, *Die Welt* claimed, had been beaten for appearing naked at a swimming contest out of "highly political motives". The *Welt* author seemed to regale in reporting that "the security let their muscles play and promised the West Germans that they will at least create the impression they were wearing swimming trunks."⁸⁰⁵

Media like *Die Welt* highlighted that the Festival demonstrated internal divisions in the "Moscow-modelled unity front" like never before.⁸⁰⁶ Perhaps that optimistic outlook showing that contacts with the East were more likely to destabilize the communist regimes than the other way around contributed to a greater willingness to allow *Ostkontakte*. By the late 1960s, contacts to Communist Bloc organizations seemed to be gaining respectability. In 1968 FR reported on SHB exchanging visits with FDJ,⁸⁰⁷ but also that even RCDS was warming to the idea of such visits. While the CDU-affiliated youth organization criticized SDS's radical methods, it encouraged CDU to pursue contacts with political forces in "Middle Germany" – the preferred label for the GDR.⁸⁰⁸ After the start of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, contacts with the East became much more accepted as they no longer contradicted the spirit of government policy. In 1971 the Jusos went on an official week-long visit to Moscow and Warsaw, which was approved by the SPD⁸⁰⁹ and organizations like SDS even established contacts with

⁸⁰³ 14 September 1968, Nr. 214, photo 01090 – FR: [Immer derselbe „Scheiß-Ärger“ mit dem KP-Flügel.](#)

⁸⁰⁴ 4 August 1968, Nr. 32 – *Der Spiegel*: [Schöne Schweine](https://www.spiegel.de/politik/schoene-schweine-a-e372e6a9-0002-0001-0000-000046020798), <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/schoene-schweine-a-e372e6a9-0002-0001-0000-000046020798>

⁸⁰⁵ 8 August 1968, Nr. 183 – *Die Welt*: [Westdeutsche Delegierte als Prügelknaben](https://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/4655/article.pdf), <https://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/4655/article.pdf>

⁸⁰⁶ Breßlein, Erwin, *Die Weltjugend und der Dogmatismus: Das IX. Festival in Sofia*, 2003, Accessed on: <https://www.bpb.de/shop/zeitschriften/apuz/25246/das-ix-festival-in-sofia/>

⁸⁰⁷ 7 March 1968, Nr. 57, photo 00520 – FR: [Die FDJ bricht ihr Schweigen.](#)

⁸⁰⁸ 9 February 1968, Nr. 34, photo 00384 – FR: [RCDS will Radikale neutralisieren.](#)

⁸⁰⁹ 18 May 1971, Nr. 115, photo 03342 – FR: [Jungsozialisten nach Moskau und Warschau.](#)

Socialist organizations outside of Europe (i.e. Al Fatah).⁸¹⁰ The desire to maintain such contacts appeared to often coincide with support for Eastern Bloc positions, thus being a possible indication of left radicalism. Examples of such radical positions were that some Juso chapters demanded in 1969 that Germany leaves NATO⁸¹¹, that it “stops any propaganda against the GDR”, and that it recognizes it diplomatically “if necessary.”⁸¹² In 1970 FR reported that Juso leader Karsten Voigt had secretly met with Walter Ulbricht, causing an outcry not only among SPD leaders, but also within the Juso federal leadership.⁸¹³ This story was again reported more sympathetically by FR in comparison with *Der Spiegel*,⁸¹⁴ but the coverage in both comes across as forgiving compared to *Die Zeit* which mockingly spoke of Voigt’s “secret pilgrimage to the ex-Juso in Pankow.”⁸¹⁵

By the end of this research period, a clear shift in the attitude toward *Ostkontakte* could be seen as exemplified by the 1973 Festival in East Berlin. Unlike the 1968 Festival in Sofia, by 1973 SPD had completely changed its attitude and not only approved, but also “welcomed” the Jusos’ participation in the Festival. CDU still objected, but to their displeasure, the party’s youth organization, *Junge Union* (JU), decided to attend.⁸¹⁶ West Germany was represented at the 1973 Festival by about 800 delegates divided into 330 communists and 470 non-communists. FR’s coverage of Germany’s participation had also changed between 1968 and 1973. It focused much less on discussing the relative merits of attending, basing the coverage on the premise that attendance at the Festival in East Berlin was the obvious approach.

The coverage of the two festivals in FR and *Der Spiegel* differed noticeably. This partially had to do with the different formats of the two publications: being a daily newspaper, FR naturally published a larger volume of shorter news articles, while a magazine like *Der Spiegel* opted for fewer and more analytical pieces. These expected differences aside, *Der Spiegel*’s coverage of both festivals was much more critical of the communist states whereas FR’s reporting presented a more optimistic view of both communist Bulgaria and East Germany, as well as the youth

⁸¹⁰ 14 August 1969, Nr. 186, photo 01986-7 – FR: [Sommerreise in den arabischen Untergrund](#).

⁸¹¹ 24 March 1968, Nr. 71, photo 00605 – FR: [Jungsozialisten: Koalition auflösen](#).

⁸¹² 25 March 1968, Nr. 72, photo 00606 – FR: [Südhessische Jungsozialisten erheben Forderungen](#).

⁸¹³ 27 June 1970, Nr. 147, photo 02732 – FR: [Jungsozialisten-Ausflug zu Ulbricht erregt Gemüter](#).

⁸¹⁴ 28 June 1970, Nr. 27 – *Der Spiegel*: [Teuer bezahlt](#). Accessed on: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/teuer-bezahlt-a-f6609dc4-0002-0001-0000-0000449310477>

⁸¹⁵ Binder, Sepp, [Zwischen Basis und Partei: Norbert Gansels Gerangel mit Karsten Voigt](#). In: *Die Zeit*, 18 December 1970, Accessed on: https://www.zeit.de/1970/51/zwischen-basis-und-partei?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

⁸¹⁶ 8 March 1973, Nr. 57, photo 04713 – FR: [„Jugend soll nach Ost-Berlin.“](#)

Left organizations. Nevertheless, the differences between these publications appear less pronounced when compared with the centrist and conservative press, which viewed *Ostkontakte* with suspicion and their proponents among the youth - as either naïve or extremist.

Left-“right” conflicts within SPD

One of the most noticeable processes inside the Social Democratic Party of Germany throughout the 1960s and until the mid-70s was the battle between its far-left wing, most vocally represented by the affiliated youth organizations, and its centrist wing represented by politicians such as Helmut Schmidt and the mayors of Berlin and Munich – Klaus Schütz and Hans-Jochen Vogel. This tug of war is significant to trace, mostly because it illustrates the growing radicalization of the youth Left, which belonged to a generational cohort of Germans shown to base its political convictions less on socio-economic issues compared to older generations.⁸¹⁷ It also matters because it contributed to forcing SPD into a balancing act between not alienating its moderate voting base and its radical, vociferous, and active youth. *Frankfurter Rundschau* provided thorough coverage of the details of this epic political battle. Unlike *Der Spiegel*, whose coverage of organizations like SDS had been rather negative since at least 1960 and which referred to them as “the lost sons” and wrote of their “radical adolescent errors”⁸¹⁸, FR’s reporting was often sympathetic. This likely contributed to the spread of their ideas among the members of originally loyal SPD youth organizations like the Jusos and SHB.

Left radicalization had been a gradual process that had started to be noticed within local SPD chapters, among youth left movements, and was also being picked up by the left-leaning press. In 1963 FR reported that the internal left-wing opposition inside the Berlin SPD was experiencing a renaissance for the first time since Willy Brandt had come to power 5 years earlier, identifying Harry Ristock as one of the Berlin left-wing’s leaders.⁸¹⁹ By 1964 the radical SDS had already been “exorcised” from SPD’s ranks, but the organization was reportedly not only gaining popularity, but also influence among the membership of SHB, its replacement. In its report on SDS’s 19th conference taking place after the “final break with SPD,” FR reported that its outgoing leader Manfred Liebel was convinced that a generational

⁸¹⁷ Baker, Kendall L., *Generational Differences in the Role of Party Identification in German Political Behavior*. In: *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 22, No.1, 1978, 121-122.

⁸¹⁸ 18 October 1960, Nr. 43 – *Der Spiegel*: *Verlorene Söhne*, <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/verlorene-soehne-a-a58ef956-0002-0001-0000-00004306709>

⁸¹⁹ 18 May 1963, Nr. 114, photo 07165 – FR: *Linke Opposition in Berlins SPD*.

change within SHB meant that it was “developing to the left” and that SDS could hope for increased cooperation with the SPD youth.⁸²⁰ This was an ironic development considering SHB had been created as a loyal replacement for the banished SDS.

Similarly, another youth organization orbiting around SPD – *Die Falken* – was also experiencing pressures from its own left wing. After almost splitting in 1963, which SPD prevented by buffing up the youth organization’s “right” wing⁸²¹, in 1965 at the 10th conference of the Socialist Youth of Germany, *Die Falken*’s formal long name, the organization declared its allegiance to SPD’s policies, including the Emergency Acts (a constitutional amendment giving the government greater powers in times of natural, political or military emergency). SPD’s initially successful attempt to stabilize organizations like *Die Falken* was not sustainable. With the negotiations to join CDU in a grand coalition, SPD angered its left-wing and fanned the flame of its popularity. Attempts to maintain stability through organizational measures appeared authoritarian and drew criticism, which was often directed against the veteran SPD politician Herbert Wehner. One example of such criticism about inner-party democracy in the SPD could be found in an article in *Die Zeit*, authored by four *Freie Universität Berlin* students and reprinted in FR.⁸²² Illustrating the level of displeasure among large swathes of the SPD youth, even Willy Brandt’s son Peter participated in protests against



the policies of the party his father led. FR reported with a hint of *Schadenfreude* stating that “father and son do not seem to be in full agreement.”

Frankfurter Rundschau, 30 November 1966, Nr. 278
Protest against the negotiations to form a grand coalition with CDU/CSU. Peter Brandt was among the protesters.

Ironically, SPD would later attack the youth Left for not adhering to the Godesberg Program, but in 1966 it was those protesting against the Grand Coalition, including SHB, who claimed that cooperation with CDU was allegedly a deviation from Bad Godesberg’s principles.⁸²³ They even called for re-establishing the interwar-period splinter party USPD as a reaction to the coalition talks.⁸²⁴ In addition to the coalition talks,

⁸²⁰ 8 September 1964, Nr. 208, photo 07803 – FR: [SDS: Rund 1000 Mitglieder.](#)

⁸²¹ 31 May 1965, Nr. 124, photo 08203 – FR: [Die Falken flogen heim in das Nest der Partei.](#)

⁸²² 24 March 1966, Nr. 70, photo 08688 – FR: [Diskussion in der SPD beginnt.](#)

⁸²³ 9 December 1966, Nr. 286, photo 09286 – FR: [SHB ruft zur Widerstand auf.](#)

⁸²⁴ 30 November 1966, Nr. 278, photo 09247 – FR: [Proteste gegen Koalition halten an.](#)

SHB read the SPD leadership's decision to revoke its 1954 ban on SPD membership for men belonging to fencing fraternities as another sign of the party's rightward shift and protested against it.⁸²⁵ In response, SPD's leadership announced its decision to cut SHB's funding,⁸²⁶ a decision that the party reversed only weeks later.⁸²⁷ While the party's right wing brought back the *Lassalle-Kreis*, the organization of SPD members belonging to *Burschenschaften*, left wingers were actively trying to lift the ban on dual SDS–SPD membership, which the party had introduced earlier.⁸²⁸ While FR was not taking sides, its regular coverage of calls to lift the SDS membership ban betrayed its openness to that idea. This coverage was in sharp contrast with media like the Springer-owned *Berliner Morgenpost*, which referred to SDS as “the Red guards at the FU.”⁸²⁹

Once Willy Brandt had taken on his new position as federal minister of foreign affairs (in addition to SPD leader), SHB did not waste any time in voicing their criticisms; thus, the second SPD-affiliated youth organization to radicalize after SDS became a headache for the party leadership at a time when the APO was already problematic.⁸³⁰ The youth organization sharply expressed its disagreement with the German government's decision to try and ban the protests against the Iranian Shah who visited Berlin in 1967.⁸³¹ FR frequently covered the conflicts between SHB and SPD including the party's plan, announced in the autumn of 1967, to cut SHB's funding off since it presented itself as the SPD youth organization without adhering to the party's program.⁸³² The death of Benno Ohnesorg, shot by a policeman during a demonstration against the Shah, as well as the raging war in Vietnam⁸³³ gave SDS new impulses for growth along with Rudi Dutschke's leadership skills after he joined in 1965. Dutschke, who was in close contact with Herbert Marcuse, and other SDS figures, along with the Frankfurt School's Prof. Habermas and Prof. Abendroth, met in late 1967 to discuss founding a new party to the left of SPD.⁸³⁴ By the summer of 1968 SPD's grip on SHB was slipping again as the organization announced its plans to allow SDS members to join the

⁸²⁵ 23 January 1967, Nr. 19, photo 09358 – FR: [Bei schlagenden Verbindungen kein Verständnis.](#)

⁸²⁶ 4 March 1967, Nr. 54, photo 09455 – FR: [SPD dreht ihrem Hochschulbund den Geldhahn ab.](#)

⁸²⁷ 9 March 1967, Nr. 59, photo 09455 – FR: [SPD unterstützt SHB auch künftig.](#)

⁸²⁸ 17 July 1967, Nr. 162, photo 09766 – FR: [SDS soll wieder in die SPD.](#)

⁸²⁹ 8 December 1966 – Berliner Morgenpost: [Die 'Rote Garde' an der FU.](#) Accessed on: <https://www.medienarchiv68.de/#/medienarchiv/die-rote-garde-an-der-fu>

⁸³⁰ Braunthal, Gerard, [The German Social Democrats since 1969. A Party in Power and Opposition.](#) Routledge, New York: 2019

⁸³¹ 14 October 1967, Nr. 239, photo 00033 – FR: [„Brandts Verhalten Erbärmlich.“](#)

⁸³² 17 November 1967, Nr. 268, photo 00166 – FR: [SPD denkt an Trennung vom SHB.](#)

⁸³³ 13 November 1967, Nr. 264, photo 00129 – FR: [Schützt diskutiert mit dem SHB.](#)

⁸³⁴ 31 October 1967, Nr. 253, photo 00078 – FR: [Die Linke stellt die Weichen.](#)

organization, thus gaining an indirect foothold in SPD.⁸³⁵ All these events were covered in a neutral tone by FR while *Der Spiegel's* coverage of SDS from 1968 referred to its activists as aspiring revolutionaries wishing to revolt against everyone – “against professors and politicians, against CDU and SPD.”⁸³⁶

1968 brought a new high in the conflict between the left and centrist wings within SPD. While on one hand Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski claimed that SPD was not interested in reaching out to the 2.5% of voters who had turned toward far-left parties,⁸³⁷ the SPD youth organizations were continuing to drift away from the Party's political positions. FR interviewed the SHB speaker Gert Börnsen (later vice-chairman of Jusos) and concluded that while the organization wished to remain an inner-party opposition within SPD, it came across more like a part of the extra-parliamentary opposition, the APO. Börnsen accused the SPD leadership of being right-wing, authoritarian, and even Stalinist, citing as an example its efforts to control the party's left wing in Berlin. While also expressing criticism of SDS, Börnsen argued the two organizations were in fact ideologically similar, sharing the wish to “democratize society on a socialist basis.”⁸³⁸ *Die Welt* reported on SHB's annual congress in 1968 and focused on radical proposals such as one to nationalize large printing companies in order to “radically change the structure of the press,” as well as to take part in the 1968 Easter March. While the reporting was devoid of negative qualifications, the text was so curated as to blur the distinction between the approved resolutions and radical individual proposals.⁸³⁹

Among the “Stalinist” methods that the youth left found unacceptable, were regulations adopted in 1968, banning SPD members from taking part in anti-SPD demonstrations. FR cited an article from *Der Tagesspiegel*, which claimed that this was a way for SPD to keep the “APO Trojan horse” away from penetrating the party.⁸⁴⁰ This new regulation had been immediately invoked in disciplining prominent left-wingers who had taken part in an SDS-organized Vietnam War demonstration in 1968.⁸⁴¹ Other measures intended to stem the far-left wave included eliminating AStAs (*Allgemeine Studentenausschuss* or student government) and

⁸³⁵ 29 July 1968, Nr. 173, photo 00977 – FR: [Der SHB bleibt in Bonn.](#)

⁸³⁶ 24 June 1968, Nr. 26 – Der Spiegel: [Zur Sonne, https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46020891.html](https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46020891.html)

⁸³⁷ 24 July 1968, Nr. 169, photo 00964 – FR: [Wischnewski schreibt die linke Opposition völlig ab.](#)

⁸³⁸ 16 August 1968, Nr. 189, photo 01012-13 – FR: [„SPD wendet die Taktik des Totschweigens an.“](#)

⁸³⁹ 1 March 1968, Nr. 52 – Die Welt (Berlin): [Studenten sprechen von „Gemeinplätzen“, Accessed on: https://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/2878/article.pdf](https://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/2878/article.pdf)

⁸⁴⁰ 18 September 1968, Nr. 218, photo 01102 – FR: [SPD schließt sich gegen Linke ab.](#)

⁸⁴¹ 29 October 1968, Nr. 252, photo 01175 – FR: [SPD verschärft Parteistrafe für Harry Ristock.](#)

student Convents in Berlin⁸⁴² and proposing plans to reduce the maximum age for Juso membership from 35 to 25, which would have cut their number in half.⁸⁴³ In addition to sharply reducing Juso membership numbers, the age cap was also intended to counteract what the SPD leadership perceived as far-left adults treating the Jusos as a far-left faction instead of joining their local SPD chapters, where their ideas would be in the minority. The age cap was ultimately dropped and instead SPD invited most democratic left-wing youth organizations, including the Jusos, *Die Falken*, SHB, VDS, and *Bundesjugendring*, to a federal meeting, where they unsuccessfully tried to iron out their ideological differences.⁸⁴⁴

SPD's attempts to balance between its mainstream voters and its radical youth was perhaps influencing the party in coming closer to some of the radical positions they championed. For instance, FR reported that by early 1969 SPD had begun championing *Mitbestimmung* or co-decision in the workplace, a policy that the youth Left had been calling for and that SPD had initially refused to support.⁸⁴⁵ In the context of the 1960s, this policy was seen as a step toward limiting the management rights of private enterprises, a step toward a hybrid "third way" that resembled the brand of workers' self-governance championed by Yugoslavia. Even without legal implementation, this societal conversation would leave a mark on many German media by the 1970s where the culture of strict hierarchies shifted in favor of "more staff cooperation [and] discussion."⁸⁴⁶ While making this relevant concession to the left, Willy Brandt called for no concessions to "antidemocratic radicalism" in light of the concerns that the young generation's political outlook was being hijacked by totalitarian communists.⁸⁴⁷ Yet this seemed to be a trend when SHB and SDS local chapters issued calls in favor of cooperation with parties like the communist DKP⁸⁴⁸ and when ADF (*Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt*) ran in the 1969 Bundestag election with candidates including members of SPD, DFU, and DKP.⁸⁴⁹ After years of threats, it was a scandal about SHB members supporting DKP that led to defunding the SHB magazine *Frontal*⁸⁵⁰ and its federal leadership.⁸⁵¹ SPD also tried to instill

⁸⁴² 9 May 1969, Nr. 106, photo 01708 – FR: [AStA und Konvent abgeschafft](#).

⁸⁴³ 20 November 1968, Nr. 271, photo 01229 – FR: [SPD plant Verjüngung ihre Jugendorganisation](#).

⁸⁴⁴ 8 January 1969, Nr. 6, photo 01351 – FR: [SPD wollte beim Jugendkongreß auf SHB verzichten](#).

⁸⁴⁵ 23 January 1969, Nr. 19, photo 01406 – FR: [SPD steht allein in der Mitbestimmungsdebatte](#).

⁸⁴⁶ von Hodenberg, Christina, *Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany's Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere*. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 394.

⁸⁴⁷ 24 January 1969, Nr. 20, photo 01416 – FR: [Brandt will „aktiven Dialog“](#).

⁸⁴⁸ 28 January 1969, Nr. 23, photo 01423 – FR: [SPD-Studenten fordern Partei-Kontakte zur DKP](#).

⁸⁴⁹ 6 June, 1969 Nr. 129, photo 01802 – FR: [SPD-Mitglieder auf ADF-Liste](#).

⁸⁵⁰ 26 February 1969, Nr. 48, photo 01495-6 – FR: [SPD dreht SHB den Geldhahn zu](#).

⁸⁵¹ 11 March 1969, Nr. 59, photo 01542 – FR: [Wird dem SHB-Geldhahn zgedreht?](#)

discipline among the Berlin Jusos, which led to protests by SHB members⁸⁵², over 300 Berlin Jusos⁸⁵³, and ultimately the Juso federal leadership, which declared its support for its Berlin members.⁸⁵⁴ FR reported on this back and forth regularly, bringing its readers detailed information about the positions of the youth Left.

By 1969 SHB found itself in the situation that SDS had occupied earlier and that the Jusos were to be in later: It did not wish to leave SPD, but at the same time considered itself part of APO.⁸⁵⁵ Unlike the early 1960s, however, according to a commentary piece in FR, by 1969 similar processes could be observed in the liberal FDP where a generational change had taken place and where the party's left wing was now determining the party's political course.⁸⁵⁶ Meanwhile, after SDS and SHB, the confrontation between SPD and Jusos was deepening all around Germany as local chapters were electing a new cohort of radical leaderships that often openly opposed the party elders.⁸⁵⁷

Regardless of the ideological and often personal animosity, on election day these organizations begrudgingly rallied around SPD as the "least of all evils".⁸⁵⁸ Nevertheless, their frustrated analysis of SPD's 1969 election win and subsequent coalition government headed by Willy Brandt was that power had gone from one faction of the bourgeoisie to another. Future Juso leader Karsten Voigt declared that this was not his victory as "there will not be anti-capitalist reform or a change in the social relations".⁸⁵⁹

Taking advantage of a relative lull in the protest wave after its electoral victory, SPD tried to re-conquer the minds of the youth by creating a new department for youth work in January 1970⁸⁶⁰ and by introducing an Amnesty Law to address those convicted of mild crimes perpetrated in the context of the wave of political demonstrations between 1965 and 1970.⁸⁶¹ SPD also tried compromising with the Jusos on some organizational issues, announced new

⁸⁵² 27 June 1969, Nr. 145, photo 01855 – FR: Berliner SPD stößt auf Kritik.

⁸⁵³ 3 July 1969, Nr. 150, photo 01875 – FR: Jungsozialisten solidarisch.

⁸⁵⁴ 12 July 1969, Nr. 158, photo 01902 – FR: Jusos mißbilligen Suspendierung.

⁸⁵⁵ 18 March 1969, Nr. 65, photo 01564 – FR: SHB will keinen Bruch mit der gesamten SPD.

⁸⁵⁶ 28 April 1969, Nr. 98, photo 01688 – FR: Die Linksliberalen bestimmen jetzt den Kurs.

⁸⁵⁷ 6 August 1969, Nr. 179, photo 01949 – FR: Bremer Jusos auf hartem Linkskurs.

⁸⁵⁸ 15 August 1969, Nr. 187, photo 01997 – FR: SHB hofft auf Sozialdemokraten.

⁸⁵⁹ 17 October 1969, Nr. 241, photo 02251 – FR: Regierungswechsel „da oben“ und die neue Linke.

⁸⁶⁰ 8 January 1970, Nr. 6, photo 02345 – FR: SPD richtet Jugendabteilung an.

⁸⁶¹ 17 February 1970, Nr. 40, photo 02447 – FR: Amnestie für Demonstrationsdelikte.

funding for them,⁸⁶² and reminded them that party decisions were also mandatory for them, adding that the Juso congress decisions from 1969 contradicted some SPD positions.⁸⁶³ A similar leftward trend was also evident among the Free Democrats (FDP) whose youth organization professed an interest in alternative political models inspired by combining the ideas of Marx, Marcuse, and Habermas⁸⁶⁴ and among the Junge Union was considering proposing a development of the CDU in the direction of the SPD/FDP coalition and was considering supporting a form of co-decision.⁸⁶⁵

By 1970, the SPD centrist wing was beginning to worry that the Left-wing expansion was affecting not only the Jusos, but also the core party itself. In Berlin, the conflict between the opposing SPD ideological wings intensified to the point that there was talk of splintering.⁸⁶⁶ In an interview with *Münchener Merkur*, former Juso leader Peter Corterier who belonged to SPD's right wing, publically called on Willy Brandt to intervene and address the growing influence of the radical left on the party.⁸⁶⁷ The growing ideological polarization within SPD meant that the lull in tensions could not last long. The expansion of the Vietnam War into Indochina brought about a new source of tension. Whereas SPD initially intended to express "regret" over the US decision to expand the theatre of war, the Jusos spoke of "genocide" (a Hessen-South delegate even referred to Indochina as "the Auschwitz of today") and ultimately succeeded in forcing the SPD party leadership to "condemn" the expansion of the war.⁸⁶⁸

With the West Berlin Jusos demanding a deconstruction of the "demonstrative federal presence in West Berlin"⁸⁶⁹ and SHB cooperating with the Spartacus groups – youth organizations with links to DKP and East Germany, CDU made a point to attack SPD for its affiliated radical youth.⁸⁷⁰ This was, at least in part, based on genuine concern that the Jusos may be able to take over the party from within and transform to pursue the Yugoslav model. These worries had been discussed by the CDU leadership in the spring of 1970 based on the leaked confidential report *Zur Lage der Jungsozialisten* written by their former organizational director Ernst

⁸⁶² 9 March 1970, Nr. 57, photo 02508 – FR: Kompromiß mit Jungsozialisten.

⁸⁶³ 30 April 1970, Nr. 100, photo 02542 – FR: SPD Vorstand distanziert sich von Jungsozialisten.

⁸⁶⁴ 11 May 1970, Nr. 107, photo 02644 – FR: Liberale Blumenkinder haben ihren eigenen Stil.

15 September 1970, Nr. 213, photo 02855 – FR: „Jungdemokraten sind marxistisch.“

⁸⁶⁵ 27 February 1973, Nr. 49, photo 04697 – FR: Junge Union rückt nach links.

⁸⁶⁶ 18 March 1970, Nr. 64, photo 02524 – FR: SPD-Linke will keine Spaltung.

⁸⁶⁷ 9 May 1970, Nr. 106, photo 02640 – FR: Brandt soll Linkstendenz stoppen.

⁸⁶⁸ 13 May 1970, Nr. 109, photo 02653 – FR: Die Jungsozialisten wollten härtere Worte.

⁸⁶⁹ 27 October 1970, Nr. 249, photo 02919 – FR: Berlins Sonderstatus unterstrichen.

⁸⁷⁰ 30 November 1970, Nr. 277, photo 03003 – FR: SPD soll sich um SHB kümmern.

Eichengrün.⁸⁷¹ While Willy Brandt attempted to influence the Jusos by attending their congress in December 1970 and demanding greater solidarity with the party,⁸⁷² Helmut Schmidt who represented the SPD's right wing thought SPD leaders should have boycotted the congress, arguing that attendance just lent credibility to the Jusos and cost the party further votes.⁸⁷³



Frankfurter Rundschau, 27 February 1971, Nr. 49 A Juso activist presented as a child returning home to his father (Willy Brandt) who is asking him to wipe his shoes clean of the mud, which would otherwise imprint muddy hammers and sickles on the floors of the SPD home.

In February 1971, the SPD leadership finally decided it was time to limit the rights of the Jusos, so as to avoid creating a “party within the party.” Willy Brandt added there was no place in the party for those who wished to transform it from a “democratic-parliamentary reform party of the Godesberg Program into a revolutionary-style cadre-party”; he decried their “spectacular congresses”, as well as their meddling in topics that were seen to lie outside the scope of youth policies. Nevertheless Brandt warned against “ostracizing” the Jusos and called for SPD to remain open to any democratic-minded people including Marxists.⁸⁷⁴ Even the legendary Brandt’s words seemed to hold no sway over the radical youth: SPD’s leadership appeared helpless when days after Brandt’s statements the federal Juso leadership rejected his demands not to hold their two congresses.⁸⁷⁵ Even Germany’s President Gustav Heinemann intervened, hoping to pacify the rebellious youth by inviting the Juso leadership for a meeting.⁸⁷⁶ SPD’s attempt to reign in the Jusos went on in March 1971 with the official publication of a party position regarding the last set of programmatic statements that the Jusos had produced at their most current congress in Bremen in December 1970, rejecting most of these positions, especially proposals that could be read as “a precondition for the general nationalization of the means of production.”⁸⁷⁷

⁸⁷¹ Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstands 1969-1973. Nr. 7 (23 April 1970) Accessed on: https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=46fea750-830c-cf5e-88d0-dcc1663dfa43&groupId=252038

⁸⁷² 12 December 1970, Nr. 287, photo 03024 – FR: Brandt wirbt um Jungsozialisten.

⁸⁷³ 15 December 1970, Nr. 289, photo 03034 – FR: Schmidt sieht Jusos aufgewertet.

⁸⁷⁴ 27 February 1971, Nr. 49, photo 03169 – FR: SPD schränkt Rechte der Jungsozialisten ein.

⁸⁷⁵ 9 March 1971, Nr. 57, photo 03192 – FR: Jusos halten an Kongressen fest.

⁸⁷⁶ 10 March 1971, Nr. 58, photo 03194 – FR: Heinemann empfing Juso-Vorstand.

⁸⁷⁷ 16 March 1971, Nr. 63, photo 03204-206 – FR: SPD rückt von Juso-Beschlüssen ab.

The Jusos were far from being SPD's only internal problem. While the party never broke ranks with them, by 1971 SPD was openly quarrelling with SHB, which FR described bitterly as now being firmly in „communist waters.” After cutting its funding, SPD also demanded that SHB change its name,⁸⁷⁸ an ultimatum that led to a splitting of the student organization into two factions.⁸⁷⁹ SHB was given a deadline to voluntarily remove the label “social-democratic” from its name, after which SPD threatened to take the matter to court.⁸⁸⁰ This long overdue tough action against SHB possibly made an impression on the Juso leadership and at their December 1971 congress in Hannover, the organization finally agreed to distance itself from communists. A token exception was made for cases where the Jusos would be fighting against monopolies. Karsten Voigt claimed that the Jusos merely wished to “strengthen and reform SPD” through a new “theory and praxis” that could “overcome the current societal system” and “realize socialism.”⁸⁸¹ Even if SPD had managed to impose organizational distance from communists on the Jusos, they elected the radical Wolfgang Roth⁸⁸² and by 1972 even the sympathetic FR rang the alarm that the “Jusos want nationalization.” The Jusos argued that “key industries and the credit system” had to be nationalized in order to achieve “democratic control” of the economy.⁸⁸³ Despite the ongoing scandals with the youth organizations and with the help of a modern US-style electoral campaign focusing on Willy Brandt, SPD achieved its biggest electoral success.⁸⁸⁴ Becoming the largest party in the Bundestag for the first time since the establishment of the Federal Republic and forming a second coalition cabinet with FDP and with Willy Brandt as chancellor in December 1972 left the youth unimpressed. The Jusos, who had reluctantly agreed to support the new coalition, began New Year 1973 with harsh criticism

⁸⁷⁸ 13 September 1971, Nr. 2011, photo 03509 – FR: In der SPD wachsen die Zweifel am SHB.

⁸⁷⁹ 6 December 1971, Nr. 282, photo 03705 – FR: Der SHB hat sich in zwei Fraktionen gespalten.

⁸⁸⁰ 13 June 1972, Nr. 134, photo 04226 – FR: Endgültige Trennung vom SHB.

While SPD was moving along with their decision to deprive SHB of the adjective in its name, in June 1972 the SHB leadership expelled some of the organization's more radical local chapters that had an ambiguous attitude on the place of violence in politics. Nevertheless SPD's legal suit against SHB continued until the court ruled to force SHB to become “socialist” rather than “social-democratic.” Even after that bitter experience SHB announced it would not call for a boycott against SPD in order to prevent a CDU win in the 1972 Bundestag election. While the youth organization did not agree with many SPD policies, SHB claimed to still prefer SPD to other German parties, because only SPD could create “better preconditions” for the pursuit of “progressive policies.” This was yet another illustration of the ambiguity that existed between SPD and its radical youth organizations. More details on these developments with SHB can be found in the following articles:

27 June 1972, Nr. 146, photo 04270 – FR: SHB schließt Hochschulgruppen aus.

20 July 1972, Nr. 165, photo 04318 – FR: SHB muß Namen ändern.

24 August 1972, Nr. 196, photo 04378 – FR: SHB will CDU-Mehrheit verhindern.

13 October 1972, Nr. 238, photo 04467 – FR: SHB unterstützt SPD.

⁸⁸¹ 13 December 1971, Nr. 288, photo 03731 – FR: Jusos grenzen sich von der DKP ab.

⁸⁸² 28 February 1972, Nr. 50, photo 03966 – FR: Jungsozialisten zeigen sich geschlossen.

⁸⁸³ 15 June 1972, Nr. 136, photo 04237 – FR: Jusos wollen Vergesellschaftung.

⁸⁸⁴ Eyssen, Susanne, Der Aufbruch der Frauen in der SPD: Die Entwicklung der Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft (ASF) während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen: 2019, 117.

against Germany's closest Cold War ally, the United States. *Frankfurter Rundschau* published as front page news a report about the Jusos lambasting Brandt for ignoring the "imperialist aggressors' [...] bombing terror" in his festive New Year's address. They demanded that the *Kanzler* condemn America's "genocide strategy" and call for a US withdrawal.⁸⁸⁵ 1973 also brought about the so-called *Stamokap debate* regarding the Monopoly Capitalism or *Stamokap Theory* advocated by the West German Communists Party (DKP). Its popularity demonstrated that many Juso chapters were moving far to the left even by the standards of the Juso leadership. *Frankfurter Rundschau* covered the leadership's call for a decisive rejection of those who supported the State, but also pointed out that a number of Juso chapters held this position.⁸⁸⁶



Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 January 1973, Nr. 2

Willy Brandt exclaims "Herbert (Wehner), I believe someone is knocking!" while the Jusos (woodpecker) are destroying his chair or symbolically – Brandt's and SPD's political positions.

The trend that had now established itself continued. Willy Brandt opened SPD's party congress in April 1973 with a speech arguing against radicalism. In light of the *Stamokap* groups, Brandt warned it was unacceptable for SPD members to pursue DKP and SED ideas.⁸⁸⁷ Nevertheless SPD delegates surprisingly elected some prominent members of the party's left wing on the leadership such as Juso chairman Wolfgang Roth, the mayor of Frankfurt Rudi Arndt, and the culture minister of Niedersachsen Peter von Oertzen.⁸⁸⁸ With the election of Juso leader Wolfgang Roth to the SPD leadership, he attempted to moderate the Jusos by adhering to some SPD positions like defending the bans on radicals working in the civil service.⁸⁸⁹

Nearing the end of the research period, the Jusos' gradual transformation into a New Left organization was becoming evident in decisions such as joining the squatting (*Hausbesetzung*) movement by occupying buildings in Bremen,⁸⁹⁰ Frankfurt, and Hannover,⁸⁹¹ which FR covered with some dismay. These *Aktionen* were often conducted jointly with Communists,

⁸⁸⁵ 3 January 1973, Nr. 2, photo 04613 – FR: [Jungsozialisten machen Brandt heftige Vorwürfe.](#)

⁸⁸⁶ 23 January 1973, Nr. 19, photo 04652 – FR: [Jusos verurteilen Fraktionsbildung.](#)

⁸⁸⁷ 12 April 1973, Nr. 87, photo 04799 – FR: [Absage Brandts an Radikalismus.](#)


⁸⁸⁸ 16 April 1973, Nr. 90, photo 04822 – FR: [Der neue SPD Vorstand.](#)

⁸⁸⁹ 14 August 1973, Nr. 187, photo 04996 – FR: [Roth definiert Juso-Politik.](#)

⁸⁹⁰ Bremen: Hausbesetzung 1973, Auf den Häfen
Materialien zur Analyse von Opposition, Von Dietmar Kesten, Gelsenkirchen, https://www.mao-projekt.de/BRD/NS/BRE/Bremen_Hausbesetzung_1973_Auf_den_Haefen.shtml

⁸⁹¹ 7 September 1973, Nr. 208, photo 05029 – FR: [Jusos besetzen Haus.](#)

Maoists, and other far-left youth organizations. Some Juso organizations continued expressing radical sentiments: the NRW Jusos criticized the “reactionary civil service law,” (*Radikalenerlass/“Berufsverbote”*)⁸⁹², while the Berlin Jusos condemned the fact that some prisoners from the Baader-Meinhof group were being held in isolation as “torture.”⁸⁹³ Echoing *One-Dimensional Man*, the first female Juso leader to be elected in January 1974, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, pointed out in an interview with FR that instead of mobilizing the people, the federal government under SPD and FDP was “pacifying” them.⁸⁹⁴ If the outgoing leader Wolfgang Roth seemed radical when calling for a “concrete formulation of anti-capitalist reform steps,”⁸⁹⁵ his successor went further: Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul criticized the outgoing Juso leadership’s report for creating the “false impression” that the current parliamentary system could “lead to Socialism [...] without fundamental structural changes.”⁸⁹⁶ At their 1974 congress, the Jusos also voted in favor of calls to nationalize the oil and banking sectors as well as key industries.⁸⁹⁷



Frankfurter Rundschau,

28 February 1973, Nr. 50,

The Jusos are shown as maybugs climbing on the sleeping “Uncle Willy”, likened to a character from Wilhelm Busch’s famous book for children “Max und Moritz.”

While espousing radical economic and geopolitical positions, the Jusos were slow in developing an interest in issues like women’s rights or rights of foreigners. It was only in March 1973 that FR first registered that the Jusos were beginning to talk about women’s rights⁸⁹⁸ and about improving the conditions for foreign workers and their integration through free language courses (but also to limit their influx where the social infrastructure housing were inadequate).⁸⁹⁹ Thus, women’s issues and the rights of foreigners, as a group to be integrated, entered the political discourse of the SPD through the

⁸⁹² 29 September 1973, Nr. 227, photo 05065 – FR: Jusos: Probleme ausgeklammert.

⁸⁹³ 15 January 1974, Nr. 12, photo 05192 – FR: „Mehr an marxistischen Positionen ausrichten.“

⁸⁹⁴ 14 November 1973, Nr. 266, photo 05155 – FR: „Die Bevölkerung sollte mobilisiert statt abgewiegelt werden.“

⁸⁹⁵ 19 January 1974, Nr. 16, photo 05203 – FR: Roth erwartet „neues München“.

⁸⁹⁶ 24 January 1974, Nr. 20, photo 05213 – FR: Antrag des Juso-Vorstands stößt auf Widerstand.

⁸⁹⁷ 28 January 1974, Nr. 23, photo 05229 – FR: Jusos fordern „Vergesellschaftung.“

⁸⁹⁸ 6 March 1973, Nr. 55, photo 04708 – FR: Jungsozialisten fordern volle Emanzipation der Frauen.

⁸⁹⁹ 7 June 1973, Nr. 132, photo 04883 – FR: Mehr Hilfe für Ausländer.

Jusos in 1973 and with FR's help, which actively covered the youth organization's ideas and discussions.

The latest Juso congress forced the SPD leadership to take further measures by allowing individual SPD members to propose changes to the party program, as long as they overlapped with the goal of democratic socialism and did not make the party ineffective. The party also decreed that painting democratic institutions as "agents of monopoly capitalism" (Stamokap Theory) and the view that the existing state must be destroyed were unacceptable positions. Nevertheless, they held sway with much of the Juso membership: 1/3 of Juso delegates were deemed to belong to the Stamokap faction, about 10% were anti-revisionists, and a little over half adhered to the traditional Juso line of "radical reform".⁹⁰⁰ The ideological polarization continued deepening with the prime minister of NRW Heinz Kühn (also SPD vice-chairman) making the accusation that Juso materials represented "individual parts [...] of a strategy [...] to melt and recast the SPD into a party of another type."⁹⁰¹ In addition to this, FR also reported on cases of older party members leaving SPD due to a conflict with the Jusos,⁹⁰² going as far as to point out that while they want socialism, "the course of the New Left was clear – we know it from the GDR."⁹⁰³

By 1974 it was clear that SPD was being weakened by its internal radicals, but Willy Brandt seemed unable to resolve the issue. After losing the local elections in Rheinland-Pfalz, SPD announced that it was going to take steps to return to the political center both on the federal and the local level, because there were no voters to be attracted to the left.⁹⁰⁴ Willy Brandt repeated yet again that the party was "not the right place" for those questioning the democratic rights and the social state.⁹⁰⁵ This fell on deaf Juso ears: less than a month after Brandt's statement, Heidi Wiecek-Zeul called for "bringing the prices under control" and future chancellor Gerhard Schröder, at that time Juso spokesperson in Lower Saxony, implied his support for nationalizing industry.⁹⁰⁶ Such statements, coming days after the arrest of one of Brandt's closest advisers Günter Guillaume and in the midst of an economic downturn caused by the Oil Crisis were not helpful for SPD.

⁹⁰⁰ 9 February 1974, Nr. 34, photo 05240-42 – FR: Abgrenzung von Juso-Gruppen.

⁹⁰¹ 12 April 1974, Nr. 85, photo 05356 – FR: Jusos wollen keinen Konflikt mit Willy Brandt.

⁹⁰² 26 February 1974, Nr. 48, photo 05257 – FR: Der Wahlniederlage folgte ein Massenaustritt.

⁹⁰³ 23 March 1974, Nr. 70, photo 05317 – FR: Senator verläßt die SPD.

⁹⁰⁴ 19 March 1974, Nr. 66, photo 05304 – FR: SPD will wieder „in die Mitte“ rücken.

⁹⁰⁵ 28 March 1974, Nr. 74, photo 05324 – FR: Deutliche Warnung der SPD-Spitze an bestimmte Juso-Gruppen.

⁹⁰⁶ 29 April 1974, Nr. 99, photo 05378 – FR: Jusos verurteilen Demagogie.

With Willy Brandt's resignation in May 1974 and the beginning of what would be Helmut Schmidt's 8-year chancellorship, a very different style of leadership began. Partially as a result of the objective conditions he had to manage (inflation, recession, unemployment, terrorism), Schmidt ended the era of SPD's "democratic reform politics", which were replaced by an increased focus on supporting the economy and addressing domestic and external security concerns.⁹⁰⁷ These priorities and perhaps Schmidt's character, political worldview, and prior tensions with the party's left wing and the Jusos,⁹⁰⁸ brought about a more assertive approach to maintaining party discipline. Soon after the change at the top and during the last year of the research period, in July 1974 SPD announced a decision that all the party's working groups, including the Jusos, would not be allowed to adopt resolutions on topics outside their main focus, which in the Jusos' case was supposed to be youth issues. It was underscored that sub-organizations could not formulate resolutions contradicting the party line.⁹⁰⁹ The Jusos finally seemed to demonstrate some understanding for the SPD leadership's criticisms, if an interview with Juso vice-chairman Johanno Strasser could be considered an indication. Strasser pointed out that they will *try* to act with more self-discipline now that the Jusos had understood their great level of responsibility within SPD.⁹¹⁰

This half-hearted commitment was not enough to dissuade Helmut Schmidt from taking further steps to reign in the Jusos. In the autumn of 1974, SPD (*Bundesschiedskommission*) published new regulations limiting the autonomy of sub-organizations, a measure mostly directed against the Jusos. Sub-organizations could now publish positions and other texts only after approval by the local SPD party leaders. Infractions could lead to immediate expulsions of party members.⁹¹¹ Furthermore, FR reported that in the autumn of 1974 the coalition government had "given in for the first time in years" to the pressure by the CDU/CSU to cut the funding of SHB and SVI. This was to be done on a temporary basis while investigating whether they were involved in anti-constitutional activities.⁹¹² FR remained seemingly neutral in its reporting of the back and forth between the Jusos and the "new" SPD, but language like "giving in" suggests that they did not regard "tightening the Jusos' room to maneuver", as an FR title read, as the best approach.

⁹⁰⁷ Eyssen, Susanne, Der Aufbruch der Frauen in der SPD: Die Entwicklung der Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft (ASF) während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen: 2019, 119-121.

⁹⁰⁸ 22 April 1970 – Süddeutsche Zeitung: Jungsozialisten wollen Schmidt abwählen.

⁹⁰⁹ 1 July 1974, Nr. 148, photo 05476 – FR: Der Spielraum für Jusos wird enger.

⁹¹⁰ 1 August 1974, Nr. 175, photo 05530 – FR: Jusos wollen sich mehr Selbstdisziplin auferlegen.

⁹¹¹ 14 November 1974, Nr. 265, photo 05658 – FR: Rechte der Jungsozialisten eingeschränkt.

⁹¹² 21 November 1974, Nr. 270, photo 05672 – FR: Bundesregierung sperrt Hochschulbund Mittel.

Frankfurter Rundschau's extremely close coverage of the conflicts between the SPD's left and right wings was natural for a newspaper whose editorial line was supportive of that party. Even though occasional negative commentary was published about the Jusos and other radical Left youth organizations, FR generally adhered to an objective tone in their reporting, devoid of judgement. Considering that these organizations often defended problematic positions, this neutral coverage appears to betray some level of sympathy. In the same vein, FR's political cartoons often depicted the radical party youth as mischievous children or cute animals. These generous and endearing depictions indicate that the newspaper downplayed the seriousness of the Jusos' often controversial positions, their problematic implications for democracy, and their harmful effect on the party. *Der Spiegel* appeared much less sympathetic in its coverage of the Jusos while also publishing much fewer articles about them. The Hamburg-based magazine also seemed to rationalize their radicalism, explaining it with the failure of "conservative" SPD local chapters that alienated the radical youth,⁹¹³ while at the same time adopting a mocking stance and criticizing the Jusos' radicalism explicitly, unlike FR.

Far-left tendencies on Campus

In addition to the party political-dimension of the radical Left's conflict and tug-of-war with the "mother party" SPD, radicalism was also evident on campus, among students, in academia, and within student government institutions. While this lies outside the purely party-political sphere, a separate look at this kind of radicalism contributes to a more complete picture of the *Zeitgeist* by adding the view from another angle – that of less formal student politics and activism, often based on the literal understanding of philosophical ideas by young people and taking place without the disciplining force of party frameworks.

One of the early forms of youth radicalism in 1964 were the Easter marches against nuclear arms, which the labor union youth *DGB Jugend* as well as *Die Falken* were active in. Unlike later student activism, the participation of leftist youth organizations in the Easter marches featured very lightly in *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Another earlier form of protest had to do with students beginning to critically examine their professors' past, as well as the histories of other individuals occupying leading positions in society. The students were encouraged by a new

⁹¹³ 4 February 1974, Nr. 6 – Der Spiegel: Heidi und Genossen, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-41784372.html>

societal mood promoting the questioning of authority, but this often clashed with the older generation. For instance, when a student publication brought up a professor's past, the rector of Marburg University reacted by banning it.⁹¹⁴ FR asked in its supportive coverage whether the past of professors is supposed to be taboo for the students. There were also instances of professors supporting the radical youth. At Gießen University in 1967, the rector, reacting to *Verfassungsschutz's* attempt to recruit his son, joined the university's AStA in opposing *Verfassungsschutz's* attempts to infiltrate SDS using student-agents.⁹¹⁵ There were already tensions around SDS. 2000 *Freie Universität* students had already protested in January 1967 in Berlin against the police searches of the organization's offices there,⁹¹⁶ something FR had reported on as part of a wave of protests. In the meantime, tensions had risen further after the murder of Benno Ohnesorg in June. The botched recruitment case, therefore, grew into a scandal that most media, including centrist newspapers like *Die Zeit*,⁹¹⁷ covered critically toward the authorities. Even Springer's *Die Welt* did not dare express support for the recruitment attempt, but focused its critique on the "primitive" approach, while apparently not rejecting the need to spy on "politically extreme" students.⁹¹⁸

Students also demanded organizational changes at universities: also in 1967, the University of Cologne's General Assembly voted against the institution's "antiquated system of governance" and demanded that students receive an equal voice to that of professors on all university bodies. This call was supported by SHB⁹¹⁹ and received support in left-leaning media like FR, which proclaimed that students were "no longer going to allow being messed around with." The hierarchical structure of universities was to be one of the chief polarizing issues⁹²⁰ at the time and FR did not shy away from taking the side of those demanding reform. The radical students also rejected academic traditions like the opening ceremonies known as *Dies*, whose processions, gowns, and overall choreography invoked a past the youth could not relate to. During the same year, FR reported on tensions at the university in Bonn, where SHB and SDS organized a string of different protests, including an *Anti-Dies* featuring Rudi Dutschke as the

⁹¹⁴ 24 February 1964, Nr. 46, photo 07479-80 – FR: [Professoren-Vergangenheit für Studenten Tabu?](#)

⁹¹⁵ 29 November 1967, Nr. 278, photo 00190 – FR: [Studenten sollten SDS bespitzeln.](#)

⁹¹⁶ 28 January 1967, Nr. 24, photo 09372 – FR: [Protestwelle gegen Polizeiaktion.](#)

⁹¹⁷ 8 December 1967, Nr. 49 – *Die Zeit*: [Gescheiterte Spitzelwerbung](#)

⁹¹⁸ 1 December 1967, Nr. 280 – *Die Welt* (Berlin): [Treffpunkt Café „Euler“](#)

⁹¹⁹ 17 November 1967, Nr. 268, photo 00168 – FR: [Kölns Studenten lassen sich nicht länger hinhalten.](#)

⁹²⁰ von Hodenberg, Christina, [Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany's Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere.](#) In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 386.

main speaker.⁹²¹ These were smaller local protests, but they often escalated into clashes with police and added up to a shared mood that would sweep Germany and other countries in 1968.

In addition to protesting about politics, values, and university life, students often replicated US examples of alternative living. An expression that symbolized the increasing New Left vector in radical left-wing thought was SDS's decision to rent once-luxurious apartments and start a commune, which they believed would reinvigorate SDS by erasing the boundaries between private life and "spare time socialism."⁹²² Some members of the organization belonged to other communes such as the anarchist Commune I. Some of them would come to be expelled in May 1967 after plotting a "cake attack" against US vice-president Hubert Humphrey during his visit to Germany.⁹²³

SDS, whose radicalism could be exemplified with a 1968 brochure professing nuanced views on the role of violence in political life,⁹²⁴ was active not only on the streets, but also on campuses – within AStAs or the elected student assemblies on German universities. The late 1960s witnessed SDS and other radical left-wing organizations taking over these assemblies at a number of universities, turning them into strongly politicized bodies focusing more on general politics than on student issues. By 1970 2/3 of the seats in student parliaments were filled by left-wing groups, the biggest one being SHB.⁹²⁵ SHB was often part of coalitions, in some cases with radical-left organizations. Therefore, despite technically still being associated with SPD, SHB was "in no way always aligned with the party line." The CDU-affiliated RCDS also received a high number of votes, but was unable to form coalitions. The "orthodox communist" organization *Spartakus*, on the other hand, was successful by teaming up with local or thematic organizations with names such as "*Liste LUST*", "*Aktion Dritte Welt*", "*Initiative kritische Medizin*", and "*Zum Beispiel wohnen.*" In Giessen, the local AStA was run by a coalition of SHB, *Spartakus*, and the Jusos,⁹²⁶ illustrating the political romance between youth SPD-affiliated organizations and overtly communist youth organizations. FR's coverage of these coalitions was usually factual and devoid of criticism.

⁹²¹ 7 December 1967, Nr. 284, photo 00221 – FR: Bonner Studenten protestieren im Freien.

⁹²² 6 February 1967, Nr. 31, photo 09393 – FR: Studenten in „Wohn-Komunen“.

⁹²³ 16 May 1967, Nr. 111, photo 09618 – FR: SDS schließt Creme-Attentäter aus.

⁹²⁴ 13 May 1968, Nr. 111, photo 00836 – FR: SDS-Stellungnahme zur Gewalt.

⁹²⁵ 10 March 1970, Nr. 58, photo 02511 – FR: SHB größte Studentenratsgruppe.

⁹²⁶ 11 March 1971, Nr. 59, photo 03199-200 – FR: Fast alle AStA's stehen links.

By 1968 the radicalized atmosphere at German universities was beginning to affect the educational process. Federal science minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU) complained that radical left-wing students were hindering higher education reform. He lamented that some professors supported class disruptions, the intentional breaking of laws, and “the principled rejection of tolerance and concrete discussion”.⁹²⁷ Another important cause for young the left-wing youth was boycotting individuals with former Nazi connections who held influential positions in academia, politics, and other spheres of public life in West Germany.⁹²⁸ To some, the perception of a joint fight against fascism justified even cooperation with the totalitarian GDR regime.⁹²⁹ In Bonn, SDS organized an Anti-Lübke Week to protest against the Federal President who was the university’s honorary doctor and honorary senator. SDS demanded that the rector Wilhelm Schneemelcher immediately strip the President of his honorary titles due to East Berlin’s allegations about his involvement in constructing a concentration camp during the war.⁹³⁰ These issues were covered by *Der Spiegel* and *Frankfurter Rundschau* alike, showing that this was a recurring theme: for example, FR reported that the “students’ critique appears to be directed against a supposed re-fascisation” of Germany.” FR also covered a demonstration in front of the Bundestag president’s (spokesperson) villa where protesters chanted “we are preparing an insurrection against the Nazi-generation.”⁹³¹ Not only were radical leftists genuinely worried about an alleged “re-fascisation”, but they also believed SPD had turned into a collaborationist party. At an APO meeting in February 1968, former SPD leadership member Wolfgang Abendroth (expelled from the party in 1961 due to his SDS membership) claimed that SPD has “increasingly been adapting to the restoration process,”⁹³² referring to a restoration of fascism. This direct accusation against the party was one of the relative rare instances of FR reporting critically about the radical left and stating that “hubbub” was still prevalent to the left of SPD.

The protests against the German Emergency Acts or *Notstandsgesetze* illustrated the level of mistrust in the state among much of the youth Left and demonstrated the fear that totalitarian far-right forces were lurking in the shadows, waiting for an opportune moment to re-establish an authoritarian dictatorship. One of the first mentions of the Emergency Acts in *Frankfurter*

⁹²⁷ 19 January 1968, Nr. 16, photo 00335 – FR: „Linksradikale blockieren Reform.“

⁹²⁸ 6 January 1968, Nr. 5, photo 00300 – FR: Rektor droht seinen Studenten.

⁹²⁹ 31 January 1968, Nr. 26, photo 00352 – FR: SDS startete Anti-Lüke-Woche.

⁹³⁰ 25 February 1968, Nr. 9 – *Der Spiegel*: Zwölf Buchstaben. <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/zwoelf-buchstaben-a-5455b62f-0002-0001-0000-000046135699?context=issue>

⁹³¹ 1 February 1968, Nr. 27, photo 00356 – FR: Studenten: Aufstand gegen die Nazi-Generation.

⁹³² 5 February 1968, Nr. 31, photo 00356 – FR: Links von der SPD herrscht weiter viel Wirrwarr.

Rundschau was in 1963, in the context of the Jusos in Hessen-South voting to urge SPD to oppose the proposals.⁹³³ This issue gained ever greater prominence and by 1965, students including SDS and SHB members, were beginning to organize actively against the Acts.⁹³⁴ As part of their campaign, in 1967 AStA leaders from Frankfurt and others universities sent a letter to the Bundestag warning that despite not being invited, they would try to participate in the last discussion about the German Emergency Act anyway. They later argued that the numerous police deployed to guard the hearing demonstrated that what was “technically a democratically elected parliament” was in fact “alienated from the views and interests of large sections of the population”.⁹³⁵ In 1968 students booed Herbert Wehner’s May Day speech in Hamburg and chanted “*Notstandswehner*”,⁹³⁶ referencing SPD’s support for the Emergency Acts. SPD’s participation in the grand coalition with CDU since 1967 and the party’s support for the emergency legislation added insult to injury and in the minds of radicals, seemingly confirmed their suspicion that the state was now devoid of opposition.

The Jusos also opposed the Acts. At their annual congress in May 1968, the Young Socialists demanded the resignation of Frank Sommers as SPD spokesperson, because he had criticized protests against the Emergency Acts.⁹³⁷ Unsurprisingly, among those protesting the Acts, along with many other students, was Peter Brandt who was arrested during an Easter demonstration and had to appear in court.⁹³⁸ While FR adopted a neutral position, *Der Spiegel* mocked SPD’s inability to communicate the changes they had proposed, but did not seem to actively oppose the Acts.⁹³⁹ With its active coverage of the protests against the Emergency Acts, the left-leaning media likely contributed to their low popularity among the youth. While 47% of Germans were in favor of the Acts, support was almost 15% lower among the youth. The public eventually lost interest in the issue after the Grand Coalition approved the law in May 1968.

⁹³³ 18 November 1963, Nr. 268, photo 07371 – FR: [Notstandsgesetze hart diskutiert.](#)

⁹³⁴ 1 June 1965, Nr. 125, photo 08209 – FR: [Studentenverbände erteilen Notstandsgesetzen Absage.](#)

⁹³⁵ 6 December 1967, Nr. 283, photo 00211 – FR: [Studenten attackieren Bundestag.](#)

Among the major political parties, it was FDP (in opposition since 1966), which demonstrated greater openness to discussing the Acts with the youth: they invited all student organizations, including SDS, VDS, SHB, and RCDS to a discussion, pointing out they felt obligated to hear out the students who had not been able to speak in official parliamentary hearings.

8 March 1968, Nr. 58, photo 00526 – FR: [FDP hört Studenten zum Notstand.](#)

⁹³⁶ 3 May 1968, Nr. 104, photo 00793 – FR: [1. Mai im Zeichen der Studenten.](#)

⁹³⁷ 13 May 1968, Nr. 111, photo 00834 – FR: [Verschärfte Gegensätze zur SPD.](#)

⁹³⁸ 15 May 1968, Nr. 113, photo 00840 – FR: [Öffentlichkeit nicht zugelassen.](#)

⁹³⁹ 22 January 1968, Nr. 4 – Der Spiegel: [Stiller Chef.](#) <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45465278.html>

In addition to being fearful of an authoritarian restoration, the radical youth also yearned for a truly new society. Herbert Marcuse was among the major influences behind this line of thinking and his lectures drew strong interest from the students, for example when he spoke at *Freie Universität* about the “New Society”. *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported that after the meeting students, who found out that the university was not going to cancel classes on the day of the Emergency Acts Bundestag vote, pulled down the university’s wooden emblem from the auditorium and set it ablaze.⁹⁴⁰ In addition to serving as an important inspiration to many young leftists, Marcuse was perceived by their opponents as having great responsibility for the wave of student protests. It was in that context that in 1968 Reiner Barzel, chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction, announced that experts would meet with CDU members of parliament to elucidate the political theories of Chinese chairman Mao and Herbert Marcuse.⁹⁴¹ Other members of the Frankfurt School who were much less supportive of the student Left, such as Theodor Adorno, were nevertheless lumped together with radical-left intellectuals.⁹⁴² The media played an important role in building up Marcuse’s image as a key influence behind the protest generation, not least by frequently covering his public lectures, speculating about his contacts with radicals like Rudi Dutschke and Angela Davis, and reporting on his political positions, notably on Vietnam.

What was FR’s editorial line toward the protests? The newspaper covered the demonstrations and initiatives of the radical Left, often expressing sympathy and understanding while remaining committed to the principles of the Godesberg Program and the Basic Law. This conclusion about FR’s editorial line can be exemplified by a commentary published in the newspaper in February 1968, comparing the “Scholls” and the “Dutschkes” and saying that the former fought for liberal democracy, while the latter “who read Mao and Marcuse” oppose it. The editorial goes on to argue that fighting against a dictatorship and against the establishment is not the same type of challenge.⁹⁴³ In addition to expressing the newspaper’s disapproval of some aspects of the protest movement, its author highlighted the connection between Marcuse’s ideas and this movement. Nevertheless, even in their critique, FR’s editors did not

⁹⁴⁰ 15 May 1968, Nr. 113, photo 00840 – FR: [Emblem der Universität verbrennt.](#)

⁹⁴¹ 8 March 1968, Nr. 58, photo 00525 – FR: [CDU/CSU läßt sich Mao und Marcuse erklären.](#)

⁹⁴² 18 May 1968, Nr. 116, photo 00848 – FR: [RCDS verurteilt SDS-Aktionen.](#)


In an obituary for Adorno published in 1969 in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, the author pointed out that “without [Adorno’s] *Dialectic of the Enlightenment* published together with Horkheimer, without his *Minima Moralia*, without his work at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research there would not be what has become under the names of student rebellion and APO a bogeyman of the bourgeoisie.”

7 August 1969, Nr. 180, photo 01952 – FR: [Theodor W. Adorno.](#)

⁹⁴³ 22 February 1968, Nr. 45, photo 00452 – FR: [Die Schools und die Dutschkes.](#)

disparage or condemn the radical youth the way the conservative sections of the press did. The same could be said of *Der Spiegel's* coverage, which was sympathetic, but only up to the point of movements like SDS going against democracy. The left-leaning media therefore contributed to the sympathies that the majority of the youth declared in relation to the wave of protests. According to polls cited by FR, 2/3 of the youths and 3/4 of the university students viewed the protests as a positive occurrence, while 26% totally agreed with Dutschke and 27% did not have an opinion.⁹⁴⁴ Perhaps this positive reporting was also influenced by a younger generation of journalists who wished to change German society.⁹⁴⁵

The shooting of SDS leader Rudi Dutschke on April 11, 1968 proved to be historical for SDS and the year of protests as it temporarily reinvigorated the organization and brought over 12 000 supporters to the streets in protest against the attack. The demonstrations protested daily for one week, often clashing with the Berlin police. The protesters focused their anger against the Springer publishing house, whose newspapers were blamed for whipping up a hostile atmosphere that allegedly provoked the shooter. It is a fact that Springer's press published at least 100 articles mentioning Dutschke between 1966 and the day of the assassination⁹⁴⁶ (in addition to articles about SDS or other youth left-wing protests) and that this coverage was typified by an air of disdain. The Springer press' hostile presentation of Dutschke can be summarized by this highly unflattering photo (**right**) in a photo-report from the large anti-war demonstration in February 1968 published in B.Z. (issue 19.02.68).



Reacting to what they believed was an assassination inspired by Springer's media, SDS declared that there will be "no peace" until the publishing house was nationalized.⁹⁴⁷ SDS activists and youths stormed print houses, destroyed the *Bild* newspaper's offices in Munich, set Springer company cars ablaze in Berlin, and protested violently all over Germany resulting in over 60 people injured.

⁹⁴⁴ 13 February 1968, Nr. 38, photo 00399 – FR: Mehrheit für jugendlichen Protest.

⁹⁴⁵ von Hodenberg, Christina, Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany's Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 382-385.

⁹⁴⁶ This is the result when searching through the articles uploaded on the Axel Springer online "Medienarchiv'68."

⁹⁴⁷ 2 April 1968, Nr. 79, photo 00605 – FR: Studenten wollen nicht nachgeben.

FR continued providing a media platform for SDS, along with other media, interviewing the organization's federal chairman Karl-Dietrich Wolff, days after the assassination, in April 1968. Wolff argued that the socialist students were in favor of freedom of expression, but would not tolerate its misuse as Springer had done.⁹⁴⁸ With the Bundestag's approval of the Emergency Acts in May and the end of the semester, Berlin could enjoy a partial lull during the summer months of 1968. With law suits against student-activists being filed for crimes committed during the demonstrations (which were treated as unlawful), further protests were provoked.⁹⁴⁹

The world was shocked by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This further contributed to a positive image of the APO among many younger antiauthoritarians in the West as SDS and other APO organizations had demonstrated support toward the Prague Spring. Helping them show they were not a Soviet fifth column, *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported about the AStAs at TU and FU Berlin, SHB, *Die Falken*, and labor union youth organizations who expressed support for the Czechoslovak⁹⁵⁰ and Polish students protesting in their countries.⁹⁵¹ In the same spirit, Dutschke had criticized (before his assassination) the system in the GDR arguing it was not a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a "dictatorship over the proletariat", which must be opposed.⁹⁵² Unlike the Old Left, which lost much support in the West after attempting to defend the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the nascent New Left drew a dividing line between organizations like SDS and orthodox communists. Being radically left, but not tainted by the crimes of the USSR preserved the youth left scene in West Germany from stigma.

Nevertheless, by 1969 the radicalization and bickering within the New Left – between Marxist-Leninists and Maoists – were beginning to alienate followers.⁹⁵³ With Rio Reiser and *Die Ton Steine Scherben* urging the youth to „destroy what destroys you,” the movement's more aggressive wing had an anthem by 1969/1970.⁹⁵⁴ Echoing critiques of advanced industrial society and its contradictions of consumerism and violence, the song went: *Radios are on,*

⁹⁴⁸ 18 April 1968, Nr. 91, photo 00724 – FR: [Der SDS will jetzt über seine Aktionen aufklären.](#)

⁹⁴⁹ 13 November 1968, Nr. 265, photo 01213 – FR: [Prozesse gegen Studenten führen zu Tumulten.](#)

⁹⁵⁰ 13 March 1968, Nr. 62, photo 00547 – FR: [Deutsche Linke zeigt Solidarität.](#)

⁹⁵¹ 16 March 1968, Nr. 65, photo 00547 – FR: [SDS-Appell an Parteichef Gomulka.](#)

⁹⁵² 22 March 1968, Nr. 69, photo 00593 – FR: [Dutschke: Entfremdung in der DDR.](#)

⁹⁵³ 6 December 1969, Nr. 283, photo 02290 – FR: [West-Berlins APO von ihrem Erbfeind bedroht.](#)

⁹⁵⁴ Mund, Heike, 1968: [The Year of Cultural Revolution.](#) 4 May 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/1968-the-year-of-cultural-revolution-in-postwar-germany/a-43643818>

*records are playing / Movies are on, TV's are on / Buy cars, buy houses / Buy furniture, buy trips / What for? / Destroy what destroys you! Destroy what destroys you! / The increasingly violent means of protesting that were taking place were criticized even by figures on the left such as Günter Grass who spoke of the “radical student left’s fascist methods.”*⁹⁵⁵

Conflicts were also taking place within student umbrella organizations like VDS. After threats that the German government would end its recognition of VDS as a non-political student umbrella organization and cut its funding, VDS attempted to redefine itself at an extraordinary session in May 1969,⁹⁵⁶ but with the majority of its leadership remaining SDS and SHB members, its funding was not reinstated.⁹⁵⁷ After months of unsuccessful internal negotiations, SDS also disbanded itself in 1970,⁹⁵⁸ leading to further fragmentation of the youth left. With more mainstream radicals streaming into the Jusos, other segments of the radical youth scene started exploring avenues of lifestyle radicalism such as squatting.⁹⁵⁹ The early 1970s brought about increasing complaints from academics, including at the FU, that the academic level was dropping, that academic freedom was being sacrificed, and that ideological fanatics were terrorizing those with opposing views.⁹⁶⁰ By the early 1970s, cases of violence became more common on university campuses including between different left-wing factions, as FR reported.⁹⁶¹

Anti-Militarism and Anti-Patriotism as examples of the Left’s transformation

A notable marker of the Left’s transformation was the decreasing popularity of patriotic sentiments, exemplified by the changing attitude of youth left-wing organizations and SPD toward Germany’s 1937 borders and the *Vertriebene*. About 9 out of 12 million had settled in what was to become the Federal Republic of Germany, making them a powerful political force. The organizations representing those who had been expelled from Germany’s pre-1937 territories generally demanded these territories to be returned to Germany.⁹⁶² Initially it was a matter of consensus and common sense among the political mainstream that Germany should

⁹⁵⁵ 10 March 1969, Nr. 58, photo 01535 – FR: [Grass verurteilt SDS-Methoden](#).

⁹⁵⁶ 30 May 1969, Nr. 123, photo 01775 – FR: [VDS legt sich auf keine politische Richtung fest](#).

⁹⁵⁷ 2 June 1969, Nr. 125, photo 01781 – FR: [VDS Gelder bleiben gestrichen](#).

⁹⁵⁸ 23 March 1970, Nr. 69, photo 02546 – FR: [Die Kinder der Revolution – Sprachlos](#).

⁹⁵⁹ 4 December 1970, Nr. 281, photo 03011 – FR: [Polizei räumte zwei Wohnungen](#).

⁹⁶⁰ 18 November 1970, Nr. 268, photo 02964 – FR: [„Konservative Hochschulpartei.“](#)

⁹⁶¹ 7 November 1973, Nr. 260, photo 05113 – FR: [AStA-Vorsitzender verprügelt](#).

⁹⁶² Ahonen, Pertti, [Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era](#). In: *Central European History*, Vol. 31, No. 1/2, 1998, 33-37.

maintain its claim to an eventual restoration of its 1937 borders and ought to support the demands of the *Vertriebene*.⁹⁶³ SPD, too, staunchly rejected calls for recognition of the country's post-War borders even if Willy Brandt and Herbert Wehner were privately skeptical of the expellees' demands.⁹⁶⁴

With the breakdown of efforts to sign non-aggression treaties with Germany's eastern neighbors in 1959, interpreted by most media as a result of expellee pressure,⁹⁶⁵ German society began feeling some fatigue with the so-called "career expellees." Nevertheless, at a time when SPD was redefining and rebranding itself into a *Volkspartei*, it was not going to change its policy alienating millions of potential voters. With the media initiating a more critical conversation about the border issue, however, it was a matter of time until the consensus would be challenged. It was SHB among the youth Left organizations that began to chip away at that consensus in 1964.⁹⁶⁶ While FR initially covered the expellee organizations sympathetically, it would also gradually come to change its editorial line.

Another issue that the radical left youth organizations prioritized at the expense of national defense was the opposition to nuclear weapons and military service. As early as 1958, students and professors "clashed" at *Freie Universität Berlin* when professors tried banning a poll on the subject of nuclear armament of the *Bundeswehr*, an initiative that took place in the aftermath of a banned protest.⁹⁶⁷ These left-leaning press appeared to welcome such attitudes: a 1966 analysis in *Frankfurter Rundschau* concluded that the left-wing students opposed nationalism and militarism, and were "against everything that mixed state and society with the irrational," thus suggesting that patriotic sentiments are irrational. The author added that "Germany has probably never had a better youth."⁹⁶⁸ *Der Spiegel's* coverage of the Easter Marches also suggested some level of support for the cause. For instance, the magazine covered the arrest of an evangelical pastor who had joined an unapproved protest and the story was told in a way that suggested the protests were righteous.⁹⁶⁹

⁹⁶³ Ahonen, Pertti, Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 31, No. 1/2, 1998, 42.

⁹⁶⁴ Ahonen, 48.

⁹⁶⁵ Ahonen, 60.

⁹⁶⁶ 25 May 1964, Nr. 119, photo 07591 – FR: Studenten für Oder-Neiße-Grenze.

⁹⁶⁷ 19 February 1966, Nr. 42, photo 08602-3 – FR: Einst wehte in Berlin ein freier Wind.

⁹⁶⁸ 2 August 1966, Nr. 176, photo 08991-2 – FR: Spiegelbild der allgemeine Gesellschaftskrise.

⁹⁶⁹ 24 April 1963, Nr. 17 – Der Spiegel: Böse Ahnungen, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45143155.html>

The 11th federal conference of *Die Falken* in 1967 called for the recognition of Germany's post-war borders and normalizing its contacts with the Eastern Bloc states.⁹⁷⁰ Later that year the Jusos, too, urged Bonn to recognize the Oder-Neiße line⁹⁷¹, as well as the GDR (opposed only by the Berlin and Rheinland-Pfalz delegates). The Jusos also demanded that Germany abstain from co-/possessing nuclear weapons and even urged the government to gradually disarm the Bundeswehr.⁹⁷² Illustrating the widening generational and ideological divide on issues of patriotism and pacifism, SPD distanced itself from these calls while *Junge Union* qualified them as “politics of recognition and surrender.”⁹⁷³ The editor-in-chief of *Deutschlandfunk* Franz Barsig, an SPD member himself, even labelled the Jusos traitors for advocating in favor of East Germany's recognition. Illustrating how far from the German mainstream these ideas were when they first emerged, they were also rejected by newly-elected Juso leader Peter Corterier.⁹⁷⁴ Throughout the following year, there were speculations that some of the student Left's positions had been indirectly inspired or even directed by East Berlin, especially when these came from organizations like SDS.⁹⁷⁵ SPD was divided in its attitude toward these trends. FR published an article about divisions in the party entitled “*Sind wir wirklich noch eine Partei?*” The text analyzed the widening rift between the party's left and right factions in the context of the over 300 members of the left wing who had demonstrated together with the West Berlin branch of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED).⁹⁷⁶

Advocating for unilateral abstention from nuclear weapons was not the Left's most radical demand: SDS went as far as encouraging *Bundeswehr* personnel to disobey orders and also encouraged politically-motivated military service objectors.⁹⁷⁷ The issue of deserters became more prominent in late 1968 and continued making headlines for months with various teach-ins and other protests demanding that deserters be left alone.⁹⁷⁸ In 1969, APO groups such as the International of People Opposing Conscription, the Republican Club, the AStAs from *Freie Universität Berlin* and *Technische Universität*, as well as SDS, SHB, and LSD organized a protest at Tegel Airport against the transfer of deserters from West Berlin to West Germany.

⁹⁷⁰ 8 May 1967, Nr. 105, photo 09605 – FR: „Falken“ für bessere Ostkontakte.

⁹⁷¹ 9 December 1967, Nr. 286, photo 00232 – FR: SPD-Jugend: Ostgrenze anerkennen.

⁹⁷² 11 December 1967, Nr. 287, photo 00234 – FR: Jungsozialisten fordern Verzicht auf Alleinvertretung.

⁹⁷³ Ibid

⁹⁷⁴ 29 December 1967, Nr. 301, photo 00284 – FR: Jungsozialisten wollen Klarheit.

⁹⁷⁵ 22 May 1968, Nr. 119, photo 00852 – FR: „SDS nicht verfassungsfeindlich.“

⁹⁷⁶ 28 May 1968, Nr. 123, photo 00873 – FR: “Sind wir wirklich noch eine Partei?”

⁹⁷⁷ 10 September 1968, Nr. 210, photo 01073 – FR: SDS will zur Revolte in der Bundeswehr aufrufen.

⁹⁷⁸ Mahler, Horst, Ulrich K. Preuss, Deserteurs-Kollektiv, BIG LIFT oder Freiheit für die Deserteure. In: *Voltaire Flugschrift*, Vol. 25, Accessed on: <https://socialhistoryportal.org/sites/default/files/raf/0019690900.pdf>

They claimed this contradicted international law and also sent protest letters to the embassies of the occupying powers,⁹⁷⁹ something that FR covered without critique.

In addition to opposing conscription, nuclear weapons, and the demands to reinstate Germany's pre-war borders, the radical left even objected to the West's hold over West Berlin. For example, in November 1968 APO held a demonstration and handed out leaflets opposing CDU's decision to hold its federal congress in West Berlin. Student newspapers from *Freie Universität* and *Technische Universität* in Berlin, which *Frankfurter Rundschau* labelled as belonging to the extra-parliamentary opposition, called on the Allies to prevent CDU delegates from arriving in the city.⁹⁸⁰ In this way APO validated East Germany's view that holding federal West German political activities in Berlin was a violation of the city's special status.

Some of the changes in attitudes toward patriotism and the military, pioneered by the radical-left groups of the APO gradually came to be adopted by wider sections of German society. As discussed in Chapter 3, SPD gradually changed its positions on the border issue and on the rights of expellees. By 1971 even *Junge Union* called for recognition of the Oder-Neiße Line as Poland's western border causing a stir in the CDU and among expellee organizations.⁹⁸¹ As was the case with other issues, FR's favorable coverage contributed to the rapid evolution in thinking about the role of the state, the military – an overall attitude toward patriotic sentiments – and how fast seemingly iron-hard positions could change, not only within the Left, but also among more conservative quarters.

Vietnam

The Vietnam War and the anti-war movement are among the top associations that people make with the 1960s and 70s along with the Hippie movement, youth resistance, and the wave of demonstrations often employing new modes of protest like sit-ins and teach-ins. With the passing of the US Congress' Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1964), which allowed for a massive military build-up without declaring war throughout 1965 and 1966, a vigorous wave of student protests against the Vietnam War began on American, as well as some larger German campuses with SDS and LSD being particularly active in opposing the war. Much like the war itself,

⁹⁷⁹ 28 July 1969, Nr. 171, photo 01924 – FR: Berlin: Deserteure sollen heute ausgeflogen werden.

⁹⁸⁰ 2 November 1968, Nr. 256, photo 01187 – FR: „Parteitag in Berlin verbieten.“

⁹⁸¹ 12 January 1971, Nr. 9, photo 03072 – FR: Oder-Neiße-Beschluß der Jungen Union verwirrt CDU.

these demonstrations received “unprecedented attention in the mass media,”⁹⁸² further increasing people’s exposure to this topic. One of the first articles found in *Frankfurter Rundschau* on the subject of anti-war demonstrations was from 1965 when SDS, together with other European youth organizations, called for protests against the US policy in Vietnam.⁹⁸³ Support for the North had already been growing among the youth left in Germany, as indicated by an FR report earlier that year about Vietcong and Cuban flags having been hoisted at a *Falken* summer camp and the stir this caused among the local community.⁹⁸⁴

The issue continued to dominate front pages and people’s minds throughout 1966. As could be expected, left-wing organizations also expressed their positions against the war. The 1966 SHB congress, for example, concluded with demands that Germany not join the war in Vietnam.⁹⁸⁵ Also during the first half of that year, Herbert Marcuse spoke at a large critical discussion at Frankfurt University about the US policy in Vietnam. “To the quiet disorder in the audience,” Marcuse shared that he was grateful to the United States and spoke “only because of the American government’s wrong Vietnam policy.” FR noted the disappointment of “would-be revolutionaries” from across Germany by the “old Marxist’s” analysis, which mentioned that communism was in retreat globally. Marcuse finally received excited applause when he pointed out that a victory of the simply-armed Vietnamese against the sophisticated US military could be a signal for rebellion “of all developing peoples” against all military dictatorships. Returning to politics in the West, he lamented the hopeless opposition and stressed the need for a “liberation of consciousness.”⁹⁸⁶ This was one of a series of speeches that Marcuse held in Germany that would contribute to influencing the youth left with new concepts and a rebellious spirit, made accessible to all by media like FR.

As the war intensified, protests became more numerous and were often held without permission. 86 SDS members, taking their cue from the Dutch *Provos*, were arrested during a “walking” protest in downtown West Berlin, demonstrating against alleged police brutality during a prior anti-war protest.⁹⁸⁷ While FR’s reporting implied the protests legitimacy beyond the letter of the law, Springer’s media highlighted how much of an inconvenience the protest

⁹⁸² Altbach, Philip, *Student Politics*. In: *Transition*, No. 28, 1967, 25.

⁹⁸³ 29 December 1965, Nr. 302, photo 08495 – FR: Studenten rufen zu Aktionen auf.

⁹⁸⁴ 16 August 1965, Nr. 188, photo 08309 – FR: „Falken“ hißten Vietcong Flagge.

⁹⁸⁵ 8 March 1966, Nr. 56, photo 08633 – FR: Studenten fühlen sich beschattet.

⁹⁸⁶ 24 May 1966, Nr. 119, photo 08820-1 – FR: Die Analyse des Exempels fand nicht statt.

⁹⁸⁷ 19 December 1966, Nr. 294, photo 09308 – FR: Polizei nimmt 86 Studenten fest.

was. Berliner Morgenpost spoke of “unruly demonstrators”, “hour-long traffic jams”, “mobbing” and “tripping” pedestrians, leaflets “abusing the police”, “riots”; on the other hand, the police’s “harsh (*unsafte*) methods” were excused with the need to “bring the unruly youths to reason.”⁹⁸⁸ With students actively engaging in anti-war demonstrations and often suffering disciplinary measures at the hands of academic administrations, universities became hotbeds of discontent, prompting the authorities to prevent student government organizations from being used as political entities. Thus, the court in Berlin, ruled to ban *Freie Universität’s* AStA from issuing a resolution criticizing US policy in Vietnam.⁹⁸⁹

The radical left demanded that Germany should in no way support the US war effort, even indirectly. Rudi Dutschke addressed a large anti-war demonstration in 1967, demanding that no American soldier be transported to Vietnam through West Berlin, and he also read a message from the Vietnamese National Liberation Front’s representation in East Berlin.⁹⁹⁰ In addition to their direct cooperation with the North Vietnamese, West German radical youth organizations often expressed overlapping positions on the war with those of Eastern Bloc states as was the case with *Die Falken* and FDJ in 1967.⁹⁹¹ Unlike SDS which was long independent of SPD, *Die Falken’s* actions were very provocative in light of the ban on SPD-associated organizations cooperating with communists.

Anti-war demonstrations often employed new forms of protest, some of which might come across as provocative even today. Sometimes this led to violent reactions: For instance Rudi Dutschke ended up being beaten up on Christmas day by churchgoers at the *Kaiser Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche* in Berlin as he tried to aid a few female SDS protesters who were being removed for trying to bring Vietnam-war themed posters to the pulpit. Media like FR gave the story detailed coverage. One can only speculate whether FR found Dutschke’s antics endearing or even they were mocking him when including information about an old man who hit Dutschke’s head with his cane or about a pastor who attacked him while “Red Rudi” retaliated with a slap on the face (with his bloody hand) yelling “you servant of the devil”.⁹⁹² With 1967, the year of Benno Ohnesorg’s murder, ending with this “Christmas tale”, it is unsurprising that

⁹⁸⁸ 18 December 1966, Berliner Morgenpost: Die Polizei ließ nicht mit sich spaßen. Accessed on: <https://www.medienarchiv68.de/dl/41/article.pdf>

⁹⁸⁹ 19 October 1967, Nr. 243, photo 00049 – FR: Politische Kritik rechtwichtig.

⁹⁹⁰ 23 October 1967, Nr. 247, photo 00063 – FR: Erst auf dem „Ku-Damm“ gab’s Verletzte.

⁹⁹¹ 14 November 1967, Nr. 265, photo 00139 – FR: FDJ-Gegeneinladung an „Falken“.

⁹⁹² 27 December 1967, Nr. 299, photo 00277 – FR: Kirchenbesucher verprügelten Rudi Dutschke.

after the war's escalation, early 1968 witnessed a further upsurge in the protests. A large demonstration of around 10 000 participants, co-organized by SDS, Liberal, Socialist, Evangelical, labor union, and student organizations, took place in February.⁹⁹³ While FR seemingly praised the large turnout, Springer's media criticized the court for allowing a demonstration of "the enemies of our state's basic order to turn the streets into a parade of pure communist propaganda."⁹⁹⁴ Another *Berliner Zeitung* publication generalized that "the indignations of *Berliners* [...] grew with every kilometer" of the demonstration until "it was just too much for some."⁹⁹⁵

Nominally non-political organizations like the Union of German Students (VDS) debated whether they had the mandate to issue positions on the Vietnam War.⁹⁹⁶ With the radical wing winning, the 1968 congress labelled the US and South Vietnam "anti-democratic", even "criminal", and called for a US withdrawal. Echoing Marcusean terminology, VDS also opposed a proposed new law on higher education that they viewed as "maintaining the existing structures of dominance at universities."⁹⁹⁷ Confirming the organization's new line, VDS vice-chairman Pätzold demanded that American deserters be given asylum in West Germany and condemned the production of war-related materials for the War as "abetment of genocide."⁹⁹⁸



Vietnam-related radicalization also directly affected SPD, some of whose members had taken part in illegal protests, holding signs (see left) announcing their party membership.⁹⁹⁹ Attempting to stem radicalization within the party, SPD expelled these members, causing an uproar among

the party youth, which decried the decision as "anti-democratic".¹⁰⁰⁰ In addition to individual party members, throughout 1968 SHB and the Jusos became increasingly vociferous in their positions on the Vietnam War. SHB demanded that SPD stand up for breaking off diplomatic

⁹⁹³ 19 February 1968, Nr. 42, photo 00428 – FR: [10000 Demonstranten in Berlin](#).

⁹⁹⁴ 19 February 1968 – B.Z.: [Wie weit ist ein Gewissen?](#) Accessed on: <https://www.medienarchiv68.de/#/medienarchiv/wie-weit-ist-ein-gewissen>

⁹⁹⁵ 19 February 1968 – B.Z.: [Das war den Berlinern zuviel!](#) Accessed on: <https://www.medienarchiv68.de/#/medienarchiv/das-war-den-berlinern-zuviel>

⁹⁹⁶ 5 March 1968, Nr. 55, photo 00497 – FR: [„Studenten als politischer Faktor.“](#)

⁹⁹⁷ 8 March 1968, Nr. 58, photo 00531 – FR: [VDS fordert Abzug der Amerikaner aus Vietnam](#).

⁹⁹⁸ 10 May 1968, Nr. 109, photo 00824 – FR: [VDS fordert Asyl für Deserteure](#).

⁹⁹⁹ British Pathe, [Anti-Vietnam Demonstration In Berlin, 1968](#), <https://www.britishpathe.com/video/anti-vietnam-demonstration-in-berlin/query/Anti-Vietnam+Demonstration+In+Berlin> (last accessed: August 10, 2020)

¹⁰⁰⁰ 9 March 1968, Nr. 59, photo 00533 – FR: [„Ausschlußliste“ der SPD-Jugend](#).

relations with South Vietnam,¹⁰⁰¹ while also advocating (together with the Jusos) that South Vietnamese liberation fighters be allowed to enter the country.¹⁰⁰² This became yet another headache for the SPD leadership. More importantly, however, the anti-war protests presented an interesting contrast: much of Germany's youth increasingly supported new ideals believing in international solidarity and pacifism over militarism and patriotism. This trend was strengthened by the left-leaning media with its frequent and sympathetic reporting of the protests.

4.2. Attitudes toward Foreigners in Germany and the Third World

As discussed in detail earlier, one of the Left's emblematic transformations was in its attitude toward foreigners at home, specifically in Germany. Stepping on a general internationalist basis, it was traditional for the Left to have an interest in and to express solidarity with foreign comrades, colonized peoples or those living under right-wing dictatorships. The socialist faith in progress, however, made underdeveloped societies unlikely objects of respect or fondness by the Left. Neo-Marxist thought, such as Herbert Marcuse's ideas laid out in his book *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), as well as other authors writing during the 1960s, elevated the role of Third World peoples, redefining them from mere passive objects of oppression into potent agents of change.

This change in thinking about foreign people is likely to have provided the impulse that eventually brought about greater openness to treating foreign workers at home as equals. That gradual process began once a critical mass of foreign workers had been generated, which in turn made political issues out of their right to remain and their eventual integration. In addition to continuing the Left's traditional policies of solidarity and international engagement, political opportunism informed by a Marcusean image of foreign workers as potential system-changing forces also inspired the Left's interest. The left-leaning press such as *Frankfurter Rundschau* aided that change by covering Third World issues and problems of foreigners and guest workers extensively and sympathetically. Nevertheless, the guest worker program was implemented in response to business demands and was initially opposed by the left-oriented labor unions.¹⁰⁰³

¹⁰⁰¹ 6 August 1968, Nr. 180, photo 00996 – FR: [SHB-Gruppe: Mit Saigon brechen.](#)

¹⁰⁰² 10 December 1969, Nr. 286, photo 02305 – FR: [SPD hat Sorgen mit dem Nachwuchs.](#)

¹⁰⁰³ Goeke, Simon, [The Multinational Working Class? Political Activism and Labour Migration in West Germany during the 1960s and 1970s.](#) In: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2014, 160–82.

During the latter half of the 1960s when foreign workers were still less of a topic in Germany, the Left there was active in supporting other causes around the world, as well as foreign left-wing students in the Federal Republic. Politically active foreign students were sometimes targeted by extradition requests or even more crudely – with assassins sent by the regimes in their home countries. Among the earliest such examples within the research period were cases of the murder or disappearance in 1966 of politically-vocal Iranian students in Germany.¹⁰⁰⁴ During the same year SDS in Bonn founded a Committee for Freedom and Justice, meant to protect such students from interference by state and political entities.¹⁰⁰⁵ Similarly, in 1967 SHB protested against the extradition of a Greek citizen wanted by Greece’s military junta and called for breaking off diplomatic relations with Greece until a democracy would be re-established.¹⁰⁰⁶ In 1967, SDS, SHB, LSD, and Humanist Student Union (HSU) members protested against a state visit by Indonesia’s minister of foreign affairs, whose authoritarian (labelled “fascist”) government was claimed to be responsible for murdering nearly one million people, as well as spying on Indonesian students in Germany.¹⁰⁰⁷ Until the end of the 1960s, most protests and activism were in the context of right-wing regimes abroad and the Vietnam War, visits of foreign politicians, and the treatment of foreign students in Germany. As the number of foreign worker began to increase, however, the first theme that emerged in the left-leaning press was the issue of poor working and living conditions for foreign workers. That topic would mark a shift in the Left’s perception of foreigners and would signal the beginning of an evolution toward New Left priorities and multicultural policies.

Living and Working Conditions vs. their Usefulness to the Economy

An important aspect of the media coverage of guest workers, which helped increase support for them among Germans were articles problematizing their living and working conditions. One of *Frankfurter Rundschau’s* earlier articles on this topic “Guest workers or foreign workers” drew parallels with the so-called *Fremdarbeiter* scheme during the Third Reich by highlighting the sometimes suboptimal conditions that over 850 000 foreign workers in West Germany lived under. Many lived in employer-provided dormitories,¹⁰⁰⁸ which was a challenge for couples and workers with children. Adding a left-wing slant, the article also pointed out

¹⁰⁰⁴ 2 February 1966, Nr. 27, photo 08561 – FR: [Dem Bonner AStA ist die Sache zu politisch.](#)

¹⁰⁰⁵ 21 January 1966, Nr. 17, photo 08544 – FR: [Studenten schützen Studenten.](#)

¹⁰⁰⁶ 13 October 1967, Nr. 238, photo 00027 – FR: [SHB setzt sich für Griechen ein.](#)

¹⁰⁰⁷ 8 November 1967, Nr. 260, photo 00101 – FR: [Studenten protestieren gegen Malik.](#)

¹⁰⁰⁸ Bither, Jessica and Astrid Ziebarth, [The Integration Picture in Germany. In It for the Long Run: Integration Lessons from a Changing Germany.](#) German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2016, 15.

that foreigners did not receive strike pay, effectively depriving them of the ability to strike.¹⁰⁰⁹ In addition to taking away a tool for defending their rights, this also undermined the effectiveness of strikes overall.



A DPA photo (left) reprinted by *Frankfurter Rundschau* (May 3, 1963) showing African and Arabic workers with a banner on Labor Day expressing support for the demands of their German colleagues.

In contrast to the issue of their suboptimal living conditions and unequal rights¹⁰¹⁰, *Frankfurter Rundschau* published articles on the ways Germany's economy benefitted from foreign workers, for instance as an instrument of economic growth at a time of labor shortage.¹⁰¹¹

As had been the case with the foreign students and contrary to claims that German churches did not do much for foreign workers,¹⁰¹² churches were among the first to call for improving the conditions for foreign workers. At their annual ecumenical meeting in 1971, the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany agreed that foreign workers greatly benefitted the German economy. The churches criticized the fact that foreign workers were hardly allowed to integrate and educational opportunities for their children were lacking. Instead, they condemned the apparent goal to keep “replacing” them with batches of “young, strong, undemanding people who do not know their rights.”¹⁰¹³ In addition to spreading awareness about such initiatives, the left-leaning press also made the public aware of other ways in which foreigners were treated unfairly. For example, FR covered a study published by the Baden-Württemberg labor minister, showing that foreigners were disproportionately affected by lethal accidents in the workplace. This led to an increased multilingual effort to inform the workers about their rights and about safety precautions.¹⁰¹⁴

¹⁰⁰⁹ 20 April 1963, Nr. 94, photo 07114 – FR: Gastarbeiter oder Fremdarbeiter?

¹⁰¹⁰ 18 August 1967, Nr. 190, photo 09867 – FR: Zusage an Belgrad problematisch.

¹⁰¹¹ 6 May 1964, Nr. 105, photo 07563 – FR: 80 000 Arbeitslose weniger.

¹⁰¹² Wilhelm, Cornelia, Diversity in Germany: A Historical Perspective. In: *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (107), 2013, 22.

¹⁰¹³ 5 June 1971, Nr. 127, photo 03369 – FR: Verbesserungen für ausländische Arbeiter gefordert.

¹⁰¹⁴ 8 February 1972, Nr. 32, photo 03905 – FR: Mehr Information für ausländische Arbeitnehmer.

At a time, when the left was beginning to advocate for integration rather than “rotation” of foreign workers, the Cologne Institute of German Industry published a study about them, favorably assessing their effect on the German economy¹⁰¹⁵ and confirming earlier studies from the late 1960s. While it was the looming Oil Crisis and increasing unemployment¹⁰¹⁶ that would eventually lead to the end of the guest worker program, it was favorable news about guest workers that lay the groundwork for integration policies. FR and other left-leaning media contributed to painting a positive picture of guest workers as people who helped the German economy while experiencing many hardships. This contributed further to the formation of a supportive attitude toward guest workers among the Social-Democratic milieu of FR readers.

Xenophobic Discrimination and Extremism among Foreigners

Two issues that emerged early on as the number of foreigners in West Germany rose were discrimination against foreigners and forms of extremism among them. One of the earliest cases of discrimination against foreign workers within the research period was reported by *Frankfurter Rundschau* in 1963: the Italian Embassy and the country’s Consulate General in Munich had protested before the German authorities after discovered that signs banning Italians had been put up at cafes and restaurants in Nuremberg.¹⁰¹⁷ While the incident was resolved, the attitude behind it was not.¹⁰¹⁸ Seven years later, in 1970, the Jusos in Augsburg alerted the prosecutor’s office about local businesses displaying signs that excluded guest workers. FR reported that the prosecutor’s office initially refused to press charges under §130 of the Penal Code (*Volksverhetzung*), because according to the prosecutor, guest workers were not part of the German population.¹⁰¹⁹ This was based on the understanding that *Volksverhetzung* or an incitement of hate against a section of the population was only applicable to established groups within German society. Eventually, a precedent ruling from the court in Celle, recognizing guest workers as part of the German population,¹⁰²⁰ made it possible for the prosecutors in Augsburg to also start an inquiry.

¹⁰¹⁵ 22 January 1972, Nr. 18, photo 03847 – FR: „Ausländerbeschäftigung: mehr Plus als Minus.“

¹⁰¹⁶ 8 November 1974, Nr. 260, photo 05651 – FR: Schon 672 000 ohne Arbeit.

¹⁰¹⁷ 1 June 1963, Nr. 126, photo 07114 – FR: Intervention Roms gegen Anti-Italiener-Schilder.

¹⁰¹⁸ Wilhelm, Cornelia, Diversity in Germany: A Historical Perspective. In: *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (107), 2013, 22.

¹⁰¹⁹ 28 October 1970, Nr. 248, photo 02920 – FR: Gastarbeiter „gehören nicht dazu“.

¹⁰²⁰ 7 November 1970, Nr. 257, photo 02935 – FR: Gastarbeiter doch Teil des Volkes.

Similar cases may have existed throughout the 1960s, but it was not until the early 1970s that the student left gradually adopted the cause of foreigners in Germany as a minority that warranted its political support. Rudi Dutschke had already argued in favor of attracting guest workers at a rally in 1968.¹⁰²¹ This was also partially in response to increasing xenophobia and hate crime incidents such as neo-Nazis setting a dormitory for Yugoslav guest workers on fire in 1971. A third factor were legislative moves, deemed too restrictive. In 1972, for instance, VDS and Christian student organizations joined foreign students (Iranian, Palestinian) in protesting a new law on foreigners, while the Jusos published a black book on discrimination against foreigners. From that point onward, the issue of foreigners would feature with increasing prominence on the Left's agenda, not least as sections of it were evolving toward New Left priorities.

In 1973 FR published an editorial arguing that “the problem already began with the word guest workers”. The author compared guest workers to the “alien workers” (*Fremdarbeiter*) during the Third Reich and concluded that one is not a guest when coming to work for someone. The text criticized employers, but also social reformers whose demands for more years of schooling, shorter working hours, and a flexible retirement age required foreigners to fill the gaps in the labor market.¹⁰²² Such interesting points would additionally engage left-oriented readers, engendering a feeling of guilt for their own social advancement. With the topic of the rights and acceptance of foreigners being increasingly discussed, more Germans developed an interest in supporting foreigners living in the country. A 1973 letter from an FR reader about excluding foreigners from a local football league¹⁰²³ illustrates that by the mid-1970s, the higher number of guest workers and the increased political and media scrutiny had made ordinary Germans more vigilant to instances of discrimination against foreigners.

While the media in Germany reported about foreigners being on the receiving end of discrimination, they also covered forms of extremism associated with their presence in Germany. As early as the start of the research period, *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported about Italian communist and neo-fascist labor unions operating in in the Federal Republic,¹⁰²⁴ as well

¹⁰²¹ Rudi Dutschke's speech at the International Vietnam Congress, February 1968, entitled „Die Geschichtlichen Bedingungen für den internationalen Emanzipationskampf“ In: Dutschke, Rudi, Geschichte ist machbar: Texte über das herrschende Falsche und die Radikalität des Friedens. Wagenbach, Berlin: 1991, 114.

¹⁰²² 18 April 1973, Nr. 92, photo 04826 – FR: Mit der Bezeichnung Gastarbeiter beginnt schon das Problem.

¹⁰²³ 22 August 1973, Nr. 194, photo 05008 – FR: Ohne Gastarbeitervereine.

¹⁰²⁴ 30 October 1963, Nr. 252, photo 07348 – FR: Radikaler Einfluß auf Gastarbeiter.

as about Greek organizations covertly spying on Greek guest workers;¹⁰²⁵ after the Italian Communist Party held a congress in Germany in 1972, local politicians called for banning foreign political parties from operating in Germany.¹⁰²⁶ In the aftermath of the Palestinian terrorist attack against the Israeli Olympic team at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the German authorities increased their vigilance of Palestinian radicals. FR reported on the banning of a Palestinian organization.¹⁰²⁷ Croatian nationalists also exported their political struggle for independence from Yugoslavia to foreign countries including West Germany, which hosted a 400 000-strong Croatian diaspora by the mid-1970s.¹⁰²⁸ This struggle also employed terrorist means such as the 1962 attack against the Yugoslav Trade Mission in Bonn-Mehlem and the killing of the Yugoslav consul in Stuttgart in 1971.¹⁰²⁹ With many workers from EC states leaving Germany, Turks who were the only predominantly Muslim group of foreign workers became the largest group of *Ausländer*. With religious differences as an added challenge of integration,¹⁰³⁰ some Turks in Germany turned to Islamism.¹⁰³¹ Islamic radicalism was also imported into Germany by the Muslim Brotherhood which started building its German network in the 1950s without attracting much attention until 9/11.¹⁰³²

In addition to advocating for better working conditions and protection from discrimination, the German left also tried to support foreign workers from pressures by extremists from their own countries or their governments. Perhaps this was a natural continuation of longstanding left-wing international solidarity, but foreigners were also likely receiving greater respect as a result of being granted political agency by popular academics like Herbert Marcuse. In addition to being subjected to stereotypes due to their otherness, members of foreign communities imported different varieties of political and religious radicalism, as well as violence and terrorism, which was harmed the public's perceptions of immigrants.

¹⁰²⁵ 4 September 1967, Nr. 204, photo 09894 – FR: [DGB Hamburg bricht Kontakte ab](#).

¹⁰²⁶ 9 February 1972, Nr. 33, photo 03908 – FR: [Weyer will keine ausländischen Parteizentralen](#).

¹⁰²⁷ 6 October 1972, Nr. 232, photo 04447 – FR: [Keine Klarheit über Ausweisungen](#).

¹⁰²⁸ Tokić, Mate Nikola, [The End of 'Historical-Ideological Bedazzlement': Cold War Politics and Émigré Croatian Separatist Violence, 1950-1980](#). In: *Social Science History*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2012, 431.

¹⁰²⁹ Tokić, 436-436.

¹⁰³⁰ Wilhelm, Cornelia, [Diversity in Germany: A Historical Perspective](#). In: *German Politics & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (107), 2013, 23.

¹⁰³¹ Rubin, Barry (Edt.), [Guide to Islamist Movements. \(Vol.2\)](#), M.E. Sharpe, London: 2010, 459-468.

¹⁰³² Steinberg, Guido, [Germany and the Muslim Brotherhood](#). In: *Al-Mesbar Studies and Research Centre and the Foreign Policy Research Institute*, 2013, 86-91.

Integration and Attitudes of Germans

Integration was not proposed as a policy until the 1970s, but even earlier, elements of it were part of the discourse of some media like FR in the form of discussing the adaptation of foreigners to life in Germany. For instance, in 1964 FR published an article about female guest workers, talking about gradually adapting to German fashion and life in the country.¹⁰³³ During this early period Germans were divided in their attitudes toward foreign workers: A 1964 poll covered by *Frankfurter Rundschau* suggested that 36% of Germans thought relations with foreign workers were good while 32% regarded guest workers as “a big problem.” 32% gave no answer, either because they had no opinion or perhaps because some felt uncomfortable sharing a negative opinion. The survey suggested that guest workers were often seen as womanizers and were disliked for being too loud.¹⁰³⁴ In 1966, FR reported on a DGB poll that concluded even DGB members were affected by “nationalist resentment” in their attitudes toward foreign workers.¹⁰³⁵

German society began addressing these resentments actively around the same time when integration efforts became part of the political discourse in the early 1970s. Perhaps the first piece on integration was a 1971 article that described a social union called *Interurban*, founded to assist foreign workers with language courses and finding apartments along with other services.¹⁰³⁶ The lack of fluency in German among foreigners had not been seriously addressed since they were usually tasked with relatively simple work, but this would become a key problem if remaining in Germany became possible. In 1972 the federal government announced the creation of a new biannual multilingual illustrated magazine intended to provide information to foreign workers.¹⁰³⁷ Lower Saxony was the first federal province to follow suit.¹⁰³⁸ In addition to national measures to help guest workers, some measures were also taken internationally: Among the guest workers in Germany were also citizens of the EEC, the precursor to the European Union. In 1974 *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported that the European Commission had undertaken an action plan to improve educational opportunities for Europeans

¹⁰³³ 11 August 1964, Nr. 184, photo 07768 – FR: Ein Besuch im Café ist schon eine Sensation.

¹⁰³⁴ 30 October 1964, Nr. 253, photo 07836 – FR: Umfrage über Gastarbeiter.

¹⁰³⁵ 25 February 1966, Nr. 47, photo 08615 – FR: DGB bekämpft Vorurteile gegenüber Gastarbeitern.

Chronologically, 1966 was the year when the film *Africa Addio*, the story around which was described in detail in Ch. 3, was taken down from cinema screens after an intervention by radical-left youth organizations. (6 August 1966, Nr. 180, photo 09004 – FR: „Africa addio“ in Berlin abgesetzt.)

¹⁰³⁶ 15 January 1971, Nr. 12, photo 03080 – FR: Ausländer-Betreuung beschlossen.

¹⁰³⁷ 11 February 1972, Nr. 35, photo 03915 – FR: Zeitschrift für Gastarbeiter.

¹⁰³⁸ 15 May 1974, Nr. 112, photo 05408 – FR: Zeitung für Gastarbeiter.

who had moved to another country, as well as the educational opportunities available to guest workers' children.¹⁰³⁹

These first steps toward integration went hand in hand with fighting prejudice. In 1971 FR reported on a government-funded study of prejudice in German textbooks undertaken by the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt (The Frankfurt School). The study found numerous instances of prejudice, which the Ministry for Economic Cooperation decided to counteract with a long-term pedagogical program to dismantle negative prejudice about development policy. The program, funded with 600 000 DM, aimed to increase public support for providing development aid.¹⁰⁴⁰ This policy demonstrated SPD's support for changing attitudes toward the Third World and together with other policies, it also likely affected attitudes toward foreign workers domestically.

Residence regulations were a key area that began to change as Germany moved in the direction of integration. In June 1974, the SPD-dominated Munich city council decided to allow foreigners to receive unlimited residence permits after residing there for at least 5 years, a decision opposed by the CSU-dominated government of Upper Bavaria as illegal and contradicting federal policy. FR commented that other federal provinces like Baden-Württemberg, Berlin, Hessen, North Rhein-Westphalia, and Rheinland-Pfalz were issuing two-year or even unlimited permits rather than the basic one-year ones. Munich's mayor Georg Kronawitter (SPD) pointed out that the move was "unchartered legal territory" intended to aid integration whereas the provincial government favored the rotation principle.¹⁰⁴¹ This case exemplified the opposing approaches to the integration of guest workers between SPD and CDU/CSU. As mayor Kronawitter pointed out, a year after the end of the guest worker program in 1973, conservatives (CDU/CSU) still supported policies rooted in the understanding that guest workers were temporarily in Germany to perform a specific task, after which they would leave. SPD, on the other hand, was gradually shifting toward a policy of integrating the guest workers and making them and their families part of German society.

As the number of foreign workers increased, their concentration in cities like West Berlin caused consternation. Having increased three-fold since 1968, by July 1971 foreigners

¹⁰³⁹ 8 March 1974, Nr. 57, photo 05280 – FR: Hilfe für Gastarbeiterkinder.

¹⁰⁴⁰ 11 September 1971, Nr. 210, photo 03508 – FR: Geschichten von den überlegenen Weißen.

¹⁰⁴¹ 10 June 1974, Nr. 132, photo 05440 – FR: München darf den Gastarbeitern nicht großzügig helfen.

amounted to over 140 000 of Berlin's population of two million.¹⁰⁴² FR reported that in 1972 2/3 of all German adults expressed antipathy toward foreign workers even though among young people (15-20 years old) that share was less than 50%. 47% of youths and 61% of adults agreed that it would be better if guest workers kept to themselves.¹⁰⁴³ Another article from 1973 reported that Turks were especially disliked and that Germans would immediately move out of a building if a Turkish family moved in – an attitude that would eventually contribute to the formation of ghettos. The same article pointed out that Berlin was the first federal province to start integrating foreigners.¹⁰⁴⁴ The magnitude of the challenge was reflected in the fact that even liberal publications like *Der Spiegel* painted a bleak picture and spoke of “first Harlem symptoms” appearing in place like Kreuzberg.¹⁰⁴⁵

In a 1971 interview with FR, Hans-Joachim Bargmann (SPD), chairman of the culture committee in the NRW parliament, pointed out that guest workers could become part of the German nation and argued in favor of integrating foreign children into German schools. He highlighted that many guest workers had brought their families and did not wish to return home, underscoring that Germans had to understand that these people would initially become guest-citizens and then full “co-citizens” (*Mitbürger*). He gave a warning, recalling that Polish workers in the 19th c. had not been properly integrated, which had marginalized them for two generations¹⁰⁴⁶ and urged Germans not to repeat that mistake.

While in the 1960s guest workers were still not viewed by the Left in Germany as people who would stay and ambition was limited to improving their living and social conditions, by the mid-1970s, their permanent settlement and integration was actively promoted by SPD. Even though the party's evolution toward supporting integration was gradual, this policy initially advocated by the radical youth left, had become a policy implemented at all levels of government. It had even been carried over to the EEC who's Social Ministers' Council, presided over by Germany, decided in 1974 to fund the integration of guest workers.¹⁰⁴⁷ By the end of the research period guest workers were also gaining the confidence and ability to express

¹⁰⁴² 6 January 1972, Nr. 4, photo 03789 – FR: [West-Berlins Einwohnerzahl sinkt weiter.](#)

¹⁰⁴³ 14 January 1972, Nr. 11, photo 03814 – FR: [„Jugendliche sind demokratischer als ältere Bürger.“](#)

¹⁰⁴⁴ 6 January 1973, Nr. 5, photo 04622-3 – FR: [Die Türken an der Spree leben wie im Ghetto.](#)

¹⁰⁴⁵ 29 July 1973, Nr. 31 - Der Spiegel: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/die-tuerken-kommen-rette-sich-wer-kann-a-5b1ba6e5-0002-0001-0000-000041955159>

¹⁰⁴⁶ 14 January 1971, Nr. 11, photo 03079 – FR: [Aus Gastarbeitern werden Mitbürger.](#)

¹⁰⁴⁷ 11 June 1974, Nr. 133, photo 05443 – FR: [Förderung für Gastarbeiter.](#)

their demands by organizing and demonstrating.¹⁰⁴⁸ With the population so divided in their attitudes toward the *Gastarbeiter* and with foreigners generally not finding German political parties likeable¹⁰⁴⁹, politicians had to maneuver carefully. It is not hard to imagine that when Federal president Scheel (FDP) stated that guest workers made German cities more colorful and livelier, adding that their presence was a “great enrichment”, that optimism was not shared by everyone.

Political Approaches to Limiting the Number of Foreigners

Throughout practically the entire research period, most German politicians argued in favor of bringing the number of foreign workers in the country under control. One of the first tangible steps in that direction was made in 1966 when Germany and Turkey agreed to cap the number of Turkish guest workers at 150 000.¹⁰⁵⁰ Not all political entities favored caps, however. In 1967 the labor union DGB issued an appeal to chancellor Kiessinger to simplify asylum procedures for Greek students and guest workers.¹⁰⁵¹ Meanwhile, foreign governments were lobbying West Germany to welcome more of their workers and afford them more rights.¹⁰⁵²

While German society was gradually warming to the idea of allowing guest workers to remain and integrate in the country, an increasing number were staying illegally. FR reported that there were 20 to 60 000 Turks residing illegally in the Federal Republic, a problem that Willy Brandt argued must be resolved “cautiously.”¹⁰⁵³ Hessen pursued such a cautious approach when it decided to allow illegal Turkish workers to register there, granting them a year of “tolerated stay”.¹⁰⁵⁴ After this period expired, about 7000 illegal Turks in Hessen were supposed to leave Germany and travel back at their own expense. To incentivize them to leave voluntarily, the workers were promised that they would be allowed to reapply for work in Germany.¹⁰⁵⁵

¹⁰⁴⁸ 5 July 1974, Nr. 152, photo 05495 – FR: Gastarbeiter protestieren.

¹⁰⁴⁹ 28 October 1974, Nr. 251, photo 05640 – FR: Zum „Festival der Freundschaft“ kamen 10 000 Ausländer. According to a 1974 poll, foreigners generally did not find German political parties likeable. SPD fared the best with a 31.7% approval rating, CDU received 11% approval, while FDP and DKP were least popular among foreigners with 1.5% and 1.4%.

¹⁰⁵⁰ 30 April 1966, Nr. 100, photo 08768 – FR: Keine weiteren Türken mehr.

¹⁰⁵¹ 7 July 1967, Nr. 154, photo 09757 – FR: DGB: Asylbedingungen vereinfachen.

¹⁰⁵² 11 November 1967, Nr. 263, photo 00124 – FR: Belgrad rügt Bonner Passivität.

¹⁰⁵³ 13 March 1971, Nr. 61, photo 03202 – FR: „Kriminelle Taten“ an Türken.

¹⁰⁵⁴ 26 March 1971, Nr. 72, photo 03242 – FR: Hessen gewählt illegalen Türken doch Aufenthalt.

¹⁰⁵⁵ 10 August 1972, Nr. 163, photo 04461 – FR: Illegale Türken müssen zurück.

A meeting of the federal and all provincial labor ministers in 1971 concluded that the social integration of foreign workers in Germany was largely dependent on “the implementation of their equality” in housing and education. Both of these had been lacking with housing often being at dormitories and barracks in industrial areas or in subpar privately rented accommodation.¹⁰⁵⁶ This meant that more social housing and better educational opportunities for the children of foreign workers were needed, including education in their native languages. Businesses were to shoulder some of the costs, while the labor unions were to counsel foreign workers. Federal provinces were entitled to apply these recommendations to the extent they saw fit.¹⁰⁵⁷ Measures in favor of integration went together with a new law, proposed by the SPD government in 1972, aiming was to decrease violent crime by making it easier to deport foreigners arrested on illegal weapons or drug-related charges.¹⁰⁵⁸

With the looming global energy crisis and unemployment creeping up in Germany, in mid-1972 Willy Brandt began to push for integrating those foreigners who were already in Germany, but also for limiting their number. At a meeting with metal workers, the chancellor pointed out that the government’s aimed for full employment and was therefore considering gradually reducing the number of foreign workers. While the Left favored a more accommodating attitude toward foreigners already in Germany, it was pro-business circles, who bore the original responsibility for the influx of cheap labor. FR quoted unnamed government sources who argued that “with the constant increasing of the guest worker quota, which economic-political growth fanatics still support, the Federal Republic has let itself become a ‘dangerous experiment.’”¹⁰⁵⁹ By the autumn of 1972, Munich reported that 20% of its population was comprised of guest workers and that the city could not handle any more. They demanded assistance with integration and insisted that the federal government cut the inflow of new foreigners.¹⁰⁶⁰ The NRW labor and social affairs minister (SPD) called for a discussion on granting foreigners citizenship and proclaiming Germany an immigrant country. He argued foreigners should not be turned into “our society’s negroes”.¹⁰⁶¹ While politicians discussed the issue, the number of foreign workers continued increasing and was expected to

¹⁰⁵⁶ Espahangizi, Raika, Migration and Urban Transformations: Frankfurt in the 1960s and 1970s. In: *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2014, 189-191.

¹⁰⁵⁷ 29 September 1971, Nr. 225, photo 03546 – FR: Mehr Wohnungen für Gastarbeiter.

¹⁰⁵⁸ 8 April 1972, Nr. 82, photo 04071 – FR: Bonn verschärft Ausländergesetz.

¹⁰⁵⁹ 6 October 1972, Nr. 232, photo 04448-9 – FR: Brandt: nahe an kritischer Grenze.

¹⁰⁶⁰ 10 November 1972, Nr. 262, photo 04528 – FR: München will Zuwanderung von Ausländern bremsen.

¹⁰⁶¹ 17 November 1972, Nr. 268, photo 04544 – FR: Figgen: Gastarbeiter einbürgern.

grow from 2.4 in 1972 to 3 million. At the same time, German businesses had no alternative to hiring guest workers, 13% of whom wished to stay in Germany according to a 1972 poll.¹⁰⁶²



The increase in the number of foreign workers between 1962 and 1973 and their countries of origin (Frankfurter Rundschau, 1973)

The situation continued escalating and in 1973 Bavarian interior minister Bruno Merck sent a letter to federal interior minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher demanding a “real policy” on guest workers. He pointed out ironically that when businesses were looking for workers, they supported the rotation principle, but after the workers were already in place, employers suddenly thought rotation was inhumane, uneconomic, and unrealistic. At a time when many politicians in Germany were adamant that the country was not one of immigration, Merck pointed out that employers were “practically accepting immigration.”¹⁰⁶³ This CSU criticism of businesses was echoed by an unlikely ally – the Jusos – who claimed that capitalist economies grew faster, which unfairly forced workers to move to the West. Unlike CSU, the Jusos were not demanding implementation of the rotation principle, but rather wanted improved social and educational conditions, a more liberal immigration law, and greater participation of foreigners in factory decision making.¹⁰⁶⁴ An ironic FR commentary in 1973 argued the Jusos or “*Radikalinskis*” had “struck again one week before the elections.” It went on that the Jusos seemed to have “discovered” the guest workers as a good example to advance their positions. President Heinemann called for a new law, based neither on rotation, nor on the integration principle while then provincial Prime Minister Helmut Kohl insisted on capping the number of guest workers.¹⁰⁶⁵ Labor minister Arndt spoke against both imposing a cap and against rotation, arguing that discrepancies between the capacity of social services, housing, and labor markets in specific areas were the real issue. Nevertheless, a report issued by Arndt’s ministry projected the number of guest workers to continue rising unless it was stopped politically. The report argued against viewing Germany as a country of immigration and insisted that the federal

¹⁰⁶² 16 December 1972, Nr. 292, photo 04594 – FR: Stingl rechnet mit drei Millionen Gastarbeitern.

¹⁰⁶³ 6 January 1973, Nr. 5, photo 04620 – FR: Ausländerpolitik bemängelt.

¹⁰⁶⁴ 14 November 1972, Nr. 265, photo 04537 – FR: „Gastarbeiter werden isoliert.“

¹⁰⁶⁵ 3 April 1973, Nr. 79, photo 04781 – FR: „Mehr für Gastarbeiter tun.“

government was not conducting an immigration policy. Caps were deemed difficult to implement, because they could not be legally imposed on EEC countries and doing so anyway could hurt Germany's reputation. Forcing the rotation principle, on the other hand, would deprive German companies of trained workers. The proposed solution was to direct foreigners toward areas that could cope with an influx, have companies cover some of the costs, and create a "gradual" scheme for granting permanent residency to those who have lived in Germany for over 5 years.¹⁰⁶⁶ A little over a month later, the government announced its permanent residency plan officially.¹⁰⁶⁷ Since immigration from EEC states could not be controlled anyway, the new decision mainly applied to Greeks, Turks, and Yugoslav citizens. The cabinet also increased the fee companies had to pay the government for each foreign worker they employed, raising it from 300 to 1000-1200 DM). This was expected to generate funds for integration and also reduce the incentives for recruiting more foreign workers.¹⁰⁶⁸ Perhaps faced with the economic realities of the oil crisis that played out throughout 1973, by December the Catholic and Evangelical churches issued a joint position paper calling for tightened controls for arrivals, but also arguing in favor of making it easier for foreigners to stay in Germany as a way to encourage integration.¹⁰⁶⁹

On November 24th, 1973, *Frankfurter Rundschau* announced as a front page headline that "Bonn" was "stopping the influx of guest workers." As a precautionary measure in connection with the oil crisis and because of "certain employment risks" that the guest worker program had caused in the context of the economic downturn, Germany was to indefinitely cease recruiting guest workers. The decision was to have immediate effect. At that point 2.6 million foreigners were believed to be working in Germany, a figure that had more than doubled in the four years between 1969 and 1973.¹⁰⁷⁰ In early 1974, toward the end of this research period, Germany announced it was considering granting financial bonuses to guest workers who returned to their home countries voluntarily.¹⁰⁷¹ This shift in policy worried guest workers already in Germany as it raised the perspective that they may also be expelled should the economic downturn continue. Therefore, guest workers in Hamburg, organized within the labor

¹⁰⁶⁶ 14 April 1973, Nr. 89, photo 04812-13 – FR: Gastarbeiter-Konzept Bonns gewinnt Konturen.

¹⁰⁶⁷ 24 May 1973, Nr. 120, photo 04875 – FR: Regierung packt das Gastarbeiterproblem an.

¹⁰⁶⁸ 7 June 1973, Nr. 132, photo 04883 – FR: Mehr Hilfe für Ausländer.

¹⁰⁶⁹ 12 December 1973, Nr. 289, photo 05151 – FR: „Fremdenpolitik überdenken.“

¹⁰⁷⁰ 24 November 1973, Nr. 274, photo 05125 – FR: Bonn stoppt Zustrom von Gastarbeitern.

¹⁰⁷¹ 10 January 1974, Nr. 9, photo 05186 – FR: Rückkehrprämie erwogen.

union DGB, signed a resolution calling for solidarity and recognition of their contribution to the German economy.¹⁰⁷²

By 1974 Germany was already led by a new chancellor who had a more decisive stance on immigration. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt declared himself in favor of equality for guest workers and German citizens, but also argued that “the influx of guest workers must be directed.”¹⁰⁷³ Soon after, on August 1, 1974, the German Constitutional Court issued a ruling making it more difficult to deport foreign citizens.¹⁰⁷⁴ At the same time the opposition was maintaining pressure on the government. CSU, for example, argued that the government should discuss with Yugoslavia ways to send back 280 000 Yugoslav citizens who were of conscription age since the USSR was threatening NATO’s southern flanks.¹⁰⁷⁵

One of the last news in the research period demonstrated the growing influence of supranational institutions like the EEC, the future EU, in determining national immigration policy. In December 1974 FR reported that the EC Commission was planning to require full social equality and political equality at the local level for guest workers from both EC and non-EC states. Social Affairs commissioner Patrick Hillery declared that the increasing unemployment in the EC must not lead to a massive return-migration of guest workers to their home countries, because that would have a destabilizing effect and because they would be needed after the crisis. The Commission proposed an action plan to the Council that included granting full social and children’s benefits for EC and non-EC guest workers regardless of where the family lived, provisions to allow individuals to accumulate their pensions from their home country and their current country, as well as the creation of advisory councils for guest workers at the local level. The plan even envisaged full participation of guest workers in politics at the local level by 1980. Hillery pointed out that since “politicians count votes” the only way to ensure the interests of guest workers was to include them in the political process. That would add about 7.5 million people to the politically-entitled population of the then small EC: According to 1973 data, there were 6 million guest workers and 4 million family members, ¾ of them being from outside the EC. More concrete proposals were to follow in 1975 after a discussion in the

¹⁰⁷² 22 January 1974, Nr. 18, photo 05209 – FR: „Ausländer nicht benachteiligt.“

¹⁰⁷³ 15 July 1974, Nr. 160, photo 05510 – FR: Schmidt sagt Steigerung der Reallöhne voraus.

¹⁰⁷⁴ 1 August 1974, Nr. 175, photo 05530 – FR: Sofortiger Ausweisung von Ausländern erschwert.

¹⁰⁷⁵ 30 August 1974, Nr. 200, photo 05565 – FR: Jugoslawen beunruhigen CSU.

Council.¹⁰⁷⁶ The overall logic of greater inclusion, however, would continue both at the EC level and within West Germany.

Anti-Racism/Third World

In addition to the growing advocacy for the rights of guest workers, the Left in Germany also increasingly focused on fighting racism, as well as on topics concerning the Third World. The number of students from Third World countries attending German universities had risen from a couple of hundred to over twelve thousand by the early 1960s.¹⁰⁷⁷ With Dutschke drawing inspiration from Marcuse and other authors to “discover the Third World revolutionary as an idealized political subject”, together with SDS member Bernd Rabehl, Dutschke “formulated a new model of political action based partly on their collaboration with Third World students.”¹⁰⁷⁸ Naturally, the interaction with politically engaged individuals from newly decolonized states or from nations struggling for independence, as well as hearing about incidents of racist behavior toward students of different races added into the radical left’s rhetoric to contribute to an overall increase in the interest in anti-racism and Third World issues. In addition to being talked about in political organizations, these issues were actively discussed by media such as *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel*, as well as the German Evangelical Church (EKD).

Fighting racism was a priority for some non-governmental organizations, as well as churches. In 1970, the World Church Council (WCC), which had previously condemned racism, decided to also fund anti-racist organizations. This seemingly commendable decision was in fact highly contentious since some organizations labelling themselves anti-racist were at that time involved in violent action. This created opposition¹⁰⁷⁹ and led to EKD eventually freezing its financial contribution to the “Anti-racism program”.¹⁰⁸⁰ In addition to FR, *Der Spiegel* also covered the initiative led by WCC Secretary General Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, a US pastor active in the Civil Rights Movement. *Der Spiegel* reported on the negative reactions among the German Evangelical community, also pointing out that the only German representative on the committee behind the creation of the fund, Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU), abstained from voting. Implying understanding for the violent struggle against racism and colonialism, the

¹⁰⁷⁶ 20 December 1974, Nr. 295, photo 05704 – FR: Gleichberechtigung für Ausländer gefordert.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Slobodian, Quinn, Foreign Front: Third World Politics in Sixties West Germany. Duke University Press, Durham: 2012, 17.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Slobodian, 51.

¹⁰⁷⁹ 16 October 1970, Nr. 240, photo 02905-7 – FR: Manchen Christen fuhr der Schock in die Glieder.

¹⁰⁸⁰ 11 November 1970, Nr. 260, photo 02942 – FR: Beitrag zum Anti-Rassismus-Programm “eingegoren.”

article ended with Mikko Juva's¹⁰⁸¹ argument that racial discrimination was a sin and those fighting it must be supported as "an act of faith."¹⁰⁸² The anti-racism and national liberation causes generally met with the support of Catholic clergy as well. This was especially true of Catholic priests from Third World dioceses who often held left-wing economic positions.¹⁰⁸³

Nevertheless, the issue of condoning violence remained topical and made support for some organizations contentious. Some on the radical left openly relativized it as they believed the state was original perpetrator of violence and all other violence was a form of self-defense.¹⁰⁸⁴ Theologian Helmut Gollwitzer, a friend of Rudi Dutschke's and pastor of future RAF terrorist Ulrike Meinhof,¹⁰⁸⁵ pointed out in a 1970 interview that the church had never completely ruled out violence, because it was clear that violence could sometimes be the only way to bring about justice. Prof. Gollwitzer added that racism was wrong and it was not the church's job to tell oppressed people whether, when, and how to rise against their oppressors.¹⁰⁸⁶ This was something that others hinted at, but did not say openly. It was a pattern of thinking, however, that mirrored almost identically Herbert Marcuse's argumentation in his essay *A Critique of Pure Tolerance* that had been printed during the previous year. This more radical approach toward anti-racism also gradually gained greater mainstream acceptance as illustrated by Federal President Heinemann's praise in 1972 for the World Church Council's special anti-racism fund despite its support for controversial organizations.¹⁰⁸⁷ FR and *Der Spiegel* both reported on the ongoing discussions in church and political circles. With their coverage leaning in favor of the initiative, they contributed to influencing their readers' perceptions.

In addition to church-related activism, the early 1970s witnessed the founding of new NGOs focusing exclusively on anti-racism and Third World liberation. That was a notable change in comparison with the previous period when radical left organizations had expressed positions about the Third World without focusing exclusively on that issue. The Africa Center in Frankfurt was one such new organization whose focus was on the roots of racist conflicts in South Africa. It was led by the 29 year old medical doctor from the Berlin Cabora Bassa

¹⁰⁸¹ Mikko Juva was president of the Lutheran World Federation.

¹⁰⁸² 19 October 1979, Nr. 43 – Der Spiegel: Wie ein Schlag, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43801117.html>

¹⁰⁸³ 15 October 1971, Nr. 239, photo 03581 – FR: Explosives Thema „Gerechtigkeit“.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Hanshew, Karrin, 'Sympathy for the Devil?' The West German Left and the Challenge of Terrorism.

In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2012, 513.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Gollwitzer, Helmut, The Way to Life. T.&T.Clark Publishers, Edinburgh:1981

¹⁰⁸⁶ 14 November 1970, Nr. 263, photo 02953 – FR: Anti-Rassismus-Programm der Kirche.

¹⁰⁸⁷ 30 September 1972, Nr. 227, photo 04435 – FR: Lob für die Antirassismus-Aktion.

Committee, Reiner Müller.¹⁰⁸⁸ *Frankfurter Rundschau* frequently covered such German NGO's, as well as similar organizations in other Western countries such as a Swedish institute focusing on the problems caused by weapons exports to the Third World.¹⁰⁸⁹

Some of this relativist attitude toward violent opposition to actual and perceived injustice spilled over to the mainstream center-left in a number of countries. In December 1971, the Socialist International, which SPD belonged to, took the decision to lend its support for national-liberation movements in Africa, particularly in South Africa,¹⁰⁹⁰ which before that had been overtly supported mainly by communist regimes. Two years later, SPD's Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski would announce his party's support for the Marxist independence movement in Mozambique, FRELIMO, along with a ban on weapons exports to Portugal.¹⁰⁹¹ This signaled a serious shift in policy from Germany's previous political line of supporting Lisbon.¹⁰⁹²

Other aspects of the interaction with the Third World that the media reported on were illegal immigration, the importation of new strands of religious ideology in the West, and support through development aid. By the mid-1970s, international organizations including the UN were beginning to take notice of the new phenomenon of large-scale illegal immigration and the exploitation of migrants¹⁰⁹³, as well as on immigration of white people to white-controlled African states, seen as a way of keeping minority rule alive.¹⁰⁹⁴ Immigration into Europe was discussed at the second regional conference of the International Labor Organization in 1974, which concluded that the pace immigration into Europe as not sustainable and Europe needed to invest more capital in the countries of origin to stop it.¹⁰⁹⁵

Along with increasing migration, openness to foreign cultures, and the presence of foreign workers in Western countries, came foreign religious practices. The first Islamic council in Europe took place in 1973 under the leadership of the ambassador of Saudi Arabia in London.

¹⁰⁸⁸ The Cabora Bassa Committee was part of an international movement to try and prevent the construction of the Cabora Bassa hydroelectric power station in Portuguese-controlled Mozambique, which was to supply electricity to South Africa.

19 June 1971, Nr. 139, photo 03396 – FR: [Afrika-Zentrum gegründet.](#)

¹⁰⁸⁹ 24 November 1971, Nr. 272, photo 03684 – FR: [Waffenexport in Dritte Welt versiebenfacht.](#)

¹⁰⁹⁰ 4 December 1971, Nr. 281, photo 03704 – FR: [Hilfe für Befreiungs-Bewegungen.](#)

¹⁰⁹¹ 7 August 1973, Nr. 181, photo 04977 – FR: [SPD stellt sich gegen Portugal auf die Seite der Frelimo.](#)

¹⁰⁹² Clissold, Gillian Rosalind Gunn, [Coercion versus Co-Optation: Western Relations with the MPLA and FRELIMO from 1956 to 1976.](#) ProQuest, Ann Arbor: 2014, 64-95.

¹⁰⁹³ 5 March 1973, Nr. 54, photo 04706 – FR: [Gastarbeiter beschäftigen UN.](#)

¹⁰⁹⁴ 12 January 1974, Nr. 11, photo 05189 – FR: [„Rassismus wird gestärkt.“](#)

¹⁰⁹⁵ 24 January 1974, Nr. 20, photo 05212 – FR: [Gastarbeiterfragen diskutiert.](#)

Wishing to export its radically-conservative version of Islam, the Council drafted plans on creating a network to promote Wahhabism in Europe.¹⁰⁹⁶ Initially the German press' treated the subject as a phenomenon concerning mainly the US, UK, and France,¹⁰⁹⁷ but by the early 1970s, they started publishing more about illegal immigrants in Germany.

Journalists were also gaining an ever greater awareness about the Third World through programs that made it easier to visit developing countries.¹⁰⁹⁸ Increasing anti-racism, migration, and the greater prominence of emancipation movements also caused an often racism-motivated counter-reaction. This in turn made mainstream political rhetoric more anti-nationalist and with an increased focus on the necessity for global understanding. It was in that context that in 1973 Willy Brandt spoke at the UN about the European legacy of “negative nationalism”¹⁰⁹⁹ and development minister Eppler called for teaching children about the necessity to live a life of partnership. Eppler argued that if a billions-strong “proletariat” in the Third World was allowed to form, it may someday rise up and demand what it believes it has been deprived of.¹¹⁰⁰

This attitude was reflected in German parties' nearly consensus approach toward development aid starting in the 1960s. An FR overview of all parties' programs before the 1969 election indicated that all major parties supported providing development aid and in fact SPD and CDU grounded their positions in similar logic: Both parties saw poverty and differences in development levels as risk factors for peace. Both pointed out that developing countries could become Germany's trading partners of tomorrow. FDP argued that development aid should be given without conditions on how to use it and pledged to prioritize countries pursuing a just income distribution. The outliers were the short-lived radical-left party *Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt*, which called for bloc-free global trade and non-self-serving development aid, and NPD whose program did not mention development aid.¹¹⁰¹ FDP's notion that recipients of aid should not be limited by prescriptions on its usage (supported by youth left resolutions), was also eventually adopted by SPD.¹¹⁰² This approach gained popularity in the early 1970s and

¹⁰⁹⁶ 13 June 1973, Nr. 134, photo 04898 – FR: Islam Rat für Europa gebildet.

¹⁰⁹⁷ 1 September 1973, Nr. 203, photo 05018 – FR: Noch gibt es in Frankreich keinen Enoch Powell.

¹⁰⁹⁸ 7 December 1971, Nr. 283, photo 03707 – FR: Presse-Arbeitskreis „Dritte Welt.“

¹⁰⁹⁹ 27 September 1973, Nr. 225, photo 05058 – FR: Kanzler warnt die Welt vor Nationalismus.

¹¹⁰⁰ 8 January 1974, Nr. 7, photo 05185 – FR: Aufruf zur Partnerschaft.

¹¹⁰¹ 23 August 1969, Nr. 194, photo 02027 – FR: Dritte Welt – Partner von Morgen.

¹¹⁰² 11 March 1971, Nr. 59, photo 03198 – FR: Der Dritten Welt droht eine soziale Katastrophe.

the “German concept” for development aid received positive assessments from states, as well as international organizations such as OECD and the United Nations.¹¹⁰³

Media like *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel* were instrumental in the birth of the new way of thinking about the Third World with their coverage, even though there was a discrepancy in how frequently they covered the subject with *Der Spiegel* publishing fewer articles about Third World issues.

4.3. Feminism and Women’s Rights in the Media

In Ch. 3, the relationship between Feminism and the Left was examined, concluding that the Left did not focus on women’s issues throughout most of the research period. As was also the case with gay rights, women’s rights activism started gaining prominence in the 1970s and became one of the leading issues at a later stage, outside of this dissertation’s research period. Here we will look at how the left-leaning media, primarily *Frankfurter Rundschau*, covered women’s issues and interests, thus raising awareness about activists and helping to spread their ideas among the readers of the left-leaning press.

Abortion was the first issue that became a central issue of women’s rights during the research period and it proved to be more contentious and slower to decriminalize than homosexuality. One of the first news in *Frankfurter Rundschau* about this was from 1969 when West Germany reformed its penal code and reduced what FR referred to as “hard” sentences for abortion. This liberalization was part of the same overall reform package that included decriminalizing homosexuality, adultery, extramarital relations, and other anachronistic offenses dating back to the Wilhelmine Period like arranging a duel.¹¹⁰⁴

The initial reforms of 1969 did not go far enough and instead of resolving the abortion issue, it became a primary bone of contention. With its Godesberg transformation, by the mid-1960s SPD had attracted more women as voters and members, including middle class women, but that had not translated into a clear engagement with women’s issues.¹¹⁰⁵ While SPD was more “liberal” than CDU on abortion, its leaders were careful not to alienate the party’s working

¹¹⁰³ 4 January 1972, Nr. 2, photo 03786 – FR: [Lob für Entwicklungspolitik](#).

¹¹⁰⁴ 30 August 1969, Nr. 200, photo 02060 – FR: [\[Title not legible\]](#)

¹¹⁰⁵ Eyssen, Susanne, [Der Aufbruch der Frauen in der SPD: Die Entwicklung der Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft \(ASF\) während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre](#). Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen: 2019, 302.

class electoral backbone whose economically-left inclinations did not necessarily imply support for socially liberal policies. Therefore, a vacuum was opened up for a more progressive approach and it was initially filled by activists and scholars rather than politicians. *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported in April 1970 that 16 law professors had presented their positions against the death penalty and against the criminalization of abortion before federal justice minister Gerhard Jahn (SPD). The proposal envisaged legalizing abortion during the first month of pregnancy or up to the third month if performed by a doctor and after counselling. Later abortions would also be permitted, but only if the mother's life was in danger or in case of major physical or mental disabilities in the embryo.¹¹⁰⁶

The Catholic Church and other conservative circles opposed abortion passionately, often referring to it as “murder”. Illuminating the newspaper's reformist position, *Frankfurter Rundschau* commented that while one side attempted to use rational arguments, the other preferred to resort to emotional argumentation.¹¹⁰⁷ If we compared FR's position to that of *Der Spiegel*, we would see something very similar: *Der Spiegel* referred to the professors' proposal as “sensational by West German standards”, but quite usual compared to the existing conditions abroad. *Der Spiegel (DS)* also covered the Ninth International Criminal Law Congress' (1970) call for states to create legal avenues for termination of pregnancies by 1984.¹¹⁰⁸ Both these newspapers adopted a progressive approach to the decriminalization of abortion, which over time would contribute to raising awareness among socially conservative working class supporters of the Left.

With the SPD leadership sitting on the fence, a 1970 meeting in Frankfurt between the SPD *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Juristen* and Justice Minister Gerhard Jahn turned into a verbal battleground. *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported on the meeting without a hint of support for the minister's position. The article also described a protest action staged by women's rights activists who interrupted the meeting and forced the minister into a dialogue. Despite FR's support for decriminalization, the article's language demonstrates the strength of gender stereotypes that still existed in 1970. While a male delegate who spoke out was designated simply as a “young lawyer”, the text described the women's rights activists as “a

¹¹⁰⁶ 1 April 1970, Nr. 79, photo 02561 – FR: [Abtreibung künftig erlaubt?](#)

¹¹⁰⁷ 27 August 1970, Nr. 197, photo 02840 – FR: [Der Staat hat nicht für die Moral zu sorgen.](#)

¹¹⁰⁸ 24 April 1970, Nr. 18 – *Der Spiegel*: [„Mit Tabus und Vorurteilen Aufgeräumt“](https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45439799.html), <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45439799.html>

pretty blond” or as “young attractive ladies who whistled and hissed in indignation.” With SPD still unprepared to decriminalize, minister Jahn promised a careful analysis of the proposal, but added that in the age of the pill, debating Paragraph 218 was “a little outdated.”¹¹⁰⁹ Thus, Jahn shifted responsibility for handling unwanted pregnancies entirely to women.

By the early 1970s, social change was beginning to come in sharp conflict with traditional church doctrines and while the Catholic Church rejected change, many Protestant denominations welcomed it. The German Protestant Church (EKD) published a book on sexual ethics, which offered a more contemporary assessment of sexual relations based on equality between men and women. Sex in marriage was recognized as more than a means of reproduction and the church recognized that divorce may sometimes be necessary. The Church even left some room for sex between lovers or closely befriended couples depending on a “relationship’s aim.”¹¹¹⁰

Second Wave Feminism, whose starting date is associated with Martha Weinman Lear’s 1968 article “The Second Feminist Wave”¹¹¹¹, published in *The New York Times*, was beginning to reverberate in West Germany. During the 8th DAG Federal Women’s Conference in 1971, the DAG head of women’s affairs argued that women were discriminated against in politics, society, education, and in the workplace.¹¹¹² The labor union gave housewives who did not receive pensions as an example and demanded pensions for women without formal employment who had raised children at home.¹¹¹³ Willy Brandt also spoke at the conference and admitted that women and men were, indeed, still unequal. Pointing out the discrepancy between the constitutional equality and reality, Brandt urged women to be more active in political life and more vociferous in their demands for equality.¹¹¹⁴ This new rhetoric, moving away from the still-unresolved single issue of abortion and toward a more general set of demands, marked a gradual evolution that would become more visible throughout the 1970s.

The period between 1968 and 1971 was also a time when some of SPD’s female members, particularly younger women with Juso membership, began demanding reforming women’s

¹¹⁰⁹ 5 October 1970, Nr. 230, photo 02873 – FR: Der Bundesjustizminister und die Frauen.

¹¹¹⁰ 25 February 1971, Nr. 47, photo 03161-3 – FR: „Sexualität ist mehr als bloße Fortpflanzung“

¹¹¹¹ Lear, Martha Weinman, The Second Feminist Wave. In: *The New York Times*, 10 March 1968, Accessed on: <https://www.nytimes.com/1968/03/10/archives/the-second-feminist-wave.html>

¹¹¹² 24 April 1971, Nr. 95, photo 03301 – FR: DAG: Frauen weiter benachteiligt.

¹¹¹³ 14 June 1971, Nr. 134, photo 03388 – FR: DGB: Rentenanspruch für jede Frau.

¹¹¹⁴ 12 June 1971, Nr. 132, photo 03383 – FR: Frauen sollen Ansprüche anmelden.

work within the party. After a few years of blocking these impulses, Annemarie Renger, chair of women's work at SPD, slowly lost control over the annual *Frauenbundeskonferenz*. The first organizational step was the founding of *Arbeitsgruppe D* and *Arbeitskreis Emanzipation* in 1970, which eventually, in 1971, managed to convince enough delegates to create a women's working group within the party.¹¹¹⁵ These steps would lead not only to the new women's organization, but also to extensive press coverage raising awareness among the general public. The *Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialdemokratischer Frauen* (ASF) elected its first federal leadership in 1973.¹¹¹⁶

1971 was to become a watershed moment for women's activism in Germany not only because of the decisive step to integrate women's activism within SPD, but also because SPD's coalition partner, FDP, joined the debate on abortion. Pressured from the outside (FDP)¹¹¹⁷ and from within, SPD was forced to begin rethinking its careful approach. A competition for progressive leadership on women's issues between the two parties would begin. In 1971, FDP's committee on legal affairs instructed its parliamentarians to support the abortion reform proposed by the 16 professors. While supporting the preservation of future lives, FDP declared they wished to make German law more humane and effective, and end the "humiliation of women."¹¹¹⁸ The left-leaning press was also not making things easier for the SPD leadership. FR actively reported on groups opposing paragraph 218 and on the petitions they circulated throughout the country. Introducing a class slant, petitioners argued that wealthier women could simply travel abroad and "buy abortions", while the poor risked their lives in over one million illegal abortions annually.¹¹¹⁹ With their youth wing backing decriminalization, in June 1971 FDP parliamentarian Liselotte Funcke declared that the party the abortion ban gone during the current legislative period. In case the Social Democrats were unwilling to cooperate, Funcke threatened with introducing an independent FDP amendment.¹¹²⁰

With so much coverage, public opinion in Germany was quickly warming to allowing women greater reproductive rights. In the summer of 1971 FR reported that 46% of Germans supported deleting §218 from the penal code with 39% opposing. Paradoxically, support was higher

¹¹¹⁵ Eyssen, Susanne, *Der Aufbruch der Frauen in der SPD: Die Entwicklung der Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft (ASF) während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre*. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen: 2019, 303-304.

¹¹¹⁶ Eyssen, 173.

¹¹¹⁷ The FDP supported the liberal proposal of the so-called 16 "alternative" professors.

¹¹¹⁸ 5 June 1971, Nr. 127, photo 03369 – FR: FDP greift Initiative „218“ auf.

¹¹¹⁹ 12 June 1971, Nr. 132, photo 03378 – FR: Gegner des Abtreibungsverbots formieren sich.

¹¹²⁰ 14 June 1971, Nr. 134, photo 03384 – FR: FDP notfalls allein gegen §218.

among men (50%) than among women (41%). Age and denomination also played a role with the youth and Protestants being more receptive to legalizing abortion.¹¹²¹ An increasing number of doctors also lent their support: 323 doctors publically came out in favor of a petition, started by the Hamburg illustrated magazine *Stern*, demanding decriminalization and even making the procedure free during the first trimester. That built upon an earlier *Stern* publication about hundreds of women who admitted about having had abortions.¹¹²² These public admissions led to criminal proceedings in some parts of Germany, notably in CSU-governed Bavaria. After police raids in Munich,¹¹²³ famous authors like Ernst Bloch and others¹¹²⁴ declared their support for *Aktion 218* and criticized the Bavarian justice system.¹¹²⁵ 26 Evangelical theologians also joined the pro-abortion side and issued a joint letter against paragraph 218, arguing that what was meant to save lives often destroyed them.¹¹²⁶ *Frankfurter Rundschau* refrained from attacking the SPD position and the church, but its reporting betrayed its solidarity with the campaigners.¹¹²⁷

Nevertheless, the center-right CDU and CSU, as well as the Catholic Church¹¹²⁸, all representing large sections of the German population, remained opposed to decriminalizing abortion. Among the authoritative voices against abortion reform was the German Association of Practicing Doctors, which urged couples to practice safe sex and argued that abortion was an act of murder regardless of when it was performed.¹¹²⁹

With support from so many quarters, the relatively conservative head of women's work within SPD, Annamarie Renger, announced a "combative approach" toward repealing paragraph 218, thus opposing her party.¹¹³⁰ Together with Liselotte Funcke (FDP), Renger demanded that the pill be included on medical prescriptions and provided for free. Most doctors and experts opposed the proposal due to its cost.¹¹³¹

¹¹²¹ 7 June 1971, Nr. 129, photo 03371 – FR: Mehrheit gegen Abtreibungsverbot.

¹¹²² 16 June 1971, Nr. 136, photo 03390 – FR: Ärzte fordern Reform des "218"

¹¹²³ 23 June 1971, Nr. 141, photo 03404 – FR: Um sechs Uhr früh kam die Polizei zu den „218“-Gegnern.

¹¹²⁴ Bernt Engelmann, Max von der Grün, Paul Schallück, Günther Wallraff, Dieter Wellerschoff, and Gerhard Zwerenz.

¹¹²⁵ 28 June 1971, Nr. 146, photo 03407 – FR: Schriftsteller solidarisieren sich mit „Aktion218“.

¹¹²⁶ 5 July 1971, Nr. 150, photo 03424 – FR: Theologen gegen Paragraph 218.


¹¹²⁷ 22 June 1971, Nr. 140, photo 03398 – FR: Millionen werden einmal im Leben "kriminell".

¹¹²⁸ 28 August 1971, Nr. 198, photo 03481 – FR: Kirche sammelt für Paragraph 218.

¹¹²⁹ 26 June 1971, Nr. 144, photo 03406 – FR: „Abtreibung ist Akt der Tötung“.

¹¹³⁰ 23 July 1971, Nr. 168, photo 03446 – FR: Annemarie Renger will kämpfen.

¹¹³¹ 5 August 1971, Nr. ?, photo 03455 – FR: „Kostenlos“ stört Bonns Experten.



Poster protesting the abortion ban, showing Justice Minister Jahn as being pregnant. *Frankfurter Rundschau* (17 November, 1971).

In September 1971, FR reported that federal Justice Minister Gerhard Jahn had decided to reform paragraph 218 by widening the list of legal abortion grounds rather than agreeing to blanket approval during the first trimester.¹¹³² The SPD Bundestag faction discussed the issue that same month. Being evenly divided between the two proposals, SPD parliamentarians agreed that §218 was antiquated and had to be reformed, but stopped short of revoking it.¹¹³³ FR commented that SPD was not divided along a classical Left-Right axis, but between social liberals and conservatives in both wings.¹¹³⁴ The view that this issue was more of a liberal than a left-wing cause illustrates that the transition from Old to New Left was ongoing, but had not yet been fully analyzed and understood. The Jusos' late arrival to the abortion debate (in late-1971, a year after it broke out) also shows that New Left priorities were not automatically part of the radical Left's agenda. Once the trenches had been dug, the Jusos expectedly joined the pro-choice party.¹¹³⁵

While the SPD leadership remained divided,¹¹³⁶ by November 1971, FDP radicalized its position labelling Jahn's proposal a "foul compromise", while the party's youth organization demanded making abortion reform a precondition for renewing the Red-Yellow coalition after the 1973 Bundestag election.¹¹³⁷ With further pressure from *Aktion 218* activists demanding his resignation,¹¹³⁸ minister Jahn announced he was considering a fourth ground for abortion – the so-called "social indication".¹¹³⁹ With its flexible definition, that would nominally maintain the status quo, while in reality legalizing most abortions.

By early spring 1972, an alternative to Jahn's official proposal had been introduced by 31 SPD and 19 FDP parliamentarians led by Hand de With (SPD) and Detlef Kleinert (FDP).¹¹⁴⁰ This

¹¹³² 3 September 1971, Nr. 203, photo 03487 – FR: Jahn entschied gegen „Drei-Monats-Lösung“.

¹¹³³ 30 September 1971, Nr. 226, photo 03547 – FR: Keine Einigkeit über Paragraph 218.

¹¹³⁴ 30 September 1971, Nr. 226, photo 03552 – FR: Ein Riß geht quer durch die Fraktion der Sozialdemokraten.

¹¹³⁵ 3 November 1971, Nr. 254, photo 03630 – FR: Berlins SPD besteht Zerreißprobe.

¹¹³⁶ 19 October 1971, Nr. 242, photo 03590 – FR: SPD fällt die Entscheidung über Paragraph 218 schwer.

¹¹³⁷ 6 November 1971, Nr. 257, photo 03642 – FR: FDP: Jahn fehlt Mut zur Reform des §218.

¹¹³⁸ 25 November 1971, Nr. 272, photo 03689 – FR: Jahn zum Rücktritt aufgefordert.

¹¹³⁹ 12 January 1972, Nr. 10, photo 03807 – FR: Jahn erweitert den Katalog für erlaubte Abtreibung.

¹¹⁴⁰ 3 February 1972, Nr. 28, photo 03893 – FR: Alternativentwurf zu Paragraph 218.

marked a deepening of the social rift, which would be reconfirmed two months later when CDU and dissident SPD members managed to veto Jahn's proposal in the Bundesrat. While CDU opposed Jahn's "fourth indication"¹¹⁴¹ on the grounds that in a welfare state there cannot be such poverty that would force women into abortions, some SPD representatives joined CDU's rejection, because they felt Jahn's reform did not go far enough.¹¹⁴²

More and more, the issue of abortion was merging into an overall Feminist rhetoric that included other aspects of womanhood and emancipation. In April 1972, *Frankfurter Rundschau* published a brief overview of the women's emancipation movement in the context of abortion, arguing that reproductive rights were just one part of a broader emancipation movement. For some women, FR reported, including former SDS members, the struggle for emancipation was connected with the idea of class struggle.¹¹⁴³ Even within SPD, women often felt ignored, but found grounds for optimism in the "global process of politicizing women, [the] stream of politically conscious women heading toward SPD, and also SPD's [increasing] interest in women's votes".¹¹⁴⁴ Signifying women's increasing say on issues pertaining to them, in 1972 the Bundestag decided to include women on the panel discussing abortion reform.¹¹⁴⁵

By the autumn of 1972, CDU had moderated its position and was now willing to allow abortions in extreme cases like rape.¹¹⁴⁶ /By 1973 CDU would also agree to abortions on medical and eugenic grounds.¹¹⁴⁷ Still, that remained far even from Jahn's moderate proposal. Unable to find a solution that would enjoy broad support, Chancellor Willy Brandt announced that abortion reform would have to wait until after the November 1972 elections. The new SPD-FDP government (1973) announced its aim to improve Germany's social climate in order to allow women to make their new consciousness and political engagement more effective.¹¹⁴⁸ Fulfilling Brandt's promise to include more women in government, the new Bundestag was to be presided by a woman, Annemarie Renger, for the first time. This was not welcomed by everyone, including within SPD's ranks. An opinion piece in FR titled "The Male Woman" argued that the "so-called emancipation of women that one wishes to demonstrate with

¹¹⁴¹ 10 February 1972, Nr. 35, photo 03909 – FR: Jahn führ sozialen Indikation ein.

¹¹⁴² 24 March 1972, Nr. 70, photo 04043 – FR: Länder lehnen soziale Indikation für Abtreibung ab.

¹¹⁴³ 11 April 1972, Nr. 84, photo 04080 – FR: Für die Meisten heißt das Motto: Ohne Männer.

¹¹⁴⁴ 13 July 1972, Nr. 159, photo 04301 – FR: Klage über Ohnmacht der Frauen.

¹¹⁴⁵ 29 March 1972, Nr. 75, photo 04050 – FR: Hearing zum Problem 218 im April.

¹¹⁴⁶ 10 November 1972, Nr. 262, photo 04530 – FR: CDU will Paragraph 218 mildern.

¹¹⁴⁷ 12 May 1973, Nr. 110, photo 04858 – FR: Union will eine „Bedrängnisklausel“.

¹¹⁴⁸ 19 January 1973, Nr. 16, photo 04638 – FR: Brandt: Bewährung im Alltag Hauptforderung.

[Renger's] appointment is not in fact a liberation of women [...], but rather the woman's remolding to fit the man's mold."¹¹⁴⁹

By 1973, the new wave had finally reached the Jusos who, at their federal congress, discussed a paper on women's emancipation that spoke of "abolishing traditional role models achieved through gender-specific socialization" and "loosening or abolishing the existing family structure."¹¹⁵⁰ While some of these ideas echoed the Marcusean notions of the need to break down the subtle forms of oppression in contemporary society, they also contradicted his quiet lamentation that contemporary industrial society had broken down the family's authority as a private sphere away from society's total control. They also indicated the wide scope of demands within the emancipation movement.

Shortly after the formation of the new coalition cabinet, in March 1973 SPD and FDP agreed on a joint amendment to the abortion law based on the time period solution.¹¹⁵¹ The government was also to overhaul German family law and remove anachronistic husband privileges like the right to forbid married women to work. The so-called "guilt principle" would also be eliminated, making divorce possible even when a marriage simply was not working.¹¹⁵²

With the reform looming on the horizon, many hospitals declared that it was impossible to force their staff to perform medically unnecessary abortions.¹¹⁵³ In the meantime, media continued exposing Germans to the reality of illegal abortions. After the uproar caused by *Stern* in 1971, three years later the television channel NDR was to shock many viewers with a feature about an actual illegal abortion. The film led to heated debates on media independence between CDU and SPD¹¹⁵⁴ and incited protests by churchgoers.¹¹⁵⁵ Germany appeared to be polarizing on abortion: in 1974 CDU threatened to submit any decriminalization of abortion during the first trimester to the Constitutional Court. That was not surprising considering many Catholic voters were influenced by clergy such as the bishop of Fulda who compared abortion reform plans to the Nazi campaign of murdering "unworthy" individuals.¹¹⁵⁶ In a similar spirit, the

¹¹⁴⁹ 19 December 1972, Nr. 295, photo 04597 – FR: Die „männliche“ Frau.

¹¹⁵⁰ 6 March 1973, Nr. 55, photo 04708 – FR: Jungsozialisten fordern volle Emanzipation der Frauen.

¹¹⁵¹ 21 March 1973, Nr. 68, photo 04744 – FR: Koalitionsparteien befürworten Fristenlösung.

¹¹⁵² 29 March 1973, Nr. 75, photos 04771 – FR: Vorrechte des Mannes in der Ehe werden abgeschafft.

¹¹⁵³ 2 October 1973, Nr. 229, photo 05070 – FR: „Bei Paragraph 218 Rechnung ohne den Wirt gemacht.“

¹¹⁵⁴ 14 March 1974, Nr. 62, photo 05287 – FR: Wehner: Wir meinen es mit der 218-Reform ehrlich.

¹¹⁵⁵ 16 March 1974, Nr. 64, photo 05299 – FR: Justiz geht nicht gegen 218-Film vor.

¹¹⁵⁶ 4 April 1974, Nr. 80, photo 05344 – FR: „CDU gegenüber 218-Reform doppelzüngig.“

head of Germany's Bishop Conference, Cardinal Julius Döpfner, warned that believers might be forced into a conflict of loyalty and criticized even CDU's limited concessions.¹¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless support for reform was increasing and by April 1974, 51% of Germans were already in favor of SPD's so-called "indications solution", 36% supported the more liberal 3-month solution, while only 10% wished to keep the existing law and 3% were undecided.¹¹⁵⁸

By April 1974, the *Fristenmodel* and the CDU proposal were left as the last two finalists for the Bundestag to decide between. 245 parliamentarians supported the SPD-FDP proposal against 219 who voted for CDU's proposal. The Christian Democrats criticized Brandt for ultimately supporting the time period solution in 1974 after having initially spoken in favor of the indications solution before the 1972 election.¹¹⁵⁹ While it was adopted by the Bundestag with absolute majority, CDU declared it would appeal the reform in the German Constitutional Court.¹¹⁶⁰ The Court eventually struck it down in 1975 and in 1976 the Federal Republic adopted a hybrid law, which was closer to Jahn's original proposal and therefore more acceptable to the Christian Democrats.

Germany was not alone in debating abortion reform during the period. By 1970, many US states were allowing abortion under different conditions, but in 1973 the Supreme Court's *Roe vs. Wade* ruling created a unified baseline. Such developments made Germany's activists see the country's compromise solution as being far from a real win. The ongoing heated debates contributed to intensifying society's focus on women's rights. The increasing participation of women in the workforce, also in academia where progressive ideas were popular, helped build bridges between women's rights and socialism, contributing to the genesis of a new wave of Feminism that demanded more than voting rights and equal pay. Marcuse's idea of the alternative revolutionary and his validation of free sexual expression also contributed to this mindset, at least indirectly. So did left-leaning media like *Frankfurter Rundschau*, but also *Stern* and others, who regularly brought news about women's activism to the broader public, preparing them to mainstream these ideas.

¹¹⁵⁷ 18 April 1974, Nr. 90, 05357 – FR: [Kirche gegen jede 218-Reform.](#)

The Cardinal supported allowing abortion only when the mother's life was in danger.

¹¹⁵⁸ 11 April 1974, Nr. 86, photo 05352 – FR: [Bischöfe bekräftigen Nein.](#)

¹¹⁵⁹ 27 April 1974, Nr. 98, photo 05376 – FR: [Brandt für die Fristenlösung.](#)

¹¹⁶⁰ 11 June 1974, Nr. 133, photo 05442 – FR: [CDU-Spitze will Verfassungsklage.](#)

The level of societal interest in abortion reform helped propel it to the status of a “hot revolutionary” subject “worthy” of the Jusos and other youth left organizations. Women, themselves, demanded more rights within SPD leading to the founding of *Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft Sozialdemokratischer Frauen* in 1972. More radical circles were founded which claimed men enjoyed privilege and demanded examining that along with women’s emancipation.¹¹⁶¹ The idea of deconstructing the Patriarchy gradually gained popularity from the 1970s onward.¹¹⁶² While radical youth movements initially ignored the abortion debate and women’s emancipation, they would soon integrate these issues, contributing to a New Left transformation where class conflict would be enriched by gender-based and other types of conflict. Bending before inside and outside pressure, SPD also evolved toward more progressive positions on women’s rights, opening a new chapter of SPD’s post-Godesberg transformation.

4.4. Gay Liberation in Germany, the Left, and the Media

The section on “Gay Liberation and the Jusos” in Chapter 3 examined the development of Gay rights activism within the West German youth left scene and concluded that this activism gained momentum after the end of this dissertation’s research period in 1974. It was during the late 1970s that the Left gradually evolved toward prioritizing issues of personal liberation, identity, and the environment. The Juso and APO archives yielded no evidence of Gay rights advocacy during the 1960s beyond the push to decriminalize homosexuality, which however was part of a wider reform of the sexual delicts in the penal code and were not framed within a gay liberation discourse. Other sources preserve some information about post-war gay scenes in some bigger German cities, as well as activists, scattered between several different cities and lacking central organization.¹¹⁶³ Despite the deeply conservative and closeted atmosphere of the post-war years, with §175 StGB not actively enforced, gay men felt some sense of comfort compared to the years under Hitler. This would change with an unexpected wave of trials against alleged homosexuals, undertaken in Frankfurt in 1950 and 1951, leading to over 200 men being charged.¹¹⁶⁴ Having resulted in a wave of domestic criticism and international

¹¹⁶¹ 3 August 1974, Nr. 176, photo 05532 – FR: Nachdenken über Emanzipation.

¹¹⁶² Eyssen, Susanne, Der Aufbruch der Frauen in der SPD: Die Entwicklung der Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft (ASF) während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen: 2019, 93.

¹¹⁶³ Rupp, Leila J., The Persistence of Transnational Organizing: The Case of the Homophile Movement. In: *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 116, No. 4, 2011, 1019.

¹¹⁶⁴ Ridley, Hugh, Law in West German Democracy: Seventy Years of History as Seen Through German Courts. Brill, Leiden: 2019, 113.

outry, this dark episode of the Federal Republic's early history, seemed nevertheless to have stunted Germany's gay community for much of the 1960s.

After decriminalization in 1969 and likely inspired by the Student Movement in Germany and the Stonewall riot and subsequent activism in the US, minimal Gay rights activism in West Germany began in the early 1970s, usually overlapping with the Left milieu, but remaining a separate and seemingly small single-issue movement. While the left-wing scene may have been more open and accepting of homosexuality, throughout the early 1970s gay rights were neither within the focus of the Jusos, nor of any other mass organization among those loosely orbiting around or formally connected to SPD. Starting in 1971, the archives mention organizations like the *Homosexual Liberation Front Berlin* and the *Homosexuelle Aktion Westberlin*, the latter having cooperated with SEW, West Berlin's branch of the East German SED, as well as with DKP. As a reaction to the strongly politicized nature of this first gay organization, the *Allgemeine Homosexuelle Arbeitsgemeinschaft* was founded in 1974 as a less ideological organization fighting for gay rights. It would, however, not be until after the end of this research period that an SPD-affiliated gay organization, *Schwusos* (1978), was finally founded (see Ch. 3).

While *Frankfurter Rundschau* does not reveal any evidence of gay rights activism before the end of the research period, everything has to start somewhere. Therefore, it is still worthwhile to examine the coverage of homosexuality and society's attitudes toward it in the left-leaning press from that period – specifically *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel*. The first instance of an LGBT topic appearing in *Frankfurter Rundschau* was in 1968. The newspaper included a brief article, titled “Ehmann remains VDS-Chairman.”¹¹⁶⁵ It was about a minor scandal concerning one of the candidates running for head of the German Student Union (VDS); Ehmann had concealed a prior conviction for homosexuality from his time in military service. The left-leaning student organization's leadership was unanimous in expressing its disapproval of Ehmann's decision to conceal his record. Nevertheless, they opted in favor of letting him keep his position despite having, as a *Bundeswehr* lieutenant, “attempted a homosexual act in drunken stupor” with a corporal under 21, leading to a 4 week prison sentence and probation. FR reported VDS's position that this was not an act “disqualifying” one from leading.

¹¹⁶⁵ 27 March 1968, Nr. 74, photo 00616 – FR: [Ehmann bleibt VDS Vorsitzender](#)

Considering FR's detailed coverage of student organizations, their relatively brief coverage perhaps betrayed a certain bashfulness or self-censorship on a subject that must have been considered awkward. In comparison, *Der Spiegel* and *Die Zeit* covered the issue in greater detail. *Die Zeit* had published a rather sympathetic text supporting Ehmann.¹¹⁶⁶ The author criticized the New Left for its limited interest in the individual. He argued that students seemed to prefer protesting foreign issues rather than addressing "much more tangible repression, which affects every one of them here and now." The author listed abortion, adultery, pornography, homosexuality, and other "German laws mostly stemming from the 19th century... which affect pupils and students very personally." The author urged VDS to discuss the issue carefully and asked rhetorically whether all of Ehmann's positive qualities were suddenly gone now that something has come out about him.

Der Spiegel, on the other hand, attacked the students for "being more like their fathers" than they cared to admit, labelling them manipulative and bourgeois.¹¹⁶⁷ *Der Spiegel* cited – ironically – the VDS Control Board's (ÜPA) statement about the issue having been "exaggerated because the usual - stuffy - moral concept based on outdated views still reigned supreme." The magazine argued that the VDS left wing attempted to relativize the "affair" in the style of "Marx, Mao and Marcuse" by saying that having been an officer was a "bourgeois puberty phenomenon" and that "even a murderer could hold the position after finishing his prison term." Perhaps not wanting to place themselves in the camp of the "morally stuffy", *Der Spiegel* only took issue with the deceit, adding that the fact "that paragraph 175 was outdated was self-evident to all delegates."

By the end of the 1960s the Sexual Revolution was in full swing, every social and political norm was seemingly questioned by the '68 generation, and even behind the Iron Curtain, the socially conservative communist states had decriminalized homosexuality by 1968 (1961-Hungary; 1962-Czechoslovakia; 1967-England and Wales in Western Europe; Bulgaria and GDR-1968). That made it almost impossible for socially liberal publications to argue in favor of anything else. All three left-leaning newspapers expressed sympathy with the individual facing pressure due to his documented homosexual experience. While at that point

¹¹⁶⁶ 29 March 1968, Nr. 13 – *Die Zeit*: [Christoph Ehmann als einzelner](https://www.zeit.de/1968/13/christoph-ehmann-als-einzelnr), <https://www.zeit.de/1968/13/christoph-ehmann-als-einzelnr>

¹¹⁶⁷ 1 April 1968, Nr. 14 – *Der Spiegel*: [Studenten/Ehmann-Affäre Fröhlich Urstand](http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46093982.html), <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46093982.html>

none of these media defended homosexuality as something normal or even fully acceptable, the texts make it obvious that the authors and editors regarded the criminalization of homosexuality as anachronistic and obsolete.

The issue of homosexuality appeared again in FR some months later, in September 1968, in the context of the push to liberalize West Germany's morality laws.¹¹⁶⁸ Perhaps an unlikely source of progressive ideas during the 1960s, *Frankfurter Rundschau* reported that CDU's youth organization *Junge Union*, had in 1968 proposed decriminalizing homosexuality, along with adultery, running a bordello, and artificial insemination. Considering that the fulfilment of a sexual orientation had been lumped together with a medical procedure and two questionable behaviors, the proposal was likely dictated by pragmatism and a desire to catch up with the times rather than by an active emancipatory attitude. The FR article did not delve into further details about JU's proposal, but laid out an even more ambitious proposal by 16 professors who were proposing decriminalizing: sodomy (*Unzucht zwischen Männern*), procurement of women (*Kuppelei*), procurement (*Zuhälterei*), incest (*Blutschande*), adultery (*Ehebruch*), production and distribution of lewd objects and publications (*Herstellung und Vertrieb unzüchtiger Sachen und Schriften*), striptease (*unzüchtige Schaustellungen*), as well as advertising contraceptives and protection against STIs (*Werbung für Mittel zur Verhütung von Geschlechtskrankheiten oder der Empfängnis*). The article clarified that while the legal experts did not consider all these behaviors to be permissible, they did not believe criminalization realistically led to prevention.

As far as the proposal to decriminalize homosexuality, which was listed first, "according to the authors, standard homosexuality does not injure any legal value that ought to be guaranteed with the help of the Penal Code." Moreover the professors asserted that "the state's condemnation of homosexuals" contradicted the principle of tolerance and stood on questionable premises. They argued that "the true dangers in this area were covered well enough by the laws on sexual duress and on the protection of youths." The authors nevertheless believed performing sexual acts with persons aged 14 through 18 should remain illegal, but supported decriminalizing sexual acts between men aged 18 through 21. All this suggests that while an emancipatory gay movement was still absent, many liberal-minded experts and the

¹¹⁶⁸ 2 September 1968, Nr. 203, photo 01053 – FR: [Ehebruch soll straffrei bleiben.](#)

left-leaning media had a tolerant attitude by the standards of the time and wished to follow the liberal *Zeitgeist*.

At the 47th Congress of German Jurists, Mannheim state prosecutor Barbara Just-Dahlmann called for sex to be removed from the penal code altogether, as had been done in Scandinavian states. She suggested that immorality should be addressed through spiritual rather than punitive means.¹¹⁶⁹ According to Just-Dahlmann, there were a number of other immoral things falling outside the scope of sexuality, such as lying before parliament or killing in military conflict. She called on the German lawmakers to immediately decriminalize “standard homosexuality” (*einfachen Homosexualität*) by amending the existing penal code. Just-Dahlmann stated that she “felt cold horror when thinking of this society’s attitudes” and shared a moving story about having to make 112 phone calls to 68 companies in order to help a gay medical-technical assistant find work. Even those who were publicly arguing in favor of homosexuality still regarded it or felt the pressure to label it “immoral”.

FR noted that some legal experts like Prof. Lackner from Heidelberg spoke against Just-Dahlmann’s “sharp formulations” and decried “the push” to legalize everything the “Sexual Revolution” had brought about. He argued this trend would result in a purely material view of sex, as well as a crumbling of the distinction between man and beast. The existence of such views in the mainstream show why those arguing in favor of decriminalization had to moderate their argumentation. SPD Bundestag member Adolf Arndt, one of the party’s top legal experts, praised the reform proposal by the 16 legal experts in his lecture on law in an open society. He made the point that value judgements should not inform a free society’s penal code.

The issue was covered again during the spring of 1969 in an FR article, discussing CDU’s plans for the upcoming electoral campaign. The party’s spokesperson Rathke pointed out that CDU’s program must be very different from that of SPD, even though he argued CDU had acquired a “liberal face.” He exemplified that point by adding that “no one among us would **still** today come to the idea to incite the people against homosexuals, which according to the public opinion might be possible.” Instead, CDU should present itself as a party that guarantees the peace, order, and security. According to the political analyst Radunski, CDU wished to

¹¹⁶⁹ 19 September 1968, Nr. 217, photo 01103 – FR: [Bonner Entwurf mutet pervers an.](#)

demonstrate a “limited courage for change.”¹¹⁷⁰ This, along with JU’s proposal, shows that CDU had also undergone some evolution on the subject of gay rights during the 1960s.

1969 was a notable year for gay rights in West Germany, being the year when homosexuality was officially decriminalized. *Der Spiegel* published a lengthy analysis arguing that the new law needed to prove itself as an adequate replacement for “a century-old law”. The changes were based on “knowledge, objectivity, and tolerance, rather than metaphysics, emotion, and paternalism.” In other words, decriminalizing homosexuality was part of a larger push to modernize the German system of criminal law in the enlightened spirit of the times, not a result of gay rights activism or greater acceptance specifically for homosexual men.¹¹⁷¹

Decriminalization still left aspects of inequality based on sexual orientation in the penal code. Some of the provisions previously under §175 were retained, which left the age of consent for homosexuals at 21 while that for heterosexuals was 14. Furthermore homosexual prostitution remained criminalized along with actual crimes like the exploitation of dependency (i.e. in an employment setting).¹¹⁷²

In 1973, the SPD-FDP coalition reformed this law further, leaving a discriminatory disparity only in the age of consent for homosexuals (lowered to 18). The issue did not feature prominently in the media, but *Frankfurter Rundschau* mentioned it in a positive context, arguing that while many had demanded reform for years, the actual changes finally started happening under SPD ministers. The backlash, mostly on the Catholic Church’s part, focused on abortion and pornography, issues that CDU also opposed at the Bundestag.¹¹⁷³ Among that “list of sins”, homosexuality seemed to take lower precedence. The lack of active opposition against decriminalizing homosexuality demonstrates that by the early 1970s most of German society realized that this could not be a crime.¹¹⁷⁴

¹¹⁷⁰ 23 April 1969, Nr. 94, photo 01672-3 – FR: Ruhe, Ordnung, Sicherheit und Kanzler.

¹¹⁷¹ 5 May 1969, Nr. 19 – *Der Spiegel*: „Der Grosse Sprung findet nicht Statt“, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45741508.html>

¹¹⁷² Davy, Zowie, Julia Downes, Lena Eckert, Natalia Gerodetti, Dario Llinares, and Ana Cristina Santos, Bound and Unbound: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Genders and Sexualities. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne: 2002, 141–142.

¹¹⁷³ 5 March 1971, Nr. 53, photo 03184-5 – FR: Sexualstrafrechts-reform bleibt umstritten.

¹¹⁷⁴ 27 August 1970, Nr. 197, photo 02840 – FR: Der Staat hat nicht für die Moral zu sorgen.

The early 1970s also marked the beginning of a change in the Protestant Church's (EKD) perception of sexual orientation. Ahead of other religions and denominations, but of course, more conservative than the changing spirit of the times in Western countries, EKD published a new manual, discussing marriage, abortion, sex, and also mentioning homosexuality. The text sought to take a "middle ground" by the standards of the 1970s, arguing that homosexuality should not be condemned as something going against nature and worthy of punishment, but also stating that EKD viewed it as a sexual defect (*Fehlform*) and warning that it should not be "idealized".¹¹⁷⁵ Rather progressive for a religious institution in the early 1970s, it could be argued that together with some of the press, EKD helped pave the way for acceptance of gay people in Germany.

The media coverage of this subject suggests that in terms of gay liberation, this dissertation's research period covers three chronological segments: the first was until 1969 when repealing the ban on homosexuality was the only gay issue in the public discourse and one that was often diluted as part of the discourse on broader reforms; the second period stretched between 1969 and 1973 and saw the emergence of small gay organizations, often aligned with the radical left. During this period calls were made for a complete elimination of the unequal penal provisions for heterosexuals and homosexuals. The third period was after 1973 when the penal code was overhauled again, more or less eliminating the criminalization of being gay. That is also when the first large and visible non-partisan gay organization, *Allgemeine Homosexuelle Arbeitsgemeinschaft*, was founded. Five years later, in 1978, *Die Schwusos* would also be founded as SPD's first gay working group. That opened new avenues for more visible forms of the LGBT activism we know today. As discussed earlier, however, it was not until the 1980s that bi and trans people joined gay activist forums and began their struggle for equality.¹¹⁷⁶

Some left-leaning media played an important role in raising awareness of the difficult circumstances gay men still lived under in Germany during the 1960s. Surprisingly or perhaps demonstrating an Old Left approach, FR which had been much less critical of the youth Left's radicalism, rarely discussed the challenges faced by the gay community and generally reported on issues matter-of-factly, refraining from much commentary. *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, published over 120 articles mentioning homosexuality until 1970 and over 200 more between

¹¹⁷⁵ 25 February 1971, Nr. 47, photo 03161-3 – FR: „Sexualität ist mehr als bloße Fortpflanzung“.

¹¹⁷⁶ Eyssen, Susanne, *Der Aufbruch der Frauen in der SPD: Die Entwicklung der Frauenarbeitsgemeinschaft (ASF) während der 1970er und 1980er Jahre*. Verlag Barbara Budrich, Opladen: 2019, 104.

1970 and 1980. Some of these were supportive of individuals like Christoph Ehmann, discriminated against due to their sexuality, while others were powerful wake-up calls for society such as a 1969 article quoting the philosopher Hans Joachim Schoeps' remark that for gay people "the Third Reich still has not ended," offering examples ranging from police harassment to attacks by "rocker" gangs.¹¹⁷⁷ The willingness of many to support their own human rights and the rights of others, as well as the media who covered issues of sexuality neutrally to sympathetically contributed to a new phase of visible activism that would lead to a rethinking of stereotypes and equality regardless of sexual orientation.

4.5. Tolerance, Media, and Political Correctness

In Chapter 3, a section on tolerance examined SPD's record with tolerance in the context of the German Emergency Acts, co-decision, as well as their attitude toward the far-right NPD and the media. This section examines SPD's and the youth left's attitudes toward the expelled question, NPD, Axel Springer, as well as anti-nationalism based mainly on the coverage of these topics in two left-leaning print publications – *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel*. Therefore this section examines not only SPD and the youth left through coverage in more or less sympathetic media, but also the coverage itself as a force that could influence societal attitudes.

The Expellees

The issue of expellees (*Vertriebene*) from the former German territories lost to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia after World War Two illustrates how SPD, influenced by a combination of pressure from the youth left and the requirements of its new *Ostpolitik*, performed a political U-turn, completely changing its attitude toward expellees. The change was so radical that it could be said SPD went from championing the expellee issue under Kurt Schumacher (who was born in West Prussia) to completely dissociating from it. A cluster of organizations, closely associated with all major parties, but especially SPD through a network of overlapping memberships, was gradually abandoned by the Social Democrats, leaving these organizations to pivot toward the party's main mainstream rival CDU and to eventually drift,

¹¹⁷⁷ 11 May 1969, Nr. 20 – Der Spiegel: Späte Milde, <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/spaete-milde-a-2be75b59-0002-0001-0000-000045741408>

in some cases, into the hands of the far-right. This section examines a few high profile instances of the expellee issue's media coverage.

In 1963, the Hamburg-based television channel NDR aired a documentary about Breslau (Wrocław) and the expellees who had left it. Expellees were invited to call in and say whether they would like to return. In the 1950s many expellees still felt a general desire to return. The passage of time, leading to better integration in the Federal Republic and generational change, as well as the post-1956 thaw making it possible to visit the old *Heimat* and becoming disillusioned with the reality there, reduced most expellees' desire to return.¹¹⁷⁸ That is why asking such a question on TV in 1963 was provocative. Unsurprisingly, many said they would not go back, contradicting a key claim of expellee organizations and the German government alike. This prompted the black-yellow coalition government to criticize NDR, arguing that the station was not entitled to conduct such "quasi-plebiscites." Expellee unions led by SPD members also criticized the documentary as naïve and pro-communist.¹¹⁷⁹ FR, on the other hand, asked in its coverage whether Breslauers were expected to keep quiet about their true feelings. This example from the beginning of the research period illustrates the apparent broad consensus on the subject of expellees and their right of return, but also the beginning of skepticism among left-leaning media.

To the extent that there were shades of difference between the positions of the political parties, it was CDU that initially seemed softer: in August 1963, the Union of Expellees warned against the CDU government's rapprochement efforts with the Eastern Bloc, which it believed threatened expellee interests.¹¹⁸⁰ Konrad Adenauer had made a point of being receptive to expellee organizations as they were initially a serious electoral force in the Federal Republic, but he is thought to have been skeptical of their seemingly unrealistic broad demands.¹¹⁸¹ The Union of Expellees' position was covered sympathetically by *Frankfurter Rundschau* whose reporting at that time was relatively supportive of the expellee positions. *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand had no qualms about embarrassing the organization. Interviewing Union of Expellees leader Hans Krüger (CDU), the magazine did not shy away from uncomfortable

¹¹⁷⁸ Demshuk, Andrew, What Was the 'Right to the "Heimat"?' West German Expellees and the Many Meanings of 'Heimkehr.' In: *Central European History*, Vol. 45, No. 3, 2012, 550-553.

¹¹⁷⁹ 10 May 1963, Nr. 108, photo 07141 – FR: Müssen Breslauer schweigen?

¹¹⁸⁰ 13 August 1963, Nr. 185, photo 07252 – FR: Bund der Vertriebenen warnt.

¹¹⁸¹ Ahonen, Pertti, Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era. In: *Central European History*, Vol. 31, No. 1/2, 1998, 48.

questions such as why the reporter behind the NDR show had been assaulted at an expellee gathering.¹¹⁸²

In 1964, an SPD Bundestag member, Wenzel Jaksch, was elected to lead the Union of Expellees.¹¹⁸³ The organization once again criticized the CDU government for its willingness to accept the Oder-Neiße border and for not demanding the right of return to Jaksch's home region, Sudetenland. Parallel with the emerging *Vertriebene*-fatigue and the gradual shift in SPD's attitude toward the expellees, some of their organizations at the local level, especially those of the Sudeten and Silesian Germans, were beginning to show signs of radicalization and contacts with the *National-Zeitung*,¹¹⁸⁴ which was heavily criticized in newspapers like *Die Zeit* for its statements that many saw as borderline Holocaust denial.¹¹⁸⁵ As the two large parties were seeking rapprochement with Germany's Eastern Bloc neighbors, which presupposed West German recognition of the post-war borders, it seemed that the expellees were running out of allies. When Franz Josef Strauss spoke in their support in July 1964, *Der Spiegel* criticized him for allegedly raising the threat of war and giving arsenal to the propaganda of communist states by depicting Germany as a "revisionist" power.¹¹⁸⁶

FR reported on an SPD memorandum from January 1965, which called for working toward peace treaties with Germany's eastern neighbors based on the country's 1937 borders.¹¹⁸⁷ The newspaper did not seem to differ and neither did Willy Brandt when he stated that no *Deutschlandpolitik* could be made behind the backs of expellees and refugees.¹¹⁸⁸ What seemed on the surface as an "idyllic" consensus between the mainstream parties, most media, and the expellees changed after SPD joined the CDU-led Grand Coalition with Willy Brandt as foreign minister.

¹¹⁸² 3 July 1963, Nr. 27 – Der Spiegel: „Die Heimat schreit nach uns“, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45144061.html>

¹¹⁸³ 2 March 1964, Nr. 52, photo 07478 – FR: Jaksch Präsident der Vertriebenen.

¹¹⁸⁴ 8 August 1964, Nr. 182, photo 07761-2 – FR: Erhard will Vertriebene anhören.

¹¹⁸⁵ 8 September 1967, Nr. 36 – Die Zeit (Dietrich Strothmann): Angeklagt: die National-Zeitung, Gerhard Frey – des deutschen Spießers liebstes Kind, <https://www.zeit.de/1967/36/angeklagt-die-national-zeitung/komplettansicht>

¹¹⁸⁶ 8 July 1964, Nr. 28 – Der Spiegel: Die unblutige Revanche, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46174138.html>

¹¹⁸⁷ 25 January 1965, Nr. 20, photo 07972 – FR: SPD veröffentlicht Memorandum.

¹¹⁸⁸ 28 June 1965, Nr. 146, photo 08251 – FR: Brandt: Deutschlandpolitik nicht ohne Vertriebene.

At the SPD party congress in Dortmund in June 1966, Brandt officially announced a new position and argued that Germany needed to accept the Oder-Neiße border to reassure Eastern Europe that the “nightmare of German revisionism” was gone, shattering the false communist narrative of the Iron Curtain’s “protective function”. Only then could Germans hope for reunification, but only with the territories currently inhabited by Germans, i.e. with East Germany. Brandt also added that by recognizing a border West Germany did not control, Bonn was underscoring the unitary nature of the two German states; Brandt also added that expellees should not enjoy the “privilege of special political sensitivity.”¹¹⁸⁹ Thereafter SPD attempted to strong-arm the unwilling Union of Expellees into supporting the new *Ostpolitik* through administrative pressure like cutting the Union’s federal funding for the Day of the Homeland. The Union did not budge. FR reported that NPD offered half of that amount, but the Union wisely rejected the offer.¹¹⁹⁰

The SPD’s U-turn was ultimately set in stone in 1970 when the Brandt-led SPD-FDP coalition government began signing a string of treaties with the USSR and other East European states. Unsurprisingly, the expellee organizations turned on Brandt as a “traitor”. The new policy was supported by much of the German press, but also received glowing reviews abroad. The foreign press recognized that “the final relinquishing of one quarter of German territory must be painful for the Germans and especially for the expellees,” but that there is “no other way out of the vicious circle of retribution and hate.”¹¹⁹¹

Illustrating the soured relations between the Social Democrats and expellees, in December 1970 FR reported about the SPD mayor of Neumünster cutting off the free telephone line and funding for the local expellee organization after their newsletter published an offensive text about the Chancellor.¹¹⁹² This kind of tensions remained in place, leading to a distancing between SPD and the expellees. In 1972, one of the leading expellee activists, parliamentarian Herbert Hupka, switched from SPD to CDU on account of *Ostpolitik*.¹¹⁹³

¹¹⁸⁹ 3 June 1966, Nr. 127, photo 08851 – FR: SPD diskutiert über Ostgrenze.

¹¹⁹⁰ 20 August 1970, Nr. 191, photo 02828 – FR: Vertriebene zunehmend unzufrieden.

¹¹⁹¹ Püllen, Kurt, Echo der westlichen Presse auf die Ostpolitik der Bundesregierung. In: *Osteuropa*, Vol. 21, No. 6, 1971, 437.

¹¹⁹² 4 December 1970, Nr. 281, photo 03012 – FR: Vertriebenen das Telefon gesperrt.

¹¹⁹³ 2 March 1972, Nr. 52, photo 03979 – FR: Wehner: Ostverträge sind nicht gefährdet.

In May 1972, the Federal Parliament in Bonn ratified the treaties, signed earlier with the USSR and Poland, thus recognizing Germany's existing post-war borders. This development was strongly criticized as a "step back" by expellee leader Czaja (CDU).¹¹⁹⁴ The Federal Republic also recognized East Germany or the GDR. 1972 was also the first year when the federal funding for expellee organizations was not to increase,¹¹⁹⁵ signaling the break with the SPD-led government. Media like *Frankfurter Rundschau* remained closer to the party line on this issue, thus contributing to the perhaps inevitable break between the left and the expellees. Others like *Der Spiegel* were openly hostile foreshadowing the relative delegitimizing of expellee demands in German society from the 1970s onward.

Axel Springer

Among the first instances when the Springer publishing house was mentioned on the pages of *Frankfurter Rundschau* within the research period was in an article from December 1964 discussing a *Bild* piece filled with *Schadenfreude* about tensions between Hamburg SPD activists and Helmut Schmidt.¹¹⁹⁶ The populist Springer press appeared to dislike the left and often looked for ways to make SPD look bad, while also trying to attract readers through low-quality, but catchy articles. This was the context in which the conflict between the youth Left and Springer was to develop, but it was to truly explode after the Shah's state visit in 1967 and the subsequent shooting by a policeman of the young protester Benno Ohnesorg. It was at that point, in June 1967, that the German Student Union (VDS) accused the Springer press together with the police for the murder, connecting it to their "systematic terrorizing of the students."¹¹⁹⁷ Left-leaning newspapers like FR would, of course, become a platform covering the protests against Springer's conglomerate.

These sentiments continued to fester throughout the summer, but remained mostly "on hold" during much of the summer break with large-scale Anti-Springer protests resuming as the semester began in October. With intellectuals such as the writers' union *Gruppe 47*¹¹⁹⁸ calling for boycotting Springer, SDS announced it was planning an Anti-Springer Day that would entail blockading Springer's newspaper distribution in West Berlin and six other key cities.¹¹⁹⁹

¹¹⁹⁴ 19 May 1972, Nr. 115, photo 04180 – FR: „Ratifizierung schwerer Rückschlag“

¹¹⁹⁵ 20 June 1972, Nr. 140, photo 04250 – FR: Haushaltsmittel für Vertriebene werden nicht erhöht.

¹¹⁹⁶ 3 December 1964, Nr. 281, photo 07886 – FR: Kontroverse um Helmut Schmidt.

¹¹⁹⁷ 6 June 1967, Nr. 128, photo 09668 – FR: VDS ruft zum Vorlesungsstreik auf.

¹¹⁹⁸ 10 October 1967, Nr. 235, photo 00017 – FR: SHB lobt Anti-Springer Erklärung

¹¹⁹⁹ 7 September 1967, Nr. 207, photo 09901 – FR: SDS plant Anti-Springer-Tag.

SDS's newly elected leadership reconfirmed its aim to "expose and destroy (*zerschlagen*) the Springer concern"¹²⁰⁰ and further protests against Springer were announced.¹²⁰¹ Against that backdrop, The German Press Council, which had previously criticized *Springer Verlag* on specific issues, now criticized the students and SDS whose protests they saw as illegal and intended to "crush the Springer concern."¹²⁰² Raising tensions further by creating an impression of collusion with CDU, at the height of the protests *Der Spiegel* accused the vice-president of the Schleswig-Holstein Landtag Schwinkowski (CDU) of having an advising contract with Springer. Schwinkowski denied the allegation,¹²⁰³ but it led to the end of his political career.¹²⁰⁴

As a speaker at the so-called Critical University had pointed out, authoritarian journalism (as Springer's press was labelled) "molded society's consciousness" in an authoritarian direction.¹²⁰⁵ Considering this view was shared by many, the 1968 assassination attempt on Rudi Dutschke further exacerbated the anti-Springer frenzy. The students recalled Springer's numerous calls for the student protests to be stamped out (*ausmerzen*), which was viewed as having possibly incited Rudi Dutschke's assassin to pull the trigger. (As was discussed earlier, Springer's coverage of Dutschke was, indeed, filled with derision.) SDS and left-wing students demonstrated in front of the Springer skyscraper in West Berlin, chanting "Springer – Murderer", throwing rocks at the foyer, and even setting 5 trucks on fire. Two youths were run over by a newspaper delivery truck while the police had to use its water cannons to disperse the crowds. Days later, about 10 000 youths protested in a number of German cities blocking the delivery of Springer newspapers for hours. The publisher expressed his "extraordinary regret" that "local authorities [were] only very hesitantly prepared to secure the delivery of the newspapers by force."¹²⁰⁶ This moderate attitude was also reflected in the small fines that were imposed on protesters convicted of illegal activities.¹²⁰⁷ A judge in Frankfurt proclaimed that the protests were not to be "condemned" as illegal, because Springer's concentration of titles posed a risk to press freedom.¹²⁰⁸ While appearing to side with the protesters, FR also reported on Springer's positions.

¹²⁰⁰ 11 September 1967, Nr. 210, photo 09911 – FR: Vom „Parteiersatz“ zur Bewegung.

¹²⁰¹ 23 October 1967, Nr. 246, photo 00063 – FR: Erst auf dem „Ku-Damm“ gab's Verletzte.

¹²⁰² 18 October 1967, Nr. 242, photo 00041 – FR: Presserat rügt den Springer-Verlag.

¹²⁰³ 19 October 1967, Nr. 243, photo 00042 – FR: „Kein Vertrag mit Springer“.

¹²⁰⁴ 12 November 1967, Nr. 47 – *Der Spiegel*, Absolute Ruhe, <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/absolute-ruhe-a-1e9a9b5c-0002-0001-0000-000046209448>

¹²⁰⁵ 2 November 1967, Nr. 218, photo 00081 – FR: „Kritisch Universität“ startete.

¹²⁰⁶ 16 April 1968, Nr. 89, photo 00706 – FR: Schwere Unruhen in vielen Städten.

¹²⁰⁷ 18 May 1968, Nr. 116, photo 00848 – FR: Nur Geldstrafen beantragt.

¹²⁰⁸ 11 March 1969, Nr. 59, photo 01542 – FR: „Springer gefährdet Pressefreiheit.“

Just about all major left and liberal-oriented youth organizations – VDS, SDS, SHB, HSU, and LSD – appealed to the labor union of printers *IG Druck und Papier* to stop printing Springer’s newspapers.¹²⁰⁹ Unlike the printers’ union, which rejected the call, the left-leaning press clearly sided with the protesters. *Frankfurter Rundschau* accused the publisher of using provocateurs to start a smear campaign against the students.¹²¹⁰ Similarly, *Der Spiegel* published a number of letters Dutschke had received after the assassination attempt, many blaming Springer.¹²¹¹ An editorial in SPD’s *Vorwärts*, written by the general editor Jesco von Puttkamer, also argued that the Springer newspapers had contributed to an emotional tarring of Dutschke and his supporters as “*untermenschen* and outsiders.”¹²¹² Both publications expressed understanding for the protesters’ positions, but also criticized the protesters for resorting to violence. This was especially the case with *Der Spiegel*, which published a number of skeptical articles about the protesters, labelling them “red students” following “their prophet Marcuse”.¹²¹³

Springer retaliated not only on the pages of his publications, but also in the courts. Future RAF terrorist Horst Mahler, then a young lawyer who had advocated violence against Springer and had led a group throwing Molotov cocktails and rocks, was sued for a quarter million DM of damages.¹²¹⁴ Society was divided between these extremes: Günter Grass, for instance, called for SPD to leave the Grand Coalition and for Wehner and Kiessinger to resign. He criticized SDS’s violent approach and urged Springer to voluntarily transfer some of his core publications to a public holding whose board Springer would sit on.¹²¹⁵

SPD had been pressured to take a stand against Springer from the start.¹²¹⁶ But the party did not react immediately and waited tactically until it had won the 1969 election before taking on the press conglomerate. After the Berlin senate had concluded that Springer’s 69.7% share of the press in Berlin did not endanger press freedom¹²¹⁷, in early 1970 SPD announced an internal review of Springer’s business. The party would review newspaper articles from Springer’s

¹²⁰⁹ 17 April 1968, Nr. 89, photo 00709 – FR: [VDS sieht „beispiellosen Zynismus“](#).

¹²¹⁰ 12 February 1968, Nr. 36, photo 00395 – FR: [Berlin: eine Stimmung wie im „heißen Sommer.“](#)

¹²¹¹ 17 June 1968, Nr. 25 – *Der Spiegel*: [„Mir war, als hätte ich die Kugel im Kopf“](#), <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46039628.html>

¹²¹² 17 April 1968, Nr. 89, photo 00719 – FR: [Nervosität in Bonn über Unruhen](#).

¹²¹³ 24 June 1968, Nr. 26 – *Der Spiegel*: [Zur Sonne](#), <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-46020891.html>

¹²¹⁴ 25 April 1968, Nr. 97, photo 00760 – FR: [Springer fordert 250 000 Mark](#).

¹²¹⁵ 3 May 1968, Nr. 104, photo 00794 – FR: [Grass: Große Koalition kündigen](#).

¹²¹⁶ 18 September 1968, Nr. 217, photo 01102 – FR: [SPD soll „Bild“ nicht drucken](#).

¹²¹⁷ 24 April 1969, Nr. 95, photo 01670 – FR: [Berlins Senat will nichts Anstoßen](#).

newspapers looking for “certain opinion manipulations.” The SPD leadership even considered founding a new national newspaper to create a counterbalance against Springer.¹²¹⁸ This led to counter-accusations by Springer’s newspapers, some of which were outlandish. *Der Bayernkurier*, for instance, compared SPD to Joseph Goebbels.¹²¹⁹ The party’s press office did not help alleviate the controversy when it expressed scathing criticism of *Bayernkurier*, *ZDF-Magazin*, and columnist William S. Schlamm,¹²²⁰ leading to mutual accusations with CDU on the two parties’ commitment to media freedom.¹²²¹

In February 1970, SPD presented at the Bundestag its report on Springer’s bias against the party and Willy Brandt personally.¹²²² CDU sided with Springer, accusing the government’s spokesperson and former *Der Spiegel* and *Frankfurter Rundschau* journalist Conrad Ahlers (SPD) of having partially excused the attacks against the Springer publishing house in 1969.¹²²³ When questioned about his newspapers’ willingness to publish letters urging violent suppression of protesters, Springer claimed he rarely read the letters.¹²²⁴

A few months later, Springer retaliated against the government. *Die Welt* and *Bild* published the leaked text of the somewhat contentious and still unsigned treaty settling the border issue between Germany and the USSR. Foreign Minister Walter Scheel commented that publishing the text was politically insignificant and could only embarrass Germany.¹²²⁵ FR commented that Springer’s newspapers *Bild* and *Die Welt*, the illustrated *Quick*, as well as Gerhard Löwenthal’s television show *ZDF-Magazin* attacked the government’s “negotiations with the East” employing “intentional indiscretions” such as the treaty leak.¹²²⁶

In September 1974, FR reported on a German Press Council statement that criticized a number of articles, mostly in Springer newspapers, which sensationalized a murder case involving a lesbian by stressing her sexuality in their headlines despite it playing no role in the murder.¹²²⁷ Springer’s problematic role on the German media landscape was thus multifaceted. It combined

¹²¹⁸ 23 January 1970, Nr. 19, photo 02391 – FR: [SPD läßt Springer-Blätter untersuchen.](#)

¹²¹⁹ 29 January 1970, Nr. 24, photo 02408 – FR: [CSU sieht die SPD „wie Goebbels“ gegen die Presse wüten.](#)

¹²²⁰ 3 February 1970, Nr. 28, photo 02421 – FR: [SPD setzt Presseattacken fort.](#)

¹²²¹ 4 February 1970, Nr. 29, photo 02423 – FR: [Wischniewski widerspricht Heck.](#)

¹²²² 20 February 1970, Nr. 43, photo 02455 – FR: [Bundestag debattiert über Fehde Ahlers/Springer.](#)

¹²²³ 21 February 1970, Nr. 44, photo 02457 – FR: [Bundesregierung nimmt Ahlers in Schutz.](#)

¹²²⁴ 5 March 1970, Nr. 54, photo 02499 – FR: [Axel Springer distanziert sich.](#)

¹²²⁵ 12 August 1970, Nr. 184, photo 02804 – FR: [Regierung verurteilt Indiskretion.](#)

¹²²⁶ 26 October 1971, Nr. 248, photo 03611 – FR: [Es begann mit den Bahr-Papieren.](#)

¹²²⁷ 26 September 1974, Nr. 223, photo 05608 – FR: [„Bild“ und die „lesbischen Frauen“.](#)

a dominant position on the market¹²²⁸ with what many viewed as low quality sensational journalism and hate mongering.

In addition to Springer's more or less objective faults, Axel Springer himself was a staunch anti-communist, which further amplified the radical youth Left's intense dislike for him and his media. Left-leaning media like *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel* reported on anti-Springer demonstrations and initiatives professionally, but the wording of their coverage often betrayed a high degree of dislike for Springer and sympathy with his opponents. This did not change that fact that *Der Spiegel* was also very critical of the young radicals and FR faithfully reported on the SPD leadership's criticism of radical statements and actions. Their coverage ultimately raised the profile of the radical Left by giving them a respectable platform. While individuals like Dutschke called for measures against Springer that echoed Marcuse's *Repressive Tolerance*, the left-leaning press did not directly support measure that could be viewed as censorship.

Attitudes toward the Far-Right (NPD) and Combatting Intolerance

Karl Popper's Paradox of tolerance mandates that an open society must reserve the right to be intolerant toward those who reject tolerant values. This counter-intolerance, however, is to be used as a last resort when the intolerant reject reasonable discussion and turn to violence. Herbert Marcuse, on the other hand, made a far more radical argument in his essay on *Repressive Tolerance*, urging against tolerating what was not Left, even when it was only problematic by radical-left standards. The radical youth Left appeared closer to Marcuse's approach in its attitude toward the Springer press, as well as toward expelled activists after the start of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Strangely enough, there seemed to be "relative indifference" among APO circles and their sympathizers on the youth Left toward NPD. It has been argued that this was due to the radical Left viewing the Federal Republic or "*Notstandsstaat*" as already "fascist" without parties like NPD which could only embarrass it.¹²²⁹

Unlike the radical Left, the Left-leaning press valued the Federal Republic's democratic system and scrutinized the far-right whose potential regrowth on Germany's political landscape was

¹²²⁸ 9 October 1974, Nr. 234, photo 05621 – FR: [Tageszeitungen formieren sich gegen Springer](#).

¹²²⁹ Shell, Kurt L., [Extraparliamentary Opposition in Postwar Germany](#). In: *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4: 1970 669.

considered a serious risk. One of *Frankfurter Rundschau's* first articles, dealing with intolerance during the research period, illustrates the context for these concerns. The newspaper rang the alarm bells about the Arab League's bureaus spreading Neo-Nazism and supporting far-right journalists in Germany¹²³⁰ due to their anti-Semitic perspective. This illustrates the context of West German society's legitimate concerns about a revival of antisemitism.

During the same year, 1965, FR also covered an SPD parliamentarian's concern about a far-right newspaper, *Das deutsche Wort*, which to the newspaper's dismay was both subsidized by the Federal Press Service and was distributed in *Bundeswehr* barracks.¹²³¹ The newspaper's wording suggested that it shared these concerns about the state unwittingly providing financial support to extremist media, which were also trying to undermine German soldiers' commitment to democracy.

It was in that context that many throughout Germany's mainstream political spectrum felt worried about the emergence of NPD in 1964 and its initial energetic growth.¹²³² Media like *Frankfurter Rundschau* would regularly cover developments about a possible NPD ban. In January 1966, for example, FR reported that FDP's vice-chairman felt confident that the government had amassed sufficient documentation to petition the courts to ban NPD.¹²³³ In the meantime von Thadden's party appeared to be in good electoral health, managing to enter the Hessen Landtag in late 1966 with about 8% of the votes.¹²³⁴ The discussions on banning NPD continued throughout 1967, with the interior minister of Rheinland-Pfalz announcing his intention to initiate steps to have the NPD investigated and potentially banned as anti-constitutional.¹²³⁵ In addition to SPD and FDP, the CDU leadership was also worried about NPD's rise and considered electoral reform as a way of eliminating the party.¹²³⁶ Ultimately, the party would never be banned.

Measures were taken, however, against individuals and media, associated with NPD. In 1969 the government threatened to cut its paid subscription to a Munich information agency, because

¹²³⁰ 14 April 1965, Nr. 88, photo 08107 – FR: Fördert Araberliga Neonazismus?

¹²³¹ 5 June 1965, Nr. 129, photo 08223 – FR: Geld für Rechtsradikales Blatt.

¹²³² Berg, Anna, Electoral Strategy or Historical Legacy? The CDU's Reactions to Far-Right Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1964–1990. In: *Social Science History*, Nr. 46, 2022, 537.

¹²³³ 7 January 1966, Nr. 5, photo 08518 – FR: Bonn will NPD verbieten lassen.

¹²³⁴ 8 November 1966, Nr. 260, photo 09200 – FR: von Hase: noch kein Verbot der NPD erwogen.

¹²³⁵ 21 September 1967, Nr. 219, photo 09948 – FR: Mainz erwägt Schritte gegen NPD.

¹²³⁶ Berg, 537-540.

of its contract with the NPD-friendly *National-Zeitung*.¹²³⁷ Similarly, a proposal to award a local NPD leader with the German cross for merits met with serious pushback,¹²³⁸ even though he technically fulfilled the criteria. Administrative measures were also taken in 1974 against a Hamburg judge and NPD member who had authored an article denying that Auschwitz had been a death camp.¹²³⁹ Even though the *Radikalenerlass* had been in force since 1972, this judge was only subjected to a pay cut. That case exemplifies the conundrum of how far tolerance ought to be extended toward the intolerant and toward propagandistic positions – a question that is still discussed today.

An even more complicated aspect were individuals committed to liberal democracy who had in the past been, in one way or another, connected to the Nazi regime. This issue was further complicated by East Berlin and Moscow using the “ex-Nazi card” as a propaganda tool against Bonn. A prominent example from 1966, covered by FR, was the Soviet smear campaign against the Grand Coalition¹²⁴⁰ and chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger.¹²⁴¹ Claims about Kiesinger’s past had previously forced Konrad Adenauer to personally defend him against the accusations of collaboration. German writer Günter Grass, who decades later acknowledged his own brief involvement with *Waffen SS*, issued an emotional letter in 1966 imploring Kiesinger to give up the position due to his former NSDAP membership.¹²⁴² The case of Kiesinger demonstrated the complex situations that could arise when principled positions of people on the Left coincided with and were encouraged by the Soviets, because they were useful to their own propaganda purposes. The left-leaning press was perhaps not as critical as it could have been when reporting on such allegations.

By the late 1960s, one of the core APO organizations, SDS, declared a boycott on what they labeled the “Nazi generation.”¹²⁴³ Their attention was not focused on far-right politicians like NPD. Instead they focused on German and US government policies, as well as on more and less significant politicians and academics belonging to the center-right. In 1968, *Res Nostra*, the student magazine at Kiel University, demanded that Prof. Karl Redecker face consequences for his regime-friendly intellectual activities during the Third Reich. After the war, Redecker

¹²³⁷ 4 February 1969, Nr. 29, photo 01444 – FR: [Ahlers kündigt Untersuchung an.](#)

¹²³⁸ 29 March 1969, Nr. 75, photo 01598 – FR: [NPD will Orden für Faßbender.](#)

¹²³⁹ 4 May 1974, Nr. 103, photo 05383 – FR: [NPD-Richter wird Gehalt gekürzt.](#)

¹²⁴⁰ 30 November 1966, Nr. 278, photo 09249 – FR: [Osten glaubt nicht an neue Politik.](#)

¹²⁴¹ 21 December 1967, Nr. 296, photo 00265 – FR: [Wohlwollen für Rechtsradikale.](#)

¹²⁴² 2 December 1966, Nr. 280, photo 09266 – FR: [von Hase: Grass appelliert an Kiesinger.](#)

¹²⁴³ 1 February 1968, Nr. 27, photo 00356 – FR: [Studenten: Aufstand gegen die Nazi-Generation.](#)

who had joined CDU, held high positions at the university and was a member of the clergy.¹²⁴⁴ The radical left seemed to view such individuals who had changed colors after the war with more disdain than those who openly expressed far-right sentiments. While the left-leaning press problematized NPD, it appeared to be sympathetic to these sentiments, as evidenced by FR reporting on the SDS-Redecker tensions under the title “As professor, politician, and preacher – unbearable.” This openness among the left-leaning press was at least in part due to a generational change that had already been taking place in the media.¹²⁴⁵

During this dissertation’s research period, starting roughly two decades after the end of World War Two, NPD was problematic enough to cause concern in Germany. At the same time, the nationalist party did not seem radical enough to warrant a ban as anti-constitutional. Nevertheless, many on the Left along with left-leaning newspapers like FR heavily problematized NPD, thus supporting a line of relative intolerance toward it. *Der Spiegel*, on the other hand, seemed to be more neutral toward the party, for instance covering Adolf von Thadden’s gaffes and antics together with those of SPD politicians.¹²⁴⁶ Nevertheless the magazine clearly and accurately labelled NPD as a “radical-right” party and exposed its connections to the NS-regime¹²⁴⁷ without instilling a sense of constitutional emergency and moral contempt that was evident in *Frankfurter Rundschau*’s coverage.

Beyond the concerns about far-right political parties and media, the left-leaning press cooperated with government attempts to promote tolerance and understanding. The first instance of *Frankfurter Rundschau* discussing the concept of intolerance within the research period was in a 1963 story about the US Field Service, which offered student exchanges aiming to broaden students’ horizons and combat “intolerance and prejudice.”¹²⁴⁸

At the same time, newspapers like FR seemed open to supporting the fight against other kinds of intolerance and extremism such as racism. Efforts to overcome real or perceived racism, however, could lead to censorship: in 1966, the German-Israeli Student Group at *Freie*

¹²⁴⁴ 4 January 1968, Nr. 3, photo 00297 – FR: „Als Professor, Politiker und Prediger untragbar.“

¹²⁴⁵ von Hodenberg, Christina, *Mass Media and the Generation of Conflict: West Germany’s Long Sixties and the Formation of a Critical Public Sphere*. In: *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2006, 371.

¹²⁴⁶ 20 September 1971, Nr. 40 – *Der Spiegel*: Personalien, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-43078827.html>

¹²⁴⁷ 10 February 1969, Nr. 7 – *Der Spiegel*: Du voll Unendlichkeit, <https://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-45789207.html>

¹²⁴⁸ 25 April 1963, Nr. 95, photo 07122 – FR: [Gegen Intoleranz und Vorurteil](#).

Universität Berlin urged West Berlin's mayor to ban the film *Africa Addio*,¹²⁴⁹ which they argued was racist. While this was not successful, the cause was picked up by the broad student left, which succeeded in forcing most Berlin cinemas to give up screening the film through boycotts and threats. This attitude was later displayed in the form of rioting during a court proceeding against an activist.¹²⁵⁰ Attempts to silence one's opponents were also made against the radical left: for example, in 1967 the court ruled that West Berlin advertising bureaus were not obligated to accept orders for posters opposing the Emergency Acts.¹²⁵¹ Similarly, in 1964 the rector of Marburg University cracked down on left-wing students who had published critical information and a rude cartoon about a law professor, accused of collaborating with the Nazis.¹²⁵² In both these instances FR called out these approaches for being "censorship" and imposing "taboos."

The early 1970s saw the birth of left-wing terrorism in West Germany, a very violent form of intolerance. In 1972, Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher reported 555 "radical left-wing terrorist" incidents, about 5 times more than the number of far-right "excesses." These 555 cases included 10 murders, 29 explosions, and 40 arsons.¹²⁵³ Some left-wing figures appeared tone-deaf in their handling the emergence of far-left terror. A prominent example was the problematizing of whether the Baader-Meinhof terrorists should be referred to as a "group" or a "gang". The writer and Nobel prize laureate Heinrich Böll, for instance, criticized internal affairs senator Heinz Ruhnau (SPD) in an open letter to the Bundestag Presidium due to his statement (in connection with the RAF manhunt) that a "decadent bourgeoisie" supported the terrorists. Böll accused Ruhnau of discrimination based on political positions and of "anti-constitutionally" slandering groups of people with a nebulous "radicalism label." The letter was supported by 14 writers including Alfred Andersch, Ernst Bloch, Uwe Johnson, Wolfgang Köppen, and Paul Schallück.¹²⁵⁴ Many prominent left-wing individuals like Jean-Paul Sartre and Daniel Cohn-Bendit decided it would be appropriate to visit Andreas Baader in jail. Such instances of relativizing a very real form of terror forced the SPD-FDP coalition government to consider criminalizing the "propagating of violence."¹²⁵⁵ This could also be viewed as a form

¹²⁴⁹ 10 August 1966, Nr. 183, photo 09021 – FR: [Neuer Wirbel um „Africa addio“.](#)

¹²⁵⁰ 20 January 1968 – Berliner Morgenpost: [Wieder Krawall](#), Accessed on: <https://www.medienarchiv68.de/#/medienarchiv/wieder-krawal>

¹²⁵¹ 18 April 1967, Nr. 91, photo 09562 – FR: [Berlin darf Plakate zensieren.](#)

¹²⁵² 24 February 1964, Nr. 46, photo 07479 – FR: [Professoren-Vergangenheit für Studenten Tabu?](#)

¹²⁵³ 7 June 1972, Nr. 129, photo 04211 – FR: [Grenzen der Freiheit.](#)

¹²⁵⁴ 19 June 1972, Nr. 139, photo 04233 – FR: [Ruhnau antwortet Heinrich Böll.](#)

¹²⁵⁵ 27 November 1974, Nr. 275, photo 05677 – FR: [Wird „Propagierung von Gewalt“ unter Strafe gestellt?](#)

of censorship or political correctness. The state also attempted to curb extremism with its 1972 *Radikalenerlass*, which prevented extremists from working in certain professions. FR reported that when it elected its new leadership, The Federation of Democratic Scholars (BDW) complained of discrimination due to the laws limiting extremists in the workplace.¹²⁵⁶

Media that were spreading hate as a way of attracting a wider readership were also curbed using all the instruments of the state. For instance, in 1972 CDU claimed that the government had involved BND in preparing the prosecution's case against *Bauer Verlag*, the publisher of *Quick*.¹²⁵⁷ *Quick* was later also sued for inciting hate after publishing an article about guest worker's children who, it was claimed, would start attacking Germans with knives once they grew up.¹²⁵⁸ Positive measures to ensure media diversity were also taken. For instance, CDU in Hessen proposed financial measures to help struggling newspapers.¹²⁵⁹

Unlike the radical Left, *Frankfurter Rundschau* did not ignore the risks associated with NPD. Its concerns were based on an understanding of West Germany's democratic nature, and understanding that many on the radical Left did not share. FR, however, covered relatively uncritically, both the smear campaigns against West Germans fed by the East, as well as the attempts to problematize criticism of those who aided the RAF terrorists. While both sides of the political spectrum occasionally employed the courts or boycotts to impose their values, FR was less critical of the Left's attempts at censorship. Such techniques gained popularity during the research period and left-leaning newspapers like *Frankfurter Rundschau* unwittingly aided this trend by not exposing it as a matter of principle.

Conclusion

This chapter mirrored the topics explored in Ch. 3, but analyzed them in the context of their coverage in the left-leaning press, primarily *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel*. Their coverage was also occasionally contrasted with that in *Springer* publications. Basing this chapter on the press, along with other sources, provided a more complete understanding of the social and political context of the events, previously discussed in relation to decisions of the SPD leadership or Juso activism documented in their publications, brochures, and programs.

¹²⁵⁶ 18 June 1974, Nr. 138, photo 05455 – FR: Wissenschaftler sprechen von Diskriminierung.

¹²⁵⁷ 15 September 1972, Nr. 214, photo 04402 – FR: [not legible] was völlig harmloser Vorgang.

¹²⁵⁸ 7 December 1973, Nr. 285, photo 05148 – FR: „Quick“ wird der Volksverhetzung beschuldigt.

¹²⁵⁹ 7 January 1974, Nr. 5, photo 05183 – FR: CDU will Hilfe für Zeitungen.

Mirroring most sub-sections in Ch. 3, this chapter looked at overall political radicalization, women's/Feminist activism, Gay activism, the issue of foreigners and guest workers, as well as the freedom of the press and political approaches that could in some ways be compared to later "political correctness." The press coverage suggests that youth left-wing organizations did undergo notable shifts and so did SPD. For example, with the radicalization of the youth, but also with *Ostpolitik* at the official level – contacts with Eastern Bloc organizations became acceptable and were no longer discouraged. That was also the case with recognizing the border status quo east of the Federal Republic; solidarity with the expellee demands was transformed from political common sense to being viewed as borderline-*rechtsradikal*. Youth organizations became increasingly radical in their ideology and rhetoric – from an initial period of demanding nuclear disarmament and contacts with communist organizations, they began to reject conscription, developed a staunch anti-Americanism in the context of the Vietnam War, and fostered lines of communication with left-wing, but also anti-Semitic organizations such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Many demanded nationalization of branches of the economy and some shared the communist idea of STAMOKAP or "State monopoly capitalism." With the shooting of student protester Benno Ohnesorg and SDS leader Rudi Dutschke, the students also turned against the populist tabloid press, particularly the Axel Springer publishing house, and employed violence in their opposition. This line of behavior was seemingly inspired by Marcuse's idea of *liberating tolerance*. The rightful opposition against erstwhile Nazis was sometimes used by the Soviet Union to serve its own propaganda. SPD constantly attempted to discipline and reign in its youth, but feared drawing a dividing line and alienating the youth.

Advances in other countries in relation to women's and gay rights also made an impact on West Germany, as did the increasing number of *Gastarbeiter*. These topics were not initially of great interest to the Left, but the newspaper articles covered in Ch. 4 draw a picture of how these priorities were gradually adopted and would eventually become part of a transformed New Left's ideological inventory. Perhaps Marcuse's idea that Third World peoples and minorities were among the true contemporary agents of revolution also influenced the Left in awakening an interest in these groups. In all three cases legal changes were made in German law that had direct effect on the lives of women, gay people, as well as foreign workers and their families. In some cases the Left also attempted to impose its positions on society employing lawsuits, protests, boycotts, which were often reasonable, but could be read as early examples of left-oriented political correctness.

Frankfurter Rundschau's coverage demonstrated an adherence to center-left politics, but without unquestioned loyalty to the SPD leadership. The newspaper sometimes published commentary, critical of the radical left-wing youth, but demonstrated an unstated sympathy and support for it by covering every initiative, statement, congress, and protest of youth left-wing organizations ranging from those close to SPD to those on the far-left. This coverage was mostly factual – without explanation or commentary – allowing the reader to draw his conclusions, but perhaps helping the radicals spread their ideas by providing frequent and respectable coverage. While it did not actively oppose radicalism, FR also did not seem to actively support liberal human rights causes during the research period. *Der Spiegel*, perhaps by virtue of its different format covered far fewer news about the radical Left than FR. Despite Conrad Ahler's connection to SPD, *Der Spiegel* was not as directly connected to the party and its coverage of the Left could be skeptical. Its coverage of the Far-Right was, similarly, less declaratively negative, even though *Der Spiegel* did not fail to objectively label radicals as such. At the same time, *Der Spiegel* was noticeably more supportive of human rights causes such those as that having to do with gay rights in West Germany.

Both of these media exemplified a new critical journalism in West Germany, which was partially brought about by a generational change taking place in editorial offices during the 1960s. The coverage that FR and *Der Spiegel* offered, helped shape German political discourse in addition to covering it. Thus, they were not only passive bystanders, but also active subjects in the dissemination of ideas and the shaping of the *Zeitgeist* of the 1960s and 70s, which SPD also molded to some degree through their reformist efforts in government.

Chapter 5

Multiculturalism and Political Correctness: Marcuse's Legacy in Contemporary Open Societies

5.1. Multiculturalism as a Contemporary Reflection of Marcuse's Notion of Alternative Revolutionary Forces

Building upon the discussions of Herbert Marcuse's book *One-Dimensional Man* and his notion of *alternative revolutionary forces*, analyzed as a micro unit-idea and then traced in terms of its reception by the German Left during the period 1963-1974, a pertinent question to ask is whether Marcuse's notion could be viewed as a precursor (or in any way connected) to the contemporary concept of a multicultural society. Did Marcuse's notion really give rise to it or are the two unrelated? What are the overlaps between the two notions? Perhaps some elements of Marcuse's commentary about language or expressions of sexuality could be associated with later developments seen as building blocks of a multicultural political worldview? Finally, this section will briefly look at the question of whether Marcuse's notion of alternative revolutionary forces still holds true in today's developed Western societies, such as the United States or Germany.

It may be argued that Marcuse's ideological aim (c. 1960s), which had an impact on his academic work, could be summarized by the opening point of his written address to the 1966 Socialist Scholars Conference. In it, Marcuse states that the *first "task of the Socialist scholar today" is not to try and make Marxian concepts fit reality, but "to recognize and understand this development in its contradiction to the original concepts, and to explain the reason for this contradiction."*¹²⁶⁰ That could be considered the basic assumption and aim of his academic thinking and research, culminating in 1964 with the redefinition of Marx's concept about the forces of revolution. This formulation also demonstrates Marcuse's political commitment to socialism outside of academia.

In the years after publishing *One-Dimensional Man*, perhaps influenced by the tumultuous politics of that period, Marcuse's views seem to have become more radical while still adhering

¹²⁶⁰ Statement for Socialist Scholars Conference, *Herbert Marcuse*, September 1966, p. 8-10, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1438.1

to the same general line, presented in *One-Dimensional Man*. For instance, in December 1968 Marcuse encouraged political radicalism by stating that the New Left could not be a political party as opposition from established society was too strong. Instead, “the so-called philosopher of the New Left [...] called on American students and leftists to ‘develop political guerilla forces to advance what he calls libertarian socialism.’” These *political guerilla forces* would be “small local groups operating independently of each other [that] can encourage political ferment and can associate themselves with restless students, racial disorders and other disturbances to foster what he calls ‘true socialist traditions.’” The report quoting Marcuse’s statement also recounted that he had pointed to China, Cuba, and Vietnam as examples of states building such traditions and opposed them to Stalinism and the “post-Stalinist brand.”¹²⁶¹

In addition to his general support for the New Left and the radical politics of the 1960s and 70s, Marcuse was vociferous in lending his support to specific topical causes of that period. An example was his solidarity with the civil rights activist Angela Davis. Therefore, while Marcuse was not a leading figure in the Civil Rights movement per se, he could be seen as a part of it. Similarly, Marcuse was supportive of anti-war campaigns or those for the rights of women. While these causes are unquestionably respectable today, they were contentious in Marcuse’s day, which meant that supporting them lent him additional credence with the radical youth.

Marcuse’s overt support for the idea that existing society ought to be replaced with a different social order (as opposed to reforming society), as well as his willingness to discuss justifications for violence, made him many enemies. Those ranged from average people and the mainstream political Right, including The American Legion, then-governor of California Ronald Reagan, and other conservatives, to extremists like the KKK. Some of these people and organizations even campaigned in 1969 against renewing Marcuse’s contract at UCSD (which was renewed annually due to his post-retirement age). As California Republican Senator Clair W. Burgener exclaimed, “the attempt at social change by Dr. Marcuse’s methods will destroy

¹²⁶¹ [Herbert Marcuse statement from December 1968](#), *Copley News Service and Associated Press*, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2001.27



our system and our society.”¹²⁶² Marcuse generated so much attention that when he was finally rehired, that made first page headlines in some California newspapers (left).

All this illustrates the fact that, on one hand, Marcuse proposed something incomparably more radical than what we would, today, call a multicultural society and his radicalism was met with a strong backlash. On the other hand, in practice he also supported a number of “softer” specific causes of liberation that were topical during the 1960s and 70s and that could be viewed as some of the building blocks of the more inclusive, less discriminatory liberal pluralist society, offering a richer palette of personal expression of people belonging to different groups, that started forming during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In making himself known as a supporter of these causes he attracted further attention to his writings among some of the activists or supporters of these causes. Therefore, as a person, he was part of the movement that led to changes in society even if he was not necessarily at the forefront and even if these changes went in a different direction from the revolution he argued for in *One-Dimensional Man*.

Did Marcuse’s notion of alternative revolutionary forces, proposed in *One-Dimensional Man*, make any important contributions to the cause of Multiculturalism or give rise to that concept? Eric Weitz and Martin Jay who were interviewed as part of this research project both reject the idea of an ideational connection between the two: Weitz argues that the answer is “no, because multiculturalism is too vague, too varied, and very easily adaptable to all sorts of political ideologies and systems.”¹²⁶³ Jay goes as far as labeling them as opposites:

I think they are the opposite. The revolutionary class argument was a residue of a quasi-Leninist notion that there should be a single agent of history, a universal meta-subject which could be embodied in a vanguard party allegedly representing its true class consciousness. Multiculturalism, in contrast, is a pluralist notion of the value of particular groups coming together in contingent ways to bring about change. It eschews the substitutionism inherent in the search for a single revolutionary subject.¹²⁶⁴

¹²⁶² Sen. Burgener joins critics of Marcuse, *Evening Tribune*, February 1969, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 2020.89

¹²⁶³ Interview with Eric D. Weitz conducted as part of this research project. Full answer in text.

¹²⁶⁴ Interview with Martin Jay conducted as part of this research project. Full answer in text.

I would agree that these arguments are correct, but would nevertheless argue that Marcuse's notion of alternative revolutionary forces did make one important contribution to the emergence of the multicultural society. Simply put, Marcuse's big contribution with *One-Dimensional Man* was in **giving agency to people who had previously been looked down upon or at least—seen as passive victims that lacked significance**. Marcuse did this in two ways: firstly he announced the death of the Marxist idea that the proletariat was the agent of change. He demonstrated—more convincingly to some than to others—that the working class in America and other developed countries had, in fact, come to be too invested in a social order that was satisfying its (false) needs. Harking back to the pre-war observation that the working classes often chose to support Fascist rather than socialist forces, Marcuse rebranded workers the “conservative popular base”. In this way Marcuse contributed to a change in thinking that countered the unfavorable hierarchical perception of minority groups.

Marcuse argued that it was below the working class stratum where the new forces of revolution could be found. That was the “substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the unemployed and the unemployable.”¹²⁶⁵ Referring to the United States in the 1960s, it was clear that African Americans were a core demographic within this list. Hippies, young political radicals, as well as other young people belonging to 1960s counter-cultures were also part of this group. In West Germany Marcuse was recognized by the radical youth Left as one of the new intellectual authorities among the older generation. While Marcuse did not necessarily mention the women's or gay rights movements directly, his formulations encouraged the women's liberation movement to define women who still faced forms of discrimination as a minority group. The same could be said about gay people and anyone who could be seen as marginalized by the *One-Dimensional* society.

Of course, societal developments are multifaceted and are never caused by only one factor, but a combination of factors. With the objective increase in the living standards and the attainment of greater democratic and labor rights in the West, it was only natural that the Left lost a major political theme. Where extreme poverty remained, it was much more associated with minority groups and marginalized communities; as society progressed toward the resolution of issues higher up in the hierarchy of human needs, the Left reinvented itself as a champion of the

¹²⁶⁵ Marcuse, Herbert. *One-Dimensional Man*, 260.

environment, human rights, and specific rights of minorities or “other oppressed groups”¹²⁶⁶, while the Right attempted to cement its hold over sections of the working class by focusing on social conservatism. In West Germany and other European countries, this process was enhanced by the demographic changes, involving the importation of workers from a number of developing European and non-European countries. In an interview, given as part of this research project, Eric Weitz points out that one of the reasons for the emergence of new social movements in the 1970s was that “they addressed what in English are called ‘quality of life issues’ [...] and that was certainly the thrust of so much of Marcuse’s writings. Of course, he would be contemptuous of much of what passed and passes for „quality of life,“ but his concern with individual liberation echoes through these movements nonetheless.”¹²⁶⁷ While Marcuse stressed the idea of liberation in *One-Dimensional Man*, it is likely that he had also contributed to the causes like sexual liberalization—granting it socio-political legitimacy—with his notion from *Eros and Civilization* (1955) that sexual repression was—contrary to Freud—not required for civilization to exist, but only necessary for the cause of domination.

It remains an open question to what extent Marcuse’s ideas came to be adopted by mainstream Left or Liberal parties or whether individual causes, influenced by Marcusean concepts, were supported on an ad-hoc basis due to the grassroots support they were receiving. Weitz, for example, states that “to the extent that they [referring to movements supporting individual liberation and “quality of life” issues] have influenced the Democratic Party in the United States, one can also see Marcuse’s influence there.”¹²⁶⁸ While Marcuse’s ideas probably did penetrate the Democratic Party, Martin Jay, highlights that they certainly did not do so under a Marcusean label: “His critique was too totalistic and his pedigree too radical to have had much

¹²⁶⁶ [Interview with Martin Jay conducted as part of this research project.](#) Full question and answer:

Q: To what extent did Marcuse’s focus on fringe groups lend moral credit to the struggle of Black Americans for civil rights, but also ethnic/racial minorities in general (including more favorable treatment of *Gastarbeiters* in Germany)?

A: Marcuse shared with many on the left a growing recognition that the workers movement was no longer at the center of progressive politics, and would have to be supplemented or even replaced by other oppressed groups. He was not, however, really in the forefront of the Civil Rights struggle or the Woman’s Movement or Gay Liberation, although he certainly came to understand their importance.

¹²⁶⁷ [Interview with Eric D. Weitz conducted as part of this research project.](#) Full question and answer:

Q: “Do you think that the influence of his ideas was limited to radical youth movements and never expanded beyond them into mainstream center-left/social democratic parties?”

A: “I believe his ideas expanded further. While there are many reasons for the emergence of the new social movements in the 1970s, certainly one of them is that they addressed what in English are called „quality of life issues.“ And that was certainly the thrust of so much of Marcuse’s writings. Of course, he would be contemptuous of much of what passed and passes for „quality of life,“ but his concern with individual liberation echoes through these movements nonetheless. And to the extent that they have influenced the Democratic Party in the United States, one can also see Marcuse’s influence there.”

¹²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

of a chance of influencing a mainstream American party. His intransigent utopianism had little chance of getting a hearing in a party that sought to gain real power.”¹²⁶⁹ It did, however, get a hearing among the youth, especially on American campuses. That is why some of the initial issues referred to as “Multiculturalism” were connected to academic debates on enriching literary and other canons in humanities with non-Western or minority authors.¹²⁷⁰ In West Germany Marcuse’s ideas were similarly not welcomed by the mainstream left-wing party, SPD, but as was discussed in chapters 3 and 4, elements of those ideas gradually contributed to the evolution of the radical youth organizations associated with SPD and ultimately came to have some effect on SPD policy, for example in promoting the integration of foreign workers and in supporting women’s and gay rights. Therefore, while Marcuse’s overall critique was not a precursor of Multiculturalism or a catalyst for direct policy change within mainstream center-left parties in countries like the US or Germany, his redirecting of attention toward marginalized groups and quality of life did ultimately come have an impact on the evolution of the Left and eventually – on Western societies as a whole.

In addition to changing the way the majority thought about minorities, Marcuse’s ideas contain the ideational key to changing the way various movements thought about each other. Marcuse’s notion of alternative revolutionary forces could be seen as motivation for increased solidarity between minority groups, because it helped them grasp their similarly unfavorable positions relative to society as a whole. An example of this solidarity, which certainly was not always present, can be heard in a 1970 interview with Huey Newton, the founder of the Black Panther Party where he emphasizes the importance of fostering “solidarity with all oppressed people.”. Speaking about the women’s liberation movement and the gay liberation movement¹²⁷¹, Newton states that women’s liberation and gay activists have “a place in the revolutionary movement.” He points out that they would like to unite with women’s groups and homosexual groups that “are politically conscious.” Newton adds that the latter have been oppressed so

¹²⁶⁹ Interview with Martin Jay conducted as part of this research project. Full question and answer:

Q: “Do you think that the influence of his ideas was limited to radical youth movements and never expanded beyond them into mainstream center-left/social democratic parties?”

A: “Although the Democratic Party in the US was moving to the left after the debacle of the 1968 election—a movement that culminated in the disastrous selection of George McGovern as its presidential candidate four years later—the effect of Marcuse on its policies and personnel was very modest. His critique was too totalistic and his pedigree too radical to have had much of a chance of influencing a mainstream American party. His intransigent utopianism had little chance of getting a hearing in a party that sought to gain real power.”

¹²⁷⁰ Friedman, Marilyn and Jan Narveson, Political Correctness: For and Against. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham: 1994, 61-72.

¹²⁷¹ The Gay Rights movement had in June 1970 just attracted attention with the world’s first Pride parade in New York City.

badly that “it was hard to convince them that The Black Panther Party is relating to them.” Later in the same interview, Newton also spoke about the importance of internal and external freedom as the most important thing to man and the necessity to make laws that promote freedom – an idea that possibly echoed Marcuse.

Of course, solidarity between minority groups has not necessarily always been the rule. The campaigns for group rights have often led to growth of identity politics and identitarian divisions – forms of bigotry against other minorities or against the majority. While these struggles for increased equality have often been successful, they appear at times to have made solidarity “insular.” Stephen E. Bronner argues that this process started in the late 1960s and became more pronounced in the 1970s and 80s, when on one hand, a “backlash began against the new social movements” and, on the other, it also pitted marginalized groups against one another. Perhaps these processes led to increasing societal polarization that resulted in the Populist wave of the mid-2010s – the election of Donald Trump as US President and the success of the Brexit referendum among other events.

As was shown earlier in this dissertation—where the case of West Germany was analyzed in greater detail—Marcuse’s intellectual influence did not directly contribute to the emergence of a multicultural society. There is no evidence that anyone set out to support multicultural policies in order to engineer more favorable election results, let alone to forge the right conditions for revolution. Policies that could be viewed as multicultural were implemented gradually and came in response to the challenges of integrating foreign-born “guest workers” and eventually their children. While they remained in Germany rather than leaving and rotating, as originally envisaged, the genesis of their presence was due to a combination of inside and outside pressures, as well as economic necessity, and not any ideological agenda.

To the extent that the Left in Germany evolved toward more quality-of-life, personal liberation, environmental and human rights issues, some of the first such political battles that were prominently debated in West Germany during the 1960s had to do basic human rights issues, such as securing full reproductive rights for women and decriminalizing homosexuality. They were too fundamental to be viewed as something inspired by Marcuse. Nevertheless Marcuse’s personal popularity among radical students and his association with some of their leaders like Rudi Dutschke helped increase mass familiarity with his ideas. Like in America, that played a

role in raising the profile of marginalized socio-political issues—initially *within* the radical youth Left, then within the mainstream Left, and eventually throughout society as a whole.

Does Marcuse’s notion of alternative revolutionary forces still hold true today in advanced Western countries? Are minorities still a force of revolutionary rejection of the mainstream? I would argue that in developed Western states like the United States or Germany, they are not. If this argument is accepted as holding true, then it could also be seen as confirmation that Marcuse’s thesis had once been correct. The more or less full integration/inclusion of previously excluded groups—through granting equal rights, through dismantling discrimination, and opening previously unavailable opportunities—has led to most of these groups joining the mainstream. This shows that Western societies—perhaps any society—can “disarm” dissident groups by including them in social life and in the political process. Countries like the United Kingdom have even used this model with the Belfast Agreement (1998), more or less successfully, to pacify Northern Ireland.

Of course discrimination has not been completely weeded out. As the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests demonstrated, tensions around race and ethnicity and allegations of racial bias still exist. Similarly, opposition to abortion and claims of unequal pay for women, as well as homophobic incidents—sometimes violent—demonstrate that contemporary Western societies can still do more to create fully equal conditions for minorities.

That, however, does not constitute a new society. It is the old society, described by Marcuse, that has, however, created conditions for individuals belonging to diverse groups to be and feel included enough to identify with the mainstream. This is exemplified very clearly by the presence of ethnic minority, female or LGBT people working as civil servants, military personnel, police officers or as other employees of the state – positions that would have once been the preserve of men belonging to the majority ethnic group and sexual orientation. All this demonstrates that Marcuse had, in fact, been correct: marginalized communities do hold revolutionary potential—even if not one that can be realized in practice—to the extent that people rejected by society also resent and reject it.

To conclude, Marcuse’s ideas expressed in *One-Dimensional Man* diagnosed accurately the ability of his contemporary Western society to integrate contradictions and to neutralize tensions by including opposing forces into the mainstream. Perhaps he also contributed to the

defining and justifying the new social movements of the 1960-70s, strengthening or perhaps even providing a theoretical basis for their struggles. By doing that—and more importantly—by granting theoretical agency to groups that had been viewed as insignificant or unworthy of attention and respect (passive victims at best), Marcuse helped elevate these groups in the eyes of the mainstream Left. The effect was that as societies became more democratic and multicultural, they became more equal and inclusive.

Thus, employing Marcuse’s theoretical framework, Western societies stripped formerly fringe groups of any destabilizing potential they may have had, turning them into supporters of the mainstream and almost into a 21st century equivalent of Marcuse’s mid-20th century American working class. Nevertheless, contemporary society is not devoid of destabilizing forces: a stagnation in upward mobility caused by the lingering effects of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis, by economic polarization, high unemployment, and the expansion of the so-called “gig economy” has swelled the ranks of a 21st-century *Lumpenproletariat* that often relies on welfare, resents elites, is angry and easy to manipulate. The shift away from traditional to social media has further increased the danger of channeling anger and ignorance in destructive directions. Time will tell whether Western societies will be able to diffuse the destabilizing potential of these new anti-systemic forces, which in their current incarnation – be they in favor of the far right or political Islam – are no longer progressive, but politically retrograde.

5.2. Political Correctness as a Contemporary Reflection of Marcuse’s Notion of Repressive Tolerance

As an interdisciplinary excursus to the discussion of Repressive Tolerance and the empirical research in Chapters 3 and 4, this section compares Herbert Marcuse’s concept and the contemporary practices lumped together under the usually critical label of “political correctness.” In the previous chapters the notion of Repressive Tolerance was discussed as a micro unit-idea along and was examined in terms of the attitudes of the German radical youth Left and left-leaning media toward the Springer publishing house, toward racist, extreme nationalist or intolerant tendencies, among others. While the term “political correctness” – at least in its contemporary sense¹²⁷² – was coined later, these examples from the 1960s and 70s

¹²⁷² The books discussing political correctness, quoted in this dissertation, mention the term being used jokingly among Western left-wingers to mock their own ideological excesses or rather seriously among Chinese communists to refer to Maoist orthodoxy. According to Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, an early example of the term’s

can be understood as manifestations of an approach formulated by Marcuse and stretching into the present. Nevertheless, I will also ask whether Repressive Tolerance and Political Correctness could conceivably be viewed as different aspects of the same mini-unit idea provisionally named “Forced Liberty”, while also analyzing the differences between the two. The notion of the two ideas being connected is certainly not unheard of. In fact, a heft of articles, published in honor of Marcuse, contains that point within the introduction, summarizing Marcuse’s reception in the Anglo-American world. It concludes that mentioning Marcuse today (the article is from 2004) returns responses ranging from yearnings of the 1960s to “heated denunciations of Marcuse as the intellectual agent behind a vaguely Marxist program of political correctness alleged to have overtaken higher education in the US.”¹²⁷³ In fact, as will be shown later, political correctness in its contemporary form was becoming well known since at least the early 1990s if not the 1980s. In other words, with some degree of arbitrariness, we may date the modern phenomenon to the late 1980s and start of the 1990s when speech codes on American university campuses became widespread, leading to a strong backlash.¹²⁷⁴ Before that, “the heated disputes were not about language but [about] the closed canons at universities.”¹²⁷⁵ The connection between Marcuse’s notion and political correctness is also evident in interviews with scholars who have worked on the Frankfurt School, conducted as part of this project. Martin Jay, for example, points out that while he is not sure the link is direct, “the critique of repressive tolerance and the limitation on the freedom of hate speech can be seen as meaningfully connected” and also that “perhaps [Marcuse’s] formulations did inspire Americans to look more carefully at the dangers of unlimited free expression, especially when the performative dimension of speech acts is taken seriously.”¹²⁷⁶ At the same time, Jay

affirming usage was in Toni Cade Bambara’s book *The Black Woman: An Anthology*, where she wrote that “a man cannot be politically correct and a chauvinist, too.”

Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin. *In Defence of Political Correctness*. Biteback Publishing, London: 2018, 58.

¹²⁷³ Abromeit, John and W. Mark Cobb (Edt.), *Herbert Marcuse: A Critical Reader*. Routledge, New York: 2004, 1.

¹²⁷⁴ Discussed in detail in the section on Speech Codes and the First Amendment.

Hughes, Geoffrey, *Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture*. Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester: 2010

¹²⁷⁵ Alibhai-Brown, *In Defence of Political Correctness*, 60.

¹²⁷⁶ Interview with Martin Jay conducted as part of this research project. Full question and answer:

“Q: Would you agree that there is an ideational connection between Marcuse’s idea of Repressive Tolerance and “political correctness” as a concept? I am using political correctness as a broad term, but it could be speech codes on college campuses in the US, could be voluntary media reporting codes, could be laws on hate speech, etc.

A: This charge has been made by those on the right who scapegoat the Frankfurt School and what they call “cultural Marxism” for alleged political correctness. I am not sure that the link is so direct, but certainly the critique of repressive tolerance and the limitation on the freedom of hate speech can be seen as meaningfully connected. There have, to be sure, always been limits on free speech when it imperils people—the classic example being crying “fire” in a crowded theater—so the legal challenges to hate speech didn’t need Marcuse’s more general argument for support. And there have been potent critics of absolute free speech, such as the American literary critic Stanley Fish, who have no use for Marcuse. But perhaps his formulations did inspire Americans to

points out that there have always been limits on free speech, that Marcuse is not the only critic of absolute free speech, and that allegations about this link have “been made by those on the right who scapegoat the Frankfurt School and what they call ‘cultural Marxism’”.¹²⁷⁷

While the notion of Repressive Tolerance has existed for much longer, has a definitive author and is defined in a more or less straightforward essay, the concept of Political Correctness is newer and its definition has not been “stabilized”, to recycle a Marcusean term. In addition to that, its authorship remains inconclusive and it has been used both as a positive term and as a critical label, much more so as the latter. Therefore, due to the contested nature of the term, proponents of political correctness usually prefer to avoid the term and employ euphemisms, calling not for “political correctness”, but rather for “socially/culturally sensitive language”. Alternatively, they insist on the politically correct assumption on a given subject as the only valid one, labeling alternative views problematic. There have also been some outright defenders of political correctness – both more recently, like Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in her book *In Defence of Political Correctness* (2018), as well as closer to when the term first gained notoriety, such as Marilyn Friedman in *Political Correctness: For and Against* (1995). These, however, have been fewer than proponents of political correctness that have preferred avoiding the term. The notion’s advocates have also differed in some of their argumentation. Due to these challenges, it is necessary to begin with a clarification of the term.

In his book *Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture* (2010), Geoffrey Hughes makes the point (speaking of England), that “political correctness of one sort or another has been a feature of English society for centuries, certainly since the English Reformation.”¹²⁷⁸ The point that various other limitations on speech have always existed is also made by Yasmin Alibhai-Brown in one of the rare books defending political correctness: she compares the prescribed phrases used by British parliamentarians, royal protocol, libel laws, and editorial guidelines with forms of political correctness “all accepted without much protest.”¹²⁷⁹ I would argue that any form of usage of euphemisms as opposed to “rude” alternatives or adherence to any given orthodoxy could be viewed as prior forms of political correctness. In that form, its history could be traced quite far back in history. Hughes points out that the term “political

look more carefully at the dangers of unlimited free expression, especially when the performative dimension of speech acts is taken seriously.”

¹²⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁸ Hughes, *Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture*, i-ii.

¹²⁷⁹ Alibhai-Brown, *In Defence of Political Correctness*, 46.

correctness” as a phrase was first used in the 1930s to describe the Chinese communist “party’s correct line” as defined by Mao Tse Tung. “It was then borrowed by the American New Left in the 1960s, but with a more rhetorical than a strictly programmatic sense [...]. The modern American manifestation emerges in quotations dating from the 1970s, in the contexts of left-wing politics and feminism.”¹²⁸⁰ As Hughes mentions, definitions of the notion today range from attempts at objective descriptions to affirmations by the Left and critical negations by the Right. Earlier discussions also seemed to lump the issue of speech with other aspects of academic life like “new fields of study, such as women’s studies or African American studies, news disciplinary approaches, such as multiculturalism and feminism, news campus practices, such as speech codes, and new cultural critiques, such as those of truth and of politics-free intellectual inquiry.”¹²⁸¹ This helps us narrow down the concept in its contemporary form to something that promotes a generally progressive approach or a “pursuit of what is claimed to be equality.”¹²⁸²

The oldest dictionary definition (as opposed to earlier biased definitions in essays and articles from the late 1980s and early 1990s) I could find on paper was one in the 1997 edition of the Oxford Dictionary of New Words. Of course the appearance of this definition in a dictionary confirms that the phrase had been in use previously before being included in a dictionary. The earliest place where my research has led me to find a variant of the phrase is in a letter from Marcuse’s son Peter from 1975 written to his father; in a paragraph discussing family relations and the joy of children and grandchildren, Peter Marcuse writes about cute things that the children do that make him happy ranging from smiling and making a smart comment to “writing a ‘correct’ political letter to the newspaper out of the blue.”¹²⁸³ What Peter Marcuse means by “correct politics” with the first word placed in quotations is that the letter was written from a left-wing perspective that his father held. This informal usage in 1975 coincides with the dating offered by Hughes and Alibhai-Brown and illustrates that variations of the term were already in use among left-wing social and intellectual circles at that point. Clearly, this usage was informal, lighthearted, perhaps humorous, and containing some degree of self-irony. It

¹²⁸⁰ Hughes, 27.

¹²⁸¹ Friedman, Marilyn and Jan Narveson, Political Correctness: For and Against. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham: 1994, vii.

¹²⁸² Friedman and Narveson, 51.

¹²⁸³ Letter from Peter Marcuse to his father Herbert Marcuse, In: Bibliothek der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Marcuse Nachlass, Ref. 1305.10

went through the stage of being debated and described seriously – critically or positively – before eventually entering dictionaries in the 1990s.

The 1997 definition goes like this: “Conformity to a body of liberal or radical opinion on social matters, characterized by the advocacy of approved views and the rejection of language and behavior considered discriminatory or offensive.”¹²⁸⁴ Current dictionaries include the following definitions: The Merriam-Webster Dictionary mentions the noun “political correctness”, but defines only the adjective as “conforming to a belief that language and practices which could offend political sensibilities (as in matters of sex or race) should be eliminated.” The Cambridge Dictionary defines the adjective “politically correct” as: “someone who is politically correct believes that language and actions that could be offensive to others, especially those relating to sex and race, should be avoided. The dictionary offers a US English definition, adding that it is used disapprovingly: “avoiding language or behavior that any particular group of people might feel is unkind or offensive.” The American Heritage Dictionary defines the terms as “Conforming to a particular sociopolitical ideology or point of view, especially to a liberal point of view concerned with promoting tolerance and avoiding offense in matters of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation”. Finally, the Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary defines the adjective as “marked by or adhering to a typically progressive orthodoxy on issues involving esp. race, gender, sexual affinity, or ecology”.

Several conclusions may be drawn from this collection of definitions. Perhaps the most prominent one is that political correctness is not necessarily factual correctness. The adjective “political” highlights the fact that this correctness is not based on an objective assessment, a rational analysis or a scientifically verified truth.¹²⁸⁵ It is about “conforming” to a body of political opinions on certain subjects deemed sensitive. The second conclusion that can be made by looking at the different definitions is that political correctness generally applies to issues related to “language”, “behaviors”, “politics”, attitudes toward groups pertaining to “race, class, gender or sexual orientation”; it is generally meant to go against “offensive,

¹²⁸⁴ Knowles, Elizabeth and Julia Elliott, *The Oxford Dictionary of New Words*. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York: 1997

¹²⁸⁵ By the 1980s ideas such as Deconstruction, Post-Structuralism, and Post-Modernism had gained influence in academia and were also contributing to a new mood of rejecting the old literary canons and more broadly the old canons throughout humanities in favor of new fields of study and new authors. These ideas all rejected the notion of a certain proven truth, therefore opening the door for the idea of a politically beneficial “truth”.

discriminatory or offensive” attitudes and is informed by a “liberal point of view concerned with promoting tolerance”. Finally, one may notice that the definitions seem to vary between dictionaries depending on when they were published and, since this is a neologism, depending on the sociopolitical leanings of the authors or publishers. Political correctness seems to have become more mainstream over time, because the initial 1997 definition that stressed “conformity” to an ideology and classified it as “liberal or *radical*”, also highlighting the notion that political correctness was about “advocacy” gave way to much more normalized definitions that do not presuppose political correctness is politically fringe, such as “agreeing with the idea that people should be careful to not use language or behave in a way that could offend a particular group of people.”

One could benevolently say that amounts to nothing more than good manners or even that political correctness is a necessary way to make marginalized groups feel included. A more critical view could be that political correctness is just a new and more acceptable word for censorship and self-censorship, perhaps even claim that it resembles the limitations on speech seen in authoritarian and totalitarian societies. As was mentioned earlier, various forms of linguistic self-censorship, euphemisms or a societally-mandated unwritten set of rules on acceptable and unacceptable speech have always existed. Some critics see contemporary political correctness as going beyond past forms of speech limitations, because – in academia – they limit academic freedom and seem politically biased:

But now institutions of higher learning formulated speech codes, designed to suppress or inhibit offensive language. [...] Double standards proliferated, especially in the matter of ‘difference’ [...] What was increasingly called ‘PC’ seemed to be the kind of social engineering that which springs from the best intentions, but can bring out less healthy Puritanical impulses in a society, as did Prohibition, the Communist witch-hunt and the abortion issue. Who started it? Some, notably Dorris Lessing, saw political correctness as the natural continuum of the Communist party line.¹²⁸⁶

The last point comes across as a heavy exaggeration, not least since the communist party line never had the tools to make itself influential in Western countries. Nevertheless, a hypothetical parallelism can be drawn between the ossification of Marxism into an ideological orthodoxy in the USSR and the way some “politically correct” positions are asserted as almost mandatory. One could, however, just as easily draw parallels between that kind of ideological stance with Christian dogma.

¹²⁸⁶ Hughes, Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture, i-ii.

Finally, looking at the parallels between Marcuse's *Liberating Tolerance* and Political Correctness, there is a similarity in that both strive to force a specific notion of liberty and tolerance. In other words, if we referred to Isaiah Berlin's 1958 essay *Two Concepts of Liberty*, we may say that both Marcuse's notion and the contemporary one could be viewed as forms of positive liberty being asserted at the expense of forms of negative liberty. Thus, they are difficult to assign value judgements to: both offer benefits, but in both cases, they contain the potential for problematic effects if offered as across-the-board solutions. Both appear to be dressed in the garments of mainstream liberalism, but both also have a Marxist connection; while Marcuse's notion hypothetically appears to lead to a blurring of the line between countering discrimination and suppressing pluralism, political correctness appears to do this in practice even though its application has been beneficial to fostering a more open and inclusive social atmosphere.

Geoffrey Hughes, in his academically rich and simultaneously entertaining book, goes on to make the point that when the debate gained full momentum in the beginning of the 1990s, even though most disowned the term, politically correct policies were widely adopted on US campuses. With about half of Americans attending institutions of higher education, these changes taking place on college campuses were bound to be reflected on society as a whole. Hughes asks: "Is the world "free" now, in terms of reasonable people without a clear political agenda being able to speak their minds on matters of public importance? Or has the notion of what is "offensive" or "unacceptable" or "inappropriate" or "racist" now taken on such broad and intrusive dimensions that open debate on contentious issues is an impossibility?"¹²⁸⁷ While the simple answer is "maybe", it is nevertheless problematic that this question is conceivable at all. Hughes offers a concise account of how political correctness began and how it functions:

Linguistically it started as a basically idealistic, decent-minded, but slightly Puritanical intervention to sanitize the language by suppressing some of its uglier prejudicial features, thereby undoing some past injustices or "leveling the playing fields" with the hope of improving social relations. It is now increasingly evident in two opposing ways. The first is the expanding currency of various key words [...]. Contrariwise, it has also manifested itself in speech codes which suppress prejudicial language, disguising or avoiding certain old and new taboo topics. Most recently it has appeared in behavioral prohibitions concerning the environment and violations of animal rights.

[...] There is an antithesis at the core of political correctness, since it is liberal in its aims but often illiberal in its practices: hence it generates contradictions like *positive discrimination* and *liberal orthodoxy*.¹²⁸⁸

¹²⁸⁷ Hughes, iii.

¹²⁸⁸ Hughes, *Political Correctness: A History of Semantics and Culture*, 1.

Unlike political correctness, Marcuse's term did not set a new quasi-required standard of speaking and writing. It did, however, call for the development and imposition of precisely that. Marcuse's program includes its own set of programmatic words such as "pacification", "liberation", "autonomy" and "authentic tolerance".

What are some differences and similarities between Herbert Marcuse's notion of liberating tolerance and the essence and practice of political correctness? Both ideas are, to varying degrees, based on a utopian post-Marxist idea of total equality between people. Both problematize the different outcomes between people and groups of people in capitalist liberal democracies. While Marcuse focused on *liberating* society as a whole from false consciousness and an inauthentic democracy, political correctness is focused on the *individual* and on lifting non-institutional forms of oppression contained in words, assumptions, and judgements. And while Marcuse wrote at a time when many minority groups were undoubtedly discriminated against, political correctness continues to operate at a time when in some countries like the USA, minority groups have—at least according to the law—achieved full equality. As fundamental issues faced by minorities have been eliminated or reduced, scrutiny seems to have been redirected toward smaller problems of practice – some legitimate like police racial bias, some a matter of discussion like the "gender pay gap", and some reaching almost comical aspects such as "safe spaces" and "trigger-warnings".

A similarity that has persisted, however, is the *modus operandi* in which some radical progressive groups attempt to impose political correctness. Martin Jay points out that "in tactical terms, some factions of the New Left also seemed to draw on the lessons of his 1965 essay on "repressive tolerance" to shout down speakers with whom they disagreed, especially over the justification for the Vietnam War."¹²⁸⁹ Similar examples have been examined in

¹²⁸⁹ [Interview with Martin Jay conducted as part of this research project](#). Full question and answer:

Q: "How would you assess the degree of influence that Herbert Marcuse exerted on the political life in West Germany and the United States during the 1960s and 70s?"

A: I can only speak about the American context, where Marcuse was an increasingly significant intellectual presence in the nascent New Left after [One-Dimensional Man](#) was published in 1964. The book's impact, however, was not immediate, but only picked up steam when the student movement grew in scope and ambition around 1968. Perhaps its primary effect was to give privileged students a sense that they too were the victims of a system that had more obviously oppressed minorities and poor people. It gave them a vocabulary to articulate the discontent that they felt couldn't be described in traditional Marxist class categories. In tactical terms, some factions of the New Left also seemed to draw on the lessons of his 1965 essay on "repressive tolerance" to shout down speakers with whom they disagreed, especially over the justification for the Vietnam War. By the end of the decade, Marcuse's general impact was already being assessed in collections such as [Critical Interruptions](#), edited by Paul Breines, and at meetings of the Socialist Scholars Conference, where I participated on a panel with Breines and Ronald Aronsohn in 1969."

Chapters 3 and 4 where the attitudes of the German youth Left and left-leaning media suggest that there was an increased intolerance during the late 1960s and 70s toward manifestations of nationalism, racism or other phenomena that the Left (in some cases rightfully so) found unacceptable.

The notion of liberating tolerance and the practice of political correctness are based on the idea that the majority is oppressive, because of its false consciousness. In both cases the negative liberties of broad sections of society are to be curtailed in order to create a truly tolerant environment to be enjoyed by those sections of society that had previously been oppressed. Both assume that inequalities and pressures could be reduced through a recreation of language that would result in altering the mentality of “false consciousness” of broad sections of the population. There are significant differences of course. Whereas political correctness concerns a relatively limited scope of topics and is “enforced” mostly through the evolving social consensus and activist pressure, Marcuse envisaged a total application of his program of liberating tolerance. Thus, while Marcuse’s program comes across as undemocratic, political correctness—for all its pressures—is essentially a process that occurs in a voluntary manner.

Both notions reject *pure* tolerance in the sense of being able to express any idea from across the political spectrum without consequences. Marcuse grounds his rejection on the argument that tolerating free discussion between opposing forces ought to ideally create a framework for fair competition of ideas, but in fact “rational persuasion [...] is all but precluded [...] and [...] the avenues of entrance are closed to the meaning of words and ideas other than the established one.”¹²⁹⁰ Both ideas are based on the presupposition that the existing rules, even though they are democratic, favor the establishment and the majority and *perpetuate* a state of oppression. While one relies on words and hopes to change the world by changing individuals and the language they use, the other is far more ambitious in its scale and far more radical in the methods it proposes. Harking back to Marcuse’s *One-Dimensional Man* and similarly to the way in which mainstream society has integrated former minorities as part of mainstream society, some of the phraseology and ways of approaching subjects have gradually made it into the mainstream since the 1990s.

¹²⁹⁰ Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, 96.

Political correctness includes newer concepts such as the concept of *privilege* based on ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation or lack of disability and the idea that this *a priori* unearned privilege is unfair and those who have it owe reverence and compensation to those without it. This overlaps with the general mood, expressed in Repressive Tolerance, but it also matches a phrase: “In such a society, tolerance is *de facto* limited on the dual ground of legalized violence or suppression (police, armed forces, guards of all sorts) and of the privileged position held by the predominant interests and their ‘connections’.”¹²⁹¹

A weakness of this comparison is that it takes a more or less clearly defined notion and compares it to something that is more of an accusatory label than a proposed program. That means that its definition, to the extent that it has one, is based mostly on critical formulations that encompass an array of measures that they—the critics—view as belonging to “political correctness”. This means that any progressive initiative could potentially be lumped together with other ideas that their detractors dislike.

An aspect of the above also contains the biggest difference between Marcuse’s program of liberating tolerance and political correctness. While the former envisages a set of policies and approaches meant to achieve an end goal, political correctness (if we can define it as such) appears to be a loose constellation of different policies and initiatives that do not pursue a specific goal even though they reflect a progressive and/or liberal worldview. Furthermore, as Eric D. Weitz pointed out in my interview conducted with him as part of this research project: while “that connection [between repressive tolerance and political correctness] makes sense [...] Marcuse was always attuned to the ruling institutions, and political correctness often arises from non-elite sources.”¹²⁹²

To conclude, a comparison between the micro unit-idea of forced liberty, based on Marcuse’s notion of repressive and liberating tolerance, and contemporary political correctness yields a number of overlaps: a shared commitment to equality, arguably an inspiration from Marxism to overcome structures of oppression, and a focus on controlling language in order to modify

¹²⁹¹ Marcuse, 85.

¹²⁹² Interview with Eric D. Weitz conducted as part of this research project. Full question and answer:

Q: “Would you agree that there is an ideational connection between Marcuse’s idea of Repressive Tolerance and “political correctness” as a concept? I am using political correctness as a broad term, but it could be speech codes on college campuses in the US, could be voluntary media reporting codes, could be laws on hate speech, etc.”

A: “Yes, that connection makes sense, though Marcuse was always attuned to the ruling institutions, and political correctness often arises from non-elite sources.”

popular attitudes. While Marcuse's liberating tolerance aims to change society completely and advocates techniques of change that do not exclude forms of suppression or violence, political correctness has few advocates and no set program other than the basics of promoting equality and kindness. Its practice, however, has included examples of pressure on academics, journalists or public figures by their employers or the media. Both notions recognize the importance of semantics and the didactic power of information. What I see as their ultimate common point, however, is that they both profess the ideal of tolerance, but recognize their powerlessness to bring it about within the framework of existing society, and thus resort to forcing their agenda on those who disagree with it. Therefore it may be said that a term uniting these two notions is "Forced Liberty". The latter can be seen as a micro unit-idea, a "pervasive complex of ideas", because it includes not only Repressive Tolerance and political correctness, but echoes past philosophical debates and political phenomena such as the discussion about the telos of tolerance, Popper's Paradox of Tolerance, and the use of censorship in authoritarian and totalitarian societies.

Furthermore, as was demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4 in the case of West Germany, a shift among the radical youth Left away from economic and class-based issues toward problems of personal liberation, pacifism, human rights, and others increased the Left's impatience toward the negative liberty promoted by the far-right. With these developments fitting into the chronological timeframe between Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and the emergence of modern political correctness in the late 1980s, a chronological continuity between Marcuse's formulations and the contemporary forms of political correctness that came influence Western societies after the 1990s can be established.

Conclusion

This dissertation has attempted to create a multidisciplinary survey of Marcuse, his influence on the New Left, as well as of the modern-day legacies of that influence. The dissertation opened with Herbert Marcuse's intellectual biography and with a discussion of his primary influences – ranging from Hegel and Marx to Freud and Heidegger. With the help of methodological insights from the historiography of ideas, Marcuse's notions of *Alternative Revolutionary Forces* and *Repressive Tolerance*, proposed in *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) and in his essay, also bearing the title *Repressive Tolerance* (1965), were analyzed as *mini unit-ideas*, a concept based on Arthur Lovejoy's methodology and its later critiques.

An ideational connection was established between Marcuse's two notions and the gradual shift away from the Old Left's traditional economic and class-oriented focus, toward new ideas and priorities focused more on quality of life issues, individual liberation and human rights, protection of minorities, environmental protection, as well as a greater solidarity with and interest in the Third World. While many of these New Left priorities can be described as having to do with culture in the broadest sense of the term, I explained why the label "Cultural Marxism" is problematic – mainly due to its association with non-academic notions implying a malign conspiracy, but also because the new priorities reach well beyond culture. That is why this dissertation ultimately opts to label Marcuse and his ideas as Neo-Marxist.

While ideational connections were established between Marcuse's two notions and the components of the German youth Left's evolution toward a New Left agenda, these connections did not take the form of documented transpositions of ideas into action, i.e. direct quotations or programmatic influences clearly attributed to Marcuse. Personal connections between Herbert Marcuse and New Left leaders such as Rudi Dutschke, Angela Davis or C. Wright Mills were clearly established in the form of letters, documented public support or academic and professional collaboration. Marcuse's immense popularity with radical students and youth was also established beyond doubt. Newspapers, magazines, and contemporary academic publications attested to the actual and perceived influence Marcuse had over the radical youth during the last two decades of his life. Furthermore, that popularity could be confirmed by the fact that Marcuse held political speeches before packed university auditoria.

Nevertheless hardly any record was found of his ideas having been literally transplanted or transposed into the political documents of the youth Left, let alone into the party programs of a mainstream center-left party like the SPD. On a broader scale (that was not specifically examined), the same could be said of the Frankfurt School as a whole and also of other individual intellectuals that one might suppose have influenced the intellectual climate of the 1960s and 70s: Jean-Paul Sartre, Jacques Derrida, Raymond Williams or Jürgen Habermas.

Working with the archives of German youth Left movements or the SPD leads to the conclusion that intellectuals were generally not quoted directly or invoked by “real life” political activists when they were proposing a policy or arguing in favor of a certain course of action. The intellectual considerations informing specific political positions and proposals were generally not mentioned in the materials I reviewed at archives such as the APO archive. For example, even though their friendship and Rudi Dutschke’s intimate knowledge of Marcuse’s academic work are documented, at no time does Rudi Dutschke specifically quote or invoke Marcuse’s ideas expressed in *Repressive Tolerance* when motivating his calls for boycotting the Springer publishing conglomerate. Nevertheless, this dissertation concludes that there is a clear influence, because the boycott is based on many of the same logical constructs and considerations. And yet, this influence remains without a clear document trail, so it must be considered indirect – based on changes in the intellectual assumptions and way of thinking of at least some sections of the population.

A likely reason for the lack of direct attributions and therefore the possibility to analyze an existing document trail is based on a belief among political leaders that their rhetoric ought to be grounded in real life in order to come across as tangible and practical rather than theoretical or academic. It is also likely that Marcuse’s radical image and the Cold War context made his *Gedankengut* an undesirable influence to advertise one’s movement with. The wide-reaching nature of many of his ideas also made Marcuse’s ideas unlikely to be transposed into a realistic political program. Perhaps intellectual ideas were commonly filtered into the consciousness of the people who read or heard them and various elements of them found their way into new modes of thinking. These modes of thinking, often based on Marxist thought, were then simply labeled progressive or radically democratic. Perhaps future research on the subject will uncover elements of a document trail in texts or documents that have not been part of this research.

Elements of the mini unit-ideas were examined empirically in the shape of specific examples or case studies that traced the evolution of West Germany’s radical youth movements and the

Social Democratic Party of Germany in a New Left direction during the period 1963-1974, also including some examples reaching past that research period. Examples of these case studies included the changing attitudes toward and growing interest in issues like women's rights, viewed through the prism of the "battle" to decriminalize abortion, the rights of foreign workers in West Germany, as well as the hostility toward the Springer media empire. These case studies, along with others, were viewed as building blocks of new political tendencies that would ultimately come to be understood under the umbrella terms multiculturalism and political correctness. The analysis discussed not only the evolution of West Germany's radical youth movements and the SPD in the context of these issues, but also looked at the relations between these entities which were quite strained at times. While the radical youth movements gravitating around SPD were quick to adopt progressive positions on social issues, but also problematic pro-Soviet, anti-capitalist or even non-democratic ideas, the SPD was faced with the fine balancing act of restraining organizations like the Jusos and avoiding the PR fallout of their radical positions without completely alienating them from the Social Democratic family.

The youth movements, too, did not immediately gain an interest in topics associated with the New Left such as women's or gay liberation. These issues were not among their priorities throughout the 1960s even if the decade is associated with changing social mores, the Sexual Revolution, and experimentation with new lifestyles such as life in communes. The political expressions of the striving for personal liberation slowly emerged in the early 1970s, gained momentum toward the end of the research period, and became more prominent after the end of the research period – in the 1980s. The type of radicalization that was evident during most the research period, on the other hand, was still predominantly in terms of excessive openness toward the Eastern bloc and non-democratic Third World movements, economic radicalism, a decreasing tolerance toward non-left or conservative opinions in the public sphere along with new modes of protest like pickets and sit-ins. As far as the SPD, the party generally rejected all forms of radicalism that had to do with abandoning or weakening either Germany's constitutional position as a parliamentary democracy and a social market economy or its geopolitical position as a NATO member and US ally. With its *Ostpolitik*, however, the SPD quickly abandoned the support for the German expellees, which it had originally championed, and gradually moderated its stance toward the Eastern bloc and East Germany. It maintained a very careful and moderate stance on the issue of abortion and on the guest worker program, but ultimately it was an SPD government that decided to allow the foreign workers and their families to integrate in Germany rather than "rotating" them as had been the original plan. The

SPD was also the first party to include a gay youth organization, the “Schwusos” (1978), within the official list of party sub-organizations. It gradually adopted a positive attitude toward equal rights for LGBT people in Germany although that shift did not begin to take place until the period between the AIDS crisis, which forced politicians to talk about and talk with the gay community, and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The dissertation also looks at the role of two left-leaning media outlets – *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel*. This role was examined in terms of the political slant of their coverage – looking at *FR* more systematically and at *Der Spiegel* in certain instances – as well as in terms of their contribution to shaping the events and the new ideas and priorities that accompanied these events. *Frankfurter Rundschau*'s coverage demonstrated an adherence to center-left politics, but without constant adherence to the SPD line. It sometimes published commentary, criticizing the radical youth, but usually demonstrated some support for it by covering its initiatives and statements. This coverage was mostly factual which helped the radicals spread their ideas. *Der Spiegel*, partially by virtue of its different format covered far fewer news about the radical Left than *FR*. While it also leaned leftward, it had no direct party affiliation and that made its coverage of the Left far more factual and less enthusiastic in tone. Its coverage of the far-Right was also less emotional even though it did not fail to objectively label radicals as such. At the same time, *Der Spiegel* was noticeably more supportive of human rights causes such as that having to do with gay rights in West Germany, while *Frankfurter Rundschau* appeared to shy away from such topics, which reflected a more socially conservative working class readership.

Potential areas for future research on related subjects could contribute further to a more in-depth understanding of the questions that were discussed in this dissertation. For example, similar connections between Marcuse's ideas and New Left youth organizations in the United States, France or the United Kingdom could be discussed in greater detail. In-depth studies of the personal archives of New Left leaders from countries other than Germany may also yield specific indications of practical applications of Marcusean thought.

Marcuse's influence and the reception of his ideas among the radical youth contributed to the establishment of the intellectual assumptions, the new *Zeitgeist* of the 1960s and 1970s. His lectures attracted great interest among politically active and educated young people, his publications were widely read and translated in different languages, contemporary

commentators and journalists had seen his influence over the New Left, some of that movement's leading figures were personally known to him. His popularity turned him into a divisive figure and he was seen as a threat by a wide range of ideological circles ranging from Orthodox Marxists such as those in the Soviet bloc to Conservatives and the Church. Some may argue that Marcuse did not influence the Zeitgeist, but was just an elite interpreter of it. If that view were true, it would not be able to account for the fact that some of Marcuse's proposed solutions – widely read and available – found their way into the actual evolving approaches, ideas, and priorities of real-life politics, even though they were not attributed to him. Therefore, Marcuse's ideas exerted an influence on political life which contributed to the evolution of the New Left and the evolution of left-wing political entities in a New Left direction. Thus, together with organic influences of advancing technology, evolving social norms, changing economic conditions, and new demographic realities, Marcuse's ideas were gradually embedded into the Left's ideological patterns, altering what it meant to have a progressive worldview. The changes that resulted from this evolution were not the result of elites implementing a pre-planned program, but rather reflected the sum of gradual and “spontaneous” developments that took place within Western societies.

With his idea of alternative revolutionary forces, Marcuse gave agency to groups that had previously been overlooked by the Left. That could be interpreted as a major contribution to the emancipation of minorities and discriminated groups. This positive contribution has been largely been overlooked by earlier research and interpretations of Marcuse's thought and influence. Similarly, Marcuse's notion of repressive tolerance contributed to a growing rejection among the Left of the post-war consensus on tolerating a very broad spectrum of political positions including “reactionary” ones. While Herbert Marcuse's ideas on this subject could be viewed as related to Karl Popper's Paradox of tolerance (and other earlier ideas), Marcuse went further than Popper both in his definition of repressive ideas and in his proposed solution.

This dissertation concludes that Marcuse's two notions – *alternative revolutionary forces* and *repressive tolerance* – can meaningfully be connected, in terms of belonging to single mini-unit-ideas, to the contemporary concepts of Multiculturalism and Political Correctness. Multiculturalism was defined broadly to mean a society that is more open not only to foreign cultures and peoples, but also prioritizes the equal rights of other minority groups such as women and LGBT people over traditional gender roles and social mores, a society that values

the environment at least as much as economic growth, and one that emphasizes quality of life and personal liberation. Political Correctness was discussed in all its complexity as a predominantly negative term of critique rather than affirmation, but also as an occasionally defended program of kindness in communicating between diverse people and groups.

Furthermore, this dissertation came to the conclusion that Marcuse's point about the capacity of advanced industrial society to absorb opposing forces was proven by the course of history in the decades after he published his book *One-Dimensional Man* in 1964. With the inclusion of previously disadvantaged and discriminated groups as fully respected and equal members of society, Western countries turned these former vectors of discontent and rejection of the mainstream into supporters and system-affirming actors within the liberal democratic political system. In addition to increasing social cohesion, the inclusion of these groups into the mainstream opened up new niches for growth that has contributed to the economic prosperity of Western and other (comparatively tolerant) developed countries. That aspect has not been a subject of this research, but it has already been convincingly demonstrated by recent studies, such as one examining the relationship between LGBT-inclusion and economic development, which found that each extra point on an 8-point "scale of legal rights for LGB persons is associated with an increase in real GDP per capita of approximately \$2000."¹²⁹³

At the same time, policies and attitudes that could be interpreted as constituting political correctness have a much more problematic record. Some could be viewed as having contributed to greater tolerance, openness, and acceptance, as well as to a kinder social discourse, but other aspects of this new approach to public debate may have contributed to greater self-censorship and a stifling of public debate. A subjective value judgement could be that the overall legacy of Marcuse's two ideas – if one is accepted as being entirely positive and the other one is viewed as being debatable – is predominantly positive.

While Western societies today have absorbed many of the formerly destabilizing vectors of the past, Marcuse's concept of "alternative revolutionary forces" in Western societies remains valid as new sections of society have become system-rejecting outcasts. They include groups who have been left behind economically, groups who reject the liberal democratic system either

¹²⁹³ Badgett, M.V. Lee, Kees Waaldijk and Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, [The relationship between LGBT inclusion and economic development: Macro-level evidence](#). In: *World Development*, Vol. 120: August 2019, 1.

due to autochthone ultra-conservative/Neo-Fascist or due to foreign radical (i.e. Islamist) motivations, as well as individuals who have fallen victim to online manipulations (“fake news”) and conspiracy theories. Often more than one of these three factors is at play. One of the challenges of the current decade will be to neutralize the destabilizing potential of these groups by counteracting propaganda through better education and regulation of social media, creating better opportunities for economically marginalized groups, and increasing their overall inclusion in society without accepting regressive values.

All this shows that Marcuse’s ideas are more relevant and influential than generally believed as they were not only accurate at defining certain key social relationships and mechanisms, but also influenced the evolution of the Left in major Western states like the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, perhaps indirectly, Marcuse influenced the evolution of the West into a more humane and friendly version of itself while also bequeathing the problematic legacy of political correctness and of an attitude of decreased tolerance toward non-progressive ideas.

In the beginning I had mentioned that intellectual curiosity was one of the motivating factors that drew me to this topic in intellectual history while another was the perception that there are links between Marcuse’s ideas and contemporary political concepts – links that have become heavily politicized, perhaps even mythologized, without necessarily receiving an equivalent level of academic attention. I would like to think that my research has made a modest contribution to reducing the noise and providing a little more clarity about the actual extent to which Marcuse’s thought influenced developments during the 1960-70s and beyond. I hope that this information would make us more appreciative of Marcuse’s positive contributions, but also give us a better understanding of his more problematic intellectual input. In both cases, I hope that my research has contributed to the reduction of notions of behind-the-scenes influences or malign plots by elites, which are unfounded.

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- Regents Back McGill on Marcuse Rehiring, leading title of *San Diego Union* (newspaper), February 23 1969 (in Ch. 5)
- Schon faßt einer, der voran, Onkel Willys Nase an., cartoon presenting the Jusos as bedbugs on the sleeping Willy Brandt, published in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 28 Februarz 1973, Nr. 50 (in Ch. 4)
- SPD members protesting against the Vietnam War, still from documentary about anti-war demonstration in Berlin, *British Pathe*, 1968 (in Ch. 4)

- Wir Gastarbeiter unterstützen die Forderungen unserer deutschen Kollegen, photo of banner held by guest workers during protest, published in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3 May 1963, Nr. 102 (in Ch. 4)
- Vater und Sohn, photograph from protest against the negotiations to form a grand coalition between SPD and CDU/CSU; Peter Brandt was among the protesters, published in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 30 November 1966, Nr. 278 (in Ch. 4)

Abstract

This dissertation traces Herbert Marcuse's role in shaping the New Left by analyzing the reception of two Marcusean notions, *Repressive Tolerance* and *Alternative Revolutionary Forces*, in West Germany between 1963 and 1974. It also looks at these notions' contemporary legacies. The research employs a multidisciplinary approach combining methodological insights from intellectual history and the history of ideas with empirical historical analysis, complemented by an excursus of political analysis. The dissertation opens with Marcuse's intellectual biography and primary influences. Based on methodological insights from the historiography of ideas, Marcuse's aforementioned notions are analyzed as *mini unit-ideas*, aspects of which are then examined in the form of specific case studies that highlight the evolution of West Germany's New Left radical youth movements and the SPD, as well as relations between them, during the research period. The dissertation also discusses the role of two left-leaning media outlets – *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Der Spiegel* in terms of both the political slant of their coverage and their indirect influence on current events during the research period. An ideational connection is established between Marcuse's two notions and the gradual shift from the Old Left's traditional economic and class-oriented focus toward new ideas and priorities focused more heavily on quality of life issues, individual liberation and human rights, protection of minorities, environmental protection, as well as a greater solidarity with the Third World. It is concluded that the reception of Marcuse's ideas did not lead to direct and documented transposition of ideas into political action, but rather contributed to the establishment of new intellectual assumptions, a new *Zeitgeist*, which influenced broad sections of the population, especially the educated youth. Among Marcuse's lasting influences is the granting of agency to groups previously overlooked by the Left, as well as the provision an ideological framework to motivate an already existing "reflex" of rejection (among the Left) of the post-war consensus on tolerating a broad spectrum of political positions including reactionary ones. This dissertation further concludes that Marcuse's two notions – *alternative revolutionary forces* and *repressive tolerance* – can be meaningfully connected, in terms of belonging to single mini unit-ideas, to the contemporary concepts of Multiculturalism and Political Correctness. Furthermore, it is concluded that Herbert Marcuse's analysis of the capacity of advanced industrial society to absorb opposing forces has been proven by the events in the decades following the publication of *One-Dimensional Man* in 1964. Reaching into the present day in its last chapter, this dissertation concludes that the full inclusion of previously disadvantaged and discriminated groups has turned these former vectors of discontent and rejection of the mainstream into supporters and system-affirming actors within the Western liberal democratic political system. In accordance with the pattern identified by Marcuse, however, new forces of negation have emerged as destabilizing vectors for advanced Western societies.

Zusammenfassung

Diese Dissertation zeichnet Herbert Marcuses Rolle bei der Gestaltung der Neuen Linken nach, indem sie die Rezeption zweier Marcuse-Konzepte, *Repressive Toleranz* (Repressive Tolerance) und *Alternative revolutionäre Kräfte* (Alternative Revolutionary Forces), in Westdeutschland zwischen 1963 und 1974 analysiert. Sie befasst sich auch mit dem zeitgenössischen Erbe dieser Konzepte. Die Forschung verfolgt einen multidisziplinären Ansatz, der methodische Erkenntnisse aus der Geistes- und Ideengeschichte mit empirisch-historischer Analyse kombiniert; ergänzt durch einen Exkurs zur politischen Analyse. Die Dissertation beginnt mit Marcuses intellektueller Biographie und primären Einflüssen. Ausgehend von methodischen Erkenntnissen aus der Ideengeschichtsschreibung werden Marcuses eingangs genannte Begriffe als *Mini-Einheit-Ideen* (mini unit-ideas) analysiert und Aspekte davon in Form konkreter Fallstudien untersucht, die die Entwicklung der neulinksradikalen Jugendbewegungen in Westdeutschland und der SPD beleuchten, sowie die Beziehungen zwischen ihnen während des Forschungszeitraums. Die Dissertation diskutiert auch die Rolle zweier linksgerichteter Medien – *Frankfurter Rundschau* und *Der Spiegel* – sowohl hinsichtlich der politischen Ausrichtung ihrer Berichterstattung als auch ihres indirekten Einflusses auf das aktuelle Geschehen im Untersuchungszeitraum. Es wird eine ideelle Verbindung zwischen Marcuses beiden Vorstellungen und der allmählichen Verschiebung von der traditionellen ökonomischen und klassenorientierten Ausrichtung der Alten Linken hin zu neuen Ideen und Prioritäten hergestellt, die sich stärker auf Fragen der Lebensqualität, individuelle Befreiung und Menschenrechte, Minderheitenschutz, Umweltschutz konzentrieren, sowie eine größere Solidarität mit der Dritten Welt. Es wird der Schluss gezogen, dass die Rezeption von Marcuses Ideen nicht zu einer direkten und dokumentierten Umsetzung von Ideen in politisches Handeln führte, sondern vielmehr zur Etablierung neuer intellektueller Annahmen, eines neuen Zeitgeistes, der breite Bevölkerungsschichten, insbesondere die gebildete Jugend, beeinflusste. Zu Marcuses nachhaltigen Einflüssen gehört die Gewährung von Handlungsfähigkeit (agency) an Gruppen, die zuvor von der Linken übersehen wurden, sowie die Bereitstellung eines ideologischen Rahmens, um einen bereits bestehenden „Reflex“ der Ablehnung (unter der Linken) des Nachkriegskonsenses über die Duldung einer breiten Spektrum politischer Positionen, einschließlich reaktionärer. Diese Dissertation kommt weiter zu dem Schluss, dass Marcuses zwei Begriffe – *alternative revolutionäre Kräfte* und *repressive Toleranz* – im Sinne der Zugehörigkeit zu einzelnen *Mini-Einheit-Ideen* sinnvoll mit den zeitgenössischen Konzepten des Multikulturalismus und der politischen Korrektheit verbunden werden können. Darüber hinaus wird geschlussfolgert, dass Herbert Marcuses Analyse der Fähigkeit der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft, gegensätzliche Kräfte aufzunehmen, durch die Ereignisse in den Jahrzehnten nach der Veröffentlichung von *One-Dimensional Man* (1964) bewiesen wurde. Diese Dissertation kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die vollständige Einbeziehung zuvor benachteiligter und diskriminierter Gruppen diese ehemaligen Vektoren der Unzufriedenheit und Ablehnung des Mainstreams zu Unterstützern und systembejahenden Akteuren innerhalb des westlichen liberal-demokratischen politischen Systems gemacht hat. In Übereinstimmung mit dem von Marcuse identifizierten Muster haben sich jedoch neue Kräfte der Negation als destabilisierende Vektoren für fortgeschrittene westliche Gesellschaften herausgebildet.