Hans-Joachim König
Stefan Rinke (eds.)

North Americanization of Latin America?

Culture, Gender, and Nation in the Americas



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North Americanization of Latin America?

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Herausgegeben von
Debora Gerstenberger, Michael Goebel,
Hans-Joachim König und Stefan Rinke
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Pilar González Bernaldo de Quiros (Université de Paris)
Sandra Kuntz Ficker (El Colegio de México)
Federico Navarrete Linares (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México)
Thiago Nicodemo (Universidade Estadual de Campinas)
Scarlett O'Phelan (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
Ricardo Pérez Montfort (Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores
en Antropología Social, México)
Eduardo Posada-Carbó (University of Oxford)
Hilda Sabato (Universidad de Buenos Aires)
Rafael Sagredo Baeza (Universidad Católica de Chile)
Lilia Moritz Schwarcz (Universidade de São Paulo)

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This book grew out of a conference held at the Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. The conference brought together a wide array of scholars from different continents and different academic disciplines including history, sociology, anthropology, and cultural and literary studies. Its aim was to sharpen our understanding of the historical dimensions of a highly controversial concept, 'North Americanization' - '*Norte Americanización*,' in a heterogeneous region that had once been the original America. During the conference we profited from a quality of intellectual exchange that is seldom experienced at academic events of this sort. We thank all contributors—speakers, discussants, and other commentators alike—for making that possible. Most contributions to the conference are published in this volume. Claudio Lomnitz, who was unable to attend, prepared an article for the book.

The international conference received the generous material and moral support of various individuals and institutions and we gratefully acknowledge their help. Our University, its Department of History and its interdisciplinary Center for Latin American Studies (ZILAS) have provided an outstanding academic environment for research on Latin America in Eichstätt. The Maximilian-Bickhoff-Universitätsstiftung, the Bavarian American Academy, and the Bavarian Research Network on Area Studies, FORAREA, have funded our conference with generous grants. Finally, we thank our team at the Chair of Latin American History: our office manager Karin Schleibinger and our student assistants Maria Müller and Daniel Boss who have contributed to the organization of the conference and to the editorial work related with this volume.

Hans-Joachim König Stefan Rinke

"Not only do they flood the world with McDonald's burgers and Hollywood movies, now they also take power in soccer." (A cameraman of *TV Azteca* after the 0:2 loss of the Mexican team against the United States at the soccer World Cup, June 17, 2002, in: *Die Zeit*, June 20, 2002, p. 2)

HANS-JOACHIM KÖNIG AND STEFAN RINKE

BETWEEN "MORAL CONQUEST" AND GLOBAL INTEGRATION: NORTH AMERICANIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA?

Impressed and concerned by the rise of U.S. economic, political, and cultural influences on a global scale and especially in the so-called "Western Hemisphere" in the course of the 20th century, Latin Americans of all social classes have increasingly asked themselves what this foreign impact might mean to them and what it might lead to. Already in the early years of that century, intellectuals from the region came to discuss concepts like the "American century" or "Americanization"—often using the Spanish term '*Norte Americanización*'—in trying to assess these new developments.[1] Like the Uruguayan José Enrique

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[1] Rufino Blanco Fombona, "La americanización del mundo [1902]," in: Id., *Ensayos históricos*, ed. Rafael Ramón Castellanos (Caracas: Bibl. Ayacucho, 1981 [1902]).

As to terminology: The editors have preferred the use of the term 'North Americanization' not because of ideological reservations against the term 'Americanization' (if that had been the case we would have had to use a different terminology altogether) but because it has been in use in Latin America since 1900 and because it is still used by leading voices in present discussions like e.g. José Joaquín Brunner, *Globalización cultural y posmodernidad* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999), p. 151. However, the contributors were free to use the terminology they preferred which in most cases was 'Americanization', the more current term in the United States and in Europe. The different use of terms by the contributors may reflect different concepts and the open discussion of these differences is part of the conception of this volume.

Rodó who warned against utilitarian "americanismo" in his highly influential essay *Ariel* of 1900, they adopted these concepts from European sources where the idea of a "North American danger" was hotly debated. For critical observers from Europe and Latin America alike it seemed that what they experienced was the "moral conquest" by the United States.[2]

In the course of the century, that idea was redefined under the term cultural imperialism. More than eight decades after Rodó, many observers agreed that the cultural conquest from the North had made headway. At that point, the Mexican cultural critic Carlos Monsiváis catalogued some of the ingredients of North Americanization in Latin America:

"Cablevisión. Comics de superhéroes. Humor rápida y malamente traducido. Infinitud de productos que sacian, inventan y modifican necesidades. Programas de televisión cuya apoteosis semanal se nutre de victorias del sistema de justicia norteamericana. Libros (best sellers) donde la mecánica del éxito programa la imaginación y la escritura. Tecnologías refinadísimas. Videocassettes. Comunicación por satélite. Ideología de la villa global macluhaniana. Videodiscos. Estrategias de consumo cuya implacable logística destruye toda perspectiva artesanal. 'Filosofía' del vendedor más grande del mundo. Películas que han impuesto mundialmente el ritmo, la temática y el punto de vista de la industria norteamericana. Software y hardware. Agencias internacionales de noticias. Desdén ante la historia de cada nación. Homogenización de los estilos de vida 'deseables'. Imposición de un lenguaje mundial. Circuito de transmisión ideológica que va de la publicidad a la pedagogía. Control de la 'revolución informática'. Revistas que distribuyen la 'femineidad'. Reordenamiento periódico de hábitos de vida ajustables a los cambios tecnológicos."[3]

When Monsiváis wrote down his catalogue the fight against that overwhelming and dominating U.S. influence had for a long time been a rallying point of Latin American intellectuals on the left and on the right. Yet at about the same time, the Venezuelan intellectual Carlos Rangel criticized the implicit basic foundations of the concept of Latin American images of and relations with the United States since the times of Rodó: the idea of a spiritual superiority of Latin America and the Latin American inferiority complex. For Rangel this paradoxical connection seemed to lie at the heart of the love-hate relationship—

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[2] José Enrique Rodó, *Ariel* [1900], ed. Belén Castro (Madrid: Cátedra, 2000), p. 196. For recent discussions about the history of North Americanization in Europe see Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2000). Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist (ed.), *Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland, 1945-1970* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997).

[3] Carlos Monsiváis, "Penetración cultural y nacionalismo," in: Pablo González Casanova (ed.), *No intervención, autodeterminación y democracia en América Latina* (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1983), p. 75.

one of the "killer oppositions" that Berndt Ostendorf criticizes in his contribution to this book—Latin Americans harbored with regard to the big brother in the North.[4] Since the publication of Rangel's book until the present onset of yet a new century, discussions about North Americanization in Latin America have changed again. Today the term is discussed in connection with the concept of globalization and postmodernity. While some claim that globalization is but a euphemism for North Americanization, which is interpreted as a decisive instrument of control, others insist that North Americanization is an irrelevant chimera and that there is no such thing at all.[5] Developing his argument, Monsiváis himself has more recently remarked that North Americanization has led to profound and yet superficial ways of integration while at the same time still provoking reactions in defense of one's own identity, of 'lo propio'.[6] Intellectuals like José Joaquín Brunner and Néstor García Canclini have stressed the double character of the North Americanization of Latinos and the Latinization of the United States, the double direction of-mainly mass cultural—flows from the center to the periphery and from the periphery to the center.[7] Both spheres tend to influence each other in what has become a transnational process of "the fading of borders in the Western Hemisphere."[8] Moreover, García Canclini has emphasized that for the governing classes seeking economic cooperation with the United States North-Americanization is synonymous with globalization. Yet, it has many different meanings in the various Latin American societies, meanings that have changed over time and that reflect the differences in gender, social class, and ethnic background.[9]

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[4] Carlos Rangel Guevara, *Del buen salvaje al buen revolucionario* (Caracas: Monte Avila,1982), p. 121

[5] The German writer Matthias Politycki ["Der verlorene Highway: Amerika als Mogelpackung," in: *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Apr. 4, 2001), p. 16] has recently remarked that the rejection of the term and concept of 'North Americanization' reminds of the arguments against the term 'Russification' in the former Communist world.

[6] Carlos Monsiváis, "Interrelación cultural entre México y Estados Unidos," in: María Esther Schumacher (ed.), Mitos *en las relaciones México-Estados Unidos* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994), p. 448. Monsiváis, *Aires de familia: Cultura y sociedad en América Latina* (Barcelona: Anagrama, 2000), p. 59.

[7] Brunner, *Globalización cultural*, pp. 151-164. Néstor García Canclini, *La globalización imaginada* (Mexico: Paidós, 1999), pp. 95-99.

[8] Berndt Ostendorf, *Transnational America: The Fading of Borders in the Western Hemisphere* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2002).

[9] García Canclini, *La globalización imaginada*, pp. 12-13.

What the more recent contributions to the debate on globalization and its possible cultural effects tend to forget, however, is the historical dimension of what is now a centennial process.[10] Change and variety in meaning from its inception at around 1900 have been essential parts of the concept of North Americanization in Latin America. Despite its recent concentration on the cultural sphere and the political economy of mass culture that concept has always included ideas of economic penetration and political domination, which have been more or less relevant in different periods and in different countries of the region. Moreover it is closely connected to a set of images and stereotypes that cross-influence each other. While critically questioning the viability of the notion of North Americanization this volume contributes to a historically informed new perspective on the relevance, the continuity and the changes of the term and concept as well as the processes related to North Americanization.

DIFFERENCE AND HEGEMONY IN THE AMERICAS

Part of the reason why the discussions about North Americanization have been so enduring and often burdened by heated emotions is the fact that despite the recent blurring of the borders, the transnationalization, and the new postcolonial structures there still remains the basic fact of historical difference. Indeed, America has consisted of different parts, among them a northern and a southern sphere. The history of the relationship between these two spheres is as complicated as are the inter-American images and perceptions between the United States and Latin America and—more generally speaking—the inter-American discourses of identity and alterity.[11] From a U.S. perspective, inter-American relations have been defined historically as "special relationships" characterized by positive concepts such as liberty, democracy, cooperation, neighborhood, as well as geographic notions like Pan-Americanism, the idea of "America" and the "Western Hemisphere." It was usually assumed that the two-part continent is united by common political and economic goals, that

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[10] For the historical dimension see Stefan Rinke, *Begegnungen mit dem Yankee: Nordamerikanisierung und soziokultureller Wandel in Chile, 1898-1990* (Cologne-Vienna: Böhlau, forthcoming).

[11] Stefan Rinke, "Das andere Amerika: Alteritätskonstruktionen zwischen den Amerikas im 19. Jahrhundert," in: Waltraud Schreiber (ed.), *Kontakte-Konflikte-Kooperation: Der Umgang mit dem Fremden in der Geschichte* (Neuried: Ars Una, 2001), pp. 205-240.

there existed a close relationship between cooperating equals, and that a fundamental identity of interests resulted from certain parallels in historical development, especially from an allegedly shared colonial past and (in the case of Latin America) a similar—if delayed—process of separation from the European mother countries. A detailed analysis of the historical process of the two parts, however, proves that from the start, conditions and opportunities differed sharply. Although the territories, which had been seized in North and South America, were all colonies of some sort, they clearly reflected their different Old World origins. By taking over from their respective mother countries an institutional and cultural framework as well as a specific way of life, they also adopted different social and political systems.

Although both North America and South America were European colonies, their former mother countries bequeathed to them very different social and political systems. Unlike developments in the North, the colonial elites in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies were not subjected to the pressure of an egalitarian ideology; rather, they thrived at the expense of the bulk of the population and, as a result, managed to develop a corresponding self-understanding. Latin American thinkers of the 19th century like Juan Bautista Alberdi and Domingo Faustino Sarmiento remarked that in contrast to constellations in the North, political emancipation alone was not sufficient in Latin America but that a mental emancipation had to accompany it. In contrast to the former English colonies, the unequal distribution of land in South America had created a strongly hierarchical society with a large dependent underclass. Contrary to Northern practices, the Indian population was not dislodged, expelled, and extinguished but assigned a service function instead. Whereas in the North political activity and administrative knowledge could be acquired not only on the county level and in local communities but also in the colonial "assemblies", political participation of the Creoles in South America was restricted to the local level (*cabildo*). Compared to the situation in North America, there were much stronger barriers in South America to the development of a colonial commercial production.

Whereas in the North the thirteen colonies became united in a confederation during and after the War of Independence, in the Spanish part of America, with the exception of Brazil, the process of separation from the mother country was accompanied by an attendant process of disintegration, itself in part a consequence of the former administrative structure. While the Northern colonies strengthened the bonds already existing among them and even expanded their

territories, the Latin American states drifted even further apart. As a result, in their foreign policies, the United States was not confronted with anything like a unified "Latin America" in later years. Hence, there was from the start a huge difference in the initial conditions, which has to be taken into account when one tries to evaluate the subsequent development in relations between the United States and Latin America. The same is true for the radically differing images that Europeans came to have of the two Americas. While the United States soon came to be considered the true America, a sort of new Europe where genuinely European ideas flourished, the South-American republics have long been seen as illegitimate, disorganized, and inferior offshoots of the European continent.[12]

In the course of the last 190 years, interested observers have increasingly emphasized the image of incompatibility of Northern and Southern goals and values. Differences and polar divisions have been constructed in order to legitimize existing and deepening asymmetries of power and wealth and resulting structures of domination and exploitation. Already at the beginning of the nineteenth century politicians and statesmen like John Quincy Adams pointed out that there could be no community of interests or of principles between North and South America because Latin Americans were inferior beings incapable of conquering and settling nature. The discourse of alterity became the basis of an expansionist policy on part of the United States, which allegedly was inevitable because it followed the laws of nature.[13] On the Latin American side, Simón Bolívar rejected the United States as a model for the constitutions of the new republics in the South. In 1824, referring to the threat posed by the Monroe Doctrine (1823), he warned of U.S. claims to hegemony, and he darkly surmised that providence had chosen the United States to bring misfortune to America – all in the name of liberty.[14] In a letter to a friend in the United States, the Colombian statesman José Manuel Restrepo left no doubt that "the difference

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[12] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1980), pp. 137-147. For the context see Hans-Joachim König, "Die Alte und die Neue Welt: (Latein)Amerika als Feld europäischer Alteritätserfahrungen," in: Waltraud Schreiber (ed.), *Kontakte, Konflikte, Kooperationen: Der Umgang mit dem Fremden in der Geschichte* (Neuried: Ars Una, 2001), pp. 153-203

[13] Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States. A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998), p. 31.

[14] Bolívar was deeply influenced by what he perceived as a fundamental difference between North and South America and he did not invite the North Americans to the first Pan-American Congress in Panama (1824/26).

between the sons of Spain and her colonies and the former English colonies is as great as that between night and day."[15]

Since the end of the nineteenth century and even more so since World War I, when the economic influence of the United States began to replace that of the British in Latin America, almost every Latin American state has experienced U.S. interventions and, therefore, an influence on its national development in one form or other:[16] as armed invasion, as diplomatic intrusions into its sovereignty, as domination of important sectors of the national economy or even of the entire country, and as a financial policy of destabilization.[17] Three basic positions were articulated on which U.S.-American policy toward the Latin American states was henceforth based and which, until the 1980s at least, transformed inter-American relations into a system of hegemony and dominance on the one hand, and of dependency and inequality on the other: (1) the belief in its own evolutionary-cultural superiority, (2) economic supremacy, and (3) the search for geopolitical security. The aims of the United States in the region were to safeguard its political and economic interests as a hegemonic power while at the same time trying to accomplish its self-assigned cultural mission. Hence, the inter-American system was "a not so special relationship" after all.[18] Since the 1980s and, especially, since the breakdown of the Soviet Union has the concept of "national security", which during the Cold War had become the decisive criterion for U.S. relations with Latin America, lost ground. The only remaining super power, the United States has also modified the application of the claim to the right of intervention. An increasingly global situation, in which the Latin American states have found new partners (Europe), whereas the United States, at the same time, has shifted its attention to the countries bordering the Pacific, is about to drastically change the relevance of Latin America for the United

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[15] John T. Reid, *Spanish American Images of the United States, 1790-1960* (Gainesville: Univ. of Florida Press, 1977), p. 19.

[16] Joseph S. Tulchin, *The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (New York: New York UP, 1971).

[17] Hans-Joachim König, "El intervencionismo norteamericano en Iberoamérica," in: Manuel Lucena Salmoral et al. (ed.), *Historia de Iberoamérica,* Vol. III. *Historia Contemporánea* (Madrid: Cátedra, 1988), pp. 405-478.

[18] Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Latin America: A Not-So-Special Relationship," in: *Foreign Policy* 32 (1978), p. 107.

States and is creating what Peter H. Smith has aptly called a "hegemony by default."[19]

From the Latin American perspective inter-American relations are generally defined as a relationship characterized by negative concepts such as U.S. dominance, imperialism, hegemony and arrogance or Latin American dependency and inequality. Reflected in these concepts are reactions to acts of intervention by the United States and to asymmetric power relations. In most cases the Latin Americans reacted in the form of an intensive anti-Americanism. But there have always been others forms of reaction that demonstrate how ambivalent or ambiguous the responses were. There is a general admiration for U.S. ideals of liberty and progress. Not only the oligarchy cooperated with the United States and exploited U.S. efforts at assistance, making extensive use of North American security concepts and anti-communists tactics, but also the bulk of the population oriented themselves toward the United States in their standards of behavior as well as in their patterns of consumption. Even the most radical critics of U.S. imperialism did not question that the United States provided a model for the Western world with regard to modernization, material wealth, and technological progress. No wonder the American way of life has been imitated or at least admired. Generally though, the United States were seen—in negative and in positive ways—as a stark contrast and often as the very opposite of one's own.

NORTH AMERICANIZING LATIN AMERICA?

Given the traditional emphasis on the unbridgeable differences and polar divisions between Latin America and the United States it is no wonder that Latin American Studies research should traditionally have followed an approach of binary oppositions. Modern as opposed to traditional, imperialist as opposed to dependent were the pairs of key words that have shaped the discussions about inter-American relations in the second half of the 20th century. Influences from one opposition towards the other were usually seen as one-way streets of modernization or domination.[20] In this binary logic the United States clearly

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[19] Peter H. Smith, *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (New York and Oxford: New York UP, 1996).

[20] See the recent criticism of this scholarship in: William Roseberry, "Americanization in the Americas," in: id. *Anthropologies and Histories: Essays in Culture, History, and Political*

was the active subject while Latin America necessarily remained a passive object. Passivity, openness to penetration, was increasingly regarded not only from an economic and political position, but also from a cultural angle when the concept of cultural imperialism was invented. In comparison to the former two levels the latter was harder to discern and thus more dangerous because potentially more undermining. In addition, as the critics claimed, the implicit ideologies related to cultural imperialism were used to legitimize the harsh realities of political hegemony and economic exploitation.[21] Often written by U.S. scholars and from a perspective that attacked affirmative and politically motivated slogans such as the "Americanization of the World"[22] or the "American century",[23] North Americanization was understood and criticized as part of U.S. economic and cultural expansion, or of "spreading the American dream."[24]

Reflecting the current discussions in cultural criticism postcolonial approaches to the study of inter-American relations have recently redefined these relations as a dynamic process not only comprising the transfer of U.S. economic and political power or ideas and way of life, but also the appropriation and transformation of these influences in Latin American contexts. They have pointed out that the sharp divisions of modern-traditional, imperialist-dependent are no longer tenable especially when talking about culture.[25] Instead of adop-

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Economy (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1989), pp. 80-91. Gilbert Joseph, "Close Encounters: Toward a New Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations," in: Gilbert Joseph et al. (ed.). *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham: Duke UP 1998), pp. 3-46. Emily S. Rosenberg, "Turning to Culture," in: ibd., pp. 497-514. Stefan Rinke, "Encountering the New History of Inter-American Relations," in: *Notas: Reseñas Iberoamericanas* 7 (3/2000), pp. 2-22.

[21] Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart *How to Read Donald Duck: Imperialist Ideology in the Disney Comic* (New York: International General, 1975). John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction* (London: Pinter, 1991).

[22] William T. Stead, *The Americanization of the World: Or, the Trend of the Twentieth Century* (London: Review of Reviews, 1902)

[23] Henry R. Luce, *The American Century* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941).

[24] Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982). Gerald K. Haines, *The Americanization of Brazil: A Study of U.S. Cold War Diplomacy in the Third World, 1945-1954* (Wilmington: SR Books. 1989).

[25] Joseph et al. (ed.) *Close Encounters of Empire*. Daniel Nugent (ed.), *Rural Revolt in Mexico: U.S. Intervention and the Domain of Subaltern Politics* (Durham: Duke UP, 1998).

tion and domination they discuss concepts like internalization, appropriation and transformation. Passive objects in what has been called the periphery gain a new dimension and can be understood as actively shaping their own fates and meanings and in turn influencing what has been called as the center. The product of that process of mutual interactions is a diffuse and hybrid mixture.[26]

Of course, the asymmetry in power relations has not dissolved. Actions remain strongly influenced by hegemonic power relations that have to be taken into account when studying the inter-American system. Yet, the new approach opens ways to look at what appears to be an old and often-told story from a new and innovate perspective, for example by focusing on the influences of a variety of transnational actors, from the editors of beauty magazines to the migrant workers at the border between the United States and Mexico. As Claudio Lomnitz has recently pointed out, contact zones have different contents and produce manifold tensions. And indeed, those between the North and South of the Americas have been multiple.[27] Their existence has been crucial for the production of images, stereotypes and perceptions, which in turn lead to a constant redefinition of the self and the other by appropriation and exclusion. In this process, identities and culture are permanently being constructed, transformed, and refashioned. This dynamic remodeling of material interactions and symbolic meanings is at the core of what North Americanization is about.

Contributors to this book look at specific historic cases discussing the inequality of power relations while at the same time dismantling the idea of homogenization and unilinear domination that has for a long time been the essence of the concept of North Americanization. They study the Latin American side to the process and ask who interpreted, constructed and used U.S. capital, advice, and cultural symbols, why this happened and when. They show that North Americanization not just provoked Yankeephoria or Yankeephobia

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Ransford W. Palmer (ed.) *U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Their Impact on Peoples and Culture* (Westport: Praeger, 1998)

[26] Ulf Hannerz, *Cultural Complexity* (New York: Columbia University Press 1992). John King, (ed.), *Mediating Two Worlds: Cinematic Encounters in the Americas* (London: BFI, 1993). Néstor García Canclini, *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995). Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1996). Richard H. Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II* (New York: Basic, 1997).

[27] Claudio Lomnitz, *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. 130.

but rather that the latter two phenomena were inextricable though extreme parts of the whole process which did at times overlap. Certainly anti-Americanism, or anti-imperialist nationalism, allowed the construction of counter images in answer to the one provided by the neighbor in the North. In setting limits to U.S. imperialism, it also allowed for a heightened sense of self without necessarily turning a blind eye to the socio-political malaise at home. In fact, criticism was directed at the selfish attitudes of the co-opting oligarchies that bear a heavy responsibility for the status quo. At the same time this resurgence of nationalist feelings induced a period of critical self-reflection and encouraged Latin Americans to explore their own cultural values as well as their potential for endogenous socio-political developments. "Anti-Americanism" is, no doubt, part of the search for a national identity, yet it also expresses the deep ambivalence that Latin America has always harbored vis-à-vis its overpowering neighbor.[28] In many of the contributions in this volume it becomes clear that in everyday situations Yankeephobia—much as Yankeephoria—played a clearly subordinate role. On the other hand, both were used or stimulated by state authorities in projects of modernization and/or in the nationalist redefinition of "lo propio."

This book is organized into five sections: the first discusses the concept of (North)Americanization and its meaning from three perspectives: a transatlantic, a United States, and a Latin American dimension. Over the course of two centuries the original meaning of the term 'Americanization' has lost its exclusivist character to signify multicultural formations in our own times. It has meant and still means very different things to different interests and thus its claim to homogeneity has never been fully accomplished (Berndt Ostendorf). Yet, looking at the second half of the 20th century one can see that the U.S. state in combination with powerful corporations, philanthropic foundations and labor unions attempted to implement a transformation of Latin America. This notion of transformation was based upon the belief in the healing effects of rising productivity. Increasing wealth would of itself lead to a reform of Latin American societies thus solving the urgent problems of injustice and poverty, or so the champions of that specific state-guided vision of (North)Americanization believed. Looking at the present realities of social polarization and gender-

[28] Hans-Joachim König, "Krisenreflexion, Krisenmanagement und nationale Identität in Kolumbien in den 1920er Jahren," in: Ute Guthunz and Thomas Fischer (ed.), *Lateinamerika zwischen Europa und den USA* (Frankfurt a.M.: Vervuert, 1995), pp. 139-161.

related inequalities, urban and rural poverty, environmental catastrophes, and unstable democracies in the region, the limits of that idea are obvious (Thomas F. O'Brien). Yet, given the recent "American MBA-driven global revolution" (Ostendorf), the question for an alternative becomes urgent. From a Latin American perspective this is a question of singular importance because Latin Americans have traditionally been in closest contact with the "colossus of the North". Americanization for them meant generation of national identity by 'othering' as well as the adoption and appropriation of a modernity originating from the world's largest market. As this consumer market gained dominance in the course of the 20th century the multi-directional process of (North)Americanization became obvious in that Latin American products and customs are "Americanized" in the United States and then re-exported to Latin America. Latino minorities in the North further complicate the picture by reinventing their own versions of the national within the North American context (Claudio Lomnitz).

The following sections treat specific historical dimensions of encounters in the Americas and of U.S. influences in Latin America from a Latin American perspective. Certainly the rise of U.S.-style consumerism over the course of the 20th century has often been interpreted as forming a basis of North Americanization.[29] Yet, were the origins of that consumer revolution indeed as unequivocally to be found in the United States as common wisdom might lead us to believe? A close look at the rise of a modern department store in Mexico City before the First World War reveals that Europeans played a key role in paving the way for North Americanization, as commerce was then—and despite the disruptions of two World Wars still is—a profoundly transnational enterprise (Jürgen Buchenau). Moreover, the commodities shaped for the spearhead of the consumer revolution—namely the "average" middle class American—gained different meanings in non-U.S. contexts. The commodification of religion has become a part of North Americanization that finds a clear expression in the everyday lives of immigrant and migrant workers from Mexico in the United States. These Mexicans adopt and adapt to the gadgets of the American way of life and of after-life, yet they do so in a selective manner criticizing and resisting elements of the mainstream culture that do not fit the hybrid new construction of their own cultural convictions (Luis Rodolfo Morán Quiroz and Claudio Lomnitz).

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29 Olivier Zunz, *Why the American Century?* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1998).

In the course of the 20th century, images of the United States have had a profound influence on many spheres of everyday life in Latin America reaching beyond the public sphere to the privacy of family homes. This process was transported by the consecutive revolutions in mass media that have marked the history of the last century. In its early decades, the new illustrated journals were both a vanguard of modernity and a means for representing idealistic versions of the "self" and comparisons with the "other." In the Cuban case, despite the overwhelming political, economic, and cultural presence of the United States these magazines reflected a nationalist discourse of self-conscious elites that did not want to follow U.S. models. Rather to the contrary, contemporary illustrations prove that they resisted cultural domination by inventing the gendered metaphor of the beloved—and betrayed—beautiful woman that symbolized the nation (Lynn Stoner). In the 1920s, the new media spread images of the United States all across Latin America into the most distant corner. Ubiquitous elements of these images were representations of femininity. The apparently ultra-modern and independent U.S. women amazed and excited observers. If the United States were the "land of the future"—a Hegelian dictum that continues to gain followers—then gender relations would probably be transformed according to the U.S. model. That prospect troubled male critics in Chile. Much like in the United States, they used the image of the allegedly immoral modern flapper in their bitter fight against liberal feminism and its claims to gender equality. Yet, in the Chilean context that image cut both ways as the national problem of gender politics gained an international dimension through the imagery of North Americanization (Stefan Rinke).

Despite similar patterns of encounter between Latin Americans and the United States there were gradual differences corresponding to the heterogeneous character of Latin America as such. North Americanization meant different things to a Cuban than to an Argentine. And if Cuban elites struggled to create an image to counter the overpowering U.S. influences in the country and thus to uphold the honor of Lady Cuba an Argentine intellectual and editor like Victoria Ocampo had other interests when thinking about the United States. Indeed, the landed Argentine elite that Ocampo belonged to, built their cultural self-confidence on their European heritage. The proud elitist vision of Ocampo's magazine *Sur*, however, flourished only until the 1960s when the populist appeal of the new mass culture sponsored by Peronist and post-Peronist regimes left it at the margins of national developments (Mariano Plotkin). Not only in mass culture, but on an elite level, too, does the exclusive notion of a purely

Latin American or U.S. culture prove problematic. The Argentine Jorge Luis Borges is known to be one of the deans of Spanish American literature in the 20th century. Yet, the man who as a boy read the *Don Quixote* in English before he read it in Spanish also acted as an important cultural mediator for U.S. literature in Latin America and since the 1960s has influenced a younger generation of authors in the United States. If any direction in this literary cross-fertilization can be discerned then certainly a circular one (Josef Raab).

In contrast to the ideal aesthetic world of the culturally privileged few, the—often state-conducted—projects of national self-assertion in Latin America put an emphasis on difference and intentionally used the American 'Other' as counter image to the 'Self.' When in the 1920s modern tourism emerged this process also worked the other way around. Thus, in the two decades following the turmoil of revolution Mexicans invented the idyllic and bucolic imagery of a relaxed and festive Mexico full of dances and fiestas in order to fulfill the stereotypical expectations of tourists from the United States. Not the least because of the multiplication by emerging electronic mass media was the routine repeated until it found entrance into autostereotypical depictions of the authentically Mexican, of *lo mexicano*. Thus, to a certain degree, North Americanization is a fundament of *mexicanidad* (Ricardo Pérez Montfort). Not only in Mexico but in the more distant Chile, too, did cultural custodians present the typical dances to more or less illustrious visitors from the United States in order to prove the essence of the national soul. This essence was created in a process that like in the Mexican case spanned the three decades from the 1920s to the 1940s. But more so than in Mexico where government and private interests formed a coalition to spread the imagery of Mexicanness in Chile it was the state that intentionally fostered a movement to what was claimed to be authentic forms of Chilean folklore. Originally this cultural nationalism was part of the strategy of middle class reformers at the head of the Popular Front government to construct an inclusive national project that spanned the gaps of social class. In the 1940s, it was still possible to include it under the banner of Pan Americanism and only later did its offspring—the New Song Movement—gain an explicitly anti-imperialist and anti-American character (Corinne Pernet). In a political sense, anti-imperialism also had its roots in the 1920s. Sandino's fight against U.S. marines in Nicaragua sparked sharp attacks against U.S. predominance on the Pan American conferences in the 1920s and 1930s (Thomas Fischer). Sandino became part of an anti-imperialist mythology that was to fire

the imagination of freedom fighters in Cold-War Latin America for much of the 20th century.

Open Questions

What, then, are the relevance and the content of the concept of North Americanization in Latin America? This book has demonstrated that it did not have the univocal directedness that the older understanding of a pernicious process of penetration implied. To repeat it here: North Americanization in Latin America meant different things to different people at different times and in different contexts. Elements included stereotypical visions of the American 'other' that stood in close connection with idealized and—sometimes—critical visions of the 'self.' In the course of the 20th century these images have increasingly tended to follow market logics. They were commodified in the process of the rise of mass culture. Yet these elements never lost their power dimension as the spread of anti-Americanism and the legacy of U.S. interventionism demonstrate.

In general, the discussions have revealed that we still do not know enough about the historical dimensions of North Americanization. Indeed, the term has been rightfully criticized for being used in an inflationary manner and for implying sweeping assumptions. More often than not, scholarship about North Americanization has only produced results that remain restricted to actions and reactions of Latin American elites. Yet, if we take on the painstaking work of analyzing the multiple dimensions of the encounters, then the notion of North Americanization remains a useful tool for structuring the approach. The implicitly comparative dimension of many of the contributions to this book reveals that there are certain common elements of sociocultural changes in Latin America in the course of the 20th century that cannot be separated from encounters in the Americas in continually changing contact zones.

In order to understand more fully the aspects of influence and appropriation, of demarcation, and of cross-fertilization more comparative work will be necessary that combine the macro- and micro-levels of analysis, that take the general cultural change into account and that try to include the reactions of all layers of society. Thus, by using non-traditional sources like movies, cartoons, paintings, pop music and so on will the analysis of cultural contacts and encounters in the Americas remain a promising field of innovative scholarship. In that way, we will hopefully gain a more historically informed idea about a chimera whose

existence cannot be denied. Only then will we learn to understand North Americanization in Latin America as part of a history of globalization in the 20th century.

PART I

NORTH AMERICANIZATION

IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

BERNDT OSTENDORF

AMERICANIZATION AND ANTI-AMERICANISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

Complex notions inhibit an analysis of the relationship among the variables they pack together.[1] And these tend to interfere with each other in a synergetic mind-boggle. For example, anti-Americanism hovers like a shadow over the Americanization debate, fed by multifarious, yet steady resentments caused by the not-yet-quite-understood effects of globalization. Globalization is for many non-Americans a creeping form of Americanization, an estimate that Americans, even liberals, steadfastly oppose. To sort out the political (and tacit) agendas contained in the concept of Americanization alone and to identify the diverse processes so described we first need to clear away the historical habits of stereotype which have over the years fossilized in stories and narratives. Only after such an archeological operation will we be able to distinguish between knee-jerk anti-Americanism and justified criticism of US politics or of global capitalism, and only then will the notion of globalization free itself from the weight of older tropes. Finally to add to the confusion there are certain cognitive differences and transatlantic dissonances in the usage of these terms: the same word may have different political implications or tacit assumptions on either side of the Atlantic.

The following questions need to be answered: 1) What has the term Americanization transported as a hidden agenda or as a tacit background assumption over the past two centuries on either side of the Atlantic? 2) Why has the issue of Americanization and its silent partner "anti-Americanism" enjoyed a remarkable renaissance since 1989 at all levels of the European public sphere? 3) Is globalization merely an expansion or intensification of a onedimensional neoliberal Americanization and hence the cause of global anti-Americanism or is the "new

[1] Thus Adam Kuper concludes his magisterial deconstruction of the term "culture". *Culture: The Anthropological Account* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 1999), p. 245. See also Berndt Ostendorf "Cultural Studies: Post-Political Theory in a Post-Fordist Public Sphere", *Amerikastudien* 40 (4/1995), pp. 709-724.

global economy" a new ball game altogether that has little or nothing to do with America?

A first working definition of Americanization may be drawn from a friendly but neutral source, the *Oxford English Dictionary*. How do the British view Americanization? "Strictly to make American, to naturalize as an American esp. as a citizen of the United States. Loosely to make American in character: to assimilate to the customs or institutions of the United States. Chiefly a term of English party politics intended to be opprobrious." And a sample sentence from the *Times* of 1860 drives the latter usage home: "This Americanization is represented to us as the greatest of calamities." According to the OED then Americanization refers to citizenship, to institutions, to customs, but it also serves as an invective directed at the political other. In England, at any rate, it is an instrument of political abuse.

The American Columbia on-line encyclopedia runs the following entry: "Americanization, term used to describe the movement during the first quarter of the 20th century whereby the immigrant in the United States was induced to assimilate American speech, ideals, traditions, and ways of life. As a result of the great emigration from E and S Europe between 1880 and the outbreak of World War I ,… the Americanization movement grew to crusading proportions... The Federal Bureau of Naturalization joined in the crusade and aided the private Americanization groups. Large rallies, patriotic naturalization proceedings, and Fourth of July celebrations characterized the campaign."[2] This entry does not focus on current usage, but makes a historical point. Americanization *used to mean* a forcible assimilation to Euro-American standards.[3] Let us remember the dark side of this Americanization drive. It was motivated by an older nativism directed against those unwilling to be assimilated to the dominant Anglo-American norm. During the twenties the Ford factory established an Americanization department to browbeat its recalcitrant ethnic workers into becoming real Americans. Henry Ford's Americanization zeal was propelled by a worthy goal, to create good citizens. Yet, this goal was buttressed by nativism; Ford was a xenophobe and rabid anti-semite. In short, his Americanization drive was stabilized by the phobia of others. It inspired the divisive political term "un-American " as in

[2] *The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia*. Columbia University Press, 1994/2000. www.google.com/ce6/society/A0803680.html.

[3] Philip Gleason, "American Identity and Americanisation," in: *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, ed. S. Thernstrom (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980).

the notorious Un-American Activities Committee.[4] After the Civil Rights era such nativistic phobia was exorcized from the public sphere.

A first observation is in order: When used within the United States the term Americanization has a different semantic range than when it is used outside the United States. And secondly, since the time of Henry Ford the Americanization policy has fallen out of fashion at home. Today, the US public and the political class have distanced themselves from the quasi-missionary attempt to bully old and new citizens into "universalism" or into what was in the twenties more correctly known as "Anglo-Conformity". Indeed anyone trying to Americanize incoming ethnics in the universalist manner described above would be accused of Eurocentrism, the original sin in the canon of multicultural neo-orthodoxy. Within the US today the care and nurture of cultural roots, of ethnic particularism and racial difference is all the rage, and Eurocentric universalism is avoided like the plague, and not only by the academic theory class.[5] Ethnic particularism has become the litmus test for projects that expect to receive grants from the NEH or the Ford Foundation (which has reversed the beliefs of its founder) and presidential candidates readily voice ethnic pieties or cave in to identity politics in order to win votes. It is not without irony that precisely at the time when the US has dropped all public policy to universalize its own citizens and at the time when according to the last census the demographic profile of the US promises to become ever more global, the old anxiety of Americanization grips the rest of the world. Are we at crossed purposes? Is it ethnic particularism within the US and unilateral Americanization for the rest of the world? Or, put more negatively, Schlesinger's "disuniting of America" at home and Huntington's "US against the rest" abroad?

And how do the nations of the world react to the real or alleged Americanization in the age of globalization? The way ethnic groups did in the United States: By strengthening (at times re-inventing) local versions of cultural nationalism and by revving up a politics of difference against the universalizing temptations of Americanization which, some critics allege, travels under the guise of globalization. In a way, therefore, we are witnessing, and this adds to the irony, the

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[4] Such nativism emerged around 1840 and was first studied by John Higham in *Strangers in the Land* (1963).

[5] Kuper, *Culture*, S. 226-228. Berndt Ostendorf, "The Politics of Difference: Theories and Practice in a Comparative U.S.-German Perspective," in: Dieter Dettke, Jeffrey Peck, Klaus Milich (eds.), *Multiculturalism in Transit: A German-American Exchange* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998), pp. 36-66.

translation of a specifically American mobilization strategy by the very people who defy Americanization into the global arena.[6] Even in defying Americanization and in rebelling against globalization, protesters are subtly following American models of anti-universalism, that is, pursuing a strong politics of localism and regional particularism.[7] The post-structuralist and feminist critique of universalism and liberalism gives this tendency a theoretical underpinning and an academic validation. The adage "think globally, but act locally," which, when contracted, gives us glocalization, has become a world-wide debate, yet one that carries many echos of American public discourses. One of the basic tenets of American populism is that all politics issues from local politics. So the localism which fights the power of American globalization has been tested and tried in the American domestic arena before it was exported elsewhere.[8] In that sense even the American dominance in the anti-Americanization agenda setting is a subtle form of what might be called "meta-Americanization."

One tacit factor which hovers above the entire debate is pure power, both hegemonic and asymmetrical.[9] A hegemonic US unilateralism plays itself out in the privileging of domestic over foreign priorities as when the international Kyoto accord had to bow to domestic interests. In what way is an American unilateralism different from, say, Sovietization or Europeanization? The difference resides in one fact: Americanization implies a tacit and, increasingly, not so tacit exceptionalism which has been stabilized by the collapse of all other alternatives. In 1989 America moved from being *a* city upon a hill to the *only city upon a hill*, the *only viable model* of political (and perhaps cultural) modernity in the world. This is the gist of Fukuyama's thesis. The US as a utopian dream – however ideological or false it may have seemed previous to 1989– acquired a triumphalist, I-told-you-so reality thereafter and became a tacit given, particularly in the way American patriots like George W. Bush behave globally. It became *selbstverständlich* and needed no further justification. The Australians Mosler and Catley put the

[6] David Mosler and Bob Catley, *Global America: Imposing Liberalism on a Recalcitrant World* (New York: Praeger, 2000), pp. 186-190.

[7] Outside the US and without the vigilance of the Supreme Court such a politics of difference reverts to its ethnocentric core and becomes a right wing agenda of apartheid. (Kuper, *Culture*, p. xii).

[8] Walter Russell Mead presents a persuasive historic etiology of American populism and its effects on the shape of foreign policy: "The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy," in: *The National Interest* No. 58 (Winter 1999/2000).

[9] Mosler and Catley, *Global America*, p. 188.

global resentment in a nutshell: "For many in the world this is the hypocrisy of American liberalism: it pursues and often imposes an order that is in its own interest, but defines it by the use of universalist liberal values."[10] The robust narcissism of American popular culture has over time increased the momentum of the rising tide of that exceptionalism.[11] Is globalization therefore a form of Americanization that remains tacit? It is perceived only by those who are victimized by it. It is telling that Left Labor and Blair-Labor are divided over this question; the former say yes, the latter no. And even liberal US-Americans are adamant that globalization should not be confused with Americanization. They claim that Americans suffer from globalization just like the Brazilians and Nigerians. The latter are not convinced and tend to question the implied solidarity of victimhood. As with Americanization there is a cognitive, transatlantic dissonance in the semantics and political consequences of globalization.

Should we, as an entry into the topic of Americanization, adopt *realpolitik,* study the history of American unilateralism and ask with Mosler and Catley where and when in world politics was the US hegemonically present and unilaterally dominant? Given the revival of the Americanization-debate after 1990, when the U.S. became the only hegemon, this periodization would make some sense. But power does not explain everything. Despite massive Soviet hegemony in the Eastern bloc between 1945 and 1989 and despite a brutal top-down "Sovietization" in the political, economic and cultural spheres it was relatively ineffective and remained exterior to local or particular cultures. And unsurprisingly, the surface Sovietization faded instantly when the iron curtain came down. By contrast Americanization, as many observers have pointed out, was not so much imposed from above, but to a much larger degree voluntary. Marxists would qualify this "free" choice in the context of a onedimensional, rigged market. Yet, through its commodities America extended its influence well into the Soviet sphere and it did so in a quasi-subversive manner. Even anti-American terrorists love American commodities. The terrorists of Sept. 11 fame were addicted to American films. This is what George Devereux meant by "antagonistic acculturation." The question of agency of those who want to be Americanized or are being subversively Americanized without realizing it needs to be kept in mind. Linguists speak of a "structural amnesia," that people forget what actually forms them. Americaniza-

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[10] Ibd., p. 3.

[11] Berndt Ostendorf, "What Makes American Popular Culture so Popular: A View from Europe," in: *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 46 (3/2001), pp. 339-366.

tion, then, is not only an open threat, but also a secret lure or promise, and we should ask what makes the resources of American civic, material and popular culture so attractive or subversively effective?[12] Fear and attraction, dream or nightmare? Covert and manifest? Direct or indirect? Voluntary or imposed? The plots and their layers thicken.

On the tacit background assumptions of Americanization.[13]

Where does that lead us? Literary anthropology lets us return to the *stereotypes* of Americanization. The narratives which we employ habitually in Europe to talk about Americanization are structured by the logic of the morality play. They negotiate between the forces of good (we) and the forces of evil (Yankee imperialism), between America as positive model (city on a hill) and America as nightmare (Gotham), between heaven and hell, between America as progress and America as decline. In the very rhetoric of Americanization there lurks a dualistic compulsion with religious, even apocalyptic or millenarian overtones. This narrative, Manichean habit which, a self-critical European might argue, we adopted from the Americans needs to be understood and moved out of the way before we can get to the processes hiding behind the stereotyped narratives.

The basis of this article are close to a hundred new publications on the Americanization of Europe, most of them published since 1990. Many more add up when you include the last two centuries. These comprise scholarly books by German and American authors or teams of scholars about all aspects of transatlantic relations. Then there were popular books situated somewhere between coffeetable books and patriotic tracts. Finally there is a near-constant journalistic preoccupation with the topic, a steady stream of articles and special numbers in leading European newspapers and journals, quite a few of them jingoistic and passionately nationalistic: *Merkur, Le Monde Diplomatique, Figaro, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. All of these added up to a rather motley spectrum and to an ambivalent score. There was a noticeable difference between the discourses on Americanization, which are more enmeshed in narrative habits than in historical facts, and the conscious and, *more frequently*, unconscious behaviors of the Americanizing subjects or Americanized objects. Often the

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[12] Berndt Ostendorf, "Some Contradictions in the Americanization-of-Germany Debate," in: Elliott Shore and Frank Trommler (ed.), *Being Present in the Other Culture* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001).

[13] A longer debate of this issue may be found in ibd.

public discourses of Americanization and the private Americanizing practices did not match.

Therefore it seemed reasonable to look first at the talk about Americanization, then ask what was being Americanized and who did it to whom? An interesting trajectory from hard to soft evidence emerged. On the side of hard evidence Americanization referred to the manifest and measurable American influences on the political, civil and economic institutions in European countries. But how did this influence affect political and economic cultures? Was Americanization perhaps a softer, less tangible, more insiduous, because invisible and covert influence of the sort that escapes the tracking devices of microanalytical methods and that can be observed only as a larger pattern and only over an extended period (*longue durée*).

Following Fernand Braudel and Siegfried Giedeon we could call it the submerged part of the iceberg of history, a sea change shaping individual behaviors and performance styles, habits of the heart, imaginaries, realms of desire, fantasies, body languages, fashions, new pursuits of happiness that are more elusive to close scrutiny and to the contemporary eye and only become manifest from a distance? Pondering this methodological can of worms it is obvious that two problematics were folded into each other which needed to be unwrapped. One was the Americanization-of-Europe debate which is part of the historiography of modernity. The second concerned the production of transatlantic attitudes, images, and stereotypes of each other driven by older traditions of jingoism, national iconography, and influencology. The latter seemed to be the hidden motor of the first debate and responsible for its rather consistent choreography. And all these methodological caveats strengthened the conviction that in order to understand the new and current Americanization debate one needed to take both a long and a distant view. Americanization discourses and Americanizing practices have been going on for a long time. In fact, the transatlantic exchange has played itself out in a compulsive *folie a deux* for over three centuries with a remarkably stable set of choreographies, but with a rather uneven, historically specific set of performances.

What are these compulsive cognitive patterns? What is the deep structure of the transatlantic relationship and what are the epistemological habits of the heart which have inscribed themselves in the choreography of this debate? There are three larger clusters of background assumptions. The first such habit can be identified as a preference for killer oppositions. Most of the abovementioned books fall into a binary pattern: *Traum vs. Alptraum*, dream vs. nightmare, heaven vs.

hell, love vs. hatred, us vs. them. Behind it there lurks the most primitive and most compulsive form of boundary maintenance well-known in anthropological or ethnographic field work. It reflects the binary structure of all ethnic othering according to the ethnocentric logic of personal achievement (we Germans) and outside ascription (those Americans) and vice versa. Its binary logic is essentially lopsided, call it selfish, partisan, or patriotic. It compares the sterling virtues of one's own culture (which we know deep in our hearts) with the worst excesses of the others (which are so apparent to the critical eye). Claude Levi-Strauss sighed that after forty years of ethnographic research he had found but that one human universal: ethnocentrism. This existential habit has predictable epistemological results and it is responsible for creating the filiopietistic battles between of the Germans-can-do-no-wrong-school vs. the Americans-can-do-no-wrong-school, a competitive parochialism of compulsive locals most cosmopolitans would rather do without. Such patriots are endowed with a strong libidinal fixation to their ethnic identity whatever collective or personal construct that may be. Their advocates are the no-fault-identity school or pass-the-buck-to-the-others school. Whatever faults there may be, always chalk them up to those on the other side of difference. This kneejerk habit continues to give rise to jingoistic journalism when reporting on the "others." As Fritz Stern writes: "these enemy images are both comfortable and spiteful." "Feindbilder sind nur bequeme Trotzigkeit." Such no-fault-identity advocates are at home in a comfortable moral fundamentalism whose world accepts only opposites such as we vs. them, victims vs. perpetrators and nothing in between. The binary trap (or refuge) is quite pervasive in time and place since it warms the patriotic heart, radicalizes the moral choices and keeps nations rallied round the flag.

This binary logic has dogged the transatlantic debate since colonial times. In fact the first commentary on the project of the peopling of the Americas was divided on moral grounds. At the quincentennial of the so-called "discovery" of America the public debate soon became a shouting match between hostile camps, laying bare a colonial double consciousness between the *leyenda rosa* and *leyenda negra*. The America-as-utopia-or-dystopia opposition, its essentialized trope, is a mere variant of this initial moral charter. What should surprise us is the fact that this deep-seated pattern continues to energize political rhetoric throughout American history into the present time. Such compulsive binarism is rampant in hemispheric relations. Upon modest reflection it is clear that such killer oppositions constitute self-serving, ahistorical and tired thinking which may account for their longevity and popularity. They are a form of mood simplification for

those at loss in a complex age and they are a welcome journalistic shorthand in the age of the soundbite. Such combat narrative favors outcome over process, event over idea. Picture Larry King Live: "Professors Barber and Huntington, we have thirty seconds left in our program. In fifteen seconds, where is the world going?" Barber: "Jihad vs. McWorld." Huntington: "The US against the rest of the world."[14]

A popular strategy to avoid the original sin of ethnocentric nativism has been the binary switch which drives out the devil with belzebub. Patriots become critics of the *patria*, fileopietists become jeremiahs and step right into the next contradiction which can be called the *Lettres Persannes* trap. The binary moral opposition remains in place, but the charges are reversed. Now a German might project an idealized America to call attention to the deficits of his own culture or vice versa. This utopian construction of an idealized Other serves - as did the *Lettres Persannes* of Montesquieu - to instrumentalize an abstract and utopian foil against which to identify, make visible and measure the dark faults and deep wounds of ones own culture. Indeed this narrative posture "from the other's point of view" marks the origin of most utopian fantasies from Thomas Morus onwards and is at work in a certain type of anthropological pastoralism of the Margaret Mead and Clifford Geertz kind.[15] Such a projection of a moral space into an imagined Other from which to make self-criticism figurable has had important political uses. But on a deep structural level such books reflect a same ethnocentric patriotism as the previous set, only now in a selfcritical, jeremiadic habit.

A curious subgenre has emerged. After the briefest of visits Carl Gustav Jung felt the urge in 1930 to educate Americans on "Your Negroid and Indian Behavior" and Jean Baudrillard paid a left-handed compliment to Americans in his *L'Amérique*. Jung and Baudrillard summarized all the terrible things Frenchmen and Germans have over the ages said about Americans, and presented these put-downs as fulsome praise. This is a particularly spiteful form of criticism disguised as oblique praise. How to avoid these traps? We need a mutual interaction or appropriation model, better yet, a cosmopolitan model which investigates the borrowing and exchanging between free agents over time without ignoring the structural or normative constraints in the public arena, be these cultural, political

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[14] In light of the events of September 11, 2001 Huntington's piece reads like a self-fulfilling prophecy: cf. Berndt Ostendorf, "Die Rolle der Religion in der amerikanischen Politik und Gesellschaft," in: Wolfgang Bergsdorf et al. (eds.), *Amerika - Fremder Freund* (Weimar: Rhinoverlag 2003), pp. 157-183.

[15] Kuper, *Culture*, pp. 75-77.

or economic, in which these agents have to operate and in which they develop their epistemologies. And in doing so we should not put too much trust in the evidence of Gallup polls. Influences work secretly and subversively, more on the level of competence than performance. There is a process at work that linguists have called "structural amnesia." People simply forget ideas and habits that are dysfunctional and constantly invent new traditions. George Devereux called attention to the fact that acculturation often proceeds in an "antagonistic" fashion. This term is particularly appropriate for cultural contact in asymmetrical power relations. Is the emergence of Turkish rap in Berlin an instance of Americanization? When Turkish youth rap in a new, hybrid language "Turko-German" and take Spike Lee's "fight the power" as a theme-song they take on three socialization agencies at one time: the German school, the German public arena (age cohorts, street, police) and domestic parental authority. Yet in that very act the young Turks will inevitably acculturate to their German constitutional freedoms (which they hijacked from an American model, Spike Lee) and, when successful as recording artists in the German market, they will become wealthy members of a popular German youth culture industry. All their antagonistic energy serves to acculturate them to the civic and commercial culture – a fact that they realize and will readily comment upon. Again to understand and follow these subtle dialectical workings of cultural give-and-take is easier said than done.

The third habit of thought has sedimented as a world-historical determinism, the *translatio imperii.* These tropes fall into an evolutionary trap, one of the oldest cognitive sink holes in the business. Bishop Berkeley (1685-1753) put the trope on its victorious track: The poem "On the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America" begins as follows:

"Westward the course of Empire takes its way;

the four first acts already past,

the fifth shall close the drama with the day.

Time's noblest offspring is the last."

Berkeley, a proper patriot, was of course referring to the British in America as time's noblest offspring. Friedrich Wilhelm Schlegel picked up the notion in 1820 when he voiced the "welthistorische Vermuthung, welche als wahrscheinlich annimmt, daß die Geisteskultur und der höhere Zustand der civilisierten Menschheit, wie sie in Asien angefangen und dann in Europa aufgeblüht, auch fernhin westwärts nach America wandern und dort mit neuer Kraft aufgehen, Europa dagegen immer mehr altern und so wie jetzt Asien, dahinsterben werde." Shortly before his death in 1918 Georg Simmel expressed his belief to Graf

Herman Keyserling, "daß dieser Selbstmord Europas zugunsten Amerikas...den Akt der Weltgeschichte einleitet, in dem sie ihre Wanderung von Osten nach Westen fortsetzt."[16] Keyserling seconded the notion with his book *Amerika, der Aufgang einer Neuen Welt* (1930) a belated counterpoint, it seems, to Oswald Spengler's equally deterministic *Untergang des Abendlands* where he claimed that, worldhistorically speaking, Europeans were already living in the North American age without realizing it. This evolutionary trope has by no means run its course. Fukuyama and the end-of-history-school chime in. According to them we have reached "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Jean Baudrillard, getting his cue from Alexandre Kojève, recognizes in postmodern, hyperreal America "utopia achieved." Folks in Peoria will be glad to find out from Paris that they are already there.

After identifying three major types of such writing and their near-compulsive logic, the question arises what drives it? What do Europeans hope or fear when they use "Americanization" as a beacon of orientation or a defensive club? There are certain recurrent hidden agendas, either deep anxieties or deep yearnings. Four clusters may be identified, but there may well be more, and the first two of these elaborate the binary fantasies mentioned above. The first, an apocalyptic, worst case scenario pictured the New World in terms of *degeneration and decline*, a threat best to avoid. By way of binary opposition, the integrated, progressive faction looked to the U.S. as its model and hoped for *modernization and progress*.[17] The third, the evolutionary model has currently found a welcome new home in the *end-of-history*-plus-*globalization-as-world-liberalism* debate.[18] All three topoi are accompanied by or embedded in a larger trajectory, that of an American-style *commodification* which elsewhere in the world causes revulsion or desire, or both. Of these four, let me run the degeneracy thesis and the commodification scare through their historical changes.

The degeneracy thesis was first articulated toward the end of the 18th century by Count Buffon's research in natural history. Abbé Raynal picked it up and it

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16 Schelling in: Ernst Fraenkel, *Amerika im Spiegel des deutschen politischen Denkens* (Köln, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959), p. 25. Georg Simmel, *Das Individuelle Gesetz* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968), p. 243.

17 Even the level-headed Australian political scientists Mosler and Catley end their book *Global America* with a killer opposition, juxtaposing an optimistic and a pessimistic projection for the 21st century.

18 Mosler and Catley, *Global America*.

was written into dogma by a frankophone Dutch clergyman who lived in Germany, Cornelius DePauw. The latter's elaboration of the thesis became a popular bestseller all over Europe *Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains* (Berlin 1768). The basic idea rests on physiocratic logic: that the wretched climate of the New World had led to a general degeneracy of all species including man. He adduces as evidence the small size and the mortality rate of Indians or the size and bizarre shape of animals (cf. armadillos or llamas). These he claimed were proof that the climate was not conducive to either physical strength or aesthetic beauty. Creole dogs, he concluded, were not only ugly, but they had also unlearned how to bark. And human Creoles had lost the moral hardiness of their parents. Thomas Jefferson bridled at such French chutzpeh and composed his *Notes on the State of Virginia* as an explicit rebuttal of the degeneracy thesis. By way of proof he sent Buffon the bones of a a bull moose. Alexander Hamilton, a native Caribbean Creole, reacted rather testily to this transatlantic putdown in the *Federalist Papers*. Hence, as James Ceaser writes, two central documents of American politics and constitutional thought arguing for a new, exceptional American Adam grew out of a rebuttal of the degeneracy thesis.[19] One should think that a thesis of such poor merit had seen its day, but it is alive and well to this day. Only when we consider the ongoing metaphorization of this belief over time, we realize the stability of the degeneracy trope in a displaced and translated form. While it begins in the late 18th century as a physiocratic argument ostensibly judging the American climate, there is a smooth transfer in the nineteenth century from nature to nurture, then to race and gender, subsequently to culture and social organization and ultimately to politics. Incidentally, the spectre of degeneracy not only energized the anti-American mood in Europe, but also fueled American self-doubt. The latter runs from the anti-Federalists over Thoreau's *Civil Disobedience* and Timothy Leary's drop-out generation to Critical Legal Studies. Consider furthermore the fear of mongrelization of the national ideal and of the white race that culminated in Madison Grant's *The Passing of the White Race,* and continued to lead a secret life in William Faulkner's novels. Residues of the mongrelization fear are currently alive in predictions that the demographic profile of the U.S. will soon tip from white to brown due to unstoppable wetbacks. "The Browning of America," now there is a title for a new bestseller. The projected date depends less on empirical evidence than on the level of nativist

[19] James Ceaser, *Reconstructing America: The Symbol of America in Modern Thought* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1997).

paranoia and may extend anywhere from 2010 to 2050. Such nativist anxiety is a function of nationalist boundary maintenance and enjoys transnational currency. It is alive and well in Bavaria, France or Austria where the new Right invokes the dangers of *Durchrassung* albeit in guarded, historically adjusted terms.

Throughout the nineteenth century there was the associate fear of going weak, feminine and soft, all three part of one gendered semantic cluster. The countervailing effort gave us a staggered phallic restoration: the strenuous decade, progressive social control, the cowboy, and Teddy Roosevelt's dude ranch. This anxiety may have been spurred by an older fear that the colonial situation, that is the climate plus miscegenation and the threat of going native, would "feminize" or "creolize" the colonizers. In 1792 Elias Chr. van Haven, a Dane, elaborated this idea, when he claimed that the consumption of certain New World foods turned people womanish. Mozart seconded the idea in his canon: "C A F F E E ... schwächt die Nerven macht Dich blaß und krank." Most recently the trope has reemerged in the rhetoric of the radical right. William Pierce writes in the *Turner Diaries* (the book that inspired Timothy McVeigh to bomb the federal building in Oklahoma) that the basic American creed, liberalism, is "feminine and soft." In Germany Rolf Winter calls American liberalism *ordnungsunfähig* tacitly assuming that *Ordnung* is male.[20] The degeneracy idea is also alive and well in the rhetoric of cultural influencology. Throughout Europe American McCulture is said to drive out European high culture, and even cultivated Americans regret this waning of European cultural authenticity under the onslaught of American commodifaction. Heidegger diagnosed American culture (and society) as *katastrophenhaft*, Disneyland was greeted by French intellectuals as a "cultural Chernobyl", and even Adorno who owed his survival to the U.S., paralleled the political gains of a *Dialektik der Aufklärung* with a cultural loss.

As usual such European challenge begets American responses. Curiously enough the Alumni Professor of English at Florida State, James Twitchell, chimes in with his book on *The Trashing of American Culture* and two more, published by the press of a high cultural institution, Columbia University, on *Adcult. The Triumph of Advertising in American Culture* and *Lead Us Into Temptation: The Triumph of American Materialism.* The Alumni professor comes across as a deviant pilgrim exulting in the Vanity Fair or as Pigpen with a Ph.D. who in a rash of cultural masochism confirms all the dire things the Germans and French have said

[20] Rolf Winter, *Little Amerika: Die Amerikanisierung der deutschen Republik* (Hamburg: Rasch und Röhring, 1995).

about the commodified degeneracy of American culture with one interesting twist --- he loves it. Let us hope the alumni know what they are doing. During the early century in the U.S., but also in the Weimar Republic, the fear of a mongrelization of white, good music by Black and Jewish soft, womanish music fueled the American and German national debates. Carl Gustav Jung's essay "Your Negroid and Indian Behavior" of 1930 clearly did not help to allay those fears. Even in the realm of politics we find permutations of this idea. During the twenties members of the Prussian diet, all male, considered the baneful influence of American "girl-culture " which would not only destroy patriarchal German power, but also "informalize" the cultural sphere and drive out "das Geistige" altogether. American proprietary individualism, thus went German fears first voiced in Weimar, degenerates to the point of egotism. *Wir wollen keine Ellbogengesellschaft* seconds Gerhard Schröder, echoed by American communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni and Robert Bellah who would restore a civil society that never existed.[21] The *laissez faire* liberal economic order is a mere guise for Social Darwinism and thus barefaced *Heuchelei,* say European Social Democrats from the late nineteenth century up to former Social Democrat leader Oskar Lafontaine. Liberal democracy is *ordnungsunfähig* and hence breeds a subculture of crime, counters the new right in the person of Rolf Winter in 1995 who adopts the arguments advanced by German socialists in the nineteenth century. From liberty to libertinism, from freedom to the Darwinist jungle the fear and rhetoric of civic decline is pervasive. And on and on the stories of decline continue in a weaving motion across the ideological spectrum.

The degeneracy argument has lefts its traces in the story of labor. Here the degradation or dehumanization of labor through Taylorism or Fordism was a big topic from the teens with a high point in Weimar but extending to the fifties in the European left with many American echos. It gave us the very European films *Modern Times* and *Metropolis.* The development from unique craftsmanship to mass production was seen by many Cassandras as a loss of creativity or, pace Benjamin, of aura and authenticity. And the same trajectory of decline inspires the current stakeholder to shareholder debates. Generally there is the complaint that globalization is sending us on the way from meaningful safe occupations to meaningless hire-and-fire-jobs of the McWork sort (Gray). The spectre of global commodification engulfs all human practice and ends in a one-dimensional

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[21] Berndt Ostendorf, "'*An American Dilemma Revisited'*: Gibt es eine (echte) Krise des amerikanischen Liberalismus? Der Versuch einer Anamnese," in: *Amerikastudien* 45 (3/2000), pp. 427-439.

world, so runs a fear in the wake of Marcuse which day by day gains new credibility in Seattle and Genoa. The degeneracy thesis is today in full swing, albeit as *gesunkenes Kulturgut* in Rolf Winter's 1995 book *Little Amerika. Die Amerikanisierung der deutschen Republik*, or in Gustav Sichelschmidt's rightist *Deutschland eine amerikanische Provinz. Der große Seelenmord*, also of 1995.

Finally the fear of decline concerns language, and here the anxiety may have a real base. Harald Weinrich, a German professor of French, complained in his presidential address to the *Romanistentag* about the "the anglophonic monoculture, in which the viruses of ignorance multiply". He asks "is not the neglect, in theory building and agenda setting, of language and of linguistic form as the one conditioning factor of human knowledge one such virus of parochialism that thrives in the milieu of agendas exclusively promoted in English, agendas that have become resistant to all criticism from the outside." Carl Schmitt, a man not normally to be trusted, observed in 1932: "It is an indication of genuine political power when a great nation determines the rhetoric and the thinking of other peoples, their lexicon, their terminologies and their concepts." Indeed the global introduction of English as a *lingua franca* seems unstoppable now as many European universities switch to English as the language of instruction in order to remain competitive on a global educational market. One side-effect is the tacit assumption that agendas that are not figurable in English do not exist or are of no importance, not only to Americans, but also to the rest of the world. The citation index has a tendency to ignore scholarship in languages other than English. This fact has serious repercussions in the teaching of foreign languages and other cultures in the United States. If the emerging world culture draws its plots from Hollywood, its interior decor from a transnational commodity culture and its information from CNN, why should Americans want to take notice of regional or particular cultures outside the US – let alone teach them? Why should an American student learn German or bother to go to Germany if the entire world including most Germans speaks English?[22]

After all is said and done the time has come to ask how useful is a term in which stereotypes are so intimately wedded to complex processes. Moreover, as the previous unpacking of a complex set of interconnected problems makes clear, Americanization has a strong seasonal or topical component, since it is enmeshed in a history of conflicting narratives and counter-narratives reacting

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[22] Some years ago *The Economist* gave to its most loyal readers a screen saver which promised "World news without an American accent."

to whatever current social change affects people most. Hence microanalytically it is not very useful. Yet in the long range it captures important political anxieties embedded in asymmetrical power relations. Throughout the course of history the blanket term Americanization has been used to bundle a variety of European reactions to the historical unfolding of the project of the American liberal order.

THE SEMANTICS OF AMERICANIZATION

In order to historicize Americanization as a signifier and unpack its contents it is useful to turn to an article that Arnold Bergstraesser of Freiburg university wrote in 1962. Bergstraesser was a political scientist who had fled Germany, found refuge in America during the Nazi period, then come back to Germany and become a founder of post-war German political science – quite in tune with the reeducation drive of the Americans. He was the spiritus rector behind the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, devoted to Third World Studies. In 1962 Bergstraesser gave the keynote address for the annual convention of the German Association of American Studies in Kiel. And the title was "The so-called Americanization of Germany".[23] Reading this essay after 40 years causes a curious and contradictory sensation. Rereading it will help to identify some of the structural changes of modern societies and thus help to tighten our grip on the past significance and present meaning of Americanization. The essay adresses its usefulness or its questionability as an analytical tool. And finally it also tells us rather drastically what has changed since Bergstraesser's time.

The gist of his lecture is simple and quite persuasive: Americanization stands for the accelerated completion of the European project of modernity. This European project could mature and develop much better in the free air of the New World because over there its inherent developmental logic was unencumbered by tradition, feudalism and estates. This is Louis Hartz pure. After it had matured in America a new and improved modernity returned to Europe: Americanization then is European modernization coming home to roost. Bergstraesser isolates four areas in which the charge of Americanization is usually made – falsely in his view. What is misleadingly called Americanization is the inexorable logic of modernization, in terms of politics, economics, technology, and society. Surpris-

[23] Arnold Bergsträsser, "Die sogenannte Amerikanisierung Deutschlands," in: *Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien* (1963).

ingly he leaves out culture, particularly the popular culture industry, and the problem of commodification.

We agree with his caveat that the term carries emotional charges which affect the political judgement: "The term is so fraught with prejudice that it is unlikely that the concept refers to reality and instead gives a false interpretation to social changes of our times, thus preventing a truly analytical approach." Besides, he says, the term suggests that America is the dominant and active partner, Germany only the passive recipient. He intimates that Americanization constitutes a real exchange between independent agents and cannot be separated from the Europeanization of America on the one hand, or from the Germanization of American inputs on the other. And then a passage follows which is startling from a position in the year 2001: "The charge of Americanization has little relevance in and applies least of all to the political realm."[24] Here we would protest. His judgement is based on a Cold War rationale still effective in 1962: Germany had moved after two desastrous wars into a situation of ready dependency. American liberalism represented security and freedom in the Cold War and in that balance of power game American leadership was largely unquestioned.

The charge of Americanization would make more sense, he averred, in economics. America represented after all an extreme instance of a customer driven, proprietary, and speculative exchange society and a liberal market economy. Again the New World version of European capitalism was so highly developed because America put up fewer defenses against the internal logic of a liberal economic system. In Europe there were to many meta-economic brakes and corporatist traditions. Again a seedling of the European enlightenment had merely grown faster and come to maturity sooner in the New World.

But America stood even more for technological innovation, automation and mechanization. Again he protests that it would be wrong to blame these developments on America since they were part and parcel of the modernizing logic in all Western societies – even affecting Soviet Russia and Hitler Germany which gave us reactionary or Leninistic modernism. However, the grimmest charge of Americanization usually was made in the social realm: the development of a lonely crowd and of a mass society. Again these developments, he says, represent the logical culmination of European traditions which had reached their purest state, indeed a state of crisis in America. In short, a Euro-

[24] "Die Anklage der Amerikanisierung hat ihren Schwerpunkt nicht im Bereich des im engeren Sinne Politischen". Ibd., p. 16.

pean crisis of mankind was coming home to roost. Therefore "Americanization turns out to be a confused reaction to general tendencies of cultural change in contemporary society." Bergstraesser calls it a pre-analytical blanket term with a hidden agenda, a category that is microanalytically useless. "The charge clouds the potential of Germany and the reality of America." Thus the Europeans can see themselves in the mirror of America, come to appreciate better the differences between America and Germany, differences caused by the structural changes inherent in the trajectory of modernity. "Those disciplines which have joined to form American Studies have the chance to study American identity, in its records and documents as well as in its political practice and thus to discover truths which are not only worthy of knowing, but important for our survival. If these changes are seriously studied the *pseudo-concept of Americanization* will disappear into thin air, anxieties caused by Americanization will attenuate and with them the *false, hypocritical and Pharisean note* that accompanies the term today" (my italics).

Let us start with Bergstraesser's taxonomy and expand it from our present vantage point. Americanization, he says, partakes of a larger field of background assumptions. The secret members of the semantic cluster are westernization, modernization, technical innovation, and the liberal market economy. The culture industry and American-style commodification may be added. All of these gradually expand and fan out into globalization.

1) Westernization – This stands for the belief in the liberal, republican Western-style democracies. Again a note of irony creeps in when we consider that such a belief is today accused of eurocentrism within the very nation that provides the model: the US. Americanization as westernization refers to the universal legitimation of civil rights, civil society, the rule of law, proceduralism, individualism, separation of powers, separation of church and state. There is a global dimension to the westernization trajectory supported by international organisations such as the United Nations or the IOC. The world over, even in Communist China, we notice a general drift towards a liberalization of the public sphere. Immanuel Wallerstein documents this fact in *After Liberalism.* And according to Fukuyama we have reached "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." The bloodless revolution and the long, successful history of the constitution explain the powerful attraction of the American model. Its attraction became more tangible after the European disasters, first after World War I, when Wilson wanted to make the world safe for democracy which in turn caused a

violent debate on the merits and demerits of American-style liberalism in Weimar. Then again after World War II when West Germany opted for "Westbindung" as an alternative to neutralism.[25] In the opposition to the road taken lurks one major source of anti-Americanism: anti-liberalism. A high point of the debate was reached during the Weimar Republic and after 1989 on the new German Right. Movements all over the world react to this liberalization trajectory. There are anti-western and anti-European factions, be they Afrocentric, Muslim fundamentalist, Asiatic values oriented, Oriental. At home a call for a stronger Mitteleuropa is a form of anti-liberalism in disguise.[26]

2) Modernization as a catchall phrase goes back a long way to the debate between *anciens* and *modernes*, to the pro and con towards the enlightenment project, or the conflicting reception of the revolutions and of technological progress. The Catholic church served for a long time as a bulwark against modernization. Modernization has many overlapping variants and may be broken down further:

As technological innovation. This form of Americanization has a lot of overlap with the notion of progress. This type of modernization refers to technical methods first developed in the United States and then adopted by the rest of the world: production in series, replaceable parts, railroad construction, R & D, and it is driven by the general hope for improvement by technology and by the belief in instrumental reason. The problem solving scientific American stepped on the scene in 1840 when the armories developed the above innovations. Historically speaking this is the oldest Americanization trajectory which has inspired Europe since then. The respective anti-Americanism, say of Heidegger or of Luddite Greens, has a strong anti-technological bias.

As mass production and the production of mass society: Key words are Taylorism, Fordism, mass production and the culture industry, and for a second round: digitalization, mediatization and the internal logic of virtual modernization. Here the anti-Americanism surfaces as an opposition to mass democratic society, often paired with an anti-liberal or an elitist bias. On the Ralph Nader side the protest is directed against the one-dimensional, totalizing monopolies of corporate America.

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[25] Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, *Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert* (Gőttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1999).

[26] Mosler and Catley, *Global America.* Berndt Ostendorf, "Rechter Antiamerikanismus: kulturalistische Ausdeutungen der Globalisierungsangst." *Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung*, 2 (2/2000), pp. 163-184.

As a plural and open civil society in which members can become citizens "regardless of religion, national origin and gender." This postulates a "civic nationalism" as opposed to an "ethnic nationalism." The associated Anti-Americanism focuses on mongrelization and race mixture, abhors creolization, hybridity, multiethnicity, or girl culture and complains the lack of true Geist. Often such anti-Americans see pluralism, multiethnicity and creolization as a consequence of the peopling of the New World. It is mostly found on the new Right.

As a liberal market Americanization. De Tocqueville quipped that Americans had made bourgeois comforts available for all and invested them with a soteriological aura. The customer oriented free market system has a strong overlap with globalization. Such a free market requires an anti-patriarchal, anti-solidaristic, anti-social democratic capitalism; it is anti-corporatist, offers freedom of choice, considers the customer king, favors a risk society instead of any planned, corporate, patriarchal, solidaristic capitalism. One consequence is the rise of a culture industry and of a popular culture as a trash culture. The attendant anti-Americanism emerges from anti-populist, from social democratic or from elitist principles.

3) Globalization – George Bush Sr. inaugurated the New World Order with its financescapes, ideoscapes, ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes (Appadurai). Globalizing realignments of transnational financial markets created new financescapes. Globalizing realignments due to the digital/media revolution created new mediascapes. Global commodification increased due to the transnational turbocapitalism or the New Economy. Global mobility patterns, asylum seekers, guest workers and a growing tourist trade caused new ethnoscapes. This fear of homogenization and market differentiation with the concomitant realignment of power becomes the obsessive cause for new conspiracy theories and of resentment politics: Lega Norte, Haider, ETA or at home The Christian Right.[27] American modes of franchising, and marketing conquer the world.

Behind the fear of globalization is a very real political constellation after 1989. The end of a balance of power, the end of the Cold War and of the Old World Order have caused havoc, particularly in the East. We are watching East European economies going into capitalism "cold turkey". A popular new anti-Americanism is growing in Russia, Bulgaria, Ukraine and in the Islamic world, while

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[27] Berndt Ostendorf, "Conspiracy Nation: Verschwörungstheorien und evangelikaler Fundamentalismus: Marion G. (Pat) Robertsons 'Neue Weltordnung,'" in: Heiner Bielefeld and Wilhelm Heitmeyer (ed.) *Politisierte Religion* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), pp. 157-187.

the respective local cleptocratic elites, be they in Saudi Arabia or Nigeria, practice the neo-liberal motto *enrichissez vous* after their own fashion. The growing formation of the European union (a new sense of Europe) and the weakening of the European nation states or national identities has led to a concomitant strengthening of local regions. New realignments in world economics lead to larger units such as NAFTA, free trade zones, Mercosur, ASEAN. Such global realignments call forth NGOs concerned with global-vs-local issues such as ecology or human rights which form new ideoscapes. Anti-globalization movements return to smaller accretions of intimacy, re-tribalization and re-localization leads to patterns of glocalization.[28]

Increasing globalization increases the desire for smaller units and the temptations of retribalization. There is a measurable decline of the nation state as a home and as an identity: Being a German, French, Italian is being overlayered by being a European on the one hand and being a Bavarian or Basque on the other. As a reaction to such loss of national identity French spokesmen such as Jospin and Vedrine are fighting against the "federalisation" of Europe fearing an erosion of national bonds. The federal idea which has both American and German origins is highly suspect to the French. Here the French have argued that the Germans have become politically too Americanized for their own good.

Anti-Americanism as anti-globalization: Post-Cold-War changes have caused retribalization and nationalist, ethnic, and fundamentalist responses. The retrenchment into small scale regroupings of intimacy and identity become the wetlands of a new anti-Americanism. Globalization has caused the new revalorization of identity politics and has triggered a renewed search for "containers" as a counterveiling movement against the decline of nations and the fading of borders. In an exaggerated form Benjamin Barber argued that McWorld has caused reactive Jihads in the Orient or its European equivalents in Ireland, Scotland, Wales, Britanny, Basque, and Padania. This is the anxiety that Roger Garaudy and the German NPD stand ready to instrumentalize. But such popular realignments have also motivated a global capitalism which has quickly hijacked localism as a new sales incentive: McDonald goes native and bows to local customs wherever it is.

[28] Berndt Ostendorf, "Introduction: Re-interpreting America: Universalism and Particularism" and "Blowing up the White House. American National Identity in the Age of Globalization," in: Roland Hagenbüchle and Josef Raab (ed.), *Negotiations of America's National Identity* (Tübingen: Stauffenburg, 2000). See also Ostendorf, "Transnationalism or the Fading of Borders," in: id. (ed.), *Transnationalism: The Fading of Borders in the Western Hemisphere* (Heidelberg. Winter, 2002), pp.1-21.

"We are more a local than a global player," intone the local representatives while they sponsor local NGOs. Glocalization patterns may be observed in the Disney and CocaCola corporations who are trying to shed their "American" identity and want to become both a "global" and "local" player.

4) Commodification and the Global Market

All of the above trajectories of change are caught up in the inexorable process of commodification. Much of the globalization debate may in fact be a displaced reaction to its global effects and to its secret attractions. But here lies the crucial problem. While at home American style commodification is part and parcel of the American liberal dream in a land packed with natural resources, its export world-wide raises new problems. Americanized commodification occurs world wide and is attractive everywhere. The reason is simple: American culture is so popular because its message to the consumers the world over resonates with the promise of consumption at American levels. In popular culture and its most important outlet, advertising, utopian dreams are channeled into a myth of salvation through commodities, a promise which gives American commodities worldwide a quasi-redemptive aura—the robust narcissism of an American exceptionalism which translates into all products of American popular culture. American culture carries as a subplot not only the promise of personal fulfilment (from Cinderella to *Pretty Baby* and *Forrest Gump*), but also of material wealth. As Marshall Sahlins put it in *Culture and Practical Reason* America is a consumer culture, in which identities and relationships appear clothed in and are fetishised by manufactured goods. Social relations appear new and improved through commodities which operate as powerful symbols.[29] Shopping for American goods therefore quivers with promise. This message of identity formation and material promise is, within America, taken with a grain of salt as all self-congratulatory puffery of American exceptionalism. But it is particularly seductive for non-Americans who miss the ironic tease, and particularly to those who suffer acutely from material want under oppressive political circumstances. As a pragmatic charter of behavior American culture projects the material utopias which are part and parcel of its civic eschatology. The problem is that American levels of wealth and of comfort cannot be universalized without straining the ecological limits of growth. Therefore this promise which may well work within an American exceptionalism can never become a world dream, its utopian promise of abundance simply cannot be kept and must be deferred (which may well result in anti-Americanism). But this prime

[29] Kuper, *Culture*, p. 170.

tease in Americanization is what makes it so effective. "In its heyday in 1960 the USA with approximately one fifteenth of the world's population was using about one third of the world's resources," writes Peter Taylor. "Obviously this provides no basis for general imitation. In fact, one estimate of the carrying capacity of the world assuming American standards of living is 600 million people, a figures passed in 1675, before the USA, let alone the American dream, was ever thought of."[30] The larger issue of Americanization as commodification still awaits a thorough European analysis.

Bergstraesser's essay helped us to untangle the tacit semantic meanings which the blanket term Americanization covers. Where did Bergstraesser slip? His prognosis that due to its Pharisean quality the debate would be soon over was dead wrong. The debate is today going stronger than ever. A second point needs to be made: precisely the political question that Bergstraesser thought negligible has resurfaced with a vengeance, particularly after September 11. The topic of Americanization may have remained on the backburner of public interest until 1989, but since then there has been a renaissance of interest and of discourses that gives Bergstraesser the lie. For it is the political import of Americanization which has changed the nature of such discourses. Americanization-as-globalization is the new issue here. And this coincidence gives rise to a further worry. In spite of the fundamental liberalization of European liberal institutions, there is a new shadow over Europe, a new anti-Americanism which closes ranks again with an older anti-liberalism which is noticeable particularly on the new right, but alarmingly also on the old left. This anti-liberalism has both a western and eastern European flank. Needless to say it is rampant in the Muslim world. In the following the focus will be on the rhetoric of the new anti-Americanism in Europe, and the European new right will serve as a barometer of certain seachanges in attitudes towards America which are part and parcel of ideological realignments. Instead of left and right ideological factions, we now have cosmpolitans and locals: hence globalization and localism go hand in hand.

ANTI-AMERICANISM OR CRITICISM OF AMERICA?

Critical attitudes towards America are wide-spread in the old and new left, in the political middle, but also in the conservative elites of Germany and Europe.

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[30] Peter J. Taylor, "What's modern about the modern world system? Introducing ordinary modernity through world hegemony," in: *Review of International Political Economy* 3 (2/1996), p. 283.

Which American acts or characteristics provoke such criticism? Here is a spontaneous list culled from a variety of articles in the press: The unipolar hegemony of the US, the wasting of global resources, unilateralism and the disregard for international agreements (Kyoto, UN, land-mines, small weapons sales), the massification of culture and absence of real traditions, the primacy of the private market over the public sphere, politics as spectacle, the political weight of fundamentalist Christian religions, the continued practice of the death penalty, structural racism and inner city violence, the power of the gun lobby and of the military industrial complex, the Manichean notion of justice, differences in ethics, the unquestioned use of surveillance methods around the globe (Echelon), genetically manipulated *frankenfood*, the belief that what is technically possible should be done, and again and again, the combination of a robust opportunism with moral hypocrisy vis a vis the rest of the world – the line of sins could be easily multiplied depending on the target group and medium, as a look into *Le Monde Diplomatique* or articles in German journals amply prove.

But justified criticism of America is one thing and anti-Americanism is quite another. The former is based on a belief in the problemsolving capacity and in the self-healing potential of liberal democracy, the belief in the fundamental liberalization of the Western world and in the global future of the liberal system. But as soon as one writes this sentence, doubts set in, whether the belief in the American version of liberal democracy is still unquestioned in unified Germany or in the globalizing world. And in a second wave doubts multiply whether this belief had deep roots in German speaking central Europe or in many other parts of the world. For criticism of liberalism runs deep roots and is currently buttressed by the poststructuralist and communitarian debates in America. The current reactions to massive globalization and modernization – behind which most non-Americans suspect America as a driving force – have simply become more noticeable. For there is a new populist localism as well, that brings to the fore older resentments against cosmopolitanism and liberalism. As we have seen the long road to the West has been paved with stereotypical resentments, whose narrative stability is remarkable. In these narratives today there is an overlap of anti-western, anti-modern, anti-technological, and anti-liberal motives. And the melange is dangerous considering the noticeable revival of anti-enlightenment rhetoric on many fronts.[31]

[31] Diedrich Diederichsen, *Freiheit macht arm: Das Leben nach Rock n' Roll 1990-1993* (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1993).

The end of the Cold War and the rise of the internet have made it harder to define and combat right wing anti-Americanism. And increasingly old left and new right wing arguments come together. Four political contexts that have positioned anti-Americanism and the old right or left division have shifted:
1) After the artificial order of the Cold War imploded the United States, now the only global hegemonic power, has tended to act unilaterally in international crises (Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan) and to yield to the temptation of ignoring international conventions. Criticism of the unilateralism of the "global bully " has increased worldwide. Hence there is a foreign policy anti-Americanism. 2) When socialism as a viable alternative to the capitalist order collapsed a crucial ideological marker disappeared with it which left the old left in a deep depression. America became the only model or scapegoat. In other words the old left turned from Socialism as a positive to American capitalism as a negative model, and we have seen a return of the Manichean divide in judgements of America. 3) The social problems of US society now were trotted out by Southeast-Asian, Japanese and European right wing critics as proof of the contradictions of an American-style liberal democracy. In Europe a psychologically deep and historically old cultural nationalism has resurfaced at the same time with a local spin: Bavaria, Padania, Britanny, Basque, Croat, Serbian, Albanian etc. A common anti-American denominator with antiliberal roots has reemerged with many echos from the twenties. 4) The liberal market economy accelerated by a communications revolution has in the past ten years developed a dynamism that has become threatening, particularly to those critics who consider globalization a function of a MBA-driven New Economy. Older reservations towards the American experiment that characterized European attitudes from 1789 to 1933 have returned at this dramatic moment and have revitalized world-historical doubts which feed a new cultural anti-Americanism with a neoconservative spin.

This ambivalent anti-Americanism takes the form of a reactionary modernism and argues for an avoidance of the excesses or mistakes of the American social and cultural order while urging to adopt their economic and technical knowhow: Accept and develop the laptop, but hold on to Lederhosen, advises Bavaria's prime minister. The radical right which is profiting from a massive intellectualization and from the digital age is more outspoken in its anti-liberalism, and, while it does not reject certain types of "American" modernizations, it tries to instrumentalize and bundle all criticism of America into a neofascist or fundamentalist rejection of the American-led, liberal and global world order.

The protesters in Seattle, Göteborg, Genoa and Salzburg divide no longer into clear left or right factions. There is no left or right view of overpopulation, of DNA research or of global warming. At best we can observe new divisions between optimistic cosmopolitans and pessimistic locals.[32]

CONCLUSION

In the adstringent context of current politics the larger debate on Americanization narrows down into some key issues: How can we keep a valid criticism of America from degenerating into reactionary anti-liberalism? What is the status of political liberalism and economic neo-liberalism in the so-called global New Economy? Are there any alternatives in view? Does the global market allow a "third way" that avoids the excesses of the New Economy or the prohibitive costs of the old welfare state? "In the US" writes Jedediah Purdy, "economics has expanded its reign to become the most respectable vocabulary for discussions of public policy, legal reasonsing and even intimate relations." MBA-driven reformers act in the name of science, humanity, or progress. "The suspicion that they are also helping to remake humanity in the image of one nation is buried very deeply indeed."[33] Is there a European way and an alternative, is there a South American way and an alternative to the American MBA-driven global revolution? Must globalization inevitably result in commodifying all aspects of our life world according to American models?

When George Soros and the *Economist* wonder: Should all human existence be defined and determined by a world market, it is time to think it over?

[32] Mosler and Catley, *Global America,* p. 205.

[33] Jedediah Purdy, "Universal Nation," in: *Prospects* (Oct. 25, 2001), p. 3.

THOMAS F. O'BRIEN

A TRANSFORMATIONAL VISION: THE AMERICAN STATE AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN LATIN AMERICA

The publication of Emily Rosenberg's *Spreading the American Dream* nearly twenty years ago has inspired an outpouring of studies on the process of Americanization in Latin America. Yet as we have gone about exploring specific implications of Rosenberg's work we have also fragmented its larger vision. Studies of Americanization have tended to deal with critical forces in this process including the state, corporations, missionaries, and foundations, as well as labor organizations in near isolation from one another. In my own work, *Revolutionary Mission* for example, the primary focus is on corporate activities while the policies and practices of the state, and other agents receive limited treatment. There is some historical justification for this emphasis. In the early decades of the twentieth century multinational enterprises played the most important role in interactions between the United States and Latin America. But this approach still tends to compartmentalize our understanding of Americanization. And as justified as the discreet treatments of these groups maybe early in the twentieth century, by the 1950s the goals and visions of these various actors had converged and, the emergence of a common vision of Latin America's transformation became manifest in ever closer cooperation between the agents of Americanization. Particularly notable was the increasing role of the state as a promoter and facilitator of Americanization as it worked to protect and promote the activities of these other actors. But the state also took on a greatly expanded role as a transformational agent in its own right.

The purpose of this essay is to return to a perspective on Americanization, which draws upon but also transcends our recent and valuable agent-specific studies that explore the process within the confines of economic, political, or cultural spheres. What I hope to provide here is the first tentative attempt to reenvision Americanization as a complex, but increasingly cohesive effort by a number of different segments of American society to reshape the economic, social, political and cultural contours of Latin America.

In the early twentieth century a coalition of large labor intensive corporations in industries such as steel, coal and textiles, as well as the investment houses that helped create them, dominated American society and politics. Through the Republican Party this coalition pursued nationalistic, protectionist tariff policies along with strident anti-labor tactics. In both foreign and domestic affairs, the coalition stressed a minimalist role for government. In terms of foreign policy the use of state power was largely limited to opening and protecting overseas markets and investments. By the end of World War I a significant, but by no means dominant group of capital intensive industries in sectors such as mining, petroleum and power generation began pursuing a different strategy. Through support for missionary undertakings and private philanthropies, which served as agents of the Social Gospel, leaders of these industries pursued progressive policies that promoted internationalism, and a more conciliatory approach to labor.[1] In turn, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) under Samuel Gompers supported U.S. overseas economic expansion, certain that it would translate into increased benefits for its members.[2] Within this loose grouping of corporations, philanthropies, unions and the state, it was the corporate and state sectors that initially shaped the process of Americanization.

At the beginning of the last century, corporate interests dominated the process of interaction between the United States and Latin America. The mining and agricultural ventures that spearheaded U.S. investment at this time tended to circumscribe the degree to which U.S. enterprise would alter the societies in which it operated. While corporations such as United Fruit and Cerro de Pasco engendered substantial economic changes, in many other ways their impact proved limited. They looked to existing labor systems to fill their needs in terms of recruitment and discipline. Corporate managers focused on short-term retention and disciplining of workers to carry out the often grueling tasks that typified mining and plantation enterprises.[3] The "reform" and "uplift" of Latin American workers simply was not a priority.

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[1] Thomas Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and American Public Policy in the Great Depression," in: *International Organization* 38 (Winter 1984), pp. 41-94.

[2] Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 349-50.

[3] Thomas F. O'Brien, *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), passim.

Early corporate actors not only had limited linkages to the larger societies in which they operated, they also entered Latin America at the behest of modernizing Liberal political elites. As a result, the companies faced risks that were largely confined to those instances where the national government suffered destabilization. The most intense involvement of the American state came in those societies marked by high levels of state instability, particularly Honduras, Nicaragua and Cuba. But in terms of reshaping Latin America the goals of U.S. intervention remained modest. Abroad, as at home, the state continued its commitment to laissez-faire social policies. U.S. political leaders protected corporate interests and where necessary created a positive environment for their development, certain that an enhanced U.S. business presence would stabilize societies in the Circum Caribbean. But the ideas of political leaders about nation building remained in their incipient stage. As for business leaders, they continued to rely largely on their own initiatives and influences, resorting to calls for intervention only when local instability posed an immediate threat to their interests. Given the anti-labor bias of many of America's largest companies, and their relatively secure position in Latin America there was little perceived need for an alliance with the union movement. In contrast, it was the fourth actor on the American side of the drama, the missionary, who exhibited the greatest vision of and commitment to a transformational mission.

By the early twentieth century, many if not most of the emissaries of the U.S. Protestant denominations to Latin America had absorbed important elements of the Social Gospel. Spreading of the word involved more than individual conversion. Missionary efforts must also address ignorance, ill health, and poverty. In Latin America, Protestant ministers would engage in a host of socially uplifting endeavors, opening schools and hospitals, and setting up athletic programs. This crusade carried not just a Christian, but a distinctly American message. As Jean Pierre Bastian has explained, "The missionary societies contributed (by means of their schools, social works and publications) to the diffusion of a new faith whose cultural matrix can be found in the *American way of life*, ..."[4] Yet for all their zeal and their commitment to a transformational mission embedded with American values, the effect of Protestant ministers remained limited. By 1911, the number of Protestants in Latin America totalled no more than

[4] Jean Pierre Bastian, *Breve historia del Protestantismo en América Latina* (Mexico: Casa Unida de Publicaciones, 1986), p. 102.

370,000.[5] But eventually private foundations, whose work in Latin America began after the outbreak of World War I, would take up the social message and reform mission of Protestantism with profound effects on the emerging coalition for Americanization.

Between the two world wars, corporate interests would remain the dominant force in inter-American activities, but their mission and the role of other actors would undergo significant change. The scope and form of corporate activity in these years was influenced by the emergence of capital intensive, internationalist corporations with progressive social policies. Leaders of these industries such as the Guggenheims and the Rockefellers, would become advocates of programs stressing education, health benefits, safety, and cultural diversions to create a sober, responsible workforce. Furthermore, to ensure the loyalty of the white collar employees who were the key to their continued control of ever larger, more complex corporations, they sought to inculcate this group with middle class values such as professionalism and consumerism. Faced with similar challenges in Latin America, most notably in Mexico, they would adopt similar strategies in their overseas operations.

Yet the corporate mission remained circumscribed by assumptions about the fundamental inferiority of Latin Americans, and negative corporate responses to statist economic initiatives and nationalist ideologies. While corporations' transformational vision remained limited, they did ally themselves with one of the more farsighted actors in the process.

American businesses developed working relationships with missionaries who seemed to offer a quick fix for workplace problems. The most immediate interest and concern of the business community were the educational activities of the Protestant churches. Beyond the obvious benefits of basic education there was the larger importance of value-laden instruction carried out by American Protestant ministers, who saw as part of their mission the need to seek reconciliation between capital and labor.[6] The missionaries represented early and quite modest corporate efforts to transform their work forces into sober, diligent, and stable employees. Meanwhile the Social Gospel had spawned a new and powerful representative for its ideas.

By the end of the Great Depression, the Rockefeller Foundation had emerged as the dominant U.S. secular philanthropy in Latin America. The Foundation

5 Ibd., p. 123.
6 Ibd., p. 126.

grew directly out of the influence which the Reverend Frederick T. Gates had upon John D. Rockefeller Sr. and reflected the principles of the Social Gospel. The Rockefeller and other private philanthropies such as Carnegie and Ford also drew inspiration from Progressive reformers who sought to do away with some of the most negative aspects of industrial corporations without radical upheaval in the existing capitalist order. Given their origin among the great corporate fortunes of America, it is hardly surprising that foundation managers mimicked corporate managers' striving for productivity improvements with their own efforts to rationalize social services and create a more efficient social order.[7] But their activities such as the Rockefeller Foundation's campaigns to wipe out Yellow Fever in Vera Cruz and the Yucatan during the 1920s represented not so much a defense of individual corporate interests as they did a concern for the stability of the international capitalist system and the growing role of the United States within it.[8]

The Rockefeller Foundation expanded its Latin American public health initiatives throughout the 1920s, but by the end of the decade it began new programs specifically designed to upgrade medical schools. Like corporate reforms these efforts reflected American biases about the inferiority of Latin American societies, and a belief that the implementation of U.S. models represented the best solution for the region's problems.[9] When the Foundation began to offer programs in agriculture, a similar bias for the American way of doing things was apparent.

The Foundation's agricultural development programs in Mexico relied on the American extension service model, which stressed the use of chemical fertilizers, and the introduction of new varieties and hybrids of crops – strategies designed for large scale, capital intensive, commercially oriented farm

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[7] Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 16-17.

[8] Marcos Cueto, *Missionaries of Science: The Rockefeller Foundation and Latin America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), p. xi. Armando Solorzano, "The Rockefeller Foundation in Revolutionary Mexico: Yellow Fever in Yucatan and Veracruz," in: Cueto, *Missionaries of Science,* pp. 51-71.

[9] Marcos Cueto, "Visionaries of Science and Development: The Rockefeller Foundation's Latin American Surveys of the 1920s," in: Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*, p. 16.

operations as opposed to the small-scale labor intensive subsistence operations that supported the vast majority of peasant agriculturists.[10]

By the beginning of World War II, the Rockefeller Foundation had developed programs designed to encourage social reform along American lines, stressing technical assistance, professionalism, and private initiatives to create a reformed, stable social environment conducive to capitalist development, especially by American corporations. The Foundation's larger concerns about the capitalist system and the growing role of the United States within it, became the guiding principles for the Americanization coalition in the decades ahead.

But if the corporate sector and foundations had become committed practitioners of the transformational process, the American state's role as of the 1920s had not changed substantially, although the challenges it faced were becoming far more complex. The growth of both working and middle classes in repressive social formations with gross disparities in wealth distribution expanded the social scope of resistance to U.S. enterprise and Americanization, but the state had yet to respond with significant new initiatives. American officials would be forced to reexamine their policies and the limited role of the state in the transformational mission as American interests suffered the dual blows of the Great Depression and rising populist nationalism in the 1930s.

The Depression not only inflicted severe economic losses on American enterprises it also undermined faith in their developmentalist capabilities. Both middle and working class Latin Americans along with elements of the peasantry rallied around populist nationalism assigning blame for the Depression to the Liberal elite as well as U.S. businesses. In the process, they rejected much of what was the transformational mission designed to turn them into sober, hard working, competitive, individualistic versions of their American counterparts. The new populist nationalist regimes of the 1930s and 40s offered an alternative to the American liberal ideal, promoting statist economic controls, nationalization of key economic sectors and state supported social welfare programs. The Fascist threat during World War II and in subsequent years, the outbreak of the Cold War further magnified these challenges. Faced with the collapse of world trade and investment along with the challenges raised by populism, nationalism, Fascism and Communism, the American state,

[10] Deborah Fitzgerald, "Exporting American Agriculture: the Rockefeller Foundation in Mexico, 1943-1953," in: Cueto, *Missionaries of Science*, pp. 73-74.

corporations, missions, unions and foundations would coalesce around a shared vision for transforming Latin America.

The Great Depression forged an alliance among the federal government, capital intensive corporations, philanthropies and labor unions. This alliance stressed both progressive labor policies and internationalist economic initiatives that would promote American trade and investment around the globe. Through the Democratic Party the alliance would pursue policies designed to resuscitate the international economy and expand opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. Critical to this alliance was a quid pro quo between business and labor in which unions accepted perpetual revamping of the workplace in return for a basic social safety net and progressive labor legislation.[11]

The key to the alliance and its ability to articulate a social, economic and political paradigm that would shape American society for the next half century was its focus on the concept of productivity. The stress on the ability to achieve ever greater levels of economic efficiency welded the business - labor alliance together through the belief as Charles Maier noted "that the United States could enjoy productive abundance without radical redistribution of economic power."[12] Furthermore, efforts by business and government to combat the Depression and win the war not only brought business leaders into state agencies, but they also created a consensus on the use of interventionist planning as a critical means to achieve productivity improvements and create a more stable form of capitalist development.[13] The broad alliance now had an ideology focused on a planned capitalist process which would achieve economic growth and general prosperity while avoiding class conflict. That shared vision would both guide and limit the alliance's project of Americanizing Latin America.

In one sense, U.S. policy toward Latin America during the 1950s remained focused on the main goal of the previous half century. As a 1954 National Security Council memorandum asserted, that goal was "to create a political and economic climate conducive to private investment of both domestic and foreign

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[11] Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New Deal," pp. 41-94.

[12] Charles S. Maier, "The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II," in: *International Organization* 31, (Autumn, 1977), p. 614.

[13] Ibd., pp. 613-15.

capital."[14] But the definition of that goal had become more complex, and the means for achieving that goal included an array of new mechanisms.

Corporations were becoming far more intricately involved in Latin American societies as they pursued their own reformist agendas, and as the rapid increase in manufacturing investments drew them into local marketing and credit networks and set them on a course of promoting American style consumerism. At the same time these enterprises had become the targets of leftist and populist political attacks and the subjects of closer scrutiny and regulation by Latin American governments. In response, the state's attempts to create a positive environment for these enterprises would lead it to launch a series of "nation building" programs designed to reshape Latin American societies in accordance with the ideology of productivity. The federal government also created a series of new institutions to help achieve this goal.

During this era the U.S. government took on the characteristics of what Emily Rosenberg has described as the regulatory state with the creation of the Exim Bank to fund international trade and later development projects, the establishment of the Office of Inter-American Affairs that took on activities ranging from propaganda to technical assistance, as well as Point Four and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) focused on economic development. In addition, the United States Information Service or USIS used a variety of media initiatives to promote attitudes favorable to U.S. investment and the larger project of Americanization. The U.S. also helped create an array of multilateral agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD (later part of the World Bank).[15] Although state initiatives in such areas as economic development and propaganda often received only modest funding the impact should not be underestimated because government was serving not as the sole initiator of such efforts but as a coordinator of a wide ranging transformational mission. Yet what is most striking about this process is the convergence of policies and perspectives among the American institutions that had long been involved in Latin America.

The convergence of views that now marked the alliance was personified by Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller's belief that the region's future depended on

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[14] Quoted in Stephen G. Rabe: *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988), p. 70.

[15] Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 176-201.

planned economic development driven by private enterprise enlightened by progressive labor practices would have enormous influence on U.S. policy toward Latin America given his various roles in government, the private sector, and philanthropic endeavors. As the director of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, Rockefeller adopted many of OIAA's programmatic goals and techniques directly from Rockefeller Foundation methods and that influence made a lasting impact on U.S. initiatives. That influence is best personified by Albion Patterson, a Rockefeller protégé who worked for the Institute for Inter American Affairs (IIAA), a Rockefeller inspired government corporation, designed to support health services. After leaving the IIAA, Patterson went on to head U.S. government agricultural assistance missions in several Latin American countries including Chile.

Patterson's activities in Chile during the mid 1950s offer particular insight into the convergence of views on Americanization. Before taking his assignment in Chile, Patterson consulted representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation, and he proudly noted that the key project he initiated, a rural development program for the area around the city of Concepción was styled after the "basic economy" approach developed by Rockefeller and his advisors in 1942. The Concepción project followed the Foundation's methodology seeking to implement an American style extension service to provide assistance to local agriculturists. But the similarities went far beyond method. The region around Concepción had been chosen because of the city's deep-sea port, the presence of steel mills, textile plants and the area's coal mines. Quite simply the city represented a booming industrial complex with a burgeoning population, which the local agrarian system could not adequately feed. The U.S. government's rural project would replicate those of the Rockefeller Foundation in seeking to promote the development of large commercial agricultural enterprises that would utilize American technologies to produce food with maximum efficiency and meet the needs of industrial growth. If a philanthropic agency had set the form and goals for government efforts, it also shaped the value system of the project, and they were not values, which assumed that the meek would inherit the earth. As Patterson himself explained:

"If the problem we are tackling in Chile is the immediate need for increased food production, we can't put any large part of our budget into giving the down-and-outer advice on nutrition, child care etc. Unless he produces more or the region around him produces more, he won't be able to follow our advice. Why involve the taxpayers of two countries in a subsidy for which we can write no termination agreement? Isn't it always in the end more humanitarian to be realistic than romantic?

The philosophy of the Plan is not to subsidize the formation of a small welfare state around Concepcion [sic]. On the contrary every effort is being made to set up the Plan in a way to encourage the formation of cooperatives and private enterprises that can take over when the Government has given the initial impulse."[16]

Patterson's version of the mantra of Americanization "planning and productivity" would be echoed by a generation of American policy makers.

A 1952 report on technical assistance to Brazil had explained in even more explicit terms the link between the ideology of productivity and the varied social service initiatives undertaken by the U.S. government in Latin America. The report's author noted that:

"The productivity of Brazilians is low because of deficient diet, lack of training and poor health. In manufacturing for example, manpower productivity is estimated to be 1/7 to 1/8 of that of the United States. Only some 38 percent of the Brazilian children in rural areas are enrolled in the primary school grades, and in the vocational field such schooling is far from keeping pace with the demands of industry for skilled workers."[17]

Malnutrition, health problems and poor education were perceived as obstacles to the all-important drive for productivity. In response, the U.S. government had helped set up and support Brazil's Special Service for Public Health and worked with it to establish health posts and well water systems. Following the Rockefeller Foundation's example in Mexico, the U.S. nurtured the development of a Brazilian national agricultural extension service and provided support for vocational training.[18] Beyond the immediate goal of productivity improvement these programs sought to ensure the stable capitalist development of Latin America.

In 1962 Irving Tragen, the American labor attaché in Caracas described the need for social development programs in Venezuela. Tragen attributed Venezuela's underdevelopment to corruption, political instability, disease, and a patriarchal social order, reflecting the social science analysis current in American academic circles and an interpretation shared by foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford. But even more striking is his understanding of what U.S.

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[16] Albion W. Patterson to Roy M. Hill, Santiago, February 5, 1954, Records of the Foreign Assistance Agencies, 1948-1961, Record Group 469 (hereafter, RG 469), United States National Archives (hereafter USNA. See also same to same, Santiago, July 7, 1953, RG469, USNA.

[17] "Brazil Country Narrative FY 1952," 832.00TA/921 LM119 General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59) USNA.

[18] "The Zona de Mata," American Consulate General & United States Agency for International Development, Recife Pernambuco, June 1971, Records of the Agency for International Development, Record Group 286 (hereafter RG 286), USNA.

assisted social development program were designed to achieve. He explained that the oil boom had thrown the old social order into chaos:

"The new social order created massive social problems, which an underdeveloped governmental system was not prepared to meet. The lack of trained technicians and administrators made government ineffectual in meeting rising popular demands for adequate housing, public health, social security and spiritual satisfaction. A society in transition lacked the human resources to channel constructively the fruits of economic transformation.

In this environment, the exotic doctrines of Marxist ideology became the medium of intellectuals for espousing utopian solutions for complex problems… .

The challenge of any program for social development in Venezuela is the formulation and execution of programs which will effectively facilitate the adaptation and fitting of the masses into the new social order.

For this, a program must be designed primarily to educate and train – both in the narrow sense of learning needed skills for incorporation into modern economic society and in the broader sense of assimilating the knowledges [sic] and discipline needed for effective and constructive participation in civic life. Those who live on the fringes of society become the most susceptible to violent change; those who have no stake in society are indifferent to its maintenance."[19]

The Rockefeller Foundation's mission of ordering and stabilizing the social order in order to protect the global expansion of capitalism had become the avowed mission of the U.S. government.

U.S. government development policies in Latin America cannot be explained simply by the transfer of people and ideas from foundations to the state. The ideas expressed about modernization, its disruptive qualities and the need for controlled development had become standard fare for discussions among American academics during the 1950s and 60s. Just two years before Tragen authored his remarks, W.W. Rostow had published his *Stages of Growth* which summarized many of the ideas current among Western developmentalists. Foundation and government programs also shared the flaw common in American developmentalist thinking of the time. While recognizing the gross disparities of wealth and power in Latin America, their programs failed to address the root causes of these inequities. Instead they sought by way of technology transfer and investment to promote American models of private sector initiatives, despite the fact that those initiatives had emerged in a radically different social and economic environment. They clung to the American ideology of productivity, believing that increased efficiency would lift Latin America from

[19] "Social Development Policy in Venezuela" Irving G. Tragen, Labor Attaché, Caracas March 22, 1962. 831.40/3-2262, RG 59, USNA.

underdevelopment without having to confront issues of wealth redistribution. In fact the academic discourse on development became another convergence point for the state and foundations in these years.

Both the government and foundations by the early 1950s agreed that a major need of Latin American and Third World societies in general was for trained leadership, particularly individuals trained in the social sciences and especially economics to serve as a cadre of technocrats who would lead their own societies' progression through planned stages of stable development. Both the Ford and Rockefeller foundations provided scholarships and fellowships for thousands of Latin Americans to be trained at American universities. In addition, by the late 1950s, the foundations had initiated programs to develop or upgrade social science departments and institutes in Latin America.[20] Government efforts closely paralleled the first part of this process as a variety of state entities provided fellowships for the training of Latin American students at U.S. universities. Indeed officials in the State Department and elsewhere worked closely with the foundations in the interview and selection process for their programs and those of the philanthropic agencies. And while the U.S. government did not put an emphasis on the creation or development of academic units in Latin American universities, the federal government did look to American academic institutions to carry out vitally important portions of its development programs. The government frequently brought in American universities such as Columbia and Texas A&M to carry out development training programs that functioned through local universities or institutions such as the Banco de Mexico. Aside from the fact that the universities represented a concentration of technical experts who shared the state and foundations' vision of regulated capitalist development, the universities held another attraction for the government. With U.S. government development projects subject to sharp criticism from Latin American nationalists and leftists, U.S. policy makers believed that the universities would be viewed as neutral, impartial sources of expertise that would benefit the region. That assumption often proved wrong as university managed projects in Mexico for example were closed down in response to student protests, but the state had other partners with whom it could

[20] Berman, *The Ideology of Philanthropy*, pp. 11-18.

pursue the goals of increased efficiency within a capitalist development scheme.[21]

The enclave profile that typified most U.S. enterprises in Latin America through the 1930s had undergone significant modification by the 1950s. This was due in part to state regulations such as Mexican statutes requiring the nationalization of the labor force in multinational corporations. It also represented a response to nationalist pressures. Creole Petroleum, for example, was quick to point out that by the mid 50s it was purchasing a quarter of its supplies and materials in Venezuela. In addition, the company supplied financing to local companies that provided the corporation with services such as hotels and ferryboats. Given its Rockefeller origins it is not surprising that Creole invested $7 million in Nelson's Venezuelan Basic Economy Corporation and its experiments designed to boost agricultural production and food distribution in the country.[22] But perhaps the most interesting intersection between Creole and other institutions involved in the transformational mission was its effort at community development.

A fundamental premise of foundation and government development projects in the 50s and 60s was the idea of self-help. As Albion Patterson's comments suggest aid was not meant to be a charitable exercise, but rather an effort to promote local initiatives. As one foreign aid official explained, community development consisted of the plans and procedures which would get local villagers and communities involved in improving their own economic and social conditions.[23] Corporate, state and philanthropic experts believed that a fundamental impediment to the further development of Latin America was its top down paternalistic social order that discouraged local initiatives and self-reliance. Community development programs, at least in theory, were designed to reverse the dynamics of these highly centralized social orders and prompt villagers to identify and solve their own problems with some outside technical assistance. In fact projects such as the U.S. sponsored initiative for the village

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[21] Albion W. Patterson to Harold E. Stassen, Santiago, January 28, 1954, RG 469, USNA. Record Group 469 contains a number of accounts of American university activities in countries such as Mexico including the local responses to these programs.

[22] Wayne C. Taylor and John Lindeman, *United States Business Performance Abroad: The Creole Petroleum Corporation in Venezuela* (New York: National Planning Association, 1955), pp. 34-36.

[23] "Community Development Programs and Methods" by Carl C. Taylor, June 1954, RG 469, USNA.

of Chonin, Brazil in the early 1950s exhibited many of the "top - down" Rockefeller techniques of careful surveying of the village's needs in agriculture, health, and education, and had imbedded within it the same preconceived notions about the ineffectiveness of folk medicine and the dire need for the adoption of new technologies.[24]

In an effort to shed its enclave image, integrate itself more fully into the local community and along the way reduce some of the costs of its company- town policies, Creole Petroleum launched its own Community Development and Integration Program in the early 1950s. The program evolved from the belief by company officials that "The tradition of local responsibility for local problems is not nearly as strong in Venezuela as for example, in the United States."[25] And as one company manager noted, its underlying assumption was "based on the world's experience that social progress is accelerated by the encouragement of individual initiative. . . ."[26] The company launched two community projects one in Tamare and the other as Juidbana. In these communities the company would promote the development of educational and medical facilities, as well as stores and housing, but reduce its own role in the provision of these services. Rather than supplying company housing on a rental basis, the firm encouraged home ownership with financing for workers. By 1959 Tamare included a shopping center, movie theater and other commercial buildings built and owned by local interests with Creole financing. Yet even more than in the case of the federal government's community development projects it was clear here that the vision for these communities was strictly an American one, closely based on America's post war suburban communities and stressing the American belief in "democratic" capitalism i.e. a system in which large and small capitalist enterprise could coexist and bring general prosperity within the same social and economic order.[27]

Even as some extractive industry enterprises like Creole experimented with development initiatives based on foundation and government models, more widespread changes were being initiated by corporations in the fast growing manufacturing and retail industries. Manufacturing within Latin America

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[24] "Community Center Project at Chonin Brazil" by Kalervo Oberg and Jose Artheur Rios, Rio de Janeiro March 29, 1954, RG469, USNA.

[25] Taylor and Lindeman: *Creole Petroleum Corporation in Venezuela*, p. 39.

[26] Ibd.

[27] *Annual Report of the Creole Petroleum Company, 1959* (New York, 1960), pp. 13-14.

required increasing integration into the region's economies, with growing reliance on local manufacturers as well as local markets and financial networks. As a result U. S. manufacturers sought to upgrade and improve these parts of the local economy.

The G.E. manufacturing operations in Brazil represented a pioneering effort of this sort. The company over the years outsourced a variety of parts and sub-assemblies for products ranging from light bulbs to air conditioners. G.E. supplied not only technical specifications for these items but also provided training and engineering advice to assist the Brazilian enterprises in filling these orders. G.E. and other companies like it were carrying out a major transfer of technology and American production methods to the Latin American manufacturing sector. At the same time G.E. and other American companies were promoting the growth of consumerism.

In Brazil, G.E. helped set up a wholesale distribution network where none had existed before, and created a line of credit stretching from local banks through G.E. and down through wholesalers and retailers and on to consumers. The company also created a market for its goods with massive advertising campaigns including radio spots and newspaper advertising as well as free trial offers for its products.[28]

Sears and Roebuck had similar impacts in its Latin American operations. In Mexico the company helped finance a variety of local suppliers in clothing, furniture and appliance manufacture. Although such efforts did not represent major technology transfers the corporation did introduce aspects of American style and design to these local producers. More importantly, Sears had a major impact upon the development of a consumer society, being among the first to place display advertising in newspapers and to introduce lighted display windows and open rack displays of goods. While hardly a pioneer in the credit field, Sears helped spread the practice of consumer credit.[29]

Although American state functionaries did not carry out programs directly designed to promote a consumer economy in the region, they did serve as forceful advocates of American business in general. As was the case in the age of Dollar Diplomacy, the state used financial mechanisms to more fully

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[28] Theodore Geiger, *United States Business Performance Abroad: The General Electric Company in Brazil* (New York: National Planning Association, 1961), pp. 70-82.

[29] Richardson Wood and *Virginia* Keyser: *United States Business Performance Abroad: Sear Roebuck de Mexico, S.A.* (New York: National Planning Association, 1953), pp. 37-38.

incorporate Latin American countries into the world capitalist economy to the specific advantage of U.S. corporations. But now the U.S. had multilateral mechanisms at its command to assist in this process. In Chile during the 1950s, the U.S. government, the IMF, the IBRD, as well as the Klein-Saks mission of private consultants pressed upon Chile a stabilization plan that increased the country's dependence on foreign loans and enhanced the power of large U.S. corporations such as Anaconda and Kennecott. On the other hand this stabilization program, like other elements of the mission of Americanization largely ignored structural inequities such as inequitable land distribution patterns and tax systems which lay at the heart of the nation's underdevelopment.[30] At the same time, the American state was also using more subtle mechanisms to promote an environment favorable to U.S. business.

While the first goal of USIS programs in Latin American countries tended to be the support of U.S. foreign policy, most program directors would agree with the one in Argentina who in 1959 listed as his second objective, "[p]roduce understanding of efforts made by U.S. through economic cooperation, emphasizing the role which free enterprise plays in advancing the welfare of Argentina and Argentine people."[31] The director in Mexico City was more direct stating that the goal was "To promote a better understanding of and confidence in free enterprise as a means of improving Mexico's economic position." Even more specifically the USIS mission in Mexico City sought, "to lessen nationalistic fears [of U.S. investment]" and "to present the basis of the free enterprise ideology."[32] U.S agencies also made a concerted effort, along with U.S. businesses, to train and discipline workers in Latin America to make them an effective workforce for a modern capitalist economy.

Just as G.E. reached out to upgrade production processes in the larger economy, the U.S. government also sought to improve productivity in the industrial sectors of Latin America. The Inter-American Educational Foundation created as a part of the OIAA in 1943 worked with national education ministries to upgrade education so that national institutions would produce "well-trained

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30 Jon V. Kofas: "Stabilization and Class Conflict: The State Department, the IMF, and the IBRD in Chile, 1952-1958," in: *International History Review*, Vol. 21 (2/1999), pp. 352-385.

31 "Annual USIS Assessment Report" Buenos Aires, October 15, 1957, Office of Latin American Operations , Record Groups 485 (hereafter RG 485), USNA.

32 "USIS Mexico Country Plan," Mexico City, June 19, 1958, RG 469; " USIS Country Plan" Mexico City, June 21, 1960, Records of the United States Information Agency, Record Group 306 (hereafter RG 306), USNA.

workers and technicians" needed for "expanding industrial enterprises"[33] In fact vocational education became a centerpiece of U.S. development efforts after the war. By 1955 the programs in Brazil had trained 21,770 shop foremen who supervised 348,000 workers, and nearly 1800 trade school teachers had participated in summer training programs.[34]

U.S. programs went beyond the training of supervisors to include management training seminars designed to introduce the principles of scientific management to industrialists, and detailed studies of manufacturing operations such as a 1954 study of the Brazilian textile industry that provided plans for worker training and technological upgrades to improve output.[35] While such programs concentrated on raising productivity, they also placed a high priority on maintaining social stability.

A description of a labor training seminar in Mexico explained both its productivity enhancing purposes and the effort to cope with the social dislocations prompted by rapid modernization. As the U.S. official explained, "The purpose of the labor training is to equip Mexican labor to maximize its contribution in the rapid industrialization process now under way in that country and to strengthen the free and democratic labor organizations against the constant threat of Communist infiltration." "It [Communist infiltration] tries to take advantage of the great and startling problems which rapid mechanization and industrialization causes in the minds of a labor force which only recently was still predominantly employed in agricultural pursuits."[36] The mention of free and democratic labor organizations referred to the fact that the American state now worked closely with U.S. labor unions to create a labor movement modeled on the one in the United States, i.e. unions that would focus on bread and butter issue of wages and benefits while eschewing threatening issues such as worker control and topics involving national politics and social issues. Those initiatives with labor worked to the benefit of American business and the controlled development vision of the state.

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[33] Report on the Status of the Cooperative Educational Program of the Office of Inter-American Affairs" June 28, 1945, 810/42711/9-446, RG 59, USNA.

[34] "Summary of the ICA Programs in Brazil," Rio de Janeiro, July 15, 1957, RG 485, USNA.

[35] "Survey of the Textile Industry of Brazil," Rio de Janeiro, February 11, 1954, RG 485, USNA.

[36] Vance Rogers to Rollin S. Atwood, Mexico City, June 18, 1956 enclosure: Memo by Ben Stephansky "Notes on the Labor Situation in Mexico," RG 469, USNA.

The cooperative efforts of the AFL and capital intensive American industries during the New Deal provided a working basis for overseas cooperation between big labor and big business during and after the war. Convinced that promoting U.S. business and business unionism in Latin America would ensure growth in demand for American made products in the region, the AFL and later the CIO became active supporters of corporate and state efforts to expand the American model of capitalism in the region.

Intense international cooperation with the labor unions dated back to the war as Rockefeller's OIAA worked with the AFL in Mexico to offer an alternative to Vicente Lombardo Toledano's left leaning Confederación de Trabajadores de America Latina or CTAL. After the OIAA's labor liaison Serafino Romauldi joined the AFL, the State Department backed Romauldi and the AFL in their creation of the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores or ORIT. In turn the IIAA supported ORIT's work, subsidizing labor-training seminars such as the one just mentioned in Mexico. These training sessions were part of a much larger cooperative effort between the AFL, the CIO, ORIT and the U.S. government to secure control of major CTAL labor unions for the government backed federation, the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM). The coalition succeeded in wresting control of the miner workers' and other key unions from Lombardo with liberal financing from ORIT and American unions.[37]

The coalition built long term relations with labor leaders through IIAA financed trips to the U.S. Between 1953 and 1956, 59 Mexican labor leaders visited the U.S. on such junkets. The purpose of one such set of trips in 1955 was explained this way by an IIAA official "To gain the cooperation of union members for the productivity goal a number of editors and writers of major labor papers will soon study the adjustment of American labor to productivity problems in this country."[38] The positive effects of such trips were apparent in the case of one Mexican labor leader, Bernardo Cobos who was sent to the U.S. on a four month USIS grant to study labor education. When he returned, Cobos was placed in charge of all worker education in the CTM.[39] USIS with the

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[37] Norman Caulfield, "Mexican State Development Policy and Labor Internationalism, 1945-1958," in: *International Review of Social History* 42 (1997), pp. 53-63.

[38] Vance Rogers to Rollin S. Atwood, Mexico City, June 18, 1956 enclosure: Memo by Ben Stephansky "Notes on the Labor Situation in Mexico," RG 469, USNA.

[39] "Concrete Effectiveness Report," Mexico City, September 13, 1955, Records of the United States Information Agency, RG 306, USNA

support of ORIT and the CTM further aided the cause by publishing a biweekly report "El Obrero" with international news on labor. But the information agency's principal mechanism for influencing labor was its film initiative aimed in the mid 1950s with particular intensity at the national mine workers union. The films designed to promote the advantages of bread and butter trade unionism, were also circulated throughout the CTM, with the approval and support of its Secretary General Fidel Velasquez.[40]

The U.S. government and ORIT also attempted with less success to undermine Chile's left leaning labor federation the CUTCh. In 1952, Serafino Romauldi tried unsuccessfully to launch an anti-Communist labor confederation in Chile. That same year he led a delegation to Chile at the invitation of the Copper Mine Workers Confederation. Among the ORIT delegates was Paul K. Reed, the international representative of the United Mine Workers Union who played a pivotal role in securing control of the Mexican Mine Workers Union for conservative pro government labor leaders. In reporting on their visits to Chile's coal mines as well as the Kennecott and Anaconda copper operations, Reed and the others focused on two issues: levels of productivity and the state of management – labor relations. In the coal mines they made note of the outdated machinery and methods, and the generally squalid living conditions of the workers. Giving expression to the American vision of high productivity corporations with modern labor relations policies that would create a prosperous working class and an environment safe for expanding U.S. investments, Romauldi concluded, "We noted that where cordial industrial relations were being practiced and grievances were speedily settled, productivity tended to rise and the average worker was generally free of anti-U.S. sentiments."[41]

USIS made a concerted effort to support the transformation of Chilean labor. Next to general support for U.S. foreign policy, the most important goal of USIS in Chile was "To demonstrate to Chilean public and official circles the progressive and dynamic nature of the American economic system with particular emphasis on modern management practices and upon the advantages of a non-political, democratic labor movement."[42] USIS in Chile created a labor bulletin stressing the advantages of traditional American trade unionism. The

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[40] "USIS Semi-Annual Report," Mexico City, August 12, 1955, RG 306, USNA

[41] Serafino Romauldi: *Presidents and Peons: Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967), p. 329.

[42] "Country Plan for USIS Santiago FY 1960," Santiago, June 26, 1959, RG 306, USNA

USIS developed bulletin material "In close collaboration with the USOM[United States Overseas Mission] Labor Advisor, the Embassy Labor Attaché and Embassy Political Officers *and always in consultation with representatives of the large U.S. industries operating in Chile*. . . ."[43] Yet as elements of the coalition continued to promote the development of Latin America through capitalist, especially American capitalist endeavors, they had not entirely abandoned the Progressive reformers goal of ridding capitalism of some of its retrograde characteristics.

During his 1952 visit to Chile Serafino Romauldi had noted that despite the high tech nature of Anaconda's operations, the company refused to engage in collective bargaining and constantly harassed the union. Clearly the company ignored the basic principles of the understanding between capital and labor in the United States i.e. that productivity increases would provide higher profits for business and more progressive policies toward labor. Romauldi also believed that his critique of the company's labor practices helped bring about changes in Anaconda policies. His observations regarding Anaconda demonstrated that despite the advanced labor relations policies and corporate welfare efforts of some American businesses, not all U.S. companies undertook such progressive measures or implemented them to their fullest extent. Commenting on a campaign to restrict foreign investment in Mexico the U.S embassy noted that the embassy needed, "to do some educating of U.S. investment here as to the danger of unresolved social problems in Mexico and need for U.S. enterprise to show an awareness of these problems, in particular by taking a similar progressive stand on social issues as they display in the United States."[44] The Progressives' goal of civilizing capitalism remained a part, albeit it a lesser one, of the mission of Americanization.

By the beginning of the 1960s the agents of that mission shared a clear and common vision for Latin America. The region would enjoy a planned and stable process of capitalist development based on a process of productivity improvement made possible by American technical assistance and most importantly the initiatives of American corporations. Ironically, Christian missionaries who were once the most ardent believers in Latin America's transformation, and who had made lasting contributions to that reformist vision, were judged and found

[43] "Country Plan for USIS Santiago FY 1961," Santiago, August 20, 1960, RG 306, USNA. Italics mine.

[44] Elmer H. Bourgerie: Embassy Counselor for Economic Affairs to Department of State, Mexico City, March 29, 1957, RG 469, USNA.

wanting by the coalition of forces that now formed the vanguard of Americanization.

The Great Depression and the war had drained money and personnel from American missionary efforts in Latin America. Furthermore their efforts at evangelization in the region had peaked with less than 5% of Latin Americans professing a Protestant religious affiliation. This is not to suggest that the missionaries did not remain a significant presence in the region. As of 1952 there were nearly 4,000 Protestant missionaries working in Latin America along with more than 1300 Catholic priests and nuns. Social service activities especially primary education still represented an important part of their work, absorbing $8 to $10 million per year of their budgets.[45] Other elements of the Americanization coalition continued to work closely with the missionaries. In Chile, missionary groups ranging from the Maryknoll fathers to Seventh Day Adventists cooperated informally with the U.S. government's technical assistance programs for agriculture.[46] The corporate sector also continued to work with missionaries, entrusting them with portions of the educational institutions they created. As a part of its community development program Creole Petroleum turned over the running of two of its hospitals to the Medical Missionary Sisters of Philadelphia and leased one of its schools to the Salesian Fathers.[47] But the diminished role of missionaries in the project of Americanization became abundantly clear in a study of the missions published by the National Planning Association in 1956.

Indicative of the changing realities, the study was funded by the Ford Foundation and written by Dr. James G. Maddox who had worked for Nelson Rockefeller on development projects in Venezuela and Brazil, and focused on the technical assistance aspect of missionary activity in Latin America. In a portion of the conclusion with the telling title "The Efficiency Problem" Maddox noted that the curriculum of missionary schools was now sadly out of date, failing to provide training that would create productive artisans and farmers. As for missionary medical institutions, they continued to practice curative medicine instead of preventive medicine, which was now the focus of foundation and government efforts. Maddox also stressed the need for the

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[45] James G. Maddox, *Technical Assistance by Religious Agencies in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 20-26.

[46] Austin Sullivan to Harry W. Yoe, Washington, September 24, 1954, RG 469, USNA.

[47] Taylor and Lindeman, *Creole Petroleum Corporation in Venezuela*, pp. 41-42.

missions to train community leaders.[48] In short, the missionaries, once the ideological vanguard for the project of Americanization had fallen badly out of step with the post war coalition's efforts to create conflict free capitalist societies through planned programs focused on productivity improvement. But a new era and a new role for missionary activity was already dawning as Pentecostal missionaries were now taking the lead in evangelization. If they were less overt advocates of the progressive reforms which had formed the core of the Social Gospel, they would help many Latin Americans cope with the wrenching changes which the process of Americanization would bring to their lives. Meanwhile the other larger and more significant agents of change, corporations, foundations, unions and the state were marching forward together, confident in the future of the new Americanized world that they were creating. Indeed, at the beginning of the 1960s, they were on the verge of launching a new and more ambitious project, the Alliance for Progress, an anti-Communist initiative that grew directly out of the shared transformational vision which the coalition for Americanization had forged during the first half of the twentieth century.

This essay explores the interplay of forces that brought into existence a powerful coalition for Americanization in the post war era. More specifically, it examines how the rise of modern high tech corporations and their philanthropic offspring, combined with challenges from depression, war, Communism, and the rise of Latin American populist nationalism, helped forge a coalition of the American state, corporate community, foundations and labor unions that carried out a coordinated campaign of Americanization beginning in the 1940s. That campaign drew upon the belief that a planned capitalist economy stressing productivity improvement could create a positive environment in foreign cultures for the expansion of U.S. economic interests, while generating increased wealth for all levels of society and thus avoid wrenching decisions over the redistribution of wealth. Their vision was of stable regulated capitalist societies emerging across the globe, which would enrich their own citizens while serving as important complements to the American economy. As implemented in Europe and Japan, the American transformational mission seemed to fulfill the promise of that vision. But in Latin America their vision proved to be fundamentally flawed. The missionaries of Americanization insisted that planned productivity increases based on technology, training, and corporate

[48] Maddox: *Technical Assistance*, pp. 102-108.

initiatives could reform Latin American societies, without having to confront and dismantle the institutions and relationships that engendered vast disparities of wealth and power. This meant that U.S. initiatives would do little to bring about more just and equitable societies in Latin America. As a result, millions of Latin American workers and peasants would flock to the causes of the Left, drawn by Marxist visions of social justice. Even today, after the seeming triumph of the American mission at the end of the twentieth century the harsh realities of social injustice and grinding poverty testify to the limits of that vision and the mission it inspired.

CLAUDIO LOMNITZ

"AMERICANIZATION" AND MORTUARY RITUAL IN GREATER MEXICO

In this essay, I explore the use of Americanization as a register for 'othering' within processes of modernization. Two dimensions of this process are emphasized: Americanization as a process of appropriation that is founded on the United States' pivotal position as the largest market in the World System, and Americanization as a way of marking modernization as foreign. These two dimensions are shown to be intimately connected. Economies of scale are critical to capitalist modernization, which is why the United States is the world's pivotal market. Therefore, US appropriation of world traditions and innovations—which is one dimension of Americanization—is often a precondition for their dissemination and expanded reproduction outside the United States.

After explaining the dialectics between Americanization as appropriation within the US market and Americanization as the rejection of Americanized modernization abroad, I explore how and why the cultural elaboration of death and of connections with the dead became a "contact zone" for the production of national identity amongst Mexicans in Mexico and in the United States. Following a theoretical argument that I developed elsewhere, I show that in the 19th century, nationalists tried to avoid identifying Mexican nationality with traditional mortuary practices. The connection between the cultural elaboration of death and national identity emerges later, during the 1920s and 1930s, in two distinct currents. One of these is championed by revolutionary artists, and the other by social psychologists and reformers. While the second tradition has a good deal of continuity with the position of liberals and positivists in the 19th century, the first developed a successful aesthetics of national identity in a qualitative leap that surpassed all prior efforts.

The identification between the cultural elaboration of death and of the connection between the living and the dead can be said to have been Americanized beginning in the 1960s. At this time, the connection between the Days of the Dead and Mexican identity was well established, while the Mexican state had

turned its back on the revolutionary project of the 1920s and 30s. This fact, compounded by the coincidence and increasing competition between the traditional celebration of the Days of the Dead and Halloween allowed political actors to build a contact zone during the festivities, which became an occasion in which capitalist modernization could be represented as an abdication of the national spirit and project.

On the other hand, this same coincidence made the Days of the Dead a useful occasion for the elaboration of Mexican-American identity, beginning in the late sixties and early seventies. As a result, the Days of the Dead can be said to have entered the US mill of national appropriation only a few years after its use as an occasion to reject Americanization emerged.

On "Americanization"

My basic framework here derives from recent work on "contact zones."[1] Very briefly, 'contact zones' in national societies can be defined as relational frameworks in which national identity is marked. One can further typify contact zones on the basis of their connection to four fundamental generative principles. Thus, national identity can be marked in social interaction when binding a political community serves to navigate any one of four contradictions. These contradictions can thereby be seen as producing the context or historical conjuncture in which contact zones emerge. They are: (1) the tension between foreign business concerns or imports and local mores; (2) internal contradictions in a key national dogma, which is that 'modernity' develops organically out of a local 'tradition'; (3) the contradiction between modernization as the fundamental national goal and the upheaval and dislocation that is generated in the modernization process; and (4) the tension between innovations adopted from a (global) civilizing process and local mores.

Each of these tensions is an aspect of a fundamental contradiction between a nation's reliance on an economy that transcends its borders, and the principle of (national) popular sovereignty. This contradiction, though universal, is felt more keenly in poorer countries such as those of Latin America, where the limits in the sovereignty of the political community are readily visible, and most techno-

[1] *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), pp.125-144.

logical innovations, styles, fashions, and habits that are key to the civilizing process are introduced from abroad.

Given this general context, what exactly is "Americanization"? Outside of the United States, the term usually refers to the imposed or willing adoption of commodities, customs, styles, social organizational forms, or systems of production that are seen as (a) coming from the United States and (b) as opposed to local custom. Americanization would thus be an aspect of the process of modernization that generates national identity, since in this case modernization appears as a kind of Trojan horse of US imperial interests. However, in order fully to understand the phenomenon at hand, a broader definition is required.

There are two divergent but interrelated senses of the term "Americanization." The first, which I just mentioned, involves the adoption or imposition of "American" objects and mores outside of the United States; the second is the nationalization of innovations of every sort within the United States. This second sense, which is often under-emphasized, is of critical significance.

The United States is the biggest consumer market in the world. Moreover, it is a nation of English speakers in a world in which English is the universal lingua franca, and it is the leading power in world politics. For these reasons, innovations that are adopted in the United States are easily bent to cater to local tastes. Foreign visitors to the United States are often struck by the carefree ways in which foreign products and practices are adapted: Tacos are served up with ground beef, sour cream, American cheese, and chopped lettuce in a packaged item known as a "tortilla shell." Proposals are drafted to increase the distance between the goal posts in soccer, in order to allow more scoring in the game, and so to make it "less boring" and more attractive to the US public. The writings of French intellectuals are packaged and assimilated in university curricula under the very American rubric of "Theory." New forms and standards of presentation of art are developed and presented in American museums. Subtitles are offered in the opera. The cinematic conventions of Hollywood have been used to render American versions of every story, from Aladin to Zorro. In some cases the universal adoption of superior quality innovations, such as high definition television, has to wait until the product is adopted in the US market for an economy of scale to be possible.

In short, the adoption of innovations in the American market regularly involves three rather infuriating (or charming) aspects. First, the tailoring of the innovation to the dominant, often focus-group generated, US taste (a first

moment of "Americanization"). The production of these tailored innovations for the massive American market regularly involves a second moment of Americanization, in-so-far as artisanal products such as tacos need to be mass produced, or as alternative designs are standardized for this key market. Finally, there is the triumphal moment of Americanization when these already doubly 'Americanized' products are exported throughout the world, as, for example, when Latin American intellectuals get their 'French Theory' in the US, or when the French get their tacos from Taco Bell. This triumphal moment is itself a result of economies of scale, economies in which standardized packaging, low costs, and ease of access are key factors. This three-step process of (US) nationalization of world innovations in some ways parallels the kind of muted usufruct that colonial powers had of colonial production, all-the-while retaining the sense that they were sole fount of world civilization.[2] The ultimate realization of value seems to occur only at the point when a world item has 'made it' in the American market, while the adoption of foreign practices and commodities always bears the marks of carefully designed adaptations to American tastes and standards of production.

I want to linger on the example of Taco Bell because this company provides an especially complete case of US appropriation. Taco Bell Americanized certain Mexican foods (tacos, burritos) both as a food form and in its system of production and sales, this is well known. But there is more. On the marketing front, and in its efforts to acquire that mantra of commodity production that is "product differentiation," Taco Bell developed a remarkable publicity campaign featuring a Chihuahua dog who speaks with a Chicano accent. In one quite sensational television commercial, the Chihuahua wears a beret in the style of Che Guevara and leads a mass upheaval, replete with red flags. He is the caudillo who is harboring in "The Taco Revolution." Here we have a third level of appropriation. In addition to the taco itself, and then to its transformation into an industrial product, Latin American revolutions and revolutionaries are jokingly mobilized in support of this product: the revolution serves the mass market. But there is one final, and less visible, level of appropriation at work here, which is at the level of labor. The tomato pickers of Immolakee Valley, Florida, who provide Taco Bell with its tomatoes. They are mostly illegal immigrants from

[2] The canonical discussion of the ways in which metropolitan reliance on colonial cultural production was elided is Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

Mexico and Central America, who are paid $7000 per year, with no benefits, as compensation for their silent contribution to "the Taco Revolution."[3] There are, then, four forms of appropriation involved in this case. The end product, however, is itself not so easily appropriated: Taco Bell products are all duly trademarked and copy-righted.

So much for Americanization as a form of national appropriation. The second sense of term, the one that is more regularly used in Latin America, regards the international influence of things American. Here we note that US influence may or may actually be marked as American, just as Americans can choose whether or not to mark products as foreign. Some US imports can go from being marked as American to being un-marked, as their presence ceases to be contested. For example, during the time when its implementation was still controversial, federalism was marked as an alien import that was ill-suited to Mexican reality. Once federalism was secured as the national system (a process that involved adopting a number of features of Mexican "centralism"), it was no longer made foreign by political actors. In fact, commodities and practices that come to Latin America through the United States are often unmarked and do not enter the field of national identity production. Few people have been accused of lack of patriotism for relying on the light-bulb or for using the home computer. Baseball is a *national* sport in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, and the influence of American state universities on the design and curriculum of Latin American universities often goes un-noted.

In fact, when we speak of Americanization in the sense of the adoption of US products, we usually forget that we are interested only in a sub-set of these products, which are those that are *marked as foreign*. In short, the term "Americanization" in this second sense is a register for "othering" modernization, either by denying local contributions to the process, or by marking specific practices and innovations as alien to the community. This strategy for generating alterity focuses attention on the United States' role as an imperial power in the background, or the bitterness that stems from seeing local products appropriated by the US, marked up in price, copy-righted, and sold around the world.

At other moments, Americanization emerges as an element in a quasi-totemic system, where different groups within a country affiliate to and identify with different foreign nationalities. So, for example, a member of the Chilean

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[3] Mica Rosenberg, The Trouble With Tomatoes, *The Nation*, 2002. [http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=special&s=rosenberg20020318].

urban middle class may choose to send her children to the German school, the French school, or the American school. Or, to give another example, Mexican social scientists can be divided into those whose international connections are principally in the US, and those who are more strongly connected to Europe. In these cases, the foreign country becomes the surrogate and sign of a particular internal group, and the international system itself becomes a resource and a symbolic referent for the construction of difference and distinction within the nation. In the case of places like Mexico, where the interconnection with the United States runs so deep, this form of identification is so widespread that many people feel filiation not just to the US generally, but to the specific cities to which they are connected. It is not uncommon to see former immigrants or families of immigrants donning the paraphernalia of the Chicago Bulls, or the Dallas Cowboys, as a meaningful statement of belonging.

There is, in short, a good deal of alienation that is collapsed in the term "Americanization." At one level, Americanization involves the triumphal appropriation of world resources, inventions and labor by the world's largest consumer market. At another, it involves marking specific practices and commodities as alien, and then linking them to a totemic system of distinction that configures the social field within a nation. In this essay, I explore these processes of identification and of differentiation as they have emerged around a specific set of practices.

DEATH AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN GREATER MEXICO

The very attempt to define a "greater Mexico" requires a theorization of "Americanization." Greater Mexico is generally understood as Mexico, plus the areas in the United States (and, incipiently, Canada) that are populated by Mexicans. However, this definition is in some respects unsatisfactory, since it ignores contact zones and borderlands within Mexican territory as well as the fact that Mexican identity may at times extend beyond the physical presence of the people whose bodies are marked as "Mexican." Arjun Appadurai's appeal to a different kind of geography of identity is instructive in this regard: "The landscapes of group identity—the ethnoscapes—around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer tightly terri-

torialized, spatially bounded, historically unselfconscious, or culturally homogeneous."[4]

If we try to define Greater Mexico as the "ethnoscape" of Mexican identity, we are instantly faced with the fact that the social space of identity production has a changing morphology, even within Mexico. So, for example, there was a time, not so long ago, when the people known as "Indians" were understood as existing on the margins of the Mexican nation. Their redemption depended on their incorporation to a Mexico that was conceived as a fusion of the modern and indigenous elements. This idea has changed radically in the past few decades. Today, many Mexicans believe that "the Indian" is the quintessential Mexican, and that modernizing projects most often represent an alien influence. This ideology, most cogently put forth by the late Guillermo Bonfil in his best-selling book *México profundo*,[5] has been taken up repeatedly in social movements in political acts wherein modernizers are represented as "Americanizers."

As a result, the contact zones that generate Mexican identity have shifted dramatically in the past few decades. The adoption of modern institutions, including modern consumer habits, was once seen as the obligatory passage into national identity. So, for instance, José Joaquín Fernández de Lizardi (*El Pensador Mexicano*), the famous journalist, wrote in his testament (1827) that "No se ven en las calles de la opulenta México sino enjambres de perros y encuerados. Mientras para ser ciudadano no sea necesario andar decentemente vestidos, la gentuza de nuestro populacho siempre será la vergüenza del mundo; y aun esta pena de la suspención de los derechos de ciudadano, que es bien grave, puede que no les hiciera fuerza: necesitan otras más graves." Today, on the contrary, it is the indigenous peasant who is seen as the quintessential representative of what is Mexican, while modernizing projects, such as a recent initiative to build a new Mexico City airport on peasant lands, are represented as being 'foreign':

"El México profundo no es algo fugaz que puedan destruir los políticos ignorantes de lo que México es y quiere ser, o de otra manera, la suma de anhelos, aspiraciones y concreciones que nos dan fondo y perfil en la historia universal. Y este México profundo es el que ha inspirado e inspira la conducta de los campesinos de San Salvador Atenco. Resisten, repulsan, descono-

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4 *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.48.

5 (Mexico City: SEP, 1987).

cen el acuerdo que millonarios y autoridades pergeñaron en el propósito de construir, en Texcoco, un aeropuerto internacional acompañado de acaudalantes negocios."[6]

Similarly, the Mexican ethnoscape within the United States has changed radically in the past decades. In the United States, Mexico first captured the popular imagination during the Texan War and, especially, the Mexican American War (1847). At this point a set of racist and colonialist stereotypes were developed, with special attention lavished on the alleged vanity and cowardice of Santa Anna, the debasement and exploitation of the Mexican people by their venial, vain, aristocratic, and exuberant overlords, the quaint charm of the beautiful señorita, the lazy indolence of the Indian, etc. After the war, travel literature on "Old Mexico" flourished, a genre that continued into the twentieth century. The Mexicans who were now incorporated to the United States, on the other hand, were a colonized people whose beliefs and traditions were usually seen as little more than fetters to progress and incorporation.

The Chicano movement of the 1960s and 70s, and the farm-workers movement of the same period brought political respect and recognition to an ethnic group, "Mexican-Americans," who, unlike any other group saving Native Americans, had some claim to prior attachment to US soil. Mexico's presence in the United States is thus highly charged and ambivalent, being, on the other hand, perhaps the most handy source of alterity (with a deep literary, artistic, and cinematic archive readily available for support), and as the greatest immigrant threat to the integrity of the United States as a melting pot.

In short, the dynamics of Mexican identity production, and the relevance of Mexican identity in social life have changed significantly over time. It is within the changing ethnoscape of this 'Greater Mexico' (including contact zones within both Mexico and the United States) that I propose to analyze the Americanization and the Mexicanization of death.

AMERICANIZATION OF THE DEAD

In Mexico, as elsewhere, the modernization of the relationship with the dead and with death begins in the 18th century. By the early 1790s a movement of cemetery reform was well under way there. Geared to the removal of corpses from the cities by way of the establishment of extramural cemeteries and prohi-

6 Horacio Labastida, "Atenco y el México profundo," in: *La Jornada* (July 19, 2002).

bitions against church burial, this movement, which in Mexico lasted into the 1860s, by which time church burials finally declined in earnest, was spurred in part by a desire to be modern, and in part by new ideas concerning disease. The vapors or *miasma* that were released by decaying bodies, and that infiltrated both the air and the water supply, were understood as the root cause of epidemics and a key to public health.[7]

As this theory took hold in the minds of the lettered classes, reactions to epidemics began to change. Throughout the colonial period, and into the era of independence, epidemics were thought to be a form of divine punishment, and they were countered with emergency measures in public health, but mostly with prayer. Holy images were paraded through the city by penitents in *procesión de sangre*, and saintly intercession was used to explain both personal survival and the termination of the episode. Thus, the prestige of images such as that of the Our Lord of the Pilar grew in the 1659 measles epidemic, as did that of the virgin of Guadalupe in the Matlazahuatl epidemic of 1736. [8] Alongside these organized religious responses to epidemics, individuals sought every sort of protection and remedy from these plagues.

Even as late as 1813, epidemics were still primarily attributed to sins against God. Since that particular epidemic occurred during the Wars of Independence, such an interpretation was not only possible, but highly credible to the social actors involved. By the time cholera swept Mexico City in 1831, however, the hegemony of the religious interpretation of epidemics had lost some of its hold, and the desperate and disparate personal attempts to ward off sickness were readily understood by the enlightened classes as just that: desparate and disparate.

So, the writer Guillermo Prieto recalls the 1831 cholera epidemic in the following terms:

"Las calles silenciosas y desiertas en que resonaban a distancia los pasos precipitados de alguno que corría en pos de auxilios; las banderolas amarillas, negras y blancas que servían de anuncio de la enfermedad, de médicos, sacerdotes y casas de caridad; las boticas apretadas de gente; los templos con las puertas abiertas de par en par con mil luces en los altares; la gente arrodillada con los brazos en cruz y derramando lágrimas… A gran distancia el chirrido lúgubre de carros que atraviesan llenos de cadáveres… El pánico había invadido los ánimos,

[7] Donald Cooper, *Epidemic Disease in Mexico City, 1761-1813: An Administrative, Social, and Medical Study* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1965), pp.16-46.

[8] Juan Javier Pescador, *De bautizados a fieles difuntos: Familia y mentalidades en una parroquia urbana, Santa Catarina de México, 1568-1820* (México: El Colegio de México. 1992), pp.46-47, provides a useful description of these mechanisms.

de manera que estaban en juego las medicinas y los remedios más contradictorios… A una mujer del pueblo ordenó el Dr. Alarcón una sangría; la mujer interpretó la medicina tomándose un vaso de sangría y el resultado fue magnífico: el médico pedía la sangre y ella le decía que había dejado el vaso vacío. El Gobernador, que lo era el Sr. General Martínez (a) *Macaco*, fulminó un bando con tremendas prohibiciones a las frutas, los figones y comestibles; en su bando hay un anatema contra los *chiles rellenos* que escalofría… Los panteones de Santiago Tlatelolco, San Lázaro, el Caballito y otros, rebosaban en cadáveres; de los accesos de terror, de los alaridos de duelo, se pasaba en aquellos lugares a las alegrías locas y a las escenas de escandalosa orgía, interrumpida por cantos lúgubres y por ceremonias religiosas… En el interior de las casas todo era fumigaciones, riegos de vinagre y cloruro…, y, frente a los santos, velas encendidas."[9]

In the face of desperation, the prestige of the scientific explanation, which was that the epidemic was caused by miasma, grew, and prohibitions against Church burial, as well as efforts to expand the number, size and quality of modern hygienic cemeteries were slowly consolidated.[10]

However, this process of modernization, which included questions of hygiene in burial, but also more general interpretations regarding the connection between religion, truth and science and the medicalization of disease, was not a form of Americanization. Medical theories were being imported principally from Europe, and the rift between traditional Catholics and both secular and Catholic modernizers was more readily mapped onto the corresponding rift in France, than onto any divergence between Mexico and the United States.

This does not mean, however, that the treatment of disease, of death and of the dead did not develop into a "contact zone." It did so, as I will show, but death emerged only slowly as a source of national identity production, and initially mostly as an aspect of more general efforts to extirpate backwardness from Mexican soil. A prime example of this is the case of infant burials. Dead infants, known in Mexico (as elsewhere in the Spanish world) as *angelitos*, were buried in Mexico amidst great celebration. In these demonstrations, Mexicans subscribed to the views of the Church Fathers to the effect that the faithful should not weep for the dead in cases when death is a direct ticket to heaven.[11]

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9 *Memorias de mis tiempos*, pp.69-70.

10 For a detailed and incisive discussion of the history of the politics around church burials, see Pamela Voeckel, *Secular Oppositions: The Religious Origins of Mexican Modernity* (Durham, Duke University Press [in press]).

11 Examples of this argumentation abound in Mexican colonial funerary oratory. For instance, during the funerary orations said for the saintly father Joseph Lanciego y Euliaz (Mexico, Joseph Bernardo de Hogal, 1728): "Preguntabale a San Bernardo su hermana, si era licito, y debido llorar por los muertos. Respondióle el Santo con el Grande Isidoro: dispone la

These views were neither problematic nor strange to Mexicans of any class until the reading public realized how remarkable the practice was of *angelito* wakes and burials to the foreign traveler.

So, for instance, Captain G.F.Lyon, who traveled in Mexico in 1828, described the burial of an *angelito* with some wonderment, and then concluded, in a most British manner, that

"It is doubtless the duty of Christians to be resigned to their afflictions; but I am sure that few English women would carry their first and only infant to its grave, with smiling countenances; and I equally can answer for the inability of the men to throw up rejoicing rockets when their first-born is taken from them".[12]

The description of *angelito* burials quickly became a staple of travel writing in Mexico, and a source of shame for modernizers who sought to bring Mexico from out of the quagmire of superstition, fatalism and indolence. Since superstition had, by the mid 19th century, become part and parcel of imperialist representations of Mexico and it was understood to be a source of backwardness, the enlightened men of the *Reforma* took it upon themselves to erradicate this practice. Thus, Article 23 of the Liberal *Ley para el Establecimiento y uso de Cementerios* (issued January 30, 1857) prohibits dancing and merriment at the wakes of the *angelitos*. In short, this particular mortuary practice was purposely disassociated from the national project, because it attracted the attention of foreigners as an example of backward superstition.

A parallel sort of dynamic is observable in the 19th century with regards to certain aspects of the celebration of the Days of the Dead. Although the feast itself was never prohibited, there were key aspects of the celebration that were an embarrassment to modernizers. In particular, the practice of *llorar el hueso*, in other words, the graveside banquet, which was prevalent in popular cemeteries was seen as a form of disorder that deserved to be policed.[13] Similarly, Porfirian reformers showed an interest in giving a higher tone to the fes-

piedad, quando la fee prohibe el llanto; y concluye: no debemos llorar a aquellos, en quienes la muerte fue transito al descanso." (p. 7)

[12] *Journal of a Residence and Tour in the Republic of Mexico in the Year 1826, with some account of the Mines of that Country* (Port Washington NY: Kennikat Press), p.144.

[13] To cite one of numerous examples: "Morelia, October 30.- During the coming festivals of All Saints and All Souls days, the sale of intoxicating liquors in the cemeteries will be prohibited, as will the entrance of persons in a state of inebriety. Previous years, in which too much merry-making has been carried on amongst the graves of their ancestors by the lower class of the population have made these measures expedient. "No Wakes in Morelia on All Souls Day," in: *The Mexican Herald* (October 31, 1908).

tivities, and in displacing the street vendors, street theater and circuses from the city center. In short, liberals and Catholic modernizers were not interested in building national identity on the basis of the peculiarity of Mexican mortuary ritual. They were, on the contrary, concerned to stem some of these practices, in-so-far as they cast a negative image on Mexico as a backward country.

The liberal determination to avoid building national identity on the basis of mortuary practices is also evident in the fact that Americanization, in the sense of adopting models from the United States, is unmarked in Mexican funerary practices of the period. For example, after the first wave of graveyard architecture (which copied the Spanish examples made principally of niches), mid-19th century Mexican graveyards tended to adopt romantic architectural conventions, particularly in the design of the tombs of elegant families, and in the general layout of the graveyard. Though the predominant model for these new graveyards was Paris' Pere Lachaise cemetery, a number of graveyards, such as San Fernando and the municipal graveyard of Dolores in Mexico City and the Belén graveyard in Guadalajara, also took New York's modern cemeteries into consideration.[14] Nevertheless, modernized funerary practices were not subjected to the accusation of being an instance of Americanization. On the contrary, the English and American graveyard in Mexico City was often admired as a model that inspired sobriety and introspection by liberal commentators in the Mexican press.

THE AFFIRMATION OF MORTUARY PRACTICE AS A PRODUCTIVE CONTACT ZONE

A broad recognition of a specifically Mexican posture toward death emerges in the 1920s, first in modern art and art criticism, and then, in a very different form, in the thematization of a defensive form of male bravado and violence that was at the core of early Mexican social psychology. In the first case, the revolutionary grandeur of Mexico found an aesthetic register in a set of practices that were understood as bringing together the pre-Columbian world and contempo-

[14] See José Manuel Villalpando César, José Manuel, *El panteón de san Fernando*. (México, Porrúa, 1981), p.44. For photos of other romantic graveyards of the period, see Manuel Aguilar Moreno, *El panteón de Belén y el culto a los muertos en México: una búsqueda de lo sobrenatural* (Guadalajara, Secretaría de Cultura, 1997) and Bernardo del Hoyo Calzada, *El panteón de Dolores* (Jerez, Zac., H.Ayuntamiento Constitucional, 1992).

rary popular practice. In the second case, an alleged indifference to life and death, found especially in the combustible combination of drunken sentimentality and male violence, was the key symptom of the sort of colonial degradation that the Revolution (with its reformers and educators) was finally poised to redress. Thus the nationalization of attitudes toward death served simultaneously as a register to develop an aesthetics of Mexican revolutionary modernism and as a register in which to identify the civilizational benchmark that the developmental state wanted eventually to reach.

For this reason, "Mexican attitudes toward life and death" were thought to be meaningful and unique, and they were ambivalently charged. However, they were not yet set in contrast specifically to the United States. On the contrary, a *cosmopolitan* intelligentsia—André Breton, Diego Rivera, Jean Charlot, Tina Moddotti, Octavio Paz—was key to the aesthetic development of nationalizing attitudes toward death, while the people involved in pathologizing "the Mexican" were also in some ways cosmopolitan: Samuel Ramos was influenced by Freud and Adler, Jorge Portilla was a phenomenologist who had trained in Germany; Erich Fromm's descriptions of authoritarian personalities in Mexico derived from his work in the Frankfurt School

Thus, one might say that the initial nationalization of attitudes toward death was not used primarily to contrast Mexico with the United States, but rather more generally to identify the specificity, the uniqueness, of that country, in contrast both to Europe, and to settler nations such as Argentina, Canada and the United States. The ambivalence of the two trends on this issue (i.e., the artistic versus the social-psychological) is evident in the fact that whereas the Days of the Dead are the highest aesthetic expression of Mexican attitudes toward life for the first group, while Mexican nihilism (*valemadrismo*) and violence is more important for the second.

However, there was a particular situation that allowed the Days of the Dead to become a powerful contact zone in the production of Americanization. By the 1950s the Days of the Dead were beginning to be represented as a declining tradition that deserved to be defended against the onslaught of capitalism and commercialism. So, for instance, the writer Mauricio Magdaleno wrote a striking piece on this subject on the Days of the Dead, 1953:

"The sentiment of time and of the earth is perfectly alien to the civilization of machines and dividends. In the frenzy of the big city, the ritual of the year doesn't count. Nevertheless, just a few kilometers from the agitated concentration of business, politics, conferences, parties (*los parties*), and the wrenching needs of the pariahs who grovel (*se revuelven*) like animals in

shanty towns of oppressive horror, in the dust of forgotten roads, emerging from the withered fields, the live gold of cempasúchil (marigolds associated with the Days of the Dead) shines in the cold November air.

In each town and hamlet of the Federal District, Acopilco, San Bernabé, Tulyehualco, San Juan Ixtayopan, Mixquic, Tecomitl, San Pedro Actopan, San Pablo Oxtotepec, Tepehauac, there are altars *(ofrendas)* in the huts and in their arches there is the fruits of autumn, pumpkin in molasses, *tejocotes*, pieces of sweet sugar cane, and the inevitable mountain of cempasuchil at the foor of the hybrid offerings for the dead. The poorest indigent hawkers of ducks and birds (*chichicuilotes*) who come with the first vapors of dawn from Cuautlalpan and Chalco to sell their merchandise with their sweet and ancient cry, guard their meager earnings for two or three months. Those women who never keep anything because they barely have enough to eat? They guard their earnings decorously, with the decorum that is due to the dead, for the yearly evocation".[15]

By the early 1960s, this sense of a traditional horizon that was being trampled by the time discipline and by the profit-motives of capitalism was compounded by the fact that there were now a number of upper class and Americanized middle class Mexicans who are beginning to throw Halloween parties and to do some door-to-door trick-or-treating in a few upper class neighborhoods. The first Halloween parties that were celebrated in Mexico occurred within the American colony, during the Porfiriato.[16] They appear to have been unremarkable for Mexicans of the time. The adoption of this custom in the upper classes, in a period when the revolutionary fervor of the 1920s and 30s had become tamed and commercialized, allowed some intellectuals to use the celebrations of the Days of the Dead as a productive contact zone.

For example, the writer María Luisa Mendoza responded in the following terms to emerging upper-class Halloween celebrations in 1974:

"I have seen adds in magazines and papers with KuKluxKlan uniform and mask for the Halloween children, which is a sort of *fiesta gringa* with witches on a broom and pointy hats, cats, and pumpkins that are a pleasure to read about in detective books, but that are absolutely unconnected to us… One feels ashamed to witness the results: in elegant neighborhoods there is a proliferation of disguised children who beg for candy and money. Today the children of our potentates learn to beg from the time that they are little. In other words, while we decry the hunger and needs of so many disinherited children who ask for pennies, sell chiclets or clean windshields, our bourgeoisie mimes the Texans, allows their children to go into others houses *(casas ajenas)* dressed ridiculously and to ask for bread which they *will* receive *(pidiendo pan que sí les dan)*."[17]

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[15] "Ritual de noviembre," in: *El Universal* (November 3, 1953).

[16] "Last Night's Halloween Party," in: *The Mexican Herald* (October 30, 1909).

[17] María Luisa Mendoza, "La A por la mañana," in: *El Universal* (November 2, 1974). Writer Salvador Novo also led the chorus of repudiation against Halloween: "This is an artificial thing (*cosa postiza*) which as regrettable as every other intromission of

The combined effect of the disjunction between peasant-time, best represented in mortuary ritual, and capitalism was now potently mapped onto the role of the US, and of the Mexican bourgeoisie, in embracing capitalism over national traditions. As a result, the Days of the Dead became a particularly useful occasion for the expression of these tensions because of its co-existence/competition with Halloween.

The contrast between Halloween and the Days of the Dead was also available to Mexicans in the United States, as they began to build their political identity in the 1960s. So, for instance, Berkeley's first Chicano cultural magazine (1973), whose mission statement declared that it was dedicated to "*la busqueda de nuestro auténtico ser así como el rescate de nuestro pasado y nuestra cultura*" (the search for our authentic being as well as for the recuperation of our past and our culture) was titled *La Calavera Chicana*, in reference to the satiric epitaphs that have been published on the Days of the Dead since the 19th century.

The utility of the *día de muertos* for the production of Mexican-American identity facilitated yet another process of Americanization because it involved the transposition of this exotic feast into a readily recognizable marker in the field of American identity politics. Thus the Days of the Dead underwent a double process of synchretic transformation: in Mexico, it came to stand for its connection to a habitus that opposed transnational capitalism, a form of development that involved not only exploitation, but also the abdication of a national project that had been proposed during the Mexican revolution (1910-1940). As such, the Days of the Dead could be adopted despite their connection to traditional Catholicism, a connection that was in any case easily underplayed, and given the clergy's long-standing policy to distance itself from traditional practices such as the *llorada del hueso*, the Days of the Dead markets, domestic altars, etc. Thus, given the prior nationalization of Mexican attitudes toward death, the co-existence between Days of the Dead and Halloween gave an ample margin to the identification between nationalism and anti-capitalism.

In the United States, the adoption of the Days of the Dead as a sign of the difference between Mexican-Americans and the mainstream also meant secularizing the festivity (a move away from its connections to the Catholic faith, and toward a more abstracted relationship between the living and the dead). Given

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Northamerican customs." Edgar González "Los 'Halowens' [sic] desvirtúan nuestra tradición, afirma Salvador Novo," in: *El Universal* (November 2, 1971).

the appetite for signs and symbols of ethnic specificity in the conduct of US identity politics, the Día de Muertos in US met with increasing acceptance and success, despite the unsettling feelings that Mexican familiarity with death often produces. If Jews could have Yom Kippur and Passover, and African-Americans can achieve broad recognition for that newly minted harvest ritual called *Kwanza*, certainly Mexicans could have their Days of the Dead. As a result, one can observe in the past two decades a steadily growing adoption of the Days of the Dead in schools in the United States, and increased familiarity with all of the traditional elements of the more elaborate altars for the dead.

CONCLUSIONS

The key significance of Americanization is that modernization can be "othered" as much as it can be naturalized. The processes of naturalization of modernization within the US are one key dimension of Americanization, since they involve either the adaptation of innovations to dominant idioms of representation and distinction, or the convenient elision of the contribution of the "foreign" to the grandeur of "America." Thus Washington DC's Vietnam War Memorial includes the name of every American who died in that war, but none of those of America's Southern Vietnamese allies. This allows Americans to understand their role in Vietnam as that of coming to the aid of the southern Vietnamese, while eliding the fact that it was at least as true that the Southern Vietnamese were coming to the aid of the Americans. Taco Bell can be heralded as a hallmark of American capitalism, combining, as it does, the ingenuity of the US fast-food industry, with innovative advertising and image creation. This is the US coming to the aid of Mexican cuisine and bringing it to the world's palate in a version that is acceptable to the US palate, and to its conditions for mass production. However, the fact that Taco Bell is a trademark, and a privately owned company, whereas the taco and the people who developed it are not means that Americanization involved appropriation in the strict sense of the term (i.e., ownership).

In Mexican national space, the nationalization of mortuary ritual emerged rather late in national history. During the 19th century, nationalists to *eliminate* traditional mortuary ritual, such as the celebrations of infant deaths, or the baccanalia at the graveside on All Souls' Day. By the 1920s, however, Mexican mortuary ritual, and more broadly Mexican attitudes toward life and death, did

become nationalized, in both a positive and a negative sense. Whereas reformers, following Samuel Ramos, pathologized a reckless attitude toward life and death in order to project a horizon of action for revolutionary social reform, artists and revolutionary intellectuals found a unique aesthetic synthesis of Mexican national culture in Mexican mortuary ritual, a mixture that combined a pre-Columbian sensibility with a popular tradition that had been rejected by the national elite since independence. These two tendencies crystalized in a readily commercialized national stereotype: the Mexican as the bosom-pal of Death.[18]

On the other hand, as the inter-penetration of the US and Mexican economies progressed, Halloween, like all other American festivities and festive modalities (from pro-football to Rudolph the Red Nosed Reindeer) became a growing presence in Mexican life. The temporal coincidence between Halloween and the Days of the Dead, a coincidence that stems from common origins, throws the difference between Mexican and American culture and history into high relief. As a result, the Days of the Dead provide a routine occasion in which the rejection of transnational capitalism and Mexican nationalism can be combined.

[18] For an alternative interpretation of how this stereotype emerged, see Carlos Monsiváis, "'Mira muerte, no seas inhumana', notas sobre un mito tradicional e industrial," in: María Teresa Pomar, *El Dia de Muertos: The Life of the Dead in Mexican Folk Art* (The Fort Worth Art Museum, 1987), pp. 11-16.

PART II

CONSUMERISM

AND THE RISE OF MASS CULTURES

JÜRGEN BUCHENAU

MARKETING 'NECESSITIES': THE CASA BOKER AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT STORE IN FIN-DE-SIÈCLE MEXICO CITY

On November 1, 1865, Robert Böker, the son of hardware producers from Remscheid, became a partner in a small Mexico City hardware store that soon attained a national reputation as the "Casa Boker."[1] "The first hardware business of real importance,"[2] the Casa Boker rose to national significance in the late 1800s. Upon the construction of a glamorous department store, observers labeled the company a Mexican version of Sears, Roebuck & Co., as the Casa Boker sold as many as forty thousand different products to retail and wholesale customers throughout the republic.[3] Still in business today, the Casa Boker has since muddled through various economic development strategies; violent and unpredictable political change; the rise of consumer culture; uncontrolled urbanization; and the conflicted relationship between Mexicans and foreigners.[4]

Not surprisingly, U.S. influence fundamentally shaped the history of the Casa Boker despite the German background of its owners. Robert Böker came to Mexico on a U.S. passport and associated with both the German and "American" communities in Mexico City. Even more importantly, before the Mexican Revolution, the Casa Boker sold more U.S. than German products, and it used

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1 From 1869 to 1909, the official name of the business was "Roberto Boker & Cía." I will use the popular name of the company for ease of reading.

2 Carlos Morales Díaz, *¿Quién es quien en la nomenclatura de la Ciudad de México?*, 2nd exp. ed. (Mexico City: B. Costa-Amic, 1971), p. 76.

3 "Un comercio moderno con sabor nostálgico. Un siglo de inagotables formas arquitectónicas: Edificio de Casa Boker, " Ferretecnic 38 (July 2000), p. 4.

4 This essay is part of a larger work that analyzes the role of the Casa Boker and its owners in the history of modern Mexico. I appreciate the financial support of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte, the University of Southern Mississippi, Wingate University, the Dupont Foundation, the Southern Regional Education Board, and the National Endowment of the Humanities. See Jürgen Buchenau, *Werkzeuge des Fortschritts: Eine deutsche Händlerfamilie in Mexiko von 1865 bis zur Gegenwart*, transl. Silke Schmidt-Rinke (Stuttgart: Heinz, 2002).

French and U.S. methods of advertising and distribution. It was not until the last twenty years that the Casa Boker, facing stiff competition from U.S. corporations such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, has ceased to be a major outlet for U.S. hardware in Mexico.

Focusing on the construction of the Boker department store in 1900, this essay argues that Europeans rather than U.S. Americans spearheaded the consumer revolution that began to transform Mexico City at the turn of the twentieth century. More recently, U.S. corporations such as Sears, Roebuck Co. only perfected a system of advertising and distribution that European merchants had invented in the late Porfiriato. This paper therefore challenges recent analyses that have stressed the role of U.S. capitalists in the cultural and economic transformation of Mexico to consider the important role of European intermediaries such as the Boker family and their business.[5] During the Porfiriato (1876-1911), German merchants became the prime marketers of "necessities" such as hardware, while U.S. producers utilized the efficient system of distribution that the Bokers and their rivals had set up for U.S. as well as European merchandise. In many ways, the Americanization of Mexico required the concomitant growth of European influence—and particularly the help of transnational German merchants such as Robert Böker and his partners.

Born May 27, 1843, Robert Böker was the eldest son among Heinrich Böker and Elisabeth Scharff's nine children. Growing up in a Spartan environment, he was raised with relatively few social pretensions, as his childhood friends were working-class children. The food he ate resembled that of his friends: buttered black and white bread three times a day, and vegetable soup with potatoes and a little meat for lunch. The family home was too small for the large family, and the children slept two to a bed, and all in the same room. Nevertheless, one thing distinguished young Böker from his friends—abundant educational and professional opportunities, which manifested themselves in eleven years of rigorous and disciplined schooling, including the last three years in Cologne. After graduation in 1860, Robert joined his father's company—later, the parent

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[5] See, for instance, Julio E. Moreno,"Sears, Roebuck Company, J. Walter Thompson and the Culture of North American Commerce in Mexico during the 1940's" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Irvine, 1998).

firm of the makers of the famous Tree Brand cutlery—to learn the ropes of business administration.[6]

Reflecting this background, Robert Böker epitomized the Prussian *königlicher Kaufmann*, or kingly merchant: well-educated, but not an academic; stingy in his expenditures; secular in outlook; patriotic and conservative in his political convictions; and committed to public service. Böker did not believe in showing off his wealth. While he attended church occasionally, he did not raise his children to become devout Christians: for him, faith served a social, and not a spiritual purpose. Böker expressed firm loyalty to the Prussian king and state, and he considered himself Prussian first and German second even after the unification of Germany. He had no sympathy for the failure of democracy in his home country, but considered himself a Liberal on economic issues.[7]

Robert Böker belonged to the patrician entrepreneurial class, the *Wirtschaftsbürger*, that had come to the forefront of German society in the second half of the nineteenth century. His generation's formative experiences included burgeoning industrialization and a rapidly growing sense of nationalism. At least among the bourgeoisie, this generation possessed a sense of great self-confidence and expected nothing short of greatness from itself and its home country. The only emotion that tempered this unbridled confidence was a widespread fear of social dissolution, a threat the elites saw manifested in trade unionism and the eventual rise of the Social Democratic Party. The *Wirtschaftsbürger* saw themselves as the vanguard of progress, called upon to bring order, technology, and Western values to the rest of the world.[8]

This particular *Wirtschaftsbürger* soon found out that his destiny included an overseas adventure. During Robert's three-year stint in "Heinrich Böker & Co.," the company became deeply involved in arms deals with the Civil War-era United States. In late 1861, his uncle Hermann Böker, who owned a hardware store in New York City operated by his sons, had sold used sabers to the Abraham Lincoln administration. Encouraged by the healthy profit from these deals (a margin of more than 200 percent), Hermann and the Lincoln administration

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[6] Robert Böker, "Lebenserinnerungen," Archivo Boker, S.A. de C.V., Mexico City (hereafter cited as AB), Fondo Memorias (hereafter cited as FM), pp. 13-16.

[7] Interview with Gabriele Buchenau, June 2, 1992, Warleberg, Germany; Robert Böker, "Lebenserinnerungen," AB, FM, passim.

[8] Jürgen Kocka, "The European Pattern and the German Case," in: Jürgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell (ed.), *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993), pp. 4-24.

signed several large-scale contracts for new combat arms manufactured in the Bergisches Land. By the end of 1862, however, when the protracted conflict with the Confederacy made the U.S. government unable to pay its debt of a few million dollars to the elder Bökers, this venture threatened to bring down the entire family business.[9]

This predicament led to Robert's trip to the New World, a trip that his father thought would provide international experience before his eldest son could become a partner in the family business. On March 20, 1863, he embarked for New York, where he began an internship in a hardware store. Robert experienced shock when he witnessed the war firsthand:

"[When the draft was held for the first time in New York City] ... the rabble got angry, set fire to all locations where the draft was held, shamelessly pillaged the uptown, and hung a large number of Negroes from lantern posts. The innocent cause of the war [sic, in English]. It was a great fortune that the Northern army ... defeated the Southerners ... at Gettysburg on July 3, a victory that freed the militia in Washington to return to New York. When the militia arrived, ... they shot four or five hundred of the mob, and the affair was over. But I had got an idea of what it means to be at the utter mercy of an unbridled rabble."

The city mob in New York, therefore, had proven quite a different matter than his poor childhood friends in Remscheid, and Robert had received his first lesson in dealing with other cultures. This lesson did not encourage him to mix with "the rabble," and he chose friends from his own social context, mostly fellow German residents and immigrants.[10]

Notwithstanding his personal views, when Robert Böker left New York for Mexico City in May 1865, this experience with conflict and cultural differences proved crucial in succeeding in a much more difficult environment for commerce than the urban United States. In terms of consumer culture and distribution, Mexico City lagged far behind New York. Mexico's manifold political, economic, and social problems precluded the emergence of the strong demand for consumer goods that had begun to spark the commercial revolution in western Europe and the United States. Importers rather than national industries serviced a limited market characterized by a small bourgeoisie and weakened further by the great upheavals of the nineteenth century.[11] A protracted conflict, the Wars of Independence ruined what had been the foremost economy of the

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[9] Robert Böker, "Lebenserinnerungen," AB, FM, 1, pp. 18-19.

[10] Ibid., 19-20. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[11] For a case study of the struggles of a clan descended from a Panamanian creole, see David W. Walker, *Kinship, Business, and Politics: The Martínez del Río Family in Mexico, 1824-1867* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), particularly pp. 217-19.

Spanish Empire. With the precious silver mines flooded and rampant banditry, the Mexican economy experienced three major economic crises compounded by a poor infrastructure, high internal tariffs, and protectionist duties.[12] The departure of most of the Spanish merchants following their country's failed 1828 attempt at reconquest weakened a threadbare system of distribution, and during the thirties and forties, banditry threatened overland trade. In addition, Mexico lacked a base of customers for foreign goods. A majority of the population consisted of peasants and indigenous villagers who did not spend their scant income on foreign-made goods, and the urban middle class remained too small to stimulate imports.[13]

Although foreign merchants served as the crucial link between the industrializing economies of the North Atlantic and the Mexican domestic market, they therefore found only limited opportunities. Afraid of bad credit and of losing merchandise in transit, most of the wholesale traders operated only on a commission basis, a practice that limited them to doing business with trustworthy retailers in larger Mexican towns. Dating from colonial times, the typical wholesale store in early and mid-nineteenth century Mexico remained the *almacén*: the warehouse store owned by a European family engaged in the export/import business. In addition, various Mexican administrations experimented with the idea of outlawing foreign ownership of retail businesses, most of which remained in the hands of Spanish immigrants.[14]

Beginning in the 1850s, however, foreign merchants and Liberal reformers created the conditions for a modern structure of marketing and distribution. While the old merchant clans, typically from London and Paris, concentrated on mining and banking, French immigrants from the small Alpine town of Barcelonnette and German merchants took over most of the *almacenes*. Even more importantly, Liberals led by Benito Juárez seized power and promised to modernize the Mexican economy by expropriating the Church and applying a heavy dose of laissez-faire liberalism. Connected to industrial producers who manufactured the hardware necessary for modernization, merchants like Robert

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[12] Richard Salvucci, "The Origins and Progress of U.S.-Mexican Trade, 1825-1884: Hoc opus, hic labor est," in: *Hispanic American Historical Review* 71 (1991).

[13] Walther L. Bernecker, *Die Handelskonquistadoren: Europäische Interessen und mexikanischer Staat im neunzehnten Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Steiner-Verlag, 1987), p. 460.

[14] David A. Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 97-99; Wilhelm Pferdekamp, *Auf Humboldts Spuren: Deutsche im jungen Mexico* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1958), pp. 55-60.

Böker found themselves in particular demand during that time. His store in Mexico City not only sold cutlery and tools, but also machinery, agricultural and mining implements, carriages, and sewing machines; in sum, the equipment necessary to build up the Mexican economy. Despite the fact that the German states had arrived belatedly on the industrial stage, German merchant houses dominated hardware sales in Mexico. These companies fell into two categories based on regional origin: those from Hamburg and those from the Bergisches Land.[15] Experienced in overseas sales and transportation, the Hanseatic clans initially had the upper hand, accounting for forty out of the fifty German *almacenes* in Mexico.[16] But many of the Bergische merchants, including Robert Böker himself, enjoyed family ties to German industrialists that gave them the exclusive representation for new German steel products, and hence greater possibilities of expansion. This expansion finally came when the dictator Porfirio Díaz established his iron-fisted rule over Mexico beginning in 1876. During the next thirty-five years, the Porfirians took advantage of increasing overseas demand for Mexican products to invite foreign capital into Mexico, build up an export-oriented infrastructure, and suppress banditry and resistance to central political authority.[17]

The Porfirian era coincided with the commercial specialization of the French and German merchants. Well-connected to textile producers, the Barcelonnettes seized control over the distribution of textiles. The Germans, on the other hand, increasingly specialized in hardware. Hardware merchants found themselves at the cutting edge of building the infrastructure of the presumed "prosperous Mexico,"[18] as many of them sold mining equipment and agricultural supplies. In addition, the affluent apex of society needed building and household supplies offered by "Roberto Boker & Cía." and other hardware merchants. Both the Barcelonnettes and the Germans realized the potential of their respective niches in the Mexican import business. As elsewhere in late nineteenth-century Latin America, a bourgeois search for social identity created a desire to consume

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15 Brígida von Mentz et al., *Los pioneros del imperialismo alemán en México* (Mexico City: CIESAS, 1982), p. 77.

16 Bernecker, *Handelskonquistadoren*, p. 562.

17 This analysis of the Porfiriato follows François-Xavier Guerra, *Le Mexique de l'Ancien Régime à la Révolution* (Paris: Harmattan, 1986), vol. 1.

18 Paolo Riguzzi, "México próspero: las dimensiones de la imagen nacional en el porfiriato," in: *Historias* 20 (1988), pp. 137-57.

foreign-made items, and an individual's claims to "modernity" rested on his or her consumption of imported goods.[19]

The Casa Boker experienced its greatest growth under these conditions. This growth was rooted in large part in the owners' decision to diversify their merchandise in terms of national origin. By the late 1880s, the Bökers sold Singer sewing machines, Remington typewriters, Studebaker steam cars, fire insurance policies from the North British & Mercantile Insurance Company, cutlery from Heinrich Böker & Co., and many other products. Therefore, the company never became an exclusively German trading house. Instead, it took advantage of its extensive connections in Anglo-Saxon countries—connections that dated back to Robert Böker's stay in New York—to emerge as a principal supplier of hardware, machinery, and carriages. In fact, the German minister to Mexico once complained vociferously to his superiors about what he believed to be a small percentage of German goods in the catalogue of the Casa Boker.[20]

In particular, the wholesale business proved a resounding success due to its low cost and ambitious geographical scope. Unlike its greatest competitor, the Hanseatic *ferretería* Sommer, Herrmann & Cía., the Casa Boker never opened branch offices in provincial capitals such as Guadalajara, Puebla, and Veracruz. Instead, it relied on agents as well as on yearly visits by out-of-town merchants. Armed with fat catalogues, the agents of the company visited merchants throughout the republic, taking orders for prompt delivery, yet generous terms that allowed up to eight months for payment. Rewarded by attractive commissions, these agents constituted the mainstay of success. While many of them were Spaniards with family ties to retail merchants in the territory in which they operated, a growing number of them belonged to the rising Mexican middle class that challenged the Spanish monopoly on petty trading. Occasionally, unsuccessful agents quit the business, invoices remained unpaid, and the legal proceedings to recover debts in distant states could take many years. In general, however, the Porfiriato had created the conditions that enabled wholesale merchants to trade nationwide. This applied particularly to the transfer of funds

[19] Benjamin Orlove and Arnold J. Bauer, "Giving Importance to Imports," in: Benjamin Orlove (ed.), *The Allure of the Foreign: Imported Goods in Postcolonial Latin America* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 8. See also William Beezley, *Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987).

[20] Wangenheim to Bülow, Mexico City, Dec. 6, 1905, Bundesarchiv Berlin, R 901: Auswärtiges Amt (hereafter cited as BAB/AA), R 12299, 5-6.

to the capital: twice a year, trains accompanied by armed soldiers *(conductas)* ensured the safe transportation of money from the outlying states to Mexico City.[21]

The retail operation initially did not fare as well as the wholesale sector. Rather than attempting to draw customers into the store by attractive displays, the Casa Boker sold cutlery and other small items over the counter. Moreover, with a small display window and a single entrance, the company did not attract passers-by.[22] "Kingly merchants" such as the Bökers resisted partaking in the new age of advertising by display. They believed that hectoring for the attention of anonymous customers did not behoove a Prussian merchant. Thus, the Bökers and their partners relied on a good family name and personal ties rather than advertising and displays. In the words of von Lübeck, "a cordial relationship prevailed between salesman and client that made work easier for both sides. The more extensive the circle of friends [of the businessman], the more successful his endeavors."[23]

After 1888, however, General Manager "don Carlos" Friederichs devoted his attention to the retail operation. Although Friederichs, like the Böker family, hailed from the Bergisches Land, his background differed from that of the Bökers. The son of farmers, he was a first-generation merchant without capital of his own who began his training in the company of Robert's father, the hardware manufacturer "Heinrich Böker." A Francophile married to a woman from Paris, Friederichs was not a kingly merchant. Rather, this entrepreneur keenly observed the commercial success of U.S. and French capitalists in Porfirian Mexico.[24]

Most importantly, the Friederichs era witnessed the exponential growth of U.S.-Mexican trade. During the 1870s, 60 percent of Mexican imports had come from European countries. Due to the absence of railroads that connected Mexico City with the northern border, only 30 percent of Mexican imports had originated in the United States, which had occupied the second place on the list of importers behind Great Britain. By 1880, however, growing U.S. demand for

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[21] Rodolfo von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, 2.

[22] Pferdekamp, *Auf Humboldts Spuren*, p. 69.

[23] von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, p. 2.

[24] "Vorbilder des unternehmerischen Gemeinsinns," *Remscheider General-Anzeiger*, Mar. 23, 1953, in AB, Fondo Hemerografía; Robert Böker, untitled ms. [1904], AB, FM; birth certificate, Carlos Friederichs, Jr., Jan. 12, 1892, AB, Fondo Edificios (hereafter cited as FE), folder "Einweihung des Hauses. "

Mexican tropical products and massive North American investments in railroad construction had begun to increase overall trade, which implied a greater U.S. share of the Mexican import market. Although many European producers also expanded their sales thanks to burgeoning Mexican demand for imported goods, their overall share of the Mexican market declined as the U.S. portion grew. In fiscal year 1900-1, the U.S. share amounted to two thirds of all Mexican imports.[25]

Nonetheless, as Friederichs and other merchants well knew, the U.S. challenge did not imply the ruin of European importers, but instead called upon them to diversify their merchandise to include a balanced assortment of European and U.S. goods. The Europeans were fortunate in that many U.S. producers preferred to sell through them as intermediaries, rather than setting up a network of distribution in Mexico. Moreover, rapidly increasing Mexican demand for finished products allowed both the United States and the European countries to expand exports to Mexico. German exports, for example, more than held their own in the hardware sector. In fact, hardware became a virtual German preserve during this time: by 1905, it amounted to 68.5% of all German exports to Latin America, compared to 29 percent fifteen years earlier.[26] Nevertheless, the U.S. commercial juggernaut did force Friederichs to increase the company's offerings of U.S. goods, up to the point that U.S. merchandise made up one third of all products sold by the Casa Boker.

In addition, Friederichs could not fail to recognize the enormous advances of the Barcelonnettes in what became the first phase of the industrialization of central Mexico. While many of the German stores had benefited from the interruption of Mexico's diplomatic relations with France after the French Intervention of the 1860s, this advantage had proven of short duration. By the 1880s, French merchants had recovered their previous share of the market, strengthened their hold over the sale of textiles, and contributed to the disappearance of two thirds

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[25] Fernando Rosenzweig, "El comercio exterior," in *Historia moderna de México: el porfiriato: vida económica*, ed. Daniel Cosío Villegas (Mexico City: Editorial Hermes, 1965), vol. 2, p. 710.

[26] Brígida von Mentz et al., *Los empresarios alemanes, el Tercer Reich y la oposición de derecha a Cárdenas* (Mexico City: CIESAS, 1987) vol. 1, p. 29; Walther L. Bernecker and Thomas Fischer, "Deutschland und Lateinamerika im Zeitalter des Imperialismus, 1871-1914," *Iberoamerikanisches Archiv*.

of the German import businesses.[27] In addition, the largest French retailers signed exclusive agreements with the major textile producers in Mexico that kept out not only the German competition, but also even their own weaker compatriots. To make matters worse for German merchants, the French left out of the deal formed a conglomerate that became Mexico's largest textile producer in Orizaba, Veracruz. Within two decades, the French-led textile industry produced undergarments, shirts, and other textiles that dropped the imports of such articles to 15 percent of their 1888 level.[28] In the succeeding decades, Ernest Pugibet, the founder of Mexico's largest cigarette factory, "El Buen Tono," created a trust that included several different industries as well as utility companies. With slick advertisements, El Buen Tono pioneered tobacco use and consumerism in the cities.[29] By 1910, French investment amounted to 55 percent of total foreign investment in Mexican manufacturing, and textile importers such as the Tron family set up sweatshops at the outskirts of Mexico City that employed six hundred seamstresses.[30]

Taking advantage of growing demand for consumer goods, the Barcelonnettes established Mexico City's first department stores during the 1890s. By that time, stores such as New York's Macy's and Paris's Le Bon Marché were well established in the commercial landscape of their respective cities. Evidenced by the Trons' 1891 construction of the famous "Palacio de Hierro"—the first monument to modern consumerism in the capital—these stores catered to the rich with fancy imported clothes, and to the middle class with Mexican textiles.[31] Frequented by the Francophile Porfirian elite, the Palacio de Hierro ostentatiously displayed its luxurious wares in gleaming windows. The French rivals of the Palacio, such as the "Puerto de Liverpool," built their own palaces

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[27] Friedrich Katz, *Deutschland, Diaz und die mexikanische Revolution: Die deutsche Politik in Mexiko 1870-1920* (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1964), pp. 95-98.

[28] Meyer, "Les Français au Mexique au XIXème siècle," *Cahiers des Ameriques Latines* 9-10 (1974), pp. 62-64; Rosenzweig,"El comercio exterior," vol. 2, p. 693; Mentz et al., *Los empresarios alemanes*, p. 30.

[29] Steven B. Bunker, "'Consumers of Good Taste:' Marketing Modernity in Northern Mexico, 1890-1920," in: *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 13 (2/1997), pp. 234-47.

[30] Meyer, "Les Français au Mexique," pp. 64-65; Raymonde Antiq-Auvaro, *L'Émigration des Barcelonnettes au Mexique*, pp. 87-98; John Lear, *Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens: The Revolution in Mexico City* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), pp. 74-75.

[31] *México, ¿quieres tomarte una foto conmigo? Cien años de consumo* (Mexico City: Procuraduría Federal del Consumidor, 1996), pp. 26-31.

of consumption a short while later, as the market for consumer goods expanded exponentially. This growth was due in large part to the emergence of women as consumers. Formerly relegated to grocery shopping in the La Merced market southeast of the Zócalo if they did not send their servants, many bourgeois women began to frequent unaccompanied the department stores west of the main square.[32] Meanwhile, staid German importers such as Sommer, Herrmann and, to an extent, the Casa Boker, pitched their wares to an all-male crowd, seemingly unaware of the sweeping changes in consumer culture. Believing that hardware, unlike textiles, was a necessity rather than an object of desire, they left their inconspicuous goods behind tall counters in dusty boxes, away from the eyes of curious consumers.[33]

The Palacio de Hierro and its rivals represented the Mexican version of the department store that revolutionized retailing in Europe and North America during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Department stores such "Le Bon Marché" and "Macy's" sprang up almost simultaneously during the 1870s, emerging from dry goods stores during a period of rapid industrial growth that resulted in the mass production of textiles. This mass production "required a retail system far more efficient and far more expansive than anything small shopkeepers had to offer."[34] As in France and the United States, the first Mexican department stores sold textiles to an upper- and middle-class clientele that practiced, as William Beezley paraphrased Thorstein Veblen, "ostentatious consumption … that … demonstrate[d] their personal, if not Mexico's wealth and reputation."[35] But as an important difference, until 1900, they did not devote much attention to marketing beyond the showrooms and the newspaper, until

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[32] E. Salazar Silva, *Las colonias extranjeras en México* (Mexico City: n.p., 1937), p. 40.

[33] Pedro Boker to Jurgen Buchenau, Mexico City, Nov. 21, 2000.

[34] Michael B. Miller, *The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869-1920* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 19-35. The first significant department store in London, "Harrod's," arrived almost twenty years later, just before the opening of "El Palacio de Hierro." Bill Lancaster, *The Department Store: A Social History* (London: Leicester University Press, 1995), p. 22.

[35] William H. Beezley, "The Porfirian Smart Set Anticipates Thorstein Veblen in Guadalajara," in: William H. Beezley et al. (ed.), *Rituals of Rule, Rituals of Resistance: Public Celebrations and Popular Culture in Mexico* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1994), p. 178.

the pioneering ad campaigns of tobacco king Pugibet opened their eyes to the possibilities of advertising.[36]

As Friederichs knew, German hardware merchants could learn from the Palacio de Hierro because they offered goods that were equally suitable for display as textiles: cutlery, hand tools, and household items. Friederichs sensed that the demand for household items gave the company an opportunity to take advantage of an incipient consumer culture in Mexico, a strategy that ultimately required the company to become a department store. Therefore, the Casa Boker acquired a warehouse located in the north part of the Centro, a transaction that opened display space in the store. The directors also purchased carts and mules to transport goods from the warehouse to the store, and they even established a delivery service for their customers in the capital.[37] As one could see in the case of the Palacio de Hierro as well as in the rapidly modernizing cities in northern Mexico, however, the business needed an imposing storefront—an impossible change in a rented building.[38] Thus, the partners decided that they needed a department store of their own.[39]

Before these plans could come to fruition, however, the business confronted the world recession of 1893, a recession that not only jeopardized Friederichs' plans for a department store, but also tested the three Bökers' long-distance relationship with their company. When the British responded to the crisis by decreeing the free minting of silver in their Asian colonies, the decision sent the price of silver reeling to 50 percent of its 1892 level. This decline cost the Casa Boker and other importers dearly.[40] Since outstanding balances on imported goods were payable in gold currencies while revenues remained in the silver peso, the "Mexican dollar," the company lost 70,000 pesos in one year.[41]

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[36] Tony Morgan, "Proletarians, Politicos, and Patriarchs: The Use and Abuse of Cultural Customs in the Early Industrialization of Mexico City, 1880-1910," ibd., pp. 152-54.

[37] Robert Böker, untitled ms. [1904], AB, FM, 5.

[38] Bunker, "Marketing Modernity," pp. 227-29.

[39] von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, pp. 3-5; Rees, *Robert Böker und seine Vorfahren*, p. 68.

[40] Enrique Cárdenas, "A Macroeconomic Interpretation of Mexico," Stephen Haber (ed.), *How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 83.

[41] von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, p. 3. On the Mexican currency crisis, see William Schell, Jr., "Silver Symbiosis: ReOrienting Mexican Economic History," in: *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81 (1/2001), pp. 123-27.

Despite this crisis, Friederichs knew that he needed to act quickly in constructing a building for the Casa Boker. In the mid-1890s, the rent on the company's principal building quadrupled, a fact that made the ongoing modernization of these rented premises unprofitable. To make matters worse, the company had run out of room, and the merchandise was scattered across many different buildings in the city center. The headquarters housed the cutlery and the household items; in other words, "small" hardware. Two other stores, both run by managers from the United States, offered "large" hardware (agricultural machines, technical instruments, and carriages), and numerous other buildings served as storage space. Consequently, Friederichs inaugurated an important shift in the management of the profits of the business. While he and his partners had thus far invested most of the surplus capital in Europe, where they considered it more secure, they now left their money in Mexico, confident of the political stability that the Porfirian regime had brought.[42] When the late nineties witnessed another boom period, Friederichs decided that the time had come to invest in a permanent home for the company. In 1897, the Casa Boker purchased a former hotel; a total area of nineteen thousand square feet. Located only two blocks from the southwest corner of the Zócalo, at one of the busiest street corners in the Centro, the site appeared perfect for the Edificio Boker.[43]

It took three more years until the Edificio Boker opened its doors. With the demolition of the old buildings underway, the partners looked for a suitable design, but negotiations with German and Mexican architects resulted inconclusive. Ultimately, they agreed on one proposed by the New York architectural firm DeLemos & Cordes. Recommended by Robert's nephew, who knew the firm from their work in New York City, this company also designed Macy's and Washington Bridge as well as the present-day building of the Banco de México. Construction began in 1898 and lasted fifteen months. The digging yielded more than just soil and rocks, as the Edificio Boker literally arose upon Aztec and Spanish foundations. Construction workers unearthed two Aztec artifacts and a Spanish coat of arms. The partners donated these objects to Mexican mu-

[42] Von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, p. 3.

[43] Ibd., pp. 3-5; Wilhelm Rees, *Robert Böker und seine Vorfahren als Wirtschaftler und Kommunalpolitiker* (Remscheid: Ad. Mann, 1961), p. 68.

seums.[44] They spared no expense: the huge new store cost the enormous sum of 1.5 million gold pesos, the equivalent of 1.4 million dollars.[45]

On July 3, 1900, Mexican President Porfirio Díaz attended the inauguration of the grandiose department store. The "Edificio Boker" epitomized multinational capitalism in Porfirian Mexico. An imposing three-storied structure, the building represented the collaboration of three nations: it was the property of German entrepreneurs, the design of U.S. architects, and the work of hundreds of underpaid Mexican laborers. It housed a company that imported and sold millions of dollars worth of hardware every year, thus serving as a vital cog in the process of modernization. Flanked by Finance Secretary José Y. Limantour, Foreign Secretary Ignacio Mariscal, and two other cabinet members, don Porfirio spoke glowingly of the Casa Boker at the inauguration.[46]

Ill. 1: The *Edificio Boker* in 1900.

[44] von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, pp. 5-6; "Edificio Boker," AB, FE; "El edificio Boker," http://cgi.servitecnet.com/impbanner?c=34&p=mexico/mexico/boker (Nov. 21, 1999).

[45] *El Imparcial* (July 4, 1900).

[46] "Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente Porfirio Díaz," AB, FE, folder "Einweihung des Hauses."

Only one minor hitch marred the ceremony. The president was supposed to enter the building through an entrance graced by a mosaic of the Mexican national emblem, an eagle with a snake in its beak sitting on a cactus. In keeping with the traditions of his country, however, Díaz refused to step on the national insignia. Hampered by his age and girth, he squeezed into the building without treading on the mosaic, visibly upset about this affront to the national honor. Although General Director Carl Friederichs solved the problem by placing a rug on the emblem, the incident typified the lack of cultural sensitivity common among foreign merchants during the era of imperialism.[47]

A palace of 20,000 square feet, the Edificio Boker represented a new departure for a hardware business. Constructed in the mold of the department stores in Chicago and New York City, the building rivaled the Palacio de Hierro in both glamour and presentation of merchandise. To draw customers inside the Edificio Boker, "goods were cunningly arranged in display windows."[48] Three entrances led customers into a large air well, where a huge round display case surrounded by a circular counter featured the famous Arbolito cutlery. Toward the walls on the first floor, customers found kitchen supplies, lamps and leather goods. An imposing staircase (made of marble imported duty-free due to the collaboration of the Díaz regime) ushered them to an upstairs level well lit by large windows. From there, a set of smaller stairs led to the third floor. Each floor had high ceilings between fourteen and sixteen feet. The second floor housed office furniture and accessories as well as art supplies, while carriages and agricultural machinery were displayed on the third floor. To haul the heavy merchandise to the upper floors, Friederichs had even installed an ornate elevator, one of the first of its kind in Mexico.[49] In striking fashion, the company had left behind the conservatism of the German kingly merchant and embraced French and U.S. strategies of consumerism. If customers sought the famous cutlery—and such was the motive of the majority of the retail customers, which included a growing number of women—many other goods enticed them along

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[47] "Paseo por el centro: Casa Boker," *http://www.cultura.df.gob.mx/paseo/r1s10.htm* (May 2, 2001); "El escudo nacional en el suelo," *El Popular* (July 4, 1900); interview with Pedro Boker, (Mexico City, June 17, 1995).

[48] William Schell, Jr., "Trade and Markets: 1821-1910," Michael S. Werner (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Mexico: History, Society, and Culture* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1997), vol. 2, p. 1432.

[49] *Deutsche Zeitung von Mexiko* (July 7, 1900); "El edificio Boker," *http://cgi.servitecnet.com/impbanner?c=34&p=mexico/mexico/boker* (Nov. 21, 1999).

the way to the center of the ground floor.[50] Predictably, the building met with the acclamation of the Porfirian elite. Finance Secretary Limantour expressed these favorable sentiments when he told von Lübeck that "you are making the city beautiful."[51] The official press chimed in with similar accolades.[52]

Not everyone, however, applauded the construction of the Edificio Boker, as it offended the sensibilities of traditionalists and nationalists alike. For example, Nicolás Mariscal, a noteworthy Mexican architect and a relative of the Foreign Secretary, labeled the Edificio Boker a "commercial pump" and criticized the stylistic syncretism reminiscent of U.S. buildings:

> "Right next to precious materials, one finds sheet lead worked into ornate figures... It gives me the impression of a worker wearing a coat and a white tie with his blue work shirt showing and the hard hat on his head. This carnevalesque mixture costs [the building] its character. When passers-by will see the building, they will go on exclaiming: my money should buy what I need rather than pay for this superfluous luxury."[53]

The building also had its detractors among the Liberal and the Conservative opposition, whose newspapers joined in lambasting the placement of the Mexican national seal on the ground as an act repugnant to the national spirit. The Liberal *El Popular* headlined a brief story "The national seal on the ground: an offense that must be corrected."[54] The story pointed out that Mexican law prohibited the use of national symbols for commercial purposes, and it asked the authorities to demand the removal of the emblem. For its part, the Conservative *El Tiempo* politely called on the company's directors to move the mosaic to a different location.[55]

When Díaz and his coterie attended the inauguration of the Edificio Boker, then, they went to a celebration that marked a new era in Mexican commerce—the first department store that did not sell textiles. Looking back, the old dictator knew that the Casa Boker had registered a significant impact on the Mexican economy. Although hard to quantify, that impact was impossible to overlook.

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[50] For information of the architecture of the Edificio Boker, consult *Edificio Boker 100 años, 1900-2000: En memoria al primer centenario de la inauguración del edificio* (Mexico City: n.p., 2000).

[51] von Lübeck to Franz Böker (Lubeck, Germany, July 6, 1950), AB, FE, folder "Einweihung des Hauses."

[52] "Inauguración de la Casa Boker," in: *El Imparcial* (July 4, 1900).

[53] Quoted in Ida Rodríguez Prampolini, *La crítica de arte en México en el siglo XIX* (Mexico City: Imprenta Universitaria, 1964), vol. 1, p. 119.

[54] "El escudo nacional en el suelo," *El Popular* (July 4, 1900).

[55] "Inauguración de la Casa Boker," *El Tiempo* (July 5, 1900).

With the Singer sewing machines, the Casa Boker had furnished technology instrumental to textile manufacturing. In addition, it had sold much of the hardware used to build the railroads between Mexico City and the U.S. border, and many of the agricultural implements used in the tropical plantations that boosted the Porfirian economy.[56] Therefore, fifteen years after the French had pioneered the modern department store in Mexico, the Casa Boker came to represent the Anglo-German response in the hardware sector. For the old dictator, the new building also represented a welcome European commercial presence that disguised what opponents of the Porfiriato labeled the "Pacific Conquest" of Mexico by U.S. investments. When Díaz raised his glass of champagne along with Friederichs and 45 invited guests and employees, he celebrated the success of his own regime, a government that had managed to convince foreign investors of Mexico's trustworthiness.

Friederichs's toast played on these sentiments. "The new building," he announced, reflected conditions

"the blessings of which all of us ... who have lived beneath the hospitable sky of this country have enjoyed for many years. And indeed, how would it have been possible for these columns to rise, or for these ceilings to vault, without ... fast modes of transportation, without the relief of liberal laws, without the protection of reasonable authorities, and—above all else—without peace and security in this country?"[57]

The company, Friederichs concluded, owed its success to Díaz, who had demonstrated a keen understanding for the situation of merchants. Clearly flattered, don Porfirio returned the compliment. Asserting that his government had done nothing except to create the conditions for economic growth, he said that only the initiative of "pioneers" such as Robert Böker could help Mexico realize its potential. He concluded his remarks by expressing his hope that the Casa Boker, "one of the most outstanding beauties of the capital," would serve as a fountain of wealth not only for its owners, but also for the country in general.[58]

An expensive ceremony that included the consumption of almost five hundred bottles of champagne, the inauguration of the Edificio Boker showed the Casa Boker at its pinnacle.[59] Robert Böker and his partners had put their

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[56] Rudolf Darius, *Die Entwicklung der deutsch-mexikanischen Handelsbeziehungen von 1870-1914* (Cologne: Welzel, 1927), pp. 60-75.

[57] "Discurso en el caso de que venga el Sr. Presidente," AB, FE, folder "Einweihung des Hauses."

[58] "Inauguración de la Casa Boker," *El Imparcial* (July 4, 1900).

[59] "Pormenor de los gastos...," AB, FE, folder "Einweihung des Hauses."

company in the position of taking advantage of the Mexican *belle époque*. While the investment of a modest twenty thousand gold pesos into a tiny *almacén* would not have led one to expect it, November 1, 1865 had marked the birth of the fastest-growing hardware store in Mexico. The main reasons for its success were the owners' and partners' international business connections, their flexibility in dealing with political change, and a long-range vision that emphasized future successes over short-term gains. Conspicuously absent at the ceremony was Robert Böker, the senior partner of the company, who considered the long trip to attend a ceremony a waste of time and money and thus sent a younger brother to represent them all.[60]

The construction of the grandiose building gave the Casa Boker enough visibility that Friederichs decided to experiment with extending the circle of customers through aggressive advertising. In the early 1900s, the Casa Boker issued a monthly pamphlet entitled *Anunciador Boker*, a serial catalogue sent to the company's customers throughout Mexico. At first, this catalogue was printed in Buffalo, N.Y., before Mexican printing facilities improved enough to produce a volume of up to 40,000 copies locally at a low cost.[61] Unlike Sears, Roebuck and other large department stores in the United States, however, the Casa Boker did not add a mail order department. As Friederichs knew, mail ordering could not easily catch on in Mexico, where a weak internal market limited demand and customers still preferred to buy on sight. Nevertheless, the directors of the Casa Boker—informed about the momentous changes in marketing north of the border—experimented with a process that had revolutionized the distribution of merchandise in the United States.[62]

Thus, nobody reflected on the fact that Mexico's stark social stratification and the country's weak internal market had prevented the so-called "Sears of Mexico" from becoming a genuine counterpart to the new U.S. commercial giants. By 1910, almost 70 percent of the Mexican population still lived a peasant existence on the countryside, and half of all urban residents were destitute. In other words, twelve million Mexicans could not afford goods such as

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60 Franz Böker, "Schicksal von Kapital und Arbeit," AB, FM, p. 2.

61 von Lübeck, "Relación," AB, FM, pp. 2-4; *Anunciador Boker*, June 1903, AB; *Anunciador Boker* Oct. 1905, enclosed in Wangenheim to Bülow (Mexico City, Dec. 6, 1905), BAB/AA, R 12299, pp. 5-6.

62 For an analysis of the rise of the department store and mail-order house in the United States, consult Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., *The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1977), pp. 225-33.

the expensive Arbolito knives, and the Casa Boker remained restricted to a relatively small circle of customers. This social reality marked a sharp difference from the United States, where millions of middle-class consumers eagerly perused the catalogues of Sears, Roebuck and other mail-order department stores. To be sure, the construction of the Edificio Boker went a long way toward bringing the company up to speed with modern commercial capitalism, and it addressed some of the shortcomings of the retail operation. Nevertheless, while the United States became the "land of desire,"[63] where conspicuous consumption announced the arrival of mass prosperity among the middle class, Mexico remained the land of necessity for most of its inhabitants.

Moreover, this giant in the hardware business appeared a dwarf when compared to the French department stores. While these businesses dealt with the same limits to their marketing capabilities, they were far superior to the Casa Boker in capitalization, political influence, and connection to domestic industry. While the Palacio employed 1,600 workers, including the seamstresses, the Casa Boker never had more than 170 people on its payroll. Unlike the Palacio de Hierro, the Casa Boker had not invested in manufacturing. Even more ominously—and an issue that would greatly distress Friederichs's successors—the building had cost too much money for a company like the Casa Boker. Not only was the company, capitalized at just over two million pesos, far smaller than the French department stores. Relative to its capital, it also had a far more expensive inventory, which it turned over a maximum of 1.5 times per year. Combined, the capital buried in real estate and inventory left the Casa Boker with a narrow cash margin. This problem would define the history of the company for the next seventy-five years and ultimately contribute to its decline after World War II.

As this analysis has shown, the owners of the Casa Boker displayed aspects of a transnational identity. They had embraced French and U.S. notions of commercial capitalism, and they had learned that foreigners living in small diasporic groups needed to cooperate in order to survive. Their promotion of British and U.S.-made products, and their acceptance of U.S. and French methods of marketing and distribution showed that they considered economic nationalism to be incompatible with commercial success. To be sure, all of the

[63] For this term, see William Leach, *Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture* (New York: Vintage, 1993).

partners returned to live in Germany, and they raised their children as Germans. But in business matters, this merchant clan displayed a transnational strategy.

This case study suggests that one cannot properly understand foreign merchants in late nineteenth-century Mexico City as being distinctly national in character. The Bökers' experience reveals that the small foreign communities in Porfirian Mexico City operated in harmony with each other, and that merchants belonged to a larger foreign rather than a national community there. This picture of transnational cooperation changed only when World War I turned former colleagues and partners into enemies.

LUIS RODOLFO MORÁN QUIROZ

THE AMERICAN WAY OF AFTER-LIFE: RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND LOCAL CULTURES IN TRANSTERRITORIAL COMMUNITIES NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE

For a great deal of the scholarly literature on cultural patterns, it is obvious how the "American" culture (i.e.: the one that comes from the United States of America) has permeated the lives and societies of the peoples south of the Rio Grande. United States imperialism has been portrayed as an inevitable and never-ending process of economic, social and cultural colonization that entails an open discourse (that of civilization and modernity) and some not explicitly stated but very visible consequences (like oppression, exploitation, destruction of native cultures). The so called "American" colonialism in countries that Ronald Reagan used to refer to as "our backyard" has been documented, denounced, and attacked by activists and social scientists in a permanent battle. The cultural traits of U.S. society are all too familiar to Latin Americans, and in some instances are even adopted as indexes of social and economic development. The urbanization and industrialization processes in Latin America are very much tied to the modernization trends generated in the foreign policy departments, the development-oriented banks as well as in the chief executive officers' desks of the big "American" enterprises.

In recent years, some authors have even pointed out that besides the economic, social and cultural modernity, Latin America should follow the path of religious modernity.[1] Religious diversification and the end of the monopoly of the Catholic church would lead to this desired but not always explicit end through the very visible efforts towards modernization of the Latin American mind and soul. Thus, the American way of life would also become the American way of after-life and soul salvation. The material expressions of the North

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[1] Jean-Pierre Bastian, "The new religious map of Latin America: causes and social effects," in: *Cross Currents* (Fall 1998), [Source: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2096/n3_v48/21202867/p1/article.jhtml].

Americanization of Latin America can be clearly seen, and sometimes even overlooked due to their omnipresence. To give an example, the Mexican population is so accustomed to the Atlanta-based black sweet drink, that it has become part of the "typical" breakfast, substituting the natural fruit juices and even the use of taft water.

The spiritual expressions are not so visible, in part maybe for historical reasons (for example the continuous struggle between church and state since the outbreak of the wars of independence against Spain, over the power to regulate peoples' lives). Yet in recent years the development of pentecostal churches in Latin America has been linked to an explicit effort of these churches, with support from the U.S. government and enterprises to push forward this process of religious modernization already begun in the mid-nineteenth century by protestant missions and its (at least allegedly) capitalist rationality.

These modernization / North-Americanization / industrialization / urbanization processes have to be put in context and, along with the ways people tend to adopt and transform the new cultural traits in their usual contexts, we should be aware that some of the elements of the so-called primitive culture have made their way north through a never-ending migrant flow. The process of cultural transformation and translation is not a simple phenomenon to analyze, especially given the ways modern communication and transportation media allow mutual influences to develop in an unprecedented manner. Thus this article will develop an argument on the manner the South American way of life has interacted with the once so pure Anglo-Saxon cultural traits. It is obvious that the North Americanization of the southern part of the continent has been dealt with extensively, and that the economic and political power differentials in America (i.e.: the whole continent) do not leave much influence to the cultures South of the Rio Grande.

However, this article will deal with the way a not so notorious but still relatively powerful flow of cultural influences can be traced as coming from the South. Some of these elements are European in origin (i.e. the Roman-Catholic religious elements, that in turn have been imported to Europe through previous imperialist efforts) and are to be dealt with in a very cautious way. For we have to acknowledge that North American Christianity is linked to different kinds of practices as compared to the elements that stem from Latin American religious beliefs. In a way, North American Christianity is supposed to have a more "intellectual" and doctrinal orientation, while that South of the Rio Grande is more practical, spiritual, and linked to the everyday needs of the people.

This paper argues that there are four different classes of elements linked with the Latin American immigrants' everyday life. The very specific lifestyle that is transported by the Latin American migrants includes frequent contact with the *terruño*, the popular Christian devotions, the selective adoption of cultural traits, and a selective resistance and critique of the "American way of life" traits.

a) frequent travel to and constant contact with the *terruño*: Migrants to the United States, especially those with legal documents, or Mexicans (with or without documents) travel frequently to and from their lands of origin. They continue to live the everyday lives of the people who are left behind in the hometown. This tendency to build and keep "transterritorial" social networks and social support both through individual efforts and collective organizations helps people to live in a "cosmopolitan" milieu: they wear American clothes even in their hometown, but they eat their "ethnic" foods even in the USA. Travel and contact within at least two different and distant geographical points also implies the potential to develop bi-cultural and bi-lingual abilities and access to different practical and symbolic worlds. Just as frequently as family members can visit those who have settled up North, those who live in the USA get to visit their hometowns and to stay with relatives;
b) popular Christian devotions that go beyond the official churches' doctrines: Catholics in Latin America are very prone to include their patron saints in the list of people and agents ready to help them at the crossing points, at the hometown and during their stay in the USA. Popular devotions are an important part of the migrants' daily lives both at the point of departure as at the point of destiny in the USA. Migrants tend to keep in touch with their beliefs even more readily and easily than with church officials. Catholics are believers, but not very prone to learn things "by heart", but from "experience". The Catholic church may or may not be a part of their lives, but the saints and popular devotions sure are. The legend of the patron saints may or may not be known by the believers, but the deeds and miracles conceded to neighbors and relatives certainly are part of what migrating catholics believe about divine powers.
c) selective adoption of the Angloamerican mainstream culture: It is very difficult to define what exactly means "mainstream" as the ongoing scholarly debates on culture and dominance show. In any case, it has been demonstrated that part of the success of a culture—reflected in its widespread use—lies in the way it can be *partially* appropriated by others, without them

being forced to understand all its elements and the codes that unite them. Both in the geography South of the Mexican-US borders, as within the territory of the United States, individuals and collectives have been able to appropriate elements of the "American" culture without having to take the whole package (if that were ever possible at a specific point in time). The members of a society can keep elements of their culture and enrich them with others that come from outside. Even if the "mainstream" or dominant culture is perceived as hostile, individuals are able to choose and bring into their cultural everyday life many elements of this "hostile" culture. What would we be without the telephone, the cars, the T.V. sets? Would we be any better culturally if we had not appropriated these objects and the needs they help to solve—although they tend to create other problems?

d) selective resistance and critique of mainstream culture: Some of the elements of "mainstream" culture are appropriated and people might even seek them actively. However, there are numerous elements from North American culture that are actively opposed by many groups in Latin America. The clearest example is the English language, not only because it is a feature of North American culture, but also because it signals a clear class-divide. People may like to use jeans, but that does not necessarily mean they will call them that way, nor that they will be willing to accept the rest of the cultural elements they are associated with them. North American sports, language, manner of speech, sense of humor, and many other features of "popular" culture, as well as religious practices and even some of the commodities that are considered "North American" are actively rejected in wide sectors of Latin American societies. In a sense, people believe they are dealing with an imperialist culture (and so they call it) that is being forced upon them, and so they react actively against the efforts that claim to substitute Latin American values and ways of behaving with "better" or more efficient behavior and beliefs. Cultural resistance is thus an active endeavour and tends to create a general taxonomy of what can be of use and what is outright impossible to accept: a culture can be resisted without having to resist all the elements of which it is formed, likewise, a culture can be adopted without having to understand and use all its elements.

MIGRANTS, IMMIGRANTS AND "ALIENS"

In 1999, 11.7% of the U.S. population was of Hispanic origin. For a total population of 272 million inhabitants, that same year were registered close to 20 million Mexicans. That figure represents as much as 7.6% of the total population. It is expected that the Hispanic population in the United States will grow from a little less than 15 millions in 1980 (around 6.4%), to as much as 66 million people, or 18.9% of the total population of the USA by 2030.[2] The city of Los Angeles in California alone, has around one million Mexicans in a city with a total population of three and a half million people. The cities San Antonio, Houston, El Paso and Chicago are close to half a million Mexicans each. In El Paso, Santa Ana and San Antonio, more than half the population is of Mexican origin, while in cities like Corpus Christie, Dallas, Chicago, Los Angeles, Houston, San Diego, Mexican population ranks between 13 and 46% of these cities' total population. A little more than 11 and a half million people of Mexican descent were born in the United States. The undocumented Mexican aliens are estimated to have reached around three million people by 2001.

The sheer presence of such a quantity of people implies that the transfer of the cultural traits of the Mexicans, if whether as heritage of an western religion (Christianity), as part of the Arabic heritage (from the conquest of Spain), as a result of the Spanish conquest of Mexico (language, religion, devotions, urban life, food...), or from the multiplicity of indigenous peoples, might well mean a re-colonization of Northern American territories. Not only are the media, and the abstract and economic (through commodities) messages of "globalization" reaching Latin America, but also people from Latin America reach the United States, taking along their own cultures with them. This trend of immigration, along with the contacts held by the immigrants with their points of origin will have a definite influence on what used to be the dominant WASP-culture.

Although First-World culture is indeed a model for a great percentage of the Latin American population, only a minority has direct access to that life style. As Veltmeyer and Petras have pointed out:

"Today, 15 to 20% of Latin Americans share a ‚First World‘ life style: they send their kids to private schools; belong to private country clubs (...); travel in luxury cars on private toll roads and communicate via computers, faxes and private courier services. (...) They are usually fluent in English and have most of their savings in overseas accounts or in dollar denominated

[2] Sergio Aguayo Quezada (ed.), *El almanaque mexicano* (México: Editorial Hechos Confiables, 2000), p. 388.

local paper. They form part of the international circuit of the new imperial system. They are the audience to which [Latin American] Presidents address their grandiloquent First World discourse of a new wave of global prosperity based on an adjustment to the requirements of the new world economic order. And despite the ups and downs of the economy they benefit from the imperial system (...) The rest of the population lives in a totally different world. Cuts in social spending and the elimination of basic food subsidies have pushed peasants toward malnutrition and hunger. Large-scale redundancy of factory workers and their entry into the ‚informal sector‘ means a subsistence existence and dependence on the ‚extended family‘, community-based charities and ‚solidarity‘ (soup kitchens) for survival."[3]

Income differentials between elite and working and peasant classes are not the only factor that push people to emigrate. Although the economic reasons to emigrate still play a major role in the decision to emigrate to the North, many of the migrant workers still declare that the existing social network built upon those who migrated first, explain many of the decisions of exactly *where* to go. It is not only plight on the job-market that determines this decision, but also factors like social resources that help to make a more efficient use of the job openings. As Petras and Veltmeyer have shown, the vast majority of Latin American population lacks access to the so-called "benefits" of the imperial system, but in exchange they have been able to create social networks that provide for information, social support and a cultural and linguistic context where the newly arrived can find a valuable economic, social and psychological resource. Certainly the immigrants, given their differences in world view as compared to the members of the receiving society, tend not to make efforts towards cultural and social integration, even as they struggle to "integrate" into the labor market.

Most of the immigrant workers help maintain an ethno-specific labor market. In a sense, enterprises have a vested interest in keeping different ethnic groups separated from each other, thus creating different economic niches for different ethnic groups. The workers tend to be kept within their ethnic groups and labor echelons at the same time that they generate ways to make sure their family members and friends get the jobs open in the particular market available for that specific ethnic group. As a consequence, job culture tends to melt with ethnic and national cultures, a process which in turns has a major impact on how particular individuals are "integrated" in a society, and how particular cultures are kept alive by the newcomers.

[3] James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, *Globalization Unmasked: Imperialism in the 21st Century* (New York: Zed Books, 2001), p. 16.

In Latin America in general, and in Mexico in particular, cultural change has been slow. Social transformations such as the acceptance of different religious beliefs and institutions (different from the Catholic church's dominance), have taken a long time. For instance, in 1857, almost half a century after the war of independence from Spain, the law advocating the "libertad de cultos" was finally installed. However, it was not until 1889 that the first protestant could be buried in a normal public cemetery in a city as important as Guadalajara (second only to Mexico City). In a way, the recent trends towards "North-Americanization" have been in existence since those years when the law that granted religious freedom was first issued, almost a century and a half ago. That law marked the entrance of a liberal view in the minds of contemporary politicians: Juárez and Lerdo de Tejada were as inclined to let the liberal protestant views in the religious sphere enter the country, as they were prone to let the liberal economic policies and ideologies help develop an industrialized society. The capitalist rationality was by then seen as the way out of poverty and the model to follow was that of the USA. The economic policies implemented by the politicians of the recently liberated countries in Latin America were very rational according to their own perspective, but certainly were not included in public consensus from the point of view of the vast majority of Latin Americans.

Some sectors and groups of the emerging nations were not sufficiently aware of what was happening in the recently industrialized urban concentrations, and others were actively against the implementation of liberal economics and thus of the industrialization policies and the "proletarization" of the peasantry. In a sense, then, as now, the agents that resisted the new capitalist *rationality*, among them the Catholic Church, were guided by a different kind of *reason*. It was not only to defend the peasantry from being exploited in the new industrial settings, but also to avoid the destruction of a structure of beliefs, practices, discourses, and institutions, that fueled a fierce resistance from the "conservatives" and the Catholic Church. The nineteenth century struggles in Mexico and Latin America between church and state have left an indelible mark on both parties in the dispute.

Not only did the Catholic Church call into question the good intentions of the liberal nation-state in appropriating the lands, buildings, riches, institutions and other resources of the clergy, but it also set in motion a defense of religious convictions and beliefs under the attack by a liberal and rationalizing state. After a few decades, people in Latin America have been able to combine nationalist feelings with religious convictions and even to hold both as part of the same

collective identity. For many years, the people left behind in Latin America by the migrants to the USA, were prone to identify as "traitors" to the national and religious feelings, the persons who migrated north. In the context of migration to the USA, Protestantism and liberalism were perceived as dangerous enemies to be fought against by those that dared to leave their safe cultures in search of economic security.

Contact with migrants, however, and with people of Mexican descent born in the USA eventually came to be more frequent and the people who went north, instead of showing signs of conversion to Protestantism, made their best efforts to keep in contact with the people, the culture and the religious convictions linked to Catholic religiosity. This religiosity, although not very intellectual or formal in its expressions, tended to permeate all spheres of behavior for both the people who undertook the trip north, and for those who were left behind in their hometowns. Catholic religiosity, both as an everyday life expression, and as a process of creating concrete tangible products (churches, holy-images, sanctuaries), has permeated Latin American culture and has been transported by the believers to their places of settlement in the USA.

The people that circulate in different national and international circuits (in most cases they do cross the international borders) tend to keep the ties with the *terruño*. And in doing so they tend to re-create their culture in new territories. Migrants, who consider themselves Catholics, tend to bring with them their beliefs, and to make an active defense of the values associated with them. In some cases, even when the believers convert into some other Christian Church, the tendency is not curtailed, but is also seen as part of the "evangelization" process beyond the national borders. Indeed the members of the Catholic church have been able to take with them and to keep alive their convictions in the new "hostile" territories of protestant culture. However, in at least one case, that of the Church on "La Luz del Mundo", members have been able to extend the faith to other parts of Latin America, and even to make it grow in the USA: in a way, this process of a new evangelization of Hispanic populations in the USA is a kind of "coming back" of the US Pentecostal movement that has once lead to the foundation of evangelical churches in Latin America. It also reflects the revival of religious feeling transported by migrant populations as part of the expression of loyalty both to their country of origin, their native language, and to their religious beliefs.

CULTURAL INFLUENCE: A TWO WAY STREET

Some of the recent popular literature on Mexican migration deals with the "Mexican Problem" in a way reminding of how this issue was dealt with in the thirties. According to many right-wing authors the Great Depression of the 1930s was in part caused by an alleged Mexican Invasion. The expression "Mexican Problem" became a very frequent slogan then and it was used as an umbrella expression to deal with the problems of education, social assimilation and integration, language acquisition, job scarcity, deflation, racial differences, cultural conflicts that were often associated with the Mexican immigrants coming to the United States.[4] In recent literature, the expression has been unearthed and is used in the context of growing Mexican immigration and a growing anxiety over the negative consequences this "analysts" fear.[5] The main concern with these authors seems to be what they call the "hispanization" of U.S. culture. As in the case of the German debate on "Leitkultur", Americans have now been forced to discuss what the main features of "American Culture" are, so that they can defend these features against the perceived onslaught of the cultural consequences Mexican immigration would have on U. S. society.

For some authors preoccupied with the negative consequences brought about by Mexican immigration to the U.S., this phenomenon "looms as a unique and disturbing challenge to our cultural integrity, our national identity, and potentially to our future as a country". The Mexicans arriving in the United States are seen as an "invasion" and this demographic movement "of more than 1 million Mexican civilians is a comparable threat to American societal security [as if over 1 million Mexican soldiers crossed the borders], and Americans should react against it with comparable vigor".[6]

On the other hand, a set of strange evaluations are opposed to these concerns. Some supporters of Mexican migration have recently argued that the lack of integration to the social, political and cultural "fabric" of the United States is positive because of the potential of Mexican culture traits to work as an antidote to the current ills of American Society. For Barbara Curtis, "today's great influx

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[4] Luis Rodolfo Morán Quiroz, "Los sentidos de la transición: migrantes internacionales y cultura regional" (Ph.D. diss. El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana 1998).

[5] Samuel Huntington, "The Special Case of Mexican Immigration," *American Enterprise* 10 (2000), [In: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2185/8_11/68660166/p1/article.jhtml].

[6] Ibd.

of Hispanics has the potential to give our country's tired ethics and jaded morality a boost", and she declares herself elated that the Mexican migrants (some of whom she has met) "don't want to become citizens because they see too many problems in our culture. These are not people who are in favor of free-for-all sexuality, irreligious schools, teen abortions without parental notification, the steady erosion of morality." For Curtis, given the high moral quality of the Mexican immigrants, "the question is, can we Americanize new arrivals in language, citizenship, and economic behavior, without eradicating the old-fashioned virtues that they bring as their most valuable contribution to our society?"[7]

Between these two opposing views, there are some elements that could help to demonstrate how the mutual influences between the so-called American way of life and Mexican culture transported by the Immigrants to the United States are mediated. This happens through constant contact of the members of the migrant fluxes with the members of both societies in the spatial delimitations in which these two cultures are supposed to act. In order to get an analytical framework for the discussion of how culture is transmitted and at the same time generated by the members of a society, the problem of mutual influences and the creation of hybridity has to be tackled within the context of two main features:

- the movement of people from the communities (in the sense of *Gemeinschaften*, and not in the American sense of a mere spatial destiny and place of residence) south of the Rio Grande to establish themselves and their social resources in the USA, includes a pendular movement that keeps traditions alive in the people and at the same time transforms the localities of origin and brings local customs to the place of destiny
- the movement of cultural traits through mass-communication media as well as other comsumption merchandises originally thought for North American everyday needs is in part contradicted and in part supplemented by the products brought by the Mexican immigrants as part of the goods they use in their everyday lives.

Within this context, the immigrants, the migrants and their family members allocate resources in such a way that they take advantage of their spatial loca-

[7] Ibd.

tions at many points along the way from the *terruños* to the northern communities. They are capable to integrate into the already existing society, especially if there exists a group of Hispanics that has arrived earlier, and there is no need to learn many things beyond the basic job skills necessary for survival. Migrants from the south can adapt and take advantage of secular and religious elements, rites and occasions that are present in the society in which they arrive. Later, the steadily growing communities become the base for a hybrid construction of culture, in a process in which the migrants manage to sustain many of the elements brought to their new societies, while at the same time integrating new elements to their previously received knowledge. The successive exchanges between members of the transterritorial communities formed by the people who emigrate plus the people that are left behind with whom they have constant contacts and communications, help them keep many of the cultural traits they came with, at the same time appropriating elements they find useful in their new environment and which can be transported home (for example automobiles, refrigerators, TV sets).

Migrant populations seem to offer the best examples of how the dominant culture of the USA is adapted, resisted and combined in manifold expressions in the public sphere (labor, consumption), as well as in the private sphere (devotion, family), both in the society of origin and the society of destiny. Congregations, popular religious beliefs, popular healing customs, moral values, language and language adaptation. The Migrants tend to live their daily lives according with the cultures they and their parents and other ancestors brought with them to the USA.

The Hybrid Construction of Culture and the Development of Transterritorial Communities

Is it possible to speak of colonialism and imperialism pure and simple when the mass mediated messages travel mostly south but the people travel mostly north? How do these pendular movements influence the building both of a feeling of community abroad, and of a series of local cultural expressions? How do resistance and adaptation generate cultural traits that combine the best of two worlds? How do the newly arrived peoples influence the native population? How are the immigrants forced to integrate into the receiving society? These questions deal with the issue of how different cultures and the individuals and

groups that keep them alive influence each other. At the same time the questions provoke the recognition of the great difficulty to find a culture without any traces of influence from cultural elements brought from some other context in the contemporary world.

Culture is a dynamic concept and in its workings involves a combination of different ways to solve everyday problems (problems that in any case can extend from the philosophical-abstract to the vital-concrete in a wide continuum of interrelations). When dealing with the way cultures influence each other, it is not only a matter of detecting "negative" versus "positive" elements. What we can hope for is to identify how different elements stemming from different sources are combined to generate a relatively "new" culture that results from a particular combination of elements and sets of elements. Even assuming that two particular cultures were not in contact (directly or indirectly through other cultures and social codes), the question of how differences in power are part of the reason why some elements are adopted or accepted, and others are not, remains real and is difficult to answer without recourse to the notion of efficiency in the solution of practical problems, or the notion of closeness to previous solutions (or a possible adaptability to the set of elements previously in place, as is the case with old and new "traditions"). In any case, the issue of power and the way cultural elements are part of majority or minority groups seems to be part of the explanation of why some elements have a larger probability to be allowed as "usable" (for example, language), while others have not (for example some practices against corporeal integrity) in a new societal and cultural environment.

Migrant populations present a clear example of how the culture clashes result not only in conflict among the members of different social codes, but also within the migrant groups. Cultural encounters create dilemmas that the immigrants and the native populations face when confronted with different ways to solve the same or similar problems. These populations, and the populations in close and constant contact with new members face the mixture of elements with two different strategies which are not exclusive—resistance or adaptation. In many instances the culture encounters create combinations in which it is relatively easy to identify which elements come from what sources. A clear example is that of the Los Angeles calendar in English and Spanish in which different elements of natural healing and Christian faith are combined in a line of time that celebrates North American alongside Mexican national holidays, Catholic alongside Protestant festivities. Although both denominations are Christian, in

the eyes of many believers they are "incompatible". In practice, however, they are meaningful to both. The examples of hybridity could be multiplied, precisely because it is very rare to find a culture in which all the elements are "pure" and none has been "imported" from some other culture and from some other group.

The transterritorial communities of migrants clarify these processes. Individual migrants can go from one point to another and remain within their own cultures, while at the same time crossing national, geographic, and cultural borders. Not two migrant communities are exactly alike, but the transitions facilitated by the members of social networks, make it easier to understand the culture of the society they are going to, without having to step out completely of the one they are most familiar with. The point is that although for example economic imperialism can imply the substitution of cultural elements (for example Coca-Cola instead of lemonade), migrants cannot be completely stripped off their aspirations and beliefs and these beliefs can even be part of the reasons to emigrate. This spatial movement implies that the migrants will bring along their social and cultural ties and that even as this other imperialism is less powerful (in terms of mass media resources or economic leverage, for example) than the North American type, it can continue to penetrate the dominant culture for many generations to come.

As already mentioned, the other imperialism can be promoted through the powerful forces of the empire when some of the tangible products of the migrant cultures are turned into "global commodities", as has been the case with cultural tangible objects as the diffusion of the tortillas, the tacos, the mariachi, some Spanish words, among others. In a way, the other imperialism can ride the same tide that brought Donald Duck to Latin America, to make sure other cultural traits are turned into a part of the commodity market and then sold as part of the Northern culture. The existence of an ethnic market seems to facilitate this "co-optation" of many cultural traits.

CONCLUSION: DIFFERENTIAL POWERS - DIFFERENTIAL ADAPTATION AND RESISTANCE

Spanish imperialism and colonial exploitation brought to Latin America the Castilian language as a dominant one and imposed it on the herd of barbarians the Spaniards thought they have encountered in what was supposed to be a

process of civilization. Many scholars have argued recently that neither the language of Spain (Castilian is in itself the language of an imperialist power within the Spanish Empire), nor the Christian beliefs could be deeply embedded in the minds of the *indígenas*. Even five hundred years after the conquest, historians continue to find not only evidence of resistance from the natives, but also of avid learning by some Europeans. They still find elements that stem from native cultures. Latin America has thus always been a place in which African, Asian, and European cultures, as well as many Indian cultural traits have been in constant battle and contact. The descendants of the autochthonous peoples that Columbus, Cortéz, and Pizarro found centuries ago, still keep many of the cultural elements that have helped them solve their daily problems and needs. These indigenous peoples have never completely accepted the Christian doctrines taught by the Franciscan Missionaries. Nor have they learned completely how to write and speak Castilian. Rather they have taught many anthropologists what is left of their languages and beliefs. Recent migration flows from backward places such as the Sierra de Oaxaca, Baja California, and (Alta) California have shown how Mixtecs keep their language and how some individuals actually become trilingual by being able to speak both the language they need at their job (Castilian in San Quintín, or English in San Fernando), and their "Mixteco" language among themselves.

The recent North Americanization of Latin America could also be interpreted as the Europeanization of the world economy. The economic shifts that have been at the core of the expanding free markets, the invasion of industrial commodities to our handcrafted societies, the electronic waves and media, are likely to continue their influence on the cultures south of the Rio Grande. It can be argued that the thesis of the supporters of globalism is right in claiming that economic imperialism tends to travel south despite the differences in culture and everyday life; but it can also be argued that this imperialist-globalist tendency is not the only one: people from the south travel north while economic reforms in their home countries force them to leave. The cultural influences from the south upon the northern countries and their everyday life are clear to see: ethnic foods, devotion, changes in time conception, concepts of law, education, role of the family. The influences are slow and come in piecemeal fashion, and yet they are finding their ethnic and geographical niches. Although in the 21st century, almost every single corner of the world has been conquered by McDonald's and Coca-Cola, it is also true that each local culture will be able to color and somehow (even if weakly) counter the European and American impe-

rialist efforts at conquering markets and the souls and households of the consumers in the rest of the world.

We can hardly question that income differentials in Latin America have an impact on migration to the North. However, migration from the South also has a very visible, although slow, impact on the Northern cultures. Despite the efforts of the imperial nations to curtail the migrant inflows to their countries, the poverty that comes as a consequence of the unfair distribution of income continues to push people to the rich nations. Poor migrants will keep on trying to solve problems of survival, even as these can be a direct consequence of capitalist "development" policies.

Petras and Veltmeyer have demonstrated that there is no inevitability to the (imperialist) globalization process. Yet there are developments that are indeed inevitable in the sphere of culture: people will learn new strategies to solve their needs, will remember from one generation to another, the rituals, traditions and the means to solve problems, and they will forget those cultural traits that lose practical, symbolical or affective value. The other imperialism that this article has introduced has to offer new solutions that might even be appropriated by big merchandising companies to be sold somewhere else, the same way that bananas and kiwis are exported to places where they are not grown. But before cultural traits can be appropriated, sold, or left behind, they will have to either prove their value in a context that is different from that of the original one (as the culture transported by the Latin American migrants up North) or they will prove useless.

Benito Juárez was willing to accept liberal ideologies and economic policies, but at the same time, Mexican nationalist feeling that he stood for, pushed him to struggle against the imperialist forces of the French Army and the Habsburg Austrian expansionist aspirations. It comes as no surprise that one of the first and foremost holidays still celebrated by the Mexican population in the USA is the one commemorating the battle of Puebla, the "5 de Mayo". This festivity is now celebrated in the United States with even more vigor than in Mexico itself. Mexican beers, tacos, the "national" colors and mariachi music accompany a loud although not very well documented party. It is celebrated both by the people of Mexican descent and by the big multinational enterprises. What this festivity demonstrates is the paradox of the commemoration of a historical battle against imperialism, which has transformed into a celebration of the other imperialism's tenacity to survive in a territory that was once the object of imperialist expansion itself. The celebration proves that Mexican culture is even

capable of invading the very center of the current imperial powers. Not only national holidays, but also, and more notoriously, the festivities of the patron saint associated with the Catholic faith have invaded the once puritan protestant United States. Hispanic migrants in general have expressed their devotions and loyalty to the patron saints of their points of origin by transplanting not only the festivities (that sometimes extend over the traditional nine day-period), but also the images. They build churches and sanctuaries in spaces where they increasingly tend to speak their own language, create their own organizations, institutions, ways of life and attitudes.

In a more general sense, additional questions regarding the invasion of weaker groups in the territories of the empire emerge. Could we expect that in the near future the Turks living in Germany will exert such an influence that the Turk language becomes part of the formal education system in Germany? This seems improbable, yet would we have expected twenty years ago that the Reaganite policy of "English Only" enforced while he was Governor of California, would be reversed to such a degree that Spanish (actually the Castilian imperialist language) would conquer such places of central national importance as California, Texas and Illinois? Indeed, what I have called the "other imperialism" is institutionally weaker than traditional imperialism. The latter can impose itself to warrant free markets and free trade of the commodities it controls. However, this weakness is part of the reason why traditional imperialism is interested in selling parts of the culture that can be stripped from native cultures, reshaped and sold back to be part of what is to be the "dominant culture". Can we expect the receiving societies to develop a way to acknowledge (and sometimes to exclude) cultural traits generated by the immigrants? As Seyla Benhabib (1999) shows in a commentary of Yasemin Soysal's concept of the "incorporation regime", the efforts to control the entrance of people can also have consequences on the kinds of cultural traits that are allowed or desired to be imported.[8]

In the definition of foreigners versus citizens, the same process seems to take place as in the process of "deciding" whether a given cultural element is "appropriated", "imposed", or "adopted". It can hardly be said where one culture ends and the other begins, and the issue on how to solve the question about which

[8] Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1994). See also Seyla Benhabib, "Citizens, Residents, and Aliens in a Changing World: Political Membership in the Global Era," in: *Social Research* (Fall 1999), [In: http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m2267/3_66/58118477/p1/article.jhtml].

individual is to be accepted as culturally close and as politically eligible for citizenship, has an anguishing similarity with the question of what cultural traits can be adopted on the grounds of their utility to the members of the culture that adopts them. The elements of different cultures and the way they interact, and combine (or repel each other) poses again the issue of power and who is to decide whether or not to admit an individual to enter a country, or to grant permission to leave it. In the field of cultural transformation, the question is even more complex: who could claim "orthodoxy" to cultural elements and recognize a legitimate way they could combine with the elements of other culture? Who could control the borders between two different cultures? At least the elements smuggled seem to be crossing a much more permeable border than those in political geography.

There is an explicit relationship between the state-based recognition of ethnic groups and the possibility for them to make explicit efforts to widen the reach (from one generation to the other, from one group to their neighbors) of their cultural traits. Even if the migrants coming from the South are not usually granted this right, is it possible to conceive that even an imperial power as powerful as the USA could be able to bring into its territory the labor it needs and prevent the people from bringing in their culture? Short of totalitarian ethnocide, how could a government be able to prevent the migrants from using and showing their cultures to others, "polluting" them with their solutions, languages, expressions? Could it be possible to prohibit a culture arguing that it is an "invasion" of the dominant cultural spaces? How could imperial powers import labor without having to import the workers brains? Is it possible to find a pure or "closed culture", in the same way that Benhabib says in her critique of the citizenship theorists that such a thing as a "closed society" is not feasible? Could the empire close itself off as a society and as a culture? The latter question can be definitely answered in the negative because the very definition of empire involves the necessity to conquer other territories and thus to have at least brief contact with those that inhabit them.

PART III

GENDER RELATIONS

AND THE ROLE OF THE U.S. MODEL

K. LYNN STONER

BEAUTY, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND CUBAN INTERFACE WITH THE UNITED STATES: JOURNAL DEPICTIONS OF ELITE NATIONALISM BETWEEN 1910 AND 1950[1]

Just as geographical delineations mark national borders, cultural artifacts shape national identities. Language, art, music, dance, refrains, style of humor, visual emblems, ideological formation, religion, food, and national myths are as basic to establishing national coordinates as a surveyor's alidade. Shared cultural experiences attach people to a place and to one another with bonds as strong as, although more subtle than, patriotic allegiances forged in wars of national independence. Wars and myths about nationalism unify a people with the purpose of surviving as a whole. Ultimately, national mythology about the national character learned through symbols and parables fosters a consciousness, a narrative, a passion that distinguishes one nationality from another.[2]

Generations of citizens of any modern state are immersed in national mythology in their ritualized ascent into full membership in the national body.[3] The

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[1] Funding for research on this project came from a Rockefeller Fellow in Residence Grant administered through Florida International University, Spring 1998.

[2] For information on cultural studies and national identity see: Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991). For information on the power of myths in founding value systems that unite people with a shared culture see: Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers, *The Power of Myth* (New York: Doubleday. 1988).

[3] Cuban writers explored what it meant to be Cuban shortly after independence. Some of the most renowned were: Lydia Cabrera, *El Monte: igbo, finda, ewe orisa, vititi nfinda: notas sobre las religiones, la magica, las supersticiones y el folklor de los negros criollos y el pueblo cubano* (Miami: Ediciones Universales. 1985). Jorge Mañach., *La crisis de la alta cultura en Cuba* (Havana: Imprenta y papeleria "La Universal", 1925). Juan Marinello, *Cuba, cultura* (Havana: Editorial Letras Cubanas. 1989). Fernando Ortiz, *Contrapunteo cubano del tobacco y el azúcar* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1983 [1940]). *Entre cubanos: psicología tropical* (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales. 1987). (Original essays written between 1906 and 1908.) *El pueblo cubano* (Havana: Editorales de Ciencias Sociales, 1991). (Taken from unpublished articles written between 1906 and 1920.) Emilio Roig de

initiation process repeated over time establishes a national sense of self which in some cases, as with Cuba, is so prominent that it is given names such as *cubanidad, cubanía, lo cubano,* and humorously *cubaneo*.[4] Mythmaking and the accumulation of a national culture occurs over time and has many authors. Pre-national traditions composed by anonymous hands determine the context from which a nation is born. Sentimental purpose, political goals, and cultural rationale propel a people to move out of their daily routines, subject their properties to possible destruction, and risk the lives of their families and themselves all for national, collective sovereignty. Stories about those brave struggles inform future generations about what it means to be Cuban. National leaders are the first to impose values on the general population and enshrine heroes as part of a legend later generations should venerate. All members of society directly or indirectly engage in the molding of the national character through the linking of familiar and popular traditions. Adding and subtracting characteristics of a collective identity is an ongoing process, of course, as is the interpretation of the myths and values a people adopt. Thus, national identity is malleable, negotiable, and controversial, but it is still the spirit that holds people together.

Historians study the process of national identity formation even though it presents methodological challenges and opens research to criticism from classically-trained historians who consider history only those accounts based on evidence about factual past events. Cultural national identity is subjective; it transforms and means different things to different people. It is expressed in standard artefacts such as letters and essays, but it is also evidenced through art and life

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Leuchsenring. Contemporary postmodernist scholars exploring the association between culture and Latin American and Cuban historical mentalité are: Eva P. Bueno and Terry Caesar (ed.), *Imagination Beyond Nation: Latin American Popular Culture* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998). Calixto Maso y Vazquez, *El caracter cubano: Apuntes para un ensayo de psicologia social* (Miami: Ediciones Universal. 1996). Robin Moore, *Nationalizing Blackness: Afrocubanismo and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 1920-1940* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 1997). Louis A. Perez. *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Jose Sanchez-Boudy, *Filosofia del cubano...y de lo cubano* (Miami: Ediciones Universal. 1996). Vera Kutzinsky, *Sugar's Secrets: Race and the Erotics of Cuban Nationalism* (Charlottesville, Virginia: University of Virginia Press, 1993).

[4] *Cubanidad* implies the active expression of Cubanness and includes the collection of tangible artifacts such as music, dance, humor, adages, etc. *Cubanía* connotes the entire idea of the essence of being Cuban. *Lo cubano* also means the essence of being Cuba, and *cubaneo* signifies the craziness of being Cuban.

styles that are more difficult to assess. It is impossible to have a definitive understanding about what Cubanness means, for example, but it is possible to hear the various voices raised in the effort to reach a consensus about the national character. By concentrating on the process and not the outcome, scholars can avoid essentialist explanations of a people, never classifying them as uniform, unchangeable, and permanently created according to a cultural, or even biological, rule. In short, the historian can know something about the clamor for national identity and little about a finite meaning of the particular Cuban character.

Studying the evolution of the Cuban national character is a rewarding and important task, because Cuba has gone from colony to quasi-democratic republic to Castro's revolution within less than one hundred years. At each juncture of dramatic change, leaders and the public have had to convince themselves of the true match between national objectives, the national spirit, and the incumbent regime. All referred to past icons and stories to prove that a particular policy or government best represented the popular will. At the same time, the public has invented cultural replies to incumbent governments and inserted in new elements into the national character. Combine this persistent and critical urge to proclaim a recognized national identity with the Cuban proclivity to produce culture, and the result is a glorious and entertaining cultural nationalism that vibrates with creativity, originality, and pride. While political leaders have more often than not betrayed the national ideal, the Cuban people have mass-produced cultural statements and artefacts about identity and intent, leaving a record of a complex and passionate society.

U.S. political, economic, and cultural hegemony was a catalyst for Cuba's cultural nationalism. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, U.S. capitalist expansion contested and challenged Cuban national identity by controlling Cuba's political administration, overwhelming Cuban culture, and suppressing national insurgencies. As a result, Cubans had to describe themselves not only in terms of their own aspirations, but in contrast to North American values and ways of being. But U.S. influence, while omnipresent, was not omnipotent. Liquidating Spanish heritage and denying Caribbean, African, and even Chinese influences was neither possible nor desirable, since Cuba was the nexus of the Americas and the confluence of many cultures. But just as Cubanness was an amalgam of cultural traits as well as a means of national defense,

and just as it was elusive and indescribable, it was also recognized and appreciated by people throughout the world. Indeed, music, dance, art, and literature, expressions of *cubania* enjoyed at home and abroad, may have been Cuba's most emphatic declaration of independence.

A review of nationalist symbols and artefacts draws attention to an unexpected fact: Cubans from every social and economic sector gendered their nation feminine. The preferred metaphor for the nation was the beautiful woman, and across that metaphor elites and humble people alike wrote their purest aspirations and greatest fears for their state. The beauty metaphor was a powerful image with both compelling and debilitating effects on national identity. Beauty and its opposite, ugliness, contained more messages than just the regularity and aesthetic qualities of physical features. They indicated class, race, education, and cultural breeding. They projected idealized images of Cubanness for fellow citizens and foreigners to understand. By molding ideal images and enshrining them in the form of beautiful women, the authors of the collective psyche embedded their own values independent of the purview of North American guidance. The nation was often depicted as a classical goddess, representing legitimate statehood dating from Greco Roman times. Portraits of virtuous mothers of the nation connoted the sacred, if vulnerable, position of the young nation as well as the capacity of Cuban women to reproduce capable citizens. Effigies of women grieving for the nation implied that in women resided moral purity and the ability to see, but the powerlessness to correct, failures in male leadership. Cubans also presented themselves in their commercial endeavors through representations of erotic and sometimes exotic temptresses. Whatever the picture, the most redundant metaphor for *cubanía* was the beautiful female, because beauty and femininity symbolized the ideal. As Richard G. Parker has noted, beauty is an ideological construct, a system of representations, that influence the ways in which people understand the proper order of things in their universe, in the structure of their social interactions, and as a means of interpreting the meaning of their social and political relations.

One might wonder about the deep psychological orientation that classified the nation as a beautiful female, and almost never male. The female nation certainly connoted an object of passion and pride, the symbol of purity and hope, the reality of a nurturing place, a home, a source of refreshment. According to Latin American private perceptions of things female described by Glenn Dealy, male politicians betrayed their wives with mistresses and ascribed power, viril-

ity, and authority unto themselves in the company of attractive paramours.[5] Thus, men established themselves in the society of national leadership and as public officers of the nation by dominating women and the state. I will argue here that by feminizing Cuba, the elite idealized her, but also found it acceptable to betray her.

This paper is an analysis of the messages and the metaphors created by elite publicists in the popular press during the first four decades of the Republic (1902-1940). Close examination of elite aspirations and the myths they generated in the popular magazines depicts a set of people who were not imitators of U.S. culture or even uncritical recipients of U.S. support and dominion. Deciphered images produced by this class prove that the elite were not a unified group, they did not wish to emulate U.S. society, and they were self conscious, if also grandiose and narcissistic, about their own position in society. Cuban creole elites looked ever more like Jose Enrique Rodo's Latin American elites who were caught between the urge to carry out aristocratic heroism, which would always lead to dictatorship, and the hemispheric commitment to popular democracy, which meant an attack on their inherited belief in the genius and nobility of the individual and their rejection of the common man as a vulgar degradation of cultural norms.[6] They also conformed to Damian Fernandez's model of the Cuban dilemma that pitted nationalistic passions against loyalty to family and individual interests. The nation, he argues, was always compromised by corrupt activities intended to better family wealth and power, because the Cuban placed her/his love of home above love of country.[7] And they feminized the nation in the same way Vera Kutinsky describes that Cuban's characterized themselves as a racially mixed society through metaphors about the beautiful mulatta found in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literature.[8]

Despite the omnipresence of U.S. culture described in Louis A. Perez's award winning book *On Becoming Cuban*, my contention is that Cuban elites maintained aspirations of nobility and power, high culture and authority, liberty and equality for themselves but not necessarily for all Cubans, and they resisted sub-

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5 Glenn Dealy. *The Public Man*. *The Latin Americans*

6 Jose Enrique Rodo, *Ariel* (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin, Co. 1922).

7 Damian Fernandez, *Cuba and the Politics of Passion* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 2000).

8 Vera Kutzinsky, *Sugar's Secrets*.

servience to the North American example of middle-class, rough and ready derring-do as a national ideal. And as an addendum to Damian Fernandez's and Vera Kutzinsky's theories, I argue that Cubans, and in this case the ruling elite, gendered Cuba female, which invited a sense of romance between Cubans and the nation. By romancing the nation, they introduced a familiar convention: the enmeshing of love interest with self interest and the common experience of betrayal of the beloved, in this case, Cuba.

II

After 1898, Cuban independence from Spain was a fact, but its sovereignty was in question as Cuba fell victim to United States expansion into the Caribbean. First occupied by the North American Army, then tutored in Anglo-Saxon constitutional law and coerced into compliance by the Platt Amendment, and finally brought to heel through a series of interventions, Cuban patriots lost control of the national idea. Because sovereignty was unrealized, nationalism was transformed from a revolutionary ideal to a passionate obsession, a fantasy, and practically speaking, an ambivalent reality. A striking feature of the Cuban condition during the Early Republic (1898-1958) was the contradiction between the ruling class's claims of democracy, sovereignty and prosperity and the truth about political instability, corruption, police repression, poverty, and utter dependence upon the United States. Most assessments of this early period portray Cuban politicians and businessmen as willing servants of the new colonizer, who understood that their livelihood depended upon cooperation with imperialists at the expense and exploitation of the Cuban people.[9] According to historical canon, the ruling elites subverted nationalist calls for unity, brotherhood, social justice, and sovereignty in order to place themselves at the apex of a hierarchical order. They sold out to the North American political demands,

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[9] Jules Benjamin, *The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberation* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990). Louis A. Pérez, Jr. *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Id., *On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality, and Culture* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. 1999). Juan Marinello, *Ensayos*. (Havana: Centro de Investigaciones Literarias de la Casa de las Américas, 1979). Fernando Ortiz, *Entre cubanos: psicología tropical* (Havana: Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 1987). Alvaro Catá, *De guerra a guerra* (Havana, 1906). Eduardo Iglesias, *Cuba independiente, 1902-1906*. (Havana, 1906).

private investments, and later international crime organizations to retain power and wealth. They stood accused of welcoming in U.S. values and culture to replace Spanish traditions and even their own independence promises.

Beginning in 1902, Cuban politicians, businessmen, bureaucrats, and publicists were the first to step forward to anoint national heroes and consecrate nationalist myths in speeches beneath newly erected statues and in written essays. Individual biographies, hagiography really, illustrated that Cuban independence had been won through the heroic efforts of Cubans.[10] Journals, statues, tombs, patriotic rituals, patron saints, music, dance, poetry, cinema, radio programs, national legends and myths, operas, jokes, caricatures, advertisements, beauty contests, social events, public acts of charity, yachting events, even the horse races were vehicles for projecting national ideals.

Intellectuals and publicists turned to the press to communicate their ideas and to notify the public of Cuba's progress as a nation. For the first time, Cubans experienced a free press, and their pent up frustration with censorship transformed into an explosion of journals, newspapers, popular magazines, and privately printed materials. Everywhere the literate found reporting and often hyper nationalist messages, and the illiterate enjoyed cartoons and caricatures that illustrated national events and the national character. *Carteles, Social,* and *Bohemia,* three of the most widely circulated of Cuba's 588 *revistas* to begin publication within the first fifteen years of the republic, emerged from the chaos and disorder that followed the devastation of three wars of independence and ran well into the 1950s.[11] The *revistas* vied with one another for subscriptions and the allegiance of a readership.

Bohemia, for example, covered national and international events, published music scores and pictures of art, entertained with amusement sections, and announced the social activities of the rich and powerful. Miguel Angel Quevedo began publication of the *revista* in 1908, and by the 1940s and 1950s, it was the most widely read magazine in Cuba when it attained a mass circulation of

[10] See the series of heroic histories published by Cuadernos de Historia Habanera directed by Emilio Roig de Leuchsenring, Cuadernos de Cultura, and the Academia de la Historia de Cuba.

[11] Roberto Esquenazi-Mayo, *A Survey of Cuban Revistas, 1902-1958* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress. 1993), p. ix.

200,000 and an estimated readership of one million readers per week.[12] *Bohemia* circulated throughout the island, and it was also popular in south Florida and Spain. The *revista* was such a standard source of information that people would not consider engaging in polite conversation at weekend parties without reading *Bohemia*, which conveniently came out on Fridays. And a popular insult reserved for a person with little knowledge or education was, "No lee ni *Bohemia*."

Social, edited by Conrado W. Massaguer the famous caricaturist and social critic but also a member of the upper class he named El Gran Mundo, contained news reports, but it was really dedicated to critiquing elite society. Members of the high life did not mind being satirized so long as they were seen in elegant surroundings carrying out public duties. Cuba's intellectual elite of all political persuasions contributed to *Social*, and Massaguer's reputation as a world renowned caricaturist attracted most of Cuba's eminent artists to draw for the magazine and to have their work critiqued there. *Social* contained studies on all of the arts, both Cuban and foreign, and it was especially rich in photojournalism that was just taking root at the time of its publication. It and *Bohemia* kept up with Cuban news and a good deal of intellectual debate about the state of the nation.

Carteles, a monthly magazine edited by Oscar Massaguer (Conrado's brother), began publication in June 1919 and reported on sports and entertainment. In 1924, Alfredo T. Quilez, a member of the progressive Grupo Minorista, bought the journal from Massaguer, turned it into a weekly magazine, and published the views of critical intellectuals who wished to end corruption and incompetence in government. By 1928, *Carteles* had surpassed *Bohemia*'s subscribership, and in an effort to dominate the market, *Bohemia*'s publishers bought *Carteles* and also eased the bite of criticism that *Carteles* had espoused.[13] Taken together, these three magazines accounted for the largest circulation, the broadest coverage of national and international events, and the greatest influence upon the formation of national identity in the print media.

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[12] Ibd. p. 8.

[13] Ibd., pp. 12-13.

III

Who were the elite and what was their dilemma? According to a diverse group of chroniclers during the early decades of the twentieth century, the people who aspired to power, prestige, and wealth originated in large part from Cuba's noble families.[14] Others rose to power during the wars of independence by acquitting themselves well on the battlefield or as the political thinkers who wrote in the underground press or from exile. These colonial landholding creoles and political intellectuals founded several factions of patriots who allied themselves to fight three wars of independence. Once victorious, the factionalized rebels had the responsibility of governing a nation building a modern society in a rapidly modernizing hemisphere, while conforming to North American demands. Previous divisions became political divides over issues such as the extent Cuba would bow to U.S. economic and political conditions, the manner and means of democratic government, racial brotherhood, loyalty to opportunistic leaders, the force of charismatic leadership over political ideals, placating feminists and labor organizers, and the matter of class divisions.

Yet, these serious disagreements about Cuba's future structuring did not factor into political party allegiances. Instead, the Liberal and Conservative parties were merely lose associations of political aspirants drawn together in efforts to gain power and the spoils of administrative privilege. They did not portend a systematic policy over the duration of administrative terms. In short, for the politically ambitious, corruption and a hunger for power and social prestige came before ideological commitments. But this did not stop the leadership from projecting their own aspirations for the nation.

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[14] Fernando Ortiz, *Entre los cubanos*, *psycologia tropical* (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1983). For information on Cuba's noble family heritage and genealogies, see Francisco Xavier de Santa Cruz y Mallen, *Historia de familias cubanas* (Havana: Editorial Hercules, 1950). While Louis A. Perez argues persuasively that the landed families lost much of their wealth in the wars of independence and afterward as American capital overwhelmed Cuban investment potential, he also acknowledges that the new leadership was controlled by U.S. interests. My point is that as titular heads of state, legislators, and businessmen determined to retain their prestige, they promoted images of a nation to the general public that also matched their aspirations, if not their own behavior. Cite *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*.

Cuba's ambitious leaders faced impossible tasks. They inherited an island devastated by war, and their own class was rapidly being divested of its wealth through the wars' destruction, their obsolete means of refining sugar, competition with U.S. sugar growers, and limited investment funds to diversity Cuba's economic base. The middle and lower classes were more seriously affected by the economic depression following the war and the boom and bust cycles that plagued the nation between 1918 and 1940. Sub-subsistence living for the rural poor and hand-to-mouth survival tactics for the urban poor and middling classes caused the desperate to become hopeless and the hopeful to become desperate.

The desired transition from a largely rural economy dependent upon tobacco, sugar, coffee, and citrus to an industrialized means of production was painful and too slow to serve the broad population. Hope came from foreign investors, mostly from the United States and in smaller portions from Britain and Spain, who pressured Cuban administrators and businessmen to give them monopolies over certain ventures such as utilities and mining and favorable reductions in tariffs such that the Cuban business community lacked any protection at all. The question was not whether Cuba could or should have rejected foreign investment, but the extent to which Cuban workers and businesses would become subservient to foreign interests. The new governing elite had to attain an acceptable balance.

Illustration 1: "Miss Cuba Receives an Invitation," in: John J. Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*. (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1993). p. 89.

Cuba's leading families were also interested in Cuba's image abroad. They were sensitive about being seen as a mongrel society, racially mixed, and even primitive in nature. In order to be an attractive investment area, they wished to project the message that Cubans were scions of noble European breeding, competent and capable of modernization. Perhaps more important for their own interests, they wished to hobnob with the world's well heeled society, and so they went to great efforts to inform the world and their fellow countrymen that they were educated, elegant, well traveled, and capable. Projecting such representations, making Cuba an inviting site for investments, and reflecting nationalist images was a complex task, and the vehicle for such projections was the popular print media.

The first thing the elite addressed, however indirectly, were the derogatory portrayals of Cubans in the US press. U.S. cartoons and caricatures insulted the Cuban national character. Theodore Roosevelt referred to Cubans as "dagos," "the mañana bunch," and branded the last war of independence as "not much of a war." The U.S. press projected several images of Cuba, all of them negative and many of them feminizing the island or deriding its primitive African elements. One common image depicted the country as a helpless maiden in need of an invitation from Miss Columbia (the North American beauty) to join the society of modern states (illustration 1). A wholly unattractive image was of black African savages in need of baths and an education and of them being forcefully civilized by clean and disciplined American authority (illustration 2). White man's burden was bringing the uncouth kicking and screaming into the twentieth century.

Given the prevailing self doubt and anxiety over national identity and their own ability to govern, Cuban leaders and their attending publicists felt compelled to project images of the nation that were both dignified and powerful to national and foreign audiences alike. As the nation rebuilt in a modern design, El Gran Mundo trumpeted Cuba's rapid progress. Photographs of modernization inspired hope in an impoverished nation and encouragement to foreign investors.

Illustration 2: Johnson, *Latin America in Caricature*, p. 217.

In Cuba, signs of progress were accompanied by images of beautiful Cuban women. Coverage of bridge construction, new road systems, the erection of national monuments, railroad station openings, school construction, public works projects, and factory openings were often accompanied by ornate tableaux of Cuban beauties from the area where the story took place. These juxtaposed stories suggested that progress was guaranteed when women of such high breeding and beauty inhabited the locations of dynamic development.[15] Authors took the opportunity to combine national ceremony and displays of progress with genetic proof of Cuban aptitude and physical attractiveness (illustration 3).

[15] "Bellas Camagüeyanas," *Bohemia* 2, 50 (December 10, 1911), pp. 510-511.

Illustration 3: "Bellas Camagüeyanas," *Bohemia* 2, 50 (December 10, 1911), pp. 510-511.

In this example, Camagüeyan beauties graced the page opposite photo articles about the construction of the classically designed railway station in the provincial capital. They were emblematic of the allure of the interior. The reader must conclude that provincial development was guaranteed by the presence of such high quality women, that the provincial beauties were interactive with the demands of modernization, and that capable Cubans resided anywhere in the island. Clearly, Cuba was the gateway to development in the Caribbean, and the classical beauty of women, even in the more remote regions of the island, was evidence of the nation's potential for advancement and grandeur.

Progressive members of El Gran Mundo initially looked to the U.S. for alternative values and ways of life from their colonial Spanish heritage. As Louis A. Perez points out, things American implied a prosperous future; retaining Spanish ways threatened stagnation and backwardness.[16] Yet El Gran Mundo progressives were not offering to surrender their fragile control over the island's resources or their social or political authority to U.S. controls, even though that,

[16] Louis A. Perez. *On Becoming Cuban*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 2000, pp. 71-82.

in large part, was what happened. Conrado Massaguer[17] wrote and illustrated a serial story entitled "Nena" in *Social* that captured the elite's desire for connection with the United States while retaining significant autonomy for themselves and Cuba (illustration 4). Nena was the daughter of a wealthy Cuban businessman, who had been educated at a U.S. finishing school. As a result of her time abroad, she adopted values that differed from the self-centeredness and incompetence characteristic of Cuba's country club set. In the U.S., she had learned to admire intellectual and moral discipline, civility, sincerity, and productivity, and she desired a man with these qualities and was repulsed by the vapid Cuban suitors of El Gran Mundo. Although she had had an admirer in the United States whom she would remember as the kind of man she would like to find in Cuba, she did not engage in a romance or courtship with him. Upon her return to Cuba, Nena was only interested in a well-educated young man who worked as her father's secretary. Unfortunately he did not have the appropriate lineage or wealth to be a potential suitor. Their salvation came when he found employment in a U.S. firm, earned a handsome salary, and with money attained the financial base necessary to marry Nena. Thus, wealth compromised family lineage as the decisive factor in a family's social status. However, wealth did not destroy or even discourage a class system; it simply made it more porous.

[17] Conrado W. Massaguer was Cuba's most recognized caricaturist between 1908 and 1959. He rose to international prominence as he traveled throughout the world drawing caricatures of presidents, royalty, great actors and artists, infamous villains, powerful industrialists and humble peasants. He was the editor of *Social*, but he drew for all of Cuba's leading journals and newspapers. Massaguer's genius was in his beautiful art deco drawings, but his genius for humor stemmed from his understanding that laughter in Cuban society came from failure. Based in the Cuban *choteo*, a unique form of humor that criticizes another in order to aggrandize oneself, Massaguer picked at the upper classes, reducing them to flawed and even villainous elements of society. Rather than including himself in this social group, which he could have done, he used him membership to authenticate his knowledge of their deficiencies. Some might argue that he practiced the same kind of betrayal that El Gran Mundo conducted through politics and business. For more about Massaguer and an analysis of his use of the female figure in critiquing Cuban society, see K. Lynn Stoner, "Massa-girls: Female Beauty and Images of Cuban National Identity, 1908-1940," *Hemisphere: A Magazine of the Americas* 9, (Winter/Spring 1999), pp. 34-47.

Illustration 4: *Social* (June 1917), p. 12.

The elite still protected their place, but they had to adopt capitalist enterprise as a means to secure their place among the more prestigious. Enterprising people could also hope to breed into what had been closed social circles. In short, American business and cultural values could save Cuba from the effete mores of colonial Spanish culture, but the North American man did not himself break into the closed circle of Cuba's high society. Nena symbolized the nation whose rescue came from the hybridization of Cuban and American culture, but whose bloodline remained purely Hispanic.

Cuba was independent only twelve years when the United States entered the Great War. As a member of the North Atlantic nations, Cuba joined the Allied Powers and declared war on Germany. But as a small nation with no interna-

tional military, Cuba sent no troops to the European theatre. Although her economy suffered when the United States direct its economic commitments toward wartime expenditures, Cuba sold agricultural products and nickel to the United States in support of the Allied troops. World War I, although traumatic economically, provided the Cuban leadership with the opportunity to prove itself in the world theatre during the most horrendous war the modern western world had known.

Illustration 5: *Social* (October 1918), Front Cover.

Cuban essayists made so bold as to criticize European presidents, prime ministers, and kings for leading Europe into such a lethal war. Meanwhile, ambitious nationalists portrayed Cuba as a reluctant but brave defender of the Allied cause. Pages of the *revistas* were filled with caricatures about Cuba's role in the war (illustration 5). Between 1917 and 1918, at least 5 of 12 front covers of

Social sported a war theme, and always with a female figure indicating national alliance with the war or, in two cases, of women waiting for their soldiers to return from war. Photo reports brought scenes of the conflict to Cuban doorsteps, and photographic portraits of El Gran Mundo indicated Cuba's war effort for the Western Front.

Illustration 6: "Cuba en guerra," *Social* (June 1917), p.11.

The most visible sign of Cuba's war effort was embodied in the first lady, Mariana Sava de Menocal, who encouraged elite women to join the Red Cross. With her, they rolled bandages for the soldiers and contributed privately to the war chest (illustration 6). Cuba's war effort was summarized by a poster that solicited support for Red Cross volunteers, not soldiers. Here a Cuban Red Cross woman assumes the same position as Uncle Sam in U.S. recruiting posters, and she asks the same challenging question, "And you?" (illustration 7). Cuba's image is a Red Cross volunteer, and the U.S. image is Uncle Sam.

Illustration 7: *Social* (May 1918), p. 13.

The Cuban war effort amounted to rolling bandages, and the U.S. sent troops. Taken together, these representations of Cuba as an island represented by a female military, feminine Red Cross mobilization, and women waiting for foreign soldiers to come home simply dismissed the contributions of Cuban men. Not a single image of the Great War included Cuban men. Yet, Cuba sent three of its greatest jurists to represent Cuba as a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles, perhaps realized by women's support efforts at home.

In time, and especially following Cuba's economic collapse in 1920, publicists representing the elite perspective of national identity showed ambivalence about foreign domination of politics and economy, and they were especially critical of the Platt Amendment's restrictions on Cuban sovereignty. Members of elite society were going on the record as resisting Cuba's assimilation into the U.S. sphere of influence and as dismissing American common, middle-class

values. In April 1924, Massaguer satirized the Cuban choice to tie itself to the United State with his scene of courtship between a young maiden (Cuba), who sadly offers her hand to the American suitor (the United States) and rejects the Spanish military gentleman (Spain). Reluctantly she accepts the advances of the American suitor, who symbolizes modernization and business with his accounting list. She rejects the Spaniard, her heritage, who is premodern, colonial, military, and miffed at her betrayal. Cupid at the bottom of the page indicates his disapproval of marriage with the American. He holds crossed swords, and his face scowls his disapproval of the cross-cultural liaison (illustration 8).



Illustration 8: *Social* (April, 1924), Front Cover.

Fidelity to the Allies and dependence upon American technology and economy did not imply Cuban absorption into the United States' way of life. American culture never fully replaced El Gran Mundo's attachment to Europe, how-

ever omnipresent it may have been. A preference for things European appeared in advertisements for luxury items. While U.S. products, such as refrigerators, radios, cars, typewriters, washing machines, medicines, and toothpastes filled ad pages, luxury products such as tailored clothes, shoes, perfumes, jewelry, chocolates, and hats were European status symbols. Appearances were everything, and being seen sporting European clothing and an American car was the ultimate. Members of El Gran Mundo also wanted to be seen as world travelers, comfortable in the highest levels of society in Europe and upper-class spas in the United States, mingling with elite society from throughout the world. Showing off their cosmopolitan elitism in their minds recommended them to the world, to their own citizenry, and to themselves as able administrators of the new nation.

In time a nostalgia for Spain reappeared, especially as issues of Cuban identity were compromised by US dominance and the dangers of modernization. "La Romantica" typifies Massaguer's longing for the traditional Spanish/Cuban lady (illustration 9).

Illustration 9: *Social* (January 1921), p.18.

This innocent and sentimental woman was challenged by the modern woman, the flapper, or in a termed coined precisely for the modern, Cuban woman, *la*

pepilla. Short dresses, flirting, smoking, drinking, promiscuous social relationships, defiance of male domination, Hollywood, and women's intrusions upon traditional male spheres threatened not only traditional Cuban morals, they also attacked the patriarchy and national social order.



Illustration 10: *Social* (March 1922), Front Cover.

The gay life, as it was called, was attributed to U.S. culture. In this caricature (illustration 10), Massaguer conflates the issue of feminine moral purity in the colonial and early national periods. The colonial wall fresco of a naked but virginal young woman comes to life and is horrified as she surveys the risque behavior of a modern couple dancing cheek to cheek and dining and drinking

unchaperoned, save for the butler. The butler is Massaguer himself, ever observant, slightly amused and slightly disapproving. In short, the world seemed topsy turvy as notions of courtship, of the protection of a woman's virtue and a man's honor, and of patriarchal order were violated in the most outrageous ways by U.S.-inspired modern standards and independent women. One of Massaguer's favorite caricatures of American-introduced modernization was Pan, the mythological deity of lust and pleasure. On more than one occasion, he depicted courtship and romance in the modern age as only sexual experimentation. Here, Pan whirls a naked woman in dance, with both hands squarely on her body (illustration 11).



Illustration 11: *Social* (July 1925), Front Cover.

The caption quips "[dancing with and touching women] is the reason why Pan gave up the flute." In large part, the North American way of life was responsible for the undermining of the traditional order of things. According to this critique, the mythical Cuba existed in the past, and female beauty in these depictions was a mask that disguised danger and disruption of Hispanic norms. At particular risk were classical notions of female virtue and male dominance.

Another point of irritation for the Cuban elite was the Manifest Destiny attitude of Anglo Americans, who asserted that their scientific and positivistic approach to human values and organizations were superior to the alleged medieval and Catholic mentalite of Spain and Latin America. The United States was progressive; Latin America was backward. Americans were honest and hard working; Latin Americans were shifty and lazy. The key to the differences was science, industry, engineering, positivism, and for some, Protestantism. But the Scope's Trial in Tennessee gave Massaguer ammunition with which to fight Anglo prejudice and to admit Hispanic Americans (and the Cuban intelligentsia, in particular) into scientific circles, perhaps even a little ahead of their Anglo American contemporaries.

Conrado Massaguer adapted the 1925 Scopes Trial (popularly referred to as the Monkey Trial) to a Teatro Bufo-style caricature (Cuban slap stick comedy) for a grateful Cuban audience. In the actual trial, a public high school teacher, John T. Scopes, was charged with violating state law by teaching the theory of evolution. At issue was whether states could ban scientific theory from school curricula and impose religious and unscientific beliefs in public classrooms. A future presidential candidate, William Jennings Bryan prosecuted Scopes and defended the State of Tennessee's authority over the contents of public educational information, and thereby supported Tennessee's religiously conservative constituency. The great trial court lawyer, Clarence Darrow, spoke for the obligation to present scientific truth in school curricula. Bryan won the case even in its appeal to the Supreme Court, which gave a victory to the anti-scientific religious fundamentalists and to their legal and political champion, William Jennings Bryan. Charles Darwin's theories of evolution disappeared from the Tennessee public school curriculum, and they were replaced with lessons in religious creationism. In one decisive court decision, the nation of religious tolerance, science, positivism, and pragmatism was caught in a glorified hypocrisy, and the world took note.

Massaguer's spoof on American fundamentalist backwardness was pointed and clever. In his series entitled "Massa-girls," he deviated for the first time from his drawings of *beautiful* women as a vehicle for social commentary. Instead, readers were treated to the face of a beautiful monkey and a play on words to drive home that those who did not believe in evolution were unenlightened (illustration 12). The title of this drawing, "Muy mono," has a double meaning. It can mean either "very much a monkey" or "very pretty."[18]



Illustration 12: *Social* (September 1925), p.11.

Essentially Massaguer was acknowledging that humankind had descended from apes (were very much monkeys), and humankind should claim their ancestry and admire their ancestral mother (how pretty). His deeper message to Cubans and Anglos alike was that modern Catholic society was enlightened, and U.S. protestant fundamentalists were not.

[18] Mono as a noun means monkey. As an adjective, it means cute or pretty.

Beauty's opposite is ugliness. Impaired or unattractive physical appearance loaded with metaphors for national values was a visual warning against things unCuban. While beauty was often closely related to virtue, national notoriety, respect, high acclaim, and promise, ugliness indicated perversion, vulgar habit, racial admixture, and social decline. Images of ugly women were reserved for qualities and ways of life most repugnant to Cubans: among them were miscegenation, feminism, U.S. imperialism, and American tourists.

As regarded feminism, Cuban women were admonished to avoid the unnatural, unfeminine ideology at all costs. Just as a Cuban woman's movement was emerging, reams of caricatures, critical essays, and photo reports depicted feminists in the worst light, especially for women: ugliness. Male critics of feminism drew a sharp line of distinction between the femininity of Cuban women and the masculinity of North American feminists. Male journalists feared that the masculinization of women was contagious, and the infectious carrier was the feminist movement. In this article about feminist activities and ideals, the author concluded that if women wished to marry and oversee harmonious families, they should remain attractive and focus their attention on the home and not on politics (illustration 13).

LA ACTUALIDAD FEMINISTA

Illustration 13: "Actualidades," *Bohemia* 5 (September 13, 1915), pp. 434-435.

Racial integration was another touchy matter. Cubans had a commitment to racial brotherhood from the time of independence, yet U.S. presence and their own recent history of slavery bolstered sentiments of racial prejudice that erupted with brutality against the Partido Independiente de Color in 1912. El Gran Mundo was not eager to advertise that a large portion of the population was of mixed blood or fully black, and they resented charges of racial mongrelism evident in popular images of Cubans in the United States. Therefore, portrayals of black Cubans did not appear in elite journals until the late 1920s when their contributions to music and dance had received acclaim in Europe and the United States. Here is a drawing by prominent artist Bottell that appeared along with the "Massa-girls" series (illustration 14).



Illustration 14: *Social* (January 1927), p. 13.

"Mi Negrita" is clearly a sexually-used, faceless, almost inhuman being. The only identifiable qualities about her is she is female. Compared with other

examples of female beauty or ugliness with embedded identity messages in this series, "Mi Negrita" is a used body with no definition, personality, or importance other than that of sexual use. Certainly "Mi Negrita" represented a perverse denigration Cuba's black citizens, and most especially women of color. It was a betrayal of the racial brotherhood rhetoric of War of 1895 objectives. The caricature might have offended El Gran Mundo, not because of its deprecation of people of color, but because it exposed philandering across racial divides. The title gave away the shameful truth about sexual promiscuity. "Mi negrita" was a term of endearment for a woman, regardless of her race. A white man could call his white wife "mi negrita." Yet, the pet name could also imply affection for a woman of color as well as sexual exploitation. Certainly the caricature exposed the complicated, exploitative, and immoral behavior that, according to the picture, left women of color exhausted and anonymous. In the end, Bottell's negrita indicated the betrayal of women in general, which was an admission El Gran Mundo might have wished not to air. The woman of color was a sexual object, and the white woman was betrayed and also abandoned by philandering husbands. The caricature, truthful as it was, brought more shame than laughter, more pain than entertainment.

Few topics penetrated the Cuban consciousness more than the persistent humiliation of U.S. domination. Political movements, especially student and labor strikes beginning in the 1920s, thrived on anti-American sentiments that many Cubans shared. The Cuban *choteo* was a natural trope for expressing anti-Yankee sentiments and rendering Yankee culture vulgar and inferior. North American travelers were always the butts of jokes. Here Conrado Massaguer portrays North American imperialism as clumsy, unattractive, stupid, imposing, and grotesque (illustration 15). In this picture, an enormous American woman dressed in a flamenco sheath, wearing a comb in her hair, and sporting a fan and shawl, takes leave of her husband, who is so sexually uninterested in his wife that he is absorbed in his newspaper. She is hopeful of an adventurous evening, and she deludes herself with the thought that she might be taken for a Spanish lady by subordinate Cuban gentlemen. The subtext of this caricature is that Yankee presence, by its sheer size, is an overbearing, presumptuous, and unwanted presence. More, Yankee conceit repelled Cubans. Yankees lacked Spanish gallantry and grace, and their plainness made their powerful imposition

all the more abhorrent. Perhaps most damning, Anglo men were sexually inactive, which for Cubans implied impotence (the opposite of powerful).

Illustration 15: *Social* (January 1937), p.15.

IV

Diplomacy and international relations are cultural matters, and so are standards of beauty. All convey perceptions about ideals, all help to determine who belongs to which circles of power, and all initiate and support a culture of celebrities, recognized people, with authority. Myths and symbolic images of beauty conveyed notions about the Cuban national character. An examination of these visual myths and symbols suggest that Cuba's political and social elites

were not the abettors of U.S. domination we have often thought they were, as they were too elite for U.S. middle-class commonness. They resisted the destruction of European elitism that U.S. domination threatened, even as they relied on U.S. protection and investment for their prosperity and safety. They rejected feminism, and they were appalled by the crass behavior and presumptions of U.S. tourists. They sought an interpretation of their own culture and nationhood independent of U.S. cultural imperialism. They used nationalist imaging to place themselves before the Cuban public as the commanders of the nation. Viewed through the lens of popular culture, the elite class was more complex than we have thought. They resisted U.S. cultural imperialism even as they cooperated with, and at times invited political interventions and economic subservience. They admired some aspects of North American pragmatism and desire U.S. products, yet they despised American behavior. They wanted to be seen and validated by U.S. elite society, but their true allegiance was to France.

Capturing Cuba's collective psyche and understanding the myths upon which it is based is an insurmountable task. Identity myths are open to interpretation, and thus they were inconstant, malleable, and illusive. Yet aspects of myth formation are observable and provide insight into belief systems that influence by invisible hand overt public behavior. Glimpses of the subjective may also help explain seemingly irrational behavior. How and why, for example, could the Cuban leadership have worked so hard at creating national myths while simultaneously undermining the island's ability to govern itself and prosper?

Damian Fernandez has shown how Cubans have been torn between a passion for the state and affective relationships within families and communities. Allegiance to the state was always undermined by people's attempts to provide for themselves and their circles of friends and family by violating laws and subverting economic enterprise, be it capitalist or socialist. Thus, national passion has always been negotiable and second to affective allegiances. Vera Kutzinsky had demonstrated the pervasiveness of the image of the mulatta in nationalist literature in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Her work also pushes the idea that nationalist images produced national identity, and regardless of how controversial interracial mixing was, it became a part of the Cuban consciousness. Glenn Dealy's contention is that philandering lent prestige to male public officials, essentially recommending them to the public as strong and virile men. While there was moral indignation about infidelity, men were

expected to find mistresses to enhance public admiration for their strength and domination. Women's fate in this regard was entirely different, as they bore full responsibility for moral purity and justice in a brutal environment. Their moral virtue precluded protecting themselves against betrayal. In their social roles, women could see and be victims of men's disloyalty, they served as a reminder of morality, but they could not accuse, disclose, or chose treachery themselves and expect to find public approval.

This paper pushes Fernandez's, Kutzinsky's, and Dealy's arguments one step further. It suggests that patriotic sentiments elicited by feminine images determined the character of popular attachment to la patria. By gendering the state female, El Gran Mundo romanced the nation. A beautiful, female nation excited passion and fidelity for Cuba and themselves, and it distinguished the Cuban character from U.S. middle-class standards. But engendering the state female also led to national derision. A feminine state invited assumptions about the nation being subservient to elite leadership and Uncle Sam. *La patria* did not inspire militant sovereignty or demand citizens to make a commitment to nation building at their own individual expense. The ideal of a sovereign Cuba did not create the impression of power and authority within the community of free states. Instead, the nation was a benefactress to the elite. The island was fertile, generous, productive, and open. Its products, both human and natural, were taken to benefit the harvester. Cuba may have been represented as a Greek goddess, la romantica, a debutante, women confronting the dangers of U.S. habits, or competent citizens, but her reality was more like "Mi Negrita."

In the end, El Gran Mundo violated its obligations as the leadership class. There is do doubt that presidents and national officials accepted U.S. financial and political commands, and in large part, U.S. hegemony was inevitable. They were also notoriously corrupt. But El Gran Mundo resisted U.S. domination of Cuban culture and the proletarianization of their society. A review of nationalist messages found in the popular press reveal a bourgeois elite that betrayed the public interest. But El Gran Mundo's betrayal of Cuba, the object of their passion, was due more to their self absorption and inexperience than to their acceptance of the Americanization of Cuban culture. They left behind a legacy of picaresque politics, a pride in Cuban culture, and an idealized image of a feminine nation.

STEFAN RINKE

VOYEURISTIC EXOTICISM: THE MULTIPLE USES OF THE IMAGE OF U.S. WOMEN IN CHILE*

In July 1922, one of Chile's leading newspapers, *La Nación*, published an article entitled "The Fear of the Vampire Woman" on its front page. The illustration that went with it showed a winged young woman in stylish clothes – which by the way were very saucy from a Chilean perspective.

Ill. 1: "El Temor a la Mujer Vampiro," in: *La Nación* (17 July 1922), p. 1.

The image shows a woman who takes cupid's task into her own hands and throws a dangerous arrow at a horrified young man. "Gone are the days," so the

* For critical comments on earlier versions of this paper thanks are due to Asunción Lavrin and to my friends and former colleagues at Tufts University Virginia Drachman and Howard Malchow.

anonymous author told his readers, "when zealous mothers watched over the virtue of their daughters and when the enemy was the lover who tried to seduce the timid maidens. Today the mothers have to watch over the virtue of their sons and defend them against the bold approaches of the girl of our days. … Today, the vampire woman who 'jazzes,' 'shimmies,' 'pets' and 'spoons' is the most formidable enemy of North American young men."[1]

Certainly, the use of the imagery of the vampire was not new to a Chilean reading audience used to the European romantic tradition and to the Gothic novel. What was new and surprising was the connection the author established with the stereotypical 'American girl' and her favorite pastimes. Jazz, shimmy, petting, and spooning were parts of the foreign and strange world of the United States that seemed to be remote not only in space but also in time and morality. This was an exotic world far detached from Chilean reality, or so it appeared. And yet, the "fear of the vampire woman" was not just an eye catching barb in an increasingly sensationalist press. It also reflected a sense of perturbation Chileans felt as they faced the modernization of their society, which seemed to be inevitable and yet at the same time foreign and thus threatening.

A complex cluster of massive changes was taking place in Chile in the first three decades of the twentieth century. While still characterized by hacienda agriculture the country suffered from the demise of an export economy based to a large degree on nitrate. Spurred by the rapid growth of population the processes of urbanization and industrialization made progress in a time that was also marked by a high degree of social unrest. The election of the Radical Party candidate Arturo Alessandri to the presidency in 1920 was a sign of the challenge to tradition. It also demonstrated the influence of the rising new middle class of urban professionals in the decade after the First World War. Although still relatively small in numbers these educated shopkeepers, tradespeople, clerks, white-collar professionals, and state employees had a profound impact on major reform projects. Yet, despite intensive public debates many of the intended social and economic reforms, for example labor legislation or educational reform, met with the stubborn resistance of a traditionalist oligarchy.[2]

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[1] "El Temor a la Mujer Vampiro," in: *La Nación* (17 July 1922), p. 1.

[2] For the significance of Alessandri's election see: René Millar, *La elección presidencial de 1920: tendencias y prácticas políticas en el Chile parlamentario* (Santiago: Ed. Universitaria, 1982). For the economic changes: Luis Ortega, "El proceso de industrialización en Chile, 1850-1930," in: *Historia* (Santiago) 26 (1991), pp. 213-245. Patricio Meller, *Un siglo de economía política chilena, 1890-1990* (Santiago: Andrés Bello, 1998), pp. 11-54. For

In addition to social and economic change, a growing number of Chileans were exposed to a variety of new images. Newspapers and magazines introduced new techniques to reproduce photographs and cartoons. Modern mass media like radio and cinema had their roots in the 1920s. Visual and popular culture were revolutionized by the emergence of a cultural industry and mass culture, perceptions of the 'other' and the 'self' were deeply transformed in the process, traditional forms of everyday life were shattered.[3]

Because many of the innovations were imported directly from the United States, the northern neighbor captured the popular imagination in Chile more than ever.[4] Backed by an enormous flow of investments, the 'American way of life' as a symbol of modernity was ever more interesting for an urban elite and an emerging middle class that went to see Hollywood movies and was fascinated by U.S. lifestyles. To countless Chileans it seemed as if they were in the middle of a new conquista carried out by the Yankees, or as they called it: the *Norte Americanización* of their country. Daniel de la Vega, a leading journalist, concluded in 1928: "The North American expansion is unstoppable. It imposes its commerce on us, it fills our streets with Fords, it makes us admire its moralizing films and now it enters triumphantly the zone of our patrimony and of our dreams."[5]

New images consisting of old stereotypes and new elements of things American—or better U.S. American—began to circulate in the 1920s. Yet, contrary to contemporary opinions and fears they were not imposed upon Chileans from an overpowering Yankee 'other' but rather they were appropriated and utilized within specific social contexts of power by Chileans themselves. In general, images and stereotypes allow us to understand, and interpret a distinct part of objective reality. They are instruments, which enable us to structure the multi-

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the middle class: Jaime García Covarrubias, *El Partido Radical y la clase media: La relación de intereses entre 1888 y 1938* (Santiago: Andrés Bello, 1990). Gabriel Salazar and Julio Pinto, *Historia contemporánea de Chile,* vol. 2: *Actores, identidad y movimiento* (Santiago: Lom, 1999), pp. 65-92. Patrick Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the Middle Class* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2001), pp. 103-169.

[3] Stefan Rinke, *Cultura de masas, reforma y nacionalismo en Chile, 1910-1931* (Valparaíso and Santiago: Univ. Católica/DIBAM, 2002).

[4] For the context see Stefan Rinke, *Begegnungen mit dem Yankee: Nordamerikanisierung und soziokultureller Wandel in Chile, 1898-1990* (Cologne-Vienna: Böhlau, forthcoming).

[5] Daniel de la Vega, "Las conquistas de Norteamérica," in: *El Mercurio* (26 May 1928), p. 3.

farious information we receive into a meaningful whole by relating it to already existing patterns of interpretation about ourselves and the world. Images function like a filter that determines not only what we see but also the way we see it.[6] These 'mental' images are reflected in the 'real' images, which in the period under study were revolutionized by mechanical reproductions in photographs and films. Their mass distribution reinforced the high persuasive power of the image and turned it into a venue of shared thoughts and emotions, thus laying the cornerstone of our modern visual culture.

The 'American girl' was a very important element of the new 'mental' and 'reproduced' images of the United States in Chile. Why were Chileans so interested in the U.S. 'vampire woman' and how did they perceive her? What do the images reveal about their attitudes towards the multiple changes they were facing in their everyday lives? What do they show about their concepts of beauty and lifestyles, of femininity and masculinity, of gender hierarchies and women's rights? It is my hypothesis that the literate sector of society read about and looked at the U.S. flapper with a mixture of curiosity, mockery, voyeuristic desire, and a sense of disturbance. The image of the Yankee girl reflected the growing apprehension about changes in family life and in the social role of Chilean women that began in the 1920s. Chilean perceptions of the exotic U.S. femininity reveal that gender as a category to establish "the social organization of the relationship between the sexes" and the way this relationship is perceived gained new relevance in public discourse.[7]

I

In the pages of the most important newspapers and magazines after the First World War Chileans were tantalized by stories and especially photos of young and successful actresses. Coverage of celebrities and celebrated beauties in the United States appeared not only in liberal newspapers or gossipy magazines but also in conservative publications. Most important was the influence of Hollywood movies that swept theaters across the country and attracted a much

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[6] Hans-Joachim König und Stefan Rinke, "Einleitung," in: Id. (ed.), *Transatlantische Perzeptionen: Lateinamerika - USA - Europa in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Heinz, 1998), p. 10-11.

[7] Joan Scott, "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis," in: *American Historical Review* (1986), p. 1053.

broader constituency than any printed medium could reach since about 50 % of the population was illiterate. The Chilean audience saw and heard with steadily growing curiosity the latest gossip about all major stars.[8]

What these images showed was a new kind of beauty of Yankee women that seemed to reflect a slowly emerging new ideal. It transgressed traditional norms and puzzled observers. Thus, in 1928, the magazine *Hollywood* could be sure of public interest when it commented upon a sensational event that had symbolic implications: "A whole continent was preoccupied with the hair of Mary Pickford. The fall of her classic curls has exasperated many of her admirers."[9] The exasperation was well-founded. The new haircut of the movie star implied a masculine look that replaced the well-rounded bodies, pale hands, and big innocent eyes of the past with a muscular slim appearance, masculine hands, and an intelligent look.[10] Physical appearance was accompanied by a new and saucy female fashion which found its new models in Hollywood, too.

Ill. 2: "Las espaldas desnudas," in: *Zig-Zag* (13 Sept. 1930)

Many custodians of Chilean customs considered a paradisiacal fashion that left ever more parts of the body like arms, shoulders, and the lower half of the

[8] A good example is: "La mujer más hermosa de Nueva York," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (21 Mar. 1919), p. 1.

[9] "Comentarios del Doctor Pullman," in: *Hollywood* (Sept. 1928), p. 31.

[10] "La belleza femenina está transformándose," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (21 Mar. 1920), p. 1. E. Gómez Carrillo, "A qué edad es verdaderamente bella la mujer," in: *El Sur* (7 Sept. 1924), p. 3.

legs uncovered shameless. To them, the new U.S. style of fashion stood out for its indecency and, moreover, served as a bad moral example.[11] Yet, at the same time a plethora of daring photos like the one above (illustration 2) were reproduced in Chilean media which showed exactly these scenes to what must have been a grateful audience given the ubiquity of the images.

In order to circumvent the auto-censorship of Chilean media, journalists who wanted to present more audacious photos, had to create a distance to their own reality. This type of picture was unproblematic so long as it was clear that the image represented the distant reality of the foreigners, the United States. Thus the U.S. had become an 'exotic' foil through which Chileans enjoyed voyeurism publicly and without punishment.

Señorita Pila Subercaseaux Aldunate
SANTIAGO Foto Llaguno.

EL GRAN CONCURSO DE BELLEZAS, ORGANIZADO POR ''LA NACION'' Y ''ZIG-ZAG''

EL JURADO GENERAL ELIGIO LAS BELLEZAS QUE REPRESENTARAN A CHILE EN EL CONCURSO MUNDIAL DE PARIS

Se elige Reina de la Belleza Nacional a la señorita Pila Subercaseaux Aldunate. — Gran velada de arte criollo, para la proclamación de la Reina.

Señora Cécily Cook de Wittig
VALPARAISO Foto Valk y Cía.

Ill. 3: "El gran concurso de bellezas," in: *Zig-Zag* (1 Nov. 1924).

Of course, these developments did not go unchallenged but became a cause of concern and outrage. To critics libertine garments were a clear symptom of decadence. Apart from causing serious health problems, they maintained, the new fashion constituted a real danger in offending common decency. As one commentator claimed, wanton female dress in the United States was "a great, enormous problem for the whole world."[12] Indeed, the sexual connotation of the new fashion was a most disturbing aspect. Mainstream Chilean concepts of fashion and beauty were still much more traditional as illustration 3 proves. According to these concepts real beauty was defined by chastity, purity, and last but not least, membership in the social elite.

However, critics of the new permissiveness fought a losing battle and they sensed it. There seemed to be no solution to this problem because, as one voice pointed out, fashion was simply following a new lifestyle that was characterized

[11] "El desnudo y la edad de la piscina," in: *La Nación* (16 Oct. 1929), p. 3.

[12] Mont-Calm, "La 'flapper' de ayer y la 'flapper' de hoy," in: *Zig-Zag* (20 July 1929).

by sports and passion for the cinema.[13] This new lifestyle was epitomized in the symbol of the 'flapper' - a term frequently used by Chileans in the second half of the 1920s for the new type of young women in the United States. The flappers were presented as urbane, sporty, single, and seductive. According to the then current stereotypes, the U.S. flapper had left behind the residues of patriarchal society like family and traditional moral beliefs. By becoming a mass phenomenon and being exported even to Chile, 'flapperismo' gave further substance to the idea of an onslaught of U.S. style modernity.[14]

If U.S. women were disturbing the traditional norms and morality that was only part of it. In addition, they were constituting an increasingly important mass of consumers. In Chilean media and especially in advertisements of U.S. brands, women were represented as consuming an enormous amount of cosmetics and household equipment, smoking cigarettes, wearing manufactured clothes, and enjoying phonographs. In addition, U.S. girls seemed to excel in modern activities like driving cars and flying airplanes. Readers could gain the impression that Yankee women were even more progressive than men and therefore embodied modernity itself.

Yet, Chilean media did not tire of pointing out that flapperismo and consumerism were dangerous. The front pages of the newspapers continuously reported sensational stories about female disasters due to their misuse of the modern gadgets they revered. Modern life was unhealthy and risky– this at least was the gist of the many reports about accidents, suicides, and mental illness of women in the United States.[15] Certainly there was an additional and hidden message beyond this: if the lifestyle of North American women was dangerous then Chilean women had better not try to imitate them. A closer look at the perceived changes of gender relations will give some suggestions as to why the male-dominated press made such an effort to convince women that it was not desirable to follow the model of the flapper.

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[13] "La moda actual: exhibición y desnudo," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (26 Dec. 1919), p. 1. See also Alacran, "Los novios en el cine," in: *El Industrial* (20 Mar. 1928), p. 1.

[14] The term 'flapperismo' was coined by María Eugenia, "Mr. Hicks y la flapper," in: *El Industrial* (14 Mar. 1928), p. 1.

[15] "Un extraño caso de doble personalidad," in: *La Nación* (13 Mar. 1922), p. 1. "El suicidio de Betty Montgomery," in: ibd. (5 Mar. 1922), p. 3. "Una dentadura que envenena la vida," in: ibd. (8 July 1922), p. 1. "La tragedia de la 'perfecta belleza norteamericana,'" in: ibd. (18 Mar. 1928), ill. supplement, p. 9. "La vida novelesca de Starr Chacha de Nueva York," in: *Zig-Zag* (25 July 1931), pp. 92-93.



Ill. 4: "Las flappers," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (9 Apr. 1929), p. 7.

II

The images of women as the vanguard of modernity in terms of appearance, lifestyle, and consumerism combined frightfully with a set of stereotypes Chileans held regarding the U.S. family organization. Since the turn of the 19th century, the stereotype of female dominance in the U.S. family and society had gained wide currency throughout much of Latin America. In Chile, it entered the public mind with the discourse of *Norte Americanización* and reinforced existing male stereotypes of the henpecked husband and his bullying wife. After the First World War it seemed to many as if women were not content any longer with defending themselves against obnoxious men or with oppressing their husbands but were now also "sustaining, guiding and controlling the world."[16] To Chilean critics it seemed as if Yankee females clearly controlled married life and did not have to give up any of their premarital freedom. Thus, they were portrayed as leaving the home and meeting other men whenever they pleased. The positive aspects of feminine emancipation were rarely mentioned. Rather commentators were talking gloomily about a feminine danger. The satirist César Cascabel concluded in 1927: "In the United States, man is the weak sex. Never in my life have I seen husbands as degraded as those who are subjected to the big stick of an American wife."[17]

According to Chilean commentators even flirtation between young people had been revolutionized to such a degree that the flappers were able to choose and to leave their lovers as they pleased. This implied that the young and unmarried women were having premarital sexual relationships with numerous partners. The contemporary "¡Oh, Margarita!" cartoons in the leading newspaper *La Nación* of the late 1920s best reflect the images current in Chile at the time (illustration 5). The archetypical flapper Margarita was the young and carefree femme fatale who had reached the ultimate stage of female liberty by playing with her male companions. While Margarita was not explicitly introduced as a Yankee she was shaped after what was perceived to be the fast living, sexually liberal North American female youth. The lack of a clear national designation heightened the relevance for the Chilean audience. This type of female existence remained far detached from reality in Chile and yet it gave reason to look

[16] "La mujer sostiene, guía y controla el mundo," in: *Hollywood* (Sept. 1928), p. 6.

[17] César Cascabel, "Los derechos del hombre," in: ibd. (Mar. 1927), p. 31.

with sorrow and/or expectations toward a future when Chilean women would follow North American standards.



Ill. 5: "¡Oh Margarita!", in: *La Nación* (21 Feb. 1926), p. 5.

Whether carefree like Margarita or surreptitious like the vampire woman, the encounter with U.S. females through popular perceptions threatened the cherished tradition of female role models. Progressive voices maintained that this was nothing but a reflection of the changing times. Yet, more frequent critiques demonstrated deep-seated reservations. The emancipation of women was hardly acceptable in a society marked by its machismo and most were agreed that "the days in which woman dedicated herself to the kitchen had been better."[18]

Many Chilean women themselves rejected what they considered as a too libertarian attitude of the North Americans. Even progressive voices on gender politics like the liberal feminists claimed a special femininity for Latin American women. Female and male participants in the discussion alike accepted the natural differences of the sexes claiming for women a special sphere of grace and beauty but also weakness and a need for protection. A conservative critic like Carmen de Burgos - alias Colombine - constructed an ideal Chilean countermodel to the Yankee flapper: "… the Chilean woman has conserved the tra-

[18] "Eran mejores los tiempos en que la mujer se dedicaba a la cocina," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (31. Jul. 1932), p. 3.

dition of the race; she is a housewife … and above all a motherly woman … mother more than anything."[19]

According to the critics of the modern women the inapplicability of U.S. standards and customs was most obvious when it came to family life. The instability of the family in the United States was considered notorious and there was a regular coverage about marital problems in that country. Commentators usually placed the blame on women: they could not decide where to find real happiness. They were torn between their social life in clubs and their household chores which were usually neglected. Moreover, as part of the gender equality they demanded modern women were committing adultery and free love, and they were fighting for liberal divorce laws. This reflected a deep disorientation tangible in the problems of childcare and in a general decline of birth rates.[20] Chileans - so the critics stated - could be happy not to have these kind of aberrations in their own country. Yet, by the early 1930s the debate about birth control in Chile was an alarm bell for conservatives who warned of repeating North American faults.[21]

Marriage—the core of the family—was singled out as a key problem area. Many Chilean observers concluded that there was a connection between the rise of Hollywood dreams and the superficiality of modern life. The crisis of matrimony was seen as a direct result of an age in which women were enjoying more and more freedom. Critics left no doubt that women were to blame because they were neglecting their children and husbands. It was claimed that the reason why men had not yet revolted against this condition was their internalization of the role as servants to women, first as brothers and later as husbands.[22]

Yet, the most important issue concerning gender relations in the media was the so-called 'explosion of divorce rates' in the United States. Given the extensive newspaper coverage the Chilean reading public had to take notice of the fact that in the United States a wave of lawsuits had developed around romantic

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[19] Carmen de Burgos, "Mujeres chilenas," in: *Cine Mundial* (Apr. 1928), p. 315.

[20] "Una esposa que no se deja besar por su marido," in: *La Nación* (12 July 1922), p. 1. "A la yanqui," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (1 Dec. 1927), p. 3.

[21] Ricardo Salas Edwards, "Dos grandes transformaciones de la vida americana," in: *El Mercurio* (28 Oct. 1929), p. 3. "La semana internacional," in: *La Unión* (21 July 1930), p. 3. Alejandro Huneeus Cox, "Birth-Control o la limitación de la natalidad," in: *Estudios* 1 (1933), pp. 28-33.

[22] Ernesto Montenegro, "La edad de oro de la solterona," in: *La Nación* (23 Oct. 1927), p. 19.

relationships. Corresponding to the stereotype of the dominance of money in all spheres of Yankee life, commentators concluded that even in love affairs and marriage the dollar ruled. Women were accused of calculating the profit to be reaped from both marriage and divorce. To critics it seemed that sinful U.S. women only married in order to get a divorce and live off the alimony. Marriage seemed to become a luxury issue when one looked at the immense sums of alimony that were part of daily life in the United States. Shamelessly, Yankee women were first seducing poor youngsters and when they had them caught in matrimony they were exploiting them to the fullest before they got rid off them. The judicial system clearly favored women and they took advantage off it. For men that implied that each marriage involved the risk of financial ruin. Small wonder then, that Yankee men would shy away from the altar. In general, it seemed that the age of materialism first introduced by males had become part of gender relations to the detriment of men.[23]

In a society like Chile in which divorce was still impossible, the images that were presented as conditions in the United States were hardly comprehensible. There were numerous sensational reports in the dailies and magazines about new records in marital separations. Divorce seemed to be a veritable mass movement or a popular sport in the United States. Indeed, Chilean visitors to that country noted that spouses decided to have a divorce for the most ephemeral reasons and that the lives of Hollywood stars like Rudolf Valentino or Gladys Walton were representative of North American marriages.[24] The philosopher Enrique Molina reported that the number of cases had risen from 25,000 in 1886 to 124,000 in 1916 with a tendency to increase further. He and other supporters of divorce claimed that this was more a reflection of social change than of immorality. From Molina's point of view divorce presented a way out of an insoluble dilemma.[25]

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[23] The sensationalist coverage of divorce in the United States was voluminous in the 1920s. A few examples: "El amor no tiene precio," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (19 June 1922), p. 3. "Las ventajas de la mujer en Estados Unidos," in: *La Nación* (3 Oct. 1920), p. 3. "Una luna de miel que cuesta dos millones," in: ibd. (25 Aug. 1922), p. 1. "Compañía agradable por 10 dollars," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (5 Apr. 1923), p. 3. (25 Jan. 1923). Domingo Melfi, "Algunos aspectos humanos del divorcio," in: *Atenea* 7 (Sept. 1928), pp. 134-137.

[24] Pinochet, *El diálogo*, vol. 3, p. 26. "Una familia que bate el record de los divorcios," in: *La Nación* (21 Nov. 1920), p. 7. "¿Viva el divorcio?" in: *Sucesos* (23 July 1924). "Hollywood bate el record de los divorcios," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (24 Sept. 1927), p. 3. "En el país de las estrellas, los contratos y los divorcios," in: *Zig-Zag* (7 Mar. 1931).

[25] Enrique Molina, *Por las dos Américas: Notas y reflexiones* (Santiago 1920), p. 185.

The majority of Molina's compatriots did not concur. For them it was clear that in the United States the duration of marriage simply obeyed market laws. According to literary critic Omer Emeth who reviewed Molina's book, the trends in the United States signified a movement back towards "pure and simple animalism."[26] The stereotypical puritan moralism of the Yankees contrasted starkly with this moral abyss. For the critics of the United States, this was yet another sign of the notorious Yankee hypocrisy. Emeth and other conservatives were convinced that Latin American and especially Chilean women would never behave like their U.S. contemporaries.[27] Many Chilean readers could not understand why nor could they accept the fact that what had been presented to them as the fantastic dream marriages from fairyland were profanely ending in divorce. However, they obviously loved to read about it.

The immense interest of Chileans in the divorce question was related to the ongoing discussions about the legalization of divorce in their own country. Since the turn of the century, that discussion gained relevance as several divorce bills were introduced in Congress in the 1920s and 1930s.[28] Yet, these attempts failed due to conservative resistance. An important argument against a divorce law was the bad example of the United States. The strength of this argument was reflected in the fact that the advocates of divorce constantly had to refute it. They tried to do so by emphasizing the positive and exemplary aspects of the liberal divorce legislation in the United States.[29] Yet they were fighting a losing battle because the sensational reports about divorce records and about immoral seductresses who were destroying marriages continued to titillate Chilean audiences. Thus, negative images of moral decay in the United States had a direct impact upon a crucial reform debate in Chile.

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[26] Omer Emeth, "El movimiento literario," in: *El Mercurio* (8 Nov. 1920), p. 4.

[27] "Lo que no hacen las mujeres de nuestra raza," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (23 Dec. 1929), p. 11.

[28] Asunción Lavrin, *Women, Feminism, and Social Change in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, 1890-1940* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1995), pp. 227-228 and 232-236.

[29] See e.g. a series of articles in the journal *Atenea*: "Atenea y el divorcio," in: *Atenea* 5 (Aug. 1928), pp. 3-4. Raúl Silva Castro, "Precisiones sobre el divorcio," in: ibd. (Feb. 1928), pp. 379-383.

III

The divorce question was only one indication of the extent to which Chilean male elites feared a modernization which seemed to imply the rise of feminism and which they perceived as North Americanization. In their fight against the Chilean feminist movement of the early 20th century critics used similar arguments to prevent the widening of women's civil and political rights. The perception of developments in women's politics in the United States again became an important factor affecting the results of the discussions. And the critics had reason to be afraid as delegations of Chilean women attended Pan American and Inter-American Congresses that demanded women's liberation, the franchise, and the right to work.

In the general discussion about feminism in Chile the United States once again was the offending example and often the point of reference around which domestic antagonists clashed. Conservative critics of the United States often connected the signs of decay in U.S. society with the rise of an aggressive feminism. They claimed that women invaded all fields of male dominance and undermined them thus destroying the very fabric of society. The feminists' quest for equality turned them into the vanguard for the masculinization of women. The inevitable result was the feminization of men who joined the the feminist cause. Yankees truly appeared as the "masters of feminism."[30]

Compared to what had already happened in the north—women gaining the right to vote and decisively influencing the prohibition question—Chileans were lagging far behind. Yet, to simply satirize Yankee feminism was to underestimate the danger. Critics noted that the movement was steadily rising among themselves, too. Conditions in the United States were the writing on the wall. They were a mirror of what Chile could turn into if it gave up its traditions and blindly followed the call of modernization and democracy. Conservative women of different social classes pointed out that "by invading the attributes of man … woman loses influence in the family."[31]

Yet, the critics of what was perceived to be Yankee-style feminism were not restricted to the conservative camp. Women who belonged to the young genera-

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[30] "El feminismo norteamericano," in: *El Sur* (6 Feb. 1923), p. 3.

[31] Luisa Fernández de García Huidobro, "¡¡Feminismo!!" in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (20 Oct. 1924), p. 3. For popular denigrations of feminism see e.g. Cascabel, "Problema feminista," in: *La Nación* (8 Apr. 1920), p. 1.

tion of liberal middle-class feminists in Chile also had a different type of feminism in mind than the one they termed the "violent North American type."[32] Theirs was to be gentle and admirable, a "sound feminism" not intended to shake the foundation of traditional society and overly provoke male sensitivities.[33] Constantly defending themselves against the scorn of male commentators, most Chilean feminists did not completely transgress traditional gender roles although they claimed moral superiority for the female sex. Indeed, satirical commentaries usually claimed that the feminists were trying to become men.[34]

Liberal feminists were convinced that because of the "different passions" of Latin as compared to Anglo-Saxon women, different political aims had to be defined for them.[35] In contrast to their sisters in the north who strove for full emancipation Chilean feminists were agreed that there were natural differences between women and men and that the former had to shape their activities accordingly. Indeed they claimed that feminism correctly understood would transform Chilean women into "better housewifes, nobler spouses, more expert mothers, and above all excellent citizens."[36] Their aims were moderate reforms in welfare, health, education, legislation, and ultimately the right to vote. Reinforced by a strong Roman Catholic tradition a woman's role remained that of wife and mother in a patriarchal family.

Yet, Chilean feminists further reiterated that in order to become as prosperous and progressive as the United States Chile simply had to start to make good use of its female potential.[37] Their assessment was often based on experiences as exchange student in the United States. Since the 1910s, women activists like Labarca not only spread news about the North American movement but more-

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[32] "El feminismo en Chile," in: *El Mercurio* (17 Apr. 1920), p. 3.

[33] "Hacia un sano femenismo," in: *La Unión* (4 Dec. 1920), p. 1.

[34] See e.g. Cascabel, "Problema feminista," in: *La Nación* (8 Apr. 1920), p. 1.

[35] Eliodoro Yáñez, "Prefacio," in: Amanda Labarca, *Actividades femeninas en los Estados Unidos* (Santiago 1914), p. xxxvii.

[36] "¿Qué clase de feminismo defendemos y por qué?" in: *Acción Femenina* (Sept. 1922), p. 17. See also Delia Ducoing de Arrate [Isabel Morel], *Charlas femeninas* (Santiago: Unión Femenina de Chile, 1930), p. 183. For a discussion of the different concepts of feminism see Francesca Miller, *Latin American Women and the Search for Social Justice* (Hanover: UP of New England, 1991), p. 74.

[37] "Una palabra …" in: *Acción Femenina* (Oct. 1922), p. 2. Eloisa J. Ruiz B., "Por qué somos feministas," in: *Acción Femenina* (Dec. 1922), p. 9. For the background see Lavrin, *Women, Feminism, and Social Change*, p. 299.

over founded women's associations like e.g. the *Círculo de Lectura* following U.S. models.[38] The aim was to stimulate women to leave their household routine and to assume social responsibility.[39] Though inspired by the Yankee example the mushrooming new organizations soon gained their own distinct profiles as did Chilean feminism in general.[40]

Apart from the U.S. model in social life, Chilean women also profited from the increasing cooperation on the Pan-American level. The participation in transnational activities which had started after 1898 was a substitute to the lack of possibilities for political participation within Chile.[41] Cooperation between U.S. and Latin American feminists at these congresses did not always function smoothly. The long-time Chilean representative Labarca echoed the consensus about the differences in Chilean and U.S. feminism when she stated in a letter to a representative of the Pan-American Women's Committee in Washington: "… for us the example of the other countries of South America signifies a more important stimulus than that of the women of the United States whom we can imitate only with difficulty because their development … has been much more rapid than our own."[42]

According to Labarca change in Chile was to come through reforms and not through revolution. In making this clear repeatedly she and her followers draw a clear distinction to the "revolutionary" North American kind of feminism. Through reforms, women were to gain a better position in Chilean public life without giving up their feminine attributes. Most important was the long over-

[38] Lavrin, *Women, Feminism, and Social Change*, pp. 286-289. In addition, see Paz Covarrubias O., *Movimiento Feminista Chileno, 1915-1949* (Santiago: Pontifícia Univ. Católica, Instituto de Sociología, Documento de Trabajo No. 22, 1974). Edda Gaviola et al., *Queremos votar en las próximas elecciones: Historia del movimiento femenino chileno 1913-1952* (Santiago: Coedición, 1986). Julieta Kirkwood, "Feminismo y participación política," in: María Angélica Meza (ed.), *La otra mitad de Chile* (Santiago: Instituto para el Nuevo Chile, 1986), pp. 13-42.

[39] Amanda Labarca, "Un servicio obligatorio," *El Mercurio* (30 Nov. 1919), p. 5.

[40] For the role of female clubs in the U.S. as models see e.g. "Los clubs femeninos de Nueva York," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (7 July 1919), p. 1. Amanda Labarca Hubertson *¿A dónde va la mujer?* (Santiago: Extra, 1934), pp. 134-136. Corinne A. Pernet, "Chilean Feminists, the International Women's Movement, and Suffrage, 1915-1950," in: *Pacific Historical Review* 69 (2000), p. 667.

[41] Miller, *Latin American Women*, pp. 72-73, 82-87, 94-95, and 105-107. Pernet, "Chilean Feminists," pp. 663-664 and 672-681.

[42] Amanda Labarca to Glen Levin Swigget (Santiago, 9 Apr. 1918). in: vol. 1, Pan-American Women's Committee, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

due reform of the antiquated legislation which had granted husbands virtually absolute legal power over their wives and children. This reform was finally begun in 1925. However, feminist critics noted that the new laws did not go far enough in emancipating women from their legally inferior position. In Congress, feminists quoted especially the U.S. model as a standard for what remained to be done in Chile.[43]

After the First World War Chilean feminists advocated for female suffrage. When in 1920 the United States amended its Constitution to grant suffrage to women this was a major impetus for reforms in Latin America and in 1929 Ecuador was the first country in the region to follow that example. Indeed, some progressive bourgeois reform supporters and even some young conservatives regarded the United States as a good example of how women contributed positively to national politics without losing their feminine grace and thus helped to check the Bolshevik danger.[44]

More often, however, the U.S. example was used for the purpose of objecting to reform. The columnists of the conservative newspaper *El Diario Ilustrado* pointed out that political equality based on suffrage was carried to ridiculous lengths in the United States. Stereotypes of female inadequacies in public office abounded in the Chilean media. Moreover, politics was seen as a dirty business in which women would lose their purity. From that perspective, female activists were nothing but lazy housewives who had run away from their homes.[45]

Despite the power of this discourse, first steps to extend suffrage to women were made in the course of the 1920s and 1930s until in March 1934 literate and tax-paying women were allowed to participate in municipal elections.[46] The decision reflected the growing importance not only of feminism but also of women in society at large. Although Chilean statistics rather blurr the fact, steadily increasing numbers of women were working not only in the traditional

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[43] Lavrin, *Women, Feminism, and Social Change*, pp. 192-197 and 211-216. For the criticism in Congress see: "Derechos civiles de la mujer," in: Chile, Congreso, Cámara de diputados, *Boletín de sesiones extraordinarias* (15 Nov. 1927), pp. 104-107.

[44] Ricardo Salas Edwards, "La futura acción política de la mujer," in: *Revista Chilena* 29 (1919), p. 339.

[45] "Casos y cosas de América," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (7 May 1922), p. 1.

[46] "El voto femenino," in: *La Nación* (13 June 1931), p. 3. For the discussion that led to the decree see e.g. "Voto femenino," in: *El Mercurio* (4 June 1929), p. 3.

jobs in industry, domestic service, and commerce but also in some professions.[47]

Contrary to anti-feminist stereotypes, most working women were not overly-independent young women unwilling to marry but rather working-class women who simply had to work in order to feed their families or siblings. For the large majority of the working women, work meant miserable circumstances and wages well below those of men. Feminist reformers fought against these problems, which they argued caused immense social problems. The writings and activities of Chilean feminists contributed to the reevaluation of reproduction and of the health of mothers and babies as a national concern. The problem of protecting working women and children tied in with the preoccupation with education, public health and eugenics fashionable in the first decades of the twentieth century. Reformers understood their task as that of social workers in the tradition of famous U.S. reformers like Jane Addams.[48] Yet they did not even have to look as far north as the United States, because the mining enclaves served as influential models. With schools and social programs, the U.S. companies attempted to discipline working class women and to construct a middle-class femininity in the U.S. style by transforming them into efficient administrators of the household, responsible mothers and conscious participants in consumption who would keep their husbands happy.[49] Indeed, these examples set a standard that contributed to protective legislation for women incorporated in the Labor Code of 1924.[50]

In addition to their activism, women of middle class background, too, slowly became an important part of the work market in these decades. As sales clerks, typists, teachers, and so on they were looking for jobs in the growing cities. Indeed, many employers preferred female workers because they could pay them lower wages.[51] In order to prepare young female professionals, feminists

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[47] For an insightful discussion of the Chilean census see: Elizabeth Q. Hutchison, "Working Women of Santiago: Gender and Social Transformation in Urban Chile, 1887-1927" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of California at Berkeley 1995), pp. 42-52.

[48] Labarca, *Actividades femeninas*, pp. 91-134.

[49] Thomas Miller Klubock, *Contested Communities: Class, Gender, and Politics in Chile's El Teniente Copper Mine, 1904-1951* (Durham: Duke UP, 1998), pp. 63-69.

[50] Hutchison, "Working Women of Santiago," pp. 301-359. Labarca *¿A dónde va la mujer?* pp. 40-42.

[51] Roxane (Elvira Santa Cruz Ossa), "La situación de la mujer," in: *El Mercurio* (25 Mar. 1928), p. 9. Id., "Las actividades de la mujer chilena," in: ibd. (14 Oct. 1928), p. 5.

demanded better educational opportunities. Frequently, the example of the United States was quoted as proof of the success to be expected by high quality vocational education for women. It was noted that the high level of education had enabled U.S. women to make astounding progress. Comparable developments were expected in Chile where U.S. businesses were now offering new kinds of clerical jobs that were open to female applicants. Some even claimed that it would be wise to train as many women as possible in the U.S. in order to fill these demanding jobs.[52]

For feminists and their supporters it was obvious that a sound education of women in the United States had contributed to the success story of that nation. In a land where everybody worshipped work, there was no question that women should participate. According to the reports and pictures, women in the United States were independently searching their own place in society and were not willing to accept a role as appendix of their husbands any longer. In banks, in public administration and even in the male domain of the military U.S. women were now playing an important role. They were finding clerical jobs in the business and administration. The stereotype of the female typist originating in the U.S. entered Chile in the 1920s. The leading U.S. typewriter producer Underwood reacted to this development by cultivating the Chilean market (illustration 6).[53]



Ill. 6: "Underwood Commercial," in: *La Nación* (14 July 1923), p. 21.

[52] Labarca, *Actividades femeninas*, p. 14 and 31-32.

[53] "El feminismo marcial en los EE.UU.," *Pacífico Magazine* (2/1917). "Feminismo norteamericano," in: *El Diario Ilustrado* (11 Jan. 1919), p. 1. "Algo sobre la mujer que trabaja," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (20 Jan. 1930), p. 1 and 27.

The image of limitless opportunities for women in the United States were accepted at face value by most supporters and opponents of feminism alike. Yet, while the former admired it the latter drew different conclusions from this erroneous judgement of conditions in the north. Critics of feminism and North Americanization claimed that after all success of a woman in the working life depended either on her beauty or on her female intuition. When the Great Depression set in and competition for the few remaining jobs became harder stereotypes like these became instrumental in once again pushing women away from public life.[54]

In that period the old stereotypes against the feminists were rediscovered and gained a new dimension. 'Flapperismo' was quoted as a sign of what would happen in Chile if the feminists asserted themselves. For the critics it was clear that feminists wanted to be like men. They were threatening the very spheres of masculinity by adopting male dress and behaviour and transgressing the social boundaries of their sex. The fear of sexual ambiguity inherent in the alleged androgyny of modern women caused nervous reactions on the part of their male detractors. Yet, by the 1930s they secretly had to admit that the liberated but also sexually seductive women they saw in the pictures from the United States did not fit the stereotype of the asexual old spinster that had traditionally been reserved for feminists. The stubborn denial of the feminity of feminists and the calumny of sexual deviance were the ultimate expressions of these uncertainties.[55] They fed on the images of the ultramodern women encountered in the land of the Yankees.

From the 1910s to the 1930s, Chileans were presented with phantastic images of female life in the United States that mirrored many of their pent-up desires. In a society in which public exhibitions of nudity were frowned upon the United States served as a disguise through which to enjoy undressed female backs or legs of a foreign and 'exotic' modern reality. As long as it remained just that Chilean males were fine although they shook their heads about some of the

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[54] "El valor de las profesiones," in: *La Información* (Jan. 1927), p. 55.

[55] "Una muchacha resuelta y animosa," in: *Las Ultimas Noticias* (25 Apr. 1927), p. 3. For the prejudice against feminists see Lavrin, *Women, Feminism, and Social Change*, p. 35.

more extreme outgrowths of flapperism and although the more critically minded warned of the dangers arising from female libertinage Yankee style.

Yet, the women from the north developed into a symbol and a model for female liberation and emancipation. The new woman as she was perceived to exist in the United States threatened traditional gender roles. If there existed a causal relationship between the spreading of images and 'Yankee expansionism'—as many contemporary observers believed—then almost everybody had to have a personal stake in the question of modern femininity. Indeed, to many male observers Chilean women appeared to be imitating the U.S. American girl. Opponents of feminism in Chile won political battles by making good use of the negative images received and constructed from the United States. They did so although Chilean feminists did not tire to differentiate themselves from the U.S. model and to claim a special 'Latin' femininity. Feminists rejected what they perceived as the extreme examples of female emancipation in the United States (and what in itself was often a biased stereotype feeding on the representations in the media) as much as their male and female critics but they failed to make this point universally accepted.

Thus, opponents to reform triumphed. But despite their victory they were left with a large residue of uncertainty because the concept of the modern woman was a troubling aspect of the progress of modernization and a sign of decadence for the very fact that it originated in the United States and thus seemed inexorable. It threatened to subvert gender roles, social order, even concepts of sexual identity. Whether supporter or opponent of feminism, the perceptions of U.S. women were relevant to all involved in these crucial discussions.

PART IV

ELITE CULTURE

BETWEEN IMITATION AND DELIMITATION

MARIANO PLOTKIN

VISIONS FROM THE SOUTH: VICTORIA OCAMPO, *SUR* MAGAZINE AND THE UNITED STATES[1]

The use of the term "North Americanization" applied to Latin American culture (even if the expression "North Americanization" appears in quotation marks) presupposes at least two strong hypotheses: first that there is such a thing as a homogeneous North American (USA) culture which can penetrate into a passive Latin America, and second, that there is such a thing as Latin America as a distinctive and also more or less homogeneous cultural space. I believe that both hypotheses are at least problematic. North American (meaning the US) culture is cross-cut by tensions and is shaped by globalizing forces that are multidimensional and multidirectional. It has been repeated many times that today the US supermarkets sell much more Mexican salsa than ketchup. Of course we can argue that it is not the same to sell salsa in Boston as to open a McDonald's store in Chiapas. Sociologist Peter Berger has established a distinction between what he calls "sacramental goods" (those whose consumption carry within itself the acceptation of certain values that transcend the particular good being consumed), and "non-sacramental goods" (those which do not have that quality). According to him McDonalds hamburgers have this kind of quality (sacramental). Every time we eat a Big Mac, for instance, we are not only doing that, but also absorbing a portion of American (i.e. US) values of efficiency, freedom, cleanliness, etc. The same thing, Berger argues, cannot be said about a Bostonian buying Mexican salsa in a Stop and Shop store. According to him there is little or nothing about Mexican values imbibed in the salsa that can be absorbed through its consumption.

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[1] I want to express my gratitude to Paula Siganevich, Lila Caimari, Piroska Csúri, and Federico Neiburg for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. All the translations of Victoria Ocampo's writings are my own.

We could argue that patterns of cultural relationships are probably much more complex than what this model suggests, and that there is no way of measuring which goods are "sacramental" and how. The reactions against McDonalds (to continue with the example) in France and elsewhere by anti-globalization groups suggest that there is an obvious symbolic component in this icon of American popular culture that transcends the Big Mac in itself, but that for some people at least carry values that are not necessarily those that Berger claim. Moreover, the penetration of other "foreign" (should we say "global"?) cultural patterns into the US cultural fabric in recent years, from New Age practices vaguely inspired in "Eastern culture", to a more tangible new kind of religious diversity that deeply permeates into the US society, is evident for anyone who visits any American large city.

Regarding Latin America as a cultural space, to take its existence for granted is at least as problematic as arguing that such a thing as a European cultural space with essential qualities, exists (in spite of the efforts of some "Europeanists"). Therefore, the "North Americanization" (even if we accept such a term) of Latin America could not mean the same thing, for instance, in Mexico, a country "so far from God and so close to the US", as Don Porfirio Díaz is claimed to have said, and which lost half of its territory to its northern neighbor; and in Argentina, a country geographically and culturally removed from the US. This is not the place to discuss these issues in detail here, but it is important to raise these questions and to bear them in mind.

This articles focuses on cultural contacts and perceptions instead of on unilateral penetration of elements of one culture into the other. In particular I am concentrating on the evolving perception on the US of Argentine writer and cultural entrepreneur Victoria Ocampo. Through her literary magazine *Sur*, Ocampo greatly contributed to shaping the Argentine field of intellectual production for three decades. She was at the same time a typical representative of her social class, the powerful Argentine landed elite, and a unique member of that group. While Ocampo shared many of the prejudices and elitist ideas of her class, she occupied a particularly prominent position in the world of Argentine and Latin American "high culture." Paradoxically, we could say that Ocampo's glance was paradigmatic of influential sectors of the Argentine society and at the same time very unique. I suggest that Victoria Ocampo inaugurated a new and more productive way of perceiving the US in Argentina that was later recovered by a new generation of intellectuals. This article, thus is not about "north americanization" but about how one culture (in this case the North American one) could

be perceived by another culture (in this particular case the Argentine one), and I do this by focusing on the representational itinerary of someone who occupied a key position in Argentine culture.


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BUENOS AIRES

In 1931 Victoria Ocampo, assisted by a group of young and brilliant Argentine intellectuals, created *Sur*, a literary and cultural magazine. *Sur* was born and developed as a component of Ocampo's dense network of international connections. At least until the early 1960s *Sur* was a mandatory referent in the Argentine world of letters, defining good taste and becoming a space of legitimation for writers. When an author published in *Sur* it meant that s/he had "made it." Although the original purpose of the magazine was to promote the cultural integration of the "two Americas," it has been noted that *Sur* looked more towards Europe than towards either of the Americas. Ocampo and her magazine have been denounced both by the cultural and political right and left as "europeistas." They have been accused of having their eyes turned towards Europe (Paris in particular), and their backs towards their own country (and continent). A quick look at the magazine's index shows that during its life European (mostly French and British in this order) writers had a much larger presence in it than writers from either of the Americas. However, North American literature did have an important presence in the pages of *Sur*, particularly during its first decade of existence. We could also say, moreover, that through *Sur*'s life, the Americas (and the US in particular) occupied a problematic position, something to consider, reflect on, and discuss.[2]

Although I am not going to dispute the centrality of European (particularly French) culture in Victoria Ocampo´s cultural entreprise, it is clear that the US occupied a central place in her imaginary as well as in her real life. New York gradually replaced Paris as her second home. Her glance towards the US was neither that of Domingo Sarmiento, who found there a model for the future of his country, nor that of the "dandies" of the 1880s who felt contempt, later mixed with fear, for the uncultured colossus of the north. Nor was her perception associated with that prevalent during the era of "consumism" when the hegemony of the US in the world became indisputable. For Ocampo, coming to terms with the US required an exercise of interpretation and it was precisely in her awareness of that need where the fruitfulness of her glance originated. Ocampo's "American experience" however, also clearly showed the limits of her interpretive effort and the tensions that originated in those limits.

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[2] This can be seen in the several "Seminars" organized by *Sur*, in which such topics as "Do the Americas have a common history?" or "Interamerican relations" were discussed.

VICTORIA OCAMPO, BETWEEN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

Victoria Ocampo was born in 1890 to a wealthy family whose presence in South America could be traced to the 16th century. Her family was related to the founding fathers of Argentina. As Ocampo herself suggested, the history of the country could be told through the history of her family and acquaintances:

"I heard people speaking about the 80 years that preceded my birth, years during which the Argentines adopted that name, as a family affair. Everything had occurred at home, or in the house next door, or across the street: San Martin, Pueyrredon, Belgrano, Rosas, Urquiza, Sarmiento, Mitre, Roca, López….All of them were relatives or friends."[3]

Like many children of her social class, Ocampo was educated in French and, to a lesser extent, in English. French was her first language and even as an adult she would have her own writings translated from that language into Spanish. Ocampo spent a substantial part of her childhood in Europe, particularly in Paris with her family. "I mixed up the French and the Argentine national anthems because for me the fatherland extended soon beyond the frontier. I did not know how to write yet. What I did know was how to remember in two languages that soon were three."[4] Victoria Ocampo, therefore, grew up European and cosmopolitan, and at the same time South American. She did not see a contradiction between her deep Argentine (or rather South American) roots and her cosmopolitanism, quite the opposite; the two aspects of her identity coexisted although in a tense relationship. In a talk delivered in Italy in 1934 she elaborated on this issue. When asked to speak about American (i.e. South American) themes, she replied: "…I have been South American for so many generations that I have forgotten how to pretend being one. I don´t feel the need to disguise myself as a South American, to disguise my thoughts South American style, or to discover South America at every moment." And later, "For me South America is so mixed with Europe, so imbibed in Europe…that it is not possible to evoke one without the other. And there are very few American themes in which Europe does not slip into."[5] One decade later, Ocampo would elaborate further on the topic:

"I believe that when I write…about Emily Bronte or about Virginia Wolf,….the little I can say about them, I say as an American. And I think, moreover, that the amount of americanism that

[3] Victoria Ocampo, *Autobiografía 1: El Archipiélago* (Buenos Aires: Sur, 1982), p. 10.

[4] Ibd., p. 8.

[5] Victoria Ocampo, *Testimonios. Segunda Serie* (Buenos Aires: Sur, 1941), pp. 291-292.

I have is not diminished by the passion that I feel for Europe, but, on the opposite, my passion towards Europe enriches it [my americanism]."[6]

ARGENTINES AND THE US

Victoria Ocampo's *Europhilia* was not an exception among the Argentine elite. The European trip and the knowledge of European languages (i.e. French) were essential components of the education of the members of the Argentine high bourgeoisie. The US was not included in this itinerary until more recent years. Unlike for people from other parts of Latin American (particularly Mexicans), for Argentines the US was considered neither a good nor a bad neighbour, geographically and culturally it was simply not a neighbour. This did not mean, however that the US was ignored, but rather that a complex pattern of perception developed. In the 1840s and again in the 1860s Domingo Sarmiento (president of Argentina between 1868 and 1874) had found in the US what he had been unable to find in Europe: a model for the organization of Argentina. Sarmiento found the future in the US, and concluded that the future worked. The coming of that future, however, would be delayed in Argentina. If in 1888, towards the end of his life, Sarmiento could predict that "We shall be America, as the sea is the ocean. We shall be the United States"[7] it was because it had not happened yet. Decades later Georges Clemenceau would say that Argentina was the country of the future, but that the problem was that it would always remain so.

With the exception of Sarmiento and very few others, however, the US was not a cultural reference for Argentine intellectuals, and New York was very seldom included in "The Trip." When it was (more often after the coming of the era of the airplane) it was considered a plus to the real cultural Mecca: Paris. People would go to New York on the way back from Paris. In the 1880s, when Argentina could still more or less realistically compete with the US for the hegemony over the southern part of the subcontinent, the few intellectuals who went to the US suspected in advance (and later of course, confirmed) how little that country had to offer in terms of real culture; the Argentine gentlemen

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[6] Victoria Ocampo´s intervention in "Debates sobre temas sociológicos. ¿Tienen las Américas una historia común?" in: *Sur* 86 (1941), p. 102.

[7] Cited in Tulchin, Joseph, *Argentina and the United States: a Conflicted Relationship* (Boston: Twayne, 1990), p. 17.

denounced the yankees as mercantile parvenues. Their vision of the genteel south of the US was, however, more indulgent. Some of the Argentines admired American dynamism and material progress, but most of them rejected what they perceived as American exacerbated materialism and lack of sophistication. Miguel Cané, a prestigious journalist and politician, and a member of the Argentine elite, put it clearly in the early 1880s when he said: "A Frenchman of the good old world with an allowance of thirty thousand francs a year can make wonders; to a yanquee, an annual allowance of 200,000 francs would not be enough."[8]

Argentines saw themselves as more educated and less concerned with mercantilism than Americans. This vision was matched by the Argentine foreign policy that consistently opposed U.S sponsored Pan-Americanism and the increassing hegemony of that country over the continent. Gradually, as the US began to excercise its power more openly in the Americas, defiance turned into fear and concern. "Don't you know that those people want to swallow us?" shouted Maria Rosa Oliver's (a close collaborator of Victoria Ocampo in *Sur*) grandfather, offended by his grand daughter's enthusiasm for Theodore Roosevelt.[9] The publication of José Enrique Rodó's influential *Ariel* and the Latin American-wide cultural movement known as *Arielismo* originated in those concerns. Latin American cultural and spiritual traditions rooted in its Hispanic past would serve as a barrier against the assaults (both political and cultural) coming from the materialistic and soulless north.

Later, in the 1920s and even during the dark 1930s, the USA would become for some the imaginary place where everything could be possible, the place where dreams could come true, and where members of the frustrated Argentine middle class, from writer Roberto Arlt to film critic Chas de Cruz, could fantasize about "pegar el batacazo" (turning things bottoms up). In any case, it continued to be true that New York had less prestige than Paris and that the US had less value than Europe in the Argentines' imaginary. The USA was primarily seen as a place to consume, not to cultivate oneself. Even much later, during the 1960s, when New York had already replaced Paris as the cultural center of the Western World, Argentine artists would go to Paris first seeking a proper education before going to New York in order to get the necessary validation in the international art market. Victoria Ocampo encapsulated Argentines perception

[8] Cané, Miguel, *En viaje, 1881-1882* (Buenos Aires: La cultura Argentina, n.d.), p. 311.

[9] Cited by Tulchin, *Argentina,* p. 24.

of New York and the US when she remembers in her autobiography: "New York was not for me more than a new, inmense unknown city. I only feel attracted for those cities full of rememberance or personal dreams. And I had never dreamed with New York…"[10] However, after 1930 New York would gradually replace Paris as Ocampo´s second home. In fact the origins of *Sur* (starting from its very name which refers implicitly to a "north"), are closely related to the US.

VICTORIA OCAMPO, *SUR*, AND THE UNITED STATES

In 1929 the American leftist intellectual Waldo Frank visited Argentina in a lecture tour. He arrived in the country right after the departure of Count Hermann Keyserling, with whom Ocampo had had a traumatic relationship. The encounter between Frank and Ocampo was momentous. "This encounter marks also an important moment in my life: my interest for the US, its writers, it cities and its "way of life" was revealed to me suddenly."[11] Frank proposed the creation of a magazine under the direction of Ocampo and invited her to visit the US to continue discussing the matter. Her encounter with Frank and with the US was from the beginning interpreted by Ocampo as an encounter with the unknown. "He [Frank] was the first specimen of a man from the North of our continent who fell under my eyes…He spoke about the US in a fascinating way."[12] This kind of ethnographic glance would predominate in Ocampo´s first visit to the US too.

According to *Sur*'s "official history" as it was promoted by Ocampo and repeated by others, Frank proposed to Ocampo that they create a cultural magazine under her direction and invited her to visit the US (a country she had never visited before) to continue discussing the project. As historian Horacio Tarcus has recently demonstrated, however, in the origins of *Sur*, not only Frank and Ocampo were involved, but also Samuel Glusberg, the editor of the magazine *La Vida Literaria* of Buenos Aires and, to some extent, also Peruvian Marxist intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui. In the context of Mariátegui's imminent visit to Argentina (he was being harassed by Leguía's regime in Peru), Frank discussed with Glusberg the creation of a new magazine, *Nuestra América*, that

[10] Victoria Ocampo, *Autobiografía VI. Sur y Cía* (Buenos Aires: Sur, 1984), p. 64.

[11] Ibd., pp. 50-51.

[12] Ibd., p. 51.

would be a continuation of Mariátegui's *Amauta* in Argentina. During his visit to Argentina (which was organized by Glusberg), Frank met Ocampo, introduced her to Glusberg and included her into the project. As Frank pointed out in his autobiography: "Victoria's contribution [to the magazine] would be her familiarity with the classics and with the last novelties in the fields of arts and letters from Paris and London; Glusberg's contribution would be his solid knowledge of the social problems and of the prophetic vision of the Americas."[13] However, the alliance between the aristocratic Ocampo and Glusberg, a Jewish immigrant intellectual with leftist sympathies, was bound to fail. After Frank's departure, Ocampo (who had the capital and the connections) appropriated the project and launched the new magazine: *Sur*. The name was suggested by Ocampo's friend, Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset. By that time Mariátegui had died without ever visiting Argentina, and Glusberg had been excluded from the project.[14]

After meeting Frank, Ocampo left for her usual trip to Europe and later in 1930, reluctantly, she finally arrived in the US, setting the direction of a triangle that she would invert only three decades later (more on this below); Buenos Aires-Paris-New York and not the other way around. Her arrival in New York made her feel uncomfortable in every possible way: she did not know what to expect, it was too hot, and her fancy French dress was unsuitable for New York's weather. She felt such a fascination with the city, however, that she almost forgot about the magazine project and was admonished by Frank for that.

Ocampo described the kind of fascination she felt for New York again in ethnographic terms. Sylvia Molloy uses Edward Said's category "orientalism" to characterize Ocampo´s description of New York City, which she (Ocampo) compared not with Paris or London, but, in an attempt at exoticizing it, rather with Rio de Janeiro. Animal noises from the Central Park Zoo, incredible skyscrapers, a light that was not like the one in Europe, noise from the cars in the streets, everything was different and unknown. And above all, the black people of New York who raised at the same time puzzlement, admiration and racist prejudices in Ocampo. The blacks provided a spectacle and everything they did was interpreted in such terms. One night Ocampo went together with Waldo Frank, the black poet Gordon Taylor and Russian film-maker Sergei Eisenstein

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[13] Waldo Frank cited by Horacio Tarcus, *Mariátegui en la Argentina o las políticas culturales de Samuel Glusberg* (Buenos Aires: El Cielo por Asalto, 2001), p. 48.

[14] See Tarcus, *Mariátegui*, chapter IV.

(whom she invited to Buenos Aires although the visit never materialized) to a service at an Evangelical church in Harlem. The excitement she felt in that opportunity is clear from the letter she wrote to her family immediately after. She started the letter in Spanish writing about other things, but half the way through, when Ocampo began describing the events at the church, she switched to French as she usually did when she felt excited about something. The church "qui ressemble un peu a un theatre", "malgré l´aspect comique de ces pauvres nègres," "il m'est impossible de vous l´écrire. Il faudra que je vous le *mime*," "ce spectacle." These are the recurrent expressions that Ocampo used when describing what she saw that night. The American black was the total "other" who incarnated better than anyone else the North American otherness. "What is going to happen?" she anxiously asked Gordon Taylor several times, who kept replying "I don't know, you will see."

Ocampo´s writings distilled a sensual feeling of inadequacy before the unknown. It is clear from the beginning that New York was not like Paris but that, at the same time, it was not like Buenos Aires either. As she herself pointed out, New York was SOMETHING ELSE and there was no point in making comparisons. Coming to terms with the US would require new analytic categories. The foundational moment of this new relationship with the city took place when Ocampo visited photographer Alfred Stieglitz in his gallery in Manhattan, "An American Place." The moment is encapsulated in a small episode. Stieglitz looked at New York through the window and said: "Is that beauty? I don't know. I don't care. I don't use the word beauty. It is life." And Victoria Ocampo: "An American Place… It never occurred to me that an oasis could have such a name. Happiness like this I did not expect."[15] This episode stuck in her mind, and two decades later Ocampo would revisit it: "And I applied to our South America what Stieglitz told me looking at Manhattan's skyscrapers through a window."[16] It should be noticed that Stieglitz himself was a hinge between American and European cultures. The husband of painter Georgia O'Keefe and the father of American modernism in photography, he was also the one who introduced European modern art into the US art market and Ocampo appreciated that.

[15] Victoria Ocampo, *Testimonio, Segunda serie*, p. 393.

[16] Victoria Ocampo, "Vida de la revista *Sur*. 35 años de una labor," in: *Sur* 303-304-305 (November 1966-April 1967), p. 10.

But New York also allowed Ocampo (as Beatriz Sarlo suggests) to think about Buenos Aires, and the Americas in general, in a different way. The relationship that Victoria Ocampo had established between Buenos Aires on the one hand, and Paris and London on the other, was characterized by a clear asymmetry. Europe was what Buenos Aires was not, and those cities had what Buenos Aires lacked. New York, on the other hand, also did not have what Paris had and yet it was fascinating in its own terms. "New York teaches her another possibility of culture, an American one"[17] says Sarlo. In fact, according to Sarlo, Ocampo was able to establish a whole new kind of relationship with North America and its intellectuals, a kind of relationship that she had never been able to establish with Europeans: a more equal one. In spite of her cosmopolitanism and her money, in Paris, Ocampo was still seen as a *grand dame* of the periphery. If Ocampo made an effort to understand the US and its intellectuals in their own terms, then Waldo Frank and others were able, according to Sarlo, to understand Ocampo in her own terms, thus making possible a new kind of relationship. As Ocampo would remember decades later:

"We felt in him [Frank] an authentic fervor for all things American, both from the north and from the south. Perhaps even more for those things from the south…We were not used to such an attitude from North American or European writers. This made us feel good and moved us at the same time."[18]

Frank's understanding is contrasted with the Europeans´ misunderstanding of the project *Sur*. Ocampo´s French friends asked her to what extent the magazine would turn its back to Europe, "simply because I said that its [*Sur´*s] main goal would consist of studying the problems that concern, in a vital way, to us Americans. To turn our backs to Europe! Do you feel the infinite ridicule of this expression?", she asked Waldo Frank in the letter that opened the first issue of *Sur*. Europeans could only offer misinterpretations of the project.[19]

Taking a close look at the exchanges between Frank and Ocampo, however, it is possible to perceive even there (although in a much more subtle manner) the kind of asymmetry that Sarlo detects in the relationship between Ocampo and the Europeans. In 1942 Frank visited Buenos Aires for the second time as part of the program of intellectual exchange established by the American

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[17] Beatriz Sarlo, *La máquina cultural: maestras, traductores y vanguardistas* (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1998), p. 135.

[18] Victoria Ocampo, *Testimonios. Septima serie, 1962-1967* (Buenos Aires: Sur, 1967), p. 177.

[19] Victoria Ocampo, "Carta a Waldo Frank," in: *Sur* 1 (Verano 1931).

government as a complement to the "good neighbour policy." The visit ended badly. A Jew, a leftist and an American, he was physically assaulted and beated up by a group of right wing nationalists, before being expelled by the Argentine government. In the banquet of reception, Victoria Ocampo took the opportunity to tell Frank once again that "[your] America and mine are, in our feelings and in our will, the same America."

Frank's vision, however, although navigating in similar waters was obviously different. After saluting Victoria Ocampo as the "real queen of South America," (a native queen?) Frank detailed the list of things that he admired from "her America": the music, the food (above all the food), the dances, "your complex and infinitely varied temperaments, as strong as your Andes, and as subtle as the perspective of your Pampas." Frank had discovered in the "Hispanic world" (which included not only Latin America from Mexico to Argentina, but also Spain), the missing dimension from "his America."

"It was the feeling that we, precisely the US, a civilization biased by the machines, led by men with heads like machines and worn out by machines, needed a new capacity of integration so the total structure of civilization would not collapse: we needed a source of strength for integration and essential knowledge that the hispanic and indohispanic world seemed to possess."[20]

This asymmetry (*civilization* in the north; *essential knowledge* in the south), however, was more nuanced than the one existing between Ocampo and her culture on the one hand, and the Europeans on the other. With them it was clear where the center was located: in Paris. The "ethnographic look" could only go in *one* direction. With the North Americans, however, the situation was different because the center was elsewhere: still in Europe (at least until the 1940s). Therefore both sides of the continent admitted the kind of ethnographic look that Frank, to some extent, practiced in Buenos Aires, but that Ocampo did not deprive herself from practicing in New York.

The discovery of the North allowed her to re-discover the South: "My first contact with the North of our continent in 1930 had as an unforseen consequence making me discover the South as much as the North," remembered Ocampo in her autobiography.[21] The knowledge originating in this relationship between "the two Americas" -what we could call Ocampo's and *Sur*'s americanism-, was, however, limited. As Sarlo points out, this americanism

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[20] "Waldo Frank en Buenos Aires," in: *Sur* 92 (1942).

[21] Ocampo, *Autobiografía* VI, pp. 67-8.

does not address the "inequality and violence that separate Latin America from the US (this blind point thus defines an ideology and politics)."[22]

What was revealed to Victoria Ocampo in her first trip was that there was another possible America, one whose contrasts with her own were encapsulated in the Panama Canal: "the blooming cleanliness of the yanquee neighborhood with its well watered grass and its white fridges (symbol of the North American civilization)…on the other side, foul odors, the way people dressed, their houses, the procastination, the dirtiness that fell to the street through doors and windows."[23] Ocampo made explicit the tension she felt as a result of the discovery of her own America through the lens of the "other" America. Ocampo writing to José Ortega y Gasset from Lima on her way back from the US: "I can not explain to you to what extent I feel drawned by contradictory feelings. It seems that I am going to explode. On the one hand, the yanquees, terribly efficient, although limited at times (in some aspects), but able to transform inhospitable places and able to make people live in remote locations; on the other hand, Panamenian, Peruvians ["and even farther South, us," Ocampo added in the published version of the letter thirty years later], miserable and unable in comparison."[24] In order to calm the anxiety provoked by the simultaneous discovery of the North and the South, and their seemingly unbridgeable differences, Ocampo seeks refuge in what she know better: Europe. "After one hour of strolling in the streets of Antofagasta, I returned to the Santa Clara and locked myself up in my room. I put on a record by Debussy, and sank my head in the record player… Debussy=Oxigen=Europe (sic)." The simplicity of this dichotomous vision of the North and the South would become more nuanced, and the perception more complex, in the following years.

It would take Victoria Ocampo thirteen years to return to the US. In 1943, in the middle of World War II, Ocampo was invited by the Guggenheim Foundation to spend six months in the US, most of which she spent in New York. According to Sylvia Molloy, this trip shows the limit of Victoria Ocampo's relationship with the US. During her second stay in the US Ocampo hanged out mostly with French exiles. Her letters to her former lover and protegé Roger Caillois (then in exile in Buenos Aires) are full of nostalgia for a

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[22] Beatriz Sarlo, "La perspectiva americana en los primeros años de Sur," in: *Punto de Vista* VI: 17 (April-June 1983), p. 11.

[23] Ocampo, "Vida de la revista", p. 6.

[24] Ibd., p. 5.

lost Paris: "Nothing that I feel, nothing that I love is attractive for this country. This makes me feel depressed, but I know that it is stupid to expect anything else."[25] Those letters contrast with the impression she transmitted in a text written one year later for publication: *USA_1943*. In this later text Ocampo showed a level of familiarity with, and comfort in the city that contrasts with the "orientalism" present in the letters of 1930, a familiarity combined with an admiration for what America represented in 1943. The letters to her friend, written immediately after the facts she narrates, on the other hand, show a totally different kind of feeling.

In *USA 1943* Ocampo expressed her love for the US, including for its food and, above all, showed a higher level of understanding. It is enough to compare the impressions of her first visit to Harlem back in 1930 (a spectacle) with the impressions originating in her visit to one of Father Divinity's "heavens" in 1943. This time what called her attention was the cleanliness, honesty and devotion of the faithful (all blacks, of course) as well as the food. No place for spectacle this time.[26] Similarly it seems that Ocampo explicitly recognized that new categories were needed to understand and appreciate what the US had to offer:

"I don't think that the North Americans are better than the rest of the world, but I don´t think either that the lack of truffles is in them a bad omen. Why should we trace a paralell between the Place de la Concorde and the skycrapers of Fifth Avenue…? The beauty of a fish is not that of a bird. Unfortunately, there are many people who hate what in the USA is different from Europe, that is to say, almost everything."[27]

What Ocampo was discovering was that the US could be liked and even loved, as long as this is done in its own terms.

The letters to Caillois, on the other hand, distill a different feeling for the city. New York was characterized as a melancholic place. This melancholy was represented by the presence of French exiles and, in a more pathetic way, by the *Normandie*, that French icon of a glorious past that almost sank in the docks of the city, like a metaphor for a less than glorious present. According to Molloy, what New York evokes for Ocampo in this visit is neither the far away Buenos Aires, nor the New York of ten years ago, but the Paris erased by the war. If

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[25] Letter from Victoria Ocampo to Roger Caillois, June 26, 1943, in Victoria Ocampo, Roger Caillois, *Correspondencia (1939-1978)* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1999), p. 143.

[26] Victoria Ocampo, *Testimonio. Tercera Serie* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1946), pp. 277-8.

[27] Ibd., p. 265.

Sarlo claims that the USA constituted the space where the asymmetry existent in Ocampo's relationship with Europe was erased, for Molloy, the USA constituted a limit, or rather a frontier for Ocampo. The referent would always be Europe. Things, however, don't seem to be so clear cut. Ocampo´s feelings for New York as they were expressed in the letters to Caillois (with whom she shared specific memories about Paris), are in good part shaped by precise historical factors and no so much by the limits of her understanding of the US.

In 1943 Ocampo, a fifty-three year old woman, was returning to New York, a city that she had not visited for thirteen years and where she had only been once before. Paris, the city where she had grown up, seemed to be lost probably for ever, and at the same time nostalgic vestiges of it could be found everywhere in New York, from the ailing *Normandie* (or the *Richelieu* full of French flags), to the numerous exiles for whom the American experience would occupy a central place in their intellectual lives.[28] But in this second trip it also became clear to Ocampo that the center of the world (and of her imaginary) had been displaced. One can only feel nostalgia for what is gone and lost, and this was clear for her:

"[In 1943] the situation of France was tragic. When I saw the Unicorn tapestry at the Cloisters, and later, in Chicago, when I saw the eyes of Renoir's women …I almost started crying. Those museums halls, bright and clean, like operating rooms froze me. France was there, but like in a coffin. It was already Greece."[29]

Of course, although she did not say so, New York was Rome. Ocampo realized that looking for Paris alive in New York was a futile exercise. Appreciating what the US had to offer, however, required a process of learning. Recalling again her momentous first encounter with Stieglitz, she would narrate the episode again years later and concluded: "Who doubted it, my dear Stieglitz! Beauty has been born together with life in your puzzling country…I have *learned* not only to admire but also to love the United States, this is what I want to say with no further delay."[30] After this process of *learning*, Ocampo concluded that *life* was West of the Atlantic.

After this second trip to the US many others would follow. From the letters she sent home it becomes clear that Ocampo felt each time more comfortable in the US. New York gradually replaced Paris as her second home. Similarly, the English language also started appearing more conspicuously in her correspon-

[28] Jeffrey Mehlman, *Emigré New York: French Intellectuals in Wartime Manhattan, 1940-1944* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 2000).

[29] Ocampo, *Testimonios. Séptima serie*, p. 131.

[30] Ocampo, *Testimonios. Tercera serie,* p. 215. My emphasis.

dence. Victoria Ocampo established a triangulation writing in French from and about New York, and in English from and about Paris. Victoria Ocampo liked the American comfort, the American prosperity and even the American food (she goes as far as to say that she liked English and American food better than other foods). Her insistence on food could be read as a metaphor for her need to "swallow" and "digest" the US. In other words, she likes American modernity, a modernity that was different from the European one, and that she could appreciate only after a process of learning. Ocampo found the Guggenheim Museum ugly but modern, efficient, and well organized; whereas the Hispanic Foundation in New York was described, in a kind of counterpoint, as disorganized, dirty, and definitely not efficient. If in 1943 she had almost cried when she saw the Unicorn tapestry at the Cloisters, by 1959 she had learnt to enjoy the Cloisters in their own terms: The Cloisters are perfect, Ocampo says "there is not lack of taste" there. Even the restrooms are perfect because they are equipped with all a women may need when menstruating and "I don't cease to admire those small things."[31] The double negation ("not lack of taste"), however, betrays the tension existing in her vision of the US. It seems that lack of taste was to be expected in American culture.

If her encounter with Stieglitz had had a foundational character, her trip of 1963 was another landmark in her relationship with the USA and Europe. This time she went first to New York and from there to Paris, thus inverting the usual direction of the triangle. And Ocampo writes to her sister Angélica from Paris:

"It has been a long time since I arrived from New York to Paris for the last time (generally I come from here to there). The impression is different. What one notices upon entering the Gare St. Lazare is another economic level, obvious deficiencies, dirtiness, noise. And when you stroll in the streets of Paris, the same thing….The streets, beautiful as ever, are (given what I carry in my eyes) those of a marvelous provincial city…Comparisons are odious, but impose themselves upon us. Paris is Rome: *incomparable*, but…*pièce de musée*, in comparison with the contemporary era whose "example" would be New York. The might of the US in enormous and is incarnated in New York."[32]

The substitution of New York for Paris –now demoted to the rank of a "provincial city"-, was of course not complete and the process reflected tensions

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[31] Letter of December 21, 1959 in Victoria Ocampo, *Cartas a Angélica y otros* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1997), p. 111.

[32] It is not clear if this was really the first time that she traveled in this fashion. What seems clear is that this is the first time she was conscious about this change of itinerary and draws consequences about it. See letter to Angelica and Pancha from Paris, November 21, 1963.Ocampo, *Cartas*, pp. 151-152.

that, it could be argued, are to some extent inherent to the Argentine culture. Ocampo defended the US from French (and Argentine) anti-Americanism. To a critical comment made by Spanish critic Guillermo de Torre (Jorge Luis Borges' brother in law and one of Ocampo's closest collaborators in *Sur*) about American films, she responded: "If all I have seen and heard in the USA (what orchestras, what theaters, what bridges, what parks, what public libraries, what museums, what cream ice-cream) is the result of the "Coca-Cola civilization" (that I don't drink), then Long Live Coca Cola!."[33] However, her comments on the US also include descriptions of drunk and stolid Americans who certainly did not go to those museums and libraries, although most probably ate the ice-cream and drank Coca Cola. The eclectic list of things that she admires from the US is already evidence of the existence of a tension in her feelings (let us also remember that for Ocampo the USA was very much limited to New York). Paris continued to be the locus of the old, we could say "restricted" high culture. But in terms of places that shaped more general visions of the world, what we could call "culture" in a broader sense, New York was clearly taking precedence.

Sylvia Molloy has emphasized the marginality of Victoria Ocampo in New York City. According to Molloy, although it is true that Ocampo went often to New York, after 1943, her contacts with the culture of the city remained shallow. Ocampo met mostly exiles and her loneliness was evident. I would like to propose, however, an alternative vision. My hypothesis is that the US does not constitute a limit for Victoria Ocampo, but rather that it is the place where the limits of her original project of modernity and, we could say, of her social class, became evident. When Victoria Ocampo began to visit New York regularly she was no longer a young woman. Moreover, for the first time she started having financial concerns. The price of things and the effort she had to make in order to keep up her lifestyle became a central topic in the letters Ocampo sent home from New York. If decades before she had showered Virginia Woolf with expensive gifts (to the latter's dismay and puzzlement), now she is concerned about the price of a bouquet of flowers that she wants to surprise Vera Strawinsky with. She discovers that the Argentine currency is weaker than before. These worries about money became evident even in Ocampo's letters to Caillois of 1943:

"This life is ruining me, even if I live a very simple life; I am becoming bankrupt because I eat meat, because my window opens to the Central Park, because I have an extra room to receive people who come to see me, because sometimes I invite them for dinner, because I was sick,

[33] Ocampo, *Testimonios. Cuarta serie* (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1950), p. 232.

and because I am used to living as you have seen me living, and here it is necessary to be a multi-millionaire to live like that."[34]

The world was changing fast and also Ocampo's place in it. When she started going to the US more frequently, the country and the social position of its intellectuals was also going through a process of deep transformation. Ocampo's original contact in the US, Waldo Frank, belonged to the last generation of progressive "European style" American intellectuals who, after World War II, were replaced by professional academics. The redefined American intellectual field of the 50s and 60s was less hospitable to the likes of Victoria Ocampo, as she painfully realized. However, if the US was not totally satisfying, neither was Europe. As her friends died, Ocampo had to confront in Paris the same solitude she suffered in the US. If in New York she sought comfort for her loneliness in the movie theaters, the same happened in Paris. Except that even in Paris she preferred American films. And thus she wrote from Paris in 1963:

"Yesterday night, I went to see a detective story they were showing in a theater in the Champs Elysée (I only go to the theaters of this neighborhood, which I consider as mine). I had seen in the previous days French films that were horrible. Among them one by Francoise Sagan. Really horrible. When I saw the streets of New York and the Americans appeared, and spoke and moved in the screen, it was as if I breathed fresh air and *returned home How close to them I felt then!* What is going on here? Here, where so much beauty exists, and so much refinement and...so much decadence... Because there is a lot of decadence and backwardness. This, you remember Angelica, I felt for a long time. All things considered, Paris, what a beauty! But I see the streets of New York and breathe. Here they [the French] don't like the Americans. I do. They [the Americans] are the world of today. There is nothing you can do about it. And to hell with the envious (because it is envy)."[35]

If in 1930, on her way back from her first trip to the US, Ocampo had sought "oxygen" in Europe, sinking herself into Debussy's music, now "fresh air" came from the sight of the streets of New York. New York City, and more generally the US were the world today. Paris was the beauty of the museums, of a world irremediably lost, which Ocampo was lucid enough not to try to hang on too hard. Victoria Ocampo's world of dandy intellectuals of the interwar period, around which she had constructed her network of relations, was vanishing, and she knew it. In Paris, she still saw Malraux, another vestige of a previous era, now recycled as a cabinet minister in the De Gaulle government. But her friends of decades past were either dead (Albert Camus, Pierre Drieu la Rochelle), or became integrated into (or we could say even shaped) the new intellectual envi-

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[34] Letter from Victoria Ocampo to Roger Caillois, August 21, 1943, in Ocampo, Caillois, *Correspondencia*, p. 146.

[35] Letter from Paris, December 1963. Ocampo, *Cartas*, p. 175. My emphasis.

ronment in a manner in which she could not follow them. One case was Jacques Lacan whom she had known since the 1930's and with whom she had established a close relationship.[36] . We could say that the US represented for Ocampo an opening to a new world and a closure of an old one.

After the fall of Peron, in the new cultural and political environment that foreshadowed the sixties, *Sur*, the journal that had, for three decades, occupied a central place in the Argentine field of intellectual production, lost relevance. Although in 1955 it was still the most prestigious Argentine cultural magazine, it was not in the position to follow the process of fast cultural modernization that started after the end of the Peronist regime.[37] The prestige of *Sur* had relied on its dense network of international connections and on its position as the mouthpiece of an intellectual elite that managed to play the role of cultural legitimating agents within the Argentine space of cultural production. *Sur* belonged to an era when intellectuals perceived themselves as members of an international elite which operated according to its own rules, and with a relatively high level of autonomy from politics. This explains why Victoria Ocampo, a pro-allied liberal, could be at the same time the lover of Pierre Drieu La Rochelle, a right wing writer who would collaborate with the Nazis during the occupation and who (also a symptom of the times) after the liberation would be saved from execution by Malraux, only to commit suicide soon after.

During the sixties this position became more difficult to maintain for the aging elite. A younger generation of writers both in Argentina and abroad was displacing them in a context of increasing politicization of culture. As a result of this, *Sur* also became politically displaced. Since the 1930's the magazine (and Victoria Ocampo) had supported all the "good causes": the Republican side during the Spanish Civil War (although mildly at the beginning), more forcefully the cause of the Allies during World War II. During the Peron regime, although direct references to the Argentine political situation were absent in *Sur*, its fierce anti-Peronism was evident, and it was punished for that. Under the peronist government, Ocampo herself was briefly incarcerated without ever being charged of any wrongdoing. Indirect but highly critical references to the political conditions were discovered in the pages of *Sur* by anyone

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[36] In several letters written in the 1930s Ocampo expressed her admiration for Lacan. They continued corresponding although sporadically through the 1970s.

[37] John King, *Sur. Estudio de la revista argentina y de su papel en el desarrollo de una cultura, 1931-1970* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989), p. 207.

who could read between the lines. For decades *Sur* had incarnated the modernizing project of a closed and narrow liberal elite. The problem was that this project lost its momentum in the 1960s.

By the 1960s *Sur* could not maintain its central position any longer. It could not cut its ties with traditional liberalism in a moment when liberalism was being questioned both by the right and by the left, and when the canonical liberal interpretations of the peronist phenomenon were being revised by a new generation of progressive intellectuals. *Sur* turned its back to Latin Americanism and, above all, to the Cuban Revolution, both cultural icons of the sixties. In the new mass culture introduced by Peronism there was little space for the kind of elitism that *Sur* incarnated and the model of intellectual it promoted. The peronist and the post-peronist governments expanded dramatically the access to higher education, and culture also became an object of consumption. Certain books became cult objects for the expanding intellectual middle-class. It was the moment of the literary "boom", when certain authors, in the words of John King, became trade marks. Victoria Ocampo could not hide her puzzlement provoked by the new developments:

> "At this same time something unheard of is happening, the crowds [el vulgo] buy the works of Julio Cortázar (no one less than Cortázar) and take their books in their Torinos [a brand of cars] or in the subway or in the bus. However, Cortázar is clearly an author for the minorities, not for those readers whom he must bore to hell...because they are not prepared to digest him nor to enjoy him."[38]

Sur was unable to find a place for itself in the fast changing world.

Some aspects of Victoria Ocampo's project, however, were recovered years later in a totally different context. In 1978, when Argentina was ruled by one of the bloodiest military dictatorships ever to exist West of the Atlantic, another group of young, brilliant intellectuals led by another woman, Beatriz Sarlo, created a new cultural magazine, *Punto de Vista*, which exists to this day.[39] *Punto de Vista* has become one of the most important and respected publications of its type in the country. The social and political backgrounds of the members of *Punto de Vista*'s editing committee could not be more different from that of the

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[38] Victoria Ocampo, "Después de cuarenta años," in: *Sur*, 325 (1970) cited in King, *Sur*, p. 212.

[39] For a more detailed discussion of *Punto de Vista*, see Mariano Plotkin and Ricardo González Leandri, "El regreso a la democracia y la consolidación de nuevas elites intelectuales. El caso de *Punto de Vista. Revista de Cultura*. Buenos Aires (1978-1985)," in: Mariano Plotkin and Ricardo González Leandri (ed.), *Localismo y globalización. Aportes para una historia de los intelectuales en Iberoamérica* (Madrid: CSIC, 2000).

creators of *Sur*. Sarlo and her collaborators are middle class university graduates who during the sixties and early seventies had been radical leftist militants.

Punto de Vista, however, recovered and updated some important elements of Victoria Ocampo's project. The editors of the magazine wanted to reconstruct the "specificity of discourses" based on a certain level of autonomy (from politics) of the field of intellectual production. The early issues of *Punto de Vista* abound in articles about *Sur* and Victoria Ocampo which (if we read between the lines) have a strong self-referential content. *Sur* became permanent reference for *Punto de Vista*, particularly at the beginnings. *Punto de Vista*'s life developed in a context (both national and international) that was totally different from that in which *Sur* existed. However, like Victoria Ocampo, *Punto de Vista* also looked at some elements of the culture of the North (in this case the academic culture of the North) in search of instruments to interpret some aspects of the culture of the South. It is significant that *Punto de Vista* opened its fist issue with an article written by an American scholar (British but living in the US, Jean Franco), and that this article was about Latin American literature. As in *Sur* European culture continued to occupy a central place in *Punto de Vista*'s project, but the magazine recaptured an updated a vision of North American culture, that originated in Victoria Ocampo or that, at least, could be traced to her writings.

Going back to the discussion that opened this article we could say that the ways of looking at the US inaugurated by Victoria Ocampo and later recovered by other Argentine intellectuals presupposed neither a North American nor a South American cultural homogeneity. The question at stake is not a unidirectional imposition of cultural patterns, but rather a selective search for interpretive instruments in a culture, that is perhaps not so foreign, to understand one's own.

JOSEF RAAB

MUTUAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF A USABLE TRADITION: THE CASE OF JORGE LUIS BORGES

The Cuban poet Roberto Fernández Retamar has pointed out that "La escritura de Borges sale directamente de su lectura . . . Para él, la creación cultural por excelencia es una biblioteca."[1] Of course Jorge Luis Borges's broad and detailed familiarity with world literature is legendary. What is of interest in the context of a North-Americanization of Latin America are the inter-American aspects of the Argentine writer, specifically his reception of U.S. literature and the ways in which U.S. authors have in turn been influenced by him. In his roles as critic, literary historian, essayist and creative writer, Jorge Luis Borges crosses national and literary borders in the Americas. As the postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha has written, such cultural border crossings are not a simple matter:

> "the object of identification is ambivalent, and, more significantly, . . . the agency of identification is never pure or holistic but always constituted in a process of substitution, displacement or projection.
>
> . . . Designations of cultural difference interpellate forms of identity which, because of their continual implication in other symbolic systems, are always 'incomplete' or open to cultural translation."[2]

In other words: we do not expect inter-cultural contact simply to lead to an indiscriminate adoption of what is perceived to be characteristic of the other culture. Dealing with the Other is always an ambivalent affair. As demonstrated by numerous essays in this volume, dealing with the Other is also a continuous affair: cultural identities keep being refashioned. The same holds true for individual identities and attitudes: Borges's tastes and sensibilities as a reader and writer shape the ways in which he adapts foreign traditions to personal practices. They also determine his work as a cultural mediator who often wrote on North American literature (primarily for Latin American audiences).

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[1] Roberto Fernández Retamar, *Calibán: Apuntes sobre la cultura en nuestra América* (México: Diogenes, 1974), p. 61.

[2] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 162-63.

In dealing with U.S. and other literatures, Borges never seems to be suffering from the stifling "anxiety of influence" that Harold Bloom had seen as characteristic of one writer's reception of another;[3] instead his example illustrates the vitalizing effect of cultural and literary contact. Borges's wide reading created something like mental "contact zones" or "border zones," which the anthropologist and social scientist Renato Rosaldo calls "sites of creative cultural production."[4]

I have selected the case of Jorge Luis Borges and U.S. writers as an instance of inter-cultural and inter-American contact. Therefore I am not concerned primarily with Jorge Luis Borges as a fabulist or poet. Instead, my focus is on the Argentine writer as a literary historian, reviewer, translator, and essayist, as a man of letters interested in the literature of the United States, as a mediator between various literary traditions in the Americas. Being already proficient in English as a young child enabled Borges to immerse himself in British and American literature at an early age. Under the tutelage of his grandmother, Borges learned to read English before he could read Spanish. In his autobiographical essay for *The New Yorker* he recalled that "the first novel I ever read through was *Huckleberry Finn.* Next came *Roughing It.*" He remarked that he even read *Don Quixote* in English before he read it in Spanish.[5] In interviews he also professed his love of Americana like western movies and *West Side Story*.[6] His acquaintance with literature in English and his mother's work as a translator of William Saroyan, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Virginia Woolf also fueled Borges's interest in translation: for example, at the age of nine, he translated Oscar Wilde's tale "The Happy Prince" into Spanish.[7]

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[3] Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry* (New York: Oxford UP, 1973).

[4] Renato Rosaldo, *Culture and Truth. The Remaking of Social Analysis* (Boston: Beacon, 1993), p. 208.

[5] Jorge Luis Borges, "Autobiographical Notes," in: *The New Yorker* (19 Sept. 1970), p. 42. The use of English had already had a long tradition in his family: as he wrote in this same essay, "My father's maternal grandfather, Edward Young Haslam, edited one of the first English papers in Argentina," p. 43.

[6] For example, Ronald Christ, "Jorge Luis Borges. An Interview," in: *The Paris Review* vol. 40 (1967), p. 123.

[7] Signed "Jorge Borges," the translation was published in the Buenos Aires daily paper *El País* under the assumption that it had been executed by Borges's father (cf. Borges, "Autobiographical Notes," p. 44).

The first and main part of my essay will illustrate how Borges's literary and cultural background and his own goals in writing inform his construction of a U.S. tradition and his select uses of U.S. authors as models. A second part will then be concerned with a reverse movement and will explore the ways in which contemporary U.S. authors construct Borges as a model for their own literary practices. In particular, I will discuss Borges's reception by postmodern fiction writers as well as by the African-American dramatist August Wilson. While the postmodernists appreciate Borges as the builder of labyrinths and textual kaleidoscopes, Wilson considers him a model for surprising plot developments, for uses of the unreal, and for explorations of fictional identities that are shaped by texts and by the systems they inhabit. Whether such mutual constructions of a usable tradition can be related to national cultures is debatable, however. Borges, to be sure, was critical of the idea of national distinctiveness or of a Latin American identity. As we read in "Borges on Borges": "I wonder if there is such a thing as Latin America. I don't think of myself as Latin American; I think of myself as Argentine or Uruguayan, perhaps, but certainly not a Peruvian or a Colombian or a Mexican."[8] Rather than postulating national traditions or "Latin American" versus "North American" features it may be more appropriate to speak of individual practices.

I. Borges's U.S. Canon

In his own fiction, Jorge Luis Borges is known for his universalism and for his uses of the infinite; for a kaleidoscopic imagination, in which real worlds interact with possible other worlds. His play with reality levels and his attempts to create fictional worlds in which there is a space for simulacra, for the uncanny, or for the improbable are trademarks of Borges's tales. When he became professor of English and American literature at the University of Buenos Aires in 1956, his own agenda as a creative writer no doubt influenced his work as a teacher, literary historian, and critic. It also becomes apparent in his choices as a translator: for example, Herman Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener," William Faulkner's "The Wild Palms," and Walt Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* (all of which Borges translated into Spanish) deal with issues of individualism, a topic that Borges often explored in his own fiction and poetry. The

[8] Jorge Luis Borges, "Borges on Borges," in: Norman Thomas di Giovanni (ed), *In Memory of Borges* (London: Constable, 1988), p. 49.

list of U.S. writers whose short stories Borges claims to have reread many times is likewise instructive: it consists of James, Poe, and Hawthorne. All three wrote tales in which an individual encounters the strange or unreal.[9]

In addition to his translations, his numerous reviews and essays, and his interview statements on U.S. writing, one testimony to Borges's lifelong preoccupation with the U.S.A. and its literature is his *Introducción a la literatura norteamericana* (1967), which he co-translated (with Esther Zemborain de Torres) as *An Introduction to American Literature* (1971).[10] Here Borges acknowledges the overwhelming, worldwide impact of U.S. literature. Paraphrasing the French critic Valéry Larbaud, he states "that beginning with Darío and Lugones Latin American literature has influenced that of Spain, while that of the United States has exerted and continues to exert an influence throughout the world, far beyond the vast domain of English."[11] Borges reminds his readers of Bishop Berkeley's famous dictum "Westward the course of empire takes its way" and of Berkeley's conception of North America as "the last and greatest empire of history."[12] Going along with this characterization (as a Latin American who experiences the U.S. dominance in the New World), Borges asserts that, being the literature of an empire, U.S. writing is noted throughout the world.[13]

He singles out, in particular, two figures who epitomize for him this global impact of U.S. literature: Edgar Allan Poe and Walt Whitman. These choices are not surprising, as both Poe and Whitman could be called 'kindred spirits' to Borges in selected aspects of their work: Borges valued Poe as a writer of "fan-

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[9] Cf. Borges, "Autobiographical Notes," p. 78.

[10] Two years before this study, in 1965, Borges had published an *Introducción a la literatura inglesa*.

[11] Jorge Luis Borges in collaboration with Esther Zemborain de Torres, *An Introduction to American Literature* (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1971), p. 5. Fifteen years later Borges told Roberto Alifano in much the same vein: "I think that one of the great accomplishments of North Americans is their literature and the influence it has had all over the world" (Robert Alifano, *Twenty-Four Conversations with Borges. Including a Selection of Poems* [Housatonic, MA: Lascaux, 1984], p. 55).

[12] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 6.

[13] Later on, when Borges discusses the literary effects of the westward expansion in the nineteenth century, he conveys a sense of the power and opportunities inherent in the United States and its literature: "As the United States grew westward and southward, as the war with Mexico and the conquest of the West expanded its already vast frontiers, a new generation of writers arose, quite alien to the Puritanism of New England and the transcendentalism of Concord" (Ibd., p. 35).

tastic invention,"[14] as a systematic builder of textual worlds, and as the inventor of the detective story. Poe's "tales . . . of intellect," as Borges calls them (or "tales of ratiocination," as they are more commonly referred to), according to Borges, "inaugurate[d] a new genre, the detective story, which has conquered the entire world and among whose practitioners are Dickens, Stevenson, and Chesterton."[15] Borges, too, is among the practitioners of this genre, which he characterizes as "ingenious and artificial." Being himself one of the best-known Latin American mystery writers of the twentieth century, it is not surprising that Borges devotes twice as many pages to Poe as he does to Hawthorne.[16] For Hawthorne Borges expresses merely "profound respect" because of Hawthorne's "play between the real and the imaginary world." As Borges said in an interview, in his opinion, Hawthorne compromised his art through his morality:

"I think that he is a creator of fables, which is not too bad. Now, an aesthetic error led him to append a moral to his fables, which often weakened them. . . . Hawthorne wrote morality tales and admirable short stories, and, because of the ancient dispute between ethics and aesthetics that must have weighed on him, he turned or tried to turn literature into a function of his conscience."[17]

On the other hand, Borges appreciated Walt Whitman, his other key figure in U.S. literature, as a poet who managed to convey a cosmic scope and who complicated the distinction between the literary persona (i.e. the lyrical I) and its author. Borges proclaims the centrality of Whitman and Poe for world literature as follows:

"it is permissible to declare in Biblical fashion that Edgar Allan Poe begat Baudelaire, who begat the symbolists, who begat Valéry and that all the so-called civic poetry, or poetry of involvement, of our times is descended from Walt Whitman, whose influence is prolonged in Sandburg and Neruda."[18]

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[14] Ibd., p. 20.

[15] Ibd., p. 23.

[16] John T. Irwin has exemplified, for example, Borges's uses of Poe in his analysis of "the reading that Borges gives of 'The Purloined Letter' when he rewrites its numerical/geometrical structure in his own detective story, 'Death and the Compass' (1942)." Irwin argues that "Borges deciphered the game of simple/odd, even/odd in 'The Purloined Letter' and then reencrypted it in 'Death and the Compass'" (John T. Irwin, "Mysteries We Reread, Mysteries of Rereading. Poe, Borges, and the Analytic Detective Story; Also Lacan, Derrida, and Johnson," in: Gustavo Pérez-Firmat [ed.]: *Do the Americas Have a Common Literature?* [Durham: Duke UP, 1990], p. 218, 235).

[17] Alifano, *Twenty-Four Conversations with Borges*, p. 103, 106.

[18] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 5.

Poe and Whitman become central figures in Borges's construction of a U.S. literary tradition, usable aesthetic models for himself and for other Latin American writers.

Thus it is not surprising that Borges, seeing Whitman as wanting for his epic *Leaves of Grass* to "include all the regions of the continent"[19] puts at the center of his best-known story, "The Aleph" a character who much resembles Whitman's persona and who attempts, like Whitman, "the enumeration, even partial enumeration, of infinity."[20] Also, Borges's first published poem, "Hymn to the Sea," was written in the style of Whitman, a style that Borges characterizes as "reject[ing] regular verse and rhyme and choos[ing] long, rhythmic stanzas, inspired by the psalms.[21] It is a style that aims at encompassing "multitude" (Whitman's term) – a goal that Borges also pursued in his own writing. While he criticizes Whitman's execution of the idea, Borges agrees with Whitman's intention, pointing out that Whitman "inserted, usually in an incorrect manner, words from the Indian languages and from Spanish and French so that his epic might include all the regions of the continent."[22] This encompassing attitude characterizes the multiple subject that perceives and records multitude – a trademark of both Walt Whitman and Jorge Luis Borges: whereas "in previous epics a single hero was dominant, . . . Whitman . . . was determined that his hero should be all men," writes Borges.[23] And later on:

"The Walt Whitman of the book is a plural personage; he is the author and he is at the same time each one of his readers, present and future. Thus certain apparent contradictions can be justified: in one passage Whitman is born on Long Island; in another, in the South. "Leaving Paumanok" begins with a fantastic biography: the poet tells of his experiences as a miner, a job that he never held, and describes the spectacle of herds of buffalo on the prairies, where he had never been."[24]

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[19] Ibd., p. 31.

[20] Jorge Luis Borges, *Collected Fictions,* Trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998), p. 282.

[21] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 32. For more comprehensive accounts of Borges's reception of Whitman, see Josef Raab, "El gran Viejo: Walt Whitman in Latin America," in: *Comparative Literature and Culture: A WWWeb Journal* vol. 3.2 (2001). http://clcwebjournal.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb01-2/raab01.html and Tomas Eloy Martinez, "Borges y Whitman. El otro, el mismo," in: *Revista Chilena de literatura* vol. 55 (1999), pp. 189-94.

[22] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 32.

[23] Ibd.

[24] Ibd.

The dissolution of the boundaries of the real, the kaleidoscopic vision as well as the reconceptualization of the subject as multiple were central features of Walt Whitman's work that appealed to Borges. They may account for Borges's long and deep relationship with Whitman: in 1917 he first encountered the U.S. poet in German translation in Geneva; in 1927 he announced his Spanish translation of Whitman's *Leaves of Grass* as being "in progress;" over 40 years later, in 1969, a partial translation was finally published as *Ojas de hierba*; in a 1980 interview he spoke of Whitman as "one of those men who cannot be thought away;"[25] and on his last visit to the United States Borges wrote a farewell poem to Whitman, entitled "Camden 1892." Being interested foremost in aesthetics and in the imagination, Borges admired Whitman's free verse, his Biblical enumerations, the rhythm of his poetry, and the multiple lyrical I of "Song of Myself" and other poems. These characteristics made Whitman the greatest U.S. poet in Borges's view and they secured Whitman's top position in Borges's U.S. canon.

In the preface to his *Introduction to American Literature* Borges conveys his views on what should determine whether a writer or work is to be included in a literary history. He is critical toward those studies "which try to make literature a branch of sociology" and he states that his own guiding principle in writing this brief literary history, by contrast, has been "the esthetic one. In the United States, as in England, literary groups and coteries are less important than individuals; literary works come into being as the natural product of individual lives. We have preferred therefore to be guided by the appeal which the works have had for us."[26] The most successful U.S. history of American literature at the time – the voluminous *Literary History of the United States*, edited by Robert E. Spiller and others, which was originally published in 1948 (with new, revised editions following in 1953, 1963, and 1974 and new printings almost annually) – takes a very different approach: its editor states that "very naturally our literature, which is a record of our experience, has been deeply, often subconsciously, aware of its responsibility in the making of a nation" and that the

[25] Willis Barnstone, *Borges at Eighty. Conversations* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1982), p. 5

[26] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 3. Borges's position is echoed, for example, by Harold Bloom three decades later in *The Western Canon. The Books and School of the Ages* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994).

book therefore reflects "the vast historical changes" that this nation has undergone.[27]

To Borges, the U.S. authors he discusses in his 95-page booklet are individual talents rather than representatives of national traits.[28] He seems unsure about how North American someone like Poe or Whitman is. But he does note that a knowledge of individual U.S. writers implies a knowledge of their country: "our fundamental purpose has been to encourage an acquaintance with the literary evolution of the nation which forged the first democratic constitution of modern times," he writes, taking on the role of cultural mediator and clearly going beyond the aesthetic principle he initially stated.[29]

In portraying the nation through its literature Borges in fact underscores the democratic spirit and the diversity of the United States. He ends his *Introduction to American Literature*, for example, with two pages on oral Native American poetry, a kind of literature that he praises for "its contemplative perception of the visual world, its delicacy, its magic, and its terseness."[30] Incidentally, these are also qualities of Borges's own writing. In stressing the diversity of the U.S.A. and its literature, Borges tries to forgo ethnocentrism[31] and to concen-

[27] Robert Ernest Spiller (ed.), *Literary History of the United States* (New York: Macimillan, 1948, third ed. 1963), pp. xix, xx.

[28] At the same time, however, as he writes in his essay "Our Poor Individualism," Borges considers North Americans and Europeans patriotic citizens who identify with their state, whereas he thinks of Argentineans as individualists. Jorge Luis Borges, *Selected Non-Fictions*, ed. Eliot Weinberger (New York: Penguin, 1999), p. 309.

[29] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 4.

[30] Ibd., p. 89. Native American literature was still struggling to be generally recognized in the United States at the time when Borges wrote his *Introducción*. In Robert Spiller's *Literary History of the* United *States*, for example, one finds a nine-page chapter on "The Indian Heritage" (p. 694-702), wedged in between chapters on "The Mingling of Tongues" and "Folklore." Borges refers only to one anthology of "oral poetry of the Indians," whereas Spiller's history also mentions Native American tales. Neither, however, refers to individual authors, only to communal texts, many of which originated in pre-Columbian times. Native American autobiographies, for instance, which were an emerging genre in the first half of the twentieth century, are omitted from both accounts.

[31] With regard to African American poetry, Borges writes: "Up to now the contributions to poetry of American Negroes have been less important than their contributions to music. We shall cite first of all James Langston Hughes, born in Joplin, Missouri, in 1902, who, like Sandburg, is a literary descendant of Whitman. . . . His verses contain pathos and are not seldom sardonic" (Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, pp. 67-68). While Borges wanted to acknowledge African-American literature as an example of the diversity of U.S. writing, he must have missed in Hughes the distance between the writer and his work:

trate not only on the literature of the intelligentsia. He reminds his readers of the vast amount of popular writing in the United States by including, for example, a chapter on "The Detective Story, Science Fiction, & the Far West." Borges's appreciation of the detective story and of science fiction can be explained through the fact that he traces both genres back to Edgar Allan Poe, one of the key figures he values most in U.S. literature. Borges can be credited with having contributed to a revision of the canon of American literature with regard to these two genres. While the 1963 third edition of the *Literary History of the United States* devotes only half a page out of its 20-page chapter on Poe to his detective fiction and mentions Dashiell Hammett (to whom Borges devotes half a page) only in passing, in a section on the international reception of U.S. literature, detective fiction is nowadays an integral part of any literary history of the United States.[32] The same holds true for science fiction, a genre that goes unmentioned in Robert Spiller's *Literary History*. Whereas Borges devotes a page each to H.P. Lovecraft and Ray Bradbury, both names are missing from Spiller's otherwise extensive account.[33]

But while ostensibly interested foremost in aesthetics and involved in portraying a nation through its literature, what is more important to Borges is to individualize U.S. literature and thus possibly to heighten curiosity: he does so by always giving some biographical information and by presenting U.S. authors in a way that might appeal to the emotions of his readers (see the example of Dickinson below).[34] Literary movements and techniques are kept in the back-

"pathos," for Borges, is not a favorable mark of distinction. The fact that Borges compares Hughes to Whitman rather than mentioning the context of the Harlem Renaissance illustrates Borges's focus on literary models and individual practices rather than cultural and social contexts.

32 The *Literary History of the United States* mentions Hammett in a list that names writers "of different literary levels" and that starts with Hemingway (at the top) and ends with Hammett (at the bottom) (Spiller, *Literary History of the United States*, p. 1314). The fourth edition of *The* Oxford *Companion to American Literature* likewise illustrates this estimation: while there is an entry on Hammett, all it contains are the years of birth and death, the titles of several novels, and the characterization of Hammett as an "author of detective novels with realistic, authentic dialogue." James D. Hart (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to American Literature*. Fourth edition (New York: Oxford UP, 1965), p. 346.

33 The 1965 edition of *The Oxford Companion to American Literature*, however, is closer to Borges's views: it contains entries on "Science Fiction," H.P. Lovecraft, and Ray Bradbury.

34 From his "Autobiographical Notes" we know that Borges was also much interested in the writers' biographies himself. He tells his readers, for example, that during his second extended stay in the United States, when he held the Charles Eliot Norton Chair of Poetry at

ground, while the writers' lives seem at least as important as their works. Significantly, the only movement to which Borges devotes a chapter of its own is Transcendentalism. What must have appealed to him is the philosophical element of Transcendentalism, the multiplicity of its origins, and the theory that "The soul of the individual is identified with the soul of the world [and] If God is in every soul, all external authority disappears."[35] This focus on the individual and her/his position in the world as well as the idea of mirror images also characterize his own creative work. As Borges confided in a later interview: "I love Emerson and I am very fond of his poetry. He is to me the one intellectual poet . . . who has ideas."[36]

In some cases, however, Borges slips into a sentimental mode when providing biographical backgrounds. For example, he narrates the following episode from the life of Emily Dickinson, whom he was later to call "perhaps the greatest lady writer and the greatest poet that America – I'm thinking of our America also – has as yet produced":[37]

"At age twenty-three, during a brief visit to Washington, Emily met a young preacher and they fell in love immediately, but on learning that he was married, she refused to see him again and returned home. *She was pretty and did not stop smiling*; she sought refuge in epistolary friendships, in dialogue with members of her family, in the faithful reading of a few books – Keats, Shakespeare, the Scriptures – in long walks in the country *accompanied by her dog, Carlo*, and in the composition of brief poems, of which she was to leave about a thousand, the publication of which did not interest her." (my emphasis)[38]

Borges's description is oversentimentalized and inaccurate (Dickinson actually left behind 1,775 poems and her correspondence with Thomas Wentworth Higginson raises doubts about her lacking interest in publishing). It seems likely that Borges's construction of Emily Dickinson relies in part on one of Dickinson's so-called "Master Letters," which were first published in 1955 and subsequently included in the 1958 standard edition of her *Letters*. In the letter, which is uncharacteristic for Dickinson because of its "direct, urgent, and un-

Harvard, he "made numerous literary pilgrimages – to Hawthorne's haunts in Salem, to Emerson's in Concord, to Melville's in New Bedford, to Emily Dickinson's in Amherst, and to Longfellow's around the corner from where I lived" (Borges, "Autobiographical Notes," p. 95-96).

[35] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 25.

[36] Barnstone, *Borges at Eighty*, p. 5.

[37] Ibd., p. 5.

[38] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 42.

abashed" tone,[39] Dickinson writes: "Could you forget me in fight, or flight – or the foreign land? Couldn't Carlo, and you and I walk in the meadows an hour – and nobody care but the Bobolink. . . . Sir – it were comfort forever – just to look in your face, while you looked in mine – then I could play in the woods till Dark."[40] Borges was probably also familiar with one of Dickinson's best-known letters, one she sent to her mentor Higginson in 1862, answering his question about her friends: "You ask of my Companions[:] Hills – Sir – and the Sundown – and a Dog – large as myself, that my Father bought me – They are better than Beings – because they know – but do not tell – and the noise in the Pool, at Noon – excels my Piano."[41] Out of such biographical sources Borges constructs a one-sided image of Emily Dickinson that foregrounds her isolationism and romantic interests. Nonetheless, he succeeds in drawing a portrait of Dickinson that might well be emotionally appealing to a student audience and that might arouse the curiosity of romantically inclined Latin American readers in her poems.[42]

Apart from raising interest in the biography of U.S. writers another technique Borges uses in fostering inter-American cultural contact is to relate U.S. literary phenomena to Latin American ones. For example, he points out differences between the North American cowboy story and the Argentine gaucho tale:

"For Argentine writers – recalling *Martin Fierro* and the novels of Eduardo Gutierrez – the gaucho is the incarnation of rebellion and not infrequently of crime; in contrast the ethical preoccupation of North Americans, based on Protestantism, has led them to present in the cowboy the triumph of good over evil. The gaucho of the literary tradition is usually a man of cunning; the cowboy may well be a sheriff or rancher. Both characters are now legendary. . . . In contrast to the *poesía gauchesca* which came into existence shortly after the revolution of 1810, the North American Western is a tardy and subordinate genre. One must admit, however, that it is a branch of the epic and that the brave and noble cowboy has become a worldwide symbol."[43]

This passage illustrates Homi Bhabha's stance, which I mentioned above, that identification with the cultural Other is ambivalent and incomplete. It also exemplifies that, for his Latin American audience, Borges seeks to valorize his

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[39] Richard Sewall, *The Life of Emily Dickinson* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1974), vol. II, p. 514.

[40] Quoted in ibd., vol. II, pp. 515-16.

[41] Quoted in ibd., vol. II, p. 542.

[42] However, few Dickinson scholars would regard the disappointment of love as the most important issue in her poetry.

[43] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, pp. 86-88.

own nation's contributions to world literature – despite their lesser international renown.

Another such instance of wavering between identification and rejection is the page and a half that Borges devotes in his *Introduction to American Literature* to Benjamin Franklin. Here he makes two comparisons to Argentineans. First, he writes of Franklin that "Not one of the thousands of pages that he wrote was an end in itself but a means. . . . he always wrote to accomplish an immediate end, far removed from pure literature."[44] Implied is the statement that Franklin is therefore far removed from Borges himself, since Franklin's main interest seems not to be aesthetics but persuasion. Second, Borges claims that "The practical nature of [Franklin's] work recalls Sarmiento, who greatly admired him, but the lucid work of Franklin lacks the bright passion that illuminates *Facundo*."[45] Thus Borges suggests that if the Franklin-Sarmiento connection is a case of the North-Americanization of Latin America in the nineteenth century, then it is one where the Latin American side adds its own distinctive stamp, where the Latin American side adapts a U.S. model to its own purposes.

While the above features illustrate Borges's self-appointed position of inter-cultural mediator, the preferences and omissions in his *Introduction* reflect affinities to his own practices as a writer. A few examples will illustrate this point. First, Borges only mentions historical and religious texts when discussing colonial North American literature. He calls the Romantic Philip Freneau (to whom he devotes a page and a half) "The first American poet of some renown,"[46] while he omits Anne Bradstreet and Edward Taylor, both of whom were well documented in other U.S. literary histories at that time. The then standard *Literary History of the United States*, for example, devotes a page to Bradstreet and two to Taylor, while the major anthology of American literature at the times (which was available in its third edition when Borges's *Introduction* was published) contains a dozen pages each of selected poetry by Bradstreet and Taylor.[47] Borges, however, seems to neglect Bradstreet because of the auto-biographical aspects of her verse, while he may omit Taylor because of his exclusively religious themes. With regard to Freneau, the poet's nationalist lyr-

[44] Ibd., p. 12.

[45] Ibd.

[46] Ibd., p. 9.

[47] Walter Blair et al. (eds.), *The Literature of the United States*. Third edition (Glenview, Il: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1971).

ics in favor of American independence are not addressed either. Borges states that Freneau's "complicated political activity does not concern us here."[48] What does interest him about Freneau, however, are philosophical questions: for example, Freneau's meditation in his poem "The Indian Burying Ground" about whether it is more appropriate to think of death as sleep or as a continuation of life. Naturally, Borges looks for elements in U.S. writers that mirror his own interests: so he picks out Freneau's poem "The Indian Student," which tells the story of a young Native American man who acquires white learning at a university but whose attention then moves away from his theoretical studies toward nature and astronomy. "The roundness of the earth and the infinity of space fills him with terror and uncertainty," writes Borges appreciatively about Freneau's figure since the terror and uncertainty instilled by the infinite are also among Borges's favorite topics in his own fictions.[49]

A second example: like most of the authors whom Borges does mention, John Steinbeck is discussed on half a page in the *Introduction*. After a few sentences on Steinbeck's biography Borges lists some of Steinbeck's best-known books and comments that "their humble setting reflects the results of the Depression of 1930. Steinbeck is outstanding in dialogue, in the description of the life he has known, and in narrative; he is less satisfactory when he undertakes philosophical or social problems."[50] Clearly Borges was not in favor of the socially engaged kind of writing that Steinbeck is known for; so he simply classifies Steinbeck as "less satisfactory," without further elaboration.

A third example: features that Borges praises in the work of William Faulkner are the rendering of "the disintegration of the South" and Faulkner's "hallucinatory tendencies," which, to Borges, "are not unworthy of Shakespeare."[51] Disintegration and "hallucinatory tendencies" are, of course, also exemplified in Borges's own fiction.[52] But then Borges criticizes Faulkner

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[48] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 10. This formulation may remind us of Borges's lacking interest in the "complicated political activity" of many Latin American countries in the twentieth century.

[49] Ibd., pp. 10-11.

[50] Ibd., p. 70.

[51] Ibd., p. 49.

[52] In a later interview Borges expands on his appreciation of Faulkner: "For him the human mind and human nature is a terrifying thing; it is a depthless abyss that fascinates him and into which he constantly delves" (Alifano, *Twenty-Four Conversations with Borges*, p. 56). This view of human nature is again shared by Borges himself.

as follows: "It may be said that Faulkner believes his labyrinthine world requires a no less labyrinthine technique. . . . his story . . . is never told to us directly; we must decipher it and deduce it through tortuous, inward monologues, just as we do in the difficult final chapter of Joyce's *Ulysses*."[53] Thirty years earlier, however, in a 1937 review of Faulkner's *Absalom, Absalom!*, Borges had written enthusiastically about Faulkner's "preoccupation [with] verbal technique," which illustrates the "human acts and passions" and "the fates and personalities of his characters."[54] Although his estimation of Faulkner's style seems to have changed over the decades, his admiration of Faulkner's use of the unreal or grotesque remained: in 1938 Borges had, for example, praised Faulkner's *The Unvanquished* thus: "the world [Faulkner] imagines is so real that it also encompasses the implausible."[55] This is of course also a trademark of Borges's own fiction.

A fourth example: Of the present time – i.e. 1967 for the *Introducción*'s Spanish version and 1971 for the book's English translation – Borges writes that Carl Sandburg "is now the best-known poet in the United States."[56] This was definitely not the prevailing opinion in U.S. literary circles at the time. Having been born in 1878, Sandburg was of an earlier generation; he died in 1967. His major poetry had been published in the twenties and thirties and even his *Complete Poems*, which were awarded a Pulitzer Prize, had already come out in 1950.[57] New kinds of poetry were coming to the forefront during the 1950s: Allen Ginsberg published his *Howl* in 1956 and Robert Lowell's *Life Studies* came out in 1959. These two writers stood for the two main poetic movements of the period: Beat Poetry and Confessional Poetry. That Ginsberg and Lowell

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[53] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 49. In the essay "Borges on Borges" the Argentine characterizes his own stylistic ideal, by contrast, as "plain and straightforward" (Borges, "Borges on Borges," p. 41).

[54] Jorge Luis Borges, *Selected Non-Fictions*, p. 178.

[55] Ibd., p. 186.

[56] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 66. Borges mentions very few works published after 1945. By contrast, the *Literary History of the United States*, starting with its second edition in 1953 included an ever-expanding "Postscript: Mid-Century and After" chapter. A possible reason for Borges's neglect of the 1950s and 1960s is given in a 1980 interview: "My eyesight left me for reading purposes . . . in 1955, and since then I have attempted no contemporary reading. . . . We can know the past but the present is hidden from us" (Barnstone, *Borges at Eighty*, p. 1).

[57] Spiller's *Literary History of the United States* discusses Sandburg in a chapter on early twentieth-century literature.

were recognized names in the canon of American literature at the time when Borges was writing his literary history is illustrated through their treatment in Spiller's *Literary History of the United States*. The 1963 edition discusses Ginsberg for half a page and contains numerous additional references to him.[58] It also states that "in the view of many critics, Robert Lowell was the most impressive poet of the postwar era."[59]

Neither Beat Poetry nor Confessional Poetry, however, is a kind of writing that Borges is fond of, which is why he leaves both poets/movements out of his literary history altogether. With regard to Beat Poetry, Borges apparently objected to the protest quality and to the strong personal involvement of the author or of his lyrical self in the poem's subject as well as to the often vulgar language commonly used there. We can deduce this from Borges's critical stance toward Sandburg's beginnings "as a poet of energy and even of violence and vulgarity."[60] Interestingly, Borges says about Carl Sandburg that "In all his work Whitman's influence is evident. Both poets handle free verse and slang, although Sandburg's use of the latter is richer and more spontaneous."[61] As an aesthete, Borges was fond of Whitman's use of free verse but weary of the language of the streets.

While Whitman is also *the* predominant influence on Allen Ginsberg and Beat Poetry, Borges may have thought of Ginsberg's work not as aesthetic literature but primarily as social protest.[62] Although Borges might have approved of Ginsberg's use of free verse, his catalogues, and prophetic juxtapositions à la Whitman, he would have rejected Ginsberg's employment of these literary devices for purposes other than aesthetic. And whereas Borges valued Whitman's poetic persona(s), he must have objected to the equation of author and speaker in Ginsberg.[63] In his short piece "Borges and Myself," contrary to

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[58] He is referred to as "the most controversial poet of the group" who "cultivate the beatnik style of life." Spiller, *Literary History of the United States*, p. 1434, 1432.

[59] Ibd., p. 1430.

[60] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 67.

[61] Ibd.

[62] After the failure of Perón Borges refused to get involved in politics; he has been much criticized in Argentina and abroad for his unwillingness to condemn the repression of post-Perónist regimes. Roberto Fernández Retamar, for example, calls Borges's political position "uno de los escándalos americanos de estos años" (Fernández Retamar, *Calibán*, p. 61).

[63] Borges contested, for example in his essay "The Nothingness of Personality," the existence of anything like a "whole self": "Personality is a mirage maintained by conceit and custom," he wrote, going on to state that "There is no whole self. He who defines personal

Ginsberg's practice, he plays with the distinction between his private self and his public persona. As he repeatedly pointed out concerning both Whitman and himself, the "I" inside the text is not the same as the "I" writing the text: "the name Whitman really corresponds to two persons: the modest author of the work and its semidivine protagonist."[64] Both Beat Poetry and Confessional Poetry, however, tended to merge the writer with the lyrical persona. That this was also Borges's main objection to Lowell becomes apparent in his interview statement: "I might like his poems – but only if he keeps his trousers on."[65] Laying bare the soul and the lyrical I's drives, desires, and anguishes was not to Borges's taste. So Lowell gets omitted from the Argentine's *Introduction to American Literature* too.

And a last example for Borges's choices and omissions: while Borges does devote about a page to the African-American novelist Richard Wright, he offers no mention of Wright's contemporary, the equally successful and well-known African-American novelists Ralph Ellison, author of *Invisible Man*. Borges's comment on Wright points to potential reasons for this preference:

> "In Paris . . . , under Sartre's influence, he moves from the specific problem of being a Negro to the fundamental problem of being a man. This transition does not imply a rupture with his previous work; in both stages his subject is always man harassed by a hostile society. He was a Marxist in Chicago; his present work reflects his disillusionment with the hope for universal brotherhood, which he expected to find in communism, and his search for other ideals."[66]

We may assume that Borges saw this movement away from the specific African-American condition toward the human condition in general and from the political toward the philosophical as missing in the work of other black writers like Ellison.

The examples given above illustrate how Borges's personal tastes (the aesthetic principle he stated in his preface, the literary and philosophical exploration of the individual and his/her position in certain systems, and the critical distance from overtly political, social or religious contents and concerns) influence his choices as a cultural mediator and his construction of a usable U.S. tra-

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identity as the private possession of some depository of memories is mistaken" (Borges, *Selected Non-Fictions*, pp. 3, 4).

[64] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 30.

[65] Willis Barnstone, *With Borges on an Ordinary Evening in Buenos Aires* (Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1993), p. 74.

[66] Borges, *Introduction to American Literature*, p. 72.

dition.[67] Rather than trying to give a comprehensive account he foregrounds in his booklet those authors and works of U.S. literature that appeal to his own literary tastes while neglecting or omitting others. The goal of his cultural mediation seems not so much to be a demonstration of the distinctiveness of U.S. literature but rather an endearing presentation aimed at increasing Latin American interest in selected U.S. authors: since it can be assumed that the majority of readers who pick up the *Introducción a la literatura norteamericana* are also enthusiastic about Borges's creative work, the Argentine writer seems to be suggesting that facets of his own literary concerns are shared by many U.S. authors.

II. Borges as a Usable Model in U.S. Literature

I will now address Borges's impact on U.S. literature. After sharing the Formentor Prize with Samuel Beckett in 1961 Jorge Luis Borges became internationally famous[68]: he also started to travel and lecture widely in the United States and he became a well-known presence on the American literary scene, accepting already that same year a one-semester appointment at the University of Texas at Austin. Twenty years later, Gene H. Bell-Villada remarked:

"The impact of Borges on the United States writing scene may be almost as great as was his earlier influence on Latin America. . . . The quiet arrival of Borges's Englished fiction was to make a key difference for the 1960s; his dreamlike artifices helped stimulate a writing culture all too steeped in WASP-suburban metaphysics and Jewish-novel neorealism. The Argentine master reawakened for us the possibilities of farfetched fancy, of formal exploration, of parody, intellectuality, and wit. . . . Borges facilitated things for North American fantasists; he put at their disposal an entire set of genres and procedures, a common property that Pynchon and

[67] Appropriately, Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, one of the major works of U.S. literature, is mentioned only in passing as "the most famous of his novels" (Ibd., p. 20). Borges does not say another word about this novel. The reasons are likely to be Hawthorne's deep involvement in his nation's history as well as his moralizing approach.

[68] As he writes, "As a consequence of that prize, my books mushroomed overnight throughout the Western world" (Borges, "Autobiographical Notes," p. 94). Gene H. Bell-Villada reminds us that in the 1960s Borges "delivered literally hundreds of lectures across the land, in fine English, with a fluency equalled by few Latin American authors." Gene H. Bell-Villada, *Borges and His Fiction. A Guide to His Mind and Art* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1981), p. 272.

other fiction writers were thence able to adopt and later develop in their own personal ways."[69]

In the 1960s, Borges's textual labyrinths appealed above all to postmodern American writers like Thomas Pynchon, Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, William H. Gass, and John Barth.[70] As the philosopher and fiction writer Gass wrote appreciatively in a 1969 article for the *New York Review of Books*: "Borges makes much of the independence of the new worlds implied by his fiction; they are 'contiguous realities'; the poet annexes new provinces to Being; but they remain mirror worlds for all that; it is our own world, *misthought*, reflected here."[71] This Borgesean textual invention of possible worlds and the confusing effects that occur when different reality/fiction levels meet have become trademarks of postmodern fiction.

Carlos Fuentes has pointed out that one of Borges's great innovations was that he made time and space into fictional characters that show the relativity of everything: "Digo que Borges convirtió al tiempo y al espacio en protagonistas de sus historias. Pero al hacerlo, nos enseñó a comprender, en primer lugar, la realidad relativista aunque inclusiva del tiempo y el espacio."[72] This feature of his fiction appealed to U.S. postmodernists, as did Borges's imaginary textual constructions that replaced realistic modes of storytelling. While, according to Bell-Villada, other Latin American prose writers in the second half of the 20th

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[69] Ibd., pp. 268-71. Bell-Villada points out that Borges's use of the unreal and of dreams, his "distillation of the lowly genre of parody," his "narratives that artfully disregard traditional distinctions between factual and fictive characters," his "expert rehabilitation of the detective story," and his "open-endedness" are among key features that appealed to U.S. writers of the 1960s (Ibd., pp. 269-71). Borges's influence is now generally acknowledged by literary histories of the United States. Some of the studies that discuss his impact – especially on U.S. postmodernism – are: Mimi Y. Yang, "Borges's Foundational Role in Postmodernism," in: Gilbert Paolini and Claire J. Paolini (eds.), *LA CHISPA '99*. Selected Proceedings (New Orleans: Tulane UP, 1999), pp. 375-86. Floyd Merrell, "The Writing of Forking Paths. Borges, Calvino and Postmodern Models of Writing," in: *Variaciones Borges* vol. 3 (1977), pp. 56-68; and Jeffrey Green, "Postmodern Precursor: The Borgesian Image in Innovative American Fiction," in: Edna Aizenberg (ed.), *Borges and His Successors: The Borgesian Impact on Literature and the Arts* (Columbia and London: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1990), pp. 200-13.

[70] Bell-Villada adds E.L. Doctorow, Ishmael Reed, and especially John Gardner to this list.

[71] William H. Gass, "William H. Gass on Jorge Luis Borges," in: Ilan Stavans (ed.), *Mutual Impressions. Writers from the Americas Reading One Another* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1999), p. 237.

[72] Carlos Fuentes, *Geografía de la novela*. Second edition (Madrid: Alfaguara, 1993), p. 47.

century conveyed "concretely physical horrors" of Latin American scenarios in "shockingly authentic" manner, the "atmosphere of threat in Borges's tales comes off as bookish and abstract," which made him a more amenable model than, say, Julio Cortázar or Alejo Carpentier.[73]

Because of the anti-mimetic quality of Borges's work, the U.S. postmodernist writer John Barth, in his essay "The Literature of Exhaustion," praises the Argentine fabulist as one of the few contemporary writers who have brought perspectival and other innovations to contemporary fiction. Barth has expressed his admiration of Borges repeatedly and clearly puts his own fiction in the same camp as Borges's. He considers the Argentine one of his main influences, admitting that "the Borges street . . . is only one street among others in my personal city of words. But it turns a meaningful corner, and a quarter-century after first discovering it, I'm still working out its ramifications in my own practice of fiction."[74] Both writers believe, as Barth states, that "We tell stories and listen to them because we live stories and live in them. Narrative equals language equals life: To cease to narrate . . . is to die. . . . If this is true, then not only is all fiction fiction about fiction, but all fiction about fiction is in fact fiction about life."[75] In an interview Barth pointed out that he also shares Borges's interest in the Cabala, explaining:

"It's the notion of the world as a text whose surface meaning may not be its real meaning; the notion that Nature and, indeed, human actions and all the things around us, whatever their apparent coherence, perhaps have a deeper coherence that we can only speculate upon: the world as God's Book or . . . the world as a novel and God as a novelist."[76]

It will hardly surprise us that Barth, like Borges, is an admirer of Edgar Allan Poe. He praises Poe's *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym of Nantucket*, for example, for its "ontological mirror-tricks, a stock trade of contemporary 'metafiction'."[77] A "stock trade" of Borges as well, we might add.

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[73] Bell-Villada, *Borges and His Fiction*, p. 274.

[74] John Barth, *Further Fridays. Essays, Lectures, and Other Nonfiction, 1984-94* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 167.

[75] John Barth, *The Friday Book. Essays and Other Nonfiction* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1984), p. 236.

[76] Loretta M. Lampkin, "An Interview with John Barth," in: *Contemporary Literature* 29 (4/1988), p. 487.

[77] John Barth, "'Still Farther South:' Some Notes on Poe's *Pym*," in: *Antaeus* 63 (1989), p. 8.

What is somewhat more surprising than the postmodernists' appreciation of Borges is that in the 1980s and 1990s the African American playwright August Wilson named Borges as one of the main influences on his artistic creation.[78] Like the postmodern U.S. fiction writers but highlighting different aspects of the Argentine's work, Wilson constructs his own version of Borges as a usable tradition. As Mark Rocha has argued, Wilson uses Borges and his work as constitutive elements of the "African American cosmology" that he has created; Borges is a presence in "the sign system [Wilson] inhabits."[79]

In his drama, August Wilson takes up Borges's notion of possible worlds and applies it to his own agenda, which is to retell and re-imagine twentieth-century African-American history. In this endeavor, Wilson, unlike Toni Morrison, does not use actual historical occurrences as his point of departure. Instead, he imagines an alternative history – "history that never happened but could have."[80] Logic, realism, and fixed expectations of cause and effect are transcended by Wilson as they are by Borges in his metaphysical journeys. Ghosts, omens and the otherworldly appear, disclosing the inner workings of reality, combining the worlds of matter and of spirit. For both writers, the beyond can reveal truths about the here and now. Facts become shaky and Wilson – like Borges – prefers to leave issues unresolved. For example, in his play *The Piano Lesson*, the claim that a young black man has killed a white landowner in order to get the land on which his ancestor had been a slave competes with the claim that the white landowner was killed by ghosts. As with Borges, no definitive answer is given.

Wilson explained in an interview that he wants to emulate the unpredictable plots of Borges:

"I've been trying to write a play the way he writes a story. One of his techniques is that he tells you exactly what is going to happen. At the outset the leader of an outlaw gang with a bullet in his head would seem improbable. When you meet the guy, he's washing dishes, and you go

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[78] In his *New York Times* article "How to Write a Play Like August Wilson" he wrote: "In terms of influence on my work, I have what I call my four B's: Romare Bearden; Imamu Amiri Baraka, the writer; Jorge Luis Borges, the Argentine short story-writer; and the biggest B of all: the blues." August Wilson, "How to Write a Play Like August Wilson," in: *The New York Times* (10 March 1991), sec. II, p. 5.

[79] Mark William Rocha, "August Wilson and the Four B's. Influences," in: Marilyn Elkins (ed.), *August Wilson. A Casebook* (New York and London: Garland Publishing, 2000), p. 4.

[80] Peter Wolfe, *August Wilson* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1999), p. 19.

'This guy is going to be the leader of an outlaw gang?' You know that he's going to get killed, but how is this going to happen?"[81]

Borges traces this interest in the development of plot lines back to Edgar Allan Poe's "The Philosophy of Composition" (discussing it for two pages in his *Introduction*), whereas Wilson makes a point of disassociating himself from Western literary traditions.[82] However, despite his claims to the contrary, Wilson's participation in these Western traditions cannot be denied. Like Borges, he has expressed his fondness for libraries, saying that "in the library for the first time in my life I felt free."[83] Another feature that Wilson says he picked up from Borges concerns the ethics of listening, which are an integral part of African-American oral traditions. He told an interviewer:

"With Borges you've got all these wires carrying electrical impulses, but they don't all connect up. When you encounter one of those little breaks, I think he wants you to stop and say, 'Now wait a second, how does *that* connect?' That's why so many of his stories are about writing stories."[84]

But most importantly, it seems that Wilson has been influenced by Borges in terms of plot developments; many of his protagonists, according to Rocha,

"conduct a Borgesean quest to locate or lose a text. . . . As with Borges's protagonist-narrators, Wilson's characters experience an annihilation which paradoxically creates a narrated self. Like Borges, Wilson presents meta-drama after meta-drama in which the primary self-reflexive topic of the plays is the very creation of text itself. . . . Wilson's obsession with the past is less that of a historian than of a Borgesean trickster who both delights and despairs in the knowledge that the past is a life-long process of (re)invention."[85]

As Wilson himself said in an interview, "My characters . . . are engaged with life, wrestling with it, trying to make sense out of it."[86] The absence of stability,

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[81] Sandra G. Shannon, *The Dramatic Vision of August Wilson* (Washington, D.C.: Howard UP, 1995), p. 19. Wilson gave Mark Rocha much the same reason for his indebtedness to Borges: "It's the *way* Borges tells a story. In Borges, it's not what happens, but *how*. A lot of times, he'll tell you what's going to happen up front, as in ["The Dead Man"] in which we're told at the beginning that a nobody from the slums will be shot in the head as a leader of his people. All of the interest is in how the story is going to be told." Rocha, "August Wilson and the Four B's," p. 13).

[82] But as Mark Rocha rightly concludes: "Through the mediation of Borges, Wilson is able to find a usable past in the Western tradition and identify himself as a writer not of America but of the intercultural Americas." Ibd., p. 14-15.

[83] Bonnie Lyons, "An Interview with August Wilson," in: *Contemporary Literature* 40 (1/1999), p. 4.

[84] Rocha, "August Wilson and the Four B's," p. 13.

[85] Ibd., pp. 13-14.

[86] Lyons, "An Interview with August Wilson," p. 11.

the constant sense of unreality, and the importance of texts accompany the efforts of both Borges's and Wilson's protagonists to gain knowledge and to (re)position themselves in the systems that they inhabit or encounter.[87]

Both Wilson and Borges are also poets. To Wilson, poetry "is distilled language . . . enlarging the sayable."[88] Although he does not mention Borges in this respect, the affinities are unmistakable. August Wilson thus constructs Borges as a usable model primarily in terms of Borges's plot developments and in terms of his integration of the otherworldly or unreal into realistic settings and plots. John Barth and other postmodern U.S. writers, as illustrated above, construct Borges as a practitioner of the notion of a world as text and as the builder of textual labyrinths that transcend limitations of time and space. Other U.S. writers have been and will be inspired by yet other aspects of Borges. Both Wilson and Barth are interested in the individual writer Borges, not the representative of any national tradition, and both constructions of Borges illustrate Homi Bhabha's point that identification is never complete.

The mutual reception and exchange, the mutual construction of usable literary traditions confirm Renato Rosaldo's position that "the notion of an authentic culture as an autonomous internally coherent universe no longer seems tenable..."[89] And Rosaldo continues: "All of us inhabit an interdependent . . . world marked by borrowing and lending across porous national and cultural boundaries."[90] Borges exemplifies this through his global connections. In his case, despite his strong interest in U.S. literature and his many interconnections with U.S. writers, one should speak not so much of a North-Americanization of Latin America but rather of universalism. As Anthony Kerrigan remarked: "His Argeninians act out Parisian dramas, his Central European Jews are wise in the

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[87] As Rocha points out, "Many other lines can be drawn from Borges to Wilson: the primacy of myth, the principle of irreality in which magic is viewed in anthropological terms as a complete system, the humor that equips one to face absurdity, and the postmodern stance that all significant human experience is textual. . . . Wilson's plays, like Borges's stories, enact an exorcism of the father and then a quest for a refigured father." Rocha, "August Wilson and the Four B's," p. 14).

[88] Lyons, "An Interview with August Wilson," p. 17.

[89] Rosaldo, *Culture & Truth*, p. 217.

[90] Ibd.

ways of the Amazon, his Babylonians are fluent in the paradigms of Babel."[91] As a writer of the infinite, Borges does not limit himself to the United States.

Where does this take us with the issue of a North-Americanization of Latin America? The case of Jorge Luis Borges challenges what José David Saldívar has called "the assumed equivalence we make between the national and the cultural."[92] What we see is an individual reader and writer at work, an individual talent who is critical of national allegiance and national literary traditions. For Borges the individual artist's ingenuity by far outweighs her/his membership in a national literature. As he told an interviewer, he believes that "the imaginings of one writer become the personal memories of others" – regardless of their nationality.[93] While inter-American influences are a reality, it is still the individual writer who decides which aspects constitute usable models for his or her own creations. Or, in the words of Borges: "The world, unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges."[94]

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[91] Anthony Kerrigan, "Introduction," in: Jorge Luis Borges, *Ficciones* (New York: Grove Press, 1962), p. 4.

[92] José David Saldívar, *Border Matters: Remapping American Cultural Studies* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1997), p. 14. On the other hand, Saldívar's plea for conceiving of "American culture and literature . . . in terms of 'migration' and not only immigration" is supported by the two-sided borrowings we see in the case of Borges.

[93] Alifano, *Twenty-Four Conversations with Borges*, p. 58.

[94] Borges, *Selected Non-Fictions*, p. 332.

PART V

THE AMERICAN 'OTHER'

AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATION

"Let's travel south of the border,
buy me a real Spanish shawl,
let's eat tamales
in downtown Nogales:
let's get away from it all."

"Let's get away from it all"
(Matt Denis-Thomas Adair)

RICARDO PÉREZ MONTFORT

"DOWN MEXICO WAY": STEREOTYPES AND AMERICAN TOURISM IN MEXICO FROM 1920 TO 1940[1]

I

Daniel Cosío Villegas, in his now classic *Memorias* recalled that in years immediately following the revolutionary armed turmoil "... what was truly amazing ... was the nationwide nationalist outburst. It was, in actual fact, a nationalism with not the slightest trace of xenophobia, it was not anti-something, but all for Mexico."[2] This nationalism was oriented towards recognizing the cultural value of people's expressions stated from a sort of introspection already present within the political medium, the educational world, but most of all within the artistic environment[3] for at least ten years. By the end of the

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[1] This lecture is a side product of the project "Nacionalismo y estereotipos culturales en México, l920 -1940," sponsored by CIESAS/México.

[2] Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Memorias* (México: Joaquín Mortiz, 1976), p. 91.

[3] Carlos Monsiváis, "Notas sobre la cultura mexicana en el siglo XX," in: *Historia General de México* (México: COLMEX, l976).

Porfiriato a few academic painters such as Saturnino Herrán or Ignacio Rosas had already shown interest in popular subjects. Starting in 1915—precisely during the revolutionary movement—a national introspection process encouraged capillarity between the academic and the popular culture, seeking to recognize in artistic expressions from the majority, rural, and underprivileged sectors, that which would be the ultimate representation of Mexican culture. To accomplish this, an 'official' penalty was needed, and of course, an external viewpoint.

An example of this process was the 1919 staging of "Mexican Dances" by the celebrated Russian ballerina Anna Pavlova. After learning "*el Jarabe Tapatío*"—regarded as being the Mexican regional dance par excellence—from the Mexican ballerina, Eva Pérez, and setting up her production with support from painter Adolfo Best Maugard, the musician Manuel Castro Padilla and librettist Jaime Martínez del Río, Pavlova performed this choreography at the Condesa Bullfighting Arena in Mexico, and received an "overwhelming response", which received the praise of President Venustiano Carranza himself.

Ana Pavlova and Adolfo Best Maugard in "El Jarabe Tapatío"
AGN, Fondo Enríque Díaz (circa 1920s)

Pavlova performed this choreography in most of her worldwide tours from then on. A program for one of her performances in New York at the beginning of 1920s referred to this choreography as follows:

"...The group of three dances, "*China Poblana*", "*Jarabe Tapatío*" and "*Diana Mexicana*" made a tremendous hit in Mexico City where, after the Pavlova season tested the capacity of the theater at all performances, these dances were performed in the Bull Ring before twenty-five thousand people, as a climax to the series. The success of this suite of dances in Mexico might be expected, but its receptions in other countries have been truly surprising, particularly in Paris and London, were it achieved great vogue and started a growing interest in Mexican arts and fabrics..."[4]

And doubtlessly, from then on the presence of Mexican popular expressions began a hasty ascent both nationwide and worldwide, in contrast with the French-style and Europeanization adopted in times prior to the revolution in Mexico.

It was thus that by the time General Álvaro Obregón reached the Presidency in 1920, a certain air of renovation seemed to float in the Mexican atmosphere. "All of a sudden,—Cosío Villegas states again—like a miraculous revelation, national songs and dances started to be fashionable, as well as all folkloric arts and crafts... And there was not one home without a gourd bowl from Olinalá, a pot from Oaxaca, or a *quexqueme* from Chiapas. In a few words, Mexicans had discovered their country, and most important, they believed in it."[5]

The acknowledgment of what Mexicans considered their own—in the terms of dialogue and action promoted by post-revolutionary regimes— led a large portion of the Mexican society to recognize itself in a series of representations and images that slowly became more simple and oriented towards creating a particular repertoire of what would be identified as the "typically" Mexican.[6]

In addition to the political and "high-culture" interpretations, a solid stream of such things acknowledged as "typically" Mexican, found its way into State education, but also and foremost into the massive communication media. School civic rituals integrated various songs and dances and invariably included the adjective 'national'. "*La Adelita*", "*La Valentina*" or "*A la orilla de un palmar*"

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[4] Alberto Dallal, *La danza en México* (México: UNAM, 1986), p.69; and "*Pavlova" Proem and Program* (New York: The Wander Press, 1922), p.21.

[5] Cosío Villegas, *Memorias*, p. 92. "Quexqueme" stands for an Indian woman's clothing

[6] See Ricardo Pérez Montfort, "La invención de lo "típico" en el imaginario: El México de charros y chinas poblanas," in: Javier Pérez Siller and Verena Radkau (ed.), *Identidad en el imaginario nacional* (Mexico: BUAP-El Colegio de San Luis- Instituto Georg Eckert, 1998).

were essential songs in children's choral ensembles, and the "*jarabe tapatío*" imposed itself as an obligatory dance in school festivals.[7]

The popular press, the theater, cinema, and the incipient radio industry disseminated this image of Mexico, where stereotypical representations appeared indistinctly. "*El charro*", "*la china*", "*el indito*" and "*la tehuana*" were, indeed, the most frequently exploited stereotypical figures.[8]

María Conesa as "*La Tehuana*," AGN (circa 1920s)

Although these representations had already been widely dispersed, in the post-revolutionary years, a common effort of the government and the private sector placed them in the national marquee as classical Mexican references.

[7] See Moisés Sáenz, *Escuelas Federales en San Luis Potosí. Informe de la visita practicada por el subsecretario de Educación Pública en noviembre de l927* (Mexico: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, l928).

[8] Ricardo Pérez Montfort, *Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano* (México: CIESAS, 2nd ed., 2002).

Capillarity between academic and popular cultures— curiously encouraged by nationalism—played the role of an authenticating lever of governmental programs, but it also justified representative syntheses that infiltrated the country's picture, literary, and musical avant-garde movements. "*Charros*", "*chinas*", "*inditos*" and "*tehuanas*" populated both mural painting and folkloric and revolutionary novels, and were introduced to popular theater and to musical nationalism, which were by then taking their first institutional steps.

Such representations of the "typically" Mexican were proudly presented to nationals and foreigners. Many of the latter, once they came in touch with the country, knew that Mexico was much more than merely a "bucolic arcade" or "*Rancho Grande*." Some of them even tried to show in their respective countries that this initial stereotypical image of Mexico, was very remote from reality.[9] Expressing himself against the inferiority image of the Mexican and their very cited complexes, so much in fashion in the 30's, the American writer and intellectual, Stuart Chase, for example, identified *charros* as follows:

> "There is a group of Mexicans, normally with more white blood than Indian, known as *rancheros*. They are independent farmers and cattlemen, occupying the wide ground between *hacendado* and village Indian. They are to be seen in the smaller cities and towns, and many still affect the picturesque *charro* costume...They do not suffer from feelings of inferiority at all, and are a joy to look at...One feels, somehow, as if all white Mexicans ought to be like this fearless, self-reliant, intelligent (within reason), and beautifully accourted... But they are not."[10]

Curiously, these visitors themselves had doubts about this representation of the concept of "Mexican" promoted by other Mexicans and which intended to be a reference, above all, to unity, originality, and general assertion. Analytical studies of these all-embracing outlooks circulated both in Mexico and around the world. Examples of this are the works by German writers such as Hilde Krüger and Egon Erwin Kisch, or the Spanish writer Luis Araquistáin, as well as the Englishmen Hamilton Fyfe and Thomas Beaumont Hohler, or the French writers Louis Lejeune and Vytold de Szyslo.[11]

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[9] Jorge Ruffinelli, *El otro México, México en la obra de B.Traven, D.H. Lawrence y Malcolm Lowry* (México: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1978).

[10] Stuart Chase, *Mexico: a Study of two Americas* (New York: The Literary Guild, 1931), p. 293.

[11] Egon Erwin Kisch, *Entdeckungen in Mexiko* (Berlin: 1945), Hilde Krüger, *Malinche* (Mexiko: 1944), Luis Araquistáin, *La revolución mejicana* (Santiago de Chile, 1929), Hamilton Fyfe, *The real Mexico* (London, 1914), Thomas Beaumont Hohler, *Diplomatic Petrel* (London 1942), Louis Lejeune, *Terres Mexicaines* (Paris, 1912), Vitold de Szyslo, *Dix mille kilomètres à travers le Mexique* (Paris, 1913).

In the United States, due both to geographical reasons and to a genuine liking of Mexican qualities, works of contrasting interests like those by Frank L. Tannenbaum, Ernest Gruening, Carleton Beals or Robert Redfield largely contributed to generate a particular awareness of Mexican reality.[12] The exchange of ideas, however, between some American intellectuals and personalities acting within the Mexican reality, tempered the specific vision with a more generalizing glance. But, following the interests to encourage a concrete market, insistence on Mexican culture peculiarities seemed to play the role of a homogenizing agent. The next sentence by Bertram Wolfe in his book, *Portrait of Mexico*, illustrated by Diego Rivera and published in 1936, established the intermediate space -somewhat paradoxical- that was sought between the need for a particular appreciation and its nationwide application:

"On national scale, Mexico is a land of great diversity and infinite variety; locally there is a marked homogeneity and uniformity... In these isolated villages there is truly a folk life, folkways, folk culture, folk songs, folklore. Here there is a high degree of communal similarity and solidarity..."[13]

Wolfe himself insisted that these cultural expressions were the principal elements that seemed to make most of the Mexican popular majority uniform after the revolution. He stated:

"Despite the constant uprisings of an outraged peasantry and the grandiloquent phrases of agrarian programs that remain largely, though not entirely, on paper, it is this "culture" that comprises in its areas the bulk of the Mexican land and people..."[14]

In general terms, the search for a new Mexican image ready to meet international consumption seemed to search for a more homogeneous viewpoint that, besides being the result of a stereotypical simplification,—with obvious responsibility of Mexican politicians, artists, and writers—was at the mercy of the most accessible customer: the American tourist and consumer.

In agreement with the guidelines of production determined by the requirements of a massive, albeit specific, market—the American—representations of

[12] Frank L. Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution: An interpretation of Mexico* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933); Ernest Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage* (New York & London: The Century, 1929); Carleton Beals, *Mexican Maze* (Philadelphia & London: J.B Lippincott G., 1931); Robert Redfield, *Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

[13] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Memorias: Portrait of Mexico* (New York: Covici-Friede Publishers, 1937), pp. 21-22.

[14] Ibd. p. 25.

Mexico were also determined by the taste and expectations of a simplifying public that was also clearly more conventional.

Although rough and revolutionary Mexico satisfied those in search for adventure and social change, the other Mexico, the typical, picturesque, and 'exotic', was that which placed itself at the costumer's service, primarily the American. This client had the additional fortune that Mexico was very close from his own vital space, and seemed almost equally strange and attractive as ancient Greece or Egypt.

II

It was precisely in the first half of 1920s, shortly after diplomatic relations were reestablished between the United States and Mexico in 1923, when Mexico opened itself to what could be deemed as an exotic adventure paradise for the average American, that is to say: tourists = consumer.

Economic effervescence of the period after World War I had unleashed a regional American campaign with the slogan "See America first" as battle cry. Trying to derive profit from this campaign, the Mexican government, due to supposed relationship of equality established with Americans in the Treatments of Bucareli, intended to attract more *gringo* consumers to the National territory through several publications which stated arguments such as the one below:

"...'See America first' is a slogan which has been adapted by numerous civic and other societies in the United States that are desirous that Americans learn more about their country before absorbing those abroad. Unquestionably there is much of interest to see here and the slogan is an excellent one, yet there exists a country to the south of us that is so picturesque and so rich in historical ruins that it has been justly called the 'Egypt of America.' This country is Mexico...."

And it added a sentence, as an invitation, suitable for the regime in turn, which stated:

"Traveling in Mexico is no harder nor more uncomfortable than in the U.S. And it's just as safe...".[15]

[15] *Greater Mexico* vol. 1 No. 7 (New York, May 15, 1924). The editor of this publication was Sealtiel L. Alatriste, a celebrity who seemed to be charging the Mexican post-revolutionary government for his enrollment in the Mexican Liberal Party during the first years of "*Maderismo*", with a stay in New York that promoted the "benefits" these governments offered to American consumers and investors.

The eagerness to attract American customers, however, was not only present in publications supported by the Mexican government destined to the main US public. Many interests benefited when diplomatic relations were reinstated between the United States and Mexico in 1923. Within Mexican territory, concretely in Mexico City, shortly after signing of the mutual recognition acts, proposals to exploit the cultural Mexican-American link reappeared before long. Magazines, news agencies, and film companies set up their branches in the Mexican capital city.[16]

Perhaps one of the most noticeable publications was the *Mexican-American* magazine, which dedicated its pages to purposes beyond reporting what was called "the pulse of Mexico". Within its pages, this weekly publication apparently playing the role of a spokesman for the Mexico-based American community, was capable of publishing pseudo-poems such as the following:

Coquettish Mexico
by Mrs. H.F. Carter

Mexico's a flirting
with her neighbor, Uncle Sam;
she plaits her dainty tresses
and dons her prettiest gown:
so when the tourists journey
below the Rio Grand
she holds out her small brown hand
and shows them round the town....

....

Uncle Sam's a flirting
with his neighbor, Mexico.
He finds her very charming,
with cheeks and eyes aglow.
He wants to get acquainted,
now they have come to terms,
to give each other mutual help
and make both nations grow..."[17]

[16] Aurelio De los Reyes, *Medio Siglo del Cine Mexicano (1896-1947*) (México: Ed. Trillas, l987), pp. 92-93.

[17] *Mexican-American, and the pulse of Mexico*, vol. 1, No. 30 (Dec. 20, 1924).

Material published in the *Mexican-American* reflected far more than what was intended to be the common territory between the semi-cultural interests of the United States and Mexican political interests. Often this magazine printed chronicles of adventures told by American embassy officers recounting their own experiences while horseback riding in Mexico City's surrounding areas. It also published reports about the "Americanization of Mexican society".[18] But it undeniably delighted in "the originality of Mexican culture" compared to everyday reality of the "American way of life". Several writers fond of folklore, of "typically" Mexican customs, and of what may be considered as the translation of "the Mexican"[19] for American consumption, such as Frances Toor or Anita Brenner, Alfredo B. Cuéllar or José de Jesús Nuñez y Domínguez, started to contribute to its pages.[20] Front pages, generally illustrated by Rafael Pruneda, seldom left out *charros* or *chinas poblanas*. In other words: an apparently recurring topic of this publication was "how different" that which is "the Mexican" appeared compared with "the American".

An invitation to visit "the wilderness of Mexico" was contained in nearly each sentence. In an attitude that lingered on for several decades, Mexican writers and artists seemed to be particularly interested in showing the concept of "the Mexican" to the American public, or at least their interpretation or translation of it into an idiosyncrasy regarded as different and therefore, outlandish. They seemed to insist upon inviting everyone wishing to know how "exotic" but essentially how "different" Mexico was.

A considerable amount of American artists and personalities accepted this invitation, particularly after the second half of the 1920s.[21] They were to be responsible of massively spreading certain interpretations of the country that

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[18] *Mexican-American, and the pulse of Mexico*, vol. 1, No. 32 (Jan. 3, 1925) or *Mexican-American, and the pulse of Mexico*, vol. 1, No. 36 (Jan. 31, 1925).

[19] "The Mexican" has to be understood as "lo mexicano", a concept that implies "essence" or "spiritual uniformity" to everything Mexican. See Henry C. Schmidt, *The roots of Lo Mexicano: Self and Society in Mexican Thought 1900-1934* (College Station and London: Texas A&M University Press, 1978).

[20] The significance of these writers in conforming Mexican national stereotypes can be consulted in the essay: Ricardo Pérez Montfort, "Una región inventada desde el centro. La consolidación del cuadro estereotípico nacional 1921-1937," in: id., *Estampas*.

[21] Helen Delpar, *The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican: Cultural Relations between the United States and Mexico 1920-1935* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press 1992) and James Oles, *South of the Border: Mexico in the American Imagination 1914-1947* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993).

would finally conform a vast tile of graphic and literary treatments of "the Mexican."

First Exposition of Mexican Popular Art
AGN, Fondo Enríque Díaz (1921)

On the other hand, in American cultural media, various Mexican intellectuals and artists such as José Juan Tablada, Luis Quintanilla, Adolfo Best Maugard or Miguel Covarrubias, just to mention four, also started promotional activities for the 'Mexican culture' aimed at contributing to the artistic and literary recognition of Mexico by the American society.[22]

[22] A very accurate follow-up for this interchange, fundamentally among the culturally privileged few is found in chapter two of "The Mexican Vogue at its peak" in the book by Delpar *The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican*, pp. 54-90.

But it was really the common and ordinary tourist, the average consumer of the "typical", who directly intervened in fixing the stereotypical products created both in Mexico and the United States and offered south of the American border. Many formal features of these products were largely adjusted to meet the interests of those who had a previously made-up image of what they were expecting to find when they arrived in Mexican land. The interest for Mexico in the United States, and the purchasing capacity increased remarkably by the end of the twenties. Data published by the American Congress stated that, by 1930, their tourism towards Mexico had produced revenues for $38 million, three times as much as 1923 expenditures.[23]

North American students dancing "El Jarabe Tapatío" in the Centro de Enseñanza para Extranjeros (CESU, UNAM)

With such a transit from the 20s to the 1930s, a couple of traveler guides for the Mexico City, were published both in English and in Spanish. One of the first to be published in Mexico in 1927 by editor León Sánchez acknowledged that "we have found only one tourist guide as regularly documented as this one is, and we are ashamed to confess that it was edited by an American gentleman and written in English. We are referring to Mr. Philip M. Terry, whose presentation

[23] Cited by Delpar, *The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican*, p.58

and edition is, indeed, magnificent...."[24] The famous and modern Terry guides regarding Mexico of the second half of the 20's were a successful product in the United States, even though they were somewhat schematic and limited. Perhaps because of that, the *Complete Guide to Mexico City and the Valley* (*Guía completa de la Ciudad y Valle de México*), edited by León Sánchez and written by Ignacio Muñoz, tried to compete with American guides by appealing to an authority, don Luis González Obregón, somewhat conservative, but a highly regarded intellectual and ethical authority in the Mexico of the 1920s. Still, although it tried to use a friendly prose, it was somewhat swollen, and rather recalled the old fashioned pompous style of the "Guias de Forasteros" (Visitor Guides) published in the XIX century.



Tourist guide for Mexican Highways (1930s)

Practical solutions to immediate problems of a tourist seemed not to have much space within the text. Written informally—very American—, when referring to food, the author told his readers:

"If you want to taste the excellence of Mexican cuisine: the secrets of regional spices with all their typical complement of sauces and salads, fries, and beverages always tasty and cheap; if you want to know about the exquisite fragrance of *tamales*, to taste a well cooked meal, multiple combinations of '*atoles*', *enchiladas*, sausages, and other temptations of Mexican food

[24] Ignacio Muñoz, *Guía completa de la Ciudad y Valle de México* (México Ediciones León Sánchez 1927), p.6.

lovers, go to '*Café Tacuba*'… or else visit the '*torterías*' that are in front of the *Teatro Lírico* and are always very crowded."[25]

This text did not include what should be an essential recommendation in American guides about being careful with Mexican food. Along with the classical recommendations, the excursions, the monument descriptions, stores, streets and buildings, the Mexican guide invited tourists to enjoy shows and festivities. Bullfights stood among the firsts, making clear reference to American tourism and to the prejudices it generated in the scarcely experimented Mexican guides:

"If you are 'Saxon', the idea of watching a bullfight will burn in you. For Saxons, bullfighting is marvelous, impressing, unforgettable... Because bullfighting has a rare virtue in Mexico. He who watches it, even if a serious person, and regardless of how acrimonious his character may be, turns for moments into a predator and, forgetting the bitterness of life, mesmerized by the bullfight... he claps, yells, stamps his feet, laughs hilariously or protests with strange energy, as if the old human framework of his vicissitudes and miseries were being left out, and substituted by a twenty-year old wrapping to enter into the *plaza*..."[26]

But, as is natural, it was in the description of popular festivities where the truly Mexican was alluded. It stated:

"If we are to believe prominent travelers, the popular and traditional festivities in Mexico have 'folklore', a typical stamp, unique all over America..."[27]

The "*fiesta*" along with the "*siesta*" were rapidly converted into indispensable references to attract tourism from all over the world, but mainly from the northern territory.

III

Undoubtedly, the so-called "typical and popular Mexican festivity" was proposed as one of the most delightful attractions to the American tourist. Far from the blood that could easily spurt in bullfights or cockfights, the "typical and popular Mexican festivity", with its *charros* and *chinas*, parades, bronco busting, and inevitable *jarabe tapatío* was more in accordance with the general intentions of tourists from the North. This festivity had much of a folkloric show of dancing, horses, typical costumes, songs, food and beverages. It was usually outdoors and above all, it was a joyful event.

[25] Ibd. p.19-20.

[26] Ibd. pp. 137-138.

[27] Ibd. p. 401.

References in American travel books of the first 1930s, with *charreadas* favored over bullfighting are not rare. An example is posed by Miriam Storm in her book *Little known Mexico. The story of a search for a place*. In the chapter dedicated to 'The *charros* ride', the author recognizes in the first place that the *charro* is different from the cowboy and the *gaucho*, and thus refers to an American entity associated to horses and to skilful maneuvers.

In very generalized terms, Mrs. Storm asserted: "Mexicans do not admire rough riding". But what she seems to have liked more of the Mexican bronco busting was the 'absence of violence', and above all, the horsemen's grace.

"No blood was to be spilled in the bull-ring today, thank heaven! Only the *charros* were to stir applause. As the gate lifted, they entered in gallant array, steeds prancing, but well under control. Their silver mounted suites were protected by *chaparreras*. There is nothing straighter than a *charro*'s back. They deploy about the ring as the bulls' dash in and the roping commences.

"Ah, *charrea*!"

"Truly *bonito*"

"*Bravo, charro*! *Bravo, toritito*!"[28]

In this description, the act of the *charreada* is strongly influenced by American taste. Such is the case of the "worthy" treatment of the animal and the word games with diminutive words, so dear to those who seek a loving approach to bullfighting. In this case, the bull does not go to death but to "the festivity".

The *jarabe tapatío* was considered the classical conclusion of the festivity, both by Mexicans and foreigners. The *jarabe* internationalized by Ana Pavlova as well as the multitudinal *jarabe* danced at the end of the festivities for the centennial of Independence consummation in 1921, were played at the slightest spur in Mexico and at "...the Roxy and Palace theatres in New York City...", according to Frances Toor's point of view,[29] with the purpose of showing something very typically Mexican to nationals and foreigners.

So renowned was this dance that in the mid 1920s, students attending the summer courses in the National University, mainly Americans, primarily requested to be taught the *jarabe*.[30] But in addition to the insistence to practice the dance, some even engaged in describing and analyzing it, such as Erna Fer-

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[28] Marian Storm, *Little Known Mexico: The story of a search for a place* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1932), pp.87-88

[29] Frances Toor, "El jarabe antiguo y moderno," in: *Mexican Folkways* VI, No. 1 (México, 1930), p.34.

[30] *México al día*, vol. 4, No. 84 (México, Sept. 1, 1932).

gusson in her book *Fiesta in Mexico* of 1934. She was interested in demonstrating the great European influence in Mexican dancing folklore, even when she recognized some native influence, however, her portraits turned out particularly simplifying, much inthe style that characterizes the tourist guide. She wrote, for example, following the statement of certain "official" culture elaborated by Mexican education authorities:

"...The dances which accompany the songs are romantic in the extreme and very Spanish in music and steps. They are couple dances, and their generic name is *zapateado*...The Indian influence is shown in the pose of the upper body, different in every dance and typical of the gait and movement of each region, and in a certain dignity and poise which make the dances truly Mexican and not Spanish. The best known and most typical are the *Jarabe* of Jalisco, the *Huapango* of Veracruz and the east coast, the *Sandunga* of Tehuantepec, and the *Jarana* of Yucatan..."[31]

In her description of the costumes, particularly that of the '*china poblana*', an appreciation of how synthetic Mexican culture seemed, arose in the following manner:

"They say a Chinese woman brought the skirt to Puebla; hence the name. But the *rebozo* is Spanish, the hat is masculine, and the shoes are French. So the costume is Mexican only in that it is as heterogeneous as the influences that have made Mexico..."[32]

By then, and this was evident in several references both American and Mexican, 'the typically Mexican' began to be downsized to homogeneously identifiable stereotypes and classified according to certain regionalization and activity. Four elements were gradually opted for until they became indispensable to be presented before the American consumer: the landscape, outfits, dancing, and handicrafts. The landscape was the natural setting and the other three were the *sine qua non* elements of the Mexican idiosyncrasy. The four met in the so-called 'Mexican *fiesta*', and rare was the book or guide about Mexico that did not emphasize its importance at trying to understand the 'typically Mexican'.

The national *fiesta* had more in common with the *charrería* and the *jarabe* than with bullfighting and cockfights. Beyond the regional festivities, whose stereotyping process was growing,[33] the *jarabe* and bronco busting filled the initial requirements of tourist consumption from the first half of the 1930s. These became the central components of the "Mexican *fiesta*" prepared for any

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[31] Edna Fergusson, *Fiesta in Mexico* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934) p.18.

[32] Ibd, p.21.

[33] Ricardo Pérez Montfort, "Nacionalismo y regionalismo en la fiesta popular mexicana 1850-1950," in: Herón Pérez Martínez (ed.), *México en fiesta*, (México: El Colegio de Michoacán/Secretaria de Turismo del Estado de Michoacán, 1998).

distinguished visitor, or at least, whose economical faculties were enough to mark the cultural medium.

"China poblana," AGN, Fondo Enríque Díaz (circa 1920s)

It was true that the dances, costumes and handicrafts of each region were emphasized when offering other places of the national territory. The *huipiles* and the *mestizo guayaberas* from Yucatan, the recognizable crowns of the *tehu-anas*, or the *cueras* of the *huastecos* appeared at the slightest spur to show the heterogeneous variety of Mexican folklore. But what generally ended the "Mexican *fiesta*" was a *jarabe tapatío*. Therefore, this was identified as "typi-cal" and "national".

Handicrafts, in turn, occupied a privileged place in American tourist con-sumption. A wide variety of objects with original and "exotic" designs began to occupy trading spaces where tourists strode in the 1920s. Stores identified as "Mexican Curious" opened on the central streets of Mexico City and sites of tourist interest always included a few small stands and shops with a number of

pieces in clay, silver, mat, leather, sugar, wood, etc., with decoration that attracted immediate consumption and the identification as a "Mexican product".[34]

Popular Theater "Mexican Curious," AGN, Fondo Enríque Díaz (circa 1920s)

Back to American tourism, both the road maps and the initial suggestions in guides and travel books identified places by their costumes, dances, and on many occasions, with a handicraft of the described places. Little by little, as print media got more sophisticated, this type of signalling became a common place that in turn determined much of the local response to tourism demand.[35]

The emerging massive communication media such as the press, radio and cinematography massively distributed these local and national stereotypes to the Mexican and foreign audience.[36] But official speeches and state promotions also had their responsibility in this. Another part should also be attributed, however, to those who assumed themselves as representatives or even genuine personifications of the Mexican stereotypes, for example the painters Diego Rivera,

[34] Victoria Novelo (ed.), *Artesanos, artesanías y arte popular de México: Una historia ilustrada* (México: CONACULTA, 1996).

[35] Some of the most illustrative maps of Mexico of the mid and final 1930s are in Leone Moats and Alice Leone, *Off to Mexico* (New York- London: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), and Ruth Poyo, *Touring Mexico* (México: Publicaciones Fishgrund, 1939).

[36] Pérez Montfort, *Estampas*.

Miguel Covarrubias, Frida Kahlo or Adolfo Best Maugard, or the veteran *charros* such as Don Carlos Rincón Gallardo or José Ramón Ballesteros.

Statements of travelers and tourist of those years also thrived, recounting their personal experiences with national and regional stereotypes, mainly *charros* and Mexican *chinas*. Showing their outfits for the recreation of nationals and foreigners, some Mexican citizens were proud of their Mexicanness in a sumptuous and theatrical manner with purposes both self-affirmative and to incite consumption of foreign visitors. Thus recall Heath Bowman and Stirling Dickinson in their book *Mexican Odyssey* of 1936. After they took a taxi ride along the cosmopolitan Paseo de la Reforma in Mexico City, the two travelers decided to stop in a restaurant.

"A group of *charros* ride up to our verandah –wrote the authors- One of them dismounts and hands the bridle to his groom, who has been following him on horse, while another leans in at the window, talking to his friends, and drinks wine seated on his horse...Behind their saddles they always carry a striped *sarape*; for this whole accouterment is traditional, dating back to the first years of the Spanish conquest, and kept alive here in the City by the Society of *Charros*. They are proud of their costumes; they know perfectly well how magnificent they look. How much more impressive than the Sunday American, with his unrelieved black, his spats and cane! Such outfits you do see here, but the *charros* are more truly Mexican...."[37]

Perhaps, the most representative figure in terms of the *charrería* staging to satisfy tourism during 1920s and 1930s was Don Carlos Rincón Gallardo.[38] Also known as the Marquis of Guadalupe and identified as one of the forerunners of Mexican *charrería*, Don Carlos used to ride his horse along the central path of Paseo de la Reforma every Sunday to conclude his parade at the Club de Charros, make a few bowknots, dance a *jarabe tapatío* and chat with natives and foreigners.

[37] Heath Bowman and Stirling Dickinson, *Mexican Odyssey* (Chicago/New York: Willet, Clarke & Co., 1935), p.75. Another similar scene can be consulted in O.A. Merritt-Hawkes, *High up in Mexico* (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson Ltd., 1936) p.165.

[38] Author of *El libro del charro mexicano* (Mexico: Ed. Porrúa Hnos. y Cia, 1939), Don Carlos Rincón Gallardo has not been duly studied. An approximation to the character may be consulted in the magazine *Cartel* (México, March 13, 1947).

Carlos Rincón Gallardo
AGN, Fondo Enríque Díaz (circa 1940s)

Not few visitors were impressed by the grace and elegance of Don Carlos; maybe they saw in him the typical Mexican whose popularity increases gradually by the proposals of massive communication media and the creation of a Mexican image capable of satisfying the expectations of foreign and tourist consumers. Some visitors even faithfully believed in his statements, as demonstrated by Erna Ferguson in 1934.

"...The Mexican *charro* is the cowboy, but he is a gentleman as well as a ranch hand, a point which is very important to the *Marqués de Guadalupe*, for the *Marqués* is a grandee of Spain, a Mexican with a long, aristocratic family tree, resentful of new ways and sworn to maintain the old custom and especially the gentlemen tradition. As the *Marqués* explains it, the rancho owner in Mexico was never a superior supervising person. He was a cowboy, expected to do whatever his men did, and do it better. So the *Marqués* conducts a weekly *charreada* near Mexico City where *charros* can test their skill at games..."[39]

[39] Fergusson, *Fiesta in Mexico*, p.246.

Postcard "Caballero en traje de charro" C.B. Waite, AGN (1917)

Rincón Gallardo had assembled such a sketch by the end of 1930s that his jokes seemed specially crafted for tourism. With some innocence, Rodney Gallop narrated the following in his *Mexican Mosaic*:

"No one dances the *Jarabe Tapatío* with greater air than the *Marqués de Guadalupe*, and he is a great authority on the correct costume for a *China* as for a *Charro* . He himself relates with *gusto* how once he was invited down into the arena to display the dance with a fair unknown. After the dance the lady begged him to tell her whether her costume was correct in every detail. 'Candour compels me to tell you, *Señorita*' he replied, 'that there is one thing wrong. Every true *China Poblana* wears lace-edged drawers. *You are wearing bloomers*.'"[40]

Fortunately, not all tourists nor all visitors fell in the stereotypic traps of those who had discovered the benefits–mostly economical—of selling the "Mexican image". Many visited and tried to understand the many Mexicos that clearly contradicted this unifying and simplifying fervor. Some even vehemently rejected this staging for tourists, since the other Mexican reality did not wait to appear from underneath: misery and social injustice. The photographer

[40] Rodney Gallup, *Mexican Mosaic* (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1939).

Helen Levitt in 1941, for example, after watching a group of poor children dancing in Veracruz, stated her deep depression and described the scene with the following dilapidating phrase:

"...It was a ritualized form of social behavior which was wholly devoid of spontaneity and communicated no individual feeling..."[41]

Nevertheless, for common tourism, stereotypic performances continued to such a degree that both foreigners and natives persisted in consuming the representations of what was identified as typically Mexican. Far from poverty and misery, full of *fiestas*, dances and showing off, much as in the "*Rancho Grande*" or in the "*Ay, Jalisco no te rajes*" films, seen worldwide exporting an idyllic image of the *charro* and of joyful Mexico, these dimensions served well to hide the rough and miserable Mexico. For many, this latter Mexico should still be hidden from national and foreign sight. Thus, the continuity of glittering Mexico was guaranteed, servicing the foreign consumer who only comes to verify the information depicted on tourist advertisements and in massive communication media. Even so, it was difficult not to see what was and still today is evident.

In this way, the invention of a stereotypic Mexico, much more than an attitude of self-understanding, derived in a translation for the American tourist and consumer about what was "different" from him or her. The creation of Mexican national stereotypes may thus be understood more as an Americanization process than as a Mexicanization process.

[41] Maria Morris Hambourg, "Helen Levitt: A Life in Part," in: *Helen Levitt* (San Francisco: Museum of Modern Art, 1991) quoted in Oles, *South of the Border*, p.206.

CORINNE A. PERNET*

THE POPULAR FRONTS AND FOLKLORE: CHILEAN CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS, NATIONALISM AND PAN-AMERICANISM, 1936-1948

In October 1935, hundreds of Chilean women flocked to the Cerrillos airport in Santiago, Chile, to catch a glimpse of Hollywood actor Clark Gable, much to the dismay of a local journalist. A few years later, in May 1941, the scene repeated itself when Douglas Fairbanks' plane landed in Chile. He had been sent on a good will tour by U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and was received by president Pedro Aguirre Cerda. Just a few months later, Walt Disney spent a few days in Chile as another special envoy after a tour that had already taken him to Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay.[1] No doubt that these episodes are symptomatic of the growing presence and power – not only in the field of entertainment – of the United States in Chile.[2] Nevertheless it would be erroneous to depict Chile in the 1930s and 1940s as a country that was simply being "americanized."

The reality was far more complex than that, as even a closer look at the Disney visit indicates. One evening, the press hosted a cocktail for Disney, the next day, the multi-talented Jorge Délano presented samples of Chilean movies.

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1 "Mujeres, espíritu, y materia," in: *Hoy*, 18 October 1935, 2; *Boletín Informativo del Instituto Chileno – Norteamericano de Cultura* 1, 3 (June 1941), 2, "Walt Disney llega a Chile," in: *La Hora*, 29 September 1941.

2 Exports to the United States more than doubled from the late 1920 to 1949, imports more than tripled. Rosmary Thorp, "The Latin American Economies in the 1940s," in: David Rock, ed. *Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 52. For a discussion of the economic relations of Chile and the United States see Michael Monteón, *Chile and the Great Depression: The Politics of Underdevelopment, 1927 – 1948* (Tempe: Arizone State University Press, 1998).

Writers, painters, sculptors and other artists congregated at the Palacio de Bellas Artes to show Disney their works. The high point of his stay, however, was an "extra-ordinary soirée" at the Municipal Theater in Santiago. There, Walt Disney was to experience Chile at its best: a program of Chilean *cuecas* and *tonadas*, performed in typical costumes, as well as a short piece of "country theater."[3] It is not a coincidence that the Chilean government chose an evening of folklore as a sample of the "state of Chilean Art" over a performance of the National Symphony Orchestra. Beginning in the late 1930s, the Chilean government fostered folklore and *chilenidad* in a variety of ways.

This paper argues that through the intervention of the state and a new cultural elite, musical folklore, especially the *cuecas* and *tonadas*, became an important component of Chile's national popular culture. Chilean cultural critics recognize today that the "national popular" culture was created in the era of the Popular Fronts, when electoral coalitions of center-left parties ruled Chile (1938 to 1948).[4] The concern of the Popular Fronts with folklore reflected broader changes in the very definitions of culture, as well as its production and consumption. The Chilean state helped push aside the art salon, the elegant concert, and private reading evenings by sponsoring public art, art in museums, libraries, and art reproduced in publications. New fields of cultural production such as popular music and artisanry became worthy of patronage and investigation. However, historians have neglected to study the influence of a new generation of professionals and intellectuals on the cultural activities of the state and the concomitant transition in cultural politics.[5] A close reading of the evolution of cultural policy would illuminate the popular-front attempt to construct a mod-

[3] The *cueca* is a courtship dance set to the rhythmic music of guitars, pianos, and accordeons and was popular in Chile, Peru and parts of Argentina. "Walt Disney llega a Chile," in: *La Hora*, 29 September 1941.

[4] Subercaseaux, Bernardo, "Nuestro Deficit de Espesor Cultural," in: Manuel Antonio Garreton and Saul Sosnowski (ed.), *Cultura, Autoritarismo y Redemocratización en Chile*, (Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1991), pp. 13-18. Carlos Catalán, Rafael Guilisasti, Giselle Munizaga, *Transformaciones del sistema cultural chileno entre 1920 – 1973* (Santiago: n.p., 1987) also point to a significant rupture in the cultural system at the time. While the electoral coalition of the Chilean center-left called itself "Popular Front" only until 1940, I use the term also to refer to the subsequent center-left coalitions until 1948.

[5] A welcome exception is Patrick Barr Melej, *Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the Middle Class* (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press 2001), but his book focuses on the 1920s and 1930s.

ern, inclusive nation-state, a topic that is particularly interesting since there had been barely any attempts at nationalist cultural politics until the 1920s.[6]

The efforts to propagate Chilean folklore took place in the context of a nationalist modernization project. Middle-class reformers at the helm of the Popular Front governments attempted to pull together the country by fashioning a Chilean identity that would include the *pueblo* while not appealing too strongly to class identities. Instead of engaging in class struggle, Chileans had to reach back to their heritage and traditions to get on the road to progress. In a sense, the institutionalization of folklore that took place was part of an attempt at middle-class hegemony in a period of progressive nationalism.

Given that the economic and also the cultural influence of the United States was growing in leaps and bounds at the time, and considering the anti-imperialist political rhetoric that the popular-front parties had engaged in for years, we could expect that the vogue of folklore had a strong anti-American component.[7] But this was not so. Instead, embracing folklore seems to have been a way of distancing Chilean culture from Europe, which after all had provided cultural guidance for hundreds of years. Chile was trying to define its own culture just as the growth of mass media made "culture chaos" easy, and some members of the cultural elite considered Argentine tangos, Mexican *rancheras*, and tropical dances as pernicious as a blind europhilia. The United States was thus not a prominent target of the folklorists. On the contrary, the turn towards folklore was frequently put into the context of developing a consciousness of a Pan-American identity. The Good Neighbor Policy of the United States, in turn, nurtured this impulse to assert independence from Europe and foster "American" cultural forms. Chilean academics interested in the topic were able to get

[6] Civic festivities such as celebrations of independence day, for instance, or the hoisting of the Chilean flag at schools were mandated only in the early 1920s. See Barr Melej, *Reforming Chile*, pp. 187-92. In 1928, plans to collect Chilean folklore did not come to fruition in part because of the severe financial crisis in Chile. Instituto de extensión musical, *Chile. Música folklórica chilena* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1943), p. 6. As far as the Latin American historiography is concerned, cultural policy and politics have been most extensively discussed for the case of Mexico. See Mary Kay Vaughan, *Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in Mexico, 1930 to 1940* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997); Gil M. Joseph and Daniel Nugent, *Everyday Forms of State Formation* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1994); for similar work on Brazil see Daryle Williams, *Culture Wars in Brazil: The First Vargas Regime* (Durham: Duke UP, 2001).

[7] Ernst Halperin points to the anti-imperialist note in Chilean nationalism during the Popular Front in *Nationalism and Communism in Chile* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965).

intellectual as well as material support from the United States for their enterprise of safeguarding and promoting national culture.

The folklore movement, supported by the government after 1938 played an important role in collecting (and thus defining) as well as diffusing Chilean folklore. These efforts had a certain impact, but they did not prevent the growing commercial success of music imports from the United States and of their Chilean imitators in the 1950s. Nevertheless, the body of knowledge and the institutions that were created in the course of the *chilenidad* campaigns laid the groundwork for more radical manifestations of cultural nationalism. In the 1950s and 1960s, a new generation of artists drew on the folklore that was institutionalized two decades earlier to launch the New Song Movement that made folkloric forms relevant again to Chileans by filling them with contemporary texts that quickly became explicitly anti-imperialist.[8]

THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF THE POPULAR FRONT

The Chilean Popular Front emerged against the backdrop of the great depression, which devastated Chile's export dependent economy in the early 1930s. The largely middle-class, reformist Radical party changed its previous policy of allying itself with the conservatives and liberals. They found new partners in the small but militant Socialist and Communist parties, which agreed to enter into the Popular Front coalition in 1936. The Popular Front attempted to mobilize the Chilean masses, and given the conditions in Chile at the time, was able to win popular support on issues such as the high cost of living or minimum wage legislation. In 1938, the Popular Front coalition narrowly won the presidency after its candidate, Radical Pedro Aguirre Cerda, had tirelessly campaigned on the slogan of "bread, roof, and overcoat." The Popular Front was an important

[8] In that sense this paper argues against some histories of the *nueva canción chilena* that claim that folk music had no place in Chilean mass media before the 1960s, that it was only performed on national holidays, or that Violeta Parra was among the first to do field studies of folk music. See for instance Albrecht Moreno, "Violeta Parra and the La Nueva Canción Chilena," in: *Studies in Latin American Popular Culture* 5 (1986): 108-126; Joan Jara, *Victor Jara. Un canto truncado*. Patricio Manns acknowledges the early folklore movement but describes it solely as an instrument of manipulation to de-mobilize the peasants in *Violeta Parra* (Madrid: Ediciones Júcar, 1977), pp. 39-45. A good analysis of the New Song Movement can be found in Jeffrey E. Taffet, "'My Guitar is Not for the Rich: The New Chilean Song Movement and the Politics of Culture," in: *Journal of American Culture* 20, 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 91-103.

step in building the Chilean compromise state. Though the coalition parties were in frequent disagreements and policy battles with each other, they were united in the belief that the state was an important actor in assuring national welfare. The "social question" became the "national question," and the government introduced a number of measures to improve the situation of the Chilean working and middle class.[9] The political right did not cease to attack the Popular Front, and in the first few years, fears of a military intervention were palpable. As a defensive strategy, the popular-front elites argued that they were the true defenders of nation and family. Disavowing radicalism, they saw to it that despite the massive popular mobilization, the collaboration of the people was disciplined and controlled.[10]

The Popular Front leaders were neither content with the state of Chilean culture nor with the *cultura* of Chileans. Chile needed productive citizens for its advancement, and too many Chileans were still illiterate or without useful technical skills that would help Chile develop into a modern nation. All the constituent parties of the Popular Front were engaged in politics of national uplift, economic as well as cultural. In the 1930s, magazines with "cultural contents" proliferated, all of them vying to orient and guide the reader's tastes. Such ventures were geared towards the ascending middle class, which in its search of education and cultural superiority might be inclined to buy a magazine such as *Hoy*, which was subtitled *The magazine for people who think.* After the 1938 triumph of the Popular Front, the political power of the middle class rose significantly, and some of its concerns were turned into state policy.[11] The Popular Front's approach to culture was two pronged: on the one hand, the government wanted to make "high culture" more accessible to all the citizens, both in terms of production as well as consumption. The idea was to liberate art from its elitist and commercial underpinnings, and to let the state assume the role of the sponsor. On the other hand, the government expanded the notion of "culture" to

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[9] The middle class benefited most from such reforms, both in terms of real wages as well as by finding work opportunities as well as power in the growing state administration.

[10] For an extensive discussion on "Respectability and Rule" see Karin Rosemblatt, *Gendered Compromises: Political Cultures and the State in Chile, 1920 – 1950* (Chapel Hill and London: 2000), pp. 27-57.

[11] Sociologist Hernán Godoy Urzúa, calls the period from the 1930s to the 1950s "the mesocratic hegemony" but does not further analyze the cultural mandates in detail in *La cultura chilena: Ensayo de sintesis y de interpretación sociólogica*, (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1982).

include the cultural production of broader sectors of the population, all in an ideal of "collective uplift."[12] The growing importance of the mass media, especially the radio and the movies, posed its own problems. Conservative Catholics were not the only ones who decried immoral dramas on the screens and denounced the foxtrots and tangos that seduced too many Chileans to dance in sinful physical proximity with the opposite sex. Popular-front elites concurred that the mass media did not contribute enough to Chile's quest for a better future.[13]

For this reason, the Chilean state greatly increased its activities in the cultural realm. Beginning in 1942, the government started to award annual national prizes in literature and art.[14] To make "high art" more accessible, various artistic disciplines were incorporated into state educational facilities. In 1940, the School of Fine Arts at the prestigious public University of Chile created an Institute of Music and a symphonic orchestra, ballet schools, as well as an experimental theater. These institutions provided venues where artists could work free from commercial pressures. The University of Chile also started its own press, which soon took up an important position among Chilean publishing houses. As we will see, the University of Chile became an important player in this project of national culture, by re-orienting its areas of research and teaching and by increasing its outreach activities. In 1943, the Ministry of the Interior added a new department to its roster, the *Dirección General de Información y Cultura* (hereafter DIC), designed as what in other countries would be called the "official propaganda machine." Among other things, the DIC was responsible for cultural extension, theater, radio, movies, and popular music.[15] The ef-

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[12] Bernardo Subercaseaux, *La industria editorial y el libro en Chile, (1930-1984) : Ensayo de interpretación de una crisis* (Santiago: CENECA, 1984), pp. 9-11.

[13] Acción católica, the catholic mass organisation, was the most important participant in the censorship board that rated movies. The organization also wrote to U.S. President Roosevelt to ask that he prevent the export of "immoral" movies to Chile. The U.S. ambassador replied that the government had no control over exports. "En defensa de la Moral: Roosevelt y la Acción Católica de Chile," in: *Boletín de la Acción Católica* 5 (May 1937), pp. 605- 606.

[14] The legislation to that end had been proposed by Pedro Aguirre Cerda, but it was implemented under Juan Antonio Ríos. The art prize was rotated between music, theater or ballet, and painting or sculpture.

[15] DIC also coordinated government action on tourism, sports, parks and zoos and had its own publishing department. The agency published yearbooks, tourist guides, as well as the magazine *Antárctica* (1944 to 1946).

forts of both the DIC and the university institutions were deeply steeped in notions of *chilenidad*, a concept that middle-class reformers had promoted since the turn of the century.[16]

CHILENIDAD AND FOLKLORE

During political campaigns for the 1938 presidential elections, *chilenidad* became a label much fought over. The Popular Front attacked the candidate of the right, former finance minister Gustavo Ross, was attacked as a man more at home in the streets of Paris than in Santiago. Pedro Aguirre Cerda, in contrast, presented himself as an example of *chilenidad* and played up his image as a simple man. His favorite dish? Beans and *cochayuyos*, the dried Chilean kelp that was a staple in the diet of the poor. Tea and bread were his and most Chileans' meager breakfast. Even for his political enemies, it was difficult to attack Aguirre Cerda on that front.[17] But the rightist political parties tried to claim *chilenidad* for themselves: Gustavo Ross, for instance, had parades of mounted *huasos,* the proud Chilean horsemen, at his campaign stops in the south.[18]

Despite the universal acceptance of the need for *chilenidad*, some progressive organizations were careful to limit this notion and addressed the dangers of extreme nationalism. The Teachers' Union, for instance, agreed that education should have an "essentially nationalist" content, but it should not tilt towards fascism. Yes, they should emphasize Chilean history, traditions, and the potential of economy and culture, they argued, "with a preference over the foreign, but without neglecting our relations with the American nations and the rest of the world." They should never lose sight of the "interdependence of the people."[19] Others pointed out that *chilenidad*, and pride in the *patria* would only

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[16] Barr, *Reforming Chile*, pp. 77-102.

[17] Interview with Pedro Aguirre Cerda in: *Hoy* (10 November 1938). To this day, Aguirre Cerda is represented in this fashion. See Jorge Aguirre Silva (ed.), *Pedro Aguirre Cerda: Ejemplo de Chilenidad* (Santiago: n.p. 1992).

[18] Barr-Melej, *Reforming Chile*, pp. 134-135.

[19] Union de Profesores de Chile, *Programa Educacional de la Union de Profesores de Chile: Resoluciones fundamentales de la Convención de Enero de 1939* (Santiago: Ediciones de la Union de Profesores, 1939), p. 18.

take hold if Chileans enjoyed decent living conditions, thus linking the concept with notions of social justice.[20]

Once in office, Aguirre Cerda looked for ways to foster *chilenidad,* and the campaign continued after his premature death in late 1941. The ministry of education began to work *chilenidad* into the curriculum and the schoolbooks.[21] The selection of the annual literature prize-winners also reflected the nationalist wave. Though the first prize in 1942 went to Augusto D'Halmar, the rest of the decade was dominated by *criollista* writers: Joaquín Edwards Bello won fame with his *Chica del Crillón*, a tale of a spoiled society girl who finds redemption in the arms of a *huaso*; Mariano Latorre, a learned man, immersed himself in the Chilean countryside until "without being a *campesino*, I made a *campesino* of myself." Eduardo Barrios, who eventually bought himself a rural estate and was rather conservative, and Pablo Neruda from the left fringe of nationalist writers rounded out the picture.[22] The winner of the literature prize for the centennial of the city of Santiago was Luis Durand's *Presencia de Chile*, which contained essays on landscape, legends, the *cueca*, the *tonada* as well as an "appreciation of the *roto*."[23] These writers, many of whom had spent a part of their childhood in the countryside, wrote about rural Chile and its archetypes, but focused on descriptions of physical beauty rather than on the rural protagonists, who did

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[20] The Commission of University Rectors stated that to foster *chilenidad*, "it is necessary that the sons of our land can live, materially and morally, in such conditions that life constitutes at least in a certain measure, a pleasure. Thus we will have to occupy ourselves with the improvement of the material living conditions." Comisión de Rectores de las Universidades nacionales, al Ministro de Educación Publica, *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, XCIX: 42/43 (1941), p. 306. Former President Arturo Alessandri Palma, under whom the first legislation mandating nationalist rituals in schools was passed in 1921, signed the letter for the commission.

[21] In 1941, Aguirre Cerda had decreed that on Mondays, all schools had to focus on an important Chilean event. In 1942, the education minister opened a contest for a patriotic primary school text book to foster love for one's homeland and its traditions. *Lectura*, 13 (January 1942), p. 36. For a discussion of the pedagogical campaigns, see Barr, *Reforming Chile*, pp. 200-210.

[22] Joaquín Edwards Bello, *La chica del Crillón* (Santiago: Ercilla, 1935). Mariano Latorre wrote the novels *Cuna de Cóndores* (1918), *Ully* (1923), *Chilenos del Mar* (1929), but published more short stories and essays on different aspects of Chilean culture. Eduardo Barrios established himself with *El niño que se enloqueció de amor* (1921) and wrote *Un perdido* (1926) as well as short stories, essays, and theater pieces.

[23] Luis Durand, *Presencia de Chile* (Santiago: Nascimento, 1942).

not have much of a voice. In that sense, *criollista* literature tended towards middle-class projections of rural life and virtues.[24]

Publishing houses went along with the trend, and started to issue compilations of folk songs and books describing old rural and urban customs for a broader reading public.[25] Many of them brimmed with romantic images of rural life, as the review of a 1939 compilation of Chilean popular songs shows:

"On the estates, in the warmth of the juicy vineyards and the enthusiasm of the rodeos, songs of a beauty that never fades, *tonada*s full of meaning and splendor were composed... a true treasure of authentic vernacular poetry."[26]

However, the reviewer of the songbook at least seems willing to take on rural culture on its own terms, to listen to the music produced by and for rural folk. In that sense, disseminating folklore was a step closer into the countryside than the *criollista* writers had dared to take. Beginning in the late 1930s, articles on various aspects of folklore, from language to alcohol usage, were found in the middle-class magazines as well as the newspapers.[27]

But the public valorization of rural folklore and the countryside did not mean that the situation of the rural folk – after all the carriers of the celebrated tradi-

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[24] Luis Durand, for instance, learned from the peasants by watching them, not by talking to them. Barr, *Reforming Chile*, p. 117. José Bengoa makes a similar point about middle-class projections in his *La comunidad perdida. Ensayos sobre identidad y cultura: los desafíos de la modernización en Chile* (Santiago: Ediciones SUR, 1996), pp. 145-148. He emphasizes the provincial origins of the Chilean middle class and its tendency to want to create "a rural, mythical past."

[25] Antonio Roco del Campo's *Notas del folklore chileno* (Santiago: Talleres Gráficos Gutenberg, 1939) was published in the series *Folleto de divulgación cultural*. The large publishing house Zig-Zag also started to publish folklore titles. In the early 1940s, the University of Chile published as books a slew of master's theses that had been written in the late 1920s: Lucila Dufourcq, *Noticias relacionadas con el folklore de Lebu* (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1943), Lucila Muñoz, *Estudio del folklore de San Carlos* (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1943), Celestina Villablanca, *Folklore de Chillán* (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1943), Guillermina González, *Las reliquias de Arauco* (Santiago: Prensas de la Universidad de Chile, 1943).

[26] Review of Antonio Acevedo Hernández, *Canciones populares chilenas. Recopilación de cuecas, tonadas, y otras canciones* (Santiago: Ercilla, 1939) in: *Hoy* (13 July 1939), p. 50. Acevedo had already published *El libro de la tierra chilena. Lo que canta y lo que mira el pueblo de Chile* (Santiago: Ercilla, 1935).

[27] Oreste Plath, "Animalismo oceanico y campero en el hablar del pueblo," in: *Hoy* (11 March 1943), p. 59; Oreste Plath, "Marcha y evolución de los estudios folklóricos," in: *Hoy* (23 September 1943), pp. 57-58; Oreste Plath, "Substancia popular de Chile," in: *La Opinión* (4 March 1945), which dealt with the folk uses of alcohol.

tions – was improving dramatically under the Popular Fronts. When Chilean rural workers started to form unions in the late 1930s and wrote more and more labor petitions, the Chilean government suspended rural unionization and let the workers suffer the landowners' reprisals.[28] Similarly, while rural folklore was celebrated as a paragon of *chilenidad*, social service institutions devised programs to modernize rural Chile and to do away with many of the customs and "superstitions."[29]

FOR THE WORLD TO SEE: DEFINING *CHILENIDAD*

Among Chile's cultural and academic elites, the interest in folklore was heightened in the 1930s by international developments. One of the institutions that first became active in the field of Chilean folklore was the Chilean Commission of Intellectual Cooperation. Linked to the League of Nations, such commissions had functioned in Europe since the 1920s. In Latin America they received an impetus in 1936, when the League of Nations convened a meeting of the commissions in Buenos Aires. Jules Romains, Stefan Zweig, Hermann Alexander Count Keyserling and other prominent writers demanded to know what Latin American culture was – and distinguished Latin Americans such as Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Alfonso Reyes and Carlos Reyles tried to answer.[30] The Chilean Commission on Intellectual Cooperation (hereafter CCCI), which had languished since its foundation in 1930, was greatly revitalized after the Buenos Aires conference and organized the 1939 American Conference on

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[28] Brian Loveman, *Chile. The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism.* Third Edition. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 212-213. For more details see Loveman's *Struggle in the Countryside; Politics and Rural Labor in Chile, 1919-1973* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1975).

[29] The Aguirre Cerda administration created the Instituto de Información Campesina that published advice books designed to be read to peasants by their literate children. Members of the institute also toured the countryside in a bus. Its subdirector, Graciela Mandujano, told an American journalist that "As soon as they [the peasants] use a cake of soap and water there is no difference between them and us." Erna Fergusson, *Chile* (New York: A. Knopf, 1943) p. 270.

[30] The conversations were recorded in *Europe-Amérique Latine* (Paris: Institut international de coopération intellectuelle, 1937). The Argentine commission published the account in Spanish.

Intellectual Cooperation.[31] The need to define Latin American and Chilean culture seems to have arisen at least partially from the interest expressed by international organizations.

The first large public event organized by the CCCI was a 1938 exhibition of Chilean popular art put together by writer and folklorist Tomás Lago.[32] The festivities surrounding the exhibition give a taste of the progressive nationalism of the era: Augusto D'Halmar and literary critic Ricardo E. Latcham invoked the virtues of the Chilean *roto* and *huaso*, and the folklorist and composer Jorge Urrutia Blondel extolled the *cueca*. Pablo Neruda gave a moving speech about the "artists of the people" and a young women's choir performed pieces written by the Pedro Humberto Allende, *criollo* composer and folklorist. All in all, the exhibition was popular beyond any expectation, so that the CCCI established a permanent Chilean Institute of Popular Art (Instituto Chileno de Arte Popular) shortly thereafter.[33]

The United States did not figure prominently in the discussion about the nature of Latin American – or American – culture. When the Institute of Popular Art organized an exhibition to celebrate the centennial of the founding of the University of Chile in 1943, the organizers seemed preoccupied with Europe. Indeed, some of the speeches implied that the increased interest in folklore stemmed from the predicament of having been cut off from European culture. Juvenal Hernández, President of the University of Chile, argued that

[31] The commission became quite active and hosted the 1939 American Conference on Intellectual Cooperation, which was financed by the League of Nations. Juvenal Hernández, Francisco Walker Linares, *La Cooperación Intelectual. Sus antecedentes. Su fundación en Chile. Su acción* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad de Chile, 1940), p. 11.

[32] *Arte Popular* (Santiago: Imprenta Condor, 1938). Tomás Lago was a friend of Neruda's published the 1926 book *Anillos* with him. He had already organized a small exhibit on Chilean popular art for the 1936 International Labor Conference in Santiago. A major weekly had heralded it as "an excellent initiative." in: *Hoy* (15 January 1936), p. 2. In 1971 he published *Arte Popular Chileno*, a foundational text for the study of Chilean artisanry.

[33] President of the Institute was Arturo Aldunate Philips. Composer Pedro Humberto Allende and Sergio Larrain Garcia Moreno were vice presidents, Yolando Pino Saavedra, Carlos Isamitt and Tomás Lago were directors. Comisión Chilena de Cooperación Internacional, *Memoria de 1938* (Santiago de Chile: El Esfuerzo, 1939), pp. 5, 23. Pedro Humberto Allende showed great interest in folklore from the beginning of his career as composer, and was the first to bring a group of Mapuche musicians to a recording session in Santiago. He received the National Art Prize in 1945. Samuel Claro, *Panorama de la Música Contemporánea en Chile* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1969), p. 6.

"We have to stimulate an affirmative will to exist by turning towards ourselves and towards our past. ... We have to look at our own artifacts, our habits, our customs – which were preserved in a pure form among the people and which show their secrets in simple forms – to get a more exact idea of our historical and social reality which is also the reality of all American countries."

Repeating the hint at a Pan-American culture, Hernández suggested that this was a propitious time to engage in a careful examination of America's "vital resources." Also Amanda Labarca emphasized that the exhibition was the foundation for a museum dedicated to "the genuinely American culture" in which "America" revealed its rich variety and wonderful sense of aesthetics.[34]

The exhibition became the cornerstone of the Museum of American Popular Art (at first called Museum of *Inter-American* Popular Art) that opened its doors in December 1944. Tomás Lago remained director of this – as he claimed – "first of its kind" museum that presented to the interested public woodcarvings, metal works, and decorated household implements. An important part of the collection was also dedicated to the Mapuche culture, though it would be a vast exaggeration to say that Chile had a vogue of *indigenismo* like Mexico or Peru. Mapuche culture was just a minor element of rural culture that became the folklore of Chile.[35] Over 23'000 people visited the museum in the first half of 1946, which was considered a success beyond all expectations.[36] The museum thus was a prime example of the two-pronged strategy to make "culture" accessible and expand the definitions of the concept.[37]

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[34] Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, and Mexico contributed material for the exhibition. The organizers stated that transportation difficulties due to the war deprived them of the participation of Brazil, the Central American countries, and the United States. Comisión chilena de cooperación intelectual, *Catálogo de la exposición de artes populares americanas* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1943), pp. 7, 9-10.

[35] The Socialist Party used the Mapuche ax, the *toquí*, in its banner, and Chilean composers would develop themes of Mapuche music. Though some exiled Peruvians tried to foster *indigenismo* in Chile, the movement never took hold. See Tito Mundt, *Las banderas olvidadas* (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1964); Loveman, *Chile*, pp. 206-217.

[36] It certainly contributed to the success that the museum was located in one of the popular green areas of Santiago, the Cerro Santa Lucia, and that there was no entrance fee. Instituto de Investigación del Folklore Musical, "Centenario del Folklore, 22 de agosto de 1946, Festividades de la semana del Folklore Chileno."

[37] After Tomás Lago retired from the Museum in 1968, folklorist Oreste Plath took over the directorship until 1973. It is unclear who was in charge of the Museum in the first seven years of the military dictatorship. It has now been renamed Museo de Arte Popular Americano Tomás Lago.

Members of the CCCI's Popular Art Institute also used the press to attempt to interest the larger public in the field of folklore. Oreste Plath argued that the "national character" could be investigated in many different areas: song and music, decorations, ceremonies and legends, artisanal techniques. As modernization, especially industrial products and mass media, was changing Chilean culture, it was necessary to explore "the life and the soul" of the Chilean people, the "pulse of the nation."[38] Thus Chileans could uncover what was truly their own.

This institutionalization of Chilean folklore happened in a context of heightened Pan-American awareness and was partly a process of distancing Chilean from European culture. The United States certainly supported this enterprise. Important figures in US cultural diplomacy encouraged Latin Americans to showcase their own, democratic traditions and find their artistic inspiration in "American" traditions instead of looking to the decadent European aristocratic culture.[39] Especially in the field of music, United States cultural diplomacy had important ramifications for Chile.

In 1939, the Department of State sponsored a conference on Inter-American Relations in the Field of Music where musicologist Charles Seeger emphasized the importance of folk and popular music to cultural understanding. As chief of the music division at the Pan American Union, Seeger published musical histories and lists of recordings of Latin American music available in the United States.[40] The Library of Congress hired a Latin America specialist, and renowned folklorists traveled throughout Latin America, including Chile, to survey the field.[41]

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[38] Oreste Plath, "Aspectos del Folklore," in: *Hoy* (17 December 1942), pp. 63-67. Plath had received his training in folklore studies abroad: the CCCI gave him a fellowship to spend a year in Rio de Janeiro. He was a long-time member of the Alianza de Intelectuales. Oreste Plath, *El Santiago que se fue: Apuntes de la memoria* (Santiago: Grijalbo-Mondadori, 1997), pp. 15-20.

[39] See Ralph Steele Boggs,"Folklore democrático y cultura aristocrática," in: *Folklore Américas* 2 (December 1942), pp. 17-20.

[40] Seeger had been assistant director of a Work Progress Administration project to collect folk music in the American West from 1938 to 1940. Gilbert Chase, "Charles Seeger and Latin America: A Personal Memoir," in: *Latin American Music Review* 1 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-5. Charles Seeger is the father of Pete Seeger, the folk singer.

[41] Gilbert Chase held this position until 1943. Ralph Steele Boggs spent six months in South America in 1940 and also visited Chile. Also he made the connection between Panamericanism and the study of the "common culture" of the New World nations. See "El

According to Domingo Santa Cruz Wilson, Dean of the School of Fine Arts of the University of Chile, a request from the U.S. Library of Congress for records of Chilean popular and folkloric music made him painfully aware that he had no appropriate material to send. Not being able to cite specific records, he decided that there should be an Institute with the mission to collect and record Chilean folk music.[42] As Dean of the School of Fine Arts, Santa Cruz was well placed to put his ideas into practice. When the University of Chile expanded in 1940, the Institute of Music Extension (Instituto de Extensión Musical) was established. It provided a space for academics as well as musicians with leanings towards folklore. Music historians, musicians, and composers such as Eugenio Pereira Salas, Carlos Isamitt, Pablo Garrido and Carlos Lavín were affiliated with the Institute.[43] With the support of Santa Cruz Wilson, the Institute of Musical Folklore (Instituto de Investigaciones del Folklore Musical) became an independent entity in 1944.

The members of Institute were internationally very well connected. Santa Cruz Wilson already had a career as diplomat and academic behind him, Pereira Salas was widely traveled and among other things had lectured as a Guggenheim fellow at Berkeley in the early 1930s. He was also one of the founding members of the Instituto Chileno-Norteamericano de Cultura in 1938. Garrido and Lavín had received their academic training in Europe.[44] In 1940, Santa

folklore y el panamericanismo," in: *Revista de la Universidad Católica Bolivariana* 4 (11-13/1939), pp. 226-229; *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, 37/38 (1940), p. 277.

[42] *Chile*, p. 7. For information on Domingo Santa Cruz Wilson's long and distinguished career see Samuel Claro and Jorge Urrutia Blondel, *Historia de la Música en Chile* (Santiago: Editorial Orbe, 1973). In the 1940s, Santa Cruz Wilson became an active member in the Instituto Chileno – Norteamericano de Cultura.

[43] The Institute was established by decree on 11 October 1940. *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, 37/38 (1940), pp. 139-140. For an account of the political squabbles surrounding the decree see Claro and Blondel, *Historia de la Música en Chile*, pp. 127-131. Carlos Isamitt had a strong interest for Araucanian music. Carlos Lavín had received his training in folklore studies in Berlin, London, and Paris. His research led him through many countries in Europe and the Mediterranean. *Chile*, p. 47. Also active in the Institute was folklorist Filomena Salas González, who married Domingo Santa Cruz Wilson after divorcing her first husband, music critic and lawyer Fernando Orrego. With Orrego she had a son, Juan Orrego Salas, who is one of Chile's most eminent composers.

[44] Pereira Salas had visited Argentina, studied at the Sorbonne from 1926 to 1928 and also travelled in Northern Africa, England, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Holland. He became a member of the Folklore Americas Association where Ralph Steele Boggs was a leading figure. Ralph Steele Boggs, "Some South American Folklorists," in: *Southern Folklore Quarterly* 6 (1/1942), pp. 114-115. Garrido was also author of a pessimistic

Cruz Wilson and Pereira Salas accepted an invitation by the U.S. Department of State to travel for a few months through the United States.[45] They visited the Library of Congress Music Division to discuss folklore with Allan Lomax and Ralph Steele Boggs. Together with Charles Seeger they devised a plan to collect and classify Chilean folklore with the help of the Pan American Union. David Rockefeller's Office of the Inter-American Coordinator even financed portable recording equipment for fieldwork. Santa Cruz, who had found it irritating that it was mostly foreigners who recorded Chilean folklore and that recordings could more easily be found in Berlin, Washington, and Buenos Aires than in Chile, was content with that result.[46]

The United States thus provided both equipment as well as know-how for the Institute. Taking the "valuable advice" of Ralph Steele Boggs and his colleagues to heart, the Institute of Musical Extension started its fieldwork.[47] They circulated a small questionnaire and a folder with instructions for collecting musical folklore and related data, and tried to get collaborators all over Chile, using mostly teachers as contacts. After the equipment from the United States arrived, they scoured the countryside to record music, and also collected information about old music, games played in the different parts of Chile, and folk culture in general.[48]

The aim of the folklorists, however, went beyond the mere collection and documentation of folklore. The point was also to bring *chilenidad* back into people's lives, that is, "returning to the people what belongs to the people, puri-

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discussion of the situation of musicians in Chile, *Tragedia del músico chileno* (Santiago: Ed. Smirnow, 1940) and became a leading figure in the musicians' union.

[45] *The Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), pp. 2-3. In 1943, Pereira Salas was invited to teach Chilean folklore at the University of Chicago, and he visited the United States on numerous other occasions. Ralph Steele Boggs, "Folklore, General Statement," in: *Handbook of Latin American Studies* 9 (1943).

[46] Santa Cruz Wilson did not seem to appreciate that Carlos Vega, a noted Argentine folklore specialist, had recorded Chilean folklore "with great zeal." *Chile*, p. 8.

[47] Ralph Steele Boggs instructed them to let the singers perform in normal circumstances and to record all the details surrounding the performance as well as the lyrics, as repetitive they might be. *Chile*, p. 52.

[48] Other well-known music specialists associated with the Institute were Jorge Urrutia Blondel and Alfonso Letelier Viu. Ralph Steele Boggs, "Folklore, General Statement," in: *Handbook of Latin American Studies* 10 (1944); Filomena Salas, "El instituto de investigaciones del folklore musical," in: *Revista Musical Chilena*, 1 (May 1945), p. 22.

fied by a short stint at school [*un paso por la escuela*]."[49] Indeed, the specialists in organizations such as the Institute of Musical Folklore selected the folklore and "purified" it, and in doing so they helped define Chilean folklore for that and subsequent generations, not only in Chile, but also abroad.[50] How exactly they decided which songs were included in their recordings, for instance, goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, several features of the intervention of the professionals can be ascertained.

First of all, it was professionals only, and not the *campesinos*, who sang at the concerts, recorded collections of "typical songs" or shared their thoughts about music, lyrics, or performance. These singers were chosen carefully, as Santa Cruz Wilson noted without any apparent irony, for their willingness "to approach as much as possible what the people do when they sing without any other witness than the land and the mountains of the Chilean countryside."[51] Thus Margot and Estela Loyola, daughters of a merchant and a pharmacist who had grown up in the provincial city of Linares and had studied piano at the conservatory in Santiago became the official voices of Chilean folklore. In 1943 they recorded *Aires tradicionales y folklóricas de Chile* with the Institute of Musical Folklore, a lavish edition that contained a booklet with the score, lyrics, as well as a critical commentary on the songs.[52] Over the next years, the Loyola sisters, especially Margot, continued their career on the radio and in live shows singing a repertoire of waltzes, *cuecas*, and *tonadas*.

Though researchers claimed to rescue "uncontaminated folklore" from the most remote parts of Chile, they did not shy away from re-arranging that music that they wanted to diffuse in new settings. Songs originally performed by one singer were transformed into choral arrangements so that they could be used in schools and other choirs. The *escuela de temporada*, university extension courses for teachers that took place during the summer, offered its first course on national folklore in 1941, and it was so popular that folklore courses became

[49] "Centenario del Folklore, 22 de agosto de 1946: Festividades de la semana del Folklore Chileno," p. 12.

[50] The Institute coordinated the exchanges with the Pan American Union and the Library of Congress, for instance.

[51] *Chile*, p. 8.

[52] The set of records cost 360 pesos, which might account for the fact that the Institute still had copies to sell at the 1946 week of folklore.

a regular feature of the summer classes.[53] Training teachers was an important conduit through which choral forms of *tonadas* and *cuecas* were "given back" to society.[54] To similar ends the Institute of Musical Folklore also issued a booklet that contained scores and verses for diverse folklore songs as well as explanatory comments.[55] The examples were drawn from concerts that the institute had organized in diverse theaters in Santiago. Thus the University of Chile, academic researchers as well as teachers played an important role in institutionalizing and promoting folklore.

In the early 1940s, the Chilean government decided to intervene directly in the cultural arena with the creation of a new governmental agency supposed to coordinate the cultural outreach activities of different government branches, the *Dirección de Informaciones y Cultura* (DIC). The DIC created a department of "popular music" in 1944, whose personnel was largely drawn from the University of Chile's Institute of Musical Folklore. The department collected folklore, recording 150 songs in its first year alone, started to film dances of northern Chile and compiled a "General Folklore Census" of Chile, which quickly grew to more than 2000 items.[56] But apart from compiling material, the DIC also expressed concerns to transform and broaden the scope of folklore.

The DIC projects show that the Chilean government used folklore very consciously as a nation-building tool. New contents in tune with the modernizing

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[53] This first course was taught in 1941 by Yolando Pino Saavedra, who was secretary of the Facultad de Filosofía y Educación at the University of Chile. Having spent his childhood in Parral and Linares, Pino Saavedra lived in Santiago, except for six years of university studies in Hamburg, where he studied folklore with Fritz Krüger. He also became a member of Folklore Americas. Oreste Plath, "Marcha y evolución de los estudios folklóricos," in: *Hoy* (23 September 1943), pp. 57-58; Ralph Steele Boggs, "Folklore, General Statement," in: *Handbook of Latin American Studies* 7 (1941), Ralph Steele Boggs, "Some South American Folklorists," in: *Southern Folklore Quarterly* 6 (1/1942), pp. 114-115.

[54] "Conversando con Margot Loyola," http://margotloyola.ucv.cl/conversando/03.html, 22.6.2001.

[55] Instituto de extensión musical, Chile. *Música folklórica chilena* (Santiago: Universidad de Chile, 1943).

[56] Carlos Lavín, for instance, went to work for the DIC and certainly brought material he had collected at the Institute for Musical Folklore. Interestingly, the folklore archives of the DIC were transferred back to the Department of Folklore of the University of Chile in 1948, and Carlos Lavín remained responsible for it. Manuel Dannemann, "The Department of Folklore, Institute for Musical Research, University of Chile," in: *The Folklore and Folk Music Archivist* 8 (3/1966), p. 62. Ralph Steele Boggs, "Folklore, General Statement," in: *Handbook of Latin American Studies* 11 (1945).

Chile were put into traditional folkloric molds to create a broadly supported national popular culture. For instance, DIC launched a music competition in 1944, because, as the promotional literature explained, the music produced and consumed in Chile was not "an authentic expression of our nationhood." The goal of the competition was to give a platform to traditional Chilean music that reflected the "the high spiritual values of the Chilean people." Citizens were encouraged to submit *cueca*s, *tonada*s, choral music, as well as "work songs." The competition valorized popular musical traditions of Chile, which the DIC considered to be "of the deepest purity, but which remain virtually unknown." The organizers further suggested that Chilean historical figures as well as typical Chilean scenarios and occupations such as fishing, mining, or agriculture, be incorporated into the music. With regard to the "working songs," DIC encouraged submissions that were "conducive to the glorification of work." The music competition thus attempted to create a new folkloric music, clearly Chilean, with which the majority of Chileans would identify themselves. The organizers were well aware that the mere existence of "typically Chilean" songs did not guarantee their diffusion and success, and promised ample radio time to the winners.[57] Indeed, DIC was an important sponsor for folkloric artists eager to re-conquer the radio waves.

THE PROBLEM OF MASS MEDIA – CHILENIDAD ON THE RADIO

Radio was an important tool for nation building in Latin America.[58] In the Chile of the 1930s, many middle class households had a radio, and in most

[57] Members of the jury were Pablo Garrido, Carlos Lavín, and Tomás Lago. 15 different categories were established, and the total prize money was 50,000 pesos. Dirección General de Informaciones y Cultura, *Concurso Nacional de Musica*, (Santiago, n.p., 1944).

[58] There are good studies of the role of the radio in Mexico, but in the larger Latin American context, much remains to be done. Nestor García Canclini, *Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993); Ricardo Pérez Montfort, *Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano: Ensayos sobre cultura popular y nacionalismo* (Mexico City: CIESAS, 1994); Joy Elizabeth Hayes, *Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture, and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920 – 1950* (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 2000); Fernando Mejía Barquera, *La industria de la radio y televisión y la política del estado mexicano (1920 – 1960)* (Mexico City: Fundación Manuel Buendía). Eric Hobsbawm makes this point with regards to the entrenchment of nationalism in the 20th century in *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 142.

working class neighborhoods, a local bar or corner store would give passers-bys and customers a chance to listen in. By the early 1940s, over 60 radio stations covered much of Chile's territory.[59] In most Latin American countries, radio developed similarly as in the United States, based on a system of private stations financed by advertising money.[60] Radio stations also employed many of the broadcast formats introduced in the United States: radio plays, game shows, dance music and the ads that financed it all filled much time on the airwaves. The news came mostly from Associated Press, the BBC, Agence France Presse, and Reuters, as only one station carried the Chilean news service Transchile.[61] While the number of radio listeners and radio stations grew steadily, the programming gave rise to heated discussions in Chile about taste, about good music, and frequently also about national culture.

All over the world, radio emissions had caused critical reactions since they were frequently perceived to cater to people's "base instincts," like mass media more generally.[62] Chile was no different, and the commercial aspect of radio accentuated the problem. One journalist insisted that Chilean radio was of poor quality because the station owners dedicated themselves "to the exploitation of this industry as if it had nothing to do with culture or intellectual manifesta-

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[59] U.S. advertisers collected good data on the number of radio sets and listeners in Latin America. See for instance Lunsford P. Yandell, "Radio Programs and Listeners in Latin America," in: *Export Trade and Shipper* (21 October 1940), pp. 7-8; William Anderson, "The Rising Tide of U.S. Advertising in Latin America," in: *Export Trade and Shipper* (1 January 1944), pp. 10–11. Both made reference to the large numbers of lower class citizens who listened to "publicly owned receiving sets" in parks and plazas, and encouraged U.S. companies to use radio to reach illiterates.

[60] The United States took advantage of its technological supremacy to impose its views through agreements of the Inter-American Conference on Electrical Communications. James Schwoch, *The American Radio Industry and its Latin American Activities, 1900-1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998), p. 78.

[61] *Ecrán* (26 February 1946), p. 20; "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (11 February 1947); "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (4 March 1947). Coca-Cola also sponsored sports broadcasts in Mexico and Cuba. Other important U.S. advertisers in Chile as well as the rest of Latin America were Colgate Palmolive and Sterling Drugs. See also Hayes, *Radio Nation*, p. 32.

[62] See for instance Jon Cowans, "Political Culture and Cultural Politics: The Reconstruction of French Radio after the Second World War," in: *Journal of Contemporary History* 31 (1996), pp. 145–170.

tions." Others concurred that the frequent commercials, the tangos, boleros, and foxtrots amounted to "continuous attacks against culture."[63]

However, the penetration of radio by non-Chilean forms and contents clearly did stir nationalist sentiments among radio listeners as well as journalists. One reader of *Ecrán*, a journal about movies and radio, complained that the radio ads were bad, "because the basis for the propaganda corresponds to other countries' customs." Another protested against the English expressions used by soccer commentators and thought that there were not enough live Chilean artists heard on the radio. The accompanying cartoon showed a man with cap and pipe who said "Today me being very gringo [Hoy yo siendo mucho gringo]."[64]

Chilean musicians also participated in the debate, albeit partially for quite self-interested reasons. Through the Federation of Professional Musicians they criticized the state of radio and the stations' reliance on records, demanding fixed quotas for live transmissions of Chilean music played by Chileans.[65] Pablo Garrido, a leading member of the musicians' union, lamented that "decadent *tangones*" killed the spirit of Chileans.[66] Folklorists working at the University of Chile had similar reservations regarding the radio. Santa Cruz Wilson criticized radio stations for piping "bad music" (the Argentine tango was again cited) into all corners of Chile. In competition with foreign music, only sugary versions of the typically sober Chilean songs were played on the radio, he complained, frequently with vulgar lyrics. Filomena Salas was afraid that "gullible peasants, in awe of the progress of the big cities" would let themselves be influ-

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63 "Hay que perfeccionar los programas," in: *Ecrán* (18 February 1947), p. 30; Mirón Callejero, "La radio y sus absurdos," in: *Hoy* (14 January 1937), p. 16; Juan Pez, "Onda Larga: Nueva Temporada," in: *Ecrán* (25 April 1944), p. 25; John Reed, "Lista negra," in: *Ecrán* (8 January 1946).

64 "Pilatunadas," in: *Ecrán* (1 January 1946), p. 25.

65 Chilean musicians organized in a 1940 congress under the leadership of Pablo Garrido. Members of two professional unions, representatives of the Chilean Labor Confederation, the CTCh, and delegates of the National Symphony, the Music Club, the Musical Society and the School of Fine Arts participated. "Primer Congreso Nacional constituyente de los músicos de Chile," Santiago, 1 to 5 July 1940, p. 6. Roberto Aron, musician and lawyer, was also active in the musician's union and worked on model legislation. Roberto T. Aron, "Anteproyecto de legislacion radial. En lo concerniente a la situacion de los artistas y empleados de Radio." Memoria de Prueba para optar al grado de Licenciado en la Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales de la Universidad de Chile, Universidad de Chile, 1942.

66 *Ercilla* (16 September 1941), p. 16. By 1947, Garrido was in charge of the Music Department of the Dirección de Informaciones y Cultura. His *Biografía de la cueca* (Santiago: Ediciones Ercilla, 1943) went through several editions.

enced by what they heard on the radio, and that the "authentic songs of our people" would forever disappear. Interestingly enough, these folklorists considered Mexican and Argentine popular music a bigger threat than American popular music, which was slowly conquering the airwaves in Chile.[67]

Far from counting out the radio, however, the Institute of Musical Folklore and the DIC attempted to use it for their own ends. In 1944, the Institute sought the collaboration of the radio stations of the Chilean south to broadcast a "S.O.S" for Chilean folklore, asking radio listeners who remembered old songs and dances to come forward. The Institute would then record the songs it deemed authentic. For one month members of the Institute traveled around southern Chile to "explore the music of the Chilean past, liberate it from impurities and show it to today's and future generations."[68] The Institute worked with radio stations to promote folklore and volunteered its specialists as commentators for concert shows.[69]

While the Institute of Musical Folklore depended on the graciousness of radio stations for free airtime, the DIC as a state agency had more power to exert its influence. Already in the late 1930s the Chilean government had attempted to regulate radio concessions more stringently, and tried to extend its control over the nature of radio programming.[70] The DIC, given its official task to contribute to the cultural uplift of the country, took the matter one step further and produced edifying radio programs. Despite strong protests of the station owners, the government forced them to transmit three to four hours of DIC programming each week, during the attractive 8 to 9pm time slot, and more, if the program was a so-called "gala audition." To promote folklore all over the country, the agency sponsored so-called radio embassies and sent the Loyola sisters to the Chilean South for radio broadcasts.[71] Their programs were heard as far

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[67] *Chile*, pp. 3, 7, 53.

[68] *Ecrán* (18 April 1944), p. 19.

[69] In 1943, for instance, Radio Chilena had a folklore concert every Sunday with Filomena Salas of the Institute for Folkloric Research as commentator. *Chile*, p. 53.

[70] In 1944, the Chilean government issued new rules: Concessions for radio stations could only be given to Chilean companies, and 75% of all personnel were supposed to be Chilean. Broadcasts had to be in Spanish, English, or Portuguese. In case of "internal commotion, catastrophe, or war" the government could censor radio stations or take them over. "Reglamento de Estaciones de Radiocomunicaciones," *Diario Oficial de la República de Chile* (22 November 1944), pp. 1-5.

[71] "Control Radial," in: *Ecrán* (29 April 1947), p. 14.

south as Punta Arenas and Puerto Montt.[72] Hermógenes Méndez, a theater and radio artist, was put under contract to broadcast his program "Chile, her people and music," and to promote records that the DIC Department of Popular Music had produced the year before.[73] In 1946, the DIC hired one of the most popular Chilean radio voices, Esther Soré ("la negra linda") to "give expression to the songs of the country." But also in this case, the limits of the folklore movement surface again: Though promoted as a folklore singer, Esther Soré's Mapuche heritage was not discussed at the time and she had even changed her real name – Marta Yupanqui Donoso – to disguise it.[74]

Other DIC programs, not focusing on music, taught Chileans what was Chilean: "Legends and Tales" were a regular component, while other programs explored the history of nitrates and copper, looked at Chilean film production, and introduced major monuments such as the cathedral of Santiago or the Alameda de las Delicias, the main street of Santiago. Another staple of the DIC programming was the "Unknown book of *chilenidad*" ("libro inedito de *chilenidad*").[75] In these programs, we see the same mixture of cultural nationalism and internationalism characterized the era.

Chilean folklore was not promoted as a measure against *norte-americanización,* on the contrary. The DIC programs attempted to put Chile's folklore into an international, and more specifically, Pan-American context. Indian folklore of Peru, Brazilian music, Argentine folk art were all introduced to Chilean listeners. More political broadcasts held forth on the value of democracy or the Pan American system.[76] The press seemed to agree that such efforts were a

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[72] "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (25 March 1947), n.p.

[73] "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (4 February 1947), p. 30.

[74] "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (9 April 1946), p. 31. Ester Soré died in 1996. *La Tercera* (7 September 1996), n.p.

[75] Dirección General de Información y Cultura, *Programas radiales*, (Santiago: n.p. 1944).

[76] European culture was still present though, especially when it came to theater or literature. Apparently, the cultural uplift of the Chilean population was adding Chilean culture to Shakespeare's Othello, pieces by Victor Hugo and Enrik Ibsen. The Cultural Extension department of the University sponsored broadcasts of adaptations of works of Tolstoi, Gorki, Dickens, and Maupassant. The epic Argentine poem Martín Fierro just managed to squeeze into the program as sole representative of Latin America.

valuable contribution to art and culture on the radio, and generally lauded such broadcasts as proof of "refined *chilenidad*."[77]

It is hard to judge the success of the popular-front campaigns for *chilenidad*. Certainly, the government used the educational facilities and the mass media to multiply the sounds and images of *chilenidad*. In 1946, the DIC organized a "Week of Chilean Folklore" in Santiago. The festival showcased Chilean folk music, an exhibition about Popular Art, dances, and featured *Flor del Carmen*, a movie set in the Chilean countryside.[78] Various events were broadcast on the "national chain," a series of private radio stations that were ordered to put on government programming. The introduction of one of the events showed the somewhat paradoxical nature of the enterprise:

> "From the heart of the people surges and grows an emotional music, with clear humanity and an distinct character… The music is with the people, with their sorrows and joys, their frustrations, their lonely moments, their hopes and fatalism. We wish that the purest of Chile, Chile's masses of workers, once again sing, with voices inspired by sensibility and joy, the songs of their folklore, their music, the deepest expression of popular emotionality."

On the one hand, the folklore was supposed to surge from the heart of the people, on the other hand, Chileans apparently needed a little refresher on their patrimony. The "masses of workers" should learn how to "sing once again."[79]

Though it is far from certain that the Popular Front was able to imbue Chile's masses with its version of *chilenidad*, valorizing and safeguarding folklore did lay the base for the New Song Movement in the 1960s. Violeta Parra, for instance, started performing in the 1940s and was in contact with Margot Loyola before travelling the countryside herself to collect songs in the early 1950s. Loyola, who remained associated with the Institute of Musical Folklore, sponsored the folklore group Cuncumén, which in turn inspired Víctor Jara in the mid 1950s. As the commercial musical culture of the United States took hold ever more extensively in Chile, explicit resistance against the US cultural domination grew. While the popular-front revival of Chilean folkloric music was opposed to the Argentine tango, the "tropical" dances, and the Mexican

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[77] "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (15 January, 1946), n.p., Director of the Instituto de extensión cultural in 1945 was Aníbal Bascuñán Valdés, "Noticiero Radial," in: *Ecrán* (3 July 1945), p. 21; *Ecrán* (12 June 1945), p. 22; "Mosaico radial," in: *Ecrán* (1 Jan 1946), p. 24.

[78] The movie was produced by the government-owned film company ChileFilms, which folded in the late 1940s. Amanda Labarca, one of Chile's most prominent educators and proponent of women's rights, collaborated in the script-writing.

[79] "Centenario del Folklore, 22 de agosto de 1946: Festividades de la semana del Folklore Chileno," p. 12.

ranchera, the New Song Movement of the 1960s (*Nueva canción chilena*) appealed much more broadly to a common Latin American identity opposed to North American cultural (and economic) domination.[80]

CONCLUSIONS: FOLKLORE AND PAN AMERICANISM

The popular-front governments invested considerable resources in the establishment of institutions that investigated and promoted Chilean folklore. By 1944, institutions engaged in the study and dissemination of folklore had proliferated to such a degree that one of Chile's folklore pioneers, Oreste Plath, called for more unification of folklore interests.[81] Nevertheless, the Popular Fronts did institutionalize as well as nationalize folklore. Most prominently, the folklore of the rural central valley, the *cueca* and the *tonada*, was enshrined as the national song and dance. Thus, the covers of the popular *Retablo Pintoresco de Chile*, a 1953 book on Chilean customs, showed scenes of mountains and valleys, the spurs of a *huaso*, a couple dancing the *cueca*, and a woman harvesting grapes.[82]

While some of members of the Popular Front governments might have had romantic ideas about folklore, this cultural movement was not entirely conservative. It did incorporate new sectors of the population as participants in national culture. Orlando Millas, a member of the Communist Party at the time, thought that the "valorization" of Chilean folklore reflected "the ascent of the people to the leadership of the country" and that the folklore celebrated "the popular struggle for liberty and progress."[83] However, the interventions of the professionals in shaping and "purifying" folklore suggests that middle class leaders were eager to keep control of the national musical patrimony.

This article has shown how state institutions managed to shape national popular culture and how folklore fit into the agenda of creating a national popular identity. While the notion of *chilenidad* points to a nationalist agenda in general, the field of folklore was not characterized by overt anti-Americanism. The popular-front cultural elites in charge of the folklore programs profited

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[80] Jane Tumas-Serna, "The ‘Nueva Canción' Movement and Its Mass-Mediated Performance Context," in: *Latin American Music Review* 13 (Fall/Winter 1992), pp. 240-256.

[81] Oreste Plath, "Museos y folklore," *La Opinión* (1 October 1944), p. 7.

[82] Antonio Acevedo Hernández, *Retablo Pintoresco de Chile* (Santiago: Zig-Zag, 1953).

[83] Orlando Millas, *En tiempos del Frente Popular: Memorias, primer volumen 1932-1947* (Santiago: Cesoc Ediciones, 1993) p. 188.

from the Good Neighbor Policy, and were apt to put their efforts into the context of developing an "American" culture, as opposed to the past cultural dependency on Europe. For more than a decade, progressive nationalism and Pan-Americanism worked together to shape Chilean folklore. But there are hints that this Pan-Americanism was not too deep-seated. Amanda Labarca, a prominent member of the Chilean Commission of Intellectual Cooperation, for instance, affirmed "the value of collaboration" – and here came a little slip – between the "two continents."[84] When folklore music resurged in the late 1950s and 1960s, it had become one more means for to point out how far the two Americas had drifted apart.

[84] *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*, XCVIII, 37/38 (1940), p. 276.

THOMAS FISCHER

ARMED RESISTANCE AND ANTI-INTERVENTION DIPLOMACY: LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1920'S

In the 1920's, the presence of the United States in Latin America's economy, society, and politics became so powerful that it significantly surpassed Europe's stagnating activities. This foreign presence affected the standards, values, habits, behavior, and traditions of Latin American societies. Among the protagonists of this "U.S.-Americanization" were individuals, companies, diplomats, and members of the military. Although parts of the population welcomed U.S.-style "modernity",[1] the transfer of "U.S.-Americanisms" puzzled other groups.[2] Opinions differed primarily regarding the growing influence of U.S. companies on the exploitation of mining and farming products, on the capital market, and on imports. Local companies felt at a disadvantage against foreign enterprises with their superior access to capital, technologies, and skilled personnel. Parts of the lower classes refused to accept the introduction of the paid-labor system. Workers, small manufacturers, and medium-sized companies, together with other social groups, formed nationalistic alliances to defend their material interests.[3] Nationalist tendencies also included cultural, ethnic, and regional components that could be used for demarcation against external influences.[4] National-

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1 See the contributions by Mariano Plotkin and Stefan Rinke in this volume.

2 Latest research emphasizes that "U.S.-Americanization" must be considered less an absolute value but more a phenomenon depending on the collective perception of certain social groups. The transfer of "U.S.-Americanisms" is not a unilateral implementation process. It is more likely that societies or social groups accept "U.S.-Americanisms" consciously or unconsciously, reshape or completely reject them. See generally, Philipp Gassert, "Amerikanismus, Antiamerikanismus, Amerikanisierung. Neue Literatur zur Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturgeschichte des amerikanischen Einflusses in Deutschland und Europa," in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 39 (1999), pp. 532-538, p. 532.

3 Relevant examples: Thomas O'Brien, *The Century of U.S. Capitalism in Latin America* (Albuquerque: Univ. Of New Mexico Press), 1999, pp. 73-88.

4 Patricia Funes, "El pensamiento latinoamericano sobre la nación en la década de 1920," in: *Boletín Americanista* 49 (1999), pp. 104-120, pp. 109-111.

ism was one resource to fight the power of U.S. agents with political means. The establishment of sovereignty, i.e. territorial integrity and political independence, played an important role in this process. Nationalist politicians demanded the United States to renounce any intervention.

This essay centers on the political efforts to limit U.S.-American interventionism in the 1920's. The starting point is the movement, lead by Augusto César Sandino, fighting the Marines in Nicaragua. It is assumed that this had a certain catalytic effect on Latin American anti-intervention diplomacy at the Sixth Conference of American States in Havana, and it is claimed that this was also related to the growing discomfort regarding the spreading "U.S.-Americanism". The protest was not only aimed at U.S. interventionism[5] but also at the ruling oligarchies, who were blamed for the bad state of domestic affairs.[6] Depending on the means and the extent of U.S. presence and the sociopolitical context the discussion yielded different results. Most protagonists nevertheless never lost sight of Latin America's common grounds. The presence of the United States was not rejected in general. However, it became the target of criticism when it was considered an obstacle to national modernization. Nationalists particularly referred to U.S. power politics in Latin America. Their criticism was directed against:

- U.S.-American economic superiority and geostrategic interests, which, if necessary, were executed forcefully by military means (this was called *imperialismo)*;
- Latin America's incorporation into a continental security concept under the unilateral command of the United States *(monroismo)*;
- the superiority of North-American goods and values demonstrated in a provocative way by many sources from the United States *(yanquismo)*.

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5 Hans-Joachim König presents an overview of U.S.-American interventionism: "El intervencionismo norteamericano en Iberoamérica," in: *Historia de Iberoamérica*. Vol. III. (Madrid: Cátedra, 1988), pp. 405-478. Also see: Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964).

6 Relevant examples: Hans-Joachim König, "Krisenreflektion, Krisenmanagement und nationale Identität in Kolumbien in den 1920er Jahren," in: Ute Guthunz and Thomas Fischer (ed.), *Lateinamerika zwischen Europa und den USA. Wechselwirkungen, Wahrnehmungen und Transformationsprozesse in Politik, Ökonomie und Kultur* (Frankfurt a. M.: Vervuert, 1995), pp. 156-161; Dagmar Kusche: "'Estrella polar' oder 'Boa magnetizador'? Die Perzeption der USA in der politischen Karikatur: das Beispiel Kolumbien, 1917 bis 1929," in: ibd., pp. 163-204.

It must be noticed that the fight against foreign predominance and the resulting limitation to development potentials had been a constitutive element of national identity since the Latin American wars of independence.[7]

SANDINO'S RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AGAINST U.S. INTERVENTION

The culmination point of a debate which became increasingly emotional and loaded with moral arguments was undoubtedly reached after the military intervention in Nicaragua in August 1926 – less than a year after the withdrawal of the Marines. According to the United States, the reason for the decision to withdraw the Marines was due to the fact that the de-facto president, the Conservative Emiliano Chamorro, had gained power after a rebellion against Carlos Solórzano in early 1926.[8] The United States, Mexico, and other isthmus states refused their diplomatic recognition. Consequently, Liberals, supported by the Mexican government under Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928), started a military campaign, spreading from the Atlantic coast, against Chamorro. Forced by the United States he resigned on 31 October. On 11 November parliament elected the Conservative Adolfo Díaz, the State Department's candidate, president. He was supposed to finish the term of Solórzano. At this time the Marines had again set up a stronghold in Managua. They declared the country's most important cities "neutral zones". Juan Bautista Sacasa, a Liberal, proclaimed a counter government on 1 December, 1926. A civil war was raging with extremely strong international participation on both sides.[9]

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[7] Examples: Hans-Joachim König, *Auf dem Wege zur Nation. Nationalismus im Prozeß der Staats- und Nationbildung Neu-Granadas 1750 bis 1856* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988).

[8] For the Central-American context see: Richard V. Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism and International Competition in Central America, 1920-1929* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989), pp. 67-98. Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States. A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard UP, 1998), pp. 260-264. As to the role of the USA, Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars. An Inner History of American Empire 1900-1934* (Lexington: UP of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 193-203. As to Mexico's role also see Jürgen Buchenau, *In the Shadow of the Giant. The Making of Mexico's Central America Policy, 1876-1930* (Tuscaloosa/London: Univ. of Alabama Press, 1996), pp. 165-183; Richard V. Salisbury, "Mexico, the United States, and the 1926-1927 Nicaraguan Crisis," in: *HAHR* 66 (2/1986), pp. 319-339.

[9] Langley, *The Banana Wars*, p. 181. (Chapter title "The Second Nicaraguan Civil War, 1925-1927").

U.S. diplomats exerted pressure on the Central American countries to recognize Díaz's government. The Salvadorian government under Alfonso Quiñonez Molina (1923-1927), the Honduran government under Miguel Paz Baraona (1925-1929)-heavily dependent on the United States-, and the Guatemalan government under José María Orellana (1922-1926) acceded to this request, while Costa Rica's Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno (1924-1928) hesitated. Jiménez Oreamuno was in a conflict. On the one hand he feared a puppet regime like the Díaz administration, in a neighboring country, but on the other hand he also feared a Liberal regime supported by revolutionary Mexico. He wanted to avoid a border-crossing escalation. In May 1927, Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. envoy extraordinary, succeeded in negotiating an armistice with the leading Liberals by holding out the prospect that the United States would accept a Liberal victory in the 1928 elections.

General Augusto César Sandino and some of his followers did not accept the agreement and continued their rebellion that turned into a nationalist mass movement. One of their first actions was the occupation of the mine in Segovia, owned by U.S. private interests. Sandino's vocabulary was clearly anti-imperialist. In a manifesto he called G. D. Hatfield, the commander of the Marines in Segovia a "miserable lacayo de Wall Street", a "sicario de Coolidge", and a "degenerato pirata".[10] Sandino pretended to support the "decoro nacional" and the "soberanía de la patria" instead of the oligarchic elites, whom he accused of having failed against the "invasores". His moral reasoning found open ears among the dissatisfied in the country.[11] Yet, his narrative did not unite all subaltern groups of Nicaragua against the Nicaraguan "oligarquías" and the foreign "invasores". But the echo in the international press exceeded all expectations. In 1927 and 1928 support committees for Sandino mushroomed in many Latin American countries. Mainly workers and nationalist intellectuals were members of these committees. Sandino's guerrilla war against the Marines became a symbol of patriotic resistance against U.S. interventionism all over

[10] "A mis compatriotas nicaragüenses," [circa 14 de julio de 1927]. In: Augusto C. Sandino, *El pensamiento vivo*. Vol. I. (Managua: Ed. Universitaria Centroamericana, 1981), p. 125.

[11] Volker Wünderich, *Sandino: Eine politische Biographie* (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1995), p. 66.

Latin America. Moreover, it stimulated anti-imperialist reflections, debates and political actions within the United States.[12]

LATIN AMERICAN ANTI-INTERVENTION DIPLOMACY AT THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES

Before this background, the Sixth Conference of American States took place in Havana in January and February 1928. Initiated by the United States, "Pan-American" events, supposed to broaden continental partnership, had taken place at irregular intervals since 1889/90. A basic concept of Pan Americanism was the idea that similar governmental systems and values would necessarily lead to a continental rapprochement. The new U.S. interest in Pan-Americanism consisted primarily of the attempt to tie Latin America's "emerging markets" ever more closely to North America.[13] The criticism of Pan-Americanism was not primarily directed against continental integration per se but–in the tradition of the Cuban nationalist José Martí–questioned the means with which this integration was to be accomplished. In his essay "Nuestra América", published in Mexican and New York newspapers in 1891, Martí had warned the Latin American public not to let the United States fence them in.[14] Latin American societies should rather accentuate the demarcation against North America and strive for authentic future on the basis of increased educational efforts for all population groups. Like most Latin American intellectuals he was not a fundamental critic of the United States but only condemned U.S. power politics.

When Charles Evans Hughes, the head of the U.S. delegation, presented his ideas for optimal cooperation of actors on the American double-continent on

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[12] Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World. The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999), pp. 137-147.

[13] On the concept of Pan-Americanism see: Mark T. Gilderhus, *Pan American Visions. Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere, 1913-1921* (Tucson: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1986); David Sheinin (ed.): *Beyond the Ideal. Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs* (Westport, Conn./London: Greenwood Press, 2000).

[14] Martí had participated as an observer in the first Congress of American States in Washington, DC and tried (in vain) to get support for the Cuban independence movement. He was afraid the Spanish colony in the Caribbean Basin might be annexed by the United States. See: Enrico Mario Santí, "'Our America', the Gilded Age, and the Crisis of Latinamericanism," in: Jeffrey Belnap/Raúl Fernández (ed.), *José Martí's 'Our America': From National to Hemispheric Cultural Studies* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 1998), pp. 179-190.

occasion of a banquet in Havana, critics all over Latin America immediately protested against this. Relating implicitly to the Capitol in Washington, Hughes circumscribed Pan-Americanism as a building that should house all countries of the double-continent. According to Hughes, Pan-American community rested on four "columns" providing a balanced relationship among all members: independence, stability, mutual benevolence, and cooperation. Latin American writers criticized Hughes claiming that the United States constantly violated these principles. From their point of view, Hughes' columns could not sufficiently support the load of a harmonious Pan-Americanism.

In an article published in the *Espectator* (Bogota) and the *Repertorio Americano* (San José de Costa Rica) the linguist Manuel Antonio Bonilla criticized Washington's the strive for hegemony and its intended penetration ("penetración") of Latin America, its greed ("rapacidad"), and the one-sided advantages based on its immense financial capacities. Bonilla realized that Pan Americanism would remain illusory as long as the United States recklessly forced its interests at Latin America's expenses. This was proven by military interventions in Nicaragua as well as by former invasions and occupations of Mexico, Panama, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. From the Latin American point of view, preconditions for a balanced community within the Americas were the anchoring of the principles of justice, mutual respect, and economic cooperation and the waiving of mere interest politics.[15] A caricature by Ricardo Rendón illustrated Bonilla's article. According to this Colombian caricaturist, the palace of Pan Americanism was inhabited by frightful creatures that personified U.S. power politics in Latin America: an octopus symbolizing capitalist greed for money, an eagle as a symbol for military, "imperialist" superiority, and a tank representing the power of U.S. intervention armies. A battleship was anchoring in front of the building indicating the threat of an intervention by the U.S. Navy.

[15] "Las columnas del panamericanismo," in: *Repertorio Americano* (17 March 1928).

Ricardo Rendón, "Las cuatro columnas de Mr. Hughes," in: *Repertorio Americano* (17 March 1928).

There was much pressure on most Latin American delegates in Havana not to restrict themselves to meaningless speeches about American solidarity and to the signing of conventions on economic relations, but to also condemn U.S. interventionism. Moreover, most delegates were convinced that the incorporation of Latin America into the U.S. sphere of interest had to be avoided by

establishing mechanisms for the protection of national sovereignty. Typical of this mindset was an article entitled "América Latina y el sacrificio de Sandino" first published in Colombia and later in San José de Costa Rica.[16] The author was dismayed by the silence of Latin American governments with regard to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua and to the shelling Sandino's troops. While the delegates of the Spanish-speaking America traveled to Havana to listen to the "declaraciones de fraternidad, de respeto y cariño de los representantes de la Casa Blanca", Sandino sacrificed his life and the lives of his Mestizo companions in an heroic but hopeless fight. According to this author it was not easy for Latin American delegates in Havana to accept the program,

" [...] que la desventura de la América latina llegue hasta tal extremo de que los representantes latinoamericanos en la conferencia se callen o se les haga callar, escondan o se les impida mostrar la herida sangrante que las hazañas del imperialismo yanqui en Centroamérica han abierto en el alma de la raza."

Already the arrival of the U.S. delegation on 15 January 1928 raised doubts as to the peaceful intentions of the U.S. government. At first, Latin Americans were pleased to hear that President Calvin Coolidge (1923–1929) and his Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg (1925 – 1929) honoured them by personally attending the opening ceremony. Coolidge's first trip abroad underlined the importance of relations between the United States and Latin America. On the other hand, the delegates from the South were worried about the fact that the president arrived at the historical port of Havana on board the battle Cruiser *Texas* surrounded by other battle ships.[17] Was this martial gesture to be interpreted as a demonstration of the hegemonic power, or did the United States want to point out that it was in a state of war? Did the U.S. delegation distrust the security measures of the Cuban hosts? These were questions addressed to the assembly by representatives from Latin America.

The introductory address Coolidge gave to the delegates at the *aula máxima* of the Universidad de La Habana did not suffice to fully dissipate the distrust that the U.S delegation's arrival had provoked among the Latin American representatives, although the gist of the Coolidge's speech was quite conciliatory. He emphasized the importance of democratic requirements and peace efforts in

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[16] "América Latina y el sacrificio de Sandino," in: *El Tiempo* (7 Jan. 1928); "América Latina y el sacrificio de Sandino," in: *Repertorio Americano* (18 Feb. 1928).

[17] Robert H. Ferrell, *The Presidency of Calvin Coolidge* (Kansas: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1998), pp. 140-141; Claude M. Fuess, *Calvin Coolidge. The Man from Vermont* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968), pp. 417-418.

America.[18] Remarks like these were appreciated by Latin American delegates,[19] and commentaries in the Latin American press were also somewhat optimistic.[20] However, there were doubts that the words would be followed by actions, i.e. that this was to initiate a fundamental change of policy towards cooperation. A Mexican journalist, who wrote for the Colombian *Tiempo*, remarked that the President of the United States had not mentioned the intervention in Nicaragua with a single of the 4,000 words of his address.[21]

Regarding the role of Latin American delegates, journalists from the region, who initially had been rather skeptical, were to be wrong. Contrary to the efforts of the U.S. delegation, U.S. interventionism became an important topic on the agenda of the conference. Although the State Department had left nothing to chance, the military intervention in Nicaragua became a burden for the atmosphere of the conference.[22] The *Comisión Internacional de Jurisconsultos Americanos* that had met in Rio de Janeiro from 18 April to 28 May 1927, unanimously passed an article proposed by the Costa Rican delegate Luis Anderson.[23] The article read: "Ningún Estado puede intervenir en los asuntos de otro".[24] This quote was addressed by Gustavo Guerrero, El Salvador's Foreign Minister, in his speech to the General Assembly of 23 January. Guerrero suggested to add a preamble to the convention by the Commission for the Reorganization of the Pan-American Union underlining the autonomy and independence of all American countries as well as their legal equality:

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18 *Diario de la VI Conferencia Internacional Americana* No. 2 (17 Jan. 1928), p. 14.

19 Jesús María Yepes', the Colombian delegate's impression. Jesús María Yepes, *El panamericanismo y el derecho internacional* (Bogotá: Imprenta Nacional, 1930), pp. 203-204.

20 See press review "Memorandum Concerning Comments in the Latin American Press on the Visit of President Coolidge to Havana," in: Archives de la Ligues des Nations, Genève [ALN], p. 514.

21 "En cuatro mil palabras el presidente no aludió a Nicaragua ni a la intervención," in: *El Tiempo* (17 Jan. 1928).

22 Frank Niess, *Sandino. Der General der Unterdrückten. Eine politische Biographie* (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1989), pp. 167-174.

23 Anderson was a renowned jurist and founding member of the American Institute of International Law.

24 Yepes, *El panamericanismo*, pp. 189-192; ALN S 514 Doss. 13, Memorandum presented by Mr. Rodríguez concerning the Pan American Congress of Jurists met at Rio de Janeiro from April 18th to May 21st 1927 (Geneva, 27 June 1927).

"Primero: Las Repúblicas del Continente Americano reconocen que la Unión Panamericana descansa en dos postulados inconmovibles: el reconocimiento de la autonomía e independencia recíproca de todos los Estados de América y su perfecta igualdad jurídica.

Segundo: El Panamericanismo consiste en la unión moral de las Repúblicas de América, descansando esa unión sobre la base del más recíproco respeto y el derecho adquirido en su completa independencia."[25]

Guerrero, well-known as "hombre que dice lo que piensa", explained the necessity of such a preamble by pointing to the fact that the trust ("confianca") of the Latin Americans had to be strengthened.[26] Using vocabulary used for the German-French rapprochement at the same time, he outlined the problems that had to be overcome in the Pan-American rapprochement. Guerrero also referred to the speech by Charles Evans Hughes. The principles of Pan-Americanism which Hughes had called "columns" were only insufficiently anchored in the convention's draft, Guerrero claimed. Thus, a formal renunciation of intervention was necessary.

Guerrero's attempt was not only based on the widespread discomfort among the press regarding the North-American presence in Latin America, it also came from personal experience. Half a year ago he had witnessed how José Matos, Guatemala's Foreign Minister, was removed from his office at the instigation of the U.S. ambassador there. Matos had hesitated to reconfirm the recognition of the Díaz government in Nicaragua which had been announced by his predecessor.[27]

In the meantime, the U.S. ambassador in El Salvador complained to President Pío Romero Bosque (1927–1931) about the actions of the rebellious Salvadorean diplomats. Romero offered to call them back immediately but Hughes thought he could control the situation.[28] Later, El Salvador's president would probably have been glad to never have called Guerrero into office. What Kellogg had wanted to prevent by all means happened now. Guerrero succeeded

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[25] *Diario de la VI Conferencia Internacional Americana*, No. 9 (24 Jan. 1928), p. 78. See also: Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris [AMAEP] CPC B. Amérique Doss. Gen. 199, Eugène Pépin, en mission à la Havana, to Aristide Briand, (Havana, 28 Jan. 1928), pp. 9-10.

[26] Ibd.

[27] *British Documents of Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers of the Foreign Office* Confidential Print. Part II, Series D, Vol. 5, Mr. Clerk Kerr to Sir Austen Chamberlain, Guatemala, 2. 6. 1927, pp. 18-20. After that, Matos was appointed Guatemala's permanent representative at the League of Nations.

[28] David Sheinin, *The Diplomacy of Control: United States-Argentine relations, 1910-1928* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 318-319.

in starting the first Pan-American discussion on interventionism. While most governments had, prior to the conference, made some vague promises to the State Department[29] the instructions they had given their delegates left leeway for interpretation. But what was even more important was the fact that they, e.g. Argentina's Honorio Pueyrredón[30], the Dominican Republic's Jacinto R. de Castro and Francisco J. de Peynado, and Ecuador's Gonzalo Zaldumbide, were nationalists who were not willing to adhere to the instructions at all costs.

The first comprehensive discussion on banning interventionism took place during a meeting of the Commission for Public International Law on 4 February.[31] The Peruvian speaker Maúrtua caused some confusion by presenting a project that substantially deviated from the preliminary work of the legal conference in Rio and which was based on forgotten suggestions by the American Institute for International Law dating from 1916. He pointed out that "nations" also had commitments in order to "earn" non-intervention, but avoided the question which authority should be responsible in cases of doubt. Maúrtua was criticized by other delegates for substituting the anti-intervention paragraph by a theory, which would create excuses for the hegemonic power. Jesús María Yepes, Colombia's delegate, wrote, "La proposición Maúrtua equivalía a sustituir la sustancia por la sombra, y en este caso tal vez por la sombra de una sombra."[32] The opponents to this proposal stated that the sovereignty of each state was of equal value. Since a speedy agreement was not in sight the discussion was handed on to a sub-commission of the Commission for Public International Law.[33]

The members of this committee, that convened closed to the public, tried to combine Maúrtua's proposal, supported by Hughes and the Nicaraguan delegate, and the Rio de Janeiro document into a compromise solution. The representative from the Dominican Republic presented a draft. Although the commission

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29 Ibd., pp. 299-300.

30 Pueyrredón, Argentina's ambassador in Washington, resigned during the conference because he could not agree with the instructions received from Ángel Gallardo, the Foreign Minister.

31 The Mexican report gives complete details of the course of the debate. *Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de agosto de 1927 a julio de 1928 presentada al H. Congreso de la Unión por Genaro Estrada* (México 1928), pp. 225-276.

32 Yepes, *El panamericanismo*, p. 236.

33 *Diario de la VI Conferencia Internacional Americana*, No. 13 (28 Jan. 1928), pp. 111-112.

was able to agree on the question of the demand for sovereignty of national states, they could, however, not come to an agreement regarding the question when it would cease.[34] The delegates from El Salvador, Mexico, and Argentina defended the sovereign rights of all countries. Peru's representative kept insisting on his vaguely formulated restrictions. Hughes, who had not participated in the sub-commission at all, let the other members know that an unconditioned recognition of sovereignty was out of the question for the United States, since it felt this to be an infringement of its own sovereignty. Owing to these unbridgeable differences the sub-commission suggested to postpone the issue to the next conference.[35] Guerrero told Eugène Pépin, the observer of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that due to the postponement the public would remember the memorable discussion of 4 February well. On this day, all speakers, except delegates from Peru and Cuba, had condemned intervention as a principle of international law.[36]

This, however, was not the end of the discussions on intervention. On 18 February, the Latin American delegates turned the last plenary session before the final ceremony into a demonstration against interventionism. The day before, Sandino, who used to sign his publications with "patria y liberdad", had sent a telegram to Havana asking the delegates for "alguna acción en pro de nuestra Soberanía".[37] Sandino's telegram contributed to increase public pressure, which may have been a contributing factor for the 17 delegations to regret, one after the other, the adjournment of the question of intervention to the

[34] *Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de agosto de 1927 a julio de 1928 presentada al H. Congreso de la Unión por Genaro Estrada* (México 1928), p. 221.

[35] Lars Schoultz believes that it was Hughes' personal objective to "convey" the problem onto his successor. Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, p. 288. However, the instructions from Kellogg, Hughes' superior might have been more important. He decided that U.S. interventionism and the Monroe Doctrine were not negotiable. Therefore, Hughes had no other choice than delay and delegating the issue to insignificant committees. In the simultaneous negotiations with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a peace treaty (Briand-Kellog-Pact) the State Department demanded to exclude Latin America as part of the U.S.-American sphere of interest. Margot Louria: *Triumph and Downfall. America's Pursuit of Peace and Prosperity, 1921-1933* (Westport, Conn./London: Greenwood, 2001), pp. 131-137.

[36] AMAEP CPC B. Doss. Gén. 199, Pépin to Ministère des Affaires Étrangères [MAE], (Havana, 18 Feb. 1928), pp. 36-37.

[37] Mensaje al Congreso Panamericano (17. Jan. 1928), in: Sandino, *El pensamiento vivo*, vol. I, p. 223.

seventh Conference of American States. Pépin described this event, unique in the history of Pan-Americanism, with the following words,

"[...] brusquement, sans que personne ne l'ait voulu, le voile est déchiré et il est clairement apparu qu'il ne pouvait y avoir de panaméricanisme sur la base d'une égalité et d'une indépendance entre toutes les Républiques, mais qu'au contraire il y avait en Amérique une seule grande puissance s'arrogeant à elle-même le droit d'intervenir à son gré dans les affaires des autres."[38]

Guerrero, the commission's president, asked by the Guatemalan delegates for his opinion and a corresponding statement, said that the spontaneous moves had convinced him, quite contrary to the discussions within the Commission, that the general assembly was ready to vote "contra las intervenciones". The day before he had mentioned in a private conversation with Hughes that he intended to waive continuing the campaign for a vote against interventionism in order to keep up appearances of harmony.[39] He had, however, also informed the head of state in San Salvador that he, as Foreign Minister, would stand for national dignity.[40] Asked by his close friend, the Cuban Internationalist Antonio Sánchez de Bustamente, president of the conference and judge at the International Court in Den Haag, Guerrero presented a resolution that read as follows,

"La Sexta Conferencia de las Repúblicas Americanas, teniendo en consideración que en este momento ha sido expresada la firme decisión de cada una de las delegaciones, de que sea consignado de manera categórica y rotunda el principio de la no intervención y la absoluta igualdad jurídica de los Estados, resuelve: Ningún Estado tiene derecho a intervenir en los asuntos de otro."[41]

Earlier the Peruvian delegate had played the part of a spoilsport, just as if Hughes had written the script for him. Now, the leader of the U.S. delegation took over that role with a temper that got increasingly worse. He defended the role of the United States as police power in the region. He stated (in English of course) that "when government breaks down and American citizens are in danger of their lives", U.S. "interposition of a temporary character" was justified.[42] While Theodore Roosevelt, Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson had justified the use of force against the American "sister republics" with their educational

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[38] AMAEP CPC B. Doss. Gén. 199, Pépin to MAE (Havana, 18 Feb. 1928), p. 39

[39] Ferrell, *The Presidency of Calvin Coolidge*, p. 141.

[40] Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism*, p. 133.

[41] *Memoria de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores de agosto de 1927 a julio de 1928 presentada al H. Congreso de la Unión por Genaro Estrada*, pp. 221-222.

[42] *Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 14-15.

task, resulting from an alleged civilizatory superiority, Hughes now came up with a new terminology: a mediating temporary action for reestablishing law and order.[43] Pépin commented,

"M. Hughes a perdu à certains moments, au cours de son discours, la bonhomie dont il n'avait cessé de faire preuve pendant toute la Conférence, il a oublié le panaméricanisme, et a parlé seulement en homme d'État de la grande République, qui a les droits en vertu de sa richesse, de sa force et de sa puissance et qui entend les exercer."[44]

Hughes interpretation of the U.S. right to intervention destroyed all hope for a harmonious course of the conference which Coolidge had expressed at the beginning of the event.[45] After a break, during which Raúl Fernandes from Brazil mediated and warned of the consequences for the continental community, Guerrero subsequently withdrew his resolution.[46] Later U.S. officials tried to palliate the revolution of the weak states in Havana by emphasizing the economic agreements accomplished. A 181-page publication of the "Final Acts" documented 11 conventions, 62 resolutions, 7 motions, and 4 agreements.[47] Some historians have been blinded by official statements like these which were obviously inspired by the State Department. David Sheinin, for example, called U.S. diplomacy at Havana a successful "diplomacy of control". According to Sheinin, U.S. diplomatic maneuvers had neutralized possibly disturbing actions even before the conference began, and Guerrero's initiative, motivated by personal ambition, was not authorized by the government of El Salvador.[48] Yet, although Guerrero's brisk way of action was not in detail agreed upon with El Salvador's President, the Salvadoran Foreign Minister, nevertheless, understood the mood of a part of the population in his own country and other Latin American states. The requests to speak during the plenary assembly on 18 February,

[43] In another publication from the same year he said, "our ambition is to be co-workers with our sister Republics, and not masters, [...] our purpose is to resist aggression, not to commit it." Charles E. Hughes, *Our Relations to the Nations of the Western Hemisphere* (Princeton 1928), p. 17.

[44] AMAEP CPC B. Doss. Gén. 199, Pépin to MAE (Havana, 18 Feb. 1928), p. 39.

[45] Yepes, *El panamericanismo*, pp. 268-269.

[46] AMAEP CPC B. Doss. Gén. 199, Pépin to MAE (Havana, 18 Feb. 1928), pp. 40-41.

[47] *Final Act. Sixth International Conference of American States; Motions, Agreements, Resolutions and Conventions* (La Habana 1928).

[48] Sheinin, *The diplomacy of control*, pp. 318-320. It is hard to understand how Sheinin can entitle the chapter on the Havana conference "American [sic] Diplomatic Triumph: The Non-confrontation at Havanna, 1928." Compare p. 286.

which Sheinin not even mentions, show that the other Latin American representatives were aware of that, too.

The Havana Conference was one of the major failures of Pan Americanism. According to the French journalist Louis Guilaine the Pan-American Union still had no political and legal foundation, "Ainsi, l'Union panaméricaine reste sans statut politique et juridique."[49] The policy-makers in Washington now knew that there was no basis for a Pan American statute in Latin America as long as they adhered to unilateralism and interventionism. Gustavo Guerrero, the Central-American "diplomatic rebel of Havana", "surrendered" shortly after his return because of the pressure exerted by the United States on the Romero Bosque government. Guerrero subsequently had to resign "voluntarily" in order to avoid a dismissal. The President sent him back to Europe, where he again represented his country in the League of Nations, to prevent the people from protesting.[50]

Although Latin American diplomacy did not achieve tangible results the conference at Havana was the first instance that diplomats from the region openly discussed a ban on intervention on a continental level. The discussion was sparked by the pressure of events in Central America and by the growing criticism of "U.S.-Americanism" in large parts of Latin America. The State Department was isolated to a large extent and only a few "satellites" supported its position for opportunistic reasons. At the Seventh Conference of American States at Montevideo in 1933 Secretary of State Cordell Hull signed an Inter-American convention prepared by the International Institute for American Law whose paragraph 8 read, "No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another."[51] At that point, facing a phalanx of determined Latin American delegates the U.S. decision-makers had no choice if the process of Pan American integration was to continue. With that decision, the process of the "U.S.-Americanization" of Latin America temporarily gained a new, more humane dimension.

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[49] "Le Panamérica et le Messianisme. Après la Conférence de La Habana," in: *Avenir* (29 Feb. 1928).

[50] Salisbury, *Anti-Imperialism*, pp. 133-135.

[51] Schoultz, *Beneath the United States*, p. 304.

CONTRIBUTORS

Jürgen Buchenau is Associate Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in History from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill after completing undergraduate studies at the Universität zu Köln. He is the author of *In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico's Central America Policy, 1876-1930* (1996), and *Werkzeuge des Fortschritts: Eine deutsche Händlerfamilie in Mexiko von 1865 bis zur Gegenwart* (2002), also published as *Tools of Progress: A German Merchant Family in Mexico City* (2004).

Thomas Fischer is currently deputy Professor of Latin American History at the University of Hamburg. In 2002-2003 he was deputy Professor at the University Erlangen-Nürnberg where he is also a Privatdozent. He has written and edited a number of books and articles. His research interests include Latin American history of the 19th and 20th centuries, Latin American international relations, European politics and the idea of Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Hans-Joachim König is a Professor of Latin American History and a Head of the Central Institute of Latin American Studies at the Catholic University Eichstätt. Currently, he is president (2002-2005) of the Asociación de Historiadores Latinoamericanistas Europeos (AHILA). He has written and edited numerous books including *Die Entdeckung und Eroberung Amerikas* (1992), *En el camino hacia la nación* (1994). He is co-editor of the series HISTORAMERICANA and Americana eystettensia and of the *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas*. His research interests include the conquest of America, state- and nation-building in Latin America, the history of Latin American historiography, and cultural and postcolonial theories.

Claudio Lomnitz is author of a number of books on culture and politics in Mexico, including *Evolución de una sociedad rural* (1982), *Exits from the Labyrinth: Culture and Ideology in Mexican National Space* (1992) and *Deep Mexico, Silent Mexico: An Anthropology of Nationalism* (2001). Most recently Lomnitz has written a political history of death in Mexico, that is still in manuscript form. Claudio Lomnitz is Professor of History and Anthropology at the University of Chicago.

Luis Rodolfo Morán Quiroz has been Professor-Researcher at the Centro Regional de Tecnología Educativa and of the Departments of Sociology and Stud-

ies in Regional Culture at the Universidad de Guadalajara. He has also taught at the Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Occidente, the Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey, and the Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas. He has been Guest Researcher at the University of Bayreuth for a project about immigrant organizations in Germany. Professor Morán Quiroz has published several articles and books such as *United Farm Workers of Washington State: una propuesta de organización campesina en Estados Unidos* (2000).

Thomas O'Brien is a Professor of History at the University of Houston. His major publications include *The Revolutionary Mission: American Enterprise in Latin America, 1900-1945* (1996), and *The Century of U.S. Capitalism in Latin America* (1999). Professor O'Brien is currently working on a study of U.S.–Latin American relations over the past two centuries.

Berndt Ostendorf is Professor of North American Cultural History at the Ludwig-Maximilians Universität München. He was a guest professor at the University of Massachusetts, Harvard University, the University of New Orleans and Venice International University. His publications include *Black Literature in White America* (1983) *Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika* (2 Vol. 1992), *Die multikulturelle Gesellschaft: Modell Amerika?* (1994), and *Transnational America: The Facing of Borders in the Western Hemisphere* (2002).

Ricardo Pérez Montfort is a Research Fellow at the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología (CIESAS), Professor at the Postgraduate Division of the Faculty of Literature and Philosophy at UNAM, Professor of History at the Centro de Investigación y Docencia en Humanidades del Estado de Morelos (CIDHEM), and a member of the National Research System. He has written numerous books and articles including *Estampas de nacionalismo popular mexicano* (1992) and most recently *Juntos y medio revueltos* (2000) and *Avatares del nacionalismo cultural* (2000). His research interests include nationalism, cultural history, the history of cinema, and Mexican historiography. Ricardo Pérez Montfort has contributed to several cultural radio stations in Mexico City and he has published five books of poetry including *Seducción y naufragio* (1994).

Corinne A. Pernet received her Ph.D. from the University of California, Irvine, in 1996. Her research fields include women's mobilization and the feminist

movement in Chile as well as the international cultural relations of the Americas. She now works at the University of Zurich.

Mariano Ben Plotkin has taught in several universities in the United States, including Harvard University, Colby College and Boston University. In 2000 he moved back to Argentina to assume the directorship of the New York University site in Buenos Aires. Since the site was closed in 2002 he has been a researcher at the National Council for Scientific Research and a Professor at the Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero. His books include *Mañana es San Perón* (1994, English translation 2002), and *Freud in the Pampas* (2001, Spanish translation 2003). He is now working on a cultural history of Argentine economics and economists.

Josef Raab is Professor of American Studies at the University of Bielefeld, Germany. His work on inter-American relations includes essays on José Martí, Walt Whitman, Chicano literature and culture as well as representations of the American Other in literature and on TV. He is the editor of four collections of essays and the author of *Elizabeth Bishop's Hemisphere*. His current projects are *The Borderlands of Identity in Mexican American Literature* and *Hybrid Americas: Contacts, Contrasts, and Confluences in New World Literatures and Cultures*.

Stefan Rinke is Privatdozent and Assistant Professor of Latin American History at the Catholic University Eichstätt-Ingolstadt. He was Visiting Assistant Professor at Tufts University. His major publications include a forthcoming book on North Americanization in Chile, the study *Cultura de masas, reforma y nacionalismo en Chile, 1910-1931* (2002) and a book on German-Latin American relations, *Der letzte freie Kontinent* (1996). He is co-editor of volumes on Latin American history and of the scholarly series HISTORAMERICANA.

K. Lynn Stoner is an Associate Professor of History at Arizona State University in Tempe, Arizona. She is the author of *From the House to the Streets: The Cuban Woman's Movement for Legal Change* (1991) and *Cuban and Cuban American Women: An Annotated Bibliography* (2000). She received a Rockefeller Scholar-in-Residence Fellowship in 1998. In 2001, she won a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Institute Award to direct an institute on the Hispanic Engendering of the Americas. She is the book review editor of the journal Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos. Her current research is on gendered crime and punishment in early twentieth-century Cuba.

In the course of the 20th century, Latin Americans had to face a constantly increasing United States influence in the Americas. They have asked themselves what this development might mean to them and what it might lead to. From 1898 to the present the concept of North Americanization has been hotly debated in the region. The term has many different meanings in the various Latin American societies, meanings that have changed over time and that reflect the differences in gender, social class, and ethnic background. After September 11, 2001 these discussions have gained new relevance due to the rapidly changing international agenda. This volume assembles an interdisciplinary set of important new contributions to crucial aspects of North Americanization in Latin America. Addressing categories such as culture, gender, and nation the articles provide new approaches to the study of inter- and trans-American relations in the twentieth century from the perspectives of historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and American studies scholars.

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