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Sustainable Conflict Management by Multinational Mining Companies in Areas of Limited Statehood

The role of company internal drivers and local governance in implementation
of sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies

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Long Abstract/Summary

Conflicts arising between multinational gold mining companies and neighboring communities in areas of limited statehood (ALS) are wicked problems. Compensation issues and demands for fair treatment and shared benefits lie at the heart of community upheavals against multinational gold mining companies, but the perceptions on the cause and resolution of conflict are far more complex. From an investor's perspective, the exclusive role of companies is to make profit, and, via the taxes companies pay, it is the government's responsibility to take care of the people. From the perspective of the communities, investors have to bear most of this responsibility, regardless of their contribution in tax. Governments stand on either side of the fence depending on whom they are addressing. Besides, underlying assumptions behind these perspectives make the search for company-community conflict resolution an even more complex matter.

From the very start of operations, intrinsic conflicts emerge in the interactions between multinational gold mining companies and neighboring communities. With the arrival of a large-scale mine, villagers are given notice to evacuate an area they have settled for ages and are told that artisanal gold mining activities are no longer allowed, despite the fact that it had been an important income-generating activity for generations. Representatives of governments and of companies promise them that, by doing so, villages will benefit from the multinational company's (MNC) operations via some form of improvement to their everyday lives (employment opportunities, health and education facilities). Thus, after the company starts operating, people expect to see visible benefits, and their demands subsequently increase as the size of the gap between expectation and realization soars. In areas of limited statehood (ALS), local communities affected by multinational gold mining companies often lack the organizational capacity to be recognized as legitimate stakeholders. Since they usually have little influence on the national government's policy-making and little capacity to articulate and defend their concerns, they often resort to confrontational strategies in the struggle to establish accountability.

Direct interaction with communities is thus of particular relevance for mining companies operating in ALS and the implementation of strategies to prevent neighboring communities from resorting to confrontation is a key concern among these companies. In light of the diffusion of the sustainability paradigm into the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) approaches of the mining sector, stakeholder engagement strategies (SES) are now perceived as a sustainable way to manage company-community relationships. We define SES as the ways companies engage with communities neighboring their operating mines to address local demands through infrastructure and capacity-building projects. Several types of SES can be distinguished on the basis of their level of inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term perspective. An ideally sustainable strategy would consist in engaging with stakeholders from the central to the village level, including state, non-state, customary, religious, youth, women, and the wider public in decision related to local development, through multilateral communication - meaning that the company is accessible to neighboring communities and fully takes their feedback into account – which would lead to the implementation of long-term CSR projects adapted to local development needs and to the building of lasting capacities for all types of stakeholders. None of the case studies in our research reaches such high social sustainability. Nonetheless, each company's engagement's strategies evolved over the period 2011 to 2013, clearly showing a trend towards the implementation of more social sustainability, but with wide variations amongst cases and over time.

When do mining MNCs who have adopted socially sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies (SES) succeed in implementing them to manage community-company conflict in areas of limited statehood (ALS)? To answer this question, we use a combination of anthropological field research and comparative methods to study five mining sites (and neighboring communities) of three multinational mining companies in two African countries. Our aim is to explore the explanatory power of drivers found in the literature from the international to the local level. In Guinea and Tanzania, the multinational companies we study started with exclusive, strategically philanthropic, and ad hoc ways of addressing the demands of neighboring communities in order to avoid direct confrontation and potential threats. In the last decade, at the headquarters level, these companies adopted discourses recognizing the overall importance of social sustainability and the effectiveness of SES to manage conflict. At the operational level, why are particular companies at particular times more successful than others in implementing sustainable SES?

Our study starts by exploring each company's reputation concerns, home country context, and commitment to international standards. We then consider the host countries' regulation and enforcement capacities. Internal company measures that are taken in order to enact company strategies at operational levels might also be relevant to explain outcomes. Also, how do local governance drivers, such as the risk of company-community conflict and the capacity of local stakeholders to co-manage implemented strategies, play out in the companies' social sustainability practices?

We find that none of the commonly accepted drivers taken separately explains the variation in SES implementation outcomes. Through a multidisciplinary approach, we conclude that It is only when internal company drivers are favorable, especially when leadership on SES is strong, that companies reach sustainable outcomes. However, companies meet mitigated success if the communities where they operate are not willing or capable to collaborate in managing conflicts. In other words, communities that are socialized into trusting one another and working together towards common goals create a favorable context for sustainability approaches, especially if companies do not use harsh responses to community confrontations. The influence of these internal drivers on SES outcomes is thus tempered by local governance characteristics. MNCs succeed in implementing sustainable community-company conflict management strategies when they successfully integrate SES strategies by recruiting agents dedicated to communities and by giving them enough resources, autonomy, and power to act.

Table of Content

Long Abstract/Summary.....	3
List of Figures.....	9
List of Tables.....	10
Acronyms.....	11
Acknowledgments.....	12
PART 1: INTRODUCTION, THEORY AND METHODS.....	13
CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION.....	13
A. <i>Statement of problem/research question</i>	13
B. <i>Relevance (gaps in the literature)</i>	14
C. <i>Argument (contribution to the literature)</i>	16
D. <i>Research design and Methods</i>	17
E. <i>Outline</i>	19
CHAPTER II — THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....	21
A. <i>Sustainability for MNCs in ALS: transition from adoption to implementation (Conceptual framework)</i>	21
1. Definition: sustainability and SES.....	21
2. Typology: key components and ideal-types.....	24
3. Implementation of SES: adoption, outputs, and outcomes.....	28
a) SES as adopted by HQ.....	29
b) Implementation outputs of SES by mining companies.....	29
c) Implementation outcomes of SES by mining companies.....	30
B. <i>Explanations/Drivers of sustainability adoption and implementation</i>	30
1. Drivers of adoption: international and home country.....	31
a) Reputation concerns.....	32
(1) Commitments to voluntary standards.....	32
(2) Size and market position.....	33
b) Peer and sectorial pressures.....	34
c) Home country.....	35
d) Naming & shaming.....	37
2. Drivers of outcomes: host country.....	37
a) Regulations.....	38
(1) Mining regulations and dependency.....	38
(2) Tools and structures.....	39
b) Enforcement and accountability.....	40
c) Conclusion on main drivers identified in the literature.....	41
3. Drivers of local outcomes: Internal Company outputs.....	42
a) Corporate culture.....	42
b) Corporate Design.....	45
c) Learning processes.....	47
4. Drivers of local outcomes: local governance.....	48
a) Local Risk of conflict.....	49
(1) History of violence and stereotypes.....	50
(2) ASM tradition.....	51
(3) History of community-company conflict.....	52
b) Local co-management capacity.....	53
(1) Formal Vertical connectedness / Top-down involvement.....	55
(2) Informal Community Cohesion.....	55
(3) (in)Formal cross-scale security harmonization.....	56
5. Conclusion literature review.....	57
6. Analytical framework.....	57
CHAPTER III — RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS.....	62
A. <i>Research design and selection of case studies</i>	63
a) Host Country.....	64
b) Gold mining.....	65
c) Companies and sites.....	66
(1) African Barrick Gold (ABG).....	67
(2) AngloGold Ashanti (AGA).....	67
(3) NordGold (NG).....	68
d) Community-company context.....	69
(1) Tanzania.....	69
(2) Guinea.....	70
B. <i>Methods</i>	70
a) Field Research: Sample and Interviews.....	71
(1) Sampling.....	71

(2) Interviews.....	72
b) Triangulation.....	73
c) Coding.....	74
d) About operationalization: weighing indicators.....	74
PART 2: ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SES BY MNCS.....	75
CHAPTER IV — VARIATION OF SUSTAINABILITY IN SES (DV).....	75
A. <i>Adoption of Social Sustainability at Headquarters level</i>	75
1. Adoption by Barrick and African Barrick Gold (ABG).....	77
2. Adoption by AGA and its Tanzanian and Guinean sites.....	78
3. Adoption by Selverstal and NordGold.....	79
B. <i>Conclusions on Adoption of Social Sustainability</i>	79
C. <i>Implementation of Sustainability in conflict management strategies at Operational Level</i> 80	
1. Implementation by NordGold’s Société minière de Dinguiraye in Guinea (SMD).....	83
(1) Inclusiveness.....	83
(2) Multilateralism.....	84
(3) Long-term perspective.....	86
(4) SMD SES sustainability over time.....	87
2. Implementation by AGA’s Societe Aurifère de Guinée in Guinea (SAG).....	87
(1) Inclusiveness.....	88
(2) Multilateralism.....	90
(3) Long-term perspective.....	92
(4) SAG SES sustainability over time.....	94
3. Implementation by AGA’s Geita Gold Mine in Tanzania (GGM).....	94
(1) Inclusiveness.....	94
(2) Multilateralism.....	96
(3) Long-term perspective.....	97
(4) GGM SES variation over time.....	98
4. Implementation by ABG’s Buzwagi, Site in Tanzania (BUZ).....	98
(1) Inclusiveness.....	98
(2) Multilateralism.....	100
(3) Long-term perspective.....	101
(4) SES Sustainability overtime.....	102
5. Implementation by ABG’s North-Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania (NMGM).....	103
(1) Inclusiveness.....	103
(2) Multilateralism.....	104
(3) Long-term perspective.....	105
(4) SES sustainability over time.....	106
D. <i>Conclusion and Comparative Summary of Adoption and Implementation in SES</i> sustainability.....	107
PART 3: DRIVERS.....	110
CHAPTER V — COMPANY INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS.....	110
A. <i>International Drivers Operationalization</i>	110
B. <i>International drivers versus HQ adoption: case Studies</i>	112
1. AngloGold Ashanti’s International drivers.....	112
2. African Barrick Gold’s International drivers.....	114
3. NordGold’s International Drivers.....	116
C. <i>Comparative summary and conclusions: Adoption versus implementation</i>	117
CHAPTER VI — HOST COUNTRY DRIVERS.....	118
A. <i>Regulation and Enforcement in the mining sector: Operationalization of Host country</i> Drivers.....	119
1. Regulations, tools and structures for Social sustainability.....	119
2. State and Non-State Enforcement and Accountability Mechanisms.....	119
B. <i>Tanzania’s drivers of sustainability in the mining sector</i>	120
1. Regulations for sustainability.....	121
2. Enforcement and accountability.....	123
3. Conclusion Tanzania.....	126
C. <i>Guinea’s drivers of sustainability in the mining sector</i>	127
1. Regulations for sustainability.....	127
2. Enforcement and accountability.....	131
3. Conclusion Guinea.....	135
D. <i>Comparative summary and conclusions</i>	136
CHAPTER VII — LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS.....	137

A.	<i>Operationalization of Local Governance Drivers: Risks and Co-management Capacity</i>	138
1.	Local risk of community-company conflict.....	139
2.	Co-management capacity of local actors.....	141
B.	<i>Local governance drivers: Case studies</i>	143
1.	ABG Buzwagi and AGA GGM in Sukuma dominated area (Shinyanga)	143
a)	GGM&BUZ Local risk of community-company conflict.....	144
(1)	History of violence and perceptions	144
(2)	ASM risk.....	145
(3)	History of Community-company Conflict	145
(4)	GGM & BUZ Risk Conclusion.....	147
b)	BUZ & GGM Co-management capacity local actors -	148
(1)	Vertical connectedness	148
(a)	BUZ.....	148
(b)	GGM	150
(2)	Informal Community Cohesion	151
(a)	BUZ.....	151
(b)	GGM	151
(3)	Security harmonization	152
(a)	BUZ.....	152
(b)	GGM	152
c)	BUZ & GGM Co-management conclusion.....	153
d)	Table summary of BUZ and GGM local governance drivers.....	153
2.	ABG NMGM in Kurya dominated area (North-Mara).....	154
a)	Local risk of community-company conflict TARIME, NORTH-MARA	154
(1)	History of violence	154
(2)	ASM risk.....	155
(3)	History of community-company conflict.....	155
(4)	Risk conclusion NMGM	156
b)	Co-management capacity local actors Tarime, North-Mara	156
(1)	Vertical connectedness	157
(2)	Informal community cohesion.....	158
(3)	Security harmonization	158
(4)	Co-management Conclusion NMGM.....	159
c)	Table summary of NMGM local governance drivers.....	159
3.	AGA (SAG) and NordGold (SMD) in Malinke dominated area (Haute-Guinee).....	159
(1)	Us versus them: Malinké of Siguiré versus MNCs	160
(2)	Cross-scale security harmonization	161
a)	SAG: Local risk of community-company conflict	163
(1)	History of violence	163
(2)	ASM tradition	164
(3)	Community-company conflict.....	165
(a)	Accountability strategies by local communities.....	165
(b)	Company's response	167
(4)	Conclusion risk SAG.....	167
b)	SMD: Local Risk.....	168
(1)	History of violence	168
(2)	ASM tradition	168
(3)	Community-company conflict.....	169
(a)	Accountability strategies by local communities.....	169
(b)	Company response.....	170
(4)	Conclusion risk SMD	171
c)	SAG: Co-management capacity local actors.....	171
(1)	Vertical connectedness	171
(2)	Informal Cohesion.....	173
(3)	Conclusion co-managemnt SAG.....	174
d)	SMD: Co-management capacity local actors.....	175
(1)	Vertical connectedness	175
(2)	Cohesion	175
(3)	Conclusion SMD co-management.....	176
e)	Table summary of SAG and SMD local governance drivers.....	176
C.	<i>Comparative summary and conclusions: Local Governance Drivers do not explain variation in outcomes</i>	176
CHAPTER VIII —	COMPANY INTERNAL DRIVERS.....	178
A.	<i>Corporate culture Operationalization</i>	180
1.	HQ-OP alignment (enhanced values)	181
2.	MD Leadership: dedication and recognition of CR	181
3.	CR leadership: dedication and self-perception	181
4.	CR integration in OP (articulation of values)	182
B.	<i>Corporate Design Operationalization</i>	183
1.	HQ-OP alignment on SES (enabling structures)	183

2.	MD Management leadership style for SES.....	183
3.	CR Leadership design: autonomy and capacity	184
4.	CR structural integration in OP	184
C.	<i>Learning Mechanism Operationalization</i>	185
D.	<i>Internal company drivers: Case studies</i>	186
1.	Internal drivers in NordGold, SMD, Guinea	186
a)	Corporate Culture: SMD.....	187
b)	Corporate Design: SMD.....	190
c)	Learning: SMD	192
d)	Internal drivers summary for SMD.....	193
2.	AGA's HQ leadership: discourses and design (GGM and SAG).....	194
a)	AGA discourses on SES	194
b)	AGA design for SES	195
c)	AGA learning from OP	195
3.	Internal company Drivers in AGA's SAG in Guinea.....	196
a)	Corporate Culture: SAG	196
b)	Corporate Design: SAG.....	198
c)	Learning: SAG	201
d)	Conclusion on SAG Internal drivers	202
4.	Internal company Drivers in AGA's GGM in Tanzania.....	203
a)	Corporate Culture: GGM	203
b)	Corporate Design: GGM.....	205
c)	Learning: GGM.....	207
d)	Conclusions on GGM internal drivers.....	207
5.	ABG's HQ leadership: discourse and design (Buz and NMGM)	208
a)	ABG discourse on SES	208
b)	ABG design for SES.....	209
6.	Internal company Drivers in ABG's Buzwagi mine in Tanzania	210
a)	Corporate Culture: BUZ.....	210
b)	Corporate design BUZ.....	211
c)	Learning: BUZ.....	213
d)	Conclusion Buzwagi Internal drivers	214
7.	Internal company Drivers in ABG's North-Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania.....	214
a)	Corporate Culture: NMGM	214
b)	Corporate Design: NMGM	216
c)	Learning: NMGM	218
d)	Conclusion NMGM internal drivers.....	219
E.	<i>Comparative summary and conclusions: no explanation</i>	219
CHAPTER IX — CONCLUSIONS OF PART 3		221
A.	<i>Synthesis part 3</i>	221
B.	<i>Limits of external drivers as an explanation for variation of implementation at operational levels</i>	224
C.	<i>Limits of Company drivers (internal and international) and National drivers (Host country and Local) in Explaining Variation of SES Sustainability</i>	225
D.	<i>General findings</i>	227

PART 4: WHAT EXPLAINS THE VARIATION IN IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES OF SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS 228

CHAPTER X — EXPLANATIONS OF FINDINGS.....		230
A.	<i>The influence of Internal company drivers and local governance drivers on The sustainability of conflict management strategies at operational levels</i>	232
a)	NMGM before 2011: failure to implement SES	233
b)	BUZ 2012-2013: higher SES sustainability	234
c)	SAG and NMGM in 2012-2013: same drivers, different effects?	236
1.	NordGold, SMD, Guinea	238
a)	SMD before 2011 versus NMGM before 2011: CR capacity and the mitigating role of community co-management capacities when risk is high.....	238
b)	SMD 2011-2012: increased inclusiveness because of a more favorable corporate culture?.....	240
c)	SMD 2012-2013: Does weak leadership lead to diminished sustainability in stakeholder engagement strategy?.....	241
d)	Conclusions, findings, and suggestions SMD.....	242
2.	AGA, SAG, Guinea.....	243
a)	SAG before 2011 versus Buzwagi 2012-2013: key features of corporate culture and the role of history of violence when co-management capacities are high.....	243
b)	SAG 2011-2012: co-management capacity's enhancing effect and the importance of company's response to confrontations	245

c) SAG 2012-2013: interdependence of design and culture, the role of CR autonomy and capacity, and of comprehensive response to community confrontations	247
3. AGA, GGM, Tanzania.....	249
a) GGM before 2011: harsh company response to confrontations can downsize the effect of favorable internal company drivers	249
b) GGM 2011-2012: harsh company response hinders good internal if co-management is characterized by low community cohesion.....	250
c) GGM 2012-2013: Hierarchical power of CR compensates weak MD leadership but company's response to conflict hindering sustainability success even with high co-management capacities.....	251
4. African Barrick Gold, Buzwagi, Tanzania.....	252
a) BUZ Before 2011: low internal drivers tend to hinder co-management capacities' enhancing effects	252
b) BUZ 2011-2012: Corporate culture's influence is greater than that of corporate design especially when leadership for implementation of sustainability is stronger.	253
5. African Barrick Gold, North-Mara Gold Mine, Tanzania.....	254
a) NMGM 2011-2012: MD's dedication combined with CR capacity and autonomy compensates unfavorable local governance drivers?.....	254
b) NMGM 2012-2013: low md and cr dedication despite some capacity with low community cohesion (even with improved mnc response and more asm alternatives) cannot lead to sustainable outcomes... 255	
B. Conclusions of Findings.....	257
1. Internal company drivers' effect on sustainability implementation and the Decisive role of leadership	257
2. Mitigating Effect of Local Governance Drivers.....	259
PART 5: CONCLUSION, DISCUSSION AND OUTLOOK.....	262
CHAPTER XI — CONCLUSIONS	262
A. Sustainable conflict management by MNCs: how to succeed in implementation (empirical findings and theoretical discussion).....	263
B. Generalization	267
C. Why does it matter in the real world? (Policy/practice implications).....	268
a) Recommendations to host government.....	268
b) Recommendations to mining sector practitioners	268
D. Recommendations for future research and outlook.....	269
(1) To what extent can sustainable SES influence the resolution of community-company conflicts?	270
(2) How transnational networks of discourse influence local demands	270
(3) When can incremental change of company practices lead to fundamental Changes?	271
(4) Outlook.....	271
SOURCES.....	272
LIST OF INTERVIEWS	286
Guinea 2011-2013	286
Tanzania 2011-2013	292
APPENDIX	299
Short Summary of findings	299
Kurze Zusammenfassung.....	300

List of Figures

Figure 1. Configuration model of organizational culture: internal and external environment [Dauber et al., 2012: 11].....	43
Figure 2. Preliminary model of analysis	59
Figure 3. Local Dynamics Framework.....	60
Figure 4. Local model of analysis.....	61
Figure 5. Local mechanisms of implementation outcomes	61
Figure 6. Sustainability evaluation continuum	74
Figure 7. Indicators evaluation continuum.....	74
Figure 8. Local level drivers leading to sustainable outcomes.....	265
Figure 9. Implementation of sustainability in a transition cycle.....	266

List of Tables

Table 1.	<i>Levels of conflicts</i>	23
Table 2.	<i>SES key components</i>	26
Table 3.	<i>Ideal-types of SES [Adapted from Kemp, D., 2009; Morsing et al., 2006]</i>	26
Table 4.	<i>Adoption, Outputs, and Implementation in the transition to sustainability</i>	30
Table 5.	<i>Community accountability Strategies</i>	53
Table 6.	<i>Main suppositions identified in the literature</i>	57
Table 7.	<i>Transition models synthesis: context of sustainability by MNCs in ALS</i>	58
Table 8.	<i>Field research periods and focus</i>	72
Table 9.	<i>Operationalization of adoption of social sustainability by MNC at HQ level</i>	76
Table 10.	<i>Indicators of sustainability adoption</i>	76
Table 11.	<i>Social sustainability discourse adoption by HQ</i>	79
Table 12.	<i>Indicators of sustainability implementation</i>	82
Table 13.	<i>SES sustainability implementation detailed over time</i>	107
Table 14.	<i>SES sustainability outcomes: DV variation over time and sites</i>	109
Table 15.	<i>International drivers operationalization</i>	111
Table 16.	<i>AGA International Drivers</i>	114
Table 17.	<i>ABG International drivers</i>	116
Table 18.	<i>NG International drivers</i>	117
Table 19.	<i>Host Country Drivers Operationalization</i>	120
Table 20.	<i>Tanzania Host Country Drivers</i>	127
Table 21.	<i>Guinea Host Country drivers</i>	135
Table 22.	<i>Local governance drivers operationalization</i>	138
Table 23.	<i>Local risks indicators</i>	140
Table 24.	<i>Local co-management capacity indicators</i>	142
Table 25.	<i>Buz local governance drivers detail</i>	153
Table 26.	<i>GGM Local governance drivers detail</i>	153
Table 27.	<i>NMGM local governance drivers detail</i>	159
Table 28.	<i>SMD local governance drivers detail</i>	176
Table 29.	<i>SAG local governance drivers detail</i>	176
Table 30.	<i>Summary local governance drivers</i>	177
Table 31.	<i>Internal drivers operationalization</i>	179
Table 32.	<i>Corporate culture indicators</i>	182
Table 33.	<i>Corporate design indicators</i>	185
Table 34.	<i>Company internal learning indicators</i>	186
Table 35.	<i>SMD internal drivers</i>	194
Table 36.	<i>SAG internal drivers</i>	202
Table 37.	<i>GGM internal drivers</i>	208
Table 38.	<i>Buz internal drivers</i>	214
Table 39.	<i>NMGM Internal drivers</i>	219
Table 40.	<i>Conclusions company culture and design drivers</i>	219
Table 41.	<i>Synthesis of drivers and sustainability over time</i>	223
Table 42.	<i>Combining Host country and international drivers</i>	225
Table 43.	<i>Combining International and Internal Drivers</i>	226
Table 44.	<i>Combining local governance and host country drivers</i>	226
Table 45.	<i>Most striking characteristics of case studies</i>	229

Acronyms

ABG	African Barrick Gold
AGA	Anglo Gold Ashanti
ASM	Artisanal and Small scale Miners
BUZ	Buzwagi Gold Mine (ABG)
CASM	Compagnie d'appuie à la sécurité minière
CR	Community Relations (department)
CRC	Community Relation Committee
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
Dpt	Department
DSM	Dar-Es-Salaam
DV	Dependent Variable
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GGM	Geita Gold Mine (AGA, Tanzania)
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Righths
IV	Independent Variable
MD	Managing Director
MDSD	Most similar system design
Mgmt	Management
MNC	Multinational Company
MoA	Memorandum of Agreement
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSSD	Most-different system design
NG	NordGold
NMGM	North Mara Gold Mine (ABG)
OP	Operational levels (company)
RPC	Regional Police Commander
SAG	Société Ashante de Guinée (AGA, Guinée)
SE	Stakeholder Engagement
SES	Stakeholder Engagement Strategy
SFCG	Search for Common Grounds (NGO)
SMD	Société Minière de Dinguiraye (NordGold)
UNGCP	United Nations Global Compact
VBIA	Village Benefits Implementation Agreement
VDC	Village Development Committee
VEC	Village Executive Council
VEO	Village Executive Officer
VPSHR	Voluntary principles on Security and Human Rights
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WEO	Ward Executive Officer

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Part 1: Introduction, Theory and Methods

Chapter I — Introduction

A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM/RESEARCH QUESTION

- *Why would a multinational mining company be nice to the villagers living around its mines?*
 - *It's all about the money!*
- [B.1, Random street interview, Berlin 2014]

Common understanding has it that a company acting in a socially sustainable way with communities around its operations – especially a western company operating in Africa – is necessarily doing so to secure its profits. Reality is more complex.

“For decades, management researchers have called for a shift away from the institutionally accepted means of doing business that only considers economic factors to an alternative paradigm that emphasizes, at a fundamental level, social and ecological harmony” [Valente, 2010: 442]. A growing number of companies respond with initiatives, such as corporate social responsibility (CSR) departments or sustainability reports. They illustrate the movement towards more sustainable ways of doing business, however, these initiatives remain true to the existing economic paradigm [Valente, 2010: 440]. The mining sector is no exception, but has recently grown more familiar with taking into account a broader understanding of stakeholders due to the nature of mining operations [Rees et al., 2012]. Stakeholder Engagement Strategies (SES) are an important part of the community relations dimension of corporate social responsibilities (CSR), and they have the potential to encourage innovations towards more “social and ecological harmony” [Valente, 2010]. Multinational gold mining companies operating in sub-Saharan Africa have increasingly adopted such stakeholder engagement strategies as conflict management instruments [Rees et al., 2012]. CSR are a business’s interpretation of sustainability, and a stakeholder engagement strategy is a sustainable way to manage company-community conflicts that is increasingly implemented in the mining sector.

Sustainable solutions to manage conflicts between mining companies and communities are of particular relevance in areas of limited statehood (ALS), which are defined by the absence of a monopoly over the use of force and/or by the lack of capacity to set and enforce binding regulations [Risse et al., 2006]. For instance, in contexts where basic infrastructures such as roads or water supply are missing and where the state lacks the will or capacity to enforce regulations in the mining sector, MNCs face more demands from the neighboring communities and also need more self-regulations to carry out their operations [Börzel et al., 2013]. Also, considering that historical backgrounds shape the perceptions and representations each group has of the other [Ward, 2013; Worchel, S., 2005], the colonial history of these areas generates a specific relationship between companies and communities. Corporations in the gold mining sector as in other extractive sectors are exposed to a higher risk of conflict with external actors, especially in the areas of environment and human rights [Rees et al., 2012]. These circumstances create an acute need for specific conflict management solutions by mining MNCs operating in ALS. However, there are various means by which companies turn sustainability principles into strategies and practices, and they are not all equally sustainable.

Buzz words — such as “social license to operate”, “sharing the benefits”, or “sustainable development” — are employed interchangeably in the mining sector as synonyms of a social sustainability approach to communities neighboring their operations [AGA, 2012a; Barrick, 2012a; Ernst&Young, 2013; NordGold, 2012a]. They are used to make consensus around a variety of understandings. Regarding sustainability levels of SES, our study considers that social sustainability starts when the strategy reaches some degree of long-term inclusiveness and multilateralism [Bowen et al., 2010; Gladwin et al., 1995; Linnenluecke et al., 2010; Rees et al., 2012; Valente, 2010].

Our study on multinational gold mining companies in Tanzania and Guinea found that companies *adopted* social sustainability approaches after one or several episodes of confrontation with neighboring communities, which is in line with the trend of more sustainable CSR practices. Not all have succeeded in *implementing* a high level of sustainability for these strategies at operational levels. The level of sustainability in SES implemented varies over time and from one operational site to another. We studied three mining companies that have adopted sustainable strategies in the past years: African Barrick Gold (ABG), a UK-based multinational company (MNC) operating in the Lake Zone of Tanzania, just recently separated from Barrick Gold Corporation from Canada; NordGold, operating in northern Guinea from its headquarters in Russia; and AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), which operates in northern Guinea and in the Lake Zone of Tanzania and has its headquarters in South-Africa. Although they agree on adopting sustainable approaches, they often fail to implement them into practices.

More specifically, NordGold’s Guinea mine, after an ambitious attempt to implement highly sustainable SES in 2012, had not implemented a change in its strategy in 2013, while AGA, also operating in northern Guinea, kept increasing the sustainability of its SES in Guinea, but not at its site in the lake zone of Tanzania. Also operating in the lake zone of Tanzania, ABG’s most problematic site increased its SES sustainability levels in 2012, but they decreased again in 2013 despite ongoing violent conflict with neighboring communities that resulted in international naming and shaming campaigns by transnational NGOs, damaging the company's reputation. On the other hand, ABG’s other Tanzanian site, located near where AGA operates, jumped from low to comparatively high levels of sustainability in SES from 2011 to 2013, a period during which it had no open conflict with the neighboring communities. Since these companies adopted socially sustainable strategies, why do we observe such diverse sustainability outcomes even in similar local contexts, and why would an MNC’s conflict management practices seem to have little to do with the type of conflict it is facing?

Our main research question is thus: *When do mining MNCs who have adopted socially sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies (SES) succeed in implementing them to manage community-company conflict in areas of limited statehood (ALS)?*

B. RELEVANCE (GAPS IN THE LITERATURE)

Most literature directly on the subject of sustainable strategies by MNCs offers a multitude of definitions and ways to measure sustainable practices by companies [Montiel et al., 2014]. The term sustainability is not always used as such. For instance, in the mining sector, the terms social risk management, corporate sustainability, community engagement, stakeholder engagement, and sustainable development all refer to CSR approaches related to companies’ relationships with the communities where they operate. These approaches all aim at some degree of inclusiveness,

multilateralism, and long-term view in their decision-making process. From the various definitions complemented by inductive reasoning from field research, we construct an ideal-type of sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy by mining MNCs. We consider that an ideally successful implementation of sustainable SES includes state and non-state stakeholders from the village to the national level through multilateral communication where each party is equally engaged and decisions are taken according to local needs and demands through far reaching and long-term projects.

Studies on sustainability strategies by companies either focus on the environmental side of sustainability or do not distinguish between social and environmental approaches [Bansal et al., 2014]. Also, there are few studies on MNC's sustainability strategies outside of the management and business literature. Therefore, although they are helpful in giving a business-centered approach on the issue of sustainability by companies, their insights on how external contexts might affect business strategy are limited [Epstein et al., 2010; Lozano, 2013]. Moreover, a large chunk of this literature revolves around making a business case for sustainability by showing how sustainable approaches might or might not help in economic performance [Ducassy, 2013; Epstein et al., 2010; Marín et al., 2012; Salzmänn et al., 2005]. Studies on sustainability strategies by companies in areas of limited statehood have multiplied in the last decade, with a focus on the necessity to recognize MNC's political role in participating in sustainable development, especially in the extractive sector [for instance, see the literature on corporate citizenship and the CSR critical agenda Blowfield, 2005; Idemudia, U., 2011a; Idemudia, Uwafiokun, 2011b; Jenkins, 2005; Newell, 2005].

To answer our question on the conditions favoring successful implementation for MNCs who have adopted sustainable strategies, the literature offers explanations pertaining to international and internal company influences. These studies on sustainability by companies are often focused on adoption of strategies rather than on their implementation [Bansal et al., 2014; Montiel et al., 2014; Utting, 2000]. Even studies addressed to practitioners aim to be read by headquarters managers rather than by agents at operational levels [Kemp 2009]. So far, most research focusing on figuring out why economic actors would adopt social, environmental, or HR approaches has found linear explanations plausible. They usually attribute adoption of sustainability-related standards by companies to market-related drivers or to norms and coercive regulations in the home or host country [Flohr et al 2010; Finnemore & Skkinik 1998; Graham & Woods 2006; Hillman 2004; Potoski & Prakash 2005].

Studies on implementation of sustainable strategies by MNCs, often revolve around voluntary initiatives or partnerships [Utting, 2000]. Some authors consider that weaknesses inherent in these trends (non-binding, non-coercive) explain why companies are not thorough in their implementation [Utting, 2000]. When studies go beyond compliance to sustainability standards by companies, they are centered on the various ways MNCs implement sustainability [Hamann et al., 2008; Montiel et al., 2014], rather than on conditions for successful implementation [noticeable exception of Lozano, 2013]. When they focus on local practices, they are more concerned with impacts on local communities, than with means to successfully implement sustainable strategies [with the exception of Kemp 2009, Rees Kemp & Davis 2009, and 2012].

There are very few studies directly explaining what drives sustainable strategies to successful outcomes. Business studies and organizational theory identify internal drivers such as corporate

culture, structures, processes, tools, and learning mechanisms to explain the success or failure of implementation of an innovative sustainable approach [Crane, 2000; Epstein, 2008; Epstein et al., 2010; Linnenluecke et al., 2010; Purser, 1994; Schein, 2004]. A handful of studies have emerged since 2009 on the local level enablers and barriers for implementing community development and conflict management by MNCs in the mining industry. Bowen et al [2010], Rees et al. [2012], and Kemp [2009], thus started to fill the gap on local-level analysis [Bowen et al., 2010; Kemp, D., 2009; Rees et al., 2012]. They provide important suggestions on how corporate culture and structures explain implementation outcomes. For instance, they identify various aspects of internal company dimensions as being crucial to the success of a company's conflict management efforts, such as: tensions between profit and social commitments, operational level leadership on company-community relationships, influence of community relation practitioners on decision-making, internal communication, willingness of senior managers, capacity and skills of practitioners. However, although they admit that external factors might also play a role in strategy outcomes, they deliberately leave these out of their study [Rees et al., 2012: 1].

In the end, literature on sustainable strategies by companies is limited in scope to environmental issues, adoption and compliance, social performance, internal drivers, and impact on communities. Studies emphasize the role of international drivers (reputation, etc.) to explain adoption of sustainability by MNCs, and of internal drivers (corporate culture and structure) to explain implementation. To enrich our understanding, we borrow from other literature on company behavior in general, in ALS, and on community engagement in action.

C. ARGUMENT (CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE)

Political science and international studies identify various “drivers” to explain the behavior of MNCs and norms of the mining/extractive industry operating in areas of limited statehood. International relations studies and political science focus primarily on international pressures pertaining to the context of industry, the market, and the home country where the company is headquartered to explain the commitment of MNCs to sustainability-related standards and the contribution of MNCs to governance [Börzel et al., 2013; Finnemore et al., 1998; Graham et al., 2006; Prakash, Aseem et al., 2006; Risse et al., 2013]. These drivers relate to reputation concerns, competition and legitimization among businesses, and the role of regulations and voluntary standards [Graham et al., 2006; Prakash, A. et al., 2007]. Studies in political science offer interesting suggestions on how statehood characteristics might hinder or increase the likelihood for companies to contribute to collective goods or services. The host country's limitations of regulation and enforcement capacity might influence implementation outcomes of governance contribution by companies at the operational level [Börzel & Thauer 2013; Haufler 2001; Graham & Woods 2006; Porter & Kramer 2002]. Börzel also considers the role of alternatives to “the shadow of hierarchy” of the state [Börzel et al., 2011]. Some studies that are not directly linked to sustainable outcomes of MNC strategies offer explanations of the effects of external actors and institutions on business behavior. These studies tend to focus on the impact of the company on communities [Hönke, 2012, 2013; Idemudia, Uwafiokun, 2011b]. They rarely investigate how companies succeed in implementation of intended outcomes [exception of Hönke & Thauer 2014 on service provision] or how communities might influence companies.

The literature on sustainable approaches to management of natural resources and conflicts offers insights on drivers influencing the success of implementation at the local level. Some studies identify antecedents to community engagement in action, such as the national context, the organizational context, the community context, and managerial perceptions [Bowen et al., 2010]. Natural resource management studies, development studies, and conflict theories consider that the local governance context is essential to the success of implementation of a conflict management strategy [Cundill et al., 2010; Cvetkovich et al., 1999; Luning, 2012; Plummer et al., 2004; Worchel, S., Dawna Coutant-Sassic, and Frankie Wong, 1993]. The role of trust and risk are particularly emphasized, especially when driven by history and connectedness factors at the local level [Cundill et al., 2010; Plummer et al., 2006; Pretty et al., 2001].

We explore the extent to which the drivers suggested in the literature explain the variability of success in implementation of sustainable strategies, especially once they have been adopted at the HQ level. We argue that international drivers and host country drivers have little to do with the variable success in implementation of sustainable strategies by MNCs. Among internal company drivers, we conclude that it is specifically the strength of leadership on social sustainability issues that leads to success in implementing sustainable SES. We also argue that local governance drivers stimulate or mitigate the effect of leadership. When strong leadership dedicated to the implementation of SES is combined with the capacity of neighboring communities to collaborate with the company, the chances of success of implementation are even higher, especially if the company does not use harsh security measures against trespassers or protestors. Consequently, we find that most studies so far have tended to focus only on part of the explanations instead of integrating internal and external drivers into their understanding of the practices of MNCs in ALS.

One could assume that our study has relevance to the neo- and post-colonial literature that recognizes new methods of pacification by extractive industries in ALS. After all, the term “neo-colonialism” was first used in reference to the mining sectors’ influence in Africa by Kwame Nkrumah in 1965 [Nkrumah, 1965]. Bohm and Misoczky later conceptualized it as “predatory extractivism” related to “primitive accumulation” as the foundation and continuing requirements of the expanding capitalist system [Bohm et al., 2013; Harvey, 2003]. What we could call neo-colonial powers, develop new techniques for “garnering consent to structural violence, resource appropriation and domination” [Butler, 2014]. Under this frame of reference, we could say that we are studying neo-colonial pacification strategies, “a process of securing the insecurity of capitalist accumulation” [Neocleous, 2011], and how they work at the local level. However, this interpretation is rooted in the economic-driven paradigm. Considering that we frame our study in the scope of interpretation of a transition to sustainability, we argue that successful implementation of sustainability may progressively guide MNCs away from these colonial tendencies, towards more harmonious ways of “cohabitating” [Luning 2012].

D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

We develop our argument by using a most-similar, most-different research design and anthropological methods of field research.

To evaluate whether international drivers suffice to explain the variation observed in implementation, we hold the company as a constant variable by comparing one company operating in two different countries and one company operating in two different locations in the same

country. A single company operating in two different countries or in two different locations in the same country should reach the same outcomes if international company drivers were decisive. We compare AngloGold Ashanti operating in Guinea (Société Ashanti Goldfield) and in Tanzania (Geita Gold Mine), and African Barrick Gold operating in two locations in Tanzania (Buzwagi and North-Mara). We observe variation between sites operated by the same company. Two companies operating in the same country should reach similar outcomes if host country drivers were decisive. We compare AngloGold Ashanti and African Barrick Gold both operating in Tanzania, as well as AngloGold Ashanti's operation in Guinea with NordGold's mine also operating in Guinea. We find variation in the implementation level of sustainability between companies operating in the same country.

We observe such variations in the success of implementation per site and per year, that international market drivers as well as home and host country drivers cannot explain the variation in implementation outcomes. We then explore local governance drivers and company internal drivers separately for each mining site. While local governance drivers do not seem to explain much, the variation in internal drivers appears to match outcomes of SES in most cases. As a result, by using a most-different most-similar system design and anthropological methods of data collection, we find that no single driver explains linearly the variation of implementation between mining sites over the research period from 2011 to 2013. By a careful comparison of the best-case scenario with the worst-case scenario, followed by systematic comparison of similarities and differences in each micro-case, we were able to isolate essential characteristics of internal company drivers and local governance drivers.

We find that NordGold's SMD site in Guinea lacks the CR resources and MD dedication to meet success in implementation of sustainable SES, despite a motivated CR manager who came and went in 2011-2012. Moreover, the **SMD** operates in a local context that is not very favorable, with a history of internal community confrontations and negative perceptions, coupled with communities that are not fond of collaborating in the management of conflicts. AGA has a site in the same region of Guinea as NordGold; however, AGA's site, the **SAG**, is more successful in implementing its HQ commitments. The SAG has more potential to succeed, because its internal drivers are more favorable, it has the opportunity to engage with well-organized youth groups, and it has no legacy of violent community-company encounters to deal with. The **GGM**, AGA's site in Tanzania, also has internal potential to reach success in implementation of sustainable strategies but has a bad history of choosing the use of force over dialog in case of troubles with communities. The cohesion of the communities around GGM is also not good, which does not help. As a result, the GGM does not fulfill its potential although it still includes a wide variety of stakeholders and is rather accessible. Both of AGA's sites score badly on long-term perspectives. The **Buzwagi** mine of African Barrick Gold, subsidiary of the largest gold mining company in the world, based in Canada, operates its Buzwagi site not far from the GGM. In Buzwagi, when leadership was not strong in 2011, the local governance context still made it seem like the company was implementing sustainable engagement strategies although this was not the case. In 2013, with good leadership and favorable local governance drivers, the site scored the highest in sustainability implementation, especially because of long-term projects. Interestingly, the worst case, the **North-Mara** gold mine (NMGM) before 2011, is another Barrick mine operating in Tanzania. In unfavorable local settings (long history of inter-clan clashes and ongoing distrust within the communities), it is necessary to have strong leadership on

community issues if the company wishes to avoid disastrous company-community relationships. With the leadership of the NMGM's managing director in 2012, the situation got better before it deteriorated again after he left, although some of his successes survived in 2013.

As a result, our refined analysis of local level dimensions shows how a strong leadership within the company leads to a higher level of sustainability of SES. We show that among internal company drivers, it is specifically the strength of leadership on social sustainability issues that leads to success in implementing sustainable SES. We also claim that local governance drivers stimulate or mitigate the effect of leadership. Neighboring communities accustomed to working collaboratively among themselves, and companies who do not use harsh security measures enhance the effect of strong leadership. In the end, we observe that strong leadership and favorable local governance drivers lead to the success of implementation of socially sustainable strategies. Consequently, we hold that it is the interaction of internal company drivers and local governance drivers that explains why some companies at certain times are more successful than others in implementing higher levels of sustainability in their stakeholder engagement strategies.

E. OUTLINE

The cases (countries, companies) selected for study here led to a puzzling observation. Namely, all companies studied here adopted socially sustainable discourses in their HQ, but not all succeeded in implementing socially sustainable conflict management at local sites, even where they were confronted by the most violent upheavals compared to other gold mining companies (and have a reputation to protect as a leading company in the sector).

To explain the circumstances that allow companies to successfully implement sustainable SES adopted by their headquarters, we first review the literature on the subject. In Chapter 2, we provide a definition, typology, and ideal-type of successful implementation of sustainable SES by MNCs. We define the concepts of adoption, implementation outputs, and implementation outcomes, the latter being our main dependent variable. This second chapter also identifies the relevant literature to answer our research question, which leads to a number of suppositions on adoption and/or implementation of sustainable SES by companies.

Our research design, consisting of a grounded theory approach from a selection of cases, comparing the most-similar and the most-different systems, is presented in Chapter 3. Specifically, we chose: one company (AngloGold) in two different countries (Tanzania and Guinea), one company (African Barrick Gold) operating two local sites (North-Mara and Kahama) in one country (Tanzania), two companies in one locality (Geita and Kahama, in the Shinyanga region), and two companies (NMGM and GGM) in two different localities (North-Mara and Geita) of the same country (Tanzania). In this third chapter, we explain our choice of methods used to collect and analyze data: field research (participant observation, semi-structured, and narrative interviews), triangulation, and coding.

Explanations from the literature generate a number of suppositions concerning the main question of this research. Our study analyzes how much they explain through systematic empirical comparison. Before operationalizing and describing the influence of each driver, we describe how to evaluate sustainability levels of SES and the variations observed in our case studies in each mining site over the three-year research period. Did all companies adopt the same degree of social sustainability at the HQ level? How successful was the implementation at operational levels? Chapter 4 describes a

disconnection we found between adoption and implementation variations. While each company adopted a high degree of social sustainability, their level of implementation varies.

Why this variation in the success of implementation of socially sustainable SES? To answer this question, part 2 explores each driver identified in the literature independently.

Chapter five explores whether, in our case studies, international drivers identified as the prominent explanation in the literature are sufficient to account for the observed variation in implementation. How well do international guidelines, reputational concerns, and home country activism and regulations explain the variation in operational-level outputs? We conclude chapter five by showing that these drivers appear not to be decisive in successful implementation of SES.

The sixth chapter analyzes the extent to which host country drivers, such as regulations, enforcement capacities, and accountability mechanisms at the national level could influence implementation of sustainable CSR approaches by MNCs. Comparing the Tanzanian and Guinean contexts of regulation and enforcement, it appears that host country drivers do not explain the variation of implementation of sustainability by companies.

In the seventh chapter, we examine specific literature on natural resources and conflict management pointing to local governance drivers. We consider the local predisposition for conflicts to occur between the company and the communities (risk of company-community conflicts). We also analyze the capacity of local stakeholders to collaborate in the management of conflict related to natural resources (co-management capacities). Our analysis of each case study with regards to these local governance factors finds that they cannot explain the success of sustainable strategy implementation.

In the eighth chapter, we explore the main suppositions suggested by recent management and business studies on the influence of company internal drivers. We operationalize and evaluate the explanatory power of the three dimensions of internal drivers: corporate culture, corporate design, and the learning process. The conclusions of this chapter suggest that internal drivers have an influence on implementation success in most cases.

The ninth chapter concludes that none of the drivers identified in the literature taken separately explains the variation of SES sustainability described in chapter 3. We conclude that it is necessary to explore the combination of internal company drivers and local governance drivers to explain the success or failure of companies to implement a sustainable conflict management strategy.

To understand what explains the variation in sustainability of stakeholder engagement strategies implemented by companies, we combine the different dimensions of local level drivers (Chapter 10). We find that the interactions of leadership dimensions within the company with favorable co-management capacities are decisive in explaining the success of implementing higher sustainability in SES.

The conclusions show how our study can be generalized and its implications (Chapter 11). We explain how our study can be relevant for government and mining sector practitioners in the actual context of diffusion of the sustainability paradigm. This last chapter also explores further research that can emerge from our findings and presents an outlook to the bigger stage on which are study is playing.

Chapter II — Theoretical Background and Analytical framework

This section explores the existing literature on the subject of sustainability and its adoption and implementation by companies. We first define our understanding of the concept of sustainability in the context of CSR in the mining sector. Therefore, we define the key components of SES in the mining sector and provide ideal-types of SES from less to more sustainable, against which we further evaluate the outcomes of implementation by MNCs. Also, we operationalize the concepts of adoption, implementation outputs, and implementation outcomes. We then examine, in particular, previous studies that were interested in analyzing drivers that might explain why companies adopt and/or implement a socially sustainable approach of stakeholder engagement. The specific context of operation of mining MNCs in areas of limited statehood also leads to a variety of studies identifying drivers of successful implementation. We will thus clarify the actual state of the art of answers to our main question, namely: *what explains the variation in the success of implementation of socially sustainable strategies adopted at the headquarters level by MNCs?* Our main suppositions then emerge from this literature review. We present how we explore these suppositions in our analytical framework. We keep the operationalization of these suppositions out of this section. The following chapters (part 3 and 4) each focus on one of the main drivers identified in the literature. We introduce each chapter with the operationalization of its key concepts, then we explore to what extent these explain the variations we observed in our case studies.

A. SUSTAINABILITY FOR MNCs IN ALS: TRANSITION FROM ADOPTION TO IMPLEMENTATION (CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK)

The variety and increasing frequency of economic crises have progressively widened the audience that is sensitive to alternative systems of thought and organization. Some of these alternatives can be grouped under the concept of *sustainability* born in the beginning of the twentieth century. From an initial focus on issues related to the environment, it progressively widened to encompass human rights and social issues. In the 1990s, the concept became popular and started being operationalized in organizations and businesses, in particular under the term corporate social responsibility (CSR). Stakeholder engagement strategies (SES) are a sustainable way to address community-company conflicts as part of companies' CSR approaches.

1. Definition: sustainability and SES

The sustainability paradigm emphasizes “at a fundamental level social and ecological harmony” [Valente 2010:442] [Catton et al., 1978; Gladwin et al., 1995; Hoffman et al., 2005; Margolis et al., 2003; Purser et al., 1995; Srikantia et al., 1997]. The concept has yet to find a consensual definition among practitioners and researchers [Linnenluecke et al., 2010; Montiel et al., 2014; Sharma, 2002]. The majority of definitions recognize that sustainability has two cores: an environmental one with a focus on ecology, and a social and human one with a focus on socioeconomic growth and development. Engagement with stakeholders is also a central concept of sustainability. Indeed, studies emphasize the necessity for increased multilateral communication (dialog) and diversity of stakeholder inclusion in order to reach sustainable objectives [Valente 2010:442; Callenbach et al. 1993; Gladwin et al., 1995; Hoffman & Sandelands, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003]. Finally, the long-

term perspective, i.e., the “future generations”¹ [WCED, 1987], is sometimes neglected in attempts at definitions, but inherent problems of a short-term view are often emphasized. If it does not last, it is not sustainable. Consequently, we define *sustainability* as the long-term interdependent improvement of social, human, ecological, and economic harmony through inclusive and multilateral approaches.

Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has become the term one uses to describe the integration of social, environmental, and economic concerns into an organization’s culture, decision-making, strategy, and operations [Linnenluecke & Griffith 2010; Berger, Cunningham & Drumwright 2007]. However, CSR strategies are not necessarily sustainable. We thus decided to focus on CSR strategies that are supposed to be sustainable by definition, such as stakeholder engagement strategies. Therefore, our study broadens the scope of literature on community relations and participatory processes by MNCs [Austin, 2000; Bowen et al., 2010; Jeurissen, 2004]. The literature on community engagement has expanded both geographically and methodologically since about 2000, from a focus on the antecedents and consequences of engagement in North America to a wide range of countries, and most recently in the poorest countries [c.f. Bowen, Newenham-Kahindi, and Herremans 2010]. Yet, for the most part, it lacks empirical case studies and small-scale sample sources on the operational level in ALS [Bowen et al., 2010].

What is engagement? The concept of engagement is related to the role given to stakeholders for participation in a company’s decision-making process. Glew, O’Leary, Griffin and Van Fleet built an operational definition of participation in organizations through key elements selected from conceptual participation research:

“We propose that participation be defined as a conscious and intended effort by individuals at a higher level in organization to provide visible extra-role or role-expanding opportunities for individuals or groups at a lower level in the organization to have a greater voice in one or more areas of organizational performance. The higher level and lower level distinction will most likely be reflected by hierarchical level, but can encompass any situation where one individual has legitimate power, authority, or control over another” [Glew et al., 1995].

This definition points out the unequal power relation that exists between companies and communities, which is reinforced in the context of multinational mining companies working in remote rural areas and surrounded by poor communities. It also clearly designates the company as the initiator of this “conscious and intended effort” to hear the voice of lower level groups or individuals. In the CSR literature, this mechanism is referred to as community or stakeholder engagement strategy (CES or SES) [Bowen et al., 2010; Campbell, 2006]. SES is the terminology we adopt, because it concretely integrates the idea that the initiative comes from the company, and because it refers to the engagement of the specific community of stakeholders.

Which stakeholders are we referring to? We conceptualize “local stakeholders” (coined in the term “community”) as those neighboring communities affected by the company’s operations who form a group of their own made of a mix of traditional (“indigenous”) groups and newcomers [Bowen et al., 2010]. They become a community as they face similar challenges in terms of development and security and perceived accountability possibilities (relationship with local governance

¹ The most widely adopted definition of sustainable development is “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own” [WCED 1987:43].

actors/authorities) in a mining area where large-scale gold mining takes place. These communities are composed of a variety of “groups”, each with its own interest and characteristics. We distinguish between local authorities (which represent the government of the country), the elders or wise men (“customary” authorities or leaders), the youth, the women, the professional associations, and the vigilante organizations, which are traditionally in charge of insuring the security at the village level (hunter brotherhoods in Guinea, and Sungusungu² in Tanzania).

Conflict management is the process of minimizing the negative aspects of conflict, by for instance reducing the frequency and violence of conflict, while increasing the positive aspects of conflict, by enhancing trust and de-stereotyping between the groups in confrontation [Bodtker et al., 2001; DeChurch et al., 2001; Kuhn et al., 2000; Rahim, 2011]. The positive aspects of conflict, or “components of peaceful co-existence”, entail decisive dimensions of perceptions constructed through history and socialization. While studies on conflict usually focus on how to reach peace after inter-ethnic or inter-country clashes, we focus on conflict between company and community. Referring to the vocabulary employed in conflict studies, the neighboring community represents the “in-group” and the company the “out-group” [Holt et al., 2005]. This “us versus them” dynamic of representation is also present within the company, between expatriates and “indigenous” employees.

We are interested in conflict management implementation by MNCs. Which conflicts are we referring to, and how is SES appropriate in managing them? “Conflict refers to some form of friction, disagreement, or discord arising within a group when the beliefs or actions of one or more members of the group are either resisted by or unacceptable to one or more members of another group” [Rahim 2011]. Conflicts vary in frequency, and in intensity (levels of violence employed), as shown in the following table (table 1). The term regular means that incidents become part of a routinized way people use to communicate their claims to the company, usually as a result of the lack of an answer to negotiated accountability strategies. Frequent incidents are those that happen without going through any kind of negotiation; they happen on a weekly or daily basis. The intensity of conflict varies with the level of violence and number of participants from the communities. Violent conflict is defined as “organized physical force, resulting from grievances between two or more parties and leading to injury or death to persons or damage or destruction of property” [Oetzel et al. 2007, cited in Rasche et al. 2008: 156].

Table 1. Levels of conflicts

Intensity \ Frequency	+	-
+	Regular violent Case: ABG North-Mara, Tanzania	Frequent pacific Case: SMD in Guinea
-	Violent/massive punctual Case: AGA in Tanzania	Pacific punctual Case: AGA in Guinea

Stakeholder engagement strategies are recognized by practitioners as a means to reduce company-community conflicts. Findings in theories of conflict and peace are consistent with this. According to a perspective on categorization effects of contact between groups, contact leads individuals from the different groups to view themselves as belonging to a common group or as sharing

² Sungusungu is a non-state system of justice including village level policing and court organization; it was legitimized by the State, which incorporated it into the judicial system, but they still have their own sanction mechanism and a variety of local organization schemes [Abrahams, 1987; Bukurura, 1994; Cleaver, 2002; Fleisher, 2000; Heald, 2006; Paciotti et al., 2004].

characteristics. This is how Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, define re-categorization [Gaertner et al., 1989]. Contact encourages individuals to ignore categories altogether and perceive others as individuals, which results in “de-categorization” [Brewer, M. B. et al., 1993]. SES can help conflict management insofar as “contact will be successful in reducing conflict and violence to the extent that individuals see themselves as belonging to a common group or category, or by eliminating the focus (salience) of group categories” [Worchel 2005: 743].

SES “bring together representatives of business, non-governmental, and public sectors in order to identify and address aspects of corporate responsibility, and have the added advantage that they have gained legitimacy among both business and development practitioners” [Blowfield et al., 2005: 507]. They have the potential to be a sustainable CSR approach to address community relations, since they relate to the three essential dimensions of sustainability identified above. We define SES as the ways companies engage with communities neighboring their operating mines in order to manage community-company conflict through two-way communication to address local demands through infrastructure and capacity-building projects. Several types of SES can be distinguished on the basis of their level of inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term perspective. Various authors present typologies of communication and CSR approaches by companies. We chose the most relevant ones according to our research question in order to offer a typology of SES that we range from less to more sustainable.

2. Typology: key components and ideal-types

Stakeholder engagement strategies have three key components: inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term view. Inclusion varies according to the type and variety of stakeholders the company chooses to include in its decision-making on CSR to manage company-community conflicts. Multilateralism is about the communication flows between companies and communities. Companies choose to communicate either unilaterally by giving information when they feel the need, asymmetrically when they give the opportunity to communities to voice their demands without integrating this feedback into the companies’ decision-making, or symmetrically when they hear the communities out and consider their feedback in order to make CSR decisions accordingly. The long-term perspective entails the type and scope of projects the company chooses to support at the local level. These projects range from short to long term depending on how well infrastructure provisions are adapted to local contexts, and on the type of capacity-building projects they entail.

Inclusion is about defining who should be considered a stakeholder. Practitioners and researchers have defined stakeholders from the narrowest understanding as shareholders, to any external affected actors, through customers and employees:

“Increasingly, managers’ roles begin to shift away from tending to stakeholders that possess characteristics of power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997) to finding solutions and business models that meet the needs of a growing number of diverse agents concurrently (Freeman, 1984; Hart & Sharma, 2004)” [Valente 2010: 459].

Before 2000, for mining companies with geographically diverse operations, the national government of the host country was usually considered as being a stakeholder. Since 2000, companies have progressively started taking into account communities affected by their operations. Research on policy implementation emphasizes that implementation depends on “whether those for whom the norms are designed were actually involved in the norm-setting process” [Beisheim & Liese 2013:30;

Börzel & Risse 2002; Mayntz 1983]. Inclusion and participation of stakeholders - in particular, in decisions that affect them - are important elements for assessment of the level of sustainability of the SES. The extended socioeconomic responsibility of multinational mining companies has brought them to the “internalization of social and environmental effects of operations” [Warhurst & Mitchell 2000 in Hilson & Murck 2000:228].

When Beisheim and Liese [2013] analyze inclusion in PPPs, they mix criteria of inclusiveness, participation, and accountability mechanisms. To measure the effectiveness of inclusion, they use criteria such as the number of stakeholders participating and involved in decision-making, and the strength or weakness of accountability mechanisms³ [Beisheim et al., 2014: 31]. We, however, will distinguish between inclusion efforts, as such, and “accountability mechanisms”, which we call *multilateralism* to avoid confusion with the means by which communities neighboring the company’s operations make the company accountable (see chapter 6). Making the distinction between inclusiveness and multilateralism in our study makes sense, because in some cases the companies engage with a wide range of stakeholders but do not complete this inclusiveness with some degree of sustainable communication. Even when companies do not acknowledge the feedback from stakeholders in decision-making, their inclusion efforts are still a relevant sign of a low level of sustainability in SES implementation. Evaluating multilateralism levels of communication between companies and stakeholders means assessing how these elements of feedback from stakeholders are integrated into the CSR decision-making process.

The literature identifies unilateral, asymmetrical, and symmetrical communication flows between company and stakeholders to evaluate the sustainability of engagement strategies by companies. In the mining sector, strategies characterized by sender-oriented (unilateral) communication with stakeholders, or ““inside-out” strategy [Pater et al., 2005: 343] are considered “traditional”. They are “well established within communications, media, external affairs and public relation departments” [Kemp, D., 2010: 5]. Some “traditional” models acknowledge the stakeholder as important in the way he receives and perceives the message but do not integrate the stakeholder's feedback (asymmetrical). This type of communication may be related to the concept of impression management, or strategic projection, which is a component of organizational identity [Rindova et al., 1998]. More symmetrical communication means are part of “emergent” models of community relations in the mining industry, “in the sense that they have only recently been formally established within organizational structures and hierarchies, and then only within leading companies” [Kemp, D., 2010: 7]. Symmetrical communication focuses on the right of stakeholders to voice their point of view. In this further step towards engagement, “persuasion can go both ways” [Morsing et al., 2006: 327]. This other extreme of communication flows is close to Habermas’s ideal of an “open, fair and non-coercive communication among all the organization’s stakeholders” [Pater et al., 2005: 348].

Abandoning previous ad hoc CSR activities with short-term effects [Hilson & Murck 2000: 230] to move towards higher adequacy to local contexts in engagement initiatives is a sign that the company’s SES encompasses a long-term perspective. The long-term effect of the SES is about sharing tools with communities in order for them to sustain their future even after the closure of the mine. “A mine can contribute to sustainable development by maintaining or enhancing the well-

³ no or hardly any stakeholders included and no accountability = LOW; some stakeholders, weak accountability through councils and forums = MEDIUM; and Broad participation, involvement in decision-making = HIGH

being of human beings of those communities in which they operate” [Eggert 2000; Hilson & Murck 2000: 230]. Companies can improve community infrastructures, by supporting the construction of roads, rails, hospitals, schools, and housing [Hilson & Murck 2000]. This kind of contribution is more relevant in a long-term approach when done in accordance to the needs, demands, and plans of the communities themselves. Companies can also improve literacy by training, supporting small independent businesses, or providing scholarships, developing training facilities or apprentice programs [Hilson & Murck 2000]. They can also help to build capacity on the long run by sharing knowledge and technology advice with local authorities and by hiring and training people from the neighboring community.

The following table (table 2) summarizes the key components of sustainable SES, the combination of which leads to various types of SES and various levels of sustainability.

Table 2. SES key components

Criteria of sustainability	Characteristics
Inclusiveness	Variety (type and level of governance) of local stakeholders Frequency of consultation
Multilateralism	Asymmetrical or symmetrical communication (accessibility and feedback)
Long-term perspective	Adapted social infrastructure Capacity building for the future

Now that we have identified and defined the key components of SES, we provide three SES ideal-types with regards to these key components (table 3). We distinguish philanthropic, traditional, and emergent models of SES. We contribute to the literature on models of CSR management by providing these ideal-types to evaluate which model a company is adopting and/or implementing. These can also serve to evaluate any other actor’s approach to sustainability regarding community engagement.

Morsing and Schultz’s description of CSR communication strategies is one of the most illustrative of the various levels of sustainability reached by CSR regarding inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term perspective [Morsing and Schultz 2005]. From their “three CSR communication strategies” [Morsing and Schultz 2005: 326], combined with the “traditional” versus “emergent” models of CSR in the mining sector presented by Kemp [2010], we will derive the categories we further employ to compare approaches of each company. Traditional approaches are less sustainable than emergent ones, from which they differ in regards to the key components: stakeholder inclusion, degree of multilateralism in CSR communication, and short to long-term development concerns (table 3).

Table 3. Ideal-types of SES [Adapted from Kemp, D., 2009; Morsing et al., 2006].

Models of SES Strategy characteristics	Philanthropy Non sustainable	Less sustainable Traditional models	More sustainable Emerging models
Stakeholders Inclusion	No consultation	Not representative of local groups	Representative of some local groups
Communication Multilateralism	Unilateral	Unilateral or 2 ways asymmetrical, information-giving	2 ways symmetrical, shared information and feedback
Development concerns Long-term view	No development concerns, gifts and donations to protect company	Ad-hoc decisions on infrastructure and capacity-building to protect the company and/or obtain support from stakeholders	Decision through consultation and adapted to local context

In the mining sector, CSR strategies used to be exclusively “philanthropic”. This meant that the company did not include local stakeholders in their decision-making, used unilateral communication if any, and managed company-community conflicts through strategic gifts and donations. Our study considers that philanthropic models are not sustainable. Social sustainability starts when the strategy reaches some degree of long-term inclusiveness and multilateralism [Bowen et al., 2010; Gladwin et al., 1995; Linnenluecke et al., 2010; Rees et al., 2012; Valente, 2010].

Less sustainable SES, characterized by unilateral or asymmetrical communication with stakeholders, are considered “traditional” [Kemp 2009]. In these traditional models, stakeholders are often listened to according to their salience for the top management, which means that not all demands can be integrated, and not all groups of stakeholders are taken into account [Pater et al., 2005]. Only stakeholders recognized as such by the company are given financial incentives, in order to keep the people they represent from creating trouble to the company. As a result, stakeholders are not representative of the local groups. The company then simply informs the stakeholders of its decisions concerning local development, feedback from the communities is not integrated. Stakeholders are considered as potential opponents or supporters, but the company does not need their feedback in order to endorse its own practices [Kemp 2009]. Communication is unilateral when it is based on a “stakeholder information strategy” because the company gives information to the public, to inform about good intentions, decisions, and actions in order to gain stakeholders’ support [Morsing et al., 2006]. In traditional models, communication sometimes flows both ways, but the company is not inclined to change or to act on the advice given by the community relations department [Rees et al., 2012]. In this case, communication is asymmetrical. Despite the impression that stakeholders are included, their feedback is not taken into account, the focus is still on short-term issues, and the fragmentation of CSR projects does not fit into any development plans [Pater et al., 2005]. The aim of the SES in traditional models is to secure continuity in the short run by including the most salient stakeholders and communicating in a unilateral or asymmetrical way.

More sustainable models are part of the “emergent” models of community relations in the mining industry [Kemp 2009: 7]. Emergent models go beyond the exclusive group of stakeholders to include “disempowered groups that may not necessarily pose an immediate risk to the company’s reputation” [Kemp 2009]. In these cases, the company seeks to be influenced and invites concurrent negotiations about CSR, to be aware of stakeholders’ expectations and of the influence of the company itself on these expectations [Morsing et al., 2006]. In this model, the engagement is ongoing and is not based only on events or crises. It recognizes the right of stakeholders to voice their point of view and focuses on development priorities. Ideally, both parties change as a result, and this new construction of reality is used as a basis for consistent action over time. The communication aims at ensuring an ongoing two-way dialog in order to safeguard the community-company relationship. The most sustainable emergent models focus on development priorities of communities, and they place local people at the center of interaction [Kemp 2009: 8]. In this case, the main focus is on ensuring the stakeholders’ rights to development, “ensuring that even the poorest and most marginalized are able to adjust to the changes brought by mining and benefit from its presence” [Kemp 2010: 9]. As a result, emergent models of SES include all groups of stakeholders and integrate their feedback in order to decide on projects that are adapted to the local context.

Consequently, we consider that an ideally sustainable SES would consist in engaging with stakeholders from the central to the village level, including state, non-state, customary, religious, youth, women, and the wider public in decisions related to local development, through multilateral communication - meaning that the company is accessible to neighboring communities and fully takes their feedback into account – which would lead to the implementation of long-term CSR projects adapted to local development needs and to the building of lasting capacities for all types of stakeholders. None of the case studies in our research reached such high social sustainability. Nonetheless, each company’s engagement strategies evolved over the period 2011 to 2013, clearly showing a trend towards the implementation of more social sustainability, but with wide variations amongst cases and over time.

From “business at all cost” to the progressive adoption of CSR standards and to sustainability adoption, the mining sector has come a long way in recent decades. Nonetheless, in practice, previous philanthropic models and harsh security practices persist, leading to ongoing human rights violations, which are not all covered by the media. Moreover, even when companies do implement more comprehensive ways of securing their operations, indirect and unintended effects on governance and communities can be strictly negative [Hönke, 2013]. Recent studies demonstrate that the most efficient SES for reducing the risk of conflict are situated towards the more sustainable end of the continuum [Rees et al., 2012]. The sustainability approach has spread to the global sphere, and now most MNCs adopt sustainable approaches to manage community related issues. All the companies taken into consideration in our research claim - in their public relations and advertising material (websites, brochures, press conference) - that they are adopting emergent models of SES (chapter 4). However, observations on the ground show otherwise, “open dilemma sharing between partners is still unachieved in reality” [van Huijstte in\ Rasche et al. 2008: 159]. Thus, companies adopt more easily than they implement sustainable approaches. What are the drivers leading to adoption and why are companies not all successful in implementing social sustainability? Our research corroborates the idea that more sustainable approaches are “emerging” and adds an explanation of barriers and enablers of success in strategy implementation.

3. Implementation of SES: adoption, outputs, and outcomes

Research on policy processes and sustainability initiatives typically examines levels of adoption rather than implementation outputs and outcomes of policies or strategies. While they acknowledge that implementation is more complex, they rarely analyze the nature of this complexity or the gaps between “rhetoric and reality” [Betsill et al., 2007: 451]. Similarly, the international relations literature on compliance and standards diffusion focuses on adoption of CSR and voluntary compliance to sustainable approaches (implementation outputs) by multinational companies, rather than on their implementation outcomes. Although both areas of research have slowly expanded their focus to implementation outcomes issues, it is still comparatively under-analyzed.

The policy adoption phase of policy process theories consists of policy formulation and decision-making. Cronbach et al. distinguished policy adoption (which easily gained a large audience and mobilized political interest) from program implementation during which controversies appear [Cronbach et al., 1980]. Most authors consider that adoption is a first step towards implementation outcomes. Compliance studies describe how MNCs are expected to comply with voluntary standards they join. First, they should incorporate the principles and standards into their corporate regulations, and then, they should integrate them into their management systems through administrative

structures and allocated resources [Börzel et al., 2011: 10]. They also should change their practices as a result, to make their behavior consistent with the requirements [Börzel et al., 2011; Deitelhoff et al., 2010]. However, many studies neglect the analysis of local practices, although they recognize the decoupling between joining a voluntary standard (adoption and output) and turning it into practice (implementation outcome) [Flohr et al., 2010].

a) SES AS ADOPTED BY HQ

Adoption refers to the way organizations (companies or public institutions) commit to standards and norms [Epstein et al., 2010; Risse et al., 2013]. In the compliance literature, adoption refers to the top-down joining or signing of a voluntary standard or norm. In the transition models, adoption is visible evidence of assumptions that shape and guide human behavior. These can be observed as MNCs make them public through discourses and public documentation. Adoption of sustainable approaches to manage community-company conflict is our first dependent variable. Our fourth chapter evaluates the extent to which companies adopted sustainable strategies to manage company-company conflicts against the ideal-types presented in the above section.

Compliance is thus about the two steps following the adoption of standards at the headquarters level of the MNC. Adoption happens at HQ levels while implementation outputs take place through the headquarters and should trickle down to the operational level. In their questioning of multinational companies' practices regarding the voluntary standards they adopt, Börzel & Hönke [Börzel et al., 2011] make the distinction between implementation of formal programs (outputs) and rule-consistent behavior (outcomes) [Börzel et al., 2011: 7]. For the sake of coherence, we will use the terms outputs and outcomes. Implementation outcomes take place at the operational level and involve the companies' interactions with external environments, whereas outputs are measures to integrate the strategy within the company at the HQ and OP levels.

b) IMPLEMENTATION OUTPUTS OF SES BY MINING COMPANIES

Company outputs correspond to internal incorporation in corporate design and culture of the principles inherent to the standard the company adopted. We refer to this as internal drivers of implementation or company outputs. Outputs correspond to the coherence of adopted strategies with management systems (functions, departments, and resources dedicated to the implementation of the standard) and corporate culture (attitude, relationships and dedications of those in charge of implementation) [Börzel et al., 2011; Epstein et al., 2010]. Outputs are processes of incorporation of a strategy within the company. They are characterized by: the number of dedicated departments and functions (structure), the way the "vision" is articulated (leadership), training, and how performance is evaluated (systems) [Börzel et al., 2011; Epstein et al., 2010; Risse et al., 2013]. The internal dynamics are part of regime trajectories in the transition models, where strategies are internalized and where actions are organized into structural and cultural systems [Markard et al., 2012]. If implementation outcome is not a (full) success, the partial adoption of implementation measures, or outputs, is part of the explanation. Business studies and organization theories consider that internal company outputs at operational levels might explain implementation outcomes. To what extent do company outputs for sustainable SES implementation conform to the more sustainable ideal-type strategy requirements with regard to inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term perspective? In our seventh chapter, we evaluate the extent to which outputs influence the outcomes of sustainable strategies.

c) IMPLEMENTATION OUTCOMES OF SES BY MINING COMPANIES

Compliance studies define implementation outcomes as rule-consistent behavior. Implementation leads to indirect impacts and negative externalities that are usually left out of most analysis [with noticeable exceptions of Börzel et al., 2011; Hönke, 2013]. Our study proposes to take the local level as a unit of analysis to understand what leads to the most sustainable outcomes of SES by companies. Implementation outcomes, or strategy outcomes, consist of the patterns of behavior (practices) at the local level. It is also the arena where external actors are directly in contact with the strategy adopted and integrated by the organization [Falastein et al., 2010]. Implementation thus confronts old and new paradigms in experiences permeable to external environments. This outcome dimension constitutes **our main dependent variable**, which is the level of social sustainability attained by stakeholder engagement strategies implemented to manage community-company conflicts at the operational level. To what extent do outcomes comply with the more sustainable ideal-type strategy with regard to inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term perspective? In our fourth chapter, we evaluate the success or failure of outcomes of sustainability strategies by companies against the previously identified ideal-types of SES.

From the above literature review, we can provide our working definitions of the key characteristics of adoption, outputs, and implementation outcomes, as well as observable features that allow their analysis (table 4).

Table 4. Adoption, Outputs, and Implementation in the transition to sustainability

	Role in transition	Key characteristics	Observables
Strategy adopted by company	Articulation of selected worldviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commitments • Strategy Formulation • Decision-making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public documentation and discourse • Codes of conduct • Commitment to VPs
Implementation of strategy Outputs	Trajectory definition (rules, tools, vision)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dedicated departments, functions, resources • Articulation of vision (leadership) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate design OP • Corporate culture OP
Implementation of strategy Outcomes	Confrontation of old and new	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Permeable to external actors • Controversial, costly, timely 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Company practices, behavior • Level of inclusion, multilateralism, long-term view

Making a distinction between adoption and implementation does not necessarily mean that there cannot be implementation without adoption. Both movements might happen simultaneously. However, in this study we focus on MNCs that have adopted a sustainable approach to community-company conflict management but are implementing it with variable success (Chapter 4).

In the next two sections, we first explore drivers identified in the literature for the adoption and implementation of sustainable strategies by MNCs operating in ALS. Then, since our analysis did not find any linear causal explanation convincing, we focus on the combination of drivers at the local levels to explain under which conditions MNCs successfully implement sustainable conflict management strategies.

B. EXPLANATIONS/DRIVERS OF SUSTAINABILITY ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION

Studies on sustainability strategies by MNCs essentially focus on international drivers to explain adoption, and on internal company drivers to explain implementation outcomes. Literature on

MNCs' as norm entrepreneurs explains their adoption of sustainability-related standards also by international drivers. Literature on MNC's behavior in ALS has the same international focus to explain adoption. Market incentives, home country regulations, and industry-related explanations point to regulations, competition, and reputation concerns. Much as norm diffusion focuses on legitimacy issues to explain isomorphic behavior by institutions, these international incentives revolve around the idea of legitimization. Legitimization, however, should be recognized as based on a changing definition, which evolves over time, depending on the dominant paradigm. Most research in the international relation literature focuses on adoption at the HQ level, although some studies mention the importance of moving from the macro to the micro level of analysis.

Most mining MNCs already adopted sustainable SES but often fail at successful implementation. Consequently, prominent explanations in the literature are not conclusive because of their focus on adoption while we aim at explaining variations in implementation outcomes. The governance literature on MNC's in ALS considers that company practices depend on the host country's regulations and enforcement capacity. Although statehood as such does not play a role because of its very weaknesses, functional equivalences might take over its role to make companies accountable. Still, the literature on the subject of private actors' sustainability-related practices in ALS does not satisfy our objective to explain local level implementation outcomes.

We thus consider "outside the box" explanations for MNC's conflict management practices in the mining sector by borrowing from conflict theories, local governance studies, and studies on natural resource management. Organizational theory, management, and business studies hold explanations concerning sustainability implementation outcomes. They identify internal drivers as determinant in the success of implementation and tend to neglect external local-level factors. On the other hand, natural resource management studies, studies on local governance, and conflict theories suggest that local governance drivers are critical to the success of implementation of a sustainable approach to conflict management.

Finally, we introduce an analytical framework. To explain implementation outcomes, we focus on essential dimensions of the drivers identified in the literature, more specifically on their tendency to be more or less sustainability-driven. Since linear explanations are not conclusive, we introduce a framework to analyze specifically local level drivers.

1. Drivers of adoption: international and home country

The increasing number of companies adopting voluntary standards and self-regulation for sustainability shows that sustainability is becoming a way to legitimize business activities. This legitimization process among peers is considered in terms of a competitive advantage when it can prevent reputation loss [Bennie et al., 2007; Graham et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 2004; Prakash, Aseem et al., 2006]. Although international studies and political science consider that such international drivers are decisive in a company's choice of CSR approach [Börzel et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2006; Risse et al., 2013], theories of public choice deny that any legitimacy concern can affect business beyond mere discourses [Graham et al., 2006; Lenox, 2003]. Studies on the influence of international standards focus almost exclusively on how they lead to adoption of CSR by multinational companies. Even when they mention as an issue that effective implementation is not systematically a consequence of adoption, they rarely analyze company behavior at operational levels.

Conditions for adopting CSR are commonly linked to the necessity to protect or enhance the reputation of the company [Potoski & Prakash, 2005]. Some studies point to the importance of pressure from consumers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or associations [Hendry, 2006; Schepers, 2006; Spar & LaMure, 2003; Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999; Ronit & Schneider, 2000]. Therefore, home country activists against mining companies headquartered in their country but operating outside their borders might also play a role, as well as international naming and shaming campaigns. Other studies consider that foreign direct investment (FDI) originating from a home country with high levels of self-regulation influence MNCs to adopt CSR approaches [Greenhill, Mosley, & Prakash, 2010; Prakash & Potoski, 2007]. A propensity to adopt a sustainable strategy is also often perceived as a reflection of certain traits of the culture of the home country [Bondy et al., 2014; Hofstede et al., 2010; Li et al., 2008; Noorderhaven et al., 2003]. Hence, the normative context and self-regulation expectations in countries where the companies are headquartered are also identified as drivers towards sustainable SES adoption.

a) REPUTATION CONCERNS

Reputation concerns linked to size (visibility, number of sites), market position (stock exchange listing), and international voluntary engagements (commitments to standards) are supposed to influence MNCs' adoption of sustainable SES.

(1) Commitments to voluntary standards

Which standards are considered legitimate? The most important international standards adopted in the extractive sector are the UN Global Compact (UNGC, 1999), the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR, 2000), the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICCM, 2001), and stakeholder engagement guidelines (2007)⁴ of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), member of the World Bank group.

These standards constitute the trajectories proposed by international institutions to promote sustainability-driven strategies in the business sector. "When a sufficient number of corporate leaders have been persuaded to adopt a set of emerging norms, they will reach a 'threshold' or 'tipping point' at which they come to be seen as legitimate and to specify appropriate behavior" [Graham et al., 2006: 870] [Finnemore et al., 1998]. This tendency is also called isomorphism by neo-institutionalists [DiMaggio et al., 1994; Friedman, 2004]. Isomorphic pressure is often considered to steer norms diffusion from 'Western' IOs to IOs in ALS [Katsumata, 2011]. Isomorphism also influences MNCs operating in the same industry or the same country – i.e., organizational fields – towards adopting the same standards. This neo-institutional theory explains answers to peer pressures by legitimization purposes. Their search for legitimacy leads organizations to adopt either traditional or innovative standards [DiMaggio et al., 1994]. In the last decades, IOs started focusing on sustainability-related issues. Simultaneously, MNCs progressively shifted towards the adoption of sustainability standards rather than sticking to their traditional apolitical and strictly economic role [Blowfield et al., 2005; Newell, 2005]. Research on international relations tends to explain this simultaneous movement by the influence IOs have on MNCs: MNCs join standards formulated by IOs. MNCs are supposed to abide by the rules and norms they set for themselves to be perceived as "legitimate" because of the socialization process in the industry, even in the absence of a sanctioning body.

⁴ Over 7,000 businesses in 145 countries around the world UNGC, 25 companies VPSHR, 21 companies ICCM

Supposition: International standards adopted in the gold mining industry generate legitimization pressures that lead companies in the same industry to adopt similar SES strategies

Supposition: The more voluntary standards a company adheres to, the more likely the company is to adopt an SE strategy

(2) Size and market position

How exposed is the company to reputation concerns? International studies suggest that consideration of size, exposure to instability, to scandals in an industry sector, and to shareholder scrutiny, influence reputation concerns. Research suggests that these factors exercise pressure on multinational companies to adopt sustainability standards, especially larger companies that are more exposed.

One of the most convincing findings in the literature concerning company participation in voluntary standards is that size and sector strongly affect their propensity to adhere to such standards [Favotto et al., 2014]. Larger corporations often have greater material interests at stake and increased reputational incentives for participating in sustainable activity [Favotto et al., 2014]. Individual company size has been an important determinant not only of political activity but also of CSR-related activities and voluntary disclosure [Bennie et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 2004: 839].

Supposition: the bigger (in terms of visibility, number of sites, and profitability) the mining company, the greater its incentive to adopt sustainable strategies.

The involvement of MNCs in CSR is also influenced by the nature of their activity. Corporations in extractive sectors are exposed to a higher risk of conflict with external actors, especially in the areas of environment and human rights [Rees et al., 2012]. Natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals are often fixed and located in politically as well as geographically difficult environments [Ross, 2003]. These political and geographical difficulties are often coined in the term “risk” and encompassed in financial and political instability evaluations in the host country. These risk evaluations are usually done prior to investing in the country. For MNCs active in these locations, reputation-building, political communication, and stakeholder engagement to safeguard their investment, in part through their participation in CSR, become important [Bennie et al., 2007]. Examples of “business symptoms” of crisis [Valente, 2010] mentioned by Luning [Luning, 2012] engender emerging solutions such as the formulation of voluntary principles, some of which are sustainability-driven. Why? Because causing environmental and social damage is costly especially because of the withdrawing reactions of consumers and investors [Dowell et al., 2000; Graham et al., 2006; WB, 2004]. “Managers may seek to protect their companies and shareholders from adverse financial consequences of reputational damage” [Graham et al., 2006: 871]. Fear of loss of reputation makes the adoption of codes of conduct, international guidelines, and responsible corporate behavior a strategy to reduce risk [Gordon, 2000; O’Rourke, 2003].

Supposition: the more politically and geographically difficult the environment (host country), the more incentives extractive companies have to adopt sustainable strategies.

Investors are increasingly motivated by normative concerns; especially after scandals, they will look for companies that take precautions in certain risk areas [Cowe, 2004: 25], because the risk of investing in a company that does not have high standards is acute, because scandals greatly decrease the market value. Since the 90s, investment in corporation and professionally managed

funds (especially pension funds) with socially responsible strategies has grown exponentially [Graham et al., 2006: 871]. They exercise pressure through screening, mostly on environment, labor standards, and recently a growing concern on diversity and community development [SFI, 2012]. Consequently, to evaluate whether a firm is subjected to reputation concerns and whether protecting its name might be an important incentive to adopt sustainable strategies, the position of the company in the industry and on the global market matters.

Supposition: The more recent scandals draw attention to a firm's social negligence or violation of human rights, the more likely it is that the company (and others in the same field) will adopt a socially sustainable SES.

Supposition: the more stock markets the company is enlisted in, the more incentives the company has to adopt sustainable strategies.

However, there is no formal evaluation of the cost of reputation loss [Lowe, 2002: 27], and additional external conditions are needed in order to make the reputation loss an important matter for the company [Graham et al., 2006]. The notion of risk itself can be questioned, because it depends on the company and its type of activity. We consider a variant of the usual assessment of risk at the national level of host country by proposing to analyze risks of company-community conflict to occur at the local level in chapter 7.

There have been increasing demands from large institutional investors to disclose all material information about their activities [Graham et al., 2006; Repetto, 2003]. If stakeholders' demands for reliable disclosure are strong, after scandals, firms with more transparent disclosure suffer fewer losses [Blacconiere et al., 1994]. Comparison of disclosure policies between companies led to attempts to develop standardized voluntary reporting indicators for stakeholders in order to easily compare companies' exposure to risk. Self-regulation can also be verified through information disclosure and reporting. The Global reporting Initiative (GRI) has developed standardized indicators to enhance comparison of higher standards between companies [GRI, 2014]. Reporting on sustainability is relevant to assess a company's adoption of sustainability, but it suffers from the lack of adequate evaluation and monitoring mechanisms concerning implementation outputs and outcomes [Kemp, D. et al., 2012].

Supposition: A company using sustainability-reporting standards in its annual activity reports is more likely to adopt sustainable strategies.

There have been many studies of the influence of reputation concerns on the adoption of sustainability standards, but their influence on implementation outcomes is comparatively understudied.

b) PEER AND SECTORIAL PRESSURES

Peer and sectorial pressure linked to economic pressure (impact of crisis on MNC) and field pressure (sectorial and geographical field of organization) are expected to influence adoption of sustainable strategies.

Studies suggest that the industry sector could affect the adoption and implementation of a sustainable strategy [Epstein et al., 2010]. Competitors may comply with sustainability standards for fear of losing market share or to emulate innovative peers, particularly under conditions of high uncertainty [Prakash, Aseem et al., 2006]. The industry sector can exercise pressure, or peer

pressure as neo-institutionalists call it [DiMaggio et al., 1994]. Following a neo-institutionalism perspective, institutions operate in an environment consisting of other institutions, where the broader environment influences each institution. An isomorphic pressure is the sum of the “forces pressing communities⁵ toward accommodation of the outside world” [DiMaggio and Powell 1991:66]. The organizational world in itself produces isomorphic pressures of different sorts, pushing organizations to resemble each other and to adopt similar strategies, structures, types of leadership, communication channels, etc.

Supposition: peer pressure from other gold mining companies (industry sector) in general and in the country of operation in particular may influence adoption of sustainability. This means that the more companies in the same industry or operating in the same country adopt sustainable strategies, the more likely a company will be to adopt sustainable strategies.

Economic pressures are the only international drivers that are expected to influence implementation outcomes because of how they restrain means directly allocated to the CR departments. This is the case because the business level is still dominated by economic-driven trajectories (profit/performance pressures). If companies are economically constrained, traditional economic-driven forces (profit/performance pressures) might trap them in path-dependence because of the uncertainty attached to innovation. The effects of economic crises are then only indirectly linked to legitimacy issues, since they only affect the public image in the long-run if the budget cuts at the OP level result in local crises that affect profits and/or are publicized at the international level [Lunning 2012].

Supposition: The more affected a company is by economic crises in its industry sector, the less likely it is that it will *implement* sustainable SES.

c) HOME COUNTRY

Home country activism from civil society as well as expected self-regulation emerging from the home country culture and normative context are supposed to influence adoption of sustainable SES by MNCs.

Recent findings by management scholars call into question earlier studies that hinted at a significant convergence of CSR practices [Moon and Matten 2008]. Generally based on content analysis of company public documents, these findings suggest that a company’s CSR strategies are influenced by global norms, but that the national settings in which firms are headquartered mediate this influence [van Tulder, van Wijk, and Kolk 2008; Chen and Bouvain 2009].

Scholars have examined the extent to which the strength of countervailing societal actors in home countries, such as trade unions or environmental organizations, influence company willingness to adopt sustainable CSR approaches [Favotto et al., 2014]. Some quantitative studies of CSR voluntary initiatives support the expectation that global corporations react to the pressure of countervailing powers and adapt to the normative context of their home countries [Favotto et al., 2014]. Studies point out, for example, that corporations located in countries with strong environmental movements are more likely to participate in the UN Global Compact [Bennie et al., 2007]. However, research on the effect that the political institutions of an MNC’s home country have on its propensity to adopt CSR programs has not yielded clear results. There is a general expectation that firms in democracies

⁵ Communities here mean the community of organization in a field or sector

will be more likely to adopt sustainable CSR, because civil society in these countries will exert greater pressure on these firms to manage their environmental and social impacts [Favotto et al. 2014]. A study by Perkins and Neumayer [Perkins et al., 2010], for example, finds that democracy has a positive, conditioning influence on the spread of Global Compact participation across borders: transnational connectivity increases adoption in democratic countries more than in nondemocratic ones. Thus, the quest for legitimization takes place not only among peers in the same industry sectors but also among companies headquartered in the same home country.

Supposition: the more democratic, i.e., the more activism on sustainability in home countries, the more likely are companies headquartered there to adopt sustainable approaches.

Prakash and Potoski find that corporations operating in countries with more rigorous environmental legislation are more likely to adopt ISO 14001 [Prakash, A. et al., 2007. 142, 144]. The same could be true for social aspects of sustainability. Neumayer and Perkins, by contrast, find that participation rates in a similar management code, the EU's Eco Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), are suppressed in countries with greater levels of formal environmental regulation [Neumayer et al., 2004].

Supposition: The more the home country's regulations on sustainability are important in number and target MNCs operating abroad, the more likely are companies headquartered there to adopt SES.

The culture of the home country where the company is headquartered is often considered to influence the MNC's behavior and principles. Hofstede's work on culture is a reference that is still widely cited in organizational theory and research on international business [Hofstede et al., 2010]. Despite criticism, it continues to be a major resource in cross-cultural fields. With similar static understanding of culture, more recent studies find that national culture has a dominant influence on corporate governance structure. Some focus on the influence of home countries of MNCs on their governance structures [Li et al., 2008]. Others recognize the impact of characteristics of the "country-of-origin" such as home-country culture, the size and openness of the home-country economy, the cultural and institutional diversity of the environments in which the MNC operates, and the international growth path of the MNC [Noorderhaven et al., 2003]. Although the effect of home country on sustainability implementation success is not evident, it is nevertheless important to take into account the influence of the broad sustainability field whose norms and notions of best management practice underpin many of these individual regimes [Dingwerth et al., 2009]. Favotto et al. [2014], through an analysis of 40 MNCs headquartered in the US and Europe, show the extent to which the home country affects the multi-faceted emphasis of CSR adoption. However, this does not account for their subsequent influence on implementation outcomes.

Supposition: The more a company's home country's normative context (regulations, awareness, culture) encompasses sustainability issues, the more likely it is that the company will adopt SE strategies.

However uncertain the effect of the home country on the company, we evaluate its effect by comparing companies headquartered in different countries but operating in the same host country in chapter 6.

d) NAMING & SHAMING

Naming and shaming campaigns against non-sustainable practices of MNCs are expected to influence targeted MNCs to adopt more sustainable strategies.

Obvious violation of social or environmental standards may provoke campaigns by international NGOs and activists, particularly if companies have adopted voluntary codes of conduct [Flohr et al., 2010; Newell, 2005]. Activists may encourage consumers to boycott products, resulting in loss of market share by the company. This mostly affects brands with mass consumers and highly visible products. If the company does not have a mass market, consumers may not know which products to boycott even if they are aware of misbehavior [Graham et al., 2006]. Ethical purchasing has been on the increase over the last few decades in the western world, but most consumers do not trace minerals from production to the shops, even very ethically driven ones. Even with perfect information, enforcement of sustainable standards by consumers is only partially effective and is mostly done only for global brands or direct sells [Graham et al., 2006: 873]. Naming and shaming campaign can take place at the international or national scale (in the host or home country). They contribute to reputation threats in the field and can be considered unacceptable by shareholders and investors. Recently, even when they start at the local level, complaints about social and environmental practices lead more and more to internationally publicized lawsuits and media coverage [BHRRRC, 2013; Hodges et al., Jul 29, 2013; Young, Sarah et al., 2013].

Supposition: the more a company has to face naming and shaming campaigns, the more likely it is that the company will adopt SE strategies.

The growing concerns for sustainability, which led to the trend towards the adoption of sustainability strategies by businesses, engender legitimization pressure for sustainability adoption in the mining sector. This trend, complemented by concerns for reputation loss and combined with recent social scandals pushing business investors and stakeholders to hold companies accountable for their adoption of international standards and self-regulation, creates the stakeholder's need for comparison. Tools making this comparison easier are becoming more numerous, which increases competition. Despite strong economic pressures in the global market and more recently in the gold mining sector itself, these dynamics seem to engender a significant number of incentives for companies to adopt sustainability strategies. We explore how these incentives play out in the three companies studied in this research. We find that they neither explain why the companies in our study all adopted sustainable SES, nor the wide variation in their implementation. A growing literature, however, is interested in explaining implementation outcomes and point out the lack of appropriate tools to do so [Börzel et al., 2012; Kemp, D. et al., 2012].

Implementation happens at the host country level where subsidiaries of MNCs are confronted with "institutional duality" [Kostova et al., 2002]. Studies recognize that the institutional context in which the company operates influences the company's behavior: for or against the implementation of sustainable approaches, that is the question. Do host country characteristics influence companies to implement sustainable SES?

2. Drivers of outcomes: host country

With the reduction of the role of the state and the increased power of multinational companies in the last two decades, it is no longer very clear who has the power to regulate whom. Some MNCs have more technical and financial resources than certain countries in the developing world. This

uneven power game can be considered to endanger the consequences of operations of these MNCs because of a race to the bottom in which countries will attract foreign investments through weak regulatory systems, which could result in catastrophic outcomes [Börzel et al., 2013]. Empirical evidence, however, shows that many of these powerful MNCs choose to self-regulate their practices even where the regulatory systems are not coercive [Börzel et al., 2013].

Areas of limited statehood are characterized “as areas in which the state lacks the capacity to set and enforce collectively binding decisions on the provision of collective goods and services or to directly provide them” [from Risse 2011 in Börzel et al., 2013: 5]. They create a context favorable to the proliferation of misunderstandings and conflicts between multinational companies and neighboring communities. We identify which areas of statehood and governance in a host country could influence the strategies implemented by gold mining MNCs operating within their borders.

a) REGULATIONS

(1) Mining regulations and dependency

Mining regulations (whether CSR and community issues are part of regulation or not) and dependency (on aid and FDI) are expected to influence implementation outcomes.

Of the more than 60 000 multinational companies in the world, over 40 000 are headquartered in Western Europe, the USA, or Japan [UNCTAD, 2000. 11-13]. Industrialized nations have grown together with MNCs, and governments have adapted progressively to regulate them [Graham et al., 2006: 868]. In the last 20 years, the debate about the inability of developing countries to regulate MNCs operating within their borders has emerged while MNCs have gained more and more power [Strange, 1996; Vernon, 1971]. The basic given is that developing countries face a weak rule of law, the absence of government administrative capacity, and weak bargaining power compared to MNCs with financial, technological, and employment resources [Graham et al., 2006: 868]. This unbalanced situation seems to go against the emergence of appropriate and effective regulations [Graham et al., 2006: 868] [Stopford et al., 1998; Wawryk, 2002] in areas of limited statehood (ALS).

Supposition: The more limited the statehood of the host country, the less likely companies are to successfully implement SE strategies.

Not only do ALS have limited control over MNCs, but they are also perceived as unwilling to enforce regulations because of the competition to attract foreign direct investments (FDI) [Börzel et al., 2013]. Pressures from financial institutions on government to reduce regulatory standards also keep these countries from regulating MNCs [Haufler, 2001]. In areas of limited statehood where MNCs operate, the state lacks the capacity to cast a credible shadow of hierarchy, because governments do not enforce their regulations [Börzel et al., 2011]. Home states are also “reluctant to impose legally binding regulation on their companies’ social and human rights behavior in other countries [Muchlinski, 2007; Zerk, 2006].” [Börzel et al., 2011: 8]. Evaluation of the negotiation capacities and power inequalities between companies and government can help to understand the context of implementation of sustainability by companies [Grant et al., 2005; Zartman et al., 2002]. Inclusion of community needs in the mining sector can depend on power inequality between state and companies. These can downsize the state’s incentive to have regulations in favor of community and local development if they are not compatible with attracting FDI (PRSP of the IMF, WB conditionalities) [Dijkstra, 2011; Herbst, 1990; McKinley, 2004]. Conditionalities of financial institutions to make financial aid depend on governments choosing policies that are favorable to FDI

thus amplify the hypothetical regulatory race to the bottom to attract MNCs with weak regulatory systems [Dijkstra, 2011; Herbst, 1990; McKinley, 2004]. Powerful industrialized members of the WB, WTO, IMF, and BIS also focus on deregulation in areas of limited statehood and protect investors [Graham et al., 2006: 868]. The result is a highly asymmetric framework of laws [Graham et al., 2006; Lowe, 2002]. A host country's dependence on international donors could thus influence how its policies affect MNC's sustainable strategy implementation outcomes [Grant et al., 2005; Zartman et al., 2002].

Supposition: The more dependent the host country is on international financial aid and FDI, the less likely companies are to implement sustainable SES.

The reverse argument has also been made about MNC "playing public roles to compensate for governance gaps and governance failures at global and national levels" [in Börzel & Thauer 2013: 4 Ruggie, J G, 1998: 13]. For instance, studies explain that under certain conditions, MNCs find it in their interest to participate in the provision of public goods and services. Because of the specific conditions of operating in ALS, "companies need to take these into account when calculating the costs and benefits of their regulatory choices" [Börzel et al., 2013: 6] [Wolf et al., 2007]]. Also, the absence of coercive regulation can create an incentive for companies:

"If the pursuit of their individual profit depends on the provision of certain common goods and collectively binding rules to produce them, and government is not capable or unwilling to provide them" [Börzel et al., 2013: 8].

This "shadow of anarchy" can turn into a major incentive for companies to fill the gap of governance [Börzel et al., 2010; Börzel et al., 2013; Ruggie, J. G., 2003].

Supposition: in the absence of any state provision of governance, companies are more likely to implement sustainable SES.

(2) Tools and structures

The theoretical capacity of authorities located in the mining areas to enforce these more or less sustainable regulations could be an important incentive for companies to implement sustainable ways to manage their relationship with local stakeholders (especially if the company already adopted the strategy at the headquarters level). The way taxes are redistributed by the state is also indicative of the level of concern of the state for the specific challenges faced by communities in mining areas.

The structures and tools of the host country might enable sustainable outcomes of MNCs' strategies in ALS. The authority delegated to decentralized authorities in mining zones can be another gauge of whether the host country context is favorable to the implementation of sustainable strategies by companies. Whether they have the authority to make companies accountable is a critical aspect of the hierarchical aspect of governance structures. Also, the shadow of the community "is most effective if the claims of local actors resonate with norms legalized by international institutions and are picked up by foreign states or international organizations, which in turn exert pressure on non-state actors from above" [Börzel 2012:14, Brysk 1993; Keck/Sikkink 1998b]. Thus, to evaluate the effect of the "shadow of the community" [Börzel 2012], the integration of national civil society in the formulation of mining policies is also relevant, as well as the participation of decentralized authorities and local stakeholders in decision-making concerning mining regulations.

Supposition: the more autonomy and power is delegated to decentralized authorities, the more likely the company is to successfully implement sustainable SES.

b) ENFORCEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Regulations need to be enforced, and companies have to be held accountable for non-compliance with hosting state regulations and their own self-regulations if they are to be effective. In areas of limited statehood as elsewhere, non-state actors (media, religious groups, NGOs, unions, political parties) sometimes also play the role of watchdogs and regulation enforcers through their monitoring and control activities [Favotto et al., 2014; Keck et al., 1998]. International institutions guide governments and companies toward transparency, against corruption and help to provide means to overcome the lack of enforcement capacities.

The state's will to enforce and sanction and monitoring is expected to influence implementation outcomes.

Supposition: the more power the hosting state has for monitoring and sanctioning, the more likely it is that MNCs will implement sustainable SES.

Supposition: the more the state is perceived as lacking enforcement capacities, the less incentive there is for companies to implement sustainable SES.

Non-state actors also take part in advocacy campaigns and sometimes take actions against MNCs to advertise their misbehavior in order to make them comply with regulations and self-regulations. "In many cases, local communities are well connected to transnational advocacy networks of NGOs and international organizations and can link up with global civil society" [Börzel 2012:13; Keck & Sikkink 1998]. Literature on social movements explain how non-state actors can make the state and private actors accountable, in ALS in particular [Azarya et al., 1987; Bayart, 1986; Gibbon, 1992; Haberson, 1994; Woods, 1992].

The "shadow of hierarchy"; i.e., the likelihood of state intervention, increases the chances of a company following the standards they adopted at the headquarters level [Börzel 2010]. Enforcement capacities are thus critical. However, areas of limited statehood are characterized by their weakness in this domain.

"Rather than hierarchically coordinating or mandating the provision of common goods, state actors seek to involve non-state actors to achieve more effective and legitimate governance (...). Non-state actors help identify relevant problems and contribute to the formulation of adequate policy solutions" [Börzel, 2012: 10].

Thus, other non-state actors acting in host countries could fill this enforcing role, either through advocacy campaigns or actions against non-sustainable behavior of companies.

Supposition: Non-state actors active in ALS can influence companies to implement sustainable strategies.

IOs and donors are expected to make companies accountable or to fill the gap of governments by influencing implementation of SES by MNCs in ALS.

The secrecy of company operations down to the operational level and whether these could be disclosed to expose or avoid corruption engenders a set of institutional tools proposed by international NGOs, namely, Global Witness, RevenueWatch, or the Extractive Industry Transparency

Initiative (EITI)⁶. A few years prior to the launch of the EITO, civil society and company representatives alike had been lobbying for a global remedy to counter the lack of transparency around the vast government revenues from natural resources. However, the rights of companies are strongly protected [Graham & Woods 2006: 880]. In ALS, a number of international investors are protected through bilateral investment treaties, WTO, or unbreakable contracts with host governments. States bind themselves to treat foreign investors fairly and equitably, give them full security and protection, and guarantee them against unlawful expropriation. This “fair and equitable standard of treatment has taken a life of its own with an exceptionally wide interpretation... greatly favoring investors” [Lowe 2002: 455]. In the end, it seems that even for companies that comply with sustainability standards, other international or bilateral mechanisms reduce the impact of their adoption. To compensate for the lack of binding regulations for companies to substantiate their claim of using sustainable approaches, international tools have been created and endorsed by some governments and other actors, such as the EITI initiative to disclose companies’ financial, environmental, and social behavior in the host country [Dashwood et al., 2014]. External actors such as international agencies can also play a role in enforcement capacity by providing technical or financial support to the state in order to balance its limitations.

Supposition: The more International “tools” and agencies are in charge of monitoring companies’ behavior in host countries, the more likely companies will be to implement sustainable SES.

In chapter six, we present an operationalization of regulation and enforcement capacity in hosting states. We then assess to what extent these host country drivers play a role in implementation success.

c) CONCLUSION ON MAIN DRIVERS IDENTIFIED IN THE LITERATURE

International relations and political science studies tend to focus on the reason for MNCs to adopt self-regulations and sustainability standards. Although studies on areas of limited statehood consider the potential influence of host countries on MNCs behavior within their borders, they often focus on the national level rather than observing local dynamics. Little has been done to understand local implementation outcomes of MNCs sustainable strategies. Neither of these drivers in fact explains the variation of success in implementing a sustainable approach for company-community conflict management. We intend to fill this gap by paying attention to local level dynamics, which another set of literature identifies as potentially influencing the implementation of sustainable strategies.

Since the literature mostly focuses on adoption and since even explanations of outcomes in political science studies about MNCs in ALS are not satisfactory, we propose to explain variation in implementation outcomes by implementation outputs and by the interactions of these outputs with local governance characteristics. The literature on organization and business studies paves the way to an understanding of the influence of internal drivers (i.e. implementation outputs) on implementation outcomes at operational levels. Other studies on conflict, local governance, and management of natural resources hint at local governance characteristics that play as enablers and barriers for sustainable strategies to have positive outcomes. We describe the essential dimensions of these two sets of local level dynamics — outputs at operational levels and local governance

⁶ The IETI was proposed by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002 at the World Summit on Sustainable Development and endorsed by the World Bank in 2003

characteristics — supposed to explain strategy outcomes. Then, we propose an analytical framework that encompasses the various drivers identified in the literature according to their tendency to be more or less sustainability driven. Finally, we propose to combine them in order to analyze and explain the variation in our dependent variable.

3. Drivers of local outcomes: Internal Company outputs


“For improved sustainability performance, sustainability strategy is only a minimum enabler” [Epstein & Buhovac 2010: 313]. Similar to policy process theory [Falastein 2010; Sabatier 1991], it is widely recognized in the business literature that adoption of a sustainable strategy is only the first step towards effective implementation of the strategies throughout the company [Epstein et al., 2010; Hilson et al., 2000; Linnenluecke et al., 2010].

Most literature so far has focused on external drivers (international, home country, host country). In addition to these, we consider internal company drivers identified by organizational theories and business studies. These internal drivers are what compliance studies refer to as implementation outputs. After adopting the approach, companies then adopt policies and procedures and finally develop them into the structures [Graham et al., 2006: 870]. These internal drivers encompass top-management’s support, HR management, training, employee empowerment and teamwork [Daily et al., 2001; Wilkinson et al., 2001], as well as employee values and underlying assumptions [Crane, 2000; Purser, 1994]. Clearly, internal drivers are divided in two, corporate design on the one hand, and corporate culture on the other. Corporate structures, tools, actors, and cultural features constitute the output for implementation of the strategy adopted at HQ levels. To explain the success or failure of a strategy to be implemented, business studies often recognize corporate culture as a key output dimension. However, it is rarely operationalized in a way that allows assessment of its effects. Studies also consider the effect of structures, processes, and tools as companies’ outputs of strategies. We use the generic term “corporate design” to refer to these dynamics (the term ‘design’ is borrowed from Beisheim & Liese 2014). Various studies identify learning processes as explaining the successful outcomes of strategies adopted at higher levels [Argyris, C., Schon, D.A., , 1978; Beisheim et al., 2014; Morgan et al., 1986].

a) CORPORATE CULTURE

A company’s approach to a particular strategy is underlined by its corporate culture, which includes the relationships, perceptions, attitude and discourses towards the strategy, while the structures and tools in place delimit how the corporate design enables the strategy. Schein [2004] divides organizational culture into three dimensions: observable culture (process, structures, and behavior), espoused values (strategies, goals, philosophy), and underlying assumptions (ultimate source of value creation). In Dauber et al. [2012], inspired by Schein’s model, organizational culture’s visible features encompass both design (structure, process, tools), and “visible” culture (goals, relationships), while “invisible” culture is defined by underlying assumptions (beliefs, values). Individual attitude is also part of Dauber et al.’s configuration model of organizational culture (figure 1), since it is the result of “patterns of behavior” operationalizing the other dimensions of culture.

Figure 1. Configuration model of organizational culture: internal and external environment
 [Dauber et al., 2012: 11]



Our research draws from Schein’s accepted definition of culture and Dauber et al.’s model of cultural change in order to measure the degree to which a company’s various internal dimensions are favorable to social sustainability. However, we will leave the invisible dimensions of culture out of the scope of this study, because they are not observable. Values are nonetheless part of the elements of culture we study in this research, but we only focus on their tangible aspects.

Culture is understood in this study in the sense of observable articulations of values into discourses, perceptions, relationships, and actions. In our research, we consider corporate culture as dynamic, since it changes over time and from one hierarchical level to another, as well as between departments at the same level. In the business literature on corporate culture, what is commonly understood as “identity” takes root in the hierarchy of values and core beliefs held by individuals and groups. Identity is “what the organization stands for” [Schein 2004; Hatch & Schultz 2010: 7]. We will not try to evaluate this invisible side of culture, because evaluation of values requires much more anthropological research and in-depth interviews. We will thus not take part in the debate around the missing link between values and behavior, between what people say and what they think [on behavior change versus culture change see for example DeJoy, 2005]. We will only study values (not cognitive or psychological) as they are articulated in discourses, perceptions, relationships, and behaviors. Therefore, we focus on what is usually referred to as image, which is “grounded in the external environment and emphasize the perceptions and overall estimation of the organization held by external constituency” [Hatch & Schultz 2010:7]. We will thus use perceptions of the company to understand how members of the company and how the company’s public representations are evaluated by its external stakeholders. We also focus on what the literature refers to as the “culture” of the company, which is the means by which members of the organization make sense of their activity. This is evaluated through their discourses regarding both their tasks and their relationships, within and outside their working environments. Image and culture of the company will be dealt with under the term “corporate culture” throughout this study.

Supposition: internal discourses, perceptions, and relationships influence MNCs' implementation outcomes.

Corporate culture's goal-setting dimension is well illustrated through the leadership's dedication to a strategy. Dedication to the strategy is recognized in the literature as an important factor for successful implementation of sustainability [Epstein & Buhovac 2010]. "Management commitment to sustainability as a core value (...) is critically important" [Epstein & Buhovac 2010: 307]. This dedication can be evaluated at the headquarters level and at the operational level by analyzing the vocabulary used in sustainability reports and public documents, as well as discourses and behavior of those taking part in decision-making concerning SES: CEO and corporate department in charge of CSR, the managing director at the operational level, and managers and officers in charge of CSR at the operational level. Moreover, leadership also influences corporate design choices that reinforce or hinder the capacity to implement a strategy. Human and financial resources available to the corporation for sustainability are also critical measures of the possibility for the sustainability strategy to be successfully implemented [Epstein & Buhovac 2010: 308]. These aspects of leadership will be analyzed separately in culture and design features of the company. Based on the assumption that actors are neither the organs of given structures nor acting fully autonomously, studies highlight how key foreign subsidiary managers interpret and integrate individual, sociopolitical, organizational as well as some home and host country factors into distinct subsidiary initiatives [Dörrenbächer et al., 2009]. This refers to leadership dimensions identified in management research [Battilana et al., 2013; Blanchard et al., 1985; Eagly et al., 2003; Egri et al., 2000; Sosik et al., 2000].

Supposition: dedication and capacity of leaders of SES in the company influence the outcomes of strategy.

While some studies analyze the role of culture as a driver for change towards sustainability, many of them only analyze this change at the corporate level without analyzing its effect at the operational level [Linnenlueck & Griffith 2010: 364]. Considering organizational culture, some argue that it is the same throughout the organization, others that there are various subcultures at each level. The integration perspective of culture considers that members of the organization all share a similar attitude. This leads to the idea of a rigidity that can rather hinder changes than promote change [Linnenluecke & Griffith 2010: 362] [Beer et al., 1990; Molinsky, 1999]. In order for cultural change to happen according to this perspective, it necessitates strong alignment between corporate levels and operational levels, as well as strong leadership to reinforce this alignment. The criticisms of this approach are manifold, mainly leading to the opposite idea that an organization is an assemblage of various subcultures depending on the departments, hierarchical levels, functions and occupations, personal contracts, networks, ethnic groups, etc. [Linnenluecke et al., 2010. 362]. In this differentiation perspective as well, cultural change appears like a challenge because it would mean that each of the various subcultures would have to change [Schön 1971]. To trigger changes in organizational culture, this perspective suggests the importance of familiarizing each subculture with the new strategy to be implemented in common, and the role of internal clarity in management styles to communicate the new strategy throughout the organization. Although they seem antagonistic, the integration and the differentiation dynamic can be present simultaneously, and their consequences on the implementation of sustainability can be analyzed.

Supposition: Whether culture is considered homogeneous or heterogeneous, corporate culture alignment in discourses and structures influences outcomes of strategy adopted by HQ.

We operationalize the concept of culture in chapter 8. Within the cultural dimensions of the company, we clearly distinguish how to assess the leadership aspects. We then use the various dimensions of culture to gauge the extent to which certain companies at certain times are more successful than others in implementing sustainable strategies.

To understand the implementation of a socially sustainable strategy, the alignment between the formal (i.e., design) and the informal (i.e., culture) systems is critical [Epstein & Buhovac 2010]. Studies focusing on the influence of corporate culture in implementation of sustainable strategies, even when they recognize the importance of the combination of culture with enabling structures, have a tendency to focus on only certain features of culture [Linnenluecke & Griffith 2010 focus on value] or to analyze implementation levels in isolation from the broader context [Epstein & Buhovac 2010].

b) CORPORATE DESIGN

While most business studies on corporate culture consider that structures are part of the operationalization of culture, for the sake of clarity in our analysis, we separate corporate culture from corporate tools, processes, and structures. We use the generic term “corporate design”. A corporate structure consists of various departments that contribute to the company's overall mission and goals. Departments we will focus on in gold mining MNCs at the operational level include security, mining, and community relations (sometimes referred to as community engagement, community development, sustainability, or CSR departments). At the top of the hierarchy, there is typically a company executive officer (CEO) at the headquarters level, and a managing director at the operational level (or subsidiary level). There is great diversity in corporate forms of enterprises. However, most corporations tend to have a “hybrid” structure, which is a combination of different models with one dominant strategy {Bridgespan 2009}.

To introduce a socially sustainable strategy for management of community-company conflicts once it has been adopted at the headquarter level (HQ) the managing directors (MD) of the mining sites are usually the next hierarchical level. Sometimes there are intermediaries directly in charge of sustainability issues between the HQ and operational levels who are usually based in the country of operation but go back and forth. These sustainability senior managers make the link between HQ and the MD and are also commonly in charge of making the link with the community relations (CR) departments. In some cases, there is a department hierarchically above the CR section; in others, the CR department is directly beneath the MD. CR officers are in charge of the ground level, most of the time the CR managers also participate in missions in the “field”. Some companies also hire “liaison” officers or agents to be based in the villages neighboring the mining operations. Liaison officers usually report to the company in case of complaints or tensions. They are “the eyes” of the company and are in charge of supervising or monitoring any community projects supported by the company.

Much of the early research most directly related to the subject of the relationships between headquarters levels and subsidiary or operational levels has dealt with the topic of the centralization or decentralization of decision-making [Van den Bulcke et al., 1984; Young, Stephen et al., 1985 1985; Young, Stephen et al., 2004]. Studies on multinational companies often emphasize the challenge of top-down implementation from the HQ down to the subsidiary levels. Yamin &

Andersson also explain the role of the subsidiary in embedding strategies within the MNC [Yamin et al., 2011]. The literature on centralization and autonomy, especially about multinational companies' subsidiaries, "has not evolved in a systematic way. Terms are used loosely and imprecisely and cause-and-effect relationships are unclear" [Young, Stephen et al., 2004: 215]. The causal relationship between headquarters and operational levels of multinational companies is unclear. Young and Tavares reviewed the literature on autonomy and centralization specifically of multinational companies based and operating in the OECD. They consider various characteristics related not only to centralization and autonomy, but also to the multinational's integration and responsiveness, as well as networks and embeddedness of the company [for a detailed literature review and analysis see Young & Tavares 2004]. Management studies often consider that headquarters are allergic to change. They consequently point out the importance of subsidiary initiatives for embedding strategies within a company [Birkinshaw, J., 1997; Birkinshaw, Julian et al., 1999; Williams et al., 2011; Yamin et al., 2011]. Management studies also describe the importance of subsidiary initiatives in "fighting the corporate immune system"; the immune system being the headquarters [Birkinshaw, Julian et al., 1999]. They then try to accomplish them in negotiations with the headquarters. Studies on HQ-subsidiary relations, however, tend to be concentrated within the OECD.

Supposition: operational level structures, tools, and processes of SES outputs influence the likelihood of SES outcomes.

Moreover, to succeed in implementing a long-term conflict management strategy, studies on policing point to the positive effects of coordination, support, responsibility taking, and supervision for effective and efficient governance of security [Shearing, 2001: 263]. These important dimensions are enabled through autonomy and through the provision of sufficient capacity to make and enact decisions about how to use resources for the implementation of a (policing) strategy⁷ [Shearing 2010: 263]. Hierarchical power of the department in charge is also critical to ensure that decisions lead to implementation.

Supposition: the more autonomy and resources available to the department in charge of SES, the more likely the company is to implement sustainable SES.

In management studies, organization theories, and psychology studies, authors present different management and leadership styles. The classic theories distinguish between directive, coaching, supporting, and delegating management styles [Blanchard et al., 1985; Purcell, 1987; Shenhar, 1998]. More recent studies focus on three leadership styles: transformational, transactional, and laissez-faire [Battilana et al., 2013; Eagly et al., 2003; Egri et al., 2000; Sosik et al., 2000]. Egri & herman [2000] consider that transformational leaders are the most prone to lead change in an organization, especially if the organization is non-profit driven. Battilana exposes how great agents of change are the ones that are the most skilled in building networks and reducing hierarchy [Battilana 201].

Supposition: The closer the leaders of SES are to the hierarchy (or the less hierarchical the company structure), the more likely the success of sustainability implementation.

⁷ "First, the ability to direct the way in which a publicly supported policing budget would be used, and, secondly, powers of inquiry and direction to ensure that the policies and regulations of the Board were adhered to" [Shearing 2010:263].

In chapter 8, we operationalize the concept of corporate design and use this operationalization to evaluate its role in each company case at operational levels.

c) LEARNING PROCESSES

Ongoing confrontation by communities neighboring the company's operations is a negative feedback in the attempt to implement a sustainable strategy to manage community-company conflicts. Unsuccessful engagement with communities when attempting to implement a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy is also an error. However, correcting an error and avoiding making the same mistake again is not an easy process and requires specific agents dedicated to the task. Questioning "the way things are done around here" demands a conscious effort that is not undertaken in most common every day tasks. This questioning process is activated by particular agents at particular times because of particular challenging situations, or because their task is precisely to question the way things are done. Similarly to Valente [Valente 2010], who suggests that the presence of "agent visionaries" is a condition for the change of paradigm, organizational theories recognize the importance of leadership in learning processes. Berger and Luckmann explain that a group dedicated to dealing with structural problems or change is much more likely to be flexible and able to learn than one routinized in other jobs [Berger et al., 1966]. "In essence, a new philosophy of management is required, to root the process of organizing in a process of open-ended inquiry", because learning to learn requires not only the ability to remain open to changes, but also the ability to challenge operating assumptions in a most fundamental way [Morgan 1986: 91].

Chris Argyris and Donald Schön distinguished three levels of learning in organizations [Argyris, C. et al., 1999]. Single-loop learning is an "adaptive learning", which focuses on incremental change. This type of learning solves problems - it consists of changing the individual's behavior, but ignores the question of why the problem arose in the first place. Double-loop learning is a generative learning, which focuses on transformational change that modifies the status quo. Double loop learning uses feedback from past actions to question assumptions underlying current views. When considering feedback, managers and professionals need to ask not only the reasons for their current actions, but also what to do next, and even more importantly, question the feasibility of alternative actions. And finally, Deutero-learning is learning how to learn better by seeking to improve both single- and double-loop learning. Beisheim & Liese [2014] analyze organizational learning in PPPs using criteria of established feedback loops, level of responsiveness to OP levels, and monitoring mechanisms [Beisheim et al., 2014. 29, 30]. Morgan emphasizes the link between culture and organizational change: "Effective change depends on changes in the images and values that are to guide action. (...) Since organization ultimately resides in the heads of the people involved, effective organizational change implies cultural change." [Morgan et al., 1986: 138]. Learning processes are then to be analyzed both in corporate design (monitoring processes, grievance mechanisms, bottom-up feedback channels) and corporate culture (bottom-up relationships, willingness to question routines) features. They are supposed to overcome the headquarters' rigidity by detecting and correcting mistakes from the bottom-up. Organizational theories, business and management studies consider learning mechanisms as drivers of change and of effectiveness [Beisheim & Liese 2013]. Sustainability strategy adoption needs to be supported by structures, by measurement and reporting, by leadership to reinforce the strategy, and by a culture that motivates decision-making behavior for a long-term focus.

Supposition: The more culture and design dimensions entail monitoring and measures to report on SES implementation (outputs and outcomes), the more likely the company is to implement successfully SES over time.

We operationalize the concept of learning at the operational level of MNCs in chapter 7 and assess to what extent companies' learning processes facilitate the change towards more sustainable SES.

We contribute to the organizational theories, management and business studies, by creating a framework to assess the effect of corporate culture, corporate design, and learning processes separately in the success of implementation of an innovative sustainable strategy of conflict management. By doing so, we make it possible to isolate various dimensions of each of these internal company drivers in understanding the implementation challenge.

Studies interested in implementation outcomes recognize that challenges faced at this stage are mainly about their permeability to external actors and structures interfering with potential outcomes. Although this complexity happens at the local level, very few studies have tried to untangle how local governance might interfere with company strategies. Studies on natural resource management consider that government should engage with local actors and institutions [Plummer et al., 2007]. As a result, they are interested in the conditions under which local dynamics are favorable to the collaborative management of natural resources between government and non-state actors [Cundill et al., 2010]. Development literature and studies interested in natural resource management identify local governance drivers as playing a key role towards sustainability. Moreover, literature on conflict resolution points out the importance of stereotypes built through historical events in finding solutions to reduce conflict [Worchel 2005]. We use concepts extracted from this literature to consider how local governance might affect company-community conflict management outcomes.

4. Drivers of local outcomes: local governance

The dynamics of societal transformations changed the conceptualization of the State in the 1990s. This led to questioning not only the role of MNCs as political actors, but also the role of local stakeholders in decision-making. Co-management responds to shortcomings associated with conventional common institutions and theories of social choice; it allows a shift of perspective away from the rational approach [Plummer et al., 2004: 883], [Armitage et al., 2008; Cundill et al., 2010; Olsson et al., 2004; Ruitenbeek et al., 2001]. What is more, in our approach we propose to take it a step further, away from the state-centered approach of co-management to allow all actors at the local level to be part of the analysis, and also to link it back to other types of collaborative management approaches.

The concept of collaborative management comes from the literature on dispute resolution and is widely used in the literature on natural resources management. Co-management makes a bridge between sustainability issues and conflict management issues at the local level. Indeed, conflict theories often emphasize the role of collaboration in the re-categorization process essential to the management of conflicts [Brewer, Marilyn B., 1996]. Co-management relates to concepts of social trust and social capital, to which political science studies on governance also refer [Plummer et al., 2006; Yaziji, 2004]. The literature on natural resource management and conflict resolution suggests evaluating the preconditions of trust and the social capital available to manage conflict by engaging with the neighboring communities [Plummer et al., 2007; Plummer et al., 2006]. "With trust, people

can create the social capital that is only possible when people work together” [Cvetkovich & Löfstedt 1999: viii]. Co-management and risk drivers are linked, because both relate to the concept of social capital. Co-management mostly relates to the building of trust amongst the communities, and risk is what might threaten the trust between communities and companies. Both sides of social trust can be observed in a local context and are interdependent. For instance, the co-management literature refers to pre-conditions that make co-management feasible [Berkes, 1997: 6], [Plummer et al., 2004: 879]. These pre-conditions or antecedents are strongly related to the risk of conflict at the local level, with a main underlying dimension being the history of the relationships among people that enter into collaborative management arrangements [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004: 879]. Focusing on governance, networks, and nodes, the literature suggests the importance of informal linkages, cohesion, and connectedness in strategies taking place at the local level [Cundill et al., 2010; Plummer et al., 2006; Shearing, 2001]. Studies on conflict and some development studies recognize the role of history and mutual perceptions in explaining the success of conflict management approaches [Brewer, Marilyn B., 1996; Hornsey et al., 2000]. We study the history of relationships both among members and groups of the communities, and between the company and the communities.

Supposition: Informal linkages, cohesion, and connectedness influence implementation outcomes of SE strategies at the local level.

Supposition: History and mutual perceptions influence outcomes of SE strategies at the local level.

a) LOCAL RISK OF CONFLICT

We define *Local risks of conflict* as the pre-conditions that delimit the gaps between “in-group” and “out-group”. The traditional approaches for studying intergroup conflict are often limited to two groups, measures of stereotype change and/or attraction [Worchel, S., 2005]. Our research complements these approaches, since it includes such factors as multiple groups, the history of the groups, and changes over time. Risk and ethical ambiguities influence opportunities for collaboration and thus need to be accounted for in order to understand the drivers leading to successful implementation of sustainable strategies [Armitage et al., 2008; Davidson-Hunt et al., 2007; Pellizzoni, 2003]. These multiple dimensions of risk encompass various actors (who engages with whom), not only communities versus companies, but also particular groups within these: artisanal miners, local authorities, youth and wise men, versus community department officers, managers, and other departments in direct relationship with communities. Discourses on each side about other actors engaging together in the management of SES — whether the other is perceived as a threat, a problem, or a partner — are thus an important parameter that we evaluate through the notion of “us versus them”.

Supposition: The more perceptions are negative about one another (“us versus them”), the less likely the company is to implement sustainable SES.

Perceptions and history thus have to be evaluated as preconditions of conflict management. Most companies also recognize that ensuring or maintaining a relationship of trust is critical for community relations’ department to avoid confrontations with communities neighboring their operations. When risk management is efficient, it reduces distrust. “If distrust could be reduced, (...), social trust would increase and risk management could function more efficiently and effectively” [Cvetkovich & Löfstedt 1999: 1]. Also, theories on intergroup relations argue that frustration and/or

competition are the basis for violent confrontation [Berkowitz, 1962; Dollard et al., 1939; Sherif et al., 1961]. These theories suggest that groups should be able to “co-exist until there is competition over scarce resources or one of the groups feels that its goals are thwarted” [Worchel 2005]. Conflict and peace theories suggest that one of the main goals of a group is its own survival [Worchel 2005; Worchel et al. 1993]. Thus, if a group fears for its security or existence, management of intergroup conflict is likely to be resisted by the group [Worchel 2005:745]. The group of artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM) might fear to disappear due the presence of the company; they may feel that their existence is threatened.

To analyze the risk/preconditions for emergence of conflict between the company and communities, we take three parameters into account: 1) the history of violence in the area of operations, 2) the importance of the artisanal and small scale mining traditions of neighboring communities, and 3) the type, frequency, and intensity of conflicts taking place between the company and the neighboring communities (history of conflict).

(1) History of violence and stereotypes

Communities in which companies operate already had various ways to manage their own conflicts before the companies started operating. Some communities are more used to violent means to resolve conflicting issues than others. Their exposure to open conflict prior to the company’s arrival might be an important reason for the level of confrontational strategies used to make the company accountable at a later stage.

Social science studies on conflict have not been very fruitful in accounting for the issue of time [McGrath & Tschan, 2004]. Most studies consider group history as an “extraneous variable”, although several research studies argued that groups often have “collective beliefs imbedded in their history that define traditional enemies and the stereotypes of these enemies” [Bar-Tal, 1990; Worchel, S., 2005; Worchel, S. et al., 1997]. Worchel emphasizes, “in order to understand the conflict, we must understand the history involved” [Worchel 2005: 746]. In order to be engaged in company–community management of conflict, social groups neighboring mining operations are often forced to collaborate in order to form a community that can be recognized as a partner by the company, regardless of their own history [Luning 2012: 208]. When these groups of local stakeholders have been engaged in long histories of intra-group hostilities, “are these experiences supposed to have stopped feeding into the present dialogue? Are people expected to have forgotten their past, disappointments, feelings of loss and perhaps betrayal?” [Luning 2012: 208]

The underlying history of relationships between the company and the communities identified by Plummer & Fitzgibbon as a pre-condition for collaboration [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004: 879] is evaluated through the history of inter-clan clashes and the “us versus them” discourses on each side. If communities are used to fighting among themselves, they might also fight with the company to make their voice heard. Work on self- categorization [Turner, 1987] and social identity theory [Tajfel et al., 1979] suggests that simply delineating an in-group and an out-group is sufficient to create the grounds for conflict [Worchel 2005: 742].

“Social identity theory posits that individuals’ esteem and personal identity is based partly on the groups to which they belong. Once group identity becomes salient, individuals will advantage their own group and discriminate against the out-group. This discrimination and conflict can occur in the absence of intent or competition” [Worchel 2005: 742].

Suppositions: a) if communities are used to violent means of resolving conflict, there is less chance for SES to attain high level of sustainability, and vice versa; b) if negative perceptions are common, there is less chance to attain high sustainability of SES, and vice versa.

Our study examines this “long history of intra-group hostility”. We describe how the communities in the area where the company operates are accustomed to handling issues through violent means, either among themselves, between different groups (political, ethnic, families), or against the government. Mutual perceptions of the community and the company also compose the background for their relationship. We give some insights into the way neighboring communities perceive themselves and the extent to which they need to protect this identity against the company (us versus them). Basically, one needs to assess the level of tension inherited from the past that the companies have to cope with in the implementation of conflict management strategies. What kind of management of conflict strategies are the communities used to and is each side ready to collaborate with the other?

(2) **ASM tradition**

ASM constitute a group among the neighboring communities whose existence is threatened by the company’s presence. Studies on conflict explain that when a group feels that its survival as a group is threatened, it increases the chance for open violent confrontation between that group and the group perceived as the enemy [Holt et al., 2005; Worchel, S., 2005]. When the group whose identity is threatened has the opportunity to activate another identity to survive, it reduces the tension and fear of loss of identity. The attitude of leaders of the group can be critical in this regard. The proliferation of alternative groups can also decrease the tension between the threatened group and its perceived enemy. Accounting for ASM tradition is essential in evaluating the willingness of local communities to collaborate [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004: 879].

The case for social identity in violent cultural conflict has not yet been established (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Research aimed at identifying approaches (and processes) that reduce intergroup conflict and hatred consider that approaches which focus on contact between people of equal status working toward a common or shared goal can reduce intergroup conflict and hatred [Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Pettigrew, 1998; Sherif et al., 1961]. Rothgerber and Worchel (1997) found that the relationship between low power minority groups is very different than the relationship between a low power and high power group. They also find that other groups that are present affect the nature of these relationships. If the communities perceive the company as an outside group threatening the very existence of their community, they might not want to be in contact with them, affecting the possibility for inclusiveness. Other groups that are present, such as elders and youth groups might affect this relationship by widening or shrinking the gap between the ASM communities (in-group) and the company (out-group). In the context of multinational gold mining companies operating in rural areas, artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) traditions and their embeddedness in communities neighboring large scale gold mining operations is often one of the first causes of company-community confrontation. Communities do not always understand that the company is the sole owner of the underground mineral on the whole territory of its license contract signed with the government. Either they do not understand, or the boundaries are not clear to them, or they simply do not want to withdraw from going to the companies’ mining pits to take a chance at finding gold. The acceptance or support of these trespassing practices by the other members of the community can be critical.

Thus, ASM tradition needs to be assessed in terms of economical and social importance for the survival of the ASM group, but also of how much support this tradition gets from the neighboring communities. “Enduring groups, that have a history and expectations about the future, have a goal to survive (...). In order to accomplish this goal, the group must ensure that individual members remain faithful to the group and carry on its traditions” [Worchel, S., Dawna Coutant-Sassic, and Frankie Wong, 1993 1993]. Local elders can hinder the success of long-term conflict management strategies to maintain the identity of the group, especially because this reinforces their own leadership. They also sometimes trigger conflicts for the conservation of the ASM group since “one of the most powerful tools in effort of group identity is intergroup conflict” [Worchel 2005: 744]. If youth groups create alternative economic activities, and if respected leaders (elders, wise men, or local state authorities) are not reinforcing the traditions, the risk of ASM to engender conflict is lower. The risk is higher if youth groups have no alternative other than artisanal gold mining in the company’s pits in order to make an income, and if leaders also preach the necessity to keep the tradition alive it can only worsen the tension.

Supposition: The more alternatives there are to ASM activities, the more likely it is that companies will implement sustainable SES.

Supposition: The less interest the local elders have in perpetuating ASM traditions, the more likely it is that companies will implement sustainable SES.

(3) History of community-company conflict

Preconditions or antecedents to co-management also entail the existence of a real or imagined crisis [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004: 879], which can be related to the concept of open or latent conflict. Considering that “the existence of a high level of conflict conspires against contact aimed at reducing inter-group conflict” [Worchel 2005: 745], we analyze local risks of company-community conflict. The way the communities react to the activities and the presence of the company as well as the way the company responds to these local accountability strategies leads to various levels of conflict.

In ALS, local communities affected by multinational gold mining companies are often located in rural areas and lack both the organizational strength to appear as legitimate stakeholders to the company, and the ability to influence the national government’s policy-making (i.e., when decentralization is not effective). In these situations where local communities lack legitimate representatives to articulate and defend their concerns, “the resort to informal and often confrontational strategies in the struggle to establish accountability can hardly be considered surprising” [Newell, 2005: 543]. Hence, SES implementation is a key concern for preventing neighboring communities from resorting to confrontational strategies.

Communities construct their own strategies to acquire a say in the way they make their needs acknowledged so they can be taken into account by companies. We distinguish two ideal-types illustrating the ways communities address their claims to the company (table 5). They either go through a negotiation process, making their claims in public hearings, writing letters and following the protocol: going through their government leaders first and trusting them to pass the message either to higher levels of government, who pass it on to the company, or to the local government, which has access to the company directly. Alternatively, they make their voices heard through physical action: sabotage, blockage, theft, and trespassing. In this context, theft can be considered an imposed accountability strategy and not merely a depoliticized criminal behavior. Interviewees

have explained how frustration is the motivating force leading thieves to trespass on mining property [Berkowitz, 1962; Dollard et al., 1939]. This frustration is based upon either the comparisons the community members make between the level of development in their village and in the housing areas for the company's higher employees, or on the lack of answers and solutions given to the communities' demands and grievances (Interviews TZ and GU 2011, 2012, 2013).

Table 5. Community accountability Strategies

Negotiated	Direct
	Indirect
	Public hearing
Imposed/Confrontational	Sabotage
	Blockage
	Theft of gold product
	Other types of theft (fuel, phones, computers, etc.)

Supposition: Confrontational accountability strategies are less favorable to the success of reaching sustainable SES, and vice versa, negotiated accountability strategies are likely to lead to higher sustainability.

The way neighboring communities communicate their grievances to the company leads to varying levels of conflict between the neighboring communities and the MNC. The company can respond more or less comprehensively to the communities' demands. Employing more people originating from the mining area and engaging dialog in case of protest, instead of sending the security guards and calling the police or the army to make arrests is clearly a more comprehensive and less risky way to respond to community confrontations. The highest risk of open conflict is when the company responds to confrontational strategies through harsh security, building walls, buffering the number of guards, and beating up or shooting at trespassers with or without the support of the police or the army.

Supposition: Harsh company responses have less chance to lead to sustainable SES implementation than negotiated/comprehensive company responses.

Scholars demonstrate that successful collaboration leads to increased trust and social capital [Leach et al., 2005; Lubell, 2005], which are also important in understanding the risk of conflict. There is thus interdependence between risk drivers and co-management drivers in company-community conflict management possibilities.

b) LOCAL CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

The way companies engage with local stakeholders is also rooted in the perceived openness and perceived competence that can increase or reduce trust [Cvetkovich et al., 1999: viii]. The company can perceive the competence of communities to collaborate in managing conflict by the way these communities are perceived to collaborate amongst themselves (cohesion) and by their capacity to contribute to the company's efforts to establish long-term capacity and infrastructures (local government empowerment).

Co-management capacities are the capacities existing within local settings to cooperate with the company in implementing a socially sustainable strategy of stakeholder engagement for conflict management. The collaboration concept is rooted in alternative dispute resolution, which focuses on mediation, negotiation, and building agreements among competing stakeholders [Snow 2001:3]. Collaborative management, or co-management, is usually used to describe "the sharing of power

and responsibility between government and local resource users” [Berkes et al., 1991: 12]. The concept is mostly used nowadays in studies on natural resource management in developing countries [Lebel et al. 2006, Raik & Deder 2007, Arbrams et al. unpublished].

Towards the end of the 20th century, social conditions were changing as the role of citizens in policy making increased and changed expectations [Koontz & Thomas 2006: 112]. The trust in the ability of government agencies shifted to distrust and to efforts to increase stakeholder involvement in policy making [Cortner et al., 1999]. The term “co-management” was born in the beginning of the 21st century together with debates around the end of the state’s centralization, hierarchy, and regulation, towards a “collaborative state” [Koontz & Thomas 2006: 111]. As does the sustainability approach developed through the WCED, the co-management approach also questions the effectiveness of top-down institutions and the rational choice perspective [Klooster, 2000; Plummer et al., 2004, 2006]. More and more studies have emphasized how local involvement was getting stronger [Paquet, 1999; Ribot, 2002] as it shifted away from centralized control and toward collaborative management [Kooiman, 1993; Plummer et al., 2004]. The number and type of collaborative activities or “cooperative governance” approaches [Glasbergen 1998] have grown since the 1990s as an alternative to top-down institutions, together with research scholarships and studies that analyze their design, management, and performance [Koontz et al., 2006: 111]. If “co-management can be thought of as a spectrum of institutional arrangements in which management responsibilities are shared between users (who may or may not be community-based) and government (...)” [Yandle, 2003.: 180], it can be applied to the arrangements implemented by companies to engage local stakeholders in the management of conflicts. Literature on collaboration in the management of natural resources so far has mainly focused on its link to environmental outputs, processes, and outcomes.

The literature on co-management focuses on environmental issues in the OECD world and often considers the state as an ultimate enabler making the strategic choices towards the use of a collaborative approach [Koontz & Thomas 2006: 112]. Contrary to this state of the art, our study understands co-management as the capacity of local actors to engage with the company in its effort to manage conflict in a sustainable way. We build on this concept to consider not only the collaboration potential between the government and local users, but also between all actors involved at the local level in the management of company-community conflict. We include non-state actors (NGOs, generational or professional associations/groups, customary leaders), state representatives, and local government authorities, as well as company representatives. We widen the usual focus of co-management studies on natural resource issues to other management issues, such as conflict management at the local level. In doing so, we provide an analytical tool to identify and measure co-management capacities (chapter 6).

How can we evaluate the co-management capacity existing in communities neighboring mining operations? The literature on co-management highlights the importance of self-organization and cross-scale institutional linkages, as well as social capital variation, as conditions to initiate co-management [Cundill & Fabricius 2010: 1, Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006]. Studies also emphasize the importance of both formal institutions and informal arrangements in the success of co-management initiatives [Pinkerton, 1989: 29] [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006: 52].

Supposition: The higher the capacity of communities neighboring operations to collaborate in the management of conflict with the company, the better the chances for sustainable SES to be implemented.

(1) Formal Vertical connectedness / Top-down involvement

Vertical linkages are a source of social capital, because they link local communities to political leverage and give them the ability to receive financial or material resources [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006:53]. The formal vertical connectedness [Pretty et al., 2001] is about how the central state is involved in local matters related to mining companies and the local government's effectiveness (resources available to collaborate with the company). The top-down involvement of the state can contribute to the effectiveness of local government actors in collaborating in the management of conflict [Koontz & Thomas 2006:112]. External linkages with non-state actors contribute to building social capital [Pretty & Ward 2001], which is necessary to co-manage community-company conflict. We analyze this top-down involvement also through the presence of non-state actors at the local level.

Co-management here is not necessarily generated by a deliberate effort on the part of community or state actors; it is considered as a capacity inherent to neighboring communities to collaborate together in defining common rules and in finding solutions to conflict. This includes the involvement of the central state as an agent acting locally and providing means at the local level to enable local actors to collaborate with the company in the management of conflict. Government actors and institutions in areas where the statehood is not limited in capacity enable co-management through public funding, technical assistance, providing personnel, material, making partnerships, and involving local stakeholders in policy making and implementation [Koontz & Thomas 2006: 112]. How much do states in areas of limited statehood participate in co-management at the local level? Top-down involvement also improves the leadership capacity of government authorities engaged with companies as stakeholders. Leadership is essential to facilitate self-regulation [Olsson et al. 2004a and 2007, Cash et al. 2006]. Thus, formal accountability mechanisms are making the link between the company and the neighboring communities. The connection between local groups and non-state actors (international, national and local NGOs) acting locally (cf. naming and shaming campaigns gone from local to international levels) foster these mechanisms.

Supposition: Top-down involvement, i.e., vertical connectedness, as a key element of co-management capacities, influences the success of implementation of sustainable SES by MNCs.

Supposition: The more central state and non-actors are interested and active in mining issues related to company-community relationships (multiplication of skilled interlocutors to represent the matters of neighboring communities), the more likely for companies to implement sustainable SES.

(2) Informal Community Cohesion

Informal community cohesion is evaluated through the collaboration channels existing between various groups at the local level and between various levels of the state acting at the local level. This dimension combines characteristics of social capital and self-organization. Cundill and Fabricius explain that relations of trust, reciprocity, the existence of common rules, norms, and sanctions can

build social capital, some of which enhance the likelihood of self-organization⁸ [Cundill & Fabricius 2010: 2, Pretty 2003]. Since sustainable conflict management is about engaging with stakeholders, their capacity to collaborate in the management is important. This capacity for co-management of conflict can be evaluated through various aspects of social cohesion. “Societal mechanisms of restraint at the local level, such as embeddedness in societal institutions and community pressure” also need to be examined to understand whether they influence companies’ behavior at operational levels [Hönke & Börzel 2013].

The connectedness within and between networks and groups — horizontally between customary and state, customary and other local groups, elders and youth — as well as across levels — multi-level and vertical — is also an important evaluation point for social cohesion at the local level [Cundill&Fabricius 2010:2]. Their capacity to share actions, as “undertaking or commitment to do things in common” might also be essential [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004:880, [see also Berkes, 1997; Pinkerton, 1989]. Adaptive capacity characteristics are also important ways to evaluate informal community cohesion, especially the communities’ experience in collaborative decision-making and the extent to which institutional diversity is encouraged or accepted [Cundill et al., 2010: 3]. The latter is related to the local pluralism characterized by the inclusion of diverse interests or inputs (participants) into the process of collaboration [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004:880] [see also Glasbergen, 1998].

Supposition: The more informal community cohesion (multi-level, inter- and intra- groups) is in local communities, the more likely the company is to implement sustainable SES.

(3) (in)Formal cross-scale security harmonization

Since this study aims at understanding the conditions under which companies adopt sustainable means to manage conflict with neighboring communities, the structure and type of security actors present at the local level and the way they are connected together might be an important factor. Official security structures and actors, however, do not represent the full context of security governance in areas where multinational mining companies operate. They are complemented by “knowledge and capacities that (are) not the exclusive preserve of state officials” [Shearing, 2001: 261]. Literature on policing extends the understanding of security governance to “a regulated network of participatory 'nodes' - each with authority, capacity and knowledge that together provide for the governance of security” [Shearing 2001: 261]. The extent of the harmonization and embeddedness with local communities [Hönke & Börzel 2013] of these nodes needs to be evaluated in order to gauge their capacity to co-manage conflict with the companies. Because of the existence of vigilante groups in the cases studied in this research, it is interesting to evaluate whether there is friction, separation, or communion between the norms of the vigilante groups and those of the rest of the community. It is also interesting to grasp the level of informal connectedness between the communities and the state police present locally, what Hönke and Börzel refer to as the embeddedness of state representatives [Hönke et al., 2013: 26].

Depending on the country’s regulations, the period, and the company’s security processes, the formal cross-scale security harmonization varies between cases. This is also a matter of self-

⁸ Ostrom’s work on long-enduring management of common pool resources provided the foundation for exploration of inherent social aspects used to construct social capital to capture nuances of social relationships: common understanding, trust, reciprocity are attributes that enhance the likelihood of self-organization Ostrom 1992, 2001b in Plumer&Fitzgibbon 2006:52

organization capacity that affects the ability to monitor and respond to threats, the capacity for feedback and remedy, and the state’s enabling legislation for collaboration [Olsson et al. 2004a; Cundill & Fabricius 2010]. The capacity of these actors and the level of cooperation between them and the company also needs to be assessed in understanding how much capacity is available to the company to co-manage conflicts with local actors.

Supposition: The more embedded the security actors are in local communities, the more likely the company is to implement sustainable SES.

Supposition: The type and structures of (state and non-state) security in the mining area influence the likelihood of implementation of SES by companies.

5. Conclusion literature review

From this literature review on the subject of adoption and implementation by MNCs of sustainability approaches to address community issues, we draw several suppositions (table 6). To what extent can international, host country, local governance, and internal company drivers taken separately explain the variation of success in implementing a socially sustainable SES? The following table summarizes the main suppositions identified in the literature (table 6).

Table 6. Main suppositions identified in the literature

Literature	Suppositions	IV	DV
International studies Political Science Compliance studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legitimization • Peer pressure • Reputation • Market pressures • Home country (statehood) 	International drivers	Adoption (Adoption leads to implementation)
Political Science Compliance studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Statehood influence race to the top or to the bottom? • ALS equivalence to Shadow of hierarchy: shadow of the market (similar to international studies), or shadow of anarchy 	Host Country drivers	Implementation
Organizational theory, business and management studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate culture • Corporate design • Learning process • Leadership 	Internal drivers	Implementation
Natural resource management Social capital theories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-management capacities • Vertical connectedness, informal community cohesion, cross-scale harmonization 	Local Governance drivers	Implementation
Conflict theories	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Risk issues based on history, mutual perception/stereotypes (Us versus Them) 	Local governance drivers	Implementation

6. Analytical framework

Although we initially considered adoption as our dependent variable (DV), since most mining companies have adopted sustainable SES, it appeared that implementation outcomes are in fact where we observe variation. Therefore, adoption became a constant and implementation outputs an explanatory driver of our dependent variable: implementation outcomes. Our literature review leads to the identification of independent variables (IV), some relating to adoption, others to implementation outcomes.

Drivers (independent variables) identified in the literature to explain MNCs adoption and implementation concern four sub-systems: international, national, business, and local. To analyze these drivers, we focus on how they reflect the tendency of each sub-system’s trajectories to be

rather sustainability-driven or rather economic-driven (table 7). We make this distinction to select the dimensions on which to focus in our analytical framework.

We consider that we are in a transition cycle that can lead to a sustainability transition if favorable trajectories keep increasing and unfavorable ones decrease [Markard et al., 2012: 956] [Geels, 2011: 38]. Consequently, MNCs in ALS have a role in the sustainability transition. Scholars agree that large firms and multinational companies can be determinant players in the transition process toward sustainability [Geels, 2011; Valente, 2010]. Although large firms “will probably not be the initial leaders of sustainability transitions, their involvement might accelerate the breakthrough” of innovations [Geels, 2011: 25] [Geels, 2011; Stirling, 2009]. Therefore, we focus on the sub-systems that might influence MNCs to adopt and implement sustainable approaches rather than stick to their economic-driven traditional approaches. The “traditional”, or economic-driven, paradigm consists of the larger institutional and sociopolitical environment of capitalism [Valente 2010; Hoffman 2003; Newton 2002]. The “emergent”, or sustainability-driven, paradigm consists of the balance of societal, environmental, and economic systems. Valente explains that the success of alternative business approaches is interdependent with the global system of thought in which they are integrated. Our analytical framework focuses on the dimensions relevant to this sustainability transition context.

Supposition: The more sustainability-driven the sub-systems influencing a company, the more likely the company is to implement successfully sustainable strategies.

Table 7. Transition models synthesis: context of sustainability by MNCs in ALS

	Landscape	Regimes	Sub-systems DRIVERS	Trajectories	
				Sustainability-driven	Economic-driven
Examples of Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beginning of 21st century Recent crises: Financial, terrorism, climate change Postcolonial era Rise of new economic powers (BRICS, fast GDP growth in developing countries) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Path-dependency: profit/performance oriented regulations and routines OECD (economic) superiority to non-OECD Dominant values: Economic over social and cultural 	International Level (IOs, NGOs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainability guidelines, standards Activism for sustainability 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conditionality in non-OECD Economic-centered practice preeminence
			National Level (Host/ALS and Home countries)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sustainability related regulations Increased stakeholder dialog 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of will/capacity to enforce Dependence on International level
			Business Level (HQ-subsubsidiary/OP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commitment to sustainability (HQ) Incremental changes (HQ&OP) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Challenges of implementation (OP) Profit/performance pressure (HQ&OP)
			Local governance Level (Decentralized authorities, informal groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Connectedness and cohesion within Trust and openness to out-groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disconnected, distrust within Fear of out-groups

We give some contemporary examples of the main characteristics of each realm of transition considered in the literature on sustainability transition (table 7) [Fuenfschilling et al., 2014; Geels, 2011; Kemp, R. et al., 2006; Rip et al., 1998; Rotmans et al., 2001]. Crises in the economic-driven paradigm contribute to existing worldviews (landscapes) along with other core trends of our times (see table 7). For instance, ecological catastrophes linked to climate change concerns, and the economic crisis linked to the fundamental assumptions of the capitalist system, call into question the “unethical and irresponsible behavior and the tyrannical demand for short-term profit” [Ban Ki Moon 2009, at the launch of the World Business Summit on Climate Change]. These trends form a

landscape context within which each part of the transition process evolves [Fuenfschilling et al., 2014; Geels, 2011; Kemp, R. et al., 2006; Rip et al., 1998; Rotmans et al., 2001]. A change of underlying assumptions has been taking place with a growing number of sub-systems translating emerging worldviews into norms and principles. The development of sustainability-related guidelines and standards by IOs illustrates the penetration of alternative worldviews into norms and regulations. These mingle with economic-driven trajectories at the international level (conditionalities of aid and FDI). These routines and regulations shape regimes, because they “enable and constrain activities” [Geels, 2002: 1260]. Despite their heterogeneity, regimes exercise a “selection pressure” on decision-makers [Markard et al. 2012]. This selection pressure influences the organization and conceptualization of sub-systems. Every sub-system’s choice to follow either sustainability-driven or economic-driven trajectories is part of the global transition process.

We thus have a list of sustainability-driven trajectories representing how each drivers’ dimensions are supposed to lead to sustainable SES adoption (international and home country sub-systems) or implementation (host country/ALS, business, and local sub-systems). We also analyze the economic-driven (or not sustainability-driven) dimensions supposed to lead to less success in implementing sustainable SES. More specifically:

→ The following are supposed to lead to more sustainable SES models (emergent):


- Sustainability guidelines and standards, and activism for sustainability at the international level;
- Sustainability-related regulations and increased stakeholder dialog at the host and home country levels;
- Commitment to sustainability (HQ), and incremental changes toward sustainability (HQ&OP) at the business level;
- Connectedness and cohesion within communities, trust and openness to out-groups at the local governance level.

→ Whereas, the following are supposed to lead to less sustainable SES models (traditional):

- Conditionality of aid and FDI in non-OECD countries and economic-centered practice preeminence at the international level;
- Lack of will/capacity to enforce, and dependence on international level at the host and home country levels;
- Challenges of implementation (OP) and profit/performance pressure (HQ&OP) at the business level;
- Disconnectedness, distrust within communities and fear of out-groups at the local governance level.

Disregarding interconnection between sub-systems, the different bodies of literature suggest linear explanations for MNCs adoption and implementation of sustainable SES. Arrows in the figure below depict these linear explanations (figure 2).

Figure 2. Preliminary model of analysis




The literature leads to key questions to which our data collection and analysis will propose answers. Do international drivers pertaining to the societal level and the industry level (peer pressure) influence MNCs' adoption of sustainable strategies? Does adoption lead to implementation? Are outputs measures taken after adoption of sustainable strategies and do they lead to sustainable outcomes, as management and organizational studies suggest? Do host countries' regulations and enforcement capacity influence implementation outcomes? Are company internal drivers decisive in implementing sustainable SES? Are learning processes essential in achieving a virtuous cycle of change towards sustainability implementation? Do local risk and co-management capacities influence the success or failure of sustainable strategy implementation by companies?

None of the theoretical approaches suggested in the literature is fully satisfying as an explanation of the variable success in implementing a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy at operational levels. Linear explanations are not valid for the variation in implementation outcomes. We assume that local level drivers (outputs and local governance) are the main factors leading to various implementation outcomes. How do we analyze these local dynamics?

Taking into account that implementation is permeable to external environments [Falastein 2010; Rees et al. 2012], we focus on the interaction of local external and internal dynamics in order to understand what leads to successful implementation outcomes. To do so, we combine the dimensions of local governance drivers with the dimensions of internal company drivers at the operational level (figure 3).

Figure 3. Local Dynamics Framework




This framework of local dynamics entails the pre-condition that adoption by HQ leads to a variety of implementation outputs that have different degrees of influence on outcomes. We start with this assumption because each company we studied is committed to sustainable strategies to manage community-company conflicts, whereas implementation outputs and outcomes vary across time and mining sites. Since outputs do not systematically lead to sustainable SES, we consider that 1) the various dimensions of outputs can be more or less in favor of sustainable outcomes, 2) local governance drivers intervene in the outcomes of MNC strategies, and 3) learning processes (dotted

arrows) depend on culture and design to further inform operational level outputs and adoption at HQ levels over time.

We analyze how the combination of more or less sustainability-driven trajectories, both in internal and local governance, influence outcomes (figure 4). If co-management capacities, local risks, corporate culture, design, and learning processes are not sustainability-driven, we expect to find the least sustainable outcomes of SES, and vice versa. More specifically:

- Connectedness and cohesion within communities, trust and openness to out-groups combined with dedicated and empowered company agents/departments in charge of SES are supposed to lead to more sustainable SES models (emergent);
- Disconnectedness, distrust within communities, and fear of out-groups combined with indifferent and disempowered company agents/departments in charge of SES are expected to lead to less sustainable SES models (traditional).


Figure 4. Local model of analysis



Supposition: The less sustainability-driven the combination of local drivers is, the less likely for the company site to reach sustainable SES outcomes.

The worst-case scenario and the best-case scenario should then be the result of the interaction of least sustainable local drivers, and of the most sustainable local drivers, respectively. Intermediate cases are then expected to be the result of the combination of less sustainable combine with more sustainable local drivers. The following figure illustrates these expectations (figure 5).

Figure 5. Local mechanisms of implementation outcomes



After assessing the general tendency of local dynamics combining the internal drivers and local governance drivers, we follow the same logic for each dimension of these drivers.

To understand the extent to which local governance and outputs characteristics explain the variation in implementation outcomes, we first assess each driver separately. How sustainability-driven are the various dimensions of corporate culture, design, and learning mechanisms? How sustainability-driven are the local governance characteristics around each particular mining-site?

To explain our findings, we compare each of the dimensions by case similarities and differences starting from outcomes. We start by comparing each sub-indicator of internal company drivers and local governance drivers for the two extreme cases: the best-rated implementation and the worst. We then compare two cases with similar sub-indicators but reaching completely different outcomes. Assessing this comparison of most-similar most-different micro cases leads to suggestions concerning the relative importance of each sub-indicator. Finally, we evaluate to what extent these suggestions are verified in the other cases over the three year research period. To do so, we compare cases two by two, holding some of the indicators constant and varying the others.

The first part of our substantive analysis consists in describing the variation in our DV. In the following part, we analyze separately each driver identified in the literature to evaluate the extent to which international drivers influence adoption in our case studies (chapter 5), and the extent to which host country drivers, local governance drivers, and internal drivers influence the implementation of sustainable SES for community-company conflicts by MNCs in their local mining sites (Chapters 6, 7, and 8). At the end of this part, we find that these drivers neither explain the constant of adoption, nor the variation in implementation (chapter 9). We thus use our local analytical framework in order to explain the variation in SES implementation outcomes by MNCs in ALS (chapter 10).

Chapter III — Research design and methods

To understand the circumstances that favor implementation of sustainable strategies by mining MNCs in ALS, we needed to use anthropological methods because of the absence of literature on Tanzania and Guinea that would have been detailed enough to give us a thorough understanding of the dynamics at stake. Not only did we need to conduct in-depth interviews with each type of stakeholder directly or indirectly involved in the process of implementation, but we also needed to compare companies, host countries, and local contexts in order to obtain generalizable data to answer our research question. Anthropological methods alone would have been enough to reach a refined analysis of local actors, structures, and power relations, but not enough for an interpretation of broader intervening variables. Comparative methods help us to reach a more generalizable understanding, while a most-similar most-different systems design ensures a systematic comparison of the variables at stake.

We chose to analyze MNCs operating in the mining sector in ALS. Since the states lack the capacity or will to regulate and enforce regulations in the mining sector, the potential for conflict is widened in ALS. The question of their influence on the way MNCs decide to interact with communities becomes more pertinent. Most areas of limited statehood are characterized by a pluralism of normative systems, including traditional, religious, and state systems of signification and regulation, which creates a complicated framework for interactions between the company and the neighboring

community [Englebert, 2000. 1, 5-6; Médard, 1982: 165]. This creates a complex system of networks, with which the company must contend in its encounters with local communities. Also, considering that historical backgrounds shape the perceptions and representations each group has of the other [Ward, 2013; Worchel, S., 2005], the colonial history of these areas generates a specific relationship between locals and expatriates. We chose to analyze MNCs in the mining sector, because companies in this sector are adopting more sustainability-driven standards than in other industries⁹. Since the industry widely adopts sustainable standards but does not often succeed in implementing them, mining companies must face particular challenges on the ground, which need to be analyzed and understood.

A. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SELECTION OF CASE STUDIES

Our research uses a combination of most-similar and most-different system design to understand the “dependent variable”, which is the variation in the level of sustainability in the implementation of stakeholder engagement strategies by multinational gold mining companies.

Mill’s “most similar system design” (MSSD) consists of comparing very similar cases which only differ in the *dependent variable*, on the assumption that this would make it easier to find those *independent variables* that explain the presence/absence of the dependent variable [Bello 2009]. This method is very helpful, because since it compares similar objects, it keeps many otherwise confusing and irrelevant variables in the research constant. In a basic sense, this method allows us to start out with similar variables between cases and try to figure out why the outcome is different. On the other hand, Mill’s “most different system design” (MDS) consists of comparing very different cases, all of which have in common the same *dependent variable*, so that any other circumstance which is present in all the cases can be regarded as the *independent variable* [Bello 2009]. This method differs from MSSD in its focus and in the fact that it does not require a strict variable application¹⁰.

We initially chose adoption of sustainable SES as a dependent variable (DV), since we believed that African Barrick Gold had not adopted a sustainable approach, contrary to most multinational gold mining companies. Along with the main literature on the subject, we thus considered international and home country drivers (independent variables) in an effort to find an explanation of why this company was an exception. In fact, after researching this case, we found that the company did in fact *adopt* sustainability but that the variation was at the level of *implementation*. The varying dependent variable is thus the implementation outcome of sustainable SES strategies. *Adoption of a sustainable strategy* became our constant dependent variable in all cases. The independent variables that vary are then the international and home country drivers, host country drivers, internal drivers, and local governance drivers presented in the literature review. We evaluate the extent to which each variable explains the variation of the level of sustainability implemented by companies in their SES.

⁹ For example, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) focuses on sustainable development guidelines for the mining industry specifically.

¹⁰ Anckar, Carsten. "On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems Design in Comparative Research." *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 11.5 (2008): 389-401. Informaworld. Web. 20 June 2011.

To evaluate whether international drivers suffice to explain the variation observed in implementation, we hold the company as a constant variable by comparing one company operating in two different countries and one company operating in two different locations in the same country. A single company operating in two different countries or in two different locations in the same country should reach the same outcomes if international company drivers were decisive. We compare AngloGold Ashanti operating in Guinea (Société Ashanti Goldfield) and in Tanzania (Geita Gold Mine), and African Barrick Gold operating in two locations in Tanzania (Buzwagi and North-Mara). We observe variation between sites operated by the same company. Two companies operating in the same country should reach similar outcomes if host country drivers were decisive. We compare AngloGold Ashanti and African Barrick Gold both operating in Tanzania, as well as AngloGold Ashanti's operation in Guinea with NordGold's mine also operating in Guinea.

Then we compare the best-case scenario with the worst-case scenario in terms of implementation outcomes (DV). We further systematically compare similarities and differences in each micro-case, with an MSSD-MDSD applied at the local level, which helps to isolate essential characteristics of internal company drivers and local governance drivers.

a) HOST COUNTRY

Tanzania and Guinea have completely different political backgrounds and history. The former is characterized by English colonization followed by peaceful regimes, while the latter has known French colonization that ended abruptly and was followed by oppressive dictatorships (to say the least) to finally have its first democratically elected president in 2011. We would expect that these different backgrounds would lead to different MNC practices and different community-company relationships. Although these differences affect the way people and institutions perceive and relate to the state and to companies, they do not explain the variation we found in sustainable strategy implementation by MNCs operating in these countries. On the other hand, we would expect these countries' similarities (i.e., similar relative importance in the mining industry for their GDP and their dependence on FDI and foreign aid) to lead to similar outcomes regarding CSR implementation by MNCs. However, we observed that the implementation outcomes of mining sites operated by the same company or by different companies in these two host countries vary despite these similarities.

Practitioners in the gold mining industry recognize Tanzania and Guinea as being among the most difficult places to operate in sub-Saharan Africa [G.146; G.151; G.144]. Although the mining industry has very different political and economical positions in these two countries, it seems that despite tax incentives and stability measures taken to attract FDI, companies consider that both countries' political or social contexts are unfavorable for conducting business.

Comparing companies operating in Tanzania and Guinea reveals interesting contrasts in many aspects of the host country drivers. Tanzania is a former English colony, which has known relative peace and democracy since its independence in 1962. It has known a long republican regime of Nyerere, whose mission was to unify the country around a language and beyond ethnic belongings. On the contrary, Guinea is a former French colony, which gained independence by rejecting the French administration entirely. This was part of the plan of first independent leader, Sekou Touré, who organized its ideology around anti-western world and socialist propaganda. The country has known one dictatorial regime after another since its independence in 1952, a series of military regimes that resulted in numerous alleged and proven massacres of its citizens and a devastated

economic and human development despite its very wealthy underground. The first democratically elected president took office in January 2011.

Tanzania has a socialist past and opened up to foreign investors during the phase of structural adjustment plans (Mining regulations in favor of MNC) in the 1990s. This signed the re-beginning of large-scale gold mining. National debates on the contribution of the Mining Sector to the national economy and the new Mining Act voted in 2010 have been fierce ever since. Each local company site has its own security and development arrangement with the national and local security forces and authorities in the form of Memorandums of Understanding. In Tanzania, mining accounts for about 5 percent of Tanzania's gross domestic product and a third of exports. In 2011, the value of mineral exports reached \$2.1 billion, more than 95 percent of which came from six gold mines. Gold accounts for 90% of the value of Tanzania's mineral exports. Tanzania also produces copper, silver, diamonds, and natural gas. The importance of the sector is growing, with the value of mineral exports increasing nearly eight-fold between 2005 and 2010.

Guinea has a totalitarian (Sekou Touré) and military past (Captain Moussa Dadis Camara), and the unions allied with civil society members and political parties to riot against the regime in place in 2007-2008. Throughout the history of Guinea since independence, each regime carried its load of civilian massacres (alleged or recognized). The first democratically (according to international criteria, despite the national contestation and criticism spotted in casual discussions) elected president of Guinea was sworn in in December 2010. Recent controversy multiplied in the past few years in the Mining Sector (corruption scandal), with the new mining code voted in April 2011 and only implemented late 2014, and the long wait for legislative elections which only took place in 2014 instead of directly following the presidential elections. National regulations fix security arrangements of large-scale mining companies, since each operating site systematically entails cooperation with a military camp (where a mix of police, gendarmes, and military officers are on duty). Most development arrangements are made through the redistribution of local taxes paid by the company, which should give preference to developing projects of affected communities. Guinea claims almost half of the world's bauxite reserves, as well as significant deposits of iron ore, gold, and diamonds. Mining accounted for 17 percent of gross domestic product in 2010 and over half of exports. However, mismanagement and corruption have plagued the sector for decades, contributing to a depressed economy and widespread public mistrust [World Bank, 2009b]. Guinea's economy is based on the mining sector (26 per cent of GDP, including processing bauxite into alumina) and agriculture (20 per cent). The mining sector provides 95 per cent of export earnings, and in 2010 gold accounted for 54 per cent of total exports.

b) GOLD MINING

The context of gold mining and its consequences are generalizable to other mining sectors, because they are all confronted with community-company conflicts, local development demands, and environmental and social issues. Corporations in the gold mining sector as in other extractive sectors are exposed to a higher risk of conflict with external actors, especially in the areas of environment and human rights [Rees et al., 2012]. Moreover, natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals are often fixed and located in politically as well as geographically difficult environments [Ross, 2003]. Hence, the mining sector is a particularly interesting area to study sustainable strategies used by MNCs to manage their conflicts with communities. Gold is interesting compared to other minerals, because it can be used after a relatively easy process of extracting the mineral out of the rocks or

the sands containing it, contrary to bauxite for instance, which requires a difficult and expensive process in order to be commercialized as aluminum. It is also interesting to study gold mining because it is often mined in open pits, which creates particular relationships with people living around the mines (contrary to underground mining). Gold's symbolic meaning and the myths created around it also attracted our interest. These characteristics are similar to diamond, but gold is less commonly considered a "conflict mineral" than diamonds, and is consequently understudied.

A focus on company-community conflicts in the context of multinational gold mining companies operating in areas of limited statehood serves as a magnifying glass on issues related to sustainable management of stakeholder engagement. Gold is a strategic resource, similar to diamonds in many respects. It provokes in-migration of people to the area for "easy" money, through artisanal gold mining or through its commerce, before and after the companies start operating. This specificity means that tensions over the ownership of land and the resource itself are magnified. Second, before large-scale mining started, artisanal gold mining was practiced within an animist background attached to the mineral itself, the context of its discovery, and to the people who seek to generate economic wealth through its discovery, "mystical" or "symbolic" dimensions [Bryceson et al., 2010; Panella, 2010]. Artisanal gold miners need the protection of the gods and divinities to find the gold, because the mineral is located beyond the limits of the village in the wilderness where demons are active [Bryceson et al., 2010; Jansen, 2010]. This attaches to artisanal gold miners a heroic dimension, which engenders representations of them as proud and dangerous to the rest of the community [Jansen, 2010]. Reminiscence of this is still to be found in some representations of people neighboring large-scale mining operations (see chapter 7). In Tanzania and in Guinea, people living in the capital cities or in other provinces consider gold mining regions to be dangerous areas in their countries. Moreover, in both countries, gold mining areas are located at the border with another country, which also holds its share of conflict-related dimensions [see literature on (African) borders conflicts, for example, Atzili, 2007; Ikome, 2012; Starr et al., 1983].

Each case chosen for this study presents a particular interest to understand why MNCs operating in areas of limited statehood implement variable degrees of sustainability in their strategies to management of community-company conflicts.

c) COMPANIES AND SITES

The three companies we study vary in size and are headquartered in very different home countries. These variations make the findings of our study more generalizable than if we had chosen similar companies. One is headquartered in the "western-world" (Canada), another in the "South" (South-Africa), and the third in Russia. Consequently, they represent different approaches to sustainability strategies for MNCs operating in ALS. Their differences in size and reputation also make our findings generalizable, since we compare two of the top four gold mining companies in the world with a much smaller company yet competing with the others, since it is unlisted on the London stock exchange. These differences, however, neither explain why they all adopt sustainable SES, nor do they explain their variable success in implementing them. We expected the similarities in size and the reputation concerns between the two most visible companies to explain their strategy outcomes, but we found such variety between sites and over time that we consider them irrelevant in this regard.

Company sites constitute our 5 case studies: AGA's 2 sites, one in Guinea and one in Tanzania; ABG's two sites in Tanzania: North-Mara and Buzwagi; and NordGold's site in Guinea: the Société Minière de Dinguiraye.

(1) African Barrick Gold (ABG)

Barrick Gold Corporation (Barrick) operates worldwide. Its African subsidiary, African Barrick Gold (ABG), is currently operating solely in Tanzania. Barrick is the world's largest gold mining company; it holds 74% of ABG's shares. ABG separated from Barrick in 2010 and is Tanzania's largest gold producer through the operation of 3 mines in the country (Bulyanhulu in 2001, North-Mara Gold Mine since 2002, and Buzwagi since 2008).

The North Mara gold mine (NMGM) consists of three open-pit deposits located in the Tarime district, North-Mara region, 43 kilometers from the town of Tarime. Mining is under way at Nyabirama, and the Nyabigena pit is in the development phase. In the wards of Nyamwaga, Kemembo, and Nyamongo, the closest villages to operations are Nyamongo, Kewanja, and Matongo. Four other villages are also affected by the mining operations of ABG: Nyangotto, Nyakunguru, Kerende, and Nyamwaga. The North Mara Gold Mines Ltd. is a subsidiary of the Barrick Gold Company from Toronto (Canada), which owns the mine. Production began in 2002 under the ownership of Afrika Mashariki Gold Mines (AMGM) Ltd. It was later owned by Placer Dome, before Barrick Gold bought the mine and created African Barrick Gold (ABG). The mine currently produces an average of 267,000 ounces of gold (8.51 tonnes) per year. At the present rate of production, it is expected that the mine will last for 12 years. In Tarime district, 40% of local people have less than 1000 TSH per day (about 0.50€) [12.06.11 The Citizen, Tom Mosoba]. There are about 15000 people living in Nyamongo. Probably more than 50 000 people around the mine depend on small scale and artisanal mining. ABG reports 10 000 households displaced by previous owners, many without compensation [12.06.11 The Citizen, Tom Mosoba; T.46]. The dominant ethnic group is (Wa)kurya. The Kurya people have the reputation of being hostile and aggressive, easily starting fights and not easygoing [T.51; T.58; T.63]. The main activity of the Kurya before the company started operating was artisanal and small-scale gold mining.

The Buzwagi mine (Buz) is located in the Kahama district, Shinyanga region and is owned by Pangea Minerals Limited, itself a subsidiary of Barrick Gold Corporation of Canada. The mine started production during the second half of 2009. Barrick Buzwagi's operations affect at least 3 villages in the Kahama District: Mwime, Mwandakulima and Chapulwa, all part of the Mwendakulima ward. The main activities of the dominant tribe, Wasukuma, are farming and raising livestock. The Sukuma people are known to be very polite, tolerant, and easygoing.

(2) AngloGold Ashanti (AGA)

In 1994, a British company, Cluff Resources Plc, was awarded a Prospecting License for the Geita mine area. In 1996, Ashanti Gold Fields Company of Ghana bought Cluff in its entirety and continued with its prospecting work until 1999, when mining activities commenced. Anglo American Corporation merged with Minorco on May 24, 1999 to form Anglo American with its primary listing on the London Stock Exchange and a secondary listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. Its gold mining operations were spun off into the separate AngloGold Corporation. In 2000, AngloGold Company of South Africa bought a 50% stake in Ashanti Gold Fields and in 2004 the two companies merged to form a joint venture company called AngloGold Ashanti Limited (AGA). Anglo American

reduced its stake in AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) to 16.6 percent in 2008 and exited the company completely in 2009. AGA now owns 21 operations on 4 continents, including six in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the Geita Gold Mine in Tanzania (GGM) and the Société Ashanti Goldfield in Guinea (SAG).

AngloGold Ashanti operates the Geita Gold Mine (GGM) in Tanzania. The Geita gold mine is located in the Lake Victoria goldfields of the Mwanza region of Tanzania, about 120km from Mwanza and 4km west of the town of Geita. The mine is wholly owned and managed by AngloGold Ashanti. The 7 villages closest to the GGM mining operations are in Mtakuja ward: Katoma, Isamilo, Mpumvu, Mugusu, Nyakabale, Bugulula, and Nyamwalembu [T.99]. Within Mwanza Region, Geita District is the dominant area for both large and small-scale gold mining. There are more than 15 official small-scale mining centers scattered over the district, including Nyarugusu, Mgusu, Rwamgaza, Nyamtondo, and Mawemeru. Geita district, although small, is the second most populous district in Tanzania. The population has doubled since the early 1990s, since migrants are attracted by the mining opportunities. About 85 % of the population is engaged in subsistence farming and livestock keeping, and agriculture contributes more than 75% of the district's GDP (Lange 2006). The main ethnic groups in Geita region are the Sukuma, Zinza, Haya, Sumbwa, (Wa)Nyamwezi, Luo, Kurya, Jita and Kerewe. The Sukuma dominate, constituting over 90 percent of the region's population.

The Société Ashanti Goldfield (SAG) - also called Société Ashanti de Guinée or Société Aurifère de Guinée - operates in Siguiri prefecture of Guinea since 1993, while exploration started in 1985. Ashanti Goldfield acquired Golden Shamrock and its 85% in SAG in 1998 [mbendi-guinea]. In SAG's contract in 1993 (convention de base), the company was not supposed to pay the *taxe superficielle* [G.35; G.6; G.7]. In 2004, AngloGold merged with Ashanti to form AngloGold Ashanti (what people call "the second SAG"). The Government owns the remaining 15%. Operations are essentially located in the Kintinian CRD (850 km from Conakry) covering an area of 12 villages commonly called Bouré. The 12 villages are directly affected by the mining activities and are all represented in the CPDS: Boukaria is where the firm is located, the others all have a pit in their area. Kintinian is the sub-prefecture's CRD, and Fatoya, Ballato, and Setiya are the villages closest to the pits. Bouré is a land of Camara, as Guineans say: the ethnic group is Malinké from the Camara clan (family). The relationship with the local population is relatively calm. The company encounters problems with artisanal miners and had the experience of a few demonstrations of young people against its practices. The last upheaval took place in the beginning of 2011. The SAG expanded its operations in 2002 and is still in exploration.

(3) NordGold (NG)

NordGold is the owner of the Société Minière de Dinguiraye (SMD) operating in Northern Guinea. It is a young Russian-based company operating 8 mines in Russia, Kazakhstan, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. Since it took over from its parent company OAO Severstal in 2007, NordGold does not play in the same range as AGA or Barrick, but it is a rapidly growing global gold producer. It has international attention, while "its Russian parent had little exposure to outside shareholders" [Thomas, 2012].

The Société Minière de Dinguiraye (SMD) operates in the two prefectures of Dinguiraye and Siguiri. In April 1989, a Convention de Base (Basic Agreement) established the operating company, SMD, as a company owned 50% by DGM (Dinguiraye Gold Mines) and 50% by the Government. In 1998, after entering into a technical assistance contract with DGM, the SMD had to go through an equity

adjustment with Kenor (Norway) and LaSource (BRGM Bureau de Recherche Geologiques et Minières de Guinée) each retaining a 50% interest. Kenor then bought 100% of LaSource in June 1998, confirming the final equities in SMD: DGM owns 85% and the Government 15%. After an exploration phase to expand the activities in 2002, Guineor Gold Corporation (Guineor) became the owner of Kenor's shares in 2004. In June 2006, CrewGold (head quarters in UK) purchased 100% of Guineor's shares as well as 15% of the Government shares. Severstal (Russian) acquired 100% of CrewGold Corporation in January 2011 [NordGold, 2011]. In January 2012, NordGold was listed on the London stock exchange and became a 100% subsidiary.

d) COMMUNITY-COMPANY CONTEXT

These companies operate in different community contexts. The type of activities, the communities' shared identities, as well as their prior conflicts with the companies, attracted our attention because we felt that their differences and similarities might explain the outcomes of MNC strategies. For instance, in our choice of cases, we selected communities that were either stereotyped as hostile to outsiders or stereotyped as easy-going and welcoming, expecting that it would affect MNCs' SES outcomes. Also, if their main activity was artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) prior to the arrival of large-scale mining MNCs, we expected that the SES would face more implementation challenges. We thus chose communities with ASM and others with alternative livelihoods. Finally, we expected that the existence or absence of past conflicts between the communities and the company (sometimes a previous owner) had to vary in order to understand the MNCs' choice of SES to manage conflicts. Due to their comparable differences and similarities, we consider that our findings concerning the influence of communities on MNC's strategy outcomes are generalizable to other communities.

(1) Tanzania

The Sukuma ethnic group is the major group in the regions where AGA's GGM and ABG's Buzwagi sites are located. The Sukuma group is perceived (by themselves and others) as a group of negotiators with calm characters (see chapter 7). AGA operates in Geita region (formerly Geita district until 2013) and ABG's Buzwagi site is situated in Kahama district, affecting mostly the ward of Mwendakulima. Both districts' capitals experienced rapid economic expansion (business center in Kahama, Geita becoming a region). It is a historically calm sub-region, where sungusungu² (village "traditional" vigilante/surveillance group) emerged in the late 1990s [Abrahams1987; Bukurura 1994] before being institutionalized by the state and transferred to the Mara region (and borrowed by Kenya...) [Fleisher, 2000]. In the North-Mara region on the other hand, where ABG's NMGM site is located, the Kurya tribe forms the major ethnic group. There are various clans within the Kurya, that are known to fight among themselves and against other tribes [Tobisson, 1986]. The Kurya perceive themselves as untamable, and people consider them dangerous and aggressive (chapter 7). The sungusungu system did not grow any roots in this setting, because people did not recognize the authority of the sungusungu leaders chosen by the government [Fleisher 200; SA.2].

In Geita, Tanzania, AGA's first encounter with community-company conflict was in 2011, when artisanal miners were rejected from the mining compounds. As they came back into town, they were joined by more people, which ended in a riot during which company buses were burned. In ABG's Kahama site in Tanzania, called Buzwagi, the company has not encountered any open conflicts with communities. The Buzwagi operations started in 2007. Traditional Kurya ethnic groups are perceived (by themselves and others) as proud and troublesome. Where ABG's North-Mara mine is located,

growth is less apparent and this is a historically agitated sub-region (cattle raiding and border conflicts). In its Tanzania North-Mara site, called NMGM (North Mara Gold Mine), ABG encounters regular conflicts with neighboring communities. The operations, under another company called Africa Mashariki Gold Mine Ltd started in 2002. Barrick Gold Corp. took over in 2006, and it was then changed into African Barrick Gold (ABG) in 2010 for the African (at the time only Tanzanian) operations of Barrick Gold Corporation.

(2) Guinea

The two gold mining companies we study operate in the Haute-Guinée region, populated mostly by Malinke (also called Madinka) people around AngloGold Ashanti's (AGA) site, as well as around the Société Minière de Dinguiraye's (SMD) site where a large minority of Foulani also traditionally cohabitate with Malinke. Historically, the Siguiri prefecture, where both companies operate, was an opposition stronghold until the elections of 2010. In Guinea, hunters (village traditional vigilante/surveillance group) have existed from the pre-colonial period and started to organize themselves more formally under Dadis (2008-2009).

The Malinke people of the border with Mali, where AGA's site (called the SAG) is situated, are known to be proud people with a strong temperament (perception of others, of themselves, and behavior observation). Bouré is the name given to the ensemble of communities around AGA's site, the sub-prefectural capital is Kinitinian, and Baraka is the one for those around the SMD, with the sub-prefectural capital being Siguirini. Siguiri, the prefecture's capital, has known rapid economic expansion. In Bouré, which is closest to Siguiri, there are some jealousies related to the development of Siguiri attributed to the profits of the SAG. In Guinea, AGA's main community-company conflicts happened in 2010, when people from inside and outside the mine got together to stop the mine's activity for 3 days. AGA's operations in Siguiri started in 1995.

In Baraka where the SMD operates, tensions within neighboring communities related to the presence of the SMD are part of the past and recent history. Under Dadis, they confronted two NGOs regarding employment opportunities and wages with the SMD, and in the last 5 years there were jealousies arising from the apparently higher economic development of Léro (the village directly next to the main pit) and Siguirini (the sub-prefecture's capital) [interviews with local authorities, elders, and traditional speakers in Siguiri, Lero and Siguirini]. The SMD's community-company conflict experiences consist of regular blockages of company worker's buses (driving them to work), peaceful marches, and oral arguments with company staff. Operations started in 1992.

To evaluate internal company drivers at operational levels and local governance drivers, we compare all five case studies from 2011 to 2013 to find out which combination of drivers explains the variation observed in sustainability implementation. In the end, it is clear that it is the interaction of local drivers (internal company characteristics at operational level, and local governance settings around operations) that allows us to explain most of the observed variation. Interaction of these local drivers inscribed in the global trend of adoption of more sustainable CSR standards explains why some sites and times are more favorable to sustainable dynamics.

B. METHODS

The grounded theory method (GT) is a systematic methodology involving the discovery of theory through the analysis of data [Yancey-Martin & Turner 1986]. Rather than beginning with a

hypothesis, the first step is data collection. From the data collected, the themes that recur most often are marked with a series of codes, which are extracted from the text. The codes are grouped into similar concepts. From these concepts, categories are formed, which are the basis for the creation of a theory or a model, or a reverse-engineered suggestion or hypothesis. This contradicts the traditional model of research, in which the researcher chooses a theoretical framework and only then applies this model to the phenomenon to be studied [Allan 2003]. Our method is closer to a later version of GT called constructivist GT, which was rooted in pragmatism and relativist epistemology. We assume that neither data nor theories are discovered, but are constructed by the researcher as a result of his or her interactions with the field and its participants (not to mention the researcher's background, personality, etc.) [Bryant, 2002; Charmaz, 2008; Mills et al., 2006; Wikipedia].

The first step of the field research, after we selected the case studies according to a MSSD-MDSD, was to conduct interviews with each type of stakeholder over a three-year period (see list of interviews p.286-292). Stakeholders were initially selected according to their status and position. From there, we also used methods of convenience and snowball sampling. We conducted field research in Guinea and Tanzania from 2011 to 2013. We also conducted semi-structured interviews in company HQ in South-Africa with managers involved with sustainability issues. Then we coded all the data collected: interviews, observations, newspapers, notes, public documents by companies, and national regulations.

We also continuously monitored press and topics related to our research questions (observatory tracker, *veille documentaire*) through internet newspaper websites (and double checking with local contacts on information from media) and through local newspapers and radio while on field research. To have an overview of the mindset of practitioners and observers of the mining sector, and to follow the image given by the companies of their own practices and the perceptions relayed by the media on the companies from the business associations and practitioners, we surveyed internet resources (websites, blogs, dedicated social networks) on discourses about companies from NGO activists and (mining) business associations.

a) FIELD RESEARCH: SAMPLE AND INTERVIEWS

We gathered data on local areas and host countries mostly through semi-structured and narrative interviews in Guinea and Tanzania (see full list pp. 286-292). We selected interviewees according to their relevance to our topic (cluster sampling), the potential they had to inform us about our research (judgmental sampling), and through snowball sampling, also called chain referral sampling.

(1) Sampling

Judgmental sampling is a non-probability sampling technique. We selected interviewees based on their knowledge and professional judgment. Since there is no way to evaluate the reliability of the expert or the authority, we combined this technique with other sample techniques.

Cluster sampling was based on the geographical clusters depending on the location of the mining sites and in capital cities, and on their status: mining employees, authorities from the relevant state ministries and institutions, level of hierarchy, NGO employees, specialized journalists, members of local groups, etc. However, within a cluster, individuals tend to have similar characteristics. There is also a risk of having overrepresented or underrepresented certain clusters. We tried to balance clusters as much as possible (see interviews).

We used snowball sampling, mostly “exponential discriminative snowball sampling” [explorable.com]. This is a non-probability sampling technique to identify potential interviewees, because they were often hard to locate. The risk of bias in this technique is due to the fact that interviewees suggest further ones that are usually people they know well; traits and characteristics are often similar [Biernacki et al., 1981]. Since this technique offers little control on the sample, we balanced it with the other techniques.

(2) Interviews

We interviewed central government, national and international NGOs and activists, and IOs in the capital city. Then, we travelled each year to mining areas, starting with regional capitals, and then going down the government’s hierarchy to the village level. We also interviewed non-state actors and journalists in mining areas, as well as youth and women groups, elders, and random individuals. Parallel to interviews, we used techniques of participant observation in mining localities. For instance, staying and living in families of neighboring communities (with translator) and being hosted by companies, allowing to observe and participate in the daily routines and discussions leading to decision-making with on-site community relations departments of multinational gold mining companies. We also participated in public meetings related to issues of community-company relationships. During our experience as a visiting academic in the University of Cape-Town in South Africa, we also took the chance to interview headquarters level sustainability-related managers of one of our company cases in Johannesburg. The following table summarizes the field research period and focus (table 8).

Table 8. Field research periods and focus

	Guinea	Tanzania	South Africa
2011	2 weeks short exploratory field research 6 weeks focus on host country and governance (national and local) = 74 interviews	2 weeks short exploratory field research 8 weeks focus on neighboring communities = 97 interviews	
2012	6 weeks focus on company and neighboring communities = 30 interviews	8 weeks focus on governance (national and local) and company = 63 interviews	
2013	2 weeks finalization focus on company internal dynamics = 31 interviews	3 weeks finalization focus on company internal dynamics = 30 interviews	Headquarters of AGA (operating in Guinea and in Tanzania)

From 2011 to 2013, we held a total of 325 semi-structured interviews (167 in Tanzania, 158 in Guinea, and 2 in South-Africa; see annex for full list). In Tanzania, we conducted 97 interviews in 2011 during our 2 field research trips, 30 interviews in 2012, and 31 in 2013. In Guinea, we conducted 74 interviews in 2011, 63 in 2012, and 30 in 2013. We also held an interview in AGA’s headquarters in Johannesburg, South Africa.

We held 51 semi-structured interviews in capital cities with members of mining ministries, relevant national and international NGOs based in the capital city, country offices of companies, journalists and activists. In the capital city, we carried out a total of 27 interviews in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, and 24 in Conakry, Guinea. In mining areas down to the village level, we conducted 274 semi-structured interviews at the local level (140 in Tanzania, 134 in Guinea), 85 of which were conducted with local government authorities (58 in Tanzania, 27 in Guinea). We organized 160 interviews and focus groups (translated) with local associative groups (wise men, youngsters, or women's groups) and with local journalists and local NGOs (59 in Tanzania, 101 in Guinea). These interviews at the local level often needed to be translated, since rural communities are not literate in languages such as French in Guinea or English in Tanzania. Finding good translators was a challenge every year in

Tanzania, while we were lucky to find a great translator in Guinea who also guided us through a lot of cultural situations, which greatly facilitated our work.

A total of 64 semi-structured interviews at the company operational (OP) level were conducted with community relations department officers and managers, security officers and managers, environment managers, administrative and human resources directors, and representatives of the companies at the village level (when those exist, such as community liaison in SMD, SAG, and ABG), and stakeholder engagement advisers (AGA). In Guinea, our requests for participant observation in the SAG and the SMD sites were granted, which resulted in 48 interviews at OP levels of companies. In Tanzania, we were not granted permission for interviews at operational levels or country offices with any of the actual employees of ABG. To compensate for the lack of interviews with ABG employees and head management, we interviewed more local government actors (58 in TZ against 27 in Guinea) and more villagers and union workers. We managed to interview former ABG employees and to obtain anonymous interviews with union workers. In Tanzania, AGA accepted our request for interviews and our request for participant observation, but due to a lack of preparedness and staff turnover at operational levels, participant observation did not happen. In the end, we interviewed 16 MNC actors in Tanzania.

b) TRIANGULATION

Triangulation entails using multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data, and/or methodologies [Deacon et al., 1998; Denzin et al., 1994; Guion et al., 2011]. However, the emphasis has tended to be on methods of investigation and sources of data. Increasingly, triangulation is also being used as a process of cross-checking findings [Deacon et al., 1998]. The benefits of triangulation “largely result from the diversity and quantity of data that can be used for analysis” [Guion et al., 2011: 3].

“Data triangulation involves using different *sources* of information in order to increase the validity of a study” [Guion et al., 2011: 1]. We triangulated our data by verifying them through interviews with a minimum of three different sources with different backgrounds. For example, if a community member gave us information, we verified through our own observation and in further interviews with government officials, company employee, journalist, or non-state actor. When available, we also triangulated through written documents such as newspapers, company documentation, or grey literature. During the analysis stage, we compared the data to determine areas of agreement as well as areas of divergence. This type of triangulation, where the researchers use different sources, is perhaps the most popular, because it is the easiest to implement.

To a certain extent we also used investigator triangulation when working in teams. “Investigator triangulation involves using several different investigators in the analysis process. Typically, this manifests as an evaluation team consisting of colleagues within a field of study wherein each investigator examines” [Guion et al., 2011: 2]. During our field research in Tanzania and Guinea, a translator and/or a driver often accompanied us. After an interview was conducted in the presence of the translator and/or driver, we would discuss the interview data collected. We also delegated some field research to a local journalist to assess our understanding on one occasion in North-Mara. Validity would be established for the information identified by each observer.

c) CODING


All interviews of the 2011 and 2012 field research were recorded when we obtained authorization from the interviewee. Most relevant interviews were entirely transcribed. In 2013, during some of the interviews, instead of recording entire interviews in which a lot of the previous data was repeated, we took notes on the relevant aspects for which we were missing information. We then coded transcriptions and notes, along with all documents gathered during field research and public documents on companies available online or in hardcopy. Coding of all field research material helped in the operationalization of concepts identified in the literature. We then categorized these concepts in order to create models of interpretation of the data. We thus did not generate suggestions and suppositions on the basis of the data collected, contrary to the traditional grounded theory approach. Instead, we used field research to categorize and operationalize suggestions coming from the literature.

d) ABOUT OPERATIONALIZATION: WEIGHING INDICATORS

To weigh the indicators identified in the operationalization of our independent and dependent variables in each chapter, we consider that they are placed on a continuum. We consider that each indicator is equally important.


Concerning indicators of adoption and implementation of SES by company (chapter 4), we place them on a continuum from not sustainable to sustainable. The continuum helps us assess the level of sustainability reached in discourses and in practices (figure 6):

Figure 6. Sustainability evaluation continuum



We consider that indicators and sub-indicators of drivers are cumulative: the more aspects are high, the higher the dimension studied overall. And conversely, the more indicators are low, the lower the studied dimension is (Figure 7).

Figure 7. Indicators evaluation continuum



After evaluating each indicator separately, we aggregate them following the same logic of continuum. It is only concerning the capacity-building dimension of the long-term perspective in sustainability strategies by companies that we considered some indicators to have more weight than others. If the company has capacity-building initiatives that reinforce the capacity of state actors instead of community members only, we considered that it was more long-term because of the potential for local authorities' capacity to benefit a wider scope of people.

Part 2: Adoption and Implementation of SES by MNCs

Chapter IV — Variation of Sustainability in SES (DV)

Social sustainability of a company's strategies concerns the inclusiveness of a variety of local stakeholders in the decision-making process, the level of multilateralism of communication with stakeholders, and the long-term perspective on consequences of the company's community-related practices (see table 2 and table 3 p.26). Because of their interdependence, the combination of these dimensions of social sustainability in CSR commitments and practices leads to, respectively, adoption and implementation of various levels of sustainability.

Buzzwords like "social license to operate", "sharing the benefits", or "contributing to sustainable development" are used interchangeably in the public claims made by gold mining MNCs to refer to their social sustainability strategies. It is now very common to find this social sustainability vocabulary in the sector. Emerging models of CSR practices are increasingly sustainable, while traditional models used to lack in inclusion of a diversity of local stakeholders, multilateralism in communications with local stakeholders, and were short-term solutions to company-community conflicts [see table traditional and emergent models of SES Kemp, D., 2010].

Considering that adoption is the first step before implementation [Epstein et al., 2010; Falastein et al., 2010; Sabatier, 1991], we first evaluate the degree of social sustainability adopted in each company's discourses at the HQ level in terms of inclusiveness, long-term view, and multilateralism. Since adoption is about formal commitments, strategy formulation, and decision-making [Falastein et al., 2010], we analyze the company's public discourses. We especially focus on the main values stated as such in sustainability reports, letters from the CEOs, and community relations and stakeholder engagement statements in reports, websites, and press releases.

We then explain how we measure the level of sustainability reached by the implementation of these strategies at operational levels. Social sustainability to manage company-community conflict is implemented in the mining sector through stakeholder engagement strategies (SES). Implementation outcomes consist of strategies turned into action. We evaluate the level of inclusiveness, multilateralism, and long-term view reached in company SES practices.

All companies adopted emergent models in their discourses on SES. The fact that implementation outcomes vary widely between cases and over time, and are not grouped by country of operation or by companies, clearly shows that international and home country drivers are not relevant to fully account for it.

A. ADOPTION OF SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY AT HEADQUARTERS LEVEL

Since adoption consist in formulation of and decision-making on strategy commitments, observable aspects of adoption are to be found in public documentation and discourses, codes of conducts, and commitments to voluntary standards (see table 4 p.30).

To evaluate the companies' commitment to social sustainability, we coded information according to the three dimensions of sustainability we identified in the literature, as follows (table 9). Inclusiveness level can be evaluated in discourses about the variety of stakeholders and the importance given to community relations. Multilateralism is observable in statements about

stakeholder status, whether these stakeholders are perceived as equal partners or as troublemakers, or are taken into account out of necessity influences how the company adopts multilateralism aspects of sustainability. The degree to which the company's CSR choices integrate stakeholders' inputs is also an indicator of the company's commitment to sustainability. Finally, the discourse perspective also indicates how committed the company is to sustainability. Choices of contributions and capacity-building initiatives influence the level of commitment of the company to sustainability, whether or not they are adapted to local needs, and whether they empower local actors on the long term.

Table 9. Operationalization of adoption of social sustainability by MNC at HQ level

Sustainability Dimensions	Inclusiveness	Multilateralism	Long-term
Indicators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Variety of stakeholders Community value 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder inputs Stakeholder status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Choice of Contributions Capacity-building strategy

What type of SES is each company adopting? We focus on the way each company's public discourses about stakeholder engagement appears in public and shareholder communication by companies [Kemp 2009; Morsing and Schultz 2006]. Wording of community-related issues in the headquarters' public documentation and discourses can belong to traditional or emergent models of SES (more or less sustainable, respectively) (see table 3 p.26). We operationalize sustainability adoption as shown in the following table (table 10).

Table 10. Indicators of sustainability adoption

INCLUSIVENESS Discourses		
	Variety of stakeholders	Community value
HIGH	Authorities down to village, including non-state	Communities stated in company core values
MED	Authorities down to village level	
LOW	State authorities	Communities not considered as core
MULTILATERALISM Discourses		
	Stakeholder inputs	Stakeholder status
HIGH	Integrated in company from the bottom-up	Considered as an equal /partner
MED	Threat or support	Considered by necessity
LOW	Not considered	Not considered or considered trouble makers
LONG-TERM Discourses		
	Choice of Contributions	Capacity-building strategy
HIGH	Adapted to local and national needs	Income generating projects empowering local leaders
MED	According to national plans	Training, scholarship
LOW	According to company plans	Short term ad hoc projects

Three company and five mining sites constitute our case studies: AGA, with its headquarters in South Africa operates two sites, one in Guinea and one in Tanzania; ABG, subsidiary of Barrick headquartered in Canada and the larger gold MNC in the world, operates two sites in Tanzania: North-Mara and Buzwagi; and NordGold, the Russian based smaller company, with it's site in Guinea: the Société Minière de Dinguiraye (chapter 3).

The three gold mining companies we studied adopted either highly sustainable or socially sustainable approaches to communities. However, the first year of field research led to the preliminary observation that neither of the two ABG sites selected for this study had a sustainable approach to engage local stakeholders to manage community-company conflict. We thought ABG was the only company that did not adopt SES, and we started investigating why this company was an exception. It is only after investigation that we found that headquarters did indeed adopt socially sustainable strategies. We then understood that the variation between our case studies happened during the implementation phase.

Although ABG does not consider community issues as a core value, the company still recognizes the importance of maintaining their "social license to operate". To do so, ABG is committed to including

stakeholders from the national to the village level. The company also considers community projects in the long-term. AngloGold Ashanti's discourses are highly in favor of social sustainability; the company makes it a core value "to leave the communities better off". AGA's discourses on inclusiveness, multilateralism, and long-term aspects are consistent with this statement. NordGold does not appear to be as committed to inclusiveness as the other two companies but has the most favorable multilateralism discourse, stating that the company is a member of the community where they operate.

1. Adoption by Barrick and African Barrick Gold (ABG)

To understand some of the core values articulated in the formulation of strategies to address community conflicts in the case of African Barrick Gold, we also studied the company's parent company, Barrick Gold Corporation (Barrick).

African Barrick Gold's parent company, Barrick Gold Corporation, is committed to the VPSHR, to the UN Global Compact, and is part of the ICCM. However, African Barrick Gold itself is not officially committed to any international standards but affirms it applies principles of the VPSHR and the Global Compact. Barrick's formulation of concerns related to social sustainability displays all aspects of the most long-term, inclusive, and multilateral sustainability discourse. They entail service delivery to neighboring communities adapted to their needs, capacity-building opportunities including long-term empowerment, and two-way communication from a variety of stakeholders at all levels [Barrick, 2012b, 2014] [Barrick, 2012a: 6]. According to Barrick's management approach to society, stakeholders' inputs and collaboration are integrated into CSR program selections according to local, national, and regional needs [Barrick 2012 #1003; Barrick 2012 #1194]. The CEO's statement prefers the term social license to operate over other social sustainability buzz words, while emphasizing the need for multilateralism and inclusion, especially of international level stakeholders [Barrick, 2012a. 6-7]. Although the main value statements of the corporation do not directly address community concerns¹¹ [Barrick, 2012a, 2012b], Barrick's wording shows the adoption of stakeholder engagement strategies situated towards the most socially sustainable end of the sustainability continuum. Barrick corporation's HQ report highlights the specific difficulties of the North-Mara site of ABG in Tanzania (NMGM). It illustrates the corporation's emphasis on inclusiveness of INGO (but also local and national) stakeholders for conflict management, the need for long-term capacity-building (development of appropriate and sustainable alternative livelihoods), and the use of international standards (see chapter 5) as guidelines [Barrick, 2012a. 7, 43]. Barrick was advised to stop reporting on ABG since ABG has become a 100% subsidiary in 2012 [Barrick 2012a: 93].

In ABG's public statements [ABG, 2012a, 2012b, 2013c], community issues are considered as part of the necessity to maintain the social license to operate [ABG, 2013b]. The vocabulary used by ABG shows a clear commitment to stakeholder inclusion: "Responsible mining means conducting our business in a way that reflects our commitment to excellence, to the benefit of all stakeholders as a whole" [ABG, 2012b: 2]. The company is committed to inclusion of a wide variety of stakeholders, such as "residents, governments, and non-governmental organisations in [the] local communities, international agencies and other interested groups" [ABG, 2014b]. Multilateralism also appears as a dimension that ABG adheres to in its relationship with local stakeholders. ABG states that it

¹¹ Values: Integrity, Respect and Open Communication, Responsibility and Accountability, Teamwork, Create Shareholder Values

“encourages open and constructive dialogue” with “all members of the communities in which we conduct business” [ABG, 2014b]. Most press releases are focused on the troublesome history of the North-Mara Gold Mine in terms of conflict management and human-rights improvement with the help of international NGOs and following international standards [ABG, 2013a]. ABG is committed to long-term improvement at the local level, by supporting “training programmes that aim to enhance skill sets within communities” [ABG, 2012b: 4]. The UK based subsidiary of Barrick even states that “a sustainable legacy also represents a shift from a traditional philanthropic approach to strategic social investment, partnership development and integration with the Tanzanian Government’s development plans” [ABG, 2014a].

Barrick and its autonomous subsidiary ABG operating in Tanzania are committed to including stakeholders from the village to the national level, in a multilateral way, and to develop projects on the long-term to secure the company’s social licence to operate (i.e. manage company-community conflicts).

2. Adoption by AGA and its Tanzanian and Guinean sites

Since 2012, inclusiveness and multilateralism have been at the center of AGA’s stakeholder engagement strategy in what they call the “continental Africa region” (including their operations in Guinea and Tanzania) [T.62]. Even before 2012, one of the company’s key value statements considers that communities should be better off for the company having been there [AGA, 2012d].

The South-African based MNC AngloGold Ashanti’s headquarter communication includes all criteria for social sustainability related to communities neighboring the mining operations. It is part of the corporation’s main value statements that communities in which they operate “will be better off for AngloGold Ashanti having been there” [AGA, 2012a: cover b], clearly claiming the long-term outlook of the company. The 2012 CEO’s letter affirms the engagement of the company towards communities and government and recognizes the necessity to improve communication with stakeholders at the local level [AGA, 2012a: 17]. AGA is committed to adopting “an inclusive approach to stakeholder engagement” including “investors, employees, host communities, civil society groups and governments” [AGA, 2012a: 90]. AGA provides a thorough definition of what the company considers to be a stakeholder, namely, “stakeholders are those who are directly or indirectly affected by our business and those with the ability to influence our business outcomes, positively and/or negatively, and social partners are stakeholders with whom we seek to build mutually beneficial relationships” [AGA, 2012d: 6]. They also stipulate their engagement toward multilateralism, since AGA aims “to be responsive to issues and concerns as they arise” [AGA, 2012d: 6]. This shows that multilateralism and inclusion are used in the discourses of AGA about SES.

AGA is committed to the Global Compact, the VPSHR, the World Gold Council, and the ICCM and IMF standards. In the company’s HQ report on operation profiles, the social sustainability discourse is also clear. Concerning their operations in Tanzania, the company’s long-term view is confirmed through the assurance of ongoing capacity-building for artisanal miners and the efforts being made to achieve “positive long-term relationships with the stakeholders” [AGA, 2012b: 4]. The long-term view is also emphasized in the report on the company’s operations in Guinea, affirming the necessity to move from infrastructure building to capacity-building for the future [AGA, 2012c: 3]. Concerning the SAG in Guinea, the company’s multilateralism and inclusiveness are manifested through the stated necessity to identify the stakeholder to engage with, through consultation. It is also made

clear that the two sites are not at the same point in the implementation of the stakeholder engagement strategy. On its Tanzanian site, the strategy “will be ready for implementation by the end of July 2013” [AGA, 2012b: 4]. The discourse thus emphasizes the need for capacity-building in order to roll out the strategy. However, former non-sustainable practices are highlighted as still being pursued to ensure continuity [AGA, 2012b: 4]. The HQ report reaffirms its acknowledgement of the context at operational sites and its will to keep pushing the socially sustainable aspects of its strategy.

AGA and its Guinean and Tanzanian subsidiaries adopt a fully sustainable discourse about their relationships with local stakeholders.

3. Adoption by Selverstal and NordGold

NordGold’s concern for social sustainability is not as developed in their discourse as the two other companies. NordGold is not committed to any international voluntary standards related to social sustainability. On their sustainability webpage, the main criterion highlighted is the long-term capacity-building for the after-mine [NordGold, 2012b]. They do emphasize the three main criteria of inclusiveness, multilateralism, and long-term (scholarships, training, scheduling support of local projects) while continuing infrastructure-building and strategic donations [NordGold, 2012b]. The CEO and Chairman letters display the most multilateral statements, recognizing that the company is a member of the community where they operate and willing to be “a good neighbour in our communities” [NordGold, 2012a: 12]. The main values statement manifests the company’s interest for social sustainability: “We value the trust of all our stakeholders and strive to create a positive working environment founded on cooperation, reciprocity and responsibility” [NordGold, 2013]. Capacity-building for the future is the main criterion emphasized throughout the HQ’s community strategy: “we support projects which our communities can sustain long after our mines are gone” [NordGold, 2012a: 77], [NordGold, 2012b]. However, inclusion is mainly focused on national level government stakeholders [NordGold, 2012a: 96].

As a result, we observe that NordGold adopted a sustainable discourse emphasizing two out of three dimensions. The Russian based company is very committed to multilateralism and long-term perspectives, but not as much to inclusion of a variety of stakeholders.

B. CONCLUSIONS ON ADOPTION OF SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

Each company studied in this research adopted social sustainability discourses concerning the way to manage company-community conflict and engagement of stakeholders in general (table 11). The level of sustainability endorsed varies slightly from one company to the other, but there is a clear consensus on the necessity to implement social sustainability, which is coherent with the trend presented in the literature review (chapter 2).

Table 11. Social sustainability discourse adoption by HQ

	ABG	AGA	NordGold
Multilateralism	MED	HIGH	HIGH
Inclusiveness	HIGH	HIGH	MED
Long-term view	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
SES Adoption	HIGH	HIGH	MED/HIGH

Although ABG does not consider community issues as a core value, the company still recognizes the importance of maintaining their “social license to operate”. To do so, ABG is committed to including stakeholders from the national to the village level. The company also considers community projects

in the long-term. AngloGold Ashanti's discourses are highly in favor of social sustainability; the company makes it a core value "to leave the communities better off". AGA's discourses on inclusiveness, multilateralism, and long-term aspects are consistent with this statement. NordGold does not appear to be as committed to inclusiveness as the other two companies but has the most favorable multilateralism discourse, stating that the company is a member of the community where they operate.

The commitments, formulation of strategies, and decision-making regarding communities issues reflect that NordGold, AGA, and ABG use discourses belonging to "emerging" sustainable models of CSR [Kemp, D., 2009] (table 3). Although the three companies all agree on the best strategy to adopt, their success in implementing the strategy at their operational levels differs.

C. IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABILITY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL

Companies reach various levels of inclusiveness, multilateralism, and long-term perspective in their implementation of stakeholder engagement strategies relevant for company-community conflict management. How can we evaluate whether a company is successfully implementing social sustainability in its CSR approach to community-relations?

Implementation is about translating strategies adopted at the headquarters into action at operational levels (table 4). The process of implementation is more complex than adoption because of its permeability to external actors and institutions [Falastein 2010; Barrett 2004]. It also entails tensions between the way things used to be done and the new ways being implemented (table 7, transition models synthesis p.58). Here, we categorize the implementation outcomes of each company according to the ideal-types defined in chapter 2 (table 3). Therefore, in this section, we address the following questions: which external actors and institutions do the companies choose to meet during implementation and how often (inclusiveness)? Through which communication channels and how do they interact (multilateralism)? And what comes out of these meetings (long term perspective)?

The level of inclusiveness of conflict-management strategy outcomes can be measured through two main dimensions: the frequency of meetings between company representatives and community representatives, and the variety of stakeholders engaging with the company (table 12). The frequency of meetings varies from no regularity - especially in the case of ad hoc meetings organized by the company when tensions rise within communities against the company - to regular meetings that take place more than 4 times a year. Regular meetings are not necessarily planned in advance; they can consist of the CR officers regularly coming through the village to greet and talk with village authorities, for example. The type and level (variety) of stakeholders can be observed by paying attention to the level and type of stakeholder engaged and consulted by the company. If the company only engages with state authorities, the variety is low, but when authorities down to the village level are consulted, we can consider it to be medium in a comparative perspective, because not all companies engage with authorities below the district level. A company that engages with state authorities down to the village level and includes traditional (wise men council, non-state vigilante groups) or religious leaders and/or local women or youth groups in their consultations has a high level of variety of stakeholders included in its SES (table 12).

Multilateralism of SES concerns the level of sustainability in the communication between the companies and the communities. To evaluate whether a company is using unilateral, asymmetrical, or symmetrical communication with its local stakeholders [Pater and Lierop 2005; Kemp 2010; Rindova and Fombrun 1998; Morsing and Schultz 2005], one needs to analyze at least two parameters: accessibility of the community relations department to the neighboring communities, and the information and feedback the company provides to the demands of the communities (table 19: multilateralism indicators). CEOs of multinational mining companies themselves recognize that “field level communications (are) crucial to management. It is argued that information must flow freely in both directions” [Luning 2012: 207].

Feedback to stakeholders informs us on how much stakeholders’ needs are relevant to the company’s practices (table 12). The more stakeholders receive feedback through information and/or actions, the more multilateral the strategy implemented. Accessibility varies according to the location of the CR offices and the means by which community members can reach the CR officers, manager, or the higher hierarchy. Location of the office is decisive, whether communities have to go through a whole security check or can simply visit by knocking on a door makes a big difference. Also, if community representatives have a variety of alternatives to communicate with the CR (e.g., phone, letters, meetings), the communication becomes more symmetrical than if they can only write letters while company representatives have the choice of means to communicate with them. On the other hand, whether community members have access to CR departments to express their demands is relevant especially if their demands are addressed, thus feedback is critical to assess multilateralism levels.

The long-term perspective of SES by companies is an important dimension in assessing the degree of sustainability of outcomes. Indeed, if a company includes a wide variety of stakeholders, meets them regularly, allows them to communicate easily with its CR department, and provides them with good feedback on their demands, the company’s strategy cannot be very sustainable if these initiatives are not followed by long-term actions implemented at the local level. The long-term aspect ensures that communities become self-reliant instead of becoming dependent on the company to sustain them.

The suitability of social infrastructures constructed or financed and the capacity-building projects implemented through the company’s CSR funding and technical assistance are two critical characteristics for evaluation of the degree of long-term perspective entailed in CSR programs by companies (table 12). Infrastructure suitability varies according to how relevant to the local development plans (LDP), needs, and demands. Beisheim & Liese [2014] also measure capacity-building to evaluate effectiveness of PPPs in areas of limited statehood [Beisheim et al., 2014: 29]. Our study adapts their capacity-building criteria to evaluate the long-term perspective of SES by gold mining MNCs. Beisheim & Liese evaluate whether the provision of assistance is short, medium, or long term, whether it strengthens local leadership’s organizational and management capacities, and whether it provides funds for capacity development¹². We consider that short, medium, and long

¹² High capacity-building consists in “Medium- and long-term provision of assistance for human resource development, strengthening of local leadership qualities, and/or organizational and management capacities. Provision of funds (grants) for local measures of capacity development”, while medium capacity-building entails “Several short-term and project-related training programs for human resource development, strengthening of local leadership qualities, and/or organizational and management capacities”, and Low “No or only some short-term and project-related activities such as provision of training manuals or best-practices documents” [Beisheim & Liese 2013: 29].

term perspectives depend on how much they are actually answering local needs and demands, and participating in the capacity of neighboring communities to develop their own skills and development means. We assess capacity-building by the type of program funded or the number of people trained, and the scope of benefits that these programs encompass. Companies also often have parallel philanthropic donations that are not considered part of a sustainable SES strategy, since they are not contributing to social infrastructure or capacity-building.

This study on multinational gold mining companies in Tanzania and Guinea found that companies adopted sustainability approaches, which is in line with the trend of more sustainable CSR practices. Not all have succeeded in implementing a high level of sustainability for these strategies at operational levels. The level of sustainability in SES implemented varies over time and from one operational site to another. African Barrick Gold (ABG), a UK-based multinational company (MNC) operating in the Lake Zone of Tanzania, just recently separated from Barrick Gold Corporation from Canada; NordGold, operating in northern Guinea from its headquarters in Russia; and AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), which operates in northern Guinea and in the Lake Zone of Tanzania and has its headquarters in South-Africa, have implemented stakeholder engagement strategies in the past years, but with a wide variety of sustainability levels. NordGold's Guinea mine, after an ambitious attempt to implement highly sustainable SES in 2012, had not implemented change in its strategy in 2013, while AGA, also operating in northern Guinea, continued to improve the sustainability of its SES in Guinea, but not at its site in the lake zone of Tanzania, where SES levels stayed average. Also operating in the lake zone of Tanzania, ABG's most problematic site increased its SES sustainability levels in 2012, but they decreased again in 2013 despite ongoing violent conflict with neighboring communities that resulted in international naming and shaming campaigns by transnational NGOs, damaging the company's reputation. On the other hand, ABG's other Tanzanian site, located near where AGA operates, jumped from low to comparatively high levels of sustainability in SES from 2011 to 2013, a period during which it had no open conflict with communities.

Table 12. Indicators of sustainability implementation

INCLUSIVENESS Implementation		
	Frequency of meetings	Variety of stakeholders
HIGH	More than quarterly	State authorities down to village, including customary/religious leaders and local groups
MED	Regular	Authorities down to village level
LOW	Ad hoc, no regularity	State authorities
MULTILATERALISM Implementation		
	Accessibility	Feedback
HIGH	CR offices accessible and personal contacts (phone, email)	All stakeholder demands are addressed, ongoing feedback and information
MED	CR offices accessible; no personal contact	Some stakeholder demands addressed, little feedback and information
LOW	CR offices inside gates, no contacts	Demands not addressed, no feedback, unilateral information
LONG-TERM perspective Implementation		
	Infrastructures adaptation	Capacity-building
HIGH	Negotiated, answering specific demands, integrated in local development plans (LDP), adapted to needs and demands	Long-term, scheduled funding for local income generating projects and empowering local leaders
MED	Integrated in local development plans (LDP), adapted to needs and demands	Training for local leaders (management, human-rights, legal), inclusive scholarship
LOW	Not integrated in LDP, not adapted to needs and demands	Short term projects or small impact scholarships

NordGold's Guinea mine, after an ambitious attempt to implement highly sustainable SES in 2012, had not implemented a change in its strategy in 2013. AGA, also operating in northern Guinea, kept increasing the sustainability of its SES in Guinea, but not at its site in the lake zone of Tanzania. Also

operating in the lake zone of Tanzania, ABG's most problematic site increased its SES sustainability levels in 2012, but they decreased again in 2013 despite ongoing violent conflict with neighboring communities. On the other hand, ABG's other Tanzanian site, located near where AGA operates, jumped from low to comparatively high levels of sustainability in SES from 2011 to 2013.

1. Implementation by NordGold's Société minière de Dinguiraye in Guinea (SMD)

There have been important upheavals around the SMD during the dark periods of the Guinean regime. It seems the SMD was more politically embedded than the SAG (AGA's site operating in the same region), which could be because the State has no share in the SMD, compared to the SAG in which the government holds 15% [G.85 SMD security director]. Since 2011, conflicts between the company and communities have not led to violence. Despite a large number of thefts, trespassing, and protests from the communities, the SMD's security, working with the Guinean army, has not used direct confrontation measures. In 2012, the community relations' manager presented a very sustainable SES to the communities and the MD. The idea was to reconcile the needs of the company for stability and the demands of the communities [G.44] [Société minière de Dinguiraye SMD, 2012b]. The strategy intended to develop the area in the long-term through the funding and monitoring of income generating activity and through inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders, both in number and variety, and engagement in ongoing multilateral dialog [Société minière de Dinguiraye SMD, 2012a, 2012b]. With the resignation of the administration manager (head of the CR section), the CR manager, and the security manager (also in charge of much of the conflict management strategies), the implementation of more sustainable conflict management did not follow through [G.144; G.149; G.154]. In 2013, none of the strategies were implemented. It appeared that the MD and the communities neither supported nor understood the innovative strategy [G.122; G.116; G.144; G.143; G.156; G.153].

(1) Inclusiveness

Before 2011, there was hardly any contact between the company and local stakeholders. The company's strategy for company-community conflict management was mostly ad hoc "philanthropic" donations to strategic members of the community, mostly wise men and religious leaders [G.44; G.86; G.89; G.83; G.123]. In 2011-2012, the company greatly improved its presence in the community. Community relations department's representatives toured the neighboring villages to introduce the new stakeholder engagement strategy to governmental, customary, and youth groups [G.116; G.118]. In the course of 2012-2013, after the CR manager resigned and some of the most qualified CR officers were shifted to other departments, consultation with local stakeholders weakened again [G.159; G.152; G.149]. Over the three-year period of research, even when local stakeholders were included, meetings were only held on the initiative of the company and mostly following confrontational events (negotiations following theft or protests) [G.83; G.85; G.86-94]. The communication was thus unilateral. The SMD established an income-generating project funding system before 2011, which allowed capacity-building adapted to the local needs. With community officers based in villages where the projects were taking place, guiding and monitoring was done on a daily basis [G.90; G.152; G.149]. In 2011 when our research started, the projects were still in place, but with the reshuffling of the community relation department in 2011-2012, follow up faded and projects were hardly existent in 2013 [G.152; G.149; G.157].

The company kept the same government relation manager since the beginning of operations under the ownership of CrewGold in 2006 [G.44; G.50; G.85]. He is based in the capital city, Conakry, and he reports to the managing director of the SMD, who reports to the headquarters [G.44; G.50; G.120]. Before 2011, besides this link with the central government, the company had little relationship with other local stakeholders; preferring to phone the prefecture officials in Siguiri (134 km away) rather than the sub-prefectural, village, or non-state representatives directly neighboring the operations [G.83; G.86-94]. Before 2011, the SMD did not have a specific engagement strategy for local stakeholders. The company made strategic donations in line with the philanthropic stage of CSR history [G.123].

Between 2011 and 2012, the SMD started including a wider range of local stakeholders in the negotiations following conflicts (stopping workers' buses, protesting in front of administrative offices; see chapter 7). Usually, these negotiations involved the sub-prefectural and hamlet chiefs from Léro, and the youth associations from Amina and Léro [G.44; G.118; G.93; G.91]. Youth groups from these two neighboring villages commonly negotiate together in case of troubles (see chapter 7) [G.121; G.123]. At the same time, the SMD entered into negotiations about compensation issues. These negotiations took place between SMD representatives, landowners, local authorities, and prefecture representatives (mines and agriculture departments) to reach a consensus [G.118; G.116]. In 2012, the mayor of Siguirini explained: "nowadays SMD is trying to rebuild the relationship and visits the Mayor and the sub-prefect often" [G.116]. The SMD also held a public forum to inform people about the changes in their CR department [G.116; G.118; G.122]. CR officers and manager then visited all 17 districts of the neighboring villages to list the income generating projects in order to evaluate them in view of future funding [G.116; G.118; G.152; G.149]. Thus, in 2011-2012, stakeholder inclusion jumped from none to a wide range and variety. In 2012-2013, village level stakeholders were no longer included, and no other public forums were held [G.143; G.144; G.149; G.154]. Inclusion variety went back down. The prefect of Siguiri stayed involved in cases of important conflicts, and the sub-prefecture level took part in negotiations following protests of the communities [G.143; G.154]. Other types of stakeholders such as customary authorities and youth groups have not been consulted since 2012.

From 2011 onwards, in cases of company-community conflict, the issue has normally been handed on to the community relations department, which then tries to talk about it with the local population [G.119]. Visits of the CR officers at the village level are mostly scheduled around growing tensions or informing about projects or blasting. "CR officers come when they feel the need, not the other way around" [G.88]. After the May 2013 protest (see SMD local risk/accountability strategies, chapter 7), there was a week of discussions between SMD and sub-prefect, wise men leaders (called *douti*), prefecture representatives of agriculture, mines, environment and livestock keeping [G.143; G.144; G.146; G.149]. Before or after that, communities did not receive the visit of SMD representatives [G.149; G.154]. Hence, between 2011 and 2013, the frequency of visits was low, since it was mostly scheduled for post-conflict negotiations.

(2) **Multilateralism**

Despite the headquarters' commitment to consider itself a "member of the communities where we operate" [NordGold, 2012a], the SMD's communication with neighboring communities is poor. Even

if CR offices are rather accessible, communication is unilateral since feedback to communities is lacking. Overall, multilateralism levels stay comparatively low from 2011 to 2013.

Since the beginning of CrewGold's ownership of the SMD, the CR and Security departments have been separated from the rest of the administration. They are more accessible because there is no need for a security badge to visit these offices. Still, although any community stakeholder has the possibility to access these offices, access to administration buildings, where the managers have their office, is restricted. These two departments directly in charge of communities are installed in the buffer zone between the gates and the administration and plant. Community leaders, state and non-state, regularly come to express their demands or complaints to CR officers. Sometimes these community stakeholders invite the CR officers to come to the village. Invitations to come to the village are usually honored by CR officers but not by the higher hierarchy [G.82; G.88; G.146; G.154]. Hence from 2011 until 2013, accessibility was medium compared to other cases in which communication took place through means other than only public meetings (phone calls, individual visits, paper work).

Since 2011, CR officers listen to communities' demands expressed in public meetings and report to the service department in charge of execution once the project has been approved [G.90; G.118; G.149; G.154]. The goal of meetings with local elected leaders is to make the local population aware of the opportunities that arise from the company being in their area –for example through the infrastructure that has been built (roads connecting places that weren't connected before) – and calming them down in case of tensions [G.90; G.118; G.119; G.120]. Meetings are thus not organized with the objective to pursue co-construction of decisions regarding CSR plans. Communication is unilateral, since the SMD representatives rarely give feedback to demands expressed by communities, be it through communication or actions. "Since 1 year and 5 months, no more contact, we are not informed of anything and no one came to explain this change" [G.123]. The fact that in 2012, the philanthropic/donation practices stopped without no explanation to the local leaders, illustrates the lack of feedback from the SMD to communities. To answer this lack of multilateral communication, the idea of creating a consultation committee was on the table since 2012. There were discussions on how regularly it should be conveyed, "participants asked that it would be each 3 months to review the engagements. It was supposed to be in June but the direction changed the plans" [G.118, SMD CR manager 08.11.2012]. In 2013, the committee was still not implemented [G.116; G.144; G.149].

The SMD projected in 2012 to support 19 income-generating groups. In 2013, groups were still waiting for the promised support [G.116; G.118; G.122]. In 2013, the company plans to diffuse information about the SMD through the radio station in Siguirini [G.144]. Radio is a good public information medium for neighboring communities, but it is also the most unilateral. The week of negotiations after the May 2013 protest (see chapter 7 local risks) led to an agreement protocol reached through negotiations [G.143; G.144; G.154]. This agreement entailed that all non-qualified job offers should privilege people from the neighboring villages. The deficit of feedback was made very clear during the following negotiations [G.143]. Creating a consultation committee was again part of the agreement reached between communities, authorities, and SMD after May 2013 [G.143; G.144; G.148].

On the whole, the SMD uses unilateral means of communication since 2011, thus SES practices stay constant at a low level of multilateralism.

(3) Long-term perspective

The long-term perspective of the SMD was based on infrastructure construction and income-generating group support before 2011. These practices slowly decreased to be almost nonexistent in 2013. This trend is mostly due to the diminishing follow up on income-generating projects implemented since 2008 in neighboring villages, and to the absence of funding for social infrastructure, doubled by the lack of expertise on local needs both by government and CR.

The SMD's participation in infrastructure construction usually does not respond to the communities' needs or demands. The company did move on from an exclusively philanthropic CSR approach to a more sustainable way of contributing to social infrastructure especially in 2012, but did not sustain it in 2013. Before 2011, the SMD's strategy to manage conflict was to make donations to the sub-prefect, local authorities, elders, and religious leaders, in the form of money ("envelopes"), rice donations, and funding pilgrimages to Mecca [G.44; G.82; G.83; G.85; G.86; G.118; G.119]. "Bonuses to the Mayor, sub-prefect etc... and around them no one else benefited!" [G.118; SMD CR manager 08.11.2012]. CSR-related building of infrastructures consisted of participating in the funding of Mosques, schools, health centers, and a stadium [G.44; G.83; G.92-94; G.118]. However, even in its participation in social infrastructures, there is little coherence between what the SMD does and the local development plans [G.143; G.150]. Until 2011, villages included in the income-generating project funding by the SMD did however participate in decisions regarding the planning of activities in their village by discussing regularly with the CR liaison officer in charge [G.90; G.149; G.152]. Still, in 2011-2012 when local groups were missing the competence to decide which project was needed, the SMD decided which type of activity to fund (without a socio-economic expertise of the area, see corporate design SMD chapter 8) [G.152]. In these cases, the SMD still tried to integrate local groups into the decision-making processes for projects in their villages [G.44; G.152]. Until 2012, infrastructures were somehow adapted to local development needs, even in the absence of accurate local development plans (chapter 7 see co-management capacities) or socio-economic studies. By mid 2012, the SMD was no longer involved in income-generating projects, which also reduced its consultation with local villages [G.149; G.154]. In 2012-2013, there was no social infrastructure funding and little integration between (scarce) CSR decisions and local development plans. In 2013, the company planned to get involved in the way their tax money is used at the local level to make sure it answers local collective needs [G.144].

The company's capacity-building aspects of SES vary from providing transport to pupils, grants for teachers, awareness programs, and technically, materially, and financially supporting income generating activities in the villages neighboring their operations. These more sustainable projects suffered from a lack of follow up until they were practically inexistent by 2013.

"Simple facts on the practices from 1995 until today, especially 2005 to 2010: 5 buses given to the communities created strong expectations, was it really beneficial and pertinent? In the long run? I showed the mistake in the strategy... how did they go around before the buses?" [G.118; SMD CR manager 08.11.2012].

The SMD provides buses to transport pupils for national exams, which contributes to some extent to capacity-building, especially considering that the SMD is located in such a remote area (134 km away

from the prefecture capital on a dirt road almost impracticable during rainy season). Since before 2011, 31 teachers are paid directly by the SMD at the sub-prefecture level, which might seem like a small effort but has its importance in terms of creating incentives for these teachers to hold classes despite the enclave situation of the locality [G.118; G.143]. The campaigns of the CR officers against artisanal mining develop awareness in communities about the dangers of mercury. Also, training of security guards in Human Rights [G.119; G.143] can be counted as participating in capacity-building in the long term, given that security guards employed by the company are usually uneducated and illiterate [G.119].

In 2008, the SMD started materially supporting agriculture projects, income generating groups, and women's associations. Some successful projects were selling crops to the SMD cantina [G.149; G.143]. Before 2011, there were 7 projects funded and monitored by the CR liaison officers [G.149; G.152; G.154]. In 2012, only two women's groups received material support (working tools) [G.116; G.123]. The 19 projects selected by the SMD in 2012 still had not received the money and no agenda had been set by 2013. Thus, income-generating project support was participating in capacity-building of local groups through sharing of knowledge and expertise until 2012 before they slowly decreased to become quasi-inexistent in 2013.

(4) SMD SES sustainability over time

The SMD's SES sustainability continuously decreased from 2011 to 2013, despite a peak in inclusiveness in 2012. Especially the long-term perspective, which seemed promising in the beginning of operations, decreased to low levels in 2013.

International drivers are not favorable to adoption in the first place (chapter 5), but NordGold adopted a socially sustainable strategy to manage community-company conflict at the headquarter levels. However, implementation is weak at its Guinean site. We explain the fluctuation of sustainability outcomes in this case mostly with the changes within the community relations department at operational level (see chapter internal). Also, despite the population being hostile to the presence of the company, neighboring communities have enough cohesion and trust among them to co-manage conflicts with the company (see chapter local).

Before 2011, when the CR department took autonomous decisions about community related projects, the department had a lot of staff and resources (including liaison officers based in villages): capacity-building projects were somewhat sustainable. After 2011, when a new, very dedicated, CR manager was hired, the autonomy within the department decreased, as did the number of agents in the field. However, the CR manager consulted local stakeholders to present his projects. He met with government authorities down to the village level and with youth associations, women groups, and wise men of each of the neighboring villages. Towards the end of 2012, it appeared that his projects were too costly and misunderstood; they were not implemented, the CR manager resigned. In 2013, there was no CR manager to replace him and the department still lacked resources and staff to meet its responsibility of implementing a sustainable conflict management strategy (see chapter 8).

2. Implementation by AGA's Societe Aurifère de Guinée in Guinea (SAG)

The relationship between the SAG and neighboring communities is relatively calm. The company encounters a lot of artisanal miners trespassing and had the experience of a lot of protests, marches, and blockage from the communities. Important non-violent protests took place in the beginning of

2011, and mid-2012, stopping the mine for 2 to 3 days each time. These various company-community conflicts have not led to open violence, because the SAG uses communication with local leaders to negotiate solutions with communities. The company increased the level of sustainability in SES from 2011 onwards. The SAG's managers and officers in charge of community issues are open to the visit, phone calls, and public demands of local stakeholders including not only state representatives from the central to the village level, but also elders, youth groups, and women's associations. However, the company implemented very few CSR activities with long-term impact. The local governance context is favorable to sustainable conflict management due to a well-organized youth and because the company always refrained from using violence to manage community confrontations (see chapter 7).

(1) Inclusiveness

Besides welcoming any community members to visit their CR offices, the SAG's local recruitment practices entail consultation on CSR practices, because the recruitments are done through the local administration and include the hunters' brotherhood. The company also has a partnership with a national NGO specialized in capacity-building and conflict resolution (the PROJEG, see chapter). The leader of youth association of the central village of Bouré where the SAG operates, took in its hands to settle the disputes about employment by organizing an upheaval in order to be heard by the company in 2012 (see chapter 7). Since then, he is the spokesperson of the youth, and the SAG involves him when they are recruiting "casual" (unqualified) labor. In 2012, women's associations were also consulted on occasion. In 2013, the SAG and other mining MNCs operating in Guinea started to advise the state on land issues, particularly related to compensation policies (see chapter 6). This entails regular meetings with state representatives at the central, regional and local levels. Besides some regular meetings, most encounters between the company and the communities are done following events of artisanal miners trespassing into the mining compound to enter the pits. The company's CR department still has a "fireman" role leading to ad hoc decisions (incremental change) instead of having a sound implementation scheme (fundamental change). In 2013, the sustainability manager was making efforts to guide the company's site towards a more long-term direction.

Since 2006, the SAG hires Madinka hunters¹³ through the village government [G.55; G.110; G.111; G.126]. The company first started operating in the Boukaria village, so recruitments there are greater than in other villages [G.110; G.112]. Then the SAG started operating in the Fatoya village, they hired people from there, and so on [G.110; G.112]. The company's operations now touch 11 villages and they are hiring people in each of them [G.52; G.130]. By hiring Madinka hunters and employing youth from these villages, the company also engages in dialog with the village administration and youth groups for recruitment procedures [G.110; G.112]. Since 2009, a national NGO with representatives in each region and most prefectures in Guinea, the PROJEG, is working with the SAG to better put in place its CSR activities in the mining region [PROJEG, 2009a]. The SAG seems to be cooperating well with the NGO and the local community [AGA, 2013]. In 2011, the representatives of the CR department of the SAG participated in the mediation committee ("comité

¹³ The hunter brotherhood in Guinea is a traditional social organization of the Madinka people. Besides their responsibility to provide meat for the community to eat, they also used to facilitate military interventions and protect villages [Camara, 2010]. The colonization put an end to their political and military role but they are still an respected social group at the local level [Camara, 2010].

de mediation et de suivi”) at the village level (see chapter 6) [G.68; G.65; G.66]. This reconciliation committee involved representatives of all eleven villages affected by the company's actions [PROJEG, 2009a: 5]¹⁴. CR officers are mostly in contact with customary authorities (council of wise men) and local state administration. [G.130; G.131; G.135]. As a result, the variety of stakeholders included before 2012 is high, since the SAG engages not only with state authorities but also youth groups, NGOs, and customary authorities.

Since 2012, SAG receives youth and women's associations from the villages when they have projects that necessitate funding [G.112; G.132; G.133]. The Secretary of the Collectivities of Siguiri mentioned that a forum was held in which women, youth, workers, the communities came together to talk about their issues with SAG [G.36]. Also in 2012, (after major blockage; see local risks chapter 7) youth groups were included in the hiring process of unqualified workers recruited from the neighboring villages [G.103; G.109; G.112; G.113]. The youth groups managed the distribution of recruitments; even some villages where the SAG has no activity benefit from recruitment procedures [G.109; G.112]. In 2013, we attended one of the meetings about compensation framework between the SAG and the prefecture authorities concerned [G.136]. There were several meetings held and more were scheduled in order to include local authorities on sensitive questions related to resettlement and compensation of land [G.130; G.136; G.137]. During negotiations about land to be acquired, prefecture, sub-prefecture, and village level authorities as well as wise men are included [G.136; G.137]. In 2013, the SAG was trying to re-launch the mediation/reconciliation committee (“comité de suivi et de mediation”) to include all village authorities in decisions related to CSR [G.130]. In 2012-2013, inclusion reached comparatively high levels of inclusiveness, since the SAG engaged with stakeholders from the local to the regional level, governmental, non-governmental, customary, and local associations.

Before 2010, the communication was very scarce between the SAG and neighboring communities. CR officers acted “like firemen” [G.130], only to extinguish the tensions in the communities. The CR officers visited communities only when tensions were rising against the company. In 2011 in Kintinian, local authorities and elders of the village met regularly with representatives of SAG to talk about the serious environmental and social problems the population had [G.58; G.60; G.61; G.66]. The meeting was held once a year [G.60]. In 2011-2012, meetings between the president of the district (representing the village concerned) and SAG (department of community relations) were held spontaneously every time the population submitted complaints that the company wanted to take into account [G.66]. In 2012, the SAG’s representatives met with the sub-prefect regularly even if there was no fixed schedule [G.61; G.114]. “Usually, the CR makes an appointment, but I can also go spontaneously in case of emergency” [G.114]. The SAG continues to hold meetings mostly in case of tension with the neighboring communities. In crisis situations, a discussion takes place in Siguiri with representatives of the SAG, of the civil society, administrative authorities, wise men, and youth leaders [Mazalto et al., 2010]. In 2012-2013, although the CR still has a firemen role, the prefect and governor take part in negotiations when tensions arise at the village level, when the roads are blocked or trucks are held up [G.130; G.140]. CR officers are regularly present in meetings at the

¹⁴Pour le Président de la CRD de Kintinia les rapports sont plus ou moins bons car, la SAG a permis le fonctionnement d'un cadre de concertation qui existait depuis longtemps mais non fonctionnel le comité de suivi/ composé de 11 villages autour de la CRD, le sous préfecture et la préfecture. La mission de ce comité est d'intervenir dans le cadre des situations entre la SAG et les villageois pour sauvegarder les intérêts des villageois. [PROJEG 2009 : 5]

village, sub-prefecture, and prefecture levels and for immediate conflict resolution as mediators [G.133; G.135; G.140]. In 2012-2013, the frequency of consultation and meetings is average in comparison to other mining sites.

Inclusiveness practices by the SAG varied a lot between 2011 and 2013 considering the variety of stakeholders and the frequency of visits of the CR in neighboring communities. The SAG kept a relatively high variety of stakeholder engagement since 2011, attaining a wide range of stakeholder in 2012. The CR departments mostly visit communities when they feel the need to calm down rising company-community tensions, but also had regular meetings with stakeholders in 2011-2012. The frequency of consultation varied significantly between 2011 and 2013. From very rare consultations before 2011, the SAG representatives started visiting neighboring village and local authorities more regularly in 2011-2012 before reducing their presence again in 2012-2013.

(2) **Multilateralism**

CR department and managers of the SAG are one of the most accessible of the five case studies over time. From 2011 to 2013, accessibility to the SAG was easy and was done through all possible means: visits, phone calls, meetings.

Since the beginning of operations, the CR offices have been open to visits without appointments and have been easily accessible for anyone without having to go through excessive security procedures. During our participant observation in 2013, we were able to assess how often people came to the administrative offices to meet either with the CR manager or the MD's advisor. Every day, community representatives of youth organization, women association, elders, and also random individuals came to the offices to express complaints, demands, or even greetings. Since 2010, individual people from communities as well as leaders from youth or women associations, local customary or elected leaders also have the possibility to call the MD adviser for any reason, and he is receptive to their call, answers directly over the phone, or invites them for an audience. The MD's adviser on community issues communicates a lot with communities, especially at the prefecture level.

Although offices are very friendly, feedback from the company to communities' demands remained comparatively low from 2011 to 2013. Despite integrating the youth leader of the area in the recruitment process for unqualified labor and giving some feedback to local authorities — especially concerning compensation related to the company's expansion of activity in 2011-2012 — feedback stays rather poor overall. People often consider that “the SAG never does anything without pressure through some kind of violence, they never ask anything about what we need for our development” [G.67, wise men for Fatoya village in the Siguiro prefecture, 4.12.2011 (translated from French)]. Chapter 7 on local governance explains more about what kind of pressure the community exercise on the SAG and what they obtain with it.

Before 2011, since the time of Conté, communities submitted their demands concerning the company to different state authorities at various levels, but the SAG did not appear to pay attention to them [G.50-67]. For instance, the SAG built their exploitation sites up to 7m from the village, even though the locals were asking to keep a distance of 500m to 1km from the village claiming that this is also an international standard that mining companies should respect [G.66; G.67].

In 2011-2012, to get some information about the SAG's actions and plans, the local population had to ask the local elected leaders, because SAG's responsible person for community relations shared

information only with the CRD (mayor and counselors of the central village of the sub-prefecture) or the sub-prefect [G.57]. This meant that local communities had to rely on the president of the District/prefecture's trustworthiness and loyalty towards them [G.58]¹⁵.

"Some meetings go smoothly while others do not... The president of the districts participates in the name of the village. Meetings are held in the cultural center of Boukaria and in the courtyard of the SAG. They are held every year. Most of the time, these are spontaneous meetings to handle problems such as employment issues or when they organize recruitment tests. There are no schedules for these meetings, it's when our problems come up to them, they analyze them and fix a meeting to which district presidents and some counselors participate, and then they report back to us (...) In case of meetings, the SAG announces through newsletters to the sub-prefect or local elected leaders" [G.57, politician of the ruling party RPG called « The Lion », 02.04.2011 in Siguri (translated from French)]

From 2011 to 2013, the SAG held meetings to tell the community (Kintinia) about their new plans of exploitation. In these cases, the SAG always manifested its will to fulfill some of the populations' demands – in order to appease them and be able to go on with the mining operations. Communities felt as if the SAG were

"Buying the community's go-ahead (...) If they need a piece of land, we leave it to them only under the condition that they satisfy some of our demands (...) but these promises were rarely followed by actions" [G.60, elders of Kintinia, main village of the sub-prefecture, 03.12.2011 (translated from French)].

The sub-prefect says he can ask for support from the SAG, who decides arbitrarily which demands to address [G.114]. In 2011, the sub-prefect asked for a vehicle and fuel; he obtained it for 3 months [G.114; G.130].

Since 2012, youth groups have been included in the hiring process of the SAG for non-qualified "casual" labor. The youth leader of Kintinian village (central town of Bouré) is the mediator between communities and the SAG for recruitment of casual laborers [G.103; G.109; G.112; G.113]. SAG recruits locals to guard the compound; altogether the company hired 405 people from the local community in 2012 [G.55]. The SAG sends the vacancy offer to all villages and the sub-prefecture splits the number of employments amongst the villages [G.57].

In 2012-2013, people considered that they were not sufficiently informed about the SAG, be it in terms of CSR activities or how the company functions, work opportunities, mining techniques, etc. Local leaders, state, and non-state (NGOs or traditional) interviewees believe that with more information there would be fewer blockages of the mining activities (see local risks chapter 7). Everyone can get information through the diffusion of radio releases by the CR, which is a unilateral practice even if it is a good way to answer the communities' demands of being informed about the company's activities.

In 2013, village and prefecture level leaders (customary and elected) are involved in resettlement plans and negotiations due to the expansion of the mine's activities [G.130; G.136; G.137]. The SAG's sustainability manager plans to start information campaigns through national media and by creating a new communication structure available to everyone in the central village of the sub-prefecture where the company operates [G.130]. Diffusing information about the SAG in national media has the

purpose to inform ministries, donors, the international media, and the Guinean public about the SAG's CSR activities and about the company's compliance with environmental standards [G.130].

Multilateralism of SES did not vary much from 2011-2012, with high accessibility to managers and officers in charge of community issues and low to medium feedback to communities' needs.

(3) Long-term perspective

Despite AGA's commitment to "leave the community better off for the company having been there", the SAG did not manage to distance itself from ongoing philanthropic CSR practices. The SAG is not yet integrating its social infrastructure funding in local development plans or answering development needs, despite multiple initiatives to turn this around (see chapter 8 on internal dynamics). The SAG uses its own fund to support CSR activities in the twelve villages affected by its operations [G.34; G.52]. However, before 2011, the SAG mostly used philanthropy as conflict prevention [G.113]. The company was giving privileges to the villages where they were operating, also in terms of infrastructures (schools and pilgrimage to Mecca) [G.113; G.130; G.59; G.67]. SAG was giving gifts to strategic people who were perceived to have the legitimacy to keep communities calm, i.e. to the local elected leaders and the elders [G.52; G.130; G.140]. The SAG, for instance, paid the president of the CRD a trip to Mecca in 2010 [G.57; G.60; G.67]. SAG also gave sugar, rice, and sheep to the council of wise men and the imams for religious holidays [G.60; G.66].

Before 2011, aside from these gifts and the construction of mosques, social infrastructures consisted mostly of building bridges, road maintenance, sports facilities, and health facilities. SAG also treated sick people in the company's clinic [G.34]. The company and the local population had signed an agreement in 2008 about which projects (building of a mosque, building of roads, etc.) to implement [G.39]. Until the end of 2011, only half of the projects were finished, leaving the local communities' plans unsatisfied [G.39; G.65]. In 2011-2012, the SAG's philanthropic practices continued. Many of SAG's projects are still not reaching the implementation phases, e.g. the electrification process in Setiya village stopped [G.56]. In 2012-2013, despite sustainable long-term infrastructure plans, the practices in place are still not integrated into local development plans and do not answer local needs. In 2012, the homes of teachers and the residence of the sub-prefect are 100% funded by the SAG [SAG 2012; G.114]. Electrification for all 12 villages was in progress, since the poles were in the ground [G.109; G.110]. In 2013, the SAG planned to use in-depth socio-economic and perception studies to make decisions relevant to community needs [sag 2013]. The SAG planned to address compensation issues in a long-term perspective by integrating the new settlement plans in the local village structure and compensating not only through material and funds but also through improving "urbanization" plans including resettled areas or developing community infrastructures [AGA, 2013] [G.136].

Since 2009, the SAG put in place a brick-making project with employees training people in neighboring villages [SAG 2012]. This was a capacity-building initiative; it was, however, not followed up sufficiently to have the intended impact [G.130]. In 2009, the SAG started consultations with the national development NGO, the PROJEG, on technical aspects to better answer local development needs [PROJEG, 2009b]. This showed the company's will to work with and support national and local NGOs. Also, in 2010, the MD's adviser on community issues was informing communities at village and prefecture levels on their rights [G.133]. This and the fact that the security manager in 2011 regularly advised local state officials on procedures to follow in order to record their claims through

paper work [G.55] are informal capacity-building initiatives provided by the SAG's staff to the local authorities. SAG has a VPSHR training program for the security guards and casual laborers on security duties [G.55] [AGA, 2009, 2012d]. These induction courses build capacities about Human Rights, even though the sessions are not very thorough; training on VPSHR is once a year, for two hours, containing a powerpoint presentation and a discussion [G.55; G.126]. Thus, the SAG's capacity-building dimension of SES until 2011 was not very efficient, but the company did take some initiatives in that direction.

Since 2012, the SAG has been involved in national level discussions with the ministry of mines and ministry of agriculture, along with other Gold Mining MNCs (SEMAFO and SMD) related to compensation regulations [Republic of Guinea 2011 #1309] [G.130; G.129]. The aim of these negotiations is for the companies to share the problems encountered and participate in reformulation of policies [G.130]. Through this initiative, the SAG is trying to reinforce the sustainability of regulations by participating in formulating the application texts related to the new mining law (see chapter 6). Instead of simply acting "like a bank" [G.130] the SAG wants to get involved in the way the tax money is used at the local level (CPDS structure in charge of redistributing taxes according to local development plans, see chapter 6). At the prefecture level, co-construction takes place on the formulation of regulations related to compensation [G.136; G.137]. The SAG thus improved its capacity-building of state administration at the prefecture level through diffusion of information on the national and international standards related to mining, by sharing the regulatory framework in negotiations about compensations. In this context, SAG shares expertise and discusses the implementation with the prefecture administration, which contributes to the government's empowerment.

In 2012, hiring a regional NGO to study the socio-economic structures of each village neighboring the SAG was an attempt to help local authorities to make development plans according to their needs, addressing their lack of community development expertise [G.127]. Authorities and NGOs from the regional to the village level participated in the assessment of local needs [G.127]. Unfortunately, the lack of professionalism of the regional NGO made the results of the process difficult to use for further planning: "a mountain that gave birth to a mouse" [G.129; G.130]. In 2013, the SAG hired experts working with local communities to thoroughly understand socio-economic contexts of the area and overcome the weaknesses of the previous report in order to make it a base to adapt CSR activities to the realities of neighboring communities' needs [G.130; G.136; G.137; G.139]. The SAG is also making the state accountable through the revision of regulations on compensation. The State then becomes answerable/bails for the compensations and every department at the prefecture level has to validate the process before asking for the state's final acceptance [G.130; G.136; G.137]. In 2012-2013, the SAG also provided ad hoc support for local initiatives by funding youth and women's associations with income generating activity projects (farming, entrepreneurship), and health awareness [AGA, 2013]. From 2012 to 2013, the SAG improved its capacity-building efforts to make them more efficient and better adapted, reaching a comparatively high level of long-term capacity-building in SES.

Infrastructures constructed by the SAG for local development are not adapted to local needs or local development plans because of the absence of studies in the area. The company started filling this gap in 2012 with a thorough investigation of the socio-economic context in partnership with a research center based in Conakry [INSUCO et al., 2013]. Long-term capacity-building programs of the

SAG started before 2011 at a medium level and reached relatively high levels in 2013, especially because of the company's efforts towards advising state authorities at national and prefectural levels.

(4) SAG SES sustainability over time

From 2011 to 2012, the SAG's SES progressively improved in sustainability. These improvements touched the three dimensions characterizing sustainability levels of SES, with inclusiveness growing from medium to medium/high, long-term perspective increasing mostly in capacity-building efforts, while multilateralism improved in terms of feedback since 2012.

AGA's international drivers present all the necessary incentives for the company to adopt sustainable discourses: reputation concerns, naming and shaming campaigns, and competition and activism on sustainability in home country (chapter 6). AGA did adopt a very sustainable discourse about sustainability concerning the communities where they operate, emphasizing the benefits of stakeholder engagement strategies to sustainably manage company-community conflict. The Guinean context on the other hand, is unfavorable to implementation of sustainable practices. There is a lack of enforcement capacity of the central state and a lack of technical competence at the central and at the local level to make companies comply with their commitments (chapter 6). AGA's adoption of sustainability did translate into some successes of implementation in its Guinean site. AGA emphasized its long-term view in its adoption of sustainability but does not (yet?) implement infrastructures and capacity-building projects adapted to local development needs. However, the SAG's practices reflect some of the commitments of the company for stakeholder engagement, especially in the variety of stakeholders consulted and in its openness to dialog with local stakeholders and the broader public. We explain the SES practices of the SAG mostly by the local governance context, but also by the fluctuations of internal drivers (chapter 10).

3. Implementation by AGA's Geita Gold Mine in Tanzania (GGM)

Despite large numbers of intruders from the beginning of operations, the first important open conflict occurred in 2012, when people burnt buses of the GGM workers. The numbers of artisanal miners in the area have increased over the last couple of years because of in-migration to mining areas in the country. GGM has an agreement with police forces and calls state paramilitary forces in case of a major crisis. Despite the attention of the company on Human Rights, communities keep complaining about events of security brutality. GGM's SES strategy has not evolved much over time despite commitments from the HQ to increase inclusion, multilateralism, and long-term practices. In this case — which is close to the case of the SAG — it appears that it is in the interaction of the company with external actors and institutions at the local level that we can find an explanation for the variation in sustainability outcomes. Although the dedication of the MD's leadership fluctuates a lot, the CR's leadership keeps enough autonomy and resources (chapter 8) to reach a medium level of sustainability despite harsh security responses against community confrontations and the lack of coordination among community groups (chapter 7).

(1) Inclusiveness

The Geita Gold Mine of AngloGold Ashanti (GGM) kept improving the sustainability of its SES from 2011 to 2013, by including each year a wider and more diverse range of stakeholders from the local to the national levels. The GGM has the particularity of regularly attending meetings from the village

to the national levels and also initiated two specific committees with the purpose of discussing their activities with community representatives.

Both before 2011 and afterwards, the GGM has consulted central and regional level government authorities in case of necessity. For example, the Ministry of Land has been involved in disputes around compensations; NEMC (National Environmental Management Council) on environmental issues; or the ministry of foreign affairs - in case of international missions - represents the central government. At the district level, since 2009, the GGM put in place a discussion forum in which local authorities from the district level participate regularly in order to discuss issues and CSR projects. This CRC (Community Relation Committee) was replaced by the MIC (Mineral Investment Committee) in 2010, which was more political, since representatives used it for political concerns instead of technical development decisions [T.162; T.156]. On the whole, before 2011, the GGM engaged authorities from the district to the national levels, which resulted in a medium variety of stakeholders. In 2011-2012, the GGM was still using the same practices as before 2011. There was slight improvement through the CR manager's participation in District Level committees and the CR representatives taking part occasionally in the Ward development council (WDC) in which all village chairmen (elected by villagers) sit [T.162; T.164]. In 2013, religious leaders started to be included in SES. The GGM's new public relation (PR) manager participated in the "Interfaith committee" meeting at the national level in Dar-Es-Salaam (see chapter 6 about interfaith committee's role in mining issues in Tanzania). The Interfaith committee representatives at the District level also started discussing with District authorities and GGM representative [T.165; T.161; T.162; T.163]. GGM's CR department is regularly invited to participate in full council (composed of representatives of each wards) held quarterly at the district level [T.155; T.156]. GGM also sometimes participated in the District security committee chaired by the District Commissioner, the district security officers and the officer commander district (OCD, head of police of the district) [T.162; T.95]. The CRC was officially re-established and held a first session at the end of 2013. The District Commissioner (DC) and the Managing Director (MD) both chaired this re-launched formula of the CRC initiated in 2009 [T.165; T.161; T.162; T.163] [GGM et al., 2013]. In 2012-2013, the variety of stakeholders in CSR consultation increased, since it now engages with stakeholders from the village to the national level, including state authorities as well as religious groups. In 2013, as part of the GGM's new stakeholder inclusion strategy the newly recruited public relation manager plans to include a variety of new stakeholders:

"Political leaders, youth, teachers, business people, and workers' wives should participate in our awareness program to have them become ambassadors and inform other people in the villages about the GGM's activities" (mining and CSR) [T.161, public relation manager of GGM, 25.11.2013].

The GGM's SES entails regular meetings with local stakeholders from 2011 to 2013, even reaching the highest frequency of scheduled visits amongst all cases in 2013. Before 2011 and in 2011-2012, with the CRC, and then the MIC, the company representatives met at least quarterly with local stakeholder. The CR department reacts in case of crisis and tensions with the neighboring communities by sending officers to discuss with communities, but the security guards and Tanzanian police are also usually involved (see chapter 7). The CR officers are also sent in the villages in case of problems or to discuss security issues before they arise. Hence, meetings are sometimes used to "defuse conflicts before they lead to physical actions" [T.162], i.e. SES is used as conflict prevention. In 2012-2013, the CR manager visited villages and wards regularly but there was no schedule for his

visits [T.162; T.164; T.166]. GGM's CR representatives were supposed to participate at the village level in the VEC (Village Executive Council formed with elected people from each "street") once a month [T.162; T.91]. VEOs did not confirm any regular meetings with GGM, but did confirm ad hoc visits of the CR manager [T.166]. The re-launch of the CRC entails quarterly meetings between GGM and authorities from the district. In 2012-2013, the frequency of meetings was moderately high compared to other cases.

Meetings between the company and the communities neighboring the GGM are more regular than for other sites we studied, and even became very frequent in 2013. Through these meetings and complementary visits of the CR representatives to the villages and the wards around the mine, the company includes stakeholders from the village to the national level. What is missing, however, in their practices, is the inclusion of non-state actors and local associations. The company plans to fill this gap in the near future.

(2) Multilateralism

The GGM offices are accessible only by going through security gates or with an authorized car, which creates a barrier between the communities and the company. The CR manager compensates for this barrier because he chose to live in the Geita town (instead of living in secured housing provided by the company) and to make himself available for all types of stakeholders, who can call him on his phone or talk to him openly during the several community meetings he attends regularly [T.162; T.99; T.156]. The feedback given to demands is not thorough, mostly because of communication issues within the company (chapter 8).

Before 2011, communities' demands were seldom addressed or answered by CR officers. People kept complaining about the same issues (water and camp of people waiting for resettlement, see chapter 7) for years without any feedback or explanations. In 2009, the GGM launched the CRC, and in 2010 it was replaced by the MIC, but these forums were used efficiently neither by local authorities nor by GGM [T.158; T.162; T.163]: "The CRC did not allow village authorities to express their demands... it was used unilaterally by the company to expose its plans to the district authorities" [T.159].

Then, before 2011, GGM's CSR practices were implemented regardless of local demands and without listening to feedback from communities. Since 2011, the villagers' complaints have been received through letters passed on to the VEO (Village Executive Officer) and through the VEC (village executive council) in which all 18 villages are represented [T.94; T.99; T.164; T.166]. During the VEC, GGM informs on CSR plans past, present, and future, and receives requests [T.161; T.162]. VEO can easily meet with CR upon demand by writing or calling [T.164]. The WDC (Ward development council) also functions as an arena to discuss the quality of CSR perceived by local communities; it is used by village chairmen to express complaints and discuss [T.164]. GGM listens to community complaints, but VEOs are not all satisfied with feedback on complaints [T.164; T.166]. After massive upheaval mid-2012 (chapter 7), discussions in the District security committee led to the decision to allocate police to guard the GGM compounds, following the advice of district authorities [T.163; T.154]. In 2011-2012, the GGM gave average levels of feedback to communities and took into account some of the communities' feedback on its CSR activities.

In 2012-2013, the CR department representatives attended all celebrations organized at the district or town levels if they were invited. In the district, the general perception is that the GGM is not

doing enough for the development of the area [T.155-160]. Most people are not informed of CSR contributions apart from the secondary school construction (see long-term). In sum, in 2012-2013, even if feedback from communities was somehow taken into account, the company did not share much information on its activities with its local stakeholders.

CR officers have remained very accessible to neighboring communities over the whole period. District, Ward, and Village authorities have the personal phone contact of the CR manager and use it for all sorts of requests [T.92; T.162; T.99; T.156]. Feedback levels went from low to high between 2011 and 2012, before diminishing again in 2013, people mostly feel like the company unilaterally presents its CSR plans without incorporating their demands. However, on occasion, the company takes advice from district authorities.

(3) Long-term perspective

In 2011, GGM built a dispensary in Nyakabale village integrated in the LDP (local development plans), built a secondary school, and provided ambulances to transport patients to the Geita Town Hospital in case of serious health issues. The company also organized bus transport from Nyakabale village to Geita town twice a day, which answered the communities' demands following the cut of a road by GGM's operations. Before 2011, infrastructure building by the GGM was integrated in LDP, and the company answered some community needs.

A water project is in progress since 2011 to distribute water from the Nyakanga dam to the whole district [T.87; T.91]. The GGM's part of the contract has been fulfilled, but the company is still waiting for the government to do its part, which is distribution [T.87; T.144; T.145]. In 2012, GGM signed agreements for casual laborers in all villages neighboring their operations [T.88; T.90; T.99; T.101]. GGM employs semi-skilled and unqualified labor through the village government. "The village government earns 20% of each salary for development purposes" [T.99, ward executive director of Mtakuja, 31.05.2012]. Thus the GGM's practices for local development are somewhat integrated in local development plans and answer local demands of employment.

In 2013, GGM decided on CSR projects according to what was discussed in District and Town forums [T.162; T.163; T.156]. The Community Relation Committee's (CRC) objective was to integrate community plans and GGM's CSR plans, to discuss the priorities in common [T.161-163]. In 2013 the Nyakabale dispensary was effective. However, communities were still unsatisfied with the GGM's CSR and complained about the lack of information on the GGM's activities [DCDO 2013, T.138, DED 2013].

Overall, capacity-building programs are scarce and not far-reaching. Since in 2011 and until 2013, AngloGold had short-term programs promoting local entrepreneurships, contributed to social projects and also offered advance training (including computer literacy, business management) [T.75]. GGM had an Apprenticeship program to send 35 young people selected from among those who complete Form 4 from the five neighboring villages to attend vocational training school in Moshi (Kilimanjaro region) every year [T.86; T.90; T.92]. GGM also funded a program from the district to train women and youth groups in entrepreneurship in 2011; 100 people were trained [DDCO District Development Officer 2013, GGM 2013] but there was no follow-up.

From 2011 to 2013, the GGM integrated some CSR funds in local development plans and answered some of the local needs. In 2012-2013, the GGM still reached only medium levels of adaptation to

local contexts, despite its effort to build infrastructures according to demands recorded during meetings with local stakeholders. Capacity-building projects illustrate the effort of the company towards long-term empowerment of local communities but are too limited in scope.

(4) GGM SES variation over time

The SES level of sustainability was more or less stable from 2011 to 2013, staying medium and reaching a slightly higher level in 2013. Although Inclusiveness improved continuously, other dimensions of SES practices varied, but not sufficiently to make an important difference in overall sustainability levels.

AGA's commitments seem to reflect the influence of international drivers recognized in the literature to be decisive in a company's adoption of sustainable approaches to community issues. We found however, that the growing global awareness about sustainability is a more convincing explanation for HQ adoption of sustainable approaches (chapter 5). The Tanzanian State's lack of enforcement will, its dependency on international donors, and the weakness of decentralized authorities, create a context rather unfavorable to make MNCs operating in the country accountable to their commitments (chapter 6). However, AGA's practices of community-company management in its Tanzanian site reach some success in implementing sustainable approaches. We attribute these successes to internal company drivers at operational levels, especially the relatively strong and stable leadership on community issues. However, this case also exemplifies how the company's harsh security answer to community confrontations hinders its potential to achieve a higher level of sustainability implementation.

4. Implementation by ABG's Buzwagi, Site in Tanzania (BUZ)

There were never any open conflicts between ABG and the neighboring communities around the Buzwagi mine (Buz) located in the Shinyanga region of Tanzania. The Buzwagi mine started operating in 2007. The sustainability of the stakeholder engagement strategy implemented increased from 2011 onwards, after facing serious theft of fuel due to collusion between workers and community members in 2010. The Buzwagi mine shows how a highly dedicated CR manager and MD, benefiting from favorable local governance drivers lead to the best-case scenario among the cases we studied. During the first field research in 2011, this site's striking difference with the other ABG site in Tanzania was puzzling, despite the fact that we were denied access to the mines in both areas. The discourses about the company and the absence of a history of community-company conflict around Buzwagi, while the worst stories were told about the behavior of the company in North-Mara convinced us that we had to investigate. Around Buzwagi, community groups, state and non-state, regularly meet and organize their demands to the company in a coherent manner that allowed them to increase the scope of benefits to every household (chapter 7). Also, the absence of pressure from artisanal miners, the neutral perception about the company, and the MNC's soft response to theft and trespassing increased the success of SES implementation (chapter 7).

(1) Inclusiveness

The Buzwagi's CR staff assists in committees usually initiated by the local government, where they are in touch with stakeholders from the village to the regional level, and since 2011 they also consult with non-state actors and involve the sungusungu to take CSR decisions. "In the committee, the planning officer, community development officer, and the water engineer represent the council. Administration and Community Relation managers or officers represent the mine" [T.146].

Since 2009, the district council (which became the town council in 2013) has been part of a Committee in which BUZ is represented, called the Buzwagi Mine Development Committee [T.146; T.152]. Before 2011, the ward level was not often contrary to the central government. In 2009-2010, ABG signed a formal agreement with LGAs (Local government authorities at the ward level) on employment opportunities for the sungusungu² [Maro, 2011; Shija, 2009]. This youth employment program created 300 jobs for youngsters from Mwime [Maro, 2011; Shija, 2009]. In 2012, the contracts were extended to the two other neighboring villages [T.123-130]. These contracts did not imply consultation with ward and village government. Thus, BUZ before 2011 exclusively engaged with government authorities, especially from the district/town to the national level, but not much with local government from the ward down to the village levels, and non-state actors were not solicited.

From 2011 onwards, the BUZ involved an international NGOs (SFCG) and the local NGO SHDEFA+ for income generating project management [T.131; T.153; T.154]. Buzwagi representatives started participating in the Ward development council (WDC)'s quarterly meetings [T.124-126; T.129; T.148]. The WDC is composed of village representatives (village chairmen) and sungusungu² leaders of each village [T.148]. It is supposed to be in place in each ward all over the country, but is not always effective and the sungusungu administration is not always involved. For example in North-Mara, the WDC does not schedule meetings regularly and does not invite the sungusungu leaders, which is a sign that cohesion is lower around NMGM than around Buzwagi. Since 2012, Buzwagi's CR staff also pays random visits to village leaders [T.123; T.124; T.127; T.129]. The Mwime village, which had a mining license sold to BUZ in 2009, felt left out of all CSR initiatives [T.151]. Since the end of 2012, the company also started including wards that are not directly neighboring the mining compound in their CSR funding (providing chairs and desks for schools) [T.148].

Hence, from 2011 to 2013, the Buzwagi mine was engaging with a wide range of stakeholders from the ward to the national level, including customary authorities (sungusungu) and civil-society organizations (local and international NGOs).

Since 2009, the Mine Development Project Committee meets quarterly or twice a year at the Town level. Before 2011, public meetings were organized at the Ward level every 2 months with the presence of BUZ representatives. "If there are any security issues they are discussed during these meetings" [T.127, Mwime Chairperson for Kati Hamlet, 19.06.2012, Mwendakulima ward, Kahama District]. Also, before 2012, BUZ organized meetings in the case of tension with the communities [T.59]. "They did not meet on a regular basis with local authorities nor organize informative/preventive meetings" [T.59, former CR officers in Buzwagi, 19.09.2011].

"In 2012 a joint committee with ABG, the District Commissioner, and local government authorities was organized for conflict resolution and a lot of ad hoc meetings were held at the district level in case of tensions" [T.122, District Human Resources Officer, 16.06.2012, Kahama District].

Since April 2013, Ward councilors were also represented in the monthly security meetings at the district level, with the participation of the RPC (Regional Police Commander) and Buzwagi's security and CR representatives [T.146; T.148]. Since 2013, every Monday, to answer demands from the sungusungu, a special meeting with CR staff about security issues is held at the Ward level [T.148; T.150]. Buzwagi CR staff and SFCG also participated in these Monday security prevention meetings to listen to the needs of the sungusungu (shelters, equipment) [T.148; T.154].

From 2011 to 2013, the Buzwagi gold mine improved the inclusiveness of SES. The variety of stakeholders went from medium to high levels, and the frequency of visits went from occasional to weekly meetings.

(2) **Multilateralism**

Multilateralism of SES by the BUZ was rather stable from 2011 to 2012. Although accessibility of the CR improved from medium to high levels, feedback only reached medium levels over the whole period.

Since 2009, it has been quite easy for community members to visit the community relations' office of the BUZ, because it is located outside the main security gates. However, the company has strict disclosure procedures that prevent any researchers to have a talk with CR officers or the CR manager without the approval of the HQ (which is not easily granted). CR officers have the instruction to filter visitors, i.e. only those who have an appointment or an open case with the CR are allowed an audience. In 2011, because of the MD's disregard for community issues, district officials were not always welcome in the company [T.66]. In 2012-2013, the situation changed. Leaders of the NGOs under contract with the BUZ (SHDEFA and SFCG) had easy access (phone, visits) to the CR managers and met with the MD if necessary. The Town authorities were welcome to visit the BUZ offices for any urgent matters with a one-month notice, otherwise they communicated with the BUZ via letters [T.122; T.146; T.147]. Between 2012 and 2013, the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) used to get the visit of the former MD regularly, and both he and former CR manager were friendly people who spoke Kiswahili fluently. Peter Burger, the MD in 2012, even spoke Kisukuma, the main vernacular language in the sub-region.

Besides revealing the dedication of the MD to community issues, this statement also illustrates how accessible the Buz mine was to local stakeholders in 2012.

Since the company started operating and until 2012, ongoing issues showed a lack of feedback from the BUZ to local demands. For instance, communities continuously complained about the unsatisfactory compensation rates and lack of adaptation of resettlement houses to local ways of life [T.69]. Also, villagers consider the sungusungu payment to be very little (120 000 Tsh/month) compared to national legal average (400 000 Tsh) [T.68].

“When we get the visit of BUZ representatives, they come only to tell about the company's CSR plans without involving us in their decisions” [T.146, Town community development officer, 25.11.2013, Kahama Town].

However, the company's decision to broaden the scope of beneficiaries of CSR funds to non-neighboring villages was an outcome from a meeting at the Town council [T.146; T.147]. Also, most issues expressed in the WDC are being addressed, including major problems pointed out regularly (water, roads). After the Monday security meetings started in April 2013, BUZ decided to build four shelters per village to answer sungusungu demands. Thus, it seems that the company is taking into account local stakeholder's suggestions on CSR more than they did before 2012. However, in 2013, Buzwagi's CR officer did not come as often to meet the communities in village level committees and instead of listening to them, they left a grievance book for each village administration office to file their complaints [T.150; T.151; T.152].

In 2012-2013, access to the CR and even to the MD became easier and was possible through various means (letters, phone, private and public meetings). Feedback to communities however was at a medium level, some needs were addressed, but the company was not in a co-construction perspective and used asymmetrical communication.

(3) Long-term perspective

Although infrastructure building started slowly before 2011, with hardly any long-term infrastructure projects from 2011 onward, the BUZ improved its long-term practice thoroughly by matching its CSR infrastructure construction with local plans and demands. Capacity-building initiatives of the mine also became progressively the best programs compared to other sites we observed because of their scope and relevance to the local context. This was facilitated by the existing trust within communities, their capacity to work together (see chapter 7), and the involvement of a local and an international NGO.

Until 2011, infrastructure projects were very few, which could be related to the fact that Buzwagi is a relatively new mine (operations started second half of 2009). Until 2011, its community investment consisted of grievance management of the resettled households, improved school infrastructure and the construction of the Mwendakulima Ward office [T.67-70]. In 2012, the Secondary school constructed by BUZ in 2011 was provided with desks and books. A health dispensary, consistent with the ward development plan, is under construction and BUZ also provided desks and books for primary schools, including schools in non-neighboring villages according to the specific needs of each village [T.122-127; T.164]. Through the village authorities, the 3 villages neighboring BUZWAGI each signed a Memorandum of Agreements with BUZ for the hiring of casual labor. 15 to 20% of the sungusungu agreement salaries are dedicated to development projects at the village and ward levels [T.122-127]. CSR projects at the Ward level also answer the demands expressed during the WDC [T.164]. Moreover, most decisions on CSR funding are discussed in meeting with the investors and government authorities (Mine development committee).

In 2013, following demands of the communities, a water project was in progress through the construction of boreholes in each of the neighboring villages. Also following demands manifested during ward and town councils, road construction and maintenance in the ward (Mwendakulima) is now in progress, in addition to a project for a tarmac road in Kahama town. [T.146; T.147; T.152] In 2013, village level authorities of one of the three villages neighboring BUZ felt left out of project decision-making (Mwime) [T.151]. This village has a particular status due to the fact that village authorities held a small-scale mining contract, which they transferred to BUZ in exchange for royalties. However, BUZ did construct a dirt road in this village in accordance to promises made in the previous years. Since 2011 and until 2013, most of the BUZ's CSR projects were chosen through the Ward and Town development programs provided during meetings with local officers, resulting in high levels of long-term infrastructure construction strategy.

Until 2011, the company had no CSR programs that aimed at building capacity for local communities or for local authorities. BUZ started training the police in 2011, and in turn police officers participated in training the local guards (sungusungu) in 2012 [T.119; T.126; T.128]. In 2011-2012, ABG hired an international NGO (SFCG) to train the police, especially officers selected to work with ABG [T.154]. Since 2012, BUZ gives an induction course on the use of minimal force (VPSHR) for Sungusungu participating in guarding the compounds after each personnel rotation every 2 months.

“The training focused on Human Rights and minimal use of force. 30 officers received this 2-3 hours training, which lasted from 4 days to 2 weeks every 2 weeks after each rotation... People recognize the benefit of this training for the police as much as their hierarchical superior... even if every policeman has received the training in their formation before, it is a good reminder” [T.119, Acting (police) officer commander district (OCD), Kahama District Police Station, 15.06.2012].

According to community members and sungusungu leaders, this induction increased the level of security.

“ABG’s training with sungusungu has very positive effects on how they then manage security for the village, they became more peaceful (how to patrol, identifying a criminal, recognize suspicious persons)” [T.130, Ward sungusungu commander, Mwendakulima ward office, 10.06.2012 (translated from Swahili)].

Interviewees often link the police’s sungusungu training provided by ABG and the decline in crime rates. In 2012, ABG supports the capacity of the police at the district level through material means too. Providing fuel (if the government fails to give enough budget) even to go 100km away, the police commander simply gives a call to the Security Manager in BUZ [T.119].

Since 2012, BUZ is financing 12 women's associations by funding the local NGO SHDEFA+, which is in charge of monitoring and advising the groups. Also, school fees and school material are provided by BUZWAGI for poor children of the Mwendakulima ward [T.148]. As a result, between 2011 and 2013, BUZ reached one of the highest long-term capacity building strategies over the five case studies.

Long-term programs for infrastructure building and capacity-building started at low levels before 2011 and grew to become one of the comparatively higher level among our case studies, especially through security staff’s trainings on Human Rights and income generating groups’ funding organized and monitored with the support of a local NGO.

(4) SES Sustainability overtime

Sustainability of SES by the Buzwagi Gold Mine started at low to medium level before 2011. Then, the company continuously improved its stakeholder engagement strategy to reach high levels in almost every dimension of sustainability in 2013. In 2013, BUZ’s SES sustainability reached the higher levels over areas and time periods studied in this research.

Barrick has a reputation to protect, since it is the largest gold producer in the world. International naming and shaming campaigns denouncing its behavior in Tanzania also regularly target the company (chapter 5). ABG and its parent company Barrick, still holding over 70% of its Tanzanian subsidiary, considering the need to maintain their “social license to operate”, adopted sustainable approaches to manage company-community conflicts, Since the 90s, Tanzanian regulations are attractive to investors following instructions from international donor institutions, although they became more community driven in the last years with the new mining act. The lack of enforcement is, however, not favorable to making companies act consistently with these regulations or to their own commitment. Our study argues that international drivers and host country drivers are not relevant anyway in the way companies behave at operational level. For instance, Barrick’s two sites in Tanzania achieve completely different sustainability outcomes. The case of Buzwagi shows how good internal company drivers at operational level lead to a higher sustainability level when the local governance drivers are the most favorable among our cases. This winning combination results in the

Buzwagi mine implementing with the most success the company's sustainable strategies of SES, especially due to long-term projects' adaptation to local needs and demands.

Even though Buzwagi reached the higher level of sustainability in SES outcomes among our case studies, it is still important to relativize this success. We rated the sustainability performance of each site compared to the other sites studied in this research. The fact that Buzwagi scored higher does not mean that the company implemented fundamental changes; it means that the Buz's incremental changes are more sustainable than the other sites.

5. Implementation by ABG's North-Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania (NMGM)

The North-Mara gold mine (NMGM) is in operation since 2002. Barrick took over in 2006. In 2011, the company had the worst behavior towards neighboring communities. Until 2012, NMGM used harsh security measures to address the ongoing open conflicts between the company and the communities (police and army using weapons, walls, surveillance). There was no CSR activity except for a water tank providing water to the communities, and the irregular watering of roads to manage the dust levels. It is only in 2012, with the arrival of a new managing director, that NMGM started communicating with the village government. By the end of 2012, ABG started involving the district government in the agreements that were being signed for development activities between NMGM and the neighboring villages. At about the same time, the central government started looking into compensation issues in mining areas. Between May 2012 and March 2013, the NMGM started fulfilling development agreements through CSR (schools, new roads, water boreholes, health services). In the end of 2013, there was some established communication between the district and the company, the level of intensity of conflict had dropped (less regular fights between intruders and security, less intruders overall, less violence from security guards), along with the numbers of complains from communities. This case shows how a dedicated managing director steering the implementation of a sustainable conflict management can turn a situation around, especially if the local context simultaneously becomes less hostile and easier to work with.

(1) Inclusiveness

Before 2011, NMGM did not include a large variety of actors from the local level. The company did not have any stakeholder engagement strategy or CSR programs before 2012. The NMGM would mostly communicate with the district and the national level or negotiate with villages or individuals separately, without informing the district of their activities at the village level. Before 2012, the NMGM used to go to village authorities only for security issues, and would use this occasion to talk about CSR and make promises, so inclusiveness and frequency of visits were very poor.

In May-June 2011, NMGM promised that all 7 villages would sign a development agreement with the mine (just after 5 to 11 "trespassers" were killed by security guards and several people were injured). These "Village Benefit Implementation Agreements" (VBIA) were negotiated because 5 of the 7 villages neighboring the mine had an agreement with the first MNC operating the North-Mara mine, which was never implemented. These VBIA signed in the beginning of 2012 and implementation of their development plans started at the end of 2012. Since 2012, the District strived to be involved and to be the intermediary between villages and NMGM for all matters concerning security and CSR [District officials, VEO, and author's own observation 2013]. In 2012, NMGM consulted the district about the VBIA implementation process. Since 2012, youth groups (income generating project beneficiaries) have been in contact with CR and other departments

depending on issues. In sum, NMGM engaged with government authorities from the district down to the village level and with youth groups, which led to an improvement of inclusion from almost none to a high level in 2011-2012.

International, national, district level, village level and local youth groups were included in the conflict management strategies of NMGM in 2013. The interfaith committee was received by NMGM upon demand (initiative from Interfaith) concerning compensation and company-community conflict issues. An ABG representative attended the interfaith committee meeting in Dar-es-Salaam. Ministry delegations are welcome at the NMGM sites. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals and the Ministry of Land can visit the mine at their initiative when issues get acute (security and compensation issues in particular). District and MEM are involved in a closure plan formulation for 2022, but Village authorities are excluded from these discussions. In 2012-2013, NMGM started engaging more with international, national, and district authorities and religious leaders, but decreased its engagement with village authorities, resulting in comparatively medium variety of stakeholder inclusion.

From 2011 to 2013, the frequency of visits did not change significantly, from almost no visits of the NMGM to rare visits in case of trouble, despite plans to have regular meetings. Until 2012, CR officers of the NMGM would hardly ever come to visit the village level and would rarely communicate at the district level. The NMGM's public relations (PR) manager would make public appearances or press releases in case of crises. In 2012-2013, the NMGM organized some ad hoc meetings to discuss security issues with authorities down to the village level. There was no regularity for these security related meeting nor for meetings with other leaders. District authorities, village authorities, and ward authorities were invited to discuss with the NMGM issues of security and intruders in 2013. Since April 2013, the company and the district authorities decided to meet once a month, but the meetings did not in fact take place regularly [T.139]. Community relations (CR) manager and Managing Director (MD) both come to the village executive officers (VEO) when they have a problem to discuss.

Inclusiveness of stakeholders in the North-Mara Gold Mine of African Barrick Gold (NMGM) varied from 2011 to 2013, especially due the consultation with stakeholders from the district and village level, including not only government authorities but also two youths associations in 2012. The company did engage with more stakeholders in 2013 than before 2011 but did not follow up its engagements with village level stakeholders, and failed to become present or accessible more frequently over the whole period.

(2) **Multilateralism**

CR offices have not been very accessible since 2013. Communication flows are mostly unilateral but allow a medium degree of feedback from the bottom-up in decision-making concerning CSR for neighboring communities. District authorities and some local youth groups' demands are taken into account more than those coming from village level authorities or sungusungu leaders.

Until 2011, physical access to CR offices was easier than later because there was no wall. Local authorities cannot reach CR officers by phone; the protocol is to write letters or pass messages to the liaison officers (see corporate design) of the village. At the time, accessibility was medium, comparatively. In 2011-2012, accessibility was not easy. The DC (District Commissioner) and NMGM did not have trustful relationships, which made it difficult even for the state authorities to be allowed to visit the company. Access to the CR department and to the mine was low. Access to CR

became more difficult by the end of 2012 because their offices are inside the gates. This entails that “people need a permit to enter and if a guard says the PR is not around no one gets in” [VEO37 2012]. From narrated experiences, in 2013, district and local government authorities were not easily welcomed into the compounds. The district preferred to invite them to his office and the VEO preferred to write the demands in a letter to the CR liaison. One of the beneficiary Project’s leaders, however, has a card to easily enter the compounds. Access to the NMGM is low; only selected individuals are granted access, and there is no other means to reach the CR than letters (no phone, no public meetings).

Before 2011, communities received no feedback on their demands and had no information concerning NMGM’s activities. Feedback improved from 2011 to 2013, reaching relatively medium levels. Until 2011, NMGM addressed very few demands from the communities (only providing a water tank and watering roads to reduce dust) and provided no feedback to communities’ demands. Between 2011 and 2012, the communities received some feedback in the form of the Village Benefit Implementation Agreements (VBIA) being signed and the occasional visit of the MD. In 2013, the two income generating groups funded by NMGM in the neighboring villages had two different statuses. One was a client, the group presents its community projects then waits for ABG’s decisions, which is usually positive; the other follows ABG’s decisions according to the plans coming from the company. During the VBIA signing process, the legal officer of the district sat with the legal officer of NMGM to discuss suggestions for amendments [T.138]. The DC felt like he was actively involved in the change of NMGM’s strategy regarding securing the mining compound and the decision to form local groups to be trained to become security guards for NMGM. VEOs have the impression that when they are called for a meeting with NMGM, the decision has already been taken; their advice is only very rarely used in decision-making. NMGM did not inform local authorities and communities that the company was supporting local income generating groups [2013]. From 2011 to 2013, feedback from the communities was sometimes taken into account in the company’s CSR decisions, but the company rarely shared information with stakeholders, i.e. communication was unilateral. Feedback was medium compared to other cases.

(3) Long-term perspective

The company preceding African Barrick Gold (ABG) in the operation of the NMGM had started a scholarship program that created a shady situation, with double grants and corruption at the village level (receiving twice the money for some students, one from the company, one from district subsidies) and, in 1995, had made an agreement promising a lot of infrastructure development that had never been implemented. Before 2011, ABG’s North-Mara mine was not constructing any infrastructures in a long-term perspective. In 2012, the MD pushed the “village benefit implementation agreements” (VBIA) and implementation started. These agreements meant that NMGM was answering local needs and integrating its CSR funding in the local development plans. By mid-2013, implementation was put on standby, thus no more infrastructure construction was taking place. The company said it was due to the gold price crisis and asked the village authorities to keep their people calm. Capacity-building was non-existent in the NMGM strategy before 2011. Then, the company started human rights training for the police and financially supporting income-generating groups.

Before 2012, NMGM provided no support for infrastructure construction. The company participated materially in the renovation of one school and one hospital and the scholarship program

implemented by the former owner had stopped. The NMGM provided a water tank for the villages with potable water and watered the roads irregularly. Before 2011, NMGM had no long-term infrastructure construction projects. In 2011 and 2012, the Village Benefit Implementation Agreements contained plans of infrastructure construction. Until March 2013, NMGM started to build these infrastructure constructions, which are planned according to the local development plans: new schools, new roads, and new water boreholes. Since March 2013, however, infrastructure constructions stopped.

Between 2006 and 2010, scholarships (school fees paid for secondary school pupils) were distributed in Nyangoto, Kiwanja, Kerende, Niamwaga, Genkulu, and two more villages later in the process. In 2011, the NMGM stopped this scholarship program and had no other projects in place to contribute to local capacity-building. In July 2011, ABG launched a program to train the police in Human Rights and an income-generating group received funds from NMGM. Thus in 2011-2012, the NMGM was involved in several capacity-building programs, including state authorities and youth, which means its long-term perspective in this regard rose to high levels. Since the end of 2012, a new income-generating group has been part of training programs led by the NMGM (leadership, entrepreneurship, and farming). Project beneficiaries are financially supported by NMGM. They implement programs for long-term alternative economic activities to replace artisanal mining. The company also aims to give a sense of responsibility to the local youth and ASM groups in providing security for NMGM. The idea is that "if they choose their own leaders then it is their responsibility to ensure security if they want to have an income". In 2012-2013, capacity-building was still high and was accompanied by awareness campaigns conducted by the youth for the youth involved in artisanal mining (who are potential trespassers stealing the gold for the company's pits).

Long-term perspective of the NMGM in SES varied a lot; starting with no infrastructure construction and no capacity-building program, it evolved in both dimensions to higher levels in 2011-2012. And while infrastructure construction stopped in 2013, capacity-building programs stayed sustainable.

(4) SES sustainability over time

NMGM did not have any SES strategy before 2011. In 2011, the company started implementing SES with an average level of sustainability, especially engaging with a wide variety of stakeholders and improving its long-term perspectives in 2012. However, in 2013, these upgrades did not keep improving, making sustainability levels of SES go back down to medium. In 2013, SES sustainability was comparatively low but was a bit higher than before 2011 when NMGM had no SES in place.

There are strong international level incentives for ABG and its parent Barrick to adopt sustainable community-company conflict management strategies, especially regular campaigns denouncing its human rights and environmental violations all over the world [for example, ProtestBarrick] (chapter 5). ABG and Barrick did adopt sustainable discourses but their non-implementation keeps firing back at them. In Tanzania however, the state does not seem motivated or sufficiently independent to enforce sustainable regulations, decentralized authorities are not empowered to do so either, and the civil society is not more efficient in this regard (chapter 6). ABG's Buzwagi site, however, is the most successful site among our case studies to implement sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies. The North-Mara site did not have any conflict management strategy implemented besides its use of force until the company hired a managing director that cared about solving community issues in the long run.

D. CONCLUSION AND COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN SES SUSTAINABILITY

The three companies studied here adopted a sustainable approach to community issues. The discourses vary in vocabulary, and each company emphasizes different dimensions of sustainability. They also differ in the motives they give for choosing a sustainable approach to communities where they operate. Some are more concerned by protecting the company's assets from economical and material damage; others base their discourse on ethical grounds. Overall they all choose to adopt social sustainability and situate their discourses in the 2nd or 3rd emergent model described by Kemp [Kemp, D., 2009].

Adoption does not necessarily lead to implementation, i.e. to a change of behavior. Although all companies adopted a social sustainability discourse regarding community issues, their success in implementing a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy to manage community-company conflict varies widely over time and sites.

Table 13. SES sustainability implementation detailed over time

Site	Dimensions	Indicators	Bef. 2011	2011-12	2012-13
SMD	INCLUSIVENESS	Variety	LOW	HIGH	LOW
		Frequency	LOW	LOW	LOW
	MULTILATERALISM	Accessibility	MED	MED	MED
		Feedback	LOW	LOW	LOW
	LONG-TERM	Infrastructure	MED	MED	LOW
		Capacity-building	HIGH	MED	LOW
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			MED	MED/LOW	LOW
SAG	INCLUSIVENESS	Variety	HIGH	MED	HIGH
		Frequency	LOW	HIGH	MED
	MULTILATERALISM	Accessibility	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
		Feedback	LOW	MED	MED
	LONG-TERM	Infrastructure	LOW	LOW	LOW
		Capacity-building	MED	MED	HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			MED	MED/HIGH	HIGH
GGM	INCLUSIVENESS	Variety	MED	MED	HIGH
		Frequency	MED	MED	HIGH
	MULTILATERALISM	Accessibility	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
		Feedback	LOW	MED	LOW
	LONG-TERM	Infrastructure	MED	MED	MED
		Capacity-building	LOW	LOW	LOW
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			MED	MED	MED/HIGH
BUZ	INCLUSIVENESS	Variety	MED	HIGH	HIGH
		Frequency	LOW	LOW	HIGH
	MULTILATERALISM	Accessibility	MED	MED	HIGH
		Feedback	MED	MED	MED
	LONG-TERM	Infrastructure	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
		Capacity-building	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			LOW/MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH
NMGM	INCLUSIVENESS	Variety	LOW	HIGH	MED
		Frequency	LOW	LOW	LOW
	MULTILATERALISM	Accessibility	MED	LOW	LOW
		Feedback	LOW	MED	MED
	LONG-TERM	Infrastructure	LOW	MED	LOW
		Capacity-building	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED

The Russian based gold mining company Nordgold claims to be committed to being a member of the community where they operate, but their practice at their Guinean site shows otherwise. Except for the offices of the CR being rather accessible to community members, the SMD hardly implements a stakeholder engagement strategy at all. Even sustainable practices of long-term community capacity-building initiated by the previous owners are not continued. Although communities around the SMD were not historically confrontational, tension grew among them after 2011, which cannot

help the company's implementation of SES, especially with ongoing jealousies between villages and families (chapter 7).

Contrary to AGA's commitment to "leave the communities better off for AGA having been there", the company's sites in Guinea and Tanzania score badly on long-term perspective. The commitments on stakeholder engagement strategies of this company headquartered in South Africa, however, do translate into inclusive and multilateral practices. The two sites of AGA that we studied in this research have the particularity of being easily accessible to the public. This means that community members can easily visit or call the CR officers when they feel the need or even if they simply want to say hi. Also, in both sites the CR tends to participate or initiate discussion forums. This also means that it was easier to interview internal company actors and witness the daily working situation at both sites. This openness to the outside facilitates the company's inclusion of a wide variety of actors. The frequency of visits of company representatives in the villages, however, changed a lot between 2011 and 2013. Feedback from the community is also usually not integrated in the decision-making. There is some coherence within AGA's SES implementation at the two sites we focus on, but variations are interesting to reveal more details about the sustainability implementation challenge. In the following chapters we show that the SAG is an example of how good cohesion among local communities and low risks of conflict, especially the absence of history of community-company conflict, enhances the company's success in implementing sustainable SES. What the next chapters will also explain is that, contrary to the SAG, the GGM's violent response to community "intruders" and protests hinders the potential of the site's favorable internal drivers to reach better levels of sustainability, also because community cohesion is not as high as around the SAG.

Barrick, with its headquarters in Canada, the main shareholder of ABG operating exclusively in east Africa, adopts a strong discourse about how their company should behave with communities neighboring their operations. Unfortunately, their behavior is far from consistent with these commitments, at least from what international media advertise, and from what we could observe in the NMGM site in Tanzania. The case of ABG is particularly interesting because of the contrast between one of their most problematic sites and their Buzwagi site, also located in Tanzania, where everything seems to go well at a first glance. This is puzzling, especially considering that most studies on the subject of MNCs' CSR consider that international drivers and host country drivers are the most likely to influence a company's adoption and implementation of sustainable CSR. ABG should then not only have the same international incentives but also the same host country limitations, expected to lead to the same outcomes. Yet Buzwagi is the best-case scenario (in 2013) and North-Mara the worst (before 2011) among our cases. In the following chapters, the comparison of the two sites operated by ABG will provide a good illustration of the main conclusions of our research. To wit, we explain that outcomes of implementation are sustainable when dedicated MD and CR manager sustain company outputs. Outcomes can reach higher sustainability when implemented in communities that are used to working together, have a peaceful history, artisanal mining activities are not the only way to make an income, and the company never reacted violently to communities' trespassing on their compound, as in the case of BUZ. Likewise, we explain further that sustainable SES cannot be implemented when company outputs are not sustained by strong leadership within the company and when CR activities take place in a context of distrust among community groups, of

historically violent clashes within communities and with the company, and of artisanal mining being the most important activity in the area, as in the case of NMGM.

From the observed variation in success of implementation, we can discern a tendency towards the improvement of sustainability levels reached every year, although not for each site and it is not linear. However, our observations suggest that there is not only a trend towards adoption of sustainability discourses in the gold mining sector, but also that emerging models are progressively becoming the norm in the mining sector. Incremental changes are undeniably sustainability-driven despite the continuous challenges of implementation and the pressure for economic performance (see table 3 transition models synthesis).

A quick look at the variation in implementation of SES already points out that international and home country drivers are not relevant to fully account for it. Indeed, variations are regrouped neither by company nor by country of operation, and thus a careful analysis of operational level drivers seems more promising (table 14).

Table 14. SES sustainability outcomes: DV variation over time and sites

SES sustainability outcomes		GUINEA		TANZANIA		
		NordGold (NG)	AngloGold Ashanti (AGA)	African Barrick Gold (ABG)		
		SMD	SAG	GGM	BUZ	NMGM
		Before 2011	MED/LOW	LOW	MED	MED/LOW
2011-2012	MED/LOW	MED/HIGH	MED	HIGH/MED	MED/HIGH	
2012-2013	LOW	HIGH	MED/HIGH	HIGH	MED/LOW	

However, the literature in international studies, political science, organizational theory, and management focusing on explaining why MNCs choose sustainability approaches, has put the emphasis on international and host country drivers for the past decades. In the next part, the first two chapters thus evaluate the extent to which they play a role in adoption and implementation of sustainability approaches (chapter 5 and 6). In the following chapter, we consider internal company drivers, which are also recognized to be important in explaining company behavior in compliance studies and business studies (chapter 7). We then explore the local governance drivers presented in the literature on natural resource management, social capital, and conflict theories to enrich our understanding of company practices when they hit the ground (chapter 8). We conclude by expressing the lack of explanatory power of all of these drivers taken separately (chapter 10) before introducing our systematic combination of local and internal drivers to finally detail how we explain what we observe.

Part 3: Drivers

Chapter V — Company International Drivers

In the present chapter we explore whether, in our case studies, the prominent explanations in the literature on MNC's behavior in ALS are sufficient to account for the observed variation in implementation [Flohr et al 2010; Finnemore & Skkinik 1998; Graham & Woods 2006; Hillman 2004; Potoski & Prakash 2005]. The main explanations put forward for MNC's adoption and implementation of CSR practices invoke external international environment inputs, i.e., international standards and guidelines, home country regulations, shareholder concerns, and international activism (naming and shaming campaigns). To account for the importance of alternatives, this chapter explores whether, in our case studies, the prominent explanations found in the literature explain the observed variation in adoption. How much do the existing pathways, such as international standards, guidelines, and home country regulations explain the variation in adoption? Do they affect operational-level outcomes? Can motivational drivers coming from reputational concerns and peer or economic pressure affect the successful implementation of sustainable conflict management?

An increasing number of companies commit to voluntary standards they set for themselves on social and environmental grounds. Some companies commit to international voluntary standards related to environment and social behaviors such as ISO, VPSHR, Global Compact... These voluntary standards are sometimes adapted and incorporated into companies' codes of conduct [Graham & Woods 2006 overview by Haufler 2001 Florini, 2003: 6]. MNCs adopt self-regulation "even in the absence of a regulatory threat by the state" [Börzel et al., 2013: 5] [Vogel et al., 2004]. Most of these standards are concerned with the environment and labor rights, while fewer are about human rights [Graham et al., 2006; OECD et al., 2001]. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises support self-regulatory efforts and encourage MNCs to regulate their own conduct with broad internationally agreed standards where government regulation is not effective. What can be considered a "broad internationally agreed standard"? In the absence of binding socially sustainable regulations that set steps to follow for all MNCs operating in ALS, it is important to map what falls into this "internationally agreed standard" category, and to identify incentives for self-regulation and adoption of voluntary standards. We will examine whether these drivers/incentives influenced the adoption of social sustainability in the cases studied in this research.

We found that our case studies eliminate these prominent explanations from the literature, since they do not explain why the three companies adopted a sustainable approach. External international drivers do not explain the variation of implementation of SES either, but they do seem to be part of the dynamic that leads to the adoption of new discourses, i.e., the trend of sustainability in CSR.

A. INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS OPERATIONALIZATION

What are the common explanations in the literature put forward as explanations of why and under which conditions firms should engage in CSR, even under conditions of limited statehood where a "shadow of hierarchy" [Héritier, 2002]—a credible regulatory threat by government— is lacking [Thauer, 2013]?

The essence of the main explanations related to international drivers is that MNCs seek legitimization by adopting sustainable approaches. It is supposed that this legitimization takes place at the industry level, at the home country level, and at the host country level. To analyze whether international drivers influenced the three companies selected for our case studies, we thus compare their legitimization incentives. We consider that since most companies in the gold mining industry adopt voluntary standards related to social sustainability in the management of company-community conflicts, legitimization is about adopting these sustainable standards (chapter 2).

We start this section by operationalizing international drivers (table 15). We evaluate the incentives pushing each company to adopt sustainable standards. We first analyze how exposed they are to reputation damage and how committed they are to standards. To do so, we compare their size and their position in the market. Then, to understand how much pressure the company faces to adopt sustainability approaches, we compare how much economic pressure in the industry affects each company. The commitments of other companies operating in the same country, as well as the company's home country normative and regulatory context are supposed to exercise pressure on the company to conform [DiMaggio et al., 1994; Friedman, 2004]. We thus compare the company's host country peers, whether other mining MNCs operating in the same country adopted sustainable approaches. We also compare the home country's civil society, government, and mining industry's concerns for MNCs' sustainability adoption. We further consider that a company reporting its activities following the GRI guidelines is more likely to adopt sustainability standards. To understand how threatened the company is by naming and shaming campaigns, we assess how much and how often media and NGOs publically criticize the company at the international level and at the host country level.

Table 15. International drivers operationalization

International drivers		HIGH	LOW
Reputation concerns	Comparative size	Known worldwide, operating more than 10 sites	Unknown firm, operating less than 10 sites
	Market position	More than 1 stock exchange listing	1 or no listing on stock exchange
	International engagement	More than 1 voluntary standard adoption	No voluntary standards adoption
Peer pressure	Economic pressure	Suffered from crisis	Did not suffer from crisis
	Other companies in host and home country	Other mines committed to sustainability	Other mines not committed to sustainability
Home country activism	Civil society	Strong activism for sustainability	Weak activism for sustainability
	Self-regulation	Adoption of sustainability is expected, GRI	Adoption of sustainability is not expected, no GRI
Naming and shaming	International	One or more naming and shaming campaign	No naming and shaming campaign
	Host country	Media, NGOs criticize often and harsh	Media, NGOs criticize with little impact

We study three multinational gold mining companies. AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) is headquartered in South-Africa, Barrick Gold Corporation (Barrick) with its headquarters in Canada and its subsidiary African Barrick Gold (ABG) headquartered in UK, and NordGold (NG) with its headquarters in Russia and recently separated from its parent company Severstal.

We find that AGA and Barrick have major incentives to adopt sustainable approaches, while NordGold has none. However, the three companies did adopt sustainable strategies (chapter 4). Following sustainability transition theories, we explain this by considering that companies select which standards to adopt according to the broader dynamics at stake at the regime level. They are not directly affected by their home country incentives or market position as potential threats to

their reputation, but they are indirectly affected by what is considered legitimate at the societal level [Valente, 2010].

B. INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS VERSUS HQ ADOPTION: CASE STUDIES

AngloGold Ashanti and African Barrick Gold have strong international incentives to adopt sustainable strategies regarding community issues, contrary to NordGold. However, all three adopted sustainable discourses encompassing inclusiveness, multilateralism, and long-term perspectives, while their implementation vary (chapter 4). We will detail the international drivers at stake for the three companies studied in this research in the light of the different characteristics we identified in the literature review and operationalized above.

1. AngloGold Ashanti's International drivers

Except for economic pressure related to the drop in gold prices in March 2013, other international drivers identified in the previous section are favorable to AGA's adoption of sustainable CSR.

AGA is committed to the Global Compact, the VPSHR, the World Gold Council, and the ICCM and IMF standards. The company is listed on the New York, Johannesburg, Accra, London, and Australian stock exchanges, as well as the Paris and Brussels bourses. AGA also has important identity-related reputational concerns, since it is the only leading gold mining MNC with an African-rooted history (born from the fusion of Ashanti Goldfields Ghana, and Anglo Gold South Africa). The company clearly has the ambition of being a leader in sustainability in the sector [SA.1; T.162]. Rather than having a press relations department, AGA trusts its actions to speak (louder than words) in favor of its reputation [SA.1; G.135; T.162]. Its compliance with the GRI further illustrates the company's interest for competing in the area of sustainability. AGA's shareholders are concerned by social sustainability and have high standards in regards to conflict management, i.e., they demand a sustainability report since 2009 and integrated reporting in 2012.

South African multinational companies compete in the area of social sustainability [Hönke, 2013]. Lobbies and national regulations are strong in the environment sector. South-African civil society is vigilant concerning social practices of the companies based in South-Africa. The Marikana events¹⁶ [Aljazeera, 2012; Mutasa, 2012] brought all mining companies to reconsider their social sustainability discourse, especially in South Africa where the event took place [SA.1.; Wilson 2014]. AGA entered into a long negotiation with its employees in South Africa, especially in the mining departments [England, 2012; England et al., 2013].

Peer pressure, or field isomorphism, is also in favor of implementing stakeholder engagement as conflict management formulas in the gold mining sector over the last decade. Moreover, in Tanzania and Guinea, other extractive companies also adopted sustainability standards (ABG, Resolute, Willimson Petra Diamond in Tanzania, NordGold (SMD), RioTinto, Vale in Guinea). Motivation to do better than other companies operating in the same country can also act as an incentive for companies. When Barrick was accused of human rights violations in 2011 because of open conflict

¹⁶ On August 16 2012, in the town of Marikana in the North West province of South Africa, police opened fired and killed 34 miners engaged in a protracted strike action outside the Lonmin platinum mine. The killing sparked international outrage and a national commission of enquiry was set up to investigate what has become known as the "Marikana massacre" [Aljazeera, 2012].

between the security forces and the communities around its NMGM mine in Tanzania, AGA's CEO called a meeting. "He wanted to be sure everything was done at operational levels (OP) to avoid such an incident in AGA, and if it was not there yet, it needed to be done" [T.62]. This boosted the implementation of SES in the company's continental Africa sites. In Guinea, company discourses are also progressively more about how to prepare for the "after-mine". Before, Community Relations departments had less importance, while recently more MNCs operating in the country are showing interest in community issues [G.125].

After the gold prices fell in 2013 [Blas, 2013; Elder, 2013; Farchy et al., 2013], several sustainability head managers of AGA at the corporate level were shifted to lower responsibility levels (Vice President Sustainability) or resigned (Sustainability manager and stakeholder engagement senior consultant) [G.135]. This is a sign that sustainability commitment of AGA has suffered from economic pressure. It also illustrates how sustainability is not considered part of the core of the business; it is not considered necessary for its survival. However, at operational levels (OP) in Tanzania, the drop in gold prices did not cause operations to suffer economic losses [T.162].

AGA faced several international naming and shaming campaigns. For instance, in June 2005, the Human Rights Watch report on AGA's activities in the DRC titled "The Curse of Gold" investigated and reported on AngloGold Ashanti's activities in the Ituri region of the DRC. The report alleged that, through its presence in the region, AngloGold Ashanti gave tacit support to militia groups and, in doing this, acted inconsistently with the company's business principles. The company denied this claim. In August 2008, British charity War on Want published a report accusing AngloGold Ashanti's parent company Anglo American of profiting from the abuse of people in the developing countries in which the company operates [Anglo American, 2007; War on Want, 2007]. The report alleged abuses committed by AngloGold Ashanti subsidiaries in Colombia, Ghana, and Mali. War on Want stated that AngloGold Ashanti was accused in 2008 in Colombia of "murders of trade union and community leaders who opposed the company's activities in the region". The company in 2006, 2008, recognized its unacceptable safety performance in its platinum mines, and safety measures were taken. In January 2011, AngloGold Ashanti was named the world's "Most Irresponsible Company" at the Public Eye Awards, hosted by the Berne Declaration and Greenpeace in Davos, Switzerland. The nominating organization, WACAM (Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining), catalogued the company's history of "gross human rights violations and environmental problems" [The Enquirer, 2011]. In Tanzania, the national media has criticized AGA's Geita Gold Mine (GGM) on its environmental practices and regularly accuses the company of polluting the water [Domasa, 2014; The Citizen, , 2013]. RevenueWatch in Guinea sent delegations to the company's site (SAG) on environment issues, especially about cyanide, and spread allegedly wrong information denouncing SAG's practices in the national and international media [G.135; G.137]. The company has been targeted and blamed thoroughly over the years, which could constitute an incentive to adopt and implement more socially sustainable strategies.

International drivers of AGA mostly present incentives for the adoption of sustainable strategies. AGA's adoption is coherent with these incentives, but its success in implementation varies widely over time and cases (table 16 AGA international drivers).

Table 16. AGA International Drivers

AGA International drivers		Before 2011	2011-12	2012-13
Reputation concerns	Size	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Market position	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	International engagement	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Peer pressure	Economic pressure sector	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Other operating mines	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Home country activism	Civil society	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
	Self-regulation	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Naming and shaming	International	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Host country	LOW	LOW	MED
INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
AGA ADOPTION OF SUSTAINABILITY		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
SAG (Guinea) SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		MED	MED/HIGH	HIGH
GGM (Tanzania) SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		MED	MED	MED/HIGH

2. African Barrick Gold's International drivers

African Barrick Gold's international drivers are not very favorable to the adoption and implementation of sustainability, but its parent company Barrick Gold Corp's international context, on the other hand, does present major incentives.

African Barrick Gold's parent company, Barrick Gold Corporation, is committed to the VPSHR, to the UN Global Compact, and is part of the ICCM. However, African Barrick Gold itself is not officially committed to any international standards but affirms that it applies principles of the VPSHR and the Global Compact [ABG, 2012b, 2013c, 2014a]. Barrick Gold is the major gold mining MNC in the world. It has active press relations internationally to advertise its sustainability concerns in each country where they operate and at headquarters levels. Its position on the market is thus a major incentive for sustainability adoption.

African Barrick Gold (ABG) is listed on the London Stock Exchange and the Dar Es Salaam Stock Exchange, and it is a constituent of the FTSE 250 Index, i.e., part of the 101st to the 350th largest companies on the London Stock Exchange. Hence, the company's position in the market and adoption of voluntary standards constitute incentives for adoption of sustainable strategies. ABG is the leading Gold mining company in Tanzania and has active press relations in the Tanzanian media. Journalists and editors are allegedly paid by the company to either propagate a good image or to stop publishing critical articles [TZ 2011, 2012]. Journalists for the national press located in districts where the company operates are encouraged (getting thankful phone calls) when they publish good image articles about ABG [Edwards, 2011; The Daily News, 2011] [T.45; T.46; T.80]. The company's community projects are usually presented in (Anglophone and Swahili) Tanzanian newspapers in the period following conflicts narrated by the media, i.e., to restore the company's image [The Citizen, 2011a; The Citizen, , 2011b]. Barrick has been trying to get rid of ABG in the last years but failed to sell its shares of ABG to a Chinese company in 2011 [ABG, 2012c; Martell, 2013; White, 2013]. This suggests that the company cares for its reputation in Tanzania. Barrick is part of the GRI, which illustrates the corporation's concern to be competitive in the area of sustainability.

Barrick's home country, Canada, is one of the most advanced in regulation of sustainability, awareness, and activism regarding the extractive sector. Canada's first attempt to advance sustainable development in the mining context was the "Mineral and Metals Policy of the government of Canada", but the document did not contain accurate sustainability guidelines [Hilson

et al., 2000: 231]. Moreover, a private member's bill from John McKay, the liberal MP for Scarborough-Guildwood, aimed at toughening scrutiny of Canadian companies operating overseas, was narrowly defeated in the House of Commons in October 2011 after the mining industry campaigned against it [Wright et al., 2011]. Security issues are a major concern for all Canadian companies operating overseas, not just in the resources industry [Chris Hodgson, president of the Ontario Mining Association in Wright, 2011]. Green Party Leader Elizabeth May, who won a federal seat in the last election, said she will urge Parliament to address human rights abuses of multi-nationals around the world [Wright, 2011]. Also, Canadian civil society is very active in denouncing extractive industry practices. Protestbarrick is a whistle blower organization dedicated to denouncing Barrick Gold and African Barrick Gold's environment and social abuses. A number of research foundations specialize in the mining sector and corporate social responsibility practices investigation.

Considering that other companies operating in Tanzania adopt a sustainability discourse, ABG's peer pressure context is favorable (AGA, Resolute, Willimason Petra Diamond). However, ABG suffered significant economic losses with the decrease in gold prices in March 2013 [Jamasmie, 2013; Wilson, 2013]. Many financial newspaper articles have cited the example of Barrick as suffering major losses and having to reduce its workforce, restructure its operations, and change its management schemes [Jamasmie, 2013; Martell, 2013; White, 2013; Wilson, 2013].

Public naming and shaming campaigns regularly target African Barrick Gold and Barrick Gold Corp. Protestbarrick in Canada keeps threatening the reputation of ABG, relaying alleged environment and human rights abuses taking place in NMGM. Internationally, the NMGM mine is blamed for irresponsible behavior by the New Zealand superannuation fund, which excluded ABG from its investment portfolio because of its poor environmental and human rights track records [Nzsuperfund, 2013]. National newspapers in countries where the company operates regularly publish stories concerning environment pollution and violation of human rights. Tanzanian villagers are suing ABG following the alleged killings of 11 villagers in North-Mara conflict in May 2011. The pollution of the Tigithie River in 2009 resulted in an environmental protection order (EPO) by the National Environmental Management Council [The Citizen, , 2013]. Tundu Lissu, lawyer from the Tanzanian NGO Lawyer's Environmental Action Team (LEAT), obtained the support of an independent fact finding mission that included representatives of MiningWatch Canada, Friends of the Earth-US, the Dutch NGO Both ENDS, and a Canadian journalist [Anton et al., 2011; Hagen, 2008] to make public the human rights abuses of ABG during the initialization of operation at the company's Bulyanhulu mine in Tanzania. This campaign came to be known as "the Bulyanhulu case". A Norwegian team made a documentary film about it in 2008 [Hagen, 2008; Ylstra et al., 2004]. In 2013, Tanzanian villagers took ABG to court in the UK for the use of force by security against communities neighboring the North-Mara Gold Mine in May 2011 [Reuters, 2013a; Young, Sarah et al., 2013]. In December 2013, the High Court ordered African Barrick Gold to stop suing Tanzanian villagers [Reuters, 2013b; Sciencythoughts, 2013]. CorpWatch also reported on several Barrick operations around the world in a report called "Barrick's dirty secrets"[Corp Watch, 2007].

International drivers of Barrick Gold Corp and African Barrick Gold are favorable for the company's adoption of sustainability discourses (table 17). ABG and Barrick adopt sustainable discourses but, again, implementation varies over time and sites, suggesting a link between international drivers and adoption but not between international drivers and success in sustainability implementation.

Table 17. ABG International drivers

ABG international drivers		Bef. 2011	2011-12	2012-13
Reputation concerns	Size	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Market position	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	International engagement	LOW	LOW	LOW
Peer pressure	Economic pressure sector	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Other operating mines	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Home country activism	Civil society	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Self-regulation	MED	MED	MED
Naming and shaming	International	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Host country	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
ABG SES ADOPTON		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
NMGM SES OUTCOMES		LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED
BUZWAGI SES OUTCOMES		LOW/MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH

3. NordGold's International Drivers

None of the dimensions of international drivers in the case of NordGold are favorable to the company's adoption and implementation of a sustainability strategy.

NordGold is not committed to any international voluntary standards related to social sustainability. The company is only listed on the London Stock Exchange and does not have a visible position in the market. NordGold is not a very well known gold mining MNCs; it is much smaller than AGA or Barrick. The company does not seem very sensitive to its reputation at its African sites [G.148; G.153]. The managing director of the mine in Guinea (SMD) is not very concerned about campaigns in local newspapers or Guinean Internet news blogs. He does not consider public opinion a direct threat to the company's activities [G.148; G.153].

Russian mining companies do not compete severely in the area of social sustainability. Russian regulations and self-regulation context on sustainability are scarce [rtbh, 2012]. The Russian business community is still more comfortable with a narrow understanding of CSR than with the notion of sustainable development widely used in Western countries [rtbh, 2012; Shvarts et al., 2013]. Emphasis is still far from encompassing social sustainability concerns in a wider sense than labor rights¹⁷.

NordGold's operations in Guinea were not affected by the decrease of gold prices in 2013. In the SMD, the cuts did not result in restructuring or reducing its workforce; cuts were only on superfluous items (coffee, photocopies) [G.143].

The company did not have to face naming and shaming campaign internationally. However, under the president Dadis Camara in Guinea (2008-2009), the SMD suffered regular accusations on national TV, threatening to shut down operations on many occasions [G.85; G.143]. Guinean newspapers contain a lot of criticism of all large-scale mining companies, but their impact is minimal because of distribution problems and lack of international connections. Revenuewatch's presence and activity in Guinea, however, did compel all extractive industry companies operating in the country to disclose their contracts publically [Guinea Mining Contracts, 2012; Revenue Watch Institute, 2013a].

¹⁷“Respondents believe that the following elements are crucial to fostering sustainable development: responsibility for the quality of goods and services; employer responsibility; corporate governance; business ethics and anti-corruption; public relations, environmental protection, efficiency and rehabilitation; supplier network” [rtbh, 2012]

International drivers for the NordGold case do not present any incentives for the company to adopt sustainable strategies (table 18). NordGold nonetheless adopted a sustainable discourse related to stakeholder engagement with a particularly strong emphasis on multilateralism and long-term perspectives (chapter 4). Implementation varies over time. This case suggests that adoption of sustainability goes beyond home country's influence and market drivers. We consider that adoption emerges from the growing global awareness of sustainability issues.

Table 18. NG International drivers

NG international drivers		Before 2011	2011-12	2012-13
Reputation concerns	Size	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Position on the market	LOW	LOW	LOW
	International engagement	LOW	LOW	LOW
Peer pressure	Economic pressure sector	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Other operating mines	LOW	LOW	LOW
Home country activism	Civil society	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Self-regulation	LOW	LOW	LOW
Naming and shaming	International	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Host country	LOW	LOW	LOW
INTERNATIONAL DRIVERS		LOW	LOW	LOW
NG SES ADOPTION		HIGH	HIGH	MED/HIGH
SMD SES OUTCOMES		MED/LOW	MED/LOW	LOW

C. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: ADOPTION VERSUS IMPLEMENTATION

Most studies suggest that international drivers such as peer pressure/competition, home country norms and regulations, or naming and shaming campaigns, influence adoption of sustainability — especially if the company has reputation concerns. We find that even with few international incentives in favor of sustainability adoption, NordGold still adopted a sustainable approach to community issues. External international drivers seem to influence the adoption of sustainability in the case of AGA and ABG, but we find no direct influence by home country or market drivers (NordGold). The adoption of sustainability discourses by NordGold despite the lack of home country and market drivers confirms that the trend towards sustainability in CSR comes from an indirect global paradigm change. The fact that the trends of adoption of sustainability do not appear to be linked to the home country of MNCs illustrates how sustainability has become a myth in the neo-institutional sense [Friedman, 2004].

Are international drivers identified in the literature more relevant in explaining implementation variety? Highly favorable international drivers lead to a wide variety of sustainability implementations. Low international drivers seem to lead to lower sustainability implementation. NordGold faces low international incentives to adopt sustainable strategies. We observe that the company adopts sustainable discourses about communities but does not successfully implement the sustainable strategy at OP levels. This case could lead to the suggestion that international drivers have little incidence on adoption but affect implementation. However, the case of ABG contradicts this with low implementation levels in some of their mining sites, despite high international drivers.

Research on international relations tends to explain the simultaneous movement of sustainability-driven IO guidelines and of adoption by MNCs of sustainability standards by the influence IOs have on MNCs. In the present chapter we explored this causal relationship and find that adoption of voluntary standards set by IOs cannot be the only reason why MNCs adopt sustainable approaches. Moreover, through our analysis of case studies we cannot confirm the effect of reputation concerns

neither on adoption nor on implementation. We also contradict studies that explain MNC behavior in ALS by the levels of regulation in their home country.

External international drivers are not a relevant explanation for the adoption of sustainability. Moreover, variations within company sites such as AGA in Guinea and Tanzania, or ABG at two sites in Tanzania, illustrate that international drivers commonly considered to be explanatory factors in the literature are not relevant to explain implementation either.

Chapter VI — Host Country Drivers

Characteristics of areas of limited statehood, i.e., limitation of regulatory and enforcement capacities, entail that the State lacks bargaining power compared to economically and technically powerful MNCs. These limitations of the state could hinder the chances of a company operating in ALS to operate in a sustainable way [Graham et al., 2006; Stopford et al., 1998]. ALS often have limited control and limited will to enforce rules upon MNCs operating within their borders because of the country's need for foreign direct investment [Graham & Woods 2006]. These assumptions lead to the idea of a "regulatory race to the bottom" in ALS. However, companies may take part in a "race to the top" [Börzel & Thauer 2013] because of the very conditions of operations in ALS. Because these conditions create uncertainty, it might become necessary for companies to adopt and implement environmental and social strategies [Börzel & Thauer 2013]. The "shadow of anarchy" [Börzel 2010] could very well incite MNCs to act in sustainable ways because of their need for regulations and collectively binding rules [Börzel & Thauer 2013; Ruggie 2004, Börzel 2010].

Governance characteristics of the host country where a company operates, especially regulations and enforcement capacity, may or may not play a role in creating incentives for MNCs to implement socially sustainable community-company conflict management strategies. We use the term governance as "institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods" [Börzel, 2012: 6]. In the present chapter we examine the level of social sustainability entailed by national regulations in countries where MNCs operate. We then turn to the way they are enforced, not only by central states but also by non-state agents [Favotto et al., 2014; Keck et al., 1998]. Are the regulatory context and the enforcement capacity within the host country on socially sustainable aspects of the mining sector an incentive for companies to implement sustainable community-company conflict management strategies?

We find that host country drivers are not relevant in explaining implementation of sustainability by MNCs operating in their borders. What matters more is how the state influences local governance drivers (chapter 7, Chapter 9).

We first operationalize regulation and enforcement capacities, which theoretically influence MNCs' practices in areas of limited statehood (see chapter 2). Then, we detail the situation of Tanzania and Guinea regarding these dimensions. We evaluate the structures and content of governance through institutions and actors in charge of regulating the mining sector and analyze their hierarchical power. Enforcement capacity of the hosting state will help evaluate the processes by which companies are made accountable, through either state or non-state mechanisms.

A. REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN THE MINING SECTOR: OPERATIONALIZATION OF HOST COUNTRY DRIVERS

To evaluate the extent to which host country characteristics provide incentives for MNCs to implement social sustainability, we consider two analytical dimensions: social sustainability of state regulations and structures, and enforcement and accountability mechanisms at the national level. We first examine the extent to which government regulations concerning the mining sector take into account community needs. To account for the level of sustainability of state regulations, we also analyze the degree of limitation of statehood in the mining areas through the capacity of decentralized authorities to manage conflict, and their level of administrative authority. National enforcement and accountability mechanisms, on the other hand, can be observed through state, non-state, and international interventions at the national level related to the mining sector and to community-company conflicts.

1. Regulations, tools and structures for Social sustainability

We expect sustainable regulations of the mining sector to include community issues and compel companies to implement a sustainable approach to community-company conflicts. Inclusion of community needs in the mining sector can depend on power inequality between state and companies (see chapter 2). These can downsize the state's incentive to have regulations in favor of community and local development if they are not compatible with attracting FDI [Graham & Woods 2006; Stopford et al 1998]. A way to understand the dependency of a country to FDI and international funding institutions is to compare the government's debts to its GDP. Government debt as a percent of GDP, also known as debt-to-GDP ratio, is the amount of national debt a country has as a percentage of its Gross Domestic Product¹⁸. Basically, government debt is the money owed by the central government to its creditors. There are two types of government debt: net and gross. Gross debt is the accumulation of outstanding government debt, which may be in the form of government bonds, credit default swaps, currency swaps, special drawing rights, loans, insurance, and pensions. Net debt is the difference between gross debt and the financial assets that government holds. The higher the debt-to-GDP ratio, the less likely the country will pay back its debt, and the more likely the country is to be dependent on external funds' conditionalities instead of making policies based on its own evaluation of the national context [Drahos, 2007; Grant et al., 2005; Herbst, 1990]. The way taxes are redistributed by the state can also inform on the level of concern of state for the specific challenges faced by communities in mining areas. To evaluate the effect of the "shadow of the community" [Börzel 2012], the integration of national civil society in the formulation of mining policies is also relevant as well as the participation of decentralized authorities and local stakeholders in decision-making concerning mining regulations.

2. State and Non-State Enforcement and Accountability Mechanisms

Here, we operationalize host country drivers (table 19). To evaluate enforcement and accountability mechanisms at the national level, we first screen the state-led mechanisms and events of sanction against companies. Also part of the analysis of the state's enforcement capacity is the way the state itself perceives its responsibility regarding social sustainability in the mining areas. Allegations of misuse of public funds, on the other hand, helps to understand whether state authorities are

¹⁸ <http://www.tradingeconomics.com>

perceived as willing to enforce regulations against MNCs within their borders. We also have to map how and who monitors company practices. Non-state actors in ALS may take on the role to lead accountability mechanisms when the state is too weak or not willing to enforce regulations [Keck & Sikkink 1998]. We evaluate the extent to which non-state actors such as media, activists, or NGOs play the role of making the mining sector’s practices more sustainable at the host country level. International organizations also provide tools to overcome the limitations of the state; we assess whether their actions tend to make companies act in more sustainable ways.

Table 19. Host Country Drivers Operationalization

Host Country Drivers		Indicators
Regulations	Mining regulation and dependency	Inclusion of community needs in regulation Debt-to-GDP ratio
	Tools and structures	Delegation of powers and resources to decentralized authorities Integration of civil society and local authorities in policy formulation Taxes redistribution
Enforcement/ Accountability	State	Sanctions and monitoring of companies Perception on will to enforce accountability of mining sector
	Non-state	Activism or advocacy for sustainability
	IOs/donors	Making companies accountable or overcoming statehood limitations in sustainability enforcement

We study the cases of five mining sites operated by three different companies in Tanzania and Guinea. Both countries changed their mining regulations in the past three years. However, neither presents many incentives for MNCs to implement sustainable approaches. Decentralized authorities in mining areas have more delegated powers and potentially more resources in Guinea, since mining MNCs’ taxes are directly managed at the local level through the CPD structure (prefectural development committee). International organizations are also more present since 2011 to overcome the limitations of the State, mostly through sub-regional structures helping with the management of taxes. Tanzania’s new mining act’s formulation brought civil society to the decision-making table but did not enforce its recommendations. Decentralized authorities in Tanzania do not have enough power or resources to enforce sustainable practices by MNCs. Despite media coverage and NGO concerns, non-state accountability mechanisms against companies are weak. In both countries, the recently launched Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) process does not seem to make companies more accountable but rather canalizes negative perception on the State’s capacities.

We find that host countries’ drivers in our case studies do not have any influence on company implementation of sustainable approaches. The debate about ALS leading to a regulatory race to the top or to the bottom cannot be settled here. The influence of the host country’s limitations of statehood on the company’s implementation cannot be verified at the national level. We find that local governance drivers are more relevant in explaining the variation in company implementation outcomes (chapter 10).

B. TANZANIA’S DRIVERS OF SUSTAINABILITY IN THE MINING SECTOR

In Tanzania regulations improved in the mining sector considering sustainability issues in particular about ASM and CSR. However, the state still depends on the contributions of the mining companies and international organizations. Taxes are not specifically distributed to mining areas and the central state does not delegate enough power and resources to decentralized authorities for them to enforce regulations. Besides, non-state actors’ critics are not effective in making companies accountable.

1. Regulations for sustainability

Regulations and structures regarding the mining sector between 2011 and 2013 in Tanzania are weak despite the launch of a new mining act in 2010. The formulation of this new regulatory framework included civil society participation and is supposed to enhance the companies' CSR activities and sustainable practices, especially on environmental issues. Although the Mining Act did increase royalty payments by companies to the central state, debates are continuous as to whether this acts in favor of national and community development. The country's decentralization process did not lead to significant delegation of power or resources to enforce mining regulations. Although some civil society members were included in the formulation of the new mining regulations, their participation did not significantly influence policy formulation. Mining areas do not especially benefit from tax redistribution, which means that local government in mining areas do not have these extra resources to manage the particular issues arising as a consequence of the presence of the company.

Tanzania is a relative newcomer to the mining sector (compared to other countries in Africa) since large-scale mining started in the late 1990s [ICCM, 2007: 30]. In the late 1980s, the country had its first global economic reform to make the sector attractive to foreign investors. However, during the period before the serious reforms of 1996 (Mineral Policy of 1997, and Mining Act of 1998), investment in the Tanzanian mineral sector was virtually non-existent [ICCM, 2007: 30]. Since 1998, the commercial mining sector has developed to become the first national exporter, with gold leading the way¹⁹ [ICCM, 2009; Lexafrica, 2011; mbendi-tanzania]. The socialist history of the country, the turn to fiscal incentives, and the growth of the sector contributed to the particularly intense political debates about the role of mining [ICCM, 2009: 1]. Debates on the true merits of fiscal incentives and stability agreements, while perceived as limiting the contribution from the sector to national welfare, have been continuous throughout the process of reviewing the mining sector's legislation that was launched by the Tanzanian government in 2005-2006 [ICCM, 2009; Olan'g, 2010; Policy Forum, 2010c].

Social sustainability in regulation increased somewhat in 2012 when the new mining act was enacted. During the reviewing process of the former regulation framework, the government formed a civil society commission (the Bomani commission). However, Tanzanian civil society complains of the lack of inclusion of the recommendation of this commission in the new act, while investors complain that it damages their confidence by limiting their growth potential. Tanzania's economic and technical dependency on external actors also weakens the extent to which it can privilege its national and community development. On 23 April 2010, the Mining Act No.14 of 2010 came into force, repealing the Mining Act No. 5 of 1998. The 2010 Mining Act re-enacted, with substantial amendments, the laws relating to prospecting for minerals, mining, processing, and dealing in minerals, granting, renewal and termination of mineral rights, payment of royalties, fees, and other charges [The Republic of Tanzania, 2010]. Improvements were made in the government's need to increase national welfare through mining revenues, and its need to enhance its management capacities [NDF, 2009]. The investors' expectations were essentially covered through stability

¹⁹ The mining industry in Tanzania grew 27% in 1999. Up to 15% of Africa's exploration expenditure has been spent in Tanzania. 2003 and 2004 have continued to see growth in Tanzania's mining industry. 2003 mining sector 3% of GDP - value of mineral exports US\$ 554,1 million. 2004 rose to 3,2% of GDP rose to 17% in 2004 to US\$ 672,5 million. In 2003 Gold was the major contributor to export revenues, accounting for more than 62% of the total, compared with 49% in 2002. Gemstone export values rose to US\$29.12 million in 2003 compared to US\$22.02 million in 2002 (expansion of mining and of trading activity within the gemstone industry).

clauses. The new Mineral sector policies entail CSR, environment, and artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) regulations [The Republic of Tanzania, 2010]. They also clarify the participation of the government in mining areas.

The recommendations of civil society were essentially presented in the Bomani commission report submitted in February 2008 and presented publically in the parliament [Bomani Commission, 2008]. Some recommendations were added to the Act. For instance, the involvement of civil society in the passing of the new mineral policy, improvement in fiscal arrangements that now include a calculation of royalties using gross instead of net back value, the agreement that mining contracts have to be reviewed regularly, and the setting of Gemstone mining as an activity to be undertaken predominantly by Tanzanians (foreigners interested in the gemstone industry in the country must partner with locals) [Policy Forum, 2010a: 15]. The new mining act also provides new requirements regarding community involvement, especially on compensation issues. It also includes clauses on consultation of local stakeholders [The Republic of Tanzania, 2010]. In 2013, the government got involved at the local level in mining areas on compensation issues [T.138-141]. For instance, a task force of land issue specialists was selected to deal with compensation litigation in the Tarime district where the NMGM operates (see chapter 7).

Tanzania's dependency on FDI and international aid is important. The Bank of Tanzania reports the Government's Debt-to-GDP ratio. Tanzania recorded a Government Debt-to-GDP ratio of 39.20 percent in 2012. It averaged 49.37 percent from 2002 until 2012, reaching an all time high of 66.60 percent in 2002 and a record low of 31.10 percent in 2007 [Trading Economics Tanzania, 2013]. In order to overcome the lack of adequate institutions, the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) has been appointed by the World Bank to support the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) in strengthening the mining sector in Tanzania [NDF, 2009: 46]. According to NDF²⁰, the revision of the Mineral Policy of 2009 aims at increasing the mineral sector's contribution to the GDP and addressing "poverty alleviation by integrating the mining industry with the rest of the economy" [NDF, 2009: 46]. Dependency is also reflected in the state authorities' attitude regarding mining companies and in Tanzanians' perceptions of the state. The companies appear to dominate the state. State authorities have the tendency to adopt submissive attitudes or to be afraid of what they could say about them. Perceptions of the Tanzanians concerning the government's power of negotiation illustrate the perceived inequalities between MNCs and the government. People perceive the government as corrupted by the multinational mining companies. Civil society members reproach the government for its lack of preparation before opening the country to investors: "no training, no experts, and no knowledge of regulations" [T.58].

Tools and structures regarding the mining sector in Tanzania are not in favor of local authority empowerment, inclusion of the civil society is weak, and redistribution of taxes does not privilege mining areas.

The central government does not delegate much power or resources to local government authorities. Moreover, the central government (as well as the multinational gold mining companies)

²⁰ The NDF-project: Mineral Sector Development Technical Assistance Project in Tanzania constituted funding of two components, which were identified and formulated during the World Bank's: 'Mineral Sector Development Technical Assistance Project' (launched in 1995). However, the NDF-components were only implemented after the World Bank's intervention had terminated in December 2001. The Credit Agreement was signed in 1999 and it expired on 31 December 2007. The Project objectives were to develop and support the Government of Tanzania's policy, regulatory, and institutional reforms within the mining sector in order to encourage private investment and environmentally sustainable development.

does not often take the decentralized authorities into account in decision-making and implementation of policies in the mining sector. It is illustrative in this regard that the mining sector is not even supposed to be dealt with by the locally elected government, since the central government appoints the personnel responsible for the sector in the different sub-regions (Zonal offices and Residents of Mines). However, the State recently started empowering district authorities in mining related conflicts, particularly for compensation issues [T.138-141]. The new mining legislation of 2010 did not eliminate the discretionary powers of the minister of energy and minerals in licensing and contract negotiations [The Republic of Tanzania, 2010]. The new mining law does not clearly outline the legislature's oversight responsibilities, and Parliament does not consistently review mining revenues [GlobalDialog, 2013]. The civil society participated in debates and formulation of the new mining regulations, but their suggestions were not fully integrated in the policy [Policy Forum, 2010b, 2010c]. The Bomani report (from the name of the commission reviewing the Mining Act) proposed that the companies pay 3% royalties, of which 20% should go directly to the locality where the mine is operating [Bomani Commission, 2008; Olan'g, 2010]. However, the 2010 version of the mining Act does not mention any retrocession to the local communities [Tanzania, 2010].

The tax redistribution system in Tanzania does not privilege mining areas [Olan'g, 2010; Policy Forum, 2010c]. The Ministry of Energy and Minerals and the Tanzania Revenue Authority both collect payments from mining companies. Companies make some direct payments to affected communities; otherwise, all revenues go to the central treasury [Revenue Watch, 2013]. Civil society leaders have advocated for subnational transfers of resource revenues, and mining companies currently pay a one-time fee of \$200,000 directly to local councils in areas where they operate [Revenue Watch, 2013]. After years of receiving very little in royalty payments from mining companies, the 2010 Mining Act increased the royalty rates between one and two percent depending on the mineral, although contract negotiations with extractive companies continue to be opaque [Policy Forum, 2010a; Tanzania, 2010]. The government has stated its commitment to establishing a mineral development fund, but this has yet to happen [Policy Forum, 2010a].

2. Enforcement and accountability

Enforcement and accountability mechanisms in Tanzania do not constitute strong incentives for companies to implement sustainable strategies. Tools for monitoring by the state exist, and some companies have been sanctioned for unsustainable behavior, mostly due to environmental issues. Researchers and practitioners recognize that citizens and civil society have a negative perception of the mining sector, and that the weakness of the state's negotiating power creates a complicated environment to do business [Goldstuck et al., 2010; Olan'g, 2010; Policy Forum, 2010c]. Non-state accountability mechanisms consist of national and international awareness campaigns, and some political and religious leaders are vocal on the lack of attention to communities in mining areas. Although they make a lot of noise, their impact is rarely thorough.

Although the Tanzanian government sanctioned some mines on environmental behavior, the government's monitoring capacity is weak. The country is a complying member of the EITI (TEITI), which showed discrepancies between revenues declared by the state compared to payments justified by companies [TEITI, 2012, 2013]. The EITI forums focus mainly on the lack of awareness for stakeholders and multiply initiatives to address it [Agenda Participation 2000, 2012; ForDia, 2012; Revenue Watch, 2012]. However, the government's lack of transparency on mining sector issues is

persistent [Revenue Watch, 2013]. The Tanzania Minerals Audit Agency was established in December 2009. While some members of civil society question its autonomy, its creation is generally regarded as a positive development, and the agency's annual reports have increased public access to information [GlobalDialog, 2013; Thumani, 2013].

The government issued an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) against African Barrick Gold's NMGM [Nyakeke, 2013]. This sanction followed a leakage issue from pipes of the TSF dam in 2009. The operational site complied with several criteria listed in order to lift the sanction [Mugini, 2011]. The National Environmental Management Council (NEMC) also penalized AngloGold Ashanti's GGM on environmental issues in 2013 [Domasa, 2014; The Citizen, , 2013]. On social issues, the government appears to be soft. In 2011, the zonal mine officer talked to the managers to try and make them understand the necessity to make things better with artisanal and small-scale miners (ASM), suggesting they could provide sensitization and training [T.64].

Demonstrating the lack of enforcement of penalties, a recent article reporting discussions held at the Global Dialogue 2013 in Dar-Es-Salaam [Simbeye, 2013], shows that putting in place a strong fiscal regime is still on the agenda of civil society and activists. Moreover, TEITI reports show increased participation of companies since 2009 (from 11 to 30), and/ but also high discrepancies which stay unresolved, pointing out the gaps of management capacity and delays experienced, especially at the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) level [TEITI, 2013: 121].

While Tanzania provides some information on mineral production and revenues, the failure to publish mining contracts and a lack of data on the state-owned mining company contributed to a "weak" score [Revenue Watch, 2013]. Little information is available on the mineral licensing process before licenses are granted. Once mining rights are awarded, information is available only in a complex digital format for a fee, and environmental impact assessments are released only upon request. The Finance Ministry publishes information on production volumes and the value of exports, but does not provide revenue data [Republic of Tanzania]. The ministry of Energy and Minerals publishes data on reserves, production volumes, prices, export values, operating companies, taxes and royalties, but has yet to disclose figures on license fees, acreage fees, dividends or bonuses [Republic of Tanzania; Revenue Watch, 2013]. The Bank of Tanzania publishes annual reports on exports and production volumes and values [Republic of Tanzania].

Overall, there is an impression of opacity and secrecy that makes the government appear as corrupted in popular representations. In this regard, the example of how the Buzwagi contract was signed is illustrative in explaining the perception people have of a corrupted government that lacks enforcement will. In July 2006, the government was starting the reviewing process of the 1995 Mining Act: no new mining company was supposed to get a contract before the new mining Act was voted. However, on February 17th 2007, BarrickGold obtained a new mining development agreement (MDA) for the Buzwagi site. On August 14th 2007, a motion was presented in parliament. The motion asked for a moratorium on the new Buzwagi mine's activity to comply with the government's decision, but the Parliament refused discussions [T.63; National newspapers archives]. This event was one of the first to bring the mining issue in the forefront, led by the Chadema party, which organized meetings about this issue in 52 constituencies [T.63]. The Buzwagi mine was never officially inaugurated.

Vocal members of parliament mostly of the opposition party and sometimes also from the ruling party advocate for the engagement of local stakeholders in initiatives and in the long-term development of communities in the mining areas. Non-state actors as well participate at the national and down to the local level in these, sometimes fierce, debates. However, actions or policies affecting MNCs directly are not changed accordingly, making the non-state accountability mechanisms weak.

Members of parliament are a very important part of Tanzanian political life. People watch the assembly as they would watch a TV show every day; kids in rural areas imitate them as if they were characters in a TV series. MPs from Chadema (opposition party) make themselves heard in the Assembly the most, but even some from the CCM (ruling party) can be very critical and will not hesitate to say it out loud. Some MPs are very vocal on the mining issues, especially on the lack of consideration for neighboring communities. When it comes to the Ward Councilors, elected village heads, and district councilors, criticism of mining companies has become politicized and is picked up in electoral politics in some regions. For instance, some interviewees consider that the opposition party Chadema wins local elections because it is more outspoken for the population against mining MNCs [T.49; T.137]. For example, this is the case in the Geita district, which seems to have been a traditional CCM stronghold [T.160]. “There are a lot of controversies with politicians supporting the mass (against the companies), even if the mass is not always doing good things” [T.156, Geita District Community Development Officer, 25.11.2013]. However, in some places, CCM-MPs have understood that showing commitment to local development and the fight against multinational companies’ practices is important for being re-elected [T.137; T.46; T.51; T.80]. The Tanzanian Mines and Construction Workers union, TAMICO, exists since 2003. Their capacity to make companies accountable has not been effective or publicized.

The state encourages service delivery civil society organization (CSO) while trying to downsize political engagement (counter-power), and it discourages alliances with opposition parties [McAlpine, fc; Policy Forum, 2008]. The NGO act makes registration compulsory, which entails alignment of NGOs with the government’s positions [Republic of Tanzania, 2002]. It also prohibits coalitions and national networking [Republic of Tanzania, 2002]. The State seems to have control over NGOs.

The Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA) is a Tanzanian foundation that organizes discussion forums and information campaigns about the impact of the extractive industry on the communities and on the Tanzanian economy. ForDIA facilitates people-centered development initiatives under local conditions through research, training, advocacy, and consultancies. In 2007 the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) provided financial support to the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) in Tanzania to build multi-stakeholder collaborations for promoting transparency in the mining industry. The project was intended to address concerns about oversight of local revenue receipts and expenditures for social services and development projects [RevenueWatch 2014]. In addition to organizing discussions on new mining legislation and contract transparency, ForDIA has also conducted a media campaign and other public outreach to influence policy and legal reforms [ForDia, 2012, 2013]. Publish What You Pay (PWYP) is also represented in Tanzania, where it is governed by a 15 member steering committee [Fordia, 2013]. With support from RWI, ForDIA has been working to mobilize and help coordinate Tanzania’s Publish What You Pay coalition. Policy Forum is another NGO trying to influence policies regarding the mining sector.

Revenue Watch is also active in criticizing the mining regulations and lobbying for the communities' needs to be integrated in mining policies. Policy Forum is a platform that shares information about mining in Tanzania and shares ideas with practitioners in Dar-Es-Salaam through the organization of forums and workshops. Policy Forum is working with RWI's support to strengthen the capacity of civil society, members of parliament, and the media, to improve resource transparency and accountability [Revenue Watch 2014].

“Interfaith leaders have been working on public advocacy for better management of mineral resources, while no nationwide effort existed previously” [Goldstuck et al., 2010; Revenue Watch, 2013]. Recently, faith groups in Tanzania have been more active in monitoring the impact of large-scale mining operations on local communities. In January 2008, religious leaders from all major faiths went on a fact-finding mission to mining communities, and they published a report outlining their findings and recommendations. In March 2008, an interfaith committee composed of BAKWATA (National council of Muslims in Tanzania), CCT (Christian Council of Tanzania) and TEC (Tanzania Episcopal Conference) published a report and a movie documentary called *A Golden Opportunity: How Tanzania is failing to benefit from Gold Mining* [Curtis, 2008]. The CCT Christian Council of Tanzania wanted to involve religious leaders in advocacy because of their network and their presence throughout the country. They might have influenced the government towards changing the mining regulation (i.e., reviewing the 1998 mining act), because they were getting very vocal on mining issues. The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) used the findings and recommendations of the review and documentary “A Golden Opportunity” to put pressure on the Norwegian government’s sovereign pension fund, which has shares in the two main companies investigated in the report (AGA and Barrick) to investigate their human rights and tax practices [Nzsuperfund, 2013].

International bodies integrated in the state structures to improve capacity have an ambivalent role. They are a good way to attract FDI but claim to be in support of local development. For instance, in Tanzania, the World Bank funds the “Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project” (SMMRP). The objective is “to strengthen Tanzania’s capacity to manage the mineral sector to improve benefits for Tanzania and Tanzanians, and enhance private investment” [World Bank, 2011]. The SMMRP is built on an analytical foundation, following on an IDA-supported Mineral Sector Development Technical Assistance Project, which came into operation in mid-1994 [GlobalDialog, 2013; World Bank, 2009a]. The official description of the projects states that this analytical work and the activities under this Project helped to attract investments for mineral exploration and mine development through a first generation of improvements to the mineral sector framework, including improvements of institutions and agencies administering the sector [SMMRP]. The project focuses on spurring local economic development through mineral sector development, reducing conflict, and improving management of environmental and social issues related to mineral sector development, and increasing growth and enhancing competitiveness in the mining sector [SMMRP]. On the ground, the project is quasi-inexistent: there are hardly any actors or structures to meet in order to verify the advancement of the project and there are few available documents.

3. Conclusion Tanzania

The new Mining Act of 2011 contains more community related concerns than the former ones and was to some extent formulated with the participation of civil society. However, the reviewing process and its consequences, along with EITI pointing out discrepancies on the side of the state,

mostly emphasized the State’s limited enforcement will and capacity. The country has to attract investors because of its dependency on international financial institutions. Moreover, the lack of effective decentralization of the mining sector is not favorable to local government’s enforcement of MNCs’ sustainability implementation. This lack of resources at the local level is also reflected in the tax redistribution system, which does not allocate more resources to mining areas where the companies operate. State-led accountability mechanisms did lead to events of sanctions against mining companies. These sanctions concerned environmental pollution, not socially unsustainable behavior. The state’s opacity reinforces the citizen’s negative perception of its enforcement will. Although some political actors, essentially MPs and opposition leaders, and some national NGOs and religious organizations lobby for transparency and community development, they are not efficient in holding companies accountable. The World Bank’s project supposed to fill the lack of management capacity of the state in the mining sector does not appear to bring any significant improvement.

Table 20. Tanzania Host Country Drivers

TANZANIA		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
Regulations	Mining regulation and dependency	LOW	LOW/MED	LOW
	Tools and structures	LOW	LOW	LOW
Enforcement/ Accountability	State	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Non-state	LOW	LOW	LOW
	International/donors	MED	LOW	LOW
COUNTRY DRIVERS		LOW	LOW	LOW
NMGMS SUSTAINABILITY		LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED
BUZ SES SUSTAINABILITY		LOW/MED	MED/HIGH	HIGH
GGM SES SUSTAINABILITY		MED	MED	MED

From 2011 to 2013, Tanzania’s regulation and enforcement capacities are not in favor of sustainability in the mining sector (table 20). Although the reviewing process of the legal framework manifested some efforts towards including civil society in the formulation and non-state actors advocate in favor of sustainability in the mining sector, outcomes did not improve accordingly. Consequently, since host state drivers stayed low during the three years of the research period while companies operating in Tanzania reached various sustainability levels in their implementation of SES, the host state does not seem relevant in explaining this variation.

C. GUINEA’S DRIVERS OF SUSTAINABILITY IN THE MINING SECTOR

Guinea also revised its mining policies in 2010. The civil society and the mining sector were involved in the BUZ process. The Guinean state is more transparent than Tanzania on the extractive industry. Taxes are redistributed in areas with mining operations and responsibilities are delegated to local government but they have little resources to enforce regulations. The non-state sector in Guinea works more on capacity-building than on accountability of the mining companies.

1. Regulations for sustainability

Regulations, tools and structures in Guinea are weak incentives for companies to implement sustainable strategies. One of the first tasks of the newly elected government of Guinea in 2011 was to revise its mining regulations. The adoption of a new mining code in 2011 created a lot of controversy, because it was launched and immediately withdrawn. Its formulation was informed by consultation with civil society actors, which had gained a lot of importance during the two-year fight against the former regime (2007-2009), preceding the first elections recognized as democratic by the international community. The withdrawal of the policy was understood as a clear manifestation of the weakness of the government compared to foreign investors who were dissatisfied with tax

clauses. Although companies pay royalties directly to the mining areas, the weakness of decentralized authorities in managing these funds led the state to revise structures in place and to postpone the launching of special reconciliation committees because of ongoing disputes between companies, communities, and local state representatives.

The new mining code was adopted (September 9th 2011) and then postponed (November 2011). The new Mining Code of September 2011 includes provisions to combat corruption, protect the environment, and review all existing mining contracts. It was implemented two years later, in April 2013. The AFD (French development agency) supported the Guinean authorities in the revision of the 1995 mining code, in order to bring the regulation up to international standards, in particular through financing two services: an international resident technical expert advising the minister of mines as an ad hoc member of the technical commission; and the SOFRECO engineering consulting firm [AFD, 2011; SOFRECO, 2011]. In 2011, the AFD welcomed the adoption of the new mining code, while SOFRECO was not entirely satisfied. Both recognized that the code reached “international standards” [Guineelive, 2011]. SOFRECO, however, they refused to certify the text as being “conform to the best international practices”, because of the residual presence of some articles introduced in the final version despite the notice of the consultant expert [SOFRECO, 2011] [G.100; G.101]. On the other hand, the AFD considered that the code was a result of a participative process of quality, it put transparency and good governance principles at the center, it introduced dispositions regarding social and environmental responsibilities during and after exploitation, and it planned for the association of local communities and the financing of local development [AFD, 2011]. The new Mining Code also provides for a Fund for Local Development, financed by a share of royalties and other fixed fees directed to local governments. Regulations were not implemented yet in 2013 [Lassourd 2013; Guinea interviews 2011, 2012, and 2013]. The new mining code plans for the creation of a local convention between the company and the neighboring communities [Republic of Guinea, 2011a]. In the mining contracts, the company has the exclusivity for all mineral resources, hence it cannot compensate ASM for their use of the underground, but the contract also says the company is responsible to help local artisanal mining [SAG et al., 1992; SMD et al., 1990].

The Government consulted heavily with Guinean civil society and with mining companies active in Guinea (who organized official comments through the Chamber of Mines) [Revenue Watch 2013]. It worked with experts from the International Monetary Fund and the Revenue Watch Institute to develop the amendments to the revised mining code in 2011 [Lassourd, 2013]. However, three months after promulgation, the mining code had to be revised. “Whether the State had to give up under the pressure of the mining companies, or the text was not rigorously written, in either case it is dangerous” [G.101]. There was not even a text of application of the code. The director of the department of mines for the Siguiri prefecture explained that the code had been promulgated and ratified but not yet enforced [G.33]. It will be the reference for all future contracts with mining companies. Revenue watch confirmed what popular opinion believed. The code was withdrawn because of the dissatisfaction of companies operating in Guinean and to make it more attractive to FDI:

“Amending a law less than two years after it was passed could be wrongly interpreted as legal instability. In this case, it was pragmatism: The Government acknowledged investor concerns that, as the global market for large-scale mining projects tightened, some fiscal provisions of the 2011 law may have discouraged investment in Guinea’s bauxite and iron ore sectors.” [Lassourd, 2013]

The Inter-ministerial commission for reviewing the mining conventions²¹ - put in place by former president Moussa Daddis Camara (in 2009) and composed of representatives of the ministries of economy, of finance, and of energy and minerals– was still officially working in 2011. The 10th of January 2012, the president announced the creation of a framework to review the mining contracts. It was composed of two committees (Strategic Contract Review Committee and the Technical Contract Review Committee), and the companies participated in the negotiations [Guinea Mining Contracts, 2012; Keita, 2012; The Republic of Guinea, 2012]. Finally, after two years of negotiations, the new code was passed by Guinea’s transition Parliament in April 2013 [Guinea Mining Contracts, 2012].

The Guinean government is very indebted and dependent on FDI and external aid [Revenue Watch Institute, 2013b]. Government Debt-to-GDP ratio in Guinea is reported by the Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea. The country recorded a Government Debt-to-GDP ratio of 64.12 percent of the GDP in 2011. From 2003 until 2011, Guinea’s Government Debt-to-GDP ratio averaged 83.9 percent, reaching an all time high of 113.0 percent in December of 2006 and a record low of 64.1 percent in December of 2011 [Trading Economics Guinea, 2013]. Another problem is that contracts with the mining companies were signed in political decades under non-transparent conditions; this led to very low tax rates of the mining sector [IPS News, 19th January 2012]. It also led to the abuse of the missing state’s capacity to overlook the mining process by the companies²² [G.5]. The mining industry is feared as being too strong, hindering the new mining policies to be implemented effectively by state authorities. Gold mining MNCs in Guinea are themselves playing the role of standards enforcers because of the weak negotiating powers of the government. In 2013, representatives of the state administration, the ministry of mining and energy, the ministry of agriculture, and the three multinational gold mining companies operating in Guinea: SEMAFO, SAG, and SMD held a meeting at the regional level (Kankan, “gouvernorat”) [Republic of Guinea, 2011b]. The ministry gathered the reports of all three companies concerning their experiences related to compensation in order to inform the new regulations [SAG 2013; SMD 2013]. In Siguiri Prefecture, SMD, and SAG installed separate accounts for the taxation funds; instead of transferring it directly to the prefecture’s account [SAG 2013; SMD 2013]. Now the tax money is held and managed by the companies until the state officials of the prefectural committee for development (CPD) have consolidated their financial management [Crew Gold SMD, 2010] [G.47; G.48; G.83; G.85]. This was carried out with the approval of the national government. The Guinean state agreed to postpone the collection of taxes from the mining companies until it would have improved its policies and management capacities at the local level.

Tools and structures in place in Guinea do not favor sustainable practices by companies. The decentralized structures of the state exist and receive taxes from the mining companies but are not efficient in dealing with financial and development issues. Recognizing the necessity to empower local actors in dealing with specific controversies in areas where large-scale mining takes place, the

²¹ Commission interministérielle chargée de la relecture des conventions de base

²² « Si je prends par exemple le régime autocratique qui vient de prendre fin avec le régime de Lansana Conté. C’est quand même un secteur aux yeux des personnes qui sont averties qui a été très mal géré en terme de gouvernance, et finalement l’analyse que j’ai aidée à faire c’est que dans certains pays quand l’état à une capacité limitée, il y a des sociétés multinationales qui profitent de cette faiblesse pour essayer de faire du n’importe quoi, et je crois que cela c’est passé ici pendant les dix dernières années où le secteur minier a été géré quelques fois de façon vraiment désordonnée et pas suivie. » [G.5]

central state created special mediation committees, but their efficiency is compromised by uncertainty.

The local prefectural committee for development (CPD) is a consultation framework which statutes on the development of the prefecture, particularly on the affectations of tax money coming from large-scale mining companies. They are constituted by all elected people from the CRDs (*communes rurales de développement*) and CU (*communes urbaines*) of the prefecture's administration services, civil society members, and the private sector [Diallo, 2011: 52]. These committees select the development projects that will be implemented in their area. The CPD's projects are financed by the taxes paid by all businesses in the prefecture, including the mining companies. However, the lack of expertise of prefectural authorities on development engineering creates a bias in selection of projects. The criteria of feasibility of projects cannot be verified and they are not adapted to local development needs, because there are no studies to assess those needs. Project selection is based on the national strategy of development, which is randomly connected to local level realities [GU 2011,2012,2013]. Guinea is missing a considerable development strategy in the mining zones, as mentioned in the report [Diallo, 2011: 13]. They work together with the SPD (*Service prefectoral de developpement*, prefectural development services), which is supported by the technical development services (*services techniques de developpement*). The CRD has the responsibilities of project management, sub-prefectural administration and local development agents to coordinate, all of which benefit from capacity-building programs offered by the PACV ("Programme d'Appui aux Communautés Villageoises") [Republic of Guinea, 2011c]. Before, the CRDs were simple political entities with no effectiveness; since 2008, the PACV have actualized their existence [G.9; G.47]. The state renewed the structure of the CPD, because the prefects had the tendency to privilege their personal needs over those of the population. The renewed CPD was first launched in Siguiri (where the SAG and SMD operate) from November 29 to December 3rd 2011 [G.48]. The new version is meant to be more transparent and to benefit from improved management. Instead of having the prefect preside the CPD, it should be an executive office composed of elected members from the civil society, decentralized government authorities (excluding the prefect), and political leaders [JO-official policy].

Monitoring and mediation committees (*Comité de mediation et suivi*) in (gold) mining zones have been in place since 2011. The ministry of mines and geology (MMG) and the ministry of territorial administration and decentralization (MATD) created them in a joint law [G.72] [Republic of Guinea, 2011c]. They are under the supervision of the communication director of the MATD. Their area of responsibility is limited to the sub-prefecture on all issues related to development, financial, and disputes issues related to the MNCs. They are composed of local representatives such as the youth, the president of the district, the sub-prefect, the mayor, members of prefectural services, and the wise men²³. The board members are supposed to be selected by the government and elected by the citizens [G.59; G.60]. The committee was meant to meet every three months. Its status is very unclear: some say it has been dissolved everywhere, some say only in some sub-prefectures, others that it has started again [GU 2012, 2013].

²³ The vice president of the monitoring committee in Kiniero detailed the 26 members of the committee: each district (9 in Kiniero) are represented, one representative of imams, dean, CRD, sub prefect, ministry of mines, 2 representatives of NGOs of the CRD, of women, of youngsters, of trade unions, of the company, and of *ressortissants*. The executive office consists of 16 elected people amongst these 26. [G.72]

Discourses about the need to put the power in the hands of the people are held at all levels. It is a clear message that development and the future of the country lie in the empowerment of people from rural areas. The government is publishing simplified versions of key official texts so that the illiterate and people who did not go far in school can understand them better; examples are texts like the CPD regulation, *code des collectivités*, *code foncier*, and the African youth charter [African Union, 2006].

In Guinea, part of the taxes paid by mining companies goes straight to the prefecture level. The prefecture of Siguiri gets 4% from SAG and 2% from SMD (SMD is paying 2% to the prefecture of Siguiri and 2% to the prefecture of Dinguiraye, since its concessions lie within both prefectures) [G.36]. Since the new government is in place, local communities actually benefit from the taxes. Before, during the autocratic regimes, the communities got no benefits (no tax money), except for the case of SAG, where people did get benefits [G.35]. The few taxes paid went directly to the central state; the communities did not see a penny of it [G.36]. The Finance Ministry collects all non-local taxes from extractive companies. However, since 2011, all tax revenues go into a single account at the central bank [Lassourd 2013]. Royalties are directly affected to the CPD account at the local level, but national mining funds are also in place to make the wider population benefit as well. In 1992, Guinea created a mining development fund that receives a small percentage of revenue directly from extractive companies for the promotion of the sector. The current Mining Code has rules for withdrawals and deposits, but these have never been followed in practice, and the fund has presented considerable opportunities for corruption [Lassourd 2013]. Its management is completely opaque, and it publishes no reports. The fund performs internal audits but does not publish them.

2. Enforcement and accountability

Enforcement and accountability mechanisms at the national level in Guinea are weak. Neither state nor non-state actors have the capacity to make companies accountable to implement sustainable strategies. There are multiple international organizations whose task is to complement this lack of capacity acting at the national and local level in the mining sector.

The state monitoring and enforcement capacity is weak despite its effort towards transparency and its membership in disclosure mechanisms (EITI). The State is perceived as irresponsible, and corruption allegations in recent years reinforce the negative image of the government as lacking the will to make companies accountable. The long history of mistrust between the local population and state administration is increased by the fact that information does not circulate easily [G.46].

Companies acknowledge the lack of monitoring and enforcement capacity of the Guinean state. They either consider that Guinea does not have the capacity to control the activities of the companies in order to guarantee compliance with national regulations [G.135] or blame the Guinean state for not enforcing conventions that date back to 1999 (never having applied the convention of 1999 between SMD and the Guinean state). Companies complain about the limitations of state authority where they operate, which allows locals to act violently against the company without fear of the consequences [SMD 2013] [Republic of Guinea, 2011b: 6]. The president's moratorium on all artisanal mining activities in 2011 was not followed through, and no sanctions were taken against those who kept on mining. On compensation issues, local state authorities are still waiting for the application texts of the new mining code.

Guinea is an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) candidate country. The government makes efforts for disclosure and transparency in the mining sector. Access to information is guaranteed in the Constitution, and the new Mining Code requires further transparency. Guinea requires social and environmental impact assessments before granting mining licenses, but public consultation is not mandatory. Licensing requirements are available before negotiations, and, since February 2013, contracts are published [Guinea Mining Contracts 2012], significantly improving transparency. In February 2013, the government published all contracts related to the mining sector. In April, amendments to the 2011 Mining Code were passed, which aim to encourage investors and local beneficiation. However, lack of infrastructure and a complex tax regime hinder investment. Guinea initiated a contract review process (“Comité Technique de Revue des Titres et Conventions Miniers”), which reflects the government’s commitment to increase transparency and accountability to Guinean citizens. The government is aiming to “increase transparency and good governance in the extractive industries and to strengthen investor confidence” [Lassourd, 2013]. Together with the Planning Ministry, the Finance Ministry publishes information on production volumes, prices, and the value of mineral exports. The Mines Ministry publishes historical data on reserves, along with some information on production volumes and exports. It also regularly publishes the names of companies operating in the country. The central bank publishes information on production volumes, prices, and the value of mineral exports. EITI reports contain information on production volumes, the value of mineral exports, companies operating in the country, subsidies, production stream values, royalties, special taxes, license fees, and acreage fees [ITIE Guinea].

Despite these efforts towards disclosure, the government is perceived as corrupted and irresponsible. State representatives do not recognize their responsibility in mining regions. According to them (governor and associate), the State’s responsibilities in gold mining areas are to assure security and to inform the population [G.28], while development should come from companies because they have the resources. However, the prefecture and village level authorities recognize that local development is part of their responsibility, which they try to fulfill with the financial help of taxes paid by the companies. Common opinions consist in considering that, since companies take the resources, they should give something back. The relationship between companies, state administration, and elected leaders results in embezzlement of resources given by the companies; and the State is not organized to guarantee that community interests are addressed [G.46]. On the other hand, companies complain that they are being asked to take the role of the State in providing electricity, road maintenance, water provision, and employment if they want to avoid conflicting relationships with the communities living around their concessions.

According to reliable sources whose assessment of the situation was verified in further interviews and observations: in all gold mining prefectures there has been seizure and misuse of tax money by prefecture officials who considered the money to be theirs [G.70; G.71]. In most cases, before 2011, the prefect made the decision of how to use the money. In the worst-case scenario, in Kouroussa (Semafo), the prefect used to split the money amongst the diverse department directors for their personal use. Another scenario, in Dinguiraye (SMD), some of the taxation money was used for constructing schools or other infrastructure, but randomly, without consulting local communities but rather following a clientelistic logic (building an “arc de triomphe” for the prefecture, or a school while there are not enough teachers or pupils to fill the three classrooms). The least bad scenario was in Siguiri (SMD and SAG), where the money was divided amongst the *communes rurales* (villages

in the sub-prefectures) with some of their representatives participating in the decisions. This shows the extent of corruption within the state administration, hindering the implementation of state projects.

Non-state actors, especially national NGOs, are very determined, and some are competent; their capacity to exercise accountability mechanisms against companies and the government suffers from a lack of resources. Media do not constitute a countervailing force, because they are not very professional and suffer from communication problems to reach an audience outside of the capital city. Guinea benefits from the technical, material, and financial support from IOs.

The state is very rarely held responsible for its actions, and even then the accusations and judgments have no serious consequences for the Guinean state. Overall, Guinean civil society is rather weak in its influence, concentrating mostly on the capital city, and its impact on state actions is very low. Civil society is slowly gaining power, but there needs to be more pressure and control on the state's services and administration's actions [G 4.6]. There are still counter-powers missing in the domain of the civil society, the judicial institutions, and the national assembly²⁴ [G 19]. The opposition is prevented (by the state) from demonstrating freely; the workers' union is hampered in its attempts to organize itself; the state is trying to disturb the judicial system [G.10]. The civil society is slowly gaining power, but there needs to be more pressure and control of the state's services and administration's actions [G.19]. The Guinean Civil Society has gained strength and importance since 2006, when the democratization process began. The alliance between labor unions, opposition parties, and civil society grew stronger, and the newly elected government seemed to be taking the civil society's propositions and advice seriously, especially concerning reviewing of the mining code²⁵.

Civil society in Guinea is well organized under the supervision of the CNOSCG (Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guinéenne), which has branches in each region and prefecture.²⁶ One can state that the civil society in Guinea has grown within the last years, but its influence is still quite weak and rather punctual. The PROJEG is a national NGO that supports local elected leaders (mayors of the communes rurales, CR, and communes urbaines, CU) to reduce the disparity between the collectivities with and without mining resources. The PROJEG works a lot on mining issues. They have done a study on conflicts at the local level, which encompassed the conflicting relationships with gold mining companies in the auriferous zones. Another study concerned the CRD finances and management problems [PROJEG, 2009b: 6]. An interesting national NGO, called CECIDE, is working on the natural resources issues and company practices (CSR, governance, gender). The NGO is associated with some of the related government initiatives. For instance, they supported the implementation of the monitoring and mediation committees, for which they trained paralegals at the local level to be information relays for local people on their rights and on the judiciary system. They also trained 150 mediators on conflict issues at the local level. In the gold mining areas, associations and NGOs are incapable of influencing local authorities or MNCs to better use their

²⁴ « Hors, malheureusement l'état est tout puissant et n'a pas de contre-pouvoir au jour le jour. Il faut créer ces contre-pouvoirs au niveau de la société civile et au niveau des institutions de l'état et notamment l'assemblée nationale et la justice. » [G.19]

²⁵ «The strength of the alliance between the civil society, the labor unions and the opposition parties was demonstrated in throughout the democratization process that started in 2006 with the first national strike. Since this alliance of "Forces Vives", the civil society has grown stronger and its importance has been recognize by the newly elected government, who officially associate it in major decision-making at the national level, especially in the process of reviewing the mining code.» [G.10]

²⁶ PROJEG is a national NGO that supervised studies on conflict resolution processes in the mining regions. For that purpose they identified key local partners and NGOs in each sub-region. In Kouroussa, studies were supervised by the NGO CAAP, and in Siguiri by the NGO Here Guinée, whose leader is also the head manager of the CGA. [G.6; G.27; G.35]

resources because they lack technical knowledge and resources [PROJEG, 2009b: 8] [Diallo, 2011: 11].²⁷

National news media consist of Internet news agencies and blogs that are very politically biased and rely mostly on rumors rather than on investigations. They are mostly accessible to intellectuals and elites because of the difficulties to access the Internet. Newspapers are mostly found in Conakry, the capital; there are national newspapers owned by the opposition party or by the party in power. Media appeared to have a paradoxical impact in our cases. On the one hand, the radio was used during the democratization process and is still used to organize protests against the companies in mining areas. On the other hand, media visibility – company’s public image through the media – did not seem to have a strong influence in the country (especially in comparison to Tanzania).

The Guinean state is supported in the mining sector by some International organizations, such as RevenueWatch, GIZ, World Bank, Agence Française de Développement, UNDP, and Banque Africaine de Développement [Diallo, 2011: 11].

RevenueWatch is present at the national and local levels. At the national level, there is a consultant actively helping the ministry of minerals in the regulatory process. The institute is also pushing the government towards transparency initiatives, such as publishing all the mining contracts. The World Bank funds structures, such as the PACV and PDLG. These capacity-building programs are funded for management training of decentralized authorities. The Aisha program of the EU works on vulgarization of official texts, AFD works on community development (especially in Boke for Rio Tinto), the UNDP is implicated in the technical aspects of the PDLG (have done technical studies at the time where they were focusing on pockets of poverty PRSP initiative). International NGOs give technical advice, for example the CECI²⁸ in Siguiiri had been helping in the first phase of the CPD.

The “Programme d’Appui aux Communautés Villageoises”(PACV) is supported by the WB, but it is limited in its reach and responds only to acute social problems [Diallo, 2011: 10]. The structure was initiated and financed by the World Bank, the FIDA, and other partners²⁹ [Republic of Guinea, 2007], who provided 90% of the necessary funds— 8% from the beneficiary community in cash or in kind, 2% from the *conseil communautaire* [G.28; G.29; G.47]³⁰. Concerning the prefectures of Siguiiri, 8% are financed by the taxes paid by the mining companies, 0.4% by the SAG, and 0.2% by the SMD (*taxe superficielle*) [SIG/PACV, 2011]. The structure has agents called *animateurs* (activity leaders) who control the implementation of local development plans and share advice on technical issues as consulting engineers [G.9; G.47]. The PACV should exclusively be in charge of hosting the funds from local taxes for more traceability, but it is now being replaced by the CPD. The PACV is present nationally in each regional capital, prefecture, and in the CRDs [SIG/PACV, 2011]. The structure is in charge of helping in the preparation of a PDL, local development plan, for the CRD [Republic of Guinea, 2011c]. This PDL is meant to come from a participative diagnosis organized by the CRD collecting the development priorities of each district (villages). The PDL leads to a PAI, annual

²⁷ « Au niveau des zones minières, le niveau de promotion de la gouvernance par les structures de gestion des collectivités locales est faible. Cette situation résulte surtout du fait qu’aucun programme national n’a pu couvrir ces zones et que les ONG qui sont présentes sur place ne disposent pas de toutes les capacités requises pour les encadrer. » [Diallo 2011 :11]

²⁸ Center for International studies and Cooperation, is a canadian NGO, the first international NGO to sign a memorandum of understanding with the Guinean authorities in 1984. It was one of the main technical support for managing the funds from the SAG from the CPD of Siguiiri, where it has then transferred the competences to the CGA (Cellule de Geston Autonome).

²⁹ Le Coût de cette phase s’élève à quelques 38,7 Millions u\$ financé conjointement par : la Banque Mondiale (IDA), le Fonds International pour le Développement Agricole (FIDA), l’Agence Française de Développement (AFD), la Fondation Américaine pour le Développement en Afrique (ADF), le Gouvernement guinée, les bénéficiaires. [Republic of Guinea 2007]

³⁰ Interview with PACV Kankan executive secretary, Ibrahim Bah

investments plan. Both plans are implemented through funds meant for local collectivities. To help in the management of the funds, the PACV also has the responsibility to train local elected leaders and ensure transparency of local markets [Republic of Guinea, 2011c]. The PDLG was created through the UNDP initiative on investigating the pockets of poverty. This investigation showed that Haute-Guinée was the poorest region of Guinea, and had to be addressed accordingly by development plans. The UN Capital Development Fund finances the PDLG. The responsibilities are similar to the PACV, and the two structures are now trying to harmonize their efforts [Republic of Guinea, 2011c]. This harmonization is officially organized by a convention [Republic of Guinea, 2011c]. The PACV and PDLG are now sharing responsibilities in Haute-Guinée. The PDLG hosts the funds, which also serve to pay the PACV agents, and the infrastructures, supervised by the PACV.

3. Conclusion Guinea

The new mining code of 2011 contains directives on social and environmental responsibilities, but its enforcement is uncertain. The very fact that its promulgation had to be postponed under the pressure of mining MNCs highlights the weakness of the state and its dependency. The State's dependence on international donors and technical support is also illustrated by the support of the AFD and SOFRECO to formulate the mining code. Although decentralized government institutions have authority and benefit from a local redistribution of taxes in mining areas, they lack the resources and capacity to make companies accountable. Decentralized structures exist to manage these local funds and also to manage community-company conflicts, but they are not effective. There is no history of companies facing sanctions for their lack of compliance to national regulations, rather MNCs complain about the state's lack of enforcement. MNCs kept taxation money in separate accounts because of this lack of accountability of the state and even advise the state on policies concerning community-company conflict management, particularly on compensation issues. There is clear evidence that the Guinean state makes a lot of effort to become more transparent in the sector but perceptions on its probity are still very negative. The state does not clearly endorse its responsibility to provide common goods in mining areas and stories of embezzlement of taxation money by state officials remain too common. Non-state actors are motivated to fill the gap of capacity of the state. National NGOs focus on capacity-building and support initiatives of community-company conflict management but lack capacity and resources to be thoroughly efficient. International interventions, however, are making a difference, advising and providing technical support through effective management structures.

Table 21. Guinea Host Country drivers

GUINEA		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
Regulations	Mining regulation and dependency	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Tools and structures	LOW	MED	MED
Enforcement/ Accountability	State	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Non-state	LOW	LOW	LOW
	International/donors	LOW	MED	MED
COUNTRY DRIVERS		LOW	LOW/MED	LOW/MED
SMD SES SUSTAINABILITY		MED/LOW	MED/LOW	LOW
SAG SES SUSTAINABILITY		LOW	MED/HIGH	HIGH -

Guinea's regulation and enforcement capacity as well as accountability mechanisms exercised by non-state actors over the three years of the research remained continuously low except for some participation of the civil society in the revision of the mining regulations and some empowerment of local government (taxes and IO support) (table 21). Gold mining MNCs operating in Guinea,

however, implement a wide variation of sustainability strategies. Consequently, host country drivers do not appear to have a direct influence on the success or failure of companies to implement sustainable SES.

D. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

While variation in implementation varies a lot across sites and time, host country drivers stayed more or less constant over the three years of research. Clearly host country drivers alone do not explain the variation in implementation of SES by companies operating in their boarders.

The recent mining regulations review in Tanzania and Guinea illustrates that in both case, the involvement of civil society in the formulation process did not put an end to suspicions that the State is not willing to privilege community well being over MNCs interests. This reviewing process also illustrates the dependence of both hosting countries to international organizations for financial, material, and technical support. The Guinean state needed the financial and technical assistance of international partners to even draft the new code according to international standards. Although the decentralized Guinean government has the authority to enforce regulations in mining areas, it lacks capacity and experience. The well-organized Guinean civil society addresses this lack of local government capacity and issues related to community-company conflict, despite its financial, material, and technical shortcomings. International institutions also provide support to manage local development plans in Guinea. An international NGO specialized in extractive industry issues and transparency supports the Tanzanian civil society, but their lobbying is essentially about providing information at the national level. Even though leaders of the opposition party sometimes denounce the necessity to pay more attention to local development, they seem to be motivated by elections rather than by turning their words into actions. The lack of power, autonomy, and resources of local government and NGOs in mining regions in Tanzania is not addressed. Guinea shows more signs of will to improve its transparency in the mining sector than Tanzania, who is very secretive in this domain. In the end, both countries have similar statehood characteristics, with a slightly more favorable context for companies to implement sustainable strategies in Guinea than in Tanzania.

Since Tanzania and Guinea's statehood limitations related to the mining sector are too similar, we are unable to settle the debate about statehood limitations leading MNCs to a regulatory race to the top or to the bottom. However, it seems like less state capacity (not even formulating the new code alone) in Guinea leads to more regulations by companies. The mining MNCs took on the role of "norm entrepreneurs" by advising the state to enforce sustainable standards (example of their meeting with the ministry to discuss land compensation policy). In Tanzania, the central state sent a task force to help apply new land compensation policies in North-Mara, because community-company conflicts about land issues were too fierce (see chapter 7). Because of the difficulty to gather information about the relationship of the state with MNCs in this case, the companies may or may not have lobbied for the state to improve its land compensation policy.

Regulations of the mining sector in ALS are progressively more about sustainability. For example, they mention the necessity for companies to integrate CSR in the national development plans, and they consider the rights of neighboring communities on their land. Also, the formulation of new regulations often follows international donor incentives to be open to civil society participation, which increases stakeholder dialog. Although these trajectories are sustainability-driven (table 3 transition models), economic-driven trajectories at the national level in ALS are still strong. The lack

of will or capacity to enforce sustainable regulations and the State's dependency on FDI contradict attempts towards sustainability. It seems that the confrontation between traditional and emergent paradigms that happens during the implementation phase is strongly at stake at the host country level in ALS.

While research on business take into account the influence of the State's regulatory capacities or weaknesses and its level of control and sanctions, the professional and interpersonal relations between government official and MNC members and their influence on the company's behavior is rarely investigated in the literature on stakeholder engagement. The effectiveness of decentralization and the competence and capacities of local state agents, as much as the way they relate to the citizens of their area, impact on how and why decisions are made by the MNC at the local level. Differences of company outcomes in Tanzania and Guinea are not directly due to host country drivers but the history of the country and the way it is reflected on local structures and relationships does matter. Local governance drivers influence the company's capacity to implement sustainable conflict management strategies.

Chapter VII — Local governance drivers

The literature concerned more specifically by the natural resources and conflict management points to local governance drivers [Armitage et al 2008; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006; Cundill & Fabricius 2010; Worchel 2005]. The present chapter analyzes the risk of conflict, conceptualized as dependent on the history of the communities, since it affects their perception and further relationships with the company [Kuhn et al., 2000; Rahim, 2011]. We analyze to what extent communities have the capacity to collaborate among themselves in order to engage with the company on conflict management [Luning 2012; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006; Cundill & Fabricius 2010].

Although host country drivers at the national level do not appear to play a role in the implementation of sustainable strategies by mining companies, local level governance drivers might be more relevant. SES represent a standardized framework for managing community-company conflicts, which might explain why their sustainability is variable [Luning 2012]. Standardization is necessary as a first step to determine which instruments to use. The next step is about adapting them to very different local contexts. However, "the standardisations turn a blind eye to structural contingencies in the processes of company–community interactions" [Luning 2012:205]. According to Luning, the shortcomings of these standardized strategies can be linked to "internal dynamics between groups residing in the concession area" [Luning 2012:206]. We define governance at the local level with the concept of network theories developed in the 21st century to answer some of the blockages inherent in traditional implementation and governance research [Börzel, 2011; Falastein et al., 2010]. We consider linkages and interactions as the main units of analysis of local governance drivers.

Studies on conflict and development studies recognize the role of history and mutual perceptions in explaining the success of conflict management approaches [Worchel 2005; Brewer 1996, Hornsey & Hogg 2000]. Another body of literature suggests that informal linkages, cohesions, and connectedness are needed to implement sustainable strategies at the local level [Shearing 2001; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006; Cundill & Fabricius 2010]. Co-management capacities are understood as the capacities existing within local settings for cooperation in the implementation of a sustainable

strategy. Local risks of conflict are the pre-conditions that delimit the gap between "in-group" and "out-group". Co-management capacities are supposed to enhance the implementation of sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies. Local risks of conflict should hinder the chances for sustainable outcomes.

First, we operationalize the concepts of co-management and local risks. Then we analyze our case studies in the light of these indicators. Finally, we conclude on the influence of local governance drivers in the outcomes of stakeholder engagement strategies by MNCs.

A. OPERATIONALIZATION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS: RISKS AND CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

Do communities have the potential to trust each other and the company to implement sustainable outcomes? The history and perceptions within communities and the stereotypes attached to them by the companies illustrate what they expect from each other. Since stereotypes built through historical events are essential for managing conflicts [Worchel 2005], we need to assess the discourses each actor has towards the others. Were there conflicts within communities before the company arrived? Are the communities used to using violent means to resolve their problems? Pre-conflict situations help us understand the stereotypes circulating about communities. We also examine redundant representations of communities constructed by the company and constructed by the company about communities. Do communities feel threaten by the presence of the company? Artisanal miners as a community group might feel the need to fight for their own survival in a context where they have to compete for resources against a much more powerful adversary [Worchel 2005]. The economic importance of this group as well as the tension between the traditional and the modern takes place between elders supporting artisanal mining activities and the youngsters motivated to create alternative income generating activities. Accountability strategies of the wider neighboring communities might tune pre-conditions into actual external/internal tensions, while MNC's response to these confrontations settles the legacy of the community-company relationship, which becomes the history of tomorrow... We summarize this operationalization of local governance drivers in the following table (table 22).

Table 22. Local governance drivers operationalization

Local risk of conflict			Local co-management capacity		
History of violence within communities	ASM tradition	History of company-community conflict	Vertical connectedness	Informal community cohesion	Cross-scale security harmonization
Inter-group clashes Us versus Them stereotypes	ASM pressure and (existence of other income generating activities) Support of ASM by local elders and/or youth	Accountability strategies by communities MNC response	Top-Down involvement of central State Top-down involvement of non-state	Multi-level state collaboration Cohesion within levels and between groups	Types of actors and structures Security actors and structures embeddedness

Implementation of any policy or strategy confronts internal and external dynamics, but even more so when it is a question of implementing sustainable approaches, because they are supposed to be implemented through collaboration. Co-management capacities of the local stakeholders illustrate how organized and coordinated they are and how new strategies can intermingle with external environments. Some "traditional" informal linkages can be closer to sustainability-driven trajectories than "modern" individualistic settings. For example, in Tanzania where traditional chiefteries have

been destroyed in favor of the unity of the nation under Nyerere, most communities are left in a vacuum of social links, which the weaknesses of local government structures cannot fill. In Guinea, by contrast, ancestral networks of solidarity still exist. However, some communities in Tanzania reconstructed linkages that are stronger (around Buzwagi) than in some communities in Guinea (around the SMD). We start by operationalizing local risks of conflict and co-management capacities. Then we present how they help us categorize our case studies. In the next chapters we will show that although the influence of these local governance drivers on SES outcomes does not appear at first glance, they are important in reinforcing or hindering internal company drivers' tendencies.

1. Local risk of community-company conflict

Communities in which companies operate had various ways to manage their own conflicts before the companies started operating. Some communities are more used to violent means to resolve conflicting issues than others. Their exposure to open conflict prior to the company's arrival might be an important reason for the level of confrontational strategies used to make the company accountable at a later stage.

Our study examines this "long history of intra-group hostility". We describe how the communities in the area where the company operates are accustomed to handling issues through violent means, either among themselves, between different groups (political, ethnic, families), or against the government. Mutual perceptions of the community and the company also compose the background for their relationship. We give some insights into the way neighboring communities perceive themselves and the extent to which they need to protect this identity against the company (us versus them). Basically, one needs to assess the level of tension inherited from the past that the companies have to cope with in the implementation of conflict management strategies. What kind of management of conflict strategies are the communities used to, and is each side ready to collaborate with the other?

The underlying history of the relationship between the company and the communities identified by Plummer&Fitzgibbon as a pre-condition for collaboration [Plummer&Fitzgibbon 2004:879] is evaluated through the history of inter-clan clashes and the "us versus them" discourses on each side (table 23). Artisanal and small-scale miners constitute a group among the neighboring communities whose existence is threatened by the company's presence. Studies on conflict point out that when a group feels like its survival as a group is threatened, it increases the chances for open violent confrontation between that group and the group perceived as the enemy [Worchel 2005; Kuhn & Poole 2000]. When the group whose identity is threatened has the opportunity to activate another identity to survive, it reduces the tension and fear of loss of identity. The attitude of leaders of the group can be critical in this regard. The proliferation of alternative groups can also decrease the tension between the threatened group and its perceived enemy. Thus, ASM tradition needs to be assessed in terms of economic and social importance for the survival of the ASM group, but also in terms of how much support this tradition gets from the neighboring communities. The ASM traditional dimension of risk as a precondition for collaboration is essential in evaluating the willingness of local communities to collaborate [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004:879]. First, we need to assess how important the ASM activities are compared to other income generating activities in the area (table 23). Then, to evaluate to what extent the ASM group puts pressure on the company, we look at the discourse and interests of elders in perpetuating ASM traditions (table 23). Are local leaders pushing artisanal miners to illegally go the mining pits? Do they benefit from these

traditional practices? Is the youth counter-balancing the importance of ASM tradition by providing alternative income generating activities?

Preconditions or antecedents to co-management also entail the existence of a real or imagined crisis [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004: 879], which can be related to the concept of open or latent conflict. Considering that “the existence of high level of conflict conspires against contact aimed at reducing inter-group conflict” [Worchel 2005:745], we analyze local risks of company-community conflict. The way the communities react to the activities and the presence of the company as well as the way the company responds to these local accountability strategies leads to various level of conflict (table 23). When communities have expectations that are not met by the company, a situation of conflict is created in which communities have to choose which behaviors to adopt. They can decide to abide by the law, go through proper channels, and file their complaints to the government (or to the company) and wait for answers. Or, they can react outside the law and take their complaints in their own hands, for example trespassing on the mining compounds, perpetuating vandalism on company property, or rioting and protesting. We consider accountability strategies (see table in literature review) to be the reactions of the communities to the company’s presence from the beginning of operations. Companies respond more or less comprehensively to these accountability strategies, especially to imposed ones. Employing more people originating from the mining area and engaging dialog in case of protest instead of sending the security guards and calling the police or the army to make arrests is clearly a more comprehensive and less risky way to respond to community confrontations. The highest risk of open conflict is when the company responds to confrontational strategies through harsh security, building walls, buffering the number of guards, and beating up or shooting at trespassers with or without the support of the police or the army (table 23).

We analyze and describe in detail the local risk of company-community conflict in each of the local governance contexts of the five sites we chose to study. Overall, the history of community-company conflicts, especially the use of harsh security response by MNCs, compromises the likelihood of success of a sustainable implementation for conflict management. The more conflicts occurred in the past, the more difficult it is to manage future conflicts.

Table 23. Local risks indicators

History of violence within communities		
	Internal clashes	Us versus them
HIGH	History of inter-clan or inter-ethnic clashes, history of confrontation within clans or families	Negative perception of MNC on communities, bad perception of MNCs by communities, strong warrior/aggressive identity
MED	New inter-clan clashes or within clans confrontation after MNC started operating	Neutral but strong stereotypes
LOW	History of peaceful relationships	Neutral open perceptions, peaceful identity
ASM tradition		
	ASM pressure	Support by local settings
HIGH	Historically major activity	Leaders enforcing traditions against MNC
MED	Historically major activity or historical diversification of activities	Youth groups propose alternative initiatives,
LOW	Historically seasonal or historical diversification of activities,	Alternatives, leaders enforcing peace with MNC
Company-Community conflict history		
	Accountability strategy	MNC response
HIGH	Theft, sabotage, trespassing Protests (marches, strikes, blockage)	Direct confrontations, harsh security of MNC
MED	Collusion community-employee for theft, jealousy between employees and communities	Police or army called, no use of force
LOW	Letters, phone calls, express claims in public forums	Increasing meetings with locals, employing local (for guarding or unqualified labor)

2. Co-management capacity of local actors.

How much do states in areas of limited statehood participate in co-management at the local level? Is top-down involvement, i.e., vertical connectedness, a key element of co-management capacities that influences the success of implementation of sustainable conflict management strategies by MNCs?

Our study evaluates co-management capacities of local actors through an analysis of the cross-scales linkages enabling local actors to co-manage community-company conflicts. These linkages are either visible in the top-down involvement of the central state or of non-state actors in local matters and in the effectiveness of local government (formal institutions, vertical connectedness), or in the security settings around the companies through the level of harmonization among security actors at different scales (formal institutions, cross scale security harmonization). It also examines the informal cohesion of actors at the local level especially examining social capital and adaptive capacities (informal community cohesion) [Cundill & Fabricius 2010, Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2004]. We evaluate these dimensions of co-management capacities in light of the self-organization and social capital characteristics defined in the literature.

We evaluate formal vertical linkages [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006] in combination with external linkages with non-state actors [Pretty & Ward 2001]. This top-down involvement of state actors is visible through, for example: service provision, empowerment, involvement in conflict resolution, and awareness campaigns on mining issues. Non-state involvement can be observed through the activities of international, national, and local NGOs concerning a particular mining site (table 24).

Informal community cohesion is evaluated through the collaboration channels existing between various groups at the local level and between various levels of the state acting at the local level. This dimension combines characteristics of social capital and self-organization [Cundill & Fabricius 2010]. To evaluate the connectedness within communities and between levels and groups, we consider customary-state cohesion, customary-community, and elders-youth relationships (table 24).

Official security structures and security nodes need to be observed to understand how local governance manages security. The literature on policing extends the understanding of security governance to “a regulated network of participatory 'nodes' - each with authority, capacity and knowledge that together provide for the governance security” [Shearing 2010: 26]¹. The extent of the harmonization and embeddedness with local communities [Hönke & Börzel 2013] of these official and nodal security settings (actors, structures, and relationships between them) need to be evaluated to understand how their capacity to co-manage conflict with the companies. The capacity of these actors and the level of cooperation between them and the company also need to be assessed in order to understand how much capacity is available to the company to co-manage conflicts with local actors (table 24).

Table 24. Local co-management capacity indicators

Formal Vertical linkages/top-down involvement		
	Top-Down involvement of State and local gvt effectiveness	Non-state involvement locally
HIGH	Improving state service provision, empowerment through task forces, involvement in conflict resolution, local government well equipped	International, National and local NGOs advocacy, international law suits for local
MED	State awareness campaigns or policies on ASM/intruders, local government some resources	Some civil society activity, active unions
LOW	No involvement, lack of resources for local government	No involvement
Informal community cohesion		
	Local communities	
HIGH	Multi-level state collaboration, cohesion within levels (customary-state cohesion, customary-community, elders-youth)	
MED	Some cohesion	
LOW	Lack of multi level and within level cohesion	
Cross-scale security harmonization		
	Type of security actors and structures	Security actors embeddedness
HIGH	Presence of state forces, harmonization between army, police, local vigilante and MNC security	Local vigilante embedded in local governance system, community trust police
MED	Presence of state forces, little collaboration amongst actors	
LOW	No state forces, no collaboration amongst security actors	Local vigilante excluded from local governance system, no trust for police

The Tanzanian sites of AGA and ABG both operate in an area dominated by the Sukuma ethnic group. Sukuma are historically peaceful and, although artisanal mining is a traditionally and economically important activity, communities around these mines are also used to agriculture, livestock keeping, and other activities. Buzwagi has enjoyed a peaceful relationship with the communities since the beginning of operations in 2009, while GGM saw its first violent company-community conflict in 2012. Community cohesion is also much stronger around Buzwagi than around GGM. We show in the next chapter that Buzwagi's relatively favorable internal company drivers in both mines explain why the site reaches higher levels of sustainability in SES outcomes than GGM.

The Kurya ethnic group is the major ethnic group in the communities around the North-Mara Gold mine owned by ABG in the northern part of the country, near Lake Victoria. Other ethnic groups fear the Kurya. Their reputation dissuaded state authorities and the company from even trying to manage anything in common until 2011. After dreadful events of artisanal miners and other community groups against company security and state police forces in May 2011 that caused injuries and deaths, the central state and the company took the situation into their hands. The dedication of the MD (see chapter 8) combined with enhanced local cohesion and security harmonization allowed the company to reach rather sustainable outcomes in 2012. In 2013, when the MD left, the situation was tensing up again.

The SAG and the SMD operate in the same sub-region of Guinea (Haute-Guinée), both in the prefecture of Siguiri. The SAG is much closer to the capital of the sub-region, while the SMD operates in a very remote area of the prefecture. This prefecture was an opposition stronghold until the first democratic elections in the beginning of 2011. Siguirka (people of Siguiri) are known for their hot tempers. Apart from these similarities, neighboring communities of the SAG and of the SMD are very different. Around the SAG, the organization of the youth is strong, and there are regular assemblies where various groups come together. The SAG faced massive peaceful protests in 2010 and 2011, to which it responded with calm, through negotiations involving the state authorities. These local governance factors added to rather favorable internal company drivers led the company to achieve high levels of sustainability in 2013. On the other hand, the SMD, whose internal drivers were mostly

low except in 2012 when there was a very dedicated community relation manager, also has to deal with jealousies within neighboring communities. Also, around the SMD, communities regularly protest and steal material property and fuel, while numerous artisanal miners are in the company's pits every day and night. Fortunately, the SMD stopped locking people in containers as a response to their trespassing. However, with rather unfavorable local governance drivers and few internal drivers to compensate (see chapter 8), the SMD cannot successfully implement sustainable strategies.

Companies operating in Tanzania encounter comparatively more community related problems than in Guinea, although practitioners consider that both countries are really difficult to operate in [G.148; G.153; T.62; SA.1]. For the anecdote, we note in this regard that in Swahili - the official language of Tanzania - there are many words to say "problem" or "conflict" (for example: tatizo, shida, tata, and many others). Linguists say that the variety of words that exist in a language to name a single concept or object illustrate the importance of the concept or object for the language community. For example, Eskimos have many words to say "snow", each nuancing the type and qualities of snow, while we have only ice and powder snow...

We first present the sites of AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) and African Barrick Gold (ABG) in the Sukuma dominated area: Geita Gold Mine and Buzwagi. Then we describe local governance drivers of communities neighboring ABG's North-Mara mine (NMGM). Finally, we present the similarities and differences of the sites of AGA and NordGold in Northern Guinea: Société Ashati de Guinée and Société Minière de Dinguiraye.

B. LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS: CASE STUDIES

1. ABG Buzwagi and AGA GGM in Sukuma dominated area (Shinyanga)

African Barrick Gold and AngloGold Ashanti both operate in an area historically dominated by the Sukuma ethnic group. Administrative boundaries change over time. The Buzwagi gold mine is located in the Shinyanga region, Kahama District, while the Geita Gold Mine operates in the newly created Geita Region (former Mwanza region), in the Geita District. With economic growth and demographic pressure, these mining areas are now populated by many foreigners and other tribes but are still dominated by the Sukuma. As a result, some local drivers at play around the Buzwagi and the GGM mines are similar while others differ.

The history of violence, the way communities are used to dealing with problems among themselves in general and before the companies started operating are similar, as well as the broad relationship between the Sukuma and foreigners (us vs them/identity). What differs in the risk dimension is the perception these communities have of the companies, the risk of ASM, and the context of company-community conflicts. Co-management capacity differs in every aspect, except for the general security arrangements since both companies encounter the same structures and type of actors, but they deal with them differently.

These differences are important explanations of the variation between ABG's two sites in Tanzania.

a) **GGM&BUZ LOCAL RISK OF COMMUNITY-COMPANY CONFLICT**

(1) **History of violence and perceptions**

History of violence is non-existent and representations/stereotypes about Sukuma people are positive. These aspects present favorable preconditions for BUZ and GGM to implement sustainable strategies for the management of conflict.

The Sukuma heritage is peaceful and there is no notorious history of inter-clan clashes or violence in the area. Sukuma in Shinyanga region is the ethnic group and region where the sungusungu² were born with the idea to protect each other from crime, especially during the night. The sungusungu is a vigilante organization based on the participation of every capable man and woman in the security of the whole community. In the Sukuma dominated area, open conflicts are not common, although witchcraft is still a common practice and is related to a history of murders of albinos (their body parts are used to protect people and bring them wealth, especially in a context of uncertainty such as artisanal mining [Bryceson et al., 2010]). The district commissioner and the police in Kahama confirm that most villages are calm and that threats of riots usually come from the town center, not from the villages neighboring the mining areas [T.120; T.146]. Moreover, Sukuma people claim their peacefulness and proudly claim their difference with the Kurya of the North-Mara region (where also ABG operates) [T.53; T.57]. They enjoy compromising and negotiating. In recent years, the number of “intruders” trespassing onto mining compounds of GGM and Buzwagi mines increased [SA.1; T.68; T.148]. Various individuals and authorities consider that the problem of intruders comes from North-Mara [SA.1; T.152]. There is a common discourse that designates the Kurya people from North-Mara to be responsible for the upheavals. Sukuma people thus consider that problems come from outside, not from within their community.

Perceptions of the communities about the company differ. Around BUZWAGI, perceptions are neither negative nor positive. At the town level, town officers and authorities consider BUZ to be a stakeholder like any other company in the district. Their perception is thus not a negative one, since they consider BUZ as a professional partner [T.146; T.152]. Around GGM however, perceptions do not seem as favorable to sustainable conflict management. Some GGM managers share the common idea that for local communities, stealing from the company is a good deed, because you take something back from someone who stole from you. GGM managers consider the neighboring communities to be troublesome, especially because of the high rates of ASM. On the other hand, an important source of distrust of the company is centered on a camp of people living in tents in Geita Town. These people were displaced from the Mtakuja village where GGM now have their housing areas for expatriates and managers. Communities from the village resettled in an area for three years before they were displaced again, some say without being compensated. The police had to displace them by force, and they were homeless before the NCA and UNHCR intervened to give them tents in 2008. This story depicts the gap between communities and company in terms of power and development. Those living in awful conditions, in deteriorated tents in the dust, were displaced to let the company occupy their land. Now, housing areas for the company employees occupy their land with all commodities (water, electricity, AC). We can imagine what stereotypes this situation might engender.

(2) ASM risk

Artisanal and small-scale mining were the main economic activities in the area before large-scale operations started in Shinyanga and Geita region. Sukuma people were mining the gold complemented by agriculture, fishing, and livestock keeping activities. However, around Buzwagi, although artisanal mining was an important activity before the company started operating, there were other important activities taking place, contrary to Geita. The shift to privileging and increasing other activities for communities neighboring Buzwagi was easier than for those around the GGM, where ASM was very dominant in the area where the company now operates.

The main activities in the BUZWAGI area in 2013 became agriculture (especially rice) and livestock keeping. In Mwendakulima Ward, Village Memorandum of Agreement for the sungusungu go through the ward and are negotiated down to the hamlet so as to insure that every household gets the chance to benefit from it. Each village gets a percentage, and households benefit from it through the rotation of sungusungu selected to guard.

The whole Geita region, on the other hand, was an ASM area long before GGM started operating. However, depending on the fertility of the soil at different geographic locations in the district, a lot of communities also did agriculture, farming, livestock keeping, and fishing [T.155; T.159]. Looking at district revenue collection in the national treasury, 90 % is derived from the Geita Gold Mine (Lange 2006). Within Geita Region, Geita District is the dominant area for both large and small-scale gold mining. "There are more than 15 official small-scale mining centers scattered over the district, including Nyarugusu, Mgusu, Rwamgaza, Nyamtondo, and Mawemeru" [T.22, General secretary of Mwanza Artisanal Mining Association, 05.04.2011, Geita]. Geita district, although small, is the second most populous district in Tanzania. The population has doubled since the early 1990s, since migrants are attracted by the mining opportunities. About 85 % of the population is engaged in subsistence production and livestock keeping, and agriculture contributes more than 75 % of the district's GDP (Lange 2006).

"One village is more conflictual... They used to be artisanal miners, now they don't know what to do so they keep stealing (...) it's a long-term conflict.. There is no solution, no resolution (..) people murmuring that the GGM is not assisting according to expectations" [T.156, Geita District Community Development Officer (DCDO), 25.11.2013, Geita District Administration Building].

Households that had strong ASM traditions were located where the GGM is now operating and were resettled mostly in Nyakabale [T.156; T.164]. This might explain why troubles are usually attributed to the people living in that village.

"When GGM started operating, most villages accepted to increase farming and agricultural activities to rebalance their income, except in Nyakabale where the soil is not as fertile and the ASM tradition very strong." [T.164, Mtakuja Ward Executive Officer, 26.11.2013, Geita (translated from Swahili)].

ASM tradition and diversification of activities present more risks for company-community conflict in the case of GGM than in the case of Buzwagi. This is one of the reasons why SES is potentially more sustainable around BUZ. This potential is actualized when company internal drivers are favorable (chapter 8).

(3) History of Community-company Conflict

The history of conflict between companies and communities is very different when comparing BUZ and GGM.

Around BUZ, local communities used confrontational accountability strategies before 2011 and until 2012, but they were never aggressive. After 2012, communities negotiated only through letters, phone calls, and meetings. On the contrary, over the three-year research period, communities around GGM kept using confrontational accountability strategies against the company, and protest sometimes resulted in open conflicts with the company. This also explains part of the differences in the SES outcomes.

From 2009 to the end of 2010, people were stealing gold sands, fuel, and material in the BUZ mine by jumping over the fence. At the time, some people made agreements with security guards (collusion) inside the mining compounds. Intruders were after gold sands or rocks but mostly fuel and material belongings such as computers, cell phones [T.146; T.147; T.132]. Collusions also happen between local people and machine drivers to take the fuel [T.160; T.132]. From 2011, after conducting an investigation and ending the contracts of the workers involved in collusion for the theft of fuels and other material items, Buzwagi entered into contract with local vigilante groups, the sungusungu, for guarding purposes, and started participating in the Ward Development Council (WDC). The level of theft slowed down, though on occasion people cut the linings preventing the leaks at the bottom of the TSF dam to use as roofing material. In 2012, theft levels went back up. At the time, the sungusungu in charge of security were complaining about not having shelters or appropriate equipment for the rainy season. Since 2011, communities usually express their demands in meetings (see inclusiveness) or write to the CR to invite BUZ representatives to come and discuss specific issues (see multilateralism). ABG always comes when invited [T.167; T.123-125].

Around GGM, communities usually go through local authorities to express their complaints about the company. Local authorities have the possibility to either write letters, call the CR manager, visit the GGM offices, or express these complains in meetings attended by GGM representatives (see chapter 4). However, they also often use imposed accountability strategies if their demands are not answered. In 2008-2009, people would protest by sleeping on the GGM roads to prevent all vehicles from passing and threatening the MD. These protests were organized because of a road that had been destroyed by one of GGM's pits. Also, since the beginning of operations, ASM communities from neighboring villages regularly trespass into the mining compounds. District officers and village authorities clearly make the link between intruders and compensation demands [T.123; T.124; T.158; T.166]. One village, Nyakabale, causes more trouble than the others. The village is composed of indigenous people and people resettled from the mining area now occupied by GGM. In 2012 there were two episodes of intruders and other people forming large riots resulting in burning cars and property of GGM in town.

After the massive upheavals in 2012, the GGM asked for the help of the state paramilitary forces, the FFU, who stayed to guard the area for a few weeks after each episodes. Since April 2012, no open conflict has taken place. In 2012-2013, ASM became a political issue, with opposition leaders encouraging artisanal miners to go to the pits. One leader also went with them into the mining compounds on occasion as a political movement to protest against GGM's lack of visible benefits for local development.

Buzwagi prefers to negotiate and hire people from the communities to guard areas. GGM also prefers negotiation, but the mine often partners with the state's security forces, leading to arrests and a harsh security image. This feeds back on perceptions and stereotypes, which reduces the

chances to implement sustainable strategies. While the Buzwagi mine always used comprehensive measure to respond to community's demands, GGM is tougher

According to a former community relations officer in BUZ, before 2008, security of the company was assured only by security staff hired by Barrick, but by the end of 2008, because of the high numbers of thefts (stealing computers, spare parts) and even some attacks on the staff, Barrick decided to do something more participatory. The sungusungu working for BUZ have the instruction to stay out of interaction with intruders and to stay peaceful [sungusungu commanders]. They call the security control in ABG, who calls the OCS, who goes where there is a problem or calls the police stationed there. [T.119]. "The sungusungu who guard ABG are well behaved, they are trusted and everyone knows them" [social pressure not to do wrong] [T.130, Ward sungusungu commander, 20.06.2012, in Mwendakulima (translated from Swahili)].

Then, in 2009, some security guards opened fire (those who fired were dismissed), and Barrick decided to hire a PSC named "group 4" from Mwanza. After discussion with the RPC (regional police commander) and OCD (district level), the police also helped with 6 or 7 officers for the nighttime from 6pm to 7am, who were allowed to open fire [T.117; T.119]. The company also changed the fence for a wall to separate villages from the housing area.

In 2009-2010, a collusion system took place between thieves from the villages and workers in the BUZWAGI mine. There were no reports of direct confrontation between intruders and security. The security guards were either part of the collusion system or they simply apprehended the thief and brought him to the police [T.119; T.147]. In 2011, BUZ dismissed a lot of employees allegedly involved in collusion with thieves. Another solution the company used to put an end to collusion was to employ sungusungu from the villages to guard the compound outside the fences. This seemed to work for a while, but in the end of 2011, the number of intruders increased, mostly with cases of people climbing the fence to steal material properties. As a response, BUZWAGI then launched the Monday weekly security meetings at the Ward level.

"If the police catch intruders, they are brought to police station and we open a case... if they cut the fence: damage property, if entered: criminal trespass. Then they go to court: the sanction depends on the magistrate, it's case per case... a fine or 6 months to 1 year prison sentence" [T.119, Police Officer Commander District, Kahama Police Station, 15.06.2012, Kahama Town].

Collaboration between BUZ and the police takes place in a soft way. The police are close to ABG; when the police know about deals (machine operators selling diesel fuel) they talk with the security manager and the MD and the people caught up in it lose their jobs [T.119; T.132]. The police meet with the security manager and MD if needed and also with the community relations department [T.119; T.154].

Ongoing trespassers and artisanal miners intruding on the GGM compound are arrested and brought to the police. People speak of the use of dogs, leading to severe biting, and bullets fired, either blank or real, causing serious injuries, even recently [T.18; T.155; T.158; T.167].

(4) GGM & BUZ Risk Conclusion

While both companies operate in the historical Sukuma dominated area, most risk parameters differ. The local risk of community-company conflict in the case of GGM is consistent with sustainability levels of SES (table 25), and the case of BUZ suggests that with lower risks a higher level of sustainability was reached in 2011-2011 and 2012-2013 but not before 2011 (table 25).

The comparison of these cases hints at the possibility of an influence of risk at the local level on the success of the company to implement sustainability. We found that the absence of local risks around Buzwagi has allowed the company to implement the most sustainable strategy among our case studies (chapter 10). The GGM's use of harsh security in case of community confrontation is the major reason why the company does not succeed in implementing higher level of sustainability even with relatively favorable internal drivers (chapter 10).

b) BUZ & GGM CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY LOCAL ACTORS -

Co-management capacities of communities neighboring the Buzwagi mine of ABG and the Geita Gold mine of AGA differ in most aspects except for the security structures and actors encountered by the company to deal with conflicts. These differences lead to the main differences in outcomes, especially because of the variation in internal drivers between these two cases (chapter 10)

Around both mines, community cohesion and solidarity networks are strong. The embeddedness of sungusungu systems exemplifies the trust between groups at the local level. Sungusungu authorities are the elders; they are consulted for resolution of local issues (especially heritage and family conflicts) [2012 interviews with sungusungu]. Even the flag of the District government symbolizes the importance of the sungusungu for the district with the bow and arrow symbol. The sungusungu system of village vigilante security originated within the Sukuma ethnic group. There is a head administrative structure at the village and ward level and

“Every young person is part of the sungusungu following criteria of physical and mental health, honesty, and respect for others” [T.128, Chapulwa sungusungu administration, 19.06.2012, Mwandakulima Ward, Kahama (translated from Swahili)].

Apart from the Sungusungu, the security structures and actors at the local level entail the state police forces stationed at the district level. Both companies have some sort of arrangement with the police to secure their compound, and both signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or memorandum of agreement (MoA) which serves as a contract with the local authorities to hire sungusungu to guard the mine's premises.

(1) Vertical connectedness

(a) BUZ

From 2011 to 2013, in the Buzwagi mining area, vertical linkages were not much in favor of co-management capacities. The state was not very involved in local issues. Non state actors, although not numerous, are direct partners of the company, which favors the company's successful implementation of SES. The local government's capacity to collaborate with other actors is highly favorable to sustainable strategies implementation. This and the absence of risk explain why Buz reaches higher sustainability outcomes when internal drivers are favorable.

In 2011, the government did not appear to consider issues affecting mining areas, such as compensation issues, as a national matter, i.e., the central level did not empower the local government officials in these issues. When the President visited the BUZ area in 2011, “he said communities should agree with the displacement and compensation rates, and he argued that it is an issue between them and the company in which he does not need to be involved in”[discourse relayed by village assembly 2011]. People at the village level do not appreciate the attitude of central level representatives:

“When government representatives visit the area, instead of stopping by the villages, they go straight to the company’s offices, while they are aware of communities’ complaints and keep promising to answer them” [T.167, village assembly in Mwendakulima, Chapulwa village, 29.09.2011 (translated from Swahili)].

In 2013, the Central level did not inform the local level on environmental and social impact assessment studies that each MNCs have to complete before operations. Although the involvement of the state is weak, the local administration nonetheless has resources to co-manage issues with the company.

The Kahama district has good material capacity. BUZ is located in the Kahama District together with another ABG gold mine (Bulyanhulu) and 2 major tobacco companies. Kahama is also a business center for people coming from Rwanda and Burundi. Each company pays a royalty levy to the district of Kahama, which uses it for development all over the district. The particular geographic location of Kahama thus makes the district’s budget relatively greater than in Geita (AGA, GGM) or Tarime (ABG, NMGM). In 2011, people had the impression that the DC was “captured” by the company [Ward authorities 2011]. Most complaints going through the DC did not receive an answer. People say the company secures its relationship with the district authorities in the beginning of their operations to have them on their side. The DC has interests in the company, since he owns the bus that drives the workers to the mine [communities 2011]. Kahama became a town instead of a District in 2013 [all interviewees 2012, 2013]. This changes the status of every level under that. It increases the presence of state administrations and empowers local government. For instance, in Kahama in 2013 there are the Town and the District administrations, which increases the number of people, the competence available, and the budget allocated to the area. Education levels are relatively low compared to other districts in Tanzania, and “people don’t value education here, they depend on the government, not on their personal initiatives” compared to the Kilimanjaro region [T.147].

Village and Ward budget entail an allowance from the district:

“We get 10% on sungusungu MoA with BUZ, buildings rented for business, no local levy. Village chairperson gets 50 000 Tsh from ABG through MoA, and sometimes the District decides to give village chairperson some subsistence money, maybe 5000 Tsh every 3 months” [T.124, Village executive officer for Chapulwa, Mwendakulima Ward, 18.06.2012 (translated from Swahili)].

Authorities from the ward level down to the hamlet level are aware of the laws concerning mining companies and the environment. The new laws are passed down from WEO to VEO to hamlets, and even chairpersons are informed of the 2004 New Environmental law and the 2010 New Mining Act. The Ward and village authorities are empowered through the knowledge of the law; they receive and use vulgarization booklets about new environmental, land, and mining laws, which they advertise throughout the villages neighboring the company [T.124]. The District in Kahama has a special committee, an environmental and infrastructure committee, to handle all mining issues, but there are not enough members of the opposition represented (implicit: it can’t go against the company) to have leverage [T.125]. “The committee is supposed to go around the mining areas and collect information, but it is not effective” [T.125, Ward executive officer, 18.06.2012 (translated from Swahili)].

Non-state actors are not very active in the Buzwagi mining area but are directly working in the area of sustainable conflict management. A local NGO, SHDEFA, helps the company implement capacity-

building programs. An international NGO specialized in conflict resolution, Search For Common Ground (SFCG), has a partnership with ABG to help manage community company conflicts. National Newspapers do not reach the area easily.

(b) GGM

Around GGM, vertical connectedness is stronger than in the case of BUZ, and there is also more top-down non-state involvement. On the other hand, the local government's capacities are weaker than around BUZ.

Before 2011, the government showed little concern for ongoing issues opposing communities to the GGM. Compensation regulations are very old. The central government started reviewing these policies and the ministry of Land involved district authorities in the process in Geita and North-Mara. District authorities empowered by the Ministry of Land do get involved in compensation issues. Since 2012, a central government task force intervened on compensation issues in Geita, which resulted in the progressive closure of the issue. The Ministry of Land, and even the Prime Minister's cabinet representatives and the President, were informed of compensation issues of Geita. The central government took the responsibility of raising the rates and value of the lands acquired by the company. In 2012, the district commissioner (DC) created a committee to review the litigating compensation report before the Ministry of Land was involved in order to make revision suggestions sent to the national level (Chief Valua). Geita is an economically growing area, which started as a small hamlet at the time large-scale mining started and became a District of the Mwanza region before obtaining the status of a Region in 2012. This change of administrative status answers the growing needs in infrastructure and state services following the growth in numbers of households, the demographic pressure created by immigration and large families. The President visited the area in mid-2013 and supported the police and the district government in their fight against ASM activities taking place in the mining compound. He issued a court order, but ASM groups contested the order and won the case [T.144].

There is a problem of water scarcity in Geita district, which GGM has been trying to address since 2011 through a partnership with the government. The Ministry of Water, through its local institutions in Mwanza and Geita, is slowing the process of distribution of clean water in Geita. The partnership between GGM and the government is not moving forward because of lengthy negotiations and lack of action on the side of the government. Regulations for mining licenses leave Nyakabale village in a disempowered situation, since they are not allowed to keep doing ASM nor to build houses (no possibility of access to top loans on property without building licenses) on lands that are part of GGM's mining license but not yet in the process of being used or compensated. The educational levels are low (67% finish Standard 7) compared to other districts in Tanzania, with numerous school drop-outs (30% in primary school) and child labor in ASM and fisheries [state officials 2013].

Political leaders, international NGOs and national faith associations are involved locally in mining issues around the Geita Gold mine of AGA.

Opposition party leaders are acting in the Geita district to hold GGM accountable, especially on compensation and shared benefit issues. They are usually radically distrustful of any moves made by the company. Politicians in the district use populism to gain the masses [T.156]. The Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and UNHCR intervened in the case of people displaced from Mtakuja village living

in town with no shelters by giving them tents to live in. Plan International is active on child labor and school dropout issues by providing 1000 pupils with school uniforms and material in Nyarugusu. In 2012, the Interfaith committee was active in Geita and has been struggling to be counted as part of GGM's stakeholders. One of their major disputes is about giving decent shelters to the displaced villagers living in tents in town due to ongoing compensation disputes since 2008. They seem to have reached a consensus with GGM to re-settle these people in decent houses. In 2013, a survey of number of families and acquisition of land for resettlement was in progress [T.165; T.158].

(2) Informal Community Cohesion

(a) BUZ

Informal connectedness is very favorable to the implementation of sustainable conflict management strategies. State, non-state, customary, youth, and professional actors are used to discussing issues of development of the district together. Harmonization of security actors is also an outcome of this important cohesion amongst actors at the local level, because of the embeddedness of the *sungusungu* within the community and the good relationship between state security and other community actors.

There is good cohesion between the village and the ward level. Village councils meet every month, and if important issues are raised, they can call a ward development council (WDC) to take place added to the regular quarterly WDC. Between SHDEFA (a local NGO working for BUZ) and villages, there is good collaboration on the selection of projects and their leaders. The local NGO also harmonizes its projects with those funded by the district in order to avoid doubles. Village authorities and elders understand each other. The Village executive officer (VEO) explained that they have a specific meeting with elders outside the village assembly, because they understand that elders feel uncomfortable around the agitated undisciplined youth. When Buzwagi started operating, communities accepted to stop mining and concentrate on agriculture and livestock keeping. Those who wanted to keep mining left the area [T.153].

(b) GGM

Communities around the GGM seemed to have had better cohesion in the past than in recent years. Recent lack of communication or disputes between groups of actors at the local levels convey the idea that informal connectedness have gone way down since 2011. They are thus not in favor of sustainable conflict co-management strategy implementation.

Between the town and the district, there are some conflicts on obtaining benefits from GGM [GGM 2013]. There are some disputes between the town and the district council in Geita. The District Consultative Committee DCC and the Town Consultative Committee TCC do not communicate together on the priorities concerning development projects. When the GGM tried to talk to their representatives together to harmonize the CSR plans, some town officials prevented the district officials from attending. Between the district and the village level, there is a lack of cohesion, illustrated by the lack of information from district officers on the CSR projects taking place at the village level. Few district and town officers were aware of all the infrastructure projects [TCDO 2013, T.138]. Interfaith committee/religious leaders had to struggle to be recognized by former District officials (and as a consequence by GGM), but they now succeeded in being recognized as stakeholders at district level.

(3) Security harmonization

(a) BUZ

Security actors are embedded at the local level where BUZ operates, which helps to harmonize practices with the security of the company and the community relations department. Throughout the three years of our research period, security harmonization was favorable to the implementation of sustainable conflict management strategies.

The Regional police commander (representing the central level) participates in a monthly meeting on security at the Ward level with representatives of BUZ security and CR departments. After collusion was investigated, the government also allocated police officers to work as guards with ABG through an MoU. Even before BUZ started operating, there was collaboration with police but no MoU [T.119]. In 2011, an MoU with the police in the Shinyanga region was signed with ABG through the regional police commander [T.104]. An MoU was sent to the Inspector General of Police in 2009. Now the MoU has been renewed with some changes, the new one was signed in May 2012. [T.119, 2012]. The Police also assist BUZ in case of theft or intruders (theft of fuel).[T.119]. Three police officers rotate every 12 hours, and 12 police officers are based in the police camp (different from police station) for patrolling outside the mine. ABG provides a vehicle and hires the driver [T.119]. Two police officers are stationed in each Ward as part of the community policing initiative from the government since 2006 [T.127; T.119], because there are very few police in rural remote areas. If someone commits a crime, anyone can arrest him [T.119]. BUZ's Community Relation representative and security manager, the VEOs of each of the three villages, the ward executive officer (WEO), and the sungusungu leaders all participate in community policing meetings [T.119]. The police do not receive any material or financial support from ABG or the central government for community policing [T.119].

In 2008, BUZ started using the sungusungu to guard their premises, because they were already organized. The sungusungu were in charge of guarding outside the gates with their traditional light weapons, while the security staff was inside the mining compound armed with guns. Since 2012, BUZ signed an MoA with the sungusungu. VEOs, sungusungu leaders, and WEO often have discussions in meetings at the ward level; they have a democratic process of dealing with the MoU with ABG, and they found a way to make each household benefit from these contracts with sungusungu [Village leaders, 2012]. BUZ engaged 250 sungusungu to assist them in security [T.104]. Their main duty is to alert the police and ABG security [T.104]. Each Monday since April 2013, a security meeting takes place at the Ward level attended by representatives of SFCG, BUZ, sungusungu, Ward and village authorities.

(b) GGM

Harmonization is high between security actors around GGM, but they are not as embedded as around BUZ.

In case of major events like the 2012 upheavals, the Field Force Unit (FFU), a national paramilitary force specialized in riots, is involved in dispersing the crowds and guarding the compounds for a few weeks after the events. At the district level, the DC and the GGM department of CR and security meet regularly to prevent conflicts and upheaval. GGM is not invited to attend every security committee, but they are invited to make public statements in case of security threats. Since 2011, there is a security agreement between the district police and GGM. The district allocates police to

guard the mining compounds. Since 2011, the Sungusungu signed an MoU with GGM in all the villages around the compound.

c) BUZ & GGM CO-MANAGEMENT CONCLUSION

Co-management capacities differ between communities neighboring the Buzwagi gold mine operated by African Barrick Gold and the Geita gold mine operated by AngloGold Ashanti. The main differences concern the cohesion between groups within communities and the embeddedness of security actors at the local level. Communities neighboring the Buzwagi mine are more connected horizontally than those around GGM. Overall, communities around GGM have medium to high levels of co-management capacities, while those around BUZ are high. GGM achieved lower sustainability levels than BUZ in the two last years of the research period.

The comparison shown in Tables 25 and 26 suggests that there is a link between co-management capacities and success of the company to implement sustainable conflict management strategies. It could also suggest the importance of horizontal connectedness in this success. Our findings corroborate this first data analysis. Around GGM, the lack of informal cohesion explains why the company does not achieve higher levels of sustainability, especially with a legacy of company-community conflict (chapter 10).

d) TABLE SUMMARY OF BUZ AND GGM LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS

Table 25. Buz local governance drivers detail

Drivers	Dimensions	Indicators	Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
BUZ local Risk	History of violence	Historically confrontational	LOW	LOW	LOW
		Perceptions of one another	LOW	LOW	LOW
	ASM risk	Importance of ASM	LOW	LOW	LOW
		Supported by local settings	LOW	LOW	LOW
	History of conflict	Accountability strategy	MED	MED	LOW
		MNC response	LOW	LOW	LOW
Local RISKS			LOW	LOW	LOW
BUZ Co-management	Vertical connectedness	Top-down involvement/ local gvt empowerment	LOW/HIGH	LOW/HIGH	LOW/HIGH
		Non-state involvement	MED/HIGH	MED/HIGH	MED/HIGH
	Community cohesion		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Security harmonization	Security structures	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
		Security embeddedness	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CO-MNGT CAPACITY			HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			LOW/MED	MED/HIGH	HIGH

Table 26. GGM Local governance drivers detail

Drivers	Dimensions	Indicators	Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
GGM local Risk	History of violence	Historically confrontational	LOW	LOW	LOW
		Perceptions of one another	MED	MED	MED
	ASM risk	Importance of ASM	MED/LOW	MED	MED
		Supported by local settings			
	History of conflict	Accountability strategy	HIGH/MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH
		MNC response	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Local RISKS			MED	MED	MED/HIGH
GGM Co-management	Vertical connectedness	Top-down involvement/ local gvt empowerment	MED	HIGH	HIGH
		Non-state involvement	MED	HIGH	HIGH
	Community cohesion		MED	LOW	LOW
	Security harmonization	Security structures	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
		Security embeddedness	MED	MED	MED
CO-MNGMT CAPACITY			MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH/MED
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			MED	MED	MED/HIGH

2. ABG NMGM in Kurya dominated area (North-Mara)

Local governance drivers related to the communities neighboring the North-Mara Gold mine's operations in Tanzania are characterized by continuous high risks of community-company conflicts. However, in the last year of our research, both conflicts actually taking place between the company and the community were reduced due to less confrontational accountability strategies by the communities and a more comprehensive response to confrontations by the company. Parallel to that, until 2012, communities were not well equipped for the co-management of conflicts, apart from the top-down participation of non-state actors in the area. In 2013, the central government started being more involved at the local level, and security structures and actors reached a good level of harmonization, making the co-management capacities of communities more favorable to implementation of sustainable conflict management strategies.

Overall, local governance drivers were very unfavorable for the implementation of sustainable conflict management strategies before 2012 and became somewhat more favorable during the last year of our research.

a) LOCAL RISK OF COMMUNITY-COMPANY CONFLICT TARIME, NORTH-MARA

In Tarime, North-Mara region, the dominant ethnic group is (Wa)kurya where African Barrick Gold's NMGM operates. The Kurya people have the reputation of being hostile and aggressive, easily starting fights and not easygoing. Traditionally, they were soldiers and were the last resist colonization in Tanzania. Nowadays, most Kurya men aspire to join the army or the police (T.1.28, ref). The main activity of the Kurya before the company started operating was artisanal and small-scale gold mining. The various clans of the Kurya people are frequently involved in fights over land and cattle. The government finally decided to turn Tarime and Rorya (Tarime had been separated into two districts in 2007) into a full-fledged police province, a special police zone, with a regional police commander and support staff [Dailynews 2011]. The communities around NMGM use confrontational accountability mechanisms against the company, to which the company usually answered with harsh security measures until 2013.

(1) History of violence

The Kurya in North-Mara have a long history of inter-clan clashes, which increased with the presence of the company, creating more rivalries between the clans. Located at the border with Kenya, there is also a history of smuggling weapons and foodstuff across the border. The Kurya people prefer to enter in conflict rather than to negotiate solutions because negotiation is a submission for them [TZ 2012,2013]. Also, the use of violence to manage conflict is perceived as efficient by state authorities located in the sub-region as well as by local leaders, even in family matters. The Kurya used to have local courts that would settle disputes by the principle of "a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye". There is also a very high rate of domestic violence amongst the Kurya.

The general perception of local communities towards NMGM was very negative: people hated anyone affiliated with the company; they wanted them to leave, because they were perceived as "killers" or "rich people who do not care about us". Companies are considered to use segregation practices to keep foreigners (white) and Africans separated during their leisure time (housing, cafeteria, bars) and on payrolls. NMGM is perceived as exploiting local unqualified people [T.47].

(2) ASM risk

Artisanal mining is historically the most important economic activity in the villages neighboring the NMGM. People have no other important source of income to date, but the land for artisanal mining has been strongly reduced because of the company's license. This means that artisanal miners need to become intruders to sustain their livelihoods. Moreover, elders sometimes fuel conflicts because they gain from it, since some elders use conflict to increase their capital in cattle or gold [DC, VEO 2013; TZ 2013]. Others contribute to their resolution [TZ 2013]. The influence of elders on youth can perpetuate inter-clan conflicts as well as community-company conflicts. Since 2012, income-generating projects supported by the company address this problem at a very small scale by trying to create new economic activities in the villages (a total of approximately 20 projects were supported in 2013). These groups contribute to release the pressure of ASM on the company by trying to reduce the number of intruders and to convert them to new activities.

One of the local income-generating groups was active before NMGM started funding some of their projects, which shows the capacity of local youth to work together on development projects. This "Nyabigena" group is a well-organized income generating and micro-credit cooperative created in 1993. Members contribute to the development of the group, and the village provided a percentage of the royalties from NMGM. In 2013, the village stopped receiving royalties, and the cooperative is now directly funded by NMGM for selected projects.

(3) History of community-company conflict

Even though demands and needs of the communities neighboring the NMGM are communicated orally during meetings attended by the company's representatives, or by letters transmitted through CR liaison officers living in neighboring villages, confrontational strategies are prevalent.

The company assisted in construction of a hospital, but people destroyed it in 2012. They also sabotaged the water pipes of a school built by NMGM in 2013 [T.104; T.144]. These were assumed as reactions to people being arrested and beaten by the police forces after being caught in the mining compound [TZ 2012, 2013]. Theft of gold/intrusion and physical encounters with security (MNC security, local police, and special police) are recorded on a daily basis. In May 2011, trespassers ended up in a fight with security that resulted in injuries and the death of villagers. In 2013, although communities did not use confrontational strategies as often as before, there were still trespassers in large numbers on a daily basis. The latest event of trespassers caught by security guards happened in January 2013, resulting in the death of one villager and a police officer wounded [GlobalPost, 2014].

Until 2012, company-community conflicts were very frequent and violent as a result of confrontations between company security and police against intruders.

There are no official statistics on security incidents occurring specifically between the company and the local communities. According to the newspaper the Citizen, on 12.06.11, the journalist assessed 70 deaths between 2000 and 2003 and about 24 wounded by security forces [12.06.11 The Citizen, article by Tom Mosoba]. An article by Jacob Mugini (Tarime reporter) on 1.02.11 in the Daily News reported 150 000 intruders in 2010. That day, an "invasion" stopped production for 37 hours, resulting in 3 dead, 91 wounded, 800 arrested, and 87 convicted. Before June 2011, the managing director (MD) was very severe on security issues; he was close to the security department and empowered the company's security officers (giving them more autonomy) [T.107]. When the mine's

security department detained a suspect, they would take people into custody without investigation and terminate some employees without proof of collusion, to make examples of them [T.107]. Intruders were mistreated, beaten, injured, and sometimes killed [T.107; T.39; T.48; T.34-38]. “Events of physical encounters between artisanal miners and security guards are regular, about every month, with a decrease in the last months of 2013” [T.139, Tarime District Commissioner, 14.11.2013]. People go to the company’s mining sites every day and every night in more or less large numbers. Their encounters with the police are systematically violent if they spend longer than agreed, if they cannot bribe the guards, or if security members that are not involved in the collusion system spot them. Almost every family has a member involved in “illegal” artisanal mining activities [TZ 2011, 2012, 2013].

The conflict that was the most covered by the media occurred in May 2011. Tanzanian citizens were shot dead by security forces when hundreds of people entered the mining compounds. In 2011, the Tarime DC explained how the district considered removing the police from guarding the mine in Nyamongo (central village) because of the collusion between some officers and “trespassers”. The DC further stated that if the police no longer guard the mine, the compounds will be guarded through participatory security groups formed by villagers, and police will return to normal patrols. This solution had already been tested before 2009, since the company was guarded by groups of villagers. In 2009, through an MoU between the police and NMGM to control intruders, the guards on interim command were separated from those on normal duty. At the time, the collusion system already existed.

In 2013, the company’s response became somewhat less harsh by hiring members of the local communities to guard the mining premises. The Sungusungu security agreements (see security harmonization), however, are not inclusive of the sungusungu administration and will soon be in confrontation with new youth groups being trained by the military to replace them [T.138], or complement them [T.141].

(4) Risk conclusion NMGM

Communities neighboring the NMGM comprise the highest level of risk of company-community conflict among the cases studied in our research. Risk conditions became slightly more favorable towards the end of the research period.

There is no apparent correlation between the level of sustainability of SES implemented by the company and the level of risk. However, we find that the level of risk partly explains why the NMGM cannot have long-lasting success of implementation in the absence of strong leadership for sustainability inside the mine. The improvements seen in 2011-2012 was due to the dedication of the MD to manage community-company conflicts and the resources he allocated to the CR department to act.

b) CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY LOCAL ACTORS TARIME, NORTH-MARA

The history of mistrust among communities neighboring the NMGM goes hand in hand with the low capacity to collaborate in the management of conflict over the three-year research period. It is only recently that the central government got involved in matters of conflict between the company and the communities related to compensation issues and that security structures and actors were harmonized resulting in better co-management capacities.

(1) **Vertical connectedness**

Before 2012, vertical connectedness with the central state was poor, while non-state actors from the national and international level were highly involved in community-company conflict management since before 2011. Local government authorities were also not well equipped to manage conflicts in collaboration with the company.

The President visited the area in mid-2013 and supported the police and the district government in their fight against ASM activities taking place in the mining compound. He issued a court order, but ASM groups contested the order and won the case [T.144]. Compensation regulations are very old. The central government started reviewing these policies and the ministry of Land involved district authorities in the process in Geita and North-Mara. District authorities were empowered by the Ministry of Land to get involved in compensation issues. The District level authorities got involved in the Village Benefits Implementations Agreements signed between NMGM and village authorities. The District legal officer reviews these agreements to make sure they comply with Tanzanian law. The Ministry of Land pushed for the participation of district authorities in policy formulation concerning compensation and resettlement issues. At the district level, a task force has been implemented through the intervention of the Ministry of Land in order to address compensation issues. The government acknowledged the lack of sustainability in regulations concerning compensation in mining areas. The company used to negotiate each case individually instead of using standards, which created a large area for contestation and uncertainty for the investors acquiring land.

Communities neighboring the NMGM have poor development conditions. The government does not provide much in the way of resources for the local authorities and administration to develop the area, while the NMGM contributes to a minimal extent to compensate this lack of necessary infrastructure.

The Tarime district where NMGM operates is more developed in terms of social infrastructures and services than most districts in Tanzania, and villages around NMGM can get electricity from the central village Nyamongo since 2010, when NMGM brought electricity with the power plant it built there. The area suffers from water shortages, which has been addressed by NMGM since 2013 through the provision of water in a container truck. Road infrastructure between Tarime town and the Villages is maintained by the transport budget of the government. Roads in the villages are being improved by NMGM through the implementation of the new village agreements. Education and health infrastructures are being improved by NMGM through the implementation of the new village agreements, while the government is providing teachers/doctors and material to make these infrastructures efficient. The national level is involved in CSR projects by providing teachers and doctors.

Non-state actors visit the area and advocate for the communities on conflict management issues. The interfaith committee's visit to NMGM concerning security and intruder issues showed their capacity to make the company accountable. An EU delegation of ambassadors came to investigate compensation issues (France, UK, Finland). Foundation Help, a local NGO based in Musoma, Mara region, founded in 1999, has a wide national and international network. The regional NGO has been active on mining issues in the Mara region. They investigate local complaints and make them public in newspapers, TV and radio. UK lawyers are taking charge of the complaints related to security

brutality against neighboring villagers during the May 2011 conflicts. In December 2013, UK lawyers won a case against NMGM [Martin et al., 2013].

(2) Informal community cohesion

Cohesion among communities at the local level is low, as well as multi-level cohesion.

The compensation task force is the only manifestation of cohesion between the central, the regional, and the district level of the government. There is also a lack of cohesion between the district and the village level. The lack of transparency people resent from the company and “its collusion with the government is illustrated by the fact that Tarime’s DC does not allow the village chairpersons to talk to the company directly” [T.39]. However, the DC is closer to the central government than to the local government, “if he is nice to the company, he represents the government” [T.49, opposition party leader, used to work for the DC office in Tarime, 07.09.2011, Tarime Town].

(3) Security harmonization

Harmonization of security actors and structures increased in 2012-2013, while the embeddedness of security structures and actors is lacking over the whole period.

The Special Police Zone was established in 2009 when the levels of crime were highest (the high crime rates, border smuggling, and community-company conflicts in North-Mara). Since then, the district commissioner and the regional police commander (head of the special police) harmonized security actors from the village to the district levels to make the North-Mara area a safer place for citizens and for investors [T.138; T.139]. Everyone in town agrees that the level of security increased a lot since 2009 and that the town is now safe even at night. The growing number of hotels testifies to that issue as well.

The special police (sent by the central government) have a (confidential) MoU with the NMGM to guard the company’s premises since 2010. Special police and local police work together in the villages neighboring NMGM, formally since 2009, but effectively since 2011. ABG has been employing federal police and private armed guards to patrol their operations since 2009, but after the incidents, statements were made that they would shift their security procedures to employ more local people in their guarding staff and get involved in human rights training for the police.

Since December 2011, the Sungusungu officially collaborate with NMGM through MoA signed at the village level. Sungusungu are in charge of guarding outside the company’s compounds since 2012. In 2013, NMGM delegated the training of new groups of young people from the neighboring villages to the military (special police), including induction into the VPSHR.

The Sungusungu system did not take root in the Mara region. The administrative structure is there, but the system is not embedded because of a lack of trust between people and a lack of understanding and consensus on the selection criteria. The government tried to institutionalize the sungusungu system in each village of Tanzania. The sungusungu, however, never rooted in North-Mara, the system exists only as a state system with sungusungu representatives in place at the village and ward levels, but the selection criteria for sungusungu community members were never understood and were considered unreliable. (Anyone from 16 to old age can be a sungusungu, the selection is based on values of honor and respect recognized in an individual by the sungusungu leaders).

Since the company started its operations, there has been an increase of violence by police. People complain of harassment by district police [T.35; T.51]. The Special Police Force Commander in 2011, Constantine Massawe, refuted this: he says the local leaders are trying to increase conflicts between police and villagers by relaying false information [12.06.11 The Citizen, Tom Mosoba]. Until 2012, the relationships between neighboring communities and the police officers guarding the mines are characterized by distrust and tension. The collaboration of each company with the state police forces makes the security system of the mine sensitive to social pressure and opens more possibilities for local communities to negotiate/bribe their way through the mining compound. This increases insecurity for the local people, since the police have a double face: sometimes helping them to get in illegally, sometimes chasing them because they entered illegally. The financial bonuses and self-satisfaction associated with working as a police officer for the company also, sometimes, lead to abuses of power. This is reinforced by the history of impunity granted to those working for the company, which is partly due to the incapacity of the local leaders to make the police pay for their wrongdoings.

(4) Co-management Conclusion NMGM

Co-management capacities of the communities around the NMGM were low from 2011 to 2012 and increased in 2012-2013. They are characterized by low horizontal connectedness, both within communities and between communities and security actors.

Sustainability levels of the strategies implemented by the company do not seem to be dependent on co-management capacity levels in the case of NMGM. We find that the low community cohesion is part of the reason why the NMGM has had difficulty implementing a sustainable strategy even when internal drivers were more favorable in 2011-2012. Also, when security harmonization became better in 2012-2013, tensions were less prevalent, which explains the slight increase in outcomes even if the company's dedicated MD was gone (table 27).

c) TABLE SUMMARY OF NMGM LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS

Table 27. NMGM local governance drivers detail

Drivers	Dimensions	Indicators	Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
NMGM local Risk	History of violence	Historically confrontational	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
		Perceptions of one another	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	ASM risk	ASM tradition	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
		Supported by local settings	HIGH	HIGH	LOW
	History of conflict	Accountability strategy	HIGH	HIGH	MED
		MNC response	HIGH	HIGH	MED
Local RISKS			HIGH	HIGH	HIGH/MED
NMGM Co-management	Vertical connectedness	Top-down involvement/ local gvt empowerment	LOW	LOW	HIGH
		Non-state involvement	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Community cohesion		LOW	LOW	LOW
	Security harmonization	Security structures	LOW	LOW	LOW
		Security embeddedness	LOW	MED	HIGH
CO-MGMT CAPACITY			LOW	LOW/MED	MED/HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES			LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED

3.AGA (SAG) and NordGold (SMD) in Malinke dominated area (Haute-Guinee)

Despite the fact that AGA and NordGold both operate in the Siguiri prefecture of Northern Guinea, risk dimensions differ from one case to the other, except the general discourses and perceptions of one another (us versus them). Each aspect of co-management capacities also differs between the

area where the SAG operates and that where the SMD operates, except for security harmonization and embeddedness factors. These differences take on considerable importance in the way the company implements the sustainable strategy adopted by its headquarters, because implementation is permeable to external actors and institutions [Falastein 2004]. If the SMD is less successful than the SAG in implementing a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy, it is partly because communities are not as organized and coordinated as around the SAG.

Around the SMD, communities have a history of jealousies between families and between villages, and they regularly use imposed accountability strategies against the company, such as theft of fuel, regular blockages of the worker buses, numerous artisanal miners entering the company's mining pits, and peaceful protests of communities in front of the company's administration building. The SMD has a history of reacting to trespassers very harshly by parking them in containers for days [see the documentary film Nugent et al., 2007]. These practices stopped before 2011. The communities neighboring the SAG's operations are much better organized to make themselves heard by the company. The youth are strongly organized to benefit from the presence of the company, especially since they organized a massive protest in 2010 related to employment issues. Aside from regular artisanal miners going to the companies' pits to steal gold — to which the company always answered by engaging in dialog — there isn't much hostility between the SAG and the communities.

There are similarities in the relationships of the two companies with the communities of Siguiri in how they perceive and stereotype one another. Companies and the communities themselves consider that the majority of people living around these companies are known for their "hot" temper and impatience. The companies consider that they are not easy people to deal with. There are also similarities in the actors and structures of security around the mines, and their embeddedness within the communities. In Guinea, each mining MNC has its attached military camp in charge of mediation and intervention in case of trouble. The traditional hunter's brotherhood assures security in the villages where the police do not reach, and their group is integrated and respected by the other groups in the community. Sometimes the companies recruit hunters to guard the company compounds in addition to their usual security staff.

(1) Us versus them: Malinké of Siguiri versus MNCs

Us-versus-them discourses concerning in-groups and out-groups are negative around the SAG and the SMD. The widely diffused idea that Guineans consider theft as a rewarding act, added to the aggressive identity attributed to Madinkas of Siguiri contributes to the tension between the company and the neighboring communities. Company members and community members both have a negative perception of one another.

There is a common belief that stealing from the company is a good deed, because you take something back from someone who stole from you "what belongs to the company does not belong to anyone" [G.150, SMD security officer, 30.09.2013]. The Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization's explained in his CPDS speech in 2012, that, in some instances, because of Guinea's past leaders' bad example, stealing took a positive connotation "*qui vole est patron*" (he who steals is a boss). However, theft is also socially condemned, especially in the Muslim culture, and imams continually explain that "if you steal, you will pay it back".

The Madinka of Siguiri are known in the country for their "hot" temper. In Siguiri the Siguirika (people from Siguiri prefecture) are from the Mandinka tradition: they believe in the given words:

“From their customs, they are used to understand yes as yes and no as no, and people are not joking about it, the given word is a serious matter. Also, we believe that the scarcity of water and the high temperature forge their strong characters (...) Once the Siguirika decided something, they will follow through no matter what” [G.106, Traditional communicator called “the True”, 03.11.2012 in Siguiri (translated from French)].

The Madinka of Siguiri are perceived and perceive themselves differently than the Madinkas of Kankan (regional capital, 150 km south of Siguiri), who are known to “leave everything to God - Siguirika are not that patient, they need to take issues in their hands!” [G.106, traditional communicator called “the true”, spokesperson for the communicators of the Manding, 03.11.2012, Siguiri (translated from Malinke)]. Siguirika are perceived as always finding a reason to be in opposition; fighting mostly through physical means and not through legal means. However, the situation of inside conflicts in Siguiri has improved compared to the times of Conté [G.105; G.108].

Echoing these representations of the communities around the SAG and the SMD, employees and managers of these companies consider that these communities are tough to interact with. The SAG’s perception is that people from Bouré³¹ think violence is the answer to everything. People are perceived as dangerous and difficult to negotiate with, as non-submissive and, “even when they pretend to understand, they don’t act accordingly and keep the level of tension high” [SAG 2013]. People from the Siguirini sub-prefecture where the SMD operates, are called the djalonke. They belong to the Malinke ethnic group. They also have the reputation of being hard to convince, not intelligent, and violent compared to other clans in the Malinke tribe [GU 2012-13]. Some SMD expatriates consider that members of the community cannot trust white people: “they consider [white people] as predators” [SMD 2013]. When white people do not attend meetings, Guinean express their criticisms more frankly. Some of the SMD’s expatriate staff believe that Guineans only understand when force is used or ‘making examples’. They even sometimes consider that these communities lack the necessary analytic capacities to compromise, which makes it useless to even try to talk to them [SMD 2013]. In the SMD, from 2006 to 2011, since only Guinean people talked French, Guinean employees were in charge of human resources. Some managers now consider that at the time recruitment was done out of nepotism and not according to competence. From 2009 to 2011 around the SMD, it was not easy to engage in dialog with the local population, because people were often opposed to the company’s representatives. People would also refuse to help the security agents recruited among the local communities. Community members working as security guards were called “white”, and locals even destroyed some of the security guards’ houses in reaction to artisanal miners being held in custody.

From 2011 to 2013, in-group and out-group perceptions were mutually negative. There was a strong “us versus them” tension defining a high risk of conflict to happen according to theories of conflict [Worchel 20005].

(2) Cross-scale security harmonization

In Guinea, the state army forces secure the mining MNC’s operations. The CASM (“Compagnie d’Appui à la Sécurité Minière”) is on the company’s security department’s budget [G.119]. Added to their own security department staff, mining MNCs also recruit security agents to guard the premises of the mine. These security agents are sometimes recruited among neighboring community

³¹ term designating the villages neighboring the company

members. They can also be chosen among members of the hunter brotherhood, traditionally in charge of securing the villages in rural areas.

The CASM consists of military, police, and gendarmes, with a majority of military. The CASM has to follow the procedure rules of the SMD and at the same time is supported by SMD with such things as housing, vehicles, diesel fuel, and bonuses. The CASM contact officers (Liaison Officer OL) from 2009 until 2013 carried out quite a soft security policy, teaching its people to protect the expats, to respect the population, and to not act aggressively or with violence [G.121]. The CASM receives subsidies from the company and is in charge of the protection of expatriates and material property. The OL is the military commander who makes the link between the army and the company. He represents the state and is responsible for the military and the police forces in the area. Besides the contact to the other officers and the coordination of his CASM staff, the contact officer has the task of coordinating the protection of the installations, the prevention of conflicts between the locals and the company, the sensitization of local elected leaders and the sub-prefectural authorities and administration; also, he is in charge of the supervision of all gendarmes in the entire locality, including those at the frontier to Mali, and instructing the local hunters to look out for suspicious people. Last but not least, his job is to intervene in case of a threat to the company [G.121].

Gold mining MNC's security staff works with the local police and gendarmerie. When they catch "orpailleurs", they hand them to the police and gendarmes, because they can't prosecute them. Normally, police and gendarmerie do their own thing (protection of the city/village) [G.55]. The Sub-Prefect is the mediator between community and company. When people become violent, he goes "into the field" and talks directly to the people to calm them down. His role is to ensure a good neighborhood between MNCs and the communities. The sub-prefect takes on the role of mediator in case of problem.

The Hunter's Brotherhood is a strong ancestral vigilante group. "Their responsibilities are: hunting, agriculture, and security of the population night and day" [G.110, Hunter's chief in Kinitinia, Siguiri prefecture, 04.11.2012 (translated from Malinke)]. This concerns the hunters of Bouré (neighboring villages of the SAG) and Baraka (neighboring villages of the SMD) [G.110]. The hunter brotherhood (who are paid by the community) and the male youth guarantee the security of Bouré³² and Baraka³³ [G.65-67]. At times, the two mining companies hired hunters to guard the compound because of their knowledge of the bush, but these recruitments are not systematic. Hunter's are also supposed to detain the secrets of the bush and are often related to sorcerers ("feticheurs"). The relationship between state forces and hunters is known to be an important one in West Africa. The former President, Dadis Camara gave a lot of power to the hunters and helped them organize. Since 2008, there has been regular collaboration in Bouré between the hunters and the military camp. "We patrol together, two hunters with one gendarme.. we are trained by the military" [G.110, Hunter's chief in Kinitinia, Siguiri prefecture, 04.11.2012 (translated from Malinke)]. The Sub-prefect has no role in the contract with the hunters. There are no tensions between hunters and local people. Hunters participate in CRD meetings and prefectural meetings as well [G.114].

³² Bouré = SAG neighboring villages: Kintinian, Fatoya, Boukaria, Kamatiguiya

³³ Baraka = SMD neighboring villages: Lero, Siguirini, Amina, Carrefou

a) SAG: LOCAL RISK OF COMMUNITY-COMPANY CONFLICT

The Siguiiri prefecture is close to where the SAG operates. This prefecture, located at the extreme north of Guinea and at the border with Mali, was famous for being a stronghold of the opposition before the democratic elections of 2011. During the different regimes, it was an arena of political conflicts that later also became inter-ethnic conflicts. Since 2011, the prefecture progressively became calmer. Artisanal mining was a seasonal activity that became continuous with the arrival of the SAG in the 1990s. However, there have always been alternative income generating activities in the area, and elders are advocates of the SAG against trespassers. Even though neighboring communities often protest against the company and the number of intruders is constant, the company still does not get into direct confrontation with the communities and prefers comprehensive means of managing community-company tensions. Overall, from 2011 to 2013, local risks of community-company conflict are medium.

(1) History of violence

Before the 2011 presidential elections, internal clashes within communities of the Siguiiri prefecture were highly favorable to conflict. Siguiiri had significant political problems between the PUP and the RPG. Tensions spread throughout the Siguiiri prefecture. Ever since the death of Sekou Touré, Siguiiri was against the PUP (Conté's ruling party). A large majority of people is with the RPG. Since the election of Alpha Condé, people have calmed down, especially in the villages, which were divided. People that were with the PUP joined the RPG after the elections. "Now we don't see any opposition to the RPG" [G.106]. "People had to be for the RPG, and this continues even today. In 2012, villages have militants of all political parties in the villages" [G.108, Former representative of the PDN political party, 03.11.2012, Siguiiri Town]. The company stimulated tensions among neighboring communities. Conflict occurs between groups and villages trying to benefit from the presence of the company and competing for small-scale mining land.

When the civil society, trade unions, and civilians organized protest in the whole country against the authoritarian regime in 2007-2008, Siguiiri was the first to organize the fights. Before the 2nd turn, the Madinka people in Siguiiri town terrorized the Fulani people. This was to discourage them from voting ethnic, because they are 43% of the population [G.101, PROJEG program manager, 28.10.2012, Conakry].

"The area is known as a fief of the opposition in Guinea and a troublesome area. Recently, during the 2011 elections (January), there were episodes of violence directed against the Fulani community, which forced most of them to move away from the area. AGA encountered frequent protests from local communities, (...) Conflicts still go on but they have calmed down (...)." [G.109, Focal point of PROJEG in Siguiiri and director of association here Guinée, 03.11.2012, Siguiiri]

Elders from Kintinian (village in the sub-region of Kintinian) describe the event of 1997 when people were shot dead and injured by the army forces who intervened after a local protest against government representatives [G.57; G.60; G.66]. The events happened in the Kintinian sub-prefecture (central village in the area where the SAG operates).

"Since 1990 when the party in power organized the mamaya [traditional celebrations following the ramadan] it was always a pretext for political fights. People that were not for the opposition party were threatened and their houses destroyed. Under Conté, PUP (ruling party) members were killed" [G.108, Former representative of the PDN political party, 03.11.2012, Siguiiri Town].

Each family has artisanal miners, but each artisanal mine belongs to only one clan. For instance, Bouré belongs to the Camara, but each family can go to the small-scale mining area to mine, while the Camara commands and controls the area. When someone finds gold, it creates problems: if the grandfather had lent the land for agriculture but the one using it finds gold and his family reclaims it. SAG can ask a village for a piece of land, but if this portion of land is at the border between two villages it can cause conflicts, especially because every village knows that recruitments by the company (for “casual” labor) are related to these portions of land. For example, the implantation of the firm in Boukaria: The SAG’s arrival changed that. Consequences are related to advantages given to some villages over others because of the area of exploitation [G.113]. There are also jealousies between those who work and those who don’t (see also Security Issues) [G.106; G.112].

From 2011 to 2013, political tensions calmed down but the tensions between neighboring villages were continuous. The boom of electronic gold detecting machines in 2012 created a lot of tension among groups and between indigenous and “gold diggers”.

In 2011, there was a rising antipathy between communities and the company, but also between communities because of the actions of the company. The presence of the SAG increased the conflict between villages. There exist conflicts of interests (concerning the presence of gold) when the company has to work in a specific zone [G.114]. “Within Bouré, there are conflicts between Kinitinian and Kamatiguiya, Fatoya and Balato, and between Fatoya and Boukaria” [G.106]. A conflict between the villages of Kamatiguiya and Kintinian emerged when SAG made a soil survey involving the people from Kintinian but not the population of Kamatiguiya. Those have brought their complaints up to the court in Kankan [G.61].

In the end of 2012, there was quite a lot of tension at the local level – such as the burning of a gendarme station seven km from Siguri – because of a massive increase in metal detector machines, causing problems for the local people [G.126]. The youth were also more likely to react violently than in the past. In 2012, the gold detecting machines created chaos. Taxes on gold detectors were made up ad hoc amongst the gold seekers. [G.109] The prefect of Siguri was forced to resign in September 2012 after bandits had attacked shops and boutiques of the city and the “intertie” of the prefect [Oct/Nov 2012].

(2) ASM tradition

ASM is historically an important activity in the whole Siguri prefecture. Customary authorities, called the dilitombas, organize artisanal gold mining activities in a very strict way [INSUCO et al., 2013]. It used to be a seasonal activity, but progressively became the main income activity all year around in the sub-region. However, the sub-region used to be mostly agricultural lands with farms and cattle but also has a strong tradition of large artisanal miner communities operating up to the border with Mali [INSUCO 2013].

Elders around the SAG feel like they have the responsibility to protect the company against protests and intruders. We consider that they lower the risk of tension created by the importance of the ASM tradition. Until 2011, the elders of Boukaria felt that they had some influence on the way the company acts towards the communities. They protected the company from the anger of the youth. The authorities, the Dilitombas (in charge of the artisanal mines), and the council of wise men managed the conflict. It calmed down and then it rose again. Since 2012, the youth groups of the

area around the mine seem to have taken over the role of elders in calming down tensions. The youth leader of Bouré prevents a lot of upheavals [G.112].

(3) Community-company conflict

(a) Accountability strategies by local communities

Relationships and the living situation with the company have changed since the company arrived, especially since the democratic elections of 2011. Since 2011, people dare to protest against SAG and show their anger and claims. Before, they were always afraid of the army intervening and shooting at the protesters. [G.67]

Before 2011, because of the fear of the authoritarian regimes, there were few accountability mechanisms by neighboring communities. However, towards the end of the authoritarian regime, in 2009-2011, during the time where upheavals against the regime were taking place in the whole country, neighboring communities mobilized to make the company accountable.

Under Conté or Dadis, it was impossible to express yourself without fearing for your life. There were upheavals in 1997, people were harmed and two were killed. The repression was organized by the state military forces stationed in Siguiiri [G.112]. Between 2008 and 2010, there were a lot of rebellions against the SAG: first, people wanted a generator, but it wasn't enough, since they lacked the fuel. Then there was fuel theft. Then they asked for the electricity 24/7 from the company. In 2009, Siguiiri marched for electricity and obtained it. However, the state and individuals never paid their electricity bill, and this is slowing down the process of giving electricity to the neighboring villages. The SAG considers that as long as Siguiiri has not paid its debts, others cannot get the electricity or it will set a bad example... In 2010, in Fatoya village, the youth had built barricades to stop traffic and the vehicles of the company, stopping production for several days. The locals were protesting the fact that SAG explored at a distance of only 7 meters from the village [G.67; G.66]. Another reason for the protest was the frustration within the local communities, because SAG had ignored a delegation of local representatives (of each village of the region of Bouré) who wanted to talk about issues as mediators. The SAG itself had proposed that the representatives come to the SAG for negotiations.

After succeeding in obtaining some benefits from the company following protests, communities became used to imposing accountability strategies against the company. Communities believe that the more they show their discontent, the more they can obtain from the SAG, because it seemed to have worked until 2012. The SAG seems to implement CSR activities only when the locals put violent pressure on the company³⁴ [G.60; G.67]. Until the end of 2012, communities continued mentioning that they had to keep up the pressure to make SAG fulfill their promises [G.67].

Negotiated accountability still takes place in parallel. Since 2011, the local community has asked the local government to tell SAG about the locals' demands and to have SAG support for the community [[G.66; G.57]³⁵ At the village level, they hand in their demands on different state levels since the time of Conté [G.67; G.66]. Local communities lodge complaints with the president of the district. It then goes to the mayor, who hands it to the sub-prefect. Moreover, since 2011, there are regular

³⁴ « Avez-vous participé à l'identification de ces infrastructures sociales ? R1 : (rire), les sept forages ont été accordés à la suite d'un soulèvement général des jeunes de Bouré. Ils ne font rien sans pressions à travers les violences. La SAG ne nous demande jamais sur les besoins de nos communautés en termes de développement. » [G.67]

³⁵ « En rapport avec la revendication, nous demandons à l'administration d'intervenir pour que la SAG cède un peu. Nous aussi, nous allons nous appuyer sur nos parents pour qu'il y ait l'entente entre la société et la population locale. » [G.57]

discussions with the MD advisor on community issues, the wise men, the elders, the districts, the youngsters, and the women. The MD's advisor is the only interlocutor they trust, and they meet with him regularly. In November 2012, the youth leaders in Siguirini went to take advice from their leaders, and they decided they should meet regularly. Now, the youngsters are the intermediaries for recruitment. They ask for recruitment of guards and hunters, and also non-qualified jobs. They try to divide the jobs equitably among the villages of Bouré. [G.112]

In Bouré, there is an association – called “Antenne” by the locals (which is probably ADB, Association pour le Développement de Bouré) – that represents all the villages of Bouré. In 2011, they chose mediators in each village, who act as intermediaries between the community and SAG [G.65]. This group of mediators tried to talk with SAG, but SAG refused to talk to them. People got angry and stopped the traffic of the company vehicles [G.67]. In the beginning of 2011 (or end 2010), through the youth organization, communities stopped the operations for three days when they found out that the condition to get hired as a security guard was to have English and writing skills, which most of the locals do not have [G.55, G.67, G.65, G.112]. There was a designated team to protect the properties of the SAG to avoid material damage. A political activist from Siguiri mentioned that during this event even communities from Bouré participated in the protest, building barricades and burning tires [G.57].³⁶ Communities neighboring the SAG operations want to be employed with a preference at equal competence. The Human Resources Director did not seem to be giving preference to the local people. During the March-April 2011 upheaval, people demanded the resignation of the Human Resources Director of the SAG and obtained it [G.103].

In 2012-2013, communities sometimes went through the local administration (mayor or sub-prefect) or they went straight to the CR when their demands were not transmitted from the local administration to the SAG. Communities come directly to the CR offices when they need to complain or make development related demands. However, protests and upheaval still took place in 2012 and 2013, and ASM blocked roads and sometimes refused to cooperate.

In the beginning of 2012, there was an upheaval and protest by the entire population of the region of Bouré against SAG over electrification issues: people from Boukaria stole electricity pylons from SAG, because they wanted to get electricity. People from Boukaria got arrested, leading to the region-wide protest [G.66]. People wanted electrification and had the example of the first march of Siguiri, who obtained electrification [G.103; G.110]. In 2013, ASM regularly blocked the roads to the pits [G.128, G.129]. Community members and state administration recognized that roadblocks are a reaction to a complaint that had not been addressed [G.2012, 2013]. People blocked negotiations over compensations and it did not directly affect the mining activities, but it did affect the mining prospects. In April-May 2013, there was half a day of blocking the roads caused by jealousy between two villages [G.135].

³⁶ « La SAG a fait une erreur. On fait un communiqué à la radio en disant que nous allons prendre des intellectuels maintenant. La population étant analphabète, quand les gens ont écouté ce communiqué surtout de les gens de Bouré, de Kintinian, ils se sont regroupés et un jour ils ont commencé à faire des barricades, ils sont mis du feu aux pneus. Les véhicules ne circulaient plus. Face à cette situation, nous sommes allés essayer de les convaincre pendant toute une journée et vers le soir, le calme est revenu. Depuis lors il n'y a pas eu d'autres mouvements. Q : Ces barricades ne se sont produites qu'une seule fois ? R : Plusieurs fois. »

(b) Company's response

The SAG's response to trespassers, protests, and upheaval is usually to call the government authorities and send community relations officers to negotiate a solution with the neighboring communities. The SAG does not use harsh security measures and rarely officially arrests people.

Since 2010, the MD adviser is a mediator in case of tensions at the local level. Local elected leaders (district president) come to thank him sometimes for his mediation in local conflicts between villages or families [2013]. After Fatoya protested in 2011, people got arrested. The Governor of Kankan and the Prefect of Siguiri came to calm people down, and the elders of Fatoya also tried to calm the youth. [G.67; G.103; G.37]. In 2011, when people from Boukaria stole electricity pylons from SAG, it was because they were enraged that Siguiri obtained electricity but they did not. The youngsters are calmer nowadays, because many have been recruited by SAG since the beginning of 2012.

2011-2012, Community Relations department of SAG is in charge of conflict prevention. They ought to look for thieves and intruders, which they either bring to justice directly (in case of theft) or send to the security department of SAG [G.126]. The security staff of SAG chases ASM. Especially women suffer from this security intervention, being kept by the company for a while and having their material destroyed [G.67].

In 2011, SAG started employing locals. These recruitments improved the relations with the communities [G.34]. Hunters hired by the SAG to guard the compounds in 2011-2012 carry their shotguns but without authorization to shoot. Sometimes they shoot in the air, but not if the suspect is unarmed. The objective is to arrest the suspect and to hand him over to the security of the SAG. There are no reports of arrested people being beaten. It is the same with those who are arrested by the security of the SAG. It happened that some trespassers were sent to Siguiri if they were not behaving well. [G.110]

In 2012, SAG's strategy was to calm people down and convince them to negotiate instead of fighting. The Manager of Community Relations of the SAG is in charge of negotiating with the locals. In case it does get violent, the sub-prefect is involved in the negotiation process. In 2013, communities and ASM regularly blocked the roads to the SAG's mining pits. The SAG called mediators to negotiate [G.128]. SAG security staff never gets involved in tense situations in order to avoid open conflicts [G.131]. CR officers are mediators in case of conflicts between the company and communities. They are there to avoid using hard security and negotiate a way out of the crisis, especially with ASM or on compensation/resettlement issues. In case of roadblock, the SAG security calls the "negotiators" [CR officers] to come and evacuate people. When there is too much tension, the security force does not intervene; they have to step back in order to avoid setting off the conflicts [G.129].

(4) Conclusion risk SAG

Communities neighboring the SAG's operation are located in an area called Bouré in the Siguiri prefecture. Risks of conflict at the local level are medium and did not vary much from 2011 to 2013 (table 29). Although conflicts occurred less often within communities after 2011, accountability strategy against the company, on the other hand, became more confrontational while other dimensions stayed constant. These particular indicators do not explain the SAG's successes in

³⁷ March-April 2011 there was a peaceful upheaval for 2 days with all the youngsters in Bouré; they closed offices and vehicles were blocked [G.103].

reaching sustainable implementation between 2011 and 2013. The fact that the SAG never reacts violently to community upheaval helps the company reach higher SES sustainability.

b) SMD: LOCAL RISK

(1) History of violence

The area where the SMD operates is located within the prefecture of Siguiri but is a very isolated rural area that is hardly accessible by car. The sub-prefecture capital is Siguirini, and villages around the mine form the area called Baraka (SMD neighboring villages: Lero, Siguirini, Amina, Carrefour). Baraka has 16 districts, 5 belong to Siguirini. Léro is the closest village to the SMD's mining operations. Before large-scale mining started in the area, there were not as many villages, and the density of population was very low [GU 2013]. The arrival of the SMD and the start of operation completely changed the local environment and went along with a growing number of disputes among local communities. "The problem is the division amongst the communities themselves, between people from the same collectivity in the sub-prefecture of Siguirini" [G.109].

A lot of people were arrested because of their opposition to the regime under Dadis (2008-2009), such as the Vice-Mayor of Siguirini, the wise men council, and 15 other people. Since the SMD started operating, there has been a latent conflict between Siguirini and Lero, because Lero is closer to the mine. Lero is thus growing faster than Siguirini, which is the administrative capital of the sub-prefecture. Siguirini has less in-migration and less economic growth compared to Lero. As a result, people from Siguirini are often in conflict with people living in Lero. In 2009-2010, there were many rising tensions in Baraka. The spokesperson of the "griots" of Mandingue, the "griot" of Framwalya himself went to resolve the conflict in one month and seven days. Three groups were involved: Siguirini against Léro and the other villages, and Baraka as a whole against the SMD. The conflict issue was about land and interests. SMD representatives were no longer visiting the Siguirini sub-prefecture representatives. Léro was refusing to recognize the authority of Siguirini. Léro was organizing meetings, but there were signs of a lack of respect, such as not attending ceremonies (baptisms, weddings) in Siguirini. Since 2011, tension was rising between and within groups, with jealousies towards workers of the SMD living in the villages, between Lero and Siguirini and between the elders and the youth.

Before 2011, there were no conflicts among communities. After 2011 and until 2013, tensions rose within the neighboring communities and between them and the company. Risks of conflict were thus low before 2011, and medium from 2011 to 2013.

(2) ASM tradition

"It's a big problem but there is nothing we can do about it, it will always happen, every day, 365 days on 365... A little less on Fridays, and little less on holidays, but it will always be, it's forever..."[G.119; SMD security director 08.11.2012 (translated from French)].

The security manager's statement on artisanal miners coming to the company's mining pits expresses the importance of the tradition around the SMD.

The whole area of Baraka used to be an agricultural land [G.143]. However, ASM was also a major activity. People from Mali or from other places in Guinea came during the dry season for artisanal mining. It was very organized through the "tombolomas" system. When the rainy season came, some ASM stayed to settle and some went back to where they came from. Since the company

started operating, artisanal mining is no longer seasonal, it is permanent. People refuse to farm except if they are given incentives, either by the SMD - when the projects in the villages worked there were less illegal miners - or by the government, if they can get subsidies. Most members of the neighboring communities are on the side of ASM against the company's activities.

ASM became the major activity in Baraka. Illegal mining in the SMD pits decreased in 2012 during the rush on gold detector machines. Now that this trend slowed down, since there is no more gold near the surface, illegal mining activities have increased again. There were 15 000 arrests of illegal miners in 2013. NGO leaders under Dadis and later in 2011 fueled conflict with the SMD (see accountability). Most of the local leaders are against the arrest of artisanal miners found in the SMD pits. The local state authorities, youth leaders, the sub-prefecture, the prefecture, the governor all ask the company to accept to forgive them instead of arresting them. They exercise pressure on the SMD and the military against holding them in custody.

(3) Community-company conflict

(a) Accountability strategies by local communities

Before 2011 and until 2013, communities neighboring the SMD used imposed accountability strategies to make their voices heard. Through pressure, theft, trespassing, and blockages essentially they made their discontent known to the company.

There was a conflict between Baraka and the SMD in 2009. It was between a group (CBS-cooperative de Baraka) that was subsidized by the SMD and another group (AREDEBA) that had not been subsidized by SMD, and the rest of the community. The CBS supported the SMD's intervention in the community without consensus from the communities. With the help of the President, the NGO forced the SMD to create 200 positions for young people over a period of 11 months. But they did not work for more than 3 months. Then there was a massive layoff. Dismissed people were very angry. This created mistrust between Baraka and the SMD.

Under Dadis there was also an important issue with workers that the president forced the SMD to recruit [G.106] Under Dadis, expatriates were sequestered in the SMD housing area. He accused all mining companies of destroying the country on TV and threatened several times to close down the mine.

In 2008, communities organized massive theft of fuel through a collaboration between people from the villages and employees maneuvering the machines. SMD was indirectly providing the fuel for the whole area [GU 2011, 2012, 2013]. From 2006 to 2010, the person in charge of the Human Resources department of the SMD did not get along well with the people from Baraka. In 2010, they put pressure on the company to make him resign. The governor and the Minister of Mines were involved, too, and summoned him for a meeting at the SMD [G.106] and obtained his resignation. In 2010, the neighboring communities organized massive strikes after an expatriate manager allegedly slapped a Guinean employee [G.119; G.143]. The 25 august 2010, people were blocking all the gates, employees had to be evacuated. The blockage lasted three days. After a trial in Siguiri, 700 people interrogated, more than 100 people were dismissed because of sabotage. The governor of Kankan intervened asking for their re-hiring, even at lower levels, and they were re-employed.

In 2011-2012, theft was still an important concern for the company, and the number of protests increased. In 2011, there was again massive collusion for theft of fuel [G.105]. In 2011, SMD reported 234 thefts. Mostly it was scrap metal that had been stolen; in quite a lot of cases it was oil

or fuel; in a few cases dynamos and empty canisters were stolen [Thefts 2011 SMD]. In May 2012, buses were blocked in the village Amina, because people wanted the pupils to be allowed onboard to go to school. Young people protested mostly because of the delay in response to their demands and in implementing promises. For example, in July 2013, there was a protest to demand the implementation of the agreement reached in Siguiri after the massive protest of May 2013. Usually, they went in groups in front of the administration building of the mine and screamed slogans. In November 2012, agricultural actors demanding compensation mobilized because of the delay of the compensation money.

In 2012-2013, although some community leaders either went directly to the company or to the sub-prefect to transmit the communities' demands and complaints, upheavals and blockages were still common practices. Youngsters often went to see the sub-prefect for recruitment issues or other problems. In 2012, women also regrouped in associations of street sweepers to get support from the SMD. The sub-prefect transmitted the file, but there was no answer from SMD [G.116]. The 28th of May 2013, there was an important community upheaval. It started by a usual blockage of a bus of workers, but more and more people came, growing from a group of 6 to a group of about 500. They blocked the buses for 48 hours and hijacked some expats. The protest was about blasting causing abortions and ongoing unanswered demands. After blocking a bus and protesting in a large group, they obtained that the blasting will always be announced in villages, and the SMD agreed to move the slaughterhouse and build a new one. In July 2013, communities blocked the buses again for 3 hours, protesting about not being involved in recruitment of non-qualified labor, while it was part of an agreement reached in Siguiri. The SMD had agreed to inform the youth of Siguirini sub-prefecture of calls for recruitment. In fact, it was one of the SMD's sub-contractors who did not inform communities about hiring opportunities.

(b) Company response

To accountability strategies from the neighboring communities, the SMD used to answer by arresting people and placing them in custody. Complaints about harsh treatment were abundant. After 2011, the company shifted to more comprehensive security measures against trespassers and protestors.

From 1995 to 2002, the SMD used to go through the local leaders for the recruitment of guards, then it stopped. There were no hunters working with the SMD, the company hired guards directly, not through the local administration. Before 2011, ASM caught in the pits were locked in containers in the sun. In 2011, when there was collusion for theft of fuel, arrested people were brought to Siguiri. Some people said the security guards of the SMD were implicated [G.105]. In 2011, there was an upheaval of the youth because of a conflict between them and the SMD because of recruiting issues. It was managed peacefully with the intervention of the ex-governor of Kankan. Oral agreements were made, but no signature given. In 2012, when the farmers mobilized and went to the SMD massively, 50 persons were received in the community relations office. The SMD gave them a new date to collect their money.

In 2012-2013, in case of upheavals, the SMD sent civil and military authorities (from the CASM military camp). The SMD went through the OL and their security guards to try to dissuade artisanal miners from illegally entering the compound, but when they found them in the pits they arrested them and brought them to the police. Once held in custody, artisanal miners hoped for the local leader to pay the bail money to get them out. In May 2013, the military intervened and people

expressed their demands. SMD lost days of production during the resulting necessary negotiations with communities, since the company had to postpone the blasting until they reached an agreement. In July 2013, after the blockage of busses for 3 hours, discussions took place at the sub-prefecture to reach an agreement.

(4) Conclusion risk SMD

Except for the relatively non-troublesome relationships among the communities neighboring the SMD and the company's comprehensive response to imposed accountability strategies, other dimensions were favorable to company-community conflicts. As a result, local risk of conflict was high over the whole research period from before 2011 to 2013 (table 28).

This high local risk of conflict combined with unfavorable internal drivers for SES in the SMD explains why the company did not successfully implement the sustainable strategies adopted at headquarters. Besides, co-management capacities were not favorable enough to compensate risks.

c) SAG: CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY LOCAL ACTORS

(1) Vertical connectedness

Before 2011, the government of Moussa Dadis Camara was directly involved with mining companies and local level issues related to them. After the first democratic elections of 2011, vertical connectedness of neighboring communities was illustrated by various interventions of the central state at the local level. There was little involvement of non-state actors from the national or international level in local matters concerning community-company relationships. Overall, in communities neighboring the SAGs, vertical connectedness was medium compared to other cases.

In 2011-2012, the government was involved in the ASM situation and launched several committees to help solve issues arising between the company and the community around the SAG. The government also targeted the common misuse of public funds specific to mining areas.

When Moussa Dadis Camara was president of Guinea, in 2007-2009, all mining companies were invited for a discussion on TV. The SAG representative was absent, so Dadis decided instantly to close the mine. The CR manager at the time (now VP of sustainability in HQ) was summoned during the night, and it was a regular practice from the president at the time. In 2011, the President created the peace committees (comité de maintien de la paix), which included the participation of ministers at the prefecture levels in case of tensions. The "comité de suivi" was created by a central government decree in 2011, officially called CCLM (Cadre de Concertation en Localités Minières). The purpose was to allow the village level to have a forum to discuss problems related to mining localities [decret 2011 JO]. Before the government started intervening in ASM matters, artisanal mining engendered a lot of clashes. In 2011, the President Alpha Condé suspended all activities in the artisanal mines to review the cadastre [G.106]. In 2011, the newly elected government put in place so called "special delegations" that were supposed to replace state administration staff in some rural communities in the gold mining areas (in Kankan, Kiniéro and Siguirini) to reduce corruption. Therefore, the democratic process has initiated the monitoring and sanctioning of corruption within state structures. However, replacing elected authorities by appointed ones is not very democratic. In February 2011, the ministry of mining and the ministry of decentralization organized a meeting to gather all the communities affected by SMD's and SAG's actions to talk about perceived problems and local conflicts [G.36].

In 2012-2013, vertical connectedness with state officials was less formal. Central government representatives would get involved in dispute resolution and hold public discourse in the Siguiiri prefecture. The initiative to vulgarize some of the laws directly related to company-community issues also showed the involvement of the state on local matters. The state also used the expertise of mining companies in policy formulation on key dispute issues (compensation of land).

In 2012, the prefect and the governor implicated themselves in conflict resolution at the local level whenever there were serious blockages slowing down the mining activities. For a problem of land in the collectivity, the prefect serves as an arbitrator. In November 2012, the sub-prefect was at the SAG because of a compensation issue regarding cashew fields. He is in regular contact with the community relations management of SAG [G.114]. In 2012, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization strongly advised everyone in Siguiiri to move on to another mentality (away from the idea that stealing is good) for grassroots development to be possible. What was also striking in his discourse was when he encouraged the audience to use the law for themselves, by, for instance, dismissing the Mayor if they assessed that he was not fulfilling his duties. Discourses about the need to put the power in the hands of the people were held at all levels. It is a clear message that development and the future of the country lies in the empowerment of people from rural areas. The government is vulgarizing key official texts for the illiterate and people who did not go far in school to understand them better. Texts like the CPD regulation, code des collectivités, code foncier, and the African youth charter³⁸. In 2012, The CCLM (Cadre de Concertation en Localités Minières) was not implemented [G.114]. In 2013, MNCs were included in national policy formulation on compensation issues. The SAG is involved in national level discussion with the ministry of mines and ministry of agriculture, along with other Gold Mining MNCs, SEMAFO and SMD related to compensation regulations [G.134; G.135]. The aim of these negotiations is for the companies to share the problems encountered and participate in reformulation of policies.

Local capacity of the state is not favorable to co-management. Local government administration around the SAG has little capacity, and they are not empowered nor considered legitimate by the communities.

The mayor of Kintinian sub-prefecture explained that in 2009 the tax of 0,4 % for the local development was used by the prefect and his entourage, but was not invested in local development.³⁹ In 2011, the "Directrice Résidente" of SAG stated in a meeting of the concerned ministries and the main mining companies of Guinea that the absence of the State in the region of Siguiiri was the main reason for the social crisis there. She said that the communities were left alone by communal, regional, prefectural, and sub-prefectural authorities, and that SAG was being obliged to play the state's role in the region [Procès Verbal 2011(2): 24; G.55]. From 2011 to 2013, communities at the village level did not attribute much authority to local elected authorities; leadership was mostly attributed to customary leaders (elders in the wise men councils) [G.139; G.135]. The problem was also that, at the decentralized levels, elected or designated authorities often privileged their own interests before those of the community they represent. The purpose of local administration is to pick up the funds, not to be responsible for local communities; the prefect's first task is to find resources, not to ensure their redistribution [G.46]. In 2011, the CR manager of

³⁸ African Union, Charte africaine de la jeunesse, 2 July 2006, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493fe1512.html> [accessed 18 February 2012]

³⁹ Draft rapport de mission d'accompagnement des OSC dans les zones minières en Haute Guinée, 2009. PROJEG. Page 5.

the SAG indicated that the state's authorities did not properly manage the local tax for development. He insisted that the local population should be better instructed about the mining convention and the duties of and linkages between the state and the companies. The SAG representatives also claim that there is a lack of law and order in the region of the mine. The government does not prosecute the thieves who are caught by the company [G.55].

(2) Informal Cohesion

There is a new NGO in Bouré since 2011. They wanted to crush ADB, and the population rejected them. In 2012, they came friendlier to the ADB in order to work together instead of against each other. Other people wanted to create problems. Some people with the new NGO discredited ADB, and they had the population with them.

Some elected leaders said that ADB wanted to go against their interests, and they put some people against the ADB. It was an issue of having the contract for transporting workers to the SAG [G.115]. When Siguiri marched for electricity in 2009, elders sensitized the youth groups to help in the search for a mutual solution [G.65]. The Governor of Kankan and the Prefect of Siguiri came to calm people down; security staff from SAG sensitized the protesters, and the protesting youths themselves made sure no one would destroy the company's facilities. Before 2011, youth followed the advice of the elders, and communities were against the local government. Since 2011, cohesion is still high within groups but not between groups. Salaries and "dotations" for hunters hired as guards are decided by the CRD. The CRD takes a percentage but it is not very official, even if the hunters know it, there is no consensus. [G.110; G.113]. This is because the CRD is hiring (contracting) the hunters for SAG, not SAG itself. The CRD asked SAG for the recruitment of the hunters (the last time that hunters got recruited), and since the CRD president's death, it's the Vice-President who is in charge of the responsibility for the payment of the hunters; but hunters want to be hired by SAG directly nowadays. It's just that the hunters are not allowed to contact the Managing Director (MD) of SAG. The CRD asked, but the MD did not appreciate that the CRD asked for the employment under the pressure of the hunters. [G.113; G.114].

After stealing the pylons in 2011, people from Boukaria got arrested, leading to a region-wide protest of the entire population of the district of Bouré against SAG. [G.66]

Since 2011, youngsters got organized amongst themselves to mobilize, they meet in coffee places and talk about what to do. They also organized the traffic control, since there are so many motorcycles and so much traffic; they post youngsters at the crossroads with whips. If you drive in the one-way street or if you drive dangerously, you get whipped! [G.106]. "People with whips are organizing traffic, because its mayhem." [G.109, Focal point of PROJEG in Siguiri, 03.11.2012, Siguiri].

However, relations between local government and community have become much better since the elections in 2010 [G.60]. Good relationship concerns local government and customary/elders authorities in 2011. For meetings on the local level, representatives of the districts are invited to the "doyen" of the village to meet with the local community and talk about the issues at stake [G.66]. In the village of Boukaria, locals meet three/four times a year at the doyen's place to talk about their issues and problems; afterwards, they communicate their decisions and worries to the local authorities.

In 2011, however, the local population did not seem to be very content with local politics, since they often lodged a complaint with the president of the district. From there, the complaint goes to the

mayor, who in turn hands the complaint to the sub-prefect. The sub-prefect informs the prefect and SAG about the issue [G.60; G.65]. The prefect cannot do anything without the mayor [G.52]. It's the elected officials of the district who are in contact with SAG. The mayor doesn't pass all the community's issues to SAG. People also say that the relationship between SAG and the President of the CRD is better than the relationship between SAG and the district's officials.

Since 2011, though communities respect local elders and wise men more than state representatives, all local groups do not recognize their authority. For instance, youth groups do not always respect the position of the wise men, and women are mostly marginalized in the whole Siguiro prefecture. Wise men are socially considered as the authority figures over locally elected leaders, but young people are driven away from the traditions the elders represent and want to lead their own way and gain more political power every year.

In 2011, in Kintinian, it's a committee that is the intermediary between community and company, informing government and company about the community's worries. The committee is made up of representatives of the « bureau de district », of the « services techniques », and of the elders, the youth and the religious leader, the sub-prefect, a teacher, and a representative of the women [G.60]. In 2013, prefecture and village level government authorities asked the youth to keep calm during legislative elections (to secure votes for RPG). They also asked the SAG to stop CR activity to avoid enhancing potential tensions. There are some dissensions between the military and the police. When the military is in place they refuse to collaborate with police.

Security structures are harmonized and embedded in local communities neighboring the SAG. In the beginning of the CASM's work, "the SAG did not guarantee to pay for our material and expenses, but now the company is financing their vehicles, their accommodation and communication as well as a monthly bonus" [G.126]. The OL (CASM Liaison Officer) advises the SAG security department in case of crisis, on whether the military should be brought in or not. The army is not supposed to be acting locally since the new government came into power. The army never used harsh treatments against artisanal gold miners [G.65]

The relationship between the SAG and the villages are rather peaceful. In Boukaria, the local community assures the security for the company. The locals are willing to defend SAG in case of conflicts. Local hunters insure the security of the villages [G.64; G.65]. Kintinian's community organized the hunters to safeguard the company's assets against thieves. The former mayor of Kintinian initiated this. Hunters and security staff of SAG get along well [G.60]. SAG has a Security staff of 400 people, of which 13 are hunters. However, the hunters are never directly hired because they carry guns (even if it is for their self-protection and not to use it against people) and because they are illiterate [G.55].

"Our engagement is based on a social contract from 2006 between the CRD and the SAG's Human Resources department. The same 13 hunters have been working for for six years...2 from Setya, 1 from Kamatya, 5 from Kintinian, 1 from Balato, 4 from Boukaria" [G.110, Chief of the Hunter brotherhood of Kintinia, 04.11.2012, Siguiro prefecture (translated from Malinke)].

(3) Conclusion co-managemnt SAG

The successes of the SAG in implementing sustainable strategies are related to the capacity of local communities to get organized and collaborate in the management of conflict. This is the case, because the SAG has favorable internal company drivers (chapter 8).

d) SMD: CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY LOCAL ACTORS

(1) Vertical connectedness

The central level of state authorities was never present in the area before 2011. In 2010, Kamissoko Renacot N’Faly, spokesperson of the “griots” of Mandingue, the “griot” of Framwalya, [G.106] mediated the conflict between Lero and Siguirini so that people would recognize the authority of Siguirini as the Sub-prefecture. The conflict is now also settled with the SMD [G.106].⁴⁰ Since 2011, the Siguirini prefect sometimes intervenes in the resolution of conflicts in Lero. The prefect usually sends missions to the site after communities send their complaints via the sub-prefect. And the Governor of Faranah decided that the tax of 0,2 % belongs to the CRD, which encouraged the population to claim their rights. He sent a negotiation team in May 2013.

Before the start of large-scale mining operations, Lero was a hamlet of about 500 inhabitants in 1995. In 2006, the mining plant came from Indonesia and the first gold was exported in 2007 [Nugent et al., 2007]. In 2012, Lero counts about 20 000 inhabitants and the whole Baraka area about 40 000 [G.143]. Lero is an enclave in Guinea, roads connecting the zone to Siguirini or Dinguiraye are difficult to use, especially in the rainy season. Very few civil servant (teachers, nurses, doctors) accept to work in the area. Local authorities hold a double discourse: to the communities they say the SMD has to answer their demands, and to the SMD they say they will handle the community grievances.

Since 1992, some NGOs came to resolve conflicts, holding workshops every 3 or 4 months. NGOs such as “reseau des femmes du fleuve Mano” or the UNDP were active and come regularly. “Le Vrai” came to resolve issues of the dismissal of workers under Dadis, together with the Dilitomba, the Madinka association, and the OGDH [G.106]. The top-down presence of NGOs is rather low in the gold mining region where SMD is operating. Except for the association AREDEBA (Association des Ressortissants de Baraka pour le Développement), there are no organizations in the mining zone that would be mediators between the mining company and the communities. The Coordinator of AREDEBA got in contact with the OSC (Organisation de la société civile) of Dinguiraye to sensitize the local population about the conflicts in the area and the mismanagement of the taxation money by the local administration [PROJEG, 2009b].

(2) Cohesion

Before 2011, cohesion was average. The ASM and farmers, livestock keepers cultivate jealousies against SMD employees, who have a stable income allowing them to have more property and take loans. Employees are discriminated against in the villages and obliged to pay about 3 or 4 times the normal prices for common commodities on the market.

From 2011 to 2013, the massive in-migration since the beginning of large-scale mining might have diminished the authority and influence of elders. The customary authorities are denied some of their authority, because the elders can only have authority over indigenous people from their lineage. Sometimes, youth groups do not inform the authorities when they plan to protest against the company. Sometimes they inform the elders. There are some divisions amongst the communities themselves, between people from the same group in the sub-prefecture of Siguirini. The conflict resolution process goes through the griot: every one sits down to talk about the story of the

⁴⁰ All information about this conflict is from the spokesperson of the “griots” of Mandingue, the “griot” of Framwalya, [G.104].

ancestors. Some conflicts are resolved that way, others not [G.106; G.107]. But going to court is very expensive, so people prefer to try and resolve it the traditional way first [G.107]. In 2013, political leaders asked the communities to stay calm during the legislative election period, and this was accepted and followed.

(3) Conclusion SMD co-management

The relatively favorable cohesion co-management capacities of the communities neighboring the operations of the SMD cannot compensate for the lack of leadership for SES at operational levels of the company.

e) TABLE SUMMARY OF SAG AND SMD LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS

Table 28. SMD local governance drivers detail

SMD		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
History of violence	Historically confrontational	LOW	MED	MED
	Perceptions of one another	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
ASM	Importance of ASM	HIGH	MED/HIGH	HIGH
	Supported by local settings	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
History of conflict	Accountability strategy	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	MNC response	HIGH	LOW	LOW
Local RISKS		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
Vertical connectedness	Top-down involvement/ local gvt empowerment	MED	MED	MED
	Non-state involvement	MED	MED	MED
Community cohesion		MED	MED	MED
Security harmonization	Security structures	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Security embeddedness	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CO-MNGMT CAPACITY		MED	MED	MED
SES SUSTAINABILITY		MED/LOW	MED/LOW	LOW

Table 29. SAG local governance drivers detail

SAG		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-13
History of violence	Historical confrontation	HIGH	MED	MED
	Us versus them	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
ASM	Importance of ASM	MED	MED	MED
	Supported by local settings	LOW	LOW	LOW
MNC-Cmty conflict	Accountability strategy	LOW/MED	HIGH	HIGH
	MNC response	LOW	LOW	LOW
Local RISKS		LOW/MED	MED	MED
Vertical connectedness	Top-down involvement/ local gvt empowerment	HIGH/LOW	MED/LOW	MED/LOW
	Non-state involvement	LOW	LOW	LOW
Community cohesion		HIGH	MED/HIGH	MED/HIGH
Security harmonization	Security structures	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Security embeddedness	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CO-MNGMT CAPACITY		HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		LOW	MED/HIGH	HIGH

C. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS DO NOT EXPLAIN VARIATION IN OUTCOMES

Local governance drivers do not appear to be relevant explanations for the variation in implementation of sustainable SES (table 30). In six out of the fifteen cases, however, co-management capacities and SES sustainability seem correlated. Also, in 7 cases, risks of conflict seem correlated to SES sustainability. Thus, local governance drivers are not directly linked to the levels of success in implementing sustainability, but they could be indirectly relevant.

Table 30. Summary local governance drivers

		Before 2011	2011-12	2012-13
BUZ	Local RISKS	LOW	LOW	LOW
	CO-MNGT CAPACITY	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	LOW/MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH
SMD	Local RISKS	HIGH	HIGH/MED	HIGH
	CO-MNGMT CAPACITY	MED	MED	MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	MED/LOW	MED/LOW	LOW
NMGM	Local RISKS	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH/MED
	CO-MGMT CAPACITY	LOW	LOW/MED	HIGH/MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED
SAG	Local RISKS	LOW/MED	MED	MED
	CO-MNGMT CAPACITY	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	LOW	MED/HIGH	HIGH
GGM	Local RISKS - GGM	MED	MED	MED/HIGH
	CO-MNGMT CAPACITY	MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH/MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	MED	MED	MED/HIGH

Host country drivers were supposed to explain the variation of implementation of sustainable CSR by MNCs in areas of limited statehood. Chapter 6 shows otherwise. Local governance drivers empirically explored in the previous sections also do not explain the variations we described in chapter 4. SES outcomes, however, seem more correlated to local governance characteristics than to host country regulation and enforcement capacities. In fact, in the next two chapters we will show that they are essential in reinforcing or hindering the effect of internal company drivers on the outcomes of sustainable strategies. Comparing two sites operating in similar localities shows how a detailed analysis of community-company relationships matters, as well as a comprehension of linkages between different groups in neighboring communities.

Disconnected communities and distrust among local actors and institutions create an external environment that is not prone to the development of sustainable practices for company-community conflict. These communities tend to be individualistic in a way that is similar to economic-driven societies (table transition models). On the contrary, local vertical and horizontal connectedness are more sustainability-driven and generate a favorable context for sustainability.

Co-management usually entails government authorities reaching out to communities, mostly for the management of issues related to environment and natural resources [Armitage et al., 2008; Cundill et al., 2010; Olsson et al., 2004; Ruitenbeek et al., 2001]. We propose to take the concept a step further away from the state-centered approach to allow a variety of actors at the local level to be part of the analysis. We indeed include non-state actors (NGOs, generational or professional associations/groups, customary leaders), state representatives, and local government authorities, as well as representatives of MNCs operating locally. We also reconstitute the initial the scope of collaborative management for dispute resolution [Buckles, 1999; Lockwood et al., 2010]. We also answer the calls from researchers in the field to broaden conflict approaches in order to include such factors as multiple groups, the history of the groups, and changes over time [Worchel, S., 2005]. Moreover, our research connects studies on broad statehood dynamics to local governance dynamics by making the link between political science studies and other more thematic studies on natural resource management and conflict theories. We also introduce an operational tool to define and assess social cohesion and trust.

Local governance drivers are not directly relevant in explaining outcomes of sustainable strategies by companies. They mitigate the effects of internal drivers, which we operationalize and describe in the next chapter.

Chapter VIII — Company Internal Drivers

As an explanation for why some companies successfully implement strategies from the headquarters to the operational level and why others fail, compliance studies, organization theories, and business studies identify the output/internalization phase as critical. The present chapter clarifies at the operational level the influence of internal company drivers on companies' success in implementing sustainable strategies to manage community-company conflicts. We first operationalize the different dimensions of internal drivers that constitute corporate culture, corporate design, and the learning process [Dauber et al 2012; Schein 2004; Epstein & Buhovac 2010; Young & Tavares 2004; Battilana 2013]. Then, we evaluate the extent to which they explain the implementation of the case studies. The conclusions of this chapter suggest that internal drivers have an influence on implementation success in most cases.

Organization and business studies explain how structures, tools, and processes are essential links between adoption and implementation [Yamin et al., 2011; Young, Stephen et al., 2004]. What does this internalization/output phase consist of? Its key characteristics are the number of dedicated departments and functions, and the resources allocated to implement the strategy adopted by HQ, as well as the way in which the HQ visions and objectives are articulated. In transition studies, internal drivers define the sub-system's trajectory, they reflect the worldviews selected during the adoption phase. We can observe these characteristics in visible aspects of corporate culture and corporate design (table 4 adoption, outputs, and implementation).

Culture is understood as the observable articulation of values into discourses, perceptions, relationships, and actions. It is a dynamic concept that changes over time and from one hierarchical level to another, as well as between departments at the same level. Corporate design is the apparatus, or functional aspect, of the company that enables strategy implementation and values operationalization. Clearly, culture and design are interdependent. In this chapter, we examine the will and capacity of the company's subsidiaries to internalize the sustainable company-community conflict management strategies adopted at the headquarters level. How do companies enable change and how do they design paths for change? Do incremental changes lead to new pathways for change through learning processes? How does tension between old and new trajectories play out inside the company at operational levels?

Corporate design operationalizes and culture articulates the main values and principles coming from headquarters (HQ) and head management at operational levels (top-down) - through managing directors at the operational level, operational managers, and ground officers - and back to the head management (bottom-up). Learning processes link the top-down and bottom-up communication through both culture and structures. The model of Dauber et al. [2012] is a useful illustration of this feedback process even if it does not provide a description of what happens between the headquarters and the operational level. What their model illustrates well are the three dimensions of the learning process. These processes, familiar to organizational theory, grow from a mere change in behavior called performance assessment, which does not question why the problem occurred, to a change of structure named single loop learning, which shows an effort to avoid confronting the same problem again, and finally to a change of strategy or double loop learning, in which the way the problem was perceived and dealt with is questioned [Argyris, C. et al., 1999]. Our study adds another layer to the learning process. Following the same chain, these learning mechanisms can

either stay at the operational level or reach the corporate level (headquarters level). At the operational level, the learning process goes from observation and feedback from the neighboring communities on the ground, to the community relations manager, to the managing director. If headquarters changes the corporate design according to the feedback they receive from the operational level, there is in-depth single loop learning. When headquarters is inspired by what happens at operational levels in order to inform further strategy in other sites, the double loop learning process is deepest.

To introduce a socially sustainable strategy to manage community-company conflicts, once it has been adopted at the headquarters level (HQ), the managing directors (MD) of the mining sites are usually the next hierarchical level. Sometimes there are intermediaries directly in charge of sustainability issues between the HQ and operational levels; they are usually based in the country of operation but go back and forth. These sustainability senior managers make the link between HQ and the MD and are also commonly in charge of making the link with the community relations (CR) departments. In some cases, there is a department hierarchically above the CR section; in others, the CR department is directly beneath the MD. CR officers are in charge of the ground level, and the CR managers also generally participate in missions "in the field". Some companies also hire "liaison" officers or agents to be based in the villages neighboring the mining operations. Liaison officers usually report to the company in case of complaints or tensions. They are "the eyes" of the company and are in charge of supervising or monitoring community projects supported by the company when such projects exist.

The following table summarizes the dimensions of operationalization of internal drivers (table 31).

Table 31. Internal drivers operationalization

	CULTURE (discourses, relationships, perceptions, attitudes)	DESIGN (structures, tools, processes)
HQ-OP alignment	Relationships, discourses	Processes (structures and tools)
MD leadership and management style	Dedication to SES and CR (recognition)	Hierarchical power of CR (autonomy)
CR leadership	Dedication to SES and communities, self-worth	Experience/skills and capacity
CR integration in OP	Internal relationships and perception of CR	Tools to create link and shared goals (sensitization, housing)
Learning	Bottom-up relationship ease	Process/tools for bottom-up communication

First, we use Schein's definition of the three dimensions of culture in order to evaluate the alignment between headquarters and operational levels. Do espoused values at HQ correspond to those at OP? The alignment between HQ and OP, through values put forward in public documents and in the CEO's discourses (culture), can be observed by comparing HQ's discourses about OP and OP discourses about CSR. Considering the corporate design dimension, it consists of comparing plans formulated by HQ with achievements observed at OP and whether there are specific structures and tools that enable strategies to be rolled out at OP levels.

Second, at operational levels, structures depend on the managing director's management style and his leadership skills. He can choose whether or not to communicate a lot with other departments and to delegate some tasks to compensate for his own weaknesses, and try to keep continuity despite regular changes in management teams (structures). The way he decides to communicate with and the respect he is perceived to give to other departments, outside institutions, and individuals also define his management style and leadership (culture).

Third, the department manager's leadership is important in defining corporate culture and structure at OP levels. The autonomy he has in making decision and the related capacity in terms of skills, materials, financial and human resources to enact and adapt these decisions counts (structure) as much as his dedication to his tasks and his perceptions of his worth to the company (culture).

Fourth, the way a specific department is integrated with other departments depends on how other departments and managers perceive it and perceive its work (culture), but this integration at operational levels also depends on how much other departments know about it through established information and communication between departments (structure). Rees, Kemp, and Davis further show that enabling this shift to more inclusive stakeholder engagement relies on the capacity of the community department to build trust not only with the communities but also within the company with technical staff, and – especially in MNC with strict top-down structures - with the parent company [Rees et al. 2012:2].

Learning processes make the link between HQ and OP levels and can be observed mostly through changes at both levels. If changes happen ad hoc because of performance assessments and if there is no feedback from this assessment at the HQ levels, the learning processes are weak. When bottom-up feedback loops are established and reach the MD, and when HQ levels are informed (through monitoring or direct communication with managers or MD), then the learning processes can lead to changes in OP, or even in HQ structures (single loop). Learning processes are most favorable to a change of strategy when the MD is fully aware of what is going on the ground and changes his strategy accordingly and when information coming from OP levels informs strategic changes at HQ levels (double loop).

We find that internal company drivers are essential in explaining the success or failure of a company to implement sustainable strategies adopted at the headquarters level. However, not all the dimensions play the same role in arriving to sustainable outcomes. Leadership is the most important dimension, both of corporate culture and of corporate design. Without dedication of a leader to his "vision" for sustainability, or means to enact the strategy through autonomy and resources, or at least hierarchical power given to strategies to be operationalized, the company will not be successful in implementing a sustainable community-company conflict management strategy.

In the following sections, we first operationalize the various dimensions of corporate culture and design. We then evaluate how they play out in our 5 case studies over time. We finally conclude on the importance of these internal drivers for outcomes of sustainability strategies implemented by companies at the operational level.

A. CORPORATE CULTURE OPERATIONALIZATION

Corporate culture is considered either homogenous or heterogeneous [Linnenlueck & Grifith 2010]. In either case cultural rigidity, or a proliferation of subcultures, challenges the implementation of top-down strategies [Beer et al. 1990; Molinsky 1999; Schön 1970]. Alignment and leadership are presented as solutions to this challenge. In a homogenous culture, they have the potential to create change in one block. In a heterogeneous culture, they can facilitate the transmission of similar objectives to each subculture.

1. HQ-OP alignment (enhanced values)

To turn adoption of sustainability into implementation, strong mission statements are considered critical in the implementation of sustainability [Epstein & Buhovac 2010: 313]. Following Epstein & Buhovac, objectives stated at the corporate level then have to be reinforced by leadership. To understand the alignment of corporate culture regarding stakeholder engagement strategies between HQ and the operational level, we return to HQ commitments. How committed is the CEO? Do community issues belong to the key values statements at corporate levels? Then, we want to analyze whether discourses at OP are in line with those at HQ. Are HQ discourses reproduced at operational levels? When a mine's managing director and/or community relation manager or other managers use the same vocabulary or frame of principles as the headquarters, it is a sign of alignment. The following table summarizes the criteria for evaluation of alignment of SES discourse (table 32).

2. MD Leadership: dedication and recognition of CR

The strength of leadership of the mine's managing director for SES indicates how the operational level enhances the values adopted at the headquarters level (table 32). Leadership for sustainability is visible in the dedication of head managers in charge of the strategy. Whether they set an example or articulate the trade-offs of the strategy to managers, or both, will influence the implementation outcomes [Epstein & Buhovac 2010]. The way the MD behaves on community issues, i.e., whether he sets a good example, is an indication of how favorable the operational level corporate culture is to the stakeholder engagement strategy [Battilana et al., 2013; Epstein et al., 2010; Valente, 2010]. For instance, his attitude towards community members, whether he is in contact with neighboring communities at all, and whether he shows respect or even familiarity towards them, are visible signs of the MD's dedication to community issues. The MD's relationship with managers and officers in charge of sustainability is also critical. His recognition of the work done by the company's community relations (CR) department, his lack of communication with the CR department manager, or on the contrary his participation in CR meetings or his recognition of the department as a key element of mining operations, are decisive features of corporate culture related to SES. The extent to which the MD's leadership approach is in favor of sustainability in SES implementation can be analyzed according to characteristics detailed in the following table.

3. CR leadership: dedication and self-perception

Another key element in assessing to what extent corporate culture is favorable to the SES is the CR department's leadership characteristics. Community relations often represent the only department in charge of CSR and the implementation of social sustainability at OP levels. Indeed, community relations departments are the first interlocutors of communities and are by definition in charge of implementing the SES on the ground. Leadership of the community relations department can be evaluated using the same measures as those used for evaluation of the leadership of the MD. Thus the attitude of the CR manager and of other managers in charge of direct communication with neighboring communities is critical in the overall dedication to the strategy. The level of CR leadership towards SES can be examined through its dedication to communities and to the strategy, and through the self-perception of those in charge of the strategy (table 32). For instance, if a manager is distant and does not show respect towards stakeholders, the SES implementation might suffer as corporate culture becomes less favorable to communities, and vice versa, if the manager

demonstrates trustworthiness, SES has a higher chance of being implemented. It is also interesting to assess to what extent managers and officers of the CR department perceive themselves as valuable elements for the company's profitability. If those in charge of the strategy feel disempowered and unnecessary, why would they strive to implement the strategy? If they believe they are indispensable for the company to function, they will be more motivated to successfully implement the strategy.

4. CR integration in OP (articulation of values)

Alignment is not only necessary in discourses between HQ and subsidiaries; it is also necessary within the subsidiaries to overcome the challenges of changing a corporate culture. This type of alignment can be observed in how much other departments care about community issues, and in the relationships between the department in charge of the stakeholder engagement strategy and others. This integration of community relations at the operational level is a visible sign of the articulation of the values related to community issues within the company.

Shifts in approach only occur if "both senior management staff and technical staff were prepared to act on advice coming from community relations" [Rees et al. 2012:14]. The integration of the community relations department with other departments at the operational level can also be determinant in the success of implementation of the stakeholder engagement strategy. The CR at operational level can be assigned the role to educate other business units about why the company should engage in sustainability efforts and can play the role of training the other departments on sustainability issues through sharing information and through collaboration [Epstein&Buhovac 2010:313]. Indeed, it comes down to how a group of individuals, framed by its own culture, will manage its relations towards the differences of other groups of individuals within an organization. The risk of conflict increases with the ongoing misalignment of objectives and actions (between technical and community departments), i.e., peaceful relationships are more likely to take place when there is a shared responsibility of outcomes within the company [Rees et al. 2012:2].

This integration role can be observed at corporate culture levels in the way other departments perceive the CR, whether they understand the role of the CR department in overall operations, or on the contrary if CR officers and/or managers are segregated (table 32). It can also be appreciated through the way these other departments relate to the local contexts and to neighboring communities, whether they adopt racist or stereotyping discourses or if they are ignorant of local contexts, or if they have some understanding and knowledge about neighboring communities and the country in which they work.

Table 32. Corporate culture indicators

HQ-OP alignment of SES discourse		
	HQ leadership	HQ-OP discourse continuity
HIGH	CEO dedication to SES, Community part of key values in HQ	HQ vocabulary used by MD/PR and by CR and other managers
LOW	CEO not committed, communities not key value for HQ	No continuity in discourse
MD (cultural) Leadership in SES		
	MD's dedication to communities	MD's recognition of CR department
HIGH	Proximity, familiarity, appreciation by communities	Recognition of importance of CR like any other department
MED	Respect, visit to communities, known by communities	Some understanding of CR, MD participates in CR meetings, communication
LOW	No or little contact with communities	Little support, little communication with CR

CR Leadership in SES		
	CR dedication to SES and communities	Self perception of CR officers
HIGH	Friendly, part-off, trustworthy	Indispensable
MED	Respectful	Valuable
LOW	Disrespectful, distant	Disempowered
CR integration in OP		
	Relationship with other departments	Perception of communities by other departments
HIGH	Understanding, integrated	Understanding local contexts
MED	Lack of understanding of CR role in OP	False discourses, ignorance
LOW	Racism, segregation	Racism, stereotyping, us versus them discourses

B. CORPORATE DESIGN OPERATIONALIZATION

Structures, tools, and processes are the apparatus, or functional aspects of the company, that enable strategy implementation and values operationalization. Literature on HQ-subsidary relations explains the importance of centralization and autonomy, networks and embeddedness, and management styles to explain the success or failure of implementation of strategies from the top down [Young & Tavares 2004; Dorrenbacher 2009]. In this section, we examine the corporate design choices to internalize the strategies adopted in HQ, i.e., enabling structures, tools, and processes [Dauber et al., 2012]. To enact the new strategy, did the headquarters design new structures to implement it at the subsidiary level? Is the MD at the operational level autonomous, or is the company centralized in a way that he needs the approval of HQ to make decisions? How hierarchically close are the MD and the manager in charge of implementing the sustainable SES strategy? Is the CR department autonomous, or is it under his control? Is the strategy embedded with tools enabling other departments to understand it? Does the subsidiary integrate local factors into its initiatives to adapt decisions to local contexts?

1. HQ-OP alignment on SES (enabling structures)

To evaluate how favorable corporate structures are to SES at the operational level, one has to take a closer look at four main features. The headquarters designs corporate structures. Consequently, the first parameter to analyze is whether headquarters actualizes their adoption of social sustainability discourse by a change in corporate structure at local levels. Also, are the plans that are announced at the headquarters level regarding community issues followed through at the operational level? The degree of achievement and tools put in place by headquarters at operational levels to operationalize discourses into structures are two key criteria for evaluation of the extent to which the alignment of HQ and OP is in favor of implementation of social sustainability in community related questions (Table 33).

2. MD Management leadership style for SES

The MD's management style is also relevant for assessment of how well structures enable the implementation of SES, especially through evaluation of the hierarchical power granted to the CR issues and through the level of internal clarity and continuity in community relations (Table 33).

Corporate structure features defining the hierarchical power of the CR consist of the official links between the department and the head management at OP, which are made clear, for instance, through existing communication channels between field officers and the MD. The number of levels of management dedicated to sustainability indicates the extent to which structures are favorable to

implementation of sustainability [Epstein & Buhovac 2010]. The more managers are responsible for the implementation, the more hierarchical power the CR has for successful implementation on the ground. When the MD directly supervises the CR department or has direct interactions with advisors about community issues, the leadership has a better chance of being strongly in favor of SES. These links show how much knowledge the MD can get concerning the CR department's resources and the neighboring community context itself in order to make CSR related decisions. Internal clarity depends on the capacity of structures to maintain continuity in policy and management practices despite internal changes, and on the clarity of goals and responsibility of those in charge of community relations. The mining sector has a lot of staff turnover at operational levels, especially from expatriates, who often constitute the majority of the management. Internal clarity evaluates to what extent strategies depend on the changes of personnel.

3. CR Leadership design: autonomy and capacity

CR leadership is another feature of corporate design that helps in the assessment of how likely it is for a strategy to be successfully implemented. Leadership goes through the department's autonomy in making decisions according to the experience, skills, and resources available to the department (Table 33). To evaluate the capacity and autonomy of the CR department, the "process management" category described by Beisheim & Liese to analyze PPPs' effectiveness is useful [Beisheim & Liese 2013: 28]. Beisheim & Liese refer to Chayes and Chayes's managerial approach of compliance [Chayes & Chayes, 1993: 188], which emphasizes the importance of scientific, technical, bureaucratic, and financial capacity in successfully complying with an adopted rule. The "process management" dimension illustrates how "effectiveness depends on the efficient and professional management [Ingraham et al., 2004]" [Beisheim & Liese 2013 #1102 @28]. Here, we use a similar approach to evaluate the capacity of the CR department, which is in charge of implementing SES to manage company-community conflict.

The department's autonomy in decision-making on CSR and conflict management issues can be evaluated through the level of information they are willing to disclose to external stakeholders, and how spontaneously they can make decisions according to their evaluation of the situations and the feedback they receive from stakeholders. Adaptation of decisions to local contexts is also a good sign of the CR managerial leadership for SES. Capacity of the CR could also be decisive in the success of implementation of the strategy. The department should be more successful in implementing the strategy it is in charge of if community relation officers are experienced, skilled, and well equipped.

4. CR structural integration in OP

The integration of the CR department at the operational level is considered critical in the implementation of a sustainable community relation strategy [Rees et al. 2012]. Certain tools can enable the CR's integration with other departments at the operational level. Informing other departments about the role of the CR for the proper functioning of the mine and cultural awareness about neighboring communities, as well as involvement of technical departments in CSR projects (Table 33) are signs of the integration of the CR department as an ambassador of social sustainability implementation.

Table 33. Corporate design indicators

HQ-OP alignment of SES structures		
	HQ leadership	HQ-OP continuity
HIGH	HQ change of structure toward SES	Achievements in line with plans, adaptation tools (use of specific NGOs or Academia)
LOW	No structural change to enable strategic change	Plans versus Achievements
MD management style for SES		
	Hierarchical power of CR	Internal clarity/continuity
HIGH	MD close to CR, delegates some CR tasks to NGOs	Clear goals and responsibilities, continuity
MED	MD has advisor on community issues or sustainable manager	Some continuity despite changes in management
LOW	Not much link between CR and MD	Frequent change of plans, a lot of management change
CR managerial leadership in SES		
	Decision-making autonomy	Capacity (material, financial and human)/Process management
HIGH	Transparent information disclosure, authorization to take spontaneous decision, adapted decisions	Team of professional, knowledge of local context/country, experience or education relevant, well equipped
MED	Uneasy info disclosure, conditional authorization to make decisions, not adapted	A few officers (4-5), with knowledge of Africa, some experience or education, medium equipped
LOW	No info disclosure, no authorization to make decisions, not adapted	1 or 2 officers, little knowledge or experience, irrelevant skills, almost no resources
CR structural integration in OP		
	Tools	
HIGH	Internal awareness campaigns on CSR achievements, intercultural awareness, inter-department meetings	
MED	Internal awareness campaign on CSR achievements, involvement of other dpt in CSR, involvement of relevant dpts	
LOW	None	

C. LEARNING MECHANISM OPERATIONALIZATION

Learning mechanisms are often identified as drivers of “effective change”, because learning to learn requires not only the ability to remain open to changes, but also the ability to challenge operating assumptions in a most fundamental way {Morgan 1986}. Beisheim & Liese [2014] analyze organizational learning in PPPs using criteria of established feedback loops, level of responsiveness to OP levels, and monitoring mechanisms [Beisheim & Liese 2014: 30]. Considering that learning happens not only through these processes rooted in the corporate design but also through relationships and knowledge (corporate culture dimension), we add these criteria to evaluate the depth of learning processes (table 34).

Observing a learning process in a short time period of three years is tricky. During our fieldwork, however, we found that certain signs indicate how thoroughly the company is willing to question its practices. Other indicators show the tools the company puts in place to do so. Some indicators show the learning process from the ground to the head management of the subsidiary, while others point to the even deeper learning processes occurring at HQ level as a result of feedback from the field.

At the operational level, if there are no feedback channels from the communities to the CR, that is, if the CR officers are not even in the field, there is no possibility of learning from the bottom up. Therefore, the presence of liaison officers based in the villages is a sign that the company is at least willing to learn from what happens there. Also, Although there are ad hoc changes in outputs after receiving negative feedback, for example after multiple confrontations by communities, it shows that the performance assessment results in some learning, even Although it is shallow. Then, Although the feedback from the ground goes from the CR to the MD, either through tools such as a

grievance mechanism, or through informal communication, the learning process becomes somewhat more profound. Although the company accepts to review its strategy at the OP level as a consequence of feedback from the field or of the knowledge of the MD on community related issues, it is a sign of in-depth learning at OP levels.

HQ levels do learn from the field Although there are no channels to receive bottom-up feedback, that is, Although the company does not follow up on implementation of strategies at the operational level. Although there are signs that the subsidiary is communicating about field events to HQ or of the HQ’s monitoring of implementation, or Although for instance the CR manager is in touch with senior managers at HQ levels, the HQ learning process is slightly deeper. Learning processes are deepest when ground level information or the knowledge and concern of the CEO for community issues result in a change of corporate level strategies.

Table 34. Company internal learning indicators

Learning processes		
	Ground to OP	OP to HQ
HIGH	OP Strategy change, MD knowledge informs new strategy	HQ Strategy change, HQ knowledge informs new strategy
MED	Bottom-up communication, feedback from CR to MD, grievance mechanism	Bottom-up communication/relationships OP-HQ, from CR to HQ, HQ monitoring
LOW	Feedback from ground to CR (liaison officers), ad hoc output changes (performance assessment)	No bottom-up feedback, no monitoring from HQ

D. INTERNAL COMPANY DRIVERS: CASE STUDIES

Conducting interviews with company staff and managers requires some daring and strategic skills. Time constraints of the managers and employees and disclosure restrictions are not easily lifted. In all cases except for our two ABG sites, we succeeded in having at least one interview with each of the managers in contact with communities (community relations, environment, and security managers). Even when the company refused to give us access to its employees, we found ways to meet with actors that could inform us about internal dynamics. For example, to understand ABG’s practices in Tanzania, we interviewed former employees, union workers, NGOs partnering with the company, and any other institutions and actors in close contact with the company. We also used other research or reports about the company’s practices to verify this information whenever possible. In the end, we were not able to gather information about every indicator for each year, but we were able to draw an accurate picture of each site’s internal drivers. As a result, some internal drivers are more detailed than others.

1. Internal drivers in NordGold, SMD, Guinea

When the company was bought by the Russian firm, “[...] language barriers, zero flexibility, and bad management [...] it was another world” [G.143]. The Société Minière de Dinguiraye (SMD) is located in a very remote/landlocked/difficult to access area of Northern Guinea. It never changed its name but often changed owners. Most recently, the young Russian-based gold mining company NordGold acquired 100% of the mine. There are 20 different nationalities among the company’s employees (a majority of Guineans who occupy the lower ranks positions and expatriates occupying supervising and managing positions, mainly Russians, Australians, French, and English). SES implementation remained relatively low over the period of the research. Russia does not have a strong culture on sustainability, but NordGold adopted a rather strong discourse of social sustainability. Guinea’s regulation and enforcement capacity does not present much incentive for companies to comply with

international and self-regulation on social sustainability. Local governance settings around the company are rather unfavorable, with co-management capacities being moderately favorable and risks of conflict staying comparatively high from 2011 to 2013. We will now detail the operational level internal drivers of the SMD.

a) CORPORATE CULTURE: SMD

I am sitting in the shade in the circle house where managers take their after-lunch coffee and cigarette before going back to the afternoon shifts. A manager looks at me, a new face, "I am told you are doing very interesting work here". I agree and start guiding him towards giving his perception of community issues. "No, no, no, I have worked with a lot of different people, but Guineans are the most difficult [...]. Although they have to write something down, you even have to tell them to take a pen. Otherwise they don't do it, they don't think. It is exhausting to work with them" [G.148, lunch with Managers at the SMD messa 30.09.2013].

In June 2006, Crew Gold (head quarters in UK) purchased 100% of Guineor's shares as well as the 15% shares of the Government. Severstal (Russian) acquired 100% of Crew Gold Corporation in January 2011⁴¹. NordGold acquired control over SMD in 2010. NordGold's CEO has a very sustainable discourse on community engagement. NordGold's main values entail community concerns. From 2010 to 2011, MD and other managers did not endorse a very engaged discourse regarding communities or SES. Managers in contact with communities were concerned about immediate threats and considered communities as obstacles to achievement of the technical targets of the company, not as stakeholders that had a say in operations [NordGold 2012; G.118]. The indifference of most managers to the matter of socially sustainable stakeholder engagement illustrates the gap between the discourse at the headquarters level and at the operational level.

In 2011-2012, the CR and other managers in contact with communities became more aware of community issues, but still did not engage with them [G.118]. In 2013, the new MD introduced a new discourse about community issues that was more in line with the headquarters' public values. His vocabulary entailed a long-term perspective about how these communities will manage when the company closes and how to integrate them in a sustainable, mutually beneficial way. The MD is dedicated to finding socially sustainable ways out of the ongoing conflicting relationship with communities.

From 2010 to 2012, the MD of the SMD had no contact with communities, never visited neighboring villages, and never introduced himself to local leaders. In sum, he manifested no dedication to SES and communities.

The new MD in place since April 2013 is more interested in community issues and is dedicated to improving relationships with communities. He has, however, not personally greeted the elders or state authorities at the local level, since he delegates this representation task to other head managers. In 2013, dedication of the MD was thus medium. Since 2010 and until 2012, the various MDs of the SMD showed little interest in the CR department's work, and there was no direct or personal relationship between the MD and the CR managers. CR managers and officers are Francophone while MDs and head management are mostly Anglophone or Russophone. This language barrier could explain the lack of communication between MDs and the CR department.

⁴¹ CPR Report on the Assets of Nord Gold for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, January 2011. Nord Gold is Sverstal's group for gold mining.

In 2011-2012, there were some direct interactions between the MD and the CR manager, but the MD did not show much interest in the CR's work except for cost related and technical issues involving other departments. In 2012-2013, the MD had direct relationships with other department managers who have an interest in CR matters and social sustainability issues. He listened and acknowledged their advice [SMD 2013].

Community relations in the SMD are the main task of the CR section, which is part of the Administration department; they are also part of the mission of the Security department, mostly in case of trespassers, theft, protests or blockages. Another group of important actors dealing with community relations in Guinea is the military liaison officers (OL), who are also responsible for establishing the link between the company and the communities, especially in the case of tensions. The dedication of each of these agents can potentially influence the perceived dedication to implementation of the SES.

In 2012, CR officers had a relatively good perception of their work. They felt valuable, since community projects were fruitful and communities recognized CR and liaison officers to be trustworthy. In 2012, the administration manager, who is the head manager of the community relation section, "wanted to solve the problems of Africa" [SMD 2013] through the company. He wanted to convince Guinean employees and neighboring communities to understand the rules and strategies of the company and consider them over their customs. At the time, the CR manager also had grand ideas for his department. He demonstrated his desire to turn the company into a collective development actor, similar to an international donor organization such as the UNDP for example. Hence, 2011-2012 was a period of strong dedication to community development during which the CR manager felt indispensable. In 2013, CR officers still valued their role as mediators between the company and the communities even though they were deprived in capacity (reduction of staff numbers and budget) and gained no recognition from their higher hierarchy.

Over the whole period, the security department showed no dedication to SES, while the OL showed a lot and the CR's attitude varied over the years. From 2010 to 2013, the security manager recognized that prevention of conflict is also about sitting with the elders and shaking hands in town. "It is important to respect the authorities, even if they are barefoot". The security department understood that it is important to be clear about what the SMD can or cannot do and avoid making them lose face in front of the communities. This attitude is ambivalent, because it shows a certain respect for local people, however, the department does not show dedication to engaging with local stakeholders in a constructive dynamic. Members of the department also perpetuate negative stereotypes about neighboring communities. Every OL assigned to the SMD showed respect both to the company and to the communities. They are dedicated to their responsibility, which consists of being the link between communities and company in preventing conflicts.

Before 2011, the CR manager of the SMD was not appreciated at all by local communities. This distrust forced him to resign. In 2011-2012, the new CR manager was very dedicated to the development of local communities and even changed the name of his department to community development instead of community relations. His discourse was mainly about how he was making the transition from philanthropic activities to long-term collective development. The administration manager during this period had respect for local communities. The CR department in 2011-2012 had medium dedication to communities compared to other cases. In 2012-2013, the administration manager had little interest in local communities and did not particularly value the work of the CR

department, which brought the level of dedication down, especially added to the absence of a CR manager.

Security department members consider that the CR department is useless: “awareness is nothing, it is wind”, as one of them put it concerning the awareness campaigns of the CR to reduce the number of trespassers. This came from the fact that the army and the security department take care of all the conflicts, and communities are not able to build long-term projects with the taxes paid by the mine or with the projects funded by the SMD. At lower levels of hierarchy, CR officers are aware of how they are perceived by some of their co-workers and some of the managers of other departments, but they emphasize that these perceptions depend more on the individual than on the departments. At a lower level of hierarchy, CR officers and other officers understand each other, and community relation officers are perceived as the facilitators for the rest of the mining operations to take place.

A few outsiders at the manager level have a much more comprehensive discourse about communities and a more sustainable idea of the approach the CR department could have in order to be efficient in managing conflict. For instance, one of them emphasized the importance of respecting local customs in order to make Guinean employees comfortable in doing their jobs: “if a sacrifice is not done properly before a blasting⁴², some employees will feel stressed for not having honored their ancestors before destroying the land and it will affect their work”. Some managers recognize the importance of dialog and of respecting the role of local authorities in creating awareness about the SMD as an opportunity to fund long-term projects. As another manager expressed: “without two way communication, every issue becomes a conflict leading to blockages and loss of profit for the company”.

On the whole, some of the other departments recognize and value the role of the CR department in the company, while other departments fail to understand the CR’s responsibilities.

Strong “us versus them” positions stated by expatriate employees and managers lead to the spread of false discourses among the SMD employees, such as: “we have a past, a present, and a future, while they think the world turns around them”. Some managers have racist discourses, considering that Guinean people are incompetent, both employees and members of neighboring communities. A dominant discourse spread through the company about Guineans being stupid, “lacking analytic capacities”, or that “they don’t have a long-term view”, or refuse to understand the way the company functions and want to “kill the golden goose” [G.143; G.151; G.153]. The idea that communities “use all kinds of pretexts to extort more money from the company” is widespread, and that expatriate employees easily say “for them, everything outside of work is more important than working”.

Even though the head of security operations in 2011-2012 had some respect for local knowledge and esteem for the capacity of the hunters to “listen to the bush”, overall, most employees have little respect for neighboring communities. Other members of the security department consider that communities are jealous of people employed in the SMD with a stable income. There is a general idea that communities have abandoned agriculture to become illegal miners, which is a false idea based on ignorance, since the area has known migrations of artisanal miners for ages. Agriculture

⁴² Detonating explosives to loosen rock and ore for excavation. [<http://www.miningonlineexpo.com/glossary.php/b.html>] When the mining operations expand, the company needs to create more open pits, this is done through blasting hectares of land.

was the main activity, especially during the rainy season, while artisanal mining was the secondary one in the dry season {Panella 2010} and progressively became more important with the gold prices rising in the past few decades.

Altogether, there is a majority of false discourse on communities based on ignorance, and even stereotyping on the verge of racism, and a minority of more comprehensive and knowledgeable views.

Corporate culture and SES sustainability levels were both low to medium in 2011-2012 and were low in 2013. They differed slightly before 2011, with a low corporate culture and medium to low SES sustainability. With levels of corporate culture and levels of SES sustainability implemented being similar in two out of the three years of the research, the SMD case shows a possible correlation between corporate culture and implementation of SES.

Corporate culture is too unfavorable to for the company to succeed in the implementation of sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies. This is why the SMD is one of the worst cases in our study.

b) CORPORATE DESIGN: SMD

Night has covered the open pits for a few hours, expatriate managers are done with their long day's work that started at 6 that morning, and they are sitting by the pool of the common housing area, having their first, second, maybe third beers. The MD is there, having casual conversations with managers. Opposite him, the training manager nabs the administration manager about the way she could deal with her communication section. She feels the sting of the remark, especially with the MD sitting next to her. "Why don't you deal with it?" she slings, to challenge the training manager, who seizes the opportunity and calmly answers "why not, would you leave it to me?"; "ok" she says with a grind. "Can I take communication under my supervision?" the training guy genuinely asks the MD. "Sure if it's alright with her (i.e., administration manager)". That is how the training department became the training and communication department. Not long after that, noticing the lack of engagement of the administration manager in community matters, he also took the community department from her supervision...

Before 2011 and until 2012, structures did not change much at the operational level. There were no significant initiatives from the HQ to make structural changes in order to put in place more socially sustainable strategies for conflict management. In 2012, HQ launched a review of their business systems at the operational level to reach more efficiency. The purpose was to question processes in place in order to understand where money could be saved and reinvested somewhere else (business management department). This concerned all departments including the CR, but was not directly concerned with social sustainability. In 2012-2013, there was medium HQ leadership at operational levels. There were no particular achievements to analyze, because there were no particular plans coming from the HQ related to SES.

Before 2012, the CR department was directly under the MD's supervision, which gave the department hierarchical power.

In 2012, the CR manager reported directly to the MD, but the CR section was part of the administration department and was divided into two subsections. This direct reporting despite the distance in hierarchy shows that the MD used the advice of the CR manager directly instead of going through the administration manager. In 2012-2013, the CR section was still part of the

administration department. After the CR manager's resignation in the beginning of 2013, he was not replaced, which shows a manifest lack of link between the CR and the MD (LOW). At the time, the MD had direct conversation with the administration manager, who represented the CR during the daily board meetings at which each manager reports to the MD. At the end of 2013, the CR section was removed from the responsibility of the administration manager to become part of the training and communication department. This is a sign of the MD accepting that there was a feedback problem between the CR and himself that needed to be addressed. It is also a sign of the power of a night out with the MD, informal communication, self-confidence, and personal characters... Here is how the story goes:

Since 2006, the SMD has had 14 different MDs including the acting MDs during transition periods. In total, 6 MDs in full position and 4 MDs since 2011. There have been 3 different administration managers since 2011. These frequent changes do not facilitate continuity in strategy. CR officers acknowledge that they make a lot of promises to communities that they cannot fulfill because of the lack of continuity in management. Sometimes they get approval from higher hierarchy, but by the time the project is launched, a new team, who does not endorse the project, can be in place. In 2013, at the OP level, the business management department was implementing a change of structure and processes for more effectiveness, but neither the MD nor department managers understood why it was being done or how it should be implemented. Overall their internal clarity was not favorable.

Until 2013, the headquarters at SMD limited the MD's autonomy, since he had to report before being authorized to make important decisions. In 2013, the MD had to report frequently to the HQ but was gaining autonomy in decision-making because of his experience in Africa and the particularities of this mine compared to the other mines of NordGold in Russia.

From 2009 to the end of 2011, the CR officers had to report their activities after they were completed. The whole department was well organized, with weekly planning and internal management dividing tasks according to the various skills of each liaison officer stationed in neighboring villages. Each community development officer could share his expertise and advise the others. They had comparatively medium decision-making autonomy and could make decisions adapted to the context according to their experience and encounters with neighboring communities. In 2011-2012, the decisions of the CR department were not adapted to communities. The change of priorities of the department from community relations to community development launched by the CR manager was an abrupt transition that did not meet the expectations of the communities. In 2012, CR officers had to wait for approval from the financial department before launching any actions. Their autonomy was squeezed.

Since 2013, MD has authorized departments to make their own decisions and has required them to ask him for supervision only in complicated situations.

Before 2011, there were seven community relations liaison officers in each neighboring village to monitor projects funded by the SMD. The logistics officer and a superintendant in CR supervised them, while the director of the department reported directly to the MD. CR liaison agents until 2012 were Guineans recruited for their skills either in agro-economy, community development, or other relevant masters degrees. They had to start by a thorough analysis of the village they were responsible for, using participative processes including all members of the village in order to guide

the planning of activities that were going to take place. The CR department had high human and financial capacity to enable sustainable projects to take place. After 2011, the budget for CR was cut and only two liaison officers were left (the others were recruited internally for other positions) and two supervising officers. In cases of very urgent matters only, the administration manager communicates with the sub-prefecture, accompanied by either a CR officer or someone from the legal department depending on the issue. Thus, in 2011-2012 the CR department suffered from a low budget and shortage of personnel. In 2011- 2012, the CR manager was a Guinean from the forest sub-region, he did not understand or speak Malinke (local vernacular language) but had a community development masters degree from a French university. Neither the MD nor the communities understood the strategy he was trying to implement. His ambition was not adapted to his role as intermediary between the company and the communities. The department thus suffered from a misunderstanding both from the higher hierarchy and from the communities. In 2012, the CR manager coordinated a socio-economic study of the neighboring communities. It aimed at gaining more data in order to adapt CSR projects to local specificities. However, it did not prove useful since the content of the study was disappointing, the approach was not operational, and it did not analyze ASM activities. In 2011-2012, the CR department had skills and some capacity to implement social sustainability. Since April 2013, the SMD chose an MD with experience in other Sub-Saharan African mines, who has knowledge and understanding of the local context. In 2013, the administration manager in charge of the CR section did not have a community relations profile and would not sit down with local communities. The CR section did not have much capacity to enable sustainable projects (little financial means and little follow up of projects). In 2012-2013, the CR process management was low. At the end of 2013, the training and communication manager newly in charge of CR had long experience of working in mining in Africa and a good comprehension of local contexts. In 2013, SMD was reviewing the skills and organizing internal training for all employees in order to reorganize the workforce according to actual competences.

Before 2011, the CR department was not integrated with the other departments, there were no tools in place to make the link and advertise their mutual goals. The training and communication manager started an awareness campaign in 2013 among all departments on the necessity of assessing the skills and of training Guinean employees. This campaign served a parallel goal of improving the cultural awareness from other managers to improve their perception of the Guinean employees and increase intercultural understanding.

Levels of corporate design and levels of SES sustainability implemented at SMD are close but do not match. In the two first years, corporate design was low, but SES sustainability was medium to low, and in the last year it was the other way around. The correlation between corporate design and success of implementation of the sustainable strategy is not clear in the case of the SMD.

Corporate design is too unfavorable for the company to succeed in implementing a sustainable strategy. This is why the SMD is one of the worst cases in our study.

c) **LEARNING: SMD**

In housing areas and during leisure time, employees usually stay grouped together by nationality and rank. Difficulties linked to intercultural comprehension and language also affect internal communication and, as a matter of fact, bottom-up learning processes, too.

CR officers transmit their analysis of community needs and their expertise on how to address them in a sustainable manner. They make their suggestions and recommendations to the administration manager through formal bottom-up channels such as monthly reports from the CR to the administration manager and, since 2011, daily morning meetings, as well as an annual report to the MD, who then reports to the HQ. Apparently, despite these existing internal channels, the CR's inputs do not reach the MD [SMD 2013].

In 2013, the MD was very open to informal discussions about management of the company during leisure time, and he welcomed criticism coming from managers. A lot of decision-making is done outside of working hours, including changes in department structures and management.

In 2013, there were contradictory signs of the learning process from the operational levels to the HQ level. The HQ wanted the MD to take part in all discussions with communities, which seems to demonstrate the HQ's interest in community issues. It was, however, not an option, because discussions with communities require a lot of time [SMD 2013]. On the other hand, when HQ representatives visit the SMD, they never visit the CR or security departments, who are directly in charge of community issues. It was made clear during the research that the HQ level does not adapt their understanding to the realities of mining at the operational level. Head management often complains about the HQ's demands for standardization, because they do not recognize the huge difference between operating a mine in Siberia and one in Guinea [SMD 2013].

Learning processes from the bottom up are weak: communication and advice from the ground do not reach the decision-makers at operational levels, and the headquarters level is not ready to learn from the specificities of their Guinean mine.

d) INTERNAL DRIVERS SUMMARY FOR SMD

In 2011-2012, the corporate culture at operational levels concerning SES within SMD was medium to low, because the improvement of CR's dedication to SES and self-perception did not fill the gap of the MD's disregard for SES, the communities, and the CR department. The SMD's institutional design was not favorable to SES, there was no alignment between HQ and operational levels, the CR had little hierarchical power and little autonomy, and the department's capacity was lower than before 2011.

Table 35. SMD internal drivers

SMD		Before 2011	2011-2012	2013
HQ-OP discourse	HQ leadership	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Discourse continuity	LOW	MED	HIGH
MD (cultural) leadership	MD dedication to SES	LOW	LOW	MED
	MD's recognition of CR	LOW	LOW	MED
CR (cultural) leadership	CR self-perception	MED	HIGH	MED
	CR dedication	LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW
CR integration	Internal relationships CR-other		MED	MED
	Other dpt perceptions on communities		LOW	LOW
CORPORATE CULTURE		LOW	LOW/MED	LOW
HQ-OP alignment	HQ leadership	LOW	LOW	HIGH/MED
	HQ-OP continuity	LOW	LOW	LOW
MD management	Hierarchical power of CR	HIGH	LOW/MED	LOW
	Internal clarity/continuity	LOW		
CR mngt leadership	Autonomy in decision	MED	LOW/MED	MED/HIGH
	Process management/Capacity	HIGH	MED	LOW
CR integration	Tools	LOW	LOW	MED
Corporate DESIGN		LOW	LOW	LOW/MED
Learning	Ground OP			LOW/MED
	OP - HQ			LOW
LEARNING				LOW/MED
SES SUSTAINABILITY		MED/LOW	MED/LOW	LOW

Altogether, internal drivers are not favorable for sustainable SES to be implemented, but a key aspect of corporate culture – CR leadership – has continuously improved (table 35). The SMD only reached medium to low SES sustainability in the two first years. Clearly, low internal company drivers do not lead to successful implementation of sustainability.

2. AGA's HQ leadership: discourses and design (GGM and SAG)

“Anglogold Gold Ashanti, born from the fusion of AngloGold of South-Africa and Ashanti Goldfields of Ghana is the only gold mining MNC with a fully African history” [SA.1]. This particular identity is meaningful for the company in the sense that it underlines its ambition to be a leader in embedded sustainable approaches in each of their mining sites in Africa and elsewhere [AGA, 2012a]. South African based MNCs, where the company has its headquarters, compete in the area of sustainability [Hönke, 2013; Kranz, 2011]. AGA has also been targeted on several occasions by media campaigns damaging its reputation (chapter 4). The company is committed to the most important socially sustainable international voluntary standard and adopted a very sustainability-driven discourse in its public documents and speeches (chapter 4). Implementation of stakeholder engagement strategies in their Guinean (SAG) and Tanzanian (GGM) sites is somewhat sustainable, except for the missing contributions and capacity-building projects with long-term perspectives. Neither of these host countries drivers has the capacity to enforce sustainable regulations nor to make companies accountable (chapter 5). Before explaining what we observed inside these two sites, we summarize the CEO discourses and the HQ design to enable the internalization of the sustainable strategy.

a) AGA DISCOURSES ON SES

The former CEO (2006-2013) at AGA headquarters, Mark Cufitani, showed strong dedication to stakeholder engagement and sustainable social strategies toward communities [Wilson, 2014]. He was even the key speaker on social sustainability in the INDEBA in Dar-Es-Salaam Tanzania held in October 2013. One of AGA's key value statements is to “leave the communities better off for AGA's operation having been there” [AGA, 2012a]. AGA has an approach to public relations that is against propaganda; they consider that their actions should speak in their favor, and they use press releases only to rectify false accusations [SA.1].

AGA launched its stakeholder engagement strategy around 2010. The new strategy originated from “a negative and a positive” source [T.62].

“The positive aspect is strong leadership: the CEO is very dedicated and it’s not just publicity, I checked before accepting the job! The negative aspect is the loss of money through ill management of community relations (...) In fact, the mine loses a serious amount of money when they have to stop operating for a day due to local communities’ protests, so it is worth using the money otherwise to save this cost (...) To me, the main part of gaining trust is recognizing mistakes (...) The company also wants to be more transparent, as a means of being better understood by the communities. I think this is a long-term strategy that will show dedication to the people” [T.62, Knowledge management and sustainability manager for AGA Continental Africa, 22.09.2011, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania].

Although the company is still economically driven, the HQ head management demonstrates strong sustainable values regarding the management of their conflicts with neighboring communities.

b) AGA DESIGN FOR SES

In 2011, the knowledge management and sustainability manager of AGA for continental Africa considered that sustainability was becoming a key department instead of just something the company had to do [T.62]. In 2012, AGA entered into partnership with some scholars to evaluate what they were putting in place [T.84-87; T.90]. AGA also decided to bring in people from diverse backgrounds (social science and development studies for example), because the company understands that technical engineers cannot fully understand development issues. At the HQ level, a restructuration has taking place since the beginning of 2013, boosted by the drop in gold prices in March 2013 [SA.1]. The idea of AGA’s new strategy is to create a framework that can be unfolded in all mining sites: “The company is working on community impact and development, and on environmental impact, and also making the link between the two because of their interdependence” [T.62]. The company uses external experts to do the social impact assessments and to understand the problem of distrust between people and company [T.84; T.90]. AGA wants to move from project planning to programs.

“The idea is to go through the MDGs in order for the community to have a plan, because if AGA wants to do development according to community plans, then communities need to have a plan, and through the MDGs, the company hopes they will take care of that, then the company can just link up to it” [T.62, Knowledge management and sustainability manager for AGA Continental Africa, 22.09.2011, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania].

The attention of HQ for its subsidiary is illustrated by their involvement in their Guinean and Tanzanian sites. For instance, in 2012, HQ entered into a partnership with a West African NGO in charge of a socio-economic study of the area where they operate, in view of adapting CSR choices to local needs. In 2013 in Tanzania, AGA HQ pushed the re-establishment of the Community Relation Committee (CRC) to insure that there was a platform for discussion between communities and the company.

c) AGA LEARNING FROM OP

In 2011, the department of knowledge management and communication for AGA continental Africa was totally new; it is part of AGA’s new management strategy. At the time of our interview, Cory Brandt had been the manager of the department of knowledge management and communication for five months. During our interview, he explained AGA’s position as follows:

“AGA’s new strategy came through a strong leadership. The CEO has been there for 5-6 years but before he could unfold his community development strategy, he had to start showing that the company could make profit under his management. He started changing the management systems, first on Safety

issues (also related to people's wellbeing) using knowledge management processes. Knowledge management is about learning from what is being done, successes and failures. The idea is to create knowledge with experience on the ground and roll it out to translate it into a practice in all our sites" [T.62, Knowledge management and sustainability manager for AGA Continental Africa, 22.09.2011, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania].

In 2011, HQ created the position of SES senior consultant in charge of SES in all AGA's mines in Continental Africa. The consultant is based in South Africa but part of his mission is to travel to the sites regularly to understand specific issues and monitor the implementation of the stakeholder engagement strategy.

3. Internal company Drivers in AGA's SAG in Guinea

In the SAG, internal drivers stayed rather stable from 2011 to 2013. Corporate culture dimensions fluctuated more than design. Most significant were the variations in the various MDs' dedication to community issues and their recognition of the CR department. There were signs that the MD's dedication and recognition were higher before 2011 than after, whereas the CR kept a respectful attitude towards communities during the three years. This variation of MD dedication should have led to decreasing sustainability outcomes, especially because the CR's resources and capacity diminished accordingly. On the contrary, outcomes got better every year. We explain this paradox by the specific characteristics of the SAG's neighboring communities. Indeed, local risks diminished from 2011 onwards, and co-management capacities stayed high (chapter 7). More specifically, the company benefited from never responding to community confrontations by violent means.

a) CORPORATE CULTURE: SAG

The SAG wants to make its CSR and sustainable activities more visible: "The purpose is not only to promote a good image, rather to avoid any false accusations and publicize when the company is doing good things" [G.130, SAG sustainability manager, 23.09.2013 (translated from French)].

This is in continuity with the discourse at HQ level considering that AGA does not have a public relations department but uses the media to make sure the public is informed and to counter bad image born out of false premises [SA.1].

In 2010-2011, according to the CR staff, "the MD was really listening to the population. He does not let the tension settle in" [G.140, CR officers, 26.09.2013, SAR CR office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea (translated from French)]. Also, we know he was not putting a lot of pressure on the CR team and he hired a direct adviser on community issues [G.131; G.140]. At the time, there was a good forum for consultation and negotiation with communities, which facilitated the management of tensions between the communities and the SAG [G.58; G.140]. Between 2011 and 2013, it is hard to tell whether the MD was dedicated to community issues or not. Communities do not remember him at all [G.58-67], which is a sign that he was not dedicated enough to show his face in the villages. In 2012-2013, with the structural change happening at HQ level, a new sustainability manager position was created to complement the MD on community issues. The sustainability manager involved the MD in CR discussion to improve his understanding of community issues: "I got him to participate in CR decision-making meetings and debriefings after community meetings" [G.137]. If the MD had to be convinced, it is because he was not dedicated to the issue. The CR staff confirmed the low regard of the MD for the CR work. In 2012-2013, CR complained of the very low level of communication from the MD to the CR officers and his feeble support in answering demands from the communities.

When asked about the restructuration taking place at operational level, directly concerning community relations and sustainability department, CR officers did not know what we were talking about. They were not involved in the re-structuration discussions. They could simply witness that their activities were stopped and they had no budget [G.131; G.140]. “No one told us why we could not go to do our usual consultation and negotiations in the villages” [G.140, CR officers, 26.09.2013, SAR CR office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea (translated from French)]. Another sign of the disregard from the subsidiary’s head management on the community relation department is the marginalization of the CR manager.

“The CR manager who is in place since 1995 did not get any training from the SAG on his tasks and responsibilities. The hierarchy has progressively marginalized him and it affects the mood of the entire department” [G.140, CR officers, 26.09.2013, SAR CR office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea (translated from French)].

Notwithstanding the marginalization of their manager, the CR staff remains dedicated to the communities. Community relations in SAG consist of 3 managers: the sustainability manager who reports directly to the HQ, the MD advisor who advises the MD on community issues, and the CR manager at the head of the CR department composed of officers with offices and in the field, and liaison officers based in villages.

The change to a higher sustainability strategy by the SAG, launched in 2012, does not mean abruptly stopping to pay pilgrimage to Mecca or gifts of rice to the elders and religious leaders. The CR knows these practices are perceived by important members of the community as a mark of recognition for the local traditions and of respect from the company [T.130]. This is an example of his knowledge of the sustainability and of his respect for the local context. It also means that the SAG intends to be more strategic on funding community projects to integrate them into local contexts so they can have a meaning in the long-term. However, if the vocabulary employed illustrates an intention to create mutual benefits, the discourse is ethnocentric. For example, he considers that the company should not keep reinforcing the leadership of elders (by consulting them on CSR) because they are perceived within the company as being the leaders of conservatism and the representatives of the Islamic influence on the youth. The will to disturb local structures and the underlying belief that a more Judeo-Christian or liberal way of doing things is morally better than that of the local Africans’ ways is troubling.

The MD adviser on the other hand, respects the elders as well as elected leaders and recognizes their influence on other members of the community as crucial [G.133]. He treats them as friends. The MD adviser and CR manager also show respect for local communities by recognizing and regularly receiving the visit of wise men and youth groups and giving them an audience and advice (chapter 4). CR officers think that communities keep asking for too many things purposely, even if they know SAG cannot do everything. Hence, they consider them clever enough to try to manipulate the CR staff. They respect communities but are not particularly friendly to them. Communities do not trust them completely [G.56; G.65; G.66].

In 2013, CR did not agree with the old practices of bargaining the peace through CSR action. They did their tasks as the hierarchy requested but without personal dedication, thus they do not feel very valuable. CR officers want to answer community demands and gain recognition from both communities and colleagues by achieving their goals as community officers [G.131; G.140]. They

accept their task of mitigating conflicts between the communities and the company through negotiation and project funding. However, In 2013, CR did not agree with the old practices of bargaining the peace through CSR action.

This rather favorable dedication of CR to community issues, even without good self-perceptions of officers, explains how the company reaches sustainable outcomes. Most importantly, they choose to stay in a “non-violent spirit” although the Siguirika communities (locally called “Siguirika”) are potentially bellicose (chapter 7). We think that maybe the Siguirika refrained from acting violently against the company despite their usual temper because the company never responded to their protests aggressively.

The sustainability manager in place in 2011 was not integrated into the team of managers at operational levels, contrary to his successor in 2012. The mining department, engineering, and geology (and also HR) departments understand the essential work the CR is doing, mostly because of the everyday benefits they get from the work of the CR officer allowing these departments to keep working [G.128; G.131]. A senior geologist called the CR officers “the negotiators”, showing that his department recognizes their importance in case of ASM causing disruption to the mining activities: “The negotiators, yes, we work with them, they help us when artisanal miners come to the pits and disturb our activities” [G.128, SAG senior exploration geologist, 23,09,2013]. During the Saturday meeting, managers of other departments appreciate hearing what the SAG is doing in the communities [G.128; G.130]. The internal relationship between the CR and other departments is hard to assess. However, the way the CR staff feels about how other departments perceive them conveys a much more positive relationship than in the SMD or the GGM. However, the sustainability manager of 2012 feels the need to plan intercultural inductions for expatriates and national managers “who all live in isolation from the realities on the ground” [G.130]. In 2013, CR officers consider that other departments cannot recognize the importance of their activities if they are not given the necessary budget.

At first glance, there are no linkages between corporate culture and sustainability of SES in the case of the SAG (table 36). However, we argue that the continuous dedication of the CR department, even if it was merely respectful to communities and not fully dedicated, contributed to the sustained increase in sustainability of outcomes. As we describe in the next section, the fact that the CR was autonomous and had relatively good hierarchical powers, also contributed to the outcomes we observed.

b) CORPORATE DESIGN: SAG

AGA’s community related values are translated into structures at OP level in the SAG. For example, in 2010, HQ created a position dedicated to engagement and dialog with stakeholders directly advising the SAG’s MD. This MD advisor is separated from the technical implementation aspect of CSR dealt with by the CR department, which is also in charge of negotiating in case of tensions with communities. Also in accordance with the HQ commitments, in 2012, the sustainability manager of the SAG wanted to put in place a participatory process, “a ‘communication house’ where people can put everything on the table, get information, and discuss” [G.135]. The SAG also tried to make the company’s behavior consistent with the international standard adopted by the HQ, for instance, by reviewing its compensation policies in accordance with the IFC recommendations [IFC, 2007; INSUCO et al., 2013]. In addition, the sustainability manager reports directly to the HQ:

“The idea is to separate the efforts on compliance to international standards from mining operations, but it only makes sense in terms of internal control, not in the execution of strategies at the operational level” [G.130, SAG sustainability manager, 23.09.2013 (translated from French)].

At OP level in Guinea, restructuration resulted in a reorganization of sustainability related departments. This reorganization was in process in 2013 but was not yet in place. In short, HQ-OP operational continuity is assured between AGA and its Guinean branch.

The sustainability manager reports directly to the HQ and is at the same hierarchical level as the MD. He is in charge of the formulation of strategy at OP level and of putting in place the conditions for implementation, while the MD is responsible for the outcomes of the strategy [G.130]. Before 2011, the CR department was more involved in decision-making on community relations issues than after the arrival of the sustainability manager in the SAG [G.52; G.125; G.140]. Since 2011, the CR manager has been marginalized hierarchically. He is not invited to attend executive meetings [G.125; G.129]. In 2012-2013, the communication between CR and the sustainability manager has not been easy or frequent. The sustainability manager introduced us to the CR officers in the administration building of the SAG. After spending some time with the CR officers, we understood that this was one of the rare times they actually had seen him. The hierarchical power of those in charge of community issues is high concerning the sustainability manager but low for the CR department team. That of the sustainability manager, however, has been essential in arriving at long-term capacity-building projects for local authorities.

The organization of CR work has changed several times, which is not in favor of internal clarity. In 2007, the CR section was part of the administration department. In 2008, the CR was divided into social development and land management departments. The very similar responsibilities of both departments created a lot of tension during a little less than a year. In 2009, the CR was reunited. Between 2010 and 2012:

“There was a vacuum, roles were not well defined... A lot of studies about local communities were taking place but not bringing much new knowledge... A lot of projects were launched and not sustained” [G.140, CR officers, 26.09.2013, SAR CR office, Siguiiri district, Northern Guinea (translated from French)].

This created suspicion internally: CR officers do not believe the restructuration will bring anything good or any changes at all. Since 2010, the MD adviser and the MD can sometimes bypass the work of the CR, which has bad consequences on the trust people give to the CR officers.

“For instance, if the CR team is sent to a village with a message from the MD explaining that there will be no recruitments because of the economic situation, but then the MD and his advisor go to the same people to offer 75 jobs, people will no longer trust CR officers and can even start thinking that they are against them” [G.131, SAG CR officers, 24.09.2013, CR office, Siguiiri District, Northern Guinea (translated from French)].

In 2013, the sustainability manager communicates more with the MD and the HQ than with subordinates. Since 2011, the confusion of responsibility created tense relationships. There was competition and internal relational problems among people in charge of community relations. Between the sustainability manager, the CR manager, the MD’s adviser, and within the CR department, responsibilities are similar but principles of action and values differ (cf. MD adviser vs. Sustainable manager). This unclear situation has not yet echoed on sustainability outcomes.

Since the beginning of AGA's operations in Guinea, the HQ let the SAG act according to their experience, because when the HQ level sends representatives to the site, they witness a well managed situation [SA.1]. At the operational level, the CR always seemed to have the autonomy to spontaneously make decisions. However, toward the end of 2013, things had changed, and CR officers had little autonomy. "Now we have to get authorization for every move from the MD (...) We can no longer go to the villages without an official message to transmit from the higher hierarchy" [T.140]. In 2012-2013, when the sustainability approach started changing at OP levels, the lack of understanding of local economy, structure, and perceptions was addressed, first by the HQ hiring a West African NGO, and then, by the OP sustainability manager hiring a Guinean NGO to conduct an in-depth socio-economic study and a perception study of the neighboring communities to be the base of all future CSR decisions. Hence, there was a higher possibility for decisions to be adapted to local needs. Also, the SAG is embedding the compensations process into local structures and habits. For example, the company is not trying to give property certificates (which communities are not used to), but rather seeks a consensus and approval from the whole community and a validation by the clan instead (as the elders would do it). The SAG's decisions on community issues are more and more adapted to local socio-economic realities. This autonomy to make decisions based on knowledge in the field is essential for the company to implement sustainable conflict-management strategies.

Since 2010, a Bamara from Mali (which is the same ethnic group as the Malinke from Siguiri) occupies the position of MD adviser. His knowledge of the language certainly is a sign of his capacity to understand local communities; he is familiar with local structures and culture and has a Master of business and sustainable development. Before 2010, the MD adviser was a Canadian who did not have much connection with communities and did not speak Malinke. The CR manager occupies this position since the beginning of exploration in 1995. He knows the communities and the company very well (and the communities know him well, too), but he was never trained as a community development manager. Between 2010 and the end of 2012, the CR department suffered a lack of capacity both in number of skilled personnel and in budget [G.52; G.54; G.140]. This was also visible when travelling through the villages; we could see some CSR constructions being on standby. Since 2011, too many people are in charge of the same unclear tasks, resulting in a lack of accountability of everyone [G.130; G.133]. This also results in "under-utilization of staff with skills and the perpetuation of counter-productive habits" [G.130]. In 2012-2013, the transition at OP level concerning the CR department resulted in a loss of power of the CR manager and lower resources attributed to the CR department. Almost no projects were put in place in 2013, because of the restructuration and lack of financial budget for the CR department. The sustainability manager has a background in anthropology; he was hired for his experience with the local context and his understanding of the challenges of local development [G.130]. Capacity and resources of the CR department in the SAG are essential reasons of its success in implementing sustainable SES.

Every Saturday morning, every manager, every superintendent, and some 1st level managers (mixing expats and locals) attend a general meeting in which the CR department takes the time to talk about CSR and community projects. To integrate the sustainable strategy within each department at OP levels:

“The next step is to recruit local competent staff to manage transectorial and technical changes in the structure of the CR department (as well as the) simplification of the compensation framework to make it accessible to the exploration department” [G.130].

The sustainability strategy is more integrated in 2013 than it used to be. This dimension turned out not to play a role in incremental implementation of a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy. We still believe it might be fundamental for fundamental changes to occur.

The high continuity between HQ and OP does not seem to be an important dimension to explain SES outcomes (chapter 10). What is more relevant is the hierarchical power given to community issues to be addressed (table 36). Despite the marginalization of the CR manager in 2013, the newly recruited sustainability manager and the MD’s adviser on community issue have an impact on the hierarchical power given to community relation issues. Another important dimension of corporate design in the SAG is the autonomy that allows CR decisions to be adapted to the local context. However, without the favorable local governance context in which the SAG operates, it would not have reached such high levels of sustainability in 2013.

c) LEARNING: SAG

2006-2011, the SAG had “liaison” officers coming from each village surrounding the mine to make the link, but this was not efficient because they were not informed enough about either their own mission/their purpose nor were they given enough information from the company to function as intermediaries [G.54; G.65; G.67]. In 2013, the management of the SAG plans to make communication and information about SAG more accessible at the village level by creating a local service with someone directly representing the MD.

“The purpose is to increase the regularity in information and allow information to flow easier from the bottom up, which would increase the grievance mechanism efficiency and centralize all complaints and demands from the communities” [G.130].

For instance, the plan is to use the “liaison” officers as information focal points in villages and for resettlement studies after selecting the most competent ones. The ‘System for People’ and ‘projectOne’ from HQ level was implemented and welcomed in the SAG as a way to

“Bring the dictatorship of hierarchy to an end (...) It allowed us to say ‘sorry sir I don’t have a vehicle or the necessary means to complete the task you are giving me’ instead of being obliged to say yes and then have to come back to explain why it didn’t go as it should have” [G.140].

The new sustainability strategy lacks a follow-up and monitoring system. A grievance office where people can officially make demands and claims is supposed to be created in 2014. In 2013, CR and sustainability managers are reassessing the CSR practices the SAG has been using from the beginning of operations in order to make the practices more sustainable. For example, the brick-making project of employees who were learning to make bricks so they could train others to make bricks is not building much capacity. In 2013, the SAG was assessing the staff of each department to recruit local people internally with CR skills into the renewed structure. Bottom-up communication is not easy. In 2013, the hierarchy did not answer the suggestions from CR officers who have knowledge and experience of the community issues at stake. Their ideas concerning the necessity to make CR activities more sustainable in the long-term were not met by budget allowances, and there was scarce internal dialog. For example, when the CR officers proposed their own mapping of key

stakeholders to meet in order to inform about their decisions on CSR, the MD did not use their advice.

Because of the restructuration that is taking place at the HQ level for a few years, and boosted by the decrease of gold prices, the CSR strategies and structures are supposed to be reviewed from the bottom up. At the HQ level, however, regulations are too standardized, sometimes disregarding local specificities. For instance, concerning the SAG, compensation issues are understood as applying only to agricultural lands or residential areas while there is range of local land issues that do not fall into either of these categories, especially in traditional ASM communities [INSUCO et al., 2013]. The HQ's effort to understand local settings is illustrated by their hiring of an NGO to conduct a socio-economic study of the area around the SAG, but they should have asked for advice on the selection of an NGO instead of relying on their "internationally renowned" status. The sustainability manager reports quarterly to the HQ to get approval on project funding [G.135] and to contribute to the annual integrated financial and sustainability reports of AGA. The sustainability manager also simplified the compensation framework to make it accessible to HQ.

Despite the will of AGA's HQ to understand the local context of operation at their Guinean mining site, learning processes are rather shallow from the ground to operational head management as well as from the operational head management to the HQ levels (table 36). In this case, there is no apparent correlation between learning processes and outcomes of the sustainability strategy.

d) CONCLUSION ON SAG INTERNAL DRIVERS

At first glance, it seems clear that internal company drivers in the case of the SAG do not explain the level of sustainability of SES implementation (table 36). However, some essential dimensions are sufficient to explain why outcomes are not worse. The continuous respect of community relations manager and officers, their autonomy to make decisions adapted to their experience, and the hierarchical power granted to community issues (MD advisor on these questions, sustainable manager at the same level of hierarchy as the MD) suffice to maintain sustainable outcomes.

Table 36. SAG internal drivers

SAG		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-2013
HQ-OP discourse	HQ leadership	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Discourse continuity	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
MD (cultural) leadership	MD dedication to SES	MED	LOW	LOW
	MD's recognition of CR	MED		LOW
CR (cultural) leadership	CR self-perception	MED	MED	LOW
	CR dedication	MED	MED	MED
CR integration	Internal relationships CR-other		MED	HIGH
	Other dpt perceptions on communities	HIGH	MED	MED
Learning	Ground OP		MED	LOW
	OP - HQ	LOW	LOW	LOW
CORPORATE CULTURE		MED/HIGH	MED	LOW
HQ-OP alignment	HQ leadership		HIGH	HIGH
	HQ-OP continuity		HIGH	HIGH
MD management	Hierarchical power of CR	MED	MED	LOW/MED
	Internal clarity/continuity	LOW	LOW	LOW
CR mgt leadership	Autonomy in decision	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Process management/Capacity	HIGH	LOW	MED
CR integration	Tools	LOW	MED	MED
CORPORATE DESIGN		MED/LOW	MED	MED
Learning	Ground OP		MED	LOW
	OP - HQ	LOW	LOW	LOW
LEARNING		LOW	LOW/MED	LOW
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		LOW	MED/HIGH	HIGH

The local governance context in which the SAG operates is what really explains why the company reached high sustainability of outcomes in 2012-2013 (chapter 10). Local communities are well organized and ready to collaborate despite their aggressive temper and history of conflicts between communities. The choice of the “non-violent spirit” of negotiation over the use of force in the event of community protests also reinforces the successes of the company in reaching sustainable outcomes.

4. Internal company Drivers in AGA’s GGM in Tanzania

The case of AGA’s site in Tanzania is puzzling, because with a very dedicated CR manager with enough resources and autonomy to enact decisions based on his expertise, the site still does not reach a very high level of sustainability in outcomes. The head management gave more hierarchical power to community relations before 2011 than after. Simultaneously, the MD gave less and less informal recognition to the community relations department. Nonetheless, in 2013 a newly recruited public relations manager made the stakeholder engagement strategy of the company come back to the forefront. In the GGM, three managers are in charge of community issues: the community relations department manager, the stakeholder engagement and public relations manager (PR), and the sustainability manager who supervises the CR and other departments.

The first year, we had an appointment with the managing director of the GGM. On the day of the scheduled interview, during the 5 hours of travel by bus and ferry from Mwanza to Geita, as we were trying to manage our arrival into the secured mining compound –accessible neither by foot nor by taxi - his secretary kept telling us on the phone that he would get back to us. Upon our arrival in the crowded Geita bus station, it became clear that he was not going to. We walked to the nearest state administration building and finally obtained from the district officers that the GGM’s MD was, in fact, attending a meeting in town, at the District Council. We waited outside the building until everyone came out of the meeting and spotted the MD by ‘gut feeling’ (and because there were not so many people that were likely to be called Gary Davies...). We ran to him before he closed the door of his 4x4 and we held the door open explaining with our short breaths and sweaty face why we were here and that he was supposed to meet with us. He invited us to climb in the car and accepted to talk during the drive back to the mine. That was our introduction to the GGM. After this, he facilitated our travel into and out of the GGM and granted interviews with the relevant managers over the following two years.

The GGM case illustrates how, despite internal dedication, resources, and autonomy to implement a sustainable SES, the history of community-company conflict hinders the potential of success of implementation. Although communities around the GGM are not used to settling problems by violence, they are also not very used to collaborating with each other (chapter 7). We show in chapter 10 that the harsh treatment they receive from the company when they illegally steal rocks from the company’s pits, and the fact that the GGM uses the help of paramilitary forces to respond in case of violent protests from the communities reduce the chances of implementing highly sustainable SES.

a) CORPORATE CULTURE: GGM

The two managers directly in contact with communities (CR and PR) perpetuate the HQ’s value concerning communities. They affirm their belief of the necessity for communities being better off for AGA being there, even if their definition of stakeholders and engagement slightly differ.

The way the PR manager describes his engagement towards community is in line with the HQ values. He says word-for-word: “we need to insure that communities are better off for GGM having been here” [T.161, GGM stakeholder engagement and public relationmanager, 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Tanzania]. He explains that it is about “understanding their needs and trying to get along together”. He emphasizes the necessity for the GGM to share more information instead of appearing as “closed behind the gates”. And to convey an image of his dedication and understanding for people’s need for transparency, he compares the community-company relationship with a marriage: the less communication the more the gap widens between people [T.161].

The CR manager’s discourse is also in line with the HQ discourse. He expresses the will to have the community better off for GGM being there, although not with the exact same terms. He defines stakeholders as those who have an interest or are affected by what the GGM is doing. According to him, the purpose of stakeholder engagement is to make an open environment for people to talk freely about the mine and allow GGM to be critical about its own activities [T.162]. This echoes the idea of recognizing mistakes to gain trust, brought forth by the senior consultant on stakeholder engagement [T.62]. We found that this strong alignment between HQ and OP does not affect the outcomes of implementation. However, this coherence strengthens the image of the company’s position regarding communities.

In 2010-2011, an MD who was the Environment Vice President Australia accepted to step down to take care of the complicated situation in GGM, to “turn around the mine” [T162]. He was very present in the communities and shook hands with workers when he visited the pits, even with unqualified labor [T.97]. He also created the CRC to ensure that the CR department was in regular dialog with communities at the district level. His successor In 2011-2013 showed his respect for communities by attending meetings when necessary and respecting local authorities when they met, but he was not very dedicated [T.53-54; T.71; T.162]. The next MD, in place since 2013, leaves the company compound only in case of serious issues [T.164].

The MD in 2010-2011 showed good recognition of all departments including CR and engaged all managers to use dialog with their subordinates to manage internal conflicts [T.162]. The MD of 2011-2013 did not have close relationships with the CR department, and this caused some misunderstandings. In 2013, the MD showed little support and little understanding of the CR department.

The MD’s recognition and dedication on community issues have a direct impact on the CR self-perception in the GGM case: high before 2011 and decreasing from 2011 onwards.

In 2011, the CR department felt empowered and recognized as valuable for the company. After 2011, GGM workers and managers in general have been under pressure and have been under recognized, especially after the gold prices declined mid-2013. From 2012 to 2013, the sustainability managers were not interested in taking advice from local authorities or from fellow Tanzanian managers. This decline in self-perception did not affect the CR’s dedication to communities.

The CR manager during the past 15 years, and the PR manager since 2013 both express a dedication to communities and dedication to their work. They use very understanding discourses concerning local communities, and they are friendly with community members. The CR manager even decided to live in Geita town instead of choosing the comfort of living in the company’s housing compounds, because he wanted to be in touch with the realities on the ground. District and Town officials

confirm that the CR manager has an understanding attitude, and they trust him to transmit their demands to the MD [T.156; T.159].

During our 2-day stay in the GGM housing areas in 2012, we observed some of the segregation tendencies that were later narrated to us by workers of the GGM. Expatriate (white) managers and African managers (although they could also be expatriates from African countries) mostly stayed in separate groups. Someone explained how some expatriate white managers even sometimes openly discussed the possibility for Tanzanian managers to have their houses built in town instead of staying in the safe, comfortable, and electrified housing areas... Internal relationships between black and white employees suggest what must be the even worse perceptions on neighboring communities. However, we could not assess this interpretation.

When observing the corporate culture indicators and sustainability outcomes, a correlation could exist, at least after 2011, between corporate culture for SES and implementation mitigated successes (table GGM internal drivers).

However, with highly favorable indicators before 2011, why was the implementation only medium? Because the communities were not ready to collaborate in the management of conflict, since, on the one hand, they are not used to collaborating on anything, and on the other hand they were badly treated during encounters with the security of the mine (see history of community-company conflict in chapter 7).

b) CORPORATE DESIGN: GGM

Similar to the SAG, the HQ values are translated into structure in the GGM. A position dedicated to stakeholder engagement and public relations directly advising the MD was created. It is separated from the technical implementation aspect and daily consultations with communities dealt with by the CR department.

Before 2011, the MD often relied on advice from the CR manager. In 2011-2012, the CR participated in executive board meetings [T.83; T.89]. In 2012-2013, the CR manager was hierarchically subordinate to the sustainability manager. He still had a direct relationship with the MD but did not participate directly in decision-making and executive meetings [T.162]. However, the PR manager directly advises the MD on questions related to communities. CR and PR managers also meet with the sustainability manager every week to review the demands of the communities, and they suggest decisions submitted to the MD for approval [T.161; T.162]. In 2013, on occasion, the GGM also works with the District officers on certain issues related to communities, to use their knowledge and expertise. As a result, the hierarchical power of managers in charge of community issues is favorable to the implementation of sustainable SES, even more so in 2013 than before. This is one of the reasons why outcomes are more sustainable in 2012-2013 than before. The fact that there are two dedicated managers, who both have hierarchical power and use advice directly coming from local authorities, explains the higher variety of stakeholders included and the higher frequency of visits in 2012-2013.

Before 2011, responsibilities on SES were clear: the CR manages CR relations with the supervision of the MD. In 2011-2012, the confusion began; the CR manager is still in place but the new sustainability manager and the former sustainability manager in transition are both on site. This situation continued into 2013, with the two sustainability managers, and the confusion of responsibilities increased with the arrival of the PR manager. The PR manager is in charge of

stakeholder engagement and communication, while the CR department is responsible for projects and budget management, and the sustainability manager is in charge of coordination (but does not take advice from them). This means that there are two departments directly in charge of community related issues. It would enhance the presence and communication of GGM at the various levels if the two departments harmonized their practices, but in fact it creates confusion and contradictions because of their different style and approach.

This confusion of responsibilities in the end did not compromise the success of the GGM to implement the sustainable conflict management strategy, probably because, despite their difference in approach, the two managers still shared a common dedication to similar goals. We found that internal clarity or its absence is not decisive in the outcomes of sustainability strategies.

After the difficulties of the first year, managers in charge of community issues very easily accepted our requests for interviews each year. Considering the obstacles we found to contact managers in the ABG sites, this was a good sign of the autonomy of GGM managers in charge of community issues (CR, Environment, Engagement). In 2011-2012, however, the CR manager could not always adapt his decisions to local needs due to blockages inside the company. In 2013, CR and PR managers had autonomy in making decisions except on certain specific issues. The CR did not succeed in granting scholarships based on merit for neighboring villages pupils, or loans for income generating projects [T.156; T.162].

From 2011 onwards, the CR department did not complain about resources allocated to enact decisions. Skills of managers in charge of community issues are also favorable for the implementation of SES adapted to local needs. From 2011 to 2013, managers in charge of community are Tanzanians and are very familiar with local specificities; they all have experience in community development. The CR manager in place since 1998 is a Tanzanian with experience in the technical department followed by a management degree from Tanzania. He is very aware of the local context, since he has been living in the area for over 15 years. He is also particularly familiar with political issues and social concerns because of his political affiliation with the opposition party and as the former national chairman of TAMICO (the mining worker union) [T.56; T.62; T.92; T.162]. In 2013, the newly recruited PR manager of GGM comes from the development sector; he used to work for Plan International.⁴³

Autonomy, capacity, and resources are decisive for the level of sustainability reached in implementing the sustainable strategy for company-community conflict management. Although the GGM does not meet higher success in outcomes, it cannot be attributed to a lack of CR leadership. The sites' harmful security habits are a more relevant explanation.

In 2013, The PR manager started an internal awareness campaign to inform other heads of departments of what GGM is doing for the communities and why. This is the only indicator of internal tools for embedding the sustainable strategy at the operational level. It implicitly means that there was nothing done for that purpose before 2013.

There are a priori no linkages between GGM's corporate design to enact a sustainable SES and its implementation (table 37). However, without capacity, autonomy, and resources, and some

⁴³ Plan International is an international NGO specialized in children rights and development. It has been created 75 years ago and is now operating in 50 countries of Africa, Asia, and America (Plan International #1394)

hierarchical support for SES over the years, the GGM would not even reach medium sustainability of outcomes. Also, if it reached higher sustainability in 2013, this can be attributed to the higher hierarchical power given to community issues (especially because the manager in charge of these issues is highly dedicated).

c) LEARNING: GGM

After 2 episodes of violent conflicts, which resulted in loss of property and trust, GGM urged the implementation of the stakeholder engagement strategy (first phase mapping stakeholders and main issues, second phase engaging in active dialog and awareness of identified stakeholders). After identifying the main trust issues, GGM started addressing them, i.e., the camp of homeless people is in the process of being resettled in houses built by GGM (see chapter 7). A grievance mechanism is in place since 2013. Another sign of how the GGM learns from its mistakes is that after an episode of conflicts with ASM in 2012, the MD advertised in Tanzania the position for a public relation manager. In 2013, the new position of Public Relation manager was effective. Its main responsibilities are to be in charge of the stakeholder engagement strategy and to directly advise the MD on community issues. In 2013, the MD uses the knowledge of the PR manager on the community to make decisions adapted to local circumstances. However, in 2013, internal relationship did not facilitate dialog between departments and from the bottom-up, contrary to 2010-2011.

HQ is regularly informed of GGM issues, especially because of the importance of ASM intruders. The HQ sustainability departments were involved in the recruitment process of the communication and public relations manager in charge of the stakeholder engagement strategy at the OP level. HQ sustainability department visits GGM on occasion with the senior consultant in charge of SES and the Human Rights senior manager (corporate) [SA.1]. The SE strategy started changing after two major upheavals from the community in April 2012. HQ and MD recognized the necessity of involving communities in CSR projects to give them a sense of ownership [SA.1; T.161; T.162]. The grievance mechanism program was drafted by the CR manager and reviewed directly by HQ senior manager in charge of human rights. The grievance mechanism was launched at the OP level in 2013.

AGA's efforts to learn from the bottom up are translated at its Tanzanian site by concrete corrections of mistakes (building houses for people left homeless from being displaced by the company, for example), which are signs of performance assessment measures. The company also reviews its strategy due to negative feedback from the field, which denotes double loop learning mechanisms. However, because of the short timing of this research, it difficult to tell whether the learning processes explain the sustainability of outcomes.

d) CONCLUSIONS ON GGM INTERNAL DRIVERS

Internal drivers were more favorable to a sustainable implementation of SES before 2011 than later on. But still, sustainability was higher in 2013 than before. Learning processes could explain this paradox, but we found that three years is too short a period to assess their influence. A more pertinent explanation in this case is the progress of hierarchical power granted to managers in charge of community issues, which increases the corporate design dimension as a whole — also because of the efforts to integrate the SES in each department. The continuous dedication of managers in contact with communities despite the lack of MD leadership also explains why the company obtains medium levels of social sustainability in their CSR outcomes.

Table 37. GGM internal drivers

GGM		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-2013
HQ-OP discourse	HQ leadership	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
	Discourse continuity	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
MD (cultural) leadership	MD dedication to SES	HIGH	MED	LOW
	MD's recognition of CR	HIGH	MED	MED
CR (cultural) leadership	CR self-perception	HIGH	MED	LOW
	CR dedication	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CR integration	Internal relationships CR-other			
	Other dpt perceptions on communities			
CORPORATE CULTURE		HIGH	MED	MED
HQ-OP alignment	HQ leadership		HIGH	HIGH
	HQ-OP continuity		HIGH	HIGH
MD management	Hierarchical power of CR	MED	MED	HIGH
	Internal clarity/continuity	HIGH	MED	MED
CR mgt leadership	Autonomy in decision	HIGH	MED	MED
	Process management/Capacity	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CR integration	Tools	LOW	LOW	HIGH
CORPORATE DESIGN		HIGH	MED	MED/HIGH
Learning	Ground OP		HIGH	HIGH
	OP - HQ		HIGH	HIGH
LEARNING			HIGH	HIGH
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		MED	MED	MED/HIGH

Since co-management capacities around the GGM are not very favorable, and the company keeps using the state police to respond to the community's imposed accountability strategies, favorable internal drivers are not as successful in achieving sustainable outcomes as they could be. The MD's lack of "vision" in leading the companies to sustainable ends also neutralizes the potential of the company's corporate culture after 2011 [Valente 2010],

5. ABG's HQ leadership: discourse and design (Buz and NMGM)

African Barrick Gold separated from Barrick Gold Corporation in 2010, but the parent company still owns 74%. The North-Mara mine is located on the northeast side of Lake Victoria in Tanzania at the border with Kenya. At this mining site, SES was not implemented before 2011, it was moderately sustainable in 2012, and then sustainability levels decreased in 2013. With headquarters in the UK (ABG) and Canada (Barrick), international incentives are quite strong to create motivation for the company to adopt a sustainability discourse. ABG and Barrick adopted a high level of sustainability in their discourses about community issues, but the success in implementation has varied over time. Tanzania's state regulation and enforcement mechanisms do not provide many incentives for companies to implement SES. ABG refused to let us interview any of their managers or employees every year; we tried to visit their corporate office in the capital city of Tanzania on several occasions, but each time we were kindly rejected by the secretary⁴⁴.

a) ABG DISCOURSE ON SES

In 2011, Barrick's CEO did not have a strong discourse on social sustainability but did show concern for murders associated with its corporation. Aaron Regent, Barrick Gold Corp's CEO (2009-2012), reacted in a press release on the incidents of May 2011 when confrontations between the local people and security guards led to serious injuries, the death of at least 5 people, and also sexual

⁴⁴ Due to the difficulties to get interviews with people connected with the ABG operations, we often had to promise them complete anonymity. We thus will not reference the interviewees who explicitly asked not to be cited, because they feared to lose their job or even their life. A full list of interviews is provided in the bibliography, although we anonymized most of those who gave us information on ABG.

assault [Koven, 2011; Toronto Star, 2011; Wright et al., 2011]. In this article, he shared his view on this horrible event.

“Where we do encounter safety or human-rights concerns, we will act. (...) We will address concerns related to security and the safety risks posed by trespassing (...) including numerous improvements to security systems, improvements to human-rights training and procedures for reporting allegations of human-rights abuses, and improvements to our community programs (...) The events I have described are serious, intolerable and must be resolved no matter how long it takes. (...) Our responsibility is that the benefit of our presence outweighs the impact. This is not to suggest some circumstances won’t remain complicated or difficult. Solutions, particularly in developing countries, demand that many different parties find common ground and ways to work together” [The Citizen, 2011a].

Communities’ long-term capacity-building, multilateralism in engagement, and inclusion of all levels and types of stakeholders is not part of the values statements at HQ levels. ABG emphasizes the importance of maintaining its social license to operate.

b) ABG DESIGN FOR SES

Barrick’s CEO (2009-2012) explained in a Tanzanian newspaper that the company should first improve security by building a wall around the open pits. This hard security measure should be complemented by more comprehensive and long-term measures. For instance, he suggested that HR training, in collaboration with an international NGO, should be put in place to improve the process of reporting abuses, and to improve community programs, the community office should also be made more accessible and meetings should be held in case of tensions.

To enact its commitments to international standards, Barrick formed a Corporate Social Responsibility Advisory Board in 2011 to discuss the corporation’s sustainability practices [Barrick Gold Corporation]:

“The Advisory Board is a forum for external thought leaders to engage with senior management at Barrick in constructive discussion and lesson-sharing, providing intelligence on emerging trends, and providing practical guidance on best practice in social and environmental performance. They meet with our CEO and other senior leaders in-person twice a year” [Barrick Gold Corporation].

This board is more an instrument of internal compliance than of implementation. It aims at “providing practical guidance on best practice in social and environmental performance” [Barrick Gold Corporation].

In 2011, ABG — Barrick’s subsidiary in Africa — launched the Mandeleo Fund to manage its community contributions for its four Tanzanian mines. This CSR fund did not have a particular aim at implementing a stakeholder engagement strategy; it is however a sign of the company’s effort to align a social strategy at operational levels with the discourse at headquarters levels. The same year, ABG decided to involve an international NGO, Search for Common Grounds (SFCG), to work on conflict resolution in the mining area. The objective is to communicate information to the communities concerning the specificities of mining operations, the particular engagement contained in the companies’ contracts with the government (MDA), and the role of the mining sector for the country [SFCG]. “The NGO’s responsibility is to gain the trust of elders before talking to the rest of the community because of the distrust people have for anyone working with ABG” [T.81, Field agent for SFCG, 18.05.2012].

This partnership with the NGO Search for Common Grounds is called “Advancing Sustainable Peace and Security in Tanzania”, is in line with the VPSHR and complemented by training for security forces working at each of ABG’s sites in Tanzania. The partnership started in 2011 and was still ongoing in 2013. It shows that the headquarters’ strategy of social sustainability in the management of conflict (as well as its commitment to international standards) is operationalized in the choice of tools implemented at the operational level. The NGO established offices in Kahama for AGA/GGM, ABG Buzwagi and Bulyanhulu, and in Tarime for Barrick North-Mara.

6. Internal company Drivers in ABG’s Buzwagi mine in Tanzania

Buzwagi reaches the highest sustainability of SES in 2013 because of strong leadership, enough capacity and resources, and a favorable local governance context (chapter 7).

a) CORPORATE CULTURE: BUZ

Since we were refused interviews with managers and employees of ABG, we cannot assess the discourse continuity between HQ and OP level managers. We can simply note that, in national newspapers (public relation discourse) and on their website, the company recognizes the necessity to mend their relationship with local people. They provide focused articles explaining incidents happening around their mines and how the company is finding solutions by contributing to development in the communities [ABG, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a].

In 2010, the MD’s discourse emphasized that the primary goal of BUZ was to make money. He addressed the CR officers with disrespect and considered that it was the government’s job to provide people with social infrastructure in these terms “if the government does not provide people what they need, why should we?” [T.60; ex-Buzwagi CR officer, 19.09.2011, Dar-Es-Salaam]. In 2011, the MD was not present in the villages neighboring the mine, and even the district representatives were not always welcome in the compound [T.66; T.64]. “The manager only occasionally comes out of the community relations office” [T.69, Village council in Mwandakulima, 29.09.11, Kahama district (translated from Swahili)]. Then, in 2011-2012, the new MD had a completely different discourse. He was more dedicated to community issues and worked closely with the CR department. Between February 2012 and October 2013, the MD (Peter Burger) was very dedicated and even “had passion for the community”, as did the CR manager at the time, according to neighboring community members [T.125; T.128]. The MD came to visit the WEO after a month in position, and regularly came to discuss community issues [T.131; T.123-125]. After 2011, the MD’s dedication was favorable to the implementation of SES.

Without permission to conduct interviews with members of the company, our study is not able to assess accurately the relationship between CR and MD. Interviews with external partners of the company, with community members, and observations, did convey the idea that before 2011, the MD did not support or communicate much with the CR department. This appeared to be different in 2012-2013, when the MD and CR often shared tasks related to communities, which implies coordination between them and recognition of the importance of the CR for the company by the MD.

The higher MD dedication to community issues and to the community relations department from 2011 onwards explains a lot of the progress of Buzwagi in implementing higher levels of sustainability in SES. This progress is also sustained by the continuous dedication of the CR manager to SES.

From 2011 until mid-2013, communities found the CR staff very friendly and open when participating in local meetings [recognized by all interviewees in 2013]. At the time, the CR manager frequently shared casual moments with local authorities and partners in town [T.153 SHDEFA+; T.159 Town Community development officer].

The CR manager's friendly attitude and the appreciation of community members of CR officers show the dedication of the CR department. Since we could not meet directly with the CR officers because of ABG's refusal, it is not possible to assess the CR member's self-perception of their value for the company. However, dedication of the department is favorable to the implementation of sustainable stakeholder engagement

In ABG, CR is separated from the other departments; physically, their offices are not with the rest of the administration. This physical separation is not favorable to daily exchange with other departments and confirms the impression drawn from our interviews with external partners of the company that the CR is independent from the rest of operational level departments.

Since 2011, workers in BUZ explain that segregation behavior was common in the workplace: in the restaurant and bar of the housing compound, white people are not welcoming to black people. They work together with Tanzanians but have separate housing areas [Workers 2011, Reporter 16.09.2011]. A worker emphasized that expats are cold, arrogant, and disrespectful of Tanzanians, who work more hours for less money [Workers 2011]. This separation in the workplace between expatriates and Tanzanians is not favorable to creating a good relationship between the company members and community members outside of the workplace and manifests the lack of understanding of local contexts from other departments. The situation did not show signs of evolution over the period of this research.

Corporate culture at operational level in Buzwagi keeps improving from 2011 to 2013 in favor of sustainable outcomes (table 38). This increase of dedication from the MD and the continuous dedication of the CR explain why the company is able to reach the highest level of sustainability in SES implementation. This is made possible because of the multi-level community cohesion of neighboring communities and the absence of a history of violent encounters between the company and the communities (chapter 7).

b) CORPORATE DESIGN BUZ

Until 2011, in ABG's Buzwagi and North-Mara mines, there were no particular initiatives, structures, or tools in place to articulate a socially sustainable strategy. With the engagement of the international NGO SFCG, the plan is to engage all stakeholders: government and law enforcement personnel (police), community leaders, company personnel and have tools for key actors to mitigate quickly. In 2011, the NGO was present and actively involved in conflict management.

Until 2012, there were no structures empowering the CR in decision-making. There were no formal links with the CR department to advise the MD on community issues [Workers 2012]. In 2012-2013, the MD decided to finance and support a local NGO in order to complement CSR activities by supporting local income generating groups targeting especially women and HIV positive youth. This delegation of power to specialized agents manifests the importance given by the MD to community issues.

Before 2011, BUZ was in the process of hiring liaison officers from villages to be intermediaries between the company and the local communities. "Village leaders were selecting candidates through small tests" [T.60]. Then, the manager changed and the project was dropped, so there was no follow up, no continuity. After 2011, internal continuity became better, projects persisted from one team to the next, such as the hiring of local vigilantes for guarding the perimeters of operations, which improved over the years, and the partnerships with NGOs were followed through.

There are clear signs that MD leadership on community issues became better in 2013 compared to before, which also leads the progress overall to more favorable corporate design for the implementation of SES. This progress, interdependent with the higher MD commitment to SES, explains why the company scored the highest on sustainability outcomes in 2013.

In 2011-2013, no transparent information disclosure and the CR was not authorized to make spontaneous decisions. ABG did not conduct any studies on local income activities or socio-economic profiles or perceptions, but former MD and CR were familiar with Tanzanian specificities. ABG rejected our requests for interviewing any of their employees each year. The first year, we tricked to find our way into the community relations office, but even when we were face-to-face with the community relations manager, he could not talk to us about anything and did not even show us the public documentation we asked for on their CSR activities. In 2013, we were lucky to cross paths with CR officers doing their fieldwork at the ward administration office while we were also going there to meet with local authorities. We tried to have a discussion, but they refused to even have a casual conversation about their activities. To us, these are signs of the lack of autonomy and accessibility of the CR.

"Before leaving their graveyards or shifting them to another location, the Sukuma need to do some rituals, traditional ceremonies for which they asked the financial support of the company in 2011. At first, the company refused, it was difficult to make them understand how natural and necessary it was since they were moving them away from sacred places. Finally, the company accepted, but the help was not harmonized, each family gained different amounts" [T.60, ex-CR officer, 19.09.2011].

This means that the CR is able to adapt its decisions to local needs. However, in 2011, the relocated housing for communities is a counter-example that illustrates the lack of knowledge of the CR department at the time the resettlement took place. ABG built new houses to compensate communities that were displaced from their traditional houses to explore a new mining area. A traditional home is made of several different huts serving different purposes (bedroom, kitchen, storage..) disposed in a circle with a yard in the middle. When the company evaluated the houses to compensate, they counted the number of huts and made a single house with as many rooms. This disregards the way of living of these families, who do most of the daily duties outside, in what used to be the yard in the center of the huts. It also deprives them of the land that the huts use to cover to bring in their cattle.

From 2011 to 2013, decisions were not taken independently from the head management and were not adapted to local needs. This was compensated to some extent by the resources and capacity of the CR department.

Visibly, Buzwagi has enough resources to enact the decisions made in common in local meetings. There were two or three community relation officers present daily in the field and subordinated to the community relations manager. Until mid-2013, CR managers spoke fluent Kiswahili and had a

doctoral degree in Anthropology. The MD also spoke Kiswahili and even the local language Kisukuma. In 2013, the new CR manager and the Administration managers were Tanzanians.

Skills and resources adequate to ensure the decisions on CSR were enacted, which was sufficient to sustain high levels of sustainability in outcomes in 2013 when the MD was dedicated and empowered the CR department.

We could not verify whether there were any tools in place in Buzwagi to ensure the integration of the SES between operational levels.

There are no visible correlations between corporate design in buzwagi and sustainability outcomes (table 38). However, the CR has had enough resources and capacity from 2011 onwards and the MD granted greater hierarchical power to community issues in 2013. This explains why despite medium corporate design indicators, the Buzwagi site in 2013 is still the best-case scenario among our case studies.

What mainly explains the SES outcomes of Buzwagi is the context in which the company operates. Around the Buzwagi mine there are no risks of company-community conflict, and co-management capacities are very high compared to other cases.

c) LEARNING: BUZ

Performance assessment is done when the company encounters more frequent thefts and trespassing rates. In such cases, the company increases its presence and communication with ward level authorities. Another strategy change demonstrating the learning process taking place in case of threats from the ground, was to integrate youth from the neighboring villages in an employment program in view of reducing this security issue [Press release BUZ 2011; Interviews ward and villages 2011]. The intermediary of an NGO specialized in conflict resolution (SFCG) is another tool used by the BUZ to gain bottom-up knowledge, and adapt new strategies accordingly. Since 2011, the NGO SFCG has investigated conflict issues without the communities knowing that the NGO is working for ABG. This allows SFCG members to participate in meetings and make independent visits to gather non-biased information from communities. For instance, they could certify that most intruders came from the Mwime village, and advised BUZ to give more feedback on the irrigation and fish dam demands from this village to allow for other activities to become more profitable for those villagers [T.153]. The MD in 2012-2013 also gained awareness of local context to inform his decision-making, through the regular meetings he attended at the Ward level and the fact that he regularly received the members of SHDEFA (local NGO) [T.148; T.154]. His decision to increase security prevention after the level of theft grew shows a change of strategy informed by knowledge coming from the field. There is no evidence of strategic change at the HQ level that would come from a learning mechanism at the operational levels.

Learning from the ground level to the CR and head management at OP goes through the correction of mistakes and the revision of the strategy. We cannot certify that there is a link between these double loop learning processes and the high sustainability of implementation of SES because of the short-term research period (table 76). However, in this case, it seems clear that learning processes did allow better understanding of community-company relationships.

d) CONCLUSION BUZWAGI INTERNAL DRIVERS

Internal drivers exercise an important influence of outcomes in case of Buzwagi (table 38). Key dimensions of leadership for SES are present such as dedication, autonomy, and resources. Learning processes might also play a role but our study was too short to evaluate their impact (chapter 10).

Table 38. Buz internal drivers

BUZ		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-2013
HQ-OP discourse	HQ leadership	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Discourse continuity	LOW	LOW	LOW
MD (cultural) leadership	MD dedication to SES	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
	MD's recognition of CR	LOW		HIGH
CR (cultural) leadership	CR self-perception			
	CR dedication	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH
CR integration	Internal relationships CR-other	MED	MED	MED
	Other dpt perceptions on communities	LOW	LOW	LOW
CORPORATE CULTURE		LOW	MED	MED/HIGH
HQ-OP alignment	HQ leadership		LOW	HIGH
	HQ-OP continuity	LOW	MED	HIGH
MD management	Hierarchical power of CR	LOW	LOW	HIGH
	Internal clarity/continuity	LOW	MED	MED
CR mgt leadership	Autonomy in decision	MED	LOW	LOW
	Process management/Capacity	MED	MED	MED
CR integration	Tools			
CORPORATE DESIGN		LOW	LOW	MED
Learning buz	Ground OP	MED	HIGH	HIGH
	OP - HQ	LOW	LOW	LOW
LEARNING		LOW/MED	MED	MED
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		LOW/MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH

Since the company operates in an area where communities are used to collaborating together and have no history of violence, the more the company's internal drivers are in favor of sustainability implementation, the higher it scores on sustainability levels of outcomes (as we will explain in chapter 10).

7. Internal company Drivers in ABG's North-Mara Gold Mine in Tanzania

Local governance drivers around NMGM are also not favorable to successful implementation despite a slight improvement in co-management capacities of neighboring communities in 2013.

a) CORPORATE CULTURE: NMGM

The key function of social sustainability, according to ABG, is securing profit for shareholders in the short term. In Tanzanian newspapers, on the company's website, and in NMGM's public relation manager's discourse [PR discourse] ABG recognizes the necessity to mend the company's relationship with local people. ABG's priority, presented in these articles, is to give its version of important incidents related to conflicts and to describe how the company is resolving these issues by contributing to development in the communities [ref articles and website]. This approach diverges from the HQ's discourse of "inclusion and dialog" or from long-term perspectives. Discourse continuity between HQ and OP seems weak.

Starting by close to no dedication, SES became a priority in 2011-2012 but appears to have gone back to not favorable to the implementation of SES in 2013. The MD's recognition of the CR department followed the same trajectory from 2011 to 2012.

Field research before 2011 did not provide much indication of the MD's dedication to SES and communities at the time. However, workers and community members' reactions to and comparative

judgment about the MD who arrived in 2011 implicitly suggest that, before 2011, the MD had little or no contact with communities. The MD's attitude was thus not in favor of implementing social sustainability. In 2011, the company hired an international NGO specialized in conflict resolution, Search For Common Grounds (SFCG), to help ease company-community relationships. SFCG advised that the managing director (MD) be more present in communities. The MD followed this advice, which manifested his dedication to answering neighboring communities' demands. When SFCG talked with elders, they asked to have a visit of the Managing Director of NMGM. Apparently, SCG convinced the MD to come, and he visited almost every neighboring village. This was corroborated by local people; they were talking about the new manager who is "really nice" and gave them hope [SFCG Tarime 2011]. In 2011, even people working for the company presented the MD as being better than the one before, especially because he attended a few meetings of the workers in 2011 (workers have meetings every morning to get a briefing by their supervisors) [ABG worker 26.08.11]. In 2011-2012, the MD came to visit the village authorities, VEOs, allowing them to express their demands directly to him. Most communities and workers interviewed recognized that the MD from 2011 to February 2012 was a leader in stakeholder engagement; his presence in and attitude towards neighboring communities demonstrated that he considered stakeholder engagement as an important value (witnessed by local government authorities, project beneficiaries and individual community members interviewed in 2012 and 2013). His decision to implement the promises that had not been fulfilled by the precedent company achieved to convey the image of an MD comparatively highly dedicated to SES and communities between 2011 and 2012. In 2012-2013, the new MD was not present in communities. An interviewee in the communities explained that he was not attending any meetings at the village level and did not visit the communities. For communication, he asks for letters to go through liaison officers of the CR department who are based in each neighboring villages. According to the district government, to the local government (division, ward, and village), and to ABG project beneficiaries [2013 interviews], the new (since February 2012) Managing Director (MD) does not have strong leadership on questions related to community demands [NMGM 2013].

Given the absence of access to the company's managers, it is only through our contact with workers and external partners of the company that we can draw an idea of the MD's recognition of the community relations department's work. Before 2011, there was no access even to remote informers. In 2011-2012, it was made quite clear to us that the CR was somehow recognized, especially because the MD worked closely with the community relations manager in drafting the implementation agreements to fulfill the promises of the former company. In 2012-2013, from the union workers' impression that the CR is diminished and from external partner's insight on the CR department's lack of links with the MD, it is clear that the CR had little support and little communication with the MD [2013 interviews].

Since access was not granted to conduct interviews with CR managers or officers in the NMGM, our study cannot assess the self-perception of CR department members during the period between 2011-2013. However, by consulting communities and other working partners of the CR, we reached the conclusion that the CR attitude did not demonstrate dedication to communities or SES, since local leaders and community members did not trust CR officers. Their attitude did not convey any attention to the community's needs or demands.

Concerning the relationship of the CR with other departments, it seems clear that the CR department is separated from other departments [ABG external partner 2013]. That has been the case from the beginning of ABG.

This is also enhanced by the fact that the perception of other departments on communities is not very understanding of cultural differences. In 2012, higher hierarchy employees, mostly European expatriates, are not close to less qualified ones, who are usually Tanzanians [T.107]. The perception by ABG workers that Tanzanians have a very low possibility to become senior managers also conveys the idea that the perception of other departments on communities are not favorable to the CR's task of implementing SES [T.107]. In 2013, Tanzanians and expatriates did not communicate much together.

During the two first years of our research, corporate culture levels and sustainability levels reached by the NMGM were the same, and in the last year, corporate culture was low while sustainability of SES was medium to low (table 39). This means that there might be a correlation between corporate culture and sustainability but it is not absolute.

b) CORPORATE DESIGN: NMGM

Until 2012, in ABG's Buzwagi and North-Mara mines, there were no particular initiatives, structures or tools in place to articulate a socially sustainable strategy. In 2013, NMGM was improving its community programs, and funding was raised in 2013. The partnership of ABG with SFCG showed no signs of activity in 2012 and rare meetings took place in 2013. Thus, discrepancies between headquarters plans and achievements on the ground progressively improved from 2011 to 2013.

Links between the CR department officers and managers over the period of 2011 to 2013 are scarce, and there is no continuity in the strategy for community-company conflict management, hence the MD's management style is not favorable to implementing socially sustainable SES.

Before 2011, the MD did not take community related advice to make decisions on CSR; the hierarchical power granted to the CR department was low. In 2011-2012, liaison officers stationed in each neighboring village were not active, and the CR manager was not present in the villages to report about community perceptions and advise the MD on community issues. Hierarchical power of the CR stayed low. In 2013, liaison officers were more active, they were assigned the task of making the link between community demands in each village and NMGM. Liaison officers report to the CR officers, who report to the CR manager, who reports to the head manager of the department, who reports to the MD. Hence, there is a long channel before demands reach the head management, which makes the hierarchical power of the CR low.

The North-Mara Gold Mine's MD changed 3 times over the period from 2011 to 2013, and consequently the leadership on SES and community issues changed. From 2011 to 2013, changes in management teams in the CR department and in the head management at operational levels are frequent, and there is no continuity in policies regarding communities, which means that internal clarity on SES and conflict-management is low.

Before 2011, as mentioned above, replacement houses constructed by NMGM to compensate families that needed to be resettled because of the mining operations were not appropriate to local ways of life, which shows the lack of research of CR managers at the time to adapt decisions to contexts.

Between 2011 and 2013, decision-making autonomy was not in favor of social sustainability strategy implementation. Since the company did not grant permission to meet with the CR department representatives from 2011 to 2013, it appears that the CR was not authorized to talk about activities without authorization from Toronto headquarters or at least from Dar-Es-Salaam. By comparison with other cases, this situation hints at the lack of autonomy of the CR at the operational level to take spontaneous decisions on who to talk to and how to present their work. In 2011-2013, the fact that there were no studies on local income activities or socio-economic profiles or perceptions conducted on the ground also demonstrates that CSR activities were not based on an understating of local contexts, and thus cannot be adapted to it. In 2011, Sungusungu leadership was not included in the decisions related to selection and training of local security guards for NMGM. This shows a lack of knowledge about local settings, which even creates exclusions and tensions in an already tense community. However, in 2012, when the company and local government started signing agreements to implement the former owner's promises, it was a very important move towards adapting strategies to local demands. People had been protesting a lot about these former agreements not being implemented and complaining about the absence of CSR activities in affected villages. Signing and starting to implement these agreements was a move that manifested the will to adapt decisions to the local needs and demands. In 2013, apparently due to the economic situation of the company, not only did implementation of these agreements stop, but the MD even had to ask the headquarters before making decisions [T.141; T.142].

Before 2011, the CR did not have enough budget to make any substantial contribution in either infrastructure constructions or CSR funding. Thus, financial capacity was obviously low. The community engagement CR manager since 2008 has some experience of the local context; he is a Tanzanian, but is mostly familiar and trained to manage security related problems, not community dialog and development issues, since he had experience as chief security officer in charge of intruders from 2004 to 2005 for NMGM. His long experience with intruders can play in favor or against implementation of the stakeholder engagement strategy. In 2011-2012, one of the CR officers was a native of one of the neighboring villages, she was one of the beneficiaries of a scholarship that allowed her to study law in Dar-Es-Salaam, where she obtained a degree before answering a call for application from ABG found in the national newspaper. This is a sign of recruitment choices in favor of the implementation of socially sustainable company-community conflict, considering that with family and friends being stakeholders, there is deeper understanding of the local specificities (HIGH/MED).

CSR decisions materialized in the Village Development Implementation Agreements signed early in 2012. From May 2012 to March 2013, a lot of CSR activities were taking place, demonstrating the financial and material capacity to enact CSR decisions (4 new schools, new local government office, construction of bore holes for water, new roads, support for local entrepreneurship projects). Implementation of CSR projects has stopped since the fall of the gold prices in March 2013. The CR manager during this period is a Tanzanian born and raised in one of the villages neighboring the NMGM, all of which suggests that in 2012-2013, process management levels were arguably in favor of SES implementation.

All departments are implicated in CSR, compensation and local project support depending on the specificities (CR, mines, exploration and land for compensation, security and CR for employment in guarding, engineering and CR for building infrastructure, etc.). The CR department does not

communicate much internally about its strategies for communities. Overall during the period from 2011 to 2013, integration of the CR at operational levels appeared to be medium.

During our research period from 2011 to 2013, and despite variations in the tools and structures related to the implementation of SES, corporate design at NMGM did not fluctuate much. It did become progressively more favorable to social sustainability, growing from a design that gave no space for social sustainability to be implemented to one that gave some leadership to the CR. Since the corporate design levels and the sustainability of SES levels matched only in the first year (table 39), there is little evidence of an existing correlation between corporate design and success of sustainability implementation in the management of company-community conflicts in the case of NMGM.

c) LEARNING: NMGM

Before 2012, there was a grievance mechanism, but the lack of feedback from CR to HQ resulted in grievances not being addressed. As a result, feedback from the ground to the operational level was medium. In 2012, the decision to implement the new village agreements came as a demonstration of recognition of past grievances, which were hindering the capacity to manage conflicts. In 2011, NMGM was reassessing community relations and several developments plans to align with government and community plans (tripartite). In 2011, ABG engaged with representatives of five villages to close out legacy issues: the company ended up paying \$100 000 per village and signing Village benefit agreements to enact previous promises made by the first investor of the North-Mara mine to the five neighboring villages. Two villages agreed in 2011, the others followed in 2012. Taking into account past grievances and signing agreements to ease tensions that built up before ABG owned the mine shows that the management at operational levels is learning from the feedback they receive from the ground. It also shows that they are changing their actions accordingly. In 2011-2012, there were signs of single loop learning at the OP level.

After mid-2012, the change of strategy towards the communities seemed to be implemented because of the knowledge of former MD. The strategy was a result of the 2011-2012 MD's dedication and decision-making that were followed through. But was it due to his dedication, or was it due to the learning systems, or both? Nonetheless, in 2012, learning from the bottom up and changing actions accordingly was part of the company strategy. The arrival of the new MD in 2012 did not coincide with the end of CSR implementation, which shows that the change of strategy was not attached solely to the personality of the former MD. Hence, the strategy at the operational level did change and led to different practices, so there is single loop learning in 2012-2013.

Barrick's CEO's press release in the Tanzanian newspapers after the May 2011 events shows the concern of the HQ on community-company conflict issues. The implication of the headquarters in operational related issues concerning community conflicts hints at the presence of double loop learning in 2011. In the sustainability report of 2012 of Barrick corporation [Barrick, 2012a], the report uses the NMGM site's innovation on conflict management through SES to inform further strategies at the corporate level to be developed at other sites, which conveys that there is a double loop learning processes in place in 2012. Hence, there is double loop learning.

However, Barrick Toronto considers that the conflicts in NMGM are important [examples of the NMGM challenges in Sustainability Report 2012, Barrick, 2012a], but also explains that ABG should no longer figure as an example because ABG is becoming independent. This would mean that the

parent company is less interested in learning from the operational level of ABG's mines in 2012. ABG is applying its strategy regarding communities in terms of social funding to all its sites in Tanzania in the form of a community fund, but the rollout of the SES strategy is not part of this strategy. There is no sign of a correlation between learning depth and sustainability of SES (table 39).

d) CONCLUSION NMGM INTERNAL DRIVERS

Table 39. NMGM Internal drivers

NMGM		Before 2011	2011-2012	2012-2013
HQ-OP	HQ leadership	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Discourse continuity	LOW	LOW	LOW
MD leadership	MD dedication to SES	LOW	MED	LOW
	MD's recognition of CR		MED	LOW
CR leadership	CR self-perception			
	CR dedication	LOW	LOW	LOW
CR integration	Internal relationships CR-other	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Other dpt perceptions on communities	LOW	MED	MED
CORPORATE CULTURE		LOW	MED	LOW
HQ-OP alignment	HQ leadership		LOW	HIGH
	HQ-OP continuity	LOW	LOW	HIGH
MD leadership	Hierarchical power of CR	LOW	LOW	LOW
	Internal clarity/continuity	LOW	LOW	LOW
CR leadership	Autonomy in decision	LOW	MED	LOW
	Process management/Capacity	LOW	HIGH/MED	MED
CR integration	Tools	MED	MED	MED
Corporate DESIGN		LOW	LOW/MED	MED
Learning	Ground OP	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
	OP - HQ	LOW	HIGH	HIGH/MED
LEARNING		LOW	HIGH	HIGH/MED
SUSTAINABILITY OF SES		LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED

Corporate culture and design drivers appear to have an influence on sustainability of SES implemented every year (table 39). Learning processes, however, do not seem to explain the success or failure of implementation.

E. COMPARATIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NO EXPLANATION

In most cases, there is a tendency for internal drivers to be similar to SES sustainability implementation, i.e., between how favorable internal company drivers are and the variation of success in the implementation of a sustainable conflict-management strategy (table 40).

Table 40. Conclusions company culture and design drivers

Company Internal Drivers		Before 2011	2011-12	2012-13
SMD	CORPORATE CULTURE	LOW	LOW/MED	LOW
	CORPORATE DESIGN	LOW	LOW	LOW/MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	MED/LOW	MED/LOW	LOW
SAG	CORPORATE CULTURE	MED/HIGH	MED	LOW
	CORPORATE DESIGN	MED/LOW	MED	MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	MED	MED/HIGH	HIGH
GGM	CORPORATE CULTURE	HIGH	MED	MED
	CORPORATE DESIGN	HIGH	MED	MED/HIGH
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	MED	MED	MED/HIGH
BUZ	CORPORATE CULTURE	LOW	MED	MED/HIGH
	CORPORATE DESIGN	LOW	LOW	MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	LOW/MED	HIGH/MED	HIGH
NMGM	CORPORATE CULTURE	LOW	MED	LOW
	CORPORATE DESIGN	LOW	LOW/MED	MED
	SUSTAINABILITY OF SES	LOW	MED/HIGH	LOW/MED

Concerning the cultural aspects of companies, coherent with organization theories and business studies, we find that a favorable corporate culture is essential for the company to succeed in implementing a sustainable strategy. To the debates on corporate culture being homogeneous or

heterogeneous, we settled on its heterogeneity. From the beginning, this was clear from the definition that we chose to give to culture. Our observations confirmed this assumption. In most cases, operational level corporate culture is not a reflection of HQ discourses. Even if objectives at the corporate level are sometimes weakened and sometimes reinforced at the OP level, this is not decisive for implementation outcomes. This contradicts one of our expectations. Leadership enforcement of a sustainable vision is, however, critical, whether it is in line with HQ commitments or not. We confirm that leadership of the MD and the CR are crucial to obtaining positive outcomes, especially their dedication. To the overly static culture definition of the business literature [Hatch, 1993] and the overly dynamic ones of anthropology studies [Geertz, 1973], Moore proposes to develop the view of a “third” culture arguing that “transnational business and the people associated with them do not in fact form solidarity cultures, but a kind of global ‘Transnational Capitalist Society’” [Moore, 2012]. This means that businesses are influenced by neither national nor organizational cultures exclusively, but rather are part of a complex connectivity in which different degrees of global integration coexist.

Corporate structures, processes, and tools, are not as essential as dedication of the SES leaders. They are still essential inasmuch as they enable a dedicated leader to push his vision through financial, material, and human resources. It is important, however, to have continuity in leadership in order to implement an innovative sustainable strategy. In cases where there is too much turnover of managers and MD, the sustainability outcomes do not last. Hierarchical power, that is, the formal relationship and the number of levels of hierarchy separating the manager in charge of the strategy and the MD, is also critical. Capacity, resources, and autonomy also stand out in our final analysis. Resources and autonomy to make adapted decisions according to the CR’s perceptions and competences about local contexts are the most important elements of corporate design to successfully implement innovations. This confirms that the similar finding of Beishim & Liese [2014] on PPPs is also true for effective implementation of sustainable strategies by MNCs in ALS.

We contribute to the organizational theories, management and business studies, by creating a framework to assess the effect of corporate culture, corporate design, and learning processes separately in the success of implementation of an innovative sustainable strategy of conflict management. By doing so, we make it possible to isolate various dimensions of each of these internal company drivers in understanding the implementation challenge.

The impact of alignment on discourses between HQ and OP was difficult to assess, since we could not directly speak with any managers of the ABG sites. However, even without accurate data on this dimension, it does not seem to be the most relevant factor in explaining success or failure of implanting a sustainable strategy. What does matter, however, is the type of people the HQ chooses to recruit in key positions related to community issues. For example in the SMD, security department negative discourse affects the overall dedication to community issues, especially in the absence of a CR manager! Not recruiting a CR manager who could compensate their ignorance of the local context is a mistake that leads to the complete drop in sustainability outcomes. On the contrary, recruitment of a dedicated MD and CR in the case of NMGM and Buz played an important role in the outcomes of sustainability implementation. Alignment on discourse and continuity of design, however, strengthens the image of AGA’s will to implement sustainable company-community relations. If CR managers were dedicated it is because the MD recruited them and chose

to leave them in place in AGA contrary to the SMD for instance where the head management decided not to recruit a new CR manager in 2013.

We found that Internal clarity or its absence is not decisive in the outcomes of sustainability strategies. The integration of the sustainability strategies within each department turned out not to play a role in incremental implementation of a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy. We still believe it is fundamental for fundamental changes to occur [along with, for instance, Rees et al. 2012; Kemp 2012].

Our study finds that learning processes do not explain sustainability outcome variation in our case studies. However, they might be relevant in the long run. Learning processes take time to make a difference in outcomes, especially if they are double or triple loops. A three-year research project does not give enough time to adequately assess their influence.

Chapter IX — Conclusions of Part 3

What have we learned from the analysis in the previous chapters? Are most common explanations identified in the literature relevant to explain the adoption of sustainable SES? Do we corroborate the main reasons for the implementation of sustainability most studies have focused on? How else can we explain the success or failure of companies implementing stakeholder engagement strategies as community-company management strategies?

Since 2011, the SMD, NordGold's mine in Guinea, has not managed to implement sustainable SES. In its Guinean operation however, AGA achieved comparatively high levels of sustainability in SES in 2013 while it started at a medium level in 2011. The GGM, AGA's Tanzanian operation, kept a steady level of medium sustainability since 2011, with slight improvement in 2013. The higher level of SES in the five case studies is reached by Buzwagi, ABG's mine in the lake zone of Tanzania, which has jumped from low levels to high levels of sustainability in SES from 2011 to 2013. ABG's North-Mara Gold Mine operations in Tanzania started with no SES, then increased its sustainability significantly, to finally decrease to a low level of sustainability in SES in 2013. What explains such variations in implementation of social sustainability in conflict management at operational levels (table 14: DV variation over time and sites p.109)?

First, through our analysis in Chapter 5 to 8, we find that none of the main drivers identified in the literature explains the variation. In this synthesis chapter, we also note that the combination of external international drivers and host country drivers do not hold a more convincing explanation than the combination of company internal and international drivers. However, it does seem that host country drivers to some extent influence local governance drivers, which in turn appear to mitigate the effect of internal drivers on company implementation of SES.

A. SYNTHESIS PART 3

None of the identified drivers taken alone can explain the variation of sustainability of SES in our case studies over time.

In Chapter 4, an analysis of our cases studies according to the main criteria for CSR adoption by MNCs pointed out by international relation and political science literature [Ruggie 2003; Potoski & Prakash 2006] shows that external international drivers do not directly affect MNCs behavior at OP levels. Political science studies spotted that the variation of statehood might influence how

companies behave inside their borders [Graham & Woods 2006]. They also accounted for the enforcement capacity and will of the state, as well as the possible functional equivalence for the shadow of hierarchy [Börzel & Thauer 2013]. They consider, for example, the level of state restraint or alternative accountability mechanisms to make companies act consistently with international standards they voluntarily commit to [Börzel 2010]. In Chapter 5, we presented these country factors related to statehood in Tanzania and Guinea. We conclude that these do not directly influence the variation of implementation of social sustainability by gold mining companies. The literature on natural resource management, conflict, and peace, as well as development or political science studies interested in local dynamics, points to local drivers related to risk and trust among communities and between communities and the company [Plummer & Fitzgibbon, 2006; Armitage, et al 2008; Cundill & Fabricius, 2010; Worchel 2005; Kuhn & Pool 2000]. These local governance drivers, evaluated against each of our case study areas in chapter 7, do not seem relevant in explaining the success of a company's implementation of social sustainability. In business studies and organizational theory, the role of structure and processes has been an evident focus to analyze how strategies are carried out from the top-down [Linnenluecke & Griffith 2010; Hilson & Murck 2000; Epstein & Buhovac 2010]. Management studies have also pointed out the important role of culture in successfully implementing a change of strategy [Dauber et al 2012; Schein 2004; Hofstede 2010]. There is also wide evidence in the literature about the importance of learning-feedback loops to allow organizations to change and learn from the mistakes in their systems, structures, processes, and to question their strategies and assumptions [Pahl-Wolstl 2010; Argyris & Schön 1999]. To the lack of operational framework needed to analyze these various features of culture in an organization, we contribute by providing ways to categorize visible aspects of culture as they manifest themselves in the implementation of a socially sustainable strategy. We use this analytical framework to assess how favorable each company's internal drivers (culture, design, and learning) are to implementing a sustainable conflict management strategy in chapter 7. We found that there is a tendency for internal favorable drivers to lead to more sustainable strategies, and vice versa.

The following table synthesizes the analysis of these various factors from 2011 to 2013 (table 41).

Table 41. Synthesis of drivers and sustainability over time

Time period	Country-Company-Sites		GUINEA		TANZANIA		
			NordGold (NG)	AngloGold Ashanti (AGA)	African Barrick Gold (ABG)		
	Drivers-DV	SMD	SAG	GGM	BUZ	NMGM	
Before 2011	International Drivers		LOW	HIGH	HIGH		
	Country	Regulations	LOW		LOW		
		Enforcement	LOW		LOW		
	Locality	Co-management	MED	HIGH	MED	HIGH	LOW
		Risk	HIGH	LOW/MED	MED +	LOW	HIGH
	Company	Culture	LOW	MED/HIGH	HIGH/MED	LOW	LOW
		Corporate design	LOW	MED -	HIGH	LOW	LOW
SES SUSTAINABILITY		MED/LOW	MED	MED	LOW/MED	LOW	
2011-2012	International Drivers		LOW	HIGH	HIGH		
	Country	Regulations	MED		LOW		
		Enforcement	LOW		MED		
	Locality	Co-management	MED	HIGH -	HIGH	HIGH	LOW +
		Risk	HIGH -	MED	MED	LOW	HIGH
	Company	Culture	LOW/MED	MED	MED	MED	MED
		Corporate design	LOW	MED -	MED +	LOW	LOW/MED
SES SUSTAINABILITY		MED/LOW	MED/HIGH	MED	HIGH -	MED +	
2012-2013	International Drivers		LOW	HIGH	HIGH		
	Country	Regulations	MED		LOW		
		Enforcement	LOW		MED		
	Locality	Co-management	MED	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH	HIGH -
		Risk	HIGH	MED	MED +	LOW	HIGH/MED
	Company	Culture	LOW	LOW	MED	MED/HIGH	LOW
		Corporate design	LOW/MED	MED -	MED/HIGH	MED	MED
SES SUSTAINABILITY		LOW	HIGH -	MED/HIGH	LOW	HIGH -	

From the above table, we observe that in most cases (eleven out of fifteen), there is a correlation between the level of internal company drivers and levels of sustainability in SES implementation. However, in four out of our fifteen cases, the correlation is not as clear (SAG and GGM before 2011, BUZ 11-12, SAG and BUZ 12-13). Why? We explore in chapter 10 how the interaction of drivers — especially local governance drivers and internal company drivers — can explain the success or failure to implement a sustainable SES at operational levels.

The interactions of the three identified internal dimensions appear to be part of the solution to successful implementation. In the next part (part 4), we bring the interrelated dimensions of internal company drivers together in explaining the success or failure of implementing social sustainability once it has been adopted at the top. Internal dimensions, however, cannot lead to successful implementation of a new strategy without their interaction with external environments. Literature on natural resources, conflict, and development studies emphasize the importance of the role given to local stakeholders in managing issues that pertain to their livelihood and well-being [Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006; Armitage et al 2008]. Although we found that they do not explain the success of sustainability implementation alone, we find that they exercise a mitigating effect on internal company drivers.

B. LIMITS OF EXTERNAL DRIVERS AS AN EXPLANATION FOR VARIATION OF IMPLEMENTATION AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS

The combination of host country drivers and international drivers does not help to understand the variation in implementation of sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies at an operational level. As the previous table and the following table illustrate (table 41 and table 42 combining host country and international drivers), there are very wide variations in SES sustainability when country drivers and international drivers stay almost constant from 2011-2013.

From 2011 to 2013, Guinea's statehood improved its mining sector related regulation through the promulgation of a new mining code, but in such a short period, enforcement capacities did not follow the same improvement (see chapter 6). During the same period, international external drivers of NordGold (NG) and AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), both operating in the Haute-Guinée region of Guinea, stayed constant (chapter 5). The SMD, operated by NG, experienced variations in internal company drivers for SES as well as slight variations in SES sustainability implementation, and the SAG, operated by AGA, has encountered important variations. If company internal drivers and SES sustainability implementation varied while Statehood and international company drivers remained steady, it implies that these external drivers do not explain variation in SES sustainability at the operational level. We thus have to explore more carefully the other potential explanatory factors.

AGA operates the GGM in Tanzania, where regulation and enforcement capacities of the state in the mining sector were relatively low from before 2011 until 2013 (see chapter 6 on country drivers). GGM is a mine owned by AGA. This parent company has given a high priority to stakeholder engagement since 2010 and, with its headquarters in South-Africa, has high external company drivers/incentives to implement sustainable strategies (see chapter 5). From before 2011 until 2013, however, GGM's implementation of sustainability in conflict management remained medium: it had very few capacity-building programs and gave little feedback to communities, while it was very accessible for complaints and met relatively regularly with many different stakeholders. Thus, neither the company external international drivers nor the host country drivers appear to have played an important role in sustainability levels of GGM's conflict management practice before 2011. It could also mean that unfavorable country drivers combined with favorable international drivers led to medium implementation of sustainability. Other companies operating under the same circumstances, however, achieved a variety of SES sustainability, such as African Barrick Gold.

African Barrick Gold operates the BUZWAGI mine and the NMGM in Tanzania. From 2011 to 2013, Tanzania's limitation of statehood stayed generally constant, despite the launching of a new mining act in 2011 (chapter 6). African Barrick Gold, with headquarters in London, and its parent company Barrick Gold Corporation, adopted a social sustainability discourse since 2011, without making social sustainability part of their core values (chapter 5). While these external drivers (country drivers and external international company drivers) stayed relatively constant from 2011 to 2013, the implementation of sustainable SES at ABG's BUZ mine jumped from low levels in 2011 to high levels in 2013, and went from low to medium low for NMGM, confirming the minor influence of external drivers on implementation of sustainable conflict-management strategies.

Table 42. Combining Host country and international drivers

		Host Country		
		HIGH	MED	LOW
International	HIGH		HIGH – (BUZ 2011-2012) HIGH (BUZ 2012-2013) MED + (NMGM 2011-2012) LOW/MED (NMGM 2012-2013) MED (GGM 2011-2012) MED/HIGH (SAG 2011-2012) MED + (GGM 2012-2012) HIGH – (2012-2013)	LOW/MED (BUZ before 2011) LOW (NMGM before 2011) MED (GGM Before 2011) LOW/MED (SAG before 2011)
	MED			
	LOW		MED/LOW (SMD 2011-2012) LOW (SMD 2012-2013)	MED/LOW (SMD Before 2011)
		SES sustainability		

Table 42 shows the combined influence of international drivers and host country drivers on SES sustainability. The influence of international drivers appears to be irrelevant in the success of implementation of SES sustainability. Most of the less successful implementations of SES are regrouped where host country drivers are unfavorable to sustainability implementation. Thus, host country drivers seem to have some influence on the overall level of sustainability attained by SES.

Due to the scale of change necessary to lead to a change in host country and international drivers, more than three years are needed before changes start being observable [Markard et al., 2012; Rotmans et al., 2001]. It is thus not surprising that international and host country drivers vary less than local drivers. Changes at the local level are, however, a sign of wider changes at the global level [Valente 2010]. The fact that companies adopted sustainable strategies triggered the variations and trends observed at the local level, even if implementation is a challenge. Successful implementations could, in turn, lead to broader changes at the global level when they combine an effective sustainability approach with criteria of success faithful to the economic paradigm [Valente 2010].

C. LIMITS OF COMPANY DRIVERS (INTERNAL AND INTERNATIONAL) AND NATIONAL DRIVERS (HOST COUNTRY AND LOCAL) IN EXPLAINING VARIATION OF SES SUSTAINABILITY

Combining internal and international company drivers (table 43), it appears clearly that internal drivers have more influence on implementation of sustainable SES than external drivers. Under favorable international incentives towards implementation of sustainability, only cases with medium or highly favorable internal drivers lead to highly sustainable implementation. International drivers play the role of pathway and awareness contributors to ease the way from adoption to implementation but do not fully explain the resulting level of sustainability that companies achieve at the operational level. Internal company factors are more decisive at the operational level, i.e., the way the adopted strategy is operationalized from HQ to the ground.

Table 43. Combining International and Internal Drivers

		International Drivers	
		LOW	HIGH
Internal Company Drivers	HIGH	MED/LOW (SMD 2011-2012) LOW (SMD 2012-2013)	LOW/MED (BUZ before 2011) LOW (NMGM before 2011) HIGH – (BUZ 2011-2012) LOW/MED (NMGM 2012-2013)
	MED	MED/LOW (SMD Before 2011)	MED + (NMGM 2011-2012) HIGH (SAG 12-13) MED (GGM 2011-2012) MED/HIGH (SAG 2011-2012)
	LOW		MED (GGM Before 2011) MED + (GGM 2012-2012) HIGH (BUZ 2012-2013) LOW/MED (SAG before 2011)
		SES sustainability	

Host country/statehood drivers, the regulation and enforcement capacity, and will of the state in which companies operate cannot explain the variation of sustainability implemented at the operational level by companies (Chapter 6). However, their interaction with two local governance drivers identified in this research hints at their limited mitigating influence on companies' successful implementation of conflict-management strategies (table 44). Companies attain a higher level of sustainability of SES when the hosting states' regulations and enforcement context contain some incentives for social sustainability and accountability of the mining sector, especially when co-management capacities of neighboring communities are higher and risk of conflicts are lower. Lower SES sustainability is found in higher risk zones, whether the host country drivers are favorable or not, and companies in lower risk zones achieve higher sustainability, especially if the hosting state provides at least medium incentives toward sustainability to the mining sector and conflict management.

Table 44. Combining local governance and host country drivers

		Host Country	
		LOW	MED
Co-management capacities	LOW	LOW (NMGM before 2011)	MED + (NMGM 2011-2012)
	MED	MED/LOW (SMD Before 2011) MED (GGM Before 2011)	MED/LOW (SMD 2011-2012) LOW (SMD 2012-2013)
	HIGH	LOW/MED (SAG before 2011) LOW/MED (BUZ before 2011)	MED + (GGM 2012-2012) MED (GGM 2011-2012) MED/HIGH (SAG 2011-2012) HIGH (BUZ 2012-2013) HIGH (SAG 12-13) HIGH – (BUZ 2011-2012) LOW/MED (NMGM 2012-2013)
		SES sustainability	
Local Risk	LOW	LOW/MED (BUZ before 2011)	HIGH – (BUZ 2011-2012) HIGH (BUZ 2012-2013)
	MED	LOW/MED (SAG before 2011) MED (GGM Before 2011)	MED/HIGH (SAG 2011-2012) MED + (GGM 2012-2013) MED (GGM 2011-2012) HIGH (SAG 12-13)
	HIGH	MED/LOW (SMD Before 2011) LOW (NMGM before 2011)	LOW/MED (NMGM 2012-2013) MED/LOW (SMD 2011-2012) LOW (SMD 2012-2013) MED + (NMGM 2011-2012)
		SES sustainability	

Host country drivers alone do not explain the observed variation in success of implementation of sustainability. However, analyzed in combination with local governance drivers it seems host country drivers have a slightly more significant influence (table 90). More specifically, host country drivers influence the local governance drivers, which in turn have some effect on overall implementation success. More sustainability within the host country combined with higher levels of co-management capacities appears to be in favor of higher sustainability implementation. When the host country is more favorable to sustainability and the risk of conflict at the local level is lower, it is also a favorable combination towards higher levels of sustainability attained by SES. Hence, local governance drivers need to be part of the explanation for the variation observed.

D. GENERAL FINDINGS

The companies' international external drivers have been constant since 2011, while SES implementation varied considerably (chapter 4 and 5). Moreover, since the two AGA mines, GGM and SAG, have different SES strategies, and the two ABG mines, BUZ and NMGM, also have different strategies, we rule out external company drivers to explain varying levels of sustainability observed at operational level. Over the same period of time, Tanzania has known a slight increase in enforcement capacities related to the gold mining sector, which did not appear to influence SES implementation of gold mining MNCs operating in the country (chapter 6). Since the SMD and the SAG are both operating in Guinea and have very different SES trajectories; and since GGM, BUZ, and NMGM have very different SES trajectories but all operate in Tanzania, we rule out the country factor as an explanation for the level of sustainability in SES.

Why are SAG and BUZ following the same SES path while they are not operated by the same companies and not even in the same country? Why are those operating in the same area, like GGM and BUZ, as well as SMD and SAG, not following the same trajectory of SES? These questions raise the need to look into the interactions of local drivers such as localities' governance specificities (co-management capacities and risks) with the operating level of MNCs' internal characteristics (corporate culture and corporate design).

Over the research period, the SMD has had low internal drivers towards sustainability, and local governance factors have not been favorable (medium co-management capacities and high risks of conflicts). In 2013, SMD had a comparatively very low level of sustainability in SES. This suggests that, overall, low internal drivers result in low sustainability levels for conflict management.

SAG maintained medium company internal drivers over time and constant high co-management capacities of communities, while the risk of conflict varied over time from low to medium. The level of sustainability in SES increased until reaching a relatively high level in 2013, pointing out the interaction effect between medium company internal drivers and high co-management capacities.

From 2011 to 2013, GGM had average levels of everything: medium internal company drivers, medium co-management capacities, and medium risks. GGM also kept a medium level of sustainability in SES over the whole period, confirming the link between internal drivers and sustainability levels.

BUZ confirms this tendency since its internal company drivers increased from low to medium while the communities' co-management capacities stayed high and kept a low risk of conflicts. In 2013,

BUZ jumped from low to comparatively very high level of sustainability in SES. BUZ attains the highest sustainability levels of SES in comparison with the other fifteen cases.

NMGM's internal capacity drivers were increasing in 2012 and decreasing in 2013, while local risks stayed high but local co-management capacities increased from low to high between 2011 and 2013. NMGM before 2011 is the only case studied where the company had not even started implementing sustainable SES. In 2013, NMGM had a medium to low level of sustainability in SES but started with no SES strategy and increased to medium levels in 2011-2012. This case points out the effect of local factors in the implementation of SES and confirms the impression that low internal company drivers lead to low sustainability.

Our conclusion concerning the influence of drivers identified in the literature is that none of them taken separately explains the variation of SES sustainability described in chapter 3 (Chapter 9). Our general findings point out the effect of internal drivers on the variation of sustainability in SES and suggest the tempering effect of local governance drivers on these internal company drivers. We conclude that it is only by exploring the combination of these two sets of local level drivers that we can explain the success or failure of companies to implement a sustainable conflict management strategy. The next chapter systematically compares each case over time to find out to what extent the interaction of these drivers explains the observed variation of SES.

Part 4: What explains the variation in implementation outcomes of socially sustainable conflict management strategies at operational levels

Complementing most international research theories about adoption of sustainability-driven trajectories in multinational companies, and coherent with business studies focusing on corporate sustainability, we find that adoption of a sustainable SES is the first step towards implementation. We chose to study cases where companies adopted SES as a means to manage conflict with communities neighboring their operations in areas of limited statehood. We consider that the practices of MNCs illustrate the progressive paradigm change from an exclusively economic-driven one toward a more sustainability-driven one [Valente 2010]. The fact that companies in the mining sector and other sectors of industry are shifting their position from perceiving themselves as operating outside the political and social domains to accepting more and more their role in society as political actors and citizens of the country they originate from and operate in [Salzmann et al, 2005; Newell 2005; Blowfield & Frynas 2005] is a sign of this evolution. Therefore, our case studies exemplify the variety of means by which companies implement sustainable SES with more or less success at the operational level, and we also explain this variety.

We summarize the empirical findings of the previous chapters to point out the most striking characteristics of each case study in table 45. The following chapter exposes the steps we took to arrive at an explanation of each case's outcomes of sustainability implementation.

Table 45. Most striking characteristics of case studies

	SMD, NordGold	SAG, AGA	GGM, AGA	BUZ, ABG	NMGM, ABG
DV1 Adoption	Emphasize on multilateralism (we are a member/neighbor of the community) No adoption of international standards	Strong emphasize on long-term (communities better off for AGA having been there) Adoption of every relevant standards	GGM has the higher frequency of visits in neighboring communities of all case studies but uses mostly unilateral communication CR department is very accessible to any type and level of stakeholders Long-term water project (answering needs) in the pipes but not effective	No particular emphasize but committed to three dimensions: Especially relationship with Tanzanian government Adoption by Barrick of international standards, ABG no commitments	NMGM has the worst behavior in 2011 ABG does not communicate neither with local government nor with non-state representatives despite a partnership with an international conflict solving NGO The most remarkable improvement in 2013 is ABG's contribution to income generating projects (including professional training)
DV2 Implementation	CR wanted to change, had a vision, but was not playing his intermediary role, his project was not backed up neither by the MD nor by the communities: big ambitions, little multilateralism Even if community representatives can easily visit CR officers, they rarely receive feedback and community projects are not followed up	Kept getting better but not linear trend Inclusion of all types and level of actors because CR very accessible (but not very responsive) Little long-term achievements (no training, no scholarships) but will to build capacity for local state (advising on compensation...) Will to adapt to local needs (studies, workshops) and train local authorities	Regulations attractive to mining sector Taxes not specifically redistributed to mining area Decentralization with no delegation of power and responsibilities to local government Media criticizing but also under influence of companies and government	Canada and UK concerned by social sustainability Strong activism	MD turnover every year or more MD in 2012 showed dedication to communities by addressing past problems and signing development contracts with each neighboring villages. This also meant more resources for CR departments. In 2013, a new MD, things were idle.
Host Country	Regulations attractive to mining sector Taxes redistributed in area of MNC operation Responsibilities delegated to local government but no resources Media little coverage	MD using advisor about communities Multiple functions and departments about communities (autonomy but little resources) Lack of communication between departments in charge Dedication of manager (information gathering)	CR very dedicated Multiple functions in charge of community issues	Increasing MD and CR manager dedication to community issues (strong CR but little resources)	MD turnover every year or more MD in 2012 showed dedication to communities by addressing past problems and signing development contracts with each neighboring villages. This also meant more resources for CR departments. In 2013, a new MD, things were idle.
Internal	MD turnover every year or more Multicultural management staff: language problems Lack of clarity on responsibilities about conflicts: security or CR CR little autonomy and resources	Strong organization of youth to benefit from MNC Regular local assemblies Massive punctual pacific conflicts MNC never answered with harsh security (prefer dialog and feedback)	Communities are historically peaceful but pressure from artisanal miners Violent conflict with people burning buses in 2012 Communities are not organized and do not communicate much together MNC uses police who uses harsh security measures	Peaceful communities historically and not much artisanal miners A lot of theft by collusion in the beginning of operations (2007) Strong cohesion within communities and with local government	Historically troublesome neighboring communities used to fight amongst each other and strong artisanal miner community Mistrust between groups within communities and towards the local government Agreement of ABG with the police using harsh security measures (killing community members on multiple occasions)
Local	Jealousies between families and between villages Ongoing pacific protest and theft Used harsh behavior but stopped before 2011				

Chapter X — Explanations of FINDINGS

Not only is there a trend towards the adoption of more sustainable strategies to manage conflicts with local stakeholders, but there is also a trend towards more success in their implementation.

The previous chapters did not convey a satisfying answer to our main research question: *when do mining MNCs who have adopted socially sustainable SES succeed in implementing them to manage community-company conflict in ALS?* In the present chapter, we analyze in detail the local interactions between companies and communities according to our local framework of analysis (figure 3 and 4 p.60-61). We compare our case studies over time for each of the sub-indicators identified in the operationalization of local governance drivers and internal drivers (chapters 7 and 8). Which specific internal company dimensions lead to success in implementation? Which local governance dimension is most critical in reinforcing favorable outputs? Under what circumstances does leadership matter the most?

In the following sections, we combine the different drivers described in the above chapters to show how their combination can help us understand the variation in sustainability level of stakeholder engagement strategies implemented at operational levels. From the previous chapters, it appears that external drivers, whether international company drivers (headquarters) or host country drivers (regulation and enforcement capacity), have little influence on implementation of SES. The combination of internal and local drivers holds more potential as an explanation for the companies' success or failure of implementing a sustainable strategy. From a broad analysis of the combination of local factors since 2011, it is clear that internal drivers are essential for successful implementation of a sustainable SES (chapter 9). It is also clear that local governance drivers can hinder or foster the effect of internal drivers. More precisely, leadership combines corporate culture and corporate design features (internal company drivers) to influence the level of sustainability in the implementation of SES by companies.

We find that the Guinean operations of Société Minière de Dinguiraye (SMD), owned by the Russian NordGold, lack internal leadership both in design and culture dimensions; this compromises successful implementation of a sustainable strategy. More precisely, the SMD's community relation (CR) department's lack of resources, added to the little dedication of the various managing directors (MD) prevents and even decreases the company's likelihood of implementing a sustainable conflict-management strategy. Moreover, the communities neighboring the SMD's operations nourish jealousies between villages and between families, which is not encouraging for the co-management of conflicts with the company. They also regularly block the worker buses to the mine and protest to obtain answers to their demands to the company, to which the company answers by sending negotiators, although it has a history of arresting artisanal miners and locking them in containers. The consequence of unfavorable internal drivers and unfavorable local governance drivers is the failure to implement a sustainable strategy.

Similarly, but too a much more serious degree, the North-Mara gold mine operated by African Barrick Gold, whose parent company is the largest gold mining MNC in the world, had zero sustainability approach when we started our study. Events of violent conflict with communities resulting in serious injuries and deaths, sometimes qualified as "massacres", were often making the

news, feeding rumors and reinforcing the stereotypes about the people and the mine. In a locality where communities distrust each other and are used to fighting to settle problems, it was necessary for the company to have a very dedicated MD in order to change the situation. This is what happened in 2012. When he left, the situation had slightly improved due to the engagement with youth groups determined to change the situation, but tensions still rose again very quickly after his departure. In this case, the improvement of state involvement in local issues also made a difference, as well as the improvement of security harmonization.

The Buzwagi mine, also operated by ABG in another sub-region of Tanzania, reached the most success in implementing the company's sustainable SES in 2013. With a continuously strong leadership for SES, dedicated and qualified to implement the strategy in a local environment characterized by strong community cohesion and peaceful history, the SES outcomes kept getting better each year. What makes these outcomes the most sustainable compared to the SAG, for instance, is particularly their long-term perspective, their frequency of meetings with stakeholders, and the level of feedback the company provides to the communities.

Anglogold Ashanti, a South African based MNC, operates the Société Ashanti de Guinée (SAG) in Guinea and the Geita Gold Mine (GGM) in Tanzania. Both have relatively favorable internal drivers, but they reach different SES outcomes.

The SAG has a rather stable internal leadership in favor of the implementation of sustainable practices. It also has the advantage of operating in a community that has favorable multi-level and inter-group relationships. Youth groups, in particular, are well organized to benefit from the company. The even greater advantage of the SAG is the absence of a legacy of community-company conflicts. The company chose to resolve issues through negotiation and CSR activities instead of using the police to arrest people or fight against artisanal miners illegally going to their pits. The SAG's involvement in capacity-building for local authorities is what allows the site to reach a higher level of sustainability in 2013 than before, even if in detail they are far from Buzwagi's outcomes.

Although the GGM's community relations department has enough resources, autonomy, power, and dedication to implement sustainable practices, their use of a harsh security approach in case of direct confrontations with neighboring communities hinders their chances of success. Their history of community-company conflict reinforces the negative perceptions and stereotypes. Added to the internal disputes between community groups, the grounds are not favorable for successful implementation of sustainable conflict management.

In the following sections, we detail the comparisons we went through in order to explain the variation of success in sustainability implementation by the company sites we studied. We describe how internal company drivers combined with local governance drivers influence sustainability levels of outcomes at operational levels. To do so, we first compare the two extreme cases (BUZ and NMGM). We apply a most-similar most-different method and systematic comparison to reach satisfying explanations for every case every year. We conclude this part with a detailed explanation of the effect of internal company drivers on outcomes, and of the mitigating effect of local governance drivers.

A. THE INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL COMPANY DRIVERS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS ON THE SUSTAINABILITY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS

The two extreme cases clearly illustrate how the interaction of internal drivers at the operational level of the company and local governance drivers affect the level of sustainability implemented by companies who adopted the most sustainable models of SES at the headquarters level.

African Barrick Gold's Buzwagi mine reaches the highest sustainability implementation among our case studies in 2012-2013 (BUZ 12-13). In this case of BUZ 12-13, the managing director shows a clear dedication to community issues. His comprehensive attitude when in contact with local community members and his recognition of the value of employees and managers in charge of community illustrates his dedication. The community relation department is obviously close to the operational level head management, has enough resources, and uses local partnerships to enact the SES. As his friendly relationships with community representatives denotes, the community relation manager is also dedicated to managing community-company conflicts in a socially sustainable way. Around the Buzwagi mine, community groups are well connected among themselves and integrated in the decision-making system of the local government. The area is renowned for its peaceful relationship with outsiders and for being the cradle of the sungusungu². BUZ also never resorted to open confrontation against thieves and intruders. These favorable circumstances result in the higher level of sustainability outcomes among our case studies over the period from 2011 to 2013.

On the opposite end of sustainability implementation is the NMGM, African Barrick Gold's mining site in North-Mara before 2011. In the NMGM case before 2011, there were no signs of the company's dedications to social sustainability regarding community issues. Neither were company member's attitude and relationship to communities (relationships were quasi inexistent with local stakeholders), nor were the resources, tools, or structure of the company enacting any socially sustainable conflict management strategy. The local context was also unfavorable. Communities living around the NMGM have a long history of inter-clan clashes and mistrust. On top of that, the company's security partnership with the Tanzanian police resulted in regular open conflict with artisanal miners, causing injuries and death of community members (and worsening negative perceptions on both sides). In this case, the absence of socially sustainable outputs for community-company conflict management, combined to unfavorable local governance drivers led to no sustainability at all in the strategy's outcomes.

What do these extreme cases suggest as explanations for this variation? The main suggestion this comparison leads to is that favorable internal drivers lead to more sustainable outcomes. It also suggests that local governance drivers have a positive influence, enhancing the effect of favorable internal drivers.

Another comparison, the SAG compared to the NMGM in 2012-2013, leads to a curious observation. Both company sites at the time encounter high co-management capacities and medium local risks. Their corporate culture is unfavorable, and corporate design features are average. While the SAG reached relatively high SES sustainability, the NMGM's implementation is medium to low. This leads us to a more detailed evaluation of sub-indicators. It illustrates how a dedicated sustainability manager, enjoying autonomy and a close relationship with the managing director, can overcome otherwise moderately favorable internal drivers. This seems to be reinforced by the fact that the

SAG's neighboring communities are not as conflicting, not as strongly attached to ASM, and more cooperative than those around the NMGM in 2012-2013. The SAG also never resorted to harsh security measures against artisanal miners, whereas the NMGM has a long history of community-company conflicts to overcome.

We will start by exploring the two extreme cases before elucidating this odd comparison and moving on to detailing the findings suggested by the systematic comparison of similarities and differences in each cases.

a) NMGM BEFORE 2011: FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT SES

The North-Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) case before 2011 is the worst-case scenario with low internal drivers, low co-management capacities, and high risks of community-company conflict resulting in the lower levels of implementation of sustainability in SES.

What we observed at the time is that SES was not implemented at all by the NMGM before 2011. Encounters between the company and local communities were very rare and led to little feedback from NMGM, who had not been building social infrastructure and did not have capacity-building projects in place.

Every single indicators of operational level corporate culture in the NMGM before 2011 was low, including key leadership features (MD and CR manager's dedication to SES). "They [NMGM representatives] comes if they have problems... maybe they say they come to the village every month, but we don't see them" [T.109, Village Chairman, Tarime District, 07.06.12 (translated from Kiswahili)]. There was no trace of bottom-up learning processes taking place, either from ground to MD or from operational levels to HQ. Corporate design also showed no favorable dimensions for implementing SES except some degree of integration of CR through the implication of all departments in CSR related to their relevant expertise.

Local risks of company-community conflicts were the highest and co-management capacities were the lowest of the five cases over time and areas. In fact, communities neighboring the NMGM are used to resorting to violent means in their relationships amongst themselves and between clans, and the perceptions of one another are very negative on both sides. Communities perceive the NMGM as exploiting local unqualified people, for example by using them for small "slave-like" labor on community projects ("bring me this", "carry that") [T.47]. Reciprocally, the Kurya people see themselves as warriors, making it difficult to collaborate with them [TZ 2011, 2012, 2013]. The company adopted an attitude of non-engagement and used harsh security measures against ASM. This might be due to fear or to the conviction that there was no solution to be found in negotiating with these local communities, since even local authorities consider violent means to be more appropriate in the area [T.139].

Additionally, before 2011, communities' cohesion was low due to the generalized distrust among local groups and unfavorable security actors and structures. The fact that the sungusungu system did not get accepted within the Kurya communities illustrates the mistrust among Kurya:

"[the sungusungu] didn't make sense... no one knows who is part, who is not... and people didn't trust the ones who were part of it (...) community policing also cannot take root, because it is done in collaboration with the police and with the government... villagers trust neither!" [SA.2]

Also, district authorities deliberately excluded village authorities from discussion on closure plans for 2012. There is also a lack of cohesion between the district and the village level. In case of need, NMGM comes to the District, and district officials consider that there is no need for the company to deal directly with village officials: “NMGM goes to the villages only for operational matters, in any other case they should use the mediation of the District level experts depending on issues” [T.139, Tarime District Commissioner, 14.11.2013]. ASM was the most important economic activity in the area, and, before 2011, was supported by customary authorities who benefited from it, while communities had no alternative income-generating activities. Moreover, communities used blockage, sabotage, trespassing, theft, and aggressiveness to make the company accountable, while in response the company privileged harsh security over negotiation. These choices led to international law suits against ABG [BHRRC 2013; Hodges et al., 2013].

The NMGM case before 2011 suggests that the interaction between unfavorable internal company drivers and unfavorable local governance drivers led to the failure to implement a sustainable SES despite international incentives and the adoption of a sustainable approach at the headquarters level. The closest comparable case is the SMD before 2011 (and until 2013), where internal drivers were low and risks of conflict high but co-management capacities were medium instead of low. The result in implementation of sustainability was comparatively a little better than the NMGM before 2011, but was still among the lowest of the five case studies. This comparison hints at the enhancing effect of co-management capacities on the sustainability level of SES.

b) BUZ 2012-2013: HIGHER SES SUSTAINABILITY

The Buzwagi mine in 2012-2013 reached the comparatively highest levels of SES sustainability of the five case studies over the research period of 2011 to 2013. In fact, BUZ’s corporate culture became increasingly favorable to sustainable SES implementation from 2011 on, and in 2012-2103, corporate design features also started from unfavorable to become moderately favorable. From 2011 to 2013, the CR was very dedicated and had enough resources, but the MD’s dedication varied. Because of these favorable local settings, the more internal company drivers became favorable (chapter 8), the more the outcomes became sustainable (chapter 4). When the MD started caring more about the communities and gave more hierarchical power to the CR department in 2013, SES were inclusive of a wide variety of stakeholders which were frequently consulted, CR managers and officers became more accessible, and long-term decisions adapted to local needs were implemented as a result.

Between 2012 and 2013, levels of SES sustainability kept increasing, especially the frequency of CR visits and accessibility of CR to communities.

In 2012, the company was mostly in contact with the town and district administration. From 2011 onwards, the BUZ involved NGOs such as the international organization Search For Common Grounds (SFCG) for conflict resolution, and the local NGO SHDEFA+ for income generating project management [T.131; T.153; T.154]. Buzwagi representatives (CR staff and manager, sometimes the MD) were invited and started participating in the Ward development council (WDC)’s quarterly meetings [T.124-126; T.129; T.148].

In 2013, “Buzwagi’s CR sometimes met specifically with elders, because elders/sungusungu can feel uncomfortable in the WDC because of the undisciplined attitude of the youth... The company also holds special meetings in case of events (football) ... and Buzwagi staff conducted awareness sensitization on HIV” [T.148; ward executive director of Mwendakulima; 26.11.2013, Kahama District (translated from Swahili)].

Moreover, most decisions on CSR funding are taken according to the town development plans, which are discussed in meeting with the investors and government authorities (Mine development committee).

“The purpose of the Mine Development Committee organized at the town/district level is to discuss how contributions of Buzwagi’s CSR can improve the development of Kahama Town and District” [T.152, Town planning officer, Kahama Town, 21.11.2013].

Since 2012, BUZ is financing 12 women's associations participating in income generating activities by funding the local NGO SHDEFA+ based in Kahama.

“All these projects achieved the 1st phase of creation and management training, 8 entered the 2nd phase of capitalization for credit and saving services, the others will enter the 2nd phase by the end of the year... We plan to include youth projects and more women projects in the next financial year” [T.153, SHDEFA+ project manager, Kahama Town, 21.11.2013].

Also, BUZ’s CR manager stayed very dedicated over the whole period, and the MD’s dedication towards SES implementation evolved from poorly to very dedicated to SES and communities, increasing the leadership characteristics of corporate culture.

“Peter Burger (name of the MD in 2012) understood Kiswahili and Kisukuma (main vernacular language in Shinyanga region)... It was also easy for me to make an appointment with him over the phone, and the mine sent me a car to go there if meetings were taking place there” [T.148; ward executive director of Mwendakulima; 26.11.2013, Kahama District (translated from Kiswahili)].

Throughout the period of research, the BUZ’s CR department kept constant capacity at average levels, with skilled managers and officers, and furnished sufficient material and financial resources, even if they lacked autonomy from 2011 to 2013. Concerning operational structures, HQ leadership and continuity with OP increased significantly since 2011, with ABG launching a fund to manage community contributions in the country and through the partnership with an international NGO on conflict management. Hierarchical power of the CR department also shows signs of progress. At the same time, learning channels were reinforced from the ground to the MD (increased communication with ward authorities if theft rates increased, attendance of the MD in ward councils) despite the apparent absence of learning processes between operational levels and headquarters.

Around BUZ, neighboring communities’ co-management capacities are favorable to SES implementation, and there is little risk of conflict. Neighboring communities’ security actors and structures are well coordinated, and community cohesion is so high (high level of horizontal and informal connectedness) that it compensates for the lack of top-down involvement of the state. Communities around BUZ have the particularity of enjoying very harmonious relationships exemplified by the integration of the sungusungu administration into the WDC and by regular meetings between local authorities, local associations, and NGOs. Communities around BUZ are not used to violence. Also, ASM was not the only activity available, and elders, youth groups, and NGOs support the diversification of activities, while there is no history of company-community conflicts. The case of BUZ in 2012-2013 exemplifies how low risk of conflict combined with high co-management capacities play an enhancing effect.

The combination of favorable corporate culture and medium corporate design features for SES, added to the enhancing effect of highly favorable co-management capacities and low local risks for company-community conflicts, appears to be the best combination in our case study for achieving

higher levels of sustainability in the implementation of SES. The case of BUZ in 2012-2013 also suggests that leadership for SES (MD and CR dedication) is an important feature of corporate-culture. It also suggests that CR capacity is a core characteristic of corporate design. The closest comparable case is the SAG before 2011, with high co-management capacities, low to medium risk of conflict, medium to high corporate culture, and medium corporate design, but the SAG at the time only reached a medium level of sustainability.

Before we compare in detail the differences and similarities between the SMD before 2011 (and until 2013) and the NMGM before 2011, as well as those between the BUZ in 2012-2013 and the SAG before 2011, we explore the interesting comparison of the SAG and NMGM in 2012-2013.

c) SAG AND NMGM IN 2012-2013: SAME DRIVERS, DIFFERENT EFFECTS?

In 2012-2013, while both cases had similar drivers, the SAG quite successfully implemented a sustainable SES while the NMGM was close to failing. Taking a closer look at internal and local governance drivers in the cases of SAG and NMGM in 2012-2013 hints to the effect of key features of each driver on the success or failure to implement a sustainable strategy to manage conflict with neighboring communities.

First, let us examine the SES sustainability itself. The SAG reaches a high level of sustainability because representatives meet regularly with various types of stakeholders from different levels of the state, with non-state organizations, and with local associations. CR officers are regularly present for immediate conflict resolution as mediators at the village level and for meetings at the village, sub-prefecture, and prefecture levels [G.133; G.135; G.140]. The SAG also receives youth and women's associations, besides holding public forums in which communities talk about their issues with the SAG [G.109; G.112; G.132; G.133; G.138]. The SAG is very accessible to communities even if the company does not give much feedback (they listen but they do not act upon it). Both the SAG and the NMGM in 2012-2013 privilege capacity-building projects, compared to social infrastructures support. The NMGM, on the other hand, gives some feedback in the form of the VBIA. However, the CR is not accessible, and company representatives almost never visit neighboring communities and include only a small variety of local stakeholders (district-level authorities and youth groups exclusively).

Second, if corporate culture is unfavorable overall and corporate design is medium in both cases, the combination of features within each driver differs. In the SAG, there is a strong HQ-OP alignment on discourses; compared to the NMGM, the SAG's CR manager is also highly dedicated.

“We disagree with building a school for a community just because the company forced them to move from where they used to live... but we still have to be the ones announcing and supervising the process” [G.140, CR officers, 26.09.2013, SAG CR office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea].

Internal integration is also much better in the SAG than in the NMGM. However, learning processes are weak in the SAG compared to the NMGM. This suggests the importance of the CR dedication, of its internal integration, and of HQ-OP alignment in reaching a higher sustainability level, that is, in the success of implementing SES.

Third, most corporate design features are similar except for the hierarchical power given to the CR department and CR autonomy, which are higher in the case of the SAG (medium hierarchical power and high autonomy) than of the NMGM (low hierarchical power and low autonomy). Whereas the SAG has hired two NGOs to understand local contexts in order to adapt its CSR decisions accordingly

and has a sustainability manager directly advising the MD, the NMGM's CR manager is not even present in the local meetings about the VBIA. These features could thus play an important role in the success or failure to implement the sustainable strategy.

Fourth, comparing the risks of conflict, it appears that the history and level of violence in the communities before the arrival of the company, combined with a strong tradition of ASM, influence the SES implementation more than the history of conflicts encountered between the company and the community from the beginning of operations. Communities tend to use more confrontational accountability mechanisms against the SAG in 2012-2013 than those around NMGM. The response of the company to community confrontations appears to affect the overall level of sustainability of SES, since SAG's response is much more comprehensive than that of NMGM. NMGM sends the special police force to arrest people, while SAG sends its CR officers to negotiate. Communities neighboring the SAG only use violence to settle their own issues when they are political, while those around the NMGM have a long history of violent conflict among themselves (inter-clan, family, and across-border clashes). Both encounter aggressive identity risks.

"The Madinka of Siguiri [where the SAG operates] is very impulsive and proud, no one is allowed to treat our dignity with scorn. They are different from the Madinkas of Kankan who leave everything to God... Siguirika are not that patient!" [G.107, traditional communicator called "The Source", 03.11.2012 in Siguiri (translated from French)].

However, the ASM tradition is stronger around NMGM even if youth groups in both cases support alternative activities. For example, since 2012, around the NMGM, youth groups leaders are used as ambassadors of the company to help change the local mind-set, especially amongst artisanal miners/intruders:

"Our association was created by students thinking about creating a relationship with Barrick (...) After getting organized, we talked to the community relations manager (...) we presented our main motive to eradicate the idea that intrusions was the main way to make an income here (...) then ABG gave us the plans for trainings and projects (...) first we have to change the mind-sets, use every occasion to talk about it" [T.142; Secretary and member of income-generating group in Nyamongo, Tarime district, North Mara, 15.11.2013 (translated from Swahili)].

Fifth, it appears that community cohesion factors are more relevant than top-down involvement of the state in explaining the sustainability level reached by the company's SES. While the state is more involved in the case of NMGM (especially through the environment task force sent by the state to resolve land disputes, see chapter 7), than in the SAG at the time, communities around the NMGM are much less interconnected than around the SAG. For instance, around the SAG there is a committee made up of representatives of the various community groups and hunters are respected, contrary to around the NMGM where no such committee exists and sungusungu are regarded with contempt.

We have pointed out some of the main correlations and key features playing a role in the interaction of local governance drivers and internal company drivers. How do the interaction of local governance drivers and internal company drivers play out in the other cases over time? Can we verify the importance of certain elements of each driver and the effect of specific combinations of these features in the success or failure to implement a socially sustainable SES? We will now explore in more detail the other case studies to confirm, detail, or correct the suggestions brought out by

our two extreme cases, starting with the SMD and the SAG, since the SMD before 2011 (and to 2013) and the SAG before 2011 show similarities with the two extreme cases.

1. NordGold, SMD, Guinea

a) SMD BEFORE 2011 VERSUS NMGM BEFORE 2011: CR CAPACITY AND THE MITIGATING ROLE OF COMMUNITY CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES WHEN RISK IS HIGH

Before 2011, the SMD's case was comparable to the worst-case scenario exemplified by NMGM during the same period, except for the co-management capacity of neighboring communities, which was medium for SMD – mostly due to its support for local income-generation groups — while it was low for the NMGM. There are some divisions among the communities and even within groups neighboring the SMD, however, they often resolve conflict the traditional way, sitting down all together with the griot to talk about the origin of their dispute through their ancestors' stories [G.106; G.107].

The SMD before 2011 also achieved low to medium levels of SES sustainability, while the NMGM before 2011 had not started implementing SES at all. This participates in the idea that co-management capacities' higher levels enhance the SES sustainability levels. Indeed, the SES sustainability of the SMD at the time entails a relatively accessible CR department for local communities, despite the company's lack of inclusion of stakeholders in any regular dialog. The SMD before 2011 participated in the construction of social infrastructures and funded capacity-building projects with a long-term perspective.

SES implementation by the SMD before 2011 was characterized by irregular contact with elders and local authorities and poor, unilateral communication with neighboring communities, which is similar to NMGM before 2011. The only difference from NMGM at the same period is that despite little inclusiveness and asymmetrical communication, the SMD still focused on long-term projects, providing support for local capacity-building through material and technical assistance with project planning for farmers and professional associations, contributing to some social infrastructure construction, while the company continued its short-term philanthropic donation practices (see chapter 3):

“For Ramadan, the elders⁴⁵ each used to receive 10 bags of rice to redistribute, and 4 to 5 bags of sugar. The SMD gave gifts to the wise men, to the district chiefs, and the religious leaders, and everyone appreciated. For 1 year and 5 months, there is no continuity with the previous practices (...). Last year, the SMD came to present a “forestier⁴⁶” who replaced Dombouya (former CR manager). I gave him prayers and praise but he didn't even give me 1 million GNF (about 100€).” [G.123; Dilitomba of Léro 09.11.2012, translated from Madinka].

SMD's corporate culture parameters were all low except for the self-perception of CR officers, which could be explained by corporate design features granting the department high hierarchical power and capacity. The site's corporate structures do not enable a sustainable SES to be articulated at OP levels. In sum, both corporate culture and structures at OP levels were not favorable to the implementation of sustainable SES. It is noteworthy that low levels of corporate design to enable SES in the SMD before 2011 still provided the CR with important hierarchical powers, autonomy, and

⁴⁵ Elders of the villages form the wise men council, a traditional social institutions of the Madinka people in charge of conflict resolution (mostly domestic and clan related disputes).

⁴⁶ Forestier is the term used to designate the main ethnic group from “Guinée Forestière”, the southeast region of Guinea.

good skills and resources. In NMGM before 2011, all parameters of design were low: little autonomy, little capacity, and no hierarchical power. Hence, these three dimensions of corporate design appear to play a crucial role in the implementation of the company's SES strategy. There might also be a link between the autonomy, skills and capacity of the CR, and the resulting SES focus on long-term projects.

At the local level, while in the NMGM before 2011 all parameters of risks were high, the only parameter that did not present a risk of company-community conflicts in the case of the SMD before 2011 is the absence of a history of violence among communities. Thus, communities neighboring the SMD do not commonly use violent means to deal with problems, despite an aggressive identity and negative perceptions of one another. ASM used to be a major economic activity supported by customary systems and there were scarce initiatives for alternative income generating activity. The community started using blockages, theft, and threats to obtain employment as accountability strategies against the SMD since the beginning of operations, while the SMD answered with the help of the army, arresting and holding people in custody, using force and inhuman practices (locking people in containers in the sun for days). Co-management capacities of communities neighboring the SMD were comparatively high before 2011, especially compared to the NMGM. Indeed, before 2011, the state was strongly involved in top-down (questionable) accountability mechanisms especially on employment issues (the president intervened to get close to a hundred people hired arbitrarily). Community cohesion was medium, and security structures and actors were highly harmonized since there are no tensions between hunters and local people and since the CASM (military camp stationed next to mining MNCs in Guinea) carried out soft security measures through respect and non-violence [G.114]. Overall co-management capacities reach medium levels. Community cohesion, particularly the connectedness of security actors with established and effective top-down collaboration, seems to be an important dimension when risks are high.

This is typically a case where the CR's hierarchical power, autonomy, and capacity combined with good co-management capacities overcome the high risks of company-community conflict and low internal drivers' parameters in favor of SES, resulting in some sustainability of SES by the company.

The case of the SMD before 2011 hints at the effect of the combination between corporate design characteristics and local governance drivers to overcome a corporate culture's lack of support for SES, resulting in some degree of sustainability in the implementation of SES. It appears that key features of corporate design such as the hierarchical power and capacity granted to the community relations' department by the managing director of the company becomes relevant in achieving relatively average sustainability in SES when neighboring communities encountered have high levels of co-management capacities. If structures enable the company's strategy of engagement despite little dedication towards SES in the company, and if these enabling structures meet with communities capable of supporting the company's strategy, even if these communities are hostile to the company, there is a chance for SES to attain some degree of sustainability.

This case also suggests that with an overall corporate culture at an operational level that is unfavorable to CR and SES, the CR self-perception can stay high if the department has hierarchical power, resources and skills. Thus, these key elements seem to compensate for the MD's lack of dedication to SES and communities.

b) SMD 2011-2012: INCREASED INCLUSIVENESS BECAUSE OF A MORE FAVORABLE CORPORATE CULTURE?

The most important change in SES sustainability in the case of the SMD in 2011-2012 compared to before 2011 was the inclusion of a wide range of stakeholders, while inclusiveness was close to zero before 2011.

Between 2011 and 2012, the SMD started including a wider range of local stakeholders but still did not make regular visits in the neighboring communities outside periods of tension. Although the CR officers and community “liaisons” regularly sit and talk with the council of wise men, customary authorities, and local state authorities (mayor, sub-prefect, district presidents), the CR manager is very rarely present in communities [G.83; G.86; G.88; G.89]. Communication did not improve since 2011: the SMD kept on their unilateral information-giving centered on their interests and did not take feedback from communities into account. Capacity-building projects were slowly fading due to the lack of follow-up but were still in place, while philanthropic activities stopped and infrastructure construction did not improve in a long-term perspective. Overall, sustainability of SES implemented by the SMD in 2011-2012 stayed medium to low.

Corporate culture characteristics stayed the same as before 2011 except for the CR manager’s dedication to SES, which jumped from low to medium-high. Indeed, in 2011-2012, the CR manager was trying to implement a collective development strategy for local communities. He wanted to put an end to philanthropic practices and wanted to focus on supporting collective projects exclusively [G.118]. However, structures were more favorable to SES before 2011 considering key characteristics such as hierarchical power and capacity of CR, which were high before 2011 and medium to low in 2011-2012. In 2011-2012, corporate culture at operational levels concerning SES was medium to low, because the improvement of CR’s dedication to SES and self-perception seems to have filled the gap of the MD’s disregard for SES, the communities, and the CR department. The SMD’s corporate design was not favorable to SES, there was no alignment between HQ and operational levels, the CR had little hierarchical power and little autonomy, and the department’s capacity was lower than before 2011. Altogether, internal drivers were not favorable for sustainable SES to be implemented, but a key aspect of corporate culture – CR leadership – improved. SMD in 2011-2012’s medium to low corporate culture, including a relatively highly dedicated CR manager with some hierarchical power and autonomy, resulted in medium to low implementation of SES. This suggests that if the CR’s dedication enhanced, the effects of this improvement were mitigated by the drop in CR capacity and hierarchical power, resulting in medium to low SES sustainability. If CR dedication were combined with a higher level of capacity, hierarchical power, or autonomy, then we should find higher levels of sustainability of SES as in 2012-2013 for the case of SAG and BUZ (but autonomy is low in BUZ), who reached high SES sustainability, or GGM which reached medium sustainability levels during the same period. This case also suggests that CR dedication affects the level of inclusiveness achieved in the implementation of SES, and compensates the reduction of resources, autonomy, and hierarchical power of the CR in maintaining the long-term perspective.

As in the case of the SMD before 2011, the co-management capacity of communities neighboring the company appears to have the effect of compensating the relatively low internal company drivers and high company-community risk of conflicts (aggressive identities of Siguirika and history of harsh treatment by companies). Community cohesion was slightly better in the case of SMD from 2011 to 2013 than around NMGM before 2011, and local government also enjoyed a little more

empowerment, which could explain why the implementation of SES was medium to low before 2011 and in 2011-2012 despite low company drivers.

If the number of conflicts within communities neighboring the SMD increased after 2011, ASM risks went down, because the gold detector business attracted most ASM groups. And if communities still used trespassing, blockage, and theft regularly to make the company accountable, the SMD, on the other hand, completely changed their response to conflicts, since the company started using negotiation means instead of aggression and violence.

Local co-management capacity had some impact in the SMD 2011-2012 case despite low company drivers, which supports the idea that CR dedication combined with hierarchical power and autonomy work together with co-management capacities to compensate the lower levels of other dimensions of company's internal drivers and high local risks (especially if MNC's response to communities' confrontations is comprehensive). Certain dimensions of corporate culture could also affect the type of SES implemented. The SMD in 2011-2012 suggests that the CR dedication affects the level of inclusiveness of local stakeholders in the SES.

c) SMD 2012-2013: DOES WEAK LEADERSHIP LEAD TO DIMINISHED SUSTAINABILITY IN STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY?

In 2012-2013, the corporate culture for SES decreased; in particular the CR leadership was not as strong even if the MD was slightly more dedicated than in 2011-2012, while HQ leadership and integration increased due to a medium to low corporate design and a low corporate culture. In 2012-2013, SES reached even lower sustainability levels than before 2011. Stakeholders in 2012-2013 were no longer consulted, and CR officers rarely visited communities, while long-term projects that had been in place since before 2011 slowed down to an almost nonexistent level.

The Russian HQ started having more frequent communication with operational level managers in 2013, and the MD's interest for community issues was also closer to HQ's public sustainability discourse.

In 2013, there was no CR manager since the one who resigned was not replaced. The loss of CR dedication and the lack of resources and hierarchical power in 2012-2013 even with more autonomy of the CR resulted in the reduction of inclusiveness and the end of long-term perspective in SES implementation. "The SMD works with 3 market gardening in Lero, Fontou and Tombani, 3 rice growing in Léro" [G.118; SMD CR manager 08.11.2012]. Before 2011, some successful projects were selling crops to the SMD cantina [G.149; G.143]. There were 7 projects funded and monitored by the CR liaison officers specialized in community development based in each of 7 villages [G.149; G.152; G.154]. In 2012, only two women's groups received material support (working tools) [G.116; G.123]. In 2013, a community relations officer asserted that there were 5 projects funded with very little monitoring, and 4 in phase of becoming self-sufficient [G.154]. This could not be verified.

In 2012, SMD representatives introduced a project to support 19 income-generating groups [G.116; G.118; G.122]. In 2013, the communities and authorities were still waiting for the company's feedback about why the projects funding did not follow through.

"19 activity groups were promised subventions but we did not receive anything yet. Since February 2012. Most groups are food-producing and the support should be financial. The promise was done in the Forum meeting at the cultural center of Sigurini with Regional authority, Prefect, Sub-prefect, SMD, NGOs, professional associations." [G.116, Sigurini Mayor 07.11.2012 (translated from French)].

This seems to confirm the link between CR hierarchical power and resources and the level of long-term project sustained by the company at operational levels.

Local risks for company-community conflicts stayed high in 2012-2013, since each parameter, of risk concerning community-company conflicts stayed relatively stable, with ongoing trespassing and theft, or bus and road blockages not resulting into any open conflicts. However, ASM risks went back up with the end of the gold detector machines trend (see chapter 6). The company's response to imposed accountability mechanisms (theft, trespassing) was still comprehensive, using more negotiations and awareness campaigns and fewer arrests of trespassers than before 2011. Co-management strategies stayed the same as in 2011-2012 with little empowerment of local government, medium cohesion, and good security actors and structure harmonization.

SES sustainability levels were higher in 2011-2012 when corporate culture was a bit more favorable (especially because the CR was dedicated to SES) than in 2012-2013 (when there was no CR manager left), and corporate design was a little less favorable to SES (especially the CR's hierarchical power and capacity) than in 2012-2013. Also, between 2011-2012 and 2012-2013, co-management capacities stayed medium and company-community conflicts stayed high. Consequently, comparing the cases of the SMD in 2011-2012 and in 2012-2013 suggests that corporate culture has a more important impact than corporate design on levels of implementation.

d) CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND SUGGESTIONS SMD

The case of the SMD from 2011 to 2013 strongly supports two main findings. It supports the idea that internal drivers are decisive in the variation of sustainability levels of SES implemented by the company, and also that higher levels of co-management capacities enhance the effect of internal drivers on SES sustainability levels.

This case also suggests that corporate culture's effect on the variation in implementation of SES is more significant than that of corporate design. In addition, the SMD illustrates how the interaction of every factor at the local level plays out in the variety of sustainability levels in the implementation of SES. Key company internal drivers' specificities count as much as the specificities of local governance drivers. Corporate culture drivers such as the CR's dedication to SES, and enabling structures such as the CR's hierarchical power and capacity, appear as essential features in explaining the variations observed in the sustainability of SES implemented by the company. Local co-management capacities in the context of high local risk do play an enhancing role on SES sustainability variations if these essential company internal features support them. Altogether, the CR's dedication to SES combined with hierarchical power and CR leadership work together with co-management capacities of neighboring communities to somehow compensate the lower levels of other dimensions of company's internal drivers and high local risks (especially if MNC's response to communities' confrontations is comprehensive see SAG 12-13, GGM 11-12).

There might also be a link between hierarchical power, skills, and capacity of the CR and the resulting SES focus on long-term projects. CR dedication seems to enhance the level of inclusiveness achieved in the implementation of SES, and to compensate the reduction of resources, autonomy, and hierarchical power of the CR in maintaining the long-term perspective. The loss of CR dedication and the lack of resources and hierarchical power of the CR appear to reduce inclusiveness and long-term perspective in SES implementation.

Finally, the case of the SMD before 2011 suggests that corporate design features granting the CR department high hierarchical power and capacity could explain why the department enjoys a good self-perception despite the lack of recognition by the MD and a lack of integration within the company.

2. AGA, SAG, Guinea

Why is the SAG one of the most complex case studies of this research? Each period studied here challenges the findings confirmed or suggested by other cases. The case of the SAG incites us to dig deeper into the company's internal drivers and local governance specificities in order to understand what is happening in each specific configuration.

a) SAG BEFORE 2011 VERSUS BUZWAGI 2012-2013: KEY FEATURES OF CORPORATE CULTURE AND THE ROLE OF HISTORY OF VIOLENCE WHEN CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES ARE HIGH

Corporate design of Buzwagi in 2012-2013 and SAG before 2011 presented medium incentives to implement sustainability in conflict management, and their corporate culture was moderately favorable to the implementation of SES. They both encountered medium or low local risks and high co-management capacities of communities neighboring their operations. The implementation of sustainability for conflict management by the SAG before 2011 was medium, since the company was not very present or responsive to communities and had no long-term infrastructure plans, but it was very open to communities' visits, included multiple stakeholders, and carried out some capacity-building. While BUZ reached the highest level of sustainability observed, the SAG before 2011 only attained medium sustainability — what explains this difference if other drivers seem to be similar?

The SAG's recruitment practices since 2006 opened dialog with the local youth, customary authorities, and the traditional hunters brotherhood (chapter 4). Customary authorities are involved in the selection of casual workers among the youth, and the hunters are recruited for guarding purposes, while the village government is in charge of the recruitment contract with the company. The company also engages with a national NGO for discussions about its CSR activity. Before 2012, the SAG engaged with a high level of stakeholder variety. However, the SAG's CR department only paid a visit to the communities when they needed to clear tensions against the company, so the frequency of visits was low. Also, the SAG is one of the most accessible companies in this study, community representatives can reach the company by phone and visit without much restriction and are welcome to do so, even if their demands do not receive much feedback and the SAG's communication is rather asymmetrical.

"In 2010, I wanted to make them aware of their rights and obligations regarding the SAG, and of the SAG's rights and obligations regarding them, so I was always going to talk to everyone (...) Community members have my phone number and don't hesitate to use it. I am available even at night in case of direct threats or high levels of tension". [G.133, MD's community issues advisor, 24.09.2013]

CSR activities before 2011 were not integrated into a long-term perspective because of ongoing strategic philanthropic practices (gifts, donations to local leaders), because social infrastructure building is not considered relevant to local development plans, and because capacity-building projects reaches a small number of people, the human rights training lacks professionalism, and other efforts only consist of informal advice and information given here and there (chapter 4). Sustainability of SES implemented by the SAG before 2011 was thus medium.

Before 2011, SAG's internal drivers were medium to high as in the case of BUZ in 2012-2013. In the SAG, operational level corporate culture allows some degree of dedication to SES, and communities and other departments have a good perception of the communities and the CR department. However, the MD's leadership is not very strong, with an MD who does not have any direct encounters with communities and rarely shows respect for the CR department, compared to the Buzwagi mine where the MD is present and actively involved in CR issues. Moreover, in the SAG before 2011, the CR managers were dedicated but not as friendly and trustworthy for the communities as in BUZ 12-13. At OP levels, the SAG's corporate design gave autonomy to the CR as well as capacity and skills to adapt decisions to local contexts, but hierarchical power was lower compared to the BUZ case. The comparison of internal drivers indicates that hierarchical power of the CR has more influence on the success of sustainability implementation than the resources and autonomy of the CR, in particular when the MD and CR dedication are very favorable to the socially sustainable strategy. In the SAG, the CR department is not as close to the MD because there are two other managers in charge of community issues who are closer in hierarchy to the MD; this unclarity is not in favor of the CR department's implementation of SES.

Before 2011, Siguiri was an important opposition stronghold, and this had the consequence of creating considerable politically related confrontations. Even a few months before the election of the traditional opposition leader at the head of the state, there was ethnical/political aggressiveness of the Malinké against the Foulani, causing many deaths and injuries. ASM tradition is important, but local elders and youth leaders try to keep the tensions down. For instance, when Siguiri marched for electricity in 2009, the elders sensitized the youth groups to help in the search for a mutual solution [G.65]. Communities did not use force when they protested in 2009 and 2010, and the company privileges a comprehensive response to tensions. On the whole, before 2011, the SAG encountered medium to low local risks of company-community conflicts. This is an important difference with BUZ, where communities have never even held an organized protest against the company.

Before 2011, around the SAG, and around BUZ in 2012-13, co-management capacities of local communities were high, meaning that communities often and easily worked together. Local risks were medium to low, because the prefecture where the SAG operates encountered considerable confrontation among local actors, and the identity of the main groups living around the mine is rooted in a proud aggressiveness. This is not the case around the Buzwagi mine, where people have a history of peaceful relationships among local groups. Around the SAG, the artisanal mining tradition is stronger, even if there is also a diversification of activity and alternative livelihood opportunities. Comparing these cases hints once again to the role played by the history of violence and ASM tradition in the level of sustainability of conflict-management strategies by the company, as suggested by the comparison of SAG and NMGM in 2012-2013.

Conclusions and suggestions summary:

The comparison of the SAG before 2011 and Buzwagi in 2012-2013 illustrates how hierarchical power of the CR has more influence on the success of sustainability implementation than the resources and autonomy of the CR, in particular when the MD and CR dedication are very favorable to the socially sustainable strategy. It also indicates the role played by a history of violence and strong ASM tradition in hindering the chances for a successful implementation of a sustainable SES.

The case of the SAG before 2011 is difficult to understand if one only looks at the criteria selected to measure the various drivers in this study. This case is more complex and necessitates a careful analysis of each feature of these criteria and the effects of their specific interactions/configuration. Indeed, we would expect medium internal drivers coupled with high co-management capacities to lead to higher levels of sustainability in SES, as in the case of the SAG in 2011-2012, and GGM in 2012-2013. Also, the co-management capacity dimension does not have the expected enhancing effect that we observe in the case of the SMD before 2011, of BUZ over the whole period, and of NMGM in 2011-2012. In this case also, the CR and MD's moderate dedication to SES do not have the expected influence on SES sustainability. Finally, the role of company's response to community confrontations appears to be less important than expected if the local history of violence counter-balances it.

Other comparable cases could help us understand what makes the SAG such a specific case and find explanations of its unexpectedly modest implementation of SES sustainability.

With medium internal company drivers, the SAG experienced medium to low risks of conflict and encountered high co-management capacities of neighboring communities before 2011. A comparable case is GGM in 2011-2012. Despite a long history of violence amongst communities living around the SAG before 2011 and the aggressive identity of the Siguirika people, the fact that the ASM tradition is diversified by other economically important activity and that the SAG has the support of customary leaders, results in medium risks of conflict. If accountability strategies by communities are not always peaceful, the SAG always prefers negotiated solutions to protests. Also, around the SAG before 2011, communities easily work together, since they have functioning local solidarity networks and security structures and actors are harmonized, while top-down involvement compensates low capacity of local government. The two main differences with the GGM in 2011-2012 are that people around GGM are more peaceful and thus history of violence is nonexistent amongst communities, and that the GGM usually answers in a much less comprehensive way than the SAG but still reaches medium sustainability of SES implementation. In summary, GGM 11-12 encounters less violent history but more violent MNC responses, SAG before 2011 had less peaceful neighbors but the company is more comprehensive, both cases implement medium level of SES sustainability. This comparison suggests that a history of violence and company response function similarly, one balancing the other when the influence of medium risk hinders the effect of co-management capacities on the implementation of SES. This comparison then appears to mitigate the idea that company response is the key characteristic of local risk in explaining the level of sustainability in SES implementation (whereas it seemed to be relevant in the case of the SAG in 2012-2013). The effect of medium risk seems to hinder internal medium drivers for SES in the case of the SAG before 2011 and GGM in 2011-2012.

b) SAG 2011-2012: CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITY'S ENHANCING EFFECT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATIONS

The SAG's internal drivers in 2011-2012 were medium and encountered a high level of co-management capacity of neighboring communities and medium risk of company-community conflicts. The company reached medium/high levels of sustainability in its implementation of SES, apparently confirming the enhancing effect of high-co-management capacities on medium internal drivers.

The SAG in 2011-2012 was still engaging with local government authorities and elders, and started to visit neighboring communities from the lower levels to the district more often, be it informally or on a regular basis and not only in case of problems (chapter 4). If the variety of stakeholders is not as great as before, the frequency of visits improved. The company remained the most accessible of all cases, and feedback improved since more demands of the communities were answered and the company held meetings about its activities, but communication was rather asymmetrical in 2011-2012. An important step towards implementing long-term CSR projects was taken in 2012 when the company hired a regional NGO to make a socio-economic report of the neighboring communities in order to adapt the company's activities to actual local needs.

The SAG's CR department in 2011-2012 had high autonomy and low capacity, while the MD's dedication to SES was low and the CR managers' dedication was medium, still, SES sustainability levels were medium to high, mostly because of high inclusiveness and multilateralism, with some capacity-building programs. Indeed, the SAG's CR officers meet youth, women, and elders groups, as well as authorities from the village to the State level, the CR managers are accessible by all means and welcome community easily, the SAG also integrates the youth group in the recruitment process, and shares knowledge with local and state authorities.

In 2011-2012, there was tension within communities but this did not give rise to violent conflicts within neighboring communities despite the aggressive temper of Siguirika and the negative perception of the company towards neighboring communities. For instance there were tensions between the youngsters and a local NGO:

"With the Youngster's association: they are against everyone but don't have a project, they act as if the youth were here to control everything (...) They want reports of the management of ADB [local NGO], but they are not even members. If they wanted to be members, it wouldn't be a problem. It is their hypocrisy and their prejudgments that are the problem"[G.115, Director of ADB, 05.11.2012, Siguiri].

However, overall, people recognize that they belong to a single ancestral family:

"Bouréka all descend from one person. Before the SAG, all the villages of Bouré were in consensus: if there was a problem, each village was represented, and they managed it all together" [G.107, "The source" traditional communicator, Siguiri, 03.11.2012].

ASM tradition did not present more risk than before 2011. Yet, communities started using more confrontational accountability mechanisms against the company in 2011-2012, exemplified by a 3-day protest that paralyzed the company's activities. Nonetheless, the company's response remained comprehensive, using sensitization and negotiation. In 2011-2012, overall local risks were medium. Co-management strategy stayed high despite less involvement of the central state in Siguiri's affairs and a diminishing cohesion among local groups. With moderate risk of community-company conflicts characterized by reduced chances for conflict within communities and a comprehensive response to some confrontational accountability mechanism of communities against the company, the SAG 11-12 almost reached high sustainability of SES. This confirms that comprehensive company response balances out overall medium local risks.

The case of the SAG in 2011-2012 also substantiates the enhancing effect of high co-management capacities of neighboring communities on corporate culture features. In this case, with medium corporate design and medium corporate culture regarding SES, the high co-management capacities enhance the effect of internal drivers to allow the SAG to attain medium to high levels of SES

sustainability (instead of medium levels if the high co-management capacity did not have this enhancing effect). Compared to the GGM in 2011-2012 who reaches medium outcomes with high to medium co-management because of top-down involvement and rather low cohesion. Also, the SAG reaches medium to high outcomes because of high co-management capacities of communities characterized by high cohesion and low top-down involvement. This case also corroborates the idea that a comprehensive company response is a key element that can compensate local risks in order to succeed in implementing social sustainability of conflict management strategies. This is confirmed by the case of the GGM in 11-12 who could reach high outcomes if it wasn't for the harsh security behavior against communities.

c) **SAG 2012-2013: INTERDEPENDENCE OF DESIGN AND CULTURE, THE ROLE OF CR AUTONOMY AND CAPACITY, AND OF COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO COMMUNITY CONFRONTATIONS**

The SAG case in 2012-2013 already helped in pointing out certain important suggestions when compared to the NMGM during the same period. When compared to other cases, the SAG 12-13 case provides more insights, especially concerning the interdependence of corporate culture and structures, and helps confirm other suggestions on key elements of design and risk drivers.

Between 2012 and 2013, SAG's internal drivers were medium, but SES sustainability was high. The company's neighboring communities had high co-management capacities (and medium risks of conflict). The MD was not dedicated to SES, while most of the CR department was dedicated to communities. Corporate design allowed little empowerment of CR but high autonomy and good CR skills. Community cohesion and security actors and structures were high, making it easy for the company to collaborate with local actors despite the lack of capacity of local government and the absence of non-state involvement. SAG's inclusiveness in SES increased, and even if its CR was not very responsive to complaints, it was very accessible to communities, and the company started implementing capacity-building in a long-term perspective.

The case of the SAG in 2012-2013 does not show the same evidence on the importance of the MD's dedication to CR and SES, because in that case, despite low dedication to SES from both MD and CR, the SAG still achieved a comparatively high level of sustainability in SES implementation. The SAG's SES leaders use convincing discourses about their dedication to community issues:

"The SAG needs to get involved in the way the taxes are spent at the local level in order to make sure they benefit the collectivity and not the administrative leaders exclusively (...) We need to invest ourselves instead of investing money" [G.130, SAG sustainability manager, 23.09.2013].

This case suggests that if corporate design allows a high level of autonomy for the CR department, as well as good capacities and skills of CR officers, it can compensate the low level of dedication of MD and CR manager and the lack of hierarchical power of CR. As in the case of the SAG in 2012-2013, and GGM in 2012-2013 (medium autonomy and high capacities), a medium corporate design characterized by favorable autonomy and capacities for the CR department has an impact on implementation levels, which points out the key role of CR autonomy and capacity features of corporate design. However, GGM and SAG also encounter high levels of co-management capacities of neighboring communities and medium levels of risk.

The SAG in 2012-2013 had high co-management capacities and medium local risk and achieved relatively high levels of sustainability in SES, confirming the influence of co-management capacity on

increasing the effect of medium internal drivers, but minimizing the influence of risks levels in hindering the sustainability of SES. For example in April-May 2013, road blocks kept the trucks and worker-buses from going to the mine, the CR officers went to the people forming the blockage to negotiate. Since they weren't obtaining results, the prefect of Siguiiri came to calm them down. GGM in 2011-2012 responded with more conflicting means to blockage and trespassing than the SAG in 2012-2013.

"It is the responsibility of the SAG to receive community representatives to listen to them and to tell them the truth, otherwise there can be no relationship between the SAG and these communities (...) We want to reach peace and stability in a non-violent spirit" [G.133, MD advisor on community issues, SAG, administrative office, 24.09.2013, Siguiiri District, Norther Guinea (translated from French)].

SAG's response to open conflict is more comprehensive (hiring more local people and using dialog to negotiate solutions out of conflicts). A refined analysis of local risks between the SAG in 2012-2013 and GGM in 2011-2012 suggests the important role of the company's response to highly confrontational accountability strategies by communities.

Conclusions and suggestions summary:

The case of the SAG mainly illustrates how the response a company gives to the confrontation of communities can influence its SES practices. From the beginning of operations, the SAG never used violent means to answer the villagers' punctual protests, or regular blockages and trespassing. The company sends CR officers or the MD's advisor to negotiate, instead of calling armed security forces to come to its rescue. This prevented the emergence of a history of conflict even though there has been a lot of tension within communities and negative perceptions about the communities (chapter 7). The cohesion of a well-organized youth with the other groups of the neighboring community also enhanced the relatively favorable internal company drivers' potential to reach some degree of inclusiveness and multilateralism (co-management capacity chapter 7). The variation of SES dimensions from 2011 to 2013 can be correlated with the variation of the leadership of the CR. Before 2011, the MD and the CR manager were not really dedicated to community issues, but they had enough resources and autonomy. In 2011-2012 and in 2012-2013 it seems that the co-management capacity of the youth group, the cohesion within communities, and the harmonization of security actors and structures around the mine, combined with the CR's dedication, compensated for the MD's lack of interest for community issues (chapter 8).

High co-management capacities enhance the effect of medium internal company drivers resulting in comparatively high level of sustainability in SES implementation. The case verifies the effect of the sustainability manager's hierarchical power and autonomy on capacity-building efforts on the resulting of SES sustainability. Comparing with other cases that have at least one low internal driver combined with high co-management capacities, such as the SAG or NMGM in 2012-2013, we notice that both cases attain only low levels of implementation of sustainability in SES. Moreover, in each of these three cases (BUZ before 2011, SAG and NMGM in 2012-2013), the corporate culture factor is low, while institutional/corporate design varies from medium to low, suggesting that high co-management capacities' mitigating influence is hindered by a low corporate culture regarding SES at operational level more than by a low corporate design for SES, except if at least one key corporate design parameter is high enough to compensate for the lack of corporate culture in favor of sustainable SES (autonomy, process management, or hierarchical power)

3. AGA, GGM, Tanzania

a) GGM BEFORE 2011: HARSH COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFRONTATIONS CAN DOWNSIZE THE EFFECT OF FAVORABLE INTERNAL COMPANY DRIVERS

Before 2011, the Geita Gold Mine of AGA implemented medium sustainability levels in its stakeholder engagement strategy at the operational level. With highly favorable internal drivers, combined with medium co-management capacities and medium risks of conflicts, why didn't the GGM before 2011 reach higher SES sustainability?

The GGM before 2011 reached a medium level of inclusiveness, because it mostly engaged with state officials down to the village level and had regular meetings with district level stakeholders through the "Community Relation Committee". Multilateralism of SES was average, because accessibility was high but the company provided little feedback and information flows were not symmetrical. The company made an effort to match social infrastructure construction with local development plans and had an apprenticeship program for capacity-building that was not far-reaching in terms of scope (35 people per year).

Before 2011, GGM internal drivers were high, since corporate culture and structures at operational levels were adapted, CR department was autonomous, was empowered to take decisions and was dedicated to SES and communities (see chapter 7). For example, the CR's discourse clearly denotes how important it is for him listening to communities' criticism: "Maybe sometimes we don't see how we are doing bad, maybe because we are part of GGM we don't have the necessary distance" [T.162, GGM community relation manager, 25.11.2013, Geita town, Tanzania].

Local governance drivers presented characteristics for a medium implementation of SES (see chapter 6). Co-management capacity was average (compared to other cases), security structures made it very easy for communities and the company to work together, and local cohesion as well as local actors' capacities were modest but allowed this collaboration. Risks were average, too, since despite some open conflicts (between security and ASM mainly), ASM risk was not as problematic as in other cases and GGM operated in a historically calm area. However, the GGM's answer to trespassing and theft was often to beef up security with the help of the state forces, resulting in comparatively harsher company response.

The case of GGM before 2011 illustrates that local drivers' medium levels characterized by the company's harsh security response to confrontational accountability mechanisms of communities downsize the influence of high company internal drivers resulting in medium SES sustainability. This case also confirms the mitigating effect of co-management capacities in the implementation of sustainable SES by company, while communities operating around BUZ in 2011-2012 had such a high level of co-management capacity that it enhanced the effect of a medium corporate culture at the operational level. At the time, BUZ had implemented medium sustainability in SES. Then, the case of GGM before 2011 in comparison to BUZ in 2012-2013 confirms the enhancing effect of co-management capacity, since in BUZ in 2012-2013, when co-management capacity was high combined with high internal company drivers, BUZ had a high level of sustainability in SES, while in GGM before 2011, with high internal drivers, a medium co-management capacity resulted in medium sustainability levels.

b) GGM 2011-2012: HARSH COMPANY RESPONSE HINDERS GOOD INTERNAL IF CO-MANAGEMENT IS CHARACTERIZED BY LOW COMMUNITY COHESION

The GGM in 2011-2012 presents a case where moderately favorable internal company drivers led to moderately sustainable SES implementation. However, considering the suggestions exposed by the above cases, we would expect the highly favorable co-management capacity of communities neighboring the GGM operations in 2011-2012 to enhance the effect of medium internal drivers and result in high sustainability of SES.

In 2011-2012, GGM's neighboring communities' co-management capacity was high and the company's OP level internal drivers were medium. The implementation of sustainability was medium, since a relatively wide range of stakeholders were regularly consulted, stakeholders had easy access to CR department and got relatively good feedback on their demands, and GGM built social infrastructure addressing local needs. Because of the high level of co-management capacities, combined with medium levels of internal capacity, this case seems similar to BUZ in 2012-2013 so we would expect co-management capacities to enhance the effect of medium internal factors resulting in high level of sustainability in SES. What hinders the effect of high co-management capacities on medium internal drivers in the case of GGM in 2011-2012?

To understand this difference, a refined analysis of internal drivers and local governance drivers could lead to an explanation.

GGM's OP level corporate culture is medium because the MD's dedication to the implementation of SES and to communities. His recognition of the value of CR, are also not favorable mainly because of the confusion between the CR and the PR managers' responsibilities. The CR manager is however highly dedicated to SES and communities.

"It is easy with him (the CR manager), me and him, we have the same responsibility for communities, he solves our problems, we want them to create their own opportunities the GGM cannot solve all the problems so it is better to have them employ themselves" [T.156, Geita District Community Development Officer (DCDO), 25.11.2013, Geita District Administration Building].

The medium corporate design for SES is more specifically due to the CR department's low hierarchical power despite its good capacity in terms of skills and experience (15 years of field work in the area) to adapt solution to local contexts. In the end, if GGM is not achieving higher implementation of sustainability it could mean that the MD's dedication to SES and recognition of CR is more important than other factors for corporate culture to have an influence on the implementation of sustainable SES. In BUZ between 2012 and 2013, the MD and CR manager's dedication was really high and MD's recognition of CR was high, while CR process management was medium, which corroborates the idea of the importance of the MD's dedication to SES in achieving comparatively high levels of implementation of sustainability in SES. The cases of GGM in 2012-2013 and GGM in 2011-2012 both illustrate the importance of the MD's dedication to SES and recognition of CR in the implementation of sustainable SES over structural features. The cases of GGM 2012-2013 and GGM 2011-2012 are similar even if corporate design increased to medium/high when, in 2012-2013, the CR gained more hierarchical power and despite a big increase in integration tools. If the case of the SAG in 2012-2013 does not show the same evidence on the importance of the MD's dedication to CR and SES (despite low dedication to SES from both the MD and CR, the SAG still achieves a comparatively high level of sustainability in SES implementation) because the SAG's design at the time compensate the low level of leadership dedication and lack of hierarchical power.

Taking a closer look at local drivers, it appears that local risks for community-company conflict around GGM in 2011-2012 are medium compared to those around BUZ in 2012-2013. In fact, BUZ and GGM both operate in historically calm areas, but the perception of one another is less positive in the case of GGM, while ASM tradition is more important. The bigger contrast however is between local communities' accountability strategies towards the company and the response of the company to these accountability mechanisms. The GGM's neighboring communities often use blockages and theft of gold in the company's compounds, to which the GGM answers through its collaboration with the police by arresting and bringing trespassers in custody. Communities around BUZ do not openly protest or block the company's work, and theft is answered by hiring guards locally and increasing dialog, thus BUZ has a more comprehensive response. This comparison could point out to the effect of higher risk in hindering the implementation of sustainable SES by the company. The same effect could explain both the case of the SAG before 2011 and the GGM in 2012-2013. However, the SAG in 2012-2013 has high co-management capacities and medium local risk but still achieves relatively high levels of sustainability in SES, confirming the influence of co-management capacity on increasing the effect of medium internal drivers, but minimizing the influence of risks levels hindering the sustainability of SES. A refined analysis of local risks between the SAG in 2012-2013 and GGM in 2011-2012 suggests the influence of company response to high accountability strategies. GGM in 2011-2012 responds with more conflicting means to blockage and trespassing than the SAG in 2012-2013 and reaches medium sustainability levels of SES. The SAG's strategy is more comprehensive (hiring more local people and using dialog to negotiate solutions out of conflicts) and reaches high sustainability levels of SES.

c) **GGM 2012-2013: HIERARCHICAL POWER OF CR COMPENSATES WEAK MD LEADERSHIP BUT COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO CONFLICT HINDERING SUSTAINABILITY SUCCESS EVEN WITH HIGH CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES.**

The GGM case in 2012-2013, with moderately favorable corporate culture and more favorable design for the implementation of SES, the company reaches medium to high levels of SES sustainability mostly because of improvement in variety of stakeholder engaged and frequency of consultation. Indeed, the CR manager participates in every local assembly from the village to the district, and the town level, besides meeting with specific groups individually when necessary [T.162; T.156]. Again, the high level of co-management capacity encountered in the communities neighboring the company's operation do not have the expected enhancing effect of the success of sustainability strategy implementation.

The case of GGM in 2012-2013 corroborates the general finding that internal company drivers' levels correspond to sustainability levels of SES. Indeed, GGM 2012-2013 has medium to high internal drivers and medium to high sustainability levels in conflict management strategies. However, with high co-management capacities, we could expect SES to attain higher levels of sustainability since high co-management has this enhancing effect combined with medium internal drivers in the cases of BUZ 2011-2012 and 2012-2013, as well as SAG 2011-2012.

Upon close analysis, and comparing with other refined analysis, it appears that this case confirms both the influence of key features of corporate culture over corporate design characteristics and the influence of medium risk in hindering the effect of high co-management capacities at the local level.

Corporate culture in GGM between 2012 and 2013 was medium, mostly because the MD's dedication to communities decreased to low levels while its recognition of CR stayed average, and

while the CR's dedication to communities stayed high (the big discrepancy between MD's and the CR's dedications could also explain the decrease in self-perception of CR manager). If hierarchical power of CR related departments and managers increased since 2011-2012, all other parameters of corporate design stayed constant, in particular the high capacity of CR. MD's dedication thus appears to be a key feature of corporate culture in explaining levels of sustainability of SES implementation.

Risks of company-community conflict around GGM in 2012-2013 were similar to 2011-2012, MNC responses still presented high risks of conflict and the accountability strategy became more violent in 2012-2013. In this case, medium risk also seems to hinder the influence of high co-management capacities on levels of sustainability in implementation of SES. It also suggests that the company's response to violent accountability strategy is a key feature of local risks explaining sustainability levels of SES by company.

Conclusions on GGM:

Leadership at the operational level stayed rather favorable to the implementation of sustainable SES, because the CR's dedication stayed stable as well as its capacity in terms of resources and skills. This stability and dedication appear to compensate the continuous decrease of the MD's leadership on community issues (chapter 8). The CR manager's dedication explains part of the successes in stakeholder engagement implementation even when the overall corporate culture was getting less and less favorable. The local context explains why it didn't reach even better levels of sustainability. The local context also weakens the efforts of the CR department to implement sustainable strategies. In a context where local communities are not used to collaborating together and lack social organization, if the GGM keeps using the Tanzanian police and paramilitary forces to respond to confrontations, causing injuries to community members and perpetuating the negative image of the company, there is little chance of reaching more success in SES outcomes.

4. African Barrick Gold, Buzwagi, Tanzania

a) BUZ BEFORE 2011: LOW INTERNAL DRIVERS TEND TO HINDER CO-MANAGEMENT CAPACITIES' ENHANCING EFFECTS

Before 2011, with low internal drivers for SES and medium to low implementation of sustainability in SES, BUZ verifies the main finding of the influence of internal drivers on sustainability levels of implementation. What else does this case tell us, especially regarding local governance drivers' influence on implementation of SES?

The neighboring communities' high co-management capacities in this case do not appear to influence levels of sustainability in SES. This hints at the higher impact of internal drivers over local governance drivers; that is, if internal drivers are low, co-management capacities have little influence on implementation levels of sustainability. For instance, before 2011, the ward level was not often engaged by the Buzwagi gold mine in discussions about CSR decisions, while the central government was sometimes involved.

“Some discussions for material support to community development projects take place between the company and the ministry... Sometimes the ward councilors and district councilors are invited to meetings on these questions” [T.64, Shinyanga Zonal Mine Officer, 27.09.2011].

Before 2011, BUZ had low internal drivers, its corporate culture didn't enhance dedication to communities or SES, and the operational level had little autonomy or capacity to adapt decisions to

local contexts, while the CR department had little hierarchical power. Around BUZ, from 2011 to 2013, neighboring communities kept high levels of co-management capacity, security actors and structures were well coordinated, and community cohesion was so high that it compensated for the lack of local government empowerment. Local risk of conflict was low, since ASM was not the only income-generating activity in the area, and elders, youth groups, and NGOs supported the diversification of activity, while there has been no history of company-community conflicts:

“When BUZ started operating, Ward and Village authorities carried out sensitization campaigns to make villagers aware of the legal rights and obligations regarding the large-scale mining investors. People were made aware that the MNC has a license and the right to mine underground contrary to artisanal miners who should divert to other activities such as agriculture, farming, and livestock keeping” [T.148, Mwendakulima Ward executive officer, 20.11.2013, Kahama (translated from Swahili)].

BUZWAGI’s implementation of sustainability for conflict management before 2011 was medium to low, since the company had no long-term strategy and hardly ever visited communities, while it included some local stakeholders and had some degree of multilateralism. Low internal drivers seem to have had the effect of canceling the influence of high co-management capacities, resulting in medium to low sustainability levels in SES.

Comparing with other cases that have at least one low internal driver combined with high co-management capacities, such as the SAG or NMGM in 2012-2013, we notice that both cases attain only low levels of implementation of sustainability in SES. Moreover, in each of these three cases (BUZ before 2011, SAG and NMGM in 2012-2013), the corporate culture factor was low while institutional/corporate design varied from medium to low, suggesting that high co-management capacities’ mitigating influence is hindered by a low corporate culture regarding SES at operational level more than by a low corporate design for SES. The case of BUZ in 2011-2012 illustrates this finding as well, since, despite an unfavorable corporate design but with a medium corporate culture, BUZ at the time reached relatively high levels of sustainability in SES.

b) BUZ 2011-2012: CORPORATE CULTURE’S INFLUENCE IS GREATER THAN THAT OF CORPORATE DESIGN ESPECIALLY WHEN LEADERSHIP FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABILITY IS STRONGER.

Between 2011 and 2012, BUZ’s internal company drivers were medium to low but the level of implementation of sustainability was high. Co-management capacity of local communities around BUZ was high. Corporate culture increased to a medium level because the MD and the CR manager were fully dedicated to SES and communities, and the learning process from the ground up to the MD increased. For example, the CR manager would share casual moments with members of the community: “With Richard (CR manager) we met sometimes after working hours... He spoke Swahili... we shared beers, we talked...” [T.153, local NGO SHDEFA+ program manager, 21.11.2013, Kahama Town].

Corporate design features were still not giving autonomy or hierarchical power to CR department. In 2011-2012, implementation of SES increased significantly, mostly by including a wide range and variety of stakeholders and putting in place long-term projects such as building infrastructures according to local needs and funding income generating activities.

Thus, the case of BUZ in 2011-2012 suggests the importance of corporate culture over that of corporate design, since the company had medium levels of SES despite the lack of hierarchical power

of the CR department and of internal continuity in strategy and management, leading to unfavorable levels of corporate design for the implementation of a sustainable SES. Another example of the higher importance of corporate culture over corporate design is the case of SMD, which varies in 2011-2012 from low to medium corporate culture and low corporate design for SES to the reverse in 2012-2013, that is, medium to low corporate design and low corporate culture for SES. As a result, in 2011-2012 and in 2012-2013, the levels of SES sustainability corresponded to the levels attained by corporate culture (medium to low in 2011-2012, and low in 2012-2013), while local governance drivers stayed constant. It is interesting to have a more detailed look into the case of BUZ's corporate culture features resulting in high sustainability in SES in 2011-2012 compared to the SMD's. In BUZ, both MD and CR dedication to the implementation of SES and community issues were high, while in the SMD, the MD was not dedicated to implementing the strategy. This comparison thus confirms the influence of leadership on the success of implementation of the sustainable strategy.

This case also illustrates how high co-management capacity can increase the effect of a medium corporate culture even if corporate design (structures) is low, resulting in medium sustainability level of SES implementation. The case of the SAG in 2011-2012 is comparable and also substantiates this enhancing effect of high co-management capacities of neighboring communities on corporate culture features. In this case, with medium corporate design and medium corporate culture regarding SES, the high co-management capacities enhance internal drivers' effect to allow the SAG to attain medium to high levels of SES sustainability (instead of medium levels if the high co-management capacity did not have this enhancing effect).

5. African Barrick Gold, North-Mara Gold Mine, Tanzania

a) NMGM 2011-2012: MD'S DEDICATION COMBINED WITH CR CAPACITY AND AUTONOMY COMPENSATES UNFAVORABLE LOCAL GOVERNANCE DRIVERS?

In 2011-2012, the NMGM reached moderately sustainable SES implementation with medium internal company drivers, unfavorable co-management capacities of communities around the mine, and high risks of community-company conflicts. In 2011-2012, co-management of neighboring communities was low; however, internal drivers were becoming more favorable to the implementation of SES than before 2011, with medium levels of corporate culture and low to medium levels of corporate design. At the time, NMGM started implementing a sustainable strategy of conflict-management with medium levels of sustainability in SES. This case thus illustrates the influence of medium internal drivers on implementation of medium SES sustainability.

Improvement of SES sustainability was substantial, since from no implementation of SES before 2011, the NMGM in 2012 started including a wide range of stakeholders and gave much more feedback to complaints (although not to all levels of stakeholders). The mine also increased its long-term infrastructure building, which were integrated into local redevelopment plans, and jumped from no capacity-building programs to funding local income-generating activity and making efforts to raise awareness of ASM groups on alternative livelihood opportunities.

Local risks stayed the same as before 2011. The conflict that was the most covered by the media occurred in May 2011. Seven or eleven (depending on reports) Tanzanian citizens were shot dead by security forces and a dozen others injured when hundreds (300 to 1000) of local people entered (armed with machetes, rocks, and hammers) the mining compounds. It was the 3rd attack on the

mine in a week. The police answered by discharging tear gas and firing guns. According to Tarime-Rorya's regional police commander "the police fired warning shots into the air, used tear gas and live ammunition to protect themselves" [T.104, Acting Regional Police Commander for Tarime/Rorya Special Police Zone, Tarime Police Station, 06.06.2012].

A refined analysis shows an improvement in harmonization of actors and security structures at the local level in 2011-2012. This slight increase of co-management capacities reinforces the change in internal drivers thus enhancing the sustainability of SES. But in this case, corporate culture's key features clearly influenced the change in SES. In 2011-2012, the NMGM's MD was more dedicated to communities, and its recognition of the value of CR department appears to have played an important role, since other corporate culture characteristics did not improve.

This dedication from the head at operational level, combined with increased autonomy and resources to enact decisions granted to the CR department, seems to be decisive in the improvement of SES sustainability. As in the case of the SAG before 2011 and in 2012-2013, and GGM in 2012-2013, a medium corporate design characterized by favorable autonomy and capacities for the CR department has an impact on implementation levels, which points out the key role of CR autonomy and capacity features of corporate design. However, GGM and SAG encounter high levels of co-management capacities of neighboring communities and medium levels of risks while the NMGM encounters uniquely unfavorable local governance drivers. What's more, there was considerable improvement of the bottom-up learning processes in the NMGM in 2011-2012, not only between the ground and the MD but also between the operational levels and the headquarters of Barrick Gold in Canada. Thus, the NMGM 2011-2012 case suggests the importance of thorough learning processes in improving both internal company drivers and implementation levels. What about other cases with high learning processes?

b) NMGM 2012-2013: LOW MD AND CR DEDICATION DESPITE SOME CAPACITY WITH LOW COMMUNITY COHESION (EVEN WITH IMPROVED MNC RESPONSE AND MORE ASM ALTERNATIVES) CANNOT LEAD TO SUSTAINABLE OUTCOMES

In 2012-2013, after an important evolution between 2011 and 2012, internal company drivers of the NMGM returned to lower levels, especially corporate culture, while co-management capacities of neighboring communities kept improving to attain high levels in 2013.

If the HQ-OP alignment improved significantly in 2012-2013 (due to learning processes being high since 2011-2012?), autonomy and capacity features of corporate design decreased (autonomy from med to low and capacity from high to med). While key corporate culture features that went up in 2011-2012 came back down in 2012-2013, the change of MD in 2012-2013 meant that the MD's dedication to SES as conflict management went back to low levels. Learning processes, however, seemed to continue to be effective from ground levels to the MD, but no longer as much from the OP to the HQ in Canada. Does this case hint at the MD's dedication's impact on key design features?

As in the case of BUZ before 2011, if internal drivers are low, co-management capacities have little influence on implementation levels of sustainability. The NMGM in 2012-2013 is also an example of a case where corporate-culture influences implementation levels more than corporate design, especially if key characteristics of corporate design are not present. In 2012-2013, every characteristic of corporate culture returned to low levels except other departments' perception of the community, which means that the CR department is not as isolated as before 2011. Also, the

learning processes established in the previous years stayed favorable from the ground to the MD but were not considered so important at the HQ level, since the headquarters questioned the relevance of NMGM's presence in their sustainability report for Barrick Canada. Key characteristics of corporate design fell to low levels of autonomy and medium levels of capacity even if HQ-OP alignment was higher than before.

The NMGM in 2012-2013 also illustrates how a low corporate culture hinders the effect of high co-management capacities by neighboring communities, especially with local risks of conflict diminishing between 2012 and 2013. Even if risks of community-company conflict were still comparatively high in 2012-2013 (open conflict happened again in January 2013 causing one villager's death and an injured security guard after massive ASM trespassing), there were a growing number of youth groups getting involved in alternative economic activities (diminishing ASM pressure). Accountability strategies adopted by communities were becoming less aggressive and MNC's response was somewhat more comprehensive (hiring more local youth to guard the mine) in the end of 2013. Despite risks being less critical and co-management capacities growing rapidly between 2011 and 2013 - especially through the harmonization of security actors and structures and the involvement of the State at the local level, which improved local government capacity and empowerment - with low corporate culture and little dedication of the CR manager or the MD to SES, levels of sustainability in implementation decreased from 2011-2012 to 2012-2013.

In sum, it is no surprise that SES sustainability is back to low levels but is comparatively a bit higher than before 2011 when no SES strategy was in place. In 2012-2013, the NMGM was still including some local stakeholders and giving them a little feedback. The mine's effort on capacity-building through the funding of income generating activities is still active although infrastructure building is on standby.

Conclusions on NMGM:

The North-Mara gold mine is a typical case where history and associated stereotypes concerning neighboring communities hindered the company and the government from even trying to implement sustainable conflict management, because it seemed like a lost cause (see chapter 7). However, the growing number of upheavals resulting in injuries and death, and also the fact that they were mediatized internationally [Koven, 2011; Toronto Star, 2011; Wright et al., 2011], may have motivated a change of attitude to reduce negative consequences and international attention. What is more certain is that the change of managing director's dedication, coupled with the state's involvement both in symptoms of crises (special police forces) and to one of the root causes (compensation issues) helped to transform the outcomes of the company's SES implementation.

The change that occurred in 2012 can thus be attributed to four main factors: the dedication of the MD, who increased the resources available to the CR, the multiplication of alternative income generating activities to artisanal mining for the youth (which was also reinforced by the MD's support of local youth), the involvement of the state, and the harmonization of security actors and structures (see chapters 7 and 8). Implementation of sustainability, however, did not survive the change of managing director that occurred towards the end of 2012, and the drop in gold prices that caused a lot of turmoil for African Barrick Gold.

B. CONCLUSIONS OF FINDINGS

What happens between adoption and implementation of socially sustainable approach to community-company conflict? Within each company studied in this research from 2011 to 2013, in most cases over time we find a correlation between how favorable corporate culture and corporate design features are, and how successful the implementation of a sustainable SES is. Other cases in which these internal company drivers do not seem correlated to SES implementation success can be explained by the mitigating effect of local governance drivers.

For example, if people stay calm around the SAG while we would expect the Siguirika to be more aggressive (chapter 7), maybe it is because the SAG is peaceful with them. Conversely, neighboring communities of the GGM, who are historically peaceful, might have become aggressive because of the company's aggressiveness towards them (police arrests, alleged beatings, dog chasing). Also, Buzwagi could reach such a high level of variety of stakeholders because people around the mining operations were already mixing up before the company arrived, and there were organizations to partner with. Even in the case of NMGM, when the company overcame the stereotypes and their fear about the local Kurya people, they found partners in the communities.

Outcomes of interactions between company and community really illustrate the effect of internal drivers meeting with local governance drivers, and the role played by the local interconnectedness of actors and institutions.

1. Internal company drivers' effect on sustainability implementation and the Decisive role of leadership

As the general findings of this research suggest, a detailed approach confirms that formal/structures and informal/cultural systems complement each other in the success of the implementation of a sustainability strategy once the strategy has been adopted by the headquarters [Epstein & Buhovac 2010]. In most cases, when internal drivers - i.e., the combination of cultural and structural systems - were low, the company reached low levels of sustainability (BUZ before 2011, NMGM before 2011, SMD 2011-2012). When they were medium, the level of sustainability of the SES was medium (NMGM 2011-2012, SAG before 2011 and 2011-2012, and GGM 2011-2012 and 2012-2013). Among the cases studied here, the GGM before 2011 is the closest to having both highly favorable corporate design and culture; still, the company's implementation of sustainability was only moderately successful. This case is an example of how it is only by analyzing the interactions between the various drivers that we can understand the success or failure of implementing a sustainable SES.

We also suggest that "informal systems are more important" even if alignment between the two systems is clearly critical [Epstein&Buhovac 2010:313]. Other cultural research also emphasizes the role of culture in hindering or fostering implementation of managerial innovation [Linnenluecke&Griffith 2010:358, Zammuto, Gifford&Goodman 2000]. Studies often identify the role of culture as the primary reason for failure of implementation. Studies consider that the inability of the organization to change its culture can hinder sustainability implementation despite having the right structures in place [Linnenluecke&Griffith 2010:359, Cameron&Quinn 2006, Cameron et al 1993, Janargin&Slocum 2007]. Corporate culture appears to play a more decisive role than corporate design features at operational levels for three of the operational sites studied here. (SMD in 2012-2013, SAG in 2012-2013 and BUZ in 2011-2012). However, the interdependence of design

and culture is illustrated in most cases. Either high hierarchical power and capacity of the CR resulting in a good auto-perception even without the recognition of the MD, as in the case of SMD before 2011, or the MD's dedication leads to certain key design features, as in the case of NMGM in 2012-2013, or when autonomy and capacity of the CR are high it seems to compensate the low dedication of the CR and its low hierarchical power, as in the GGM case between 2011 and 2012.

If this study confirms the crucial role of culture in enacting the change towards more social sustainability, it adds that specific features of internal systems are particularly critical, such as leadership in culture and structure, even more so if they are simultaneously strong. Leadership has various characteristics (see chapter 7.1), some are more cultural, such as the level of dedication to the SES. Others are related to the structures and tools of the company, such as the hierarchical power, capacity, and autonomy given to the department in charge of implementing the SES. The best-case scenario, BUZ in 2012-2013, shows the importance of leadership in attaining a high level of SES sustainability. In BUZ as well as in the case of the GGM in 2012-2012, the MD's leadership is strong. He is dedicated to SES implementation and recognizes the importance of the CR. It appears that this strong leadership is more important than other factors for corporate culture to have an influence on the implementation of sustainable SES. In BUZ 2012-2013, the CR manager's leadership is also strong, with CR hierarchical power proving to be a core characteristic of corporate design. The case of the SAG in 2012-2013 also implies the importance of high hierarchical power. In that latter case, hierarchical power compensates for low dedication of the CR manager to SES, especially when enhanced by high co-management capacities. The case of BUZ in 2012-2013 suggests the role of leadership (MD dedication) and also suggests that CR capacity is a core characteristic of corporate design. The case of the SAG in 2012-2013 implies the same finding since high hierarchical power of the CR compensates for unfavorable MD and CR manager dedication to SES in influencing implementation of sustainability. In this case the effect of internal drivers is also enhanced by high co-management capacities of neighboring communities.

The MD's dedication to the change of strategy proves to be critical in implementing higher sustainability of SES in five of the case studies (GGM 11-12 and 12-13, BUZ 12-13 and NMGM 11-12), especially when combined with specific features of the corporate design. MD dedication and recognition of the CR department combined with high hierarchical power of the CR results in high sustainability of SES, as in the case of BUZ in 12-13, but when combined with low hierarchical power it results in medium sustainability (GGM 11-12 and 12-13). When MD dedication is combined with good autonomy and capacity of the CR, it results in medium SES, as in the case of the NMGM in 2011-2012. The importance of autonomy and capacity of the CR is also suggested in the case of the SAG in 2012-2013, where these key corporate design features compensate for the low dedication of the MD resulting in medium to high SES sustainability. In sum, various combinations of leadership features - at the level of the MD or at the CR department level, either related to the culture (dedication, recognition, relationships) or to design aspects (hierarchy, capacity, autonomy) - lead to higher level of sustainability in the implementation of SES.

Leadership thus proves essential in the success of implementation, as other scholars have recognized. "The role of committed leadership can never be overstated" [Epstein&Buhovac 2010:307]. Epstein & Buhovac, for example, emphasize the importance for leaders to clearly articulate the vision of sustainability, and how leadership makes the link between structure, culture, and learning processes [Epstein&Buhovac 2010:307]. Valente also considers that "business

visionaries who recognize the limitations of the broader system and communicate these potential implications create awareness of the need for change” [Valetne 2010:466]. Business visionaries, such as dedicated and empowered MDs and CR managers, are a critical enabling condition to paradigmatic change.

International management studies examine subsidiary-level factors that promote global initiatives in MNCs. Together with these studies we studied “inter-unit networking, subsidiary learning from internal and external sources, shared strategic goals”. A survey of 118 subsidiary managers, triangulated with interviews with 20 key informants, by Williams in 2009 supports our finding that these variables “combine to activate initiatives within the MNC and thus act as a source of competitiveness on a worldwide basis” [Williams 2009:92].

If internal drivers are so important in the implementation of sustainability, we would expect a high level of implementation of sustainability in SES in the GGM before 2011, with high corporate culture and high corporate design, but the level attained was only medium. GGM at the time also had an MD and a CR manager dedicated to SES and communities, and the CR department had high autonomy and good capacities, key leadership features were thus present. Then, we explored the local governance settings in which the GGM operates to understand why highly favorable leadership did not have a direct effect on success of sustainable strategy implementation. Local governance drivers, since they are part of the direct external environment the company interacts with to implement a sustainable stakeholder engagement strategy, play a mitigating role in the implementation challenge.

2. Mitigating Effect of Local Governance Drivers

Compliance or non-compliance with voluntary standards such as the VPSHR and corporate security practices as a whole often have negative effects on collective security at the local level [Hönke, 2013]. In our perspective, we add that effects of local governance also affect company practices related to community-company conflict management. The way local communities are connected to each other and the history of conflict within these communities affect the implementation outcomes of sustainable approaches.

To the conclusion of the decisive role of a strong leadership, we add that for implementation of sustainability to succeed, it cannot neglect the role played by the organization’s direct external environment. Case studies show how local governance drivers also matter. Most cases over time illustrate the decisive influence of the co-management capacities of neighboring communities in mitigating the effect of internal company drivers on the sustainability of SES implemented at operational level by companies. Higher co-management capacities of neighboring communities lead to higher sustainability of SES. With low internal drivers, as in the SMD before 2011 and between 2011 and 2012, we would expect low sustainability implementation, but combined with medium co-management capacity, the company almost reached medium levels of SES sustainability. With high co-management capacity around the SAG in 2011-2012, 2012-2013, and the GGM in 2011-2012, combined with medium internal drivers, they reached a medium/high or high sustainability of SES. High co-management capacities combined with highly favorable internal drivers resulted in the most sustainable SES implemented of all case studies. Moreover, this most successful case (BUZ in 2011-2012) illustrates again the importance of corporate culture. In this case, with medium corporate culture and low design features but high co-management capacities, the SES sustainability was high.

It seems that low corporate culture reduces the effect of co-management capacities in the cases of BUZ before 2011 and NMGM 12-13 but not in the case of SAG 12-13. The SAG 12-13, despite unfavorable corporate culture, still had favorable leadership at the CR level. The CR department's dedication to community issues combined to corporate design dimensions also favorable to the CR leadership: high autonomy of CR, good capacities, especially skilled officers, and good hierarchical power with several managers directly in charge of social sustainability and community-company conflict management issues. This special combination appears to compensate for most of the corporate culture dimensions' being unfavorable. In the end, co-management capacities of neighboring communities enhance the effect of favorable internal company drivers on success of sustainability implementation, especially when leadership for SES is strong.

Case studies also suggest that risks play a mitigating role in the variation of implemented sustainability. Higher risk hinders the chances for sustainability to be implemented successfully, as in the case of GGM in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 (medium sustainability reached instead of high when high co-management is combined with low risk). Lower risk appears to be linked to higher sustainability of SES in the case of BUZ in 2011-2012 and 2012-2013. Three cases suggest that a key feature of risk is the company's response to highly confrontational accountability strategies. When the companies employ a comprehensive response (more dialog, more employment), they reach a higher level of SES sustainability (SAG 2012-2013) than when they use harsher security answers (police and arrest) and achieve medium SES sustainability (GGM 11-12 and 12-13, NMGM 2012-2013). Going back to the case of GGM before 2011, where leadership was strong but the company only attains medium levels of sustainability. Compared to the best-case scenario of BUZ 12-13, co-management capacities of communities neighboring GGM were only medium and were not as high as in the case of BUZ in 2012-2013. This illustrates the mitigating influence of co-management capacities on high internal drivers. Indeed, around BUZ, neighboring communities' security actors and structures are well coordinated and informal community cohesion is so high that it compensates for the lack of local government empowerment. GGM had low community cohesion and medium harmonization between security actors, despite comparatively high local government empowerment. Also, BUZ in 2012-2013, contrary to GGM before 2011, encountered very low risks of conflict with communities over the whole period. Around BUZ, ASM was not the most important activity, and elders, youth groups, and NGOs supported other income-generating initiatives, while there is no history of company-community conflicts. Around GGM before 2011, even if the history is not one of confrontation, perceptions of one another were not so positive, ASM is traditionally more central in the local economy and in customary systems, and communities often use imposed accountability strategies to which GGM does not always respond by peaceful negotiations. Thus, the case of BUZ in 2012-2013 exemplifies the role of local risks in mitigating the effects of co-management capacities and internal drivers. The role of the company's response in implementing high levels of SES is, however, is not clear in the comparison of these cases, since too many features of local risks differ.

Co-management capacities and risk of conflict are important dimensions of local governance in mitigating the effect of internal company drivers of the implementation of a sustainable SES. Cases suggest that the local governance dimensions that are most important to explain outcomes of conflict management by MNCs are informal community cohesion and the history of community-company conflicts. This finding also illustrates the confrontation between the old and the new "ways

of doing things”. Informal cohesion is usually (but not in the case of Buz) attached to traditional linkages of solidarity between elders and youngsters, and between local community groups that are still alive in West Africa (but not intact). This connectedness, even though it is rooted in the past, is still a sustainability-driven trajectory (table transition model synthesis). The legacy of community-company conflict is also the effect of past unsustainable conflict management strategies — which used to be the norm — that privilege harsh security measures over soft negotiations and dialog in order to solve community-company conflicts.

In the end, we find that strong leadership for SES - i.e. “agent visionaries” [Valente, 2010] dedicated and/or empowered to implement sustainable SES - leads to successful implementation of sustainable strategies when combined to favorable local governance settings (high co-management capacities and low risk of conflict). Dedicated and empowered MDs and CR department are likely to succeed in implementing a socially sustainable strategy to manage community-company conflict when communities neighboring their activities are used to collaborate among themselves and do not face harsh company security measures.

Part 5: Conclusion, discussion and outlook

Chapter XI — Conclusions

“Why would a multinational mining company be nice to the villagers living around its mines?” [B.1]

To this question, we answer: a multinational mining company should be nice to the villagers living around its mines, because companies are part of a business system that is dependent on a societal system that has begun to change in the past decades. Companies are among the symptoms that made the system change in the first place. They participated in engendering crises that called into question the main principles of the system. They are now becoming part of the solution. Although they now agree on adoption of innovative approaches to prevent the recurrence of crises, they often fail to implement practices that will avoid repeated occurrence of the symptoms. So, when do they succeed in being “nice”? They succeed when they internalize innovative strategies successfully by recruiting agents dedicated to communities and by allowing them to have resources, autonomy, and power to act. Successful implementation of SES is also completely dependent on the communities with whom they are trying to “be nice”. Some communities that are socialized into trusting one another and working together towards common goals create a context in which change initiated by the company can spread. When companies succeed in implementing change, it creates incentives for other actors to change, which reinforces the change towards a new, sustainable paradigm.

Nordgold has no reputation concerns, faces no competition on sustainability, was never targeted by campaigns, and still adopts a very sustainable discourse on communities. Also, why does a single company (ABG) reach completely different outcomes at two of its sites operating in the same country: one reaching the most success, and the other failing the most in implementation of sustainable strategies?

Existing theories meant to explain adoption and/or implementation of sustainable strategies by MNCs in ALS are not sufficient. To this literature our study adds a small sample comparative study with anthropological empirical research methods, with the operationalization of concepts widely used (corporate culture, sustainability), and with a complex approach to explain the degree of success of social sustainability implementation by MNCs in ALS. To explain implementation outcomes, we had to combine internal company characteristics with local governance characteristics. This means that we also had to change our own paradigm of thought, since we had to interpret our observations “outside the box”. We had to provide a local framework of analysis.

Until recently, most literature on business and CSR sustainability analyzed firms as international actors taking progressively more social and political roles, especially when operating in areas of limited statehood [Blowfield 2005; Blowfield & Frynas 2005; Newell 2005; Valente 2010]. The ambiguity of such a role has been researched as well. Studies have focused not only on why multinational companies would adopt CSR strategies at all, but also on whether their practices in ALS were likely to be sustainable or not [Börzel & Thauer 2013; Haufler 2001; Graham & Woods 2006; Porter & Kramer 2002]. The “why” question has been mostly resolved through the idea of reputation concerns, market competition, regulations, and legitimization mechanisms [Flohr et al 2010; Finnemore & Skkinik 1998; Graham & Woods 2006; Hillman 2004; Potoski & Prakash 2005]. Whether the practices of MNCs are likely to be sustainable in ALS gave rise to opposite views. Some

scholars argue that they lead to a “race to the top”, others on the contrary, to a “race to the bottom”. Some studies consider that the “shadow of hierarchy” (regulation and enforcement will and capacity of the hosting state) is an essential condition for MNCs to act in a “good” way in ALS [Börzel, 2012].

Another set of studies remotely related to business and CSR sustainability suggests a different perspective. Rather than focusing on the company’s motives, these studies emphasize the role of collaboration and social cohesion in reaching sustainable outcomes [Armitage et al 2008; Plummer & Fitzgibbon 2006; Cundill & Fabricius 2010]. Although they do not directly consider the company as an actor and are often limited to state agents in collaboration with other “legitimate” agents, they have the advantage of giving insight into local level dynamics. Other studies analyze conflict specifically, proposing to take into account the historical and mutual perception context encompassed in the degree of risk of conflict [Kuhn et al., 2000; Rahim, 2011; Worchel, S., 2005].

It turns out that the question of why and how successfully companies adopt and implement sustainable strategies is not about whether companies should or should not adopt sustainable strategies, since they are as a matter of fact adopting them. It is more about understanding the elements that lead to successful implementation. The answer to that is embedded in a complex interaction of local level drivers, which also depend to some extent on feedback from the local to the international levels. We show that multinational gold mining companies have indeed adopted sustainable strategies to manage conflicts with communities neighboring their operations. We also describe the challenges of successfully implementing them. We present evidence that international drivers, the limited statehood of the host country, local governance dynamics, or internal company features taken separately cannot explain the success or failure of implementing a sustainable SES. We explain the variations in the implementation of socially sustainable SES by MNCS by the interactions of internal and external drivers at the local level.

A. SUSTAINABLE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY MNCS: HOW TO SUCCEED IN IMPLEMENTATION (EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL DISCUSSION)

We show that gold mining companies in Guinea and Tanzania implement sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies at the operational level. We provide an analytical tool to evaluate the level of sustainability reached by three companies at five different mining sites with variation over time from 2011 to 2013. Then, we consider each driver identified in the literature separately to evaluate to what extent they explain the variation of success in implementation. To do so, we combine our most-similar most-different system research design to a grounded theory approach in order to operationalize these drivers. This operationalization provides a way to systematically compare the explanatory power of each characteristics of every driver in our case studies over time.

By doing so, our study allows a more detailed analysis than that offered by previous studies concerning the drivers and obstacles to the implementation of socially sustainable CSR. What our research adds to the existing literature is a pragmatic perspective on the drivers of change toward sustainability. It provides a systematic analysis of empirical data to illustrate how drivers identified in the literature so far can be evaluated with a focus on the micro level. To the literature on the subject, our study adds a small sample of anthropological empirical research and a focus on the

interaction of local governance drivers with corporate culture and design. Our research also answers some of the concerns in the literature on the necessity to provide more operational level and local level analysis. For instance, while the corporate culture factor is often emphasized as an explanatory driver for a company's behavior in the literature, studies usually recognize the necessity for a more systematic exploration of its effects.

Comparison of two companies with completely different international drivers but adopting similar strategies —AGA versus NG — shows that international drivers (reputation, home country, naming and shaming campaigns) cannot directly explain the adoption of sustainable strategies. We also observe variation in strategy outcomes when we compare one company operating in two different countries — AGA in Tanzania and Guinea — which convinced us that the HQ context does not directly affect implementation outcomes. Likewise, our observation that one company reaching different outcomes at two different sites operated in the same host country — ABG's two sites in Tanzania — shows that host country drivers do not play a decisive role in implementation. Hence, the specific history of company-community relationships and stereotypes attached to them are important. Moreover, comparison of two companies operating in a-priori similar local governance contexts — AGA and ABG in Sukuma communities, or AGA and NG in Siguirika communities — but reaching different strategy outcomes indicates that local governance contexts need to be investigated more thoroughly. Comparison of the two extreme cases (best-case and worst-case of implementation outcomes) also conveys the idea that the specificities of local level dynamics influence outcomes, especially considering that these two extreme cases are operated by a single company.

We then had to carefully compare local governance drivers and internal company drivers at operational levels and “play the game of similarities and differences” to arrive to our conclusions. These contradict some of the indirectly related literature and add a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the conditions for successful implementation of sustainable strategies.

Our conclusions contradict most studies concerning the effect of reputation concerns and market drivers on MNCs's strategy implementation in ALS. However, only a minority of these studies is truly investigating MNC's behavior at the local level. Those that provide an analytical approach to local level dynamics often consider impacts on communities rather than drivers of outcomes [Hönke, 2013; Idemudia, Uwafiokun, 2011b].

We also conclude that government regulations and enforcement actors in areas of limited statehood have a limited effect on the implementation of sustainability by foreign companies in their borders. In line with the complex system approach used by Valente [Valente 2010], this appears to be mostly due to the fact that ALS are tied to the economic paradigm by their material and financial dependency on it. However, if local governance drivers matter, it is also due to the power and recognition the central state attributes to local government authorities and structures (decentralization effectiveness). We point out this relationship between local governance and host country drivers in the conclusion of part 3 (chapter 9) but we did not develop this point much further.


As has been recognized by management research, external pressure of stakeholders matters in the implementation of sustainable strategies by companies [Linnenlueck & Griffith 2010]. What matters most are the constellation and capacities of local actors, as we show in our study. Political science

research also recognizes that successful implementation “might depend on a functioning state structure providing some basic collective goods and services, such as political stability, security, roads or energy supply” [Börzel & Thauer 2013:240; Börzel et al 2012]. We add that the presence of these state structures is mostly relevant at the local level and that they rely on informal cohesion and multi-level connectedness to be decisive in sustainable strategy implementation by MNCs. Moreover, this dependence is “particularly likely if complex tasks are involved that rely on the cooperation of other actors than business” [Börzel & Thauer 2013:240]. Clearly this is the case of the tasks related to company-community conflict management. A company-community conflict is not a bi-partite conflict; it is a multi-partite one in which all types of actors need to play their parts, including state actors.

Our study also confirms that corporate culture matters in order to enact the dynamic of change towards sustainability. We provide empiric data to confirm that structures and cultures combining certain key factors are more favorable to sustainability implementation as Linnenluecke and Griffith suggested through the CVF schema illustration [Linnenluecke & Griffith 2010]. An organization that is low on internal process values and high on open system values is more likely to be successful when changing towards sustainability [Linnenluecke & Griffith 2010:364]. Hence, specific aspects of informal and formal systems work together. We contribute to this literature by expanding our understanding of the role of corporate culture, since we provide an operationalization of this concept in order to analyze its effects on strategy outcomes. We provide empirical case studies and small-scale sample sources on the operational level in ALS [Bowen et al., 2010]. Therefore, our study broadens the scope of the literature on community relations and participatory processes by MNCs [Austin, 2000; Bowen et al., 2010; Jeurissen, 2004]. We contribute to the literature on models of CSR management by providing ideal-types to evaluate which model a company is adopting and/or implementing. These can also serve to evaluate any other actor’s approach to sustainability regarding community engagement.


Our research shows that external and internal drivers identified in the literature work in combination to explain both the variation in implementation (figure 8) and the drivers of change toward sustainability (since success of implementation is part of the change). We conclude that MNCs succeed in implementing sustainable community-company conflict management strategies when they recruit agents dedicated to communities and give them enough resources, autonomy, and power to act. Communities that are socialized into trusting one another and working together towards common goals create a favorable context for sustainability approaches, especially if companies do not use harsh responses to community confrontations.

Figure 8. Local level drivers leading to sustainable outcomes



The various drivers can be integrated into a wider system of change towards the sustainability paradigm. If sustainability-driven approaches become the norm at the local level, then instead of feeding back into the system to reinforce the economic paradigm, new sustainability-driven trajectories progressively change the system. We suggest that what happens at the local level between MNCs and neighboring communities, through positive and negative feedback, contributes to the change of paradigm (figure 9). By refining the analysis of local level dimensions, we were able to isolate essential characteristics of internal company drivers and local governance drivers. We argue that among internal company drivers, it is specifically the strength of leadership on social sustainability issues that leads to success in implementing sustainable SES. We also claim that local governance drivers stimulate or mitigate the effect of leadership. Specifically, when neighboring communities are accustomed to working collaboratively among themselves and when companies choose negotiation over harsh security measures, this enhances the effect of strong leadership. In the end, strong leadership and favorable local governance drivers lead to the success of implementation of socially sustainable SES. Moreover, we consider that positive and negative feedback from experiences of implementation at the local level contribute to the change of paradigm. We illustrate these dynamics in figure 9.

Figure 9. Implementation of sustainability in a transition cycle



Positive feedback from successful implementation creates emulation for other actors to act in a sustainable way. This feedback increases the number of sustainability-driven trajectories at the sub-systems level, which influence regimes and landscape on the longer term. Negative feedbacks are at the origin of crisis within the companies. They also feed global awareness when they are mediatized at the national and international level. They create incentives for companies not to reproduce these symptoms of a broader crisis of the economic-driven systems. Hence, we suggest that the local level where implementation happens acts as a laboratory for subsequent innovations. The implementation level reflects tensions between existing and innovative approaches: local level dynamics concentrate landscape forces, regime forces, and are potential niches or laboratories.

Altogether, there is no simplistic answer that can grasp the drivers of change towards more sustainable strategies by MNCs. Changing towards more social sustainability requires not only a global awareness and existing pathways for change, but also a willingness of participants (both companies and communities) to share their knowledge and participate in the sustainable strategy

(this dimension is beyond binding regulations) and in the empowerment of local actors by all means at their disposal.

B. GENERALIZATION

Lawrence's study on an extractive company's engagement with international NGOs explains that motivation, mutual goals, and organizational capacities on both sides are enabling conditions, while success of SE is driven by cultural affinity, recognition of the other as legitimate, trust issues, and acceptance of incremental gains [Lawrence, 2002]. Lawrence's focus on mutual relationships touches upon how the interaction of internal and external drivers explains stakeholder engagement practices of oil companies. In the oil industry, Idemudia [Idemudia, Uwafiokun, 2011b] also recognizes the reciprocal responsibilities of communities and companies in the outcomes of corporate citizenship on sustainable development. Although these studies do not directly consider community-company conflict management and are limited to a single-case study, they hint at the possible generalization of our study to the oil industry. Moreover, the results of a case study in Peru on conflict management and corporate culture in the extractive industry by Rees, Kemp, and Davis [Rees et al., 2012] are similar to our own. We can thus consider the possibility of generalizing our findings to the extractive industry operating in ALS on other continents.

Studies concerned with other types of industry sectors such as the automotive or the manufacturing industry also reach findings comparable to our study. For example, Hönke & Thauer [Hönke et al., 2014] also consider to some extent the interaction of internal and external drivers in their study on conditions for effective service provision by MNCs in the automotive industry in ALS. Their findings are similar to ours in the sense that they consider both the "norms and beliefs held by coordination partners" (legitimacy) and the company's "organizational structures" (institutional design) to be decisive in the effectiveness of a company's contribution to service provision in ALS. In the manufacturing sector also, a study by Bey, Hauschild, and McAloone [Bey et al., 2013] finds that the main barriers for implementation of environmental strategies in companies "are a lack of information on environmental impacts and lack of expert knowledge, and lack of allocated resources". This in essence means a lack of leadership dedication and capacity to implement the strategy, which is consistent with our findings on internal drivers. Other studies on social sustainability implementation in the manufacturing and metals industries also emphasize the role of internal organizational practice [Longoni et al., 2014], and even pointing out the issues of trust, group culture and institutions, and head management dedication (to 'walk the talk') [Lozano, 2013]. Consequently, although more research is needed about enablers and barriers to successful outcomes of strategies by companies in other industries, we foresee that our findings also apply to other industries.

We borrowed our suppositions concerning local governance drivers from a wide variety of studies on ethnical conflicts, natural resource management outside of ALS, and local governance in various contexts. Since most of these suppositions were confirmed, we consider that our findings are generalizable to a variety of communities in ALS as well as in areas of consolidated statehood.

C. WHY DOES IT MATTER IN THE REAL WORLD? (POLICY/PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS)

a) RECOMMENDATIONS TO HOST GOVERNMENT

Inspired by Valente's list of "Future schemata and anticipated private sector response", we recommend that government regulations follow "ecological and social priorities alongside economic ones" and that "policies (should) reflect simultaneous creation of all three dimensions with no tradeoffs" [Valente 2010: 463]. In areas of limited statehood in particular, government should delegate more power to local level government authorities and develop participative structures where state and non-state actors can discuss decisions in common. This would make even more sense if capacity-building efforts targeted specific needs.

According to us, one of the most important shortcomings of government in ALS is communication. The state should ensure that dialog is established between: elected and non-elected authorities with communities they represent; various levels of government; local associations and community groups and local authorities; local authorities (elected and non-elected) with the central government; mining companies and state authorities at the local level; and mining companies and local groups representatives.

These communications should be regular and multilateral. Transmitting messages without listening and integrating feedback cannot lead to favorable outcomes in conflict management or in local development. For instance, if local communities understood better the functioning of the state and the functioning of mining companies, demands that are usually the foundations of conflicts could be moderated and adapted to each actor's responsibilities.

Organizing regular public meetings is a step towards better communication and better development and conflict management. This could have benefits on several levels: policies and regulations, implementations and enforcement of these policies and regulations, feedback from implementation challenges, discussions on the possible solutions, implementation of solutions, etc... This system of learning needs rigor and persistence in order to gain the confidence of actors and to avoid repetition of mistakes [see learning loops by Pahl-Wostl 2009: 359]. This requires honesty and transparency at each step of policy implementation and for each activity linked to the development of local collectivities. Honest and transparency would also give more credibility and recognition to implicated actors. It is important to keep the population informed at every stage. To do so, thorough independent socio-economic studies should be conducted. In the absence of state capacity (lack of means or competence), it would be the task of international donors' institutions to ensure that such independent (from the state and from the IO) studies are conducted and used to inform further policies and funding. Valente also considers that future schemata and rules of international institutions should become "Inclusive, context-specific solutions derived from bottom up with top-down support" [Valente 2010: 453].

b) RECOMMENDATIONS TO MINING SECTOR PRACTITIONERS

For the mining sector practitioners, our recommendations cover three essential aspects of community-company relationships: follow-up (on communication and support), capacity-building (advise, share knowledge and expertise), and respect (from all levels of the company for communities). Close follow-up and successful examples will motivate other groups of the communities to loosen the pressure on the company. There is also often a need to increase the

representativeness of consulted groups and increase regularity of communication to reach co-construction of solutions to community-company conflicts. It is also important that each new MD show his respect to local authorities and traditional authorities: 'they respect respect'. Consequently, the simple act of greeting them can help avoid further problems. Having a designated translator in each department in case of necessity would be a plus, especially if the company's employees cannot speak the official language of the country. We present our recommendations about capacity-building projects, communication, and community relations departments in bullet points:

Capacity-building:

- Fund scholarships instead of schools (schools should be funded by local taxes in order to fit into national development plans and have teachers sent by the government);
- Provide active support of long-term agricultural and artisanal projects, to train authorities, women, and youth associations on alternative activities (entrepreneurship, management of projects, planning, etc.);
- Schedule program support to make local groups auto-sufficient;
- Select the right actors in the villages (trust the advice of CR officers, and conduct socio-economic studies with the help of natives of the country and sub-region);
- Skilled community relations (CR) agent advise, supervise regularly and report to the CR Department and Managing Director;
- CR agent also trains local people to become CR agents.

Communication:

- Regular meetings with representatives of all groups in each village and in sub-prefectures (include women, youth, professional associations and local NGOs in meetings, not just local authorities and wise men);
- Find feasible solutions in common (make local actors part of the decisions). Understand why long-term projects have not been sustained. It is not because these people do not have the long-term vision as many employees of the SMD like to say; it is rather a matter of understanding what is keeping them from seeing the benefits of long-term projects.
- Reduce pressure related to recruitments and deepen understanding of the complexity and realities of the mine. Inform people about the mining activities, not just on projects related to them.
- Never promise anything before funding is secured (never say yes or maybe; it is better to say no and explain the reasons).

Community Relations Department:

- CR manager should report directly to MD to have more credibility and take responsibility for his actions. This also reduces bureaucracy and allows more frequent reports.
- Hire a CR agent to advise people in charge of projects funded by the local tax (follow up and capacity-building).
- Communicate on Community Relation department projects with all departments in the company to avoid recurrent negative discourses.
- Maybe have a pair of CR managers: one expat and one Native of the country or even the sub-region that speaks the local language (to be recognized as legitimate intermediaries by the communities and by the head management).

D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND OUTLOOK

What further research might now be done as a result of our work? Now that we have shown how important local dynamics are for the implementation of sustainable strategies by MNCs, the direct remaining question is: when does success in implementation lead to long-term conflict resolution?

Also, what explains the similarity of local demand and the company's practices beyond the adoption by HQ and beyond direct community needs? Finally, addressing the main limit of our study: under what conditions do successful incremental changes in company practices lead to fundamental change in company practices?

(1) To what extent can sustainable SES influence the resolution of community-company conflicts?

By taking the company as the main unit of analysis, we found conditions under which they implement sustainable strategies to manage company-community conflicts. However, another interesting area to research is: What might explain the chances for long-term company-community conflict?

In Buzwagi, the absence of conflict is not a consequence of the company's strategy, and in SMD and SAG, despite the relatively low level of sustainability of SES, the relationships are more peaceful than in North-Mara or Geita. So what could explain the level of conflict other than the implementation of socially sustainable conflict-management strategies?

How much re-categorization is taking place between the company and the communities? Are national accountability structures and perceptions of the mining sector hindering or facilitating the chances for long-term peaceful relations? How much are co-management capacities rebalancing power inequities and "fear of the other" at the local level? It would be interesting to understand to what extent a successful implementation of SES has an impact on the way each group (government actors, community actors, company actors) questions and re-defines its perception of the other groups. This re-categorization of the other and of one's own group might allow a long-term mutual understanding and continuous learning from the other groups. Learning processes inside the company could lead to re-categorization of perceptions of neighboring communities. What could lead to an ongoing re-categorization of the communities' perception of companies? What role do these factors play in achieving long-term company-community peaceful relationships?

The success of conflict resolution could be measured through acculturation processes and depth of learning process (single loop or double loop, allowing or not allowing initial stereotypes to be questioned), insofar as it avoids creating new conflicts and allows ongoing re-categorization of the cultural groups participating in conflict management arrangements [see Worchel2005]. Research on this subject could also use the literature on policing, for example on conditions for successful policing arrangements with non-state actors [Shearing, 2001: 267].

(2) How transnational networks of discourse influence local demands

The interaction of local governance drivers and internal company drivers at operational levels also points to the existence of transnational networks of discourses. Various discourses influence local demands, CSR choices (long-term decisions), as well as the level of engagement (inclusiveness and multilateralism). The local arena is influenced by various levels of discourse, which are essential in what we could observe on the ground. It is not only about meetings between local people and the MNC: the local setting constitutes a network of discourses, which brings together international, national, and local discourses, making the locality a transnational arena. Media influence both the national and international attention to specific localities and the behavior of agents. International discourses and institutional pressures influence the media themselves. These international discourses penetrate the local sphere, as "increasingly they do so [communities engaging with corporations] in ways that assume global significance because of new forms of global organizing and

the influence of media and telecommunications, which expose companies' activities to greater scrutiny, as well as the nature of the claims company themselves now make about their global operations" [Newell, 2005: 541]. These local settings can thus be considered as transnational networks of discourse of three parties, which would be an interesting area of study.

(3) When can incremental change of company practices lead to fundamental Changes?

We found that even the most successful implementation of a sustainable conflict management strategy does not go beyond incremental changes. Learning processes over a longer period of time could be investigated to find out whether they are the drivers of more fundamental transformations. These learning processes could be analyzed not only within the company, but also from the local level to the central state, as well as from the local to the global sphere. How can experiences at the local level inform future decisions at the host country and international levels? How do simultaneous sustainability-driven trajectories happening in different sub-systems aggregate to create a change of paradigm at a societal level?

(4) Outlook

The interactions between communities and companies can lead to sustainable outcomes when each side agrees to find the will and the means to co-manage their conflicts. However, these interactions in the mining sector cannot be envisaged outside of a power relation game.

According to neo-colonialist interpretations, companies wall themselves, figuratively and materially, to avoid having to face their position in a "tenable colonialist system of domination in a formally post-colonial era" [Butler, 2014: 88]. They are perceived as "forting up" [Dupuis et al., 2008] to maintain their comfortable existence of non-awareness and non-accountability, through material advantage and psychic well-being [Butler, P. 2014: 95]. Consequently, one could suggest that company members "live in complicity regarding conditions of racialized structural violence in the form of large-scale displacement, loss, death, dispossession, and impoverishment (exclusion from wealth)" [Butler, P. 2014: 87]. This can be linked to the concept of "accumulation by dispossession" coined by David Harvey [Harvey, 2003] suggesting that neo-colonial powers develop new techniques, such as SES, to garner consent in order "to intercept and declaw demands (...) to cede territory, lands, and resources back to those who were displaced and dispossessed" [Butler, P. 2014: 95]. Without denying the validity of these interpretations within the dominant economic-driven paradigm, we propose to interpret our study through a more optimistic lens.

Despite the fact that even the best-case scenario only succeeds in implementing incremental changes at this stage, we prefer to consider our study as evidence that the status quo is being challenged by numerous emerging successful sustainable ways of interacting. For instance, as company members accept to move outside their literal and figurative walls, truly inclusive, multilateral, and long-term decisions between companies and communities about the local development and the management of conflict can succeed in breaking colonial patterns. After all, sustainability transition studies imply that, as sustainability-driven trajectories become the norm, they are bound to rebalance power relations.

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List of Interviews

- B.1. Maximilian C. Berneau, Business counselor, random street interview, 03.03.2014, Berlin, Germany
- SA.1. Jessica van Onselen, AGA Public Affairs and Communication senior Manager (former sustainability manager), Abiola Okpechi, Human Rights senior advisor, and Felicity Fouche, manager stakeholder engagement strategy, 10.09.2013, AngloGold Ashanti head quarters, Johannesburg South Africa
- SA.2. Director of a Tanzanian NGO, 11.09.2013, Gold Reef Hotel, Johannesburg South Africa

GUINEA 2011-2013

- G.1. Moustapha Diop, Law Professor (specialist in development issues), CEMAF (Centre d'Etude des Mondes Africains – Research Center of African Worlds), 02.02.2011, Paris, France
- G.2. Thierno Bah, Guinean PhD and writer expatriated in France, not affiliated, 03.02.2011, Paris, France.

- G.3. Dominique Bangoura, PhD in political science, Accredited to supervise research, (specialist in security issues in West Africa) , OPSA (Observatoire Politique et Stratégique de l’Afrique) Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, 03.02.2011, BNF Paris, France.
- G.4. Dominique Kpogomou & Mr. Barry, members of CNT Conseil National de Transition – National Transition Council, (government monitoring commission and representatives of diaspora in France and Switzerland), 22.02.2011, Palais du Peuple, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.5. Mamady Koulibaly, economist, World Bank Guinea, 22.02.2011, World Bank office, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.6. Moctar Diallo, director of PROJEG, national NGO, 22.02.2011, in his office, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.7. Akumba Aboubacar Diallo, journalist and editor of newspaper l’Aurore, 22.02.2011, Petit Bateau Hotel, Conakry, Guinea [through Mamady Koulibaly, WB]
- G.8. Biro Diallo. CNOSCG 2 (National counsel of civil society organizations in Guinea - Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guineenne, national NGO, specialist of Kindia region, 23.02.2011, Petit Bateau Hotel, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.9. Allassane Touaré, National Director of the PACV (Programme d’Appui aux collectivités villageoises – Support program for the village communities), Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, 23.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.10. Mamadou Taran Diallo, PWYP (Publish What You Pay), EITI Guinea (Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative), 23.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.11. Bano Barry, Vice Rector in charge of research, Sonfonia University, 24.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.12. Mamoudou Diallo, SEMAFO Guinea, General Director, 24.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.13. Cherif Diallo, Chamber of Mines, Executive Director, P.I., 24.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.14. Alhassane Condé, Minister of Decentralization, 25.02.2011, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.15. Yayé Mariama Diallo, national director of decentralization, 25.02.2011, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Conakry, Guinea.
- G.16. [Christa Ilieva, economic advisor, and Egide Kalima program coordinator, European Union Delegation in the Republic of Guinea, 25 02.2011, Conakry, Guinea.]
- G.17. Hadiatou Barry, interpreting, Association of the victims of camp Boiro, 25.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.18. Bruno Charbonnier, Ministry of Decentralization and local development, MAEE (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes – Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs), Technical advisor for the Minister, 25.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.19. Vice-Director of Research, Sonfonia University, 26.02.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.20. Aboubacar Condé, Deputy sub-prefect of Kiniero, Kongsso, Condé, Community Secretary for the CRD (Communauté rurale de développement – Sub-Prefecture), Mamadou Cissé, CRD Community collector, Yauna Condé, Kiniero Police superintendent, 27.02.2011, Kiniero, Guinea
- G.21. Public figures of Kiniero, 27.02.2011, Kiniero, Guinea (JH&ET) [Translation Madinka>French by Djoumessi]
- G.22. The youth of Kiniero, spokesperson of the « patriots » Mourou Condé, other intervention Waou Condé, 27.02.2011, Kiniero, Guinea
- G.23. Semafo : Dr. CAMARA Laye mining operations manager, Oussmane Kollet Cissé Security Department manager, Hafy Fofana Director of Community Relations manager, 28.02.2011, Kiniero, Guinea
- G.24. Elected representatives & CRD Kiniero, 28.02.2011, Kiniero, Guinea
- G.25. Women of Kiniero, Hawa KANTÉ spokesperson, other intervention by Diéné Dramé, Hajdjag Gnama Condé, Fanta Cissé, Nantèrèn Keita, 28.02.2011, Kiniero, Guinea [translation by Waou Condé]

- G.26. Djoumessi Assoumane and his assistant, CAAPE NGO, 28.02.2011, a bar near the hotel, Kouroussa, Guinea
- G.27. Gabriel, PROJEG and Alphonse Name, president of the CNOSCG of Kankan, 01.03.2011, Kankan, Guinea
- G.28. Sayoun Dioubaté, Government Planning Director, Gouvernorat Kankan Region, 01.03.2011, Kankan, Guinea
- G.29. Boubacar Diallo, PDLG Kankan, 01.03.2011, Kankan, Guinea (JH&ET)
- G.30. Maxime Joël Millimouno, History student, currently working on his PhD thesis, University of Kankan, 01.03.2011, Kankan, Guinea
- G.31. M.Faya, Head of the Geology department, University of Kankan, 02.03.2011, Kankan, Guinea
- G.32. Vice dean, head of Research in social science, University of Kankan, 02.03.2011, Kankan, Guinea
- G.33. Ibrahima Bah, Prefectoral director of mines and geology of Siguiiri, Mining Department, 03.03.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.34. Said Doumboya, President of CPOSCG, Mamadou Traoré, head of the conflict department, CPOSCG (Conseil Préfectoral des Organisations de la Société Civile en Guinée - Prefectoral counsel of civil society organizations in Guinea), 03.03.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.35. Nanamoulou Magassouba, Mayor & Vice President CPD, 03.03.2011, Siguiiri, Guinée
- G.36. Chief administrative officer of the local communities, Siguiiri, Collectivities General Secretary. Siguiiri Prefecture, 03.03.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.37. Ibrahima Khalil Magassouba (aka. Magas), vice president CGA (Cellule de Gestion Autonome – Independent management committee) in Siguiiri and Here Guinea Association, 03.03.2011, Tam-Tam hotel, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.38. Director of the Tam-Tam hotel, Influential businessmen (school construction, etc...) and support of the civil society of Siguiiri, 03.03.2011, Tam-Tam hotel, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.39. President and vice President of the Kintinia CRD, other member of the CRD, 04.03.2011, Kintinia, Guinea
- G.40. Oury Barry, Head of the special projects department, SEMAFO. 24.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.41. Abdoulaye Kaba, National Office of decentralization, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, 25.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.42. Mamoudou Diaby, Secretary-General, Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EITI, 25.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.43. Thomas Lassourd, Revenue Watch consultant at the Ministry of Mines and Geology, 25.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.44. Fara Emile Tenguiano, Head of the Community Development department, SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye – Dinguiraye Mining Society), 25.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.45. Akumba Diallo, journalist & civil society, 26.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.46. Moktar Diallo, Director, PROJEG, 26.11.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.47. Barry, PDLG (Programme de Développement Local en Guinée – Local Development Program in Guinea), 28.11.2011, Kankan, Guinea
- G.48. a) Alhassane Conde, CPD Minister MATD, opening speech, 29.11.2011, Siguiiri (Assisted to CPDS (Comité Préfectoral de Développement de Siguiiri – Prefectoral Development Committee of Siguiiri) 29.09 – 03.12.11)
- G.49. b) CPD, 30.11.2011, Siguiiri (Assisted to CPDS (Comité Préfectoral de Développement de Siguiiri – Prefectoral Development Committee of Siguiiri) 29.11 – 03.12.11)
- c) CPD J2, 01.12.2011, Siguiiri (Assisted to CPDS (Comité Préfectoral de Développement de Siguiiri – Prefectoral Development Committee of Siguiiri) 29.11 – 03.12.11)
- G.50. SMD Government relation manager, 29.11.2011, Hotel Manding, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.51. Fode Dembele, Director of the Rural Radio of Siguiiri, 30.11.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea

- G.52. CR manager and general secretary (Société Aurifère de Guinée – Gold Company of Guinea), Ashanti Goldfield Company, Community Relations Office, 01.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.53. SAG, Environment Department, 01.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.54. SAG, Community facilitators, 02.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.55. Denis SAG, Head of the Security Department, 02.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.56. Elected Representatives of the Setiya District, 02.12.2011, Setiya (Siguiiri Prefecture), Guinea
- G.57. Sekou Savané known as « The Lion », Politician, RPG (ruling party) de Siguiiri, 02.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.58. Counsel of elders, 03.12.2011, Boukaria (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.59. Wise man, 03.12.2011, Boukaria (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.60. Deans, 03.12.2011, Kintinia (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.61. Representatives of the Youth, Women, Civil society and President of the District, 03.12.2011, Kintinia (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.62. A wise man, 03.12.2011, Kintinia (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.63. Elected Representatives, 04.12.2011, Boukaria (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.64. Representatives of the Women, 04.12.2011, Boukaria (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.65. Representatives of the Youth, 04.12.2011, Boukaria (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.66. Elected Representatives of the District, 04.12.2011, Fatoya (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.67. Wise men, 04.12.2011, Fatoya (Siguiiri Prefecture)
- G.68. Fanta Mamadi Condé, Executive Secretary of the CGA (Cellule de Gestion Autonome – Independent Management Committee) of the CPDS (Comité Préfectoral de Développement de Siguiiri - Prefectoral Development Committee of Siguiiri), 05.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.69. Prefectoral Director for Environment, 05.12.2011, Siguiiri, Guinea
- G.70. M. Traoré, Prefectoral Director for Environment, 07.12.2011, Kouroussa, Guinea
- G.71. Prefectoral Director for Mines, 07.12.2011, Kouroussa, Guinea
- G.72. Namoudou Conde, Vice President of the Mediation and Monitoring Committee, 08.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.73. Mayor of the CRD (Commune rurale de développement – Rural development municipality), special delegation, 08.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.74. Wise men, 08.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.75. Secretary General of the CRD, 08.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.76. Member of the Trade Union, SEMAFO, 08.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.77. Wise men, elected representatives of the District, representatives of the Youth, 09.12.2011, Balan (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.78. Namoudou Conde, Vice President of the Mediation and Monitoring Committee, 09.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture) *end of interview* [recorded]
- G.79. Waters and Forests Attaché, Kiniéro Sub-Prefecture, Kouroussa Prefecture, 09.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.80. Representative of the Women, 09.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.81. Representative of the Youth, 09.12.2011, Kiniéro (Kouroussa Prefecture)
- G.82. Sub-Prefect, Mayor, Representative of the Youth, 11.12.2011, Banora (Dinguiraye Prefecture)
- G.83. Elected representatives of the District, 12.12.2011, Lero (Suigiri Prefecture) [recorded]
- G.84. Head of the Environment Department, SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye – Dinguiraye Mining Company), 12.12.2011, Lero (Suigiri Prefecture)
- G.85. F. I-B., Deputy Head of the Security Department, SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye - Dinguiraye Mining Company), 12.12.2011, Lero (Suigiri Prefecture)
- G.86. Wise men, 13.12.2011, Lero (Suigiri Prefecture)
- G.87. Representatives of the Youth, 13.12.2011, Siguirini (Suigiri Prefecture)
- G.88. Mayor etc., 13.12.2011, Siguirini (Suigiri Prefecture)
- G.89. Wise men, 13.12.2011, Siguirini (Suigiri Prefecture)

- G.90. M. Camara, Community officer of the SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye - Dinguiraye Mining Company), 14.12.2011, Amina (Siguiri Prefecture)
- G.91. Babasidi, Wise man, 14.12.2011, Amina (Siguiri Prefecture)
- G.92. Representatives of the Women, 14.12.2011, Lero (Siguiri Prefecture)
- G.93. Representatives of the Youth, 14.12.2011, Lero (Siguiri Prefecture)
- G.94. Representatives of the Women, 14.12.2011, Siguirini (Siguiri Prefecture)
- G.95. CECIDE (Centre du Commerce International pour le Développement – International Trade Center for Development), 19.12.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.96. Ibrahima Soumah, Former Minister of Mining, 19.12.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.97. Dr. Soriba Soumah, Secretary General head of Mining Safety Department, Ministry of Mining and Geology, 20.12.2011, Conakry, Guinea
- G.98. Mme Barry Ramatoulaye Bah, Resident Director of AngloGold Ashanti, AngloGold Ashanti Company in Guinea, Conakry, 25.10.12
- G.99. Fode Berete, Head of the Mining Department, Conakry, 27.10.12
- G.100. Akumba Diallo, Journalist, expert in mining issues, Conakry, 27.10.12
- G.101. Moctar Diallo, Director, PROJEG (Civil Society Organisations and Youth's Capacity Building Program - Programme de Renforcement des capacités des Organisations de la société civile et de la Jeunesse Guinéenne), Conakry, 28.10.12
- G.102. Gabriel, regional focal point, PROJEG, Kankan, 31.10.12
- G.103. Bala Camara Senior, former inhabitant of Bouré (Siguiri), Kankan, 31.10.12
- G.104. Chief hunter of Kankan, Kankan, 02.11.2012
- G.105. Representative of the UFDG (Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée – Union of the Democratic forces in Guinea) in Siguiri, Siguiri, 03.11.12
- G.106. Kamissoko N'Faly known as « The True », Traditional Communicator of Framwalya, Spokesperson of the griots from Manding, Siguiri, 03.11.12
- G.107. « The Source », Traditional Communicator of Siguiri, Siguiri, 03.11.12
- G.108. Former Secretary-General of the PDN, Siguiri, 03.11.12
- G.109. Magassouba, focal point of Siguiri, PROJEG and Heree Guinée, Siguiri, 03.11.12
- G.110. Kayin Camara, chief hunter of Kintinian (Siguiri), Kintinian, Siguiri Prefecture, 04.11.12
- G.111. Mamadi Kanté, hunter working with the SAG, Kintinian, Siguiri Prefecture, 04.11.12
- G.112. Bala Camara (President of the Youth of Bouré), Lamine Camara, Almany Keita, Representatives of the Youth of Bouré, Kintinian, Siguiri Prefecture, 04.11.12
- G.113. Vice mayor, Kintinian, Siguiri Prefecture, 05.11.12
- G.114. Sub-Prefect, Kintinian, Siguiri Prefectures, 05.11.12
- G.115. Director, ADB (Association pour le Développement de Bouré – Association for the Development of Bouré), Siguiri, 05.11
- G.116. Sub-Prefect and Mayor of Siguirini, also Director of AREDEBA (Association des Ressortissants pour le Développement de Baraka – Citizen Association for the Development of Baraka), Siguirini, Siguiri Prefecture, 07.11.12
- G.117. 2 of the 200 people dismissed by SMD: Representatives of the NGO's CBS (Coopération de Baraka S. – Baraka S. Cooperation) and AREDEBA, Léro (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 07.11.12
- G.118. Fara Emile Tenguiano, Director of the Community Development Department (Community Relations), SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye - Dinguiraye Mining Company), Léro (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 08.11.12
- G.119. F. L-B, Director of the Security Department, SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye - Dinguiraye Mining Company), Léro (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 08.11.12
- G.120. Administration and Human resources manager, SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye - Dinguiraye Mining Company), Léro (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 09.11.12

- G.121. Major Diallo, Military Liaison Officer (CLM) of the CASM (Compagnie d'appui à la Sécurité Minière – Mining Safety Support Company), base of the SMD (Société Minière de Dinguiraye - Dinguiraye Mining Company), Léro (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 09.11.12
- G.122. Chief hunter of Siguirini, Carrefour (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 09.11.12
- G.123. Traditional Communicator (griot/dilitomba/..), Léro (Siguirini), Siguiri Prefecture, 09.11.12
- G.124. Soulemame Camara known as « Soul », player in the uprising against the Prefect of Siguiri (September 2012), Siguiri, 10.11.12
- G.125. A. F., Director of the Community Relations, SAG (Société AngloGold Ashanti de Guinée – AngloGold Ashanti Company in Guinea), Siguiri Prefecture, 12.11.12
- G.126. Denis, Director of the Security Department, SAG (Société AngloGold Ashanti de Guinée – AngloGold Ashanti Company in Guinea), Siguiri Prefecture, 12.11.12
- G.127. Attending to: Training workshop and sharing of tools for the Needs and Costings Assessment and infrastructure inventory, organized by The MDG Centre West and Central Africa mandated by the SAG, Siguiri 13/16.11.2012
- G.128. SAG exploration geologist, 23.09.2013, SAG airplane from Bamako to Siguiri
- G.129. A. F., SAG CR manager, Alhassane Touré, SAG CR officer, 23.09.2013, SAG Messa, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.130. J. P., SAG Sustainability manager, 23.09.2013, SAG housing area, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.131. Ton., Ca., Tou., Ch., SAG CR officers, 24.09.2013, SAG CR department office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.132. Cidiki Kourouma, Youth Prefectoral director and CBO representative (young women association for the development of the youth of Siguiri), 24.09.2013, SAG MD advisor office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.133. Abdoulaye Diané, SAG MD community advisor, 24.09.2013, SAG MD advisor office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.134. Tou. & Ch., SAG CR officers, 24.09.2013
- G.135. J. P., SAG Sustainability manager, 24.09.2013
- G.136. J. P. SAG sustainability manager, Damien, INSUCO expert, Siguiri prefecture representatives, meeting on compensation issues, 25.09.2013, Siguiri Town, Northern Guinea
- G.137. J. P., SAG sustainability Manager, Damien INSUCO expert, meeting post-prefecture, 25.09.2013, Siguiri Town, Northern Guinea
- G.138. SAG Human Resources Director, 25.09.2013, SAG Messa, Northern Guinea
- G.139. INSUCO team, Research Institute of social sciences and engineering based in Conakry, 25.09.2013, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.140. Tou., Ch., CR officers, 26.09.2013, SAG CR office, Siguiri district, Northern Guinea
- G.141. Youth from Siguiri, 26.09.2013, Hotel Mandingue, Siguiri Town, Northern Guinea
- G.142. A. F., CR manager, 27.09.2013, in front of SAG CR office, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.143. C. A., SMD Security Manager, every day 28.09.2013 to 03.10.13, SMD Security office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.144. M. P., SMD training manager, 28.09.2013, SMD Training office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.145. F. K., SMD assistant administrative and HR director, 28.09.2013, SMD Training office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.146. SMD manager Saturday gathering, 28.09.2013, SMD housing area « base-vie », Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.147. Board meeting, 30.09.2013, MD office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.148. Lunch with MD and other managers, 30.09.2013, SMD Messa, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiri prefecture, Northern Guinea

- G.149. Sek. Kad. Ber., B. M. Cam., Th. Abd. Dia., SMD CR department, 30.09.2013, CR department office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.150. Am. Sack., SMD security officer, 30.09.2013, SMD Security office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.151. SMD Mining Director, 30.09.2013, SMD Messa, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.152. Macky, SMD former CR liaison officer, 01.10.2013, SMD finance office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.153. Diner and drinks with MD and Training Manager, 02.10.2013, SMD housing area « base-vie »
- G.154. Th. Dia., SMD CR officer, 02.10.2013, SMD CR office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.155. SMD representatives meeting with OL (military liaison officer), 02.10.2013, Military Camp, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.156. SMD administration director, 03.10.2013, SMD office hallway, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.157. Oumar Fadiga, elder of Lero and security agent, 03.10.2013, SMD security office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.158. -Business System manager, 03.10.2013, SMD Business system office, Lefa Gold Mine, Siguiiri prefecture, Northern Guinea
- G.159. Fara Emile Tenguiano, former SMD Community Relations manager, 03.10.2013, phone interview, Guinea

Participant observation and interviews in the SAG's CR department from 23.09 to 26.09 ; Participant observation and interviews in the SMD's CR, Security, and Training departments from 28.09 to 03.09

TANZANIA 2011-2013

- T.1. Representative of the Sustainable Management of Mining Resources Process (SMMRP, WB initiative), Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 29.03.2011, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.2. General Secretary of TAMOWA (Tanzanian Miners Woman Association), 29.03.2011, Stamico, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.3. Program Officer of Research Publication and Documentation, and executive director of Land Rights Research and Resources Institute - Haki Ardhi, 30.03.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.4. PhD student/lecturer, University of Dar es Salaam, Institute of Development Studies, 30 March 2011, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.5. Legal Officers, LEAT (Lawyers Environmental Action Team), 30.03.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.6. Media Manager, Communication and Advocacy, Policy forum, 30.03.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.7. Coordinator of Publish What You Pay Tanzania (PWYP), Fordia, 31.03.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.8. Revenue Watch Senior Regional Associate, 31.03.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.9. Tanzanian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (TEITI), National coordinator, 31 .03.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.10. Assistant Commissioner for licensing, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, 1.04.2011, Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.11. Researcher, Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), drop-in-visit, 1.04.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.12. Director and research associate, Economic and Social Research Foundation Tanzania (ESRF), 1.04.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

- T.13. Eastern Sahara Resource Watch, consultant in natural resource management and controversial journalist, Former associate at Norwegian Christian Aid), 2.04.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.14. Chairman of Tanzanite One and head of the Tanzanian Chamber of Mines, 3.04.2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.15. Zonal Office geologist, 3.04.2011, Mwanza Zonal Mines Office, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.16. Zonal Office Inspector, 4.04.2011, Mwanza Zonal Mines Office, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.17. Commissioner of Mines of the Ministry of Mines and Energy, (was on vacation in Mwanza), 4 .04. 2011, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.18. Associate, Mwanza Policy Initiative (MPI), 4 April 2011, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.19. Star TV, Director of Programs, 4.04.2011, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.20. District Commissioner Geita, 5.04.2011, Geita, Tanzania
- T.21. Human Resource Officer and District Treasure Officer, District Council Geita, 5.04.2011, Geita, Tanzania
- T.22. General Secretary of MWAREMA (Mwanza Artisanal Miners Association), 5.04.2011, Geita District, Nyarugusu Village, Tanzania
- T.23. Resident Mines Officer and Inspector of Mines and Explosives, 6.04.2011, Geita, Tanzania
- T.24. Director, local NGO (Musoma), 7.04.2011, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.25. Country Coordinator Tanzania, ACORD (Agency for Cooperation and Research Development), 8.04.2011, Mwanza, Tanzania
- T.26. Former Member of Parliament in Kahama (200?-2005), now PhD student in University of Dar es Salaam, 9.04.2011, Dar es Salaam University, Tanzania
- T.27. Legal and Human Rights Center, (LHRC) Legal Officer Human Rights Monitoring Unit, 9 April 2011, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
- T.28. Journalist and activist in the mining issues, former member of NCA, 14.08.11, Dar-Es-Salaam
- T.29. Country Representative and Program Manager, NCA, 15.08.11, NCA offices, Dar-Es-Salaam
- T.30. Director of Local NGO (Musoma), 16.08.11, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania
- T.31. Political science researcher on civil society organization, 17.08.11, Dar-Es-Salaam
- T.32. Corporate Social Responsibility specialist in Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC), 19.08.2011, LHRC, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania
- T.33. Leader of the SMMRP project in the Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), 20.08.2011, ESRF, Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania
- T.34. Farmer/Miner, displaced by NMGM, 25.08.2011, Nyamongo Village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.35. Farmer/Miner, displaced by NMGM, 26.08.2011, Nyamongo Village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.36. Former Gold miner and local leader, 27.08.2011, Nyamongo Village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.37. Kerende former chairperson, 28.08.2011, Kerende village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.38. Elder women and sons, skin affected by water pollution, 28.08.2011, Matongo ward, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.39. Matongo ward Chairman, 28.08.2011, Matongo ward, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.40. Weigeta village Chairman, 29.08.2011, Weigeta village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.41. Farmer, affected by NMGM, 30.08.2011, Weigeta village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.42. Livestock keeper, lost cattle due to water pollution, 30.08.2011, Weigeta village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania

- T.43. Elderly women, health problems, 30.08.11, Weigeta village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.44. Elderly men, health problems, 30.08.11, Weigeta village, Tarime district, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.45. Journalist for the Daily-News for Tarime District, 01.09.11, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.46. Journalist for the DailyNews for Tarime District, 01.09.11, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania (second interview)
- T.47. Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC) monitor for Tarime district, 04.09.2011, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.48. Former village chairman, 07.09.11, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.49. Leticia Ghati Mosore, Opposition political leader, used to work in DC office in Tarime, 07.09.11, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.50. LHRC monitor, 07.09.2011, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.51. Journalist for the DailyNews for Tarime District, 07.09.2011, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania (report from Nyamongo)
- T.52. Journalist for Mwanza region (newspaper in Kiswahili), 09.10.11, Mwanza town, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.53. Livestock keeper and artisanal mine (junior), 10.09.11, Nyakabale village, Geita district, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.54. Livestock keeper and artisanal miner (senior), 10.09.11, Nyakabale village, Geita district, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.55. Women artisanal miners processing stolen stones in Kigoma's facility, 10.09.11, Kigoma ward, Geita district, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.56. Branch chairman, district secretary, GGM branch secretary, and worker member, Tanzanian Mining Committee (Trade Union) TAMICO Geita, 10.09.2011, Geita town, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.57. Camp of homeless displaced people, 10.09.11, Geita town, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.58. Director of DCCC Dar-Es-Salaam Christian Communication Center, 16.09.2011, Dar-Es-Salaam
- T.59. Legal trainer and councilor and LHRC monitor for Mwanza, from Kivulini NGO based in Mwanza, 17.09.11, Steers, Dar-Es-Salaam
- T.60. Ex Community Relations Officer in Barrick-Buzwagi, 19.09.2011, Dar es Salaam
- T.61. World Bank consultant working on EITI Tanzania, 22.09.2011, WB building, Dar es Salaam
- T.62. Knowledge management and sustainability manager for AGA Continental Africa region, 22.09.11, Dar-Es-Salaam,
- T.63. Member of Parliament for Kigoma, 27.09.11, Shinyanga town, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.64. Acting Shinyanga Zonal Mine Officer, 27.09.2011, Shinyanga town, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.65. Human Resource District (DHR) councilor in Kahama, 28.09.11, dictrict council, Kahama town, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.66. Community Relation Manager ABG-Buzwagi, 29.09.11, ABG-Buzwagi (brief talk), community relation office, Kahama district, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.67. Wards of Mwendakulima, Chapulwa village council with ward leaders, 29.09.11, Mwendakulima ward, Kahama district, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.68. Sungusungu administration, Mwendakulima ward, 29.09.2011, Kahama district
- T.69. Village council in Mwandakulima, 29.09.11, Mwendakulima ward, Kahama district, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.70. Head teacher of Mwendakulima secondary school, 29.09.11, Mwendakulima ward, Kahama district, Shinyanga region, Tanzania
- T.71. Managing Director, Geita Gold Mine, 30.09.2011, in the car, Geita town, Mwanza region, Tanzania

- T.72. Mwanza Zonal Mine Office Director, 30.09.2011, Mwanza Zonal Office, Mwanza town, Mwanza region, Tanzania
- T.73. Search for common grounds, assistant program manager, 04.10.2011, Tarime town, North-Mara region, Tanzania
- T.74. Political science PhD student and former MP for Shinyanga, 06.10.11, University of Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania
- T.75. Consultant/coordinator of GGM Water Project, skype conversation 31.03.12
- T.76. Mine Engineer, Mineral inspector in Inspection department, Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), 10.05.12, Dar-Es-Salaam (DSM)
- T.77. Officer in charge of Small-scale mining, Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), 10.05.12, Dar-Es-Salaam (DSM)
- T.78. Coastal issues, National Environment Management Council (NEMC), 11.05.12, DSM
- T.79. Head of Environment Unit, Principal Forest Officer, Environment engineer and Mine Inspector of Environment, and intern, Environment Unit, Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM), 11.05.12, Dar-Es-Salaam (DSM)
- T.80. Journalist and manager of NGO HROA, Daily News reporter for Tarime, 18.05.12, Tarime Town, North-Mara region
- T.81. Field agent for Tarime, Search For Common Grounds (SFCG), 18.05.12, Tarime Town, North-Mara region
- T.82. Zonal Mine Officer, 21.05.12, Mwanza Town, Mwanza region
- T.83. *Sustainability Manager Continental Africa, Managing Director, Sustainability Manager GGM, Geita Gold Mine during Stakeholder Engagement Strategy (SAS) Presentation, 24.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.84. *Geita Acting District Administrative Officer (DAS), during Stakeholder Engagement Strategy validation exercise (with Sustainability Manager Continental Africa and team from Wharton University in Pennsylvania), 24.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.85. *Representatives of Interfaith Comity Geita, during Stakeholder Engagement Strategy validation exercise, 24.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.86. *Mayor of Town council and Bakwata secretary and former District Council Chairman in 1999 (AGA's start), during Stakeholder Engagement Strategy validation exercise, 24.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.87. Environmental superintendent, GGM, 24.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.88. Security Manager, GGM, 24.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.89. *Stakeholder Engagement Strategy validation exercise meeting presentation to MD
- T.90. Community relation and sustainable development front line manager, GGM, 25.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.91. **Geita Water Project seminar (with head consultant), in Geita Town hall, 25.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.92. Geologist, Geita Resident of Mines Office, 28.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.93. Acting Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS) and Accountant, Regional Administration Office, 28.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.94. District Head Councilor and Treasure for translation, District Council, 29. 05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.95. Officer Commander – Criminal Investigation Dpt (OC-CID), Geita District Police Station, 29. 05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.96. TAMICO National Executive Council, 29. 05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.97. Acting District Executive Director (DED), District Council, 30.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.98. District Environment Officer, District Council, 30.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region

- T.99. Ward Executive Officer (WEO) of Mtakuja Wrad, Village Executive Officers (VEO) of Nyamwalembo, Mugusu and Mpumvu, District Council, 31.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.100. Geita Interfaith Commity Coordinator, 31.05.12, Geita District, Geita Region
- T.101. Sungusungu leader, village chairperson CCM, deputy secretary village, and VEO, Isamilo Village Office, 01.06.12, Isamilo Village, Geita District, Geita Region [translated]
- T.102. NEMC coordinator and environment management officer, NEMC Mwanza branch, 04.06.12, Mwanza town, Mwanza region
- T.103. District Administrative Secretary (DAS), Tarime District Council, 06.06.12, Tarime town, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.104. Acting Regional Police Commander (RPC) for Tarime/Rorya Special Police Zone, Tarime Police Station, 06.06.12, Tarime town, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.105. Environmental Officer and assistant, Tarime District Council, 06.06.12, Tarime town, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.106. District Executive Director (DED), Tarime District Council, 06.06.12, Tarime town, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.107. TAMICO member NMGM, 06.06.12, Tarime town, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.108. Economist, District council, 06.06.12, Tarime town, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.109. Kwanja village chairman, 07.06.12, Kwanja Village, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.110. Kwanja VEO, 07.06.12, Kwanja Village, Kemambo Ward, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.111. Matongo Ward Sungusungu Commander, 08.06.12, Nyangoto Village, Matongo Ward, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.112. Nyangoto VEO, 08.06.12, Nyangoto Village, Matongo Ward, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.113. Sungusungu Assistant Commander for Matongo and Kemambo Wards, 08.06.12, Nyangoto Village, Matongo Ward, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.114. Nyakunguru Sungusungu commander, 08.06.12, Nyakunguru Village, Kibasuka Ward, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.115. Nyakunguru VEO, 08.06.12, Nyakunguru Village, Kibasuka Ward, Tarime District, North Mara region
- T.116. Shinyanga Zonal Mine Officer, Zonal Mine Office, 13.06.12, Shinyanga town, Shinyanga region
- T.117. Regional Police Commander (RPC) Shinyanga, 14.06.12, Shinyanga town, Shinyanga region
- T.118. Acting Resident of Mines, Resident of Mines Office, 15.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.119. Acting Officer Commander District OCD (usually OCS), Kahama District Police Station, 15.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.120. Program coordinator, DELIRA NGO (Development and Life Releef Association), 16.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.121. Acting Environmental Officer (District game officer), District Council, 16.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.122. District Human Resources Officer (DHRO), 16.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.123. VEO Mwime, in Mwendakulima Ward Office, 18.06.12, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.124. VEO Chapulwa, in Mwendakulima Ward Office, 18.06.12, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.125. WEO Mwendakulima, in Mwendakulima Ward Office, 18.06.12, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region

- T.126. Mwime Secretary Sungusungu and Mwime Commander sungusungu, in Mwime Village Office, 19.06.12, Mwime Village, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.127. Mwime Chairperson for Kati Hamlet (represents 3 hamlets of village), in Mwime Village Office, 19.06.12, Mwime Village, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.128. Chief, Vice chief, Secretariat and member of council), Chapulwa Sungusungu, in Mwendakulima Ward Office, 19.06.12, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.129. Ward councilor and Hamlet Chairperson in Chapulwa, in Mwendakulima Ward Office, 20.06.12, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.130. Ward sungusungu commander, in Mwendakulima Ward Office, 20.06.12, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.131. Projestus, SHDEPHA+ NGO (Service Health and Development for People Living Positively with HIV Aids), program manager, 20.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.132. TAMICO member ABG-Buzwagi, 21.06.12, Kahama Town, Kahama District, Shinyanga region
- T.133. Representative of Inspection Department, MEM, 26.06.12, DSM
- T.134. Corporate accounts manager, KK Security Tanzania, 26.06.12, DSM
- T.135. Director of publications, NEMC, 27.06.12, DSM
- T.136. Ex ABG Lawyer, Peak attorney, 27.06.12, DSM
- T.137. Election section, Legal and Human Right Center (LHRC), 29.06.12, DSM
- T.138. Sebastian Massanja, Tarime District administrative secretary (DAS), 14.11.2013, Tarime Town, North-Mara Region
- T.139. John Henjewe, Tarime District Commissioner (DC - 3 years), 14.11.2013, Tarime Town, North-Mara Region
- T.140. Jerry Minja, Land Issues Task Force secretary, land officer since 2008, 14.11.2013, Tarime Town, North-Mara Region
- T.141. VEO Kwenja village, 15.11.2013, Kwenja village, Tarime District, North-Mara Region [Translated by Anthony Magoti]
- T.142. Rose Msonge, Secretary and member, SACCOS, Youth Association funded by NMGM, 15.11.2013, Nyamongo village, Tarime District, North-Mara Region [Translated by Anthony Magoti]
- T.143. Abdallah Kenaja, Salma Hamidu, Secretary and member, Nyabigena Mining Cooperative Society & SACCOS, 15.11.2013, Tarime District, North-Mara Region [Translated by Anthony Magoti]
- T.144. Robin Farrington, Carlo Pekhazis, Manfred Matz, GIZ Water Stewardship Program, 16.11.2013, Hotel Tilapia, Mwanza Town, Mwanza Region
- T.145. Manfred Matz, GIZ Water Stewardship Program, 20.11.2013, phone interview
- T.146. Boniface Mapunda, acting Town Director, 20.11.2013, Town Council, Kahama Town, Shinyanga Region
- T.147. Franael Reuben, Community Development Officer since 2010, 20.11.2013, Town Council, Kahama Town, Shinyanga Region
- T.148. Cecilia Sinekwa, Mwendakulima Ward Executive Officer (WEO), 20.11.2013, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga Region [translated by Franael Reuben]
- T.149. Rehema Juma Bujiku, Facilitator for Income Generating Groups, 20.11.2013, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga Region [translated by Franael Reuben]
- T.150. Martin Shija assistant secretary, Mangwa Mtwali chief sungusungu, Ward Sungusungu commandment, 20.11.2013, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga Region [translated by Franael Reuben]
- T.151. George Kingi, Mwime village executive officer (VEO), 20.11.2013, Mwime village, Mwendakulima Ward, Kahama District, Shinyanga Region [translated by Franael Reuben]
- T.152. Town planning officer, 21.11.2013, Kahama Town, Shinyanga Region

- T.153. Venance Muzuka, Program manager, SHEDEFA+ local NGO, 21.11.2013, Kahama Town, Shinyanga Region
- T.154. L. M., Project manager since June 2012, SFCG, 22.11.2013, Kahama Town, Shinyanga Region
- T.155. Ali Kidwaka, Geita District Executive Director (DED) since January 2013, 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.156. Doris Ng'homenge, Geita District Community Development officer (DCDO), 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.157. Rehema Kabanda, Geita Community Development employee, 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.158. Celerin Kanunga, acting District Administrative Secretary (DAS), 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.159. Majagi Maiga, Geita Town Community Development Officer (TCDO) since November 2012, 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.160. Geita District Executive Director (DED), 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.161. Tenga Tenga, GGM Stakeholder engagement and communication manager since April 2013, 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.162. J. M., GGM Community Relation Manager, 25.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.163. M. Magochie, Geita District Commissioner (DC) since June 2012, 26.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region
- T.164. Taossi Shabani, Mtakuja Ward Executive Officer (WEO), 26.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region [Translated by Shigela]
- T.165. Adam and Tony, Interfaith Committee secretary and Chairman, 26.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region [Translated by Shigela]
- T.166. William Paul Massere, VEO Nyakabale, Thomas Wambura, Nyamatagata street Chairman (former VEO), 27.11.2013; Geita Town, Geita Region [Translated by Shigela]
- T.167. Tamico worker in GGM, 27.11.2013, Geita Town, Geita Region

* Invited by Sustainability Manager of Continental Africa in GGM to observe and listen during Stakeholder Engagement Strategy validation exercise accompanied by team of researchers from the Wharton University of Pennsylvania.

**Invited by Water Project Manager in GGM to observe the management of the water project especially assisting to the key stakeholders meeting in town and to the symbolic transfer of the project to contractors including a tour from the location of the water-pump to the distribution hill in Geita Town.

Appendix

SHORT SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In light of the diffusion of the sustainability paradigm into the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) approaches of the mining sector, stakeholder engagement strategies (SES) are now perceived as a sustainable way to manage company-community relationships. Mining companies use SES to address tensions and disagreements between themselves and the communities affected by their operations.

When do mining MNCs who have adopted socially sustainable stakeholder engagement strategies (SES) succeed in implementing them to manage community-company conflict in areas of limited statehood (ALS)? To answer this question, we use a combination of anthropological field research and comparative methods to study five mining sites (and neighboring communities) of three multinational mining companies in two African countries. Our aim is to explore the explanatory power of drivers found in the literature from the international to the local level. In Guinea and Tanzania, the multinational companies we study started with exclusive, strategically philanthropic, and ad hoc ways of addressing the demands of neighboring communities in order to avoid direct confrontation and potential threats. In the last decade, at the headquarters level, these companies adopted discourses recognizing the overall importance of social sustainability and the effectiveness of SES to manage conflict. At the operational level, why are particular companies at particular times more successful than others in implementing sustainable SES?

Our study starts by exploring each company's reputation concerns, home country context, and commitment to international standards. We then consider the host countries' regulation and enforcement capacities. Internal company measures that are taken in order to enact company strategies at operational levels might also be relevant to explain outcomes. Also, how do local governance drivers, such as the risk of company-community conflict and the capacity of local stakeholders to co-manage implemented strategies, play out in the companies' social sustainability practices?

We find that none of the commonly accepted drivers taken separately explains the variation in SES implementation outcomes. Through a multidisciplinary approach, we conclude that it is only when internal company drivers are favorable, especially when leadership on SES is strong, that companies reach sustainable outcomes. However, companies meet mitigated success if the communities where they operate are not willing or capable to collaborate in managing conflicts. In other words, communities that are socialized into trusting one another and working together towards common goals create a favorable context for sustainability approaches, especially if companies do not use harsh responses to community confrontations. The influence of these internal drivers on SES outcomes is thus tempered by local governance characteristics. MNCs succeed in implementing sustainable community-company conflict management strategies when they successfully integrate SES strategies by recruiting agents dedicated to communities and by giving them enough resources, autonomy, and power to act.

KURZE ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Das Nachhaltigkeitsparadigma findet zunehmend Eingang in die Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)-Ansätze im Bergbausektor. Stakeholder-Engagement-Strategien (SES) werden nun als nachhaltige Art und Weise zur Gestaltung der Beziehung zwischen Unternehmen und der lokalen Bevölkerung aufgefasst. Bergbau-Unternehmen bedienen sich diesen Strategien um Spannungen und Unstimmigkeiten zwischen ihnen und den betroffenen Gemeinden zu benennen. Unter welchen Bedingungen implementieren multinationale Bergbau-Unternehmen, die auf sozial nachhaltige SES zurückgreifen, diese erfolgreich im Rahmen des Konfliktmanagements zwischen Unternehmen und lokalen Gemeinschaften in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage greift die Studie auf eine Kombination aus anthropologischer Feldforschung und vergleichenden Methoden zur Untersuchung von fünf Bergbaustandorten (und ihren angrenzenden Gemeinden) dreier multinationaler Bergbau-Unternehmen in zwei afrikanischen Staaten zurück. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die Aussagekraft von Einflussfaktoren aus der Literatur auf internationaler bis lokaler Ebene zu erforschen. In Guinea und Tansania gingen die untersuchten Unternehmen zunächst exklusiv, strategisch philanthropisch und ad hoc auf die Forderungen der angrenzenden Gemeinden ein, um direkte Konfrontationen und eventuelle Drohungen zu vermeiden.

Die Führungsebenen der Unternehmen haben im letzten Jahrzehnt die Relevanz sozialer Nachhaltigkeit und die Effizienz von SES zum Konflikt-Management anerkannt. Warum aber sind bestimmte Unternehmen bei der Anwendung nachhaltiger SES zu bestimmten Zeiten erfolgreicher als andere? Zu Beginn der Studie werden die Reputationsrisiken der Unternehmen, ihr nationaler Herkunftskontext und ihre Bindung an internationale Standards untersucht. Anschließend werden die Regulierungen der Gastländer und ihre Durchsetzungskraft mit in die Analyse einbezogen. Ebenso relevant zur Interpretation der Resultate erscheinen interne Maßnahmen, die der Umsetzung der Unternehmensstrategie dienen. Wie tragen zudem Einflussfaktoren lokaler Governance-Strukturen, wie die Kapazität lokaler Akteure eingeführte Strategien zu co-managen, zur Einführung der sozialen Nachhaltigkeitspraktiken der Unternehmen vor Ort bei? Wie stark beeinflussen sie beispielsweise das Risiko, dass zwischen Unternehmen und der lokalen Bevölkerung Konflikte entstehen?

Die Studie zeigt, dass keiner der Faktoren, die gewöhnlich zur Deutung herangezogen werden, für sich betrachtet, die Ergebnisvarianz bei der Umsetzung von SES erklären. Die Anwendung eines multidisziplinären Ansatzes führt zur Erkenntnis, dass Unternehmen ausschließlich unter günstigen internen Bedingungen, insbesondere im Falle einer starken Führung der SES, nachhaltige Ergebnisse erzielen. Der Erfolg wird jedoch begrenzt, wenn die Bevölkerung in Nähe der Bergbaustandorte nicht gewillt oder fähig ist, beim Konfliktmanagement zu kooperieren. Mit anderen Worten: Vertrauen sich die Anwohner und arbeiten sie zusammen auf gemeinsame Ziele hin, begünstigen sie den Erfolg nachhaltiger Strategien, insbesondere wenn Unternehmen nicht scharf auf Konflikte innerhalb der Bevölkerung in Nähe der Bergbaustandorte reagieren. Der Einfluss der unternehmensinternen Ergebnisfaktoren wird also durch die Eigenschaften der lokalen Governance abgeschwächt. Multinationale Unternehmen sind bei der Einführung nachhaltiger Konfliktmanagementstrategien dann erfolgreich, wenn es ihnen gelingt Mittlerpersonen einzustellen, die für die Bevölkerung in der Nähe der Bergbaustandorte eintreten, und wenn sie ihr genügend Ressourcen, Autonomie und Handlungsmacht geben.

Curriculum Vitae

For reasons of data protection,
the curriculum vitae is not included in the online version

