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Jerusalem 2060: Images of Future

A Leitbildanalyse in Protracted Conflict

Dissertation

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Zusammenfassung

Aufgrund des anhaltenden Konflikts zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern ist Zukunft in Jerusalem außergewöhnlich umkämpft. Im öffentlichen Diskurs besteht ein Ungleichgewicht zwischen Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, in dem die Narrationen von Zukünften durch die Narrationen von Vergangenheiten überschatten werden. Zudem werden Zukunftsbilder durch den jahrzehntelang anhaltenden Konflikt und dessen internationale Relevanz stark von artifiziellen Zukunftsbildern beeinflusst. Tatsächliche Zukunftskonstruktionen konkurrieren und verschmelzen mit oktroyierten Zukunftsszenarien und politisch motivierten institutionellen Zukunftsbildern. Insgesamt gibt es kaum wissenschaftliche oder empirische Arbeiten, welche sich explizit und grundlegend mit Zukünften, alternativen Zukunftsperspektiven oder langfristigen Szenarien der *Menschen* in Jerusalem beschäftigen.

Die Dynamik der Marginalisierung von Zukunft in dem anhaltenden Konflikt verstärkt die Hürden für die Bewohner der Stadt tatsächliche und bedeutsame Leitbilder zu formulieren. Sie existieren größtenteils unterbewusst, unreflektiert und Individuen können sie meist nur schwer aufrufen oder direkt auf sie zugreifen. Die Ebene der Zukunft und die fünf Funktionen von Leitbildern – Orientierung, Motivation, (Entscheidungs-) Entlastung, Abgrenzung und Gemeinschaftsbildung – sind jedoch wesentlich für die Fähigkeit von Sozietäten aktiv ihre Zukunft durch Imaginationen im Jetzt zu gestalten. Besonders in anhaltenden Konfliktsituationen mit einer Nullsummenmentalität ist ein Diskurs über wünschenswerte, nicht wünschenswerte, mögliche und unmögliche Zukünfte der verschiedenen Parteien von enormer Bedeutung.

Daher ist das Ziel dieser Arbeit unbewusste und weitgehend unzugängliche Leitbilder in Jerusalem mit der Methode der Leitbildanalyse – einem mehrstufigen, speziell für unbewusste Zukunftsbilder konzipierten Prozess – zugänglich zu machen. Es werden 33 einzigartige Perspektiven von Meinungsführern aus verschiedenen Bereichen und Gesellschaftsschichten in Jerusalem untersucht welche durch explorative Tiefeninterviews Einblicke in sechs einzigartige Leitbilder für Jerusalem 2060 gewähren. Diese sechs Leitbilder werden im Anschluss analysiert, diskutiert und miteinander verglichen um sie den Bewohnern von Jerusalem als tatsächliche und authentische Perspektiven zukünftiger Entwicklungen zurückzuspielen.

Im Laufe der Analyse zeigt sich deutlich, dass entgegen der vorherrschenden Meinung, die eruierten Leitbilder nicht primär die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Konfliktpartei widerspiegeln, sondern darüber hinaus gehen. Es sind Abbilder persönlicher Einschätzungen von Zukunft, welche sich ungeachtet der Nationalität und Religion untereinander decken oder unterscheiden.

Insgesamt ergab die empirische Untersuchung einige unerwartete und einige vor allem im Nachhinein erwartbare Ergebnisse. Die finalen Leitbilder, ganz besonders aber auch die Analyse der Leitbildmodule zusammen mit den direkten Zitaten der Interviews, ermöglichen neue Perspektiven auf Zukunft in anhaltenden Konflikten und unterstreichen die immense Wirkung und Wichtigkeit von Leitbildern auf die aktuellen Entwicklungen in Jerusalem, trotz ihrer strukturellen Marginalisierung in beiden Gesellschaften.

Schlüsselwörter:

Jerusalem 2060, Zukunftsbilder, Leitbild, Leitbildanalyse, Nahostkonflikt, Israel, Palästina

Abstract

Due to the protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict future in Jerusalem is very contested. There is a significant imbalance between past, present and future, where the importance of future is widely substituted by the importance of the past. In addition, imaginations of future in Jerusalem are disproportionately impacted by artificial images of future. All mental constructs regarding futures are competing with scenarios imposed on by third parties as well as politicized by institutions and actors with specific agendas. There is little to no scientific or empirical work focused specifically on futures or long-term scenarios of Jerusalem or its citizens.

This marginalization of future increases the barriers to address true and meaningful guiding principles (Leitbilder), which are, for the most part, hidden, un-reflected and sometimes very difficult to access by the people of Jerusalem. However, future and the five functions of Leitbilder – Orientation, Motivation, Burden Relief, Community Building and Differentiation – are key for the ability of any social entity to actively shape long-term developments by today's imaginations. Especially in protracted conflict with a zero-sum attitude a discourse on desired, undesired, feasible and unfeasible futures by the different parties is fundamental.

Therefore, this study aims to uncover the subconscious and largely inaccessible Leitbilder prevalent in Jerusalem with the method of the Leitbildanalysis. The Leitbildanalysis is a multi-step process tailored and specifically designed for drawing subconscious mental constructs of future into the open. This work entails an in-depth exploration of 33 unique perspectives of opinion leaders in Jerusalem from all walks of life to form six comprehensive images of Jerusalem 2060. They are then analyzed, discussed and compared along conflict lines to be handed back to the citizens of Jerusalem as true and unfeigned images of prospective developments.

By and large, this study sheds light on the circumstance, that contrary to common belief, the images found do not align with conflict ideologies but rather individual attitudes towards future.

As a whole, the examination of the perception of futures for Jerusalem in 2060 reveals various unexpected and some, especially in hindsight, apparent aspects. The final six images of future

but also the detailed analysis of the Leitbild modules in combination with the direct citations from the interviews enables a new perspective on future in protracted conflict, emphasizing the stipulating role of guiding principles to stem the tide and shape future developments in Jerusalem – in spite of their systematic marginalization.

Keywords:

Jerusalem 2060, Guiding principles, Images of future, Leitbildanalysis, Middle East conflict, Israel, Palestine

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Glossary

Al-Aqusa mosque – Haram al Sharif; One of the three holiest mosques in Islam, located on the ruins of the destroyed second temple, from which only the Western wall remains, the holiest place in Judaism. The physical proximity and the overlapping of these holy sites elevate them to one of the most contested and central issues of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. (Vries, 2017, pp. 189-191; Sway, 2015, pp. 108-113)

Al-Nakbah – ‘Catastrophe’ in Arabic; the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, and the forcible dispossession and destruction of a major part of Palestinian Society (Al-Hardan, 2015, pp. 622-24).

Abu Mazen – Mahmoud Abbas; Chairman of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) and leader of the Palestinians in the West bank since his victory in the presidential elections in 2005, after the death of his predecessor Yasser Arafat (MEED, 2005, p. 2).

Haredim – Ultra-orthodox Jews; Perhaps the most visibly identifiable subset of Jews with black suits and hats; closed off, very conservative communities united by a strict interpretation of the halakha – Jewish law – in all aspects of life (e.g. MeaShearim in Jerusalem). Haredi Judaism prefers not to interact with secular society preserving traditions from modern life, often times rejecting Zionism and the state of Israel (Weiss, 2018; Berkley Center, 2019).

Herzl, Theodor – Founder of political Zionism; one of the most important symbols in the collective memory of Israel until today; he and his ideas serve as a basis for justification both for the political right and left (Livnat, 2009, pp. 9-15).

Knesset – ‘Assembly’ in Hebrew; the Israeli Parliament, located in West Jerusalem, next to Park Saker and the Governmental Campus.

Mount of Olives – Important religious landmark in Jerusalem; a mountain range on the eastern edge of the old city overlooking the temple mount and the Dome of Rocks; location of one of the largest Jewish cemeteries, site of several key events in the life of Jesus, home to an ancient Palestinian village; proclaimed to be the closest point on earth to heavenly sanctity, eternity and God (Bentovim, 2015).

Oslo Accords – In the early 1990s PLO leadership and the Israeli government held secret negotiations in Oslo, resulting in the iconic signing of the Oslo Accords by Yassir Arafat, Yitzhak Rabin and President Clinton on the south lawn of the White house. However, the high hopes sparked by this agreement caused an even steeper fall into disappointment and hopelessness once the agreement failed and tensions reignited – symbolizing today how peace and coexistence are impossible between Israelis and Palestinians (Anziska, 2018, pp. 267-287).

Rabanut – The council of the chief rabbinate of Israel; in 1947, Israel's first Prime Minister David Ben Gurion sent a letter (coined the status quo letter) promising that all matters of civil life will remain under the responsibility of the religious authorities like it was during the ottoman rule. This Status quo, meant to continue the tradition, is however causing tensions between religious and secular parts of society today (Friedman, 2019, pp. iii-vi; Yinon, David, 2000).

(Islamic) Waqf – Religious trust; managing cultural heritage and Endowments in Jerusalem with an important organizational and developmental function; influential third sector besides the private and the governmental. Conceptually waqf means to give a new legal status with religious associations (Assi, 2008, pp. 380-385).

Zionism – Movement to fulfill the national aspirations of the Jewish people in their ancestral homeland; however, often charged with negative connotations especially for non-Israelis; an expression of national pride, an right to self-determination, referred to by many Palestinians as a colonial enterprise that owes its existence to Western world's post-Holocaust shame (Rosenbaum, 2019, 119-127).

1. Introduction

“If you stand on one of the mountains around Jerusalem you can see Jordan, you can see the Mediterranean Sea from the other side. It's very beautiful. [...] It's very special, really. It's even hard to explain the feeling of the energy here. It's different here. [...] Jerusalem is very, very, very special and very unique and the feeling is really very different than anywhere in the world. [...] That's a bit strange but that is Jerusalem.” (I17, l. 32-41)

The fascinating thing about Jerusalem is that almost every human being has some kind of relationship with this city. Often quite an emotional one. Even the reader probably has a personal, anecdotal, religious or historic knowledge of this city. We have all heard about her, we might love or admire her. In any case she strikes a chord. Not just because of the ongoing conflict, the news stories and the unresolved status quo. Not just because she is claimed and contested over by so many different peoples and religions as their own, their center piece, their home and origin. Maybe it is her complexity, her beauty or her enormous historic weight, her ancient stones – witnesses of tragic and wondrous events. Maybe it is the high hopes for her future – a receptacle for the dreams and wishes of humanity.

In any case, she is unique. And of unique importance. For many individuals, communities confined in (co)existence, nations, religions, the region and even for the whole world – not necessarily because she actually is, but mostly because of what she stands for, her immaterial value. This importance, the prescribed meaning makes it difficult to research her in a scientific and objective way, detached from this secondary layer. And it makes it very difficult to present findings without prejudice and preconceived notions. However, it also gives her great importance and with this importance comes the necessity to understand.

This work will not aim to investigate all the complexities and issues that coincide with Jerusalem, as many of them are studied extensively – but explore something unknown by nature – her prospects and possible futures.

1.1 Jerusalem as a focus of research

Considering the sheer volume of works examining Jerusalem and its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it surprises that little to none scientific, literary or even journalistic work

is focusing on Jerusalem's long-term futures. There are some headlines, that fail to deliver and revert to issues of the present or the past (Hasson, 2002a, b, 2007b, Bar, 1993; IPCRI, 1993; Hass, 2014; Manor, 2014; Sheizaf, 2014a; Breger & Ahimeir 2002); some are mostly artificial readmissions of the 'Two-State-Solution' which are enormously vague and ambiguous (Gideon & Sylvester, 2014; Sheizaf, 2014c; Hasson, 2014; IPCRI, 2014; Sahlan, 2003); some are rigid plans to develop the city's physical infrastructure or technological capabilities (Hasson, 2010; Sheizaf, 2014b; Orpaz, 2014) – however, there is no real, comprehensive, current investigation of what lays ahead for this city, especially from a true perspective of its citizens and stakeholders.

Afterall, Jerusalem's futures are a very difficult subject of research. Its heavily contested, deeply historic nature gives Jerusalem's prospects great significance to many dissimilar groups. This infuses the already high uncertainty of long-term futures with multiple layers of ownership and different perceptions of time. Despite its relatively small size, Jerusalem holds the position of one of – if not the most – important religions centers in the world, of critical relevance to all three monotheistic religions, adding a specific spiritual, global and geopolitical aspect to its future. These added layers increase the difficulty of systematically dissecting the inherently unknown and the individual perceptions of future in this city tremendously.

Beyond its religious significance, Jerusalem also holds great meaning in creating identity. It somewhat serves as a projection screen for the cumulated desires and fears of everyone invested in its importance, propelling the stakes and complexities of Jerusalem 2060 into both a very ambiguous and a very explosive subject of research.

Furthermore, its status as a national, spiritual and political symbol is a blessing and a curse for the real city and its inhabitants at the same time. It creates an enormous pressure of expectations towards the city which in turn adds weight to the process of imagining what lays ahead. In Jerusalem, exploring the future is not just difficult in one regard – the inherent uncertainty of futures in general – but difficult in multiple additional aspects. Future is an extremely contested political, socio-economic and religious sphere.

“[Jerusalem] is the key of the solution and the key of the conflict at the same time.” (128, l. 57-58)

Furthermore, Jerusalem is a microcosm of all the issues, unanswered questions, disappointments, struggles, challenges and disputes between Israelis and Palestinians at large. This city represents on a small but condensed scale what the predicaments in the peace process are and why it has been stagnating for decades. Jerusalem is where the problems between the parties are most prominent and imagined futures for both are most difficult and distant. But it is also the starting point for any solution; a possible pacification of the region and an example to the whole world. Opposite to how the peace process was approached in the 90's during the Oslo Accords, there is a dominating feeling of 'Jerusalem first' today. If the issue of Jerusalem could be solved – a viable future imaginable – everything else could follow suit. This is why this work focuses specifically on Jerusalem and its long-term futures of 2060 (Hirsch, 2002, p. 91).

All in all, the future is the only vital layer of contention in a truly solution-oriented approach of conflict resolution. A conflict can only be solved in the future. However, as previously noted, since the decline of the Oslo accords a bewildering lack of authentic futures has evolved in the social discourse causing a continued disintegration of desirable or at least feasible images of collective futures until today. This phenomenon aligns with a certain fatigue and hopelessness of the citizens when it comes to addressing (im)possible solutions. This sense of lack of future literacy evoked a deeper immersion into the question of how Jerusalem's futures actually look like for its citizens in the present. How do Jerusalemites personally relate to their common future – away but not necessarily apart from the conflict. Even though future and conflict are closely linked to each other and there are many striking positive synergies between their respective studies, this study is explicitly not designed as an exercise on the peace process.

1.2 Scientific relevance

This paper sets out to illuminate the importance of accessible futures for the creation of direction. It is an in-depth study of key perspectives in a situation of weak and unclear future imagery where future perspectives are of crucial, even existential importance. It promises new insights into what key actors deem feasible, desirable, undesirable and unfeasible for Jerusalem specifically but also seeks to add to the understanding of the mechanisms of how

individuals create futures in protracted conflict. Furthermore, the contested nature of future in Jerusalem can lead to additional hypothesis of how social entities use images of future (or a lack there of).

This work aims to examine the different functions of future images and especially Leitbilder in conflict settings. It adds to the understanding of the different kinds of long-term Leitbilder that are actually existing and are possibly shared between the conflict parties – consciously or unconsciously.

As futures studies are still at the beginning of their establishment as a scientific discipline, this work also describes and adapts a prominent tool, the Leitbildanalysis. It aims to broaden the scope of this important tool by adding another study that would help to better understand the process of identifying collective images of future in different contexts and settings with the Leitbildanalysis, revealing the overarching importance and relevance of engaging with futures for all social entities in creating meaning and direction. With the Leitbild methodology especially hidden and implicit images, unknown but powerful, can be constructively identified. It also enables the weeding out of artificial images that are driven by exterior agenda or political manipulation. It solicits structure to social discourse on the topic of long-term futures on a scientifically sound basis.

Finally, the process of the Leitbildanalysis itself, especially the in-depth interviews, the prominent featuring of direct quotes in this study, but also the final results as well as the derived future images, can acts as a catalyst for social engagement with possible futures.

As social entities create their own future through actions in the present the ability to actively imagine future is a tool to shape and impact what is to come. A process of uncovering hidden, and underlying Leitbilder through the process of a Leitbildanalysis can be an appropriate tool to grant citizens and political actors' agency and help to advance them from the feeling of passivity towards their shared future.

1.3 Focus and research questions

This work focuses, in an exploratory scientific approach, on the images that exist today of a future Jerusalem in 2060. As there are no, or at most very fragmented, inconsistent or artificial pictures of collective futures accessible in the public debate, this thesis aims to gain

in-depth insight into hidden but authentic manifestations and implicit collective constructs of futures in the holy city.

The main research question is therefore: What implicit or hidden ‘Leitbilder’ can be identified for Jerusalem 2060?

How do opinion leaders in Jerusalem imagine, defend and explain their long-term perspectives of Jerusalem? How do different actors describe future? What is their underlying agenda or conception of the world revealed by these images? How do the current imaginations of future fit into the social context and the collective identity as well as the memory of Jerusalem? How consistent are they internally and how do they fit to each other or, in fact, don’t?

For the comparison between future perspectives of different communities in the city, the research focuses on: (How) do desired and feared futures of different social and ethnical groups in Jerusalem differ? To which current realities and historical narratives do they refer and connect to? What is the relation between the narratives of the past and the narratives of the future? And to some degree even, what does the relationship to the future and the imaginations of Jerusalem 2060 reveal about Jerusalem today?

Examining the data under the hypothesis of the preceded Master thesis and examining the phenomenon of the perception of ‘no future in protracted conflict situations’, is of interest for the final tier of questions after the preliminary comparison of the final six Leitbilder: What empirical indications exist for and against this hypothesis? Why could future be to a high degree a non-issue in this highly contested city? Are long-term and desired or feasible futures especially difficult for inhabitants and opinion leaders to describe - 20, 30, 40 years ahead, but also as little as 5 years? If yes, what hypothesis could explain this phenomenon? And finally, what hypothesis can be derived from the data to grand insights on: (How) can a social dialogue about desired and feasible long-term futures be established and what could be the benefits?

To converge onto these issues a fundamentally open, flexible and unstandardized research design was chosen. This approach should ensure a methodology befitting a research where hypotheses were to be generated and formed as part of the qualitative framework of the Leitbildanalysis, due to the little preexisting research conducted in this specific field.

1.4 Literature review

The state of international research regarding Jerusalem, especially in the context of the Middle East conflict, is extensive to say the least. Of primary interest for this work is research that deals with Jerusalem in a holistic outlook or its nature in a present-day perspective with long-term implications. Notable are, among many, for example Madelaine Adelman and Miriam Fendius Elman's "Jerusalem: Conflict & cooperation in a contested city" (2014), Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Rieniets' "City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism" (2006) or Meron Benvenisti's "Jerusalem, the torn city" (1976).

Of additional great relevance are contributions that specifically relate to possible developments in the future; e.g. Michael Dumper "Jerusalem Unbound: Geography, History & the future of the holy city" (2014), Marshall Breger and Ora Ahimeir "Jerusalem: a city and its future" (2002), Shlomo Hasson, "State, Religion and Society in Israel: Scenarios for Jerusalem" (2002b), "Sustainable Jerusalem" (2004), "Jerusalem in the Future: The Challenge of Transition" (2007a), and "Successful Jerusalem" (2007b), Moshe Hirsch "Whither Jerusalem? Proposals and Positions Concerning the Future of Jerusalem" (1995), "Two States in One Space - A New Proposed Framework for Resolving the Israeli - Palestinian Conflict" (2014). These works provide comprehensive perspectives on the history, describe the status quo of Jerusalem today and follow conclusions for the future by extrapolating certain trends.

However, as mentioned above, there is a striking blank in literature when it comes to comprehensive analyzes of long-term futures. Especially with a focus on desired, feared, feasible and unfeasible futures of Jerusalemites. There is no radically open approach to the future – as it is always considered in line with solutions to the conflict, a pre-set agenda or within the set framework of a one- or two-state scenario. In addition, there is no research on underlying or hidden concepts, paradox and nonlinear ideas, differences in ideas engrained and anchored in the subconsciousness of the various societies in the city.

The state of literature in terms of images of future and the methodology of futures studies and foresight is extensive, even though it is a relatively young discipline in the scientific field. Due to this fact there are hardly any widely accepted standards, however, the works of Kreibich (2006), Kreibich and Dürr (2004) or Popp (2016), Popp and Schüll (2009) Gerhold, Holtmannspötter, Neuhaus, Schüll, Schulz-Montag, Steinmüller and Zweck (2015) are some

of the works providing the necessary framework for this study as well as long-term futures studies in general and the understanding of different future-oriented processes in society.

Particularly relevant is the literature on the concept of the Leitbild and the Leitbildanalyse, developed by the research group 'environmental education' at the Free University Berlin (Giesel, Haan & Rode 2002; Giesel, 2002, 2005, 2007; Haan, 2001, 2002, 1997; Haan & Schaar 1994, 1995; Haan, Kuckartz, Rheingans & Schaar, 1996; Schaar, 1996, Kuckartz, 1996).

1.5 Critical considerations and self-reflection

Critical considerations and a critical self-reflection are the basis of all scientific endeavor – however, in the omni-politicized context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict it is the sole most important premise. All too many works, papers and essays have been placed in the service of political agenda under the cloak of scientific research.

No researcher is free of bias. As human beings with feelings, convictions as well as opinions, it is impossible to be fully neutral – especially in such an emotional context as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I spent over two years in Jerusalem for my research. Years in which I gained insight and knowledge about the city, its inner workings and its people, but I also gained social relations, friends and colleagues. I lost the claim to an unbiased third-party investigation or neutral perspective on all of these highly politicized issues – not least, because the interviews themselves were highly impactful and emotional processes. There is a personal affiliation to the place and a feeling of being deeply invested in its future – since the day this thesis was set into motion.

However, there is no need to claim absolute independence of the enquiry. A passionate but particularly self-reflected one has to be sufficient. All things considered, taking a subjective viewpoint, empathizing with each interviewee the perspective of any one individual living in the city, trying to survive and trying to build a future, can even be beneficial. Not aiming for a greater moral justification, but an individual prospective of future for themselves and their children, can enable a scientifically aided examination if and how certain futures can exist side by side or stray far from each other.

2. Theory

The theoretical discussion of this thesis circles around three areas: First, future as a construct and its relation to the past, second, a classification of different kinds of images of future and third, a showcasing of the Leitbild theory as well as the special benefits Leitbilder could provide to the social fabric of Jerusalem. All three aspects will be deliberated in general theoretical terms and then adopted to the setting of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2.1 A constructivist perspective of future

The investigation of future in a constructivist perspective arose with modern times, when the deterministic image of the world guided by an almighty god was replaced by the believe that humans are the engineer of their own destiny. Since the enlightenment, action and events are believed to alter the course of the future making it open to exercise influence over its untrodden path (Beck et al. 2001, 35). Furthermore, future is seen as something that does not exist as a monolithic unit but an ever shifting, multilayered construct of interaction with the past and dependent on a certain perspective or conception of the world (Haan & Rülcker, 2009). Especially, Reinhart Koselleck's view (1979, 2004) of the relationship between past and future will be a focal point in the following paragraphs, including an excursus into the current discussion around how social confirmation bias effects the construction of futures.

2.1.1 The future we create

"... the future Jerusalem is in the hands of [...] all those who love Jerusalem [...] and they have to start the making of its future." (119, l. 255-258)

Without a doubt, the future does not exist. Not yet.

However, it also very much does – as a mental construct that leads our actions and perceptions in the present (Schüll, 2006; Grunwald, 2009, 2015). In the constructivist perspective of critical futures studies, and Inayatullah in specific (1990; 1998; Milojević & Inayatullah,

2015), future is fluent, shaped by our experiences of the past and the collective memory of our social entity. It is molded by the social narratives of who we are as a people and who we aspire to be. What we believe to be the future reveals much of what we believe to be the nature of the world around us and our agency in it, our goals, dreams and believes.

Therefore, future is open and can be shaped to a certain degree. It is shaped by social narratives, political action, historical developments and events in the present – but also the perceptions we hold in the present of the future. Especially relevant for this study is the role that the imagination and deliberation of futures play in continuously shaping and renegotiating societies guiding principles. Images of future and especially guiding principles play a pivotal role in negotiating the long-term interests of different groups. In the best-case scenario they can foster common goals – even though common goals might seem unattainable in the present. This active negotiation over futures however requires tangible images of future, rather than subconscious and hidden ones (see below 2.2.3 The five functions of 'Leitbilder').

The imagined future – conscious or not – plays a central role in all forward planning. It is an all-encompassing and non-static principle, adaptable to new sets of circumstances. It feeds off our experiences, our identity and our hidden desires. It is heavily influenced by 3rd party expectations and interests and limited by the rules, rituals, believes and experiences of our interconnected surrounding – pillars of our social life (Berger & Luckmann, 2003).

2.1.2 The future and its relation to the past

"I would say Jerusalem is the history with a future. [...] We can only see the future of Jerusalem from it's past."
(124, l. 62-65)

In his work 'Futures Past' (2004) Reinhart Koselleck describes the conception of time when thinking of the past as 'historical time(s):' It is "the wrinkles of an old man, or the scars in which a former fate is preserved" (Koselleck 2004, p. 1). The historical time is beyond the generality of a measurable natural time such as seasons or the biological time of the human body. It touches on the interconnectedness of systems and the hierarchy of events and it is not one but rather many superimposed on top of each other, with every individual or thing having its own construct of time. These forms of historic time relate through the dimensions

of present and future with a rhythm of rituals and reoccurring social rites. (See Koselleck 2004, pp. 1-3) “Above all, an individual can think of the successive generations in family [...], where different spaces of experience overlap and perspectives of the future intersect, inclusive of all the conflicts with which they are invested.” (Koselleck 2004, p. 2)

Humans are creatures of experiences. The perception of past holds a high value in forming the experience of the present, advising for decisions taken and opinions held. The mind is not a blank slate contemplating possible futures. It relies on a baseline to process the unknown, drawing from the past to imagine future. Not only personal experiences play an important role in the present conduct of life and the short and long-term planning, but the collective memory as well. The past, the collective narrative of the past, which is iterated by shared stories and habits, has many of the same tasks that images of future have. The past is being constructed in our minds in a similar way and collective memories are shaped and reshaped by a specific culture of memory. The past does not exist as a monolithic unit in the present – and is, in this regard, very much like the future. Furthermore, any given past has a given future. There is an undeniable relation between past and future throughout history (See Koselleck 2004, pp. 1-3).

Both pasts and futures play an important role in creating the experience of present. The three dimensions of time help to locate individuals in community and community in time. They evoke and enforce a sensation of identity and belonging.

This notion of time underlines the importance of a certain balance between past, presence and future. Between experience, existence and expectation in the perception of a social entity as well as in the mind of the individual. However, an absolute balance of the different layers of time is not feasible. Personal preferences and lifestyle, as well as social surrounding, cultural influences and especially the process of aging change the relationship between the specific layers of time respective to the specific need or agenda – increasing either one over the other. It is a mechanism of compensation. An overemphasis of one dimension, however, erodes the other dimensions substantially. E.g. if a person or social entity has little hope or positive expectations for the future; a negative and frustrating existence in their present life, a turn towards experiences in the past can act as a safe haven. Similarly, past experiences can be traumatic for a person or social entity and therefore future is emphasized. The same can be true for the present - it can be the last refuge from uncertain, looming futures or doomed pasts. The extreme of this, the marginalization of one dimension canceling out either past or future entirely, leads to an imbalance that gives way to growing inactivity or paralysis. Where

in turn an existence disregarding past and future can lead to an increase in recklessness and unplanned, impulsive actions. Therefore, it is paramount that individuals and social entities acknowledge and aim towards a balance of these dimensions of time, continuing to create past and future every day in the present.

The last aspect that is paramount for the relationship between the layers of time is the human mind and the linearity in which it functions. The mind is wired to assume a continuation of the past into the present and onto the future. However, reality shows that events rarely are linear. A very vivid example of this phenomenon is the studies of biographies compared to the study of diaries (Felden, 2008).

We as humans construct a continuity, a so-called red line into our past that gives us meaning and consistency in the form of a bigger picture. Our daily experiences, however, mostly tell a story of incoherent and random experiences that we struggle to make sense of – driven by chance and with no specific order. This reveals a mechanism of selective memory of past occurrences, a re-narration in an attempt to create a coherent connection between the past and the future throughout the present. This ‘making of sense’ can be helpful for a deliberation of futures, as it gives us guidance, stability and an overall framework. However, it can also be limiting – cutting away all the possibilities that do not fit into this predetermined structure. Especially in the context of protracted conflict the perceived linearity of futures due to the narration of the past can be immensely restrictive – keeping the actors locked in an unsustainable circle of perpetuated conflict (See below 2.2.4 Leitbilder in protracted conflict).

Breaking open this constraining linearity is something futures studies addresses with its methodology, enabling a systematic deliberation of futures and a more exhaustive array of possibilities to give way to an inherent openness shaped by society and its individuals.

2.1.3 Confirmation bias

“Even though social media connects everybody to everything that is going on in the whole world, in a way that was not true when I was a girl, [...] you would think that it would bring people closer – but it isn't.” (I14, l. 327-331)

Similar to the narratives of the past, images of future are social constructs – subjective and anything else than set in stone. They are constantly remolded by new experiences, opinions and the social context they are recited in. As of late, however, this process is not just directed by traditional media, social settings or (religious, social or political) opinion leaders anymore but increasingly by new technologies and their algorithmic interpretation and filtering of the traditional spheres through social media. Even though exclusive recitation bubbles with a heavy confirmation biases have existed in the social fabric of the different communities in Jerusalem before Facebook, Twitter and Instagram due to the closed-off physical social realities of Jerusalem, social networks have been digitally amplifying the biasing effects manifolds. By enabling faster, easier and more streamlined iteration loops these new technologies have augmented the social enclosure of solely reproducing specific, easily available, self-affirming facts as well as non-facts severely. This aggravates the exasperation between the two entities even further, with an even harsher and more impenetrable perception of ‘us’ and ‘them’, ours and theirs, our home and future or their atrocity and unwillingness – it hardened the zero-sum mentality where one can only thrive when the other does not. The digital discourse, especially in the younger generation, is increasingly held with an underlying tone of absolute black and white (Weber, Mangold, Hofer & Koch, 2019).

Social media also promotes a more hostile climate of immediate threat, where negative and even destructive futures gain momentum. They are being created and recreated on the background of an amplified circulation of shocking and systemically biased algorithms preferencing arousing notices which in turn structurally leads to an enhanced perception of the present as permanently under threat (Burns, 2018).

These negatively impacted images of future guide actions, perceptions and therefore decision made by entire social entities especially in volatile places like Jerusalem. They are impacting policy and social realities. However, they rarely are explicit. They are hidden inside respective confirmation spheres, un-reflected and unchallenged by deviating opinions or a shared reality. Their impact is indirect but not less impactful. This enables the persistence and even an extension of unquestioned stereotypes. This way fears, and to a degree even the traumatic status quo of protracted conflicts, become permanently and deeply anchored in the sub-conscious collective mind.

The process of unveiling and engaging with hidden images of future, could potentially promote (self-) critical thought, challenge current concepts and enable a social discourse about what is desired – transcending to some degree current events and stereotypes. It focuses

much less on ‘the other’ and more on the self. Especially with an open concept of future social entities are able to engage with a multitude of possibilities for long-term futures. It enables a debate that challenges linear perspectives of future and gives agency and ownership to actively impact and shape the presence through these images. Thus, being more than mere attempts to predict future events.

The effect of new technologies in the perception of time and social conflict should be investigated further to further develop and consolidate these initial hypotheses. However, research into these powerful mechanisms is as recent as the technologies themselves and will aid in revealing new aspects by providing a deeper understanding of their impact on social discourse, opinion and the perception of futures.

2.2 Different images of future

In the following, there will be a short introduction into a typology of images of future. It serves to clarify the differences in the multitude of futures, which too often are thought of as one monolithic, sometimes even deterministic, single future.

Six relevant categories of differentiation were identified: desirability, collectivity, probability, authenticity, explicitness and scope - all existing on a scale rather than being dichotomous. The exercise of describing the different kinds of images of future in detail allows for the focus of the analysis onto a specific group of images, carrying over into the working definition of the term ‘Leitbild’ or guiding principle. This will act as a point of reference for all further elaboration as there is no academic consensus or clear definition of the term in social sciences (Giesel, 2007, pp. 13 - 14).

This typology is based on the Typology of Leitbilder by Giesel (2007) but extended by four additional categories vital to any image of a future.

2.2.1 A typology of images of future

Especially in the setting of protracted conflict the future reveals itself as multifaceted. Even though futures will transform themselves into a single present with time, their existence as

futures is ambiguous. Therefore, it is essential to structure the many imaginations of future in different dimensions.



Figure 1: The six dimensions of an image of a future

The diagram above illustrates six basic categories that any comprehensive image of a future holds. These categories can be placed, each, on a scale. This means that an image ranges in its desirability between extremely desirable and undesirable. It can be everything between an individual representation of a future to an image that holds global value. The same image can be regarded as anything between extremely improbable to very likely as well as between absolutely artificial to totally authentic. It can be fully implicit, explicit or anything in between. And finally, its scope can range between a very close to a very distant future.

These categories are referenced and used by different scholars in the field of futures studies but are rarely put together as a comprehensive or explicit framework. Furthermore, they are used most commonly as categories with dichotomic values, not as values on a scale. Most of these scholars also introduce specific terminology, which will partially be adopted into this model (Giesel, 2007, p. 39).

One of the most basic and intuitive categories, which is also one of the main focal points of this study, is perceived desirability. Images of future with a focus on positive (utopic) or negative (dystopic) outlooks are described as images that are especially relevant in guiding actions and decision making. These images of future connect closely to our emotions and stimulate personal ties with certain scenarios. Therefore, they can be very powerful tools to actively shape a societies' future. People who identify with these concepts on a deeper level, often actively engage with them and are more likely to help turn desired ones into reality or

try to prevent undesired ones altogether (McClelland, 1985; Stewart & McClelland, 1982). This makes images of desirability especially attractive in the context of protracted conflict, not least because the default scenario of business as usual tends to be concurrent with a dystopian image of a future.

The category of collective versus individual futures, like all categories, also exists on a scale. Analyzing broader societal futures and transcend individual ideas into a larger context is another commonality, when working with social entities. However, personal futures are naturally interlaced with collective imagery. Collective perspectives are influenced by individual lives, values and experiences and in turn influence those. Even though interviewees provide their individual images of future, these images are still of a collective nature. In case of this study, they focus on a future Jerusalem as a whole and in a larger setting of developments, rather than personal lives and private matters. Relating to private aspects works as a tool that allows for relating more closely to abstract futures. The main focus lies on the larger political and social framework of future dictating the circumstances of private futures. Jerusalem's meaning beyond a merely personal importance further catalyzes this process.

Another aspect of differentiation between images of future is probability. It is needless to say, that it is futile to apply percentages to different scenarios, as it is impossible to predict accurately future events. However, many of the described images are placed on the scale of probability by the interviewees themselves. This is rather telling and gives an insight into who places what scenario where and especially why. Therefore, it is also of special interest in the comparison of different groups and subgroups, e.g. between Israelis and Palestinians. Often times the more likely an image is viewed to be, the more relevant it becomes for an individual or group. This enforces a certain linearity as the business as usual or status quo scenarios are often seen as most likely. The more a perspective deviates from it the more unlikely it becomes in the eyes of many individuals. Developments, however, are rarely strictly linear, but can be disruptive or exponential, e.g. the fall of the Berlin wall or the impact of the internet.

Authenticity is another fundamental category in the context of exploring futures. It investigates if future representations are real images of future or artificial ones. The artificial

ones are officially engineered, superimposed images with no societal anchor whereas real images are always produced, reproduced and held onto by individuals of the group. They are actual views of people concerning the future (Haan, 2002, p. 4). This differentiation is of special importance in the context of protracted conflict because there is a strong tendency towards political appropriation of future. This challenge, however, cannot fully be resolved as imposed images can rarely be clearly identified and have over time merged with or even become actual ones. It is important to clarify that this category also exists on a scale between extremes. Artificial images rarely present as purely artificial, similarly, to how authentic representations of future are always formed by institutions exerting influence on the mental constructs of people. At the same time, actual concepts formerly anchored deeply in the psyche can be pushed out, becoming hollow mantras that lose their credibility and authenticity.

Another core category is explicitness. It relates to how explicit or implicit images of future are and how tangible and accessible they are to their beholder. In the context of protracted conflict this is especially difficult prompting the choice of the Leitbildanalysis as the most adequate analytical tool. As already mentioned, any social discourse about futures and therefore the process of explication is hijacked by political parties and standpoints in the context of protracted conflict. This leads to a situation where not only the scientific process is challenged by politically charged agendas but also the images of future are actively directed and orchestrated in the categories of desirability, collectivity, probability and then claimed and propagated (authenticity) to an overwhelming degree. Therefore, authentic images that are actually action guiding can be more easily buried deep in the subconscious. The values and ideas of future that individuals hold exist in a state of unawareness or minimal explicitness – possibly even completely un-accessed by the individual in daily life – needing to be placed into the open by a systematic process.

Finally, the scope of an image of future tells us if we are engaging with close futures – maybe even tomorrow, or in a year – or a very distant futures of 50 or a hundred years. The scope is important when looking at insecurity and the unknown. The further futures depart from the reference point of the present day the more unsure and unknown the interrelations of our complex world become. However, this can also serve as a benefit and free the beholder from a perceived dependency chained to the past. It can enable a more creative perspective of

futures, uncover underlying beliefs deemed to not conform to popular opinion or unlikely due to current events, contra superimposed images or self-reinforcing recitation spheres. Longer time spans can serve as an accelerator of personal convictions rather than social commonplaces. Furthermore, it can force a person out of their comfort zone. On the downside, however, it is then also less suitable to act as an anchor for actions in the present – as the factor of unknown increases exponentially to the point of irrelevance (anything could happen).

Therefore, there is a situational need to balance a tender equilibrium between futures too far to be relevant or comprehensible and too close to feel determined by the present, reaping the benefits of being less burdened by past events and the current status quo and still potent enough to exercise influence onto the present.

2.2.2 A definition of the term 'Leitbild'

The term 'Leitbild' is German and roughly translates into guiding principle. However, its meaning is slightly more complex and nuanced. As mentioned above, it refers to the hidden images and perceptions of future that are actually action guiding, as well as in need of explication in order of being manipulated or directed. (Marz & Dierkes, 1992; Haan, 1996) In the context of this study Leitbilder hold a distinct value of desirability; the interviewees visions, goals, hopes and dreams but also fears and concerns for long-term futures (Haan 1996, p. 293). If not directly indicated differently, the term refers to collective images of future, almost exclusively located on a national level, e.g. Palestinian or Israeli images. Furthermore, all images of future or fragments of future images discussed in this study will be specifically assessed regarding the category of probability in order to formalize a structure and enable an understanding of the images on a deeper level as well as in relation to each other. The final Leitbilder will only display aspects deemed feasible by the interviewees. Likelihood and feasibility are, however, deeply intertwined with desirability. The fringes of these two categories fade into each other and influence each other greatly in the setting of protracted conflict, reinforced by feelings of having no control and no influence over personal futures.

Leitbilder in this study are also strictly deducted from the interviews rather than from institutions, official declarations or the media, which serves to elevate the authenticity values

of the images as much as possible. However, notably, a genuine lack of future images or discourse and the long-term reproduction of certain well-known political images as socially dominant mantras can lead to the effect of individuals reverting to some degree to artificial images as a default.

The scope of 'Leitbilder' was consciously settled on a very long-term time horizon for this study, trying to enable the beholder to think beyond the short term and the staggeringly strong current constraints. The interviews themselves, based on the Leitbild analysis, serve as a first step of engaging in a process of explication.

Creating a comprehensive, current inventory of actual images of different futures, called Leitbilder in the following, as well as describing possible pervasive blind spots lies at the core of this work. Clearly verbalized formerly un-reflected views and ideas are defined as explicit Leitbilder, whereas images extracted from the subtext and the context of the interviews are implicit Leitbilder – together forming the final six Leitbilder of this study.

Leitbilder are never monolithic images but rather an intricacy of many different or even opposing Leitbild fragments present in a social entity (or even a single individual) at the same time. They can exist parallel and do not necessarily form homogeneous sets. Furthermore, Leitbilder are not static. They can change and adapt over time, receive additions or even radical turns.

The Leitbildanalysis is seen as the appropriate qualitative tool to capture these underlying and hidden sentiments and is introduced under section 4. Methodology.

2.2.3 The five functions of Leitbilder

According to Haan (2001, p. 75) there are five practical functions of Leitbilder: Orientation, motivation, burden-relief, community building or consensus, and differentiation between in and out-group. These five dimensions are especially valuable in a setting of protracted conflict, where each of these five aspects are imperative for the maintenance of a sense of continuation, security and coherent identity (see below, 2.2.4 Leitbilder in protracted conflict). In the following, the dimensions are described in depth and then transferred to the setting of Jerusalem.

Orientation:

Leitbilder or 'guiding principles function to clarify the goals and aims of a [social entity. They] serve [...] to gather and concentrate energies on one goal. The proclamation of a [...] guiding principle lets everyone know what principles their behavior should be based on [and] establishes a guideline for their actions.' (Haan, 2002, p. 6) Furthermore, they help to stir the individuals towards the future and therefore reduce the significance of tradition (Haan, 1997, pp. 6-15)

Community building:

'Whether guiding principles are openly identified or latent – guiding principles that are mutually shared encourage [individuals] to regard themselves as part of a 'we'. Guiding principles bolster team spirit, or at least they should. A guiding principle creates a common horizon of future-oriented goals. The existence of an openly or latently shared guiding principle ensures that one's own interpretations of tasks and goals are compatible with those of the [social entity]. This unity makes [it] strong and effective.' (Haan, 2002, p. 6). However, if there is no common goal, no strong sense of 'we', or just a partial inclusion of individuals in the 'we' in a situation of prolonged conflict there is no common horizon formed and actions and behaviors are not compatible with each other.

Motivation:

'Third, guiding principles should make the objectives of an [entity] attractive. They function to ensure that [individuals] not only voluntarily identify with the goals [...], but do so out of a sense of commitment, and from a general positive attitude. [Those] who identify with an [entity's] guiding principle do not need to be prompted to do their tasks. They do it willingly and on their own initiative. Guiding principles have a pull not a push function.' (Haan, 2002, p. 6) However, if guiding principles are lacking so are their objectives. They can't act as motivation to further common goals and promote positivity. Self-initiative built on common principles and goals are lacking. A high degree of disillusionment by the experience of a multitude of failed attempts to improve a situation can further lower the motivation – even to a state of stagnation.

Burden-relief:

‘If guiding principles are truly internalized, then the [entity’s] need to continually negotiate goals and aims disappears. It is freed from the danger of consuming itself in self-definition. And, in general, considerations such as which action is proper and in what form should the [entity’s] goals be attained need no longer be thematized. Guiding principles shorten negotiation processes and, to the extent in which they achieve this, work to ease internal communication.’ (Haan, 2002, p. 7) In the case of Jerusalem, however, there is a constant pressure to negotiate everything. Individuals and institutions are overburdened with politically loaded decisions and the assessment of which action is deemed acceptable to the cause (e.g. one tram way took around ten years to be built). This effectively signifies a standstill of important social and physical development. In addition, there is a high burden on everyday life of individuals. Citizens have to find a way through the reality of the conflict constantly while making future plans in a situation with no long-term security.

Differentiation:

‘Guiding principles also aid in differentiating the [entity] from others. This is the differentiation function of guiding principles. It is important for [entities] to differentiate themselves from others, to have a distinctive profile, to be unique. Guiding principles bond [individuals] to the [entity] [...]. They can also build a ‘we-feeling’ as opposed to ‘others’. Of course, differentiation from others can be harmful as well if the guiding principle does not offer sufficient opportunity for a gain in identity and the [entity] does not develop enough ‘We-strength’.’ (Haan, 2006, p. 7) Jerusalem is facing an enormous challenge of not having a coherent ‘we’ against ‘them’ image that is locally consistent. Of course, the categories of the conflict are extremely dominant in defining ‘us’ and ‘them’, to the point of hostilities and violent attacks against the ‘other’. However, inside Jerusalem there is a multitude of ‘we’ groups with subgroups that each extend beyond the borders of the city. What it means to be a Jerusalemite means something different to all of them and they do not join as one. There is no strong social bond holding the city together. Furthermore, migration patterns and commute patterns add another layer of complexity.




Figure 2: The five functions of Leitbilder

These functions can be related back to the six dimensions of images of future – scope, desirability, collectivity, probability, authenticity and explicitness.

The dimension of scope makes a Leitbild into a viable image of a future in general. The longer it reaches into the future the harder it is to outline or imagine it. The closer it remains to the present, the stronger it sticks to the present, failing to provide any function.

The desirability of a Leitbild effects how much it can motivate. Especially on the extreme ends of the spectrum of high desirability and undesirability it can act as a strong motivator.

Taking the hierarchical model of approach-avoidance motivation (Elliot, 2006) into consideration, both negative as well as positive motivation – “defined as the energization of behavior [...] towards positive [...] or away from negative stimuli” (Elliot, 2006, p. 112) – is part of our evolutionary heritage. However, positive motivator such as desirable images of future seem to provide a more sustainable motivation, compared to negative motivators such as feared images of future, which are able to strongly motivate in the short-term but have a tendency to burn out over time, due to their very nature of being aversive and stressful. Furthermore, it can at best only lead to the absence of undesired futures (Elliot, 2006, pp. 114-115). “Thus, avoidance motivation is designed to facilitate surviving, whereas approach motivation is designed to facilitate thriving.” (Elliot, 2006, p 115).

The collectivity of a Leitbild directly effects the community building function. The Leitbild builds a community among the number of individuals that the Leitbild is shared in. The more homogeneous and the higher the ratio of individuals in a social entity with a certain Leitbild, the stronger the function of building community is among them.

The burden relief function can only activate if an image is relatively probable. The more improbable and unfeasible it becomes the more irrelevant it gets to the social entity and therefore the lesser effect of actually relieving burden.

Authenticity on the other hand is key for creating orientation. Artificial Leitbilder are at risk of lacking the ability to provide true and meaningful orientation. The higher the authenticity and the anchoring in the minds of the individuals the deeper the effect of actually guiding their action pervasively. A purely imposed image, however, fails to impact action sustainably.

And finally, the aspect of explicitness. The greater the value of explicitness the greater a Leitbild can act as a factor of differentiation. Manifest Leitbilder can act as a reference of self for the social entity and act as an encouragement of discourse.

Each function seems to enhance each dimension, and each dimension affects each function in turn. At this point, however, the described relations between functions and dimensions are hypothesis and require much further research and testing.

2.2.4 Leitbilder in protracted conflict

Leitbilder and protracted conflict have a close but very difficult relation. This can be illustrated by the following, citation of Gerhard de Haan (2002, p. 6) originally from an organizational context, translated into the context of protracted conflict with minor terminological adaptations. ‘Guiding principles gather and focus the goals, visions, and hopes of [society]. For the people [...], guiding principles summarize the general aims they share. They reduce the complexity of the world, activate people’s energy and help focus their attention. In the end, when everyone’s [action] is governed on a daily basis by this shared guiding principle, the expected effect is greater [...] satisfaction and, above all, greater success [...].’

The crucial role Leitbilder play in focusing and mobilizing society’s forces, make them susceptible for being used by all involved parties, creating fundamentally competing or

contradicting images. In this context of narrative supremacy more nuanced images are phased out of the collective consciousness, ill-equipped for an increasingly polarized debate. This extenuates the tension between politically motivated artificial guiding principles and actual, but implicit and not concurrent Leitbildern further. Especially negative and feared futures are imbedded deep into the psyche, not just positive and hopeful ones, having a strong impact on people's lives.

Future in general is contested on a higher level, an existential level. It is more fluid, more volatile and often more fearful. Leitbilder are especially implicit, bordering on a vagueness or void of tangible futures, making the individual engagement with long-term future seem to be even more difficult than under the common circumstances of increasing insecurity of postmodern societies (Lübbe, 1990; Wilke, 2001; Bechtle, 2003).

However, Leitbilder can take on a special role in the context of contested futures such as protracted conflict, through the opportunities presented by their five functions, even though they can only detach themselves from current realities as far as linguistic and mental limitations in society allow for (Peteet, 2005, pp. 154-163; Hammack, 2011, pp. 332-339).

Shared orientation:

If a clear image of a future is presented in an identity conflict or a protracted conflict, it is easier for the individuals on both sides to successfully identify with shared goals and policies. With a shared future, a logic connection between 'us' and 'them' can be established, introducing interests not exclusively as a part of a zero-sum logic but possibly as aligned. A shared direction can also enable the increase in individual willingness to invest energy, resources and emotions.

Furthermore, a distinct orientation increases the perception of reliability, continuity decreasing uncertainty. This is the basis for consistency, stability, long-term planning and coordinated actions, leading to overarching goals enabling societies to outgrow themselves but also to grow closer together.

Explication of goals and interests:

Before there can be a shared orientation, or even shared goals social opinions need to actively be formed in a systematic process of elaborating and negotiating different futures. This process aims at identifying overarching priorities for both societies, by taking stock of the differences. An inclusive deliberation of futures can ensure the necessary engagement with

long-term perspectives to move forward. However, this is not just lacking between conflict parties but also within. There is no actual knowledge over the Leitbilder of the own social entity, much less the other's.

Long-term certainty:

One of the greatest challenges in protracted conflict is the deep and existential insecurity of one's self and identity. In any resolution of a protracted conflict this needs to be addressed (Kimmerling 2008, p. 220). This insecurity puts a great burden on individuals with a lack of being able to think or plan long-term, with detrimental effects on both societies and individuals. Leitbilder address this lack and increase perceived uncertainty of possible futures by a sense of being in control of ones' own future. Engaging with a multitude of different possible futures departing from the present increases the feeling of being able to create ones future and the own agency in it – counteracting a feeling of apathy.

Motivation and new perspectives:

Positive Leitbilder anchored in the collective mind can be highly motivating. Protracted conflict is defined as long lasting conflicts where individuals loose hope and are greatly disillusioned with negotiations or the peace process overall (Hammack 2011, p. 357-361). In this situation, the process itself is actually engaging and being part of shaping socially relevant guiding principles, increases the feeling of having a share in future developments. The collective imagination of hidden or implicit futures is able to rejuvenate the stagnating process as well as inspire individual's curiosity and collective creativity. This creativity can enable a flexibility for deeply needed new approaches and ideas that in turn can potentially be used for the setting of protracted conflict (Mavroudi 2010, p. 172; Bar Tal 2001, p. 601).

To open a societal perspective to the fringes of potential futures does not just mean a greater space for deliberation and decision making but to actually consider fringe scenarios that are less popular and to not be stuck in a perceived linearity.

Equality building:

The asymmetry of power between actors is one of the main challenges of protracted identity conflicts. These current constraints are, however, set circumstances. One very easy but

effective way to bypass these current conditions is through a thought experiment of long-term futures. The innate insecurity of future elevates weaker players or pushes stronger ones down on the same level of unknown futures. In the imagination of a future, everyone can be equal. Furthermore, the deliberation of Leitbilder often addresses these asymmetries of power directly, e.g. through the imagination of a continuation of the asymmetry, a convergence of power or even a revision of the balance of power in general.

This can even act as a connecting element between the parties. Kimmerling claims that the social entities of the Middle East are emotionally not ready for peace. (Kimmerling 2008, p. 219). Not just historical narratives but also images of future can act as an anchor of the individual and the social entity. Leitbilder can set a frame of interpretation similar to historic narratives. They can transcend collective meaning and purpose in a less constrained way, as there is little space for discourse in the politicized narratives of the past in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Hammack, 2011, p. 337). The past is overshadowed by competing claims, negative interdependency and a zero-sum logic. The future, however, holds at least the potential of resolving social schisms and resentments. The successful construction of overarching guiding principles can therefore be a key aspect of creating a new and shared identities, shaping ever adaptable and extendable social realities (Kimmerling, 2008, p. 217).




Figure 3: The five potential functions of Leitbilder in protracted conflict

3. The subject of research

The focus of this work is the long-term future of Jerusalem. However, any future perspective needs to be placed into context. Therefore, this chapter will give an impression of the reality of life in Jerusalem today as well as some historical landmarks from the perspective of the interviewees.

Due to Jerusalem's complexity and highly contested nature a separate doctoral thesis could easily be comprised of single aspects of current or historic Jerusalem respectively. However, there is a need not to leave future perspectives without any context, warranting increased condensation. This dilemma gave way to the compromise of avoiding oversimplification, by basing the essential points predominantly on the interviews of this study and taking them directly from the raw data. This approach hopefully limits the discussion centered around the positions stated – given that they are not necessarily the author's own – while still providing ample necessary context for non-Jerusalemites.

The following chapter should not be understood as an objective truth but the illumination of the mental context of future perspectives from the interviewees themselves. This aims at preventing the release of the Leitbilder into a contextual void while providing an important framework for recipients less familiar to the inner dynamics of the city. This compromise ensures an adequate understanding of the long-term perspectives discussed in chapter 6.3 Leitbilder Jerusalem 2060, without the pretense of representing extensively politicized issues to a degree of satisfying each position.

"Jerusalem is more than a city, it's an idea. It's a concept. And the things we are willing to sacrifice to uphold this concept ..." (I32, l. 448-449)

A big issue when working on the topic of Jerusalem is, that to each person the term 'Jerusalem' means something different. It might have the same weight, value or meaning, but it might not be the same thing. Jerusalem is a mental construct more than a physical reality – even when talking about physical realities. The city's 'schizophrenic' nature, as well as its beauty and historic weight, may very well be one of the first things even first-time observers pick up while visiting the city.

In the following, the different aspects of this impression will be showcased, shining a light onto the many nuances Jerusalem can incorporate, even if it is not always able to reconcile them.

3.1 The physical Jerusalem

“There is this view of Jerusalem, like this amazing... it can't be that because it's not a paradise. [...] It's a normal city.” (I5, l. 155-156)

There are two layers to Jerusalem, a physical and a metaphysical one. As the physical layer is easier to grasp it will be the first focus, followed by a discussion around the metaphysical layer. Both layers are closely related to each other. They rely on the way inhabitants read and recite their reality, are relatively constant, but are still renegotiated every day.

For illustration purposes it is helpful to offer a map of Jerusalem, even though, maps are political tools, especially in the case of Jerusalem where there are no agreed borders. The following is a map from the left Israeli NGO “Ir Amim”, working on informing inhabitants, especially Israelis or Jews from West Jerusalem, about the situation in East Jerusalem.




Figure 4: Map of Greater Jerusalem, ir amim

3.1.1 Borders and demarcations

“Physically it has borders. [...] \laugh\ Where they are is complicated, but it has borders and the old city has borders and the temple site has borders. So even if they are, you know, not exact, and there is some debate about them, conceptionally it is pretty clear. More or less.” (I4, l. 55-61)

Jerusalem has not one border – it has multiple. There is the ‘green line’, a line that was drawn with a green pen on a map as the armistice line in 1948. It physically divided Jerusalem between Jordan and Israel for many years. It was an armed and hard border secured by soldiers and sniper fire until the Israeli victory in the 1967 war and the followed annexation of East Jerusalem (I10, l. 108-133; I9, l. 155-166; I29, l. 346-391).

Later Jordan gave up the claim to this area in the wake of the Oslo peace accords and the ‘Green Line’ remained as the internationally recognized basis for a future negotiation and agreement of the border between Israel and Palestine. This line holds great meaning to this day – as it also roughly represents the population distribution. Most Israelis live west of this line, most Palestinians live east of it. However, no visible physical border remains that separates East and West (I29, l. 121-163).

“East and West Jerusalem is a factum until today. Regardless the settlement activities, regardless of the illusions. The line is there. You can remove a line on the map, you can remove the line on the ground, but you cannot remove it in the heads of people on both sides. Both sides think twice now before they are crossing the line.” (I29, l. 124-128)

Like most other major cities around the world Jerusalem has been dramatically increasing in size over the last century, incorporating more and more formerly disconnected villages. However, which areas are, and which are not part of Jerusalem has always been contested.

“[The British mandate] defined the borders with a very political and sociological instrument, [...] in order to continue to claim there is a Jewish majority in the city.” (I29, l. 108-111)

After the annexation in 1967, the municipality of Jerusalem was formed unifying East and West Jerusalem. The municipal border includes all areas of Jerusalem that Israel regards as Israeli but these are not the factual boundaries of Jerusalem. After the second intifada, a wall was built between Israel and the West bank to prevent uncontrolled movement between these

two areas. However, its course is not congruent with the municipal boundaries, much less the green line. It excludes large Palestinian settlements that are inside the municipality turning them into, so called, 'No man's land' outside of Jerusalem, outside the control of both Israeli municipality and Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. However, it also includes some larger strips of uninhabited land that formally were and officially are not part of the municipality (I17, l. 71-277; I29, l. 208-226; I23, l. 145-154).

Despite all these different, competing demarcations there are no borders Palestinians or Israelis can easily agree on themselves, making it difficult to say where Jerusalem ends or begins. The one thing Jerusalemites can easily agree on is, that the old city is the heart of Jerusalem and that there are two separate economic centers in Jerusalem outside the old city, one for Palestinians (Salah Eddin Street in the East) and one for Israelis (Jaffa Street in the West) (I25, l. 78-93).

"I don't find myself pondering the actual boundaries of the municipality and the actual lines of control, who belongs where and what belongs to whom. To me Jerusalem is a concept. I honestly don't know, and I don't care that much. [...] To me it's as flexible as can be. The old city is the only strongly physical Jerusalem." (I1, l 51-79)

3.1.2 The Old City and the Holy Sites

"In the past the life of Jerusalem was in the old city. [...] When we are speaking about Jerusalem, we speak about the holy places here." (I20, l. 30-32)

Also, in the case of the old city maps are contested. However, the following map represents the historical layout, which is roughly supported by the current demographics in the inner city.




Figure 5: Map of the old city and Holy sites, Encyclopaedia Britannica

There are four sectors inside the old city: The Muslim Quarter, which is the biggest, the Christian Quarter, the Armenian and the Jewish Quarter. In total the area accounts for less than one square kilometer. Densely packed inside are multiple major holy sites of all three monotheistic religions.

Crucial for the understanding of the sensitivity of the situation inside the city walls is the fact, that they are all extremely close in proximity, with the Al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock being located directly on top of the temple mount, the remains of the Jewish temple. Making the Western Wall part of the structure and a separation virtually impossible. This circumstance fuels the feeling of ‘either theirs or ours’.

Even though Jewish religious law prohibits Jews from entering the area of the destroyed temple or rebuild it until the messiah has arrived, many Palestinians, and Muslims in the

whole region, are afraid Israel is trying to destroy the Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. This fear is fueled by Jewish extremist religious fringe groups that do actually aim to rebuild the temple as well as Israeli archeological excavations around the area, mainly the Western Wall tunnel. (I26, l. 329-331; I27, l. 88-93; I30, l. 82-94).

The Church of the Holy Sepulcher is the main Christian holy site inside the old city. It is shared by a number of Christian denominations, a system not always without conflict. Generally, the administrative control and organization of the holy sites lies in the hands of each religious community in the city, e.g. the Waqf in the case of the Muslims and the Chief Rabbinate in case of the Jews (I16; I12, l. 547-562; I4, l. 357-366; I1, l. 856-860).

3.1.3 Demographics

“There’s a lot of the struggle /pause/ of what the demographics of Jerusalem will be and who gives the tone of what Jerusalem will look like.” (I5, l. 276-277)

Possibly the most sensitive aspect of Jerusalem is demographics. Each group in Jerusalem wants to establish ‘facts on the ground’ through demographic majorities, because the boundaries are very much contested. It creates a situation where Jerusalem is perceived to belong to those who physically live there (I5 l. 284-623; I17, l. 84-90).

The actual numbers vary to a significant degree depending on who is providing the information, making them rather unreliable. However, it seems that the biggest group are Israeli Jews living in Jerusalem now, with few Palestinian Christians and a growing number of Palestinian Muslims. The birth rates of Palestinians are said to be much higher than those of Israelis. On the Israeli side the Haredim are having similar higher birth rates, leaving secular, liberal or moderate Jews as a decreasing minority (I8, l. 232-251; I23, l. 301-308; I5, l. 274-279).

Additionally, there is migration into and out of the city. Israelis have the ability to move to and from Jerusalem freely, despite a very high level of living costs. Overall, there has been negative Israeli migration especially for secular or liberal Jews towards the city of Tel-Aviv since many years (I1, l. 325-332; I8, l. 543-550).

Palestinians also claim that many are leaving the city as it is too hard to live there. There are increasing issues with space and housing, infrastructure and education etc. in East Jerusalem. However, once Palestinian Jerusalemites leave the municipality they leave behind their status

as a resident and the right to return to the city after a while. In turn, it is very hard to bring a spouse or family member into the municipality. All in all, the absolute number of Palestinians in East Jerusalem is still steadily increasing – projected to reach 50% before the middle of the century (I10, l. 280-323; I13, l. 179-185; I20, l. 132-136; I23, l. 304-308, I 28, l. 53-58).

“You are [...] challenged every day in your existence [...]. I have to proof all the time that I am living in Jerusalem. My wife became an expert in archiving the papers. Who is collecting electricity bills for ten or fifteen years...my wife. You cannot imagine, we have three or four closets of papers all classified and filed, because she is afraid that one day, they will ask her, where were you in the last seven years?” (I29, l. 399-405)

3.1.4 Settlements inside Jerusalem

“They are building unethically settlements which are illegal under international law. They are /deep breath/ really demolishing the peace project here. Every day today.” (I24, l. 98-100)

Settlements are a complex and difficult aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, settlements and settlers (Israelis living east of the internationally recognized green line) differ from each other greatly depending on their location and motivation. Settlements in Jerusalem can be roughly assigned into one of two categories, either religious/nationalistic, or economic/oblivious.

Especially in the old city, settlers most of the time are from the category religious/nationalistic. Their aim is to physically reclaim Palestinian parts of the old city by buying property there. They are often quite radical, or even violent, as living there is not just limiting and uncomfortable but actually dangerous (I33, l. 100-106).

The motives of settlers in neighborhoods outside of the old city, such as Ramot or Gilo, however, are often mainly economical. Jerusalem has a very high cost of living and comparatively very low wages. Living east of the green line cuts living costs significantly and is the only way to afford staying in Jerusalem for many people. In the majority of cases, either individuals do not know that they are living in a neighborhood that is viewed by the international community and Palestinians as a settlement or they do not care, as most Israelis believe the entire city of Jerusalem to rightfully be a part of Israel, since the annexation in 1967. They would not at all categorize themselves as settlers (I9, l. 155-166; I24, l. 140-351).

“I never knew for example, growing up that I am a settler, so to speak. But in the eyes of the international community my neighbourhood, most of it, is beyond the green line, so ... in the eyes of the world, that's a settlement. But for me, I was just a Jerusalemite.” (I9, l. 159-161)

3.1.5 Language

“When you walk into the ultra-orthodox area or East Jerusalem you feel separated from the world. It's a different language on the billboards, the street names, how people look, the type of shops they have. Anything from the wideness of the street to the type of buildings and how clean the streets are. It feels like you are in three different countries.” (I1, l. 301-305)

There is no shared language in Jerusalem. Arabic and Hebrew are official languages. This means, that in many cases inhabitants are unable to communicate and understand each other. Many Palestinians speak Hebrew, as they are dependent on work in West Jerusalem, but few Israelis speak Arabic. English, however, is very common because the economy heavily relies on tourism. English is the second language in School – before both Hebrew and Arabic. Additionally, Palestine was a former British colony, with English as an important part of the system (I29, l. 253-267; I1, l. 301-307).

Furthermore, each language has its respective alphabet, consolidating the physical separation between the different Jerusalems on signs and in the public sphere (I1, l. 301-307; I9, l. 308-337; I11, l. 542-550).

3.1.6 Calendar, week and holidays

“The first week of June for us is a very sad memory, because we remember the 1967 war. For them ironically, it's the conquest of the other part of Palestine and the other part of Jerusalem, so when they celebrate the independence of Israel we are also commemorating the Nahkbah.” (I19, l. 166-169)

There is a manifest difference in the day to day in Jerusalem. Technically, Israelis have a different calendar than Palestinians and a different date for a new year. The Jewish week counts Sundays as the first day of the week, making Shabbat (Saturday) the off work day, whereas Muslims celebrate Fridays and Christians Sundays as the end of the week – all these social structures differ greatly from each other while existing at the same time in parallel to

each other in the same few square kilometers. It means that the social spheres are disconnected from each other not just, but also, through time and dates (I10; l. 52-372).

Needless to say, that the immense number of holidays – often coinciding with a steep increase of pilgrims – are also only applicable for one religious' group, namely only those who are part of it. There is no joint celebration – even worse – the secular holidays in Israel, like the Independence Day or the Jerusalem day, are the Nakbah (the catastrophe) for Palestinians. This practice reignites hatred and tension each year, especially as celebrations lead through the Palestinian part of the old city (I32, l. 20-33; I7, l. 454-455).

3.1.7 Parallel systems

“You barely see them look each other in the eye. For some reason some of us just feel like the other does not exist. This, the denial of the existence of the other, is very weird, especially in Jerusalem. It gives some sense of stability. It gives some sense of peace under camouflage. It's not real peace, but at least people exist together, shoulder by shoulder. People walk the streets of old Jerusalem, hitting their shoulders, a man or a woman, Israeli or Palestinian, Jewish, Muslim or Christian without getting into a fight. And this is weird” (I28, l. 81-87)

The School systems of the different groups in Jerusalem are unrelated, so is the educational content. Even though the annexation left the Israelis in control of the curriculum, there is little oversight (Palestinians insisting on the Jordanian curriculum that is also taught in the West Bank – demonstrating their belonging – it is an ongoing contention). Overall, school in Jerusalem is a place of segregation – orthodox, secular and private schools raise children in closed off systems, with a separate curriculum and in different languages (I11).

In a similar fashion there exist two parallel systems for most infrastructure. Public transportation is either Palestinian (going to Bethlehem, Hebron and Ramallah) or Israeli (to Tel-Aviv, Haifa or Beersheba), garbage disposal for example but especially religious and social life are for the most part separate, parallel structures (I11;128).

3.1.8 Rights and status

“After the War of 67 Israel occupied [the West Bank and the Gaza Strip]. The only place that Israel joint is Jerusalem. But they didn't give the people of Jerusalem citizenship. They gave them just IDs, they became residents. They keep the Jordanian passport [...]. In Jerusalem they are residents and not citizens.” (I11, l. 92-363)

A very big issue in Jerusalem is legal status. Different to Israeli Palestinians, living in Israel since the foundation of the country 1948, Palestinians living in East Jerusalem do not have an Israeli Passport. In the process of annexing Jerusalem in 1967, the space was annexed by Israel - not so the people. This leaves a very challenging situation, where most of them still own a Jordanian passport, like Palestinians living in the West Bank. They are permanent residents in Jerusalem, not citizens. This means they have access to health care and social services, and can participate in the local elections but they can't vote in national elections and their status can be revoked (e.g. if they fail to provide prove that Jerusalem is their 'center of life'). This insecure status causes much friction and frustration and the feeling of being second-class citizens in their own city (I9, l. 746-749; I13, I17, I28, I20).

"That is hard for us to see, honestly [...] it is not acceptable for any person on the earth, that people come from NewYork and they have more rights than us. That is like too crazy." (I17, l. 265-267)

3.1.9 Culture

"Two countries, two cultures living in the same land." (I24, l. 163-164)

There is a common joke, saying that an Israeli and a Palestinian would get along great on a deserted island. This implies, that culturally the people of Jerusalem are closer than one, or even they themselves, would think. Habitus, self-image and food culture are very similar, partly because they share the same environment, partly because they share a history and their religion and language have common roots.

The collective feeling of victimhood is an important part of social identity, both people have struggled for a long time to build their own nation. And both form a complex multi-layered society between religion, conflict and tradition.

"It's not easy to find a place with a lot of traditions, very deep traditions like Jerusalem. In this corner you have a Syrian group, they have their own vision of the city and its history, then you have some Ethiopians who have their own story, the Moroccans there who have a different story and some relationship to the city, you have Kurds. We have so many cultures, ethnical groups, religious groups who managed to live beside each other. Not very romantic, not always without problems, but they survived for centuries living close to each other. And in spite of their own independent character." (I29, l. 57-66)

3.1.10 Diaspora and 3rd parties

This work focuses on the Leitbilder of Jerusalemites. However, Jerusalem is of great concern to many who are not living in Jerusalem, nor in Israel or the Palestinian territories. To understand the dynamics inside the city, it is important to have a rough idea on who has stakes or influence in the city, ranging from the diaspora, to other nations, the U.N and the international press.

3.1.10.1 Palestinian diaspora

„We will gather our people from all over the world. [Those] who left 1948, 1967. They will come back here. Everyone will give them a decent place to live. Not camps. You know, human beings. And I think they deserve... they are not dogs... today the dogs live better than 95% of our refugees in the camps. They live in the desert, they live under the rain and under the sun.“ (I7, l. 620-626)

The Palestinian diaspora is spread over the world, in the US, the EU but especially in the neighboring countries like Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and especially Jordan. Most Palestinians in the Palestinian territories own a passport from one of these countries. The Palestinians living in these countries live in refugee camps until today – decades after having fled. This is often discussed as a hurdle for the peace process, as the right of return is a central issue. Israel claims they are not integrated into the other countries' societies on purpose, being treated as a human bargaining chip in the negotiations of the conflict. What is clear is that generations grown up in refugee camps without work and perspective are a catastrophe with delayed effects on the whole region (I30; I19; I9).

Specific exact numbers are often impossible to estimate as status and situation vary greatly. However, UNWRA's statistic (2016) speaks of 2.206,736 official Palestinian refugees alone in Jordan and 470.000 in Lebanon, plus 29.000 that fled from Syria into Lebanon (2019). Every one of the estimated 13 Million Palestinians, diaspora or not, relates to Jerusalem and the image of the golden roof of the Dome of Rocks as a place of home. Their respective governments derive policy from this importance and these ethnic ties are important in trade, commerce as well as financing the Palestinian territories (I30; I17).

3.1.10.2 Jewish diaspora

„One of the big issues about Israel is that a lot of influence on what happens in Israel comes from Jews outside of Israel.” (I5, l. 529-530)

Similarly, the Jewish diaspora is located all over the world, they as well use influence onto politics and act as a source of finance, in almost all instances – building schools, hospitals, infrastructure, financing culture, science, NGOs or even the settlements.

The right of return is an Israeli law, based on the Nürnberger race laws persecuting Jews and people with Jewish ancestry. Today, any such person is eligible to apply for Israeli citizenship as the state of Israel was created to provide a safe place for the Jewish people.

This, however, also leads to a dangerous interfusion of Jews and Israelis. Even though there can be close relations, these two terms are not necessarily synonymous. American or European Jews are in most cases not Israeli, they are American or European citizens while at the same time, not all Israelis are Jewish (but Palestinian, Bedouin, Druze etc.).

3.1.10.3 The US, Europe, Russia and the Arab World

“The change will not come from within us. We will not change our ways willingly. [...] A political process will be coerced on us by the international community and we will walk into it grudgingly, but we will walk into it. And we will complete it eventually.” (I32, l. 157-163)

Historically, other nations have played a central role in the development of Jerusalem. From the Romans to the crusaders, the Ottomans and the British – many have colonized and conquered Jerusalem. Today, America especially plays a key role in the peace process and the assurance of Israeli independence. Europe – largely due to British as well as German past – has invested interest in the development of the region and the peace process, and is an important source of finance. Since the failure of the Oslo accords, Palestinians have been increasingly doubting the EU and even more so the American involvement. This in turn increased the importance and influence of Russia in the region.

At the same time, the Arab countries play a key role. Especially Iran and Saudi Arabia exert influence in the Palestinian territories (Shiite-Sunni conflict) – up to the point of influencing culture and religious practice according to their image.

The UN is one of the biggest foreign players in Jerusalem. There are multiple UN institutions located in Jerusalem and its surrounding, e.g. the UNTSO, UNESCO and UNWRA. UNTSO alone provides over 400 jobs and spends contributions from a multitude of countries¹ in local projects and activities (UNTSO, 2016).

3.1.10.4 International press and social media

„Everything that happens, people take the telephone, film it and show it all over the world.“ (I31, l. 321-322)

Finally, the role of the international press should be considered. Jerusalem is a rather small city, however, according to a source in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are more foreign journalists registered in Jerusalem, than in the whole of Africa (MFA, 2016). This is only partially due to the conflict and the global interest in Jerusalem. There is also a high number of journalists covering the Arab world from Jerusalem, as it is a relatively safe and comfortable place to operate in. However, this high density of international press also leads to a relative overrepresentation compared to other global issues and a heightened prism of conflict and violence – as this is what media mostly focuses on. This, however, reflects back on the diaspora, Israelis, Palestinians and Jerusalemites.

Most of the time, people don't witness stories firsthand but through the filter of media. As the media plays a crucial role in the (international) perception it is a very important part of the conflict. Narrations are created and reinforced based on these stories, waging a constant war of imagery and words between the parties. Today, maybe even more than ever before. Campaigns and phrasing are tools that get mingled in with reality, especially in the time of social media – making it hard to uncover what is truth and what is strategy.

¹ Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, India, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and United States

3.2 The metaphysical Jerusalem

“The problem with Jerusalem is the symbolism. It is not the reality, right? And the symbolism that Jerusalem seems to suffer from, as a city, is because it seems to bypass people. The religious symbolism, the political symbolism, bypasses the needs of the people who live here and minimize their importance.” (122, l. 243-246)

The issue of the perception of Jerusalem in the media already passes into the realm of the metaphysical Jerusalem. Perception is key. Perception is power. This is especially true when talking about a city that is not just stones and walls but a symbol.

Jerusalem as a symbol as well as its meaning to the different groups will be discussed in the following paragraphs, drawing mainly but not exclusively on the insights given by the interviewees.

3.2.1 The name

The name is already a topic of contention. In English, it is called Jerusalem and in Hebrew Yerushaláyim (יְרוּשָׁלַיִם), however, in Arabic it is called Al-Quds (الْقُدْسُ). The image before the mental eye differs depending on the name that is given to this place and the situation the speaker is in. Calling the city Al-Quds or Yerushaláyim is a political act of asserting a way of intellectual claim over the city.

Other, phrases that are of social importance is East and West Jerusalem. Even though this technically does not mean a hard separation between the two different areas of Jerusalem, it is often associated with it. While there is something like East and West Jerusalem today, its unclear properties and demarcations makes it a concept highly dependent on the speakers' views and ideas.

The term reunified city or united Jerusalem on the other side, claim an ideal state historically achieved in 1967 with the annexation of East Jerusalem and the old city. However, it does not exist in the city today unchallenged. The idea of a united Jerusalem can serve as a term of hope for some Israelis representing a gain. Palestinians, however, collectively deny this term as it corresponds with a loss.

3.2.2 Religion

Life is dominated to a high degree by religion in Jerusalem. The economy, private and social life but also politics are heavily influenced by religious practices, the holy sites and the conflicts each denomination has with the others.

There is a situation of ignorance to maintain the sensitive equilibrium, where Jews pass through the Muslim Quarter on their way to pray at the Western Wall ignoring and in return being ignored by their neighbors. This habit of active negation is a mechanism to deal with the impossible situation, the contradictions and inconsistencies created by the reality of life in the city and the ideals, beliefs and convictions surrounding her – however this façade regularly cracks revealing the mental incoherency of right and wrong in this conflict.

“Sometimes revolting is the only thing left for this kind of people. We have seen last year similar incidents where a man leaves his beautiful wife and three children looking at the TV seeing the Israeli settlers getting into the Al-Aqsa mosque every day and doing whatever they shouldn't be doing inside. He revolted, he took his car and he ran over two or three people who were standing waiting for the bus. So, this is the reaction that people sometimes feel, that they have no other option. Their religious feelings, their human feelings took them to this extent, which is very ugly. But at the end, if you really look at it in depth, sometimes you do not understand did he really have another option or not. Sometimes we see that this is the love for his religious faith and the holy place and his religion. But sometimes you cannot really understand these things to some extent, and many things happen without understanding them.” (I28, l. 145-159)

3.2.3 Layers of Meaning

“The way we see the city is a symbol. The way we put our energy and our money to upholding this symbol affects everything in life in a normal city. We have this abomination every year on Jerusalem day, the flag procession through the Muslim quarter, it effects the everyday life. [...] The sense of shame and hatred.” (I32, l. 454-458)

Deep-rooted dichotomies are apparent for both entities fighting over the moral ownership of Jerusalem.

For Jews Jerusalem was an idealized and for the most part imagined place while they were persecuted and expelled all around the world for centuries. It was a safe place full of dreams

that would come to life once they would resettle and reclaim it. Each evening and morning prayers call upon Jerusalem as the place where all sorrow ends for the Jewish people. And even Jews who are not religious at all, find an importance in Jerusalem that is existential. Existential to the people and to the nation – a place they could finally return to. This sentiment makes compromise seem unfeasible even for the more moderate part of society. Additionally, the current status quo, leaves Israel firmly holding the control over the whole city – giving little incentive of taking risks for a different (better) future.

However, many Israelis also detest Jerusalem while prescribing to her great meaning and value. They associate, to some degree rightfully so, poverty, bad services, chaos, violence and an increase of religious and orthodox control with the city. For years it has seen an exodus of secular Jews, with many choosing to commute to work every day from outside the city. Furthermore, most Israelis do not feel comfortable entering the old city anymore and few Israelis have ever been to East Jerusalem or the Palestinian neighborhoods, except maybe as a soldier, due to a prevalent feeling of insecurity in the Arab dominated areas (I14, l. 621-627).

For the Palestinians, on the other hand, Jerusalem is the center of political and social life. The core of their still to be achieved nation – with a picture of the golden roof of the Dome of the Rock hanging in each household. It is the promise of their own nation after centuries of heteronomous control. But most of all it is home, where their ancestors have lived, their grandparents have died, and their children are expected to build a future.

However, many choose to leave Jerusalem. Especially many of the young Palestinians leave for other countries or the West Bank, in search for a better life. Jerusalem offers little in terms of an economic, educational or professional perspective to them. The overbearing conflict makes dissent inside the social fabric almost impossible. Living in a reality of tension and hatred, where everything needs to be contested, is exhausting. The constant fear, the everyday fight, frustration and the treatment as second-class citizens are eroding the community – giving way for crime, violence, drugs and religious radicalization. Making the reality of life in Jerusalem not the most desirable or pleasant experience altogether (I17, I29).

3.2.4 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Due to the limitations and the focus of this work, there will be a fairly succinct depiction of historic events and core issues. For the purpose of showing how deep the conflict lies and its protracted nature a brief summary and contextualization, however, is necessary. It is by no means intended to be a complete and exhaustive depiction of past or current events, but will hopefully, with adequate references, provide an initial step towards a basic idea of the historic situation and the different perspectives involved.

3.2.4.1 A brief history

There is said to have been a rather peaceful co-existence between Jews, Christians and Muslims in Jerusalem before the ideology of nation states took root all over the world. With this new ideology, however, came the desire for Jews and Palestinians alike to create their own nation. Over the course of the Second World War Jews fled to the British colony 'Palestina' increasing their numbers and igniting a conflict on the question of to whom this land belongs to (I29, I31).

After the horrors of the second world war the UN awarded the Jews their own country in the area of the former British colony. They proposed a partition plan, assigning certain areas to be the newly found Palestine and the newly found Israel. The Palestinians and the Arab world, however, rejected the plan seeking to expel the Jews by force, starting the first war in 1948. Against all expectations Israel won and declared itself a state, whereas Palestine broke into several parts controlled by Egypt, Jordan and Syria. This prompted years of war and conflict between Israel, Palestinians and the Arab world reinforcing the respective narratives and increasing the differences between the people. The events culminated in the first hopeful peace process in the form of the Oslo Peace accords, spearheaded by the Americans. After an intense period of negotiations, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed a promising step-by-step plan in 1993 aiming at an overall solution of the conflict (I14, I. 778-792, 19, I. 95-303).

This sparked a euphoric reaction on both sides, with both nations being convinced of getting everything they had been waiting for the last forty years of war and deprivation. However, these hopes were soon to clash with reality, leaving two deeply disappointed people and an utterly failed peace process.

“We were full of hope and something came out of Oslo to give us hope. But it was such a short term. In very, very little time we started seeing all the negative indicators for a depressed society and depressed people and it was very difficult to see that. [...] What was signed was not at all satisfactory for many Palestinians, and for justice.” (I19, l. 105-110)

The failure of the peace process, the unsolved and to the Palestinians unacceptable situation lead to the first and later the second intifada, waves of violence and the reignition of the conflict – which was more protracted than ever before.

The disappointed hope over the Oslo accords lingered on and cast a shadow over all following attempts to find an agreement or even get the parties together on a negotiation table. The peace process is respectively in a standstill to this day, prolonging an unsustainable situation and a deepening rift between the people.

3.2.4.2 Jerusalem’s role

“We can share Jerusalem, we can share historical Palestine, we can share what we can call Israel-Palestine. This is the key of the solution and the key of the conflict at the same time.” (I28, l. 58-62)

Much work was done on why the Oslo accords failed to such an extent, and most of it can be speculated on – however, a big issue was and is Jerusalem. As an intensified microcosm of the greater conflict Jerusalem signifies all its difficulties and stumbling blocks in a concentrated form. In the Oslo accords it was therefore put at the end of the agenda. This logic, however, turned out to be deeply flawed, as both parties never actually reached a final agreement for the city but broke apart over it. This makes Jerusalem the key factor of a future settlement that will have to be solved first, not last.

The rift between the people is also especially prominent in Jerusalem, as it is of central importance to both people. They live closely together in a shared but separated city – parallel but interrelated at the same time. They both want to claim it for themselves but can’t fully deny the other exists. They both have overreaching expectations for the city as a place of home, salvation and national self-realization that in reality cannot be met. A compromise is neither incentivized nor aspired.

At the same time the long and lasting period of conflict, suppression, violence, fear and terror has eroded the social fabric – between Jews, Muslims and Christians but also inside each social entity respectively.

3.2.4.3 Current situation

“I see the city grid locked.” (I32, l. 314)

Jerusalem is at a standstill. Or a rather quickly escalating standstill. The deadlock of the situation perpetuated the negative effects on the people and the city itself. The great resilience of its inhabitants acts as a buffer between reality and idealization, at the expense of the quality of life and the social cohesion and overall development. Much acute inner fraction disputes are postponed by the urgency of the conflict – a continuous state of emergency where neither individual freedom nor personal expression can persist above the collective threat.

This makes the current situation extremely difficult, but also underlines the urgency and inevitability of having to deal with it. But it also gives some hope for the future, as there is the minimal consensus that Jerusalem is the key. The key to peace, and the key to a better future with a crucial role to play – in any kind of future.

4. Methodology

Subsequently, there will be a contextualization of the methodological approach, the Leitbildanalysis, and its position and development in futures studies. The approach is then described in detail, with special attention given to the six analytical categories. From this ‘classical’ approach an adapted version of the Leitbildanalysis is derived to account for the unique context and challenges of the research subject. A justification of the choice of an extraordinarily long scope will conclude this chapter.

4.1 The Leitbildanalysis in futures studies

‘Again, and again we hear that guiding principles are attractive as principles, but do not fulfil their guiding functions.’ (Haan, 2002, p. 4) This realization was the background to the adoption of the Leitbildanalysis into futures studies by the research group ‘Umweltbildung’ (environmental education) at the Free University of Berlin. The challenge was, that they were facing manifested principles that lack tangibility.

As discussed under 2.2.2 Leitbilder are not necessarily manifest. They are often not articulated or reflected by the beholder but are impacting our actions and convictions. To uncover those hidden images, the research group of the ‘Institut Futur’ has developed the Leitbildanalysis. It aims to look past the often-artificial official images, bringing the Leitbilder into the open, realigning and reassessing the existing guiding principles with new images and concepts (Haan, 2002, p. 9; Haan, 2001).

The instrument can be categorized as a typology-forming method of qualitative research (Haan 2002, p. 70) that is especially suited for this research, as it is able to identify and reconstruct implicit Leitbilder in a strictly analytical manner – pulling into the open concepts and frameworks that formerly were hidden, and therefore inaccessible to the formal examination of social sciences (Giesel, 2007, pp. 116-118; Haan, 2001). The Leitbildanalysis is the best theoretically imbedded analytical tool with the strongest conceptual framework and a fully transparent approach for the purpose of examining underlying desires, motivations and believe systems about the future in a social entity – enabling a comparison and the systematic demonstration of discrepancies between them (Giesel, 2007). Furthermore, this

method showed a potential to analyze images of future in a wide range of contexts – even in a setting of protracted conflict and the political appropriation of the future, discussed in detail in paragraph 4.4 The adapted Leitbildanalysis.

4.2 The structure of the Leitbildanalysis

After conducting semi standardized qualitative interviews the data is analyzed using six distinct dimensions of guiding principles (Haan, 2002, p. 9; Giesel, Haan, & Rode, 2002): Desire- & Feasibility-projections, Coenaesthesia, Semantic Succession, Social Imagery, Perspective synchronization and Perspective desynchronization. These are the first-tier categories of the analysis and can be divided in three Groups: Emotions, Figures of Speech and Community/Differentiation. At the same time, they can be classified as either directed at the level of the individual or at the level of the social entity (Giesel, 2007, pp. 119-120).




Figure 6: The primary categories of a classic Leitbildanalysis

The distinction in focus between individual and social entity, however, does not imply that these are individual images in the sense of personal images of future; that they are not shared in the wider group but produced by the individual. This is not the case, as Leitbilder always have a social aspect. However, they are recited and assessed by the individual. These dimensions are the individual preconditions to form Leitbilder. they relate to how the individual presents and defends shared Leitbilder on an individual level (Haan et a. 1996, pp. 290-292; Birkel, 2002, p. 242).

4.3 The categories of the classic Leitbildanalyse

Desire and feasibility projections: This category focuses on the one hand on what is regarded as the best-case scenario, and on the other what is probable or feasible. This category is one of the most important ones for the analysis of guiding principles.

It deals with positive, forward directed notions shared between the members of a specific social group. At the same time these statements assign a certain degree of feasibility to a scenario. Both aspects combined represent common long-term goals in an ideal world – without getting detached from a realistic assessment.

Coenaesthesia: Truly action guiding Leitbilder are not just a concept that relates to the rational mind but to the emotions. This category looks at the way future representations resonate in the whole persona. The feelings that are triggered and the emotional weight in general are significant in uncovering Leitbilder, that people truly identify and engage with.

Semantic succession: This category examines the bigger picture one has of the world. It reveals the underlying orientation of an individual. The greater mental frame is examined by looking closely at the relation between pictorial language and arguments. If metaphors and rational concepts fall together it speaks to a high level of internalization of an image or concept.

Social imagery: This category of the Leitbildanalyse describes the narrations the community is built around. Metaphors, symbols, pictorial language and comparisons play an important role in creating prospective images.

Perspective synchronization: In this category shared perspectives, convictions and ideals are examined. Those statements that reinforce a sense of community or 'us', that the individual feels to be conceptually part of.

Perspective desynchronization: The last category, on the other hand, describes convictions and perspectives individuals fundamentally disagree with and they clearly distance themselves from.

4.4 The adapted Leitbildanalyse in conflict settings

When adopting the Leitbildanalyse into a conflict setting, it needs to provide additional aspects and customized categories. In the following these adjustments are presented in detail.




Figure 7: The adapted primary categories of a Leitbildanalyse in protracted conflict

As mentioned before, protracted conflict signifies a situation where different actors are perpetuated in a specific hostile and unrelaxed situation of conflict for an ongoing period of time. No disintegration of the status quo or even an improvement of specific aspects of the situation are in sight. This heavily corrupts the ability of the affected population to actively imagine futures (especially the feasibility of long-term dimensions but also their general desirability). With the ability of creating images of future or Leitbilder in the daily life decreasing, social functions of Leitbilder (like Orientation, Community Building, Motivation and Burden Relief function) are eroding. This emphasizes not only an unstructured, open approach as described in 5. The approach of the Leitbildanalyse, but the introduction of additional categories.

Feared but feasible projections: In addition to the positive side the negative side of a probable future needs to be included in the analysis in the setting of protracted conflict. The worst-case scenario, the most undesirable, plays a prominent role, as it often represents futures deemed likely or highly likely.

Feared and unfeasible: However, there are also negative or feared perspectives deemed unfeasible. Even though these are not highly relevant for the final analysis, this can be highly

informative in weeding out certain artificial scenarios or setting certain scenarios into relation between different groups, fearing different futures and finding different scenarios unfeasible.

Desired but unfeasible: The desired but unfeasible futures are also normally not part of the classical Leitbild analysis. However, in protracted conflict, these images can be very telling, as feasibility is often impacted and further limited by the conflict itself.

Desired and feasible: This is one of the most complex categories to navigate when it comes to the context of protracted conflict. In the setting of protracted conflict, the line between desirability and feasibility is often extremely blurred or subconsciously equated. This category helps to assess these tense interrelations and tries to draw a line between what is and what is not deemed feasible – but just wishful thinking.

Coenaesthesia: Especially in Jerusalem the future is a deeply emotional issue on an existential level. People are deeply emotionally invested to the depth of their identity, meaning and survival as a whole community. Therefore, this category is a fundamental one, often implicit but sometimes very explicit. The differentiation between positive and negative emotional resonance is sometimes difficult but adds to further a systematic examination.

Semantic succession: This is a very interesting category in the setting of protracted conflict, as the larger mental frame is the main motivator to derive the future from. This might be the category best suited to differentiate between the different kinds of future representations present in Jerusalem. However, it is also the most challenging category to pinpoint and attach to specific statements or affections.

Social imagery: Jerusalem is especially dense in social imagery, as the future is contested and claimed with words. Jerusalem naturally provides a plethora of allegories, symbols, metaphors, narrations of meaning - be it national, religious or political. This overload of symbolism gives a unique opportunity for dissecting through and categorizing them towards a long-term horizon.

'Us' construct: The original category of 'Perspective synchronization' was adapted, as the underlying factor was not mere shared ideas or concepts but along the conflict lines, ethnic

or national groups. This led to the description of the perception of ‘Us’ in the eyes of the interviewees.

‘Them’ construct: Similarly, the ‘Them’ construct describes the other; everything that is not part of we; the antagonist in the conflict. Both categories were not always clearly cut as to who counts as ‘we’ but clearly distinguishable, acting as virtual opposites on to each other. ‘Us’ and ‘them’ is an omnipresent and all-embracing concept in Jerusalem, as part of the zero-sum logic of protracted conflict.

Blind spots: Finally, the overall category of blind spots is added. This category aims to converge on all inconsistencies, illogic arguments and contradictions presented in each interview. It also captures all statements and sentiments towards, a concept of no future or an extremely volatile unpredictable future or a fundamental unwillingness to engage with it.

Through this multilayered process of the adapted Leitbild analysis several condensed statements for each category and each interview are derived. In a next step these phrases are systematically aggregated by a factor analyses making sure that each category is covered and can be put into relation to the others (Haan, 2002, p. 12). Afterwards six latent Leitbilder are articulated by precise, distinct and coherent statements.

Even though the aspect of coherency is an important part in this stage, it is ambiguous. The assumption of coherency and consistency does not necessarily directly reflect the reality of the situation in Jerusalem. The nature of human existence and especially the situation of ongoing conflict disrupts cohesion, consistency and often times even basic logic – increasing the importance of the perspective of Atopias² in the process of analyzing the different categories.

² The term Atopia relates closely to the terms Dytopia and Utopia. The two extremes tend to mirror each other: in one the world appears evil, in and of itself, capable of self-destruction as if uncontrolled and autonomous somehow; in the other there is a sense of mastery of the world by technology, the world itself appears good. Both are projections of human dreams which loom nightmarish or unfold paradisiacal. In contradistinction to the utopian or dystopian hyperboles, Atopias consider an unexaggerated, critical but often contradicting view of the world. Atopia is a realm of discourse characterized by a more nuanced, analytic attitude. It relates closer to social realities, even though it is not completely alien to fiction. “Atopian thought remains on the spectrum of utopian and dystopian thinking, although it is midway between the extremes.” (Barclay, 1990, pp. 107-110).

Therefore, inconsistency, can and should not be strictly avoided at all cost, as it is part of the actual and relevant perspectives on futures. Coherency, however, does apply to a certain degree, as the internal logic of the community, the individual and therefore the Leitbild is a necessity for being action guiding and relevant for serving as orientation, even though it might come short of the actual complexity of reality. As an abstract tool for the purpose of examining existing Leitbilder in Jerusalem, it is respectively adequate.

4.5 The scope

The time horizon of the study is 2060. This is a rather distant perspective, even in the context of futures studies. This extremely elongated horizon was chosen due to the innate nature of *protracted* conflicts. In ongoing situations of conflict, that have begun even before the lifetime of some interviewees, the pervasiveness of this reality is enormous. The past and the present consume the future and obstruct the view into alternatives. This prompted the decision to distance the interviewees even further from the present and their perception of 'how things are, things will always be'. The time space forward until 2060 was also roughly the same time space as backwards when Jerusalem was still divided, partly ruled by newly founded Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan – a very different situation compared to today and a corner stone in the modern history of Jerusalem. The excursion into this past was often actively reflected on before the interviewees as a trigger to open their mind and enable the idea of change.

Looking back, this decision was crucial not only to enable different and positive more distant images of future but to showcase the basic insecurity when it comes to the future. Taking 2060 as a time horizon itself sparked debate with the interviewees disclosing deeper convictions. Their often emotional reactions to a Jerusalem that actually exists in 2060 or a Jerusalem that will not survive the next 5 years was especially telling, uncovering many hidden assumptions.

It also enabled to dig deeper with interviewees unwilling to take any kind of future perspective, insisting on the fact that Jerusalem will always stay the way it is. This way over politicized answers and standpoints could be challenged and pried open to some degree.


5. The approach

This chapter describes the empirical approach of the study in detail. It will focus on how and in what context the data was collected and later processed. The data acquisition, examination and assessment were all done in the framework of the Leitbildanalyse, which is comprised of ten phases, presented in the very beginning.

Then, the sample will be discussed in depth, as this is the foundation for any analysis. In the following, the interview guideline is introduced, as well as the underlying thoughts and theoretical framework of the semi-structured qualitative approach of the interviews and the interview setting. Language was another important aspect of consideration for the process of data collection as well as for the analysis later on.

Finally, the iterative process of data examination in the framework of the Leitbildanalyse is presented. Here, the focus will be on the exploratory typology.

5.1 The process of the Leitbildanalysis



The ten phases of a Leitbildanalysis

Figure 8: The ten phases of a Leitbildanalysis (Haan, 2001, p. 96 - translated)

This figure illustrated the individual sequences of the Leitbildanalysis in a tangible manner. The analysis starts with the first step, the data collection and the setup of the interview guideline and ends with the comparison of the final six Leitbilder that were identified. The whole process is executed in regard to the analytical categories of the adapted approach of the Leitbildanalysis.

5.2 The sample

To identify the interviewees a stakeholder analysis was performed in order to ensure a sound selection of participants. The composition of the sample is the basis of all following results and the representation of the different socioeconomic, ethnic, religious and political groups that have a stake or influence in the future developments of Jerusalem is crucial (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997).

5.2.1 Sample size

The Sample Size represents a balance between available resources and the need of thorough investigation, ensuring a certain representation and scope. In the context of the doctoral thesis, a sample size of 30 interviewees seemed appropriate to the research question as well as the assurance of high-quality raw data and a sufficient versatility. During the iterative selection process the sample size increased slightly to a total number of 33 experts ranging over a wide field of one or more expertise, such as politics, journalism, education, art, culture, religion, science, economy and conflict/peace or socially relevant activities.

5.2.2 Definition of experts

Due to the qualitative nature of the dataset and the limited sample size it was crucial to find an adequate strategy to select the sample. The interviewees were therefore consciously chosen following a precise set of predefined characteristics to qualify each one as specifically relevant and with a unique standpoint for the research question. This was done following the qualitative sampling strategy of maximum variation sampling. Following this strategy meant

purposefully picking a wide range of variation on dimension of individual traits (Patton, 1990, p. 172).

The most important and obvious criterium to serve as an expert was having a close and direct relationship to Jerusalem. This meant that experts needed to either have spent an extensive amount of time living the reality of the city and often having been born there, ensuring a deeply rooted personal relationship and a precise knowledge of its dynamics.

Another criterium was to act as an opinion leader. Catalyzed by their position, field of employment or role in society they needed to be in the position of being able to influence the social fabric around them – not only acting as a representation of a wider range of individuals with their opinions and standpoints but also being able to shape the views of the future of others with their own.

5.2.3 Selection criteria and composition

But not only the fact that the experts were from Jerusalem and held positions of influence were integral for the selection. An equally important aspect was representing different areas and backgrounds. The sample tried to reflect the intense diversity of the city and consider all relevant subgroups. Therefore, it includes leaders of all three religions, leaders of economic, scientific, cultural and political institutions, powerful individuals from traditional families and prominent journalists.

Furthermore, the sample set out to reflect a wide range of age, political convictions or affiliations, religious beliefs as well as roughly the same number of female and male interviewees.

Most important for the sample was an equal distribution between Israeli and Palestinian interviewees.

Striking was the fact that from all the potential interviewees less than a hand full declined the proposition of participating in the project. All of them showed high levels of interest and commitment as well as willingness to take personal time without any other incentive then to provide their perspective. This shows how deeply, and personally involved Jerusalemites seem to be in the topic of long-term perspectives for Jerusalem. The future, the conflict and their personal convictions are issues Jerusalemites are deeply invested in – this invested interest could be interpreted as an underrepresentation of a topic deemed highly relevant in the social reality of the city.

5.3 Data acquisition

5.3.1 Qualitative interviews

The primary set of data for the Leitbildanalysis are individual, personal, in-depth semi-structured, qualitative expert interviews from 09/2014 until 09/2015. This approach presented itself as suited best for the research question as it is of explorative nature and allows for the inquiry of a complex, heavily interrelated issue with a lot of information in the subtext. A quantitative approach would possibly be suitable as a further step of challenging the results of this thesis. For understanding the relation between Jerusalem and its future as well as the emotionally charged future representations of specific social groups, however, in depth interviews were required. The decision for individual rather than group-based interviews was made, in light of the highly emotional topic that very likely would have led to a standstill during a group discussion rather than a deeper exploration of the issues. The high level of latency and unconsciousness of long-term futures concerning Jerusalem made an individual approach with an individual timeline necessary. This way the interviewer could account for individual needs in the process of unveiling underlying concepts.

The interviews were scheduled as open ended, informal conversations with a timeline led by the interviewee, lasting for roughly one to two hours.

5.3.2 The setting

The interviews were always done in person and in the location of choice of the interviewee. It was communicated that it should be a place where the interviewee felt most comfortable or had a deep connection with. This started out as an exercise to make the interviewee more relaxed, open up to the difficult task of thinking ahead alongside a very distant time horizon; to enable an easier entrance into highly emotional topics (Friedrichs, 1990, p. 224; Lamnek, 2005, pp. 371-73). But after all, it turned out to be in almost each case a physical representation of their personal standpoints, a place of intense meaning and relevance for the interviewee in Jerusalem and often a symbol for their perspective of the future Jerusalem. The location of choice was extremely important for the interview and gave the content more context. Consciously or subconsciously, the place made the introduction to the topic and the issues discussed part of the interviewee's reality in the multifaceted city of Jerusalem.

Analyzing the locations afterwards helped understand where the individuals were coming from and helped the interviewee in transitioning into the world 40 years ahead. It gave each interview a unique setting in which the interviewees could feel free and talk directly from their heart.

5.3.3 Language

Due to the sensitive, emotional and complex content of the issue, language and the verbal expressions interviewees choose to describe their perspectives and reasoning are crucial. Therefore, providing a setting where the interviewees would be able to express themselves in their native tongue would have been ideal. However, there were also arguments against this, what consequently led to English as the selected language of choice.

Firstly, there was practical concern of having the same interview guideline for all interviewees. Furthermore, conducting an interview, especially an interview directed towards a very long-term future, requires some experience and practice. As Hebrew and Arabic were not possible as languages during the interview without an intermittent translator present the benefits compared to potential misunderstandings and missed nuances seemed limited. The risk of details lost in the chain of translation and the prolonged time in a theoretically limited focused attention span didn't seem reasonable under these circumstances.

Additionally, in depth interviewees, expressions of emotions as well as subtle between-the-line implications resonate clearly only in the language they are delivered in – less so in translations. Choosing to conduct the interviews in English right away took away some comfort from the interviews but circumvented the shortcomings of a translation. A comparison and the dealing with raw data not in the original tone would not have provided the desired results.

Finally, even though English is not the mother tongue of most interviewees, all of them, and most of all potential candidates, exhibit a surprising and proficient level of English. Elderly interviewees in their 70ies as well as people from different economic and educational backgrounds displayed this proficiency as well due to the fact, that all of them use English almost on a daily basis (presence of international institutions, contact with tourists, academia and business, churches etc.). Jerusalem always has been a very international place, and its former colonial power was England. All these aspects combined led to the conviction that English is an appropriate choice and from the standpoint of comparability desired, language

to conduct the interviews in. In practice, this assumption proved to be correct as there was just a single interviewee turning down an interview due to language skills.

5.4 Acquisition tool

5.4.1 Interview guideline

The interview guideline was designed under the premises of the Leitbildanalysis and acted as a mental frame for the interviewer. It was designed under the consensus of qualitative social Sciences as well as the experiences already made with the Leitbildanalysis in other settings (Haan, 2001; Giesel, 2007).

After deliberation with the doctoral thesis adviser, the questionnaire was refined and subjected to a testing phase of three interviews. With additional insights the questionnaire was edited and expanded in a few places. During the following interviews the guideline was further edited, however only small changes were necessary. In the end, current events (knife intifada 2015) made the interviews more challenging while trying to stay focused on long-term perspective. The ongoing and acute impacts on the day to day life and an understandable need to incorporate the events into the interview from the perspective of the interviewees made the detachment from the gridlock of the presence increasingly challenging.

The structure of the interview guideline was as following:

Icebreaker

Personal/emotional connection

Defining Jerusalem

Main challenges/opportunities (STEEP)

* Thought experiment of long-term past to better access long-term futures. *

Main challenges/ opportunities 2060 (STEEP)

Personal assessment on established long-term concepts

Narrative, emblematic approach to Jerusalem 2060

Unrestricted desired vision of Jerusalem 2060/ assessment plausibility

Time machine to Jerusalem 2060/ most likely scenario 2060

Metaphor Jerusalem 2060

Open question

The full guideline is attached in Appendix I.

The interviewees agreed beforehand to be recorded. The agreement to be recorded was reaffirmed just before each interview and is the first part of the audio files. For the assurance of a free mindset and an open sharing of possibly sensitive opinions in this highly politicized context, the careful handling and protection of data was ensured for each interviewee above all. Therefore, the anonymization of data was already ensured in the transcription process.

5.4.2 Concept and style of the interviews

The style of the interview was that of a friendly conversation with minimal notes. The questions should enable the interviewee to talk as openly as possible straight from their heart. As the topic of a future Jerusalem is closely related to the conflict, it was necessary to be very sensitive to the different individuals and standpoints. The primary active guidance of the interviewee was to steer the conversation in the direction of the future and long-term perspectives, which often posed a real challenge. Otherwise, the interviewer acted as an enabler of conversation trying to keep the interviewee talking, reflecting on the layers behind a string of arguments, reasoning or introducing a new topic after another had been exhausted.

5.5 Data processing

Due to the very emotional, and for every interview personal, issue of Jerusalem 2060, there were additional notes made during each interview. They contained the setting, the mood, interruptions, emotional reactions, physical displays of frustration or resignation etc. interviewees displayed during the interview. These notes were transferred into the coding matrix in the form of memos.

There was a short questioner at the end of each interview handed to the participants to either fill out right away or send back a few days later, containing self-descriptions of age, political affiliation and ethnical and religious standpoints. This information was relevant to understanding the interviewees on a deeper level and putting their statements into a wider context.

The transcription itself was oriented at the extended transcription system of Dresing and Pehl (2011), focusing not just on what was said, but also how it was said. The transcripts were then filtered several times for relevant paragraphs and coded with the qualitative analysis tool MaxQDA. In a partially deductive and partially inductive process, the first tier Leitbild categories were applied to the data, supplemented with unique categories that emerged directly from the data. These new categories were later adopted to the adapted Leitbild approach for the context of protracted conflict. This iterative process was framed as a qualitative content analysis. In the first and second wave each interview was viewed separately, one after the other. In the third wave each category was applied to the full body of data, one after the other to additionally derive exhaustive sub-coding for each category.

In the third phase of the Leitbildanalysis, the coded segments were isolated and framed together. They were interpreted and organized with relation to each other to create the second tier Leitbild categories that are closely related to the specific content layer of the data. This was an interpretative step with a qualitative, and a for the research question individual nature. These categories were then fully developed through another wave of analysis of the whole of the coded elements and a deeper understanding of each aspect in phase four of the analysis. All elements were then grouped and categorized extensively in the sub-categories. Most codings were distinctly categorized, however, some items were also coded into multiple categories. This, however, was kept to a necessary minimum to truly view certain items as a representation of one clear aspect of the overall picture (Haan, 2001, pp. 97-98). All analytical steps were done with MaxQDA. A coding-plan is attached for review for the purpose of traceability and the ability to recreate in the appendices III and IV.

This led to the next step of the analysis. In phase five of the Leitbildanalysis, 3rd- and 4th-tier categories were generated. These are phrases from the data that illustrate the categories. This enriches the second-tier categories with so called 'coding-trees' to allow a detailed and accurate narration of the final versions of the Leitbilder in a later stage and formalizing the process of description or depiction of certain futures (Haan, 2001, pp. 97-99).

5.6 Data analysis

The analysis part of the Leitbildanalysis begins in phase six, the classification of the previously identified categories and the creation of Leitbild modules. From this point on the systematic dissection of data reverts into a systematic reaggregation of data, to evolve and organize them in a coherent way and find the underlying patterns shared throughout the interviews.

These modules later act in phase seven as the basis to revert to the second-tier categories and be assigned back to the interviewees. In this step, a factor analysis provides the support to systematically group them effectively (Haan, 2001, pp. 97-99).

In phase eight a matrix is derived from the factor analysis, the different dimensions of the Leitbild modules, the underlying categories as well as context protocols, giving way to the deduction of the final versions of coherent, clearly defined and unique Leitbilder. These are then narrated based on their specific context and data in phase nine (Haan, 2001, pp. 97-99). In the final step these Leitbilder are compared, put into a relation with each other (especially alongside conflict lines), and realigned with the research design and the theoretical background as well as the hypothesis to enable the status-quo description of current, persistent Leitbilder (Haan, 2001, pp. 97-99).

While the process of the Leitbildanalysis is heavily structured, the categories are generated based on the content and the subject of research. This means, based on the interpretation of the analyst. The emphasis lies on the ability to understand and be sensitive to the scientific exploration of the individual issue. The development of the ability to relate and penetrate the issue from different angles and personal standpoints to truly uncover that which is hidden in the subtext, was very helpful during this phase. In addition, a sensibility to nuance and interrelated strings of meaning and logic seemed relevant as well as a filtering perspective in a way to finally produce a condensed set of Leitbilder (Giesel, 2001, pp. 235-236). This process, which retrieved six Leitbilder for Jerusalem 2060, is depicted, compared in detail and set into perspective in 7. Discussion.

5.7 Reflexivity

As was prominently mentioned in the introduction, the reflexivity of the researcher is particularly important in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Jerusalem as a city with global stakes.

The contested nature of Jerusalem, heavily loaded with meaning on an existential level for entire social entities as well as a long history of being exposed to open and violent conflict, is just the most basic aspect of why any findings will be received with the utmost skepticism and scrutiny by all actors.

Having lived in Jerusalem for almost three years I have made personal bonds with many inhabitants, taken part in many cultural and religious ceremonies and been torn between the political narratives of both sides. In the beginning, I was sure, that one could stay objective – but soon found out that especially as a foreigner you will unconsciously have to choose – depending on who surrounds you every day.

In this context plain truth does not exist and is not freely accessible for us as individuals. Combating this personal bias, I had to be transparent with my own beliefs and my agenda – always questioning my motives and convictions. I believe in peace. I believe that the differences, the painful past and the violence can be overcome in acting towards the future. I believe – in this specific case – the only way out of the acute situation, that is detriment for any side, is the focus on what lies ahead, and what can be done to shape the future into a desired one for all. In this future, I believe, there is space for both nations. And I believe that if politicians don't actively search for a way to support the people in following a path towards a future for all, Jerusalem will not thrive – nor will its inhabitants.

This belief was part of my strategy to reconcile the different standpoints on the past and the present. Looking at the long-term it suits no one to deny responsibility and blame the other party. Looking at the Jerusalem of our children and grandchildren it only matters what happens from now on forward.

Warding against biased analysis primarily meant being open and forthcoming with my methodology and relying heavily on the framework of the Leitbildanalyse as well as exerting as little influence over the interviewees as possible during data acquisition. During the data analysis I systematically refrained from unreflected and premature judgement by questioning my deductions, ensuring a high level of transparency in each analytical step and the possibility of intersubjective confirmability.

6. Empiric results

This chapter will describe the empiric results drawn directly from the interviews in the process of the adapted Leitbildanalysis. Each of the ten categories (Desired-feasible, Desired-unfeasible, Undesired-feasible and Undesired-unfeasible, Coenaesthesia, Semantic Succession, Social Imagery, Synchronization, Desynchronization and Blind spots) will be discussed in detail for all interviewees. Based on these modules a factor analysis will facilitate the congregation of patterns and the articulation of distinct Leitbilder. At the end, a comparison and a differentiation between Israeli and Palestinian perspectives will occur.

The decision to structure the results in a non-binary way between Israelis and Palestinians was made during and after analysis. The author originally intended to structure the results as first and foremost Israeli and Palestinian as there were expected to be steep differences. During the process, however, it became clear, that there are important overlaps and similarities that go beyond a second-tier comparison. Furthermore, a concurrent analysis increases the understanding of the content as equally important by all recipients. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as future images of Jerusalem are hyper politicized. Therefore, it seemed greatly beneficial to not openly label the statements of the interviewees in the initial analysis. This could potentially help to transcend these categories to a certain degree.

There are always both Palestinian and Israeli examples present, except if clearly stated differently. The direct quotes are sometimes slightly adapted for better readability, however, not altered in their intent, content or wording.

6.1 Leitbild modules

After multiple circles of analysis and a reiterative process of condensing complexity, 60 unique and diverse Leitbild modules were formed based on the 3rd and 4th tier categories. They will be described and discussed in detail in the following and will serve as the basis for the Leitbilder afterwards.

Feared /feasible	Feared /unfeasible	Desired /unfeasible	Desired /feasible	Coenaest heis	Semantic succession	Social imagery	'Us' construct	'Them' construct	Blind spots
Violent escalation	Continuation of status quo	Two states	Absolute victory	Hope	Ownership	Existential core	Smart, creative	Weak, careless, Incapable	Unpredictability
Economic time bomb	Violent eclipse	Peace	Cathartic destruction	Hopelessness	Blame	Bright and holy	Vigilant, strong, enduring	Untrustworthy	Past over future
Social erosion	One-sided dominion	Genuine coexistence	Creative-Spiritual-Techno Utopia	Hatred	Incapable leadership	Natural and normal	Reasonable, responsible, compromising	Illegitimate, undeserving	Contradictions, dichotomies
Forced expulsion		Fantasia	Stiff compromise	Love	International community	Destructive darkness	Tolerant, open, peaceful	Uncompromising and in denial	Denial, delusion
Collective apathy		Return to the past	Parallel capitals	Home	We have to find a way	Purgatory, monsters and corruption	Victimhood	Dangerous, violent, fanatic, evil	Wishful thinking
Ethnic ghettos			Pluralistic coexistence	Horror	What really matters	Volatility		Positive traits	
Mutual destruction			Thriving international city			Duplicity			
Waves of conflict									

Table 1: Overview Leitbild Modules

6.1.1 Feared futures

The primary categories of the Leitbildanalysis in the context of Jerusalem 2060 was desirability. Desired and undesired futures were directly focused throughout the interviews. From the very beginning it was apparent, that undesired long-term futures were as important to the interviewees as desired ones. Their feasibility, however, was extraordinarily hard to assess for everyone (an aspect investigated further on a later stage of the analysis, see chapter 7.3 Shared Perspectives). While desirability was relatively easy to assign for most interviewees, feasibility was often hijacked by wishful thinking or general traits of the interviewees (optimists vs pessimist). This hints towards a difficult relation with long-term (and even short-term) futures, an aspect discussed in more detail in chapter 6.1.8 Blind spots. The choice to put undesired futures as the first category was made due to a greater clarity of the interviews on this category. Undesired futures were in general easier and in more detail described as their desired counterparts.

6.1.1.1 Feasible feared futures

“It will be bad. Really, it will be bad.” (I11, l. 278-279)

Feasibility and unfeasibility were very commonly a mirror image of each other in connection with desirability. Most interviewees went so far as saying chances of certain futures are 50/50, either it’s going to go this extreme way or the exact opposite of desired and undesired – cheating the question in a way subconsciously. Making it a flip of a coin.

6.1.1.1.1 Violent escalation

“If you leave people in frustration, if you leave people in poverty, if next year we come and say 90% is the poverty rate in East Jerusalem, politicians will not have ... In 5 years when Israeli and Palestinian leaders want to talk about politics and final status negotiations you will not find people to buy into your ideas because you left them in misery and suffering, and they are not moderate people anymore.” (I25, l. 109-113)

The most common undesired future interviewees deem somewhat to extremely feasible across the board is violent escalation. In this future the current issues are not dealt with, there is no meaningful negotiations and the continued accumulation of fear, frustration, anger and resentment erupts in uncontrollable and irrepressible violence spawning more violence. This perspective of a radicalized East Jerusalem that leads into violence, however, is widely shared, also by the other side.

“... it's probably going to go there, because, as I told you, the young leadership of the other side, of the Arabs, I am really afraid, they are growing up ... with a lot of hatred for us. Which is going to create an explosion. [...] /pause/ because we treat them as second-degree citizens, this is why. Because we don't care about them. Because we are racist. \pause\ Plain and simple. Pure and simple.” (I8, l. 431-438)

This trend of radicalization and culture of violence is also not seen as limited to the Palestinian population.

“I cannot ignore the fact that they are increasing in terms of number. I cannot ignore the fact that they are turning the city to become a military city, full of police and security and cameras and all these things. I cannot deny the fact that the fanatic right wings are increasing, today you have 29 members of Israeli Knesset and 12

ministers from the settlers. I cannot deny the fact the West bank is becoming the kingdom of Judea and Samaria, you have 650 000 settlers in the West bank. This reality is in what direction it will go. It depends on the culture of the city, whether the culture of fear and resentment and fight will continue, or the culture of peace and reconciliation will prevail. For the time being we live the culture of fear and uncertainty. There is no culture of reconciliation or accepting the other. On the contrary we are coming with the idea of killing the other.” (I27, l. 120-128)

The dystopian vision with violence and a culture of hate, is seen as rather imminent, universal and existential. With Jerusalem as the center, drawing the whole region into conflict – and there is little to be done about it.

“It is not gonna be a gradual sociological thing. Mine is the big bang theory. There is going to come an existential conflict in which there is going to be a war for survival and Jerusalem is going to be the epicenter. I really believe that the next decade, maybe two decades we are going to see this happen.” (I14, l. 347-352)

This future, due to lack of a better term unduly labeled by the author as ‘violent escalation’, is the most common picture of the future to be found in every interview. Not all Jerusalemites (want to) believe this is going to happen, but all fear it might. This dystopian vision of annihilation is strongly anchored in the conscious and subconscious minds – as it is easily retrieved and drawn into the open. It does, however, not predominantly structure day to day activities and decisions (Jerusalemites are not a collective of preppers³, but there is a psychological process of growing accustomed to this bizarre reality, to be able to live and function normally in a city that one is convinced of, is going to go up in flames in the own life time or sooner than later).

“At the end of the day, people have to go to work, children have to go to school. Things go back to the abnormal situation they are used to live in. But if the situation prolongs, there will be more poverty, there will be more tension. It is directly related, directly.” (I23, l. 202-205)

³ Individuals actively preparing for a system collapse, a catastrophe or an end of the world/war scenario

6.1.1.1.2 Economic time bomb

“This is a time bomb, like ... in a generation we will have tons of kids here who don't know basic Math, don't know basic English and what are we going to do? We will just become a poor country. [...] I read the statistic today, that today the poverty of our population is 37% by 2035 ... in 20 years from now it will be 50%. Future, there you go.” (I9, l. 383-392)

Closely connected to this future perspective of ‘violent escalation’ is the one that focusses on the economic breakdown of the system, that often coincides with violence. The main difference, however, is that the core trigger is not a general sentiment of hate but an economic neglect.

“If you have tension, if you have conflict, you will see the number of tourists drop and there will be huge problems. [...] The population will become more radical because the basics of life will not be obtainable, and this will be really challenging. They will be easier trapped in other narratives, more ideological.” (I24, l. 326-333)

The concern is very much that the economy will not be able to develop, is very reliant on the tourist sector, the population is outgrowing the economic development and that poverty and disparity is going to drastically increase in Jerusalem, both in East and West Jerusalem. Especially the increasing Haredi population is of concern for West Jerusalem, economic futures and its long-term implications.

“There is a high chance of us having a lost generation of Haredi boys with zero skills to integrate in the labour market. [...] People don't understand the severity of it because we don't feel it as much yet. It's a long-term process, but when it matures it's too late already.” (I3, l. 509-524)

Overall, the increase of poverty in Jerusalem is also seen as a self-enhancing process of radicalization, poverty, violence, conflict and marginalization leading down a very likely path of destruction.

“Because we are on the brink, we are on the edge. [...] Poverty will become so bad it would result in food riots, it would result in the fact that taxes on people like me would increase even more and more and more people like me would leave the city, which would only expedite the problem, the final crash. I see how all infrastructure ceases to function because there is no money to keep it going. I can easily see a disaster.” (I32, l. 184-193)

6.1.1.1.3 Social erosion

“I think that people in Jerusalem are very weird and they are getting weirder and weirder every day and it will get even weirder.” (I21, l. 122-123)

Radicalization is a recurrent theme in almost all modules of undesirable futures. However, this chapter focuses on radicalization as part of a change in the social fabric, an erosion of culture, norm and even identity through protracted conflict. Ongoing antagonism especially affects the youth, the young generation that grew up in this environment, which doesn't know a different world and therefore builds its future accordingly.

“And we will lose more because if people continue to live in poverty our social fabric will be seriously affected. From a demographic point of view, we will remain in this country. Palestinians will not leave, it's not 48. Palestinians are here. But the cost will be the quality of people we will have in 20 years. With the world that we are living in, it is alarming to me as a moderate Palestinian leading an important Palestinian organization. Because there will be no room for people to talk about economy, existence and coexistence.” (I25, l. 287-298)

However, the tension and the conflict are taking a toll on the social fabric on both sides having to navigate the conflict, contradictions and emotional stress that the reality of living in Jerusalem puts on individuals every day.

6.1.1.1.4 Forced expulsion

“If they are in charge, we are not going to be able to live here.” (I14, l. 310)

The aspect of social erosion goes alongside with the feared future of being pushed out of their city or displaced. In this collective imagination the city is being gradually and silently taken over by the ruling class. Interestingly this is a very strong and common fear for all groups in Jerusalem.

The Palestinians are afraid of an Israelification, led by the Israeli government, driven by a neglect and a political gentrification.

“If you all the time have problems, you are miserable... you say what can I do? I have to leave. [...] It will be for the Israelis only. And this is their policy...” (I13, l. 104-115)

“If I physically think about it, I see that we are losing, as Palestinians. Muslims and Christians. We are losing space. Houses, land... We are losing every day, every single day we are losing more and more.” (130, l. 281-283)

The people of the old city, Jews, Christians and Palestinians alike are also afraid to lose the city to the tourists.

“I should not be very pessimistic, but I am afraid in 50 years that ...now, we as Christians are very few here, in 50 years we will be much less. That the churches will be open for tourists, not for congregations. And that we people of Jerusalem are not living here anymore. I am afraid of that. Not only because of the political situation, because of a greater globalization.” (120, l. 276-279)

The Secular and liberal religious Israelis, however, are afraid of the Haredim taking over the city completely, driving them away to cities like Tel Aviv.

“One of the biggest fears about Jerusalem is that it becomes very, very ultra-orthodox. And that other kinds of people here won't be able to be here. There is a lot of struggle on what the demographics of Jerusalem will be and who gives the tone of what Jerusalem will look like. Obviously, we have less kids \laugh\ then the Arabs and the Haredim and that's a demographic issue. [...] It's something that they say about Jerusalem, about Israel in general, that if we continue with the way things are going, the demographics are not in the favour of secular or liberal Jewish people. In the first grade in Israel like 50% are Haredi and Arabs. And that means that in 10, 20 years, those are the people that are going to make Israel tick. And it's a problem. /pause/ [...] The moment that's who gives the tone of what Jerusalem or Israel look like, it won't be something that I feel connected to. If at some point 70% of Jerusalem are ultra-orthodox and they decide, because it's a democracy, so they would be in power. So, all the decisions made will be in that perspective. And I won't find my place here definitely /!/. I am not willing to live in a city that allows segregation on sidewalks or in buses between men and women. It's not democratic and it's not something I want to be part of. So now we fight it. But if we are a minority, we might not be able to fight it.” (15, l. 274-299)

And the traditional religious and Haredim in turn fear to be marginalized by the Palestinians in the city.

“The rate of them having children is bigger than the Jewish families. So, if they are going to have one vote for share, very soon they will take over.” (12, l. 189-191)

And then there are those who see conspiracies and plots. Due to the highly contested nature of Jerusalem, it is us against them and one way or another we are getting threatened by someone.

“I am sure people are plotting to take it, I imagine so, I mean that is not a conspiracy theory, but I think it's a realistic thing, that Jerusalem is high on people's agendas *ehm*, and it is an explosive place in that sense.” (I4, l. 444-447)

6.1.1.1.5 Collective apathy

“People will not live in serene peace. [...] This is the destiny of the city. It will stay the center of conflict.” (I28, l. 90-95)

Facing a deeply protracted conflict every day for many years is an emotional struggle for the inhabitants of Jerusalem. Especially after the disappointed hopes raised by the promise of a better future and peaceful coexistence during the Oslo accords, many are emotionally drained and have resigned. In a feeling of collective apathy, they seized all personal effort in shaping a future for Jerusalem – as they believe they don't have agency over their city at all nor impact on future developments.

“But if there is not any solution ...we have to accept what's going on. ... what can we do?” (I13, l. 430-431)

This feeling of ‘no possible solution’ is very common and often combined with a sentiment of ‘there are many solutions – just no will’ (discussed further in chapter 6.1.3 Coenaesthesia). Both are indicators of trying to bridge the gap between desired and feasible futures by taking away responsibility and agency from human decision makers. Similarly, arguing towards a higher power, destiny or human nature takes away the human factor and the responsibility from the bizarre situation created by the ongoing conflict in Jerusalem and the living reality of its inhabitants.

“For me it is all one big mess of different people wanting to be the ones on top of the others. There are two groups, two major groups, well divided into many subgroups and that's the nature of humans, they divide into groups, they can't stop fighting with each other, and I can't change that. I don't see what could.” (I6, l. 403-407)

6.1.1.1.6 Ethnic ghettos

“In 25 years, you will see barbed wires and people shooting each other” (I10, l. 567)

There is surprising unity when it comes to the negative views on dividing the city with physical borders. While most currently see a division of the city, some wish for some sort of clear designation of areas towards a specific ethnic group. But no one wants to live in a city with hard borders and physical separations, like Jerusalem before 67. However, this is a real concern for many. Already today most individuals from both ethnic group either feel extremely unsafe or never step into the areas of the other, due to being afraid for their lives. The wall /separation fence circling the city gives another impression on how restrictive reality can be.

A gradually heightening projection of the current situation leads towards a Jerusalem where violence is on the rise, which leads to further alienation, hostilities, shielding from danger, isolation into fenced communities and a city where free movement is less than guaranteed but widely and physically impossible. This future of ethnic ghettos comes with oppression, terror and a very volatile nature.

“They will probably build a lot of walls like the wall in Berlin, with a lot of guards and shootings and stuff. And then each and every one will be living in their zone, a guarded secure area. /pause/ That's the path we are on. There will be one area, which they could mix ...which will be also guarded [...] so they can keep trading and keep meeting, keep finding new reasons to hate each other. So, the hatred can still be built up.” (I6, l. 469-472)

Another historic analogy fits into this image of a future Jerusalem:

“The things will continue like this, I don't know. Then it will be ... it will maybe... I never visited south Africa under the Apartheid regime, but it looks like it will be like Apartheid. Mainly the Arabs will be more and more living in their ghettos, neighborhoods, and they will be afraid to go to the other side of the city. Less and less. There is nothing, no real partnership between both sides, even today. And when you think about what might develop, what is most likely I think it might go in this direction.” (I11, l. 236-241)

6.1.1.1.7 Mutual destruction

“If the Israelis don't find the will they will lose, and we will lose.” (I25, l. 285-287)

The most fatalistic image of Jerusalem is the combined augmentation of all undesired aspects to the point of reciprocal eradication. This, however, also seems to be the most empathic undesired image – as it does not only focus on ‘I’ and ‘we’, but also considers ‘them’.

“Each time that something happens, it brings bad spirits into the city because we have sons and brothers in the army, and they have relatives on the other side.” (I15, l. 241-242)

“They are breaking us, we are breaking the Israelis, the Israelis are breaking us. This will continue to be.” (I29, l. 207-208)

Sometimes it is just purely fatalistic. A last claim on independence and autonomy – the choice to deny.

“In the coming 50 years lets die with the Israelis. If they want to change, they are going to change Al-Aqsa mosque. If they do it in two years, an explosion will come here. If they do it in 5 years, explosions will come. If they want to change it in 10 years, let's die with them.” (I30, l. 92-94)

It also highlights the uncompromising interdependency between the different groups, which translates into a connected fait – a shared future – one way or the other.

“There is terrible dependency between the Arab part and the Jewish part, and on both sides, it goes both ways, on the other hand there is a very, very high level of hatred. So, dependency plus hatred equals tension. /pause/” (I6, l. 776-779)

“But if it continues another 50 years, we will be more hardship for another 50 years. People will not leave willingly, and we will just be the thorn in their throat.” (I23, l. 57-59)

6.1.1.1.8 Waves of conflict

“Jerusalem will be more of the same.” (I32, l. 148)

Finally, there is the image of an ongoing conflict. A somewhat controlled hostility with periods of violence. This is the equivalent of a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario for Jerusalem. It is undesired but at the same time an almost exclusively Israeli image as Palestinians rate this image as highly unfeasible.

“Sometimes there is more tension, sometimes less tension. 1990 was all this peace negotiations, so there was a feeling that things are going to settle down, but then everything exploded even in a much larger scale. This is the kind of tides of more tension and less tension, of violence, less violence and the possibility to live within it.” (I26, l. 79-82)

This is seen to be a likely future also because of the prominent role of history and religion in Jerusalem and conservative systems unlikely to shift quickly.

“[In 2060] I find the same thing. All over again. Because people have changed, the style the fashion, but the same conflict. This one will tell you this is the place, no doubt, Mohammad went up to the sky from and it's a very holy place and people will take tourists to another place and say this is the place where Jesus walked. There is a philosophy, believes that lasted for thousands of years and it's not going to change. Religious people hang on to those believes. It's part of their life and some are ready to die. So, what do you think will happen? Maybe we will go back to miniskirts? I don't know, but except for fashion it will be the same. This is why it is an eternal city.” (I18, l. 220-227)

The image of the status quo gives an impression on how hard it is for inhabitants to break out of the lock in of the continuation of the conflict.

“[In the year 2060] I am going to see a city which is roughly 1,5 million strong in a metro area of about I don't know 3 million. I am seeing Ramallah, El bire, Beit lehem, Beit Jalah, Mevaseret, Ma'ale Adumim becoming one huge conurbation. I see the city grid locked. [...] It's hard for me to imagine, seeing it any cleaner then it is today. It's so engrained in us. I don't see that changing.” (I32, l. 311-316)

The only Palestinian image towards the status quo is the one of no agency and resignation:

“It remains an unsolved story. Until then we will stay in this status quo, ups and downs because, no side can take a big decision on the future of the city, without a real solution, like a big solution, for the whole thing.” (I17, l. 143-145)

This notion of no agency and the undesirability of the status quo is widely shared in the Israeli views; however, it is giving some kind of safety through the illusion of predictability.

“And its hidden underneath and you can't feel it but it exists, in both sides. [...] It is because of the political issue. There is no solution whatsoever. Everybody tries to keep the status stable. Nobody sees any kind of solution sometimes in the future. And this state of mind goes on for almost 20 years now. So, it's a kind of strategy with surviving and you have to keep living. You have to do daily duties, you go to the shop or to the street, the cinema, theaters and entertainment. But it exists underneath, and it's very much supervised by the police. It's not a real... I mean they pretend that it's a really peaceful place.” (I26, l. 107-118)

As difficult as it is to live in Jerusalem, it has and could be much worse – not just theoretically but tangibly. So, part of it is also wishful thinking – `It has always been like this, therefore it will always be like this – we are fine`.

“That's a continuous. /laughing/ It has been like that through the whole history. It was always ups and downs, violence and tensions and conflict. So, it wouldn't be different now. When I would go with you over the history of this city it was always like that...” (I16, l. 431-433)

6.1.1.2 Unfeasible feared futures

“If [...] someone else will rule and decide what happens here it will look completely different from what we are seeing now. I don't see that happening.” (I5, l. 620-623)

Among the undesired futures only few are categorized as unfeasible, as the range of detrimental and hopeless scenarios are widely normalized by the current situation in Jerusalem.

6.1.1.2.1 Continuation of status quo

“There is a point in history where this will collapse, regardless of how strong it is and regardless of how protected.” (I22, l. 180-181)

As mentioned above, the continuation of the status quo is a predominantly Israeli scenario, seen as not feasible by the majority of the Palestinian interviewees.

“In the long-term the status quo will not exist. We are living a very bad situation. Things look like business as usual, it's not business as usual. And things will have to change and sometimes change can come very quickly.” (I28, l. 163-165)

However, it is also a prominent sentiment of some of the Israeli interviewees.

“To continue things as they are right now [...] will explode in our faces. In our life time. There is no way we could sustain this, no way we can keep this going for many more years.” (I32, l. 373-375)

Many put a timer on this system and the status quo, however, unsure of what comes after.

“It doesn't work. It can work for 20 years, it can work for 50 years but it can't work for 100 years.” (I25, l. 486-487)

Palestinians describe it with a certain calmness, a convincing clarity and undoubting simplicity.

“I am not worried about it. The situation will not be kept for 50 years.” (I29, l. 182-183)

“It will be different. [...] It cannot continue this way.” (I31, l. 213-232)

Whereas most Israelis can only see it if they choose to look underneath the image of ‘business as usual’ humans tend to adopt.

“It's a kind of illusion that Israelis have. They say OK, we can live in it. We can go on Saturdays to the old city and the shops are open, and we can eat in restaurants and it can maintain, let's say for another ten years, twenty years. But not in the long-term.” (I26, l. 341-344)

However, there are those Israelis who share the perspective, that a continuation of the status quo is absolutely unfeasible.

“/pause/ I don’t think that the situation of sustained occupation ... that is open ended, that is forever, is viable.”
(I9, l. 209-210)

All in all, most interviewees agree, that the current situation is both not sustainable and not desirable. This does not mean that there is agreement on why it is undesirable or what the alternative would be.

6.1.1.2.2 Violent eclipse

“I don't think there will be a very big explosion. It's not what I feel. The tension is not strong enough. /pause/ No.” (I21, l. 336-337)

Only few interviewees see the violent eclipse as unfeasible, all of which Israeli and all of which due to rather non-rational arguments or in connection with contradictive assessments.

“In 5 or 20 years maybe, there will be barbed wire fences and there will be fighting, and I won't be here because I won't be able to live here. This coffee shop will be smoking ruins. I can't ... I can't ... I don't ... Something inside of me says that's not going to happen, because it could have happened, and it hasn't yet, and there were really shitty years here ten years ago. Jerusalem has seen the ruin, going downhill towards that but it didn't happen. [...] We are not going to let that happen. If somebody tries to make that happen, we are going to stop them.”
(I10, l. 712-718)

It all shows a certain wishful thinking and a fear of the horrors of past times at the core of this future image, which makes it rather delicate.

“That it wouldn't be like all hell will ... or? I don't think it's possible. I think it's too important for too many people. And hell was here... 15, 10 years ago with the intifada. That was hell. In this place here people died. You know, here. And there. And in this street. Like there were four different bombings and ten people died in each one of them. That's hell. [...] I don't think that's coming back. I hope we've gone through the worst in that perspective. I mean two people dying when someone takes a car and... it's terrible. But it's not close to what used to be here.

I can't even imagine. That's terror. And if we went through that then we are good \laugh\. I hope." (15, l. 810-824)

6.1.1.2.3 One-sided dominion

"Jerusalem will never belong just to one group." (117, l. 83-84)

The last undesired module that many see as unfeasible or unlikely is one-sided forceful domination. Even though the different groups fight for dominion over Jerusalem, no one will give it up due to its symbolic force for the nation states, as capitals, as their history and origin as well as home. The crucial role Jerusalem plays for the monotheistic religions makes it globally significant and demographic estimates suggest, that Israelis and Palestinians both will continue being relevant factors in the city.

"There is no way one party could control the city forever, so wake up." (123, l. 306-307)

Especially Palestinians emphasize that Jerusalem without Palestinians will not be possible, as they will not leave or be made to leave even though Israel is in control. A Jerusalem without Palestinians is unrealistic.

"In the long run it will not work. With all the Israeli policies in the city, to put away Palestinian from the city the percentage of Palestinians is increasing even with walls, even with barriers, even with Israeli settlements, even with the lack of proper infrastructure. The number and the percentage of Palestinians in the city, according to the Israeli definition and figures, is continuing to grow." (124, l. 304-309)

6.1.2 Desired futures

"I want to go to the old city of Jerusalem and see people smiling and thinking of a better future, [...] a genuinely brighter Jerusalem. It's shining on the faces of its people [...] whether Israelis or Palestinian. Smelling this brightness when you walk in the streets of Jerusalem, which we don't have, which we don't see." (125, l. 511-515)

Not all interviewees were able to describe desired futures. Often desirability was described as the mirror image of undesirability or it stayed rather vague and general. Interestingly, a more tangible image often was presented when negative aspects were integrated into desired future images or there was a sort of emancipation from the political doctrine of a two states solution.

6.1.2.1 Unfeasible desired futures

“We are not going to have joint schools, not going to happen. The education system of the Haredim is not going to merge with my kids’ education system and with the Arabs. [...] It would be wonderful if all the kids went to the same school, but it's not going to happen here in the next two generations. It's not going to happen.” (I10, l. 623-628)

The unfeasible of the desired images were often easier described as the feasible. However, it is very telling of the overall sentiment or relation towards the future, when interviewees found it even difficult to produce unfeasible positive images.

6.1.2.1.1 Two states

“Unless some ... very, very not human politician will come and say, ‘Hey, lets all smoke joints!’ [...] Some Mahatma Gandhi from the Arab side and another healer for the Jewish side. I don't know. It's not going to work. The crazies will be like hell. They don't wanna give up on hell. They project all their shit on us. It's not something that a charismatic leader can cure.” (I6, l. 450-458)

The two states solution still dominates the framing of positive futures for Jerusalem in the public and especially the international debate. It is deeply anchored into the collective minds, but most interviewees view two states as an absolutely unrealistic or unachievable scenario. It seems to be a hollow mantra, acting as a blank canvas for very different contents; a relic of the past. It has survived as a brand, central for the debate, but what it actually means to have two separate states in practice differs from each individual highly.

“It's easy to talk about a two states solution but when you really break it down its hard for me to imagine a two states solution taking shape any time soon. [...] And I don't see any other solution but the two states solution. It's the only option.” (I32, l. 365-373)

Even though it seems like the most acceptable or agreeable solution for many interviewees on both sides on paper, in practice the reality on the ground has emerged in a way, that makes enforcing two separate states unachievable. At the same time, there is a pervasive feeling of it not being pursued in the reality of politics – which turns it into a sort of front for politicians to alleviate the pressure for not dealing with long-term futures.

“There are all kinds of solutions, the most reasonable one is the one that was almost achieved with the last try of peace talks, dividing the city between national entities, keeping municipals services more or less as one unit. No borders between sections, but you have your definition of one capital of two states. This is a kind of wishful thinking today, because nobody is even doing anything to achieve this.” (I26, l. 318-322)

“They killed [the two states solution] and I don't see any Israeli government on the horizon who is ready to do that. Even if they tomorrow will elect the so-called left center in Israel, they are not capable to revive it. I think it's too late. They would have to remove half a million Israelis from the West Bank. I don't see that. [...] It's like a dream, even the extreme left in Israel does not believe in this anymore.” (I29, l. 366-375)

And then there are those who are even angry and upset by how unrealistic and hollow the phrase of a two states solution became, freely voicing their frustration over the peace process as futile.

“They are dreaming. They are dreaming. They are dreaming. Jerusalem is one city, Jerusalem is one city. Some politicians are dreaming. I think they drank a lot that night. And they are dreaming. Look, why don't we do it like this? This is for you and this is for me and we will be quiet, and you will be quiet. They are laughing about it. [...] It doesn't have the earth to live with.” (I30, l. 335-341)

6.1.2.1.2 Peace

“... that could maybe solve things. [...] But still ... who is going to take the chance. /pause/” (I6, l. 585-586)

Beyond practical political solutions or defined plans or roadmaps like the one or two-states solutions, this paragraph illustrates the common sentiment of peace as inherently impossible

– even though ultimately desired. The underlying rational is, that no one would take a chance on peace without guarantees – of which there are none.

“Peace. Peace. Peace. Peace process [...] ... that is what I hope to have. But I don't think it will come to that.”
(I11, l. 402-404)

“If I could have it however, I wanted, I would love to see it as a place of economic growth, a place where people come to work, a place where essentially Muslims and Jews can live together, if that is even possible. I don't think it is. Really. Just a peaceful place. You don't have to worry when you leave the house. I don't think it's possible.”
(I33, l. 163-165)

6.1.2.1.3 Genuine coexistence

“If I could have it however, I wanted, I would love to see [...] a place where essentially Muslims and Jews can live together, if that is even possible. I don't think it is. Really. Just a peaceful place. You don't have to worry when you leave the house.” (I33, l. 163-166)

There is great longing for real, lasting and genuine coexistence and adjacent peace, due to the protracted nature of the conflict as well as its omnipresence in daily life and the exhaustive force of fear and hatred. A shift in status quo towards equality, acceptance and tolerance for everybody. However, many can't believe in such a future.

“In 50 years, I hope that Jerusalem will still be one city for two nations, open for three religions. That we will have a peaceful city, like its name. Jerusalem, the city of people. For all who are coming. That is my hope. And that we will not divide Jerusalem between the groups. Everyone should have the same rights to live in the city and everybody should have the same status. [...] I don't see that there are those steps in the future. I can't see that we will have a better future.” (I20, l. 140-148)

Jerusalemites on both sides are longing for a mundane peace. A ‘small Peace’ of sharing ordinary tasks and day-to-day activities with the other side. It may seem to be a small ask – the minimum requirement for a tolerable life, which should be possible everywhere. However, this sort of normalcy is seen far out of reach.

“It's not realistic. How I would like to see it? It's not realistic. It's not real. Of course, I'd like to see, you know, everyone Jews eating in kosher Arab restaurant, /pause/ and I would like to see it in a very peaceful way,

/pause/ but it's not real. It's not going to happen. [...] To dream? [...] Well, that would be the dream. Someone could live wherever they live, I could rent an apartment in SalaHadin and feel like it is the most normal thing to do. /pause/ It's not going to happen. /pause/ [...] To live wherever I want. But even to live together, walk ... and I could see those populations living together and everyone maintaining his own social structure and heritage and not ... wanting to kill the other one. It's not going to happen. That's like, that's a dream which is not realistic. /pause/" (I6, l. 352-373)

6.1.2.1.4 Fantasia

"My unadulterated fantasy were to see the three Jerusalems living together as equal with mutual love, respect and tolerance. These are the basic things that probably everyone told you, I am no different. But it is all imaginary. It is completely unrealistic." (I32, l. 258-260)

When it comes to fantasies there are those who are closely related to genuine coexistence with peace, love, equality, tolerance, safety and freedom for everyone, that mirror the paragraph above 'Genuine coexistence'. These specifically are deemed one level less realistic, especially by Israelis. However, it is important to note, that there are quite a few others who actually do believe this to be possible (discussed later in chapter 6.3.6 A thriving community).

"Utopia of Jerusalem? like any other city. Like to go and to feel that you like to be here, that you are not afraid of anything, that you can go anywhere ... and that people will not hate you and you will not hate anybody." (I8, l. 462-464)

And then there are those fantasies which leave the realm of physical reality completely, for lack of any feasible positive futures.

"I would like to see rivers and lakes /laughing/ instead of mosques and synagogues. [...] yes, like you know, a long river on the green line, I would love to see that. If we have to separate people lets separate them on the water, that you can sit at the banks of each side and fish together and whatever. That's the fantasia." (I19, l. 383-419)

"There would be people of different faiths walking around comfortably, one next to the other, ehm ... and maybe a temple standing on the temple mount, and everybody would feel comfortable praying there. And poverty would be gone, and there would be wolves lying down with lambs in the street \smile\ how is that?" (I4, l. 372-376)

6.1.2.1.5 Return to the past

"[In 50 years] I hope I will find Jerusalem in the situation as I remember it before the occupation." (I30, l. 270)

Even though references to the past are not extremely common in the interviews, they are very prominent. It seems to be an escapism that is very strongly felt and lived by in the more traditional/religious groups of the city. The apparent contradiction between the terms past and future is bridged by wishful thinking.

"So, in order to have a better future, it should be open, it should go back to the period when Jerusalem was the center of economy for Palestine. An open city with open borders where people can exercise their faiths in freedom." (I25, l. 219-222)

"But assuming that messiah doesn't come the next 50 years I think more people will bring back this whole original Kibbutz idea, which is the future. Like what we had. [...] We will go back to a more and more natural consumption. [...] We can produce in our own kitchen [...], cars will go down, [...] everybody has more bicycles ..." (I2, l. 316-518)

6.1.2.2 Feasible desired futures

As discussed in chapter 2.2 a powerful tool to create a sustainable and highly motivating Leitbild for a social entity to is the uncovering of shared, desired and feasible images of future. The challenge in this specifically is, that desirability is highly reliant on the perspective. Even though Israelis and Palestinians (or even specific subgroups) might share a certain desired image, which they deem also feasible, the challenge is, that it still might be inconsolable – as it often comes down to diametrically opposed positions.

6.1.2.2.1 Absolute victory

“Either they will win, or we will win. It's one or the other.” (I14, l. 305)

The most extreme of the desired modules that is also seen as feasible is closely connected to the one that was already described as undesirable and unfeasible: ‘One-sided Dominion’. In this specific facet it is labeled ‘Absolute Victory’ as it is the result of the underlying idea.

This illustrates, how some interviewees try to keep themselves neutral having lost faith in the peace process, subconsciously assuming their own side will win.

“I think [Jerusalem] is pretty extreme. I am not sure it's possible for both groups to live together, we tried enough time. It's either gonna be one or the other.” (I33, l. 184-185)

Then, there are those who openly revert to violence, wishing to eradicate the other, negating their place in Jerusalem. This is often a form of wishful thinking, originating from a place of frustration over political and military inferiority.

“Listen, when we take out the disease from our country, [...] Israel, we kick out Israel from here and it will happen. It will happen trust me. Less than 50 years. It will happen. It will happen. Write the date and keep reminding yourself... [...] anyone goes up fast... you can see it in 30 years, now I can't tell you. [...] In 20 years, there will not be Israel here. No, there will not be Israel here. Fuck them. I hope less than 20 years. I hope in five days. But it is impossible five days.” (I7, l. 465-513)

“The government of Israel will be pressured by the Jewish population to evacuate these people. And they will evacuate these people and find another place in the country to send them to. Whatever it takes, they will be gone. It's not going to be sustainable. [...] They'll use force. They will face the battle with the international community, pressure, whatever. It's about choices. Every country takes measures that hurt some part of another population. If they start feeling the pressure of society... it's a country designed for the Jewish people to come together and they are coming. And when they are coming, they don't have somewhere to live and we have another population that has another 22 options in the world. It makes no sense to sacrifice the original population when you can try to accommodate the second population in a place that is also good.” (I2, l. 408-422)

Another variation focuses more on desirability and less on feasibility. How and why these futures might come to pass is more or less consciously excluded.

“I think it shouldn't be [a shared capital]. It should be only for Palestinians. and of course, nobody will accept what I say /laugh/. [...] The Palestinians want it like that. Want it to be only for Palestine.” (I13, l. 455-460)

Lastly, the group that is less straight forward, even in their description of what it is and what it actually means that they are saying – reverting to cumbersome rationales, religion and rather counterintuitive images of morality. These images are strong on both sides but seem rather isolated in their specific characteristics.

“Ultimately there is a messianic vision of the temple being rebuilt and Jews worshipping god and everybody else coming to pray to god on the temple mount as well, so that's the ideal. Em, and that's what we pray for and yearn for.” (I4, l. 242-244)

“If Zionism is defeated as an ideology many Jewish fanatics will leave the city on their own, because the Zionist narrative will disappear, and everybody will revert to the scientific merit of Jerusalem. The scientific narrative means that you come, and you do scientific research and you say, we are sorry we did not find any clues that indicate that David or Solomon ever existed. Or that Abraham ever existed. Because there is no archaeological proof.” (I22, l. 260-266)

“In Jerusalem they have this law, in every 90 years nobody owns anything in Jerusalem. Everything goes back to the state. [...] It hasn't passed yet because we are like 48 of creation, so 50 years from now the first 90 will be passed so the state will get back a lot of land and I think they will focus on trying to accommodate more and more people that are coming. [...] The reality of the moshav starts coming to the city. Because it's sustainable to have production and distribution on site. A lot of people in San Francisco, Jews also, are leading this thing of making vertical agricultural. They could have it in every building to provide for the whole community. Things like urban farms. People are trying. [...] And I hope they also find solutions to printing everything in 3D. They will soon be printing human tissue.” (I2, l. 322-343)

“They will lose, and the Jewish inhabitants will live here in peace and harmony ... with a hand extended in peace towards all its neighbors and all the other religions, because if Judaism is in charge, we don't have any problems with being friends with the Muslims and the Christians.” (I14, l. 307-310)

“After surgery it will be a quiet city, a happy city, people helping one another, loving the city. [...] There is no difference between Muslims and Christians, they will always be friends.” (I30, l. 378-382)

Finally, there are those who believe 'time is on our side'. One way or another, given enough time, the problems will be solved by itself. These are exclusively Palestinian.

"People of Jerusalem, people of these old countries, they have seen it all. They have seen 400 years of ottoman rule, they have seen more vicious occupiers. And they saw that they came and went, and we believe that this will not last forever. We are still here, and they will go." (I28, l. 187-189)

"Every year we grow at least 1 %. That means in 20 years or even less we will be the majority population. [...] They are in deep shit. They do not understand it until now." (I29, l. 140-146)

"Mass deportation is not possible to do any more with today's international relations. They lost the game in 1967. They had a chance in 1967 but they lost it. So, either they deport us from this country, or they accept the one state solution." (I29, l. 354-358)

However, the Israeli counterpart is a timeless continuum, relating more to the status quo scenarios discussed above.

"I have a feeling that the basic core will stay. And all-around things are changing and changing." (I21, l. 145-146)

"A Palestinian person sat with us and we talked, and we are people and we are taking care of each other. What happened there would happen again. And that's it. [...] So, if it will stay as it is today it might be the best. Because other scenarios are ... going to be harder." (I21, l. 294-299)

"You know sometimes they do statistics about how the Arabs, they are going to take over Israel demographically and you have to make a Palestinian state otherwise they are going to take over ...they don't want to have 12 kids either... they're young girls they don't want to have 12 kids. They don't want to have 8 kids. they also want to have 3 kids. So, the growth of the population is stabilized and is not expanding to an extend that the statistics, which are based on stuff that was going on 20 years ago or 40 years ago. It's not happening, because people from these large families, they don't want to repeat the mistakes from their parents, so I don't think demographically that you can say the city is ..." (I14, l. 558-565)

6.1.2.2.2 Cathartic destruction

“The worst is still ahead, but then it would become better.” (I32, l. 153)

Probably one of the most counterintuitive desired and feasible futures described by interviewees, are scenarios of cathartic destruction. These images follow a kind of tabula rasa principle, where the lock in effect is felt so powerfully, that one must break free and restart from scratch. This reboot, however, is enabled through violent destruction. Jerusalem as the Phoenix rising from the ashes.

This is a very, if not the most, disturbing image – and it is a fairly common one, if not one everyone believes in to some degree. The appeal of this scenario is its ability to reconcile the situation today with the desired futures of tomorrow in a coherent way. This gives the individual a backdoor to logically argue, while keeping up orientation and hope in a situation, that would normally exclude that. This seems to be especially important for individuals who exhibit more optimism.

However, adopting such an image, just out of psychological need of coping with the status quo, gives rise to the tangible effect these underlying images have on behaviors, choices and therefore real developments.

There are those with a more radical believe who really see the destruction itself as something positive:

“Extreme darkness before the light comes. [...] A crisis to shake people’s lives and souls and see if they reassess what is really important to each person’s life. (I2, l. 832- 838) [...] Everything is just getting worse, but that's because messiah is really coming. And before something gets high it's going to get the lowest of the lowest.” (I2, l. 451-452)

“By peace by talking it will never change, I guarantee you. [...] Because, anything that was taken by force will never come back unless by force. [...] Now, if by force everything changes, it can change in one day, then we can restore again.” (I7, l. 394-418)

And then those who just see it as a tool, a necessary evil for a greater good:

“Or a big war. I don't know. It's going to ..it has to change.” (I8, l. 277)

"It will explode, and the explosion will redefine Jerusalem." (I29, l. 216-217)

And those who think they are the righteous creating a better world:

"I think there is going to be a huge war. And we are going to wipe down the people who are in favor of hatred."
(I14, l. 304-305)

"I hope that we will manage to bulldoze a lot of the parts of the new city, to rebuilt it. [...] In a more human way."
(I29, l. 449-451)

And then the optimists, trying to cling on to their vision of a better future for Jerusalem:

"Things will get worse with growing exasperation and frustration. [...] A growing chauvinism among Jews, I see polarisation, I do see more violence, more tension. In the very very long run, 50 years is a fair assessment, we will come to some kind of solution. I have a basic idea what it would be like, but I do think that it will become a lot worse first." (I32, l. 148-153)

"People pay a big price for war. Their life, the life of their children, houses, homeland but after that, when they succeeded, they try to rebuild what they lost. Here there is no choice. [...] We have to stop the Israelis." (I30, l. 405-411)

An abrupt system change is not just seen feasible and desirable regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also the Haredim in Jerusalem. An extremely traditional, closed off, backwards directed and already dominant community that will eventually completely take over in West Jerusalem demographically.

"It's like an avalanche, a little bit more snow and a little bit more snow and this one and that one, and all of a sudden you have this... cataclysmic change... but the cataclysmic change was building up all along. [...] It's this woman leaving her husband and this boy saying I don't want to be married to this woman and I don't want to live in poverty. I want to get a job and I want to go to the army ... little by little by little. This could take 20 years, this could take 30 years... this could take 50 /!/ years. but eventually this whole system is going to collapse, because it is not based on anything." (I14, l. 447-458)

6.1.2.2.3 Creative-Spiritual-Techno Utopia

“Shake it off and get together. That's what it takes for messiah to come” (I2, l. 305-306)

The Spiritual- as well as the Techno- and the Creative Utopia are in a way advanced states of the Status quo, and therefore desired images exclusively for Israelis. All of them are to some degree marginalizing or at least blacking out the Palestinian issue.

“I want this to become a centre of learning, academia, high tech industries. I would like a green, clean, functioning city with great public transportation 24/7. What everyone would like for their city.” (I32, l. 248-250)

“I expect to find a lot more technology, easier ways to get around, like in the sky, with no traffic /laughing/. Cars in the sky and stuff like that. Advanced...” (I33, l. 172-173)

Especially the spiritual side of this category seems inclusive, however, is rather exclusive in the reality of its context:

“Religion will be taking a much more important role very soon. Not only here, because it's the centre of the world for religion, but also in other countries. They will start seeing how religion has been used for social control and how the faithful people together are really changing reality. [...] With this kind of trends religion will not be seen like it is seen today. People will really take this more seriously. [...] People are already looking for something. It starts with in-satisfaction. [...] The more people studying the more they realize that nothing makes sense. So they start searching meaning in something else.” (I2, 365-670)

And then there is the inner Israeli issue of the demographically increasing Haredim:

“We will have to find a way to eat the cake and have it too, to allow people to be religious and to pursue their studies and believes while working. 30 years ago, you could have said oh these ultra-orthodox minority, what are we going to do about them. In 30 years, the question is going to be reversed, the ultra-orthodox are going to ask themselves, oh these few secular people left, what are we going to do about them. I do see that happening. Don't ask me how, but we will have to find a way to allow people to be religious, religion to be one of the hallmarks of this city as it always was, and at the same time make it thrive, regardless of its religiosity.” (I32, l. 201-210)

The creative Utopia is predominantly secular or left leaning, it is however still very much focussed on the perspective of Jerusalem as an advanced status quo:

"I would like to have much more fusion in the field of culture, being together and creating together. [...] I know that there are a lot of interesting tries and I guess that when you don't feel afraid it will happen from itself because it is interesting, it is attractive for somebody to get to know the other culture better. So hopefully it will. [...] Each will keep its own heritage, but we will have some common goals to bring together, you can see it in music, for example and it is beautiful so I hope that it will happen in different fields. [...] I hope that if we succeed to bring more initiatives and creative people it will affect the energy of the city. It will bring more business, have more private public ventures... and I don't know, it is hard for me to think what can happen. But in a good situation the sky is the limit." (I15, l. 296-317)

6.1.2.2.4 Stiff compromise

"It's going to take a long time, and we haven't even started counting." (I23, l. 234-235)

The first inherently positive module is a cautiously hopeful one. It emphasizes the useful cooperation between the different sides and the benefit of working together for the whole of Jerusalem. However, it also acknowledges the long history of hate and fear. It is a future where coexistence is slowly built by hard work and with many setbacks. The module is about compromise and feels like a compromise in itself. It ties to appeals to reason and insight of all involved.

"These people will realize this game is not going anywhere. Simply. We are both here and that's it. And we have to manage. With the other one, the indigenous one and with the one that came, and there is a place for all these groups to feel home. And to practice their religion and their culture and all that." (I17, l. 315-318)

"I don't see love, I don't see accommodation, I don't see acceptance. That would take way more than 50 years from now. That will take centuries to somehow get rid of the bad blood. It would take generations upon generations. I see a stiff kind of coexistence that is not borne out of love but borne out of habit." (I32, l. 328-331)

An important aspect is the general possibility or feasibility of finding a path forward together, while ensuring and respecting each other's needs and spaces. The possibility of actively creating a better life for all inhabitants of Jerusalem and even beyond.

“Jerusalem will be, could be an open international city even, with a special status. Much to the dislike of Palestinians and much to the dislike of Israelis. We will do a referendum in 20 years and see what happens. It has to be an internal solution. That is the best thing. It won't be on any one's terms. It's not like one side will win and one side loses. It can't be. So, both sides have to compromise.” (I23, l. 239-245)

“My optimistic Jerusalem is one where you can be part of your own community but with the neighboring community. I am not as Utopian to believe that in Jerusalem 2060 Arabs and Jews will be marrying each other and having children. It's not that kind of a situation. [But] It should be open to working together in education and you do see it already in the hospitals.” (I10, l. 405-413)

“It will take time to coexist and to learn how to coexist. That does not mean that in the beginning we will not have a lot of problems, that is absolutely right, but I think it will not be impossible. If you [...] feel you are part of it [...], you have totally different attitudes. If you are not challenged every day in your existence your attitude is different.” (I29, l. 395-400)

“I don't need that a Palestinian person gives up his or her truth of the story and the other way around. The truth is not one thing, it is not one face. There are different ways.” (I17, l. 405-406)

Another important aspect of the slow building relationship that is growing into a better future for Jerusalem is the economy:

“I hope it goes into the way of economic prosperity and a better coexistence that this prosperity brings, because you have the definitions of East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem, but all in all even after a peace signing or a Palestinian state, what is going to change in Jerusalem? Just the definition of who owns the place. But the same people are going to live here and there, and we are going to have to live together.” (I3, l. 681-686)

“Hopefully with a political settlement there will be more incoming tourists and that will benefit the tour operators, the travel agencies, hotels will work, restaurants will work and when the restaurant works, they buy from the butchers and the vegetable place... and everybody works.” (I23, l. 150-153)

6.1.2.2.5 Parallel capitals

“East Jerusalem will be under Palestinian jurisdiction and then it will be their problem and not our problem” (I9, l. 472-473)

A variation of the classical two states solution is still a feasible future for some Jerusalemites. However, it’s almost exclusively an Israeli image. This is rather surprising, as the ruling party for a long time now promotes an image of an eternal and undivided Israeli capital. Possibly also as a result of this policy the Palestinians have mostly moved on to different desired images beyond the two states/ two capitals scenario (see 6.1.2 Pluralistic coexistence and thriving and international city).

The consensus for those who see Jerusalem as two capitals for two people, base this image on soft border and free movement between two clearly defined entities, which cooperate in good faith.

“We can divide the city politically without paying a price. On our daily lives. That’s why people are so scared of dividing the city, but I think they don't really realize ... [...] Because they imagine a wall. The way Jerusalem was divided before 67. They imagine a wall going down the middle of the city, with Jordanian snipers on the other side and violence and no access to the holy sites and to the Western Wall. But that’s not what it's going to be like. Even Abas, Abu Mazen when he speaks about the divided city, he speaks about an open city that doesn't have a wall [...]” (I9, l. 177-187)

“It doesn't really matter whether we have on the map a line but actually we don't care. I don't want it to be a border. The city has to be shared functionally, I have to be able to walk down to the old city, walk anywhere and they have to be able to walk here. [...] It could be like in Berlin where they have a thing where the wall used to be. That's OK. It has to be clear. [...] Once we understand the extreme situation anything can be done.” (I10, l. 689-699)

This image also accentuates the underlying rationale, that in order to preserve a truly Jewish state, the Palestinians have to be dealt with separately. It tells a story as much about self-preservation of culture and self-determination in a democracy as it does about respect and understanding for the needs of the other.

"[You cannot] have the same territory act as the same capital for two different people. [...] If you pass a line on the ground and you say from this point on this is [...] Jerusalem and Al-Quds instead of West Jerusalem and East Jerusalem it becomes a whole different story." (I1, l. 802-809)

"We should divide Jerusalem \laugh\ Keeping this is not in our benefit at all. We need to compromise like everyone needs to compromise. Jerusalem will also have to be a part of the compromise. It's already divided, who are we kidding. Like, honestly, you know, you just cross the road and it's a different city. So, come on. We will benefit from the official divide. [...] We could be the capital of Israel without SheikJarrah and JabbalMukaber. We can. We should. There is no reason." (I5, l. 782-792)

6.1.2.2.6 Pluralistic coexistence

"We actually have this chance to live with each other." (I20, l. 271)

The image of pluralistic coexistence focuses more on finding a way to live closer together, with mutual benefits. Being forced to exist on the same space could mean opportunity, where everyone can develop freely. At the core of the image lies Jerusalem as a place for everyone, accepting each other regardless of how. Even though this might come with compromise, this image is a very hopeful one.

"Right now, Jerusalem is different and bad. And it needs to be different and fun, and special and interesting. It can be all these things. [...] A bit secular, a bit quirky, you can be a tolerant person, you could be gay, you can live with your partner without getting married, you can do whatever you want. This is the sexy bit of Jerusalem and a lot of people have a good time." (I10, l. 283-240)

"[You don't need] to change everyone into a robot that has the same thoughts and feelings. [...] There is no problem with an ultra-orthodox Jew having kosher humus with a secular and a Palestinian who have the same kind of rights to be themselves in a society." (I1, l. 571-574)

"I want [Jerusalem] to look a lot like [...] this area of Jerusalem. Which is Jewish but pluralistic, very open to all sorts of different ideas. For it to be more like... still to have the conflict but to be more just. It may be too optimistic, but for no one to be excluded \laugh\ .. and for us not to be racist and the people to feel safe." (I5, 740-745)

The image has also an egalitarian claim, while at the same time criticizing other communities in Jerusalem for their very closed-minded nature.

"I hate places that are getting more and more like MeaShearim and I can't go there and the old city I can't go there without hearing sexist remarks about me being a woman. So, it's a bad thing to live in divided worlds. The boundaries have to melt. You don't make more and more fences. We need less and less. As I said to you, in daily life people are people and that's it. That's it. I look into your eyes, mine are brown, a different color, that's it... that's it." (I21, l. 321-326)

Finally, this image also acts as a beacon of hope for the next generation. Where the needs of the ones to inherit this situation are taken into considerations clarifying the need to act.

"What I describe is really how I want Jerusalem to be for a better future for my children and for Israeli children. [...] The right approach is to have the will of excepting others, having issues of coexistence with a greater framework, with a package for the future." (I25, l. 324-345)

6.1.2.2.7 Thriving international city

"Believe it or not, we can make it here, one day. They go to Ramallah and I fly to Tel Aviv." (I7, 67-68)

The most dominant and common positive future is the thriving international city. It is strongly represented in all groups, with slight differences. There is a universal desire for a prosperous, open city for all its inhabitants.

However, similar to all other chapters, this image is very susceptible to being filled with well-intentioned, nice sounding ideas, which still promote the interests of the own group. Especially the very common phrasing of an 'open Jerusalem' often means 'open in my perspective'. Israelis for example mostly mean that the access to East Jerusalem needs to remain, whereas Palestinians speak about the separation barrier/wall that should not cut off Jerusalem from the economy and the people of Palestine.

The first aspect is that the emphasis is on a peaceful Jerusalem:

"I believe that there are benefits to Israel /pause/. A win win situation is going to the peace... if Israel will go towards peace... it will ...the situation is different. all kinds of life will be better than going to the other side. {...] Everywhere. And I find myself a lot saying, what prime Minister Rabin who was killed, said ... something like

this, that the dangers of Israel, the Jewish people took on themselves going by the peace track is less than continuing in the existing situation. This is what I believe.” (I11, l. 306-315)

“Muslims and Jews lived together for 600 years in harmony. There is no reason that they can't do it again, it's much easier even now. With the quality of life, with the modern life, but all religions can be used to discriminate other people and to kill in the name of god.” (I17, l. 437-440)

Another aspect is the shared nature of Jerusalem; for all its citizens, with equal civil rights – a Jerusalem in a one state solution or an international city:

“If you ask Palestinians, do you want Jerusalem, or do you want a state, there is no state without Jerusalem. There is no economy, no spirit, no nothing. I'd rather have no state and have civil rights and have access to Jerusalem. Honestly.” (I17, l. 146-149)

“A shared city is maybe the only solution, but a shared city not between Jews and Palestinians and Muslims and Christians, a shared city among the humans. The human beings that live in the city.” (I22, l. 309-310)

“A solution which is more sensible, is the one state solution. Two countries, two cultures living in the same land. OK, you have to figure out a government system for Jerusalem and at the same time we could call for the international community to help, the UN system maybe.” (I24, l. 163-165)

“I am not against a one state solution. I would like to see my children living in their own state. It could be an Israeli-Palestinian state. That they are full citizens.” (I29, l. 433-435)

Another important aspect is the aspect of an unrestricted Jerusalem, which relates to the paragraph about parallel capitals. Here open borders and free movement is emphasized:

“I definitely don't want a divided city again, even as a Palestinian. I want to be able to go anywhere. An open city, probably two municipal councils. I don't care. I don't care how it is realized.” (I23, l. 165-167)

“In a one state solution there is no problem. [...] If you get then one regime representing the people you will have a totally different development. A lot of pressure will be released from this city.” (I29, l. 381-387)

Furthermore, a core concept is the equality of all inhabitants, regardless of their nationality:

"I wish that at least my children will have a clear nationality in their passport, and they are treated as full citizens. I don't mind whether it's called Palestine or Israel-Palestine or Palestine Israel, as long as they feel at home, and they are recognized as at home." (I29, l. 439-442)

"I'd like to see it more as a model ...like... Montreal, or ... I don't know, Swizz cities that have bilingualism, where the national ... identity is known but it doesn't play an existential role in life, where Jews and Arabs are comfortable in each other's language. And they interact on a normal level. That's how I would like to see the city." (I9, l. 599-602)

And lastly the achievement of a thriving Jerusalem, through the realization of all the aspects discussed above. Here Jerusalem is deemed to be an example of coexistence and citizenship for the entire world, with a certain uniqueness inherent to the idea of Jerusalem. With this image interviewees are confident, this will come to pass, even though it often remains unclear as to how this might develop.

"I see Jerusalem in 20, 30 years as being the place which will actually be OK. We are living together, we are working together, we are using our resources together, we are planning together, we are fucking each other. It is great, it is working. You Palestinians shut the fuck up, now, look what we have done here, copy what we have, do the same. Whether it's a two-state solution or whether it's a one state solution, whatever works. This is the place where it has to work first. [...] An example, a starting point." (I10, l. 543-553)

"... if we were allowed to develop normally Jerusalem could fulfill its promise as it was promised to the Jewish people, that it would be a city of peace. And that would be a place where god could dwell among human beings. All of those things would actual come to fruition if we were left alone. So, I am hoping that we are left alone /laughing/. (I14, l. 806-809)

"I would like to see our children living together and playing together and have fun with each other, I would like to see one society, excepting each other without any differences. Without any problems. To see the women drinking coffee together, the neighbors greet each other and the men playing Sheshbesh with each other. That would be a beautiful picture of Jerusalem. All three religions, two nations living in a place like no place else in the world. That is my hope for the future." (I20, l. 264-269)

"I'd like to see a prosperous city, really, with people coming literally from all over the world. Vibrant, just enjoying the culture, the food. It's a wonderful place to be. That's the Jerusalem I dream of." (I23, l. 212-214)

“If we can equally share this resources and culture that we have Jerusalem will benefit, not only for its people but also for the surrounding and beyond.” (I24, l. 314-316)

“I am sure in 50 years there will be new values, a new understanding of what is identity, what is humanity and what is the other. [...] It will allow for easier living in Jerusalem. It will ease the tension out.” (I31, l. 240-245)

“But Jerusalem itself is the big thing that connects these people. We have different ways of taking care of it, but it's enough to be a purpose.” (I2, l. 586-588)

“So, my pinkest vision is to see calm people. To see people that breathe as they live. And not people that all they think about is the next minute.” (I21, l. 257-258)

“If there is going to be any kind of solution, some kind of international unity or joint custodianship or any of this type, it will change the whole picture to a much more optimistic one. Because the main problem now is in the long-term people don't have any hope, and on both sides.” (I26, l. 138-141)

6.1.3 Coenaesthesia

This category refers to the overall state of the individuals, especially their emotions, body language, intonation and general attitude. Even though a general tonus could be identified for the interviewees, there were often sudden shifts in the coenaesthesia of an interviewee. Even though most could be identified as general optimists or pessimists, all interviews had contradicting tendencies of feelings and attitudes towards Jerusalem and its future, sometimes even on the same issues or in the same sentence.

Rather than using the very broad categories of positive and negative emotions the decision was made to focus on the following six complimentary categories of basic emotions prominent in Jerusalem:

Hope and Hopelessness, Love and Hate, Home and Horror.

6.1.3.1 Hope and hopelessness

The feelings of Hope and Hopelessness were the most obvious dichotomy during the interviews. Those who presented a basically optimistic view towards life were especially

struggling to balance these emotions. It seemed as if the optimists drew their energy from hope – being left tired and drained, as it gets harder to present and defend hopeful futures in the current reality of the city.

The dichotomy of hope and hopelessness, however, was found to be relevant for all interviewees to a varying degree. Possibly because the future is a fundamental plain of time for the psyche, personal development of self-fulfillment and therefore existential. If future is threatening or dominated by violent conflict it creates a struggle for the individual.

6.1.3.1.1 Hope

“When you have life, you have hope.” (I18, l. 301)

The term hope includes other aspects, that are by itself deemed as hopeful or have positive attributes for a future Jerusalem, such as optimism towards the future, peace, tolerance and diversity.

One important aspect of this hope is that Jerusalemites feel, that there are many solutions and “many ways to bring people together.” (I20, l. 110) This genuinely gives individuals hope to believe in a better future, engage in action and be part of a process to actively move towards some kind of resolution.

“We can do it, even if Jerusalem's holy places are so difficult. Who is the boss. OK, now this is your circle this is my circle, or we will take turns, or whatever.” (I18, l. 128-130)

Another form of hope is the historic brand of Jerusalem (also discussed in chapter 3.2). Jerusalem equals hope in itself. Jerusalem, the metaphysical one, is the place of longing for Israelis and Palestinians, a place on which their hopes and dreams crystalize – no matter the physical reality of Jerusalem.

“My people have been dreaming about it for thousands of years. We prayed to return here. Three times a day [...] it's very deeply engrained in us. [...] Its a city of hope and dream.” (I4, l. 36-51)

“[Jerusalem] is a big flower, this is the first thing that comes to my mind, I mean by flower hope... this is hope... like the sun, like a candle ...” (I11, l. 554-556)

But interestingly, most of the time hope is structured in the opposite way. Instead of a reason or a real phenomenon that results in a feeling of hope many interviewees state that they are optimists and therefore have to have hope – as a mechanism of self-preservation in the face of no alternative, no other solution.

“I am a very optimistic person. I believe there is hope for a better future. [...] Yes, it is gloomy, yes, it is difficult, yes, it is alarming, but we can't say that, because still there is an opportunity that we have to realize with all the challenges, with all the problems that we are facing.” (I25, l. 106-150)

“I worry ... I am optimistic but really worried. But my hope [...] is that it will ...it should change into this direction. That one day we will look back and say oh, that was the checkpoint, that was the wall... like Berlin. That's my hope [...] because I don't know another solution.” (I17, l. 244-248)

Sometimes this hope is even fatalistic, or existential to preserve some kind of sanity in the reality of life in Jerusalem:

“I really, really hope it stays [talking about an institution of tolerance and peace] I need this. I need to see the city live. I need to see the city not becoming a ghetto.” (I21, l. 34-39)

“This is when my optimism comes, and this is where I like, and I want, and I need to look at the future, it's a need, it's an urge for me.” (I19, l. 191-193)

“I am optimistic because that's what you have to be.” (I10, l. 367)

Generally, the word hope is used frequently during all interviews. However, most of the time to describe developments that are desired but counteracted by current reality. Hope is a synonym for ‘I fear/think this not happening’.

“I hope that the new generation will be wise enough [and] more clever than our generation.” (I15, l. 224-234)

“I hope Jerusalem won't become more racist towards each other.” (I21, l. 217)

6.1.3.1.2 Hopelessness

“When I speak with people, there is no hope.” (I11, l. 355-356)

Hopelessness, on the other hand, is also a very dominant feeling, especially throughout the Palestinian and left leaning interviews. It comes along with feelings of being powerless, frustrated and also a great deal of feeling sad and embittered. This is affecting the individuals deeply during the interviews, with long pauses, repetitions, irony, mimicry and other physical reactions.

“/Deep breath/ /Pause/ Imagine what is going on in this country... I don't think it will become better. I don't think it will be better than it is now, it will be worse.” (I13, l. 244-245)

“I don't see a solution. [...] That's the bottom line of what I am saying. I don't see a solution. I do not see a solution. But look, make everyone [...] smoke joints and you know whatever... [...] Some problems they do not have a solution.” (I6, l. 556-562)

“.. /Long pause/ It is like a dream. You want to dream for the best ... and it's not even easy to dream for the best. It's so farfetched. [...] I dreamed a lot for many, many years, and I said [...] it can happen. But you know the kind of people that live today in Jerusalem, whether Palestinians or Israelis, are not the kind of people who will [...] take care of the city.” (I19, l. 481-486)

This can lead to total apathy and the feeling of ‘it doesn't matter’ because there is no feeling of agency over their own life and the future. A certain final fatalism in the face of powerlessness.

“/Pause/ I don't think that the people in Jerusalem can do anything.” (I13, l. 250)

“Since there was a Jerusalem it was immersed in blood and racism and discrimination and wrongdoing and sin and violence. [...] And I hate to say this, but you start to think that maybe this is the normal way for this city.” (I32, l. 392-400)

“Sometimes I do think that maybe another earthquake should delete us all and then you can get some kind of dinosaur to decide what he wants to do with the city.” (I19, l. 466-468)

On the other hand, many who see the hopelessness and frustration, see it as the biggest problem for the creation of a better future in the long-term:

“The main problem now is in the long-term people don't have any hope, and on both sides.” (I26, l. 140-141)

“I don't see at the horizon any possibilities of change or hope. The most dangerous enemy of any people is the lack of hope. [...] The people are seeing, rightly so, the blackness of the situation. A very black blackness.” (I29, l. 37-40)

And finally, there is a great sadness and sorrow about Jerusalem, its past and its future:

“My own children are not allowed to come back again. I fight for it. I am crying when I call my son and my daughter, hello how are you. [...] We talk to them, but we don't touch them.” (I12, l. 76-79)

“This is terrible, to think that we are losing our country. /Pause/. We lost everything.” (I13, l. 7-8)

“I worry a lot. I worry a lot... the future of Jerusalem is worrisome for me. [...] /Sad laugh/ But then, I believe in people, that they are unpredictable. Maybe one day some of those who are on the other side can slowly wake up. ... see that they can make it brighter for themselves. /Pause/ /Tearing up/ ... /Crying/” (I19, l. 500-506)

“There was this area that the Arabs ... all the buses that were bombed by Palestinians. It was the leaders that said that to them, and honest people were very hurt and kids... /long pause/.” (I21, l. 288-289)

6.1.3.2 Love and hate

There is a great deal of hatred in Jerusalem, but also a great deal of love and appreciation. Many of these feelings are directed towards the other side, but also towards the city itself or towards the own (sub)community.

6.1.3.2.1 Hatred

“There is a lot of hatred. People here hate each other's guts.” (I10, l. 52)

During the interviews it became clear, how much hate there was in Jerusalem. This hatred is hard to be conveyed, as it often connected with phrases that didn't explicitly talk about hatred. This anger comes with contempt and the denial of the other's rights.

There is the open and obvious hatred:

"My homeland is surrounded by enemies which want to steal it and make it different." (I30, l. 16-17)

"The young people are so embittered by what they see..." (I31, l. 435)

"Mamila cemetery, where Jamar *family name* was buried and today his skeletons are being desecrated because the Wiesenthal center and the municipality of Jerusalem are building a very famous museum of 'tolerance'. It's not even tolerance between Israelis and Palestinians, it's tolerance between Ashkenazi and Sephardi, I think. It's so ridiculous and so pathetic. [...] To see how Israel has this impunity, all this freedom to do whatever it wants with our roots and our heritage, other peoples dried blood and bones. It's our history, it's our DNA, it's our... it's our life that they are trying to delete. All the time. All the time." (I19, l. 26-34)

And the stories that talk about hatred:

"There is a lot of hate. If you go to [...] the stadium at Saturdays, the football games ... [...] death for Arabs, they sing it as usual. And I began to ask myself ... if one would say that in Germany, death for Jews, the whole world will ...but here you can say death for Arabs like usual. It's like [...] 'Yeah we are proud' ... crazy. How could you say this?" (I11, l. 199-218)

"One day I was called to cover a bombing in the market, and I saw the pieces of human flesh with the tomatoes together on the floor. ... It took me years until I came back to the market. [...] I couldn't possibly. I couldn't. Because of the 14 or 15 people becoming minced meat with tomatoes." (I18, l. 103-110)

Then there is the subtler hate, that is concealed by narratives and disrespect:

"The wailing wall is not holy. When I was a kid, I used to pee on the wailing wall, before the Jewish came, I used to pee there when I was a kid, trust me." (I7, 43-44)

And then there is the anger and disappointment towards Jerusalem itself, not living up to the promises she made or to what she should be representing in the eyes of her inhabitants:

“It used to be a love-love relation and then it turned into a love-hate relation and now I am trying hard for it not to become a hate-hate relation. I am disillusioned with this city. The more I know about it, the more I live here, the more hopeless it all seems. [...] it all seems to be going downhill fast. And I have less and less hope and more and more sorrow and even rage.” (I32, l. 12-16)

And finally, there is a lot of pressure in the city, that translates into the life of the inhabitants which try not to be defeated:

“It's the combination of affection and devotion but a lot of tension. You cannot see it when you are visiting, but when you are living in Jerusalem you can feel it. Times and places of tension. You become very much acquainted with this geography of where to go and where not to go.” (I26, l. 61-64)

“Sometimes it's a bit too demanding on oneself, it's a bit of a load, sometimes I want to feel like I am free, I am not a Palestinian I am not an Arab I am not a Muslim I am not a Jerusalemite. All these layers tense up in me. They are a load. A very heavy load.” (I19, l. 231-234)

6.1.3.2.2 Love

“I came to Jerusalem when I was still young [...] and I really I fell in love. I love the place.” (I11, l. 19-21)

Even with all the hate and sorrow, or maybe because of it, there is also a lot of love, respect and a feeling of community. But the awe and adoration the inhabitants have for the city itself is seemingly unique. There is a great respect for her history, diversity and meaning and a deep individual connection.

“Even the air in Jerusalem I find it different from the air in other cities, the food is different. [...] The people are different, the people of Jerusalem.” (I13, l. 59-61)

“I was borne in this city, I like the complexity, I like the challenges living here and I like the texture, the stones, the layers of history and the puzzle of people from all believes and origins and aspirations.” (I18, l. 9-11)

“I love Jerusalem.” (I19, l. 6; I5, l. 39; I11, l. 21; see I4, l. 57-51; I30, l. 237; I15, l. 32; I14, l. 282; I6, l. 14; I17, l. 86-87; I22, l. 40; I27, l. 111; I29, l. 48; I7, l. 6)

"I am captured by this city. I cannot always explain it. And it's not always rational, mostly irrational. But I am in love with the city, especially the old city. Sometimes in order to continue to love somebody you ignore all of his problems." (I29, l. 46-49)

Jerusalem instills a feeling of togetherness and greater belonging. However, this feeling of unity is most of the time not translatable to all parts of Jerusalem. There is the overall idea that the tension can be overcome by this unique feeling of love.

"You can feel that you are part of the universe, more, the center of the world." (I19, l. 388-389)

"The second you walk out of your door in Jerusalem, you are going to have a very interesting day. You are going to meet different kinds of people, they are going to yell at you, they are going to push you, but they are going to be like your best friends ten seconds later. There is a mentality, there is a sense of togetherness and a sense of family. You know that you walk out your door and whatever happens to you somehow it will be alright. That's a nice feeling." (I33, l. 143-147)

"It is like we have a child, her name is Jerusalem, and the mum and dad are divorced [...] and both claim that they can take care of her much better than the other one because they both love her, right? They love Jerusalem. So, if the love and the belonging is true to Jerusalem as a city, as an energy, as a history, then all parts can cooperate in order to make it better for everybody." (I17, l. 175-179)

And then there is the spiritual feeling of god and outright holiness pervasive throughout the communities and the city:

"It is much more important and old. It is a transforming experience. You go there, you walk, and you live in a different place. Jerusalem in the right mood, in the right light, in the right moments, is a very wonderful city to be in. This fraction, the stone, the feelings of the place they do produce an altered state of consciousness that is very peaceful. It's very quiet. I could not imagine myself away from it." (I31, l. 80-86)

"So, for me to actually be here ... it's ... it's like another worldly blessing. That you feel, that you never really get used to." (I14, l. 70-72)

6.1.3.3 Home and horror

The third dichotomy is between home and horror. The most common and straight forward relation most Jerusalemites have to Jerusalem, but at the same time the deepest, is the feeling of home, of origin, of roots and pride. However, the same place also evokes a lot of horrors. Its inhabitants face a lot of existential fears and insecurities in their actual daily routines in the city. They worry deeply about their future and their life.

6.1.3.3.1 Home

“It’s the city I belong to” (I19, l. 10)

Jerusalemites feel a deep connection to the city. It is their home and pride and it represents their roots and history. Here is where they want to create a future.

“Jerusalem [...] takes me from the heart to the heart, grasps me.” (I19, l. 23-24)

“I am borne here I grew here all my life. I am from a family who lived on this mountain for many hundreds of years.” (I12, l. 54-55)

“You feel what’s the right place for you. And Jerusalem felt that way. [...] it’s home.” (I33, l. 13-26)

“Every morning I see the dome of the rock, I see the old city from my roof. I lived abroad, but then I returned to my hometown because I believe in the cause.” (I25, l. 500-502)

Whereas all Interviewees see Jerusalem as their home, there are also those with ubiquitous feelings of belonging, ownership and identity. They claim Jerusalem by calling it home. They claim the future through the past. And this claim is an exclusive one.

“The Jewish people have returned to its land.” (I10, l. 657)

“For me Jerusalem is my identity. [...] This is my city. I live here, I work here, my faith, my body of language, this is my family, my neighborhood, this is my shop, and this is my market, and this is my playground, and this is my

platform, my society, the lectures, the meetings. It's my life. [...] You cannot take me out of this belonging. I belong to Jerusalem." (I27, l. 32-66)

"I was borne in Jerusalem, my children were born in Jerusalem, my father was borne in Jerusalem. [...] I have been studying in the old city when I was young, my father studied here, my daughter studied here in the same Friars collage [...]. It's home. It's my beautiful home [...], that I will not relinquish. [...] It's not only belonging, but ownership." (I28, l. 62-73)

6.1.3.3.2 Horror

"There is fear. And the fear is a strong force." (I21, l. 196)

There are two existential horrors: Uncertainty and Unsafety. The home and the future they try to build is endangered. There is a constant threat of terror attacks, violent escalation and structural oppression that makes Jerusalemites feel not safe in the city on an existential level.

"I don't think people will stop being afraid of being run over or buses exploding. Even though it might not happen a long time it is still something that is very in the core of being an Israeli Jew, to be afraid of terror." (I5, l. 754-756)

"You don't feel a sense of security or safety here, with many soldiers and the settlers using these machine guns. It's just a terrifying landscape." (I24, l. 107-108)

This fear also limits personal movement and freedom:

"More and more people are afraid to go to the Jewish sector." (I31, l. 200)

"I don't feel as comfortable going in the Muslim part of it as I would want to." (I1, l. 79-80)

And then there is the worry about the future that brings fundamental uncertainty:

"I worry a lot. I worry a lot. The future of Jerusalem is worrisome for me." (I19, l. 500)

"We don't know where this [society] is moving. They are no long-term solutions." (I2, l. 549-550)

“In this city, you really can't predict anything. You have to sort of guess. Because everything can change every day.” (I4, l. 234-235)

And finally, there is the worry what this uncertainty will do to the people:

“For the Palestinians, the feeling that you are not safe in your homeland. Like your existence is not ... I don't mean small things. The existence of the person and the house and the family is in danger. And this makes you behave differently, crazy.” (I17, l. 79-82)

“I am really afraid, they are growing up ... with a lot of hatred for us” (I8, l. 432-433)

“It's about insecurity. It's very insecure here. So, people tend to dig in their past and look for security and roots because roots hold you.” (I21, l. 136-138)

6.1.4 Semantic succession

There are several lines of arguments that surface together with linguistic pictures around the topic of Jerusalem 2060, some of which were already indicated in the analysis above. Their core relevancy to the overall discussion and the mental frame of the interviewees give merit to another investigation from this angle.

6.1.4.1 Ownership

Almost unanimously the interviews see Jerusalem under threat. They fear for the future, they fear being pushed out and feel the need to defend the city from the invaders, the occupiers, those who revert the city into medieval circumstances or just neglect or take over their beloved Jerusalem. Hence, they make it clear that it's ‘ours’ or ‘everyone's’ and not ‘theirs’. Even though the perspective changes between Israelis and Palestinians, the arguments and the bottom line is almost identical for both.

The Palestinians argue: We are born here; our family is from here. You were put here, you are foreigners. You want to take Jerusalem away from us and that is why we will always fight you.

Some argue from the perspective of survival:

“As Palestinian, we want to survive, and we want to keep our feet standing in our city. Because this is our city. We were borne here, I was borne here. We didn't come to this city flying, using a plain or using boats. My grand, grand, grandfather was borne here. The Jews ... 95% they came through planes.” (17, l. 145-149)

“The international community took these people after the Holocaust and made them home in my home.” (128, l. 193-194)

Others from the perspective of necessity:

“My homeland is surrounded by enemies which want to steal it and make it different.” (130, l. 16-17)

“Like a surgery. It's not nice to see blood, but the doctor loves to see blood because after he saw blood he searches for the dirt and takes it away. And Jerusalem needs surgery. [...] After surgery it will be a quiet city, a happy city.” (130, l. 366-378)

The Israelis argue: We were here first; this place was taken away from us. In the whole world, we have only this place. You can go somewhere else and feel home. Therefore, we will always fight for it, you and anyone else.

“Jerusalem is ancient. It goes back to the dawn of history of our people. If your part of that tribe [...] they are family ...then this is part is of your family history. And so, it infuses everything that happens here with such a different dimension.” (114, l. 62-65)

“The Palestinians don't need Jerusalem. Because Jerusalem is not the undivided eternal capital of the Palestinian people.” (11, l. 767-768)

“The new religions have the Vatican, and Medina and Mecca. What the heck do people want with Jerusalem? We don't have anywhere else but Jerusalem. That's hypocrisy. If Jerusalem would really! be that important they would not have those other two cities.” (12, l. 698-701)

"[A survivor of the holocaust] tells this story of how it was Passover eve and they were sort of trying to have a Seder and how do you have a Seder because it's a fucking [concentration] camp there. They would say the prayers and sing the songs and were thinking oh, our forefathers have been in so much pain in Egypt and we are in so much pain now. We have much less than they had, and he reaches the end of the prayer, next year in Jerusalem and he says yeah, at least that is something that I can stand behind. And I am so lucky because after the war was over, I moved to Israel and I spent the next 40 years every year saying, now I am in Jerusalem." (I1, l. 706-718)

6.1.4.2 Blame

The majority of interviewees see the responsibility for peace largely with the other side. The failures of the past are assigned to the wrongdoings of the other and the bleak prospect for a better future is seen in the unwillingness or inability of the other.

The Palestinians argue: The Israelis are in control. No matter what we do or want, ultimately, the only ones who can actually do something in this situation are the Israelis – and they do not want to. Clearly showcased by the government they elect and their policies.

"Everybody sees that Israel is not really for peace, with this government or the latest governments. Because if you are talking about giving back 22% of the land to its legal, lawful owners you do not built settlements inside this 22%." (I28, l. 195-197)

"As long as Israel is closing the city and all its economic development and potential, there won't even be any discussion about the economy." (I19, l. 281-282)

"The political terms of a solution are known to everybody and they have been around for decades, really, but it's just the, I don't know, stubbornness, the arrogance, the power of their fear..." (I23, l. 64-66)

These mechanisms of pushing responsibility onto the other can even reveal rather absurd perspectives.

"I remember once a dentist, he lived in Jerusalem. On one of the checkpoints the soldier was talking to him. He told him I am a doctor; I am a dentist. He said I don't believe you. Well, he died after two days. /Pause/" (I13, l. 747-450)

The Israelis argue: We have tried everything. We have offered everything. They want to wipe us from the face of this country and will never be satisfied until we are gone. That is why they are not participating in a peace process.

"They don't want to give up on hell. /pause/ [...] They project all their shit on us." (I6, l. 456-457)

"There is no two states solution. You can only have a two states solution with people who are willing to accept your existence. If you have people that you are negotiating with that say you have to disappear then [...] this is not a two states solution conflict, this is a conflict between people who want to wipe you off the face of the earth and that's their solution. Everything less is not a solution for them.

They don't want a two states solution, and anybody who looks at what is going on is Syria and Iraq and Isis ... who do you think you are dealing with? You are talking about a two states solution, it's a solution for a problem that doesn't exist.

If you had two populations that were both civilized, and they were willing to come to some modus operandi then you have a two states solution, what world is that in? Where is that conflict? Who are these people? If you look at the conflict of this country realistically and at the realistic antagonists- forget about it.

The Jews have made every effort with the Oslo accords to see this come true. It is a delusion, which we paid very, very dearly for by people getting blown up. The minute we took down the checkpoints terrorists came in and blew themselves up. That's the reality of this situation." (I14, l. 770-782)

6.1.4.3 Incapable leadership

"If I had to [find solutions to the future of Jerusalem] I would." (I1, l. 637-638)

Another thing many interviewees see eye to eye on is their disillusionment with the leadership and the politicians, no matter their own or the other sides'. There is a high degree of disillusionment, especially after the failure of the Oslo accords. They see politicians as widely dishonest, corrupt, manipulative, unwilling and incapable.

"I don't like politicians... because all the time they are lying and making things which is not nice ... and they won't tell you what they agree to. Always it is under the table." (I13, l. 419-421)

"[But] politicians and parties they want to use this big important symbolic cause for their politics [...] and I don't think they care a lot about the daily life of the citizen here whether Jewish or Arab, it's just using it. Unfortunately." (I17, l. 120-226)

“They are watching it drown and they are not doing anything.” (I19, l. 260-261)

“The big politics is very badly done by politicians who didn't get into any solution.” (I15, l. 149-150)

“We have a very bad leadership on all sides. Israeli and Palestinian [...]. We don't have that kind of leadership we used to have that can be courageous men of peace, no we don't.” (I28, l. 207-209)

6.1.4.4 International community

The view on the international community is not homogeneous. Some see it as an important part of building a future in Jerusalem, some criticize it for not taking actions and some blame it for the situation. It is a tool to emphasize the own position and reassure the own perspective on the future.

International community as a hope:

“That's why I am relying on the international community, because we need the world to save us from ourselves. I don't think we will try on our own.” (I32, l. 438-440)

“I feel there are many, many governments, or many European people, who start to understand the Palestinian issue, because in Europe in the past 100 years they don't want Jews to be in their community.” (I30, l. 47-50)

Critique on the international community:

“For the time being there is no mediator, EU is not playing the role it should play as an active mediator in the peace process and Americans they turned out not to be interested anymore.” (I25, l. 455-458)

“There is a huge discussion about them defining the Palestinians, but they are evacuating 40 000 indigenous people that have been there since always. Like, who do you think you are? Go, take care of your own issues.” (I2, l. 724-726)

6.1.4.5 We have to find a way

Another strong sentiment is that there is no alternative. There is no option to fail, to not figure out the situation in Jerusalem and come to terms with it. One way or another.

“We have to find a way to live together. But in order for that to happen everyone has to compromise or everyone has to give something.” (I5, l. 232-233)

“It will be fine. [...] It has to be, it has to become for both. It can't go on forever.” (I23, l. 154-158)

“We have to find a political solution and we have to have peace here. Unless we are going to have peace here, we will be in this atmosphere and this is the big and the most important challenge we need to get solved.” (I8, l. 89-91)

“And even in the bleak situation that we are living in, I can show you with numbers and with figures that even Israelis cannot endure and eventuate under such a situation.” (I24, l. 153-155)

“It's not going to happen tomorrow, but it can't carry on forever, this situation. It's just not feasible because people [...] want to have lives.” (I10, l. 376-378)

6.1.4.6 Peace will benefit us

The most intriguing rational is a very straightforward one, which might suffer from the hyperbolic focus and the pushing of blame onto the other side. It's the perspective, that if there were peace, also the own faction would benefit greatly from it. This seems, due to the political current power distribution in Jerusalem, especially relevant for the Israeli side.

“There is East Jerusalem and then there is West Jerusalem and they are not the same city. And then it won't be part, and we won't not only feeling guilty, but we won't be responsible for what's going on there and we will be able to take care of ourselves. [...] We will benefit from the official divide.” (I5, l. 646-787)

“Jerusalem has to be solved. It has to have a level of security, not just a real but also a mental security. It has to feel that it is living in peace with itself,” (I10, l. 280-381)

“And if it will come to peaceful terms life will become much more normal. Like any other city.” (I18, l. 67-68)

“I mean... all the things we could do together. The things we could develop together and the worlds that we can reach together with the Israeli and the Palestinians combining their talents. It's completely dumb not to.” (I18, l. 117-120)

6.1.4.7 What really matters

Another common theme is that if peace is possible the details do not really matter. That if there is war, no one can gain from Jerusalem's holiness or beauty. However, this should be regarded with some caution, as the reality is that the parties are very conflicted and do care about details. Still, the prominent argument is, that the absolute priority should be a solution, a better future – with civil rights, equality and peace– everything that is holding off the peace process today should be secondary.

"I don't care. I don't care how it is realized. [...] In 50 years, there has to be a political settlement otherwise things will deteriorate further and there will be more ghettos, more riots, more demonstrations." (I23, l. 167-174)

"I really, really think that there is needs for a solution to the Palestinian situation. And I don't care how. Because they have to have a citizenship of one kind or another. I think they need to be allowed to have a certain degree of responsibility towards the city for it to have a chance to survive." (I1, l. 545-548)

"I would like to see my children living in their own state [...] and they are treated as full citizens. I don't mind whether it's called Palestine or Israel-Palestine or Palestine-Israel, as long as they feel at home, and they are recognized as at home." (I29, l. 433-442)

"I am for every solution that will bring a solution. I am for a solution. I don't care about territories." (I8, l. 415-416)

Another aspect of this is, that this conflict over Jerusalem is not worth dying for.

"For me, like this, use of Jerusalem, all this old city and the beautiful stuff here. For me it's not worth one life. And there are people who think that it is worth dying for, and I don't think ...nothing is worth dying for, nothing. The most important thing is to live, and I don't care where. To live good. So why do you have to die for something. You die, you know, you will not exist anymore, so what do you care?" (I8, l. 450-454)

"I want [my grandchildren] to have freedom ... and freedom without a life is not enough .. and a life without freedom is not enough ..." (I12, l. 347-348)

"Give the children home to the mothers. Leaders in this world, when they have taken the children to fight [...] and for what? What? What are they doing? They never leave the heart of the mothers. [...] Because there is no

one mother saying... black or white, or Christian or Muslim or Jews, they are all mothers. And that is what the people in the world don't understand." (I12, l. 93-104)

And finally, the argument that it doesn't matter who you are – we are not that dissimilar from each other – all equal, all human.

"I care about the Israeli people like I care about Palestinians. This is what counts." (I25, l. 460-461)

"Loving each other. be happy, celebrate, whatever, Christmas, Easter, Muslim, Ramadan, Jewish, I don't care. But living as human beings. Not I am better than you, no. [...] It is my soul my dignity is above you. Free. Happy. taking care of each other. [...] Open. Very simple. Normal, like the mother takes care of the baby and how the baby loves his mother." (I7, 646-658)

"I want to feel that we are all equal. God created us in his image, so we are all equal as sons and daughters of god. This is how I want to feel in Jerusalem. Everybody, Jews, Muslims or Christians should feel the same, that we are the sons of god, we live as brothers and sisters in the city." (I28, l. 251-254)

"I don't care about who you are, from where, which language, what you believe... I can see you are beautiful..." (I12, l. 484-485)

6.1.5 Social imagery

During the analysis it became clear that one of the best ways to access underlying convictions and perceptions of the future was the focus on pictorial language, certain images and comparisons, but also the choice of stories told, and quotes recited. While difficult to dig through the politicized and gridlocked perspectives of the conflict, the other or a future of the city, the ease and precision in which interviewees connected certain beliefs and convictions with certain socially shared imagery was very revealing, especially on second glance. Even though these images might not always translate directly into images of future, they increase the understanding of the context and the view of the world of each individual connecting to their future image of Jerusalem 2060. They tell a story of what Jerusalem truly means to them, and what they believe the city is at its core (to some degree also in the future).

6.1.5.1 The existential core

There are those images that have a central theme, a vortex, a magnet, a core, the heart, the key – something existential. This reveals much of the value and status of Jerusalem in the life and the understanding of the world of the interviewees.

“They have been looking at Jerusalem as the beating heart of the Jewish existence, the Jewish craving for their own home. That is Jerusalem. It is where our story starts, it is where our story is said to end. It’s sort of the key to the entire Jewish identity.” (I1, l. 682-685)

“We always think Jerusalem is the heart. And the heart of Jerusalem still beats.” (I31, l. 447-448)

“Here there is something like a magnet that holds you into the core of the universe.” (I21, l. 84-85)

Then there are those images that are existential, but also with a survival theme, fierce and enduring:

“Very typical to the area [are] specifically flowers that bloom after disaster. After a big fire, after everything is ruined, they have so much strength inside that they bloom again. [...] This moment is passing away [-] memento mori. And then these flowers they rise again and again, [...] the flowers they struggle, and they find their way.” (I21, l. 10-17)

“[Jerusalem] is exactly like the water for the fish and the sky for the birds.” (I30, l. 5)

And then those who claim exclusive ownership:

“How can I share you my house? How can I share it? You took my house by force, because I am not strong. It doesn't give you the right ... When I grow up, slowly, slowly and I stand on my feet and I will be strong, ... then... I will take my house back.” (I7, 731-734)

6.1.5.2 The bright and holy

Jerusalem is also often described as something beautiful or bright, illustrating a very positive and hopeful relation with the city.

“Jerusalem is the window to the sky. It's the way to heaven.” (I30, l. 39-40)

“[Jerusalem is] Helen of Troy. This beautiful, beautiful princess that belonged to a people. They were at war with other people and they were trying to broker a peace and then when they finally did they came and had this big celebration. There the prince saw the beautiful Helen of Troy and he just couldn't resist. He had to have her. He stole her with his ship and ran away. This started the war of Troy, the huge, deadly, the face that launched a thousand ships. [...] And so this this rather beautiful city is being demanded by two different people and they are willing to, instead of having nice peaceful kind of negotiations of peace, kill each other and many others and destroy everything and anyone. Just to get this prized possession. If it worth it or not is a different question.” (I1, l. 919-929)

It is seen as something precious, even holy:

“It is something very precious. maybe a treasure, a diamond, something like that.” (I13, l. 518-519)

“It's like a trophy everybody is fighting to get. Some kind of prize. Jerusalem is a prize and sometimes it's with that team, or sometimes with that team, but at the end of the day it has to be shared” (I23, l. 294-296)

But also, something delicate and vulnerable, especially by the Israeli interviewees:

“[Jerusalem is] one of those toys that you push one little thing and then 500 things happen. This falls and this turns and this tumbles.” (I1, l. 378-379)

“It holds something very delicate, very delicate. Like a spider's net. And if one of the threads were to tear apart, things will fall after them.” (I21, l. 157-158)

And something peaceful, diverse and tolerant that can act as an example for the world:

“The mosaic of Jerusalem is amazing. That has to be kept. It is taboo to destroy it and we can convert Jerusalem into an example for dialogues for people around the world who are in need for that. [...] This is what Jerusalem could do in the future.” (I29, l. 458-464)

“I see it as a step forward in the development of mankind. And the development of harmony in the word, sort of a little petridish in which we have tried everything and come to the wonderful development of this growing ability to live together and we can share this with other places in the world where there are conflicts.” (I14, l. 799-804)

6.1.5.3 Natural and normal

An extremely frequent image was that of Jerusalem as something normal, like any other city or place, lending an insight from the basic desires of the interviewees. Especially the comparison with other cities was abundant.

Here the religiousness and spiritual value is emphasized:

“It's a religious city so it should be open, as the Vatican state in a different world.” (I24, l. 52-53)

Here the peaceful and non-violent respectful conduct is accentuated:

“I prefer to see it as a peaceful... \pause\ like Amsterdam. \laugh\. Maybe. [...] To legalise the weed. \laugh hard\
This would solve a lot of problems here. I am sure of it.” (I8, l. 486-491)

Whereas here, a positive reconciliation and an unlikely future are called upon as possible:

“When Berlin was united, I was invited to go meet with other Journalists for the reunification. I was touring the city and I saw a different atmosphere completely. There was a joy of creating something new. A very interesting experience for me. To see how two people are coming together. After years of difference. A barrier between them, not only the wall, but a completely different mentality. [...] It is an example of people deciding this city will not be divided. And I think this is our chance as well.” (I18, l. 272-284)

This example outlines tolerance and acceptance of different faiths:

“I wish I could have a Jerusalem like Cordoba was in the 15th century, where Jews and Muslims actually lived together. Equally. There is never full equality, there is never a symmetry, but we can do a lot better than we are doing now.” (I32, l. 231-234)

But Jerusalem was also compared with more abstract things; images that evoke something natural, unstoppable but calm – a natural force like water.

“Yes, you can block the advance of history like you are trying to block a river. Eventually the water will climb over you and it will cover you.” (I22, l. 303-305)

“White foam in a large sea, that hardly changes the landscape. As long as you have radical Islam [...] going around beheading Christians and talking about wiping Israel off the map, I don't see any way for Jerusalem to create some kind of harmony officially.” (I14, l. 293-296)

"[Jerusalem] is like water. You can't hold it. It's running through your fingers .. there is no way to describe it. It's just continually changing." (I21, l. 103-104)

Finally, there are quite some images relating to human relationships, like the one between a mother and a child. This was especially an image Palestinians held.

"There is a feeling that you are protected from the vicious. We feel safe. It's like an embryo in the mother's womb, you feel protected. You feel that everything will be OK, that all these other times will not affect you. You will not get sick, you will not age." (I31, l. 91-93)

"[Jerusalem is] like the mother [who] takes care of the baby and how the baby loves his mother." (I7, l. 657-658)

6.1.5.4 Destructive darkness

There are, however, also darker and more destructive images picturing division, darkness, violence and victimhood in relation to Jerusalem, connecting closely to the current and past reality of the city.

These images talk about a violated city, a city desecrated by the conflict and treated negligent an unbecoming her position; the behavior of her citizens causing lasting damages.

"Jerusalem has always been the city of peace. Now it's a city of pieces, social disintegration, environmental degradation, physical fragmentation." (I24, l. 420-421)

"It's better to call it holey city, a city with a lot of holes." (I29, l. 22)

"This city was always a tinder box." (I32, l. 387)

"It's like an avalanche, a little bit more snow and a little bit more snow and this one and that one, and all of a sudden you have this... cataclysmic change... but the cataclysmic change was building up all along." (I14, l. 447-449)

"You know the Yiddish word for shit? Its 'oivoi'. That's the metaphor." (I6, l. 570-571)

Some see a darkness in her in form of perpetuating dynamics, a never-ending process or even a vicious circle or a lasting lock-in. In these images there is a sort of standstill in time.

“It's a vicious cycle. [...] a trap of violence. [...] We will be reaching a very dark tunnel.” (I25, l. 283-483)

“Pretty soon it will come to a point, the critical point... like a critical mass and /pause/ ... a nuclear explosion. there are enough protons to cause a chain reaction.” (I6, l. 262-265)

“[Jerusalem] is a rope. People are trying to pull on the rope from each side and sometimes the rope goes a bit to this side and sometimes the rope goes to that side. [...] And that's the way it is going to stay.” (I5, l. 829-835)

6.1.5.5 Purgatory, monsters and corruption

The extreme end of this perception is one of a purgatory, a prison, hell or heat. Jerusalem as a place of corruption and unsolved existential issues. These images have a gradual aspect to them, increasing in intensity over time.

“It is sort of between hell and heaven. [...] You have to stay there until something is solved.” (I1, l. 212-214)

“A greenhouse for extremism, that has to be dismantled.” (I29, l. 451-452)

“It seems like ... many, many crazy people from all over the world come here and for some reason \pause\ I don't know... use it as an anchor for their craziness.” (I6, l. 40-41)

And then there are images that see Jerusalem as a kind of monster. An unsaturable entity of conflict at its core.

“OK, there are two dogs⁴ that are fighting on a meal and now you give each dog a separate bowl and they can, you know, chew their own food and be quiet. It doesn't work like that. [...] It's many dogs. It's like many, many, many dogs ... who are mixed together.” (I6, l. 100-106)

“It's like one of those predator plants that you have in the tropics. It needs blood otherwise it's not Jerusalem.” (I32, l. 407-408)

⁴ Dogs are seen as unclean, impure and dangerous in Jewish and Islamic tradition

“In a way this city is one of those ancient gods, the Molech⁵, that you would sacrifice children to. It did you no good, but you had to do it.” (I32, l. 444-445)

6.1.5.6 Volatility

A less common but still quite prominent picture is that of an erratic and unpredictable force, a Jerusalem slipping out of control, with no plan for the future.

“[Jerusalem is] like a water slide, you know how you go like that, (head first) and you never know where you will end up? And you are going very fast, and it's kind of out of your control,” (I9, l. 660-662)

“It's like a boat that gets pushed into different directions and sort of sails through.” (I9, l. 696-697)

6.1.5.7 Duplicity

Lastly, there are various dichotomies; images that are contradictory or incoherent. Throughout the entire Leitbildanalysis dichotomies surface on each conjunction. They are especially visible when it comes to pictorial language.

“It's like catch 22 a bit. [...] a little bit like a double life. Like you have friends they are Arabs, you talk to them you can relate to them and then you are scared when you get on the bus or the train is going through an Arab neighborhood.” (I33, l. 51-53)

“Jerusalem [is] a city with a personality disorder. /laugh/” (I9, l. 130)

“Jerusalem is a golden bowl full of snakes and scorpions. /laugh/” (I26, l. 398)

“[Jerusalem] is like sex, its! about both being able to conquer and [being able to be] soft and loving. We live inside each other and we are leaving something behind. The different parts of Jerusalem have been raping each other and they have to find a way to do it which does something good for each other and brings them together. Make something out of it.” (I10, l. 741-748)

⁵ A Canaanite deity associated in biblical sources with the practice of child sacrifice. The name derives from combining the consonants of the Hebrew *melech* (“king”) with the vowels of *boshet* (“shame”) (Tesch, 2017)

6.1.6 'Us' construct

In the classic approach of the Leitbildanalysis the categories of 'Synchronization' and 'Desynchronization' are used to describe concepts that help create inner group cohesion or help to distinguish each other from other standpoints. In the adapted Leitbildanalysis approach, however, these categories will focus on the self-image and the image of the other that are being recreated. The reasoning behind this shift in focus is, that in the context of violent an ongoing conflict social groups form less alongside issues and content, but groups are forced to form alongside often ethnic conflict lines. These lines are extremely rigid and impervious, and quite random in nature. One is either on the Palestinian or the Israeli side. However, the perceived and prescribed images for 'us' and 'them' are built on almost identical themes for both conflict parties.

These concepts of a positive self-image and a negative image of the other is highly dependent on each other and deeply related, therefore there will be some quotes that align with more categories, not just the one they are subsumed in. The following does not elicit what is rightfully or not part of the self-image and the image of the other, but merely describes the findings from the interviews.

Both conflict parties see themselves as smart and creative, vigilant, strong and enduring, reasonable, responsible and open to compromise, as tolerant, friendly, open hearted and peaceful while being the (mostly innocent) victim of the other.

6.1.6.1 Smart and creative

Creativity but also high intellectual levels are highly important for both societies. Israelis as well as Palestinians are proud of their cultural heritage or art, music, religious scholars as well as scientific traditions. Education and academic studied have a high significance in life.

"We have great universities; people are really smart. Israelis in general are smart, but the Hebrew university is one of the best universities. It's on the top list of the world." (I33, l. 208-210)

"The young generation are bright people. And that is really amazing [...] there are a lot a lot of smart and beautiful in the young generation." (I12, l. 282-286)

“You can see that there are also many creative artists coming out of this struggle. It can be bitterly beautiful. Painters, photographs, intellectuals, writers.” (I19, l. 235-236)

6.1.6.2 Vigilant, strong and enduring

Especially due to the protracted nature of the conflict there appears to be an increased need to reinforce the image of oneself as vigilant, strong and enduring – never giving up, never giving in, never showing weakness. This resilient image of the own entity probably ties in closely with real experiences of the sometimes even existential struggles of everyday life in Jerusalem on both sides.

It can also act as an invocation, of increasing itself through repetition, almost like a self-fulfilling prophecy.

“We are standing, we are strong. [...] Israel bombed Gaza, killed thousands, but still in Gaza they stand. [...] Negotiation from power, not from weakness. [...] We kick out Israel from here and it will happen.” (I7, l. 435-469)

“Jews are not giving up for sure.” (I2, 711-712)

“Many Palestinians are close to the land, like trees. Nothing will take us.” (I17, l. 326)

“If somebody tries to make that happen, we are going to stop them” (I10, l. 718)

“We [...] are following the resilience approach. We will remain, we will continue with an open heart and mind, until our partner believes that Jerusalem is an open city.” (I25, l. 389-390)

“We are not the red Indian. Are you hearing anything about the red Indian? /long pause/ [...] You are not. You are hearing about the Palestinians every single day.” (I30, l. 219-222)

“If you are not willing to push back you are going to get the city you don't want. that's why it is very important to be vigilant.” (I14, l. 494-496)

6.1.6.3 Reasonable, responsible and compromising

Interestingly both communities see themselves largely as the only reasonable party of the conflict, willing to compromise and thoroughly responsible. But also, ethically superior and spiritually enabled to live up to the expectations of this extraordinary place.

"[Jerusalem is] the gateway to Heaven for all people who are looking for it. The Tora was given to the Jewish people to hold the Tora, it's like a book standing in a library shelf someone needs to take care of the shelf. But the book is not just for us. It is for whoever wants to access. Abraham was the only named Jew and his sons Itzhak and Jakov but after that the majority of people were from around here. They heard the word of Abraham and they came, and they saw the truth. They saw how peace was better than war. That is the word that brought so many people together. We Jews we just have this function of facilitating the process, but the process is not ours. [...] It's really what god wants." (I2, l. 806-828)

"If we are able to lead an ethical campaign against Zionism, I think we will defeat the ideology." (I22, l. 174)

"Our struggle is not with Judaism. I have never been against any Jew. I live with them as people, as human beings like I am. But I am against extremists, and against being fanatic, whether Palestinian or Israeli. I am against this as a Jerusalemite, as a person caring about my future and the future of my children." (I25, l. 471-475)

"I believe in 50 years we, Muslims and Christians, are living in the old city as one family. [...] If there is no Zionist, we will live as Palestinians in peace with Jews." (I30, l. 107-304)

"It is also a tremendous responsibility, because the hopes that the Jewish people had for coming back to the land of Israel and resettling Jerusalem were the deepest part of their existence and their believe. And here you are and you are fulfilling that and you can't just live an ordinary life if you live in Jerusalem you have to be part of something that ... you are part of something, de facto, that is extraordinary, and you have to live up to that." (I14, l. 14-19)

6.1.6.4 Tolerant, open and peaceful

Similarly, the self-images are dominantly tolerant, open-minded, open hearted and above all peaceful. The narrative is, that 'we' are the only ones being nice and civil, even in the face of conflict and hard circumstances, with humanistic values and high moral standards.

How much of these narratives actually, hold up to prolonged critical inquiry is at least questionable, however, this is the basis of the self-image created and reinforced on both sides.

“All the Palestinians in the Eastern part of Jerusalem come to Jerusalem to shop, they walk down our main street, they go into our stores, have they ever been harassed? Have they ever been stopped? Has anybody said to them when they came to the shop in the center, In Malha... you can't shop here, you can't go into this restaurant and sit down and have a cup of tea? No. Even in the worst part of the intifada when Jews were getting blown up by Palestinian terrorists every other day. People still came, less, because they were uncomfortable, but they still came, and they were not harassed, not one.” (I14, l. 133-139)

“The problem is not there. Muslims and Jews actually have lived better together than Christians and Jews. Christians slaughtered Jews in Europe. The Muslims never slaughtered the Jews. They have actually lived more in harmony and peacefully together. Even when the Islamic Empire was a strong empire it did not slaughter the Jews, or the Christians for that matter.” (I22, l. 157-161)

“Whoever it is we have around is welcome, they become part of it if they want to become part of it.” (I28, l. 37)

“The Jewish inhabitants will live here in peace and harmony ... with a hand extended in peace towards all its neighbors and all the other religions, because if Judaism is in charge, we don't have any problems with being friends with the Muslims and the Christians” (I14, l. 307-310)

“We want to destroy that wall. [...] We are as a peace taker here between different faiths and religions and languages.” (I12, l. 233-238)

6.1.6.5 Victimhood

Both parties have built their image of self to a very high degree on victimhood. This is arguably the strongest aspect of their group identity, and one that makes it very hard to find common ground. This way, the ‘Us’ is heavily reliant on the ‘them’ as the perpetrator; it runs the risk of disintegrating as soon as the image of the enemy begins to be questioned.

This paragraph, as mentioned, specifically does *not* deal with the question of who has the right or the reason to feel like a victim, but describes the prominent subjective feeling itself, as this is very important for the construction of future images and especially Leitbilder in the conflict.

Most of the victim's narrative is based on being the victim of the violent other. This is a self-image almost all interviewees share; often being a very dominant sentiment.

"I live one minute away from the synagogue where four people were killed praying [...]. They were teachers that we had. My rabbi is still cut here [showing left arm]. Everybody asks why. How did these guys enter the synagogue with axes? The whole community in HarNov knew the guys because they were working in the supermarket and they just thought maybe they are delivering something. Or maybe they just woke up and said OK today I am going to talk to god and just came. We are very peaceful people. It's all about prayer. Even the army doesn't like to be doing what they are doing. They are forced to do it, because there is a lot of hatred here." (I2, l. 731-742)

"Most of the times it is the settlers or the army who are beginning the problems. Who are provoking and if an Arab defends himself then he is the bad one, shoot him. There are all these lists now on Facebook for an Arab to conduct himself so that the Jews don't kill him. An Arab should not carry a handbag or put his hand in his pocket. If he has a lunch box, he should not have a plastic knife with it. When they walk past him, he should close his eyes, close his ears and not respond in any way." (I31, l. 140-146)

"We are in a big jail. They mean to kill us, emotionally, mentally, physically, business, everything..." (I7, l. 69-71)

"If you look at Isis or other groups, they drag us back into old times. That is the world that we are living in. Beheading people." (I18, l. 306-308)

Another angle is a wider one, based on negative impacts and life itself that the other is seen to be responsible for:

"You will see that people who are highly unemployed are educated people, with university degrees. And when they work in restaurants washing dishes, they are fired and humiliated and discriminated ...you can imagine." (I25, l. 433-435)

"We have to suffer their collective avoidance of reality." (I31, l. 347)

Some are focusing more on the overall situation and living conditions that only passively reverts to the other:

"This frustration makes illnesses for the people and they die early" (I13, l. 447)

“Both sides need to make an effort. And I feel like we are making more of an effort than they are. To me it feels that way. And I think that we are so willing and essentially that's hurting us.” (I33, l. 251-253)

And finally, there is the victim narrative that is not directly related to the other, but more a general feeling:

“The Europeans have slaughtered the Jews and we have to pay for that. But we don't have to pay for it just because it was a European mistake we have to pay further because it has become an American European interest. The president of this Israeli state provides enough geopolitical and economic protection for the interests of the West. At some point against the Soviet Union, and against the BRICS countries and Iran and against, I don't know, growing China. We are a card in the middle.” (I22, l. 161-167)

“We will be in between trying to keep them [Palestinians and Haredim] from kicking each other in the ass. And we will be the ones who will be kicked most, because that is what always happens. The one who tries to maintain the world, is the one who is hated the most.” (I6, l. 343-346)

“All the Jews that were evacuated from Europe left everything behind. [...] And the next generation was always poor and homeless, having to start from scratch somewhere else. And finally, we have a place that tries to accommodate all of them that were tortured from other countries. Why do we need to listen to these countries right now?” (I2, l. 780-785)

Finally, there are some who express a more critical self-image, but this is not very common. Even then, it is often only partially self-critical or reveals hidden traits of the dominant self-images described above.

“[The] reality is that you have two nations in this city, and you can argue that oh the Muslims never really cared about Jerusalem and it wasn't even taken and during the Muslim rule it was a tiny... it's true that under the Turks it was a shit hole, [...] but today you have 350 000 Palestinians living inside the city borders and more living around and they see this as their place, and you are not going to change that. That's reality.” (I10, l. 679-684)

“Some Palestinians think extremely, they want to get the Jews back to Poland, they want their Palestine...” (I17, l. 312-314)

Sometimes this critique is only limited to certain parts of society or very generalized critique of the whole of humanity:

"I just detest the human being for how dumb you can get. How egoistic, how self-centered are you, how religious, how stupid Mine, mine, mine." (I23, l. 283-285)

"I think that Ultra-orthodoxy has its share of those who would be very comfortable sitting in a court room in Iran and judging whether a woman can get a divorce." (I14, l. 197-199)

6.1.7 'They' construct

Complimentary to the Self-image, both conflict parties see the other generally with traits like weak, stupid, careless and incapable, extremely untrustworthy calculating liars, illegitimate and undeserving, uncompromising, racist, selfish and in denial and most of all dangerous, violent, fanatic and outright evil. These prescriptions of the other are not always easy to clearly point out or pin down, as they are often subtle implications or part of very specific examples, therefore each statement should stand for its own, together forming a cluster of similar expressions, frequently overlapping with other aspects.

Some interviewees express also partially positive images of the other, or at least show a degree of understanding and empathy towards the other. However, the overall images reveal a general categoric mental divide in the process of creating an image of 'us' and 'them', where everything deemed negative and bad seems to be projected onto the other, while the positive aspects are heavily denied or reverted back to the self-image.

6.1.7.1 Weak, careless and incapable

The first aspect prescribed to the other is one of weakness. The other is seen to act stupid, self-destructive, as careless, or simply incapable and with no high standard.

This interviewee refers to the other as tense; unable to feel safe and relaxed. And a sentiment of pity:

"But I think Israel will never really feel that it's completely secure as long as it is occupying us. I don't think they will ever feel relaxed and secure. They need to feel all the time that they are a kind of victim and insecure. This is why I pity them, I feel sad for them, that they feel so, because even if we are occupied, we are not really afraid." (I19, l. 371-376)

Here the other is described as acting only in short slightness and consequently foolish:

“Oppression will not lead to security. When you oppress people, if you oppress any animals, they will revolt. [...] It's not smart.” (I25, l. 484-487)

The other is framed as having no moral values shame or decency, as well as a general moral decline:

“And unfortunately, we have less and less Israeli gentlemen of the old European background. They died. Those who had shame, values, humanity decency, who had humanistic values no longer exist. They died.” (I31, l. 453-455)

Here the focus lies on ungrateful, unreasonable and violent:

“[Some of the] people who are walking around [in your city] are becoming terrorists – attacking, stabbing, running over ... out of frustration, out of brainwashing, out of whatever it is that leads them to that. And they do that with a residency, which basically gives them nearly every right that an Israeli citizen has [...], free movement, free government services.” (I1, l. 214-219)

The following refers to an overall sentiment of carelessness and callousness:

“I guess that when you have nothing to lose you can be much more violent then when you have something to lose.” (I15, l. 238-239)

The other is seen as weak, stubborn, uncooperative, incomprehensible and stupid harming their own community by their actions:

“They will not play the game and take part in it. It is bizarre, they cannot bang on the table and say, I want 25, 17 % going to the infrastructure in this village. Because they don't sit in the municipality. If they would decide that the municipality business is not connected to the national aspirations, where the border will pass in the future, they could make their life better. Lessen the stupidity of war and endless conflict. Sometimes OK, you want to be the owner of the whole Palestine and I want to be the owner of all Israel. In the meantime, let's make sure, water, roads and schools are built correctly. NO. [...] It is a question of non-recognition. Or torpedoing working together as excepting the other. They don't want to.” (I18, l. 193-204)

This speaks of a dangerously generalized sentiment of the whole prescribed ethnic group of being undemocratic, dirty, dysfunctional and violent:

“I see Arab cities in the Arab world. They are usually quite miserable. Non-democratic, very conservative, quite dirty, dysfunctional, even violent. And I am afraid this is going to be the situation in East Jerusalem if the city is divided.” (I32, l. 274-277)

6.1.7.2 Untrustworthy

Another important aspect of the image of the other is one of distrust. Most interviewees express a deep-rooted suspicion of the other: They see 'Them' as breaking agreements in principle, one who cannot be relied on under no circumstances and acts unfairly. Sometimes this sentiment goes as far as seeing the other as treacherous, deceptive or deceitful. In some cases, it is directed towards individuals, in others it is a more general attribution describing a plot against the peace process or against the own community. This is a continuous feeling throughout the interviews, however, seems to be expressed more frequently by Palestinians.

"Netanyahu is the one who wants to rally the religious. He wants to keep the situation in a state of chaos, and I don't know what's his problem. He does not want the Arabs obviously. Just imagine Nir Barkat going around the city with his gun telling every Jew to defend himself, when in fact it's them who are attacking. And then they make up a story. To say there is a big security problem produced by Arabs, these terrible people, is all an Israeli narrative. They objectify you, dehumanize you to exclude you. And these terms are so clear... that he is being that evil." (I31, l. 181-187)

"Why did they do this wall? Why? [...] They built this wall on our land, not on the part which they had in 1948, and they don't mind. They come to this house; they demolish it without asking people." (I13, l. 306-308)

"That is pretty much the agenda, why the neighbours are trying so much to infiltrate or influence the culture. That's how the Islam got a lot of other countries, by influencing the culture. [...] The rate of them having children is bigger than the Jewish families. So if they are going to have one vote for share, very soon they will take over." (I2, l. 183-191)

"They say something, and they do something else." (I30, l. 323)

"The Israelis in my opinion know exactly what they are doing. They even now opened an office called the office to develop the East part of Jerusalem, not East Jerusalem. The East part of Jerusalem, you understand the mentality?" (I22, l. 104-106)

"They are making business, they are making money, they have no problems, they are stealing, they are bullshitting everybody. the kings are not living better. They live better then Kings." (I7, l. 84-86)

6.1.8 Illegitimate and undeserving

The aspect of legitimacy is a fundamental one especially in the context of protracted conflict, as denying it increases the own standing inside the mentality of a zero-sum logic.

“People [are] coming from Ukraine, from Russia and they say this is our land... /pause/ come on. Come on, doesn't make sense to me as a person. Maybe I am stupid, but teach me, show me. Correct me, come on. I mean ...” (17, l. 610-612)

“They [have] another 22 countries that follow their law. Go back to those countries if you really want to follow this law. [...] Whoever studies the Koran can see that it doesn't mention anything about Jerusalem. They don't have Jerusalem in their book. They talk about Mohammed. [...] It's their home but they could be moved to other areas.” (12, l. 277-430)

“You go into East Jerusalem today and it's neglected, [...] I cannot blame the Jewish town hall for every discarded piece of candy wrap.” (132, l. 281-283)

6.1.8.1 Uncompromising and in denial

Seeing the other as a self-involved, self-centered entity doing harm to the overall situation and Jerusalem as a place, is closely related to the prescribed traits of the other mentioned above and below, such as ‘weak, careless and incapable’ and ‘dangerous, violent, fanatic and evil’. However, it comes with a certain sense of sadness and apathy that the other can't see ‘reality’ or doesn't want to change it.

“They are /deep breath/ really demolishing the peace project there. Every day today.” (124, l. 99-100)

“[They] will have to face reality and let go of its dream to have it all.” (123, l. 63-64)

“It's a big problem until they want to figure it out, they want it better.” (18, l. 107)

Israelis fault the Palestinians for not participating in the system whereas Palestinians blame the Israelis for forcing them to be part of a system, where they are not equals.

“When you don't vote and when your voice isn't heard in the political system ... then you get discriminated against. So, there are racial elements here ... there is the majority being unfair to the minority, but there is also a decision ... there is this culture of boycotting that the Arabs have taken in general against Israel. [...] It creates suicide bombers. It creates very frustrated citizens, who take their car and run into police men, like we had yesterday and the day before. It creates other problems of crime and drugs.” (I9, l. 746-758)

“And they are not even ashamed at how they keep confiscating Palestinian houses without giving anyone compensation. You know, the reality to say, yes, this is your house, but I want to confiscate it anyway.” (I19, l. 183-185)

“And the Palestinians never come and say, OK how are we going to run Jerusalem together. They only say it's our capital. Fine, you want it, great, let's say we give you half of it, but then what?” (I10, l. 703-704)

6.1.8.2 Dangerous, violent, fanatic and evil

The most obvious, straight forward as well as widely spread aspect of the image of the other is the one of the enemy. The conflict reproduces a reality where there are acts of violence and hate committed daily, feeding into the image of the other as a violent and dangerous perpetrator at times even fanatic or outright evil.

“You watch how they burn children alive now, and they are very proud of this because they don't believe that we are human beings. They don't look at us as normal people with a soul and a spirit and life.” (I27, l. 128-130)

“These people want you dead. They want you out of here. They want to take over this country. They want to kill you; they want to rape your daughters and they want to take over your homes and your businesses. That's what they want.” (I14, l. 187-789)

“[We] know what to expect and what not to expect. And to believe when they say we are going to build a wall, to believe when they say they will massacre you all, to believe when they say we invade Gaza and don't leave any person living there.” (I19, l. 125-128)

“Jews are brought up now to hate Muslims. Churches throughout the country are being burned, attacked and desecrated not only the mosque.” (I31, l. 126-128)

“They are dressed like in Europe and go blow themselves up. You have all these teenagers killing. [...] Like Golda Meir said, there will only be peace when [...] Arabs love the killing as much as what? I forget the quote, ... love their kids as much as they hate us.” (I33, l. 201-259)

6.1.8.3 Positive traits

There are some who have positive or at least partially positive images of the other. However, these images often act as an alibi to shield oneself from questioning the simplistic construct of good and evil or to enhance the positive self-image (by being able humanizing the other) or to justify the own images of the past, presence and future (especially for the political left). Genuine acceptance of the other as a fellow Jerusalemite in all accounts, good and bad, is virtually impossible – due to the protracted and socially engrained mechanisms of the conflict and the distant realities of life on both sides.

The image of the ‘neighbor’ is a very interesting one; here the only ones who fall into the category are the ‘good neighbors’. This is very selective and especially popular on the right or religious end of the spectrum. Taking a closer look at the context, these statements reveal to be not accepting and tolerant at all.

“Our neighbours... I have friends, Jewish friends now, they are honey, sugar. we talk we drink coffee together, and I don't hurt him, he doesn't hurt me. Don't get me wrong. I have friends now today. With all the shit and they understand my situation.” (I7, l. 607-609)

“Whenever anybody says to me terrible things about the Arabs and they hate the Arabs I say ... hey, you speak with somebody from Jerusalem. These people are my neighbors. They were my doctors; they were my builders. these are people that I am living side by side with.” (I14, l. 101-104)

To the point of common self-delusions:

“I actually honestly feel that whenever they talk about East Jerusalem becoming the new capital of a Palestinian state what I always remember are the protests of the Arabs in East Jerusalem. Who don't want to be part of a Palestinian state /laughing/ ... who are terrified that they are going to be thrown to the Palestinian State because of its violence and its corruption. And the fact that it, you know, they probably killed more Palestinians than anybody.” (I14, l. 105-110)

Then there are the linings of true empathy or appreciation getting quickly mashed in with the dominant constructed perspective to being able to uphold.

“But they have something, which I admire. It's their solidarity, how they work together. But they work together to conquer, /sad laugh/ which is also horrible.” (I19, l. 203-205)

“There is a construction site next to my window and most of the workers here are Palestinians and I saw a very racist sticker against Arabs, and I couldn't stand it. I just tried to tear it away, but it didn't go so well. So, I went at night and just colored it in black because I didn't want them to get offended by that, even though it was in Hebrew. But they understand I am sure.” (I21, l. 337-341)

And, finally, the genuine but often saddening feeling of: **We are all the same, sitting in the same boat that might not float much longer.**

“Every mother loves her kid and she is doing the best for him, there is no option. [They] love their kids and they are doing their best for their sons and daughters.” (I21, l. 193-196)

“We have to one day wake up. We and the [others] alike. We are not so different. We are trying all to avoid thinking about the realities.” (I29, l. 330-332)

“God created us in his image, so we are all equal as sons and daughters of god.” (I28, l. 251-252)

6.1.9 Blind spots

“It's like a painting that just [has a] frame and there is nothing inside. So, it's not black but it's also not white... it's just unknown.” (I16, l. 457-458)

The category ‘Blind spots’ was added to the Leitbildanalysis during the process of organizing the raw data. This means that it is specific to the context of protracted conflict, but also might not yet be fully conceptually developed or streamlined.

There are several important stand-alone aspects of this category, all of which are closely related but important to be distinguished.

The relationship to future is shaped by unpredictability. The lack of future and a feeling of overwhelming unpredictability, however, can be related back to protracted conflict, as

existential insecurities increase dramatically. Here also the placement of past over future is a notable aspect of future as a blind spot.

Impacted by this unpredictability of future are contradictions and dichotomies, as they increase notably by trying to fill in certain blind spots. Contradictions and dichotomies seem to be especially closely related to the situation of protracted conflict. Similarly, denials and delusions as well as wishful thinking all have a certain layer of future they relate to, but at their core lies the uncertainty and the blind spots created by the conflict, not the future.

6.1.9.1 Unpredictability

A very common blind spot is the future itself. There is little active consideration for long-term futures in Jerusalem. This might be true for humans in general, however, in the interviews it seemed to be more pronounced and more comprehensive.

In the 33 interviews there were over 130 mentions of the phrase ‘I don’t know’. These are all individual statements of being unable to assess or evaluate future. It could be just a normal wording, even a filler, but combined with the other indications that the future is more unknown than in other places, it seems greatly relevant. Furthermore, the sheer number of this attitude and the contexts they are expressed in are indicative of a great and overwhelming uncertainty felt towards long-term developments to come.

The inability to try to predict long-term or even short-term futures and the volatility in Jerusalem comes to light most clearly, when this is directly expressed.

“\Pause\ Impossible!\ to predict! [...] I really don't want to have a go, because it's ... anything!\ can happen between now and then. The world is in such a state of flux.” (I4, l.250-255)

“But the thing is about Israel that there are many sorts of regional and political developments that are sudden and sort of unexpected ... it's very hard to project so far into the future. Ehm... things can depend on like ... the administration in the United States, they can depend on so many different external ... factors that it is really hard to guess... what the middle East is going to look like, so ...” (I9, l. 519-524)

“I don't know. I do my best to try to help people to see that kind of reality, [...] learn that being different is a richness and not something bad. You never know how it will be. I try my best.” (I15, l. 230-233)

“In Jerusalem we lack wishful future thinking.” (I25, l. 542-543)

“The people here, nobody knows the secret for your PhD.” (I7, l. 71)

“In a country that exists for 67 years it's hard to imagine 50 years in the future. [...] Everything and nothing can change.” (I1, l. 462-463)

“I don't know, really I don't know, how things will ... will happen. It's difficult to know.” (I11, l. 463)

“I don't think anything is stable here, nothing. It's the middle East, things can change. Things can change quickly.” (I17, l. 323-324)

Also, the feeling of having no agency or having no future, no hope for the future, leaves the individuals ultimately with a void of unpredictability:

“The Muslims started this way of living, to become radical and fanatic in their thinking, after they didn't see any hope for the future.” (I20, l. 78-80)

“You will see this, if you don't have a future. If you don't have a window of opportunity you will do anything. So, unless you open this window of opportunity and make sure that they have a future and a plan Palestinian or Israeli will go radical.” (I24, l. 258-260)

Then there are those, who, due to the situation of unpredictability, completely gave up on long-term perspectives, focusing on the now:

“I don't [have a vision for the city]. I want small steps. I know that I won't be able to achieve a lot in my work, so I put myself in very, very small goals and I know that I will be able to achieve them, before I die and then we will see who will continue.” (I16, l. 463-465)

“There is a saying in Hebrew that only fools pretend to be prophets these days and I don't try to prophecy about it, I think you have to take it one day at a time. Make the most of it.” (I18, l. 80-82)

And finally, there are those who talk about 50/50 chances. This is an escapism of having to take a standpoint, because they genuinely feel it could be either one of two extremes (and everything in the middle):

“It's really crazy, it's a 50/50 chance.” (I3, l. 718)

"I don't know. If Israel will go towards peace or towards apartheid, and this is two directions." (I11, l. 285-286)

"I don't want to predict, it's too personal. Is your child going to be successful or not? It's hopeful. [...] It's pointless, I can't. On the one hand things don't look very optimistic, on the other hand it could be much worse. OK three things could happen. It could be really bad. And in 25 years you will see barbed wires and people shooting each other, or it will be wonderful and happy or basically this crazy situation will have endured for another 50 years. How can I predict? it's impossible." (I10, l. 558-570)

6.1.9.2 Past over future

"There is no thinking about the future but only the past." (I21, l. 5)

A strategy that connects closely to the issue of unpredictability of the future is the retreat into the past. There are many who choose to live and concern themselves with the past to shield themselves from the overwhelming uncertainty as well as detrimental outlooks.

This was one of the core challenges for the interviews. Even though the focus of the interview and the individual questions were clearly focused on the very long-term, which was expressed sometimes weeks before the actual interview, many interviewees fell back into the pattern of discussing current challenges. This can be seen as a natural process; however, there were also those who would, or could, not be guided into future perspectives of Jerusalem almost at all, thriving in stories about the past. There was a clear imbalance across all interviews of the interviewees feeling most comfortable putting their mind to present or past events.

"I prefer to deal with the past, this is my field of expertise. I don't know. It's very difficult to expect..." (I29, l. 346-347)

"[Jerusalem is the] continuation of three thousand years of history. [...] It's something which ended thousands of years ago and it was brought back to life." (I14, l. 5-13)

6.1.9.3 Contradiction and dichotomies

One of the key elements of Jerusalem and its futures are dichotomies and contradictions. Throughout the analysis they defined much of what Jerusalem is and is seen as in the future.

The choice of summarizing the dichotomies, contradictions and illogic phenomena under the aspect of blind spots was due to the fact, that they are a symptom of a greater disorientation, a result of blind spots between desire and reality at the very base of the conflict. Even though there are many instances where the cracks or even gaps in logic are apparent, the following paragraph focuses on a hand full of examples of how this leads to seemingly schizophrenic statements of individuals that are present in everyday life throughout Jerusalem.

It is the way it isn't:

"It is still like that now. But now I cannot see it." (I30, l. 279)

"But there is the thing that I believe, and then there is the thing I think is going to happen. Which is not necessarily the same." (I2, l. 683-684)

"I don't see it /laugh/ ... I don't know how it's gonna be changed. I have no idea. It's a miracle. And there are miracles here, that at least is something we do have in this city." (I16, l. 229-230)

"Physically it has borders. [...] \laugh\ where they are is complicated, but it has borders and the old city has borders and the temple site has borders. So even if they are, you know not exact, and there is some debate about them, conceptionally it is pretty clear. More or less." (I4, l. 56-61)

"Do I love Jerusalem or hate it? /laugh/ Do I love it or hate it, am I happy here or am I very depressed. Am I doing the right thing to be here, to stay here in my city?" (I19, l. 6-7)

"Jerusalem nowadays is safe. We can go everywhere where we want. We are not afraid of bombs. It is a secure city to live in. [...], Many Palestinians are not going to the Israeli side. And many Israelis don't like to come to the old city or to the Palestinian side, because of the political situation. [...]" (I20, l. 182-192)

"I feel the Palestinians don't have any power to make changes [...]. They don't have power. But the people always have a secret power." (I30, l. 155-260)

"You can do small acts of kindness, coexistence. I have two Arab lawyers in the building, and we are living peacefully. I think that both of them are fishy." (I18, l. 82-84)

"I don't see any way for Jerusalem to create some kind of harmony officially. But there is a de facto harmony that is going on which comes from the authentic life of people" (I14, l. 296-297)

The past is the future:

“Look at the history, you don't claim the history alone here. Jerusalem is the history of the future. The future comes from its history.” (I 24)

“I think more people will bring back this whole original Kibbutz idea, which is the future. Like what we had.” (I2, l. 316-318)

“I would like to live in a modern world but in a political situation that takes us before 1948. And before the British mandate. I would prefer that we are still in the Jordan era, maybe between 48 and 67, in East Jerusalem.” (I28, l. 239-241)

Hopeless hope:

“There is no hope for us. But if they will agree to any solution which gives us our rights, ... Which is impossible, so everything will become worse and worse... [...] We try to live together. We try to live together. /pause/ [...] Really, I can't ... I can't ... I don't have an idea on this. I don't know what will happen. They are now a part of Jerusalem. And they have their ways and we have our ways... but maybe ...maybe we will find something to make us live together...” (I13, l. 289-301)

“/Pause/. Today I don't think there is any hope. I see the young generation, carry with them so much potential that it's very hopeful. [...] They carry hope and they carry strategy and they carry intelligence; they carry knowledge, they carry sharpness and they also know the enemy.” (I19, l. 116-124)

“I worry ... I am optimistic but really worried.” (I17, l. 244)

“So probably it will stay the same. I don't know. [...] Definitely until you don't have peace here, we will always live with tension. [...] I prefer to be optimistic. You know, I prefer to think that in some \!\ way it is going to resolve, you know, somebody come and solve it. Hopefully [political leaders]. Or a big war. I don't know. It's going to ...it has to change. Because ...but we say that for the last 20 years and nothing happens, so, ... \pause\ but I want to be optimistic, and to believe it's going to be their turn. And people will get to their senses. [...] Not these days with this government no way.” (I8, l. 262-283)

Peace and war:

“It's a kind of [an] unnatural peace, or tranquility. [...] The tension exists underneath.” (I26, l. 98-103)

“So, in essence the ideal is nice, because we show that it is our land and we did fight for it, we did die for it. On the other hand, it's causing... just think how many people died, or are dying because of this every day. Sometimes in those situations you can never win. “ (I33, l. 203-106)

6.1.9.4 Denial and delusion

The most difficult aspect of the analysis was the filtering out the segments of denial and delusion. This was very difficult, as it is, especially in the case of indirect denial, that is closely connected to a judgement of the actual statements and a reclassification sometimes far from the original content intended by the interviewee. However, the direct quotes will hopefully illustrate this issue and speaking for themselves.

Some interviews also describe the aspect of denial and delusion in Jerusalem, regarding the other and the conflict itself, directly, as a form of a directly described denial:

“Because of this phenomenon that is special about Jerusalem, that we feel that the other does not exist.” (I28, l. 286-287)

“The truth is I never go to East Jerusalem. I am afraid to go to East Jerusalem. [Like] Most Jews in West Jerusalem [...] I would never in my life wonder into the Eastern part of the city. [...] So, I guess, like most Jerusalemites, if you can't see it, it's not a problem.” (14)

“This conflict is an impossible conflict. So, I prefer not to think about it.” (18, l. 480)

“Also, between the different groups. We exist as if the other does not exist. Otherwise we will have to fight them every day and they will have to fight us every day.” (I28, l. 185-186)

“Zionism is the most just ideology of the 20th century, [...] but it made one big mistake: What do we do with the other group of people who are there. To this day, still like the ostrich, put his head in the sand. ‘OK there is not really Palestinians, they are called something else.’ Talking about Jerusalem being ‘undivided forever and ever’, the capital of Israel. It's a nice idea, but it's not reality. [...] The reality is that you have two nations in this city and you can argue that ‘Oh the Muslims never really cared about Jerusalem and it wasn't even taken and during the Muslim rule it was a tiny...’ It's true that under the Turks it was a shit hole, [...] but today you have 350 000 Palestinians living inside the city borders and more living around and they see this as their place, and you are not going to change that. That's reality.” (I10, l. 661-684)

Others exhibit this aspect of denial with taking back what they just said or judging themselves for it:

"In 5 or 20 years maybe, there will be barbed wire fences and there will be fighting, and I won't be here because I won't be able to live here. This coffee shop will be smoking ruins. I can't. Something inside of me says that's not going to happen." (I10, l. 712-715)

"[Most likely] we keep the status quo. It's like lying to ourselves. But this is how we live today." (I28, l. 259-260)

And then there are those where hopes become believes, because the alternative is to be overwhelmed or paralyzed by what is to come:

"I hope they will succeed. I really hope. You know what? Futurism is a very frightening subject. Mainly for mothers. I can't bear to think negative thoughts about the future." (I21, l. 65-66)

"There is not a big space between what I believe and what I can say for sure will happen." (I30, l. 299-300)

"...it's overwhelming and so instead of bringing people closer and making them more willing to stand up to evil, they are covering. Leave me alone. I can't be crushed instead ... I am not listening to the news today; it is too frightening." (I14, l. 336-338)

"But then I cannot see all bad. I don't want to be thinking about that." (I16, l. 319-320)

And there are those, who think some aspects of future are too bad to become reality:

"I know that there are very hard possibilities. And I know that this city had ... hard, hard days. And I know that it's a circle. I know that it comes once in a while. I don't see the future, I don't see time as a straight line, but rather in a circle." (I21, l. 70-72)

"So, if it will stay as it is today it might be the best. Because other scenarios are .. going to be harder." (I21, l. 298-299)

Finally, there are those, who can only look the other way:

"I know that people are struggling, I see that in the Eastern and Western city, I see that, but I don't know a vision." (I21, l. 372-373)

"I almost don't feel [the Israeli-Palestinian issue] in my daily life." (I21, l. 287)

Indirect denial emerges alongside conspiracies, illusions and delusions. This is, as mentioned above, extraordinarily hard to judge as an objective researcher. However, it is a pervasive aspect and also relatively common, as well as stated with a lot of vigor and conviction. Therefore, it was decidedly included in the micro analysis, however less in the macro analysis of the formation of the overall Leitbilder.

“The police change the stories, [...] and they say it was a mistake. The Palestinian Authority is covering it up. They don't mention anything at all. There is a plot between them, there is a complicity.” (I31, l. 333-383)

“Very soon we are going to have something like the crusades again. They are using the Palestinian conflict to be invisible. They are creating this anti-Israel propaganda with the hashtag peacemakers to not appear in the conflict, but they are the ones turning people against each other. Divide and conquer. [...] They are running the show. They make both sides poor and weak to try to take over the control of Jerusalem.” (I2, l. 557-567)

“The strong forces are continuing to separate.” (I21, l. 295-296)

The conspiracies are frighteningly similar to each other. The Palestinian conspiracy theories, however, draw heavily from well-known and old European anti-Semitic images.

“Fine, they have power. They have economic power; they have media power but even the American congress. It's almost pathetic, it's almost a joke. The best congress that money can buy, you know what I mean? People even know that they are bought. When the average American rises and realizes that his congress or Senates allegiance is not to his own president, rather to the Israeli president, it will blow up. And I always keep saying I hate to be a Jew in America when this happens. They are going to blame them; they are going to be the scapegoats. The average Jewish guy living in America, he is going to be blamed and he is going to pay dearly for that. The Jews lobby is practically buying congress men and Senators” (I23, l. 89-97)

“The Jews have something in them. They try to meet together, have money and then they change every place they are living in. Many of the banks in Europe are held by the Jews and now we have a new thing, it's Zionism. They are playing with the Jewish religion to reach their goals. It's far away from the Jewish religion, but they use it to change the world and that comes from the believe of the Jews, that they are the chosen people in the world and the other people, non-Jewish, are the servants. [...] From this point the Jews try to hold the power to change especially Jerusalem and most importantly Al-Aqsa mosque. They believe that Al-Aqsa mosque is the temple mount. They dream for 2.000 years, that one day they have the temple mount in Jerusalem.” (I30, l. 50-64)

The delusions and illusions speak about situations far from facts or are speaking for the other side. Anecdotal and subjective views are framed as a world order, in a sort of cognitive dissonance where, one has to hold up a positive self-image and at the same time justify the collective actions.

“It's like Game of Thrones, it's like out there in the frozen wastelands. You have got all the zombies coming. That's what I think the Palestinians of East Jerusalem feel. They look over the wall at this vast wasteland [...], they are standing on that wall and they are aligning themselves with the Jews who don't want that to come into the city any more than they do, because what could they possibly have to gain from it? I think the rational Palestinian in East Jerusalem feels that way.” (114, 757-764)

“If the Arab world get together and stand, I don't want war but at least... [...] the Palestinians will do it, the Lebanese and the Iranian. These are the people who will change everything, and it will change – also for Israel. In 20 years, we will not see this \pointing at an Israeli crowd at Jerusalem day\. God knows my dear.” (17, l. 442-459)

“I am totally sure, even if nobody will admit it in front of you, that the Palestinians living in Jerusalem are very, very much aware that they are the lucky ones. Because they have health insurance, they have a possibility to work and they live in a democratic, uhm, society. [...] I think that people will understand that, with all respect to politics, what they want is to have a quiet and comfortable life.” (115, l. 157-165)

6.1.9.5 Wishful thinking

And finally, there is wishful thinking to various degrees. Similar to the argument made for illusions and delusions interviewees often speak about situations and prospects based primarily on desires, not facts. However, the views and opinions are not as radical or detached from the views of the other. Likely and desired is not kept apart but confused and overlapped to fit the own needs of keeping hope and being able to have a future (also see above 6.1.3.1 Hope and hopelessness).

“Both sides together. There is hope... we like to think so. /laughing/.” (133, l. 272)

The laughter says a lot in this moment. The interviewee ends the interview on this note, disillusioned, clinging on to something he wants but does not believe in. It is a sad, ironic and broken laughter, overwhelmed with reality.

"I see my grandchildren setting up home here and more and more this being accepted in the rest of the world as the capital of the Jewish state and there is less and less conflict about that. That's my optimistic scenario. [...] I think I am in the majority. I really do. I think that knowing the people who live in this city, I believe that I am really in the majority." (114, l. 696-705)

"When is it going to stop? It can't go on forever. We have younger generations; we are getting more education and Arabs are getting more education. I think it will happen; I am hoping that it will happen." (133, l. 231-233)

"I think the stand of Germany will not be the same in 15 years if Israel is continuing to kill children and destroy houses and burn children and attack us with heavy balls. And if the German governments will be silent about that, I believe that the German people will not share that." (130, l. 292-295)

"The Torah and the Koran are so related, its one. God is this and that. [...] In essence Sufism and Judaism, Taoism, Buddhism, it's all the same. People connecting and growing in spirituality." (12, l. 640-643)

"I think it's possible. /Pause/. Because injustice should not prevail forever and ever." (119, l. 191)

"It's such a complicated area, it's hard to ... /pause/ see the future. \laugh\ But there is one part of me that thinks that it will stay the same. It will not change. It will be always like this." (18, l. 225-227)

"As I said to you, in daily life people are people and that's it. That's it. I look into your eyes, mine are brown, a different color, that's it... that's it." (121, l. 324-325)

6.1.9.6 Notables

The striking thing often was how identical the perspectives between Israelis and Palestinians were. Contrary to the working hypothesis it was impossible to tell, based on the future images alone, from which side it was coming from. Examples for that were multiple, some of which were included in the analysis above. A final example for this shows how identically these two individuals describe their reluctance to leave the city they love dearly:

"From one side I love Jerusalem [...], my kids were borne here, and my life is here but [...] I began to think to leave Jerusalem [...]. Because I think the situation is really very bad here, not easy. /pause/" (111, l. 159-162)

"From one side I really love the place but it's not an easy place to live in. It's got a lot of things that... make you wonder, if it is worth living here. Especially about the future. /pause/" (I6, l. 14-16)

Lastly, some iconic scenes should conclude the section of consolidation of Leitbild modules, all during the last few Interviews. They relay an unobstructed impression on some selected aspect of what the situation is today and what that means for a future.

The first was during the height of the Knife intifada in the Summer of 2015. The interview was conducted with an elderly man, an artist from one of the old Jerusalemite families – with a moderate political view, aged in the occupied Jerusalem but mostly extending a hand towards his Jewish neighbors in the interview.

In the middle of the interview his daughter comes home. A short conversation leads to this exchange:

"Daughter: I want them to leave.

Father: You don't think there can be conditions where we can live together?

Daughter: No! /vigorous/

Father: They made it impossible?

Daughter: Impossible. /klick with the tongue/ We don't want to. The new generation, all of the ones you see going out now, no one wants this. No one. Uh-uh. Sorry. /shaking of the head/" (I31, l. 422-431)

On the other side there is a similar feeling of increasing intolerance of the other. This statement is by a highly educated, religious women, one of which are seen by some as the driving forces in the future of West Jerusalem:

"Jerusalem is the eternal undivided capital of Israel, yes, I think enough of us have died for that." (I33, l. 226)

And as a final quote; a researcher of the history of Jerusalem:

"There is this saying, Heshbon nefesh, to stop and think about what you are doing and where all of this is going." (I32, l. 413-415)

6.3 Leitbilder Jerusalem 2060

The Leitbilder of Jerusalem 2060 were composed around the core category of the adapted Leitbildanalysis, Desirability and Feasibility. Therefore, patterns around feared/feasible as well as desirable/feasible were identified and integrated with aligning values from the other categories before crossmatching them back. This iterative and very detailed process produced six Leitbilder for Jerusalem 2060:

1. War and terror
2. A phoenix from the ashes
3. A future on our terms
4. Ethnic ghettos
5. Cold coexistence
6. A thriving community

In the following each of the six Leitbilder will be presented and discussed. At the very beginning of each introduction, a condensed table of the factor analysis will be put forward. Then the Leitbild will be articulated in all their aspects before being analyzed in detail. Finally, their corresponding interviews and interviewee are going to be examined as well as their interrelations towards each other.

There was a great struggle whether to include a 7th Leitbild: The business as usual scenario – a continuation of the presence; an extrapolation of the status quo. This was a rather prominent image, especially for some Israeli interviewees. However, this is – also by the interviewee's own admission – a superficial avoidance of future in general, rather than an actual image of a future. It acts to enable day to day action but is secondary to underlying images that are truly action guiding. It is a way of not dealing with increasing complexities and the unknown. Therefore, it is neither complex nor surprising. It is also not unique, but in its nature part of any perspective on the described futures – a sort of non-future.

Consequently, the decision was made to take it out of the core analysis as well as active comparison. However, it should not be omitted. Continuation is a prevalent, however, often self-relativized image of Jerusalem 2060, at least partially deemed as unfeasible.

6.3.1 Leitbild 1: War and terror

	I 1	I 2	I 5	I 8	I 1 6	I 2 2	I 2 4	I 2 5	I 2 6	I 2 9	I 3 2
A 1	5	5	1	4	2	4	3	5	5	4	5
A 2	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	2	1	2	2
A 3	0	0	4	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0
A 4	3	1	5	4	5	5	2	3	4	2	1
B 1	0	0	2	0	0	3	4	2	3	2	2
C 1	4	1	3	3	1	0	2	0	2	2	3
C 2	2	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	5
C 3	0	0	2	3	2	0	0	0	1	0	3
D 1	0	5	0	0	0	5	3	5	0	5	0
D 7	0	4	1	0	0	5	5	5	1	5	1
E 1	0	1	5	5	0	0	0	5	2	1	1
E 2	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	5	3	3	5
E 4	0	0	5	2	1	1	2	1	3	4	1
E 6	1	1	2	5	1	0	1	1	4	1	5
F 1	2	5	5	1	1	5	5	1	0	1	0
F 2	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	4	0	3	0
F 3	3	0	0	0	1	0	3	3	0	0	1
G 4	2	0	5	0	0	3	2	5	0	4	5
G 5	2	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	2	4	0
H 3	2	2	0	0	2	2	0	4	3	0	0
H 5	0	5	0	2	0	3	2	5	3	2	0
I 4	2	0	0	3	0	3	3	4	2	2	2
I 5	2	4	0	4	3	5	4	5	2	2	4
J 3	0	5	2	3	1	0	0	0	4	0	5

Table 4: Factor Analysis L1 War and Terror

In 2060 Jerusalem has raised generations in terror, violence, inequality, hate and no perspective for their own future. The youth is radicalized on both sides, not just on religious or political views, but also regarding their overall mindset. The continued bloodshed increases the zero-sum logic of the conflict and the rise of religious fanaticism leaves no room for tolerance even towards one’s own society. Moderate forces are being pushed out or squashed.

At its 100-year anniversary a violent rebellion was proclaimed, which marked the beginning of the 6th intifada – the bloodiest of all so far and the one with the highest number of civilian deaths.

The great majority of the inhabitants in the city are impoverished, which further fuels violent escalation and intolerance. Both sides are trying to take Jerusalem by force - a merciless fight over every inch of the city. The old city and the adjacent city centers are battlegrounds, no longer accessible. UN forces are trying but failing to control the situation also at the holy sites. Jerusalem is a dark purgatory full of destruction.

The current generation of youth in Jerusalem will grow up to hate the enemy, if possible, even more than the preceding ones.

This image of a future is fueled by dichotomous emotions and heavy contradictions. Jerusalemites seeing this as the city’s future love and honor their city. However, they predominantly see the horrors and the violence in the city. There is the feeling of hope alongside the feeling of hopelessness. There is also a great feeling of ownership, while blaming incapable leaders and the other side, which is seen as deeply unwilling, violent, dangerous and outright evil. The self-image is on the contrary, one of being a victim unable to change this doomsday scenario – all but at destiny’s mercy.

The continuation of the status quo seems to be extremely unlikely and there is no faith in a two states solution whatsoever.

It is the most prominent clearly negative future image of Jerusalem 2060 and coincides with a wide variety of positive images, mostly with the following two: visions of absolute victory or a thriving international city.

It is clearly a bi-national image, accessible to a number of different characters – if not all Jerusalemites.

6.3.2 Leitbild 2: A phoenix from the ashes

	1	1	1	1	1	1
	2	7	4	8	9	0
A	5	0	3	2	4	3
D	5	5	5	5	5	5
D	5	5	5	2	5	3
D	4	1	5	5	5	0
E	0	2	4	2	4	3
E	0	1	0	3	1	4
F	5	5	4	5	1	5
G	5	0	0	2	2	2
G	0	3	5	4	2	3

G 5	2	4	4	0	4	0
H 1	0	2	3	3	0	0
H 2	2	5	2	2	2	3
H 3	2	4	5	5	0	0
H 4	3	4	5	3	0	3
H 5	5	5	2	5	2	4
I 2	2	5	3	2	0	5
I 5	4	5	5	0	2	5
J 2	2	0	2	0	2	0
J 3	5	3	5	0	0	3
J 4	2	0	5	4	0	0
J 5	3	2	5	2	0	2

Table 5: Factor Analysis L2 A Phoenix from the Ashes

Like a phoenix from the ashes Jerusalem has seen total destruction in 2060. The culmination of the conflict has just passed. After the wipe out of the 3rd world war, Jerusalem is being rebuilt. Those who survived are figuring out what really matters. Even though the economy lies in ruins much like the cultural and social life in the city, there are less structural and historic barriers to finally solve important issues. The dome of rocks, the western wall and the church of holy sepulcher were all burned down to the ground together with a large part of the old city. However, experts from Aleppo start internationally funded recreation efforts of the city center. There is little left to preserve the historic heritage of thousands of years and the decimated population stands before the ruins of their beloved city – with a feeling of being freed of the constraints of the past. With an innate sense of rejuvenated vigor but also stern sadness, they choose to rebuild the city the way it always was supposed to be. From scratch.

Jerusalemites seeing this as the image of the city in 2060, see violent escalation as much as they see a potential for it being cathartic. A way to purge Jerusalem and emerge positive from a conflict that has been dragged on for way too long. It is a promise of finally establishing a thriving Jerusalem – even if that means to destroy it. The feeling of love and home is especially strong, where violence is seemingly the only way to getting to where they desire their city to be.

Interestingly, there is a heavy focus on a positive self-image, with traits like the willingness to be compromising, reasonable but also righteous, vigilant strong and enduring. At the same time, they see themselves as the victim, as smart and creative, open, tolerant friendly and

especially – peaceful. The others are almost exclusively dangerous fanatics that can't be trusted.

A uniqueness of this image is its strong relation to the past. Jerusalemites who describe this future image are heavily tied in with the past through desiring a return to it, or at least the ways of the past.

Besides this image having great contradictions, it is heavily anchored in wishful thinking, but also great denial, especially of the other. This is absolutely a bi-national image – of the more extreme, nationalistic wing of both factions.

6.3.3 Leitbild 3: A future on our terms

	I 2	I 7	I 1 3	I 1 4	I 1 9	I 2 2	I 2 3	I 2 4	I 2 5	I 2 7	I 2 8	I 2 9	I 3 0	I 3 3
A 1	5	0	1	3	2	4	2	3	5	3	2	4	3	0
A 4	1	0	3	3	1	5	1	2	3	0	1	2	2	0
B 1	0	0	0	0	1	3	3	4	2	0	3	2	0	0
C 4	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	0	2	0
D 1	5	5	5	5	3	5	4	3	5	2	5	5	5	5
D 2	5	5	1	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	5	3	0
D 7	4	1	0	5	4	5	5	5	5	0	5	5	0	0
E 1	0	0	5	2	5	0	1	1	5	0	1	3	0	1
E 4	0	2	1	4	5	1	0	2	1	1	2	4	3	5
E 6	1	1	5	3	4	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	5	4
F 1	5	5	5	4	3	5	0	5	1	1	5	1	5	3
F 4	2	3	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	0	2	0	2	1
G 1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2	0
G 4	0	5	0	0	2	3	3	2	5	3	0	4	0	0
G 5	2	4	0	4	4	2	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	0
H 1	0	2	0	3	4	0	3	0	4	2	3	0	0	3
H 2	2	5	0	2	3	0	5	2	2	3	2	2	3	0
H 3	2	4	0	5	4	2	3	0	4	2	5	0	0	3
H 4	3	4	0	5	0	3	0	2	3	0	3	0	3	2
H 5	5	5	5	2	5	3	3	2	5	2	5	2	4	4
I 1	3	4	0	0	4	0	2	2	3	0	0	4	0	2
I 2	2	5	2	3	5	2	3	3	5	2	2	0	5	2
I 3	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
I 4	0	3	5	0	2	3	3	3	4	2	4	2	3	4
I 5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	5	0	2	5	5
J 3	5	3	3	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5
J 5	3	2	0	5	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	0	2	4

Table 6: Factor Analysis L3 On our Terms

Jerusalem is a place for only one nation in 2060. A long and intense struggle preceded this state of one-sided dominion with many sacrifices leading up to it. Jerusalem lost a great part of its multi-cultural and religious identity, however, there is no day to day struggle between the people anymore. The city can be administered, and the safety of tourists and inhabitants increased dramatically.

The international community condemned the takeover. Sanctions and guidelines for the assurance of joint existence were imposed on the city but in the end no other nation wanted to further destabilize the greater region after decades of religious disputes and rivaling national aspirations.

Some of the victims are being compensated and even though they are unwilling to accept the new situation, practically there is no possibility to oppose the new regime in Jerusalem.

The forceful takeover is not only apparent in demographics but especially in the cultural face of the city. The motto here is the extraction and extinction of the other and their historic effect on the city. From now on, Jerusalem is and should always be one's exclusive capital.

However, with the removal of the enemy there is a rise in bigotry and nepotism. The isolation of the population inside a bubble of reality intensifies further to the point where there are new opposing factions inside the own community. But there is no real protection for minorities. It is a dictatorship of the majority, with no space for progressive forces.

Jerusalemites who desire absolute victory also often fear violent escalation and a forceful expulsion as well as absolute takeover of their city by the other faction. They believe that there is only one viable way to improve Jerusalem for themselves, and that is by taking over. This image connects to the image of the phoenix from the ashes, however, is much broader and less accepting of the others existence. A continuation of the status quo is seen as outright impossible.

Interestingly Jerusalemites with this vision for the city 2060 also relate to fantastic and very unrealistic images, that seem to be inspired by scripture, fairy tales or movies.

Besides the deeply rooted feeling of love for the city, there are strong feelings of hope but also horrors.

There is a very heavy focus on all positive traits of the self-image and all negative traits of the image of the other – even more prominent than in all other images – probably being drawn

from the active experience of the occupation in the city today; acting as a moral justification of this vision.

As for the conclusion of this image, it is important to say, that this is not a bi-national image but a Palestinian dominated one. This image, however, does not only exist in its pure and radical form. There is also a strong connection to the idea of a thriving international Jerusalem in 2060. However, from the current Palestinian perspective, the majority see some kind of ‘takeover’ as the only way to reach equality or justice.

6.3.4 Leitbild 4: Ethnic ghettos

	I 1	I 6	I 9	I 1 1	I 1 2	I 1 7	I 2 1
A 1	5	3	0	2	0	2	1
A 5	0	1	0	3	0	1	1
A 6	4	5	4	4	4	4	2
A 7	0	5	1	0	0	0	1
C 1	4	5	2	1	0	0	0
D 5	5	1	5	1	1	1	0
D 7	0	0	3	4	4	5	3
E 1	0	3	1	3	0	2	2
E 6	1	0	2	5	5	3	5
F 1	2	1	1	0	3	2	0
G 3	2	4	2	0	0	5	5
G 4	2	5	2	2	0	2	2
G 6	2	2	4	0	0	0	0
I 4	2	2	0	2	0	2	1
I 5	2	2	2	2	3	2	5
J 1	2	0	3	5	0	0	2
J 4	0	1	0	4	2	1	5
J 5	1	0	1	0	5	2	5

Table 7: Factor Analysis L4 Ethnic Ghettos

In 2060 Jerusalem resembles a high security prison more than a holy city. The different communities live in isolation by high walls and fences. The existence of the other is tied to being shut out by physical barriers, however, as there are close spaces and a growing demographics people are trapped in certain areas. Even though these communities are rather homogeneous, the hostility and hate towards the populations beyond the walls increases steadily and regularly culminates in violent attacks. A siege like atmosphere with weapons and checkpoints dominate the face of the ancient sandstone city. The social and cultural

stratification grows between the various boroughs to the extreme. There are many formal and informal no-go areas for the citizens and terror attacks are part of normal life. Personal freedoms and movement are extremely limited and at the same time highly monitored. Cameras, drones and other surveillance technology controls life in every aspect, including free speech and political engagement. This results in a retreat into the private life as much as possible. At the same time corrupt leadership is not being held accountable and bargains away the city’s rights and resources. Only the holy sites and touristic attractions are kept in an artificial state of a theme park like island of the old city.

This image of a Jerusalem 2060 comes with visions of collective apathy and mutual destruction. The two states solution might be desirable but utterly unreachable. Its positive counterpart is the vision of Jerusalem as a symbiosis of parallel capitals and an international space for two people.

The pervasive feeling of this image is the rather frequent combination of hope and horror, whereas the aspect of ownership is an important concept. Besides important dark and negative social imagery, there is imagery that speak of Jerusalem as a very normal and natural place; sometimes a place of great volatility. This also connects to a strong feeling of fundamental unpredictability of future that is special to Jerusalem. Trying to contain this overwhelming unknown brings forth the concept of walls, weapons and barbed wire fences. This image is a clearly bi-national image, of those who have lost hope or at least have great doubts for the city in 2060.

6.3.5 Leitbild 5: Cold coexistence

	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I	I
	1	3	4	5	9	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
A	5	2	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	5	5	0		
A	3	4	3	5	1	1	1	0	1	3	1	4	1	0		
A	4	1	0	0	4	2	4	0	4	1	0	0	1	0		
A	0	0	3	1	0	1	1	0	3	2	1	5	3	0		
B	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0		
B	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0		
C	2	0	1	1	3	5	0	1	0	0	0	3	5	0		
D	0	5	1	3	0	5	5	4	3	1	5	4	4	4		
D	5	0	3	4	5	5	1	1	1	4	0	0	4	0		
D	0	3	1	1	3	4	4	3	5	0	5	1	1	0		

E1	0	0	1	5	1	5	0	1	3	3	0	2	1	1
E3	3	0	0	0	0	1	3	2	1	0	0	0	5	1
E4	0	0	4	5	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	3	1	5
E5	0	0	1	0	2	3	0	1	2	4	1	1	2	5
E6	1	2	3	2	2	1	5	0	3	3	0	4	5	4
F3	3	2	1	0	1	0	1	2	3	0	1	0	1	0
F5	0	0	0	4	4	3	0	0	0	3	5	0	1	1
G3	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	5	3	2	4	5	0
G4	2	0	0	5	2	2	2	0	2	3	3	0	5	0
G7	3	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	2	2	4
H5	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	2	2	3	3	0	4
I4	2	0	2	0	0	2	2	0	2	5	3	2	2	4
I5	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	3	2	2	5	2	4	5
I6	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	5	2	0	0	3	1	2
J1	2	1	2	2	3	2	5	1	0	2	0	5	4	1

Table 8: Factor Analysis L5 Cold Coexistence

2060 Jerusalem has embarked on the long and windy road of coexistence. Against all odds and much resistance committed leaders finally took steps towards a resolution. With heavy political pressure and financial incentives, the international community forced both parties to sway from their uncompromising positions clearing the path towards the improvement of living standards, safety, planning security, equality before the law and clear statuses. Parallel worlds were established with open borders and cooperating administrations. This system is not defined by love but habit. Stiff but regular interactions on all levels promote rational considerations towards self-preservation. Each cultural space inside the city keeps intact, there is a stable economy between the two capitals and safe and free movement is guaranteed for the most part.

A gradual demilitarization of the city takes effect. Clear rules and economic benefits increase the acceptance of the new order, even though most citizens are not in favor of the new system. There are many setbacks along the way, but positive developments prevail due to a clear separation of responsibilities and bi-national councils. Jerusalem slowly leads itself into a more accepting and peaceful future, where both nations can exist, and some day may even thrive.

This image of Jerusalem has notably many blind spots. It is also an Israeli dominated vision. It is a positive spin of the idea of ethnic ghettos and waves of conflict. A future where violence escalates, or one side takes over is deemed unlikely. However, so is peace.

This is the most emotional image of all, hope, hate, love, home and horror all have a place except hopelessness. Important concepts are especially the responsibility of leaders as well as the idea that there must be a way. Even if the future is seen as unpredictable - one way or the other – this conflict must be solved.

Interestingly there is also a duplicity in the imagery around Jerusalem. The self-image is the one of victims but the image of the other is not just that of dangerous or uncompromising individuals but also often times somewhat positive.

6.3.6 Leitbild 6: A Thriving Community

	I 2	I 1 0	I 1 1	I 1 4	I 1 5	I 1 7	I 1 9	I 2 0	I 2 1	I 2 2	I 2 3	I 2 4	I 2 5	I 2 8	I 2 9	I 3 1
A 1	5	0	2	3	0	2	2	3	1	4	2	3	5	2	4	0
A 4	1	1	1	3	0	1	1	2	1	5	1	2	3	1	2	2
B 1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	3	3	4	2	3	2	5
C 4	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D 1	5	0	0	5	0	0	3	0	0	5	4	3	5	5	5	x
D 4	0	5	5	3	4	3	0	3	0	0	5	2	1	0	2	0
D 6	0	5	0	0	3	2	0	1	3	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
D 7	4	4	4	5	3	5	4	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
E 1	1	5	0	4	1	3	5	1	3	0	0	0	5	0	1	0
E 2	0	1	3	2	1	2	5	1	2	0	1	1	5	1	3	5
E 4	0	0	2	4	1	1	5	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	4	4
E 5	0	3	0	0	1	2	3	2	1	1	1	1	2	3	1	5
E 6	1	1	5	3	0	3	4	5	5	0	0	1	1	0	1	5
F 1	5	1	0	4	0	2	3	2	0	5	0	5	1	5	1	x
F 5	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	5	2	2	0	0	0
F &																
G 2	0	2	2	5	3	2	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	4	2	0
G 3	0	0	0	4	0	5	2	2	5	5	2	3	0	2	0	4
H 3	2	2	0	5	0	2	4	0	0	2	3	0	4	5	0	2
H 5	5	2	0	2	0	2	5	4	0	3	3	2	5	5	2	4
I 5	4	0	2	5	3	2	5	3	5	5	5	4	5	0	2	5
I 6	0	1	0	5	5	2	3	0	5	1	0	1	3	0	2	1
J 4	2	0	4	5	2	1	0	0	5	0	1	1	0	4	0	3
J 5	3	2	0	5	4	2	2	0	5	1	0	0	0	2	0	3

Table 9: Factor Analysis L6 Thriving Community

By 2060 Jerusalem has turned into a thriving community. The economy is booming, and everybody benefits from the millions of tourists sweeping through the city every year. All

areas are open and well kept. To be able to provide space for everyone Jerusalem grew beyond its seven hills, but with a special focus on long-term planning, there is a balance between necessary infrastructure and green areas in the city.

Over the years Jerusalem has become an example of peaceful coexistence in the world. This created an overarching identity in the city of peace, with all citizens speaking Arabic and Hebrew. The evolving culture, the feeling of belonging to Jerusalem and cherishing her above all, integrates a growing number of scholars with a diverse group of artists from all over the world. Jerusalem is also the place where religion innovates itself, a place of exchange and recognition.

Equal representation ensures a culture of mutual respect and results in the acknowledgement of what is good for my neighbor is good for me. There is the understanding that it is up to Israelis and Palestinians to shape their shared future.

This is a bi-national image, however dominated by Palestinians. Israelis lean towards the image of cold coexistence with parallel aspect rather than one of an integrated Jerusalem.

There are fears of violent escalation and forced expulsion, the status quo however is not seen as viable at all to continue. Similar to the image of 'Cold Coexistence' it is a very emotional image; however, hatred plays less of a role than hopelessness.

Furthermore, there are similarities in the concept of 'we have to find a way' and 'what really matters'. It is not about calling Jerusalem part of a Palestinian state but being able to call it home and having a future for the next generation as well as a clearly defined status – less violence and more rights.

The imagery of Jerusalem is the one of brightness, holiness but also that of a natural and normal city.

Also similar to L5, the self is described as the compromising victim, the other as both dangerous and with positive characteristics. Overall, there is some amount of denial and wishful thinking involved with this image.

7. Comparison

In this chapter all six Leitbilder are being compared to each other to shine light on their differences and similarities. The question of which current realities and historical narratives they incorporate and connect to will be addressed as well as a draft presented of what persona can be placed behind the different Leitbilder.

Generally, the order of Leitbilder follows a negative towards positive Logic, leading to the comparison of negative (L1 War and terror, L2 A phoenix from the ashes, L3 A future on our terms) and positive Leitbilder (L4 Ethnic ghettos, L5 Cold coexistence, L6 Thriving community) first internally and then to each other.

7.1 Comparison of negative Leitbilder

A true difficulty presented itself by framing the Leitbilder as negative and positive, as first of all none are only one thing and second, all their positivity or negativity depends on the perspective of the beholder. Therefore, these categories should be assessed as supportive framework, with no terminal significance.

This being said there is a conscious choice of placing 'L1 War and terror', 'L2 A phoenix from the ashes' and 'L3 A future on our terms' in the negative category as they are very exclusive in their categorization. Even though the existence of the other is acknowledged in each Leitbild – it is clear that these images mean something completely different to both sides if they were to become reality. This relationship is flipped 180 degrees if the image is held by the opposing faction. The only one with egalitarian aspect is 'L1 War and terror'.

L1 however, is also clearly the most radically violent and destructive and is therefore placed at the outer end of desirability for the great majority of interviewees, whereas 'L2 A phoenix from the ashes' and 'L3 A future on our terms' rates highly desirable with many beholders. L2 generally seems to be more violent and destructive than L3, arguably even as much as L1, or more, with a righteous attitude and a positive spin on violence.

All three seem to be assessed as very likely, having little to no real opposition or doubt in if they could be feasible or become true. Even if they are partially strongly desired, they are at the same time very feared by others.

All of them were fairly easy in the process of imagination on the side of the interviewees and also easy and forthcoming in their, at times very detailed, description.

7.2 Comparison of positive Leitbilder

Similar to the difficulty of categorizing negative Leitbilder, it was challenging to categorize the positive as well. Especially the image of 'L4 Ethnic ghettos' was hard to place. However, the aspect of an egalitarian not strictly violent scenario of Jerusalem 2060 qualified the image as positive – which is an indicative result by itself.

All three images 'L4 Ethnic ghettos', 'L5 Cold coexistence' and 'L6 A thriving community' are in one form or another a cohabitation of both entities in Jerusalem and equal footing. They differ however in their willingness to do so. Where societies of Jerusalem are forced to cohabitate in L4, controlled by force, physical barriers or even a 3rd party authority, they accept this arrangement begrudgingly in L5 for lack of better alternative and outright enjoy and welcome it intrinsically in L6. Here, they value the culture and character of the other as a benefit for the city as a whole - making the whole greater as the sum of its parts.

This also illustrates the difference in valuing and respecting the other. Where there is little to none in L3, L4 is phrased as just not being able to see the others value and right to Jerusalem; whereas L6 is the full realization of mutual appreciation. This also coincides with violence. L4 is not at all a peaceful scenario, whereas L5 is also not strictly peaceful but L6 is the culmination of human aspiration and the fulfillment of the historic promise of Jerusalem as the city of peace and tolerance for everyone. This, however, also leads to the drawback of the positive images (partially excluding L4) of being highly contested in their feasibility. Even though there were a decent number of advocates of L5 and L6 many challenged them as wishful thinking, ranking them as outright impossible – ever.

All of them were also rather difficult for the interviewees to imagine; even more so the more hopeful they were. A detailed description or practical consequences for the future especially in images L5 and L6 were extremely difficult to pin down.

7.3 Comparison of negative and positive Leitbilder

The negative, violent and destructive images of L1, L2 and L3 were much easier accessible to the interviewees overall than the positive ones. L1 - L3 were also commonplaces, especially L1 was a construct all interviewees could relate to, to some degree. This probably is due to the fact, that L1 is perceived as the 'historic' Jerusalem of perpetuated violence, being stuck in an endless cycle of violence.

Those interviewees describing themselves as optimists were reluctant to ultimately accept the consequences for L1-L3 (and especially L1) for the future, however also framed it as a choice of not believing in those, but rather more positive images like L5 and L6, not denying them feasibility or probability. More often than not, when asked directly, they were deemed rather likely, also by individuals leaning towards positive images. The underlying reason for this seeming duplicity is the integral attempt to reconcile personal hopes and positive individual attitudes with the frustrating and saddening reality of the conflict in everyday Jerusalem.

Furthermore, those inclined to negative images L1-L4, here framed as pessimists, were considering themselves as realists while categorizing those with hopes for the future as dreamers. Many of these interviewees were extremely disillusioned with future prospects of the city and adamant about the fact that the conflict will never change. The ultimate reasoning for this often was an overarching logical concept like human nature and the destiny of the city. This strong position might stem from the utter disappointments of the peace process over decades and the devastated high hopes of the past. L1-L4 are images that speak of the erosion of trust in the system and in political institutions, where images L5-L6 emphasize the believe in people and the communities of Jerusalem as ultimately human – and therefore similar in their desires and needs. Some individuals reconcile these positions adopting aspects of both those underlying believes.

All in all, the stark differences between positive and negative images are the perspectives held about 'us' and 'them'. With a strong perception of these two categories interviewees had a tendency to erect walls, offer little understanding and even justify violence, claiming the future for themselves (a defensive position). Whereas those who could transcend these categories into one of all Jerusalemites with human qualities seemed to believe in the possibility of building bridges, empathize with the other side, ultimately believing that piece and a shared future in Jerusalem is possible – at least some day.

8. Discussion

In the following an overall Israeli and an overall Palestinian perspective as well as a shared one is discussed to try to answer the research questions of what the results of this study reveal about Jerusalem today.

Examining the data under the hypothesis of ‘no future in protracted conflict situations’, was of initial interest and will be addressed in this paragraph. The question of why Jerusalemites struggle to describe long-term but also sometimes rather short-term futures, even though there seems to be a great receptivity or desire to address futures, will also be of interest. Closing in chapter 8.2. with some thoughts on how social dialogue of desired and feasible long-term futures can be established and what the benefits could be.

8.1 Israeli perspectives

It is clear, that the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives are in some aspects different from each other, even though the core Leitbilder of Jerusalem are shared across conflict lines.

Overall, the interviews showcased that most Israelis are OK with the situation. This does not mean, that there are not many concerned for their future. They are genuinely struggling with the reality of life in Jerusalem or are very critical of the status quo of the conflict, which does not set the negotiations for a resolution as a high priority. However, during the interviews it transpired, that for most Israelis the conflict or the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis is not the most pressing issue right now. Some choose to faze it out completely. Some are too overwhelmed to deal with it and therefore retreat into a world where this does not seem to be an existential threat. Others outright deny its importance, rendering it a side note in a multitude of challenges – often behind the struggle for position with the Haredim.

The interviews provide a baseline of concern, contained through the control over Jerusalem. The Israelis are in a position of power in Jerusalem and, for the most part, shape present developments. Even though the depth and sustainability of this control can be debated, it gives them a sense of priority over the future. This, however, is in no manner inevitable or predetermined. Especially long-term futures are fundamentally unknown and, as many interviewees have pointed out, especially volatile in this city.

This situation of perceived control also increases the perception of continuation. Either with a negative or positive spin, Israelis lean towards the idea of ‘more of the same’ or a ‘two

separate entities' situation, where their part of the equation remains the same, but the Palestinians get what they want as well – with a separate nation-state.

However, their experience of day to day reality in Jerusalem also leaves them to believe disruption is extremely likely. The complexity of Jerusalem and its issues are acknowledged as something unpredictable and therefore oppose this feeling of continuation. This leaves especially the Israeli interviewees with an extreme level of what is referred to in this study as 'blind spots'. There is a significantly higher percentage of denial, shielding concepts, wishful thinking, inconsistencies and contradictions throughout the Israeli interviews.

8.2 Palestinian perspectives

The Palestinian interviews are very open towards disruption. There is a consensus, that it is unsustainable to continue in a similar fashion until 2060. How this disruption is seen to play out however, depends very much on the individual. The common denominator throughout all interviews is the Israeli control over Jerusalem. It is the first and foremost issue and affects all aspects of life every day. It creates visible dynamics that reach far into the future – especially when it comes to the mentality of the younger generation.

The Palestinian concern for their future is staggering. So much that many hold on to the past to an intense degree. Where Israelis retreat into the present Palestinians retreat into the past. In the past they are looking for narratives of 'Palestinian strength' and an 'egalitarian and tolerant spirit of Jerusalem'. There is a yearning for an 'open' city, as today it is cut off from the rest of the Palestinian territories by a wall. And there is a longing for not being second-class citizens in their own home with less rights than the Israelis. But also, a strong fear of being pushed out and marginalized coupled with a feeling of growing in numbers.

There is a striking general undertone for one Jerusalem with two nations, with equal rights and true coexistence. An acceptance of the other to the benefit of both. However, a striking number of Palestinians feel that this is out of their hands, as it is Israel who holds on to the control over the city.

Finally, there are those who indulge in fantasies of power, longing for retribution in scenarios of little mercy for Israelis and futures that would not have a place for Jews from all over the world, if the decision was left to them.

8.3 Shared perspectives

Both sides face a paradox situation of being guided by conflicting fragments of different Leitbilder at the same time. What is desired collides with what is feared and likely or even possible. Jerusalemites experience the unbearable reality of the protracted conflict every day. At the same time, they experience a very human, greater longing for peace, safety and an economic prosperity. This fuels a situation where future becomes part of a coping mechanism to consolidate these aspects. Rather than producing a realistic or even probable outlook the focus shifts towards providing any kind of viable future to be able to continue in the present. Politicized visions of the future also overshadow the true images on both sides with reiterations of narrations of wishful thinking and made believe.

For the most part, desirability and feasibility stand on opposite sides of the spectrum. Jerusalemites reconcile this through creating collective paradoxes. Furthermore, futures are extremely hard if not impossible to access or describe for the individual. They are often highly inconsistent or even contradictory. The deeply rooted illogic is indicative of how much the whole plane of future suffers in protracted conflict. Unsafe situations create insecure realities with uncertain futures. This stands in contrast to the innate desire to plan and control their future. It also, in the long-term, facilitates ultimately an overall suppression of long-term considerations affecting all aspects of life.

Furthermore, these future fragments exist in an environment of general suppression of other issues and topics as well as a fundamental decontextualization and idealization. Meaning, that individuals, subconsciously or consciously, select what should be part of their world, their attention and their source of information. This behavior is amplified by the parallel worlds existing in Jerusalem, which are similarly irreconcilable than the multiple aspects of different Leitbilder in an individual's mind. The premises are not questioned because they do not have to hold up in front of diverging facts or opinions.

There is a level of decontextualization that creates a situation where fragments of future are not put in interrelation to each other. They might seem somewhat reasonable by itself but are easily exposed as partial mental makeshifts by examining them next to each other, testing them for an overarching logic. At times, this decontextualization reaches a point, where the described future fragments are even ill-fitted to the personal reality of the individual. This exposes them as necessary but eventually useless place holders in lack of better alternatives instead of legitimate future imaginations.

Furthermore, there is a high level of idealization. Often these limited and artificial concepts of future exist not only isolated from each other but from reality. They themselves are bordering the impossible, describe extreme action or are an exaggerated form of a desire fueled by a lack in present-day Jerusalem. Existential issues of the day to day reality are flipped and projected into a future with no concern if the outcome truly is a desired scenario for the individual or the social entity. An act of defiance rather than creation.

All in all, this reflects a true need for consistent images of future and a huge potential in describing them. Disjunct fragments and representations are being utilized by individuals to fill the void of an existential need. These fragments seem to be deeply engrained in the psyche because they are derived from mental concepts that define identity and position in the conflict. However, in truth they are a form of Atopias – a tool to deal with a double existential insecurity. They are mental constructs to form an inner stabilization in the face of the mental insecurity of the future and the physical insecurity of protracted conflict.

In chapter 2.2.3 the six functions of images of future and especially Leitbilder were introduced: Orientation, Motivation, Community-building, Differentiation and Burden-relief. It is obvious that these are also the functions the Leitbilder of Jerusalem 2060 attempt to fulfill. However, in present day Jerusalem there is a great lack of orientation, an overwhelming feeling of apathy, a sense of community dominated by tension towards the other and a differentiation based on narratives of black and white rather than a well-considered one. Most of all there is a high individual burden to carry when it comes to future in Jerusalem - so pronounced even, that many are coping with it by either planning on or actually leaving Jerusalem.




Figure 93: Failure of functions – The lack of Leitbilder in protracted conflict

In a situation where future is highly contested, even to an existential degree, the functions of Leitbilder can become secondary to the claim for future itself. With instability and in unsafe environments images of future seem to divert their power towards upholding a mental balance. They are unable to unfold their true potential as collective guidelines and fail to actively shape and meet their basic functions. In a situation of protracted conflict images of future are dysfunctional – making the process of drawing them into the open, describing and discussing them in a contextualized way as well as collectively reshaping them into wholesome and functioning constructs extremely difficult but even more principal.

8.4 Next steps

“This is, among the disputed cities in the world, maybe the most difficult. Because it looks that there is no solution to this situation and all the solutions that exist, people don't have the strength to go toward.” (126, l. 9-11)

The question of the possibility of establishing a broad social dialogue on strong and feasible long-term futures lied at the heart of this research endeavor from the very beginning. After this process the potential benefits of establishing desired, collective, probable, authentic and explicit long-term Leitbilder for the city as well as the risks in not doing so became more apparent, especially in connection with the five functions of Leitbilder and the failure of those.

This leaves the issue of how such a process could be achieved. Surely, the results of this study could be used in some ways to engage with futures. The two most intriguing options are either a visualization and a future use as a tool to start a broader systematic discourse of future in both societies or as a basis for adapted small scale workshops – a collective and active engagement with positive futures of Jerusalem, in Jerusalem and for Jerusalemites. This type of workshop would be particularly suitable to enable the production of positive collective as well as practical ideas and next steps in a long-term time horizon (Jungk & Müllert, 1993; Steinmüller, 2002; Kuhnt & Müllert, 2006; Popp & Schüll, 2009).

However, fundamental shifts in this deeply engrained social fabric of future seem only possible over time and with a commitment and involvement of either major regional and political actors or the civil society in general. Only if an effort is made, with monetary and time commitment as well as prominent individuals a measurable success might be possible.

Finally, and here the experiences of actually engaging with the inhabitants of Jerusalem leaves one with a great amount of hope, there is the option of a grass root movement for actual futures in the lives of Jerusalemites.

The desire for feasible future is a basic human need. This need seems to be more demanding the further away actual solutions in Jerusalem seem. Leaving individuals involved with the feeling, that if Jerusalemites gets a real opportunity and chance to build their own future, they might actually take it.

9. Conclusion

9.1 Reflection on authors position

This study has a few sections dedicated to the reflection of the authors position. Even though this might seem overeager, it aids notably. Protracted conflict leads systematically to strong biases, needing to be addressed by a systematic reflection on all stages of the work.

The results of this study show how much the author emphasizes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the key element to futures in Jerusalem. Even though a conflict-oriented guideline was purposefully not imposed on the interviewees (but instead a very open interview design was chosen) it did not seem viable to pursue futures under a different premise. Based on the data a perspective beyond the conflict would not have been representative, however, it is imperative to acknowledge, that this aligns with the authors conviction.

Even though technology and ecology for example were identified as major fields of relevancy in 2060 by the author, they were not relevant enough to the interviewees to be devoting more attention to.

9.2 Reflection on Methodology

As the future of Jerusalem is focus of very little scientific work, the Leitbildanalysis was a very suitable choice to produce a first level of hypothesis with. The politicized and overshadowed nature of futures in Jerusalem made the tool of the Leitbildanalysis an ideal instrument to uncover underlying long-term images. Its structured process of iterative coding in tiers enabled the carving out of six general mental frames but also helped shed light on a multitude of more specific aspects, especially in the form of the Leitbild modules. This

sensitivity to detail revealed surprising similarities between the factions of the conflict and thereby, hopefully, adds to enabling a discussion and reflection of futures in Jerusalem beyond the deadlock of Israeli-Palestinian narratives. Furthermore, it clearly demonstrated the severe obstacles to trying to transcend these by putting them next to each other into the open in a neutral fashion.

Additionally, the ability to adapt the Leitbildanalysis specifically for the context, tailoring it to the difficult nature of protracted conflict, was key to reaching the results.

In retrospect, all of the above made the Leitbildanalysis a uniquely fitting tool to gain profound and relevant insights into the obscure and difficult futures of Jerusalem.

However, the Leitbildanalysis in its original form does not take account of the overall difficulty and contested nature of future in protracted conflict. The degree of fragmentation and contradiction inside the same individual was higher than expected. This issue was addressed by adding an overarching category of 'blind spots' to the analysis but should be refined further in future examinations.

Furthermore, the Leitbildanalysis is designed to explore the futures of one entity. In addition, even though Jerusalemites did turn out actually being one entity in the end, this made working with it during the analysis difficult. As the base assumption was, that there are two separate entities, each separated into sub-entities with each one having unique images of future. This increased the number of possible categories and scenarios greatly. Only when they started to align it became clear, that the futures are transcending these categories. The blurred lines between national, religious or ethnic groups, however, made it especially difficult to deal with perspective syn- and desynchronization as this kept constantly shifting. Therefore, replacing this element by a deeper understanding of who and what 'us' and 'they' turned out to be very helpful.

Finally, the greatest challenge was to encourage the interviewees to stay on topic of long-term future images. The wide and positive resonance to participate made it easy to find suitable participants, however, during the interviews itself only a fraction of time was spent actually talking about the future – despite persistent encouragement. Especially during times of heightened conflict and imminent tension in the summer of 2015, it was almost impossible to move past current events. Here, further refinement and additional strategies could be beneficial.

9.3 Summary of the Results

Overall, this study describes four bi-national and two corresponding national images of Jerusalem 2060. Here, they are listed along the spectrum of decreasing violence as followed:

1. War and Terror
2. A Phoenix from the Ashes
3. A Future on our Terms
4. Ethnic Ghettos
5. Cold Coexistence
6. A Thriving Community

The image of **‘War and terror’** describes a future Jerusalem in ruins, without a solution but propelled violence. With no giving in or willingness to compromise but forced confrontation. A place where civilian life is made impossible.

This is probably the image with the greatest resonance in probability. It is seen as more or less likely by almost all participants – Israeli or Palestinian, right, left, center religious and secular. Sadly, this is in a way the ‘business as usual scenario’.

The **‘Phoenix from the ashes’** images describes a Jerusalem in 2060 that has burned itself down to the foundation to be rebuild. In the wake of destruction and conflict lies a new beginning, the only way to change course, the only hope for improving life in the holy city. This was the most unexpected image of all. It seemed counter intuitive to desire a cataclysmic event to be able to create a better Jerusalem. However, this is thought by many interviewees, Israeli and Palestinians alike. It seems that especially those who tend to be optimists revert to this image, as it seems to be the only way of keep believing that another world is possible.

A **‘Future on our Terms’** describes an uncompromising view on Jerusalem. Everything belongs to ‘us’ and nothing to the other. On both sides a number of interviewees believe, that someday the city will only belong to them. In this mindset it is secondary if the other is accepted as an addition or erased from the face of Jerusalem – the important aspect is, that they are in sole control.

This is a very common image for nationalists or religious nationalists, but increasingly also the young generation. In this uncompromising mindset the other might or might not be hated – but is marginalized. It seems like these individuals share less reality with the other side. It enables negative myths and narratives to replace actual experiences and acknowledging their humanity.

The image of **‘Ethnic ghettos’** describes a divided Jerusalem. Physically, culturally, socially and economically. It draws from the past and present situation in Jerusalem, from the cold war Berlin and gated communities. The underlying believe is, that only a barrier can keep the people from Jerusalem from killing each other – even if that means living in cages.

This is the pessimist’s version of an optimistic scenario. Those who have no faith in humanity and its ability to resolve war and conflict. Also, this image is present on both sides. However, there is an overwhelming consensus among all interviewees, that this should never happen. Dividing Jerusalem is an unacceptable scenario – that is still seen as likely by some.

‘Cold coexistence’ means learning to live with each other. Jerusalem as two capitals for two people. With clear responsibilities and open borders. This might take decades, but it’s worth it for ‘us’, even with all the setback that are inevitable. Because there is no alternative for living in this region. Not love but acceptance of the other.

This is the dominant image of Israeli liberals. Even if it is unclear how this situation can be achieved, there is a consensus in the left, that this is necessary and especially beneficial for the Israeli society as a whole. To be able to focus on other issues and to be safe in the long-term as well as retain control and the Jewish character of Israel.

A **‘Thriving Community’** describes Jerusalem in peace. Where everyone can live as equals in the city and the city is prospering. Amicable tolerance and close relations towards the other are possible as soon as the unjust and one-sided rule of today is abolished. Hate and violence will end, and the young generations can live their potential together. A win-win-win situation. This is the Palestinian equivalent of ‘Cold coexistence’. This is the image of liberal but also many from the political center. It is a very common image that, however, includes the inability of Palestinians to impact the developments towards this future. The underlying conviction is, once we are able to overcome this dead lock, the sky is the limit.

9.4 Final Remark

“Everything that I said was a surprise to me as well.” (121, l. 396)

With all its weight, sorrow and sadness, disappointed hopes and disillusion of reality in Jerusalem today – there is one thing that remains. The future is unknown. Jerusalem’s future will happen one way or another, and it is shaped already by the images that its citizens appropriate today. These images are not set in stone. And in this process alone, the words ‘I don’t know’ were stated over 130 times.

Even though hope has been dismantled over many decades by the failing peace process, greatly diminishing agency and the imagination of future, it shows, that the future is a frame without an image; neither black nor white. The people of Jerusalem are open for a discourse of future to overcome the mental dissonance between what they want and what they think will happen.

If there is one thing this study has shown, then that there is a great individual need to talk about Jerusalem’s future, but also a great inability. There are strong artificial images, empty caskets filled with unreflected desires, none qualifying as true or strong Leitbilder. The people of Jerusalem are in search of viable images for their future and the future of their children. There is a need to surpass this crippling situation of disorientation, mental drainage and paralysis to find a balance between past, present and future and thus own their future.

The aim of this study, to uncover and better understand Jerusalemites true images of long-term future guided itself into illustrating how closely the human existence circles around the future. Only the future can potentially bring Jerusalemites closer together, by realizing that despite the differences of how Jerusalemites see the future, Israeli and Palestinian visions largely align.



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Appendix I: Interview guideline and Interview process

Interview Guideline

What is the first thing that comes to your mind, when you think of Jerusalem?

What is your personal connection to the city?

What emotions do you connect with the city?

What does it symbolize for you?

What is Jerusalem in your point of view / how would you define Jerusalem?

Where are its borders? What is its status?

What makes it what it is / what are its core characteristics?

What are the biggest challenges in Jerusalem today?

What are the biggest opportunities?

(adapted STEEP analysis e.g. Security, Infrastructure, Employment, Unity/Division, Politics, Education, Religion, Economy, Status, Leadership, International Players, Demographics, Waste, Water, Public Transportation, Is- Pal Conflict, Climate Change, Technology, Gender, Civil Society, Wildcards)

*

It can be very challenging to think long, especially in the gridlocked situation of Jerusalem.

The following should not be understood as a strict projection of the future, but as a range of possible options or scenarios.

I am interested in your personal point of view of the future.

50 years is a very long-time horizon. It can be helpful to think back 50 years and realize how impactful developments can be and how drastically circumstances can change, sometimes in a very short period of time.

*

What are the biggest challenges in 2060?

(drawing from the aspects and items mentioned before)

What will be the most impactful ones? Why do you think that?

What are the biggest opportunities in 50 years?

(drawing from the aspects and items mentioned before)

What are the preconditions, in your opinion, for them to fully be able to develop?

What are the main hurdles?

There are some pictures of a future Jerusalem that exist today (e.g. the media, society or national/international politics).

What do you think of the image of a Jerusalem in a two states solution?

(Short description and assessment)

What do you think of the image of Jerusalem as the eternal united capital of Israel?

If you would be asked to paint a picture of a Jerusalem in 50 years, how would it look like?

How would you like Jerusalem to look like in 50 years?

What is the most important step towards this Jerusalem?

How realistic do you think this image is? Why?

If you would step into a time machine that would bring you to Jerusalem in 2060, what would you expect to find, once you step out of it?

My final question would be, what metaphor describes a future Jerusalem best in your opinion?

Is there any aspect of a future Jerusalem that was missing or was under represented?

Is there anything you would like to add?

Appendix II: Context Protocol

Demographic Questions

What is your age?

What is your sex?

How would you describe your Ethnicity/Nationality?

Where were you born?

What is your religious orientation?

What is your profession/employment situation?

What is your highest level of education?

How would you describe your political orientation?

In which city / neighborhood do you currently live in?

Is there anything you want to state about the interview / Interviewer?

Can you think of a central question or issue that was not addressed?

Thank you very much for your support, you can always reach out to me with Questions.

If you are interested, you can leave your email address here and I will be happy to send you my findings in the end of my PhD process, that you helped to create.

Appendix III: Coding schematics and documentation of the process

After the transcription process, the interviews were filtered and reduced to respective excerpts of relevant content. These were then coded in iterative cycles.

1. First the data was coded as statements and passages regarding the future and other issues (regarding present and past).

Both content blocks were then addressed in Detail, the statements about future were then categorized as Desired, Undesired, Feasible and Unfeasible. The following first tier codes:

Feared, likely – Social erosion, har borders, outside threats, mutual destruction, economic breakdown, violence, radicalization, displacement, one-sided takeover, no agency, status quo, ghettos

Feared, unlikely – violent escalation, continuation, division, one-sided control, shared capital

Desired, unlikely – Return to past, fantasia, peace, resolution of conflict, shared space, pos. leaders, good economy, two states, equality

Desired, likely – one-sided control, thriving open city, utopia, pluralistic coexistence, two capitals, Compromise, peace, economic coexistence, cathartic destruction, time is on our side

2. The second cycle filtered the data under the aspect of Emotions and the overall or shifting emotional condition of the interview. This was first divided into positive, negative and ambivalent Emotions before categorizing them in Detail as:

Ambivalence

Negative emotions – Ironic laughter, tension, fear, injustice, hopelessness, frustration, hatred, anger, sadness, insecurity

Positive emotions – peaceful, tolerant, religious, pride, safety, love, home, hope, community, uniqueness, diversity

3. Subsequently any images, social imagery or pictorial language, metaphors, symbols, examples, quotes and anecdotes were filtered from the data and systemized as in principle positive, negative or ambiguous. The sub codes were as followed:

Quotes, examples, delicate, central, peaceful, bright, precious, normal, unpredictable, hell, darkness, violence, catastrophe, prison, vicious circle

4. In the following the raw data was filtered against the background of Semantic Succession, arguments and reasonings prevalent or dominant, frequent or central in the interviews, perspectives of human nature and views of the world, the reasoning behind the forces that hold the world around Jerusalem together at its core:

The destructiveness of the occupation, romanticizing of the past, future blindness, we have to find a way, Oslo disappointment, Solution is impossible, lack of political will, it's their fault, Jerusalem is ours

5. Finally, all data was reviewed in regard to the perception of self the others. How do interviewees describe, witness or believe their own social entities role to be and how does that relate to the image of the 'enemy'. This was then broken down to the following traits of 'Us':

Positive – reasonable, deserving, vigilant, tolerant, peaceful, victim

Negative – passive, insecure, divided

And 'They':

Negative – disease, undeserving, weak, treacherous, unwilling, violent, racist, fanatic

Positive – on our side, smart, similar

6. Throughout these steps was the coding of blind spots done. Everything inconsistent, contradictive or bordering delusional was marked as Blindspot and revisited in the very end to analyze and categorize this as followed:

I don't know, contradictions, dichotomies, known unknown, unknown unknown, denial, wishful thinking

Appendix IV: List of Codes

Fearful projection	0
Likely	0
Institutional societal erosion	4
Hard border two states	3
Outside threat/3rd parties/non-Jerusalemities	5
Connect fait/mutual destruction	13
Economic time bomb/poverty/no tourists	22
Uncontrolled violence/destruction/radicalization	74
Expulsion/displacement/assimilation/extinction	53
Jews/Israelis take over	2
Haredim take over	4
Tourists take over	2
No agency/influence over development	10
Controlled continuous (waves of) conflict/standstill/status quo	29
Ghettos /violent segregation/division	27
Unlikely	0
Violent escalation	4
Continuation of Status Quo	20
Forced division	1
Undivided city (under Israeli control)	10
Forced dominance	5
Shared capital	1
Desired projections	0
Return to the past	8
Fantasia	3
Unlikely	0
(Taking a chance on) peace in general	1
Secular city	1
Shared education	1
Charismatic leaders	1
Improving economy/poverty	2
Corpus separatum	1
Peace under Israeli control /undivided city	14
One shared city (two states)	15
Two separate but cooperating cities	23
Beautiful city/open /equality (one state?)	11
Resolution of the conflict	7
Likely	0
Technological utopia	5
More public space	2
Back to Palestinians	5
Takeover by force	1

Peaceful thriving 'open' city	1
Takeover/uncompromising /everything	17
Eternal Israeli capital	1
Messiah temple/thriving	3
Israel takes over (by force)	3
Increased responsibility /inclusion of Haredim/Palestinians	7
Israel makes peace/political settlement	1
Creating creativity/tolerance	10
Pluralistic Coexistence no matter how/Place for everyone/compromise	21
Two capitals/Yerushalaim, ALQuds	6
Clear/soft border, separate (but open)	21
Israeli capital (with pal capital)	2
No clear border/ connected	4
Stiff coexistence/ slow build/compromise	23
Peaceful/diverse/shared/open/thriving city/acceptance	54
(One) Bi-/inter-national city/state/integration of all	36
International pressure to a solution	3
Increase religiousness/spirituality	7
Intellectual interest in Jerusalem	1
Investment/education/economic coexistence	24
Continuation (character, religious center, tourists)	12
Revolution /cathartic destruction	34
Time is on our side	16
Emotions	0
Ambivalence	3
Negative Emotions	0
Sad/ironic laughter	90
Pressure/ tension	17
Worry/ fear	32
Absurd/unjust	6
Antagonistic	5
Hopeless/frustrated/apathic/powerless	38
Hate/ anger	14
Sad/pity	21
Unsafe/ unsure	33
Positive Emotions	0
Peaceful/ calm/tolerant	2
Religion	13
Pride/passion/meaning	8
Satisfied/safe	4
Love	16
Hope	20
Optimistic	32
Community	10
Uniqueness	9

Diversity	13
Home	39
Semantic succession	0
Effects of occupation/status quo	0
Distraction/social stagnation/disintegration	2
Romanticizing the past	1
Future darkness	1
Political instability	1
Radicalization	1
We have to (and therefore will) find a way	11
It's the only way/unsustainable	6
Will benefit us greatly /there are many solutions	8
Force is the only way/language they understand	2
Oslo disappointment	15
Unjust	1
Disappointment	3
Solution impossible (for us)	0
International role	7
To blame	1
Providing the solution (shifting to our side)	6
Unhelpful	2
No assurances	1
Human nature	2
Lack of will (politicians)	2
(Rel.) leaders/government/representation	0
Doing a good job	3
Unwilling	2
Manipulating /using	6
No representation/election	2
Corruption/weak delectants/liar	13
Ambiguous terms	1
Not the time	1
It's their fault	17
Just don't want to	2
Catering to clientele/exclusivity	1
Laziness/poverty	1
Racism/ideology	2
Occupation/bad economy	2
Jerusalem is ours	18
Jerusalem belongs to everyone	9
Metaphors	0
Quotes, Sayings	0
Other	2
Palestinian	4
Israeli	5

Examples (positive?)	31
Positive/ precious	0
Other cities	15
Delicate/vulnerable/intimate	3
Key/center/heart/origin/existential	13
Peace coexistence/ diversity/kindness	9
Light bright right beautiful	8
History/ pol-national monument	4
Precious/holy/valuable/ownership	5
Baby/mother	3
Natural /normal/inconsequential	18
Negative/destructive	0
Unpredictable	1
Hell/anchor for craziness/shit	3
Self-destructive/ stupid	1
Divorce/disintegration/denial	5
Other cities	1
Darkness/black/tragedy	6
Violence/injury/victim	19
Vigilant/new beginning	2
Apartheid/discrimination/Nazi	4
Disease/poison/natural disaster	14
Prison/no agency purgatory	9
Vicious circle /continuum of violence hatred	6
Ambiguous	11
Not Jerusalem	1
Strategies to create better future	0
Other	0
Contact	2
(Economic) pressure	1
Mass psycho therapy	1
Compromise	1
Pragmatism	6
Language	1
Vote	2
Time	2
Roots	1
Fight/stand up	1
Marihuana/art and culture	4
Leaders/ strategy	20
International community	11
People/ vision	36
(Miraculous?) change of heart/mind/religion	30
Work/economy	17
Joint effort/equality	23

Education/ young generation/ women	27
They-construct	0
Overarching They construct	1
Negative	76
Disease	1
Decadent/have everything	1
Hold power/ control the world/feel their better than others	8
Undeserving/foreigner(newer)/ Jerusalem is not important	6
Divided	4
Stupid/failing	4
Cowards/weak	3
Treachorous/double standards/selfish/not genuine	14
Denial/ignoring/unaware	8
Careless/unable	2
Unwilling/uncompromising/deflecting blame	13
Racist/unethical	3
Intolerant/untrustworthy/irresponsible	7
Violent terrorist/perpetrators/criminal/don't want peace	16
Fanatics/religious extremists/radicalization	9
Victim	4
Occupier/perpetrator/actor	30
Positive	24
Revolting (on our side)	2
Smart	1
Conscious/taking responsibility	1
Similar/human	11
Victim/trying but failing	2
Us-construct	0
Overarching Us-construct	4
Negative	21
Flawed	1
Divided	3
Religious/radical	1
Weak	3
Nonstrategic	1
Asleep/passive	2
Ignorant/unaware/unable	7
Unwilling to do what is needed/uncompromising	6
Uprooted/ insecure/ artificial creation of tradition	2
Insensitive /military force/oppression	4
Positive	29
Reasonable /trying/aware/smart	11
Growing	2
Righteous /deserving/equal	11
Vigilant /strong /fierce/enduring	20

Tolerant/friendly/open/peaceful/ responsible	12
Victim/trying but failing	46
Blind spots	0
Contradictions/inconsistencies - dichotomies	0
Tolerant intolerance	1
Unsolvable solutions	1
Good and bad	2
Favorable enemy	5
It is the way it isn't	11
Powerless power	1
Dangerous safety	4
Love and hate	3
Hopeless hope	7
Peace and war	4
Concept	13
Known unknown / verbalized	0
Either for us or against us	2
The other perspective	5
The solution	10
The future (unpredictable, instable)	41
How status quo survives	1
Active denial of reality/conflict	6
Active denial of the other	3
Conflict as a distraction	5
Unknown unknown / subtext	0
Balance /same boat	1
Hiding/giving up	8
No future, no reality, no solution (but wish for)	4
Past over future	6
Conspiracy	3
Wishful thinking	22
Someone will come save us	5
Unreal, not important, canvas other/conflict non-issue	12
Change (through escalation-last hope?)	3
Want vs. likely/reality	9
I don't know	132
Jerusalem today	0
Uniqueness	88
Historic/geographic importance	1
Microcosm /key of conflict	4
Holy sites/religion	1
Multiple Jerusalems/cosmopolitan	1
Boundaries	23
Don't know/ doesn't matter much	2
Divided Jerusalem	1

Challenges	1
Media misrepresentation	1
Migration/demographics	7
Interconnectedness	4
Occupation	67
Pal rights/status	1
Settlements	2
No man's land	1
Division	59
Three cities	5
Poverty	19
Politicians/leaders	32
Housing/cost of living	25
Exclusivity/ownership	34
Tradition/religion	52
Economy/education	45
Security/violence	28
Infrastructure	21



Selbstständigkeitserklärung

Ich erkläre hiermit, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbstständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe.

Alle Ausführungen, die wörtlich oder inhaltlich aus anderen Schriften entnommen sind, habe ich als solche kenntlich gemacht.

Die Arbeit wurde in gleicher oder ähnlicher Form noch keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt.

Berlin, 03.03.2020

Julia Lampert