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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING AS ORGANISATIONAL ACTION

Exploring Organisational Processes Within the United Nations Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

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ABSTRACT

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping is carried out by a complex bureaucratic organisation – the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. This organisation is necessary for the work of UN peacekeeping operations. It is also a dynamic social entity, which produces its own processes, rules and procedures capable of making sense of the complex post-war recovery issue. This thesis explores how organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy work. It does so by cumulating three independent articles under this general research question. The first article develops a theoretical framework of analysis through introducing two core concepts of organisational sociology, 'coupling' and 'communication', to the study of UN peacekeeping. It argues that the interconnection between these two concepts define a dynamic organisational space in which UN officials interact and shape peacekeeping activities. The second and third articles present the results of a qualitative case study: the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and its headquarters, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Through the use of interpretative methods, the second article particularly identifies general strategies used by UN officials to organise and influence peacekeeping activities within UNMIL and DPKO. The third article investigates the disconnection between the organisational perspective of UNMIL and that of DPKO, and analyses the use of communication practices in protection against intra-organisational interferences. The results of these articles reveal that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is more than a rationalised organisation functioning to fulfil a specific goal or mandate. Rather, its organisational processes rely on the creativity and flexibility of its individual member as well as their ability to make their work influential within the organisation. This thesis also shows that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy includes a high degree of organisational diversity, as it incorporates multiple perspectives and autonomous local frameworks in which UN officials interact and organise peacekeeping activities. However, this decentralisation also produces many contingencies and uncertainties. Hence, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy protects its formal programmatic development from the diversity of its organisational action through a strict hierarchical vetting process of reference documents. Even though this practice ensures organisational survival, it often does not adequately reflect the practical knowledge produced by the diverse activities at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Peacekeeping der Vereinten Nationen (UN) wird von einer komplexen bürokratischen Organisation ausgeführt. Diese Organisation ist nicht nur eine notwendige Grundlage der Arbeit von Friedensmissionen. Sie ist auch ein dynamisches sozio-politisches Gebilde, in dem Prozesse, Regeln und Prozeduren entwickelt werden, die dem komplexen Sachverhalt der Friedenssicherung in Nachkriegskontexten Sinn verleiht. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, wie Organisationsprozesse innerhalb der UN-Peacekeeping-Bürokratie funktionieren. Diese Frage wurde im Rahmen von drei unabhängigen Artikeln bearbeitet, die in dieser Dissertation kumulativ zusammengeführt werden. Basierend auf *Kopplung* und *Kommunikation*, zwei grundlegende Konzepte der Organisationsoziologie, wird im ersten Artikel ein theoretischer Rahmen zur Analyse von Organisationsprozessen der UN-Bürokratie entwickelt. Das zentrale Argument hierbei ist, dass der Zusammenhang zwischen Kopplung und Kommunikation einen dynamischen Raum definiert, in dem Fachkräfte der UN interagieren, um Peacekeeping-Maßnahmen zu gestalten. In den beiden anderen Artikeln werden die Ergebnisse einer qualitativen Fallstudie der UN-Friedensmission in Liberia (UNMIL) und deren Hauptquartier, der Hauptabteilung Friedenssicherungseinsätze (DPKO), präsentiert. Die interpretative Analyse im zweiten Artikel identifiziert generelle Strategien, die von UN-Fachkräften verfolgt werden, um die Gestaltung und Organisation von Peacekeeping-Maßnahmen zu beeinflussen. Der dritte Artikel konzentriert sich auf die Distanziertheit zwischen den Perspektiven der Friedensmission (UNMIL) und des Hauptquartiers (DPKO). Hierbei wird insbesondere der Gebrauch von Kommunikationspraktiken zur Verteidigung von Interessen gegenüber interner Einmischungen und Interventionen untersucht. Die Ergebnisse der drei Artikel beschreiben die Organisation von UN-Peacekeeping als eine Bürokratie, die sich, trotz ihrer rationalisierten Hierarchie, sehr stark auf die Kreativität, Flexibilität und Durchsetzungskraft ihrer individuellen Mitglieder verlässt. Diese Forschung zeigt auch, dass die Organisation der UN-Bürokratie diversifiziert ist. Sie beinhaltet verschiedene lokale Perspektiven und autonome Bezugsrahmen, in denen Fachkräfte auf unterschiedlichen Organisationsebenen interagieren. Diese formelle und informelle Dezentralisierung beinhaltet jedoch Kontingenz und Unsicherheit für die Organisation von UN-Peacekeeping. Daher beschützt die UN-Bürokratie ihre formale Programentwicklung vor der Diversität ihrer lokalen Entscheidungsrahmen durch das Prüfen und Selektieren von Referenzdokumenten. Dieser hierarchische Reflektionsprozess schließt jedoch selten das praktische Wissen lokaler UN-Akteure ein. Er sichert jedoch das Überleben von UN-Peacekeeping als internationale bürokratische Organisation.

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ACRONYMS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	Assistant Secretary General
COS	Chief of Staff
DFS	Department of Field Support
DM	Department of Management
DMS	Director of Mission Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GEMAP	Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HOFO	Head of Field Office
HoM	Head of Mission
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
IOT	Intergrated Operational Teams
IR	International Relations
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
JOC	Joint Operations Center
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MILOBS	Military Observers
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUC	United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Service
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
OO	Office of Operations
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBPS	Peacekeeping Best Practice Section
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PET	Policy, Evaluation and Training Division
R&G	Recovery and Governance
RC	Resident Coordinator
RoL	Rule of Law
SG	Secretary General
SITCEN	Situation Center
SITREP	Situation Report
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
US	United States
USG	Under-Secretary-General

1 INTRODUCTION

> The answer to the question of whether peacekeeping works is a clear and resounding yes.[1]

Fortna's statement is straight forward and positive, concluding her quantitative assessment of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. As UN peacekeeping missions tend to be sent to particular difficult situations which are often very unfavourable for their success, the UN peacekeeping record is bound to look dire. However, 'controlling as much as possible for factors that might influence the degree of difficulty of a particular case, it is clear that intervention by the international community helps maintain peace'.[2]

As clear as Fortna's conclusion is, it also points out the inherent ambiguities and uncertainties continuously faced by UN peacekeeping. The list of difficulties and setbacks encountered is long, reaching from the failure to protect civilians in places like Rwanda and Srebrenica[3] to accusations of sexual assault in various mission areas[4] and causing an outbreak of cholera in Haiti.[5] Also the ways and means to control case-specific difficulties are diverse. As violence escalated rapidly in South Sudan in December 2013 resulting in approximately 10,000 fatalities and over 700,000 displaced people, the head of the UN mission in South Sudan admitted that the UN had not been able to predict this crisis,[6] even though it had been mandated to establish an early warning system. Unable to react in a preventive manner, the execution of the mission's mandate to protect civilians was de facto reduced to protecting those civilians who were able to flee into one of the UN camps secured by UN military.[7] In Côte d'Ivoire, the escalation of violence in a post-electoral stand-off between two presidential candidates in 2011 led to widespread atrocities and hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Here, the UN peacekeeping mission intervened directly, not only clearly acknowledging a rightful winner of the elections but also supporting his military campaign with direct use of force.[8] Again, the UN peacekeeping mission faced criticism for having given up its impartiality in supporting

[1] Fortna, 2008, p. 173.
[2] Fortna, 2004, p. 288.
[3] UN, 1999a, b.
[4] See e.g. Kent, 2007.
[5] Chan *et al.*, 2013.
[6] Johnson, 2013.
[7] Schumann, 2014.
[8] ICG, 2011, Nossiter, 2011.

one side with military means.[9] Hence, UN peacekeeping seems to be continuously 'under fire',[10] both literately and figuratively through the critique it is facing. Beyond the question asking if peacekeeping works, it still seems to be a very difficult task for the UN to live up to exceedingly high expectations[11] while its legitimacy is constantly questioned.

Researchers, policymakers and practitioners often point to the complexity of peacekeeping operations as a cause for such ambiguity.[12] For example, UN Under-Secretary-General (USG) Alain Le Roy, head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the time, stated in a speech in 2009 that 'peacekeeping operations are exceedingly complex. Peacekeeping operations must draw support from, and navigate between, numerous components, each one of them variable and potentially unpredictable'.[13] The problem with such 'complexity arguments' is that they predominantly point in self-defence of UN peacekeeping towards factors in the environment of organisations, such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, which carry out peacekeeping operations.[14] This UN peacekeeping bureaucracy incorporates the UN secretariat's DPKO and Department of Field Support (DFS) as well as 16 current peacekeeping missions worldwide. Clearly, its organisational environment including international politics and the political and social systems of post-war countries is complex, ambiguous and to a certain extent unpredictable. Yet, the sense of bureaucracies such as that of UN peacekeeping is to deal with these complexities. They are made to reduce uncertainty, enable predictions and legitimise action based on these assertions. Barnett observed the same reflecting the UN's role during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994:

> New York, as headquarters is referred to by UN hands, developed peacekeeping rules that limited who would qualify for relief and assistance; developed a system of thought that helped them to maintain a faith in the value of the international community, even while acting in ways that potentially violated those values; and developed a sense of powerlessness that could lead them to deny their capacities for action.[15]

This suggests that in order to determine and judge the outcome of peacekeeping (i.e. the question 'does peacekeeping work'?), it is important to generate an understanding of the internal dynamics

[9] Plett, 2011.
[10] Rubinstein, 2008.
[11] Thakur and Thayer, 1995.
[12] See e.g. Aoi *et al.*, 2007b, de Coning, 2009, Krasno, 2004a, pp. 246-248.
[13] Le Roy, 2009, p. 14.
[14] For example, Le Roy lists eight issues that increase 'uncertainty and unpredictability' (such as the lack of consensus at the level of the Security Council or diminishing regional and local support for peacekeeping missions) out of which only two (headquarter management and personnel recruitment) are internal factors. See Le Roy, 2009, pp. 14-15.
[15] Barnett, 2002, pp. 9-10.

and processes of the organisation which provides the foundation of action within the world of UN peacekeeping.[16] In other words, it is necessary to study *UN peacekeeping as organisational action*.

The approach in this thesis affords such a study of the organisation of UN peacekeeping. It explores the underlying organisational processes and enabling activities of actors within the organisation of UN peacekeeping. This provides an important contribution to studies like Fortna's assessment of UN peacekeeping which analyse the relationships and/or causal mechanisms between different input factors (independent variables) and the outcomes of UN peacekeeping (dependent variable).[17] To a certain extent these studies observe the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as a 'black box', often based on the assumption that it is a rational hierarchy designed to efficiently and effectively implement a certain goal.[18] I argue that organisations intervening in a post-war context, such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, are not necessarily 'functional' and 'rational' projections of an externally articulated formal goal or mandate, but are produced and reproduced through internal social interaction and communication processes. The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is itself a *dynamic social phenomenon* which produces its own rules and procedures capable of making sense of the complex world.[19] Hence, I apply a reconstructive approach to the study of UN peacekeeping[20] which concentrates on the *process of organisation*.[21] Efficiency and effectiveness are not seen as presupposed bureaucratic rationalities, but rather analysed as factors qualifying organisational interaction processes equivalent to ambiguity, uncertainty, or contingency. Such factors are explored in order to reconstruct the organisational processes which lead to and reproduce a meaningful framework or organisation. As these processes clearly can impact the outcome of UN peacekeeping operations, this research contributes an important 'building block' to a more in-depth understanding to the question asking how peacekeeping works.

Consequently, in order to understand outcomes, meanings, positions and actions produced by UN peace operations, this thesis explores how UN peacekeeping works as a complex 'organisation in action'.[22] The research question underlying this thesis thus is considerably open and straight forward:

How do organisational processes within the United Nations peacekeeping bureaucracy work?

[16] See also Autesserre, 2009, Barnett and Finnemore, 2004.
[17] Fortna, 2004, 2008. For studies with a similar focus see e.g. Dobbins *et al.*, 2005, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006.
[18] Such research parallels evaluative organisational studies which typically presuppose an organisational goal and/or identified criteria of success according to which the effectiveness and/or efficiency of an organisation can be evaluated and assessed, see Vogt, 2009, p. 7.
[19] Luhmann, 2006, March and Olsen, 1989, Weick, 1995.
[20] Vogt, 2009.
[21] Weick, 1985.
[22] Thompson, 1967.

In this research, this broad and explorative question is approached in three distinct but interconnected ways. The first applies different approaches of organisational theory to the study of UN peacekeeping. The core question here is how organisational procedures and practices can manage and cope with the ambiguities, uncertainties and dilemmas of peacekeeping operations. Here a general framework of analysis is developed through which UN peacekeeping can be assessed as organisational action. Secondly, the research turns to the empirical assessment of organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Based on an in-depth qualitative case study of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and its headquarters DPKO, it explores the strategies UN officials use to influence and shape peacekeeping activities while exceeding the inherent limitations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The third approach continues to investigate the UNMIL/DPKO case study and explores how different organisational perspectives within the organisation of peacekeeping change the local use of management and communication tools. For this purpose I focus on contrasting the headquarter perspective of DPKO with the mission perspective of UNMIL. All three approaches have produced separate results and conclusions which are presented in three independent journal articles. In this thesis, all three articles are cumulated in order to integrate the different results under the general research question and allow overall conclusion

1.1 Organisational Action and the Research on International Peace Operations

The literature on international peace operations often uses the word 'peacebuilding' as an overarching term for the multiple activities that international organisations, bi-lateral donors and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pursue in order to assist a state and society in in its post-war recovery.[23] The research on 'peacebuilding' includes substantial gaps in its understanding of the social dynamics within bureaucratic organisations that implement peace operations. The following section provides a brief overview of the research on 'peacebuilding' and elaborates how an analysis of UN peacekeeping as organisational action complements to this academic field.

'Peacebuilding' literature has predominantly examined the normative and operational feasibility of international interventions in war and post-war situations. It has been valuable in critically addressing the norms underlying international 'peacebuilding'.[24] Scholars have shown that 'peacebuilding' genuinely is based on liberal values, aiming to (re)build a post-war state as 'liberal

[23] See e.g. Barnett *et al.*, 2007. It is important to note that within the context of the UN the term 'peacebuilding' is used much more narrowly, often institutionally referring to operations led by other UN departments and institutions than DPKO (see below).
[24] See e.g. Pugh, 2004.

market democracy'.[25] Operationally, such 'liberal peacebuilding' translates into 'tools' and measures of re-building a post-war state, including interventions in support of security, economic revitalisation, democratic participation, and human rights promotion.[26] Research on 'peacebuilding' has also made extensive efforts to evaluate and assess the effectiveness of these tools as well as the conditions for their failure or success.[27] These studies have produced an elusive 'track record' of peace operations and very often include suggestions and policy recommendations on how to improve them. Moreover, this research has widely acknowledged a gap between the (liberal) aspirations of international peace operations and the actual outcome.[28]

The 'peacebuilding literature' has often neglected internal dynamics and processes within the organisations that carry out post-war interventions. Even critical research approaches, which in recent years have increasingly turned towards a qualitative empirical assessment of the gap between aspiration and the reality of 'peacebuilding' interventions, often portray an international intervention as one actor within the political and social field of the post-war state. These studies have been valuable in addressing the perceptions of 'local'[29] populations and communities towards interveners.[30] Moreover, scholars have also pointed out that 'peacebuilding' is a process of political interaction and negotiation between the interveners and agents of the 'intervened' in a post-war setting.[31] From this perspective the outcome of 'peacebuilding' is a compromise between the aims of international 'peacebuilders' and the interests of 'local' actors who often very rationally oppose and resist the social change induced by international intervention.[32] Reflecting the 'resistance' and 'critical agency' of local actors to liberal peacebuilding, many studies call for the inclusion of 'bottom-up' approaches into the portfolio of international interventions.[33] However, questions arise as to how and to what extent international interventions can integrate constructive critique and the demands of 'local' actors in their own programmatic portfolio and practice.[34]

[25] Paris, 2002, 2004, Richmond, 2004.
[26] See e.g. Chesterman *et al.*, 2005, Jackson, 2011, Krause and Jütersonke, 2005, Milliken and Krause, 2002, Ogata and Cels, 2003, Ottaway, 2002, Reilly, 2004, Schwarz, 2005.
[27] See e.g. Dobbins et al., 2005, Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006, Fortna, 2004, 2008, Paris, 2004, Tull, 2012, Zuercher, 2006.
[28] See e.g. Krause and Jütersonke, 2005, p. 449, Paris, 1997, p. 57, 2004, Zuercher, 2006.
[29] The term 'local' is very often used to describe national actors within a post-war country (the 'intervened'), see e.g. Chesterman, 2007, Narten, 2008. However, I generally use the term differently referring to interaction processes at various levels and locations within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. When used to describe 'intervened' actors, I thus highlight the word with quotation marks.
[30] See e.g. Neumann, 2013, Pouligny, 2006, Talentino, 2007.
[31] See e.g. Bonacker *et al.*, 2010, Riese, 2013.
[32] See e.g Barnett and Zuercher, 2008, Diestler and Riese, 2013, Zürcher *et al.*, 2013.
[33] See e.g. Mac Ginty, 2010, Richmond and Mitchell, 2012, Richmond, 2009.
[34] Campbell, 2008, Neumann and Winckler, 2013.

The question of including 'local' demands and knowledge within international 'peacebuilding' interventions is one reason why in recent years some research has begun to include theories, models and knowledge of organisation studies into 'peacebuilding research' and investigate the management of international post-war interventions. The UN, as a major actor in many post-war interventions, has fallen under special scrutiny in these efforts.[35] For example, scholars have applied specific concepts of organisational theory such as 'successful failure'[36], 'organised hypocrisy'[37] and 'organisational design'[38] to peacekeeping in order to provide alternative explanations to the UN's failures and persistence.[39] A further example is Benner *et al*.'s study of 'organisational learning' as a method of creating and managing knowledge within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.[40] Linked very closely to policy development, Benner *et al*. give a useful insight particularly of the political interaction processes that were necessary to develop a 'structure' or 'framework' of 'organisational learning' within DPKO. However, beyond examining 'organisational learning' as a political stance and policy development process, the study gives little understanding as to how it is actually included in day-to-day interaction processes and interpretation frameworks of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.[41] In general, even though these organisational studies have provided valuable insights to specific problems such as coordination or knowledge management within the organisation of UN peacekeeping (and international interventions in general), there still remain wide gaps in this research. In the following, I will point out the three most important shortcomings and explain how the research in this thesis attempts to contribute in filling these gaps.

First, studies often focus on explaining organisational pathologies and dysfunctions. However, despite its limitations, UN peacekeeping does continue to produce positive results.[42] Moreover, one can generally assume that UN officials are eager to contribute to the recovery of war-torn countries and act as effectively as possible. Barnett and Finnemore's ground-breaking work on international bureaucracies is a good example of how the analytical focus on dysfunction fails to capture this

[35] Seibel *et al.*, 2008.
[36] Seibel, 2008.
[37] Lipson, 2007.
[38] Junk, 2012.
[39] A further branch of organisational literature on peace operations examines the interaction between different organisations involved in peace operations, theoretically analysing interventions as organisational networks as well as empirically identifying factors and mechanisms which support inter-organisational collaboration. See e.g. Döring and Schreiner, 2012, Herrhausen, 2007, Paris, 2008.
[40] Benner *et al.*, 2011.
[41] Benner *et al.* themselves suggest that as an addition to their research, in-depth studies of processes within the organisation are necessary to understand the inherent frameworks and criteria of knowledge management. See Benner et al., 2011, p. 222.
[42] On the continued positive contribution of UN peacekeeping, see e.g. Fortna, 2008, HSRP, 2013, p. 3.

continued contribution of UN peacekeeping.[43] Using UN peacekeeping and its failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 as a case study,[44] Barnett and Finnemore's research is compelling in pointing out how international organisations act as bureaucracies, wielding authority and power as an actor in international politics. However, like many other approaches to the organisation of UN peacekeeping mentioned above, this research looks into the process of bureaucratic rationalisation in order to understand pathologies and dysfunctions in the behaviour of international organisations. Similar to the policy-oriented evaluative assessment of effectiveness and performance of UN peace operations (or 'peacebuilding' interventions in general), such a focus on dysfunction often also involves pre-defined (theoretical, moral or rational) assumptions of how peacekeeping should work or function. This thesis offers an alternative view by reconstructing the organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and showing how UN officials use such processes to shape peacekeeping activities despite bureaucratic dysfunctions and limitations. It shows that UN officials apply certain strategies to exceed internal bureaucratic constraints and limitations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy in order to continue to do their work as effectively as possible.

Second, particularly critical researchers have often linked performance of international 'peacebuilding' actors to a bureaucratic 'culture' or 'framework' of 'peacebuilding'.[45] While investigating the peacebuilding intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Autessere for example argues that

> Western and African diplomats, UN peacekeepers, and the staff of nongovernmental organisations involved in conflict resolution share a set of ideologies, rules, rituals, assumptions, definitions, paradigms and standard operating procedures. In the Congo, this culture established the parameters of acceptable action. […] It made diplomats and UN staff members view local conflict resolution as an unimportant, unfamiliar and unmanageable task.[46]

Autesserre's critique of peacebuilding in DRC includes striking parallels to Barnett's observations of the UN during the genocide in Rwanda, cited above, which points to the processes within international bureaucracies that frame and legitimise action.[47] As compelling as the 'culture' arguments are, they can also be criticised. Most importantly, the frames of the 'peacebuilding culture' Autesserre identifies in the 'field', and which Barnett detects at international level, are located at a relatively high level of abstraction. Agency of 'peacebuilders' is not unanimous. Interventions usually involve multiple organisations which often not only stand in competition and

[43] Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, 2004. Many of the organisational studies on UN peace operations build on this work.
[44] see also Barnett, 2002, Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, pp. 121-155.
[45] See e.g. Autesserre, 2009, 2010, Debrix, 1999, Higate and Henry, 2009, Rubinstein, 2008.
[46] Autesserre, 2010, p. 11.
[47] Barnett, 2002.

thus specifically separate themselves,[48] but also include their own interpretative framework, routines and process of interaction. The research in this thesis even goes a step further in this critique, suggesting that despite bureaucratic 'frameworks', the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as *one* organisation includes considerable organisational diversity itself. The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is not only formally decentralised but also informally relies on autonomous and diverse interaction frameworks and decision-making arrangements at various levels and locations within its organisation. This thesis investigates the organisational processes that interconnect the diversity of agency and the overall bureaucratic 'culture' and 'frameworks' of 'peacebuilding' within one implementing organisation. Hence, it contributes to a more precise understanding of the relationship between 'peacebuilding frameworks' and the activities of international interventions.

Third, studies on international interventions in post-war countries tend to assess either the 'field' segment of 'peacebuilding' (such as the UN peacekeeping mission) or the dynamics at the level of international organisation and politics (such as UN headquarters and the Security Council). For example, similar to many other authors Autesserre on the one hand focusses on the 'field' level, investigating 'local' actions and interactions in the post war country.[49] Barnett and Finnemore, on the other hand, concentrate on the international level or actions of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as an international organisation, while even contrasting 'field' level activities to the interpretations made at international level.[50] Schlichte and Veit convincingly show that different 'cultures' and interaction frameworks of 'peacebuilding' (which they refer to as 'arenas') are loosely coupled, whereas they include different discourses and activities due to the different environments with which they are confronted.[51] This thesis goes a step further and argues that within bureaucratic organisations different interaction frameworks are embedded within the organisational hierarchy. Hence, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is investigated as one complex organisational entity engaging within the 'field' *and* the international environment. Rather than separating the analysis of different 'cultures', 'frameworks' or 'arenas' at different hierarchical levels, this approach makes it possible to detect the variety of organisational perspectives that exist at different levels and locations within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Next to enabling a comprehensive analysis of UN peacekeeping as organisational action, such an approach allows for an assessment of the diversity within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as well as the constraints and conflicts that arise when particular organisational perspectives protect themselves from interferences by actors from within the same organisation.

[48] For example, the competition between 'military peacekeeping' and the 'humanitarian' space of action in Liberia, see Higate and Henry, 2009, pp. 85-92.
[49] Autesserre, 2010.
[50] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, pp. 139-154.
[51] Schlichte and Veit, 2007.

In sum, this thesis contributes a 'building block' that helps to comprehend the organisation of UN peacekeeping as a social entity rather than a rationalised functional entity. The aim is to go beyond both mere evaluation of peacekeeping and the discussion of dysfunction. Rather, it attempts to step deeper into the micro/meso level of the organisation of one entity of 'peacebuilding' interventions, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, examining how day-to-day interaction processes within this organisation (re)produce frameworks which define and make sense of both function and dysfunction. Moreover, this research investigates the diversity of perspectives within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as well as the organisational processes which crosscut and connect different interpretations, meanings and judgements all comprised within one organisation. Thus, I locate this research not as opposed to evaluations and analyses of organisational dysfunction, but as complementary groundwork that provides a better understanding of UN peacekeeping with all its achievements as well as mistakes

1.2 Analysing UN Peace Operations as Organisational Action: Approach, Findings and Relevance

Reflecting the purpose of investigating one organisational segment of international interventions in post-war countries, this thesis avoids using the broad 'peacebuilding' terminology generally used in the literature on international peace interventions, but follows the institutional terms of the UN. Hence, I use the term 'peacekeeping' to refer to all missions and activities administered by DPKO.[52]

In order to investigate UN peacekeeping as organisational action, I chose a two-step explorative research strategy. The first step, which is presented in article 1 (chapter 4), theoretically approaches the organisation of UN peacekeeping through the angle of organisational sociology. It outlines a general framework of analysis which builds on the nexus between the two fundamental processes of organisation 'coupling' and 'communication'. Here, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is described as a space of organisational action which includes a variety of procedures and practices that are based on formal requirements or informal communications, as well as loosely coupled organisational

[52] In UN terminology the term 'peacebuilding mission' is institutionally separate from 'peacekeeping' and describes missions administered by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). DPA-administered missions usually do not include military and police components. This, however, does not suggest that peacekeeping is purely military. On the contrary, DPKO-led missions very often include a broad variety of substantive areas in which the military and police are only one part of a large political enterprise (see also chapter 3 below). In this thesis I use the term 'UN peacekeeping bureaucracy' (in article 1 interchangeably with the term 'UN bureaucracy') to refer to the organisation of UN peacekeeping. The term 'UN official' describes a member of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Moreover, I also use the term 'peace operation' interchangeably with the word 'peacekeeping'. This thesis exclusively focusses on the substantive side of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy which excludes all supportive and administrative functions that in UN peacekeeping missions are normally located under a mission support pillar and at headquarters fall under the responsibility of the Department of Field Support (see also chapter 2 below).

meanings or tightly coupled responsiveness. UN officials manoeuvre through this organisational space on a day-to-day basis, coping with the ambiguous and at times dysfunctional challenges of UN peacekeeping. Through combining different practices and procedures located in this organisational space, UN officials not only 'make sense' of the world of UN peacekeeping but also influence and shape peacekeeping activities.

The second step of the research strategy reconstructs patterns of interaction within the organisation of UN peacekeeping through an interpretative case study of one typical hierarchical segment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, namely the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and its headquarters (DPKO) in New York. The qualitative data of this case study was accessed through in-depth field research in Liberia and New York, including 80 interviews with UN staffs at various duty stations.[53]

The data is analysed and presented in two distinct ways. Article 2 (chapter 5) identifies two general strategies which UN officials use to influence peacekeeping activities within UNMIL and DPKO. The first strategy is *getting work acknowledged* which includes all efforts of UN officials to enhance the visibility and reception of their work within UNMIL and DPKO. The analysis shows that formal factors such as function and hierarchy rarely provide a sufficient basis for acknowledgement. Hence, within UNMIL and DPKO much effort for acknowledgement is based on individual factors, such as the personality of UN officials, their trust relationships with colleagues, and personal visibility within their specific local context in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The second general strategy to influence peacekeeping activities is *making work relevant*. This strategy refers to the efforts of UN officials within UNMIL and DPKO to connect their work with the authority or knowledge that can qualify its relevance for peacekeeping activities in Liberia. Again, formal factors do not necessarily guarantee relevance. Junior and middle management officials, for example, try to connect to senior managers and gain access to their authority. However, such access is often guarded by the individual management preferences of the senior manager and their trust relationships. Alternatively, UN officials also embed their work in local interpersonal networks that exist within the context of UN peacekeeping and contribute to the knowledge exchanged in such networks. Here, the relevance of work is often limited to the local context in which the UN official is situated within UNMIL and DPKO.

The analysis in article 2 (chapter 5) includes two important findings. Firstly, the importance of individual factors leads to various ways through which the two strategies are implemented by UN officials at different levels and locations of UNMIL and DPKO. UN officials must get their work acknowledged and make it relevant. In order to do so, they have to adapt to the local preferences

[53] For a detailed discussion of the case selection and research methods, see chapter 2 below.

and practices that enable acknowledgement and relevance. Hence, UNMIL and DPKO include a considerable diversity of interaction frameworks and decision-making arrangements which not only comply with formal decentralisation and delegation of authority, but also crosscut formal hierarchy with informal networks and working relationships. The second finding is that in UNMIL and DPKO formal hierarchical instruments rarely directly control the practices and outcomes of these diverse interaction frameworks, but rather concentrate on vetting the reports and reference documents describing these outcomes based on predefined programmatic criteria. Hence, even though the local interaction frameworks and organisational perspectives are diverse and autonomous, the programmatic development of UN peacekeeping remains stable and predictable.

Article 3 (chapter 6) investigates the organisational diversity of UNMIL and DPKO in more detail. Different interaction frameworks create distinct perspectives on organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Article 3 identifies two important organisational perspectives within the UNMIL/DPKO case study. The first is that of DPKO which is not only focussed on providing support to the mission, acting as political mediator between the mission and members of the Security Council. Much of the attention of DPKO's headquarters perspective also lies in the programmatic development of UN peacekeeping in the context of international politics. The second organisational perspective is that of UNMIL. The priority here is supporting the government of Liberia in its post-war recovery efforts.

The analysis of both DPKO and UNMIL's organisational perspectives not only shows the distinctiveness and disconnection between both sides. It also demonstrates how communication procedures and practices are used by both to actively protect their perspectives from interferences from within the organisation. At DPKO, communication procedures are used to protect basic principles and powers within the organisation of UN peacekeeping, such as the primacy of political over military decision-making. Moreover, communicative behaviour protects the visibility of the work of individual members within headquarters and the autonomy of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy towards members of the Security Council. At UNMIL, communication procedures and practices are used in the protection of its influence within Liberian politics, defending working processes from DPKO interference, as well as promoting the visibility and integration of the work undertaken by individual members and local intra-organisational groups and units. This protectionist behaviour can lead to increased coherence, integration and autonomy of the each organisational perspective. However, it also promotes disconnection, conflicts and misunderstandings between DPKO's headquarters and UNMIL's mission perspective and can undermine an effective combined interaction reaching beyond the limits of one separate perspective.

All three articles produce independent findings and relevance for the research on UN peacekeeping. Combined under the broad research question of this thesis, these findings substantially contribute to an important theoretical 'building block' in the understanding of peace operations.[54] Three dimensions are especially important here and describe the theoretical relevance of the research on UN peacekeeping as organisational action cumulated in this thesis.

Firstly, this research delivers an original insight into the creation of organisational agency and practice of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. It shows that the organisation of UN peacekeeping does not produce linear solutions to complex problems, but rather enables creativity and flexibility in its organisational processes. This allows members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to manage and cope with the ambiguities and dilemmas of interventions in post-war countries. However, it also creates problems and hindrances for the individual actor, as it does not guarantee that his/her work becomes a valuable contribution to peacekeeping activities. Rather, UN officials have to engage in political interaction within the organisation in order to have their work acknowledged and seen as relevant. These internal practices are important criteria for UN officials reflecting the success or failure of their contribution to peacekeeping activities.

Secondly, all three articles show that different peacekeeping activities do not necessarily directly reflect one general bureaucratic 'framework' or 'concept'. Rather, the implementation of peacekeeping activities is based on organisational diversity. They are organised locally within various autonomous and local frameworks, which are formal and informal decision-making arrangements and shape interaction processes through which work gets acknowledged and is made relevant. Such local frameworks exist at all levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. They also create and defend specific perspectives on the organisation and implementation of peacekeeping activities.

Thirdly, this thesis identifies *organisational survival* as an important factor for analysing UN peacekeeping.[55] Even though the implementation of peacekeeping activities is based on organisational diversity, the programmatic development seems to be made stable and predictable through a rigorous vetting of reports describing the various processes and outcomes at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Hence, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy protects itself from the contingencies of its implementation through a relatively predetermined programmatic reproduction, resulting in a gap between the general programmatic framework and

[54] On the usefulness of 'building blocks', see George and Bennett, 2005, p. 76.

[55] The use of the term 'organisational survival' is here projected onto the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy in general. Organisational survival in the sole context of a UN peacekeeping mission has a different connotation, as such a mission is founded on a temporary basis and the actions of mission employees should lead towards gradually making their own jobs obsolete.

organisational activities of UN peacekeeping. Organisational survival is an important demand within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. However, with such a perspective, the success of UN peacekeeping is defined through its organisational prevalence rather than its impact within a post-war society such as Liberia.

Next to this theoretical contribution, the articles in this thesis also have a strong practical relevance. The examination of the organisation of UN peacekeeping provides valuable contributions, detecting gaps in coordination, interaction and information-sharing processes. Here, two aspects are especially important.

Firstly, the analysis shows that in order to use the freedoms and autonomies provided by UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, officials require competencies in using internal strategies to influence peacekeeping activities. However, the case study UNMIL/DPKO displays a lack of structural guidance to help its individual members engage in these internal processes. Also, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy does not support a systematic exchange of substantive personnel at different locations within its organisation which could help to bridge divides and conflicts between different organisational perspectives. Hence, UN officials must depend on their individual abilities to adapt to different local decision-making arrangements and be influential. Otherwise, their work only exists as an unnoticed and irrelevant side track to the main organisational discourses and implementing processes of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

The second practical aspect concerns the handling of knowledge within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The case study UNMIL/DPKO has shown that even though knowledge may be important within local networks, practical knowledge particularly has only limited value for the efforts of individual UN officials to make their work influential. Moreover, despite the struggles of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to build structures of knowledge management and organisational learning during the last decade,[56] practical knowledge still does not have much impact on the programmatic development and 'big picture' of UN peacekeeping. Reflecting the practical knowledge of its diverse and autonomous organisational interaction frameworks could also be a method of increasing the impact of local stakeholder demands in post-war countries such as Liberia on the programmatic development of a UN peace operation. However, the interests of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to secure its organisational survival towards the UN member states and the international public often inhibit such a reflective foundation of information and knowledge within its organisational structures.

[56] See chapter 3 below.

1.3 Thesis Overview

This thesis is structured in three parts. The first introduces the approach, methods and background of the studies presented in the three cumulated articles. Here, chapter 2 outlines the research strategy generally applied in this thesis, positioning the separate articles as integral part of this approach. It also explains the research methods applied for case selection as well as accessing, analysing and ensuring the quality of the empirical data. Chapter 3 outlines the background of UN peacekeeping and its involvement in Liberia. It first assesses the organisational development of UN peacekeeping throughout the last two decades. Secondly, it introduces the multilevel environment in which the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is situated. Thirdly, chapter 3 provides a brief overview of Liberia's civil war and the UN's involvement to nurture and keep the peace in this specific context.

The second part of the thesis includes the three cumulated articles, each of which forms a separate chapter.[57]

Article 1 (integrated as chapter 4) is entitled '*Managing the Complexities of Intervention: United Nations Peace Operations as Organisational Action*'.[58] It develops the theoretical argument of UN peacekeeping as organisational action. At first it discusses the relevance of the organisation of UN peacekeeping for its activities. It then elaborates two fundamental concepts of organisational theory named 'coupling' and 'communication' as the basis for developing a framework of analysis which captures the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as a dynamic social entity and space for interaction.

Article 2 (integrated as chapter 5) is entitled 'Exceeding Limitations of the United Nations Peacekeeping Bureaucracy. Strategies of Officials to Influence Peacekeeping Activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations'.[59] This article explores the strategies of UN officials to influence peacekeeping activities within UNMIL and DPKO. For this purpose, it first presents the interpretative analysis of the most important factors influencing organisational processes within UNMIL and DPKO. It then illustrates the two general strategies (1) getting work acknowledged and (2) making work relevant with empirical examples, investigates the diversity of their implementation at different levels and locations of UNMIL and DPKO, and discusses the implications for organisational action and programmatic development within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

[57] Changes to the articles were only made in order to match their design and format to the overall thesis. To be integrated in this thesis, the spelling was adapted to British English.
[58] Article 1 is published as Winckler, 2011.
[59] Article 2 is published as Winckler, 2015.

Article 3 (integrated as chapter 6) is entitled 'Protectionism within the Organization of United Nations Peacekeeping. Assessing the Disconnection between Headquarter and Mission Perspectives'.[60] In this article, two important organisational perspectives, namely those of DPKO and UNMIL are contrasted. Based on the qualitative data, Article 3 analyses both organisational perspectives and their use of communication practices and procedures to protect and defend their integrity, coherence and autonomy.

Part III discusses and concludes the results of the three articles cumulated in this thesis. Chapter 7 summarises the two main lines of arguments that connect all three independent articles. The first is the notion that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is a dynamic organisational space of interaction in which its members must apply specific strategies in order to get their work done as effectively as possible and influence peacekeeping activities. The second line of argument is the observation that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy incorporates substantial organisational diversity. UN officials must not only adapt their strategies to local organisational frameworks, they also actively protect local perspectives from intra-organisational interferences. Finally, chapter 8 concludes this thesis by discussing and reflecting on the combined theoretical and practical value of all three articles.

[60] Article 3 is published as Winckler, 2014.

Part I METHOD AND BACKGROUND

2 APPROACHING THE UN PEACEKEEPING BUREAUCRACY AND RESEARCH METHOD

The following chapter provides an overview of the research strategy and methods used to accomplish all three articles cumulated in this thesis. My research is a multifaceted exploration of UN peacekeeping as organisational action. 'Exploration' generally refers to a 'broad-ranging, purposive, systematic and prearranged' examination and investigation of a poorly discovered field of research.[61] In order to frame the explorative process it makes use of theoretical 'sensitizing concepts'[62] and empirically concentrates on a phenomenon with clearly defined boundaries (the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy). This allows the development of generalisations within this specific field of investigation.[63] For this purpose, my research generally follows the logic of abduction,[64] in which known elements (of organisational theory) are brought together with the findings of peace and conflict research as well as data from an in-depth case study of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy in order to create new ideas and propositions for the understanding of peacekeeping interventions. In order to analyse the empirical data, it uses interpretative methods.[65] This means that the empirical data is not analysed through a deductive system of operationalisation.[66] Rather, this research puts multiple subjective meanings and interpretations experienced in the field at the centre of the analysis, from which patterns of interaction are identified within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.[67]

This approach is elaborated in detail below. Firstly, the research strategy is introduced, which consists of two steps: 1) the generation of a general analytical framework of UN peacekeeping as organisational action; and 2) a qualitative case study of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and its headquarters the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York. Secondly, this chapter outlines the research methods used for the case study and its analysis.

[61] Stebbins, 2001, pp. 3-4.
[62] Blumer, 1954.
[63] Stebbins, 2001, pp. 12-15.
[64] The term *abduction* goes back to the philosophy of C.S. Peirce, see e. g. Apel, 1976. See also Kelle and Kluge, 2010, pp. 24-27.
[65] Yanow and Schwarz-Shea, 2006.
[66] Yanow, 2006.
[67] Bohnsack, 1991, Geertz, 1973, pp. 9-28, Kelle and Kluge, 2010, pp. 16-18.

2.1 Research Strategy: Approaching UN Peacekeeping as Organisational Action

The approach to UN peacekeeping introduced in this thesis builds on two general assumptions. Firstly, UN peacekeeping is a bureaucratic organisation. This means that it breaks down complex problems into 'manageable and repetitive tasks' which are organised and coordinated within a hierarchical framework.[68] UN peacekeeping activities cope with a high amount of ambiguity and complexity. Through bureaucratic rationalisation, organisations aim to reduce and manage this complexity. Thus, through its bureaucracy, the complex issue of peacekeeping becomes feasible.

The second assumption is that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is not only based on top-down hierarchy, but also includes horizontal forms of control and interaction. Organisational scholars have shown that despite rationalisation processes, social interaction and decision-making within bureaucratic organisations still includes a high amount of ambiguity and contingency.[69] Moreover, individual bureaucrats enjoy different amounts of autonomies in decision-making in order to adapt such rules to the requirements also brought to them from external stakeholders.[70] Bureaucrats thus have to pursue their work not only according to functional goals and behavioural rules, but also engage in the communication processes which organise and link different actors and stakeholders within the organisational boundaries of UN peacekeeping. Hence, the organisational complexity of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy evolves with the interaction processes between its members.

Based on these considerations, the first step of the research strategy is to develop a general analytical framework on how UN peacekeeping can be understood as a bureaucracy and complex organisation in which individual actors manage and cope with the ambiguities and dilemmas of peacekeeping. The result of this analysis is presented in article 1 (chapter 4) in which the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is reflected and analysed by applying perspectives and tools of organisational sociology. Hence, this first research step creates an explanation to an empirical problem (coping with the ambiguity of post-war peacekeeping) through the use of theoretical knowledge of a different field of research, namely organisational sociology. The general research logic behind such an approach is abduction.[71] This term generally describes the formal process behind scientific 'discovery', particularly involving reshuffling explanatory approaches and knowledge in an original way in order to generate 'new ideas' and approaches.[72] Hence, the conclusions presented in article 1 (chapter 4) are propositions which can shape and direct further analysis, but also call for further differentiation and analysis especially through empirical research.

[68] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 18. See also Weber, 1978.
[69] March and Olsen, 1976a.
[70] Lipsky, 2010, Moore, 1987.
[71] Kelle and Kluge, 2010, pp. 24-27, Reichertz, 2010.
[72] Anderson, 1987, p. 47, Kelle and Kluge, 2010, p. 25.

In order to develop a framework of analysis for the organisational dimensions of UN peacekeeping, I especially devise the concepts of 'coupling' and 'communication' which are fundamental processes within complex organisations. On the one hand, the notion of 'coupling' refers to the quality of interconnection between different entities, dimensions and meanings of organisation.[73] The extent to which different organisational elements are coupled varies between 'tight coupling' and 'de-coupled'. The former refers to the responsiveness of different organisational elements, the latter points out their distinctiveness. On the other hand, 'communication' describes how information is transmitted, received and interpreted within the organisation.[74] Communications vary between formal and informal processes. Here, the former organises interactive processes of information exchange based on formal bureaucratic procedures. Informal communication processes crosscut formal hierarchies and often builds on interpersonal trust relationships as a way to process information and knowledge.

Coupling and communication are two interconnected concepts of organisational theory capturing fundamental processes within complex organisations. I argue that the nexus between coupling and communication provides the analytical framework to locate and understand the use of different practices and procedures within the organisational context of UN peacekeeping. In this sense, the nexus between coupling and communication should be understood as the organisational space in which members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy interact, organise and shape activities. This organisational space is not without tension and conflict. Rather, it can be characterised as a dynamic space in which members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy have to combine loosely and tightly coupled elements as well as formal and informal communication processes in order to achieve their goal. Hence, the nexus between coupling and communication creates a dynamic framework for analysing the interactions and activities of UN officials within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

The first research step presented in article 1 (chapter 4) provides a theoretical framework that helps to understand the dynamics and processes within the organisation of UN peacekeeping. However, the aim of this thesis is to investigate how organisational processes work within the organisational space conceptualised in the framework of analysis. For this purpose, the second step in the research strategy proposes an in-depth case study of one hierarchical segment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, namely UNMIL and DPKO.[75] The interpretative analysis of the case study is based on extensive data accessed during field research in Liberia and New York.[76] The theoretical framework

[73] Orton and Weick, 1990.
[74] Luhmann, 2006.
[75] For details on the case selection, see section 2.2 below.
[76] For details on research methods, see section 2.3 and 2.4 below.

developed in the first research step is here used as a broad 'sensitising concept' that helps to precisely identify and frame the most important factors that influence organisational processes.

Within UNMIL and DPKO, UN officials especially referred to eight important factors that influence organisational processes.[77] These comprise three structural factors which are the necessary formal conditions for UN officials to engage in organisational processes within UNMIL and DPKO. Structural factors include *function*, which is the description of formal responsibilities; *programme*, which describes the core techniques and programmatic values of UNMIL and DPKO; and *hierarchy*, which connects functions and programmatic values through a formal system that organises its members as un-equals with the inferior official reporting to his/her superior.

Structural factors influence the organisational processes as they are based on the formal organisation of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. However, the framework of analysis outlined above characterises the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as a dynamic social entity in which organisational processes are also influenced by individual factors which describe the abilities of individual UN officials. Members of UNMIL and DPKO especially referred to three important individual factors: *personality*, which is the personal ability of individual UN officials to participate effectively in organisational interaction processes; *trust*, which is the basis of informal communication processes; and *individual visibility*, which is an important source of reputation reaching beyond the visibility provided by formal function.

The formal organisation of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy can be explained by structural factors. The influence of personal attributes on interaction processes that go beyond its formal structure is captured by individual factors. However, neither category comprises much information on the quality of the organisational processes they are influencing within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Here, UN officials at UNMIL and DPKO often referred to two further factors which I categorised as 'qualifying factors'. This comprises *authority*, which describes a powerful position that qualifies communication processes through value, competence and the implication that a decision does not have to be further questioned; and *knowledge*, which makes communication substantial and meaningful within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

[77] The factors presented here are the final result of an analytical coding process which is described in section 2.4.1 below. The categories and factors are presented in more detail in article 2 (chapter 5).

Figure 1: Factors Influencing Organisational Processes within UNMIL and DPKO



Figure 1 is an illustration of all eight factors influencing organisational processes within UNMIL and DPKO. It also points out that one factor cannot independently shape the content and outcome of an organisational process. Rather, it is always a combination of several factors that enables UN officials to meaningfully participate in organisational processes and shape peacekeeping activities. The qualitative case study of UNMIL and DPKO presented in article 2 and (chapters 5 and 6) investigates how UN officials draw on different factors to pursue their work and shape peacekeeping activities. It shows that they intentionally and strategically use interconnections between different factors in order to gain influence. Article 2 (chapter 5) identifies two general strategies that involve several factors of different categories. It also discussed their application and adaptation to different requirements at various levels and locations of UNMIL and DPKO. Article 3 (chapter 6) goes a step further and investigates an important breach within the UNMIL/DPKO case – the divide between mission and headquarters. Here, the different perspectives of the two entities within the case study are outlined, pursuing the question how these different perspectives change the way communication procedures and practices are used within the organisation of UNMIL and DPKO. In the following, the methods of this empirical analysis are laid out in detail, including case selection, inquiry methods and the analytical process.

2.2 Single Case Study Method and Case Selection

This research aims at a comprehensive analysis of the organisational processes and dynamics within the bureaucratic framework of UN peacekeeping, including both headquarters and field dimensions. The objective is to generate an understanding not only of formal bureaucratic processes but also of informal behaviour and interactions that UN officials use to organise peacekeeping activities. For this purpose, in-depth case study research is an ideal method to study UN peacekeeping as organisational action as it allows 'capturing the emergent and immanent properties of life in organizations'.[78] Moreover, in order to generate an in-depth understanding of the organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, the enquiry requires depth rather than breadth. Therefore, I decided to concentrate on one single case. As Stake argues,

> we may be interested in a general phenomenon […] more than in an individual case, and we cannot understand a given case without knowing about other cases. But while we are studying it, our meager resources are concentrating on trying to understand its complexities.[79]

In this sense, even though single case studies intrinsically include a trade-off concerning generalisation, it allows this study to concentrate limited resources for field research into the depth of one case which represents a certain social phenomena. For this purpose I chose to study what Gerring calls a 'typical case' which 'exemplifies what is considered to be a typical set of values, given some general understanding of a phenomenon'.[80] The following explains my understanding of a 'typical case' within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and the selection criteria that led to the choice of UNMIL/DPKO as the single case studied in this thesis.

The unit of analysis in my research is the *UN peacekeeping bureaucracy*, which includes the relevant branches of the UN secretariat as well as all peacekeeping missions worldwide. A case within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is defined in my research as one hierarchical mission-headquarters segment.[81] I here concentrate only on so-called multidimensional peacekeeping missions as they represent the main concern both of DPKO and research. Moreover, my research focusses on the substantive side of peacekeeping. This includes a broad range of political units, such as civil affairs, human rights, demilitarisation and demobilisation, security sector reform, rule of law as well as

[78] See Hartley, 1994, p. 231.
[79] Stake, 2005, p. 444.
[80] Gerring, 2007, p. 91.
[81] There are still several comparatively small missions operating under DPKO leadership which especially focus on military peacekeeping tasks, such as the observer mission in India and Pakistan or the peacekeeping force in Cyprus.

military, police, and corrections. However, it explicitly excludes the administrative support side of peacekeeping which is led by the Department of Field Support (DFS).

As shown below in more detail (see chapter 3), due to the development and functional differentiation especially in the first decade of the 20th century, certain patterns have evolved which may characterise a 'typical' peacekeeping mission (or what it should look like according to the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy). This includes, for example, the integration of multiple substantive dimensions, a mandate in support of the host government (rather than formally taking over the administration) and robust capacities of involved military peacekeepers. Table 1 gives an overview of DPKO-led multidimensional peacekeeping missions in 2010 – the beginning of my field research.[82] All of these missions with their subsequent hierarchical line to DPKO are potential cases to study.

Table 1: DPKO Led Multidimensional Peacekeeping Missions in 2010[83]

Mission Name	Acronym	Working Language	Start of Operation
United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo	UNMIK	English	Since 1999
United Nations Mission in Liberia	UNMIL	English	Since 2003
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	French	Since 2004
United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti	MINUSTAH	French	Since 2004 (succeeding several other missions operating since 1993)
United Nations Mission in Sudan	UNMIS	English	Since 2005
United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	UNMIT	English	Since 2006
African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur	UNAMID	English	Since 2007
United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	MINURCAT	French	Since 2007
United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo	MONUSCO	French	Since 2010 (succeeding another mission operating since 1999)

The case selection is based on both theory-led and practical criteria. The following three aspects are most important:

Stable and developed organisation. Even though they are complex organisations, peacekeeping missions are principally designed to be a temporary structure. Moreover, the fragile post-conflict environment makes organisational development difficult and peacekeeping missions, as well as

[82] The table excludes so-called 'political missions' led by DPKO such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.
[83] Source: UN, 2011a, pp. 280-282.

DPKO, at first find themselves in a continuous stage of crisis management rather than following an established organisational routine and interaction practice. As the focus of this study lies on everyday permanent dynamics rather than extraordinary reaction activities, it is important to select a mission which has been established several years back where the post-war environment has stabilised to a level in which the mission is able to follow its routines rather than continuously react to volatile events around it.

Perception of success. UN peacekeeping often has been subject to harsh criticism and 'bashing'.[84] Commending successes often seems to fall short in comparison to criticising its failures. Involved in the most fragile and in some cases in-humane situations of the world, and loaded with huge expectations both internationally as well as in the individual post-war country, it is clearly very unrealistic for UN peacekeeping to meet every objective and demand. Consequently, an organisational analysis of UN peacekeeping is in danger of concentrating too much on organisational dysfunction which may automatically lead to a biased assessment of the organisation of peacekeeping as not working well. The aim of my research, however, is to go beyond this evaluative dysfunction bias and analyse *how UN peacekeeping organisation works* or, respectively, *how work is done within the organisation of UN peacekeeping*. For this purpose it is important select a case study which is genuinely perceived as a success story – or at minimum not as a continuous failure or crisis. Here, problems and challenges will still be observable, however, one can expect day-to-day working processes not to be shadowed by constant claims of malfunction.

Accessibility. In order to conduct field research, possibility of access is critically important. On the one hand, this is based on contacts and networks which open doors and provide access to the organisation. Here, for example, language is an important aspect. As table 1 shows, many important missions have French as working language. Due to my own capacities, I however had to focus on missions with English as the primary working language. On the other hand, particularly in a post-war context, access is a matter of the practical resources available. In huge countries with largely bad infrastructure such as the Sudan, mobility is a problem. In order to go beyond headquarters in Khartoum, El Fasher or Juba, the researcher is largely dependent on the logistical help of organisations such as the United Nations, for example, using UN flights or convoys into rural areas in order to examine organisational life in the outposts (field offices) of the UN mission. Moreover, the security situation is also an important determinant for the mobility of the researcher. Due to limited resources, such practical aspects of accessibility and mobility play an important role in the case selection process.

[84] For an example see Sanjuan, 2005.

Considering these factors, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is the ideal case for my research.[85] Established in 2003 and confronted with a rocky start, it has developed into a fairly stable organisation (see also chapter 3.3 below). In the UN it counts as an 'old' mission, and genuinely as a success story and model of a multidimensional mission.[86] Even though many rampant challenges remain, the situation in Liberia has improved significantly since the end of the civil war. Since 2005 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, the first female president in Africa, leads the country. She knows the international system well due to her former career at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.[87] For UNMIL this steady improvement meant that it became increasingly questioned by UN member states for its strong presence. However, at the time of research UNMIL still included a wide range of substantive units. In the budget year 2009/2010 UNMIL employed around 540 international staff, 1,000 national staff and over 230 international volunteers.[88] It also incorporated a comparatively strong uniformed segment with around 8,000 military peacekeepers under arms and around 1,000 UN police.[89] Despite the debate about the upcoming withdrawal of UNMIL, the substantive apparatus of UNMIL in particular was still considerably large and comparable to other multidimensional peacekeeping missions in the world.[90]

Importantly, accessibility to Liberia was also given. At the time of my field research in 2010/2011, there were regular commercial international flights to Liberia's capital, Monrovia. Liberia is a relatively small country. Thus, even though the infrastructure is bad, rural towns and provincial capitals were nearly all accessible within a day's travel by car in the dry season. I sometimes took advantage of logistical help provided by UNMIL and non-governmental organisations operating in the area, but I was also able to independently travel by 'bush-taxi' throughout the country in order to examine UNMIL field offices in rural areas.

[85] The following assessment is made according to the status of UNMIL in 2010 at the start of my field research.
[86] Benner et al., 2011, pp. 24-25.
[87] This facilitates the high level interaction between the mission and government, however, as in all other post-war countries, interaction processes between the peacekeeping mission and government is not without controversy and friction. For more analysis on the interaction processes between government and international intervention in Liberia, see Neumann and Winckler, 2013.
[88] UN, 2009a, p. 4.
[89] The level of UNMIL's military deployment is an advantage, for example, to UNMIK which has no control over armed peacekeepers provided by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and is also substantially phasing out its activities compared to the strong years in which it wielded executive administrative powers. Also, UNMIT only has military observers on the ground and a 'hybrid' operation like UNAMID also includes potential untypical intervening factors such as internal collaboration between UN and African Union peacekeepers.
[90] In fact, in 2012 the Security Council decided next to further reducing UNMIL's military presence to increase the number of UN police units in Liberia. See UN, 2010b, p. 3.

2.3 Conducting Research in the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

Conducting research in an organisation, which from its internal logic and through its formal rules and procedures protects itself from information leaks, can be challenging. A field researcher enters an organisation as an external stakeholder with a separate, sometimes incompatible, agenda.[91] The following section outlines how I gained access to UNMIL and DPKO and the methods I applied in accessing data on and within this specific headquarter-mission segment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

2.3.1 Gaining Access to DPKO and UNMIL

Gaining access to the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as an external researcher particularly involves trust-building. This is created on the one hand through clarity of intent as well as through the help of 'gate keepers' – well-connected UN officials interested in the research project and willing to facilitate it through information and contacts to different people and sections relevant to the cause of the research. During my research, I relied on formal access points and informal networks in order to reach out to relevant information and data.

Formal access points: as an external researcher it is important to claim a certain formal authority within the UN. In Liberia this included, for example, introducing oneself to the mission spokesperson and Chief of Staff or using the hierarchical lines between UNMIL headquarters and field offices.[92] Using formal access points created a sense of transparency, clearly stating my intentions while moving within the perimeters of the UN hierarchy.

Informal networks: the use of existing informal networks was crucially important. After creating a certain amount of interest and trust through conversations with an interview partner, it was always useful to be recommended by this contact person to a colleague or friend s/he knew well. The major advantage was that with such a trustful recommendation, a certain amount of connection already existed with the next interview partner. Moreover, specifically using different access points through informal recommendation, I was often also able to use different networks to contact different persons in the same organisational unit, a practice which provided cross-referencing possibilities. The use of formal access points and informal recommendation is not always distinctly separable. Rather,

[91] Members of both UNMIL and DPKO are very familiar to researchers acquiring information. However, confronted with such an external request, they still often and very naturally react with mistrust and are careful in what they actually say.

[92] What also helped was a recommendation of the regional division at DPKO in New York which put formal weight on my request to conduct research within UNMIL.

formal and informal recommendation often played hand in hand in order to contact important offices and interview partner.

My research particularly focusses on middle management officials. Nearly all are formally forbidden from speaking publically for the organisation – for example, with reporters, researchers and alike. Hence, speaking with me nearly always meant for my interview partners to breach their formal range of authority, even more so as I was interested in internal working processes.[93] Reflecting this research environment I stuck to the specific ground rule that all interviews would be anonymous. This was the basic agreement communicated with interview partners (even if they were formally allowed to speak with researchers), in order to enable a more open and critical space for narrative interaction.

2.3.2 Accessing data on DPKO and UNMIL

A mix of methods was used to access data on and within DPKO and UNMIL. Prior to the actual field research, I conducted intensive an analysis of official UN documents on the formal hierarchical relationships between different units in DPKO and UNMIL. The result of this initial analysis was a detailed picture of the structure of DPKO and UNMIL, outlining responsibilities and reporting lines or the manner in which the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy should work, according to the official version published in reports to the Security Council as well as budgetary reports to the General Assembly.[94] Moreover, I conducted several background discussions with former UN staff, particularly in Germany, who provided inside views and qualitative substance to the formal shell generated from the documents.

During the field research I relied on semi-structured interviews and to a lesser extent participant observation and document analysis as methods of accessing data. The interviews provide the core basis of data used in the analysis. Observation was particularly used to examine the organisational surrounding and workplace atmosphere at different locations of UNMIL and DPKO. This also included casual background talks. Especially in Liberia, I was often invited to evening activities and social gatherings of UN staff which not only provided me with important contacts but also useful background information as well as an impression of life in Monrovia and at field offices. Such observations were recorded in notes and attached as memos to specific interview transcripts. Next to the preliminary document analysis in advance to the field research, I also continuously collected and analysed further documents (sometimes provided by interview partners). Observations and

[93] If and how UN officials talked to me often depended on their personal confidence. Sometimes it was very important to close the office door in order to guarantee privacy and a more secure place to talk. At other times a narrative interview was impossible or dependent on the direct superior's approval.

[94] For an overview of the formal functions and workings of DPKO and UNMIL, see chapter 3.

documents mainly served as background material confirming the authenticity and plausibility of the interviews.

I conducted a total of 80 semi-structured interviews with UN officials: 32 in New York and 48 in Liberia (including 14 interviews at field level). In Liberia, five interviews were conducted with two persons at once. Moreover, I also interviewed four persons more than once. In sum, while using the interview format I spoke with 78 UN officials during my field research.[95] 14 interviews were removed from the core basis of data for analysis, mostly because they were made for control purposes with members of other departments than DPKO (such as Department of Safety and Security, DSS, and Department of Public Information, DPI), as well as UN agencies (such as UNDP in Liberia) which collaborate with DPKO/UNMIL but do not share the same inside view on interaction processes.[96] This leaves 66 semi-structured interviews as the core data basis. The other interviews are used as background material similar to the observations, casual background discussions and document analyses. Interview partners were mainly members of middle management, including six members of director level management. My research focussed on international members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. In the UNMIL field offices I, however, also interviewed Liberian national staff members whose role was to represent a substantive section in a county. As already noted above, the sampling of interview partners followed different patterns and aimed at generating a cross-cut through the substantive side of the UNMIL and DPKO organisation.

The method of semi-structured, narrative interviews was chosen in order to gain access to information which lies beyond the functional surface of the organisation. Such interviews have the advantage that they allow the interviewer 'to ask a series of regularly structured questions, permitting comparisons across interviews, and to pursue areas spontaneously initiated by the interviewee'.[97] While providing a basic structure, the interview focusses on the 'stories the subjects tell', as well as their perceptions, opinions, issues and examples.[98] Thus, all interviews were based on a pre-structured guide that loosely covered issues of communication and work practice. In a typical interview, I first issued an entry question asking for a brief description of the work the interviewee was generally doing. Building on this first engagement, I then started to explore the interaction processes underlying these normally very functional descriptions of responsibilities. The interview guide helped to remind me during the interview process of specific aspects I wanted to acquire, but did not predict specific questions or their sequence. Rather, this was determined by the narrative of

[95] Out of which 52 were male and 26 were female. For a list of all interviews conducted in Liberia and New York see appendix B.
[96] In rare cases, interviews were also sorted out as to their quality and added value, for example, in cases where interview partners did not have sufficient time to provide in-depth information.
[97] Berg, 2009, p. 109.
[98] Kvale, 2007, p. 72.

the interview partner as well as the 'stories' and 'examples' s/he provided. In fact, depending on the willingness and time of the interviewee, the issues laid out in the manual were rarely covered completely question by question, but integrated in a discussion about the work processes the interviewee was facing.[99]

The first interviews I conducted in Liberia were recorded on tape. However, I soon noticed that the tape recorder posed an unwanted barrier to an open narrative interaction with the interview partners. UN officials seemed to open up more in an informal atmosphere of professional interaction among 'business partners' that share common interests than in a static interview situation of recorded questions and answers. Even though this has negative effects on the detailed quality of interview transcripts, I decided to abstain from tape-recording altogether. Instead I used memorising and interpretation techniques to record interviews and finalise the transcripts. During the interviews I took as many notes as possible. Every interview in the field was succeeded by an initial two-step follow-up: firstly, I filled out a pre-designed interview wrap-up form. This form summarises the personal information of the interviewee as well as my first impression of the interview (such as kind of interview, own performance, reflections on character, sympathy, trustworthiness of interview partner, and non-verbal interaction and behaviour) and observations about the location of the interview and its surroundings.[100] The second step of initial follow-up was to go over the notes made during the interview and complete them with fresh memory additions and details which I had not been able to write down during the interview. This also included narrative phrases if they were clearly memorised.[101] The transcripts themselves were based on interpretation. Reflecting the interview situation in detail (based on the notes and wrap-ups), I wrote down the text of the interview record. Fill words, which were recreated during this process, are indicated through brackets in the final transcripts.[102] The major trade-off of this method is a loss of narrative detail and a lack of material for direct citation. Thus, in the articles I predominantly use indirect citation and only reference a narrative directly if it can be found in the original notes made of the interview.

[99] The interview guide is enclosed in appendix C. The manual was adapted several times during the course of field research due to important issues and requirements which came up during the interviews.
[100] Credit goes to Hannah Neumann for advising me on these wrap-ups and allowing me to use a form very similar to the one she designed. See Neumann, 2013. The wrap-up form is provided in appendix D.
[101] In order to identify the added pieces I used different colours for the additional details.
[102] Similarly, I also transcribed the first interviews recorded on tape as interpretative detailed summaries, while highlighting direct verbal accounts which could be used as citations.

2.4 Analysis

For the analysis of the data accessed in the field I relied on interpretative methods. An important instrument guiding analysis is the use of 'sensitising concepts'. Beyond ethnographic approaches in the social sciences which advocate a pure inductive approach, many scholars have joined Blumer's classical argument that qualitative research needs to build on theoretical 'sensitising concepts' that give 'the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances'.[103] In deductive methods, theoretical knowledge is operationalised through concepts and variables which predefine the scope of empirical data necessary to test the theory. Sensitising concepts also provide direction to research, interest and interpretation of data. They point out ways to develop precise understandings of the social phenomenon under scrutiny. However, contrary to deduction, such concepts allow the framework of analysis to systematically develop and 'proceed along with the data rather than from some ideas that existed before'.[104] Consequently, sensitising concepts often start out as a fairly general and abstract knowledge and become more concrete and concentrated throughout the process of data analysis.[105]

In its initial stage, the data analysis for the case study in this thesis was guided through using the general theoretical framework of UN peacekeeping as organisational action (the nexus between 'coupling' and 'communication') as a broad 'sensitising concept'. This preliminary analysis already began during the initial stages of the field research. Here, the abstract theoretical concept provided direction to the continuing field research, whereas the accessed data refined and differentiated the conceptual framework. After this initial elaboration, the analysis concentrated particularly on one specific structure of analytical codes that summarised different factors influencing life and work within the organisation of UNMIL and DPKO.[106] Again drawing on organisational theory, these factors were specified, prioritised, and reinstated as integral aspects of the analytical process. Then, the interconnections between these factors were investigated through extracting the data coded with more than one factor. Moreover, I also separated the data accessed in UNMIL from DPKO in order to contrast different perspectives evolving between UN peacekeeping headquarters and missions.

2.4.1 The Process of Coding

The analytical process described above is based on coding, meaning that segments of text and/or empirical data content are connected with a code which is an 'abstract representation of an object or

[103] Blumer, 1954, p. 7.
[104] van den Hoonaard, 1997, p. 30.
[105] Kelle and Kluge, 2010, pp. 38-40, Stebbins, 2001.
[106] Richards calls this interpretation phase 'analytical coding'. See Richards, 2009, p. 97.

phenomenon'.[107] The grade of abstraction and the substance of such codes can vary significantly. Based on the development of sensitising concepts, qualitative coding processes can be highly fluid. It aims to concentrate the analytical data in order to make singular phenomena comparable, to enable systematic analyses of interconnections between singular phenomena and, at the end, to generate conclusions at an abstract and generalised level.[108]

The coding process starts with 'opening up the data'[109], which implies scanning the data for meanings and categories. This results in a long list of categories, topics, sources, description and attributes. This list was then revised, sorted and structured. Here I differentiated between analytical, descriptive and topical codes.[110] At the heart of this process lies the analytical coding which refers 'to coding that comes from interpretation and reflection on meaning'.[111] I identified one analytical code structure of primary importance named 'attributes of organisational action'. In this structure, the factors influencing working processes within the organisation of UN peacekeeping are recorded and summarised. In the process of reframing the initial generation of codes, the data was reviewed several times in order to identify the most important categories apparent in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Moreover, categories were carefully revised according to the theoretical stances in organisational theory in order to enable possibilities of generalisation. In the final stage of this interpretative process, three categories of factors influencing organisational processes were devised.

The first category is 'structural factors' which define the formal bureaucratic foundation of working processes within UNMIL and DPKO. This includes a) function, that defines the formal responsibilities of UN officials; b) programme, describing the core techniques and programmatic values of the organisation; and c) hierarchy, which connects function and programme through requirements and duties. The second category is 'individual factors', which describes the abilities of individual UN officials within DPKO. This includes a) personality, describing the influence of the personal attributes of individuals participating in interaction processes; b) trust, the basis for informal communication and interaction; and c) individual visibility, which serves as an important source of reputation within

[107] Bazeley, 2007, p. 66.
[108] Qualitative coding and analysis is often associated with the Grounded Theory approach which provides specific techniques and tools for generating mid-level theory from qualitative empirical data. See e.g. Corbin and Strauss, 2008. As I am not specifically following the steps of the Grounded Theory approach (and, more modestly, aim at contributing a theoretical building block rather than a theory), I generally follow a more inclusive approach to qualitative coding. See Richards, 2009. Clearly, however, this approach, like much other qualitative research in social science, is inspired by the techniques of Grounded Theory. To systematically assist with the coding process I used the computer programme NVivo. For an introduction into the structure and workings of this programme, see Bazeley, 2007.
[109] Richards, 2009, p. 77. In Grounded Theory approaches this step is often referred to as 'open coding', see e.g. Flick, 2009, pp. 307-310.
[110] Richards, 2009, p. 96.
[111] Richards, 2009, p. 102.

UNMIL and DPKO. The third category is 'qualifying factors', which define the quality of communication processes within UNMIL and DPKO. This category includes a) authority, through which communication is qualified with value and competence; and b) knowledge, which makes communication substantial and meaningful within UNMIL and DPKO.[112] These categories and factors were used as core analytical instruments and interpretation frameworks for extracting patterns of interaction for the whole case UNMIL/DPKO as well as in contrasting the perspectives of DPKO and UNMIL. Through queries, the data coded with two or more factors in different categories was extracted, providing core themes that display patterns within the interconnections between structural, individual and qualitative factors. These enable an in-depth understanding of the strategies and practices used within the process of organising peacekeeping activities within the UNMIL and DPKO.

Next to the 'attributes of organisational action', several code structures of secondary importance were also identified and summarised. This includes an analytical background category named 'perspectives of organisational action'. It, for example, comprises, if a UN official thought of the global ambition of UN peacekeeping while explaining a work practice rather than the local realities s/he or his/her unit was facing. Moreover, references to nationality/nationalism, organisational tradition, personal ambition, long and short term decision-making were recorded. These factors were particularly used to ensure the quality of the data and reflect the individual interpretation framework of the specific interview reference. Moreover, several descriptive codes structures were recorded which include information on the interview partner,[113] level of organisation,[114] categories indicating descriptions of living and work environment,[115] and the different communication processes which interview partners described.[116] Moreover, topical codes openly referenced substantive examples

[112] The categories and factors as described here are the end result of the analytical coding process. At these final stages of analysis, the categories and codes were developed on paper outside of the computer programme, NVivo. In order to simplify the analytical argument in the articles, I also revised the names of the categories and factors in the final analytical stages. In the analytical process I referred to 'qualifying factors' as 'mixed factors'. The name was changed after extensive peer debriefing. This category also included a third factor named 'intervention/interference' which I in the end excluded from the analysis and treated as practice of UN officials rather than an attribute of working processes. For a more detailed description and definition of the final categories and factors, see article 2, (chapter 5).

[113] In NVivo, an interview partner is stored as 'case', information on the 'case' is stored under 'case attributes'. See Bazeley, 2007, pp. 42-43.

[114] This includes an outline of all functional hierarchical levels of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, both for mission and headquarters.

[115] Categories were separated between living and work environment sorted along the different locations interviews took place in order to recall such descriptions as background information.

[116] This included a mix of categories and sub-categories which indicate if interview partners described a specific communication process. Coding trees included special issue-related communication processes (such as crisis communication and human rights reporting) as well as level of communication, failures of communication, and form of communication such as formal reporting or interpersonal interaction.

and issues that interview partners explained or chose as illustrations during the interview.[117] Both descriptive and topical coding was used for background checks, and helped to cross-check and quickly access specific descriptive categories and examples within the empirical data.

2.4.2 Ensuring Quality of Data and Analysis

Unlike theory-testing approaches in social science which has been able to sustain a relatively broad agreement on core criteria such as validity and reliability, the debate on criteria and methods ensuring the quality of interpretative research is far from consensus.[118] Many scholars have tried to apply adapted versions of 'validity' and 'reliability' in order to create checks for their data and analysis comparable to those of deductive research.[119] Other contributions created a completely new set of criteria, suggesting that qualitative inquiry should be controlled for its 'trustworthiness'.[120] Both lines of arguments have produced scores of methodological recommendations as to how to ensure the quality of qualitative research. I will here concentrate on three general interconnected aspects which conclude the most important criteria of quality control: 1) credibility; 2) intersubjective plausibility; 3) transparency and reflexivity.

The first is *credibility* which is genuinely considered the most important criterion of qualitative research, mirroring the variable-oriented criterion of validity. The central question for my research is how to ensure that the reconstruction of organisational interaction processes adequately reflects the realities experienced by the actors within the organisation.

There is a long list of methodological recommendations to ensure the credibility of qualitative research. Based on ethnographic approaches an important method is 'prolonged engagement'[121] in the field, aiming at developing '*an early familiarity with the culture of participating organisations*'.[122] Generally there are clear limits within this method for a qualitative study of an organisation. Without actually directly engaging in the work context – i.e. working for the UN and thus to some extent 'going native' – there is limited space for an 'external' to engage within the organisational boundaries without overstretching the demands on staff and 'gatekeepers responsible for allowing the

[117] Such coding allowed easy cross-referencing where a topic was referred to by more than one interview partner.
[118] See e.g. Schwarz-Shea, 2006, Searle, 1999, Shenton, 2004, Steinke, 2004.
[119] See e.g. Flick, 2009, pp. 384-392, Richards, 2009, pp. 147-153. Searle points out that in this process 'a sometimes bewildering variety of new concepts arose'. See Searle, 1999, p. 467.
[120] Influential here is the categorisation of Lincoln and Guba who differentiate between credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability as criteria for 'trustworthy' qualitative research. See Lincoln and Guba, 1985. Compare also Schwarz-Shea, 2006, Shenton, 2004.
[121] Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 301.
[122] Shenton, 2004, p. 65 (italics in original).

researcher access to the organisation'.[123] Moreover, limits in resources made it necessary to concentrate my actual visits in the field. I was able to travel twice to Liberia. The first trip (in September 2010) with a duration of two weeks fulfilled the purpose of familiarising myself with the research surrounding, finding multiple access points to UNMIL and conducting a first series of interviews. The second trip (March/April 2011) was extended (six weeks) and included travels to UNMIL field offices. After the first visit to Liberia, I stayed three weeks in New York in order to assess DPKO. What helped to familiarise myself with the research field was the extensive document analysis and multiple informal background talks conducted with former UN personnel in Germany prior to my field research. I also acquired much background information from fellow researchers who had already conducted research both at UNMIL and DPKO. Even though my stay in the field was limited, many UN staff devoted much time talking to me during interviews and showing me around specific office spaces. An average interview was one hour long.[124] Sometimes I met several times with some contact persons and was able to follow up on specific information.[125]

A second well-referenced method of credibility is 'triangulation'.[126] The application of this method in qualitative research is considerably blurred and often very generally used as a term describing attempts to use 'different sorts of data or methods in handling data'.[127] Ideally, a phenomenon here is assessed by 'using at least three different analytical tools' or sources and methods of data collection.[128] In this general sense I used triangulation in accessing UNMIL and DPKO from different access points (persons contacted through independent recommendations) and using different ways of sampling interview partners (as described above).[129] Next to semi-structured interviews with DPKO and UNMIL personnel, I also interviewed external actors with access to the organisation but with a slightly different view on the issue. I also applied additional methods such as observation and document analysis. This supporting data provides 'a background to and help[s] to explain the attitudes and behaviour of those [UN officials] in the group under scrutiny'.[130] Moreover, for the analysis I also used theoretical sensitising concepts which are based on multiple theoretical stances

[123] Shenton, 2004, p. 65.
[124] In exceptional cases interview partners took over two hours to explain their view on UN peacekeeping. Often, however, UN staff only had tight time windows to speak with me and sometimes interviews were also interrupted as the participant had to attend to an urgent task.
[125] As noted above, particularly in Liberia I was often invited to informal gatherings and evening activities of UN staff which provided a wider impression of work and life of UNMIL members there.
[126] See e.g. Richards, 2009, pp. 148-149, Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p. 102, Shenton, 2004, pp. 65-66.
[127] Richards, 2009, p. 148.
[128] Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p. 102. According to Flick, triangulation needs at minimum two different points from which the research issue is observed. See Flick, 2004, p. 309.
[129] I accessed both DPKO and UNMIL through three different networks. As outlined above, gaining access to singular offices and units of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy was sometimes difficult (occasionally the offices were just too small), but I generally aimed at gaining access to such subunits through two lines of recommendation in order to enable the crosschecking of references.
[130] Shenton, 2004, p. 66.

and paradigms in order to generate a comprehensive understanding of the case at hand. Nevertheless, the results of the case study are deeply rooted in the empirical findings as the different concepts (the factors characterising organisational life) were not developed deductively, but rather by constantly questioning and revising their scope on the basis of the empirical findings. Such a process is often subsumed under the term 'negative case analysis' which, however, is confusing terminology if the research is a 'single case study'. However, the methods subsumed here basically describe a careful and reflexive handling of interpretative conclusions, consciously searching 'for any evidence – that is the 'negative' or negating case – that will force a re-examination of initial impressions'.[131] This was especially done in the final stages of analysis as the content and examples given by UN staff coded within the interconnections of two factors were contrasted in order to reach conclusions about the patterns of interaction within UNMIL and DKPO.

Finally, so-called 'member checks' are often discussed as an important method of gaining credibility, often referring to a process in which the data gathered in interviews (transcripts) and more refined products of the analysis are given to the source persons in order to be checked and validated.[132] This method has also been under strong criticism.[133] Especially problematic here is that the realities, goals and perspectives of the organisation member and the external researcher may be different. Thus, member-checking always includes a reinterpretation of the original data or concepts from the source perhaps in defence of his or her actions rather than towards the creation of an adequate representation of 'reality'. Moreover, any formalised check of data would have compromised my approach of informal interaction with interview partners. Thus, as already outlined above, I concentrated on generating considerable trust relationships with the interview partner during the research process in order to gain access to dynamics underlying the formal shell of UNMIL and DPKO.[134] Moreover, I shared my initial analysis with selected and accessible UN insiders in order to discuss the concepts and research results in an informal manner.

The second general aspect of quality control is *intersubjective plausibility.*[135] It refers to the notion that even though qualitative research cannot undergo intersubjective rigorous testing compared to variable-oriented research, the plausibility of argument, methodological and analytical process should go beyond 'selective plausibilization' through illustrative empirical features.[136] Thus, the research process should be recognisable and comprehensible.

[131] Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p. 107.
[132] Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 314, Richards, 2009, p. 149, Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p. 104.
[133] See e.g. Sandelowski, 1993.
[134] On 'tactics of ensuring honesty of informants', see also Shenton, 2004, pp. 66-67.
[135] See e.g Steinke, 2004, p. 324.
[136] Flick, 2009, p. 384.

Two methodological clarifications are important here: firstly, the interpretations and conclusions made in this study are based on in-depth, but also selective, background knowledge as well as extensive empirical data. Consequently, the empirical data may be interpreted differently on the basis of a different knowledge framework and can challenge the conclusions made in this thesis. Thus, the modest aim of this thesis is to engage in the debate on peacekeeping, contributing a 'building block' to theory-building. For this purpose, the research process must be reproducible especially through ensuring the transparency of the different steps of data generation and analysis (see below).

The second clarification relates to the advantages and disadvantages of presenting the research results in the format of articles within a cumulative thesis. Plausibility is often achieved in qualitative science through 'thick description'.[137] This refers to a presentation format which includes the 'nuanced portrait' of interaction processes based on the 'wealth of detail' necessary to capture the 'context-specific nuances of meaning'.[138] This confirms the researcher's interpretations. The article format sets limits to this qualitative narrative. It produces independent accounts of specific aspects and questions in research, must consider perimeters such as word count and consistency within the separate article and, thus, concentrates on specific aspects rather than examining the breadth and 'thickness' of the research. Nevertheless, both case study articles are embedded in rich empirical detail, producing conclusions about the organisational processes within UNMIL and DPKO not only based on examples brought to me by members of UNMIL and DPKO but also, as far as possible, including contextual information.[139] The trade-off concerning detailed description is countered by the major advantage of the article format supporting a different well-acknowledged method of ensuring quality in interpretative research which is often referred to as 'peer debriefing'.[140] This is the 'process of exposing oneself to a disinterested peer'[141] in order to identify possible bias and check if the research and analytical process is plausible. For this purpose I have engaged in discussions with fellow researchers and my supervisors, as well as having presented my results at scientific conferences and workshops. However, the anonymous peer-review process through which the articles had to successfully pass for publication can be counted as one of the most rigorous checks for intersubjective plausibility, consistency and applicability to other analytical concepts and approaches.

[137] Geertz, 1973.
[138] Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p. 101.
[139] Moreover, chapter 3 provides a detailed background account on the development and complexity of UN peacekeeping and its engagement in Liberia in order to contextually embed the three separate articles within the general framework of the research project.
[140] Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp. 308-309, Shenton, 2004.
[141] Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 308.

The third general aspect of quality control is *transparency and reflexivity*. Transparency is a general cross-cutting criterion which produces both credibility and the recognisability of the research process. Moreover, it also refers to an open reflexivity of the researcher's own subjective position in the field.[142] Much of the chapter above aims at making transparent the research process that stands behind the three articles.[143] Additionally, the following final section outlining the research methods briefly reflects on my subjective position as a 'Western' researcher within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

2.5 Reflecting and Avoiding Bias: Being a 'Western' Researcher and 'Cultural' Diversity within the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

The UN and its peacekeeping bureaucracy include many nationalities, 'cultures', ways of thinking and working. A researcher also engages in such a setting on the basis of his own subjective background, which can lead to strong biases based on misunderstandings and prejudice. The objective of the following section is to firstly provide a brief outline of the development of my own subjective position during this research project. Secondly, I will reflect on 'cultural' diversity within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and the strong bias 'cultural' problems can produce for my research.

At the start of my research, I had considerable 'theoretical' knowledge about the UN and its peacekeeping operations but had never encountered the UN bureaucracy directly. The war in Liberia as well as the failures and reasonable successes of the UN to establish and keep the peace were also part of knowledge I had gathered through extensive reading and study. However, even though I had previously travelled and worked in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, I had never been practically involved with issues concerning Liberia before, let alone visited the country. Due to practical work experience in a large German development cooperation, I had some indication as to how internal dynamics influence day-to-day working processes and outcomes in complex organisations. I drew much of my motivation to study the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy in the fact that, compared to international development cooperation,[144] the research on international peace support interventions revealed an astonishing gap in the reflection of such internal organisational dynamics. My practical inexperience with the UN made me relatively unprejudiced towards its internal dynamics. Initial background talks had provided me with an idea of the life as a bureaucrat within the UN, with all its challenges and accomplishments. However, it did not lead to an evaluative

[142] See e.g. Mauthner and Doucet, 2003, Schwarz-Shea, 2006, p. 103.
[143] To increase transparency, appendix B provides a list of all interviews conducted in Liberia and New York. However, this list protects the anonymity of the interview partners and only discloses the broad area of their work.
[144] See e.g. Hüsken, 2006, Mosse, 2005.

bias, but rather afforded me a sense of how overwhelmingly complex the organisation of peacekeeping actually is. Even though this relatively unprejudiced attitude certainly was of advantage in approaching the UN organisation open-mindedly, it also led to critical moments especially concerning the 'cultural' diversity within the UN.

At the beginning of my research my practical inexperience with the UN made me relatively prone to subjective opinions of my contact persons within UNMIL and DPKO. However, I soon noticed that it is important to reflect my own position as a 'Western' researcher as well as the personal backgrounds of the interlocutors in order to create a 'fair' picture of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Personal opinions of UN officials towards their employer are particularly diverse and range from 'the UN is the most exciting place to work' to 'extremely frustrating'. In New York, for example, I talked to a 'Western' military officer who was very frustrated about the 'non-functional' and 'chaotic' business structure of DPKO. A couple of doors down, I then talked with a military officer from Pakistan who perceived DPKO oppositely as an extremely good and well-organised workplace.[145] As a 'Western' researcher I had the feeling that I managed to build up a far more trustworthy relationship and 'bond' with the 'Western' official during the interview than with the officer from Pakistan which enabled an exchange of more in-depth information. However, the personal backgrounds here are decisive in order to understand such contrary positions: the 'Western' officer compared the UN with the military command and control of his army and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation). The background of the officer from Pakistan was completely different, considering that s/he was presumably well paid at the UN, living in New York and 'back home' s/he would have to participate in an armed conflict.

The UN is a 'world organisation' not only because it includes the highest levels of intergovernmental organs (such as the Security Council and the General Assembly), but also because members of its bureaucracy are recruited worldwide.[146] The military is a very specific issue in the staff recruitment process[147] but also civilian substantive staffs are of multiple origins. Particularly in Liberia, 'Western' UN officials often spoke of 'cultural problems', meaning that work processes are often interpreted very differently based on different 'office cultures' in the country of origin which makes effective cooperation very challenging. Through my background as a 'Western' and German researcher, I had far less difficulty in gaining access to 'Western' (and especially in New York, German) officials and their perspectives than to others. It, thus, was important to reflect this position in order not to get entangled with a 'Western'-biased perception of working processes in the UN (which is often linked

[145] Interview 1A, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1B, DPKO, 2010.
[146] For a reflection of the term 'world organisation' and its dimensions, see Koch, 2012.
[147] For more details on the role of the military in the UN, see chapter 3 as well as Winckler, 2012, pp. 164-169.

to multiple complaints about administrative dysfunction). I also tried to control this bias by using different access methods (formal and informal) as well as multiple informal networks (see above).

Arguing from a more abstract standpoint, there are also serious questions concerning the impact of 'cultural' factors in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. For example, many middle management personnel have enjoyed higher education at 'Western' standard or even at universities in Europe or the United States, regardless of their origin. Moreover, 'cultural' segregation is against a fundamentally implied norm in the UN which a former senior UN official called 'UN-minded'. This includes respecting the 'cultural' diversity and multi-nationality of the organisation beyond any specific national affiliation.[148] Nationality certainly can play an important role in the UN (for example, recognisably in the recruiting processes, especially of senior level staff). However, work frustration is very seldom directed toward groups of people, but rather the personal inabilities of a counterpart or colleague. In fact, many people also perceive the diversity of the UN as its advantage, which makes it an exciting place to work. In conclusion, the impact of 'cultural' diversity and nationality in the UN bureaucracy is not necessarily causally interlinked with the day-to-day work processes in the UN bureaucracy. Rather, such questions open up a broad new field of investigation which go beyond the limits of my research. My position as 'Western' researcher combined with limited resources, time in the field and access to the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy made it impossible to provide an authentic and fair reconstruction of the impact of 'cultural' diversity within UNMIL and DPKO. Thus, such data was included as background and context information in order to enable reflexivity, but was excluded from the core analysis of the interaction processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

[148] Background discussion with former senior UN official, Germany 2010.

3 UN PEACEKEEPING: ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MULTIPLE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN LIBERIA

The following chapter provides the necessary background information for an organisational analysis of UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and the UNMIL/DPKO case study examined in this thesis. Firstly, it explores the development of UN peacekeeping and its formal organisation. Secondly, it provides an overview of the different organisational environments which surround the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, and create the external framework of its organisational activity. Thirdly, this chapter turns to Liberia. Here it briefly introduces the civil war and outlines the UN's involvement in establishing and maintaining peace in Liberia.

3.1 Development and Complexity of the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

In order to analyse UN peacekeeping as an organisational action, it is necessary to provide some background as to what the organisation stands for and where it comes from. The UN was founded in 1945 as an international organisation between sovereign states.[149] The UN, as diplomatic framework, is built on the fundamental international norms of the equality of member states and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of a member state.[150] With its Security Council and General Assembly it continues to be one of the most important forums for diplomatic interaction between states today. However, the UN also exists as a large bureaucratic organisation. This includes its secretariat, as well as offices and agencies situated and operating worldwide.[151] The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is an important segment of the overall organisation. In the last two decades, it has developed as one of the most important security management tools of the UN. It is based on three principles - impartiality, consent of all parties and non-use of force - which builds on the general diplomatic norms of the UN.[152] Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping has drawn a lot of attention as it involves a combination of military, civilian and political intervention within the internal

[149] Gareis and Varwick, 2006.
[150] UN, n.d.
[151] For an overview of the departments, offices and agencies subsumed under the so-called 'UN system' see UN, 2011a.
[152] See UN, 2008a.

affairs of sovereign UN member states. Even though legally covered with a Security Council mandate, its operations have often been perceived by member states as conflicting with the international norms upon which the diplomatic framework of the UN is built.[153] Moreover, tensions between traditional principles and individual norms, such as human rights or the protection of civilians, which have been equally important norms of UN peacekeeping in recent years, have repeatedly created normative and operational dilemmas and challenges for the missions and officials on the ground.[154]

This thesis examines the organisational processes within the bureaucratic organisation of UN peacekeeping which is constantly operating on this conflictive ground between different and sometimes opposing norms, principles and political interests. Due to anxiety towards military intervention by the UN, many member states have repeatedly withheld support for organisational development of a UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. This was particularly so in the 1990s when it was seen as a temporary measure to confront temporary problems, such as an international or civil war. Despite this lack of support, the peacekeeping bureaucracy has developed as an increasingly complex and influential segment of the UN system, including widely recognised organisational structures. Two dimensions are important in this organisational development. The first is the quantitative expansion of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Especially since the beginning of the new millennium the quantity of personnel and missions has multiplied, creating continuous managerial adaptations within the organisation of peacekeeping. Secondly, UN peacekeeping has significantly increased its qualitative portfolio over the last twenty years. Since 1999, UN peacekeeping missions are predominantly multidimensional, meaning that next to uniformed components they include a strong civilian bureaucracy. This focusses on various substantive issues such as capacity-building, human rights, reintegration, reconciliation, rule of law, and democratisation. More than ever, UN peacekeepers are essentially 'statebuilders'. The following sections discuss the quantitative and qualitative development of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy in detail by assessing the challenges it faced over the past two decades.

3.1.1 The Quantitative Expansion of UN Peacekeeping

At the end of the 1990s UN peacekeeping was going through a severe crisis. After the Cold War, its operations had been strongly pushed both by the secretariat and powerful states such as the United States (US).[155] However, major failures such as those in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) and Rwanda had substantially cracked its image as an effective conflict-management tool. UN member states increasingly turned their back towards UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. By the

[153] See e.g. Bellamy and Williams, 2010, pp. 3-5, 29-41.
[154] See e.g. Bellamy, 2009, Holt and Taylor, 2009, Karlsrud, 2013, Nasu, 2011.
[155] Al-Qaq, 2009.

beginning of 1999 'there were fewer peacekeepers under the blue flag than ever before or after in the post-Cold War period'.[156] However, in the same year this trend began to change dramatically. With the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in June 1999, UN peacekeeping was not authorised to implement military peacekeeping tasks (which were under NATO control), but it was in charge of a civilian transitional administration, which had full executive control over a given territory.[157] Such a powerful wide-ranging mandate had been unprecedented but was remodelled only months later with the creation of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Here the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy was also entrusted to lead the military peacekeeping component.[158] Moreover, 1999 saw the creation of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)[159] as well as the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)[160] which would later become the largest UN peace operation in history (since 2010 it has operated under the name United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo – MONUSCO[161]). In the following years, several more multidimensional UN peacekeeping missions were established, among others the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in 2003.[162]

Benner *et al*. convincingly assess the rapid growth of UN peacekeeping in the last decade.[163] They point out that even if the total number of peacekeeping missions per year remained fairly stable (varying between 15 and 19), personnel (military, police and civilian) increased from under 17,000 to over 125,000 in 2010. The overall budget increased tenfold from 800 million US Dollar in 1998 to 7.8 billion US Dollar in 2010. The reason for this rapid growth is the renewed scope of UN peacekeeping. Even though classical military peacekeeping missions continued to exist, many of the new missions included multidimensional mandates that clearly exceeded classical military tasks. 'For almost every closing mission, a more ambitious operation was established somewhere else.'[164] One result of this trend is that an average mission can itself be labelled a 'complex organisation' by its quantitative scope, with around 1,000 civilian staff, 300 UN volunteers, hundreds of local staff as well as the number of mandated military observers, civilian police and armed peacekeepers and a multi-million US Dollar budget.[165]

[156] Benner et al., 2011, p. 13.
[157] UN, 1999c.
[158] UN, 1999e.
[159] UN, 1999d.
[160] UN, 1999f.
[161] UN, 2010b.
[162] UN, 2003b.
[163] Benner et al., 2011, pp. 15-16.
[164] Benner et al., 2011, p. 15.
[165] Trettin and Winckler, 2012.

The quantitative expansion of UN peacekeeping missions also had to be encompassed in its headquarters. In his autobiographical account of his role during the Rwandan genocide, the former force commander of the United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Dallaire describes the workplace of the DPKO as he found it in 1993:

> Like many first-timers at the UN, I was impressed by the grandeur of the chambers of the General Assembly and the Security Council. But I soon learned that the real work went on in a rabbit warren of offices that lay just out of sight of the general public. The drabbest and most cramped offices seemed to belong to the DPKO. Staff were working in dreadful conditions: desks squeezed together, phones jangling constantly, outdated computers crashing, people often short of office supplies.[166]

In these early days, DPKO was a relatively small department. Perceived by UN member states as a temporary structure, staff plans only included around 60 positions and were added to by gratis secondments.[167] Despite this, the DPKO had already managed to install a 24 hour Situation Room[168] and cover crucial (military) support functions.[169] With the transfer of the field support division from the Department of Management to the auspices of DPKO in 1994, the UN secretariat bundled substantive and operational coordination responsibilities under one department.[170] In the budget year 1997-1998 (amid the crisis in UN peacekeeping during the end of the 1990s), the DPKO incorporated 279 authorised posts (excluding 134 additional gratis personnel)[171] but was under pressure to reduce its size in ratio to the decreasing number of field personnel. As UN peacekeeping re-emerged in the new millennium, its headquarters again also rapidly grew. This is shown in table 2, which outlines the ratio of headquarters to field personnel between 2002 and 2007.

Table 2: Growth in Peace Operations Managed by DPKO in Relation to Headquarters Personnel[172]

	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
Total field personnel in mission	57,018	68,722	81,593	89,104	100,981
Number of posts in DPKO	593	595	601	630	679
Ration of DPKO post to field posts	1:96	1:115	1:136	1:141	1:149

Table 2 also demonstrates that even as the DPKO expanded, with nearly 700 posts in 2007, the ratio of staff in missions and headquarters increased as well. In 2007, the UN again decided to reform its headquarters structure and split the support division from the political and military headquarters of

[166] Dallaire, 2005, p. 48.
[167] UN, 1993.
[168] An information hub and crisis response management facility.
[169] With the change in gratis personnel policy in 1997 and 1999, the DPKO increasingly employed their military personnel directly UN, 2002b, p. 1339.
[170] UN, 1994.
[171] Durch *et al.*, 2003, p. 53.
[172] UN, 2007a, p. 6.

UN peacekeeping. Next to DPKO a new department entitled Department of Field Support (DFS) was established.[173] This reform again bolstered the headquarter staff levels to currently around 1,000 personnel, including both DPKO and DFS.[174] Consequently, during my field research in 2010, the DPKO did not remind the observer much of the Dallaire's impressions of 1993. Staff still complained about the work conditions (such as slow computers), DPKO was spread over four Manhattan skyscrapers (also due to renovation works at the UN headquarters building). However, particularly with its Office of Operations (OO) located very prominently at the heart of the UN secretariat, DPKO is in no way a small backroom enterprise anymore.

3.1.2 The Qualitative Breadth of UN Peacekeeping

Next to the quantitative expansion, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy has experienced significant development in its substantive portfolio over the last two decades. Public debate on UN peacekeeping often tends to singlehandedly focus on its military side. Soldiers with blue helmets remain the visual sign of UN engagement in war and post-war settings and clearly a very important aspect of UN peacekeeping. However, contemporary UN peacekeeping consists of far more than military 'blue helmet' intervention. In fact, DPKO has led and still leads peacekeeping missions that are purely political with no control over military assets (such as UNMIK or the United Nations Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA). Current UN peacekeeping missions often include a wide range of activities, including demobilisation and demilitarisation of combatants, human rights monitoring and education, institution-building especially in the security, justice and rule of law sector (including corrections and civil policing), reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts, support of humanitarian aid, reconciliation and peacebuilding, as well as economic development. Peacekeeping missions seldom act as a donor, but rather as a door-opener. They ideally provide a certain amount of stability, predictability and access for other actors to engage in the reconstruction of war torn societies. Without executive mandates, they often exist as a shadow-bureaucracy next to national governments, engaging with government counterparts on every level, providing know-how, administrative, logistical and political support.

The origins and development of this substantive breadth of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s are well documented and analysed.[175] The end of the Cold War made it possible for the UN secretariat to leave the deadlock of normative and political neutrality. It initiated and formed international norms of UN intervention, which included a military component, and stood on liberal grounds such as

[173] UN, 2007a.
[174] UN, 2011b, 2012a.
[175] See for example Dobbins *et al.*, 2005, Durch, 1993.

humanity, democracy, and welfare.[176] In 1992, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali famously created a sweeping outline for the UN's conflict management role in his 'Agenda for Peace'.[177] Moreover, during this time a multitude of peacekeeping missions were created with various degrees of complexity as well as cohesive and executive powers.[178] Classical peacekeeping missions (*first generation*) continued to exist which included 'an interposition of a force after a truce has been reached' and involves little civilian contribution.[179] However, such peacekeeping was designed especially for international conflicts between states, whereas the UN was increasingly facing multi-dimensional civil wars. Meeting these new demands, *second generation* missions were established, more ambitious than classical peacekeeping, building on the consent of conflicting parties and often including the substantive goals of liberal peacebuilding such as economic rehabilitation, elections and human rights monitoring. A *third generation* also evolved under the title of *peace-enforcement* which allowed peacekeeping missions to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and engage in proactive enforcement and protection activities. Nearly all of the second and third generation missions included an election component,[180] but otherwise the substantial scope varied considerably. In Cambodia the UN established a transitional administration between 1992 and 1994, whereas in Liberia it only contributed to the existing peacekeeping efforts of the ECOWAS with an observer mission and electoral component between 1993 and 1997. With a Chapter VII mandate, the UN desperately tried to enforce disarmament and consent amongst the warring factions in Somalia (1992-95). Moreover, it utterly failed to protect civilians from campaigns of mass murder in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995).

These failures created a massive blow to the substantive and organisational development of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. However, in the midst of its crisis, UN peacekeeping started to reinvent certain characteristics of its organisational structure and substantive breadth. Two aspects are important here: firstly, the failures of Rwanda and Srebrenica opened a 'window' of critical self-reflection. Secondly, based on this self-reflection and responding to the new demand for UN peacekeeping involvement since 1999 it made extensive efforts in professionalising its organisational structure.

At the end of the 1990s a series of reports were published which for UN standards were remarkably self-critical, most notably the reports on the UN's role in Bosnia ('The Fall of Srebrenica')[181] and

[176] Krause and Jütersonke, 2005, Paris, 2002, 2004.
[177] UN, 1992.
[178] Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 11.
[179] Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, p. 11.
[180] Paris, 2004.
[181] UN, 1999b.

Rwanda[182]. The Srebrenica report was commissioned by the General Assembly to the Secretary General and co-authored by two young political officers who had been serving in Bosnia during the critical time. The report on Rwanda was later compiled by an independent inquiry established in March 1999. Before then, many senior managers at DPKO had upheld the prevalent line of organisational self-protection, articulating dismay about the Security Council pushing the blame towards the secretariat. 'In this view, member states had failed the UN […] when they had sent lightly armed and defensively mandated peacekeepers into a war zone in the first place.'[183] The authors of the reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica challenged this view by presenting a highly inclusive and detailed assessment as well as a blunt and substantive critique not only towards the member states but also the implementing bureaucracy.

This 'window' of self-reflection at the end of the 1990s is remarkable especially because of the thoroughness, analytical sophistication, and self-criticism that had become the official line of the UN secretariat at this particular time.[184] UN Secretary General Kofi Annan accepted the Srebrenica and Rwanda reports as they were written, even though the critique was directed towards DPKO under his leadership.[185] This provided Annan with strong political leverage in a time of a severe crisis within UN peacekeeping. As an observer of the UN under Annan's leadership concludes:

> [t]he UN had never subjected itself to such painful self-scrutiny. Nor, of course, had most of its member states, including the democratic ones. […] his [Annan's] willingness to accept institutional blame […] demonstrated […] that the institution, or at least the secretary-general, understood how very deep and urgent was the need for change.[186]

This self-criticism thus established the political groundwork and basis for the reform processes to come. Moreover, as mentioned above, 1999 also afforded unprecedented demands for UN peacekeeping. UNMIK and UNTAET were missions with extraordinary substantive breadth and executive powers which had never before been implemented by the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

[182] UN, 2012b.
[183] Benner et al., 2011, p. 32.
[184] Berdal, 2001, pp. 46-47. Benner *et al.* perceive the reports on Srebrenica and Rwanda as a 'turning point in terms of self-criticism'. See Benner *et al.*, 2011, p. 34. However, I argue that such self-scrutiny is connected to this specific period in the development of UN peacekeeping. Currently, such a report challenging the structures, processes and leading persons within the UN bureaucracy is very unlikely to pass through to any stage of official publication. A good example here is the recent internal report on the UN's role during the last stages of the civil war in Sri Lanka. A Sri Lankan governmental military campaign in May 2009 had defeated the rebel forces. Up to 40,000 people died in the last five months of the war. The report pointed to the failure of the UN in responding to these events, critically reflecting on flaws in reporting and accountability structures as well as early action capacities. Deemed to be shelved, the only way this internal criticism went public was through its leak to the press. Only in reaction to this leak did the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon publically admit the UN's failure and published a censored version of the report. See BBC, 2012b, Doucet, 2012, UN, 2012b.
[185] Annan served as head of DPKO between 1993 and 1996.
[186] Traub, 2006, p. 115.

DPKO clearly lacked the competencies and expertise, for example, in establishing and administering a complete justice or education system in Kosovo. Other new missions such as in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and Liberia (UNMIL) were equipped only with a supportive mandate but also followed a multidimensional approach. On the one hand, DPKO had to hire many new personnel and external expertise.[187] On the other, the need to establish sustainable and functionally-differentiated bureaucratic structures that were able to provide the broad range of expertise needed in UN peacekeeping became more than evident.[188]

In August 2000 the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which had been established a couple of months earlier under the leadership of the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, presented its very influential report which is broadly referred to as the *Brahimi report*.[189] The aim of this panel was to 'make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change'.[190] As Berdal observes, 'there is a ritualistic quality to some of its recommendations.'[191] An example is the call for 'clear, credible and achievable' Security Council mandates,[192] even though experience has shown that member states 'prefer to leave mandates unclear' if they achieve a consensus at all.[193] However, what makes the Brahimi report a 'landmark'[194] document is its attempt to redefine and re-establish crucial aspects of UN peacekeeping. Building on the critical self-evaluation of UN peacekeeping of the past years, it clarifies what peace operations should not be doing (military peace enforcement interventions) and what they should be able to do once deployed (act robustly in self-protection and protection of civilians from mass murder). It also clearly outlines the substantive breadth of UN peace operations, for example, calling for a more holistic approach in the rule of law sector in which civil policing is only one part of a more systemic approach. According to the report, this should not only be part of the functional outline of a mission but also be established as a structural capacity of DPKO. Moreover, headquarters should be given strategic analysis capacities, an early warning and response system, as well as knowledge management structures which can systematically capture and process UN peacekeeping experiences. The report also included a broad range of administrative reform proposals which should enhance the pace of mission deployment.

In the following years, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy underwent a phase of rapid reform and growth. Dependent on the support of member states (see below), many of the Brahimi report

[187] For example, DPKO had completely no education expertise and hired the whole UNMIK education department from scratch. See Background Discussion G, former UN official in UNMIK, 2010.
[188] Benner et al., 2011, pp. 25-26.
[189] UN, 2000c.
[190] UN, 2000c, p. viii.
[191] Berdal, 2001, p. 47.
[192] UN, 2000c, p. 10.
[193] Berdal, 2001, p. 47.
[194] Durch et al., 2003, p. xv.

recommendations were implemented, particularly concerning administrative structures.[195] On the substantive side, the reform processes often included hard political struggles, both within the peacekeeping bureaucracy as well as in negotiation with UN member states.[196] The majority of new missions were designed to be multidimensional and with a robust mandate, smaller missions such as UNAMSIL or MONUC became reinforced after encountering violent resistance. In Liberia, UNMIL became the first mission with a whole pillar dedicated to rule of law, directly operationalising the ideas of the Brahimi Report (see chapter 3.3.2 below). DPKO also grew rapidly and was provided with the resources to begin systematic knowledge management and review processes. It likewise made several efforts to standardise the basic principles and operational procedures of peace operations, create binding policy doctrines as well as guidance for the field.[197]

One visual outcome of these reform processes is a gradual functional differentiation in which DPKO's formal structure step by step adapted to the substantive breadth of UN peacekeeping recognised in the Brahimi report. This can be best illustrated by assessing how the organogram of DPKO developed over time. The first organogram that is publically available dates from 1994, the peak of UN peacekeeping involvement in the first half of the 1990s, and reflects the integration of the field support division in DPKO which had been previously under the auspices of the Department of Management (see figure 2). This organogram shows the first signs of functional differentiation. At the centre of DPKO lies the Office of Operations (OO) which leads the political support for missions. It is already differentiated between three regional divisions and incorporates an electoral division, located previously in the Department for Political Affairs (DPA). The second pillar of DPKO is the Support Office which not only includes logistical and administrative support but also mission planning, civilian police and demining. Striking in this diagram is the small military capacity. Even though the missions at this time had a strong military focus (i.e. Somalia) the military component of DPKO is only illustrated with one box named 'Military Advisor'. Despite the fact that the Situation Room was also setup by military gratis personnel, political leadership is clearly manifested in this organisational hierarchy.

[195] Durch et al., 2003.
[196] For an interpretation of the political struggles in implementing the substantive recommendations of the Brahimi reports, see Benner et al., 2011, pp. 39-43.
[197] The standardisation process culminated in 2008 with the publication of the so called Capstone Doctrine which summarised the basic principles of UN peacekeeping as a framework of organisational action, see UN, 2008a.

Figure 2: Organogram of DPKO, 1994 (Source: UN, 1994, p. 14)



Figure 3: Organogram DPKO 1999/2000 (Source: UN, 2000a, p. 17)



This functional minimisation of the military impetus had changed in 1999, even before the Brahimi reform processes (see figure 3).[198] Here, the military and civilian police components were combined in one division headed by the military advisor. Moreover, mission planning and training were reorganised under the military pillar of DPKO rather than the support pillar. Yet, the military and police remained formally graded at a lower hierarchical level (headed by a military officer equivalent to Director 2 level) than the civilian pillars (both headed by an Assistant Secretary General/ASG). Otherwise the changes to the 1994 structure are minor. The Situation Room was now under civilian auspices in the Office of Operations. The Policy Analysis and Lessons Learned Unit were the functional shell of what would later develop into the Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit.

Figure 4: Organogram DPKO, 2002 (Sources: UN, 2001, p. 7, 2002a)



Figure 4 shows the organisational structure of DPKO two years after the Brahimi report. Even though the heart of DPKO, its Office of Operations, didn't change in its functional outline, its supports appear far more differentiated, reflecting many of the recommendations outlined in the Brahimi report.

[198] See also Durch et al., 2003, p. 131

Military and civil police are projected as separate pillars with direct access to the USG. Under the military pillar there are new specific technical services, such as the Force Generation Service which is dedicated to military personnel recruitment as well as a support unit which focusses on current military operations. In the police pillar, not only has the Civilian Police Advisor been upgraded with direct access to the USG, but for the first time it also reflects a broader approach including units substantially focussing on criminal law and the judiciary. After the mission support pillar had been stripped of several functional units in 1999, it now appears more differentiated with a diversion between administrative and logistical support and their technical subunits. Furthermore, the Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit appears as a new section directly under the office of the USG. It subsumes the former Policy Analysis and Lessons Learned Unit, and gained a lot of attention during the following years. It was developed entirely from scratch in order to build knowledge management and guidance tools as well as to enhance standardisation and professionalisation of UN peacekeeping practices.[199]

The Brahimi reforms were followed by a number of further reform projects. 'Peace Operations 2010', for example, was launched in 2006 and tried to push the issue of personnel recruitment, peacekeeping doctrine and partnerships with regional organisations. With the latter two aspects it particularly focussed on the Peacekeeping Best Practice Section, which in the following years implemented a system of Best Practice collection and distribution as well as training. It moreover developed into an in-house think tank which also interacts with different partners and institutes outside of the UN. With the change of DPKO leadership in 2008, the Peacekeeping Best Practice Section was tasked to formulate a reform agenda which is known as the 'New Horizon process' and focusses on effectiveness, cooperation and support strategies.[200] Next to these programmatic developments, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy continued to adapt its organisational structure. The most significant reform was the separation of the Operations Support Office from DPKO as the new Department of Field Support (DFS) also headed by a USG which, however, reports to the USG of DPKO.[201] This reform was suggested by the new Secretary General Ban Ki Moon but his final reform proposal was heavily based on DPKO's 'Peace Operations 2010' package.[202] The result of the structural reform can be seen in the organogram of contemporary DPKO and DFS (see figure 5).

Even compared to the post-Brahimi organisational structure, this organogram seems highly complex. From a functional structure of 18 formally recognised entities in 1994, the 'United Nations

[199] Benner et al., 2011, pp. 41-42.
[200] UN, 2009b.
[201] UN, 2007a.
[202] Benner and Rotmann, 2007.

Figure 5: Organogram DPKO/DFS, 2011 (Source UN, 2011c)



Peacekeeping Group' as it is called in 2011 comprises 77 entities (29 in DPKO, 36 in DFS and 12 integrated 'shared capacities').[203] DFS as a department incorporates one ASG as well as four divisions (field personnel, finance, logistics, and communications technology) and their functionally defined subunits. Also within DPKO several major amendments to the post-Brahimi structure took place. The first is the extension and differentiation of the Office of Operations which was chronically overstretched by the continuously increasing demands of peacekeeping operations throughout the decade and hadn't been changed in its basic functional outline since 1994. In addition to including a further division concerned with Africa, the reform also installed sub-regionally defined Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) with the aim of bridging the different sections and fragmentations within UN peacekeeping headquarters. Subsequently, IOTs are led by a first level director (D1) and are included next to the desk representatives of police, military and field support. The second major alteration is the upgrade of both Rule of Law and Military Affairs to separate the ASG-led sub office. For the military this is the highest rank an advisor had ever held within DPKO. His office, even though it is not included in the organogram of figure 4, includes several teams and sub-offices, including a military Chief of Staff and an Assessment Team which is the first military capacity for strategic assessment in DPKO ever formally accepted by UN member states. An important differentiation to the earlier structure also is the second substantive civilian pillar in DPKO under the leadership of an ASG entitled Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI). It includes the Police Division and separate sections specialised in either the security sector or rule of law. The final major amendment to the previous organisational structure is the inclusion of new shared capacities. A joint Chief of Staff oversees the interconnection between DPKO and DFS and directly controls, among others, the Situation Centre, Public Affairs Section, and a new Information Management Unit which oversees technical communication protocols. Moreover, the Peacekeeping Best Practice Section has been consolidated with all training units under the upgraded umbrella of the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division. However, even though the structure has been approved by the member states, it operates under cuts of resources and staff especially in the area of evaluation.[204] Nevertheless, with this reform the headquarter structure of DPKO for the first time begins to visualise the substantive breadth of peacekeeping envisioned in the Brahimi report and implemented in the field through its functional outline.

In conclusion, the assessment of quantitative and qualitative expansion has shown the development of UN peacekeeping from a small but emerging segment of the UN system to a large, multifunctional enterprise. However, comparing the organograms of DPKO in addition to assessing the development within the outline of UN peacekeeping missions only provides an impression of the differentiated

[203] See also Trettin and Winckler, 2012, p. 118.
[204] UN, 2007b, pp. 26-27.

formal functional structure. It shows the efforts of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to reflect the substantive diversity of its enterprise through its functional and externally visible structure. Organisational complexity, however, evolves through the interaction processes that (re)produce this structure. Moreover, such a formal structure is often de-coupled from actual interaction within the organisation, meaning that the publically visible structure represents how the organisation should function (rational, effective, hierarchically organised) rather than how organisational processes actually work in day-to-day practice.[205] In this thesis, the structural development, outline and differentiation of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is taken as a starting point for further analysis of UN peacekeeping as organisational action. However, structure is understood not so much as a pre-existing fact, but rather as a process of what is done within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Structural factors, thus, are one element among others that create a framework of interaction within the organisation of UN peacekeeping.

3.2 The Multilevel Political Environment of the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

In order to analyse UN peacekeeping as an organisation in action, it is important to reflect the organisational environment and its potential impact on day-to-day life within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Even though it wields certain power and autonomy as an international bureaucracy,[206] it is not autarkic but interdependently connected with actors in its surroundings. Moreover, as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy acts as a multilevel organisation, it operates in multiple political environments reaching from international politics between powerful member states in the Security Council and General Assembly to national and 'local' politics within a post-war country. The following section provides a brief assessment of the most important actors and dynamics within its multiple organisational environments.

Figure 6 is a simplified illustration of the levels within which the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is located as well as the subsequent actors and organisations with whom it has to interact. Three levels are especially important:[207] Firstly, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is a political actor in international politics, creating meaning and frameworks of interpretation for UN peacekeeping as an international policy. This means that it interacts with the UN member states, especially at the level of the Security Council and General Assembly through its influential Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The member states have their own political

[205] Meyer and Rowan, 1991.
[206] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004.
[207] The regional level is the fourth environment which includes cooperation with regional international organisations such as the European Union or the African Union. See e.g. Boulden, 2003. As this level is not an important factor for the case study examined in this thesis (UNMIL/DPKO), regional cooperation has been excluded from this background overview.

interests. They can also impact the working processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Secondly, it competes with other international organisations regarding authorities, resources and political leverage in the field of post-war recovery. Thus, even within the overall umbrella of the UN system, coordination and 'integration' with partner organisations has been a matter of controversial political negotiation and conflict.[208] Thirdly, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy interacts with 'local' governments and other stakeholders in the political context of the post-war country, such as opposition parties, rebel groups, or civil society organisations. The post-war country is a political 'arena' in which 'local' actors do not necessarily share the same interests as the peacekeeping intervention. In the following section, these three levels in the organisational environment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy are discussed in more detail.

Figure 6: Locating the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy (own illustration)



[208] As this thesis focusses on the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, I concentrate here on actors within the UN system. There are however also external organisations such as international NGOs which interact with the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy on all levels. See e.g. Aall, 2000, Abiew and Keating, 1999, Murdie and Peksen, 2014.

3.2.1 The International Level: UN Member States and Peacekeeping

UN member states, particularly in the Security Council, not only authorise but also finance and equip peacekeeping missions. Thus, member states can have a huge impact on the functional outline and substantive breadth both of peacekeeping missions as well as DPKO through their regulatory power over the budget. Peace operations are funded through budgets separate from the UN's regular budget. Many of DPKO's placements are also financed externally through the so-called 'Peacekeeping Support Account'. This is processed in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), an under-committee of the General Assembly. All important member states (including the permanent five members of the Security Council) sit on the ACABQ. Security Council resolutions are often vague and leave a lot of room for interpretation, but the precise outline and scope of a peacekeeping mission is drawn through budget negotiations between the secretariat and the ACABQ.[209] It determines how many civilian personnel are permitted to participate, how well specific programmes (such as human rights or DDR) are funded, as well the design of the differentiated and multi-layered functional outline of the mission. Also the functional differentiation process of DPKO described above was processed through negotiations with the ACABQ. Even though the Brahimi report was endorsed by the Security Council, its concrete implementation depended on funding which is controlled in the ACABQ.

Thus, it is no surprise that the interests of member states can impact the day-to-day work within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. In his autobiographical account cited above, Dallaire describes his impressions of the Military Advisor of DPKO, Maurice Baril, a Canadian general like Dallaire whom he considers an old friend and colleague:

> New York had changed him [Baril] in an almost indefinable way. […]He was becoming more cautious and more politically sensitive. For instance, he and his staff always dressed in civilian clothes. He told me that he had instituted this policy because uniforms made the civilian staff at the UN uncomfortable and created unnecessary friction. The new, more astute Maurice [Baril] understood that to woo allies he had to become more flexible than his military background generally allowed. […] Maurice [Baril] had become masterful at marrying political, diplomatic, humanitarian and military imperatives in an organization full of internecine friction.[210]

This is a military general's view of the very unmilitary institution on which he had to rely in order to build up the UN mission in Rwanda in 1993. For a military officer used to, and educated in, a system of tight hierarchy, order and control, DPKO still can be a very frustrating workplace. Dallaire's description shows the impact that political factors can have on the work within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. For example, Baril managed to create influence through small things, such as abstaining

[209] Background Discussion A, former senior UN official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[210] Dallaire, 2005, pp. 51-52.

from showing constant uniformed presence in an organisational department which is constantly under critical surveillance regarding its military interventionism.[211] The use of military force by an international organisation is a controversial issue because coercive powers are seen by many UN member states as a crucial criterion of state sovereignty.[212] For many member states this translates into an understanding that the UN should not hold its own structural military means. Every military asset under the command of the UN, every mandate and every headquarter structure is meticulously reviewed under this premise. Thus, it is no surprise that in a speech in 1995, Ruth Wedgewood concludes that 'the missing military infrastructure, the archaic qualities of the Secretariat, and the preeminence of members' inconsistent political wills, mean the United Nations does not have a sophisticated capacity to run military operations'.[213] In fact, DPKO was not only 'never set up to be a military command center',[214] but it was never meant to be one. Rather, UN peacekeeping is functionally outlined to be externally recognised as a political (and not military) enterprise.

The political impetus of the member states on UN peacekeeping becomes especially clear through a brief review of how reform initiatives are processed. In the 1990s, the failure of member states to provide not only adequate military means but also sufficient legal basis led to impossible situations for UN peacekeeping. In Bosnia, for example, UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) was mandated to protect humanitarian convoys. This mandate allowed the UN military to protect itself and the food inside the trucks through the use of force. It, however, excluded the protection of UN civilian staff and thus the protection of those driving the food trucks.[215] The transition from such ambiguous to more 'robust' mandates was a long political process. It was reinvigorated by the Brahimi report which strongly supported the quest for 'robust' peacekeeping, stating that 'military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate' and commit to 'impartiality' as 'adherence to the principles of the Charter'.[216] It further states that this

> means that mandates should specify an operation's authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly, but able to pose a credible deterrent threat […]. Such forces should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount a defence against violent challengers.[217]

Even though these recommendations were well received by the Security Council, the General Assembly was more cautions. Often linked to the broader debate on military intervention for

[211] A norm which has been uphold until today.
[212] Annan, 1998, Goulding, 2004, Heller and Sofaer, 2001.
[213] Wedgwood, 1995, p. 637.
[214] Wedgwood, 1995, p. 637.
[215] Interview 1C, DSS, 2010.
[216] UN, 2000c, p. 9.
[217] UN, 2000c, p. 9.

humanitarian purposes,[218] sovereignty as 'responsibility to protect',[219] as well as the post 9/11 US-led 'war against terror' and its intervention in Iraq in 2003,[220] several member states felt threatened by these ideas.[221] 'Limiting the UN's ability to support or plan for such action became a focus of their approach to implementing the [Brahimi] report.'[222] As a result, the creation of essential military capacities, such as information and intelligence gathering as well as strategic analysis and planning, was severely undermined. To date such functions have only found a preliminary presence in the UN bureaucracy and are mostly under civilian leadership.[223] Any calls for Standing Force capacities of the UN (also included in the Brahimi report) have been denied. Moreover, even though the military component of DPKO has been continually strengthened over time, its standing within the internal hierarchy of DPKO compared to the political components is low.[224]

A consequence of member state influence is that, despite the Brahimi report, reform proposals are rarely based on independent inquiries, but rather commissioned through 'DPKO discussion papers' or so-called 'non-paper'. For example, the 'new horizon' reform process was initiated through such a 'non-paper' which is a document that has the endorsement of senior leadership in the DPKO and DFS but does not necessarily reflect the official position of the UN or any commitment of the Secretary General.[225] As such, it also does not find entry into the official records of the UN. In the 'new horizon' process the 'non-paper' was used to initiate an informal debate with the member states in the General Assembly on specific issues of peacekeeping. It was formalised, not completely but recognisably, through the inclusion in a report of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.[226]

Both the Brahimi and 'new horizon' reform processes show the politically complex interactions between secretariat and member states. Regardless of the bureaucratic efforts of standardisation and functional differentiation, the varying political interests of UN member states impose a degree of contingency which DPKO attempts to encounter through diplomatic rather than bureaucratic methods. This political inconsistency poses challenges in the reduction of organisational uncertainty via bureaucratic structures and affects long-term strategic planning.

[218] See e.g. Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003.
[219] Bellamy, 2006, Chandler, 2004, ICISS, 2001.
[220] Bellamy, 2006.
[221] Benner et al., 2011, pp. 16-21.
[222] Durch et al., 2003, p. 8.
[223] Norheim-Martinsen and Aasland, 2011.
[224] Winckler, 2012, pp. 164-169.
[225] See also UN, 2009b, p. 2.
[226] Interview 1D, DPKO, 2010.

3.2.2 The International Bureaucracy Level: Coordination and 'Integration' of UN Efforts

UN peacekeeping is only one actor amongst many other internationally operating organisations engaged in the field of post-war recovery. Next to the influence of UN member states, interaction with other international organisations is important for the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and can influence its organisational processes. Just as is the case for the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, many organisations working in the field of post-war recovery act under the umbrella of the UN system. An observer of the UN very quickly encounters cleavages between these different organisations and departments, such as the rivalry between DPKO, DPA, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Consequently, coordination between these different components of the UN has been an issue of extensive analysis and policy debate.[227] Already in 1997 the Secretary General Kofi Annan called for integration of UN efforts in post-war recovery,[228] and since then a series of 'integration' reforms have been initiated. It has been included in the Brahimi reform process, projected through the development of 'integrated missions'[229] and the implementation of the 'Delivering as One' doctrine.[230] On the one hand, integration and coordination is a term through which it is attempted to achieve bureaucratic effectiveness, such as preventing duplication of efforts and streamlining resources.[231] On the other, it tries to combine the streams of UN internal politics, interests and influences of different departments and organisational actors.[232]

One example of 'integration reform' concerns the efforts to enhance 'cohesion' of all UN actions, aiming to 'integrate' the humanitarian and development branch of the UN (coordinated by OCHA and UNDP) within the UN peace operation structure. In the wake of the Brahimi reform processes, a directive was given by the Secretary General on the relationship between UN agencies and the peacekeeping mission. It stated that the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), as head of the peacekeeping mission, should also 'provide overarching leadership to, the UN team in the country'.[233] S/he is assisted by two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary General (DSRSG). One DSRSG also acts as Resident Coordinator (RC) and Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), chairing the UN Country Team (a coordination body of all UN stakeholders in the country). This system was first implemented in Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, such an integration especially of humanitarian actors met fierce resistance in the humanitarian community led by OCHA. The fear was that humanitarian aid would become 'militarised' and 'politicised' through its integration in the

[227] See e.g. Benner et al., 2011, pp. 173-207, Campbell, 2008, Paris, 2008.
[228] UN, 1997, p. 39.
[229] UN, 2006b.
[230] UNDG, n.d..
[231] Campbell, 2008, p. 556.
[232] See e. g. Doss, 2012.
[233] UN, 2000b, p. 1.

peacekeeping mission, undermining the non-conditionality and neutrality of humanitarian aid in a conflict zone which are important working principles for humanitarian agencies in gaining access to persons at risk.[234] Even though the conflict between humanitarian and peacekeeping actors continues, the leadership model of the 'triple-hat' DSRSG has been reproduced and exists in nearly all contemporary multidimensional peacekeeping missions. However, humanitarian agencies are very careful in claiming their space of action (for example, by marking their cars with blue signs to distinguish them from the black signs of peacekeeping missions), and integration of agencies into the structure of a peacekeeping mission has constantly developed into a more 'pragmatic' relationship.[235]

Reflecting a renewed integration doctrine led by the UN development branch under the title 'Delivering as One', an interview partner in Liberia stated that it

> only makes sense. We [UNMIL and the UN Country Team] should work together. But it isn't often considered that it does take a long time. […] It needs a lot of creativity to work together in a coordinated way.[236]

It becomes clear that even in an 'integrated mission', integration by no means is a purely technical issue. It rather reflects and processes the political interaction and responsiveness between the different organisations involved in the field of post-conflict recovery, claiming and protecting their specific space, interest, resources and leverage. Locally, 'integration' very often seems to be based on the 'creativity' of the individuals involved, bridging organisational boundaries and working together in a cohesive manner.

3.2.3 The National Level: The Post-War State as Political Arena

The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy not only interacts with member states and international bureaucracies. By intervening in a post-war country, it also engages with national and sub-national actors such as the host government which also constitutes an important and influential level in the organisational environment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Intervening in a post-war state means that an internationally operating organisation, such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, not only meets with 'local realities' on the ground.[237] Rather, it intends to change how political authority and power is practiced by 'local' actors and institutions.[238] As already mentioned above, the tools and methods of these interventions are often based on liberal ideals and values, aiming at building

[234] See e.g. Higate and Henry, 2009, pp. 85-92, Stoddard and Harmer, 2006.
[235] Benner et al., 2011, pp. 180-187.
[236] Interview 1E, UNMIL, 2011.
[237] Schlichte and Veit, 2007.
[238] Free, 2010, Riese, 2013, p. 18.

democratic structures of legitimising, accounting and controlling for political power.[239] However, UN peacekeeping rarely takes over formal executive powers and forms a transitional administration as in Kosovo. Rather, peacekeeping missions are predominantly deployed in support of a host government. This is the case in Liberia, where a senior UNMIL official articulated the formal self-image of the UN peacekeeping mission as follows:

> The UN is here to support the government of Liberia. So we [the UN mission] do not take action. The government takes actions. The UN may provide some kind of support, direct or indirect, in terms of advice, by acting on high levels. So we do not do policies. We do not take policies. We do not implement policies. […] So in that respect we do not control.[240]

Both empirically and theoretically there are many reasons to suggest that the informal power and status of UNMIL goes far beyond this formalised 'we do not take action' statement.[241] On the one hand, providing (or denying) support through logistics, monetary resources as well as technical and political know-how always includes a certain amount of influence on the content that is produced. Due to the complicated processes that accompany policymaking, development and security agendas in addition to applicability for international aid, international advisors often fill gaps in overstretched governmental ministries. 'What is planned as "doing *with*" ends up as "doing *for*"'.[242]

On the other hand, international interventions change existing socio-political power relationships through the act of intervention. Daxner *et al*. call this the creation of an 'intervention society' which consists of both 'intervening' and 'intervened' elements.[243] This does not mean that interventions always manage to shape governance processes and institutions according to their liberal intentions, objectives and instruments. However, at a minimum UN peacekeeping missions (as important part of an intervention) function as an important actor in the wider political framework of the intervention state. They hold their own political interests, objectives, resources and strategies, which do not necessarily match with those of 'local' actors.

Post-war intervention thus is about political negotiation, which very often leads to compromised results of policy initiatives that the interveners 'advise' the government to pursue.[244] Moreover, peacekeeping missions also often deal with multiple non-state actors, such as rebel groups, militias or civil society organisations that pursue even more diverse interests. Bøås, for example, examines the fight of international intervention against widespread corruption during the period after the 2003 peace agreement in Liberia in which a transitional government, including a wide range of former

[239] Barnett, 2006, Paris, 2004, Richmond, 2004.
[240] Interview 1F, UNMIL, 2010.
[241] see also Bøås, 2009, Neumann and Winckler, 2013, Wilén and Chapaux, 2011.
[242] Neumann and Winckler, 2013, p. 620.
[243] Daxner *et al.*, 2010, p. 10.
[244] Barnett and Zuercher, 2008, Riese, 2013, Zürcher et al., 2013.

rebel leaders under Gyude Bryant, was in power.[245] This government was a temporary power-sharing compromise between rebel leaders who perceived it as the 'last chance of enrichment' and gaining profit from the war they had fought. This led to the 'open mismanagement and theft of state resources' by government members.[246] To fight these corrupt practices and the misuse of international aid, the UN and international community imposed a trusteeship system in which important sources of public revenue, such as the port and airport in Monrovia, would be under international supervision as well as in key ministries.[247] This plan met government resistance as this undermined its interest in sharing the war revenue. Only under immense international political pressure did the government give in and signed a revised version of this plan – the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP).[248] Nevertheless, it remains unclear if this international action led to a significant decrease in corruption. As Bøås points out

> most ordinary Liberians are tired of corruption and corrupt leaders, but they also face this dilemma on a daily basis, as the culture of patrimonial exchange encompasses all aspects of life in Liberia. You cannot live and work in the country without being part of this system in one way or the other.[249]

Thus, the action of the international intervention, even with a strong tool such as international control over state revenue, encounters problems in reaching into the political reality and day-to-day life in Liberia. The intervention's actions are often based on its own system of programmatic self-reference. Consequently, they also lead to resistance of 'local' actors, compromising and obstructing the implementation of international initiatives as well as creating parallel informal social systems that provide basic services to those Liberians who are not reached by the formal system introduced and supported by the international intervention.[250]

The 'do not take action' statement of the senior UN official cited above can be seen as a self-protection 'shield' of the UN mission countering the political and social ambiguities in post-war countries such as Liberia. It is intended to uphold the formal integrity of the mission, managing expectations towards UNMIL (both local and abroad) as well as stressing the primary responsibility of the Liberian government that is (or should be) in control and taking action. Similarly, Anderson concludes that 'statebuilding intervention is undertaken in a manner that makes it difficult to

[245] Bøås, 2009. The transitional government was replaced following democratic elections in 2005 by the new government under President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf.
[246] Bøås, 2009, p. 1335.
[247] See also Dwan and Bailey, 2006.
[248] Anderson, 2010.
[249] Bøås, 2009, p. 1338, see also Anderson, 2010.
[250] Neumann and Winckler, 2013.

attribute responsibility for both success and failure', which leads to a 'contentious' relationship between government and intervention:

> The fact that they [government and international intervention] are being held accountable through different mechanisms and systems thus provides each 'partner' with a clear interest in taking main credit for popular outcomes, while allocating blame for unpopular ones on 'the other'.[251]

Hence, beyond the official rhetoric of 'partnership', both the processes and outcomes of post-war reform efforts are subject to political interaction. Clearly, such an environment can also influence interaction processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. As Bøås observes, corruptive practices in Liberia not only altered the perception of international officials in just one year - from a sense of 'optimism and joy' that their work was helping Liberia recover from its civil war to 'bewilderment and frustration' at the behaviour of their Liberian interlocutors - but also changed the intervention agenda to 'taming' the 'Liberian culture of corruption'.[252]

In sum, the three levels of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy's organisational environment outlined above include multiple sources of ambiguity and contingency. In order to pursue its organisational interest and objectives, it is confronted by and deals with national interests and suspicion among member states in the Security Council; competition with other organisational actors even within the broader context of the UN system; and the political negotiation and interaction with 'local' actors within post-war states that often pursue different agendas than the social change proposals introduced by the UN mission as an agent of the international post-war intervention. All these influences contribute to the decentralised outline of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, as the different environmental inputs can shape specific perspectives on peacekeeping. Based on this background, this thesis explores how organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy are managed under the conditions of such multilevel ambiguity and uncertainty.

3.3 The Civil War and UN Involvement in Liberia

The following section turns to Liberia, the substantive context of the case study examined by this thesis (UNMIL and DPKO). In the 1990s, Liberia produced vast images and stories of 'mankind at its lowest'.[253] Infamous accounts of child soldiers, a videotape showing the rebel leader Prince Johnson drinking beer while watching his men cut off President Samuel Doe's ears, and tales of a warlord who

[251] Anderson, 2010, p. 148.
[252] Bøås, 2009, pp. 1335-1336.
[253] Bøås, 1997, p. 354.

always killed a child and drank its blood before going to battle seem only the tip of the iceberg.[254] Fourteen years of violent conflict and civil war resulted in over 250,000 deaths and millions of internally displaced people and refugees.[255] It left 'almost every single piece of institution and infrastructure broken or bent'.[256] The civil war in Liberia has multiple dimensions. Its causes, drivers and consequences, both for Liberia as well as for West African region, are well documented and analysed.[257] The purpose of the following section is to give a brief overview of this war in order to understand the background of UN peacekeeping's specific engagement in Liberia.

3.3.1 Liberia and its 14 Years of Civil War

Liberia is a small country in West Africa, which inherits an extraordinary diversity of indigenous languages and local customs.[258] Around 16 'tribal' groups have been identified by anthropologists, describing 'rough approximations of regional and sometimes religious identity'.[259] In the early nineteenth century the territory was purchased by the American Colonization Society as a place for resettling freed slaves in Africa. These settlers founded the state of Liberia as an independent republic in 1847 with a constitution based on the American role model.[260] From the beginning this political system entrenched a large divide between settlers and the indigenous people and communities. The small Americo-Liberian elite governed the country by separating 'civilised' settlers from 'natives' and through a system of centralised control and oppression.[261] The 'natives' were systemically excluded from any substantial participation in national politics and economy.[262] Wealth and public resources served the interests of the 'settler oligarchy' which also managed to oppress any rebellions through centralised rule, distortion of local structures and violence.[263] Even though in the twentieth century several efforts were made to integrate the local population of the 'Hinterland', this 'oligarchy' dominated Liberia until the coup d'état of 1980 (see below). Moreover, the arrival of international extractive companies after the Second World War and the resulting industrial extraction of natural resources increased the nepotism of the Americo-Liberian regime. In particular, under the Presidency of Tubman (1944-1971) oppression and ruthless displays of violence against political opposition accelerated.[264]

[254] See for example Hoffmann, 2011, Williams, 2002.
[255] ICG, 2004.
[256] Bøås, 2009, p. 1329.
[257] See for example Adebajo, 2002, Levitt, 2005, Omeje, 2009b.
[258] For a map of contemporary Liberia, see UN, 2014a. This map is also included in Appendix E.
[259] Moran, 2008, p. 4.
[260] Levitt, 2005, p. 89.
[261] Neumann, 2013, p. 176.
[262] Dalton, 1965.
[263] Levitt, 2005, Neumann, 2013, pp. 168-194.
[264] Bøås, 1997, pp. 368-370.

In 1980 a group of low ranking indigenous army officers managed to stage a coup against the ruling President Tolbert and overthrew the Americo-Liberian regime. Samuel Doe, the highest ranking officer (a master sergeant), became the new president.[265] At first this coup was well received by the population, appreciating the end of 158 years Americo-Liberian autocracy. However, it quickly became clear that even though the persons had changed, the type of regime under Doe remained very similar to the old one. Instead of building on the settler-native divide, Doe based his rule on his ethnic origins, establishing hegemony of the Krahn.[266] This ethnic segregation manifested itself in Doe's repression of an attempted coup in 1985 which led to drastic retaliation by the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia especially in Nimba County against Gio and Mano ethnic groups.[267] In the following years Doe maintained a system of nepotistic 'big-man' policies, with flourishing corruption that enriched him and a small communally-defined segment of Liberian society, combined with brutal force in the oppression of members of other tribes suspected to be enemies.

On Christmas Eve 1989 the rebel movement National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor crossed the border from Côte d'Ivoire into Nimba County aiming to overthrow Doe. Building on the animosities against Doe's regime, especially amongst Gio and Mano groups, this rebel movement rapidly emerged and by mid-1990 controlled a large proportion of the country as well as parts of the capital, Monrovia. Doe's position had become very weak and Taylor's military success was hindered only by a split in his rebel movement (Prince Johnson and his Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia/INPFL) and more significantly by the military intervention of a peacekeeping force from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group – ECOMOG). Taylor, fiercely opposing the Nigerian-led ECOMOG, engaged the intervening troops in heavy fighting but eventually ECOMOG managed to push the NPFL out of Monrovia.[268] In the subsequent battle of Monrovia, Prince Johnson's INPFL was able to capture and kill Doe. Hereafter, the warring parties increasingly split into various different factions. A chaotic and brutal war of ethnically-defined militia groups emerged.[269]

Several international attempts to reach a ceasefire and stop the fighting failed. After the Contonou agreement was signed in 1993, the United Nations joined ECOMOG with a peacekeeping observer mission named United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). However, all international efforts to broker a lasting peace agreement failed until the 'revised Abuja accords' which were signed

[265] Levitt, 2005, pp. 194-197.
[266] Bøås, 1997, pp. 371-374.
[267] Neumann, 2013, p. 194, Saye, 2009, p. 35. An estimated 3,000 Mano and Gio were killed and many fled to Côte d'Ivoire.
[268] Adibe, 1997, pp. 475-476.
[269] Bøås, 1997.

by all relevant actors 1996 in Accra.[270] This agreement laid out plans for demobilisation and disarmament of combatants as well as general elections. Under the auspices of UNOMIL and ECOMOG, elections were held in July 1997 and overwhelmingly won by Charles Taylor.

After Taylor took office, UNOMIL was declared a success and replaced by a small peacebuilding office.[271] However, Taylor's presidency 'became indirectly a continuation of the war […] ruined by despotism, brigandage and perpetuation of underground war economies'.[272] Just two years after Taylor assumed office new rebel movements emerged and challenged his rule. At the same time, ECOMOG concluded its withdrawal from Liberia.[273] A new round of civil war escalated and by 2003 a rebel group named LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy) sieged Monrovia, while a further rebel militia, MODEL (Movement for Democracy in Liberia), opened a second front from the South East and managed to capture the important port city of Buchanan.[274] Under such severe military pressure and brokered by the diplomatic efforts of ECOWAS and other international actors (especially the United States), Taylor resigned office and was granted asylum in Nigeria.[275] This paved the way for a new Comprehensive Peace Agreement which was signed in Accra in August 2003. After ECOWAS had reinstated a new peacekeeping force on a temporary basis, the UN also decided to create a new multidimensional peacekeeping mission. In October 2003 the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) commenced, integrating the personnel and security functions of the ECOWAS peacekeepers. With a troop strength of up to 15,000 soldiers and a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIL is regarded as a 'robust mission'.[276] It continues to exist in reduced form today.

3.3.2 Functions, Development and Outline of UN Peacekeeping in Liberia

The structural outline and mandate of the two UN peacekeeping engagements in Liberia - first, the small observer mission (UNOMIL) and second, the large multidimensional peacekeeping mission (UNMIL) - is considerably different. UNOMIL was launched in the aftermath of the 'Agenda for Peace' and at the time declared a new model of peacekeeping. The major responsibility would lie in the hands of a regional organisation and its peacekeeping force (ECOMOG), whereas UNOMIL would only

[270] Adibe, 1997, p. 481.
[271] Paris, 2004, p. 93.
[272] Omeje, 2009a, p. 11.
[273] Levitt, 2005, p. 217.
[274] Levitt, 2005, p. 234.
[275] Taylor was arrested by Nigerian authorities in 2006 and handed over to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. See e.g. Timberg, 2006. In 2012, he was sentenced to 50 years in jail for his involvement in the civil war in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002. See e.g. BBC, 2012a.
[276] Aboagye and Bah, 2004, pp. 3-6.

monitor and verify the peace process, giving the ECOWAS intervention legitimacy in their actions.[277] Moreover, this intervention clearly sees free and fair elections as its linear objective.[278] This allows some involved persons to still perceive UNOMIL as a success, even though the electoral triumph of Charles Taylor clearly did not favour a sustainable peace in Liberia.[279]

UNMIL was created in the aftermath of the Brahimi report. Consequently, it is a strong mission compared with UNOMIL. At its peak deployment it incorporated up to 15,000 military troops (including military observers and staff officers), over 1,100 uniformed police officers, around 600 international civilian staff, and 300 international volunteers.[280] UNMIL's mandate and structural outline, which has only slightly changed since 2003, mirrors many aspects of the reform processes ongoing within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy at the time. Foremost stands a robust security agenda. UNMIL is equipped with a mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ensure security throughout the county. It is also tasked to protect civilians 'without prejudice to the efforts of the government'.[281] The focus on security also included security sector reform which initially particularly concentrated on the demobilisation and disarmament of armed groups and militias.[282] From the start, UNMIL focused on the reform and capacity building of the Liberian police force.[283] The United States subsequently took the lead in assisting with the reform and training of the Armed Forces of Liberia, hiring private military companies to implement the programme.[284]

Next to the broad field of security, the UNMIL mandate is directed towards statebuilding. UNMIL is mandated to support the government in re-establishing 'national authority throughout the country' and consolidating 'governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions', as well as assisting with national elections.[285] Contrary to UNOMIL, elections were not seen as the final objective but rather, mirroring the Brahimi report recommendations, as one step in building a democratic state.[286] The Brahimi report was also reflected in the prominent status of rule of law within the functional outline of UNMIL. Aiming at

[277] Macqueen, 2002, pp. 175-176.
[278] Paris, 2004, pp. 91-92.
[279] Eisele, 2000, p. 187.
[280] UN, 2003b, p. 3, 2004, p. 3, 2006a, p. 3. For a UNMIL deployment map of the year 2010 (start of my field research), see UN, 2010a, p. 82. This map is also included in appendix E.
[281] UN, 2003b, p. 4.
[282] See e.g. Aboagye and Rupiya, 2005, pp. 260-263, Nichols, 2005. For a critical view, see Jennings, 2007, Munive and Jakobsen, 2012.
[283] Aboagye and Rupiya, 2005, p. 262.
[284] See e.g. Malan, 2008. For a critical view on SSR in Liberia, see e.g. Bøås and Stig, 2010, Podder, 2013.
[285] UN, 2003b, p. 4. See also Anderson, 2010, p. 138.
[286] ICG, 2005. In the 2005 election Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf won and became the first female president in Africa. In 2011 the second national election was held (again won by Johnson-Sirleaf) which was widely regarded among international actors as an 'important test for Liberia's transition from civil war to democratic, constitutional government'. See n.a., 2011, p. 4.

integrating all UN system-wide efforts to strengthen rule of law in Liberia, it was recognised in a separate substantive pillar including UN police, corrections, legal and judicial systems, and human rights.[287]

Beyond the rule of law, UNMIL includes a second substantive pillar entitled Recovery and Governance (R&G) which comprises civil affairs, political affairs and recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration. Here, UNMIL also follows the reform directives of the time as the DSRSG of R&G is also the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC) heading the UN Country Team. As mentioned above, particularly in the initial phase of the mission, the integration of the 'humanitarian space' into the peacekeeping mission created huge conflicts between the different organisations involved. Nevertheless, since 2008 UNMIL has expanded the idea of 'integrated mission' in its presence in Liberia's counties. UNMIL maintains its presence throughout Liberia via 15 field offices (one in each county). These incorporate different branches of the headquarter sections, such as civil affairs, human rights, UN police, justice and legal system support. Before 2008 these sections worked separately for the different supervisors in Monrovia without any formal position directly coordinating them in the field. In 2008, the mission leadership reformed this field structure and created the position of Head of Field Office (HOFO) who, as the highest representative of the SRSG in the country, oversees and coordinates also the activities of UN agencies in the field.[288]

From its ambition, mandate and functional outline, UNMIL is recognisable as a post-Brahimi reform multidimensional peacekeeping mission in which, especially compared with UNOMIL, a range of new and adapted measures were implemented. Benner *et al*. call UNMIL a '"must win" case for the UN', a test ground for integration, and more holistic and systemic approaches to state and institution-building.[289] However, similar to the functional differentiation of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy at headquarter level, the structural outline of UNMIL described above does not allow for any conclusions on the interaction processes within the organisation which fill the structures and formal procedures with meaning. Hence, its structural outline again can only serve as a starting point for the further exploration of UNMIL in connection with DPKO as a case study representing UN peacekeeping as organisational action.

[287] See Blume, 2008. The functional outline changed slightly over time. At the onset, UNMIL's rule of law pillar was named 'Rule of Law and Operations' and included the Civil Affairs Section and Electoral Advisory Unit, see UN, 2004, p. 40. By 2006, and after the elections in 2005, the electoral advisory unit was dissolved and the Civil Affairs Section was transferred to the second substantive pillar of UNMIL, Recovery and Governance, see UN, 2006a, p. 53.
[288] UN, 2008b.
[289] See Benner et al., 2011, p. 24: 'If the UN's idea of multidimensional peace operations comprising peacekeeping and peacebuilding elements could succeed anywhere, it would have to succeed in Liberia.'

3.4 Summary

This chapter has provided three important background aspects: firstly, it observed the development of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy after the end of the Cold War by examining its quantitative expansion as well as increasing the qualitative breadth of UN peacekeeping. Based on the discussion of major turning points and reform initiatives of UN peacekeeping (especially its crisis at the end of the 1990s and the reform processes initiated by the Brahimi report), the development and differentiation of the functional structure of its headquarters are outlined here. Secondly, this chapter has portrayed UN peacekeeping bureaucracy as a multi-level organisation which engages in multiple environments that can influence its internal organisational processes in various ways. The assessment in this chapter concentrated on three levels: firstly, the dealings with UN member states in the Security Council and General Assembly; secondly, competition (and integration) with other international organisations involved in post-war recovery; and thirdly, political interaction with various 'local' actors in post-war countries. The third background aspect introduced in this chapter is the specific background to the case study examined in this thesis, UNMIL/DPKO. This included a brief historical overview of the civil war in Liberia in addition to the different stages of the UN's involvement in establishing and keeping peace. Moreover, it also outlined UNMIL's functional and substantive composition. This multi-layered background serves as a starting point for the further analysis of UN peacekeeping as organisational action. It also helps to contextualise these separate results and to draw general conclusions on the results of the three articles cumulated in this thesis.

In the next part of this thesis presents the three articles. Article 1 (chapter 4) turns to the theoretical exploration of UN peacekeeping as organisational action, developing a framework of analysis for further empirical research. The chapters 5 and 6 present articles 2 and 3, which concentrate on different aspects of the qualitative UNMIL/DPKO case study. Article 2 (chapter 5) identifies two general strategies which UN officials use to influence peacekeeping activities, and discusses their implementation at different levels and locations of UNMIL and DPKO. Article 3 (chapter 6) explores the differences between UNMIL's mission perspective, operating in the political environment of post-war Liberia, and DPKO's headquarters perspective which is directed towards international politics and the dealings with UN member states in the Security Council and General Assembly. As all three articles stand as independent scientific contributions with their own findings and conclusions, they are also individually integrated as separate chapters in the following part of this thesis. At the end of this thesis, a third part rounds up the separate article results and discusses overall lines of arguments, generalisations and conclusions.

Part II ARTICLES

4 ARTICLE 1 – MANAGING THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTERVENTION: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS AS ORGANISATIONAL ACTION

The following chapter has been previously published as an article in the Journal *Peace, Conflict and Development*, *18, pp. 83-103*.

Abstract: This article assesses a major gap in the literature on UN peace operations in post-war situations, which may be described as the 'organisation of intervention'. Research has extensively pointed at the UN's failure to achieve its own objectives and operationally reach its own standards of interventions. However, there has been very little consideration of the means of the UN as a bureaucratic organisation, which manages and copes with these ambiguities and failures of intervention. This article theoretically explores the organisational conditions and processes through which UN officials manage the gaps between aims and achievements of UN peace operations as an integral part of their daily work. The goal is to develop a theoretical framework to analyse the internal organisational rules and procedures of the UN, which enable as well as affect the daily management and routine of peace operations in interaction with its environment. For this purpose, the article includes approaches of organisational sociology to understand UN peacekeeping and draws on empirical illustrations to clarify propositions for further research.

Keywords: United Nations; Peacekeeping; Post-War; Bureaucracy; International Organisation.

4.1 Introduction

Looking back, the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) Ban Ki-Moon might have good reasons to resume two decades of peace operations with mixed feelings and judgments. On the one hand, the UN administration has emerged as the prominent agent of peace operations. Since the end of the 1990s UN peace operations in fact have been rapidly expanding in number, size, budget as well as responsibilities.[290] Moreover, the UN administration has widely been credited for creating

[290] Benner et al., 2011.

and sustaining stability in countries emerging from turmoil and war.[291] Thus up to the present day, the UN administration is called to lead, organise and conduct multiple peace operations around the world. UN peacekeeping seems to be one of the prominent responses to violent conflict. Institutionalised as a standard procedure of global politics, it is the first choice of many states to respond to war and civil conflict – if they respond at all.

On the other hand, the UN administration constantly seems to fail according to its own objectives and the norms and values it seems to produce and impose on others. UN peace operations inherently include normative aspects of security, welfare and participation.[292] A democratic state and market economy are the declared programmatic pillars of sustainable reconstruction and post-war recovery.[293] Evaluations of UN peace operations, however, have pointed out the lack of democratic and economic sustainability.[294] Very often, the outcome is some type of autocratic regime rather than a democratic state.[295] This might stabilise the security situation of the country, but according to the programmatic design of peace operations it undermines the sustainability of the peace process. Debrix even goes further with his critique by stating that 'the more the UN tries, the less it achieves.' The UN reveals 'its basic (empty) formalism' even more in a time, in which it 'is primed to take the lead and direct humankind toward peace and harmony.'[296] In conclusion, norms and values remain a 'façade', a 'logocentrism' or a 'building' to be looked at by tourists from the outside.

The critique on UN peace operations may be illustrated and widened by taking a close look at a photo (see Figure 7) published by the UN in 2009.[297] The picture shows an Afghan woman from above in a polling booth, holding what seems to be her identity card in one hand and using the pen to put a cross on the ballot with the other. At first, this of course is a public relations error. The UN should not publish a photo of a person with her identity card just ready to vote in a polling booth in an election supported by the UN Mission in Afghanistan, which is supposed to be free and fair. However, there is more to this photo than a publication faux pas, especially because, based on the principles of democratic vote propagated by the UN, *this photo should never have been taken*. The secrecy of the ballot is one of the main principles of free and fair elections. If a UN photographer is allowed to take a picture of a person in a polling booth, it both eradicates the sense of the polling booth and undermines the principle of free and fair elections. In this case, the UN cannot even pretend to support free and fair elections as a measure for sustainable peace, revealing cracks even

[291] Dobbins et al., 2005, Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Fortna, 2004, 2008.
[292] Krause and Jütersonke, 2005, Schwarz, 2005.
[293] Ottaway, 2002, Paris, 2002, Richmond, 2004.
[294] Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, Paris, 2004.
[295] Zuercher, 2006.
[296] Debrix, 1999, p. 6.
[297] UN, 2009d, p. 61.

Figure 7: UN Photo by Tim Page Entitled 'An Afghan citizen votes in the country's presidential and provincial council elections, Herat, Afghanistan. 20 August 2009' (Source: UN, 2009d, p. 61)

in the façade of UN's norms and values. Thus, formalism prevailed, as the UN helped the Afghan people conduct elections, but this UN photographer did not even care about the intimacy of the polling booth. If the UN photographer would have taken pictures of an election in his own country (United Kingdom), he would either have never thought of taking a photo from the inside of the polling booth, or in the worst case scenario this would have been prevented by security, observers or the voter himself. Thus, the question here not only is why the UN photographer was allowed to do this in an UN supported election in Afghanistan. It also raises the question why the UN photographer even thought to be permitted to do so, knowing that this undermines the intimacy of the involved voter.

This photo is of course only an illustrative feature and provides no grounds for any general conclusions. But it points to a major gap in the literature on peace operations of the past two decades, which has predominantly been focussed on the normative and operational feasibility of peace operations. Evaluations and studies have pointed to the achievements of UN peace operations. They have also identified gaps, failures and dilemmas of peacekeeping endeavours. But they have often failed to include an analysis of the process, which emerges on the basis of foreign intervention in a post-war society, as well as the bureaucratic structures that are the basis of the UN's engagement in the highly complex process of post-war recovery. It is the UN bureaucracy that makes peacekeeping interventions work. Moreover, as UN peace operations have consequences for

the country intervened, it in return also produces consequences for the UN as the organisation that intervenes. It is the organisation of intervention that gives UN officials the administrative backing to support the Afghan government to organise the elections. However, it is also the organisation of intervention that gives the photographer the opportunity and legitimacy to take a photo of an Afghan woman inside of a polling booth. In other words, it is the organisation of intervention, which copes with and manages the gap between the normative aspirations of the façade and the achievements in the field.

The purpose of this article is to theoretically explore the organisational conditions, routines and procedures, through which processes and dilemmas of UN peace operations are managed in the daily work of UN officials.[298] The goal is to develop a theoretical framework of analysis of the internal organisational processes of the UN that affect the daily management and routine of peace operations in action. Thus this work neither concentrates on the programmatic measures of peacekeeping nor does it measure their success or failure. Rather this article focuses on the organisational structures which serve as the basis and boundaries of the implementation of peacekeeping. The UN is studied as a bureaucracy, which inherently includes not only formal hierarchy but also horizontal forms of authority and control. This paper argues that two basic theoretical stances drawn from organisational sociology may help to understand the organisational dilemmas of peace operations in their daily work: the first is the concept of coupling, which refers to the differing quality of lines interconnecting different segments and dimensions of organisation; the second is the organisation of communication, which refers to how information is transferred, processed and transformed to knowledge and organisational memory. Both stances are in many ways interconnected, but they also serve as distinct sets of conditions of organisational management and daily working life. This paper argues that observing the nexus between these two sets of conditions provides the analytical basis to generate an understanding of the processes and mechanisms, which bridge the inherent dilemmas and paradoxes of daily work in UN peace operations.

4.2 The UN as an International Organisation and Bureaucracy in Action

Perhaps due to its linkages to the discipline of International Relations (IR), up to this day the literature on international peace operations has very rarely opened the 'black box' of the UN as the major organisation that conducts interventions. There is not much literature on how the UN manages

[298] The theoretical argument is supported by empirical illustrations that are based on primary UN documents, several background discussions with former high-level UN officials and field research in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in New York conducted in 2010.

peace operations and on the organisational dynamics in which these post-war interventions are embedded. Within IR theory, the UN and its sub-organisations have usually been studied as international organisations that in the common line of interpretation serve as a 'structure of rules, principles, norms and decision-making procedures through which others, usually states, act'.[299] As the UN is not accounted to be a self-referential autonomous agency under the assumption that it would act according to the will of states, there was no need to learn about the way the UN as an organisation behaved. More recent research has started to take a closer look at the functions and behaviour of international organisations such as the UN. These approaches include publications from an IR perspective[300] as well as studies from administrative science[301] or ethnographic and sociological approaches.[302] Much of this work is based on different theories, concepts and models of organisational sociology.[303] The advantage of these approaches is that it enables a differential picture of what and how the UN actually does, rather than merely focussing either on the normative framework or the functional input and outcome.

The UN includes an international framework, which consists of a set of legalised rules and norms that protect individual states (and in some cases also the rights of individuals) and are practiced by the states within the intergovernmental organs such as the Security Council and the General Assembly.[304] It, however, also exists as a bureaucratic organisation, which by definition exercises authority on the basis of rules and the collection and specification of knowledge.[305] Campbell rightly points out that both components are 'conceptually separate, but operationally interdependent'.[306] The point here is that in order to generate an understanding of how UN officials cope with and manage the dilemmas and paradoxes in their daily action, it is essential to understand the organisational dynamics that bridge the spheres of international and bureaucratic politics. The argument of this paper is essentially based on two basic organisational spheres: coupling and communication. Both will be introduced and discussed in detail below after specifying the concept of bureaucracy used in this paper.

To discuss the UN as a bureaucratic organisation requires some specification of the term bureaucracy. One can basically follow Barnett and Finnemore, who summarise the function of bureaucratic organisations as follows:

[299] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 2.
[300] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, Benner et al., 2011.
[301] Seibel et al., 2008.
[302] Bonacker et al., 2010, Rubinstein, 2008, Schlichte and Veit, 2007.
[303] Lipson, 2007, Paris, 2008 Herrhausen, 2007.
[304] Gareis and Varwick, 2006.
[305] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004.
[306] Campbell, 2008, p. 559.

> Bureaucracy breaks down problems into manageable and repetitive tasks that are assigned to particular offices and then coordinated under hierarchical command.[307]

In the classical Weberian interpretation these processes of categorisation and specialisation of knowledge are strictly formalised and practiced in a closed hierarchy – a fact that makes Max Weber conclude that bureaucracy is the most effective and rational form of administration.[308] More recent accounts on bureaucratic organisations have pointed out the implications of formalism and informalism for day-to-day work processes,[309] as well as the importance of organisational survival, which provides a framework for appropriate decision-making.[310] Generally the literature pays high attention on information and knowledge as a substantial part of bureaucratic organisation, as it is the basis of its power and authority and therefore vital for its action within its organisational environment. Bureaucratic solutions to complex problems generate information and knowledge that are selected, processed and saved within the organisation itself.[311] Solutions thus become rules and routines, standardised as operation procedures, institutionalised within the organisational setting and culture, reflected by and included in an organisational scheme of interpretation, identity and knowledge.[312]

Weick characterises daily organisational life as organised through the continuous process of connecting interaction with reasonable consequences.[313] Through this conduct routines emerge and are sustained on the basis and within the structural rules and resources. It is a communicative process between constituent actors who reflexively monitor routine interaction whilst reproducing their 'mutually linked role relationships'.[314] Organisations create (and are created as) conditions to control the reflexive reproduction of relationships and practices. These govern and control the conduct and spread of information and their influence on the day to day practices of actors, and vice versa. In other words, the role of an actor within an organisation is not only determined by prescription, but also by the way s/he performs and realises the prescription in his/her daily work. It also depends on the power and measures s/he has to fill the gap between the prescribed role and the way s/he is performing – or the way s/he is supposed to perform in relation to other actors both within the organisation and its environment. This performance may be highly dependent on the current situation; however, as moral authority and prescriptions of standards may be important for

[307] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 18.
[308] Weber, 1978.
[309] Beetham, 1987.
[310] March and Simon, 1958.
[311] Elwert, 2000, Luhmann, 2006.
[312] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, Douglas, 1987, March and Olsen, 1989, Powell and DiMaggio, 1991.
[313] Weick, 1985.
[314] Giddens, 2009, pp. 199-200.

the independence and power of the organisation, the actor may be required to respond to these standards even though his/her performance may vary.

The essence of this is rather simple: organisational actors always have a dual responsibility towards the client as well as the organisation. A UN official in the field might (or even is bound to) find the tools provided by the organisation ineffective whilst considering the interest and preferences of local actors. The solution for such problems is to find a compromise, not only towards the situation and actors UN officials are confronted with in the local context of their work,[315] but also towards the organisational context that provides the constitutive basis of their officialdom. In practical terms, within the organisational context, this for example might mean a decrease of resources and jobs.[316] Thus, organisational actors in their daily work are confronted with rules, which govern their sphere of action, provide definitions of efficiency, supply paths to reach the goal, and set standards of accountability. But they also have to be responsive to unintended consequences of their actions and are influenced by contingent effects and ambiguous environments. Organisational action thus routinely combines the search for predictability through reduction of uncertainty and the interdependency of a system with its environment under conditions of high complexity. This is achieved by the goal of 'satisfactory accomplishment' rather than maximising efficiency,[317] which itself is based on organisational rules and procedures that guide the constant and routine 'muddling through' of organisational actors.[318]

4.3 The UN and its Peace Operations as Loosely Coupled Systems

In the course of this debate, the notion of 'loosely coupled systems', most prominently introduced by Weick,[319] seems highly useful as a basis for understanding the organisational dynamics of the UN and its peace operations. A 'loosely coupled system' generally refers to an image which Orton and Weick call 'dialectical', as it allows research to include both closed (i.e. technical and rational) and open (i.e.

[315] Barnett and Zuercher, 2008.
[316] In a background discussion conducted in 2010, a former Chief of Staff in a UN peacekeeping mission referred to a situation in which the demobilisation and demilitarisation of former combatants didn't work on the basis of lack of confidence by the former combatant groups. After a year, the progress report pursued an extension of the mandate with the same amount of resources without being able to show any concrete results. This was rejected by the Chief of Staff, arguing that it would not be possible to receive these resources on the basis of the progress of the programme in the responsible Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The result was a significant reduction of resources and size of the programme, resulting both from the lack of cooperation by the clients and the inability of the organisational actors to refer to the progress of the programme according to the standards, which would allow for an extension on a similar scale. See Background Discussion A, former senior UN official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[317] Thompson, 1967, p. 9.
[318] Lindblom, 1959, March and Simon, 1958.
[319] Weick, 1976.

environmentally interdependent) variables into an analysis of an organisation.[320] In order to applythis approach to the UN and its peace operations, the main characteristics of loosely coupled systems will be clarified below in detail.

The main feature of tightly coupled elements is 'responsiveness'. Thompson points out, that organisations include a core technology, which as an idea or abstraction refers to a closed-system logic and consists of rationally tightly coupled elements or a chain of causal events.[321] The type of technology does vary. Moreover, it is not supposed to be perfect (although the organisation might seek perfection). It may even be ambiguous in itself – or especially in comparison to environmental influences.[322] But it does include operating standards, which technically are responsive to each other and provide actors with answers to solve specific problems, organisational stability and predictability towards environmental events and influences. Therefore, organisations protect their core technologies from exogenous influences.[323] On the other side, the crucial characteristic of de-coupled elements is 'distinctiveness'.[324] Technology only becomes action if they are applied to a social surrounding. Thereby, organisations always face problems, for which there is no solution provided by its technologies. Organisational action thus is the translation of standard procedures to environmental circumstances of implementation. This requires a certain amount of flexibility to meet environmental uncertainty. Organisations might act highly (inter-)dependently from environmental influence, trying to create meaning and/or legitimacy for their problem solutions at an institutional level.[325] Internal fragmentation, competing and ambiguous technical solutions, and lack of personal overview over internal organisational complexity might require flexible managerial solutions.[326] In fact, the management and administration of a complex organisation is perhaps the level, in which open and closed system logics meet most clearly, as here not only the resources are acquired as input for organisational action, but also the output and feedback is controlled. The administrative process holds together multiple streams of organisational action crosscutting formal hierarchies and networks, and interlinking environmental and internal demands of efficiency and accountability.[327] This requires both flexibility and predictability. The main feature of a loosely coupled system thus is the connection of both distinctiveness and responsiveness.[328]

[320] Orton and Weick, 1990, p. 205.
[321] Thompson, 1967.
[322] March and Olsen, 1976b.
[323] Thompson, 1967, pp. 18-19.
[324] Orton and Weick, 1990, pp. 203-205.
[325] March and Olsen, 1989, pp. 46-47, Meyer and Rowan, 1991.
[326] Orton and Weick, 1990, pp. 206-207.
[327] Thompson, 1967, p. cp 11.
[328] Orton and Weick, 1990, p. 205.

The conceptual openness of the loosely coupled system approach surely is both its strength and weakness. It is an inclusive concept, which comprises various competing accounts on bureaucratic organisations.[329] Its conceptual weakness is its vagueness as it tries to include much and concretises very little. The concept of loosely coupled system thus cannot stand alone as a feature, which qualifies an organisation. It rather lays the basis for a more detailed discussion on organisational structure, its creation and processes. In Orton and Weick's words, 'loose coupling may lead researchers to study structure as something that organisation do, rather than merely as something they have.'[330] From such a perspective, the crucial feature of a loosely coupled system is not the coupling as such, but rather the quantity and quality of managerial interventions, which stretch vertical and horizontal lines of organisational control between elements and events,[331] make outcomes and changes mismatch the initial intention,[332] produces and reproduces rules, practices and relationships,[333] locates and transforms the selective storage of information and knowledge,[334] and compensates for the lack of organisational adaptation to external requirements.[335]

If UN peace operations are considered as a loosely coupled system, the discussion above gives answers to the problem explored in this paper on a relatively high level of abstraction. UN peace operations are a distinct organisational entity which are founded under the umbrella of the 'UN family', supported and connected by numerous departments and sub-organisations which offer specific technology, advice and/or staff for its operation in the field. The UN mission moreover formally holds a high degree of delegated authority and autonomy to transfer these technologies into field action.[336] Beyond the UN structure, the loosely coupled systems approach however enables a broad perspective on the communicative processes, which are the foundation of day-to-day life within an organisation. These, however, are specified and organised within the setting of an organisation as interplay between formal and informal communication structures.[337] As there may be both formal and informal tight and loose couplings within every element or level of an organisation, the relationship between different communication structures have to be considered as a second major factor, which crosscuts the different forms and levels of organisational coupling as well as sets conditions for managing conceptual and practical inconsistencies and uncertainty in daily

[329] For an overview see Orton and Weick, 1990.
[330] Orton and Weick, 1990, p. 218.
[331] Orton and Weick, 1990, Weick, 1976.
[332] Brunsson and Olsen, 1993, March, 1994.
[333] Giddens, 2009.
[334] Luhmann, 2006.
[335] March and Olsen, 1989, Powell and DiMaggio, 1991.
[336] Campbell, 2008, Herrhausen, 2007.
[337] Beetham, 1987, p. 19.

organisational life. In the following section, the different communication structures will be considered in more detail.

4.4 The Organisation of Communication

The term 'communication' refers not only to the mere transfer of information, but also to the self-referential process of creating and sustaining meaning and knowledge. It is the basis of decision-making and interaction as well as of organisational programme and action. In other words, communication is the medium of organisational reproduction, bridging gaps of achievements and action and referentially linking knowledge, practices and interactions.[338] Communications are processed vertically along the lines of hierarchical control[339] as well as horizontally through coordination and social control.[340] Both forms of organisation require two basic sets of competence: firstly, the authority and ability to issue directives; and secondly, the professional competence and specialised expertise in the field of action.[341] Both sets of competencies are a product of internal and external education and training, as personnel is chosen according to both their educational and professional experiences, which are constantly developed on the basis of the internal standards of operation. The nexus between communication processes and the different competencies constitute the level and quality of complexity of an organisation in reflection and demarcation to its environment. Luhmann terms this process an 'operational closure', through which an organisation tries to gain control over the complexity of its structure and endeavour.[342] Information and knowledge thus not only have to be processed and stored, but also adulterated and forgotten. Therefore an organisation forms a memory, located within the processes of decision-making and pre-decision organisational activity.

An organisation thus organises its communications in a way that leads to and controls both memory and oblivion. What, however, does this mean for the day to day life of members of the organisation? How do they participate within these organisational processes? Where do they receive the information and knowledge they need to fulfil their tasks? Generally one may assume that organisations as well as its personnel depend on information which can be considered as 'realistic'. This is even more so the case in situations that are volatile and uncertain such as a post-war setting, in which coercive and military means may be necessary. 'Realistic information', which refers not only to the transfer of information but also its interpretation according to the situational challenges, may

[338] For an overview see Theis, 1994.
[339] Beetham, 1987, Benveniste, 1991.
[340] Brown and Duguid, 2001, Ouchi, 1980, Powell, 1990.
[341] Luhmann, 2006, pp. 312-313.
[342] Luhmann, 2006, p. 315.

be the basis to save the life of the organisational personnel as well as clients and persons in the local environment it is directly involved in.[343] However, realistic information is potentially something unpleasant for the person (or organisational unit) that is reporting,[344] as it may contradict with the organisational rules and standards or on a lower scale of abstraction may also undermine the goals of persons or units at a higher hierarchical level. Thus, the organisation of communication relies on two major assets: firstly the confidence and reliability of the personnel involved to report realistic information; and secondly different channels through which this information can be processed, selected and distributed.[345]

Here, organisational sociology generally refers to the differentiation between formal and informal organisation of communication structures. The former refers to the formally established bureaucratic procedures within hierarchical administrative systems. This form of organisational self-information

Figure 8: Formal Reporting Lines between UN Mission and Headquarter (Source: UN, 2009c, p. 7)



Abbreviations: OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; PBSO, Peacebuilding Support Office; DPA, Department of Political Affairs; DPKO, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DFS, Department of Field Support; DM, Department of Management; DSS, Department of Safety and Security; OLA, Office of Legal Affairs; DPI, Department of Public Information; UNLB, United Nations Logistics Base; USG, Under-Secretary-General.
Note: The Office of Information and Communications Technology was created in December 2008 as an independent office within the Secretariat.

[343] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, pp. 121-155.
[344] Elwert, 2000, p. 72.
[345] Elwert, 2000, Hüsken, 2006.

makes transfer of information and its potential uncertainties a duty. However, formal communication procedures may also signify an efficient and accountable way of processing problems to the outside public. This means that the formal reporting structures might meet environmental requirements, e.g. of efficiency and accountability, rather than the demands of the functions of the organisation in action.[346] This controversy may be illustrated by a brief look at the formally fixed and regulated reporting schemes of the UN and its peace operations. Within its hierarchical system, every post, office or job formally exists within a clearly defined line of reporting. These reporting lines enable an overview of the organisation in form of an organogram, such as shown in figure 8.

Figure 8 shows the broad organisational setting, in which peacekeeping missions are embedded. Next to lines of coordination with other departments which are programmatically and/or actively involved in peace operations, UN peacekeeping missions are formally embedded in a line of reporting – from the Head of Mission (HoM)[347] to the UN Secretary General (SG) through the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This reporting line includes political and administrative responsibilities in reflection of the international mandate given by the Security Council. Thus, the HoM is the position through which formally all reports and information flows before it passes on to the headquarters.[348] The reporting line here thus clarifies the hierarchical line of control rather than the practice of organisational communication. Zooming into such an organogram on a more detailed level, one can observe that every office, post or position in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is connected to formal reporting lines and thus embedded in this hierarchical system. An organogram thus gives an impression of formal assigned authority. However, it does not give any information about the use of communication channels assigned to the formal lines of reporting. Here, a brief illustration of the formal communication and reporting channels between UN headquarter and mission can be instructive. There are at least five types of reporting procedures:

Situation Report (SITREP): There are several variations of these SITREPs according to their frequency (there are daily, weekly and monthly that all produce certain differences of reporting) as well as their level of formality (distinction between formal and technical reporting).[349] UN officials judge the use

[346] Meyer and Rowan, 1991.
[347] In most peacekeeping missions the HoM is a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who formally is on the same hierarchical level as a USG.
[348] Background Discussion A, former senior UN official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[349] Every section of a mission prepares a daily report, which is normally processed by the Joint Operations Centre (JOC) of the mission into a SITREP (3-4 pages), which is then cleared by the office of the HoM before it is sent to New York. At the same time, the sections also feed their 'technical reporting lines' (illustrated as dotted arrows in figure 2) to the specific sections in New York with a separate and more detailed SITREP. See e.g. Interview 1F, UNMIL, 2010, Interview 1G, UNMIL, 2010, Interview 1H, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1I, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010 and Background Discussion B, UNMIL official, 2010.

and value of this reporting channel differently. On the one hand, many officers in middle management of DPKO in New York perceive the SITREPs generally useful to stay informed.[350] On the other hand, a former SRSG acknowledged that at least the daily reporting was more a burden of duty than a productive inducement of work, based on the impression that nobody in headquarters was really interested in reading these reports.[351]

Code Cable: This is not a normal bureaucratic communication instrument, but a means of diplomacy to issue politically motivated notices. As Code Cables are used very similarly between DPKO and Missions, they always have to be signed by the USG (DPKO) or the HoM. The relevance and importance of this communication tool is very high, as they often include highly controversial and politically delicate information.[352]

The biannual *Report of the Secretary General* to the Security Council: These reports are highly elaborated diplomatic documents. They include aspects and passages of all mission components, whereas the coordination and finalisation are tasks of the Office of Operations (OO) in DPKO. It is generally described as a highly difficult process to manage and can lead to severe conflicts between OO and a mission. It is however a highly important reporting tool, as it is the reference document of the mission towards the Security Council and thus the basis for the extension of a mission's mandate. Moreover, it is the only reference document that is publically accessible.[353]

Special reports to intergovernmental organs of the UN (through the Secretary General) concerning specific issues (such as gender, child poverty, HIV): In the judgment of former high-ranking UN officials, who served in several peacekeeping missions, these reports have least importance. They would often be considered a burden of duty, drawing resources from the mission without having a significant impact on decision-making, both within the UN bureaucracy and its intergovernmental organs.[354]

Best practices, evaluation and knowledge management: The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section in DPKO collects and summarises reports on experiences in the field and publishes them in generalised form of best practices papers, handbooks, guidance materials or thematic issues. This communication tool seems to be of use especially for young professionals seeking advice on how to act in extreme situations. Experienced UN officials, however, perceive this standardisation of

[350] See e.g. Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1L, DPKO, 2010.
[351] Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[352] Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1M, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1N, DPKO, 2010, and Background Discussion A, former senior UN official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010, Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[353] Interview 1L, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 1P, DPKO, 2010.
[354] Background Discussion A, former senior UN official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010, Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.

practices also as a threat for their own flexibility and autonomy and therefore consider it to be of very little relevance as a source of information and knowledge.[355]

In sum, the relevance of the formally fixed channels for the day-to-day work of UN officials seems to vary greatly depending on the rank and routine of the individual. However, the information seems to be especially important to signify and reproduce the UN and its peace operations as a specific organisational hierarchy and design. Formal reporting procedures are often reference tools of the mission to the UN headquarters and the member states of the UN, thus functioning as an important basis of their persistence and recognition.

This leads to the second general form of communication, which is referred to as informal. In fact, one may assume that no formal communication procedure is processed without some sort of informal handling. To judge the importance or triviality of the daily code cables requires some informal knowledge about the resonance they have at headquarters. To know what and how information has to be included in the regular reports to the Security Council in order to be diplomatically balanced requires informal knowledge of the political demands concerning the report. Formal communication lines are effectively shortened by informal exchange of information, e.g. by asking to change a paragraph before submitting the report rather than sending it back for review. This, of course, also includes an intervention in the content of the report according to the requirement of what is supposed to be the content of reporting.

Informal communication is an important source of self-information, not only for each person involved, but also for the organisation with regard to its ability to secure its traditions and induce innovations simultaneously. Elwert characterises informal communication structures as *Gabenökonomie*, which roughly may be translated as an economy of gift exchange.[356] Information and knowledge is one type of gift as well as trust, critique, praise or share of responsibility. The exchange of gifts here is not automatically corruption (even though it may take forms of patronage or similar forms). It is a basic and normal requirement of successful day-to-day work to judge and act according to trustworthy guidance. Where formal communication makes the transfer of information and knowledge a duty, informal communication builds on mutual interpersonal confidence as the basis for understanding. As 'realistic' information is something potentially unpleasant to be reported, not only the individual but also the organisation depends on the informal exchange of information

[355] See e.g. Interview 1M, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 1Q, DPKO, 2010 as well as Background Discussion A, former senior UN official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010, Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[356] Elwert, 2000.

that crosscuts hierarchical levels. This secures self-information and knowledge behind the formal and programmatic organisational guidelines.

The problem with informal communication is not its existence. Many scholars have pointed to the importance of informal communication in bureaucracies regardless of (or in addition to) the formalised professionalism set up by Weber in his ideal bureaucracy model. What makes a study of informal communications difficult is the blurred border between the formal and informal. There are clear characteristics which make communication formal – i.e. hierarchy, duty, contract, protocol – as well as features which are typically informal – i.e. interpersonal contact, confidence, social control. But there is a high flow of communication that lies between these two poles. A meeting, for example, which is declared to have an informal character, may be far more formal than a chat in the corridor or during dinner – regardless of the importance or relevance of the information exchanged. A former Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)[357] remarked that he would have met the Secretary General (SG) on every visit to New York, as well as the USG of DPKO, the relevant desk officers, and other persons relevant to the mission he is leading. As the schedule of the Secretary General is very tight, he would have 15 minutes to refer to the most relevant issues in a brief and comprehensive way. These meetings always were highly formal and decisions made here would be directly recorded and be the basis for the work of the mission in the field. On the other hand, personal contact and confidence between the SRSG and the SG are also important points of reference and control.[358] Similarly, the SRSG would have met other high-level UN officials on different issues and also in preparation for the meeting with the SG. The main purpose of these consultations was that the problems and issues which had to be managed included a huge amount of responsibility and uncertainty. The SRSG was anxious to include other persons in his decision-making, especially in order to reduce his own uncertainty and share the responsibility of its possible intended and unintended consequences. To handle specific situations, it was of essential importance for him to know the right person he could ask for advice and help.[359] This was only possible on the basis of a personal network, which had to be maintained during his visits to New York. Though this is an illustrative example of the communicative practices of a high-level UN officer who has not followed

[357] The following is based on Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[358] Once the SRSG did not set a meeting with the SG and on meeting the SG in the lift, the SRSG was asked why he didn't come by and was encouraged to meet the SG every time he was in New York.
[359] To give an example, the former SRSG here referred to an event of kidnapping. Even though the mission itself was not directly involved or affected in this event, it was constantly disturbed by UN headquarters in terms of reporting and keeping UN headquarters informed about the situation. To preserve the capacity of his team and the mission for their primary tasks, the SRSG asked the USG of the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) for advice, and he sent him a specialist for kidnapping to cope with the situation. As the specialist also took over the communication with New York, the mission could carry on with its primary work without any disturbance. The former SRSG remarked in the background discussion conducted in 2010 that this solution was only possible, because he knew and had access to the crucial responsible person.

the common career path in the UN administration (as many HoMs) and thus is expected to be involved in the political sphere of the UN, it does indicate that daily working life and practices usually is a mixture of formal and informal interactions. Both forms of organisational communication are inherently necessary, to meet its two central requirements – confidence and reliability of the channels used to issue information and knowledge.

4.5 The Organisational Field of Tension and the Management of Daily Routine and Work

Analytically, coupling and communication can be portrayed separately. They, however, do not stand independently within an organisational framework. Taken together, the nexus between coupling and communication may be illustrated as in figure 9.

Figure 9: The Nexus between Organisational Coupling and Communication



In Figure 9 both communication and coupling are illustrated as axes of a diagram forming four combined spaces. In each of these four spaces, different procedures of management can be situated according to their conditional assets. It is important to note that as the communication and coupling axis are distinct but connected processes, their nexus has to be analysed as a field of tension. Loosely coupled and formal elements of organisation therefore do not necessarily hinder the existence of informal and tightly coupled management procedures. In fact, the existence of both might be necessary factors for an organisation to propose and resume its functions under conditions of

ambiguity, even though the relevance for the personal day-to-day working life might greatly vary over space and time.

In the upper-left space, where de-coupling meets formal communication, management procedures can be found, which formally signify and (re-)produce distinctiveness between different units, sections and dimensions of an organisation. The clearest example for such a procedure is formal delegation of authority, which leads to a certain amount of autonomous responsibility and distinctiveness of the authorised agent or organisational unit.[360] As mentioned above, the UN mission in general and the HoM specifically enjoy a high degree of delegated authority. But the UN hierarchy as such is characterised by a highly complex web of delegated authorities. This is very important for the daily work of both the mission and DPKO, i.e. as no activity is undertaken without securing that all (relevant) claims of other persons or authorities are considered.[361] A second example is formal cooperation, which may take place internally (between different units of the organisation), and towards the organisational environment (together with organisations or units within the environment in which the organisation or its specific unit is locally situated). Here communication is highly restrictive, and organisations carefully channel information needed for cooperation, and thus formally protect the distinctiveness of the organisations and units involved.[362] The UN and its peace operations provide many examples of such formal cooperation, e.g. the peacekeeping mission with other UN organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), bilateral government initiatives, or local government structures. A further example is the creation of the so-called Integrated Operational Teams (IOT) under the lead of DPKO's Office of Operations in 2007, through which the formal communication channel between the relevant divisions and units of the department should be broadened in order to raise the efficiency of cooperation whilst managing and supporting the respective missions.[363]

The lower-left space of figure 9, where tight coupling meets formal communication, illustrates the formal management procedures that are designed to be highly responsive. This is especially observable in hierarchical reporting schemes, described in detail above. The UN has a set of rules and procedures that define how these reporting schemes have to be applied. There are rules of engagement, unity of command, the daily code-cables, progress reports etc. Different departments, divisions or units may also try to formally hold authorities such as personnel recruitment,

[360] In its simplest sense, the agent has delegated authority to choose its policy according to the problem to be solved rather than to implement the policy given by the principal or superior, compare Bendor *et al.*, 2001, p. 242.
[361] See e.g. Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1R, DPKO, 2010 and Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[362] Luhmann, 2006, Thompson, 1967.
[363] UN, 2009c.

procurement management to secure their power and the responsiveness of the subordinate unit. A further example is an official committee and meeting in which reports are issued and decisions taken that require the responsiveness of all the units (or sometimes also all other organisations) involved. The hierarchical management procedures set the framework for daily work and form the basis for the persistence of the organisational enterprise.

Turning to the right side of the diagram in figure 9, in the lower right space, where tight coupling meets informal communication, such management procedures are located that lead to a high degree of responsiveness, but are based on informal communication channels. This might refer to local management procedures, such as regular round table meetings in an office, or a close and trustful cooperation between the SRSG and his/her secretary or policy advisor. It might also refer to close personal links, for example between the SRSG and his fellow colleague in some departments in New York. Other examples are local personal networks, which are highly referential towards each other throughout formal hierarchies and thus set informal barriers within a formal organisational setting.[364] In its extreme version such networks may also be negatively characterised as patronage. Interestingly, this space does not only refer to local phenomena but also to general organisational identity settings. Thus, loyalty to the UN and its hierarchical and normative settings is controlled not only by hierarchical reference, but also by informal collective identity, which is referred to as being 'UN-minded'. If a colleague is perceived as not 'UN-minded', s/he is considered to be disloyal, and vice versa. This may lead to formal consequences, such as the non-renewal of his/her contract.[365]

Finally, the space on the upper right, where loose coupling and informal communication meet, forms the conditions for management procedures based on personal confidence and also conserves a high degree of distinctiveness. In a broad sense, this accounts for knowledge networks based on personal contacts and collective identities, which crosscut the programmatic structure of an organisation.[366] Another example are groups called 'communities of practice' in which learning and information transfer are based on an identity or social context shared by its members on the basis of their practical involvement.[367] These networks are explicitly boundary spanning, may be local or virtually global and clearly crosscut formal hierarchies. They include individuals who are not only working in different programmatic contexts within an organisation, but may also contain persons from different organisational or national backgrounds. In the context of UN peace operations, nationals might gain

[364] For an ethnographic study of such networks in the organisational context of the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), see Hüsken, 2006.
[365] Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[366] Hüsken gives an interesting example for such a network in the context of the German GTZ, as he describes a network of East-Germans working in Yemen and other Arab countries, who support themselves on the basis of their similar homeland background (even calling themselves 'Ossis im Orient'). See Hüsken, 2006, p. 203.
[367] Brown and Duguid, 2001.

entry to such networks as well as employees from other international agencies operating in the country.[368] Thus, in such networks or communities, shared identities and confidence (as an interpersonal norm) form grounds on which responsiveness is made possible up to a certain extent. But, on the other hand, the distinctiveness of the individual in his personal day-to-day working setting is preserved.

The diagram in figure 9 gives an impression of the organisational field of tension, in which an organisational actor routinely performs his/her daily work, a programme is implemented, a report is written or a piece of information is transferred, interpreted and processed. Actors find help and annoyances in this field of tension and they will individually set their own preferences, but they are not able to exclude the management procedures of any of the four spaces in total, as the practice of these procedures, though they are analytically distinct, always stand in relationship to the practice of the other.

4.6 Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to explore the organisational processes through which the UN and its peace operations manage and cope with complexity, processes and constant inconsistencies and dilemmas between the programmatic goals and its daily organisational action. As UN officials have a dual responsibility towards the peace process in the respective society (the client) and the UN system, its standards and values (the organisation), peace operations as organisational action means a constant and routine balancing act between political and bureaucratic demands. In order to capture this organisational action in a systematic way a framework was developed, which suggests that the procedures that manage the daily practice can be located within an organisational field of tension formed by the nexus between organisational coupling and communication. In order to be implemented, any programme or policy is transformed by the interconnected and reciprocal use of these management procedures within this field of tension. In order to receive responses within the organisational setting, any implementation is also transformed by the interconnected and reciprocal use of these management procedures within this field of tension. Thus, one may expect UN officials to constantly navigate within this field of tension throughout their scope of action and on a regular routine basis.

If one reconsiders the photography of the Afghan woman in a polling booth described at the beginning of this paper according to this theoretical framework, one may come to a critical and differentiated conclusion. The picture intrinsically is a reproduction of the implementation of the

[368] Schlichte and Veit, 2007.

programme and not of the standard of free and fair elections. Thus, in order to take and publish the picture, the UN photographer draws his legitimacy from (and thus refers to) the organisational procedures located in the nexus between coupling and communication rather than the programme of supporting elections in Afghanistan. Similarly, as the UN organisation allows such a picture to be taken and published, one may suppose that its programme of supporting elections in Afghanistan also refers to organisational procedures situated in the nexus between coupling and communication rather than the transfer of its standards to the Afghan context in which the election programme is implemented.

Generalised and applied to the perspective of the organisational actor, who is in charge and is confronted with the internal organisational dynamics and dilemmas of peace operations, one may concretise two major propositions:

Proposition 1:

Policies and programmes of UN peace operations are reflected by UN officials according to their compliance to the procedures located within the organisational nexus between coupling and communication rather than their application to the peace process within the post-war setting they are implemented.

Proposition 2:

Daily practices of UN peace operations are reflected by UN officials according to their application to the procedures located within the organisational nexus between coupling and communication rather than their compliance with policies and programmes of UN peace operations.

These two propositions may serve as the basic structure to be tested and enhanced by empirical research. As it focuses on the organisational processes and dynamics of the daily practice of UN peace operations, it should be concerned with identification, judgement and usage of procedures of management and reference located in the nexus between organisational coupling and communication. Such a research is promising, as it provides a deep insight into how processes and (deviant) outcomes are transferred into programmatic feedback. Moreover, it may generate an understanding on how UN officials use these methods and processes to cope with the ambiguities and uncertainties of their regular and routine work.

5 Article 2 – Exceeding Limitations of the United Nations Peacekeeping Bureaucracy. Strategies of Officials to Influence Peacekeeping Activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

Winckler, Joel Gwyn (2015): Exceeding Limitations of the United Nations Peacekeeping Bureaucracy. Strategies of Officials to Influence Peacekeeping Activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. *International Peacekeeping*, 22(1), pp. 43-64, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.992576.

6 ARTICLE 3 – PROTECTIONISM WITHIN THE ORGANISATION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: ASSESSING THE DISCONNECTION BETWEEN HEADQUARTERS AND MISSION PERSPECTIVES

The following chapter has been previously published as an Article in the Journal of International Organization Studies, 5(1), pp. 71-84.

Abstract: The aim of this article is to assess the disconnection between the United Nations (UN) headquarters and its peacekeeping missions by exploring the perspectives of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York and the United Nations Mission in Liberia. It argues that even though there is a need for decentralisation in the highly complex organisational setting of UN peacekeeping, it is aggravated by communication processes and behaviour that protect the autonomy and interests of both headquarters and mission from internal interferences. The findings of this study indicate that internal protectionism leads to a diffusion of responsibilities and undermines the development and acceptance of common organisational goals. It concludes by proposing approaches on how to improve communication management in the organisation of UN peacekeeping.

6.1 Introduction

> There is a huge difference in the dynamic in New York and in the field. It is a difference in perspective and in the awareness on how processes and things work.[439]

The above description of an experienced official in the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) clearly points out a disconnection between UN headquarters in New York and the UN peacekeeping missions in the field. This observation is neither surprising nor a new revelation. Rather, it is a well-known issue debated by both academics and practitioners. Barnett and Finnemore, for example, analyse this gap reflecting on one of the biggest failures in the history of UN peacekeeping in 1994 in Rwanda.[440] Their assessment of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) highlights how reports from

[439] Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011.
[440] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, pp. 121-155.

the UN mission in Rwanda were received, interpreted, and turned into knowledge in New York, which in no circumstance reflected the reality lived by the UN personnel on the ground. As the statement above indicates, one does not have to look into the depths of the Rwandan genocide to observe this gap. Rather, it suggests that in such a highly complex organisational and political endeavour as UN peacekeeping, it is an organisational normality that staff and members of both UN headquarters and missions cope with on a daily basis.[441]

The disconnection between UN headquarters (which in the case of peacekeeping is represented by DPKO and the Department of Field Support/DFS) and peacekeeping missions also seems obvious because of geographical facts. The realities on the ground and working environments (i.e., in an office in a skyscraper in New York or a post-war situation such as Liberia) could not differ more. However, the physical factors are not the only things creating the gap. UN peacekeeping is designed as a decentralised organisation. DPKO is a comparatively small head of an extremely large body of around sixteen peacekeeping missions, with a total of approximately twenty-two thousand civilian staff and ninety-eight thousand military and police.[442] DPKO does not and cannot conduct the day-to-day management of all peacekeeping missions.[443] This is formally expressed, for example, in the fact that the head of mission (HoM), who in most cases is a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), is situated on the same hierarchical level as the head of DPKO (an Under-Secretary-General). But it also points to the fact that DPKO and UN missions serve in different environments and require different means to achieve their goals. On the one hand, the mandated task of the mission is to support the host government and exist in the political environment of the post-war country. On the other hand, DPKO deals with the interests and political dynamics of the Security Council. These diverse challenges inevitably lead to different organisational perspectives.

Schlichte and Veit have pointed out that these perspectives (re)produce their own discourses on peacekeeping, which do not necessarily depend on each other or create joint solutions to problems.[444] This article goes a step further, arguing that different perspectives also change the way organisational processes are managed locally through communication behaviour. The organisation of UN peacekeeping heavily depends on processing information and knowledge. Being a political organisation with neither donor nor executive functions, information and knowledge are the central resources of power of UN peacekeeping, both at the headquarter and the mission level, enabling it to engage and shape politics either at the international level or in the national context of the post-war

[441] Winckler, 2011.
[442] Trettin and Winckler, 2012.
[443] Interview 1P, DPKO, 2010, and Background Discussion E, former senior UN Official in DPKO, 2012.
[444] Schlichte and Veit, 2007.

country.[445] On all levels of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, authority over information also enables a certain autonomy and leverage to interact with local counterparts. The central argument of this article is that organisational actors in peacekeeping missions and headquarters protect this autonomy and influence it through their communicative behaviour. These practices exist next to confidentiality regulations toward other organisations. They are located within the UN bureaucracy, aiming to control internal interferences in local decision-making processes by other organisational perspectives. This makes the interaction between headquarters and mission especially difficult, leads to confrontation, conflicts, misunderstandings, and dysfunctions. The communicative behaviour of organisational actors on both sides significantly aggravates this disconnection between DPKO and the missions.

This article will explore the use of communication processes as internal protective behaviour by conducting a qualitative empirical analysis of the different organisational perspectives of DPKO in New York and the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).[446] The selection of UNMIL as a case study provides the advantage that it is generally observed as a successful, 'well managed', peacekeeping mission.[447] This allows an analysis of the different organisational perspectives within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, which are not biased by a general perception of dysfunctional and flawed management. On this basis, the study generates a better understanding of day-to-day political life within the peacekeeping bureaucracy, providing insights on how different interests and programmatic outlines of international organisations, such as the UN, translate into micro dynamics on different levels of bureaucracy, and vice versa. Finally, it also produces important inputs for the further development of communication and information management of UN peacekeeping.

The analysis below is structured in two parts: The first will briefly recall the gap between DPKO and peacekeeping missions, describing the formal and informal communication channels between the two perspectives; the second step will analyse two perspectives of peacekeeping, namely the headquarter perspective of DPKO and the mission perspective of UNMIL.

6.2 Disconnection between DPKO and Missions through Communication Channels

The observation that there is a disconnection between DPKO and the peacekeeping missions does not mean no information exchange exists. On the contrary, communication processes are essential, especially in terms of support from DPKO to the missions as well as a reference of the missions

[445] Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, Benner et al., 2011.
[446] As this study focusses on the political and substantive dynamics of peacekeeping, it explicitly excludes an analysis of the support and administrative components of the peacekeeping bureaucracy.
[447] Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010.

toward DPKO. However, according to staff members in DPKO and UNMIL, there are not a lot of regular, working-level contacts between mission and DPKO. Desk officers in New York who have been previously deployed in relevant field locations sometimes use informal contacts in the field to verify information. However, as informal interaction between the mission and DPKO is rare, desk officers and even directors in New York often only refer to their officially assigned contact persons, which are apportioned due to the hierarchical level of employment.[448] In Liberia, there are very few UNMIL officers who seek regular contact to New York for professional and substantial reasons, except if it comes to joint events, such as a visit of a DPKO senior manager to Liberia.[449]

There are, however, formal communication channels that cover the gap between headquarters and the mission. The three most important will be introduced hereafter.[450] First, there are the daily and weekly situation reports (SITREPS), which represent the organisational routine of the reporting line between the mission and DPKO. SITREPS are the first line of reference of the mission to DPKO and, therefore, progress through a rigorous vetting process within the mission. The second – and from the headquarter perspective perhaps the most important internal communication tool between the missions and headquarters – is the so-called 'Code Cable.' It is essential to note that a Code Cable is not a normal bureaucratic communication instrument. Rather, it is a means of diplomacy to issue politically motivated notices and is used in a very similar way between DPKO and the missions. Code Cables always have to be signed at the highest level by the USG (DPKO) or the HoM and thus are also addressed to the highest level. Finally, the reference document of the mission that is open to the public is the biannual Report of the Secretary General to the Security Council. These reports are highly elaborate diplomatic documents. They include aspects and passages of all mission components, whereas the coordination and finalisation of the document is assigned to the Office of Operations (OO) in DPKO.

The most important observation here is formal communication lines are predominantly diplomatic in the sense that they usually have a political purpose. Thus, Code Cables, for example, are often a result of negotiations between both sides before being issued.[451] The reason for this might be that they bridge not only a gap in the formal organisational setting, but they also protect daily work activities on both sides. This will be analysed, turning to the assessment of the two broad perspectives identified in the organisation of UN peacekeeping, referring to the work in DPKO as the 'headquarter perspective' and in UNMIL as the 'mission perspective.'

[448] Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1L, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1M, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1P, DPKO, 2010.
[449] Interview 1E, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 2D, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 2H, UNMIL, 2011.
[450] For more details see Winckler, 2011, pp. 94-96.
[451] Background Discussion F, former senior official in UN peacekeeping mission, 2011.

The empirical analysis is based on a field study conducted in New York and Liberia in September/October 2010 and February/March 2011, which produced a crosscutting insight into both DPKO and UNMIL through conducting interviews with UN professionals and directors as well as participant observation. The following analysis is explorative and basically follows two steps for both the headquarters and the mission perspective. The first is a general description of the organisational perspective and its actors, including a brief introduction of the organisational structure. The second step explores the communication processes within each organisational setting, generating an understanding of the communicative behaviour within the separate organisational perspectives, as well as toward each other.

6.2.1 The Headquarters Perspective of DPKO

As illustrated in Figure 11, DPKO is structured in four pillars: the Office of Operations (OO), the Office of Rule and Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI), the Office of the Military Advisor (OMA), and the Policy, Evaluation and Training Division (PET). OO acts as the connection between the missions and

Figure 11: Organisation Chart DPKO (own design 2011)



Acronyms: DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations); IOT (Integrated Operational Team); OMA (Office of Military Affairs); OO (Office of Operations); OROLSI (Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions); PET (Policy, Evaluation and Training Division); USG (Under-Secretary General)

the intergovernmental organs of the UN, such as the Security Council. It is structured in four divisions in which the world of peacekeeping is geographically divided. Every division incorporates so-called integrated operational teams (IOTs), which include not only civilian personnel but also a representative of the military, police, and support side. The second substantive pillar is OROLSI, which includes the police division, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, security sector reform, and mine action. Third, OMA provides services to the mission and member states (such as generation of peacekeeping troops), as well as military advice to DPKO leadership. The fourth pillar is PET, which has a somewhat exceptional position in the structure of DPKO. Crosscutting all aspects of peacekeeping, especially its most important section, the Peacekeeping Best-Practice Section (PBPS) has the task to enhance the long-term professionalisation of peacekeeping. At the top of the hierarchy of DPKO is the under-secretary general (USG), who is supported by his front office and the Chief of Staff (COS).[452]

Organisational charts and terms of reference describe functions and areas of responsibility. However, in daily organisational life, functions are often blurred and areas of responsibility are frequently not clearly defined. What stands out is a web of delegated, received, and defended authorities.[453] Every decision or activity has to be cleared within this web of authority, as it especially states jurisdictions and powers of interpretation and the usage of information. One of the basic principles of decision-making in DPKO, for example, is the primacy of politics, especially over the military, which gives OO an accentuated position within the (informal) hierarchy between the four pillars of DPKO.

This emphasised position of OO can be observed in its interactions with other sections. If, for example, OMA is tasked to provide advice or a position paper to UN leadership or member states, it has to coordinate with the civilian side, as DPKO cannot produce more than one position on one subject. Views between the civilian and the military side often differ significantly, a conflict normally solved through negotiation. Here, the civilian side always has the advantage to refer to the primacy of the political, much to the frustration of the military.[454]

A further example is the preparation of background and strategy papers by specialised substantial units or persons in other pillars of DPKO. In order to prevent a departmental conflict over competencies as well as to ensure the relevance of the paper and the information it incorporates, this can only be done in agreement with the IOT, allowing UN officials in the IOT to prevail at the centre of the political process. The problem of the specialised substantial employees is to present

[452] The COS is also responsible for the concerns of Department of Field Support (DFS), which provides logistical and technical support to the missions.
[453] Interview 1J, DPKO, 2010.
[454] Interview 1A, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1W, DPKO, 2010.

their work in a fashion that does not offend any authorities and positions of power. Including an analysis of the information may, for example, challenge senior management (especially at the director level) in their authority over the interpretation of information, as 'analysis is the task of the directors.'[455]

In these internal interaction processes, everyone tries to find and claim their own field of action and responsibility. This does not necessarily have to match with the respective formal terms of reference and functions. The aim is to make oneself (and the capacity of the unit) visible without offending the authority of someone else – or in the words of a UN official (not in OO), it would involve distributing as many business cards as possible without 'promoting' oneself too much.[456] A former member of OMA in DPKO described his/her arrival in New York as a very difficult process. S/he noticed very quickly the terms of reference describing his/her functions were irrelevant, as s/he personally was not included in the relevant processes s/he should have been participating in. After two very frustrating months, his/her own initiative, and the circumstances through which s/he made various contacts to high ranking officials in the smoker's room made him/her slowly become an integrated part of the team.[457] Visibility, thus, is essentially a problem of getting access to relevant processes of decision-making. However, it is important to avoid claiming one's formally fixed scope of action as such attempts are prone to fail.

Daily interaction, working, and decision-making processes within the headquarter perspective of DPKO interplay with both function and personality. Here, not only is information the key, but the key is also the way it is handled within the web of authority. At the same time, the framework of action is often very limited for members of middle management, depending heavily on the preferences of the (leading) persons involved. Interestingly, Code Cables turn out to be a very important instrument for members of middle management in DPKO in reference to their own work. Code Cables here are the visible result of an individual activity, which is signed and thus recognised at the highest level of the organisation.[458] On the other hand, it is also a way of protecting authority and dividing responsibility along the lines of hierarchy. A Code Cable has to pass all relevant hierarchical levels before it can be signed by the person at the top of the organisation (which is in most cases the USG DPKO). The signature process not only ensures the semantic correctness of the document, but it also divides the responsibility for this activity along the web of authority and the levels of decision-making within the

[455] Interview 1R, DPKO, 2010.
[456] Interview 1A, DPKO, 2010.
[457] Background Discussion D, former UN official in DPKO, 2010.
[458] Interviews with several UN officials in DPKO, New York, October 2010.

organisation. This is practiced vertically through the hierarchical revision process of the document, as well as horizontally through its distribution to inform other offices and departments.[459]

The integrated operational teams (IOTs) in OO stand at the centre of these processes, acting as mediators and advisors without any specific substantive appointments. Here, the various threads of peacekeeping as a political process come together on different levels of interaction. Next to the routine work (such as drafting talking points for presentations of the senior management in intergovernmental organs of the UN), IOT desk officers described a second aspect: political involvement in what seems to be a stalemate in the work of the peacekeeping mission. IOT can help, for example, in lobbying for extension of mandates or increased donor involvement. It has a mediatory position: on the one hand, as support and oversight of the mission, and on the other hand, in representing the peacekeeping mission toward the member states.[460]

A good example for the work of the IOT and OO is the preparation of the biannual report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the progress of the peacekeeping mission. Formally, it is the report of the mission, and actually the SRSG presents this report to the Security Council on behalf of the Secretary General. However, it is compiled under the lead of the IOT. The reason is that the information for this report is selected on the basis of political interests within the Security Council rather than on the needs of the mission, which – according to the perspective of DPKO – may be judged more accurately by the UN officials in New York. This may lead to a highly difficult and conflictive negotiation process between headquarters in New York and the mission, especially because (according to the mission perspective, see below) DPKO barely considers the internal negotiation processes within the mission.[461]

A second example is the case of the 2010 extension of the UNMIL mandate. In the eyes of the member states, UNMIL seemed to have succeeded in enabling a fairly secure and stable situation, making the massive peacekeeping mission in Liberia increasingly obsolete. In comparison to other missions, the situation in Liberia seemed very calm. What the mission could report on was not in any way near as explosive as the reports from other countries such as Sudan. This development brought the mission under strong pressure to justify its own existence. Nevertheless, UNMIL viewed its strong presence as the crucial condition in order to sustain the peace process in Liberia. In preparation of the extension of UNMIL's mandate in 2010 there was a substantial debate about the withdrawal of the UN troops from Liberia. In this process, OO became one of the mediators between the Security

[459] Interview 1M, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1N, DPKO, 2010, Interview 2I, DPKO, 2010.
[460] Interview 1L, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1P, DPKO, 2010.
[461] Next to interviews with UN officials in New York, October 2010, and Monrovia, March 2011, see also Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.

Council and UNMIL, managing to effectively slow down the momentum of UNMIL withdrawal by persuading the Security Council members to postpone it at least until after the elections in Liberia in October 2011. On the other hand, OO also conducts its role in reminding and clarifying the concerns and interests of the Security Council to the mission by pushing for results. As, for example, the lack of capacities of the Liberian government to take over the responsibilities on security from UNMIL is one of the core arguments for the extension of UNMIL's mandate, OO felt a need for an 'initial push' from headquarters to get the security handover process started. Even though such interference from headquarters in the responsibilities of the mission does not create 'positive reactions […] someone has to play this role, as the masters [in the Security Council] will not carry on forever with this mission.'[462]

Here, the influence of the member states within DPKO becomes visible. They are often described as 'masters,' whose interests and decision-making have considerable influence on the work within DPKO and the missions. Even though DPKO does not control the missions, several DPKO officials have mentioned in interviews that the physical closeness of DPKO to the Security Council and the representatives of its member states give the word of officials in New York a comparatively high weight toward the missions. The influence of the member states in the Security Council on the daily work of DPKO is also reflected in its constant struggle to ensure a certain amount of political autonomy. Hence, assessment and analysis of information is often limited to the mere description of facts and incidents in order to ensure the political correctness of the report. Evaluation and policy planning often are used by senior management as a political tool to push specific issues or processes regarding the development of peacekeeping in international politics. Guidance and policy development often get stuck in the netting of political interests between the Security Council, DPKO, and the peacekeeping missions. With such tasks one very easily reaches boundaries set by political interests. However, it also protects the political work of DPKO from failure in the missions, as it diffuses responsibilities and decision-making processes throughout the web of authority in the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

6.2.2 The Mission Perspective of UNMIL

As shown in Figure 12, UNMIL is organisationally divided into four pillars, which are headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and her office at the top of the hierarchical pyramid. The military, headed by the force commander of UNMIL, covers both the military peacekeeping contingents, which are geographically located and divided in two sectors (A and B), and the military observers (MILOBS). Next to the military, UNMIL headquarters in Monrovia consists

[462] Interview 1L, DPKO, 2010.

of two substantive pillars that are both led by a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (DSRSG). The first substantive pillar is called Recovery and Governance (R&G), which includes civil affairs, recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration, and political affairs. Appointed as resident coordinator (RC) and humanitarian coordinator (HC), the DSRSG R&G also chairs the UN Country Team that comprises all UN organisations and agencies in the country. The second substantive pillar is Rule of Law (RoL), which subsumes four sections: Human Rights, Justice, Corrections, and UN Police (UNPOL). Next to mission headquarters in Monrovia, UNMIL maintains civilian field offices in all fifteen Liberian counties, which are headed by a Head of Field Office (HOFO) that is appointed by the SRSG but formally reports to the DSRSG R&G.[463]

Figure 12: Organisation Chart UNMIL (own design 2011)



The big difference to the headquarters perspective of DPKO is UNMIL's technical and political alignment towards shaping national politics in Liberia. Here, the attribute 'political' predominantly points to UNMIL's support to the government of Liberia. UNMIL itself is structured as a 'shadow

[463] Mission Support is a fifth pillar of the mission, which is headed by the Director of Mission Support (DMS).

bureaucracy' in which most units and persons have their counterparts in the national Liberian bureaucracy. In some areas, UNMIL directly bridges technical gaps of the government's communications system, for example, through sending letters, faxes, and e-mails, as well as facilitating transport. In all areas, UNMIL has its own reporting system parallel to the Liberian government. Information from the field may be processed in the mission headquarters and used as a resource while shaping political processes at the national level. In recent years, UNMIL tried to pull itself out of all informally assumed leadership roles aiming to solely fulfil a consultancy role and push government officials into the lead. However, even in the position of the 'back seat,' UNMIL seems to remain the access point to three crucial resources for national development: security (practically ensured through the presence of peacekeeping troops), knowledge (the competencies which are brought into the country 'from the outside' on different levels and thematic areas of state building and peace consolidation), and money (coordination with donors). These three resources are the practical basis of UNMIL's existence in the national context of Liberia, but they also have day-to-day implications on the position, function, and work of individual members of UNMIL.

Security has the topmost priority in the work of the peacekeeping mission.[464] The mission also clearly possesses the power of interpretation on what is relevant for security not only in the national context of Liberia but also for everything that might endanger the mission and its mandate. Thus, a high amount of information generated by UNMIL refers to security-related events. The interpretation of this data is usually carried out in a small circle at the top of the mission's hierarchy. In special reports, staff at various organisational levels is encouraged to assess and analyse the data. However, in the hierarchical context of the UN, the transfer of facts and event-related data seems far easier than the circulation of opinion and interpretation. Here one seems to walking a fine line between the hierarchical requirements and overstretching one's individual competencies, and not everyone has the professional experience to know how to handle this productively. Reporting that goes beyond mere description seems to depend heavily on personality, experience, and individual abilities. However, such reporting also strengthens specific involvements and might lead to increased profile and visibility within the organisational context of UNMIL.

The importance of profile and visibility may be illustrated by examining the process of compiling a new strategic peacebuilding priority plan for Liberia in March 2011.[465] The plan aims to strengthen national capacities in order to enhance the ability of the government to completely take over

[464] The following aspects are drawn from several interviews with UNMIL officials and observations in Monrovia and Field Offices, Liberia, September 2010 and March 2011.
[465] Interview 2D, UNMIL, 2011 and Interview 2J, UNDP Liberia, 2011. The priority plan sets the strategy for the use of the Peacebuilding Fund in Liberia, which is approved by the UN Peacebuilding Support Office and administered by UNDP, New York.

responsibility for security after the withdrawal of UNMIL. The initiative includes a great amount of new financial resources from the Peacebuilding Fund. The negotiation process concerning this plan included a vast amount of different stakeholders, including a delegation from New York as well as the Liberian government, UN agencies, and UNMIL. After an initial workshop with broad participation of all the different stakeholders, the plan (which formally is a document of the Liberian government) was drafted under the guidance of the New York delegation within the offices of the RoL pillar in UNMIL headquarters. A crucial aspect of this document is the formal conceptual integration of the thematic fields 'justice' and 'security.' UNMIL is the first mission that incorporated a separate organisational pillar on the rule of law. This means a great amount of personnel and competencies is assigned to the thematic field of justice. Despite its size and capacity, this organisational field has always been operating slightly isolated, and there were very few formally fixed connections with the field of security. With the new peacebuilding plan, this is fundamentally changing as the security relevance of the field of justice is formally fixed and thus made attractive and feasible for donor activity. This implies a reorientation in the priorities of the mission, as this document is the basis for the medium-term financial scope of action. Such a revision of priorities creates new opportunities for many people, who have so far been working in the background as their thematic field did not attract sufficient donor attention. However, critique of such concepts is often also based on the perceived danger for individual thematic 'territories,' which entails personal access to resources and power. Everybody wants to be involved, and not everybody understands why he or she has not been included sufficiently in the process of compiling this document.

In interviews, UNMIL officials often complained about territorial issues. In this context they also frequently referred to the so-called 'stove piping': people tend to send information through 'stove pipes' of the hierarchical chain of reporting rather than sharing it horizontally with the colleague next door working on similar issues under a different chain of command.[466] Next to the isolation of operational areas, stove piping has two major effects: First, it slows down the decision-making processes within the organisation, as decisions are taken on the basis of simultaneously existing but disconnected information selection processes. One experienced UNMIL official stated that this might endanger the relevance of the mission's work. If the mission and its bureaucratic apparatus take too long compiling concepts, developing political positions, or making decisions, donors would try to bypass these procedures and cooperate directly with the government. In this case, the mission would have invested a lot of effort and resources into shaping a political process in which it is not a relevant stakeholder anymore.[467] The second effect of stove piping is the constant shifting of individual

[466] Especially Interview 1T, UNMIL, 2010, and Interview 1U, UNMIL, 2011.
[467] Interview 2D, UNMIL, 2011. Similar statements were also made in Interview 1E, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 2H, UNMIL, 2011.

responsibility and accountability. Similar to New York, the diffusion of responsibility for political and organisational activities goes along many little, hierarchically structured working steps. At middle management level there are very few formally fixed systems of horizontal information sharing. In some offices, this might not be such a problem, as the team has worked together for several years and people know each other very well, or there is a leading personality, who proactively supports and calls for coordination, critique, and information sharing in specific meetings. Such horizontal sharing processes often seem to depend more on the ability of individual persons than on organisational structures. It seems to take a great amount of courage and trust in the colleague next door to share information in a free and critical manner. An experienced UNMIL official explained that people would be very happy to share if the project is advanced or nearly finished. Before this stage, many colleagues would find it difficult to generally inform about a project without speaking about the details. This can lead to frustration, because the other side might have worked on similar issues that could (or even should) have been linked to it in favour of the project.[468]

The political representatives of UNMIL are the senior management and especially the SRSG. Therefore, flow and selection of information within the organisation is also always directed to the senior management of the mission in order to keep them informed. Information processing under SRSG Ellen Margrethe Løj (current HoM at the time of my research) has become very hierarchically structured. Within this structure, only a limited number of organisational units have the authority to oversee the quality of the information that reaches the SRSG. For example, since 2008 reports from the field have been centralised. Next to the separate reporting lines of the different sections, there is now one integrated weekly report from the field, which is written by the HOFOs, overseen and compiled by the Field Support Team, and then finds direct access to the senior management.[469] The interpretation and strategic assessment of all information is also centrally organised in the Joint Mission Analysis Cell (JMAC), which in UNMIL is also assigned to compile the daily SITREPs to DPKO.[470]

Information gathering as part of organisational self-information is the first strand of hierarchical information selection within UNMIL. The second strand concerns UNMIL's correspondence with New York. On various levels of the mission, the connection to New York has very little relevance. Separate sections send technical reports to their respective counterparts in DPKO, but the political interaction is centrally organised in the office of the SRSG. What stands out is the very low intensity of direct working level interaction between UNMIL and DPKO. There are some formally delegated contacts.

[468] Interview 2D, UNMIL, 2011.
[469] UN, 2008b See also Interview 1V, UNMIL, 2011, and interviews and observations in five UNMIL field offices, March 2011.
[470] Background Discussion B, UNMIL official, 2010, and Interview 1U, UNMIL, 2011.

Again and again there are technical and thematic inquiries and exchange of information. This is dealt with by the respective organisational unit, but is repeatedly described more as a burden rather than a productive involvement. For many members of middle management there is just no real necessity for regular communications with New York. There are some issues that indeed would need attention by New York, but this is mostly processed through the formal communication channels of UN hierarchy.[471] From the mission's perspective, the relationship to New York often is characterised by a lot of mistrust and suspicion. As an experienced UNMIL official put it, the ideas in New York on how processes in Liberia should work are very different from how the mission actually functions.[472] Another senior UNMIL official complained about the incompetence shown at times in the respective section in New York, with Code Cables, for example, coming back just repeating what has already been sent. What would be needed are support and guidelines to work out how to do things best, for this mission, for guidance of staff, and for future missions. For the senior official, these priorities are off, even understanding that the demands of the work and leading personalities in New York are difficult.[473]

In some ways, the office of the SRSG is the clearinghouse for everything that reaches the HoM and subsequently is passed on to New York. However, it is also the office that keeps off pressure and requirements of New York from the rest of the mission. A good example of this is the pressure already mentioned above to justify UNMIL's massive resources in times where the situation is regularly reported as calm. UN officials in this office stand in middle ground between claims and arguments of specialised units of the mission and requirements of DPKO. It is this filtering and internal diplomatic effort that protects the day-to-day work of the mission from debates on UNMIL's withdrawal and the ambiguity of the threat of organisational self-destruction when the Security Council deems UNMIL's mandate to be fulfilled.[474]

A further example on a more routine basis is the biannual drafting of the progress report of the secretary general to the Security Council. Every section, division, and unit of the mission participates in this process. Organisational units all draft their respective passage of the document, which then is sent through the hierarchical lines of the substantial pillars of the mission to the office of the SRSG that compiles the mission's draft of the report. Thus, the human rights section would write a passage on human rights in Liberia. This text would be sent to the office of the DSRSG of RoL, which would compile the contributions of the other sections of the RoL pillar to be passed on to the office of the SRSG. What seems to be rather simple is in reality a constant fight about text passages, language,

[471] Interview 1E, UNMIL, 2011.
[472] Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011.
[473] Interview 1E, UNMIL, 2011.
[474] Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 2H, UNMIL, 2011.

and syntax. It is also a conflict about competencies, the specific motivation of organisational units to highlight their work, and the diplomatic obligations of this important report. The office of the SRSG mediates in this process. But they do so not only towards the other units of the mission. After the mission's draft has been finalised, the office of the SRSG has to defend the draft and revise it according to the requirements of New York. This can become very complicated, as the final version of the report also has to account for the demands of the separate units in the mission.[475]

The line of communication to New York seems especially important in terms of UNMIL's reference towards their mandate, which is the legal basis of its existence. However, it seems to have very little relevance if it comes to the day-to-day work in the national or local context of Liberia. It often seems to be more a burden that leads to delays of decision-making processes. For many individual UNMIL officials, other factors, such as the local environment and conditions, the individual collaboration with Liberian counterparts, the organisational standing and visibility of their specific thematic field of action within the policy of the mission, as well as the attention of donors, seem to be far more important in their day-to-day work. However, regular reporting and the processing of requests from New York are important. Feeding and carefully controlling the communication line to New York prevents interferences from New York and protects UNMIL's scope of action.[476]

6.3 Conclusion

> In no national or multilateral bureaucracy there is such [individual] entrepreneurship and autonomy […] However, trying to impose some doctrine or hard basic rules on […] information flow and sharing has therefore been very problematic in being accepted.[477]

This quote from a senior UN official in New York manages to grasp the core dilemma portrayed in this article. It describes decentralisation as a gift, a strength, and an important part of the organisational design of UN peacekeeping. This especially provides flexibility in a business that has to adapt to highly dynamic and precarious environments in post-war countries. In such a complex setting, gaps and the development of different organisational perspectives, such as the disconnection between DPKO and UNMIL assessed in this article, are inevitable. It may be necessary, as both DPKO and UNMIL are facing different challenges in their political work, to develop different interests and procedures of interaction. However, this article has also shown that communication processes are often used as measures to protect autonomy within the organisational setting. Even though this protectionism might create some coherence within the own organisational perspective, it fosters the

[475] Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 2H, UNMIL, 2011.
[476] Interview 2H, UNMIL, 2011. See also Background Discussion C, former SRSG in UN peacekeeping mission, 2010.
[477] Interview 1Q, DPKO, 2010.

disconnection between headquarters and the mission. It also prevents the creation of common organisational standards and plausible interferences from the other side.

In this article, the communication behaviour in the headquarters perspective of DPKO has been assessed as protective in three interconnected ways: First, in protection of basic principles, such as the primacy of the political. Even though military advice, competency, and field experience should be needed in managing an enterprise that involves sending thousands of troops into post-war settings, political interests and arguments have priority regardless of their reflection of the realities in the mission. The second form of protectionism concerns the visibility and profile of individual staff and their work. Members of middle management have to find their role and scope of action within a complex web of authority that does not necessarily reproduce formally assigned functions. Thus, communication tools such as Code Cables are used to create visibility of actions without actually taking over full responsibility for these actions as it has to run through a hierarchical signature process. Moreover, Code Cables usually create additional work for staff members in UNMIL and are often perceived as a burden, as they rarely serve as a method of individual visibility from the mission perspective. Third, communication practices are used to defend a certain amount of autonomy of DPKO toward the member states of the Security Council. This not only means communicative action is politically framed toward the interests in the Security Council, but it also explains a structural lack of strategic interest, as this diffuses responsibility of any mission failures.

The communicative behaviour within the mission perspective of UNMIL may also be summarised as protective in three ways: First, it protects the sources of power and influence of UNMIL within the political context of Liberia. Even though the mandate sets the legal framework, the ability to shape politics in Liberia is created locally, especially through effective self-information. The mission itself is the first recipient of the hierarchical information selection and interpretation process. Similar to the headquarters perspective of DPKO, the second form of protectionism focuses on the visibility and profile of the scope of action of individual UNMIL staff members. However, the methods in UNMIL differ to those in DPKO. Visibility and the protection of thematic territories are often linked with the prominence of the issue at stake. A formal connection to the subject of security, for example, promises attention and access to donor funds, as it is the top priority of the mission. The example of the development of the peacebuilding priority plan has shown how interference from New York, especially if it is connected to financial resources, can substantially disrupt the setting of individual organisational actors and lead to conflicts and defensive reactions within the organisational perspective of UNMIL. Third, UNMIL has developed mechanisms of information filtering and processing, which protects the mission from such interferences of DPKO. Especially the office of the SRSG in UNMIL serves as a buffer between the mission and DPKO, carefully controlling the

information that is sent to headquarters as well as processing incoming requests. This also includes protecting day-to-day work in the mission from demands for UNMIL withdrawal or defending a mission compromise for the biannual report of the secretary general from the requirements and interests of OO in DPKO, which are assigned with the final coordination and drafting of the document.

Organisational theory suggests that different perspectives in a complex and differentiated organisation provide the basis of day-to-day decision-making.[478] This study underlines the importance to include these internal dynamics of organisational life into the study of international peace operations. In the interaction processes with counterparts of UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, such as the member states in the Security Council or the government of Liberia, the overall organisational objectives or norms rarely determine the process and outcomes of negotiations.[479] Rather, organisational actors at different levels have to adjust to the interests of the other side. They also have to find ways to use their organisational perspective as a powerful stance as well as how to respond to the programmatic objectives of peacekeeping.

The findings of this study suggest that these dynamics and struggles can lead to organisational internal protectionism and dysfunction. Protective communication behaviour is mostly directed toward the defence of autonomy, scope of action, and recognition both at the individual and the organisational level. However, it undermines productive interaction beyond the limits of its own organisational perspective. It creates misunderstandings, sentiments, and conflicts within the organisational setting of UN peacekeeping. Moreover, it also prevents effective learning from experiences and the creation of institutional knowledge and memory that is not solely connected to personalities and interpersonal contacts. As important as it is to protect the autonomy of different organisational actors in a decentralised organisational system, it is also necessary to bridge differences with a systematic approach of information and knowledge sharing. In recent years, the UN has tried to implement some measures to enhance this exchange, such as the web-based Communities of Practice, which allow UN staff who are working on specific subjects to share experiences from all over the world.[480] However, as this study has shown, more effort should be made.

In conclusion, two suggestions for the development of the communication management in the organisation of UN peacekeeping can be made. The first approach should be based on formal arrangements, which allow for a systematic exchange or rotation of UN staff in order to experience

[478] see e.g. Luhmann, 2006, Orton and Weick, 1990.
[479] see e.g. Barnett and Zuercher, 2008, Zürcher et al., 2013.
[480] Interview 2E, DPKO, 2010, Interview 2K, DPKO, 2010, and Interview 1U, UNMIL, 2011.

and understand the different organisational perspectives of UN peacekeeping. The recruiting system currently does not enable such an exchange. Headquarters' staff often manages to gather some experience in the field. On the other hand, it is rather accidental that someone from UNMIL applies for a job in DPKO and manages to strive professionally in this very competitive environment.[481] However, a systematic exchange of mission staff could be helpful to decrease the sentiments in the field toward headquarters, as it enhances the understanding of the requirements within the headquarters perspective.

The second approach is to encourage increased informal exchange between the middle management staff in headquarters and missions. This type of informal interaction has often been discouraged by senior leadership in order to prevent any leaks and spreads of politically delicate information and rumours. However, professionals should be entrusted with the responsibility over certain information in order to informally exchange views and experiences with counterparts. Through such interaction, learning processes may be started and produce an added value in the work within the organisation of UN peacekeeping.

[481] Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011.

Part III DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

7 UN PEACEKEEPING AS ACTIVITY AND PRACTICE WITHIN A COMPLEX ORGANISATION

UN peacekeeping copes with the ambiguities and uncertainties it continuously faces both at post-war country level as well as those of international politics through its complex bureaucratic organisation. This thesis explores how organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy work. All three articles cumulated in this thesis contribute to an enhanced understanding of the processes of organising UN peacekeeping, generally showing that this process involves more than mere bureaucratic rationalisation. Rather, a complex organisation such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is a multidimensional space of social interaction which incorporates its own ambiguities and dysfunctions. UN officials have to cope with these processes in order to continue doing their jobs and shape peacekeeping activities.

The articles above are the result of two general research steps. The first is a theoretical assessment of UN peacekeeping as an organisation in action, which is presented in article 1 (chapter 4). The second research step is a qualitative case study of one specific hierarchical segment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, namely UNMIL and its headquarters DPKO. The results of this case study are presented in article 2 and article 3 (chapter 5 and 6). Cumulating both steps of analysis and the results of the three independent articles under the general research question of this thesis, two core lines of argument can be identified. The first is the notion that the organisation of UN peacekeeping is a complex space of social interaction which is shaped through the interconnections between tightly and loosely coupled organisational elements as well as formal and informal communication processes. Members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy not only navigate within this complex setting but also adhere to specific strategies in order to get their work done. The second general line of argument is that the complex organisation of UN peacekeeping includes various organisational perspectives. This not only means that UN officials at one specific locality prioritise rules and practices differently than others elsewhere in the organisation. They also actively protect specific local perspectives from intra-organisational interferences. In the following, these two general lines of argument are elaborated in detail.

7.1 The Organisational Space of Interaction within the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

In order to discuss the first general line of argument, it is important to briefly revisit the theoretical framework of analysis developed in article 1 (chapter 4) in order to reflect and contrast the empirical results of the UNMIL/DPKO case study. This framework builds on two general concepts of organisational theory: coupling and communication. On the one hand, coupling describes the distinctiveness and responsiveness of different organisational elements, whereas complex organisations such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy include a mixture of distinct (de-coupled) and highly responsive (tightly coupled) elements.[482] On the other hand, communication refers to the interactive and self-referential process of transferring information as well as creating and sustaining meaning and knowledge. Here, an important distinction can be made between formal communications which are interactive processes established through bureaucratic procedures, and informal communication processes which crosscut bureaucratic hierarchies and are often based on interpersonal trust relationships.[483] Both coupling and communication are interconnected analytical concepts. Taken together they form a field of tension in which the procedures and practices of UN peacekeeping are located. For example, some procedures such as delegation of authority emphasise distinctiveness (and thus refer to loose coupling) as well as formal communication as they are based on formal bureaucratic rules. Other formal procedures, such as reporting, are contrarily designed to ensure responsiveness and hence produce tight coupling of organisational elements. Moreover, there are also informal practices which increase responsiveness, such as local networks and management procedures based on interpersonal interaction. Finally, other organisational practices such as broad and open networks of knowledge exchange also often informally crosscut hierarchical arrangements or even organisational boundaries, but include criteria of distinctiveness (such as the subject of knowledge exchange) and hence foster de-coupling of organisational elements.

If this organisational field of tension is understood as a dynamic social space in which members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy (inter)act, it becomes clear that the procedures and practices located in this organisational space can be both assistance and hindrance for the efforts of individual UN officials. This space is dynamic because the individual UN official will never be able to only draw on one specific form of interaction but will have to use different formal and informal procedures that produce tight or lose coupling. In order to successfully cope with and manage the ambiguities and uncertainties of UN peacekeeping, officials must find a way to use the opportunities and avoid the annoyances within this organisational space. For this reason, it is a very important point of reference

[482] See i.e. Orton and Weick, 1990, Weick, 1976.
[483] See e.g. Elwert, 2000, Luhmann, 2006, Theis, 1994.

for members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy while reflecting local demands and activities in a post-war country as well as general programmatic concepts and policies of UN peacekeeping.

The empirical case study, UNMIL/DPKO, reveals two general strategies which UN officials follow in order to effectively participate in this organisational space of interaction and influence UN peacekeeping activities in Liberia (see article 2, chapter 5). Both of these strategies propose the use of various procedures and practices located in the organisational space defined by the nexus between coupling and communication. The first strategy is *getting work acknowledged*. This subsumes the efforts of UN officials to make their work visible and enhance its reception within the organisation. As the empirical analysis shows, UN officials have to use a variety of formal and informal tools to achieve this particular strategic goal. Formal hierarchical reporting is one way of creating visibility. However, the empirical data also shows that formal function and tightly coupled hierarchical procedures, such as formal reporting, may not be sufficient for work to be acknowledged. Hence, many UN officials at UNMIL and DPKO also rely on informal factors such as personal visibility and interpersonal trust relationships. The second general strategy is *making work relevant*. This approach includes efforts of connecting work with authority or knowledge through which it can qualify as a relevant aspect of UN peacekeeping activity in Liberia. Similar to the first strategy, UN officials cannot rely on procedures in one specific spectrum of the nexus between coupling and communication to achieve relevance. Rather, they must often adjust to the individual preferences of senior officials who are in the position to declare the relevance of a specific working process. Alternatively, relevance can also be achieved by gaining access and contributing to the knowledge which is developed and exchanged in local networks. This especially involves responsive and informal practices.

The importance of the two strategies to successfully interact within, and effectively navigate through, the organisational space between coupling and communication can be best explained through the following concrete empirical illustration. The following story of a dedicated UN official at a UNMIL field office trying to effectively respond to a case of arbitrary sentencing is a good example of the struggle it can take to manoeuvre within the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.[484] A local judge had sentenced four persons to lifelong prison for practicing 'witchcraft', even though 'witchcraft' is not a legal case according to Liberian law. The UN official at the UNMIL field office perceived it as his/her duty, as well as the responsibility of UNMIL, to pursue this case not only in defence of the four imprisoned individuals, but also in support of the rule of law in Liberia. The UN official responded to the case in different ways. At first, s/he used formal reporting as a

[484] The following paragraph is based on Interview 2L, UNMIL Field Office, 2011. See also Winckler, 2012, pp. 162-163.

method of creating awareness of the case at UNMIL headquarters. However, the field official's formal reporting did not create sufficient acknowledgement of his/her work within UNMIL. Moreover, even though the case may have been a relevant issue at field level, it initially had no relevance for UNMIL's activities at national level. Hence, the field official's reports did not trigger any response from his/her superiors in Monrovia who could have pushed for a release of the four individuals at national level. In his/her further efforts to pursue this case, the field official used different ways next to formal reporting to raise attention for the case. One method was to explain the case during field visits of high ranking UN representatives, senior management officials and ambassadors of UN member states. This method aimed at creating recognition and tried to make the case relevant through the authority of individual high-level UN representatives. Without having a strong and responsive interpersonal network within UNMIL headquarters, drawing the interest of an individual senior manager seemed the only chance the UN official had to make his/her work influential. After two years, things started to move at UNMIL headquarters. The field official had finally managed to get his/her work acknowledged there. However, due to a mistake made by the field official in his/her formal reports, UNMIL headquarters again dropped the case before it was made public or brought to the attention of the Liberian Ministry of Justice. The acknowledgement of his/her work was still not strong enough to bridge a formal mistake in the official's reporting. Despite this disappointment, the official continued to raise awareness for this case. During a visit of the SRSG to the county, the official finally managed to get the attention of a UNMIL senior manager who requested that the case documentation be handed over. Through the authority of the SRSG, this specific case became relevant for peacekeeping activities at UNMIL headquarters. However, the influence of the field official's work still was limited. Even though the four individuals sentenced for 'witchcraft' were released, the case had no effect on the overall reform of the Liberian justice system and the local judge who practiced this arbitrary sentencing remained unsanctioned.

This and other similar examples show the difficulties individual UN officials can have in pursuing their work in an effective manner. It not only depends on the relationship with Liberian counterparts but is also is a result of the organisational complexity of UN peacekeeping. To do their job, UN officials must use opportunities and work through the hindrances within the organisational space defined by the nexus between coupling and communication. There is no bureaucratic guarantee that work will have an effect. Rather, UN officials have to find ways to get their work acknowledged and make it relevant in order to secure its influence within the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The UNMIL/DPKO case study has also pointed out a lack of structural guidance for individual members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to successfully manoeuvre through its organisational space. Even though many UN officials would regard this intra-organisational action as daily routine, the example above also shows that much work, effort and potential remains unnoticed

and continues parallel to the influential streams of organisational discourse if a member is unable to create recognition and relevance.

7.2 Diversity and Protectionism within the UN Peacekeeping Bureaucracy

Getting work acknowledged and making it relevant can be identified as important strategies for UN officials to influence UN peacekeeping activities. However, the case study also points out that these strategies do not predetermine the use of certain procedures and practices. Rather, the empirical data reveals the diversity of how interaction is organised and decisions are made at various levels and locations of UNMIL and DPKO. Formal hierarchical positions and functions enable a certain amount of authority, yet they do not define the authority of an individual official or organisational unit. Rather, the UNMIL/DPKO case study shows that authority is often defined vaguely and stated through the performance of individual personalities interacting with other colleagues and adapting to local decision-making frameworks. Hence, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy does not only exist as one large framework in which interaction and organisational processes take place. Rather, it also incorporates multiple local frameworks which autonomously determine how UN officials interact, decisions are made, and peacekeeping activities are organised and processed. Such local interaction frameworks are not only based on formal delegations of authority, but also crosscut formal hierarchy through informal and interpersonal networks. This means that a certain degree of adaptation to the organisational demands of local interaction frameworks at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, as well as flexibility in the use of different procedures and practices located in the nexus between coupling and communication is necessary to achieve the strategic goals acknowledgement and relevance.

The example of the UNMIL field official and his/her efforts in response to a case of arbitrary sentencing can again be used to illustrate and concretise this observation. One important reason for the official's long-time failure of gaining acknowledgement of the case or making it relevant seems to lie in not having adapted his/her work to the demands of the organisational processes at UNMIL headquarters. Relying on the responsiveness of visiting senior management officials, who are simultaneously confronted with many other demanding issues during their visits to field offices, over a number of years clearly did not draw sufficient attention within UNMIL headquarters to the case. The field official admitted that s/he would not travel to Monrovia and directly 'push' such a case.[485] However, other empirical examples suggest that more personal interaction with mid-level headquarters personnel might have resulted in a higher visibility of the official's work within

[485] Interview 2L, UNMIL Field Office, 2011.

UNMIL.[486] Through closer informal ties at UNMIL's headquarters, the field official may also have had better acquaintance on what exact formalities are necessary in the decision-making process of his/her section. This may have prevented the formal reporting mistakes which undermined his/her efforts even after the official had gained recognition within UNMIL two years after the actual court sentencing. This example shows that adapting to local interaction frameworks can be very difficult. Clearly not every UN official has the opportunity, access and ability to sufficiently succeed in this process. Hence, it can make working processes within the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy both challenging and frustrating.

The adaptation processes are also difficult, because local interaction frameworks create different and autonomous perspectives on organisational processes and activities. These differing local perspectives not only describe their local positions and preferences, but also use communicative practices to protect their autonomy. The UNMIL field official above was stuck between his/her field office perspective concerned with local county politics and the headquarter perspective dealing with national politics in Liberia. The issue also included a conflict of, at minimum, two different substantive perspectives (rule of law versus political support of the Liberian government). Such competing perspectives incorporate different interests. They are also organised through the use of different preferential practices and procedures which serve and protect their particular interests. The criteria through which different UN officials reflect and judge a specific case such as 'witchcraft' can vary significantly. Hence, outcomes often are compromises between the various interests and preferences of different UN officials protecting different organisational perspectives. At times, such compromises can be very difficult to achieve within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.[487]

Article 3 (chapter 6) provides a detailed assessment of two prominent and broad organisational perspectives within UNMIL and DPKO, namely the disconnection between mission perspective of UNMIL and that of DPKO headquarters. This analysis not only shows the distinctiveness of the organisational perspectives advocated at UNMIL and DPKO. It also shows how communication procedures are used to protect the coherence, autonomy and influence of separate organisational perspectives. Within UNMIL's mission perspective communication procedures are used to protect its power and influence, particularly regarding the political context of Liberia. Moreover, such protective behaviour is aimed at integrating individual stances and other sub-perspectives within the organisational framework of the mission, as well as defending local working processes from DPKO interferences. Within the DPKO headquarters perspective, communication procedures are used to protect the basic principles and political powers within its organisation, such as the primacy of

[486] Interview 1V, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 1Z, UNMIL Field Office, 2011.
[487] In the case of arbitrary sentencing for 'witchcraft', the final compromise involved the release of the four individuals but refrained from demanding any reform of the justice system or sanctioning of the local judge.

political actors in comparison to military personnel. Moreover, it also protects the visibility of individual work by its personnel and defends a certain amount of UN peacekeeping autonomy against members of the Security Council.

The analysis in article 3 (chapter 6) shows that protectionism creates a coherency of individual perspective. However, it can also undermine meaningful interaction that goes beyond the limits of the own perspective. Examples, such as the interference of a delegation from New York into the preparation of the Liberian peacebuilding priority plan in 2011, show how input from another perspective can disturb the practices of UN officials acting within a particular local framework and provoke a hostile and competitive reaction rather than creating a cooperative and integrative activity. A lack of understanding of the interests and organisational arrangements within other perspectives also undermines joint activities such as drafting the biannual report of the Secretary General to the Security Council on the progress of UNMIL. This formal process becomes highly contested between mission and headquarters, as it serves different interests for both organisational perspectives. For the mission, this document brings together all the different substantive aspects, positions and activities organised within UNMIL towards one common goal. At DPKO, the report of the Secretary General is primarily a diplomatic document which has to be tailored towards the demands and interests of the Security Council.

The existence of different, decentralised perspectives that include various interests and indifferently prioritise organisational procedures and practices located in the nexus between coupling and communication are an important basis of day-to-day life and work within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. This allows it to be flexible and open to the different challenging environments it is facing. However, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy also tries to integrate and streamline the diverse decentralised frameworks. As the empirical case study of UNMIL/DPKO shows, such integration requires an enhanced understanding of the demands and processes located within different organisational perspectives. Moreover, such an understanding requires structural incentives and guidance. In the case of UNMIL and DPKO, the empirical data reveals a lack of such structure.

7.3 Concluding Remarks

Both lines of argumentation cumulated in the empirical case study UNMIL/DPKO mirror the propositions made in the theoretical framework of analysis (see article 1, chapter 4). They propose that the organisational procedures and practices located in the nexus between coupling and communication are the most important point of reference for UN officials. On the one hand, UN officials reflect on how to use organisational procedures and practices, rather than on the impact

peacekeeping activities may pose for their clients (such as the state and society of Liberia), in order to be influential within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The diversity in how organisational procedures and practices are arranged within various frameworks and perspectives at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy makes such a reflection process very difficult. On the other hand, the programme of UN peacekeeping is also reflected on the basis of rules and procedures located in the nexus between coupling and communication. As discussed in article 2 (chapter 5), many structural procedures are devoted to framing the reference documents produced by autonomous interaction frameworks and organisational perspectives according to predefined programmatic criteria of UN peacekeeping in Liberia. The use of hierarchical communication tools to reproduce the programme of peacekeeping is often a predetermined process that leaves little room for bottom-up approaches and the inclusion of local knowledge. The programmatic reference process does not adequately reflect the organisational diversity of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and its various activities and outcomes. Rather, the main point of reference in reflecting on the peacekeeping programme is the method and procedure of creating the substantive reference. Put differently, the programme of UN peacekeeping is not reflected according to its local outcomes and realities, but rather based on the organisational practices and procedures located in the nexus between coupling and communication. In conclusion, this self-referential process can lead to a detachment between activities of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and the programmatic values of UN peacekeeping. Despite the diversity of various interaction frameworks and perspectives within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, the programmatic development of UN peacekeeping is made stable and predictable.

Beyond the issue of programmatic reference and development, the UNMIL/DPKO case study especially outlines the local autonomies and freedoms that exist within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. These autonomies are exercised differently at various organisational levels and locations. They embed distinct organisational perspectives which incorporate and protect different interests. Organising UN peacekeeping essentially can be characterised as a political rather than a rationalised bureaucratic process. It involves shaping compromises between different interests and demands as well as balancing preferences in using diverse practices and procedures within the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. In order to cope with the dilemmas and ambiguities, UN officials have to engage in political negotiations within the organisation of UN peacekeeping. This opens much space for innovation and original thought in creating local solutions to local challenges. However, these intra-organisational politics can also lead to failures, a large amount of frustration and work which continues unnoticed and without impact within the influential streams of organisational discourse.

8 CONCLUSION

> The business model of the UN is highly chaotic.
>
> There are a lot of rules, but nobody follows them.
>
> Everybody is his own entrepreneur.[488]

The goal of a bureaucratic organisation is to break down complex problems such as post-war recovery into manageable solutions. UN peacekeeping only works because it is operated and implemented by its complex bureaucratic organisation – the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Mirroring the results of this thesis, the three statements above made by a senior UN official in New York controversially describe important characteristics of this bureaucracy. Like many other UN officials, s/he refers to UN peacekeeping as 'chaotic'. However, this does not mean that it is disorganised. In fact, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy includes many organisational rules. However, it also allows its members to find ways to pass on these rules. It includes extraordinary autonomies, freedoms and opportunities for its members to shape peacekeeping activities, follow specific interests, and decide what s/he wants to do or leave. UN officials act as an 'entrepreneur' rather than a civil servant. Hence, despite its organisation the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy itself is highly ambiguous.

This thesis cumulates three independent articles which all shed light on the organisational ambiguities of UN peacekeeping and generate an understanding of how the organisational processes of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy work. In order to capture its complexity and social dynamic, this thesis has developed a framework of analysis (see article 1, chapter 4) which characterises it as a organisational space in which its members interact on a day-to-day basis. This space is defined by the interconnection between coupling and communication, two fundamental processes in complex organisations. It incorporates various organisational procedures and practices that are grounded on different tightly or loosely coupled organisational elements and use formal or informal communication processes. In order to do their job, UN officials draw on combinations of these

[488] Interview 1Q, DPKO, 2010.

procedures and practices, trying to use opportunities and avoid hindrances within the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

The UNMIL/DPKO case study (presented in articles 2 and 3, chapters 5 and 6) reconstructs how UN officials interact and organise peacekeeping activities within one specific hierarchical segment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The empirical analysis reveals two general strategies which UN officials use to interact within the organisational space of UNMIL and DPKO and influence peacekeeping activities. The first is getting work acknowledged, which refers to efforts of UN officials to become recognised though enhancing their internal visibility. The second strategy is making work relevant, which includes efforts of UN officials to connect their work to authority or knowledge through which their work can be qualified as relevant. The case study also reveals the organisational diversity of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Even though UN officials use these general strategies, this does not predetermine the specific practices and procedures that are necessary to achieve acknowledgement or relevance at a specific level or location in UNMIL and DPKO. Rather, they incorporate various organisational perspectives, which include separate local frameworks of interaction, and prefer different practices and procedures that serve and protect their particular interests. Instead of mere rational bureaucratisation, organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy involve political interactions between its members. UN officials not only act as 'entrepreneurs' but also negotiate compromises between the interests of different intra-organisational stakeholders.

This chapter discusses on the theoretical contribution of the research results of all three articles cumulated in this thesis and the value for further research on UN peacekeeping. Moreover, the final section concludes on the practical implications of the research results and recommendations for the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

8.1 Transferability and Theoretical Contributions

The aim of this thesis is to provide a 'building block' to the study of peacekeeping interventions in post-war countries while contributing a specific view on the organisational dynamics within such interventions. The UNMIL/DPKO case investigated in this thesis is a typical representation of a hierarchical segment of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy (see section 2.2). Hence, even though the specific outline of multidimensional peacekeeping missions varies, the general patterns and organisational dynamics revealed through this case study can be expected to occur similarly at different hierarchical segments of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Moreover, the results are contrasted on the basis of a theoretical framework of analysis which is built on organisational

sociology. The inclusion of this theoretical background enables the following interpretations and investigations from an alternative theoretical standpoint. This enables a certain amount of transferability of the UNMIL/DPKO case study and allows following general conclusions and suggestion for further research.

One of the important questions in research on international interventions in post-war countries is how peacekeeping works and under what conditions it is successful. The work and success of UN peacekeeping clearly depends on many external factors in uncertain and ambiguous environments such as post-war Liberia. The research in this thesis adds an important factor to this research: the organisation of an intervention. To understand how peacekeeping works, it is important to understand how the bureaucratic organisation makes peacekeeping work. This thesis has shown that this includes more than a mere investigation of the organisation's effectiveness, its failures and dysfunctions as an international bureaucracy, or the efficiency of its management. The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is a dynamic social entity in which multiple decisions are made, projects implemented, information interpreted, and knowledge created. The UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is an organisational space which enables interaction between its members, organising and shaping peacekeeping activities. The UNMIL/DPKO case study shows that UN officials use strategies of gaining acknowledgement for their work and making it relevant in order to actively participate within this process. As these strategies are general and do not determine the use of any specific organisational procedures and practices, it can be expected that they can be similarly identified within other hierarchical segments of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Next to the interaction between members of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and actors within its organisational environment, the leverage and work of UN officials is influenced by their ability to apply these strategies within their own organisation.

Studies, which have included the organisation of peacekeeping interventions, often concentrate on a general bureaucratic 'framework' and 'culture' that streamlines and unifies the perspectives and activities of UN officials.[489] The results of the UNMIL/DPKO case study contrarily point out the organisational diversity within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. A complex organisation such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy includes more than one bureaucratic 'culture' or 'framework'. Rather, it incorporates various multiple perspectives and frameworks at different levels and locations in its organisation. The disconnection between UNMIL and DPKO examined in article 3 (chapter 6) represents a prominent divide between two broad organisational perspectives. This can similarly be found in many other hierarchical mission-DPKO segments of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. But as the case study also shows, there are more than this one specific divide within the UN

[489] See Autesserre, 2009, 2010, Barnett, 2002, Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, Piiparinen, 2008.

peacekeeping bureaucracy. Organisational perspectives and frameworks develop not only due to formal decentralisation policy and delegation of authority but also through informal networks and personal relationships. They are often created and preserved through the use of different ways and means to define and protect local autonomy. Hence, formal and informal decentralisation of authority and decision-making also creates differences between the concrete procedures and practices that are used to organise and shape peacekeeping activities at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. To achieve the strategic goals acknowledgement and relevance, UN officials have to adapt to these local practices and preferences. Rather than depending on guidance through a general bureaucratic framework, the leverage and work of UN officials depends on their ability to adjust to the fragmented and localised organisational frameworks within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

Next to organisational diversity, this thesis suggests that further research on UN peacekeeping should also include *organisational survival* as a decisive analytical factor. Even though organisational survival has often been overlooked in the study of international interventions in post-war countries, it is an important factor that helps to understand the ambiguities and dysfunctions of such enterprises. UN peacekeeping is an organisation which operates under multiple normative, institutional and political constraints. On the one hand the UN is an intergovernmental organisation that is governed by the principles of member state equality and sovereignty. On the other hand, peacekeeping is guided by international principles that apply to individuals, such as human rights or the protection of civilians. Moreover, it is engaged with other competing organisations in the area of post-war recovery and involved in volatile and very unpredictable post-war environments. Over the last two decades, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy has developed within these multiple constraints. From the perspective of organisational survival, the question of success of UN peacekeeping becomes a matter of organisational prevalence rather than actual impact. UN peacekeeping works if the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy thrives and develops. Protecting this development throughout deep crises and difficulties (such as major recognised failures in Rwanda and Bosnia, see chapter 3) is a major organisational goal of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

The basis for such organisational survival is a stable and predictable programmatic development of UN peacekeeping. Here, the general bureaucratic ‘culture’ or ‘framework’ of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy seems to become important. The analysis in this thesis shows that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy tightly controls the information and knowledge, which is used to develop its general programmatic framework. In the case of UNMIL/DPKO, this process is managed through a strict hierarchical vetting process of formal reference reports. This often seems to be a predetermined process in which the criteria for selecting information are predefined according to the programmatic

values of UN peacekeeping, as well as political preferences within the Security Council. However, this reference process neither adequately reflects the organisational diversity nor does it include the practical knowledge held within local informal networks and organisational perspectives at different levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Put differently, the programmatic development of UN peacekeeping is made stable and predictable through hierarchical control but does not represent the 'entrepreneurship' it enables 'on the ground'.

These findings mirror an important critique of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy in recent years, arguing that the UN would not sufficiently allow local demands for peacekeeping to influence the programmatic development and design of UN peacekeeping operations.[490] The analysis in this thesis provides an explanation as to why this is not the case. In fact, decentralised organisational frameworks and perspectives could provide an ideal basis for reflecting and including demand-centred 'local' knowledge for peacekeeping in countries such as Liberia. However, the strict streamlining of programmatic reference prevents such bottom-up development and feedback. In the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, local knowledge can qualify work as relevant in a local context but does not seem to provide the necessary relevance to influence the 'big picture' of UN peacekeeping as an international programme and policy. Hence, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy seems to incorporate a strong disconnection between its formal programme and its organisational practices.[491] The formal programme and structure does not necessarily organise and reflect the diversity of activities, but provides the foundation for the organisational survival of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

In conclusion, the analysis presented in this thesis represents basic research which raises important questions and topics for further studies. This especially concerns the effects of the organisation of UN peacekeeping on interactions beyond the organisational borders of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The inclusion of 'organisational survival' into the study of UN peacekeeping would be an important step in this direction. Even though this thesis does point to organisational survival, it does not provide an explanation, yet, as to how the normative, institutional and political tensions in which UN peacekeeping exists have an effect on the organisational performance of UN peacekeeping.[492] Based on the results of this thesis, one hypothesis could be that the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy with its diversity creates a buffer between institutional demands for organisational survival and peacekeeping activity.

[490] Autesserre, 2010, Campbell, 2008.
[491] This echoes the classical theoretical argument of Meyer and Rowan who suggest that within complex organisations, the formal rationalised bureaucracy is likely to be detached from the actual (informal) activities. See Meyer and Rowan, 1991.
[492] for one example of a study on the organisational performance of UN peacekeeping that goes in this direction, see Lipson, 2010.

A second important lead to further research is the impact of such organisational diversity on the peace process in post-war countries. Recent research has characterised peacekeeping and similar interventions in support of post-war recovery as continuous and multi-level political negotiations between intervening actors (such as the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy) and the intervened (such as the government of the Liberia or 'local' authorities).[493] The study of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy enables an extended view on the position and influence held by UN officials in these negotiations. On the one hand, organisational fragmentation could be a decisive weakness as it seldom provides a strong and coherent bargaining position, leading to unintended results and compromises. On the other hand, organisational diversity could be an important strength as it allows UN officials to concede local compromises and adapt to local demands without endangering the general programmatic development and organisational survival of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Similarly, further research could also investigate the influence of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy on the development of international peacekeeping policies and related aspects, such as the *responsibility to protect*[494]. For political interactions with member states on the intergovernmental level, the organisational fragmentation of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy could be an advantage as it protects its general programmatic framework from the continuous discrepancies, compromises and failures in the field. However, it also blocks much of its invaluable practical knowledge to become part of the negotiation and decision-making processes at international level. The effects of organisational diversity on such political negotiations should be studied through comparative research, for example, by contrasting several local organisational frameworks within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy and their negotiations with government counterparts.

Finally, the analysis in this thesis points to the organisational diversity of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy by recognising the importance of individual factors, such as personality, trust and individual visibility, in relation to formal structure and hierarchy. This means that the organisation and performance of peacekeeping often incorporate significant contingencies depending on the performance and preference of individual members. Research on UN peacekeeping has started to focus on the importance of specific individuals, for example, by analysing SRSGs as individual authoritative actors who occasionally may not strictly comply with the programmatic norms of UN peacekeeping and even initiate change through their controversial actions.[495] The results of this thesis suggest that such individual authority can be found at many levels and locations of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. With this it provides a basis for more in-depth research on how

[493] See e.g. Barnett and Zuercher, 2008, Bonacker et al., 2010, Neumann and Winckler, 2013.
[494] See e.g. \Chandler, 2004, ICISS, 2001, Thakur, 2002.
[495] See i.e.Karlsrud, 2013.

individuals can influence peacekeeping activities and why the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy relies on, and copes with, the contingencies created by individual action.

8.2 Practical Implications and Recommendations

Next to the theoretical contributions, the results of this thesis have strong practical relevance. In the conclusion, this final part concentrates on two important areas of practical implication which includes several recommendations for improving organisational processes within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy.

The first area is the political nature of the work within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Many UN officials commended the decentralised and diverse nature of the organisation as a strength of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. It not only allows flexibility in responding to a volatile and uncertain environment. It also provides UN officials with wide-ranging opportunities and freedoms to create and shape peacekeeping activities. This creative freedom and political work makes it an exciting place to work. However, this work only becomes valuable within the framework of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, if officials manage to get their work acknowledged or ensure its relevancy. Moreover, UN officials have to adapt to the interaction frameworks and preferences of local organisational perspectives. Hence, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy intrinsically relies on the ability of its members to participate in the intra-organisational political process in an effective way. It depends upon UN officials to act as 'entrepreneurs' within its organisational space. Without such ability, work is unimportant and has limited impact on organisational processes and peacekeeping activities. This not only leads to a lot of frustration, misunderstanding and internal conflicts but also externalises ideas, critiques, knowledge and talent that could be a benefit to peacekeeping activities.

The case study of UNMIL and DPKO indicates that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy lacks structural guidance for its individual members. Structure does not exclusively involve top-down hierarchical control. Rather, the decentralised structure of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy should be formally acknowledged, especially in providing more formal authority to diverse local decision-making arrangements. Recent missions such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan have implemented formal decentralisation by installing director-level heads of field office and cross-cutting State Operation Centres which, similar to JOC and JMAC at mission headquarter level, provide information analysis and operational coordination services for all substantive sections at field level. This can, however, only be successful if these decentralised units are provided with relevant resources, capacities and formal authority to be recognised and regarded as relevant by the other substantive sections.

Structural guidance could also include efforts to strengthen the abilities of individual UN officials to cope with, and productively engage in, political interaction within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Training could, for example, concentrate not only on substantive knowledge and its technical implementation, but should also include ways and means of implementation within the local organisational space and enhance the hierarchical competence of individual officials.

Finally, it seems very important that individual officials are encouraged and enabled to participate in informal communication processes. UN officials often seem afraid of risking career and job opportunities if they raise critique or say something inappropriate. In some cases such as the disconnection between UNMIL and DPKO, informal communication is even formally disregarded in order to prevent rumours from spreading at headquarters. Influential individuals in middle management, however, rely heavily on informal communication to receive acknowledgement and relevance regardless of their formal hierarchical position. Moreover, they manage to reach beyond their own organisational perspective and adapt to other local interaction frameworks. As described in article 3 (see chapter 6), formal arrangements that enable a systematic exchange of staff, for example between headquarters and mission, could be helpful in providing a better understanding and more experience of other organisational perspectives within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. The current recruiting system does not comprise such a systematic rotation of civilian substantive staff. For example, even though DPKO staff usually have some field experience, it is rather accidental if a UNMIL staff member, let alone a field official, manages to apply and successfully pass through the competition at DPKO.[496] Nevertheless, a systematic exchange of staff, also including mission field offices, could decrease sentiments and enhance understanding of the different requirements, interests and preferences of other organisational perspectives.

The second area of practical implication concerns the knowledge of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. In the course of the Brahimi reform processes DPKO has made significant efforts to professionalise the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy, including knowledge management and structures of organisational learning. The development of these structures has been a long vigorous political struggle within the bureaucracy.[497] As shown in the assessment of the organisational development in chapter 3.1, the result has been an increased functional differentiation of the formal structure of DPKO and peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy has developed knowledge, resource networks and platforms for specific technical issues such as security sector reform. The Peacekeeping Best Practice Section (PBPS) has also made extensive efforts in creating basic standards for peacekeeping operations that can guide especially inexperienced UN officials in

[496] Interview 1O, UNMIL, 2011.
[497] Benner et al., 2011.

the field.[498] However, even though the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy has produced some structure to support the collection of technical and issue-specific knowledge, the UNMIL/DPKO case study shows that practical experience and knowledge still seem to produce only localised relevance. The system of rigorously framing of reference documents, applied in order to control the programmatic development of UN peacekeeping, inhibits a substantive reflection and inclusion of practical knowledge in the 'big picture' and general framework of UN peacekeeping. Hence, much of the knowledge management and learning structures introduced in the last decade have encountered a large acceptance problem in the field as well as at headquarters. Knowledge management tools, such as the intranet, are perceived as 'useless' and 'user unfriendly'.[499] Best practice is sometimes regarded as an interesting input, if officials find the time to read the paper.[500] Learning and knowledge management structures often seem to be perceived as a separate organisational perspective. Instead of being included in the day-to-day activities, it seems to run as a parallel operation.

The problem here is that the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy loses a lot of potential in denying structural support for the inclusion of practical knowledge, experience and criticism in its programmatic development. As already noted above, the decentralised organisation of UN peacekeeping could be an ideal structure for listening to and redirecting efforts to 'local' demands of peacekeeping and peacebuilding rather than following the mechanisms of organisational survival and the demands of powerful member states in the Security Council. In order to introduce such a demand-focused approach of knowledge management, the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy would have to open structural lines of communication for its members at different levels and locations to share their information and knowledge beyond their local perspective and framework. Then, local activities might begin to be reflected in the programmatic development of UN peacekeeping. Moreover, knowledge could become a stronger factor that helps UN officials to qualify their work as relevant and so influence peacekeeping activities.

Even though such efforts are desirable, it is not only studies of organisational change that suggest that such reforms can be extremely difficult.[501] Rather, the challenges can already be observed through a brief examination of PBPS's efforts to introduce web-based bottom-up discussion forums, called *Communities of Practice*. The idea behind these platforms is to provide a secured learning space for professionals in specific substantive areas, enabling them to exchange experiences and practical knowledge even though they have never before seen each other. For this purpose, strict

[498] Interview 1M, DPKO, 2010.
[499] Interview 1P, DPKO, 2010, Interview 2E, DPKO, 2010.
[500] For example, see Interview 1F, UNMIL, 2010.
[501] See e.g. Brunsson and Olsen, 1993, March and Olsen, 1989.

rules of access as well as administrative moderation are used to compensate for the trust relationship of local interpersonal networks.[502] Several officials both in UNMIL and DPKO commended the *Communities of Practice* as an interesting tool.[503] However, it also quickly reaches its limitations as many users do not have the formal authority to share experiences beyond their official reporting lines.[504] Thus, in their attempt to pull knowledge transfer out of the personal realm and into a more open and formal space, the *Communities of Practice* quickly clash with the hierarchical system of controlling official reference documents which the forums try to circumvent.

This example of *Communities of Practice* makes clear that knowledge-sharing and learning processes are also part of the political and social interaction within the organisational space of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. Similar to other activities associated with UN peacekeeping, creating new and more enhanced methods of including practical knowledge on a broader level of organisational processes and development could undermine the powerful interests of other organisational actors and perspectives. Currently, such methods of knowledge sharing strongly are opposed by the organisational interests and practices of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy to secure its survival and protect its achievements and development from outside interference by the Security Council. Hence, even though such knowledge sharing procedures are desirable, their introduction evidently may lead to intra-organisational conflict, political negotiation and compromises.

[502] Interview 2E, DPKO, 2010, Interview 2K, DPKO, 2010.
[503] See e.g. Interview 1D, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1U, UNMIL, 2011, Interview 2M, DPA (former DPKO), 2010.
[504] Interview 1R, DPKO, 2010, Interview 1U, UNMIL, 2011.

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[505] This list only includes interviews cited in the thesis. For an overview of all interviews see Appendix B.

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Part IV APPENDIX

A LIST OF INCLUDED ARTICLES

This appendix provides a list of all separate articles cumulated in this thesis.

Table 4: Articles Included in Thesis

Reference Number in Thesis	Title	Year of Publication	Journal	Authorship
Article 1	Managing the Complexities of Intervention: United Nations Peace Operations as Organisational Action	2011	Peace, Conflict and Development, 18, pp. 83-103	Single authorship by Joel Gwyn Winckler
Article 2	Exceeding Limitations of the United Nations Peacekeeping Bureaucracy. Strategies of Officials to Influence Peacekeeping Activities within the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations	2015	*International Peacekeeping,* 22(1), pp. 43-64	Single authorship by Joel Gwyn Winckler
Article 3	Protectionism within the Organization of United Nations Peacekeeping. Assessing the Disconnection between Headquarter and Mission Perspectives	2014	Journal of International Organization Studies, 5(1), pp. 71-84	Single authorship by Joel Gwyn Winckler

B LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Appendix B provides a list of all semi-structured interviews conducted in Liberia and New York. Interview partners are all referenced as 'UN officials' to protect their anonymity. They are sorted according to the organisation level/department at which the interview partners are engaged. Broad categories of the substantive work areas of the interview partners are referenced in a separate column. These substantive work areas are not necessarily equal with the functional title of the officials, but rather should be understood as general descriptions of working areas within the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy. This list does not include background discussions (see bibliography).

Table 5: Interviews Included in Core Data of Analysis

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL/ORGANISATION	PERSON	TYPE OF INTERVIEW	WORKING AREA	PLACE	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	DATE
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	19 October 2011
DPKO	UN official	Single	Military	New York	2	7 and 11 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	26 October 2010
DPKO	UN Official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	25 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	25 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	19 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	20 September 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	15 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	22 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	15 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	22 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	19 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	26 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	20 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	14 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Military	New York	1	11 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	18 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Military	New York	1	21 October 2010

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL/ORGANISATION	PERSON	TYPE OF INTERVIEW	SUBSTANTIVE WORKING AREA	PLACE	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	DATE
DPKO	UN official	Single	Military	New York	1	7 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	12 October 2011
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	15 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	19 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Military	New York	1	11 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	19 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	19 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	22 October 2010
DPKO (former)	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	11 October 2010
DPKO (former)	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	12 October 2011
Field Office	UN official	Single	WFP Liberia	Liberia	1	17 March 2011
UNDP Liberia	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	17 September 2010
UNDP Liberia	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	24 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	29 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	04 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	16 September 2009
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	07 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	23 September 2010
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	2	15 September 2010 and 3/8 March 2011

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL/ORGANISATION	PERSON	TYPE OF INTERVIEW	SUBSTANTIVE WORKING AREA	PLACE	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	DATE
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	29 March 2011
UNMIL	Two UN officials	Group	Substantive	Monrovia	1	08 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	2	24 September 2009 and 1 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official and seconded UN official	Group	Substantive	Monrovia	1	28 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	24 September 2009
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	03 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	11 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	10 March 2011
UNMIL	Two seconded UN officials	Group	Military	Monrovia	1	23 September 2010
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	21 March 2011
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	07 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	23 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	16 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	14 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	Seconded UN official	Single	Military	Liberia	1	25 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	23 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	Seconded UN official	Single	Military	Liberia	1	16 March 2011

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL/ORGANISATION	PERSON	TYPE OF INTERVIEW	SUBSTANTIVE WORKING AREA	PLACE	NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS	DATE
UNMIL Field Office	Seconded UN official	Single	Military	Liberia	1	25 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	25 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	16 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	Two seconded UN officials	Group	Military	Liberia	1	17 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	17 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	14 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	17 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	8 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	Seconded UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	17 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	Two seconded UN officials	Group	Substantive	Liberia	1	23 March 2011

Table 6: Background Interviews Removed from Core Data of Analysis

ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL/ORGANISATION	PERSON	TYPE OF INTERVIEW	SUBSTANTIVE WORKING AREA	PLACE	AMOUNT OF INTERVIEWS	DATE
DPI	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	20 October 2010
DPKO	UN official	Single	Substantive	New York	1	26 October 2010
DSS	UN official	Single	Safety and Security	New York	1	26 October 2010
DSS	UN official	Single	Safety and Security	New York	1	21 October 2010
DSS	UN official	Single	Safety and Security	New York	1	22 October 2010
UNDP Liberia	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	2	16 and 24 September 2010
UNDP Liberia	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	16 September 2010
UNDP Liberia	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	15 September 2010
UNDP Liberia	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	30 March 2011
UNMIL	Two UN officials	Group	Substantive	Monrovia	1	20 September 2010
UNMIL	UN official	Single	Substantive	Monrovia	1	24 September 2010
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	25 March 2011
UNMIL Field Office	UN official	Single	Substantive	Liberia	1	16 March 2011

C INTERVIEW GUIDE

Appendix C encloses the outline used as general guidance during the semi-structured interviews. As noted in chapter 2.3.2, this interview guide was in no way all-inclusive and did not predetermine the interview. Rather, interviews often had an informal 'business meeting' character, and the interviewer often followed specific stories and themes told by the interview partners. The guide was used to remind the interviewer of important areas which might still be discussed during the interview.

Figure 13: Guideline for Semi-structured Interviews for Field Research in UNMIL and DPPKO

Introduction	Thank you for taking the time to talk to me. It is a great pleasure for me, because I think the discussion with will be very interesting and valuable for my research. <u>Introduction of person and general topic</u> I am researcher from the Free University Berlin (as you already know) and especially interested in the use of communication and reference mechanisms in the United Nations and their peace operations. The general question for me here is how you communicate in your daily work and if communication tools help you to do your work. This might be very obvious for you, as you are someone who is directly involved. But for me – from an external perspective – it is of course not. So the point here really is that I want to learn from your experiences and perspectives. <u>Mode of Interview</u> I will ask several questions which from different perspectives all connect to what I think is relevant to communication processes within UNMIL (or DPKO). Please feel free to answer to the questions on what freely comes to your mind. <u>[Taping</u> To be sure that none of the information gets lost – and in order to concentrate more on the discussion rather than on taking notes – I would like to tape our conversation. Is that fine for you? If you feel uncomfortable during the interview, you may just say and I can switch it of and on again, just as you like.] <u>Disclaimer</u> I will of course treat the information you will give me with great caution. Please be assured that I will protect your anonymity. Please let me know if you have any special requests concerning this issue. Have you got any further questions or shall we just start?
Opening Question	I would like to start the interview by specifying your professional involvement within the UN and its peace operation here in Liberia: You are *TITLE* in *OFFICE*. What range of tasks does this position include? o In a few sentences: what are the major difficulties for you to successfully complete these tasks? o How do you manage these difficulties as part of your daily work?

Formal Reporting Structure

Can you show me in which reporting lines your position is formally embedded?

- Organization chart

Do you issue/receive regular reports?

- Type of report.
- Where is it sent to and processed?

Types/Use of Reporting/Communication

What types of reports do you issue?

- Formalized reports
- Communications/briefings
- Preferred medium of communication?

What type of information do you normally include in your report?

- Strategy and Policy
- Public Information
- Recommendation (to take action)
- Progress report

How do you normally communicate with others?

- Access to other sections/departments.
- Informal network, gathering
- Example for collaborative work on project.
- Problems of communication (Example).

What is the main use of the reports you issue?

- Judge the importance of different communication channels
- Is reporting useful for your daily work?

Do you follow the history or progress of your reports?

- Do you know how the information you report is processed once you give it out?
- Is the information adjusted by those receiving it?
- How do you process sensitive information?

Reporting and Job Satisfaction

When is a reported piece of information relevant or important/irrelevant or unimportant?

- Your expectation.
- Does the expectation affect the way you issue your reports?

When do you think is a piece of information valuable within the UN and its peace operations?

- What makes you confident?
- Do you receive feedback?

Delegated Competences

Do you act on the basis of delegated competencies?

- Autonomy of action
- Definition of authority
- Supervision/monitoring/assessment of delegated competences

Are you in power to delegate competencies?

- Expectation towards the other
- Supervision/Monitoring/Assessment

Give an example of project/communication /work process ()

- Good or bad management/ coordination.
- Important factors for success.

Receive Information/Give Information

What is your main source of information you need to fulfil your tasks?

- Trustful advice
- Reports from subordinates
- Personal experience/education
- Best Practice/Training

What is the major source of the information you report?

- Informal communication
- Formal reports
- Personal experience

To whom do you directly respond?

- Hierarchy/Loyalty/Trust
- Informal communication/what does it mean for you? (Examples)

How do you verify information?

How do you share information?

- Circumstances in which you or colleagues refrain from sharing information (examples).

Impact Questions

How does your work contribute to UN peace operations (in Liberia)?

How do your reports contribute to UN peace operations, incl. collection of knowledge?

Do you know about the good use made of your reports in archives, knowledge gathering and decision making?

Closing Question

Before we close the interview, is there anything important you would like to add, or do you have any additional question?

Do you know any other UN official that may be interesting for me to talk to? If yes, can you give his/her contacts and would you give him/her a short notice?

I will be staying in Liberia for *another two weeks* and will come back for another research trip; may I approach you again, if I have any additional questions?

If you have any additional information, questions or comments please do contact me.

Thank you very much.

D INTERVIEW WRAP-UP FORM

In the first stage of transcription, all interviews were reflected in a wrap up form immediately after they took place. Appendix D makes this wrap up form available.

Figure 14: Interview Wrap-up Form

Interview Wrap-up		
Date of interview		
Place of interview		
Personal Information of Interviewee	Full Name/Code	
	Age	
	Gender	
	Formal Position/ Profession	
	Since	
	Prior Positions	
	Education	
	Place of origin	
First Impression *(kind of interview, own performance, sympathy with interview partner, non-verbal elements, character, behaviour of interview partner…)*		
Context Information *(where did the interview take place, how was the place, how did I feel…)*		
Further Contacts *given by inter-viewee*		
Further Comments		

E MAPS

Appendix E provides two maps of Liberia. The first is a geographical map including main roads and county borders. The second is a UNMIL deployment map from 2010, the year of my field research.

Figure 15: Map of Liberia (Source: UN, 2014a)

Figure 16: UNMIL Deployment Map, 2010 (Source: UN, 2010a, p. 82)