

# East Prussia 2.0: Persistent Regions, Rising Nations

Maria Polugodina  
Theocharis Grigoriadis

School of Business & Economics

Discussion Paper

Economics

2020/8

# East Prussia 2.0: Persistent Regions, Rising Nations

Maria Polugodina\*, Theocharis Grigoriadis†

## Abstract

In this paper, we examine the economic and political effects of the breakup of East Prussia into what is today Poland, Russia and Lithuania. We explore the dissolution of imperial regions into the boundaries of modern states, adding new insights to the research on the imperial legacies. We expect that German imperial legacies in the form of advanced economic institutions, and specifically East Prussian legacies of nationalistic and conservative political preferences, persist in the territories of former East Prussia in Poland, Russia and Lithuania compared to neighboring regions in their respective countries. We find no pattern of persistence in former East Prussian territories of contemporary Poland, whereas East Prussian persistence appears to be robust in Lithuania. We find strong evidence for the comparative persistence of political preferences in the Kaliningrad region, whereas we observe no economic spillovers. Drawing evidence from West German electoral data in the aftermath of World War II, we find that the presence of East Prussian refugees is conducive to conservative and nationalist support in the FRG. Hence, the East Prussian legacy relates primarily to the persistence of political preferences and migrating agents.

*Keywords:* institutions, political economy, political preferences, migration, East Prussia, West Germany

*JEL Codes:* F14, N74, O52, P51

---

\*Freie Universität Berlin, Institute for East European Studies & School of Business and Economics, Garystr. 55, 14195 Berlin, Germany, Tel. +49 30 838 72979, maria.polugodina@fu-berlin.de.

†Freie Universität Berlin, Institute for East European Studies & School of Business and Economics, Garystr. 55, 14195, Berlin, Germany, T: +49-30-838-57037, theocharis.grigoriadis@fu-berlin.de.


# 1 Introduction

It is widely accepted that cultural and institutional factors have a massive impact on economic behavior and economic development. Economic research on persistence of cultural traits has gained much momentum in the last few decades, and an important role is played by the literature on legacies of states long vanished. It includes studies of the European empires that broke down in World War I, and of the long-lasting impact of socialism. The case of Poland, in particular, a single state reborn from the ashes of three empires, is popular in the literature as it shows how cultural traits of the different empires have persisted for a century, even in a unified political and institutional space.

Our goal is to investigate the question of cultural persistence from a different perspective, namely, through a lens of state dissolution. If one installs different institutional environments in a homogenous region, will the similarities across this region persist? Our regional focus lies in the former German province of East Prussia, which, by the end of World War II, was partitioned between Lithuania, Poland and Russia (at that time as a member of the Soviet Union). The region's location within the modern states is illustrated in Figure 1. Like borders that vanish *de jure* but are *de facto* visible in socioeconomic data for decades, regions that vanish through such dissolution might remain visible for quite long. Especially in terms of geographically small regions like East Prussia, one can ask whether there is a tradeoff between nation-building, which culminated in the development of nation-states during the twentieth century, and the preservation of regional ties, both economic and cultural, which have existed for centuries. In economics, for example, geographic proximity and common history or culture are an important factor in economic integration (see, e.g., Anderson and Wincoop 2003, and Wolf et al. 2011). More broadly, there is still the debate in economic geography whether it is the region or its population that determines the distribution of economic activity.

In line with research on cultural transmission in families and through inter-family spillovers (see, e.g., Bisin and Verdier 2001), we study cultural persistence in former East Prussia through the lens of the demographic shock and pre-shock diversity in that region. Our empirical approach to capture “culture” is to compare political preferences, as revealed by voting outcomes, and entrepreneurial activity in and around former East Prussia. Using detailed regional data on modern Lithuania, Poland and Russia, we first investigate whether the regions of those countries located in former East Prussia are different from those located outside it. For Lithuania and Poland, we do so using the regression discontinuity design. In the case of Russia, as the region of Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg) is geographically detached from the “mainland”, we employ what is a novel method in economics: coarsened exact matching, an automated algorithm that stratifies covariates and offers the degree of post-matching covariate imbalance. Second, we also test for the similarities between the regions of the three countries in former East Prussia. Finally, as the region experienced a massive population outflow in the aftermath of World War II, we also investigate how the migrating East Prussians affected the political preferences in the regions they moved to.

Figure 1: East Prussia before World War II and the modern states



*Source:* Authors' work. Base map: GADM, HGIS Germany & ESRI Gray

We find differential patterns of East Prussian persistence across the Polish, Lithuanian and Russian territories of former East Prussia. In Poland, we observe no pattern of East Prussian persistence, with the former East Prussian territories of Poland exhibiting no significant difference in entrepreneurship in services that are more reliant on economic institutions, compared to the areas of Poland on the other side of the border. The same observation holds for political preferences: nationalism and political conservatism are lower on the East Prussian side of the internal Polish border. In Lithuania, in contrast, we observe strong patterns of persistence when we evaluate both political and economic outcomes. While the political legacy of East Prussia is significantly stronger than the economic one, we also find that economic institutions, as exhibited through entrepreneurship types, are stronger on the East Prussian side of the internal Lithuanian border. For Russia, too, we show that the East Prussian political legacies of nationalism and conservatism persist in Kaliningrad, whereas there is no evidence of persistence in relation to economic activity.

Moreover, we find that the massive population movement from East Prussia to other German regions after its partition between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1945 affected the voting patterns in the expellees' host regions in West Germany. In line with the historical patterns in East Prussia, the regions with higher shares of East Prussian expellees in total population tend to vote more conservatively and nationalistically.

These findings perfectly illustrate the persistence channel usually postulated, namely inter-generational transmission of values (such as political preferences) and transmission of skills and networks (conducive to economic development). We find that the regions where persistence is "broken" are those that were most ethnically homogenous and where

an almost complete population exchange took place after World War II. In contrast, we find evidence for persistence in Lithuania, where the Memel region was annexed as early as shortly after World War I and the German share of the population gradually decreased in the next 25 years. Thus the assimilation and gradual departure of the German population may have secured a better transmission. The absence of persistence in Poland is also in line with the notion of interrupted transmission and with the literature on migration, which states that migrating people are different from those staying in home regions (younger, more entrepreneurial, more liberal-minded). In fact, the voting patterns we observe today may well be the result of the selection bias of migration. The findings on West Germany also suggest that East Prussia “moved out”, with its population taking their preferences with them and voting accordingly in their new homes. Overall, our findings not only highlight the importance of inter-generational transmission (“the people”) in socioeconomic development, but also question the extent to which current studies on persistence implicitly rely on this channel.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we survey the related empirical literature on the role of culture in economics, border persistence, and the role of refugees on political polarization and economic development. In Section 3, we provide an overview of the historical development of East Prussia. In Section 4, we discuss our data and empirical strategy. Section 5 reports persistence results from the constituent territories of East Prussia. In Section 6, we discuss the effects of East Prussian migration on West German political outcomes. Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Related literature

The role of non-economic forces in economic behavior is gaining growing attention in the scholarly literature. This link is often set up through institutions and culture that can influence the determinants of long-term economic growth and hence have long-lasting impacts. The literature receiving the greatest attention is on domestic institutions as has been introduced by Acemoglu et al. 2001, Engerman and Sokoloff 1997 or La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008, who investigate mechanisms through which colonial rule affects current development and domestic political and economic institutions. In the context of our current investigation, relevant research refers primarily to the significant persistent impact of the institutional legacy of the former pre-WWI empires on economic, political and social development. Schulze and Wolf 2009 find that the political borders that separated the Habsburg Empire’s successor states after World War I became visible in the economy as early as from the mid-1880s onwards. They explain this effect of a “border before a border” by the rise of nationalism along ethno-linguistic lines, controlling for the role of physical geography, changes in infrastructure, and patterns of integration with neighboring regions outside of the Habsburg customs and monetary union.

Yet, despite this socioeconomic disintegration in empires before the war, the legacy of inter-imperial differences looks substantial. In Eastern and Southern Europe, Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007 shows that the Habsburg successor states in South-Eastern and Central Europe have more efficient institutions accommodating their modern market economies than the successor states of the Ottoman Empire. Grosjean 2011a; Grosjean 2011b has found negative and persistent effects of Ottoman rule in South-Eastern Europe on financial development and social norms of trust. Becker et al. 2016 identify a positive legacy of Habsburg rule on the lack of corruption and on the levels of trust in state institutions in Eastern European countries. Peisakhin 2015 explores how the division of a homogenous Ukrainian population between the Austrian and Russian Empires for almost 150 years has affected political attitudes and behavior in the regions that were subject to divergent imperial treatments. He surveys individuals in settlements within 15 miles (25 kilometers) of the historical Austrian-Russian border and shows that the two survey clusters differ in attitudes toward Russia and Europe. He refers to it as a “cultural legacy of historical institutions”. Lechevalier and Wielgoths 2013 discuss the effects of the borders between Poland and other countries, but additionally provide a broader view on border effects using evidence on Abkhazia and Israel. Furthermore, research on Ukraine (Löwis 2015), Czech Republic (Šimon 2015), Romania (Rammelt 2015) and Serbia (Tomić 2016) provides evidence for differences in social and political attitudes and for the reappearance of historical borders. Šimon 2015 also points out the importance of demographic discontinuity, with its negative effect on civic engagement. His findings on electoral turnout in the Czech Republic are in line with research of Urbatsch 2017 on effects of ethnic cleansing in Poland. We will show, however, that demographic discontinuity has more broad effects too.

In the case of Poland, research on the differences between three regions – former partitions by neighboring empires – is numerous. Such differences manifest themselves in physical infrastructure and technology (Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Hryniewicz 2003; Zukowski 2004), political behavior and voting patterns (Bartkowski 2003; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015; Wysokinska 2015), economic development (Bartkowski 2003; Wysokinska 2015; Zukowski 2004), interpersonal and institutional trust (Hryniewicz 2003), cultural capital (Lewicka 2005; Zarycki 2015), and social capital (Bukowski 2015; Lewicka 2005; Zukowski 2004). There is also a lot of research produced on the population composition of Western and Northern Poland. It deals with the local and regional identity of populations (e.g. Kozłowski 2003; Eberhardt 2010), social and cultural adaptation processes of new inhabitants (see the review in Michalak et al. 2011), collective memory and identity of displaced persons (Giedroją 2005; Wylgała 2014), integration within Poland (Sakson 2006; Wolf 2005), and identity after EU accession (Makowski 2008). Methodologically, recent studies of imperial legacies often rely on spatial regression discontinuity analysis to estimate discontinuous jumps in social, economic and political characteristics at the internal border of the former empires (Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary) in contemporary states (see, e.g., Bukowski 2015; Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2015). We use the regression discontinuity design for some of our hypotheses, but also apply additional methods to handle geographic discontinuities and differences across the

three countries in our data.

The majority of the literature discussed above focuses on the persistence of borders that no longer formally exist. The notable exceptions are Becker et al. 2016 and Grosjean 2011a; Grosjean 2011b, who focus on legacies of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, respectively, in several modern states in Central and South-Eastern Europe. A further important example is Beestermöller and Rauch 2014 on trade within the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The authors show that the successor states of the Habsburg Empire still trade more with each other than can be predicted by traditional models and explain this effect with the persistence of trading capital through cultural memory unrelated to personal contacts or networks. They identify this channel instead by excluding other possible transmission channels. Our goal is to focus on the persistence of certain attitudes in a region dissected by new borders and characterized by quite different demographic developments after that partition.

Most of the research explicitly or implicitly explains the persistence of border effects through the persistence of cultural traits. Culture is generally regarded as a fundamental determinant of economic development. North 2006, p. 4 defines “culture” as “the accumulated beliefs and inherited institutions from the past that provide the framework within which we begin thinking about [research] problems”. Tabellini 2010 proposes that culture is shaped by contemporaneous social interactions as well as the cultural traditions inherited from earlier generations and finds that the proxies for culture are quantitatively significant determinants of per capita GDP levels and growth rates across European regions. An important theoretical contribution in this regard is that of Bisin and Verdier 2001, who show how cultural traits of children are formed by family socialization and the social environment of their neighborhood. They argue that the socialization efforts of parents inside the family are higher in more diverse societies, thus leading to stable equilibria with high cultural heterogeneity. In more homogenous societies, much of socialization is transferred from the family to the society. An implicit conclusion one might draw is that, in more diverse societies, cultural persistence can be more resilient to large-scale demographic shocks as it is less dependent on the social ties outside the family. Another relevant contribution on preference persistence is that of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, who study German division and reunification and argue that it will take one to two generations for East Germans’ preferences to converge toward those of West Germans completely. This implies that dismantling the differences in preferences takes about as much time as it does to develop them in the first place.

Specifically when discussing the persistence or transmission of political preferences, we have to take into account the massive flow of refugees from the eastern regions of Germany into what was to become the FRG and the GDR (as discussed in the next section). Here, it is also important to take into consideration the literature on the formation of political attitudes and the impact of migration. Especially relevant here is the large body of literature on migration and right-wing party preferences. Increased migration has been shown to be correlated with higher levels of right-wing and extremist right support, especially among the poorer and less educated population (Corneo 2010; Decker

et al. 2014; Falk et al. 2011; Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006; Shayo 2009). The argument also generalizes to the overall perceived threat of migrants to the natives, e.g. also because they bring other attitudes and cultural traits with them (Berning and Schlueter 2016; Decker et al. 2014; Konitzer and Grujić 2009). Interestingly, however, people tend to react with less hostility to refugees (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2006), and the evidence on the relation between the influx of refugees and right-wing party preferences is mixed (Konitzer and Grujić 2009; Sekeris and Vasilakis 2016; Steinmayr 2016). This relation depends on, among other things, the integration of the refugees (Böhm et al. 2018; Konitzer and Grujić 2009; Steinmayr 2016), which can be facilitated by refugees' own skills, a favorable economic situation in the host regions or cultural similarities (Braun and Dwenger 2018; Cheung and Phillimore 2014; Gericke et al. 2018). At the same time, the way the governments handle the influx of refugees echoes in right-wing party preferences (Hälbig and Lorenz 2019; Steinmayr 2016). That being said, right-wing party preferences and anti-migrant attitudes are not always fueled by the (actual) migration. There is evidence for intergenerational transmission of these preferences – the channel of preference persistence also discussed above (Avdeenko and Siedler 2017). Related to this, Ochsner and Roesel 2016 show how refugees themselves having more nationalistic attitudes influences the voting patterns of their host regions in the long term. This finding connects directly to our hypothesis on the influence of the expelled East Prussians in their host regions, as to be discussed below.

### 3 Historical background

The German presence in Eastern Europe dates back to the beginning of the thirteenth century, when the Teutonic Order started its crusades against the pagan Baltic tribes (Jasinski 1993). Prussian borders started taking more permanent shape in the fifteenth century, with the eastern border determined in 1422 and remaining unchanged until the end of World War I (Forstreuter 1955). In the west of Prussia, the fifteenth century brought the Teutonic Order losses to the Polish Kingdom, and the second treaty of Thorn in 1466 defined the Prussian border in the west and south for three centuries to come, until the first partition of Poland in 1772. The centuries-long warfare led to depopulation of the region by native Baltic peoples, especially in the eastern borderlands. The population losses were mostly recovered through migration of the German population into the region, thus leading to large-scale Germanization of Prussia (Forstreuter 1955).

In 1525, the Teutonic Order's Grand Master Albert of Brandenburg converted to Lutheranism and secularized the Prussian territories, converting Prussia into a hereditary duchy, which was inherited by the elector of Brandenburg in 1618. In 1701, Frederic III of the House of Brandenburg was crowned "King in Prussia" Frederic I in Königsberg, uniting Brandenburg and Prussia into one Kingdom of Prussia. What was originally the Duchy of Prussia would later become the province of East Prussia (Solsten 1996). The borders of Prussia changed significantly around the turn of the nineteenth century. Through the partition of Poland, it regained the territories lost through the treaty of




Thorn, while also receiving substantial lands in the east and south. Some of these were, however, lost to the Russian Empire during the Napoleonic wars. The borders set in the Congress of Vienna would remain unchanged for a century, until the end of World War I.

Ever since the secularization of Prussia, the duchy, and later the province of East Prussia, was the stronghold of German agricultural nobility (Berdahl 2014). While industrialization transformed western regions of Germany throughout the nineteenth century, East Prussia was almost untouched by this process. The main economic sector was still agriculture, and most industry was mainly supplementary to it or was based on raw materials produced locally or, especially towards the end of the century, imported from the Russian Empire (Ambrassat 1912). Being located along the shore of the Baltic Sea, East Prussia also had several important seaports, Königsberg being the main one. The export goods were primarily grain and wood, again not only produced locally, but also increasingly shipped from the Russian Empire by internal waterways (Ambrassat 1912). Thus, it is not surprising that, politically, East Prussia was also a stronghold of conservatism and growing nationalism in the German Empire. It was one of the largest supporters of conservative Lutheranism and, towards the second half of the nineteenth century, with Russia rising as a direct competitor in agricultural production, also of protectionist trade policy (Beck 1997).

In terms of population, the long history of Prussian state formation led to very high demographic diversity in the east of the Kingdom of Prussia (and later of the German Empire). Figure 2 shows an extract of a 1906 map of ethnicities in Central-Eastern Europe. The border of the East Prussian province followed the course of the Vistula river (German: Weichsel), yet shifted a few kilometers to the east, so that the city of Elblag (German: Elbing) was at this border on the West Prussian side. Within the nineteenth century borders, especially in the provinces of West Prussia, Posen and Silesia, there was a substantial Polish population, leaving the Germans a minority in many areas (especially in the countryside). East Prussia was much more homogenous, with an almost purely German population in the north, but Polish majorities in some southern areas and a slight Lithuanian majority in the Memel region (Eberhardt 2002). The complex demographic structure in the south, however, differed from the Polish areas in other German provinces. A large share of the East Prussian Poles were Evangelical Protestant Masurians, who mostly considered themselves neither Polish nor German, even though many adopted either Polish or German identity (Eberhardt 2002).

Thus, the national conflict rising in the German Empire at the end of the nineteenth century touched East Prussia to a lesser extent. The suppression of the Catholic Church through Bismarck's Kulturkampf was less critical for the Protestant Poles, and the predominance of Poles in areas where they were in the majority was usually not as substantial as in other provinces, although the imperial policy of Germanization naturally contributed to tensions in East Prussia too (Eberhardt 2002; Tilse 2011). Co-habitation of Germans and Poles resulted in extensive cultural exchange, and much of the population (especially among the Poles) was bilingual. Also, mixed marriages were quite common in the Prussian East. Many Germans and Poles could adopt either Polish or German

Figure 2: Ethnic groups in Central Europe in 1906



Notes: The color red denotes prevalence of German ethnic groups. Green and light green denote prevalence of Polish and Russian/Belarusian populations, respectively. Gray denotes prevalence of Lithuanian population. The bold gray line delineates the border of the German Empire in 1906. Source: Scobel 1906, p. 31.

identity, depending on what was more advantageous in specific situations (Eberhardt 2002). Thus, for example, Tilse 2011 speaks of the process of cultural transnationalism, instead of exchange or assimilation.

The situation was similarly less intense in the Memel region (in Figure 2, the area with the Lithuanian majority in the north of East Prussia, between the Neman river (German: Memel) and the state border). Despite the Lithuanian national identity generally having developed relatively late (Staliunas 2016), most of the conflict on the Russian side increased, while the population in Lithuania Minor (Memel region) did not actively identify themselves with a Lithuanian nation. Even the naming of the “two” nations was different in the Lithuanian language (Vareikis 2002). On top of that, Lithuanian nationalist discontent was directed against the Polish population, predominant in the south of Lithuania and in Vilnius, rather than against the Russians or Germans (Staliunas 2016; Vareikis 2002). As a result, the Lithuanians in the Memel region were much less eager to separate from the German Empire and unite with Lithuania Major – the part of Lithuania under Russian control (Vareikis 2002).

Border re-drawing in the 1919 Paris Conference in the aftermath of World War I was

primarily based on the ethnicity principle, which resulted in huge territorial losses in West Prussia, Posen and Silesia and, later, in silent acceptance of the separation of the Memel region from East Prussia (compare also the borders of 1914 and 1933 in Figure 1). The very mixed demographic structure in the south of East Prussia, however, made use of ethnicity principle there virtually impossible, so the peacemakers had to take the will of the majority of the population into account (Eberhardt 2002). While the results of the plebiscite raised discontent in the reborn Polish state (Wrzesinski 1985), the outcome was an almost unchanged southern and western border of East Prussia for a further thirty years to come.<sup>1</sup> During the interwar time, the German share of the population in the Memel region gradually decreased, but, with generally good German-Lithuanian relations, no massive outflows occurred (Eberhardt 2002; Nikzentaitis 2002).

An important outcome of the Versailles treaty, however, was the major discontent in the German provinces about the new borders, especially those in the east, with this remaining a public issue well after the treaty came into effect (Harvey 2000). Nationalistic organizations and political parties actively used this issue in their rhetoric, especially focusing on the preservation of the “Germandom” and military and cultural vulnerabilities created by the new borders (Harvey 2000). In addition, the eastern provinces were largely agricultural, making them more prone to nationalism due to both the overall lower income level of the population (Friedrich 1937, see also Section 2) and the farmers’ high dependence on their place of birth (Friedrich 1937). With Germany already being in a difficult economic situation as a result of after-war hyperinflation and unsettled reparations issues, the Great Depression aggravated the economic distress. East Prussia, now also in its disadvantageous position as an exclave, suffered severely from the crisis (Harvey 2000). By 1933, East Prussia became one of the major supporters of the nationalists (see also Figure C.3 in the Appendix).

The German territorial losses in the East were drastic after World War II. The rest of East Prussia first became a Soviet occupation zone and then was divided between Poland (constituting the Warmińsko-Mazurskie voivodship) and the Soviet Union (with the city of Königsberg, renamed Kaliningrad). As the Soviet army advanced into East Prussia in early 1945, the inhabitants massively fled from their homes. Those who had remained in the occupied areas east of the Oder-Neisse line until the end of the war were expelled in the next few years. The majority of Germans left East Prussia by the end of 1945, as shown in Table 1 for East Prussia as a whole and each of its districts (Regierungsbezirke). Especially before their expulsion by the Polish and the Soviet governments, the easiest way for people to leave East Prussia was by way of the Baltic Sea. Thus the entry points for the East Prussian expellees in the West were mostly in the north of Germany. As a result, in West Germany most of the East Prussian expellees landed in Bremen, Hamburg, and the states of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony.

The massive inflow of the population from the former eastern provinces – but also from the Soviet occupation zone – required that the West German authorities be actively involved

---

<sup>1</sup>In fact, the western border of East Prussia was moved further west to accommodate a small part left in the east of the former West Prussia into the province.

Table 1: The number of refugees from East Prussia, 1944-1955

	East Prussia total	RB Königsberg	RB Gumbinnen	RB Allenstein
1944	185701	25118	134326	24886
Jan 1945	551734	305129	33585	117951
May 1945	74725	33620	13954	19084
Aug 1945	32817	11546	2250	14419
1946	23834	7997	1681	5358
1947	19924	12828	908	4154
1948	11105	9020	958	934
1949	843	408	131	217
1950	526	118	119	209
1951	111	59	29	10
1952	121	49	18	42
1953	391	116	81	151
1954	278	109	27	122
1955	210	43	29	118


*Source:* Besser 2007

in managing this migration. They determined the places of settlement for the expellees and refugees, with local economic conditions playing a minor role – the choice was mostly driven by the availability of housing (Braun and Dwenger 2018). The expellees were then prohibited from changing their residence until 1947, after which they could only move with the permission of the authorities. The relocation ban was completely lifted in May 1949, with the result that the geographical distribution of expellees was almost the same in 1950 as in 1946 (Braun and Dwenger 2018). East Germans (including East Prussians) were quite similar to the native West German population in most socio-demographic characteristics (such as age and education) (Braun and Dwenger 2018). However, they were distinguishable, for example, by their eastern dialect and often treated as foreigners in their host settlements (Glück and Sauer 1997). The distribution of the East Prussian expellees was highly uneven across the states of West Germany, reaching up to almost 15% of the total population in some districts of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony but barely exceeding 2% in the southern states (see Figure 3).

Back in East Prussia, of some 1.2 million of its former German inhabitants, a total of a few thousand remained in the three new states throughout the Cold War period (Eberhardt 2002; Zyromski 1985). The demographic shock was somewhat less severe in Lithuania, since as early as 1925 only 43.5% of the population in the Memel region was German, and this share decreased even further during the interwar period (Eberhardt 2002, p. 40). Also, unlike Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania was little affected by Soviet internal migration. Some Russian population came to the republic throughout the Soviet period, mainly as employees in the bureaucracy, military staff and technical staff working on industrialization plans. These migrants, however, remained quite dispersed across



Figure 3: Share of East Prussian expellees in FRG population, 1950



*Source:* Authors' work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011a, population data: see Table A.1

towns and in the countryside, and their total share was kept very low by the fast natural growth of the Lithuanian population (Eberhardt 2002).

In Poland and the Kaliningrad region, on the other hand, the aftermath of the war meant an almost complete exchange of population. In the new Polish Warmińsko-Mazurskie voivodship, no more than 25% of the population were pre-war residents. The huge loss was recovered mainly through in-migration from the Warsaw region and former eastern Poland (which was ceded to the Soviet Belarus after the Second World War) and largely comprised a younger population (Zyromski 1985). In the Kaliningrad region, the effect was even more devastating, as the north of East Prussia was a predominantly German region before the war. Population replacement there was complete. While loyalty to the regime of course played a role in the choice of the settlers, the choice of source regions for resettlement tended to be driven by convenience: the Russian-speaking population mostly came in from the regions of Pskov and Smolensk, and in rural areas also from the “black earth” region in Central Russia and Ukraine, which combined proximity to Kaliningrad and a relatively high population density (Diener and Hagen 2011; Eberhardt 2002).

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, migration was quite mild, relative to what happened during and after World War II. For example, in Poland, the total yearly number of newcomers in internal migration between voivodships rarely reached 2% of the incumbent population.<sup>2</sup> Several thousand ethnic Germans appeared in the first post-Soviet census, but, it seems, these tended to be bilingual Germans, who proclaimed themselves Polish after the war to avoid expulsion (Eberhardt 2002). Moreover, their share in the total (Polish) population was still negligible. Similarly, a few thousand ethnic Germans moved to Kaliningrad from other regions of the former Soviet Union, but here too they were too few to constitute any meaningful minority (Eberhardt 2002). Thus, one can safely assume that the current population in former East Prussia is mostly comprised of the descendants of after-war migrants. In Lithuania, however, there is still a substantial share of descendants of pre-WWI inhabitants.

## 4 Data and methodology

### 4.1 Hypotheses

While our case focuses on the legacy of one region, instead of the long-term effects of borders, the underlying question is quite similar. Our expectation is that culture is persistent. It is transmitted directly by people in their families, but also indirectly through neighborhood socialization and the choice of the socialization environment. A solid theoretical foundation for both direct and indirect channels was suggested by Bisin and Verdier 2001. Moreover, as the literature discussed in Section 2 suggests, not only does it take decades to level out the differences created by varying institutional settings, but it also takes a similarly long time to create such differences by installing varying institutional settings in the first place. More specifically, we might expect that the legacies of East Prussia are persistent and still traceable in all three states under consideration. One can apply the argument of imperial legacies, with long-lasting institutional impact, not only to differences within one modern country, but also to our opposite case. Some features of East Prussia apply more to this particular province and less to the German Empire as a whole (and even less so to the diverse regions of the Russian Empire). Thus, we may expect that:

**Hypothesis 1.** *In modern Lithuania, Poland and Russia, the regions located in former East Prussia and those located outside former East Prussia show differences in culture as captured by political preferences and entrepreneurial activity.*

At the same time, given the relative homogeneity within East Prussia, we can also expect that the regions formerly located in East Prussia are even more similar across the modern state borders if intergenerational transmission takes place:

---

<sup>2</sup>Authors' calculation based on official Polish statistics.

**Hypothesis 2.** *In modern Lithuania, Poland and Russia, the regions located in former East Prussia are less different across the modern borders than regions located outside former East Prussia.*

The idea behind the persistence argument is that, even though the population structure was mixed in some areas of East Prussia, cultural assimilation (or cultural transnationalism) between the Germans and the Poles or Lithuanians, respectively, provided for a certain level of homogeneity in values. By simple historical predominance of the German population in East Prussia and through the effects of German schooling, the relations developed more in direction of Germanization of the Polish and Lithuanian population than vice versa. Thus, even if the German population moved out of the region, the remaining Germanized Poles and Lithuanians would transmit the attitudes to their descendants, and also possibly to the migrants coming into the region. In addition, the political and ideological systems were quite similar in all three states between 1945 and 1989, as Lithuania was directly a part of the Soviet Union and Poland was largely under Soviet control. Thus, for more than a half of the partitioning period, the possibilities for the three states to drift apart were limited. The divergence was more likely to unfold during the transition period.

The major argument against any persistence is, of course, the scale of the after-war demographic shock. With most of the population decimated in the regions ceded to Poland and the Soviet Union, remaining inhabitants were likely too few to transfer any values to the migrants coming to fill the demographic vacuum. If anything, they might have been more likely to assimilate with the migrants if these had any unifying value sets.<sup>3</sup> Given the scale of the demographic shock in the Polish and Soviet parts of East Prussia, it is likely that the patterns of persistence postulated in Hypotheses 1 and 2 will not be present to the same degree in the three countries under investigation.

Furthermore, in view of the transmission channel discussed above, the follow-up question we pose is: Did East Prussian migrants affect the voting patterns in West Germany, either through their own preferences or through the reaction of the native population to the migration inflow? The inter-generational transmission of values postulated as the main channel in most studies of persistence is based on individuals' values and preferences. While being forced to leave home for a new region is certainly, among other effects, a massive psychological shock, there is little reason to believe that the values a person developed during his/her entire life would be completely reversed by this shock.

---

<sup>3</sup>Another argument might be that the development during the Soviet era was shaped by military interests, especially in Kaliningrad as the main Soviet naval base in the Baltic Sea. While this role of Kaliningrad definitely had an impact on economic development in the region and the city of Kaliningrad was essentially a closed military area until the 1980s (Diener and Hagen 2011), the hinterland resembled the countryside in other Soviet regions, and the focus on military manufacturing can well be considered a mirror to the general disequilibrium in the Soviet economy, with excessive attention to heavy industry. Structural and regional imbalances were characteristic for all of the Soviet Union (Escoe 1995). Thus, while the military importance of Kaliningrad might have contributed to the creation of new identities and values in the region, it is unlikely to be the most important factor.

Therefore, we hypothesize that the political preferences were affected in the regions where the East Prussian refugees found their new homes immediately after the war:

**Hypothesis 3.** *The regions in the FRG that hosted more East Prussian refugees were characterized by more conservative political preferences and higher support for nationalistic parties shortly after World War II.*

## 4.2 Data


We have collected statistical data on political and socioeconomic outcomes in Lithuania, Poland and Russia. The political data are compiled from official statistics and are treated as cross-section datasets, even though the elections do not coincide in all three countries. We, however, chose elections whose timing was closest to each other, and focused on the period before 2014, so that the outcomes are not influenced by the deteriorating East-West relations or entry of openly populist parties and candidates into governmental bodies. We consider parliamentary elections of 2011 (Poland, Russia) and 2012 (Lithuania) as a cross-sectional dataset. The data include the turnout and the number of votes for each of the parties, which we coded along the political spectrum (left-right position) and ideology (liberal, conservative, nationalist, etc.). We can, thus, calculate the share of votes that conservative or nationalistic parties received in respective elections. While we admit that survey data on political preferences would reflect the attitudes better than the political outcomes, we are limited by the geographical representation of such surveys, which is critical for an analysis of the attitude differences in this relatively small region. The election data on very low levels of administrative division are, however, readily available.

The dataset for Russia is compiled at the county (*raion*) level, which is the second level of administrative division. In addition, due to the country size, we only look at the counties within former East Prussia and in the neighboring regions of the western mainland of Russia (regions of Leningrad, Smolensk, Bryansk, Pskov and Kursk). For Lithuania and Poland, the data are available at the third level of administrative division (*gmina*) in Poland and for polling districts in Lithuania. As a result, we analyze a total of 158 counties in Russia, 2480 *gminas* in Poland and 2000 polling districts in Lithuania. Figure 4 offers a visualization of our political dataset for Lithuania, Poland and Russia with respect to conservative political preferences and in relation to the former East Prussian region (for electoral turnout and nationalist political preferences see the respective Figures C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix).

With respect to economic outcomes, we collect data on the number of enterprises in different sectors based on the first level of the NACE Rev. 2 classification. In the case of Lithuania, the data on sectoral employment are additionally available. It is also the most geographically detailed dataset, based on a grid map of Lithuania, with the size of grid cell equal to one kilometer. With four years of data from 2015 to 2018, this generates a total of 29,963 observations. In the case of Poland, the data are based on the administrative divisions and are collected for *gminas* for the years 2015-2017, with a total



Figure 4: Share of votes for conservative parties in parliament elections in Lithuania (2012), Poland, and Russia (2011): East Prussia and neighboring regions




Source: Authors' work. Base map: GADM & ESRI Gray, election data: see Table A.1

of 7,434 observations. Finally, in the case of Russia, the data are collected for districts (*raions*), as is the case for electoral data too. Some districts are missing, however, and the classification of sectors was only harmonized with the NACE classification of 2017. Thus, with the two years of data, we are left with 274 observations.

In order to explore Hypothesis 3, we collect the data on the 1949 Bundestag election results by electoral districts, which we code along the ideologies of participating parties so as to calculate the share of votes received by conservative and nationalistic parties. To calculate the density of the East Prussian refugees, we use the number of refugees from each former eastern province in each of the West German districts (*Kreise*) reported in the population census of 1950 (Braun and Dwenger 2018). We then calculate the share of each province's migrants in the total population. To control for other socioeconomic variables and political preferences before the war, we also utilize the electoral and socioeconomic data of 1920-1933 compiled by Falter and Hänisch 1990. The *Kreise* are then aggregated to 194 "mega-districts" to handle the geographical mismatch between the electoral and the administrative districts. Figure 5 offers a visualization of our political dataset for West Germany with respect to conservative political preferences (for nationalist political preferences see Figure C.4 in the Appendix).

Figure 5: Share of votes for conservative parties in parliament elections in the FRG, 1949



Source: Authors' work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011a, election data: see Table A.1

### 4.3 Methodology

Our approach is mainly based on a regression discontinuity design. The underlying assumption is that the border of former East Prussia is exogenous. Throughout the formation of the Prussian state, the borders were determined by warfare and negotiations with Poland, Lithuania and later the new neighbor, Russia, and often cut through historical ethnic areas. After World War II, the border between Poland and the Soviet Union did not follow any ethnic or economic criteria either, but rather was determined by the balance of power and strategic military considerations. The only case where a border was more or less determined by ethnic composition of the area's population, was the separation of the Memel region through quiet acceptance of Lithuanian annexation. However, as we showed in the previous section, the German population in the region was quite substantial, and the Lithuanian population was Germanized. The argument of inherent national unity with Lithuania Major was thus questionable. Lithuanian influence in the Memel region was indeed weaker than the German in the interwar period (Vareikis 2002). In addition, the new border quite conveniently followed the course of the Neman River, although there were also some predominantly Lithuanian areas south of the river,

which remained in East Prussia (see also Figure 2). Therefore, we can safely assume that the borders of both East Prussia and the successor states were drawn exogenously.

### 4.3.1 Robust RDD in Poland & Lithuania

The absence of territorial continuity between the Kaliningrad region and Russia does not allow us to perform the robust regression discontinuity design as introduced by Calonico, Cattaneo, Farrell, et al. 2017. We use Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2014; Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik 2015 only for the Polish and Lithuanian data. Thus, our baseline regression is:

$$Y_i = \alpha_i EastPrussia_i + \beta_1 Distance + \beta_2 EastPrussia_i Distance_i + \beta_3 X_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the electoral or economic outcome: turnout, share of votes for conservatives, share of votes for nationalists and number of economic entities in an economic sector.  $X_i$  is the set of additional controls such as city dummy, altitude, latitude and longitude.  $Distance$  denotes the distance from the centroid of the territorial unit to the East Prussian border, which is the forcing variable in our model. The interaction term  $EastPrussia * Distance$  shows that the distance of each territorial unit to the East Prussian border varies with its historical attachment to East Prussia.

### 4.3.2 CEM in Russia

We correct for the territorial discontinuity between the Kaliningrad region and the rest of Russia by introducing Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) to compare economic and political outcomes between Kaliningrad, on the one hand, and neighboring Russian regions such as Pskov, Leningrad, Smolensk, Bryansk and Kursk, on the other (Datta 2015; Iacus et al. 2009). Thus, the proposed baseline model is the following:

$$L_1(f, g) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{l_1, \dots, l_k} |f_{l_1, \dots, l_k} - g_{l_1, \dots, l_k}|$$

where  $L_1 \in [0, 1]$  is the measure of multivariate imbalance,  $f_{(l_1, \dots, l_k)}$  denotes the relative multivariate frequency distributions of treatment units and  $g_{(l_1, \dots, l_k)}$  denotes the relative multivariate frequency distributions of control units in  $k$ -dimensional space. Furthermore, if  $TE_i = Y_i(T_i = 1) - Y_i(T_i = 0) | X_i$ , where  $TE_i$  is the treatment effect,  $Y_i$  the outcome variable,  $T_i$  the treatment variable and  $X_i$  the set of pre-treatment covariates, then we compute the local sample average treatment effect such that

$$LSATT = \frac{1}{m_T} \sum_{i \in T^m} TE_i \quad (2)$$

where  $m_T$  is the number of matched treated units and  $T^m$  the subset of matched treated units (ibid.). The main advantage of the CEM method is that it does not require the common pre-treatment trends for both treatment and control observations, and there is no data extrapolation (Datta 2015).

### 4.3.3 Similarities in East Prussia

To investigate Hypothesis 2, we use an approach similar to the regression discontinuity design for a pooled dataset on Lithuania, Poland and Russia. Because of this pooling, however, we have to account for the differences between the countries. We do so by introducing the country dummies and differentiating between the effects of East Prussia in the three countries:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 LT_i + \beta_2 PL_i + \beta_3 LTEP_i + \beta_4 PLEP_i + \beta_5 RUEP_i + \gamma_1 Distance + \gamma_2 EP^*Distance_i + \delta X_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (3)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the electoral outcome: turnout, share of votes for conservatives and share of votes for nationalist parties.  $LT_i$  and  $PL_i$  are 1 for Lithuania and Poland, respectively, and 0 otherwise (Russia serves as a base),  $LTEP_i$ ,  $PLEP_i$  and  $RUEP_i$  are 1 for regions in Lithuania, Poland and Russia, respectively, located in former East Prussia and 0 otherwise. Note that they are additive to the overall country effects, meaning the cumulative effect of being, for example, in Lithuania in former East Prussia is  $\alpha + \beta_1 + \beta_3$ . Similarly, one can also calculate the effects for the other two countries.  $X_i$  is the set of additional controls, such as city dummy, latitude and longitude.  $Distance$  denotes the distance from the centroid of the territorial unit to the East Prussian border, and the interaction term  $EP^*Distance$  shows that the distance of each territorial unit to the East Prussian border varies with its historical attachment to East Prussia. We only perform this exercise for the political outcomes, as the economic outcomes are not directly comparable across countries due to the differences in collecting the statistics.

In terms of Hypothesis 1, such a regression should deliver results similar to the RDD and CEM approaches discussed above. Its advantage, however, is that such pooling and the use of interaction terms allows us to test statistically if the effects we observe for particular groups (e.g. regions in former East Prussia) are different.

### 4.3.4 Political preferences in the FRG

We use the geographic variation in the number of East Prussian refugees in the FRG to identify the effect of the East Prussian migration on the voting results in the first parliament elections after the end of World War II. We consider this variation exogenous for, as discussed above, the settlement pattern was determined by geography and the

settlement decisions of authorities, mostly dependent on housing availability (hence, indirectly on war damage). We run robust OLS regressions of the vote shares of conservative and nationalistic parties on the share of East Prussian refugees in the total population, controlling for other refugees, large cities, age and gender structure, religion, prewar electoral patterns, and economic structure of the respective districts. Based on data availability for the control variables, some further geographic aggregation was necessary, and so in most specifications we end up with 162 regions to analyze. The basic regression is:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{ShareEastPrussia}_i + \beta_2 X_i + \epsilon_i, \quad (4)$$

where  $Y_i$  is the electoral outcome in 1949,  $\text{ShareEastPrussia}_i$  is the share of East Prussian refugees in the host region  $i$ , and  $X_i$  is the set of control variables outlined above.

With possible concerns that, despite the way most of the expellees left their home province and how they were settled by the authorities, their distribution in West Germany might still be endogenous, we also check for the robustness of our results with an IV regression, using latitude as an instrument for the share of East Prussians in the total population. The latitude reflects the evacuation routes over the Baltic Sea and the respective settlements primarily in the North of Germany very well and, based on the Montiel-Pflueger test, appears to be a strong instrument for the geographical distribution of the East Prussian expellees.

Finally, since spatial data are being analyzed, there is a possible concern that any results we find are not driven by the independent variables but by the spatial autocorrelation between the regions. As Kelly 2019 suggests, spatial autocorrelation can exaggerate the t-statistics and the Conley procedure does not fully correct this, mostly because either only one neighboring region is given non-zero weight in the adjustment or the cutoff radius for the zero weight is set very low (and so still too few regions get non-zero weights). Taking this into account, we test for spatial dependence in our data and check the robustness of our OLS results with a spatial autoregressive model (SAR), using the inverse distance to weight the covariance matrix and not setting any cut-off on the weights. Thus, we assume decreasing but non-zero mutual influence of the regions that are further apart.

## 5 Persistence in former East Prussia

We first concentrate on economic and political outcomes at the historical borders of East Prussia within modern-day Poland and Lithuania. It is obvious that the internal Polish-East Prussian border reveals no statistical significance when it comes to several areas of entrepreneurial activity (see Table B.3 and Figure C.7 in the Appendix). Nevertheless, political outcomes in what used to be East Prussia within the boundaries of contemporary

Table 2: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia


Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Conventional	-0.061***	0.018	-3.42	-0.096	-0.026	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.046**	0.018	-2.59	-0.081	-0.011	2479
	Robust	-0.046*	0.028	-1.68	-0.100	0.008	2479
Polska Jest Najważniejsza	Conventional	-0.009*	0.005	-1.71	-0.018	0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.014***	0.005	-2.72	-0.023	-0.004	2479
	Robust	-0.014	0.009	-1.46	-0.032	0.005	2479
Platforma Obywatelska RP	Conventional	0.068***	0.026	2.60	0.017	0.119	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.058**	0.026	2.22	0.007	0.109	2479
	Robust	0.058	0.040	1.47	-0.019	0.136	2479
Prawica	Conventional	0.001	0.001	1.38	0.000	0.002	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	1.19	-0.001	0.002	2479
	Robust	0.001	0.001	0.72	-0.002	0.003	2479
Nowa Prawica	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-3.43	-0.007	-0.002	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.006***	0.001	-4.66	-0.008	-0.003	2479
	Robust	-0.006***	0.002	-3.04	-0.010	-0.002	2479
Turnout	Conventional	-0.038**	0.016	-2.37	-0.069	-0.006	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.035**	0.016	-2.22	-0.066	-0.004	2479
	Robust	-0.035	0.022	-1.62	-0.078	0.007	2479
Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.060***	0.018	-3.32	-0.096	-0.025	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.045**	0.018	-2.51	-0.081	-0.010	2479
	Robust	-0.045	0.028	-1.63	-0.100	-0.009	2479
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.005	0.020	-0.25	-0.043	0.033	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007	0.020	-0.34	-0.045	0.032	2479
	Robust	-0.007	0.029	-0.23	-0.063	0.050	2479
Nationalist Share	Conventional	-0.061***	0.018	-3.42	-0.096	-0.026	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.046**	0.018	-2.59	-0.081	-0.011	2479
	Robust	-0.046*	0.028	-1.68	-0.100	0.008	2479

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.

Poland differ significantly from respective political outcomes on the Polish side of the East Prussian–Polish border. Table 2 and Figure 6 show the estimation results for conservative, liberal-conservative and nationalistic parties (the results for all parties can be viewed in Table B.1 and Figure C.5 in the Appendix). As these results indicate, in the territories of pre-war Poland, the conservative party *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Justice) vote share is higher by a mean difference of 4.6 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected confidence interval (CI) and at the 10% level with a robust CI. Similarly, in the territories of pre-war Poland, the liberal-conservative party *Polska Jest Najważniejsza* (Poland Comes First) vote share is higher by a mean difference of 1.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level with a bias-corrected CI, that of the labor party *Polska Partia Pracy - Sierpień 80* higher by a mean difference



Figure 6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia



of 0.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected CI, and that of the socialist party *Nasz Dom Polska* (Our Home Poland) higher by a

mean difference of 0.2 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected CI.

Furthermore, aggregated conservative and nationalist vote shares in the territories of pre-war Poland are also higher than those in former East Prussia by an average difference of 4.5 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively, which is statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected CI. The vote share of the right-wing party *Nowa Prawica* (Congress of the New Right) is also higher in the pre-war territories of Poland and the same observation holds for electoral turnout, an indication of a politically mobilized society. In contrast, the vote share of the party *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej* (Democratic Left Alliance) is higher in former East Prussia by an average difference of 2.6 percentage points, which is statistically significant at the 1% level with both bias-corrected and robust CIs. Similarly, the vote share in former East Prussia is higher for the liberal party *Ruch Palikota* by a mean difference of 1.9 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level with a bias-corrected CI and at the 10% level with a robust CI. The vote share of the liberal-conservative *Platforma Obywatelska RP* is higher in “Polish East Prussia” by a mean difference of 5.8 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected CI. Several robustness checks including covariates such as city dummy, latitude and longitude or an increase of the border bandwidth from 60 km to 100 km do not change the baseline findings reported for both economic and political outcomes (see Tables B.11-B.13 in the Appendix).

Overall, the East Prussian lands of modern Poland reveal lower levels of political conservatism and support for nationalistic parties compared to the pre-war Polish territories on the other side of the border. “Polish East Prussia” appears to be more progressive rather than conservative in terms of electoral results. This, in fact, is the opposite of Hypothesis 1. The former East Prussian territories do not show a higher level of economic institutions either, as indicated by entrepreneurship in the sectors of information and communication, real estate activities, professional and scientific activities, financial and insurance activities, and other services.

When we evaluate the internal East Prussian border in Lithuania, we find that, in terms of economic outcomes, only enterprises offering professional and scientific services appear to be more developed on the East Prussian side of the border, with a mean difference of 2.289, statistically significant at the 1% level both with bias-corrected and robust CIs (see Table B.4 in the Appendix). Financial and insurance enterprises do not reveal any significant difference in terms of their frequency across the historical border, whereas real estate enterprises, information & communication as well as other services are significant in the opposite direction, i.e. reveal a discontinuity in favor of the pre-war Lithuanian territories (see also Table B.4 in the Appendix). With respect to political outcomes, the results are presented in Table 3 and Figure 7 for conservative, liberal-conservative and nationalistic parties and in Table B.2 and Figure C.5 in Appendix for all parties in the sample. We find that, in the pre-war Lithuanian territories, the *Social Democratic Party* vote share is higher by an average difference of 6.2 percentage points, statistically significant at the 5% level both with bias-corrected and robust CIs. A similar observation



Table 3: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Homeland Union	Conventional	-0.028***	0.011	-2.65	-0.049	-0.007	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.039***	0.011	-3.68	-0.060	-0.018	2000
	Robust	-0.039***	0.013	-2.91	-0.067	-0.013	2000
Liberals Movement	Conventional	-0.0004	0.013	-0.04	-0.027	0.026	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.034**	0.013	-2.57	-0.060	-0.008	2000
	Robust	-0.034**	0.017	-2.03	-0.067	-0.001	2000
Order & Justice	Conventional	-0.104***	0.037	2.79	0.031	0.177	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.128***	0.037	3.42	0.055	0.201	2000
	Robust	-0.128***	0.044	2.87	0.040	0.214	2000
Poles' Electoral Action	Conventional	-0.004***	0.002	-2.54	-0.007	-0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.027***	0.002	-17.45	-0.030	-0.024	2000
	Robust	-0.027***	0.002	-11.70	-0.032	-0.023	2000
Peasant & Greens Union	Conventional	-0.001	0.012	-0.10	-0.025	0.023	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.011	0.012	0.91	-0.013	0.035	2000
	Robust	0.011	0.016	0.70	-0.020	0.042	2000
Liberal & Centre Union	Conventional	-0.008	0.005	-1.59	-0.017	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007	0.005	-1.37	-0.016	0.003	2000
	Robust	-0.007	0.006	-1.15	-0.018	0.005	2000
Christian Party	Conventional	-0.006**	0.003	-2.06	-0.011	0.000	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.005*	0.003	-1.86	-0.010	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.005	0.003	-1.47	-0.012	0.002	2000
National Association	Conventional	-0.003	0.002	-1.52	-0.006	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004**	0.002	-2.35	-0.008	-0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.004*	0.002	-1.78	-0.009	0.000	2000
Young Lithuania	Conventional	$-7.0 \times 10^{-6}$	0.001	-0.01	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	$4.3 \times 10^{-5}$	0.001	0.04	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Robust	$4.3 \times 10^{-5}$	0.001	0.03	-0.002	0.003	2000
Turnout	Conventional	-0.011	0.019	-0.59	-0.049	0.026	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.013	0.019	-0.67	-0.051	0.025	2000
	Robust	-0.013	0.024	-0.54	-0.060	0.034	2000
Conservative Share	Conventional	0.093**	0.036	2.58	0.023	0.164	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.106***	0.036	2.94	0.036	0.177	2000
	Robust	0.106**	0.042	2.53	0.024	0.189	2000
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	0.057*	0.030	1.88	-0.002	-0.660	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.026	0.030	0.87	-0.033	0.085	2000
	Robust	0.026	0.037	0.72	-0.046	0.098	2000
Nationalist Share	Conventional	0.073**	0.034	2.13	0.006	0.140	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.084***	0.034	2.45	0.017	0.151	2000
	Robust	0.084**	0.042	2.01	0.002	0.166	2000


Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.

holds for the *Homeland Union* and the *Liberals Movement*; the mean difference is 3.9 and 3.4 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.

Moreover, vote shares of parties such as *The Way of Courage, Order and Justice, Poles' Electoral Action, Socialist People's Front, National Association* and the *Emigrants' Party* are significantly higher on the pre-war Lithuanian side of the border. However, the *Labor Party* exhibits an average difference of 6.1 percentage points in favor of East Prussian territories in Lithuania, which is statistically significant at the 5% level with a bias-corrected CI and at the 10% level with a robust CI. Similarly, the conservative vote share is higher in the former East Prussian territories of Lithuania by a mean difference of 10.6 percentage points, statistically significant with a bias-corrected CI at the 1% level and with a robust CI at the 5% level. The nationalist vote share is also higher in the same direction by an average difference of 8.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level with a bias-corrected CI and at the 5% level with a robust CI. We introduce several robustness checks here as well by changing the border bandwidth from 60 km to 100 km and by introducing covariates in the robust RDD such as city dummy, city distance, latitude and longitude (see Tables B.17-B.19 in the Appendix). Our initial results (Tables 3 and B.2 as well as Figures 7 and C.6) are reinforced.

The Lithuanian border confirms our first hypothesis in terms of the dynamics of East Prussian persistence. Political, and to a lesser extent economic, outcomes suggest the presence of an East Prussian legacy that favors more advanced economic institutions and higher levels of political conservatism and support for nationalistic parties. Rather than offering a linear narrative of post-imperial persistence, what we find is that the extent of the demographic shock may be a powerful predictor of long-run persistence. While populations usually follow the path of a defeated army and evacuate territories that are conceded to the rival military adversary as a result of an international truce or treaty, what is crucial is the prior existence of ethnic and linguistic diversity in the province or territory conceded, its prior sectoral and resource structure, and the degree of violence of the population transfer *per se*. This is why Poland deviates much more significantly from the hypothesis of East Prussian persistence *in situ* than Lithuania.


Figure 7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia



We now turn to the case of Russia. As already mentioned above, the matching algorithm CEM allows us to coarsen the values of the covariates with the purpose of equalizing the number of treated and control units within each stratum of the covariates (Datta 2015; Iacus et al. 2009). As shown in Tables 4-5 as well as in Tables B.5-B.6, we run two different matching exercises, one with city dummy and altitude as the set of covariates (Match I) and another one with an augmented set of covariates including the distance to the Russian border (Match II). As Figure 8 indicates, coarsening includes many more strata in the second rather than in the first matching model. The same observation holds for economic outcomes (see Figure C.9). When it comes to political outcomes compared between Kaliningrad and the neighboring – and territorially discontinuous – Russian regions, Table 4 reports 17 treated units matched to 40 control units with a post-matching multivariate imbalance of  $1.874 \cdot 10^{-16}$ . Similarly, Table 5 reports 13 treated units matched to 19 control units with a post-matching imbalance of 0.25. When we evaluate comparative economic outcomes with the CEM algorithm, we find that the degree of matching efficiency between the treated and control units is lower. Table B.5 reports 38 treated units matched to 64 control units with a post-matching multivariate imbalance of 0.232, while Table B.6 shows 28 treatment units matched to 20 control units with a post-matching multivariate imbalance of 0.679.

Table 6 summarizes the political effect of East Prussia for two different matching models. Assuming constant treatment across strata, we estimate the local sample average treatment effect on the treated units (LSATT) both for Match I and Match II. We find that, for United Russia, there is an increase of 7.7 percentage points in Match I, statistically significant at the 1% level, while there is an increase of 5.4 percentage points in Match II, statistically significant at the 10% level. In other words, the share of votes given to the United Russia party is higher in former East Prussia (the Kaliningrad region). For the party Patriots of Russia, there is a statistically significant increase of 0.5 percentage points at the 1% level. The conservative vote share is also significantly higher in the

Figure 8: CEM weights vs. strata (political outcomes)



(a) Match I

(b) Match II

Table 4: Political matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening, Match I

		Treated				Control	
Number of strata:	15						
Number of matched strata:	5						
All		22				136	
Matched		17				40	
Unmatched		5				96	
Multivariate imbalance measure:	L1 = $1.874 \times 10^{-16}$						
Univariate imbalance measures:							
Variable	L1	Mean	Min	25%	50%	75%	Max
City	$1.00 \times 10^{-17}$	$-2.10 \times 10^{-17}$	0	0	0	0	0
Altitude	$1.80 \times 10^{-16}$	-2.244	16	-6	0	-6	-17

Table 5: Political matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening, Match II

		Treated				Control	
Number of strata:	53						
Number of matched strata:	7						
All		22				136	
Matched		13				16	
Unmatched		9				120	
Multivariate imbalance measure:	L1 = 0.25						
Univariate imbalance measures:							
Variable	L1	Mean	Min	25%	50%	75%	Max
City	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Altitude	0.026	-4.276	-2	-11	-5	-11	-17
Distance to the Russian border (rescaled)	0.083	-0.080	0.15	-0.067	-0.1	0.067	-0.567

Kaliningrad region than in the neighboring regions of Russia in our sample: in Match I there is an increase of 7.7 percentage points, statistically significant at the 1% level, and in Match II an increase of 5.4 percentage points, statistically significant at the 10% level. The results of the conservative vote appear to be driven by the United Russia vote share. The nationalist vote share is higher in Kaliningrad as well, producing an

Table 6: Political estimates of East Prussian impact in Russia (Kaliningrad)


Outcome	Matching Model	Coefficient	Std. Err.	t	N	R-squared
United Russia	Match I	0.077***	0.021	3.74	57	0.202
	Match II	0.054*	0.031	1.78	29	0.105
LDPR	Match I	0.004	0.006	0.62	57	0.007
	Match II	0.001	0.010	0.09	29	0.000
CPRF	Match I	0.027**	0.012	2.32	57	0.089
	Match II	0.012	0.014	0.88	29	0.028
Just Russia	Match I	-0.098***	0.014	-7.17	57	0.483
	Match II	-0.059***	0.019	-3.19	29	0.274
Yabloko	Match I	-0.016***	0.006	-2.75	57	0.121
	Match II	-0.013**	0.005	-2.65	29	0.207
Patriots of Russia	Match I	0.005***	0.001	5.49	57	0.354
	Match II	0.005***	0.001	3.60	29	0.324
Right Cause	Match I	-0.0002	0.000	-0.54	57	0.005
	Match II	0.0001	0.001	0.17	29	0.001
Turnout	Match I	0.020	0.015	1.36	57	0.032
	Match II	-0.002*	0.022	-0.08	29	0.000
Liberal-Conservative Share	Match I	0.077***	0.020	3.77	57	0.206
	Match II	0.054*	0.030	1.81	29	0.108
Nationalist Share	Match I	0.081***	0.018	4.50	57	0.269
	Match II	0.055**	0.024	2.26	29	0.159
Conservative Share	Match I	0.077***	0.021	3.74	57	0.202
	Match II	0.054*	0.031	1.78	29	0.105

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

increase of 8.1 percentage points in Match I, statistically significant at the 1% level, and an increase of 5.5 percentage points in Match II, statistically significant at the 5% level. The liberal-conservative vote share shows the same results as the conservative share.

Similarly, more progressive and left-wing parties receive higher vote shares in western Russian regions of our sample other than in Kaliningrad. The vote shares of Just Russia and Yabloko exhibit a decrease of 9.8 percentage points and 1.6 percentage points, respectively, in Match I, statistically significant at the 1% level for both parties. In Match II, we observe a decrease of 5.9 percentage points for Just Russia and of 1.3 percentage points for Yabloko, statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. Figure 9 visualizes Table 6 both for Match I and Match II. Table B.7 and Figure C.10 present matching results and LSATT estimates for economic outcomes in Kaliningrad and its control western Russian regions. Our results show no pattern of persistence in terms of institutions-intensive entrepreneurial activity in Kaliningrad. The respective LSATT estimates of information and communication, real estate activities, professional and scientific activities, financial and insurance activities, and other services are either statistically insignificant or point in the opposite direction (real estate activities). Hence, we observe that the political legacy of East Prussia persists in Kaliningrad in the form

Figure 9: Post-CEM regressions (political outcomes)



(a) Match I

(b) Match II

of conservative politics and a significant role for nationalist politics, while there is no persistence of German economic institutions in entrepreneurial activity.

Turning to our analysis of the pooled sample (as in specification (3)), the results are presented in Table 7 for the full sample and a sample in which Russia is excluded (denoted LTPL). We experimented with excluding Russia due to a possible objection that the Russian (“hybrid-democratic”) political system is not comparable to that of Lithuania and Poland. Exclusion of Russia, however, has no significant effect on the other results. Similar to the RDD and the CEM results, regions in East Prussia tend to vote less conservatively and nationalistically in Poland and more conservatively and nationalistically in Lithuania and Russia. All these effects are highly significant, except for nationalistic voting in Russia. Interestingly, Lithuania and Poland in general tend to vote more conservatively than Russia. Lithuanian regions also tend to lend less support to nationalistic parties than Russia and less support to both conservative and nationalistic parties than Poland.

At the bottom of Table 7, we also measure pairwise if Lithuania, Russia and Poland are statistically distinguishable inside East Prussia and, for the full sample, if Lithuania and Poland are distinguishable outside East Prussia. The latter measure is also repeated through the Lithuanian country effect in the smaller sample, and the coefficients are quite close. As could be expected, all three countries are significantly different from each other both inside and outside former East Prussia. An interesting result, however, is that the difference between Lithuania and Poland in East Prussia seems to be less in absolute terms than that outside East Prussia. The last three lines of Table 7, therefore, also report pairwise the difference in absolute disparities between the modern countries within versus outside East Prussia. It is important to note that we only compare the *magnitude* of the disparity in this case, even if East Prussian and non-East Prussian effects go in different directions. The negative coefficient means that the country difference within

Table 7: Estimation results for East Prussia, pooled sample

Sample	Full	Full	Full	LTPL	LTPL	LTPL
Dependent variable	turnout	cons.	national.	turnout	cons.	national.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LT	0.004 (0.014)	0.052** (0.027)	-0.283*** (0.019)	0.070** <sup>*</sup> (0.006)	-0.253*** (0.010)	-0.171*** (0.010)
PL	-0.077*** (0.017)	0.266*** (0.034)	-0.134 (0.025)			
LTEP	-0.053*** (0.009)	0.110*** (0.015)	0.099*** (0.013)	-0.052*** (0.009)	0.125*** (0.015)	0.103*** (0.013)
PLEP	-0.054*** (0.012)	-0.070*** (0.012)	-0.088*** (0.011)	-0.061*** (0.012)	-0.083*** (0.012)	-0.101*** (0.011)
RUEP	0.052* (0.031)	0.443*** (0.044)	0.180 (0.032)			
City	0.053*** (0.004)	-0.021*** (0.008)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.057*** (0.004)	-0.020*** (0.008)	0.001 (0.005)
Dist. to EP border (tkm)	0.071*** (0.012)	0.285*** (0.024)	0.065*** (0.020)	0.083*** (0.013)	0.348*** (0.024)	0.082*** (0.021)
Dist. to EP border (EP) (tkm)	-0.032 (0.092)	-1.493*** (0.290)	-1.187*** (0.248)	0.106 (0.311)	-1.358*** (0.256)	-1.004*** (0.240)
Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4637	4637	4637	4479	4479	4479
R-squared	0.366	0.244	0.341	0.354	0.221	0.200
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
LT vs RU in EP	-0.100***	-0.280***	-0.364***			
PL vs. RU in EP	-0.182***	-0.247***	-0.401***			
LT vs. PL in EP	0.082***	-0.033**	0.037***	0.079***	-0.045***	0.033***
LT vs. PL outside EP	0.081***	-0.214***	-0.150***			
$\Delta$ LT vs. RU in EP / outside EP	0.096***	0.227***	0.081***			
$\Delta$ PL vs. RU in EP / outside EP	0.105***	-0.020	0.268***			
$\Delta$ LT vs. PL in EP / outside EP	0.001	-0.180***	-0.112***	0.009	-0.208***	-0.138***

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. LT = Lithuania, PL = Poland, RU = Russia, EP = East Prussia, LTEP = Lithuania in East Prussia, PLEP = Poland in East Prussia, RUEP = Russia in East Prussia.



East Prussia is smaller than outside it, whereas the positive coefficient indicates a larger difference within East Prussia. Indeed, we find Lithuania and Poland are more similar within East Prussia than outside it with respect to conservative and nationalistic voting. They are, however, indistinguishable in this regard with respect to turnout. At the same time, both Lithuania and Poland seem to be more different from Russia within East Prussia than they are outside it. Thus, our results both support and contradict Hypothesis 2. Given the history of the region, this might also reflect how the scale of the demographic shock, together with pre-shock diversity, affects cultural persistence.

For Lithuania and Poland, we also repeated the exercise limiting the sample to a bandwidth of 60 km and 100 km from the East Prussian border, which brings the specifications even closer to the RD design. The results are reported in Table B.20 in the Appendix and are fully in line with the results reported above. Moreover, within these smaller bands, Lithuania and Poland become statistically indistinguishable from each other within East Prussia with respect to conservative voting and, for the bandwidth of 100 km, also with regard to nationalistic voting. This lends more support for Hypothesis 2 in the region with more geographic proximity, more initial diversity and a (somewhat) lower scale of the demographic shock.

## 6 Migrating East Prussians

The results for the voting behavior in the FRG after World War II are presented in Table 8 for conservative voting and Table 9 for nationalist voting. For the sake of brevity, we only present the specifications with relevant control variables. For conservative voting, we find a significant positive effect of the share of East Prussians in the district population on the share of votes the conservative parties receive. The coefficient is statistically significant and highly stable, and this result is robust across a variety of specifications, including IV-estimations. We thus conclude that the presence of the East Prussian expellees in West Germany indeed resulted in more conservative voting, which is consistent with the hypothesized conservative political preferences of the East Prussian population. The effect appears even stronger when we control for the presence of refugees from the other Eastern provinces (compare specifications (1) and (2) in Table 8).

The results for nationalistic voting also support our hypotheses. Namely, the share of the East Prussian expellees in the total district population is positively related to the share of votes the nationalistic parties received in 1949. This result is also highly robust, with only one exception: controlling simultaneously for the share of workers as well as shares of agriculture and of trade and financial sector in the economy renders the effect of the East Prussian expellees insignificant (but still positive) in the IV-specification. Given the high correlation between these three controls, however, and the fact that this is the only combination that influences the significance of the result, it is unclear whether it is due to weak robustness or the specification error.

Table 8: Estimation results for conservative voting in West Germany

Method Dep. variable:	Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Conservative votes																
Share of EP expellees	1.178*** (0.263)	2.139*** (0.678)	2.804*** (0.293)	2.457*** (0.311)	2.427*** (0.309)	2.417*** (0.308)	2.906*** (0.296)	2.759*** (0.284)	2.702*** (0.304)	3.923*** (0.503)	2.941*** (0.562)					
City	-0.091*** (0.024)	-0.026 (0.028)	0.043** (0.019)	0.041** (0.020)	0.035* (0.020)	0.029 (0.020)	0.030 (0.021)	0.020 (0.020)	0.055* (0.029)	0.035* (0.020)	0.021 (0.026)					
Conservative votes 1933			0.868*** (0.055)	1.071*** (0.078)	1.087*** (0.080)	1.091*** (0.082)	0.890*** (0.057)	0.834*** (0.056)	0.832*** (0.084)	0.884*** (0.050)	0.888*** (0.099)					
Male			-2.575*** (1.027)	-2.410** (1.021)	-2.436** (1.026)	-2.475** (1.047)	-2.897*** (1.062)	-2.405** (1.020)	-0.794 (1.173)							
Protestants				0.146*** (0.051)		-0.169 (0.350)			0.012 (0.056)							
Catholics					-0.152*** (0.050)											
Entrepreneurs																
Industry							0.141** (0.070)		0.152 (0.110)							
Public sector										0.632*** (0.211)						
Wage ratio (EP to host)																
Agriculture ratio (EP to host)																
Entrepreneurship ratio (EP to host)																
Other eastern regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
N	194	194	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	163	162	162	162	162	162
R-squared	0.197	0.323	0.690	0.704	0.705	0.706	0.699	0.706	0.772	0.609	0.727	0.727	0.727	0.727	0.727	0.727
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. EP = East Prussia

Table 9: Estimation results for nationalist voting in West Germany

Method	Robust		Robust		Robust		Robust		Robust		Robust	
	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	
Dep. variable:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	
Nationalistic share												
Share of EP expellees	2.512*** (0.502)	2.719*** (0.464)	2.675*** (0.461)	2.637*** (0.470)	2.671*** (0.450)	2.696*** (0.501)	2.820*** (0.432)	1.797*** (0.284)	1.502*** (0.400)	1.853*** (0.360)	0.541 (0.468)	
City	0.022** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.011)	0.047*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.011)	0.008 (0.013)	0.018 (0.014)	0.020* (0.012)	0.045*** (0.013)	0.027* (0.015)	0.022* (0.013)	
Nationalistic share 1933		0.078** (0.035)	0.080** (0.035)	0.081** (0.036)	0.083** (0.035)	0.098*** (0.035)	0.069** (0.033)	0.146*** (0.035)	0.107*** (0.037)	0.098*** (0.034)	0.147*** (0.040)	
Male		0.501 (0.538)	0.600 (0.555)	0.031 (0.463)	0.336 (0.487)	-0.120 (0.464)	1.241* (0.726)					
Workers		-0.150*** (0.047)							0.111 (0.103)	-0.097 (0.103)	0.600*** (0.184)	
Entrepreneurs			0.391*** (0.117)				0.048 (0.326)		0.103 (0.103)	-0.813** (0.384)	-0.943*** (0.354)	
Agriculture				0.070*** (0.025)			0.016 (0.067)		0.158*** (0.065)		0.571*** (0.123)	
Industry					-0.095*** (0.024)				-0.107*** (0.041)			
Trade & finance						0.178* (0.106)				-0.026 (0.131)	0.911*** (0.215)	
Wage ratio (EP to host)	0.087*** (0.031)						0.018 (0.040)					
Agriculture ratio (EP to host)							0.000 (0.001)					
Entrepreneurship ratio (EP to host)							-0.055** (0.022)		-0.073*** (0.019)	-0.074*** (0.022)	-0.086*** (0.022)	
Other eastern regions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	
N	194	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	
R-squared	0.730	0.774	0.773	0.767	0.776	0.763	0.806	0.649	0.706	0.683	0.665	
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	
Montiel-Pflueger F								68.213	40.903	50.501	32.549	

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. EP = East Prussia. Column (7) does not show the following (statistically insignificant) variables: Industry ratio (EP to host), Workers ratio (EP to host)

In view of the literature discussed in Section 2, the explanation for this positive relation can be twofold. On the one hand, this may be the reaction of the native West German population to the semi-foreigners from the Eastern provinces. This is supported by the prevalence of positive relations to refugees from other provinces (except Berlin and Pomerania, partially statistically significant effects) and is in line with the research on immigration and right-wing voting (see Section 2). On the other hand, as the share of nationalistic voting in the 1920s and 1930s predicts the respective patterns after the war in the West German states, so may the high prewar support of nationalistic parties in East Prussia (see, e.g., Figure C.3 in the Appendix) convert to higher support of nationalistic parties by the East Prussian expellees in 1949.

As a “placebo” test, we also regress the share of East Prussian expellees on the share of votes for nationalistic and conservative parties in 1933, as reported in Table B.23 in the Appendix, and find that the share of East Prussian expellees is negatively related to the conservative vote, although the relationship becomes positive if further controls are added. In contrast, the share of East Prussians is positively related to the nationalistic vote, both with and without controls. Adding the controls takes away about half of the effect. Thus, there must be some unobservable variables affecting both the (long-term) voting patterns and the settlement of the refugees. However, if we use the IV approach (with latitude as an instrument), as in the main regression, the explanatory power of the “placebo” regression drops substantially, and the coefficient on the share of East Prussians approaches zero. This is not the case with the main regression and lends support to our IV approach.

There are several possible objections to the results presented. The first is the issue of self-selection, which may both influence the choice of place of residence and reflect a selection bias in preferences. In these circumstances, however, we consider this bias very small, if any. As discussed in Section 3, almost all the surviving population of East Prussia had to leave the area, and so the possibility to self-select into migration did not exist. The expellees could not choose their place of residence strategically either, due to settlement by the military authorities and the subsequent relocation ban, as discussed earlier in Section 3 too. Furthermore, our IV approach tackles this problem well.

Another possible – and very valid – objection is that the question of the eastern provinces was not quite settled by the time of the first Bundestag election. It might be the case that the East Prussian expellees voted for the parties who favored the support and integration of the refugees in West Germany and who refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line. The former is barely a concern, as essentially all parties expressed the necessity of proper integration in their programs. Only some very regionally focused parties with a relatively small electoral base, like the Bavarian Party (Bayerische Partei), expressed a demand not to receive the expellees and/or to send them back. Still, even they typically acknowledged that those who had already been settled should have the possibilities to integrate in the social and economic life in their host regions Mintzel 1986. The acceptance of the new borders was not that universal, however. Some of the parties explicitly claimed in their electoral programs that the eastern territories (both, the Soviet occupation zone and

the former eastern provinces) should belong to Germany, some did not take any side on this question, while the communist party explicitly stated the Oder-Neisse line should not be revised. We thus used the party programs and/or their closed session resolutions and singled out the parties that were explicitly against the Oder-Neisse line. We then checked the robustness of our result with respect to the conservative vote by splitting the sample into parties rejecting the Oder-Neisse line and those not doing so. This exercise was not possible with respect to the nationalistic parties as there were only two of them, one being negligibly small. We did, however, test whether the presence of the East Prussian expellees is positively related to voting for parties against the Oder-Neisse line independently of their ideology.

We present the test results in Table B.21 in the Appendix. Indeed, voting for parties against the Oder-Neisse line is positively related to the share of the East Prussian expellees in the total population, even after controlling for other expellee groups and socioeconomic characteristics of the districts. This result holds both for conservative parties and in general for all parties that expressed a position against the new borders. At the same time, the effect of the East Prussian expellees on voting for conservative parties who did not declare a position with regard to the Oder-Neisse line is insignificant. This might seem to overturn our finding of support for conservative parties in favor of revision of the new borders. However, a closer look at the composition of parties rejecting the Oder-Neisse line shows that the positive results are completely driven by the German Party (Deutsche Partei), which was both conservative, nationalistic and against the new borders. The effect of the East Prussian presence on the group of parties against the new borders does not withstand the exclusion of the German Party: the coefficient becomes insignificant when controlling for the other expellees and even changes the sign when not controlling for the other expellees (see specifications (7) and (8) in Table B.21). At the same time, voting for the German party is consistently positively related to the share of East Prussians, both when taking the full sample and when restricting it only to the regions where the party was actually present: Bremen, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, which are also the regions with high shares of East Prussians (see Table B.22 in the Appendix).

Another argument against voting for border revision only is that there were several parties that expressed their position against the Oder-Neisse line but were not conservative or nationalistic, with the liberal FDP (Free Democratic Party/Freie Demokratische Partei) being most explicit among all parties in its demand to return the eastern provinces to Germany while supporting the Eastern expellees in their host regions (FDP 1948; FDP 1949). At the same time, as noted above, the communist party (KPD) explicitly stated that the revision of the borders would endanger peace and should not be attempted (Parteivorstand der KPD 1949). Had the East Prussian expellees voted primarily in the hope of restoring the old borders, we would see a positive relationship to voting for FDP and a negative relationship to voting for KPD. This is, however, not the case. In fact, the share of East Prussians is negatively related to the FDP share, as could be expected given the hypothesized East Prussian conservative preferences (see Table B.22 in the Appendix). This result is robust across several specifications. At the same time, there is

no consistent relationship between the share of East Prussians and voting for KPD: the negative effect vanishes once the shares of other expellees are controlled for.

We, therefore, conclude that the positive relationship between conservative voting and the share of East Prussians in the district population is not completely driven by the parties' position with regard to the new German borders. Neither is nationalistic voting likely to be driven only by the dissent of the native population, as the German Party, for which there is the strongest positive relation with the share of East Prussians, demanded proper integration and support for the refugees (Mommsen 1960). As such, the German Party had a strong standing among the expellees, including the East Prussians. It expressed rather conservative and nation-centered views, demanded good living conditions for the refugees, declared Germany to be both to the west and to the east of the Oder-Neisse line, and above all, drew a lot of members from the associations of the Prussian-conservative DKP/DRP and provided "political shelter" to the expellees, who were not yet allowed to form their own parties (Mommsen 1960; Schmollinger 1986).

The robustness check with the spatial autoregression largely confirms our findings. The Moran's I-test indicates both for the conservative and nationalist shares that there is spatial dependence.<sup>4</sup> The overview of the SAR results can be found in Table B.24 in the Appendix. For the conservative share of votes, the results are robust to individual and any combination of the spatial lags of the dependent and independent variable and of the error term. The direct effect of the share of East Prussian expellees is comparable to that in the OLS estimations, while the total effect is mostly even larger. For the share of votes for nationalistic parties, the results are robust to spatial lags of the share of East Prussians and of the error term, but not to the lag of the dependent variable. Inclusion of the latter inflates the standard errors, especially of the indirect effect, and thus no conclusive evidence is obtained. At the same time, this result depends on the estimation method: using robust maximum likelihood instead of the generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS) generates more moderate standard errors. The direct effect of East Prussian expellees is also close to that in the OLS estimations throughout all specification. Still, the outlier result of the spatial lag of the dependent variable calls for some caution when interpreting the results for nationalistic voting.

## 7 Conclusion

While most economic research on cultural persistence investigates the long-term impacts of different cultural or institutional environments within one modern state or across otherwise similar states, our focus is on the opposite case. In this paper, we investigate whether a relatively homogenous region can persist as such after being exposed to different

---

<sup>4</sup>The Moran test for the conservative share returns  $\chi^2 = 19.14$  (the independent variables were the share of East Prussians, city, conservative share in 1920 and wage in East Prussia relative to host region). The Moran test for the nationalistic share returns  $\chi^2 = 8.83$  (with the share of East Prussians, city, nationalistic share in 1920 and wage in East Prussia relative to host region).

political settings. While not questioning that the new regions diverge, we ask whether this divergence is slowed down by common history.

We find that legacies of former East Prussia only partially persist in the region in the case of both political and economic outcomes. This persistence greatly depends on how much of the original East Prussian population was left in the area and who filled the demographic vacuum created by World War II and the partitioning of the province. We find most evidence for persistence in Lithuania, where the departure of the German population was much more gradual, stretching over 25 years. There is little evidence for economic persistence in Poland or Russia. In fact, in Poland, also in the case of political preferences, our hypothesis of persistence is rejected. Moreover, we find that the flight and expulsion of the East Prussian population in the aftermath of the Second World War changed the political outcomes in the first parliamentary election in the West German regions where the expellees were settled. This finding implicitly supports the idea of intergenerational transmission as the main persistence channel, but also advocates caution in the interpretation of persistence in Eastern Europe. With the massive population movements in the mid-twentieth century, it might be tempting to describe culture as persistent, where it is actually more likely to be determined by a selection bias of migration.

## References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson (2001). “The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation”. In: *American Economic Review* 91.5, pp. 1369–1401. DOI: [10.1257/aer.91.5.1369](https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1369).
- Alesina, Alberto and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). “Good bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of Communism on people’s preferences”. In: *American Economic Review* 97.4, pp. 1507–1528. ISSN: 0002-8282.
- Ambrassat, August (1912). *Die Provinz Ostpreußen, ein Handbuch der Heimatkunde*. Königsberg: J.H. Bon.
- Anderson, James E. and Eric van Wincoop (2003). “Gravity with gravitas: A solution to the border puzzle”. In: *The American Economic Review* 93.1, pp. 170–192. ISSN: 0002-8282. DOI: [10.1257/000282803321455214](https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803321455214).
- Avdeenko, Alexandra and Thomas Siedler (2017). “Intergenerational correlations of extreme right-wing party preferences and attitudes toward immigration”. In: *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 119.3, pp. 768–800. ISSN: 14679442. DOI: [10.1111/sjoe.12190](https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12190).
- Bartkowski, Jerzy (2003). *Tradycja i polityka: wpływ tradycji kulturowych polskich regionów na współczesne zachowania społeczne i polityczne*. Warszawa: Zak.
- Beck, Hermann (1997). *The origins of the authoritarian welfare state in Prussia: Conservatives, bureaucracy, and the social question, 1815-70*. Social History, Popular Cultur. University of Michigan Press. ISBN: 9780472084289.

- Becker, Sascha O, Katrin Boeckh, Christa Hainz, and Ludger Woessmann (2016). “The empire is dead, long live the empire! Long-run persistence of trust and corruption in the bureaucracy”. In: *Economic Journal* 126.590, pp. 40–74. DOI: [10.1111/ecoj.12220](https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12220).
- Beestermöller, Matthias and Ferdinand Rauch (2014). “A dissection of trading capital: Cultural persistence of trade in the aftermath of the fall of the iron curtain”.
- Berdahl, Robert M (2014). *The politics of the Prussian nobility: The development of a conservative ideology, 1770-1848*. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9781400859788.
- Berning, Carl C. and Elmar Schlueter (2016). “The dynamics of radical right-wing populist party preferences and perceived group threat: A comparative panel analysis of three competing hypotheses in the Netherlands and Germany”. In: *Social Science Research* 55, pp. 83–93. DOI: [10.1016/j.ssresearch.2015.09.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2015.09.003).
- Besser, Christoph (2007). *Die deutschen Vertriebenen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von 1945 bis 1969*. Cologne.
- Bisin, Alberto and Thierry Verdier (2001). “The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of preferences”. In: *Journal of Economic Theory* 97, pp. 298–319. DOI: [10.1006/jeth.2000.2678](https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2678).
- Böhm, Robert, Maik M.P. Theelen, Hannes Rusch, and Paul A.M. Van Lange (2018). “Costs, needs, and integration efforts shape helping behavior toward refugees”. In: *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 115.28, pp. 7284–7289. ISSN: 10916490. DOI: [10.1073/pnas.1805601115](https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1805601115).
- Braun, Sebastian and Nadja Dwenger (2018). *The local environment shapes refugee integration: Evidence from post-war Germany*. Tech. rep.
- Bukowski, Pawel (2015). “How history matters for student performance. Lessons from the partitions of Poland”.
- Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo, Max H. Farrell, and Rocío Titiunik (2017). “rdrobust: Software for regression-discontinuity designs”. In: *Stata Journal* 17.2, pp. 372–404. ISSN: 1536867X. DOI: [10.1177/1536867x1701700208](https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867x1701700208).
- Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocío Titiunik (2014). “Robust data-driven inference in the regression-discontinuity design”. In: *Stata Journal* 14.4, pp. 909–946. ISSN: 1536867X. DOI: [10.1177/1536867x1401400413](https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867x1401400413).
- (2015). “Optimal data-driven regression discontinuity plots”. In: *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 110.512, pp. 1753–1769. ISSN: 1537274X. DOI: [10.1080/01621459.2015.1017578](https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.2015.1017578).
- Cheung, Sin Yi and Jenny Phillimore (2014). “Refugees, social capital, and labour market integration in the UK”. In: *Sociology* 48.3, pp. 518–536. ISSN: 00380385. DOI: [10.1177/0038038513491467](https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038513491467).
- Corneo, Giacomo (2010). “Nationalism, cognitive ability, and interpersonal relations”. In: *International Review of Economics* 57.2, pp. 119–141. ISSN: 18651704. DOI: [10.1007/s12232-010-0097-2](https://doi.org/10.1007/s12232-010-0097-2).
- Datta, Nirupam (2015). “Evaluating impacts of watershed development program on agricultural productivity, income, and livelihood in Bhalki watershed of Bardhaman District, West Bengal”. In: *World Development* 66, pp. 443–456. ISSN: 0305750X. DOI: [10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.024](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.024).



- Decker, Oliver, Johannes Kiess, and Elmar Brähler (2014). “Die stabilisierte Mitte - Rechtsextreme Einstellung in Deutschland 2014”. Leipzig. URL: <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ss0ar-389999>.
- Der Bundeswahlleiter (2016). *Wahl zum 1. Deutschen Bundestag (14. August 1949). Endgültige Ergebnisse der Stimmen nach Wahlkreisen*. Wiesbaden. URL: <https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/bundestagswahlen/1949.html>.
- Diener, Alexander and Joshua Hagen (2011). “Geopolitics of the Kaliningrad exclave and enclave: Russian and EU perspectives”. In: *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 52.4, pp. 567–592. ISSN: 1538-7216. DOI: [10.2747/1539-7216.52.4.567](https://doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.52.4.567).
- Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina (2007). “The reat divide revisited: Ottoman and Habsburg legacies on transition”. In: *Kyklos* 60.4, pp. 539–558. ISSN: 00235962.
- Eberhardt, Piotr (2002). *Ethnic groups and population changes in twentieth-century Central-Eastern Europe: History. Data. Analysis*. London & New York: Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN: 0-7656-0665-8.
- (2010). *Migracje polityczne na ziemiach polskich (1939-1950)*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
- Engerman, Stanley L and Kenneth L Sokoloff (1997). “Factor endowments, institutions, and differential paths of growth among New World economies”. In: *How Latin America Fell Behind. Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914*. Ed. by Stephen Haber. Stanford University Press. Chap. 10, pp. 260–296.
- Escoc, Gisela Meyer (1995). “The demise of Soviet industry: A regional perspective”. In: *Journal of Comparative Economics* 21.3, pp. 336–352. ISSN: 10957227. DOI: [10.1006/jcec.1995.0005](https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.1995.0005).
- Falk, Armin, Andreas Kuhn, and Josef Zweimüller (2011). “Unemployment and right-wing extremist crime”. In: *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 113.2, pp. 260–285. ISSN: 03470520. DOI: [10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01648.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01648.x).
- Falter, Jürgen W. and Dirk Hänisch (1990). *Election and social data of the districts and municipalities of the German Empire from 1920 to 1933*. Cologne. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.8013>.
- FDP (1948). *Heppenheimer Proklamation der Freien Demokratischen Partei*. URL: <https://www.freiheit.org/grundsatzprogramme-und-dokumente>.
- (1949). *Die Bremer Plattform der Freien Demokratischen Partei*. URL: <https://www.freiheit.org/grundsatzprogramme-und-dokumente>.
- Forstreuter, Kurt (1955). *Preussen und Russland. Von den Anfängen des Deutschen Ordens bis zu Peter dem Grossen*. Göttinger Bausteine zur Geschichtswissenschaft: Bd. 23. Göttingen, Musterschmidt [1955].
- Friedrich, Carl Joachim (1937). “The agricultural basis of emotional nationalism”. In: *Public Opinion Quarterly* 1, pp. 50–61. ISSN: 0033362X. DOI: [10.1086/265061](https://doi.org/10.1086/265061).
- Gericke, Dina, Anne Burmeister, Jil Löwe, Jürgen Deller, and Leena Pundt (2018). “How do refugees use their social capital for successful labor market integration? An exploratory analysis in Germany”. In: *Journal of Vocational Behavior* 105, pp. 46–61. DOI: [10.1016/j.jvb.2017.12.002](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jvb.2017.12.002).

- Giedrojć, Marzenna (2005). *Kształtowanie tożsamości kulturowej mieszkańców Pomorza Zachodniego w drugiej połowie XX wieku*. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego.
- Glück, Helmut and Wolfgang Werner Sauer (1997). “Demographie und Sprachwandel: Flüchtlinge, Besatzer, Gastarbeiter, Touristen, Aussiedler”. In: *Gegenwartsdeutsch*. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, pp. 87–97. ISBN: 978-3-476-04110-4. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-476-04110-4\\_7](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04110-4_7).
- Grosfeld, Irena and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2015). “Cultural vs. economic legacies of Empires: Evidence from the partition of Poland”. In: *Journal of Comparative Economics* 43.1, pp. 55–75. ISSN: 10957227.
- Grosjean, Pauline (2011a). “The institutional legacy of the Ottoman Empire: Islamic rule and financial development in South Eastern Europe”. In: *Journal of Comparative Economics* 39.1, pp. 1–16. DOI: [10.1016/j.jce.2010.05.003](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2010.05.003).
- (2011b). “The weight of history on European cultural integration: A gravity approach”. In: *The American Economic Review* 101.3, pp. 504–508.
- Hälbig, Mirja C. and Jürgen R. Lorenz (2019). “How Stalin and Roosevelt influenced the federal elections in 2017 East Germany”. In: *Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Session: Economic History II, No. D07-V1*. Kiel, Hamburg: ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
- Harvey, Elizabeth (2000). “Pilgrimages to the 'bleeding border': Gender and rituals of nationalist protest in Germany, 1919-39”. In: *Women's History Review* 9.2, pp. 201–229. ISSN: 09612025. DOI: [10.1080/09612020000200246](https://doi.org/10.1080/09612020000200246).
- Hryniewicz, Janusz T (2003). “Polityczne i gospodarcze następstwa zaboru pruskiego”. In: *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne* 4.13, pp. 61–78.
- Iacus, Stefano M., Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro (2009). “cem : Software for Coarsened Exact Matching”. In: *Journal of Statistical Software* 30.9, pp. 1–27. ISSN: 1548-7660. DOI: [10.18637/jss.v030.i09](https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v030.i09). URL: <http://www.jstatsoft.org/v30/i09/>.
- Jasinski, Tomasz (1993). “Die Rolle des Deutschen Ordens bei der Städtegründung in Preußen im 13. Jahrhundert”. In: *Stadt und Orden. Das Verhältnis des Deutschen Ordens zu den Städten in Livland, Preußen und im Deutschen Reich*. Ed. by Udo Arnold. Marburg: N.G. Elwert Verlag, pp. 94–111.
- Kelly, Morgan (2019). “The standard errors of persistence”. URL: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333571096>.
- Konitzer, Andrew and Jelena Grujić (2009). “An electorate adrift: Refugees and elections in post-Milošević Serbia”. In: *Europe - Asia Studies* 61.5, pp. 857–874. ISSN: 09668136. DOI: [10.1080/09668130902905057](https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130902905057).
- Kozłowski, Kazimierz (2003). *Osadnictwo polskie na Pomorzu Zachodnim. Mity i rzeczywistość*. Szczecin.
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2008). “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins”. In: *Journal of Economic Literature* 46.2, pp. 285–332.
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W Vishny (1997). “Legal determinants of external finance”. In: *The Journal of Finance* LII.3, pp. 1131–1151. ISSN: 0022-1082.

- Lechevalier, Arnaud and Jan Wielgoths, eds. (2013). *Borders and border regions in Europe: Changes, challenges and chances*. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, pp. 1–2. ISBN: 9783837624427.
- Lewicka, Maria (2005). “Ways to make people active: The role of place attachment, cultural capital, and neighborhood ties”. In: *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 25.4, pp. 381–395. ISSN: 02724944.
- Löwis, Sabine von (2015). “Phantom borders in the political geography of East Central Europe: An introduction”. In: *Erdkunde* 69.2, pp. 99–106. ISSN: 00140015.
- Makowski, Adam, ed. (2008). *Polacy na ziemiach odzyskanych: Regiony przygraniczne w poszukiwaniu tożsamości: Przed i po akcesji*. Szczecin: Instytut Historii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych.
- Mayda, Anna Maria (2006). “Who is against immigration? A cross-country investigation of individual attitudes toward immigrants”. In: *Review of Economics and Statistics* 88.3, pp. 510–530. ISSN: 00346535. DOI: [10.1162/rest.88.3.510](https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.88.3.510).
- Michalak, Andrzej, Andrzej Sakson, and Ź Stasienuk, eds. (2011). *Polskie Ziemię Zachodnie – Studia socjologiczne*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
- Mintzel, Alf (1986). “Die Bayernpartei”. In: *Parteien-Handbuch: Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980. Sonderausgabe Band 1: AUD bis CDU*. Ed. by Richard Stöss. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, pp. 395–489. DOI: [10.1007/978-3-663-14349-9\\_6](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-14349-9_6).
- “Deutsche Partei” (1960). In: *Deutsches Handbuch der Politik, Band 1: Deutsche Parteiprogramme*. Ed. by Wilhelm Mommsen. München: Olzog Verlag, pp. 714–715.
- MPIDR and CGG (2011a). *MPIDR population history GIS collection (partly based on Bundesamt für Kartographie und Geodäsie 2011: VG 2500 Verwaltungsgebiete (Ebenen) 1:2.500.000. Stand 01.01.2009 – Frankfurt am Main)*. Rostock.
- (2011b). *MPIDR population history GIS collection (partly based on Hubatsch and Klein (eds.) 1975 ff.: Grundriß der deutschen Verwaltungsgeschichte – Marburg)*. Rostock.
- Nikzentaitis, Alvydas (2002). “Ostpreußen in der litauischen Geschichtsschreibung”. In: *Baltisch-deutsche Sprachen- und Kulturenkontakte in Nord-Ostpreussen: Methoden ihrer Erforschung*. Ed. by Jochen D Range. Essen: Die Blaue Eule, pp. 143–164.
- North, Douglass C (2006). “What is missing from political economy”. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Ed. by Donald A Wittman and Barry R Weingast. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780199548477. URL: [www.oxfordhandbooks.com/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548477-e-057](http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548477.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199548477-e-057).
- O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Richard Sinnott (2006). “The determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration”. In: *European Journal of Political Economy* 22.4, pp. 838–861. ISSN: 01762680. DOI: [10.1016/j.ejpolco.2005.10.005](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpolco.2005.10.005).
- Ochsner, Christian and Felix Roesel (2016). “Migrating extremists”.
- Partei Vorstand der KPD (1949). *Einheit Frieden Wohlstand. Das Wahlprogramm der KPD*. Frankfurt/M.
- Peisakhin, Leonid (2015). “Cultural legacies: Persistence and transmission”. In: *The Political Economy of Governance: Institutions, Political Performance and Elections*. Ed. by Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero. Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 21–39. ISBN: 978-3-319-15551-7.

- Rammelt, Henry (2015). “Shadows of the past: Common effects of communism or different pre-communist legacies? An analysis of discrepancies in social mobilization throughout Romanian Regions”. In: *Erdkunde* 69.2, pp. 151–160.
- Sakson, Andrzej, ed. (2006). *Ziemie Odzyskane/Ziemie Zachodnie i Północne 1945-2005 - 60 lat w granicach państwa polskiego, Seria Ziemie Zachodnie. Studia i Materiały nr 23*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni.
- Schmitt, Karl, Hans Rattinger, and Dieter Oberndörfer (1994). *District data (Censuses 1950-1987)*. Cologne. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.2472>.
- Schmollinger, Horst (1986). “Die Deutsche Partei”. In: *Parteien-Handbuch: Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980. Sonderausgabe Band 2: CSU bis DSU*. Ed. by Richard Stöss. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, pp. 1025–1111.
- Schulze, Max-stephan and Nikolaus Wolf (2009). “On the origins of border effects: Insights from the Habsburg Empire”. In: *Journal of Economic Geography* 9, pp. 117–136. DOI: [10.1093/jeg/lbn040](https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbn040).
- Scobel, A., ed. (1906). *Andrees allgemeiner Handatlas in 139 Haupt- und 161 Nebenkarten nebst vollständigem alphabetischem Namenverzeichnis. Fünfte, völlig neubearbeitete und vermehrte Auflage. Jubiläumsausgabe*. Bielefeld & Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing. URL: <https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view/10448358>.
- Sekeris, Petros and Chrysovalantis Vasilakis (2016). “The Mediterranean refugees crisis and extreme right parties: Evidence from Greece”.
- Shayo, Moses (2009). “A model of social identity with an application to political economy: Nation, class, and redistribution”. In: *American Political Science Review* 103.2, pp. 147–174. ISSN: 00030554. DOI: [10.1017/S0003055409090194](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090194).
- Šimon, Martin (2015). “Measuring phantom borders: The case of Czech/Czechoslovakian electoral geography”. In: *Erdkunde* 69.2, pp. 139–150.
- Solsten, Eric, ed. (1996). *Germany: A country study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. ISBN: 0844408530.
- Staliunas, Darius, ed. (2016). *Spatial concepts of Lithuania in the long nineteenth century*. Boston: Academic Studies Press.
- Steinmayr, Andreas (2016). “Exposure to refugees and voting for the far-right: (Unexpected) results from Austria”.
- Tabellini, Guido (2010). “Culture and institutions: Economic development in the regions of Europe”. In: *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8.4, pp. 677–716.
- Tilse, Mark (2011). *Transnationalism in the Prussian East. From national conflict to synthesis, 1871-1914*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Tomić, Đorđe (2016). *Phantomgrenzen und regionale Autonomie im postsozialistischen Südosteuropa. Die Vojvodina und das Banat im Vergleich*. Göttingen: Wallstein-Verlag.
- Urbatsch, R. (2017). “Long-term effects of ethnic cleansing in the former Polish-German borderlands”. In: *Political Geography* 58, pp. 56–66. ISSN: 09626298. DOI: [10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.01.004](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.01.004). URL: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.01.004>.
- Vareikis, Vygtantas (2002). “Germano-Lithuanian relations in Lithuania Minor and certain aspects of the ”Memelland Identity” in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”. In: *Baltisch-deutsche Sprachen- und Kulturenkontakte in Nord-Ostpreussen: Methoden ihrer Erforschung*. Ed. by Jochen D Range. Essen: Die Blaue Eule, pp. 81–98.

- Wolf, Nikolaus (2005). “Path dependent border effects: The case of Poland’s reunification (1918 – 1939)”. In: *Explorations in Economic History* 42, pp. 414–438. DOI: [10.1016/j.eeh.2004.10.002](https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2004.10.002).
- Wolf, Nikolaus, Max-Stephan Schulze, and Hans-Christian Heinemeyer (2011). “On the economic consequences of the peace: Trade and borders after Versailles”. In: *Journal of Economic History* 71.4, p. 2011. DOI: [10.1017/S0022050711002191](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050711002191).
- Wrzesinski, Wojciech (1985). “Disputes over East Prussia’s history between 1920 and 1939”. In: *Polish Western Affairs* 26.2, pp. 219–239.
- Wylgała, Anna (2014). *Przesiedlenia a pamięć: studium (nie) pamięci społecznej na przykładzie ukraińskiej Galicji i polskich” Ziemi Odzyskanych*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika.
- Wysokinska, Agnieszka (2015). “Invisible wall: How history matters for economic development”.
- Zarycki, Tomasz (2015). “The electoral geography of Poland: Between stable spatial structures and their changing interpretations”. In: *Erdkunde* 69.2, pp. 107–124. ISSN: 00140015.
- Zukowski, Ryszard (2004). “Historical path dependence, institutional persistence, and transition to market economy: The case of Poland”. In: *International Journal of Social Economics* 31.10, pp. 955–973. ISSN: 03068293.
- Zyromski, Stanisław (1985). “Population processes in Warmia and Mazury in 1945-1949”. In: *Polish Western Affairs* 26.2, pp. 291–302.

## Appendix

### A Data description

Table A.1: Data profile and sources

Variable	Unit	Period	Data source	Notes
<i>Political data in former East Prussia</i>				
Turnout	%	2011 (Poland, Russia), 2012 (Lithuania)	The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania; Polish National Electoral Commission; Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation	Share of valid ballot papers in total number of voters
Votes for conservative parties (Lithuanian parliamentary election)	%	2012	The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania	Share of people voting for: Order and Justice; Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action; Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union; Christian Party; 'Young Lithuania'
Votes for conservative parties (Polish parliamentary election)	%	2011	National Electoral Commission	Share of people voting for: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice); Prawica (Right Wing of the Republic)
Votes for conservative parties (Russian parliamentary election)	%	2011	Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation	Share of people voting for: United Russia
Votes for liberal-conservative parties (Lithuanian parliamentary election)	%	2012	The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania	Share of people voting for: Order and Justice; Lithuanian Poles' Electoral Action; Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union; Christian Party; 'Young Lithuania'; Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats; Liberals Movement of the Republic of Lithuania; Liberal and Centre Union; National Association 'For Lithuania in Lithuania'
Votes for liberal-conservative parties (Polish parliamentary election)	%	2011	National Electoral Commission	Share of people voting for: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice); Prawica (Right Wing of the Republic); Polska Jest Najważniejsza (Poland Comes First); Platforma Obywatelska RP (Civic Platform); Nowa Prawica - Janusza Korwin-Mikke (Congress of the New Right)

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

Variable	Unit	Period	Data source	Notes
Votes for liberal-conservative parties (Russian parliamentary election)	%	2011	Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation	Share of people voting for: United Russia; Civic Platform
Votes for nationalistic parties (Lithuanian parliamentary election)	%	2012	The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania	Share of people voting for: Homeland Union - Lithuanian Christian Democrats; Order and Justice; National Association 'For Lithuania in Lithuania'; 'Young Lithuania'
Votes for nationalistic parties (Polish parliamentary election)	%	2011	National Electoral Commission	Share of people voting for: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
Votes for nationalistic parties (Russian parliamentary election)	%	2011	Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation	Share of people voting for: United Russia, LDPR
<i>Economic data in former East Prussia</i>				
Overall	Number of enterprises	2015-2017 (Poland), 2015-2018 (Lithuania), 2017-2018 (Russia)	Geospatial data on economic entities in operation by grid, Statistics Lithuania; Local Data Bank, Statistics Poland; Database of Indicators of Municipalities, Federal State Statistic Service (Russia)	Number of economic entities in operation (Lithuania, Poland) Number of reporting enterprises (Russia)
Agriculture				Number of economic entities by economic activity: agriculture, forestry and fishing
Manufacturing				Number of economic entities by economic activity: manufacturing, mining and quarrying, and other industry
Construction				Number of economic entities by economic activity: construction
Wholesale & Retail Trade				Number of economic entities by economic activity: wholesale and retail trade, transportation and storage, accommodation and food service activities
Information & Communication				Number of economic entities by economic activity: information and communication
Financial & Insurance Activities				Number of economic entities by economic activity: financial and insurance activities
Real Estate Activities				Number of economic entities by economic activity: real estate activities
Professional & Scientific Activities				Number of economic entities by economic activity: professional, scientific and technical activities, administrative and support service activities

Table A.1 – continued from previous page

Variable	Unit	Period	Data source	Notes
Public Administration				Number of economic entities by economic activity: public administration and defense, education, human health and social work
Other Services				Number of economic entities by economic activity: other services
<i>Political and socioeconomic data in West Germany</i>				
Conservative votes in FRG	%	1949	Der Bundeswahlleiter <a href="#">2016</a>	Share of people voting for: Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Christian Social Union (CSU); German Party (DP); Centre Party (Zentrum); German Conservative Party / German Right Party (DKP/DRP)
Nationalistic votes in FRG	%	1949	Der Bundeswahlleiter <a href="#">2016</a>	Share of people voting for: German Party (DP); European People's Movement in Germany (EVD)
Share of expellees in FRG districts	%	1950	Braun and Dwenger <a href="#">2018</a>	Share of expellees from East Prussia, Berlin, East Brandenburg, Silesia, or Pomerania in the total district population
German elections 1920-1933	%	1920-1933	Falter and Hänisch <a href="#">1990</a>	<i>Conservative parties:</i> share of people voting for Centre / Bavarian People's Party (separate parties until 1928); German National People's Party; Christian Social People's Service (from 1930) <i>Nationalistic parties:</i> share of people voting for NSDAP (from 1928); National People's Party; German People's Party
Share of industry, agriculture, or entrepreneurship in East Prussia vs. FRG districts	%	1939	Falter and Hänisch <a href="#">1990</a>	Share of employees in industry, agriculture, or entrepreneurship in total employment – ratio of the share in East Prussia to that in the FRG district
Demographics of FRG districts	%	1950	Schmitt et al. <a href="#">1994</a>	Share of males; young people (aged 15-20); old people (aged over 65); Protestants; or Catholics in total population
Employment structure in FRG districts	%	1950	Schmitt et al. <a href="#">1994</a>	Share of workers; entrepreneurs; employees in agriculture, industry, trade & finance, or public sector in total employment



Table A.2: Descriptive statistics: Main variables

Variable	Lithuania					Poland					Russia				
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Distance to East Prussian border	29,963	96.82	60.96	5.043	252.2	7,434	223.5	120.1	343	466.2	274	602	288	13	1060
East Prussia City	29,963	0.066	0.248	0	1	7,434	0.038	0.192	0	1	274	0.161	0.368	0	1
Agriculture	29,963	0.158	0.364	0	1	7,434	0.122	0.328	0	1	274	0.131	0.338	0	1
Manufacturing	29,963	0.311	0.862	0	24	7,434	30.2	41.20	0	1301	274	0.653	2.006	0	12
Construction	29,963	1.240	4.218	0	87	7,434	164	745.24	2	28510	274	5.047	11.22	0	63
Wholesale & Retail Trade	29,963	1.004	4.461	0	114	7,434	201.15	814.19	4	31612	274	0.723	2.968	0	23
Information & Communication	29,963	4.834	20.57	0	460	7,434	579.6	3071.6	13	125483	274	2.5	7.555	0	46
Financial & Insurance Activities	29,963	0.443	3.756	0	130	7,434	57.83	761.87	0	37717	274	0.135	0.766	0	6
Real Estate Activities	29,963	0.108	1.174	0	61	7,434	50.51	378.52	0	16171	274	0.015	0.242	0	4
Professional & Scientific Activities	29,963	0.618	4.601	0	225	7,434	97.17	651.94	0	25645	274	0.595	2.339	0	20
Public Administration	29,963	1.812	13.36	0	462	7,434	221.46	2140.4	1	100236	274	0.314	1.759	0	16
Other Services	29,963	1.036	4.995	0	170	7,434	165.09	879.11	6	33669	274	0.631	2.793	0	17
Number of employees	29,963	1.963	9.091	0	243	7,434	143.27	803.54	4	34250	274	0.42	2.023	0	14
Number of economic entities	11,569	410.1	1451	0	47307	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na
Turnout	29,963	13.37	62.40	1	1796	7,434	1712.4	10186	68	434676	274	17.25	31.71	0	196
Conservative Share	2,000	0.518	0.075	0.299	0.962	2,479	0.425	0.069	0.231	0.726	158	0.565	0.086	0.401	0.865
Liberal-Conservative Share	2,000	0.220	0.149	0.025	0.950	2,479	0.335	0.126	0.040	0.831	158	0.475	0.116	0.257	0.936
Nationalist Share	2,000	0.441	0.134	0.077	0.957	2,479	0.653	0.111	0.184	0.924	158	0.479	0.115	0.266	0.936
Nationalist Share	2,000	0.234	0.093	0.007	0.704	2,479	0.332	0.124	0.040	0.829	158	0.606	0.093	0.40	0.952

Table A.3: Descriptive statistics: Individual parties

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Lithuania</i>					
Labor Party	2,000	0.248	0.110	0.029	0.760
Social Democratic Party	2,000	0.201	0.101	0.000	0.779
Homeland Union	2,000	0.131	0.069	0.000	0.487
Liberals Movement	2,000	0.066	0.051	0.000	0.343
The Way of Courage	2,000	0.067	0.046	0.000	0.294
Order & Justice	2,000	0.089	0.075	0.000	0.635
Poles' Electoral Action	2,000	0.050	0.146	0.000	0.950
Peasant & Greens Union	2,000	0.062	0.069	0.000	0.811
Liberal & Centre Union	2,000	0.023	0.031	0.000	0.383
Union YES	2,000	0.012	0.015	0.000	0.157
Socialist People's Front	2,000	0.011	0.013	0.000	0.153
Christian Party	2,000	0.014	0.014	0.000	0.171
National Association	2,000	0.008	0.009	0.000	0.150
Young Lithuania	2,000	0.005	0.006	0.000	0.053
Democratic Labor & Unity Party	2,000	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.063
Emigrants' Party	2,000	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.030
Republican Party	2,000	0.003	0.007	0.000	0.156
People's Party	2,000	0.003	0.004	0.000	0.064
<i>Poland</i>					
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	2,479	0.332	0.124	0.040	0.829
Polska Jest Najważniejsza	2,479	0.020	0.012	0.003	0.199
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	2,479	0.082	0.049	0.003	0.529
Ruch Palikota	2,479	0.089	0.031	0.014	0.226
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	2,479	0.163	0.109	0.011	0.766
Polska Partia Pracy - Sierpień 80	2,479	0.006	0.005	0.000	0.077
Platforma Obywatelska RP	2,479	0.290	0.135	0.000	0.703
Nasz Dom Polska	2,479	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.042
Nowa Prawica	2,479	0.008	0.009	0.000	0.086
Prawica	2,479	0.003	0.004	0.000	0.048
<i>Russia</i>					
United Russia	158	0.475	0.116	0.257	0.936
LDPR	158	0.131	0.033	0.015	0.207
CPRF	158	0.204	0.048	0.035	0.318
Just Russia	158	0.150	0.056	0.011	0.315
Yabloko	158	0.025	0.019	0.001	0.118
Patriots of Russia	158	0.011	0.004	0.000	0.032
Right Cause	158	0.004	0.002	0.000	0.010

## B Estimation results

### B.1 Persistence in East Prussia

Table B.1: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia (all parties)

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Conventional	−0.061***	0.018	−3.42	−0.096	−0.026	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.046**	0.018	−2.59	−0.081	−0.011	2479
	Robust	−0.046*	0.028	−1.68	−0.100	0.008	2479
Polska Jest Najważniejsza	Conventional	−0.009*	0.005	−1.71	−0.018	0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.014***	0.005	−2.72	−0.023	−0.004	2479
	Robust	−0.014	0.009	−1.46	−0.032	0.005	2479
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Conventional	0.021***	0.007	3.06	0.008	0.035	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.026***	0.007	3.82	0.013	0.040	2479
	Robust	0.026***	0.009	3.04	0.009	0.044	2479
Ruch Palikota	Conventional	0.029***	0.007	4.23	0.016	0.043	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.019***	0.007	2.66	0.005	0.032	2479
	Robust	0.019*	0.010	1.92	0.000	0.037	2479
Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe	Conventional	−0.039	0.025	−1.59	−0.088	0.009	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.032	0.025	−1.31	−0.081	0.016	2479
	Robust	−0.032	0.036	−0.91	−0.103	0.038	2479
Polska Partia Pracy – Sierpień 80	Conventional	−0.004*	0.002	−1.90	−0.007	0.000	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.004**	0.002	−2.06	−0.008	0.000	2479
	Robust	−0.004	0.003	−1.55	−0.009	0.001	2479
Platforma Obywatelska RP	Conventional	0.068***	0.026	2.60	0.017	0.119	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.058**	0.026	2.22	0.007	0.109	2479
	Robust	0.058	0.040	1.47	−0.019	0.136	2479
Nasz Dom Polska	Conventional	−0.003***	0.001	−2.79	−0.005	−0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.002**	0.001	−2.03	−0.004	0.000	2479
	Robust	−0.002	0.001	−1.39	−0.005	0.001	2479
Prawica	Conventional	0.001	0.001	1.38	0.000	0.002	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	1.19	−0.001	0.002	2479
	Robust	0.001	0.001	0.72	−0.002	0.003	2479
Nowa Prawica	Conventional	−0.004***	0.001	−3.43	−0.007	−0.002	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.006***	0.001	−4.66	−0.008	−0.003	2479
	Robust	−0.006***	0.002	−3.04	−0.010	−0.002	2479
Turnout	Conventional	−0.038**	0.016	−2.37	−0.069	−0.006	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.035**	0.016	−2.22	−0.066	−0.004	2479
	Robust	−0.035	0.022	−1.62	−0.078	0.007	2479
Conservative Share	Conventional	−0.060***	0.018	−3.32	−0.096	−0.025	2479
	Bias-Corrected	−0.045**	0.018	−2.51	−0.081	−0.010	2479
	Robust	−0.045	0.028	−1.63	−0.100	−0.009	2479

Table B.1 – continued

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.005	0.020	-0.25	-0.043	0.033	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007	0.020	-0.34	-0.045	0.032	2479
	Robust	-0.007	0.029	-0.23	-0.063	0.050	2479
Nationalist Share	Conventional	-0.061***	0.018	-3.42	-0.096	-0.026	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.046**	0.018	-2.59	-0.081	-0.011	2479
	Robust	-0.046*	0.028	-1.68	-0.100	0.008	2479

*Notes:* \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.

Table B.2: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia (all parties)

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Labor Party	Conventional	0.059**	0.026	2.27	0.008	0.110	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.061**	0.026	2.36	0.010	0.112	2000
	Robust	0.061*	0.033	1.84	-0.004	0.127	2000
Social Democratic Party	Conventional	-0.105***	0.024	-4.29	-0.153	-0.057	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.062**	0.024	-2.55	-0.110	-0.014	2000
	Robust	-0.062**	0.032	-1.97	-0.125	0.000	2000
Homeland Union	Conventional	-0.028***	0.011	-2.65	-0.049	-0.007	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.039***	0.011	-3.68	-0.060	-0.018	2000
	Robust	-0.039***	0.013	-2.91	-0.067	-0.013	2000
Liberals Movement	Conventional	-0.0004	0.013	-0.04	-0.027	0.026	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.034**	0.013	-2.57	-0.060	-0.008	2000
	Robust	-0.034**	0.017	-2.03	-0.067	-0.001	2000
The Way of Courage	Conventional	-0.010	0.007	-1.30	-0.024	0.005	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.023***	0.007	-3.13	-0.038	-0.009	2000
	Robust	-0.023**	0.010	-2.39	-0.042	-0.004	2000
Order & Justice	Conventional	-0.104***	0.037	2.79	0.031	0.177	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.128***	0.037	3.42	0.055	0.201	2000
	Robust	-0.128***	0.044	2.87	0.040	0.214	2000
Poles' Electoral Action	Conventional	-0.004***	0.002	-2.54	-0.007	-0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.027***	0.002	-17.45	-0.030	-0.024	2000
	Robust	-0.027***	0.002	-11.70	-0.032	-0.023	2000
Peasant & Greens Union	Conventional	-0.001	0.012	-0.10	-0.025	0.023	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.011	0.012	0.91	-0.013	0.035	2000
	Robust	0.011	0.016	0.70	-0.020	0.042	2000
Liberal & Centre Union	Conventional	-0.008	0.005	-1.59	-0.017	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007	0.005	-1.37	-0.016	0.003	2000
	Robust	-0.007	0.006	-1.15	-0.018	0.005	2000
Union YES	Conventional	0.007	0.005	1.45	-0.002	0.016	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.010**	0.005	2.02	0.000	0.019	2000
	Robust	0.010	0.006	1.49	-0.003	0.022	2000
Socialist People's Front	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-3.57	-0.007	-0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007***	0.001	-5.63	-0.009	-0.004	2000
	Robust	-0.007***	0.002	-4.25	-0.010	-0.004	2000
Christian Party	Conventional	-0.006**	0.003	-2.06	-0.011	0.000	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.005*	0.003	-1.86	-0.010	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.005	0.003	-1.47	-0.012	0.002	2000
National Association	Conventional	-0.003	0.002	-1.52	-0.006	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004**	0.002	-2.35	-0.008	-0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.004*	0.002	-1.78	-0.009	0.000	2000

Table B.2 – continued

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Young Lithuania	Conventional	$-7.0 \times 10^{-6}$	0.001	-0.01	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	$4.3 \times 10^{-5}$	0.001	0.04	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Robust	$4.3 \times 10^{-5}$	0.001	0.03	-0.002	0.003	2000
Democratic Labor & Unity Party	Conventional	-0.001	0.001	-0.73	-0.003	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.0003	0.001	0.32	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.0003	0.001	0.28	-0.002	0.003	2000
Emigrants' Party	Conventional	-0.0003	0.001	-0.53	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.001*	0.001	-1.74	-0.002	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.001	0.001	-1.49	-0.002	0.000	2000
Republican Party	Conventional	-0.0002	0.001	-0.39	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.0002	0.001	-0.37	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.0002	0.001	-0.29	-0.002	0.001	2000
People's Party	Conventional	0.0003	0.001	0.39	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.0005	0.001	0.68	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.0005	0.001	0.56	-0.001	0.002	2000
Turnout	Conventional	-0.011	0.019	-0.59	-0.049	0.026	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.013	0.019	-0.67	-0.051	0.025	2000
	Robust	-0.013	0.024	-0.54	-0.060	0.034	2000
Conservative Share	Conventional	0.093**	0.036	2.58	0.023	0.164	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.106***	0.036	2.94	0.036	0.177	2000
	Robust	0.106**	0.042	2.53	0.024	0.189	2000
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	0.057*	0.030	1.88	-0.002	-0.660	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.026	0.030	0.87	-0.033	0.085	2000
	Robust	0.026	0.037	0.72	-0.046	0.098	2000
Nationalist Share	Conventional	0.073**	0.034	2.13	0.006	0.140	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.084***	0.034	2.45	0.017	0.151	2000
	Robust	0.084**	0.042	2.01	0.002	0.166	2000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.

Table B.3: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	4.616**	2.198	2.10	0.307	8.924	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-0.406	2.198	-0.18	-4.714	3.902	7434
	Robust	-0.406	2.857	-0.18	-6.006	5.195	7434
Manufacturing	Conventional	-11.542	12.442	-0.93	-35.927	12.843	7434
	Bias-Corrected	4.904	12.442	0.39	-19.481	28.289	7434
	Robust	4.904	13.629	0.36	-21.807	31.616	7434
Construction	Conventional	-0.172	15.274	-0.01	-30.108	29.764	7434
	Bias-Corrected	13.461	15.274	0.88	-16.475	43.397	7434
	Robust	13.461	16.94	0.79	-19.740	46.663	7434
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	-63.149	47.570	-1.33	-156.384	30.087	7434
	Bias-Corrected	8.756	47.570	0.18	-84.480	101.991	7434
	Robust	8.756	50.425	0.17	-90.075	107.586	7434
Information & Communication	Conventional	-5.253	3.666	-1.43	-12.439	1.933	7434
	Bias-Corrected	2.683	3.666	0.73	-4.503	9.869	7434
	Robust	2.683	3.717	0.73	-4.602	9.969	7434
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	-7.251	5.694	-1.27	-18.410	3.908	7434
	Bias-Corrected	4.166	5.694	0.73	-6.994	15.325	7434
	Robust	4.166	5.706	0.73	-7.019	15.350	7434
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	-8.160	19.374	-0.42	-46.132	29.812	7434
	Bias-Corrected	8.298	19.374	0.43	-29.674	46.270	7434
	Robust	8.298	19.954	0.42	-30.812	47.408	7434
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	-32.301	19.339	-1.67	-70.205	5.602	7434
	Bias-Corrected	15.761	19.339	0.82	-22.143	53.665	7434
	Robust	15.761	19.274	0.82	-22.015	53.537	7434
Public Administration	Conventional	-16.464	20.089	-0.82	-55.839	22.910	7434
	Bias-Corrected	20.355	20.089	1.01	-19.019	59.729	7434
	Robust	20.355	21.307	0.96	-21.405	62.115	7434
Other Services	Conventional	-13.358	15.953	-0.84	-44.627	17.910	7434
	Bias-Corrected	16.439	15.953	1.03	-14.830	47.707	7434
	Robust	16.439	16.385	1.00	-15.675	48.552	7434

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidth is 60 km.

Table B.4: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	-0.154***	0.014	-10.90	-0.182	-0.127	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.161***	0.014	-11.37	-0.189	-0.133	29963
	Robust	-0.161***	0.020	-8.14	-0.200	-0.122	29963
Manufacturing	Conventional	-0.326***	0.035	-9.42	-0.393	-0.258	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.272***	0.035	-36.79	-1.339	-1.204	29963
	Robust	-1.272***	0.053	-23.96	-1.376	-1.168	29963
Construction	Conventional	-0.429***	0.031	-13.74	-0.490	-0.368	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.406***	0.031	-45.02	-1.467	-1.344	29963
	Robust	-1.406***	0.052	-27.06	-1.507	-1.304	29963
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	-3.197***	0.088	-36.20	-3.370	-3.024	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-6.974***	0.088	-78.95	-7.147	-6.800	29963
	Robust	-6.974***	0.151	-46.24	-7.269	-6.678	29963
Information & Communication	Conventional	-0.118***	0.008	-14.11	-0.134	-0.101	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.297***	0.008	-35.73	-0.314	-0.281	29963
	Robust	-0.297***	0.014	-21.39	-0.325	-0.270	29963
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	-0.047	0.004	-11.88	-0.054	-0.039	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.137	0.004	-34.84	-0.145	-0.129	29963
	Robust	-0.137	0.006	-22.48	-0.149	-0.125	29963
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	-0.539***	0.020	-27.62	-0.577	-0.501	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.226***	0.020	-62.83	-1.264	-1.187	29963
	Robust	-1.226***	0.031	-39.27	-1.287	-1.164	29963
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	-0.893***	0.027	-32.69	-0.947	-0.840	29963
	Bias-Corrected	2.289***	0.027	-83.75	-2.343	-2.235	29963
	Robust	2.289***	0.046	-49.57	-2.38	-2.199	29963
Public Administration	Conventional	-0.770***	0.024	-31.73	-0.818	-0.723	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.475***	0.024	-60.76	-1.522	-1.428	29963
	Robust	-1.475***	0.038	-38.67	-1.550	-1.400	29963
Other Services	Conventional	-1.067***	0.044	-24.32	-1.153	-0.981	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-2.472***	0.044	-56.35	-2.558	-2.386	29963
	Robust	-2.472***	0.071	-34.75	-2.611	-2.332	29963
Number of Employees	Conventional	-103.13***	9.426	-10.94	-121.59	-84.651	11569
	Bias-Corrected	-289.67***	9.426	-30.73	-308.14	-271.19	11569
	Robust	-289.67***	13.433	-21.56	-315.99	-263.34	11569
Income of Economic Entities	Conventional	0.074	0.202	0.36	-0.322	0.469	5457
	Bias-Corrected	-0.397**	0.202	-1.97	-0.792	-0.001	5457
	Robust	-0.397	0.269	-1.48	-0.923	0.130	5457

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km.



Table B.5: Economic matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening, Match I

		Treated				Control		
Number of strata:	17							
Number of matched strata:	5							
All		44				230		
Matched		38				64		
Unmatched		6				166		
Multivariate imbalance measure:	L1 = 0.232							
Univariate imbalance measures:								
Variable	L1	Mean	Min	25%	50%	75%	Max	
City	$1.2 \times 10^{-16}$	$1.4 \times 10^{-16}$	0	0	0	0	0	
Altitude	0.147	-3.305	16	-6	-8	1	11	

Table B.6: Economic matching results for Russian East Prussia (Kaliningrad) coarsening, Match II

		Treated					Control	
Number of strata:	52							
Number of matched strata:	6							
All		44					230	
Matched		28					20	
Unmatched		16					210	
Multivariate imbalance measure:	L1 = 0.679							
Univariate Imbalance Measures:								
Variable	L1	Mean	Min	25%	50%	57%	Max	
City	$1.9 \times 10^{-16}$	$-5.6 \times 10^{-17}$	0	0	0	0	0	
Altitude	0.071	-3.196	-7	0	-2	1	11	
Distance to the Russian border (rescaled)	0.518	-0.012	0.002	-0.017	-0.015	0	0.002	

Table B.7: Economic estimates of East Prussian impact in Russia (Kaliningrad)

Outcome	Matching Model	Coefficient	Std. Err.	t	N	R-squared
Agriculture	Match I	-2.189***	0.568	-3.86	102	0.130
	Match II	-1.938**	0.861	-2.25	48	0.099
Manufacturing	Match I	-10.779***	3.032	-3.56	102	0.112
	Match II	-9.071**	4.289	-2.11	48	0.087
Construction	Match I	-1.095	0.838	-1.31	102	0.017
	Match II	0.071	0.944	0.08	48	0.000
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Match I	-7.211***	2.304	-3.13	102	0.089
	Match II	-7.429**	3.467	-2.14	48	0.091
Information & Communication	Match I	-0.074	0.239	-0.31	102	0.001
	Match II	0.214	0.383	0.56	48	0.007
Financial & Insurance Activities	Match I	0.105	0.081	1.30	102	0.017
	Match II	0.143	0.170	0.84	48	0.015
Real Estate Activities	Match I	-1.300**	0.648	-2.01	102	0.039
	Match II	-1.393*	0.736	-1.89	48	0.072
Professional & Scientific Activities	Match I	0.100	0.517	0.19	102	0.000
	Match II	0.571	0.979	0.58	48	0.007
Public Administration	Match I	-0.321	0.627	-0.51	102	0.003
	Match II	0.071	0.871	-0.33	48	0.002
Other Services	Match I	-0.374	0.520	-0.72	102	0.269
	Match II	0.071	0.871	0.08	48	0.000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table B.8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	8.946***	1.919	4.66	5.186	12.706	7434
	Bias-Corrected	1.549	1.919	0.81	-2.211	5.309	7434
	Robust	1.549	2.422	0.64	-3.197	6.295	7434
Manufacturing	Conventional	26.726**	10.813	2.47	5.533	47.920	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-9.528	10.813	-0.88	-30.722	11.665	7434
	Robust	-9.528	16.513	-0.58	-41.893	22.837	7434
Construction	Conventional	42.131***	12.816	3.29	17.012	67.251	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-4.393	12.816	-0.34	-29.513	20.726	7434
	Robust	-4.393	19.305	-0.23	-42.230	33.443	7434
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	64.921	39.925	1.63	-13.331	143.172	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-70.617	39.925	-1.77	-148.869	7.634	7434
	Robust	-70.617	59.724	-1.18	-187.673	46.439	7434
Information & Communication	Conventional	11.305***	3.284	3.44	4.869	17.740	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-1.949	3.284	-0.59	-8.384	4.487	7434
	Robust	-1.949	6.166	-0.32	-14.034	10.137	7434
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	6.424	4.645	1.38	-2.680	15.289	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-6.135	4.645	-1.32	-15.240	2.969	7434
	Robust	-6.135	7.308	-0.84	-20.458	8.188	7434
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	23.947	15.680	1.53	-6.784	54.679	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-2.229	15.680	-0.14	-32.961	28.502	7434
	Robust	-2.229	23.128	-0.10	-47.559	43.101	7434
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	37.988**	15.252	2.49	8.095	67.880	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-30.859**	15.252	-2.02	-60.752	-0.967	7434
	Robust	-30.859	27.440	-1.12	-84.640	22.921	7434
Public Administration	Conventional	25.106	15.578	1.61	-5.427	55.639	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-16.484	15.578	-1.06	-47.017	14.049	7434
	Robust	-16.484	25.195	-0.65	-65.866	32.898	7434
Other Services	Conventional	24.447**	12.355	1.98	0.232	48.662	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-19.572	12.355	-1.58	-14.830	4.643	7434
	Robust	-19.572	19.824	-0.99	-15.675	19.281	7434

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.

Table B.9: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	4.220*	2.228	1.89	-0.148	8.588	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-1.646	2.228	-0.74	-6.014	2.721	7434
	Robust	-1.646	2.898	-0.57	-7.326	4.034	7434
Manufacturing	Conventional	-7.503	11.291	-0.66	-29.633	14.628	7434
	Bias-Corrected	7.994	11.291	0.71	-14.137	30.124	7434
	Robust	7.994	12.770	0.63	-17.035	33.022	7434
Construction	Conventional	5.784	13.565	0.43	-20.803	32.371	7434
	Bias-Corrected	15.783	13.565	1.16	-10.803	42.370	7434
	Robust	15.783	15.300	1.03	-14.205	45.771	7434
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	-38.641	40.035	-0.97	-117.108	39.826	7434
	Bias-Corrected	19.970	40.035	0.50	-58.498	98.437	7434
	Robust	19.970	44.691	0.45	-67.624	107.563	7434
Information & Communication	Conventional	-3.578	3.093	-1.16	-9.640	2.485	7434
	Bias-Corrected	3.377	3.093	1.09	-2.685	9.440	7434
	Robust	3.377	3.081	1.10	-2.661	9.415	7434
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	-4.703	4.811	-0.98	-14.132	4.726	7434
	Bias-Corrected	5.515	4.811	1.15	-3.914	14.944	7434
	Robust	5.515	5.176	1.07	-4.629	15.659	7434
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	-3.355	16.026	-0.21	-34.765	28.055	7434
	Bias-Corrected	13.196	16.026	0.82	-18.214	44.606	7434
	Robust	13.196	17.390	0.76	-20.887	47.279	7434
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	-24.008	17.177	-1.40	-57.673	9.657	7434
	Bias-Corrected	18.902	17.177	1.10	-14.763	52.568	7434
	Robust	18.902	17.788	1.06	-15.962	53.767	7434
Public Administration	Conventional	-7.881	16.716	-0.47	-40.644	24.882	7434
	Bias-Corrected	23.612	16.716	1.41	-9.151	56.375	7434
	Robust	23.612	17.721	1.33	-11.120	58.344	7434
Other Services	Conventional	-6.252	13.283	-0.47	-32.287	19.784	7434
	Bias-Corrected	19.801	13.283	1.49	-6.235	45.836	7434
	Robust	19.801	14.250	1.39	-8.129	47.730	7434

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude and city dummy.

Table B.10: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	8.973 <sup>***</sup>	1.998	4.49	5.057	12.890	7434
	Bias-Corrected	1.270	1.998	0.64	-2.647	5.186	7434
	Robust	1.270	2.520	0.50	-3.669	6.208	7434
Manufacturing	Conventional	36.294 <sup>***</sup>	13.345	2.72	10.138	62.450	7434
	Bias-Corrected	2.532	13.345	0.19	-23.625	28.688	7434
	Robust	2.532	19.124	0.13	-34.951	40.014	7434
Construction	Conventional	55.194 <sup>***</sup>	14.294	3.86	27.178	83.209	7434
	Bias-Corrected	8.034	14.294	0.56	-19.982	36.049	7434
	Robust	8.034	20.850	0.39	-32.831	48.898	7434
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	113.620 <sup>***</sup>	43.082	2.64	29.186	198.063	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-28.895	43.082	-0.67	-113.334	55.544	7434
	Robust	-28.895	63.043	-0.46	-152.457	94.667	7434
Information & Communication	Conventional	15.603 <sup>***</sup>	4.660	3.35	6.470	24.736	7434
	Bias-Corrected	3.282	4.660	0.70	-5.851	12.414	7434
	Robust	3.282	7.295	0.45	-11.017	17.580	7434
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	11.587	4.851	2.39	2.078	21.095	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-1.375	4.851	-0.28	-10.884	8.133	7434
	Robust	-1.375	7.575	-0.18	-16.222	13.472	7434
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	33.687 <sup>**</sup>	13.331	2.53	7.559	54.679	7434
	Bias-Corrected	8.391	13.331	0.63	-17.737	28.502	7434
	Robust	8.391	21.037	0.40	-32.841	49.623	7434
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	56.933 <sup>***</sup>	19.381	2.94	18.946	94.919	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-11.611	19.381	-0.60	-49.598	26.375	7434
	Robust	-11.611	30.803	-0.38	-71.985	48.762	7434
Public Administration	Conventional	42.960 <sup>***</sup>	15.332	2.80	12.909	73.011	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-2.987	15.332	-0.19	-33.038	27.064	7434
	Robust	-2.987	24.437	-0.12	-50.883	44.908	7434
Other Services	Conventional	38.256 <sup>***</sup>	11.754	3.25	15.218	61.294	7434
	Bias-Corrected	-8.894	11.754	-0.76	-31.932	14.144	7434
	Robust	-8.894	19.050	-0.47	-46.231	28.443	7434

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude and city dummy.

Table B.11: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Conventional	-0.078***	0.015	-5.18	-0.107	-0.048	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.047***	0.015	-3.11	-0.076	-0.017	2479
	Robust	-0.047**	0.021	-2.25	-0.087	-0.006	2479
Polska Jest Najważniejsza	Conventional	-0.007**	0.003	-2.09	-0.013	0.000	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.010***	0.003	-3.14	-0.016	-0.004	2479
	Robust	-0.010*	0.009	-1.68	-0.021	0.002	2479
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Conventional	0.017***	0.006	2.86	0.005	0.029	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.022***	0.006	3.69	0.011	0.034	2479
	Robust	0.022***	0.008	2.91	0.007	0.038	2479
Ruch Palikota	Conventional	0.033***	0.006	5.72	0.022	0.045	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.026***	0.006	4.49	0.015	0.038	2479
	Robust	0.026***	0.008	3.33	0.011	0.042	2479
Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe	Conventional	-0.049**	0.020	-2.40	-0.088	-0.009	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.032	0.020	-1.60	-0.072	0.007	2479
	Robust	-0.032	0.029	-1.13	-0.088	0.024	2479
Polska Partia Pracy – Sierpień 80	Conventional	-0.004**	0.001	-2.53	-0.006	0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003**	0.001	-2.12	-0.006	0.000	2479
	Robust	-0.003	0.002	-1.41	-0.007	0.001	2479
Platforma Obywatelska RP	Conventional	0.091***	0.021	4.33	0.050	0.132	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.050**	0.021	2.38	0.009	0.091	2479
	Robust	0.050	0.030	1.64	-0.010	0.110	2479
Nasz Dom Polska	Conventional	-0.003***	0.001	-3.38	-0.005	-0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003***	0.001	-3.09	-0.004	-0.001	2479
	Robust	-0.003**	0.001	-2.26	-0.005	0.000	2479
Prawica	Conventional	0.002***	0.001	3.07	0.001	0.003	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.0002	0.001	0.44	-0.001	0.002	2479
	Robust	0.0002	0.001	0.31	-0.002	0.002	2479
Nowa Prawica	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-4.97	-0.006	-0.003	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004***	0.001	-4.98	-0.006	-0.003	2479
	Robust	-0.004***	0.001	-3.15	-0.007	-0.002	2479
Turnout	Conventional	-0.020	0.014	-1.45	-0.047	0.007	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.051***	0.014	-3.71	-0.077	-0.024	2479
	Robust	-0.051***	0.019	-2.73	-0.087	-0.014	2479
Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.076***	0.015	-4.97	-0.105	-0.046	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.045***	0.015	-3.05	-0.076	-0.017	2479
	Robust	-0.045**	0.021	-2.21	-0.087	-0.005	2479
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	0.004	0.016	0.26	-0.028	0.036	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.011	0.016	-0.66	-0.043	0.021	2479
	Robust	-0.011	0.023	-0.47	-0.056	0.034	2479
Nationalist Share	Conventional	-0.078***	0.015	-5.18	-0.107	-0.048	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.047***	0.015	-3.11	-0.076	-0.017	2479
	Robust	-0.047**	0.021	-2.25	-0.087	-0.006	2479

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.



Table B.12: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Conventional	-0.055***	0.014	-3.99	-0.083	-0.028	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.052***	0.014	-3.76	-0.080	-0.025	2479
	Robust	-0.052**	0.023	-2.29	-0.097	-0.008	2479
Polska Jest Najważniejsza	Conventional	-0.008	0.005	-1.61	-0.017	0.002	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.013***	0.005	-2.64	-0.022	-0.003	2479
	Robust	-0.013	0.009	-1.42	-0.030	0.005	2479
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Conventional	0.018***	0.006	2.88	0.006	0.030	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.024***	0.006	3.82	0.012	0.036	2479
	Robust	0.024***	0.008	3.16	0.009	0.039	2479
Ruch Palikota	Conventional	0.030***	0.005	5.45	0.019	0.041	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.022***	0.005	4.07	0.012	0.033	2479
	Robust	0.022***	0.008	2.75	0.006	0.038	2479
Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe	Conventional	-0.039*	0.023	-1.66	-0.085	0.007	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.038	0.023	-1.61	-0.084	0.008	2479
	Robust	-0.038	0.035	-1.09	-0.106	0.030	2479
Polska Partia Pracy – Sierpień 80	Conventional	-0.004**	0.002	-1.99	-0.007	0.000	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004**	0.002	-2.07	-0.008	0.000	2479
	Robust	-0.004	0.003	-1.55	-0.009	0.001	2479
Platforma Obywatelska RP	Conventional	0.063***	0.022	2.87	0.020	0.106	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.066***	0.022	3.02	0.023	0.109	2479
	Robust	0.066*	0.036	1.86	-0.003	0.136	2479
Nasz Dom Polska	Conventional	-0.003***	0.001	-2.77	-0.005	-0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.001	0.001	-1.50	-0.003	0.001	2479
	Robust	-0.001	0.002	-0.94	-0.005	0.002	2479
Prawica	Conventional	0.001**	0.001	2.15	0.000	0.003	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.001*	0.001	1.77	0.000	0.002	2479
	Robust	0.001	0.001	1.06	-0.001	0.003	2479
Nowa Prawica	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-3.10	-0.006	-0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.005***	0.001	-4.57	-0.008	-0.003	2479
	Robust	-0.005***	0.002	-3.01	-0.009	-0.002	2479
Turnout	Conventional	-0.034**	0.016	-2.19	-0.065	-0.004	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.034**	0.016	-2.19	-0.065	-0.004	2479
	Robust	-0.034	0.022	-1.59	-0.077	0.008	2479
Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.054***	0.014	-3.87	-0.082	-0.027	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.051***	0.014	-3.66	-0.079	-0.024	2479
	Robust	-0.051**	0.023	-2.22	-0.097	-0.006	2479
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.002	0.020	-0.12	-0.041	0.036	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003	0.020	-0.15	-0.041	0.035	2479
	Robust	-0.003	0.029	-0.10	-0.060	0.054	2479
Nationalist Share	Conventional	-0.056***	0.014	-3.99	-0.083	-0.028	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.052***	0.014	-3.76	-0.080	-0.025	2479
	Robust	-0.052**	0.023	-2.29	-0.097	-0.008	2479

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude and city dummy.

Table B.13: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Conventional	-0.068***	0.011	-6.01	-0.090	-0.046	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.044***	0.011	-3.90	-0.066	-0.022	2479
	Robust	-0.044***	0.017	-2.68	-0.077	-0.012	2479
Polska Jest Najważniejsza	Conventional	-0.006**	0.003	-2.02	-0.012	0.000	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.009***	0.003	-3.01	-0.015	-0.003	2479
	Robust	-0.009	0.006	-1.61	-0.020	0.002	2479
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Conventional	0.015***	0.006	2.67	0.004	0.026	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.019***	0.006	3.47	0.008	0.030	2479
	Robust	0.019***	0.007	2.74	0.005	0.033	2479
Ruch Palikota	Conventional	0.032***	0.005	6.57	0.022	0.042	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.027***	0.005	5.55	0.018	0.037	2479
	Robust	0.027***	0.007	4.13	0.014	0.040	2479
Polskie Stronictwo Ludowe	Conventional	-0.046**	0.019	-2.37	-0.084	-0.008	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.037*	0.019	-1.92	-0.076	0.001	2479
	Robust	-0.037	0.027	-1.36	-0.091	0.016	2479
Polska Partia Pracy – Sierpień 80	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-2.65	-0.007	0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003**	0.001	-2.24	-0.006	0.000	2479
	Robust	-0.003	0.002	-1.49	-0.007	0.001	2479
Platforma Obywatelska RP	Conventional	0.082***	0.018	4.65	0.047	0.116	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.053***	0.018	3.03	0.019	0.088	2479
	Robust	0.053**	0.026	2.04	0.002	0.105	2479
Nasz Dom Polska	Conventional	-0.003***	0.001	-3.46	-0.004	-0.001	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.002***	0.001	-2.83	-0.004	0.000	2479
	Robust	-0.002*	0.001	-1.96	-0.005	0.000	2479
Prawica	Conventional	0.002	0.001	4.05	0.001	0.003	2479
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	1.00	-0.001	0.002	2479
	Robust	0.001	0.001	0.68	-0.001	0.002	2479
Nowa Prawica	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-4.73	-0.006	-0.002	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004***	0.001	-4.67	-0.006	-0.002	2479
	Robust	-0.004***	0.002	-2.98	-0.006	-0.001	2479
Turnout	Conventional	-0.017	0.014	-1.21	-0.043	0.010	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.045***	0.014	-3.27	-0.072	-0.018	2479
	Robust	-0.045**	0.019	-2.39	-0.082	-0.008	2479
Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.066***	0.011	-5.79	-0.088	-0.044	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.044***	0.011	-3.84	-0.066	-0.021	2479
	Robust	-0.044***	0.017	-2.63	-0.076	-0.011	2479
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	-0.006	0.017	0.34	-0.028	0.039	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003	0.017	-0.20	-0.037	0.030	2479
	Robust	-0.003	0.024	-0.14	-0.050	0.043	2479
Nationalist Share	Conventional	-0.068***	0.011	-6.01	-0.090	-0.046	2479
	Bias-Corrected	-0.044***	0.011	-3.90	-0.066	-0.022	2479
	Robust	-0.044***	0.016	-2.68	-0.077	0.012	2479

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude and city dummy.

Table B.14: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	-0.133***	0.013	-10.13	-0.159	-0.107	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.159***	0.013	-12.09	-0.185	-0.133	29963
	Robust	-0.159***	0.019	-8.46	-0.196	-0.122	29963
Manufacturing	Conventional	0.198***	0.031	6.40	0.137	0.258	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.984***	0.031	-31.88	-1.045	-0.924	29963
	Robust	-0.984***	0.049	-19.94	-1.081	-0.888	29963
Construction	Conventional	0.043	0.026	1.62	-0.009	0.094	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.086***	0.026	-41.34	-1.137	-1.034	29963
	Robust	-1.086***	0.045	-23.91	-1.175	-0.997	29963
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	-1.389***	0.069	-20.07	-1.524	-1.253	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-5.860***	0.069	-84.70	-5.996	-5.725	29963
	Robust	-5.860***	0.125	-46.82	-6.106	-5.615	29963
Information & Communication	Conventional	0.009***	0.007	1.20	-0.006	0.024	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.226***	0.007	-30.33	-0.241	-0.211	29963
	Robust	-0.226***	0.013	-17.20	-0.252	-0.200	29963
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	-0.008***	0.004	-1.98	-0.015	0.000	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.121***	0.004	-31.51	-0.129	-0.114	29963
	Robust	-0.137***	0.006	-21.13	-0.132	-0.110	29963
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	-0.225***	0.017	-12.96	-0.259	-0.191	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.045***	0.017	-60.26	-1.078	-1.011	29963
	Robust	-1.045***	0.026	-39.84	-1.096	-0.993	29963
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	-0.235***	0.025	-9.27	-0.284	-0.185	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.920***	0.025	-75.92	-1.970	-1.871	29963
	Robust	-1.920***	0.042	-45.79	-2.002	-1.838	29963
Public Administration	Conventional	-0.457***	0.021	-21.78	-0.498	-0.416	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.257***	0.021	-59.91	-1.298	-1.216	29963
	Robust	-1.257***	0.035	-35.40	-1.326	-1.187	29963
Other Services	Conventional	-0.332***	0.039	-8.57	-0.408	-0.256	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-2.142***	0.039	-55.32	-2.217	-2.066	29963
	Robust	-2.142***	0.065	-32.79	-2.270	-2.014	29963
Number of Employees	Conventional	11.186	8.443	1.32	-5.363	27.734	11569
	Bias-Corrected	-245.83***	8.443	-29.12	-262.38	-229.28	11569
	Robust	-245.83***	12.489	-19.68	-270.31	-221.35	11569
Income of Economic Entities	Conventional	0.398**	0.181	2.20	0.044	0.752	5457
	Bias-Corrected	-0.222	0.181	-1.23	-0.575	-0.132	5457
	Robust	-0.222	0.251	-0.88	-0.713	-0.270	5457

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.

Table B.15: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	-0.143 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	-10.07	-0.170	-0.115	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.155 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	-10.96	-0.183	-0.127	29963
	Robust	-0.155 <sup>***</sup>	0.020	-7.85	-0.194	-0.116	29963
Manufacturing	Conventional	-1.099 <sup>***</sup>	0.037	-29.70	-1.172	-1.027	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.674 <sup>***</sup>	0.037	-45.24	-1.747	-1.602	29963
	Robust	-1.674 <sup>***</sup>	0.055	-30.31	-1.783	-1.566	29963
Construction	Conventional	-1.251 <sup>***</sup>	0.035	-35.95	-1.319	-1.183	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.843 <sup>***</sup>	0.035	-52.95	-1.911	-1.775	29963
	Robust	-1.843 <sup>***</sup>	0.055	-33.33	-1.951	-1.734	29963
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	-6.478 <sup>***</sup>	0.104	-62.26	-6.682	-6.274	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-8.723 <sup>***</sup>	0.104	-83.83	-8.926	-8.519	29963
	Robust	-8.723 <sup>***</sup>	0.165	-52.99	-9.045	-8.400	29963
Information & Communication	Conventional	-0.279 <sup>***</sup>	0.009	-31.65	-0.296	-0.262	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.379 <sup>***</sup>	0.009	-42.97	-0.396	-0.361	29963
	Robust	-0.379 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	-26.46	-0.407	-0.350	29963
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	-0.115 <sup>***</sup>	0.004	-27.90	-0.123	-0.107	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.172 <sup>***</sup>	0.004	-41.73	-0.180	-0.164	29963
	Robust	-0.172 <sup>***</sup>	0.006	-27.46	-0.184	-0.160	29963
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	-1.142 <sup>***</sup>	0.022	-51.88	-1.185	-1.099	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.550 <sup>***</sup>	0.022	-70.40	-1.593	-1.506	29963
	Robust	-1.550 <sup>***</sup>	0.033	-46.49	-1.615	-1.484	29963
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	-2.144 <sup>***</sup>	0.034	-62.57	-2.211	-2.077	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-2.946 <sup>***</sup>	0.034	-85.96	-3.013	-2.879	29963
	Robust	-2.946 <sup>***</sup>	0.053	-56.10	-3.049	-2.843	29963
Public Administration	Conventional	-1.230 <sup>***</sup>	0.026	-47.65	-1.280	-1.179	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.698 <sup>***</sup>	0.026	-65.80	-1.749	-1.648	29963
	Robust	-1.698 <sup>***</sup>	0.040	-42.91	-1.776	-1.621	29963
Other Services	Conventional	-2.127 <sup>***</sup>	0.048	-44.43	-2.221	-2.033	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-3.010 <sup>***</sup>	0.048	-62.87	-3.104	-2.916	29963
	Robust	-3.010 <sup>***</sup>	0.075	-40.27	-3.156	-2.863	29963
Number of Employees	Conventional	-240.29 <sup>***</sup>	10.099	-23.79	-260.08	-220.49	11569
	Bias-Corrected	-355.20 <sup>***</sup>	10.099	-35.17	-374.99	-335.41	11569
	Robust	-355.20 <sup>***</sup>	14.182	-25.05	-333.00	-327.41	11569
Income of Economic Entities	Conventional	-0.472 <sup>**</sup>	0.211	-2.24	-0.885	-0.059	5457
	Bias-Corrected	-0.669 <sup>***</sup>	0.211	-3.18	-1.082	-0.256	5457
	Robust	-0.669 <sup>**</sup>	0.284	-2.36	-1.225	-0.113	5457

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.

Table B.16: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Agriculture	Conventional	-0.137***	0.013	-10.42	-0.163	-0.111	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.158***	0.013	-11.99	-0.184	-0.132	29963
	Robust	-0.158***	0.019	-8.39	-0.195	-0.121	29963
Manufacturing	Conventional	-1.022***	0.036	-28.67	-1.092	-0.952	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.802***	0.036	-50.53	-1.872	-1.732	29963
	Robust	-1.802***	0.054	-33.30	-1.908	-1.696	29963
Construction	Conventional	-1.120***	0.032	-35.10	-1.182	-1.057	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.879***	0.032	-58.91	-1.941	-1.816	29963
	Robust	-1.879***	0.051	-36.80	-1.979	-1.779	29963
Wholesale & Retail Trade	Conventional	-6.206***	0.097	-63.91	-6.397	-6.016	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-9.108***	0.097	-93.79	-9.298	-8.918	29963
	Robust	-9.108***	0.152	-59.91	-9.406	-8.810	29963
Information & Communication	Conventional	-0.355***	0.009	-37.90	-0.374	-0.337	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.471***	0.009	-50.26	-0.490	-0.453	29963
	Robust	-0.471***	0.015	-31.39	-0.501	-0.442	29963
Financial & Insurance Activities	Conventional	-0.110***	0.004	-26.47	-0.118	-0.102	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-0.189***	0.004	-45.58	-0.197	-0.181	29963
	Robust	-0.189***	0.006	-31.25	-0.201	-0.177	29963
Real Estate Activities	Conventional	-1.039***	0.021	-49.77	-1.080	-0.998	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.599***	0.021	-76.58	-1.640	-1.558	29963
	Robust	-1.599***	0.030	-53.71	-1.657	-1.541	29963
Professional & Scientific Activities	Conventional	-2.070***	0.036	-57.43	-2.140	-1.999	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-3.160***	0.036	-87.67	-3.230	-3.089	29963
	Robust	-3.160***	0.053	-59.52	-3.264	-3.055	29963
Public Administration	Conventional	-1.221***	0.024	-50.25	-1.269	-1.173	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-1.768***	0.024	-72.75	-1.815	-1.720	29963
	Robust	-1.768***	0.039	-45.59	-1.843	-1.691	29963
Other Services	Conventional	-1.976***	0.046	-42.97	-2.066	-1.886	29963
	Bias-Corrected	-3.262***	0.046	-70.93	-3.352	-3.172	29963
	Robust	-3.262***	0.072	-45.03	-3.404	-3.120	29963
Number of Employees	Conventional	-223.70***	9.817	-22.79	-242.94	-204.46	11569
	Bias-Corrected	-396.55***	9.817	-40.40	-415.79	-377.31	11569
	Robust	-396.55***	14.119	-28.09	-424.22	-368.88	11569
Income of Economic Entities	Conventional	-0.402**	0.190	-2.12	-0.773	-0.030	5457
	Bias-Corrected	-0.703***	0.190	-3.71	-1.074	-0.331	5457
	Robust	-0.703***	0.267	-2.64	-1.225	-0.180	5457

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.

Table B.17: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Labor Party	Conventional	0.057**	0.025	2.33	0.009	0.106	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.057**	0.025	2.31	0.009	0.105	2000
	Robust	0.057*	0.033	1.74	-0.007	0.121	2000
Social Democratic Party	Conventional	-0.118***	0.023	-5.21	-0.162	-0.074	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.081***	0.023	-3.57	-0.125	-0.036	2000
	Robust	-0.081***	0.029	-2.76	-0.138	-0.023	2000
Homeland Union	Conventional	-0.020**	0.010	-2.02	-0.039	-0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.029***	0.010	-2.90	-0.048	-0.009	2000
	Robust	-0.029**	0.013	-2.25	-0.054	-0.004	2000
Liberals Movement	Conventional	0.013	0.013	0.95	-0.013	0.038	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.026**	0.013	-1.98	-0.052	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.026	0.016	-1.58	-0.058	0.006	2000
The Way of Courage	Conventional	0.000	0.007	-0.03	-0.014	0.013	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.012***	0.007	-1.69	-0.025	0.002	2000
	Robust	-0.012	0.009	-1.25	-0.030	0.007	2000
Order & Justice	Conventional	0.087**	0.037	2.38	0.015	0.159	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.120***	0.037	3.28	0.048	0.192	2000
	Robust	0.120***	0.044	2.70	0.033	0.207	2000
Poles' Electoral Action	Conventional	0.002*	0.001	1.74	-0.001	0.005	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.028***	0.001	-19.43	-0.031	-0.024	2000
	Robust	-0.028***	0.003	-10.94	-0.033	-0.023	2000
Peasant & Greens Union	Conventional	-0.008	0.012	-0.71	-0.031	0.014	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.008	0.012	0.71	-0.014	0.031	2000
	Robust	0.008	0.015	0.53	-0.022	0.038	2000
Liberal & Centre Union	Conventional	-0.008*	0.005	-1.71	-0.017	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.006	0.005	-1.37	-0.015	0.003	2000
	Robust	-0.006	0.006	-1.13	-0.017	0.005	2000
Union YES	Conventional	0.008	0.005	1.74	-0.001	0.017	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.011***	0.005	2.35	0.002	0.019	2000
	Robust	0.011**	0.006	1.71	-0.002	0.023	2000
Socialist People's Front	Conventional	-0.003***	0.001	-3.04	-0.005	-0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007***	0.001	-6.32	-0.009	-0.005	2000
	Robust	-0.007***	0.002	-4.48	-0.010	-0.004	2000
Christian Party	Conventional	-0.007***	0.003	-2.81	-0.012	-0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004*	0.003	-1.74	-0.009	0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.004	0.003	-1.30	-0.011	0.002	2000
National Association	Conventional	-0.002	0.002	-1.07	-0.005	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004**	0.002	-2.38	-0.007	-0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.004*	0.002	-1.71	-0.009	0.001	2000

Table B.17 – continued

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Young Lithuania	Conventional	0.0003	0.001	0.38	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.0004	0.001	0.45	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.0004	0.001	0.36	-0.002	0.003	2000
Democratic Labor & Unity Party	Conventional	-0.001	0.001	-1.38	-0.003	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.0002	0.001	-0.16	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.0002	0.001	-0.14	-0.003	0.002	2000
Emigrants' Party	Conventional	0.000	0.001	-0.17	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.001	0.001	-1.34	-0.002	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.001	0.001	-1.07	-0.002	0.001	2000
Republican Party	Conventional	0.000	0.001	-0.07	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.000	0.001	-0.05	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Robust	0.000	0.001	-0.04	-0.002	0.001	2000
People's Party	Conventional	0.000	0.001	0.24	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	1.22	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.001	0.001	1.12	-0.001	0.002	2000
Turnout	Conventional	-0.013	0.018	-0.71	-0.049	0.023	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003	0.018	-0.15	-0.039	0.033	2000
	Robust	-0.003	0.024	-0.11	-0.049	0.043	2000
Conservative Share	Conventional	0.074**	0.036	2.05	0.003	0.146	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.097***	0.036	2.66	0.025	0.168	2000
	Robust	0.097**	0.042	2.29	0.014	0.179	2000
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	0.059*	0.028	2.10	0.004	0.114	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.036	0.028	1.26	-0.020	0.091	2000
	Robust	0.036	0.035	1.00	-0.034	0.105	2000
Nationalist Share	Conventional	0.065**	0.033	1.99	0.001	0.130	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.089***	0.033	2.67	0.023	0.152	2000
	Robust	0.089**	0.041	2.13	0.007	0.169	2000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km.



Table B.18: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Labor Party	Conventional	0.068**	0.026	2.59	0.017	0.119	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.068**	0.026	2.59	0.016	0.119	2000
	Robust	0.068**	0.034	2.00	0.001	0.134	2000
Social Democratic Party	Conventional	-0.085***	0.021	-3.99	-0.126	-0.043	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.069***	0.021	-3.25	-0.111	-0.027	2000
	Robust	-0.069***	0.026	-2.66	-0.120	-0.018	2000
Homeland Union	Conventional	-0.039***	0.010	-3.70	-0.059	-0.018	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.034***	0.010	-3.23	-0.054	-0.013	2000
	Robust	-0.034**	0.014	-2.48	-0.060	-0.007	2000
Liberals Movement	Conventional	-0.016	0.011	-1.39	-0.037	0.006	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.014	0.011	-1.30	-0.036	0.007	2000
	Robust	-0.014	0.014	-1.00	-0.043	0.014	2000
The Way of Courage	Conventional	-0.014**	0.007	-2.01	-0.028	0.000	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.018**	0.007	-2.58	-0.031	-0.004	2000
	Robust	-0.018**	0.009	-1.98	-0.036	0.000	2000
Order & Justice	Conventional	-0.099***	0.037	2.64	0.025	0.173	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.083**	0.037	2.20	0.009	0.157	2000
	Robust	-0.083*	0.044	1.87	-0.004	0.170	2000
Poles' Electoral Action	Conventional	-0.007**	0.003	-2.20	-0.014	-0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.016***	0.003	-4.65	-0.022	-0.009	2000
	Robust	-0.016***	0.004	-3.73	-0.024	-0.024	2000
Peasant & Greens Union	Conventional	0.008	0.012	0.66	-0.016	0.032	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.011	0.012	0.90	-0.013	0.035	2000
	Robust	0.011	0.016	0.69	-0.020	0.042	2000
Liberal & Centre Union	Conventional	-0.007	0.005	-1.34	-0.017	0.003	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.006	0.005	-1.14	-0.016	0.004	2000
	Robust	-0.006	0.006	-0.96	-0.018	0.006	2000
Union YES	Conventional	0.007	0.005	1.46	-0.002	0.016	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.008*	0.005	1.75	-0.001	0.017	2000
	Robust	0.008	0.006	1.29	-0.004	0.021	2000
Socialist People's Front	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-3.74	-0.007	-0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.005***	0.001	-4.58	-0.008	-0.003	2000
	Robust	-0.005***	0.002	-3.48	-0.009	-0.002	2000
Christian Party	Conventional	-0.008***	0.003	-2.91	-0.013	-0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.006**	0.003	-2.22	-0.011	-0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.006*	0.003	-1.74	-0.012	0.001	2000
National Association	Conventional	-0.003	0.002	-1.47	-0.006	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.003	0.002	-1.54	-0.006	0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.003	0.002	-1.17	-0.007	0.002	2000

Table B.18 – continued

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Young Lithuania	Conventional	0.0001	0.001	0.06	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	0.50	-0.001	0.003	2000
	Robust	0.001	0.001	0.40	-0.002	0.003	2000
Democratic Labor & Unity Party	Conventional	-0.0004	0.001	-0.41	-0.003	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.0003	0.001	0.31	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.0003	0.001	0.28	-0.002	0.003	2000
Emigrants' Party	Conventional	0.000	0.001	-0.69	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.001	0.001	-1.42	-0.002	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.001	0.001	-1.22	-0.002	0.001	2000
Republican Party	Conventional	-0.0001	0.001	-0.20	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.0001	0.001	-0.19	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.0001	0.001	-0.15	-0.002	0.001	2000
People's Party	Conventional	0.0002	0.001	0.39	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	1.11	-0.001	0.002	2000
	Robust	0.001	0.001	0.93	-0.001	0.002	2000
Turnout	Conventional	-0.006	0.020	-0.33	-0.045	0.032	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.012	0.020	-0.60	-0.050	0.027	2000
	Robust	-0.012	0.025	-0.48	-0.060	0.036	2000
Conservative Share	Conventional	0.093**	0.036	2.55	0.021	0.164	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.073**	0.036	2.01	0.002	0.144	2000
	Robust	0.073*	0.042	1.74	-0.009	0.155	2000
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	0.032	0.029	1.10	-0.025	0.088	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.019	0.029	0.66	-0.038	0.076	2000
	Robust	0.019	0.034	0.57	-0.047	0.085	2000
Nationalist Share	Conventional	0.058*	0.035	1.65	-0.011	0.128	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.047	0.035	1.33	-0.022	0.116	2000
	Robust	0.047	0.042	1.11	-0.036	0.130	2000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 60 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.

Table B.19: Covariate-adjusted RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – Bandwidth of 100 km

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Labor Party	Conventional	0.079**	0.025	3.20	0.031	0.127	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.053**	0.025	2.14	0.004	0.101	2000
	Robust	0.053	0.033	1.59	-0.012	0.117	2000
Social Democratic Party	Conventional	-0.078***	0.021	-3.67	-0.120	-0.036	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.076***	0.021	-3.56	-0.118	-0.034	2000
	Robust	-0.076***	0.025	-2.99	-0.126	-0.026	2000
Homeland Union	Conventional	-0.047***	0.010	-4.60	-0.068	-0.027	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.030***	0.010	-2.92	-0.050	-0.010	2000
	Robust	-0.030**	0.014	-2.11	-0.058	-0.002	2000
Liberals Movement	Conventional	-0.014	0.011	-1.24	-0.035	0.008	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.023**	0.011	-2.09	-0.044	-0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.023	0.014	-1.61	-0.051	0.005	2000
The Way of Courage	Conventional	-0.017**	0.007	-2.34	-0.030	-0.003	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.005	0.007	-0.77	-0.019	0.008	2000
	Robust	-0.005	0.009	-0.58	-0.024	0.013	2000
Order & Justice	Conventional	-0.091**	0.037	2.48	0.019	0.163	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.105***	0.037	2.85	0.033	0.177	2000
	Robust	-0.105**	0.044	2.38	0.019	0.191	2000
Poles' Electoral Action	Conventional	-0.004**	0.002	-1.99	-0.007	0.000	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.025***	0.002	-14.26	-0.029	-0.022	2000
	Robust	-0.025***	0.003	-8.90	-0.031	-0.020	2000
Peasant & Greens Union	Conventional	0.008	0.012	0.68	-0.015	0.030	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.011	0.012	0.93	-0.012	0.033	2000
	Robust	0.011	0.016	0.68	-0.020	0.042	2000
Liberal & Centre Union	Conventional	-0.007	0.005	-1.49	-0.016	0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.006	0.005	-1.21	-0.015	0.003	2000
	Robust	-0.006	0.006	-0.99	-0.017	0.006	2000
Union YES	Conventional	0.007	0.005	1.42	-0.002	0.015	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.011**	0.005	2.46	0.002	0.020	2000
	Robust	0.011*	0.006	1.80	-0.001	0.023	2000
Socialist People's Front	Conventional	-0.004***	0.001	-3.61	-0.006	-0.002	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.007***	0.001	-6.18	-0.009	-0.005	2000
	Robust	-0.007***	0.002	-4.40	-0.010	-0.004	2000
Christian Party	Conventional	-0.010***	0.002	-4.05	-0.015	-0.005	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.006**	0.002	-2.31	-0.010	-0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.006*	0.003	-1.74	-0.012	0.001	2000
National Association	Conventional	-0.002	0.002	-1.33	-0.005	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.004*	0.002	-2.15	-0.007	0.000	2000
	Robust	-0.004	0.002	-1.55	-0.008	0.001	2000

Table B.19 – continued

Outcome Variable	Method	Coefficient	Std. Err.	z	95% Confidence Interval		N
Young Lithuania	Conventional	-0.001	0.001	-0.65	-0.003	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.001	0.001	1.31	-0.001	0.003	2000
	Robust	0.001	0.001	1.03	-0.001	0.004	2000
Democratic Labor & Unity Party	Conventional	-0.001	0.001	-0.89	-0.003	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.0002	0.001	-0.18	-0.002	0.002	2000
	Robust	-0.0002	0.001	-0.15	-0.003	0.002	2000
Emigrants' Party	Conventional	-0.0004	0.001	-0.91	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	-0.001	0.001	-1.06	-0.002	0.001	2000
	Robust	-0.001	0.001	-0.85	-0.002	0.000	2000
Republican Party	Conventional	0.0000	0.001	-0.06	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.0001	0.001	0.11	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Robust	0.0001	0.001	0.08	-0.001	0.002	2000
People's Party	Conventional	0.000	0.001	-0.03	-0.001	0.001	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.001*	0.001	1.67	0.000	0.003	2000
	Robust	0.001	0.001	1.56	0.000	0.003	2000
Turnout	Conventional	-0.010	0.019	-0.53	-0.047	0.027	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.003	0.019	0.13	-0.035	0.040	2000
	Robust	0.003	0.024	0.11	-0.045	0.050	2000
Conservative Share	Conventional	0.085**	0.036	2.33	0.014	0.156	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.086**	0.036	2.36	0.014	0.157	2000
	Robust	0.086**	0.042	2.05	0.004	0.168	2000
Liberal-Conservative Share	Conventional	0.017	0.028	0.60	-0.039	0.073	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.027	0.028	0.96	-0.028	0.083	2000
	Robust	0.027	0.034	0.81	-0.039	0.093	2000
Nationalist Share	Conventional	0.041	0.035	1.18	-0.027	0.109	2000
	Bias-Corrected	0.072**	0.035	2.09	0.005	0.140	2000
	Robust	0.072*	0.042	1.72	-0.010	0.155	2000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bandwidth is 100 km. Covariates include latitude, longitude, city distance and city dummy.

Table B.20: Estimation results for the similarities with East Prussia, Lithuania and Poland – Bandwidth of 60 km & 100 km

Bandwidth Dep. variable	60 km turnout (1)	60 km cons. (2)	60 km national. (3)	100 km turnout (4)	100 km cons. (5)	100 km national. (6)
LT	0.089*** (0.010)	-0.209*** (0.021)	-0.136*** (0.020)	0.088*** (0.009)	-0.260*** (0.019)	-0.141*** (0.018)
LTEP	-0.017 (0.012)	0.128*** (0.023)	0.091*** (0.021)	-0.024** (0.010)	0.111*** (0.016)	0.033** (0.015)
PLEP	-0.035*** (0.013)	-0.089*** (0.016)	-0.099*** (0.015)	-0.034*** (0.012)	-0.143*** (0.014)	-0.135*** (0.013)
City	0.011 (0.012)	-0.094*** (0.019)	-0.062*** (0.017)	0.038*** (0.005)	-0.086*** (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)
Dist. to EP border (tkm)	0.604*** (0.143)	0.396** (0.193)	-0.022 (0.204)	0.475*** (0.061)	-0.390* (0.104)	-0.555*** (0.097)
Dist. to EP border (EP) (tkm)	0.458 (0.420)	-1.673*** (0.438)	-1.388*** (0.397)	-0.219 (0.317)	-0.503*** (0.277)	-0.386 (0.260)
Location	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	894	894	894	1611	1611	1611
R-squared	0.406	0.280	0.150	0.369	0.358	0.180
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Lithuania vs. Poland in EP	0.106***	0.008	0.054**	0.099***	-0.006	0.027
$\Delta$ LT vs. PL in EP / outside EP	0.018	-0.201***	-0.082***	0.011	-0.254***	-0.114***

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.

## B.2 East Prussian refugees in West Germany

Table B.21: Estimation results for parties against the Oder-Neisse line or those not taking position

Method	Robust OLS	Robust OLS	Robust OLS	Robust OLS	Robust OLS	IV	Robust OLS	Robust OLS
Dependent variable	cons_ noaligned (1)	cons_ noaligned (2)	cons_ noaligned (3)	all_noline (4)	all_noline (5)	all_noline (6)	no_wt_dp (7)	no_wt_dp (8)
Share of EP expellees	0.411 (0.374)	-0.047 (0.844)	2.858*** (0.616)	2.357*** (0.735)	1.868*** (0.707)	2.221*** (0.646)	-0.849*** (0.243)	-0.298 (0.443)
City	0.002 (0.016)	0.005 (0.018)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.048 (0.015)	-0.018 (0.020)	0.055*** (0.018)	0.038** (0.017)	0.023 (0.016)
Nationalistic votes '33	0.945*** (0.047)	0.950*** (0.048)	-0.082** (0.034)	-0.712*** (0.048)	-0.379*** (0.072)	-0.769*** (0.044)	-0.763*** (0.042)	-0.654*** (0.049)
Male	-0.104** (0.870)	-2.633 (1.026)		0.654 (1.013)	2.845*** (0.970)	1.285 (0.975)	2.881*** (0.729)	0.813 (0.903)
Old (65+)					2.181** (1.051)			
Protestants					0.240*** (0.046)			
Workers					-0.554*** (0.160)			
Entrepreneurs					-1.030*** (0.496)			
Trade & finance					0.417** (0.209)			
Wage ratio (EP to host)					-0.044 (0.092)	-0.271*** (0.095)		
Other eastern regions	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Observations	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162

Table B.21 – continued

Method	Robust OLS cons_ noaligned	Robust OLS cons_ noaligned	Robust OLS cons_noline	Robust OLS all_noline	Robust OLS all_noline	IV all_noline	Robust OLS no_wt_dp	Robust OLS no_wt_dp
Dependent variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
R-squared	0.690	0.774	0.757	0.803	0.886	0.726	0.649	0.709
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

*Notes:* \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are as follows:

cons\_noaligned    conservative parties aligned with the Neisse-Oder line  
cons\_noline       conservative parties against the Neisse-Oder line  
all\_noline        all parties against the Neisse-Oder line  
no\_wt\_dp         all parties against the Neisse-Oder line, except Deutsche Partei (German Party)

Table B.22: Estimation results for selected parties in West Germany

Method	Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS		Robust OLS					
	dkp_share	(1)	dp_share	(2)	dp_share	(3)	dp_share	(4)	fdp_share	(5)	fdp_share	(6)	fdp_share	(7)	fdp_share	(8)	kpd_share	(9)	kpd_share	(10)
Share of EP expellees	0.203 (0.274)	2.655*** (0.563)	1.210** (0.580)	2.032*** (0.694)	-1.112*** (0.329)	-1.705*** (0.349)	-1.566*** (0.371)	-1.128*** (0.292)	-1.705*** (0.349)	-1.112*** (0.329)	-1.705*** (0.349)	-1.566*** (0.371)	-1.128*** (0.292)	-1.566*** (0.371)	-1.128*** (0.292)	-1.128*** (0.292)	-0.484*** (0.071)	-0.484*** (0.071)	0.094 (0.195)	0.094 (0.195)
City	0.012** (0.005)	0.025** (0.011)	0.031 (0.028)	0.031 (0.028)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.024*** (0.016)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.041*** (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.024*** (0.016)	-0.044*** (0.013)	-0.024*** (0.016)	-0.024*** (0.016)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.030*** (0.008)
Nationalistic votes '33	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.058** (0.025)	-0.169** (0.063)	-0.261*** (0.062)	-0.335*** (0.045)	-0.335*** (0.045)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.351*** (0.044)	-0.335*** (0.045)	-0.335*** (0.045)	-0.169** (0.063)	-0.169** (0.063)	-0.169** (0.063)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.351*** (0.044)	-0.351*** (0.044)	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.098*** (0.016)	-0.110*** (0.017)	-0.110*** (0.017)
Male	0.234 (0.254)	-0.159 (0.554)		7.722*** (2.376)	-1.629** (0.707)		0.201 (0.918)	-1.361** (0.654)	-1.629** (0.707)			0.201 (0.918)	-1.361** (0.654)	0.201 (0.918)	-1.361** (0.654)	-1.361** (0.654)	1.841*** (0.350)	1.841*** (0.350)	1.152*** (0.383)	1.152*** (0.383)
Old (65+)				5.462*** (1.854)			2.189*** (0.837)					2.189*** (0.837)								
Protestants																				
Entrepreneurs																				
Agriculture																				
Trade & finance				-0.492** (0.238)																
Other eastern regions	Yes	Yes	No	Yes <sup>a</sup>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	162	162	34	34	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162	162
R-squared	0.459	0.758	0.303	0.742	0.559	0.559	0.671	0.671	0.559	0.559	0.671	0.666	0.426	0.666	0.426	0.426	0.420	0.420	0.553	0.553
Prob > F	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses.

<sup>a</sup> One significant region only



Table B.23: “Placebo” regression for voting outcomes in 1933

Method	Robust OLS		IV		Robust OLS		IV		Robust OLS		IV					
	cons. share '33	cons. share (1)	cons. share '33	cons. share (2)	cons. share '33	cons. share (3)	cons. share '33	cons. share (4)	cons. share '33	cons. share (5)	cons. share '33	cons. share (6)	nat. share '33	nat. share (7)	nat. share '33	nat. share (8)
Share of EP expellees	-1.853*** (0.231)		-0.000005*** (0.000002)		0.492** (0.191)		0.000007*** (0.000002)		1.945*** (0.244)		0.000006*** (0.000001)		0.901*** (0.291)		-0.000003* (0.000002)	
City	-0.081*** (0.024)		-0.063* (0.033)		0.026*** (0.014)		0.033 (0.024)		-0.025 (0.016)		-0.045*** (0.028)		-0.041*** (0.013)		-0.062*** (0.020)	
Conservative votes '20					0.392* (0.050)		0.418*** (0.060)									
Nationalistic votes '20													0.419*** (0.098)		0.177* (0.107)	
Protestants													0.107** (0.051)		0.311*** (0.072)	
Observations	162		162		160		160		162		162		160		160	
R-squared	0.145		0.060		0.844		0.614		0.222		0.039		0.660		0.533	
Prob > F	0.000		0.002		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. IV instrument: latitude (East Prussian share as endogenous variable).


Table B.24: Spatial autoregression for conservative and nationalistic votes

Method	gs2sls cons.	gs2sls cons.	gs2sls cons.	gs2sls cons.	gs2sls nat.	gs2sls nat.	gs2sls nat.	gs2sls nat.	gs2sls nat.	gs2sls nat.	ml nat.	ml nat.
Dep. variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(11)
Share of EP expellees	2.402*** (0.343)	2.267*** (0.344)	1.865*** (0.448)	1.825*** (0.502)	2.017*** (0.355)	2.272*** (0.333)	2.187*** (0.369)	1.953*** (0.349)	2.164*** (0.374)	2.095*** (0.141)	2.069*** (0.164)	
City	0.032 (0.021)	0.032 (0.021)	0.028* (0.015)	0.022 (0.015)	0.022** (0.010)	0.026** (0.012)	0.027*** (0.010)	0.026*** (0.009)	0.026** (0.010)	0.023*** (0.011)	0.024** (0.011)	
Wage ratio (EP to host)	-0.511*** (0.086)	-0.501*** (0.087)	-0.294*** (0.094)	-0.190* (0.113)	0.140*** (0.031)	0.107** (0.051)	0.028 (0.054)	0.022 (0.035)	0.033 (0.065)	0.135*** (0.048)		
Conservative votes '20	0.560*** (0.053)	0.569*** (0.052)	0.541*** (0.046)	0.535*** (0.042)								
Nationalistic votes '20					-0.016 (0.028)	0.011 (0.023)	-0.042 (0.028)	-0.027 (0.026)	-0.050 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.028)	-0.037 (0.029)	
<i>Spatial lag</i>												
Dep. variable	0.072 (0.069)			0.091 (0.172)	0.959* (0.512)			2.031*** (0.481)		0.628*** (0.184)	0.449 (0.674)	
Share of EP expellees		1.352 (1.140)		3.143 (2.574)		-0.357 (0.741)		-2.608*** (0.481)	0.494 (1.404)		0.561 (2.158)	
Error term			3.052*** (0.697)	6.502 (4.114)			3.015*** (0.556)	0.736 (2.238)	2.822*** (0.473)		0.898*** (0.152)	
<i>Average impact of East Prussia</i>												
Direct	2.402*** (0.343)	2.267*** (0.344)	1.865*** (0.448)	1.828*** (0.503)	2.314 (3.587)	2.272*** (0.333)	2.187*** (0.369)	2.296 (6.697)	2.164*** (0.374)	2.115*** (0.138)	2.081*** (0.165)	
Indirect	0.163 (0.173)	1.183 (0.998)	3.165* (1.670)	3.165* (1.670)	37.504 (482.14)	-0.312 (0.649)		6.952 (159.37)	0.432 (1.229)	2.932 (2.195)	2.283 (2.464)	
Total	2.564*** (0.438)	3.450*** (0.970)	1.865*** (0.448)	4.994*** (1.465)	39.818 (485.72)	1.959*** (0.494)	2.187*** (0.369)	9.249 (166.06)	2.596** (1.155)	5.047** (2.184)	4.364* (2.465)	
Observations	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	161	
Pseudo R-sq.	0.576	0.580	0.548	0.551	0.313	0.643	0.627	0.331	0.617	0.628	0.513	
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* - significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. gs2sls = heteroskedastic generalized spatial two-stage least squares; ml = robust maximum likelihood


## C Figures

Figure C.1: Turnout in parliament elections in Lithuania (2012), Poland and Russia (2011): East Prussia and neighboring regions




Source: Authors' work. Base map: GADM & ESRI Gray, election data: see Table A.1

Figure C.2: Share of votes for nationalistic parties in parliament elections in Lithuania (2012), Poland and Russia (2011): East Prussia and neighboring regions




Source: Authors' work. Base map: GADM & ESRI Gray, election data: see Table A.1

Figure C.3: Share of votes for NSDAP in Germany, 1933



Source: Authors' work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG 2011b, election data: see Table A.1

Figure C.4: Share of votes for nationalistic parties in parliament elections in the FRG, 1949



*Source:* Authors' work. Base map: MPIDR and CGG [2011a](#), election data: see Table [A.1](#)

Figure C.5: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia (all parties)




Figure C.5: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia (all parties) – continued






Figure C.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia (all parties)






Figure C.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia (all parties) – continued




Figure C.6: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Political outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia (all parties) – continued




Figure C.7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia




Figure C.7: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Poland vs. East Prussia – continued




Figure C.8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia




Figure C.8: RD results with robust bias-corrected CIs: Socio-economic outcomes in Lithuania vs. East Prussia – continued






Figure C.9: CEM weights vs. strata (economic outcomes)



(a) Match I

(b) Match II

Figure C.10: Post-CEM regressions (economic outcomes)



(a) Match I

(b) Match II

**Diskussionsbeiträge - Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft - Freie Universität Berlin**  
**Discussion Paper - School of Business and Economics - Freie Universität Berlin**

2020 erschienen:

- 2020/1 ASSEYER, Andreas: Wholesale price discrimination with regulatory asymmetry  
*Economics*
- 2020/2 JESSEN, Robin und Johannes KÖNIG: Hours Risk and Wage Risk:  
Repercussions over the Life-Cycle  
*Economics*
- 2020/3 ASSEYER, Andreas: Collusion and Delegation under Information Control  
*Economics*
- 2020/4 ADAM, Marc Christopher: Liquidating Bankers' Acceptances: International  
Crisis, Doctrinal Conflict and American Exceptionalism in the Federal Reserve  
1913-1932  
*Economics*
- 2020/5 BÖNKE, Timm; Rick GLAUBITZ; Konstantin GÖBLER; Astrid HARNACK;  
Astrid PAPE und Miriam WETTER: Die Entwicklung und Prognose von  
Lebenserwerbseinkommen in Deutschland  
*Economics*
- 2020/6 HUNDSDOERFER, Jochen und Eva MATTHAEI: Gender Discriminatory  
Taxes, Fairness Perception, and Labor Supply  
*FACTS*
- 2020/7 ZHU, Junbing und Theocharis GRIGORIADIS: Chinese Dialects, Revolutionary  
War & Economic Performance  
*Economics*