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GLOCON Working Paper Series • No. 3 • Dec 2016

Global Change - Local Conflicts?
Conflicts over land in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa in times of global transformation

GLOCON Working Paper Series

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Editing and Production: Lydia Galonska/ Anna Dobelmann
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Prause, Louisa: Struggling for land access: The success and failure of social movement actors' framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale land transformations.
GLOCON Working Paper Series, No. 3
Berlin, December 2016
ISSN: 2510-4918
This publication has been funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF)

SPONSORED BY THE
Federal Ministry of Education and Research

Freie Universität Berlin

Struggling for land access: The success and failure of social movement actors' framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale land transformations

Louisa Prause

Abstract

Struggles over meaning construction are an essential part of conflicts over large-scale land transformations. To advance the land access claims of local communities, social movement actors engage in specific framing strategies to mobilize resources and support. This article explores how the discursive context shapes the success or failure of social movement actors' framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale mining and agro-industrial projects. Discursive opportunity structures (DOS) and framing are the key theoretical concepts used. I argue that the outcomes of framing strategies can only be understood when we combine DOS with a thorough analysis of social movement actors' ability to act on the opportunities provided by discursive structures. Empirically, the study compares conflicts over gold mining and agro-industry in Senegal. Some elements of the discursive structures differ depending on the purpose of the large-scale land transformation in question and as such provide distinct opportunities for social movement actors. Other elements of the discursive structure are tied to large-scale land transformations in general. As the empirical analysis shows, not all social movement actors can use these opportunities in the same way. The article contributes to our understanding of the importance of discourses and framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale land transformations. Conceptually, I explore the strengths and weaknesses of a theoretical framework combining DOS and framing.

Zusammenfassung

Konflikte um großflächige Landtransformationen zugunsten von Bergbau und Agrarindustrie haben in den letzten Jahren stark zugenommen. Dieser Artikel untersucht die diskursive Dimension dieser Konflikte. Im Zentrum steht die Frage nach dem Erfolg oder Misserfolg von framing Strategien sozialer Bewegungsakteure. Ob framing Strategien erfolgreich sind oder nicht lässt sich einerseits anhand von diskursiven Gelegenheitsstrukturen (DOS) erklären. Andererseits beeinflussen die Konstruktion ihrer Zukunftsvisionen und Fähigkeiten unterschiedlicher Bewegungsakteure, sowie ihrer Gegenspieler_innen, inwiefern Bewegungsakteure sich mit ihren Forderungen durchsetzen können. Empirisch wird ein Konflikt um eine Goldmine mit einem Konflikt um ein agrarindustrielles Projekt im Senegal verglichen. Dieser Vergleich zeigt, dass DOS unterschiedlich ausgestaltet sind, abhängig vom Zweck der Inwertsetzung von Land, also für

Bergbau oder Agrarindustrie. Gleichzeitig gibt es Gemeinsamkeiten in den Diskursen, in Bezug auf die Abwägung von sozialen und ökologischen Risiken. Diese übergreifende Struktur der Diskurse kann jedoch von unterschiedlichen Akteuren nicht gleichermaßen genutzt werden. Der Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Bedeutung von Diskursen und framing Strategien in Konflikten um großflächige Landtransformationen. Gleichzeitig werden Stärken und Schwächen eines theoretischen Rahmens aufgezeigt, der DOS und framing kombiniert.

Keywords: Social movements, conflicts, land grabbing, mining, discursive opportunity structures, framing

Schlagwörter: Soziale Bewegungen, Konflikte, land grabbing, Bergbau, diskursive Opportunitätsstrukturen, Framing

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Introduction

We are currently witnessing a global 'land rush' that is transforming vast tracts of land for the purpose of agro-industrial crop production and mining. The lands seized for these purposes are usually not empty and unoccupied; rather, such lands often provide resources central to the preexisting livelihoods and well-being of those living in or from these territories (Bebbington/Bury 2013:11; Borras/Franco 2013). As such, the increasing valorization of land for agro-industrial or mining uses is being accompanied by increasing conflict.

Land-based resources determine the purpose of extraction, but they also interact with pre-extraction political economies (Bebbington/Bury 2013). Groups of local communities will have used the land and its resources for economic purposes, but will have also assigned cultural meaning to them. Political ecologists have stressed the importance of discourses and knowledge in conflicts over nature (Escobar 1996). Indeed, "beliefs, ideological controls and discursive practices, as well as negotiated systems of meaning, shape all forms of access" to resources (Ribot/Peluso 2003: 168). Social movement actors supporting local communities' claims for land access construct specific frames, "schemata of interpretation" (Goffman 1974: 464), to win over allies and mobilize organizational and financial resources. The principal question that this article addresses is therefore not if discourses shape access to land but rather how they shape the outcome of framing contests in conflicts over large-scale land transformations.

I aim to explain why some framing strategies put forward by social movement actors succeed while others fail, even though the movements might mobilize in a similar national and cultural context. I compare the framing strategies of social movement actors struggling for land access for local communities in conflicts over large-scale land transformations for mining and agro-industrial purposes. This article shows that different discourses are connected to the specific purpose of the land transformations. This partly explains the success or failure of social movement actors' framing strategies, since they face different opportunity structures. Nevertheless, some discursive opportunities are similar in both sectors. Here, success and failure can only be fully understood when the abilities of movement actors to make use of discursive opportunities are taken into account. My research is based on an empirical case study from Senegal. With this article, I aim to contribute to research on meaning construction and discourses in conflicts over large-scale land transformation.

Most contributions that analyze meaning construction in conflicts over large-scale land transformations for agro-industrial purposes (land grabbing) have thus far been rather

descriptive and provide little explanation for the success or failure of specific framing strategies. Contributors argue that presenting land as idle and unused is an important frame to legitimate large-scale land transformations for agro-industrial purposes (Borras Jr/Franco 2012; Borras et al. 2010; Li 2014; Neef/Touch 2012). Carol Hunsberger and Alberto Alonso-Fradejas (2016) show how the cultivation of flex crops allows companies to strategically shift their alignment to different discourses. Depending on the context, they refer to dominant discourses of food security or climate change mitigation, since oil palm can be used for cooking as well as biofuel production. Social movements struggling against such projects, on the other hand, try to make visible the variety of local land uses, from pastoralism to small-scale agriculture, for the sustainable use of wild plants, as biodiversity reserves, etc. (e.g. Pye 2010).

In the literature on conflicts over mining, several authors stress that for a social movement's success, it is important to locate the problems related to mining on a specific scale. Movement actors reframe their claims in relation to the audience they want to reach, at the local, national or international level (Haarstad/Fløysand 2007), or establish new scales of meaning in their framing to push for a change in the scales of regulation (Urkidi 2011; Urkidi 2010). Furthermore, movement actors tap into different dominant discourses such as biodiversity, national identity and democracy discourses to legitimate their claims (e.g. Haarstad/Fløysand 2007; Buchanan 2013). However, frames suggesting an alternative land use such as biodiversity conservation are only convincing if there is indeed an important occurrence of biodiversity in the area. Frames are as such tied to the specific material conditions of a place (Davidov 2014). So far, a comparison between struggles over agro-industrial and mining projects is missing in the literature. It therefore remains unclear if and how discourses differ according to the purpose of land valorization. Furthermore, the literature does not offer a sufficient explanation of how and why some discourses become dominant in a certain context, while others do not. Finally, we know little about why some movement actors are able to use given discursive opportunities, while others are not.

To respond to these gaps in the current research on conflicts over large-scale land transformations, I combine two analytical concepts from social movement theory: framing and discursive opportunity structures (DOS). Conceptually, this article intervenes in the debate on framing in the study of contentious politics by suggesting that framing outcomes cannot be explained either by the discursive context or by the framing strategies of social movement actors alone, but only through a careful analysis of both dimensions. Drawing on the concepts of DOS and framing (Benford/Snow 2000), I argue that differences in the outcomes of framing strategies are as much dependent on the discursive context as on the counter-framings of social movement opponents, frictions within social movements, and the specific visions for future land use put forward by social movements.

Empirically, I analyze two cases from Senegal: the conflicts around the Sabodala gold mine and over the Senhuile agro-industrial project. Data on both cases was collected during three periods of field research in April-May 2014, February-April 2015, and March-May 2016. I conducted 63 non-standardized interviews in Dakar and in the two areas where the Senhuile project and Sabodala mine are being implemented: in the departments of St. Louis and Kédougou respectively. Interviewees were representatives of ministries and subordinate government authorities, business associations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local initiatives, employees and (ex-) workers of the Senhuile and Sabodala companies, as well as artisanal miners, pastoralists and residents affected by both projects. Additional information was gathered during seven focus group discussions, informal meetings and observations at both project sites . In addition, the analysis is based on articles in the Senegalese and international press, reports by national institutions, and documents from Senegalese NGOs. Furthermore, I conducted a thorough analysis of the Senegalese mining law (code minier), the land law (loi sur la domaine nationale) and the environmental law (code environnementale), as well as the national development plan (Plan Sénégalais Emérgent, PSE) and its concrete policy program the Programme d'Accélération de la Cadence de l'Agriculture Sénégalaise (PRACAS) in the agricultural sector. A similar policy program does not exist for the mining sector.

The article is structured as follows. I start out with some conceptual reflections on the key theoretical terms of this article, namely ‘discursive opportunity structures’ and ‘framing’. I then identify key elements of the DOS in which the respective conflicts are embedded. Subsequently, I turn to the conflicts around the Senhuile project and the Sabodala gold mine and analyze the framing strategies of supporters and opponents in both cases with regard to the DOS. In conclusion, I summarize the outcomes of my empirical analysis and discuss the usefulness of a framework that combines DOS and framing in the study of conflicts over agro-industrial and mining projects.

Analyzing claim-making processes: Framing and discursive opportunity structures

For the empirical analysis of the claim-making process in conflicts over the valorization of gold and land in Senegal, I build upon concepts from social movement theory. Frame analysis has been proposed by social movement theorists to investigate how contentious actors interpret certain political realities and how they use these interpretations to mobilize support. The framing perspective builds upon the constructivist principle that meanings do not naturally attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences that people

encounter. Instead, they arise through the interpretative activities of actors (Snow 2004). Frames refer to the organization of forms of experiences and the interpretation of situations (Goffman 1974).

A key argument of the framing approach is that mobilization does not occur automatically where objective grievances exist. Instead, mobilization is a result of the way in which social actors discursively define and communicate those grievances (Snow et al. 1986b). Social movement actors "frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow/Benford 1988: 198). Frames are instrumental means for contentious actors to achieve goals that are largely negotiated prior to the framing process.

Benford and Snow (2000) introduced three dimensions of collective action frames: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing attempts to identify the causes of a specific problem and attribute blame. Prognostic framing proposes a course of action and possible solutions to the problem. Motivational framing finally calls for collective action and support for the movement (Benford/Snow 2000: 616-617). Frames may or may not include all three dimensions. For a frame to be effective, it needs to be credible as well as salient. Benford and Snow identify three factors that impact the credibility of a frame: its consistency, its empirical credibility and the credibility of the frame articulators and claims makers (Benford/Snow 2000: 619). A frame's salience to its targets is affected by its centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity (Snow/Benford 1988).

To achieve frame credibility and salience, and as such effectively advance their claims and interests, social movements engage in strategic processes. David Snow et al. (1986) conceptualized these as frame alignment processes and identified four basic strategies: frame bridging, frame extension, frame transformation, and frame amplification. Frame bridging refers to the linking of at least two ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem (Benford/Snow 2000: 634). With frame extension, social movements aim to depict their interests as extending beyond their primary concerns to include issues that are presumed to be of importance to potential adherents. Frame transformation refers to changing old understandings and meanings and generating new ones (Benford/Snow 2000: 625). Finally, frame amplification refers to the idealization, clarification, or invigoration of existing values and beliefs (Snow et al. 1986b).

To be successful, a frame needs to be culturally resonant. With the exception of frame amplification, the strategic processes identified by Benford and Snow all explain the success or failure of social movements' frames in terms of their own choices and capabilities to construct framings that are credible and salient. This implies that to mobilize others

and advance their claims, social movements merely have to construct the right frames (Oliver/Johnston 2000). Mirjam Werner und Joep Cornelissen (2014: 453) argue that "the overall result of this strategic view of framing is the tautological argument that those who won framing contests simply employed the most resonant frames." This conception of framing certainly neglects the fact that social movements always operate within a specific social, cultural and political context. Much of the framing research fails to take seriously the constraints and incentives that are imposed on social movements by the political and discursive opportunities presented to them (Jaspers 1997). Furthermore, the process of frame amplification remains vaguely defined, as it is unclear how to identify the existing values and beliefs that actually matter for social movements and how social movements succeed in constructing frames that are culturally resonant.

To explain the success or failure of certain frames in advancing a movement's claims, we need a more theoretical approach to the often mentioned cultural context. I therefore combine the framing approach with the concept of discursive opportunity structures (DOS). The idea is that a movement's frame and the political and cultural environment in which it is expressed work in combination to produce a movement's desired political outcome (McCammon et al. 2007: 726). The concept combines the political opportunity structures (POS) approach with discourse theory. The POS approach is built on the assumption that the political institutional context of social movements' actions is crucial for explaining their formation, development and success (cf. Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1996). Koopman und Stratham (1999) argue that it is not only the political institutions but also the cultural and discursive context that constitute opportunity structures. DOS "may be seen as determining which ideas are considered 'sensible', which constructions of reality are seen as 'realistic', and which claims are held as 'legitimate' within a certain polity at a specific time" (ibid.: 228). The concept of DOS thus introduces an important distinction between frames and the larger system of meaning. To succeed, movement actors must incorporate and respond to critical discursive elements in the broader cultural and political context (McCammon et al. 2007). Like the POS approach, DOS also emphasizes the role of structure. However, structure itself can never be the cause of action. Rather, discursive structures become opportunities when movement actors recognize them and make the conscious decision to respond to them (Ferree 2003).

In the literature, very different factors have been treated as DOS. One strand of literature analyses the structure of mass media as DOS (Motta 2015; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans/Olzak 2004). Others focus on institutionalized discourses, either through policy regulations (Motta 2015), court decisions (Ferree et al. 2002) or long-term socio-cultural elements (McCammon et al. 2007). Holly McCammon et al. (2007) go so far as to analyze opposition framing as DOS, something that I argue is clearly based on a second party's actions and is therefore not an independent structure.

DOS may explain the success or failure of frames proposed by certain movement actors in a certain national context at a specific point in time. In this article, I define DOS following Myra Marx Ferree (2003: 309) as "institutionally anchored ways of thinking that provide a gradient of relative political acceptability to specific packages of ideas." As such, a discursive structure is a strand of a broader discourse that becomes relevant for social movements' actions through its institutionally backed power in a certain thematic field. Discursive opportunities can be made up by one or more discursive structures. I argue that these institutionally anchored ways of thinking can best be analyzed as policies and laws, as these provide longer-term structures backed by institutional power (Ferree 2003; Motta 2015).

However, we cannot simply derive successful claim-making from the presence of DOS. As Ferree (2003) stresses, DOS always work in combination with the actual framing efforts of social movements. The effectiveness of the articulated frames depends on their alignment with discursive opportunities that open up in certain moments in time. However, this alignment can be done more or less skillfully and combined with other strategies, as identified by Benford and Snow (2000), such as frame bridging or frame extension. I therefore propose a combined analysis of DOS and social movements' framing strategies, as well as the framing strategies of their opponents, in order to understand the success or failure of a movement's frame.

Operationalizing DOS and outcomes for conflicts over land in Senegal

My analysis focuses on the current Senegalese mining and land laws with regard to the principles guiding the government's decision on whether to attribute land to a large-scale project or not. Large-scale land transformations in the Global South are always negotiated in terms of national development (Haarstad/Fløysand 2007; Deonandan 2015; Hunsberger/Alonso-Fradejas 2016). National development policies are closely tied to the question of land use, promoting certain kinds of land use as opposed to others. I therefore argue that the specific DOS for actors involved in struggles over land are not only made up by national laws regarding land attribution, but also by national development policy. This policy is itself the outcome of previous social struggles and is strongly influenced by international agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national Western donor agencies.

Large-scale land transformation for agricultural but also mining purposes in Senegal must first be evaluated through an environmental and social impact study (Code Minier, § 26, 28; Code de l'Environment, Chapitre V). As such, the common denominator of the institutionally anchored discourse on large-scale mining and agriculture is that decisions for or against agro-industrial and mining projects must be based on an assessment of the risks for the local populations and the environment. However, regarding their contribution to

national development, the policy discourses regarding mining and agriculture differ. For the agricultural sector, the Plan Sénégalais Emérgent and the policy programs based on this national development plan stress the imperative of the most productive land use to achieve food security for the local population and independence from food imports (Plan Sénégalais Emergent § 258, Plan d'Action Prioritaires). In the national agricultural development policy PRACAS, the main objective is defined as "to nourish the population in a sustainable manner and on an endogenous basis" (PRACAS). One of its central aims is to achieve self-sufficiency in terms of rice (auto suffisance en riz) and onions. On the other hand, with regard to mining, the national development plan PSE stresses the financial contribution of the sector in terms of revenue, taxes and employment (Plan Sénégalais Emérgent, § 262). Here the grounding principle is that financial gain for the national state will enable the government to invest in further development projects. Both cases – large-scale mining and agriculture – thus have an identical component in their discursive structure based on risks for the environment and local populations; they differ, however, in their emphasis on two different aspects of national development. Given that the cultural context is similar in both cases, I evaluate whether differences in the development discourse provide a satisfactory explanation for the success or failure of the framing strategies of both movements' actors.

To evaluate the success and failure of both movements, I propose a qualitative approach based on the concrete aims and means of the respective movements. A universal definition of what constitutes the success or failure of a social movement is so far missing in the literature. Movement success has been analyzed in terms of protests staged, visibility in the media, members and financial resources mobilized, changes of laws or in discourses, etc. (Bernstein 2003). I argue that movement success can best be evaluated according to the concrete objectives formulated by a movement. The aims of both movements' actors in Senegal have been to advance and secure the land claims of local populations, either by stopping large-scale land transformations or by reaching a compensation agreement that would grant local populations access to alternative lands or adequate monetary compensation. Neither movements' actors aimed to mobilize for long-term protests and large-scale demonstrations. Rather, they intended to gather support from other national and international NGOs and initiatives and garner media attention. As such, I evaluate success and failure first and foremost based on the overall objectives of the movements: were projects stopped, downscaled, or alternative lands or adequate compensation payments given to the local populations that lost their land? Second, I conceptualize success based on the strategies used by the social movements to achieve their overall objectives: have social movement actors attracted support from other national and international NGOs? And have they achieved strong visibility for their claims in the national and international media?

As we will see in the following paragraphs, the movement against the Senhuile agro-industrial project has been considerably more successful than the movement against the Sabodala gold mine in attaining media attention, gathering support from other organizations, and successfully delaying, stopping or downscaling projects.
In the following sections I first turn to the conflict around the Senhuile agro-industrial project. I briefly sketch the development of the conflict around the project and then analyze the framing strategies of both the coalition against land grabbing and supporters of the project with regard to the DOS. I then turn to the conflict around the Sabodala gold mine. After a brief outline of the development of the mining sector in Senegal more generally, I turn to the framing strategies used in the conflict around the Sabodala mine in particular.

Conflicts over agricultural projects in Senegal: The Senhuile case

In the context of the 2008 global financial crisis, as well as the food, energy and climate crises that began in the mid-2000s, investments in agricultural land have surged. This increase has been particularly strong in Africa (Cotula 2013), and Senegal is no exception. Large-scale land acquisitions and industrial agriculture had a minimal presence in Senegal prior to the mid-2000s. However, from 2006 onward, several international and national investors started trying to acquire land in Senegal. These dynamics have not only been fostered by a multi-faceted crisis of capitalism, but also by national politics. Former president Abdoulaye Wade introduced his program to foster large-scale industrial agriculture in 2006 under the name Grand Offensive National Agricole (GOANA), encouraging international and national investors to acquire land in Senegal and providing detailed support for land acquisitions for international investors through the national investment agency Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements et Grands Travaux (APIX). Such national initiatives were seen in many African countries at the time. They were encouraged by international donor agencies such as the World Bank, which stressed in a well-publicized report the economic potential of idle and empty lands in Africa (Deiniger/Byerlee 2010).
Estimates about the scope of land deals in Senegal vary strongly. Land Matrix (2015) estimates that 250,000 ha have been taken over by international companies since 2000. NGOs in Senegal estimate that the land use rights of 844,976 ha have changed since 2000; their estimates include land leased by religious leaders or national political elites (ENDA PRONAT 2015). When international companies are involved, land is mainly transformed for the purpose of food crop production for the European market.

Large-scale land deals have been highly contentious in Senegal. Following the World Social Forum 2011 in Dakar, about 20 civil society organizations in Senegal, local peasant initiatives and the national peasant organization Conseil National de Concertation et de cooperation des Ruraux (CNCR) organized themselves into a network against land grabbing, the Cade de Réflextion et d'Action sur le Foncier au Sénégal (CRAFS). They have successfully prevented several large-scale land deals in Senegal (ENDA PRONAT 2015). Currently, the most contentious project in the country is the Senhuile project.

In 2011, Senhuile initially planned to lease 20,000 ha in the municipality of Fanaye to grow sweet potatoes for biofuel production. However, after several demonstrations, violent confrontations and a widely heard media campaign organized by CRAFS, former president Wade stopped the project and relocated it to the nature reserve of Ndiael in the municipality of Gnith via two presidential decrees. Parts of the Ndiael nature reserve are protected under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (RAMSAR) for the conservation of endangered wetlands. In the first of his presidential decrees, former president Wade downgraded some of the land from its status as a nature reserve, wherein agricultural activities had been forbidden. This allowed him, in his second presidential decree, to lease the land to Senhuile for 50 years, and without charging the company any rent (ActionAid 2014). After the relocation of the project to the Ndiael reserve in 2012, Senhuile aimed to cultivate sunflowers destined for oil production in Italy. However, this plan was abandoned by the company. When the management changed in 2014 they started producing rice, maize and peanuts for the local market on 2000 hectares (Interview, representative of Senhuile, 06 February 2015, Dakar). After yet another change in management in 2016, the company is now planning to extend and restructure its crop production.

Before the arrival of the Senhuile project, the land in Ndiael had been used by pastoralists. Thirty-seven villages with a total of about 9,000 inhabitants lie inside the project area. To contest the project, villagers formed the Collective pour la défense de la terre à Ndiael (hereafter referred to as the Collective). They are supported by CRAFS and several international NGOs such as GRAIN, Re:Common, ActionAid and Peuple Solidaire. Villagers staged several small demonstrations and in 2012 blocked the Senhuile workers and their machines as they planned to continue the clearance of the land. Their main protest repertoire has been a media campaign informing the national and international public about the case. The pastoralists and their allies demand the immediate cessation of the project and the redistribution of the 20,000 ha to the local community.

To date, Senhuile is still cultivating in Ndiael. However, in 2016 the governor of St. Louis downscaled the project to 10,000 ha. Whether this was done upon the demand of the company or as a response to public pressure is unclear. Nevertheless, the government plans to grant Senhuile a leasehold and as such stronger control over the land. How much

the company will pay for this is still under negotiation. Even though the coalition against land grabbing, CRAFS, could not entirely stop the Senhuile project, they have considerably delayed its development. Their struggle has attracted massive attention from the national and international media (for an overview see farmlandgrab.org 10.11.2016) and they have gained support from some major international NGOs, who in turn have published several reports on the case (ActionAid 2014; CRAFTS 2013).

'Idle land and productive modern agriculture': Framing for large-scale agricultural projects

Supporters of the Senhuile project, mainly state officials and the company itself, present the land in the Ndiael reserve as 'under-used' (sous-utiliser) (Prause 2015). They argue that the project is bringing a previously only scarcely used and empty area under cultivation (Interview, representatives of Senhuile, 06 February 2015, Dakar). They have framed this claim not only through text and speech acts but also in the form of a map issued by the government of the project area (Agence Nationale d'Amenagement du Territoire [map] 2012). Only six of the existing 37 villages are marked on the map. The project's supporters further reduce the land use in the area to pastoralism, which in turn is devalued as an economic activity since its use of land is presented as unproductive. Ministry officials argue that large areas of arable land in Senegal are only used by pastoralists for a few months of the year, thus offering a big potential for more productive land use (Interview, Ministry of Agriculture, 26 February 2015, Dakar).

At the same time, supporters of the Senhuile project stress that the local communities held no formal land titles to the area, and that the government had thus legally attributed the land to Senhuile (Interview, representative of Senhuile, 06 February 2015, Dakar). It is argued that there was no need for formal community consultations on the matter. After the management changed in 2014, the company did initiate a corporate social responsibility (CSR) program. They enhanced their framing efforts by presenting the project as cooperating closely with local communities and bringing social benefits to the population of the area. They argued further that the project will benefit the community since the company will create jobs in the area and make the necessary investments to develop agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation cannels.

While the 'idle land frame' was particularly prominent at the time of the installation of the project in the Ndiael reserve in 2012, in the following years Senhuile shifted towards framing its activities more strongly in terms of productivity and economic development. When the company started producing rice, maize and peanuts for the local market in 2014, they reframed their discourse in terms of productivity and food security. They stressed that the project would contribute to increasing domestic rice production in Senegal, and as such would constitute an integral part of the government's objective to

achieve national self-sufficiency in rice production. This framing strategy was enhanced by the new management in 2016. To date, Senhuile frames its activities even more strongly in terms of productivity and agricultural know-how, stressing its professionalism, high yields and investments (Senhuile 11 April 2016).

The 'idle land and modern agriculture frame' taps into the DOS on large-scale land transformations in Senegal in terms of taking up the idea of productive land use and social risks. First, they frame the land as having been idle before Senhuile arrived in the area. As the land was previously unused and uninhabited, they argue that the project poses no negative impacts for local communities. Instead, the project will create jobs and bring necessary know-how to the area. Second, they present their own agricultural production as being a major contribution to the national development goal of achieving national self-sufficiency in rice, while simultaneously portraying pastoralism as an unproductive activity. Nevertheless, they do not manage to construct a convincing frame with regard to environmental risks. Even though Senhuile states that it is supporting the protection of the RAMSAR reserve, the company does not construct a convincing narrative of how it is actually contributing to the protection of the reserve and the general environment. Due to changes in the management, the Senhuile narrative also lacks consistency and narrative fidelity and as such has major weaknesses, something that opponents of the project have been quick to exploit.

'Peasant agriculture': Framing against land grabbing

CRAFS have constructed a frame that can be termed 'peasant agriculture'. They diagnose the threat to the livelihoods of the local pastoralists as a central problem of the Senhuile project, presenting the loss of land as a sure way to push them further into poverty. In an urgent appeal published by CRAFS and international NGOs supporting the coalition, they argue that "The actions of this Italian-Senegalese company pose a grave threat to the food sovereignty of 9000 inhabitants in the affected region." (Peuples Solidaires, Actions Aid 2014). Their frame thereby stresses the diverse ways in which local communities use the land. They also present an alternative map showing the 37 villages actually located in the area, and emphasize that the local populations use the area not only for pastoralism but also for the collection of wild fruits and medical plants (Word 2014). CRAFS presents pastoralism as an integral part of small-scale agriculture in Senegal.

The local communities in turn identify themselves as agro-pastoralists involved in cattle breeding as well as farming (Focus group discussion, members of the Collective, 16 March 2015, Thiamène; see also Lo/Touré 2016). Furthermore, they present pastoralism as an important activity for the Senegalese economy, as it creates prosperity in the pastoralist regions and renders them independent of state support. Members of the Collective frame the land in Ndiael as a source of their identity as pastoralists. They

emphasize that the land has been used for pastoralism by their families for several generations, thereby stressing the importance of their connection to the land and to their place of birth, something that is resonant for every Senegalese and even African (Focus group discussion, Collective, 16 March 2015, Thiamène). As such, they bridge their pastoralist identity with general Senegalese national values.

CRAFS further states that the lack of access to land is a major reason for young Senegalese people to try to migrate to Europe, often in small fishing boots (pirogues), leading to many deaths at sea. Irregular migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands has been a major issue since the mid-2000s. Several government programs have been designed to stop young Senegalese people from attempting this precarious passage to Europe. In stressing that land loss increases rural poverty and prevents young Senegalese from building a future in the country, CRAFS constructs a direct link between land grabbing and irregular migration (Focus group discussion, ENDA PRONAT, 12 February 2015, Dakar). Through these efforts of frame bridging, they connect two formerly unconnected issues and extend the importance of land grabbing from a local and rural phenomenon to a national problem.

CRAFS attributes blame to the national government, whom they present as being responsible for land deals and their negative consequences, as well as to the Senhuile company itself. The Collective presents the land allocation as illegitimate, since it was attributed to the company without any prior formal community consultation and therefore lacked participation and democratic legitimacy (Collective 2012). Finally, they frequently refer to the Senhuile project as unproductive. Activists stress that Senhuile has only been able to cultivate a few hundred hectares of the leased land, and that yields are low (Interview, CNCR, 04 February 2015, Dakar; Interview, Collective, 04 February 2015, Dakar). They take issue with the fact that the management of Senhuile is divided among different investors, thus presenting it as a dubious company. This discursive move is backed by an investigative report conducted by GRAIN on the investors behind the deal (CRAFTS 2013), which presents a somewhat shady company structure and reveals one of the investors' connections to other dubious business deals.

CRAFS also highlights in several reports the negative impacts of the project on the bordering wetlands, which are protected under the RAMSAR Convention (Word 2014). They state that the water use of Senhuile endangers the preservation of the wetlands as well as of the migratory birds that rely on the wetlands along their route. Additionally, defor-estation by Senhuile and excessive fertilizer use have come under criticism from CRAFS. The pastoralists' land use, on the other hand, is presented as environmentally sustainable (ActionAid 2014). The anti-land grabbing coalition proposes the redistribution of the land to the local communities, since they argue that small-scale agriculture (explicitly including pastoralism) would use the land in a more productive way than the

Senhuile enterprise. Activists contrast the Senhuile yields with the small-scale farms in the neighborhood, arguing that the small-scale farmers produced more rice per hectare in the same amount of time than the company, even though Senhuile has much larger financial capacities at its disposal (Interview, Collective, 04 February 2015, Dakar).

With the 'peasant agriculture frame', opponents of Senhuile tap into the opportunities of the discursive structure built around risks for local communities and the environment, as well as the development vision of achieving food security. CRAFS frames Senhuile as presenting a threat to the local communities and the environment, and they discredit the project as unproductive, undemocratic and shady in terms of its business model. At the same time, they provide a convincing 'counter-frame' to the claims of Senhuile project supporters of idle and underused lands in the area, using alternative maps and detailed accounts of the economic activities of the pastoralist communities. They thereby profit from inconsistencies in the company's own framing. With the support of international NGOs, CRAFS has provided evidence for many of its claims, e.g. through the investigative reports conducted by GRAIN, and the measurement of yields per hectare by small-scale farmers in the area. As such, the peasant agriculture frame of CRAFS gains empirical credibility. The strong ties of CRAFS to the local communities and the framing of their identity as attached to the land of their ancestors – just as any other Senegalese – lends them strong credibility as frame articulators and connects their problem to the national identity. In arguing that land grabbing enhances rural poverty and is as such a key reason for the irregular and perilous outmigration of young Senegalese, they link two structurally unconnected frames and topics. They depict their interests as extending beyond the concrete Senhuile case to the wider problem of irregular migration. The anti-land grab coalition thus engages successfully in the strategies of frame bridging and frame extension.

The anti-land grab coalition in Senegal therefore not only effectively uses all three discursive opportunities derived from the national policy discourse, but also provides an effective counter-framing of the issue, and engages in frame bridging and frame extension. This explains the success of the movement in attracting support and media attention, and in delaying the project several times.

Conflicts over large-scale mining: The case of the Sabodala gold mine

In the context of the global financial crisis, gold prices have risen to unprecedented heights. These dynamics have led to a new gold mining boom around the world, especially in Africa and Latin America, where investments in exploration and exploitation activities

have risen significantly (UNECA 2011). The mining boom in West Africa has not only been driven by high gold prices but also by a liberalization of mining legislation, facilitated in many cases by the World Bank (Campbell 2010). This new generation of mining codes has been explicitly designed to attract foreign investment in the mining sector and offers significant benefits to investors such as tax exemptions and low-revenue payments.

Senegal is an exemplary case of this current dynamic. The mining industry was poorly developed until the beginning of the 2000s. In 2003, the government of former president Wade introduced a new mining code offering large benefits to investors, such as tax and custom duty exemptions as well as revenue payments of only three percent (Code Minier, Loi n° 2003-36, 24 November 2003). The liberalization of the mining law and rising gold prices have proven to be significant incentives for large- and medium-scale companies. Gold mining in Senegal takes place in Kédougou, a poor and sparsely populated region bordering Mali and Guinea, about 800 km south-east of the capital Dakar.

The gold deposits in Kédougou have not only attracted international companies but also large numbers of artisanal and small-scale miners, many of whom migrate from neighboring countries. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) has a long history in the Kédougou region, as in most West African countries on the Birimian belt. Gold has been mined artisanally in Senegal since pre-colonial times. ASM was traditionally practiced by the local population as an additional livelihood activity next to agriculture and pastoralism in the dry season, mainly in the form of gold panning of surface sands along river streams (Niang 2014). However, driven by the high gold prices and the lack of efficient regulation of ASM by the Senegalese state, tens of thousands of migrants from other West African countries have travelled to Kédougou in search of gold. Their exact number is unknown as is the amount of gold they mine. However, the population of some villages where larger gold deposits have been found has in recent times risen from a few hundred inhabitants to between 15,000-50,000 inhabitants (Focus group discussion, artisanal miners, 13 April 2016, Kharakhena). Furthermore, many of the local villagers have oriented their primary livelihood activities towards ASM. The NGO La Lumière estimates that in the rural Kédougou area today, around 60% of household income is derived from ASM and around 40% from agricultural or pastoralist activities (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). Despite recent attempts by the Senegalese government to regularize the sector through a police-enforced hold on all ASM operations, the demarcation of corridors reserved for ASM, and the granting of licenses solely to Senegalese citizens, informal mining in Senegal continues to be widespread. Thus the vast majority of artisanal miners have no security of tenure or legal entitlement to work a plot of land, and consequently no grounds upon which to receive compensation payments if an industrial mining company is granted a concession to the land.

Senegal's first industrial gold mine, known as Sabodala, began production in 2009. Today the mine is owned by the Canadian Teranga Gold Corporation (TGO). TGO holds (via its Senegalese subsidiaries Sabodala Gold Operations and the Sabodala Mining Company) a mining permit for 246 km2 and exploration licenses for over 1,000 km2 (Teranga Gold Corporation 2013). From 2013 to 2015, TGO produced between 5 and 6 tons of gold annually.

The installation of the first large-scale gold mine in Senegal has not gone uncontested. Conflicts have arisen around several issues, though one topic that has kept arising since the mine began production is the closing down of the ASM sites on the TGO concession. Local villagers, supported by a few local NGOs based in Kédougou such as La Lumière, SADEV and KEOH, demand secure access to their ASM sites and have requested land and monetary compensation for the mines they have lost. Their success, however, has so far been limited. They have been unable to secure access to ASM sites on the TGO concession or to obtain satisfactory compensation lands for the local population. National media attention has also been limited to concrete protest events, while the international media has hardly reported on the matter. The only two major international NGOs that have taken an active part in either funding local organizations or in publishing their concerns are Oxfam International and Amnesty International. However, unlike the anti-land grab coalition against the Senhuile project, this has not yet led to sustained long-term cooperation and collaborative international campaigns. Rather, TGO has continued to expand their operations, receiving continued support from the national government of Senegal and from regional government authorities.

TGO's 'sustainable mining frame'

Supporters of the Sabodala gold mine, the company itself as well as state officials present their land use as responsible, sustainable and a motor for development. They frame their activities under a 'sustainable mining frame', referring to themselves as a "responsible partner in sustainable resource development" (Teranga Gold Corporation 2015: 6). As the TGO Chairman and CEO state, "responsible mining is the way we do business. It is part of our culture and embodies our core values of integrity, care, respect, collaboration, performance and communication" (ibid.: 7). The company presents its corporate strategy as grounded in democratic practice through community consultations and thus as being responsive to the local people's needs (Groenewald 2015). They frame their activities as fostering economic development and growth in the region. TGO stresses that the communities profit from job creation, revenue payments and CSR programs, such as the construction of schools and community gardens. The company describes the aims of its activities in its 2013 Responsibility Report as being "To make a positive difference in the communities in which we live and work and to share the benefits of our mining presence

to leave a lasting, positive legacy that will continue to be enjoyed for generations to come" (Teranga Gold Corporation 2013: 4). TGO also frames its activities as being beneficial to the development of the nation as a whole. They state that "Teranga works in close partnership with the Government of Senegal towards the achievement of its Emerging Senegal Plan goals" (Teranga Gold Corporation 2015: 13). They stress their financial contributions through revenues, taxes and investment in infrastructure, and thereby their investment in national development.

The communities around the mine are portrayed as having been poor and cut off from the economic development of the country until the Sabodala mine was opened (Groenewald 2015). Former land use is mostly portrayed as small-scale agriculture and pastoralism. ASM is acknowledged to exist, though it is portrayed as an anarchic activity that constitutes a major impediment to the development of the region. The company describes ASM as an "illegal semi-industrial activity" and criminalizes miners for their illegal infringement on concession land (Teranga Gold Corporation 29 February 2016; Interview, representative TGO, 04 March 2016, Sabodala). Furthermore, TGO presents ASM as an activity largely driven by migrants and stresses its "negative environmental and social impacts to nearby communities including a rise in crime, violence and health issues (…)" (Teranga Gold Corporation 29 February 2016).

Artisanal miners are not only accused of having deficient rules and regulations, but are also critiqued for their irresponsible use of mercury and cyanide and lack of accountability for environmental degradation (Interview, Forestry Department, 03 March 2015, Kédougou). State officials frequently portray artisanal miners as environmental criminals and hold them responsible for the contamination of groundwater through the use of mercury and for deforestation in the area (Interview, Forestry Department, 03 March 2015, Kédougou; Interview, Mining Ministry, 16 February 2015, Dakar). TGO, on the other hand, presents itself as capable of managing the environmental risks of large-scale mining. They refer to their water management scheme, which according to them guarantees that the water used for mining is recycled and never returned to the environment (Teranga Gold Corporation 2015: 20).

In their framing, TGO manages to tap into all three discursive opportunities regarding large-scale land transformations for mining purposes. In presenting their activities as responsible, sustainable and responsive to community demands, they effectively present large-scale mining as a development potential for local communities rather than a social risk. Furthermore, they manage to portray large-scale mining as environmentally risk free, since the company has the know-how and the financial capacities to 'manage' the environmental risks. They contrast this self-image with artisanal miners, whom they portray as environmental criminals who recklessly use mercury and cyanide and thus contribute to the contamination of groundwater and streams in the area. Furthermore,

TGO and ministry officials stress the presence of migrants in the ASM sector (Teranga Gold Corporation 2015; Teranga Gold Corporation 27 May 2014; Interview, Mining Ministry, 16 February 2015, Dakar). Supporters of large-scale mining take up the DOS of national development in their focus on the company's financial contributions to and its cooperation with the national state. As such, they contrast their activities – that benefit the entire nation – with ASM – that mainly benefits migrant workers from neighboring countries who export their winnings directly. Their framing is consistent and backed by a large number of reports and studies issued by the company's CSR department, which lends their framing empirical credibility.

'Social Justice': The framing strategies of artisanal miners

To advance land and compensation claims for the local population, civil society actors and local community groups have constructed a 'social justice frame'. They argue that the main problem is that local communities have lost access to their traditional mining sites through TGO's mining concessions, and that this poses a major threat to their livelihoods. With regard to the closure of the Gora site – a rich ASM site on the TGO concession – they assert that without being granted an alternative corridor as compensation, the local population has no means to guarantee its food supply (Interview, representative of the villages surrounding Gora, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). They furthermore point to the poverty of the local population in comparison to the fenced facilities of the mine and its high production total. They emphasize that the villages next to the mine do not even have access to electricity or a water supply, while in the mine "even the toilets are air conditioned" (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). NGO representatives stress the fact that the areas "that are rich in gold, are the areas paradoxically poor" (Interview, Comité Sénégalais des Droits Humains, 05 February 2015, Dakar).

Local NGOs also attack the way in which the mine was implemented. They refer to the environmental and social impact study that was issued only after the mine began production and stress the fact that the allocation of the concession did not allow for any real participation in Senegal (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). In their diagnostic framing, they thus present the way in which the mine was implemented, as well as its consequences, as unjust. They cast doubt over Teranga's representation of the mine as contributing to local development and being responsive to local people's needs. Referring in their own terms to national development, NGOs emphasize the low revenue payments made by TGO and the large tax exemptions granted to it. They argue that TGO's activities mainly profit the company, not the nation, and that the local population bears the entire costs of the operations (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou).

The artisanal miners working near to, or displaced from, the Sabodala gold mine

concession construct their own identity, not explicitly as artisanal miners but as local communities engaged in farming, cattle herding and ASM. They legitimate their claims to the land by stating that they hold traditional land rights to certain plots that are now part of the TGO concession and that they were not consulted prior to the allocation of the land to TGO. The artisanal miners refer to the long tradition of ASM in the region that predates gold extraction by large-scale and foreign operators. The chief of Sabodala, a village that lost its main traditional mining site to TGO, states that "Our fathers and the fathers of our fathers have done ASM here" (Focus group, inhabitants of Sabodala village, 04 March 2015, Sabodala village). Furthermore, the local communities present themselves as the 'true explorers' of the gold deposits in Senegal, claiming that industrial mining companies only came to the area because the artisanal miners had discovered the gold deposits first (Focus group, villagers of Faloumbou, 04 March 2015, Faloumbou). In referring to the long tradition of ASM in the region, the artisanal miners not only point to their traditional land rights but also present ASM as a traditional and normal economic activity that has always been a central part of their livelihood activities, alongside small-scale agriculture and pastoralism. Even though the artisanal miners are aware that their activities are illegal, they nevertheless present them as legitimate.

With their framing, local communities and their NGO supporters manage to tap into the DOS on social risks. In emphasizing the contrasts between the high-tech TGO site and the surrounding villages without electricity or water supply, they present a counter-frame to TGO's narrative of responsible mining for local development. They back up their land claims by referring to their need for access to land for survival. Furthermore, local artisanal miners and their NGO supporters try to construct a counter-frame to the negative image of ASM, by presenting it as a traditional and normal part of their livelihood portfolio. They identify themselves not explicitly as artisanal miners but as local communities and inhabitants. Thus they try to circumvent the negative images attached to the identity of artisanal miners in terms of environmental impacts, and aim to distinguish themselves from migrant artisanal miners.

Due to the heavy negative environmental impacts of ASM, however, they have not managed to construct an effective counter-frame to their representation by TGO and state officials as environmental criminals. Local communities have after all no opportunity to present themselves as environmentally more friendly than the TGO operation and thus cannot align their frames with the discursive structure on environmental risks. Unlike the agro-pastoralists in the Senhuile case, they have also not managed to present ASM as an economic alternative to TGO's operations that could make a better contribution to national development objectives. On the one hand, they cannot compete with the production levels and investments of TGO. On the other hand, they have not managed to construct a development vision based on ASM. On the contrary, they also put forward the idea of

sustainable large-scale mining, only with a slight reinterpretation of what sustainable means with regard to local development and social risks.
Opponents of the large-scale TGO mine have therefore not managed to create a frame that resonates with the broader discursive structure on mining in Senegal. Their framing lacks salience and cultural resonance and their land claims are neither portrayed as sensible nor realistic in the national media. Their framing efforts are further weakened by frictions among the actors supporting the local communities around the TGO project. Amnesty International, as an international NGO, has opted for a human rights frame to advance the claims of the local communities. However, in their framing they focus on land claims with regard to agricultural land, and they support compensation claims in cases of resettlement. At the same time, however, they acknowledge frequent human rights violations such as child labor in ASM activities, and as such exclude land access claims to ASM sites from their framing (Amnesty International 2014).

Conclusion: Explaining the success or failure of social movements' framing strategies

Why do some framing strategies put forward by social movement actors succeed while others fail, even though the movements may be mobilized in a similar national and cultural context? This article aims to contribute to the research on meaning construction in conflicts over large-scale land transformations. It goes beyond existing studies by empirically analyzing how dominant discourses differ according to the purpose of land valorization and how in turn social movement actors are able to take up these incentives and constraints to explain the success and failure of their framing strategies. Conceptually, the article aims to intervene in the debate on framing in social movement theory. I argue that we need to combine the concept of framing with the concept of DOS in order to understand the differences in the outcomes of framing strategies. I define DOS as institutionally anchored ways of thinking (Ferree 2003) and demonstrate that these can be operationalized for the empirical analysis of conflicts in terms of laws and policies.
The empirical analysis of DOS and framing contests in conflicts over agro-industrial and mining projects in Senegal has shown that even for movements that formulate similar claims – in this case access to land – discursive structures can vary in the same cultural and national context. In the agricultural sector, an important discursive structure is centered on the principle of food security and national food production, a development objective that is not transferable to other land uses such as mining. DOS are thus not arbitrary but are tied to the specific purpose of land valorization. As such, different discourses provide distinct opportunities for movement actors involved in struggles over

large-scale land transformation in different economic sectors, thus explaining the success or failure of their respective framing strategies.

Differences in the DOS only partially explain framing outcomes, however, since not all social movement actors can use DOS in the same way. Different movement actors are more or less well positioned to tap into existing DOS. While the anti-land grab coalition CRAFS was able to take up opportunities opened up by discourses on social and environmental risks, the local miners mobilizing around the TGO industrial gold mine could only tap into the DOS on social risks. The negative impacts of ASM for the environment were successfully taken up by the supporters of the TGO mine as a frame. They discredited artisanal miners as environmental criminals due to groundwater contamination through extensive use of mercury and cyanide and the depletion of forestry resources.

Whether social movement actors are able to successfully align their framing strategies with the discursive opportunities is thus constrained on the one hand by their own objectives – in this case the land use they put forward as an alternative vision to the large-scale land transformation in question – but also by the counter-framing strategies of their opponents. Framing efforts can be further weakened by frictions in the representations of and support for claims within civil society coalitions (Pye 2010). To provide a comprehensive explanation of the success and failure of social movement actors' framing strategies, we thus need to carefully combine the concepts of DOS and framing, thereby paying close attention to the actors involved in the framing contests and their respective claims.

The comprehensive features of the DOS that I observed in Senegal, namely those tied to questions of environmental and social risks, have been highlighted by other authors working on conflicts related to mining (Luning 2014; Buchanan 2013) or to struggles over the introduction of GMO crops (Motta 2015) in different national contexts. This suggests that discursive structures tied to large-scale land transformations might have some comparable features that are, nevertheless, supplemented by other components depending on the land transformation in question. These features could be explained by the strong influence of transnational treaties, as Motta (2015) suggests, or by the strong impact of international agencies on land-related policies in the Global South. Many of the mining laws in West Africa, for example, have been reformed in the past 20 years with support from the World Bank (Campbell 2010).

I argue that neither differences in the DOS nor the framing choices of social movement actors can alone explain the outcomes of framing contests. Instead, framing contests need to be carefully analyzed within and together with the discursive structure in which they are embedded. Combining these two concepts provides an important step forward in the empirical analysis of meaning constructions and discourses in conflicts over large-scale land transformations. It offers a concept that is empirically more manageable than the

more elusive concepts of hegemonic or dominant discourses so often used by scholars working on conflicts over mining and agro-industrial projects (Buchanan 2013; Haarstad/Fløysand 2007; Davidov 2014; Hundsberger/Alonso-Fradejas 2016). Here, hegemonic discourses are often implicitly derived from the frames that social movement actors use, presuming that they are trying to tap into powerful discourses. By grounding discourses in institutionalized practices, the concept of DOS allows for an independent identification of dominant discourses with regard to specific topics. This framework is highly useful for analyzing the outcomes of framing contests, though it does not necessarily allow for more general statements of movements' successes or failures in terms of conflicts over large-scale land transformations. To do this, we need to extend the analysis to include actor constellations, power, financial and organizational resources, and political opportunities.

Conceptually, DOS is a suitable tool for overcoming one of the central weaknesses of the framing approach: success and failure are often explained as a result of the actors' skillfulness in constructing frames, ignoring the structural constraints produced by the discursive context. DOS provides an important tool with which to grapple with the often vague notion of discursive context. Nevertheless, the concept of DOS remains imprecise, and more work is needed on the conceptualization of the terms discourse, discursive structure and discursive opportunity, as to date it is still unclear what makes a discursive structure different from a discourse, and how we define a discursive opportunity.

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