Framing of the 2006 Lebanon War in the Egyptian Press

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Abstract

English

The 2006 Lebanon war was as a link in the chain of the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike the previous wars between the Arabs and Israel, the 2006 war in Lebanon took place amid a changing regional and international political and cultural context. Based on the constructionist approach as a theoretical background, the study aimed to explore the role of media in wartime. It focused on one aspect of the prolonged Middle East conflict by depicting the 2006 Lebanon war in order to explore the main frames in the Egyptian press, as well as the orientation of the newspapers toward the war journalism and peace journalism frames. The uniqueness of this particular war was the role played by non-state movements in the region, transcending the traditional ideologies of Pan-Arabism and Islamism prevalent in the Middle East, and introducing a new ideological frame referred to as "transnational Islamo-Arabic order" (Valbjørn & Bank, 2007). The thesis structure is based on the content analysis of three Egyptian newspapers representing three ideological tendencies in the society: the governmental, the liberal, and the leftist Pan-Arab trend. The central argument was the ideological orientation of the newspaper would affect the framing of the war. The study treated the ideology of the newspaper as the independent variable and the frames as dependent variables. Despite the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the tension between the two sides was reflected in the media. The purpose of studying the framing of war was to shed light on the political system in Egypt and how different factors – including political factors, social norms, ideological perspectives and journalistic organizational structure – mediate to determine *how* the media framed specific events dependent on the nature of the event itself, as well as other factors. The press framed the war within predetermined frames that resonated deeply in society. Based on the definition of framing adopted by Entman, the thesis relied on the deductive approach in identifying the frames of the 2006 war in Lebanon in the newspapers under study. The analysis recognized six main frames: *victim/feuding neighbors, strategic interest, responsibility*, *reconciliation*, *protest*, and *heroic Hezbollah*. Furthermore, the thesis concerned the study of framing within the premise of Galtung's competing war journalism and peace journalism frames in order to reach an understanding of the role of media in war times. The frames were determined in news, editorials, and visuals. The period of analysis was the war time from July 13 to August 15, 2006. The study applied the purposive sample to select three newspapers based on the circulation of the newspaper and the influence of the political ideological trend it represented. Then, censuses of all issues related to the Lebanon war of 2006 were analyzed in the chosen newspapers. The analysis involved a total of 1728 materials, including 756 materials in *Ahram*, 822 in *Masry,* and

150 materials in the weekly *Araby*. Findings suggested that the Egyptian presses under study did not homogenously frame the 2006 Lebanon war but were divided along lines of ideological tendencies that affected their framings. The state-owned press was inclined to echo the stance of the Egyptian regime while the liberal press showed more diversity in framing the war. As for the leftist press, it corresponded with the ideological perspective of the Nasserite party it represented.

Abstrakt

Der Libanonkrieg im Jahr 2006 war eine weitere Etappe im andauernden Nahostkonflikt. Ungleich den vorhergegangenen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Israel und den arabischen Staaten, stand der Krieg 2006 erstmals in einem Kontext der politischen und kulturellen Veränderung – sowohl auf nationaler wie auch regionaler Ebene. Basierend auf einen konstruktivistischen Ansatz als theoretischen Rahmen, versucht die vorliegende Arbeit die Rolle der Medien in Kriegen zu erforschen. Als Teil des Nahostkonflikts wird sich bei dieser Arbeit auf die Darstellung des Libanon Kriegs von 2006 fokussiert, um dadurch die grundlegenden *Frames* der ägyptischen Presse und deren Haltungen zu den *Frames* des Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus zu untersuchen. Die Einzigartigkeit dieses besonderen Krieges liegt bei den Rollen der nichtstaatlichen Bewegungen in der Region, die die im Nahen Osten geläufigen traditionellen Ideologien des Pan-Arabismus und des Islamismus überschritten und eine neue ideologische Rahmenbedingung, die „transnationale islamo-arabische Ordnung" (Valbjørn / Bank, 2007) einführten. Der Aufbau der Arbeit basierte auf der Analyse dreier ägyptischer Zeitungen, die ihrerseits die drei ideologischen Tendenzen innerhalb der ägyptischen Gesellschaft repräsentieren; Einen von der Regierung vorgegebenen, einen liberalen und einen den Pan-Arabismus vertretenden linken Trend. Die Hauptthese war hierbei, dass die ideologische Orientierung einer Zeitung das *Framing* des Krieges beeinflusst. Die Ideologie der Zeitungen wird hierbei als eine unabhängige Variable behandelt, wohingegen die *Frames* als abhängige Variablen angesehen werden. Trotz des Friedens zwischen Ägypten und Israel wurden die Spannungen zwischen beiden Länder durch die Medien reflektiert. Der Einstieg der Untersuchung von *Kriegsframing* erfolgte durch das Beleuchten des politischen Systems in Ägypten und über die Frage, inwieweit Faktoren wie Politik, soziale Normen, ideologische Perspektiven und die Organisationsstruktur des Journalismus zusammenspielen. Dadurch wird determiniert, wie die Medien bestimmte Ereignisse in Abhängigkeit zur Natur der Ereignisse als auch zu anderen Faktoren einfangen. Nachrichtenagenturen hielten den Krieg in einem von der Bevölkerung ausgehenden vorbestimmten Rahmen fest. Ausgehend von *Entmans* Definition des *Framing* obliegt dieser Arbeit ein deduktiver Ansatz bei der Identifizierung von den *Frames* des Libanonkriegs 2006 in den zu untersuchenden Zeitungen. Sechs *Frames* werden in die Analyse mit einbezogen: Opfer / Zerstrittene Nachbarn, strategische Interessen, die *Frames* der Verantwortung, der Aussöhnung, des Protests, und der heroischen Hisbollah. Ein weiteres

Anliegen der Arbeit ist die Untersuchung des *Framings* unter der von Galtung aufgestellten Prämisse über konkurrierenden Rahmenbedingungen des Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus. Dies kann zu einem Erkenntnisgewinn über die Rolle der Medien in Kriegszeiten führen. Die *Frames* wurden durch Nachrichten, Überschriften und Illustrationen ermittelt. Der Zeitraum der Analyse umspannte die Kriegszeit zwischen dem 13. Juli und dem 15. August 2006. Begründet durch die Auflagezahlen der Zeitungen und deren Einfluss auf die politisch ideologischen Meinungen die sie vertreten, erfolgte eine bewusste Festlegung auf drei Zeitungen. Daraufhin folgte bei jeder der drei Zeitungen ein Zensus aller Themen, die sich auf den Libanonkrieg von 2006 bezogen. Dabei entstand eine Sammlung von 1728 Materialien, darunter 756 Auswahlstücke von *Ahram*, 822 von *Masry* und 150 in der Wochenzeitung *Araby*. Die Ergebnisse vermuteten, dass die ägyptische Presselandschaft kein einheitliches Bild zum Libanonkrieg 2006 darstellte, sondern aufgrund der ideologischen Unterschiede der Zeitungen verschiedenen Arten des *Kriegsframings* benutzt wurden. Die staatlich kontrollierten Zeitungen wiederspiegelten die Haltung des ägyptischen Regimes, wohingegen bei den liberalen Zeitungen unterschiedliche Ansätze des *Kriegsframings* zu beobachten sind. Für die linksgerichtete Presse gilt, dass ihre Meinung mit der ideologischen Perspektive der nasseristischen Partei einherging.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

People communicate to interpret events and to share their interpretations with others. This interpretation of events constitutes their reality. Accordingly, the constructed reality is not monolithic. There are multiple ways of constructing reality. Media presents reality through different portrayals of that interpreted reality. The social construction of that "reality" is grounded within the premise of media frames (Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). The depth of a given frame depends on its resonance with the deeply rooted cultural norms of the society and is rarely questioned. Nevertheless, a particular frame may vary over time depending on the variance of the political and cultural base of the news media (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.32). Since the construction of reality is a cultural process rather than a professional one, journalists seek information that literally fits within the cultural frames of the society. In the same vein, many antagonists find it difficult to propagate their own frames in the society. There are three major elements that affect the construction of frames in the media: first, the nature of the event itself; second, the quest for a "good news story"; and finally, the degree in which the story resonates with the cultural values in the society (p.41). However, the political culture through which the news media works influences the ways the media interprets events. The political culture is defined as the set of values, norms, beliefs, and practice in which the media works (p.39). Journalists search for facts and images that resonate with the political culture of the society, otherwise they run the risk that their story will go offline. In the media, war events are rich narratives that provide the news stories with aspects of human interest, heroism, tragedy, as well as personal experience. Stories of war generate collective bonds and communal values among members of the society in a sense that "[n]ational feelings of communal identity, pride, patriotism, as well as historical parallels and past myths, are all summoned through the genre of war reporting and these generally seek to position 'us' in opposition to 'them', and do so in symbolically and rhetorically affective ways" (Cottle, 2006, p.77).

The question thus remains: which frames are transmitted through the media? The answer to this question is complicated. A myriad of research tends to explain the reasons behind reporting specific events while omitting others. The nature of the information entitles that some events are worth covering due to the richness of their news values more than other events. Galtung and Ruge (1965) introduced twelve criteria to determine the newsworthiness of a specific event: frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, unexpectedness, continuity, compositional balance, elite nations, elite people, personification, and negativity. These criteria are introduced in the process of gate keeping, and continue through the decision to

select particular events up to the framing of these events. Wolfsfeld (2004) highlighted four major values of news: immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism (p.16). Wars and violent conflicts are rich with news values. In short, the relation between media and war is interrelated. The media has the potential to make war more visible. The mediation nature of media in distant wars is referred to by Cottle (2006) as "Mediatized Conflict." The term, as explained by Cottle, is used to "emphasize the complex ways in which the media are often implicated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images about them" (p.8). This idea of "[m]ediatized conflict" hypothesized a more powerful role of the media, as "capable of enacting and performing conflicts as well as reporting and representing them."The media relation to the conflict is active "*performative*" of events rather than representative of events (p.9). This "performative" role puts the media under the scrutiny of political power, which exerts different forms of media control. The context of this political control is determined by a number of elements. First, authority tends to control the media by a host of litigation and organizational regulations. Second, the political orientation of the journalists working in the media tends to be in consistent with that of the authority. Finally, the framing of events in the media is inclined to match the political and social norms of the society (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.39). Antagonists compete with each other to gain access to the media and market their ideas and norms. However, the authority, in many cases, tends to control the political environment and prevents antagonists with an opposing political agenda to gain access to media and promote their frames of interpretation. The ability to control the political environment in which the media works suggests the ability to promote certain media frames. The political environment is not static. Any changes in the political environment lead to further changes in the media rendering it independent and critical rather than supportive and propagandistic. The dialectical relation between media and politics is best understood within the principle of politics-media-politics (PMP) cycle suggested by Gadi Wolfsfeld (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.26). He hypothesized that the media and the political environment influence one another in the sense that any change in the political environment affects the change in the media content, which in turn has an impact on the political environment (p.31). However, the realm of information technology today allows for the expansion and diversification of the sources thus limiting the ability of the authority to be the sole legitimate source of information. This diversity of sources helps make the conflict more transparent in what Brown (2005) termed as "*Schattschneider effect.*" The *Schattschneider effect,* as hypothesized by Brown, means that "the more public a conflict becomes the greater the potential for initially uninvolved groups to intervene and by doing so to change the potential outcome." The multiple sources of information and the diversity of the groups who share media reduce the ability of the authority to act as a sole "definer" of reality (p.64).The information technology widens the scope of news gathering and news production in a way that allows more people to be involved in the conflict. In times of war, the

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media comes under pressure from the authority to act as a propaganda tool propagating the mainstream frame (Cottle, 2006; Wolfsfeld, 1997). This control over the media, in addition to the enriched news values of war reporting, affects the role of media during conflicts. Wars are often considered major news stories in the media, while peace processes often receive scant attention. Wolfsfeld (2004) argued that "due to a fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news values, the media often play a destructive role in attempts of making peace" (p.15).

Technically, the media plays fundamental roles in wars. First, it reports the immediate events from the war zone. Second, it relies on elite sources to interpret events and dramatize the victims who are a major "ingredient" of news during wartime. Although the reports on the victims stimulate hate and bigotry (Sontag, 2003, p.13) and could "leave collective scars that remain for many years to come" (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.23), they raise the public awareness and exert pressure on authority to act in order to alleviate the suffering and hardship of the victims (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.65). In sum, the media, as a product of the political environment, plays a dual role as catalyst of bigotry and conflict or definer of peace and reconciliation.

1.1 Problem Definition

In Egypt, the media is a mirror of the political system. Despite the claimed pluralism in the media structure and the variance of television channels and newspapers representing a wide ideological spectrum, the regime still maintains monopoly over the political environment. Wolfsfeld hypothesized that the authorities' degree of control over the political environment would determine how independent the role of news media is in political conflicts (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.24). Ever since the 1952 coup d'état that established the contemporary republic regime in Egypt, the authority took control of all the levers of power in the country. The regime retains a monopoly on the political system through developing a mechanism that combines coercion and co-optation. Even the contended democracy adopted by the regime of Mubarak in the late 1990s and early 2000s was meant to accentuate the nature of the authoritarian spirit of the state rather than advocate for the democratic measures (Marfleet, 2009). Several factors led to weakening the tight control of the regime on the political and media environment: the proliferation of the private newspapers, the introduction of the Pan-Arab satellite channels, and the free accessibility of the internet in Egypt (Abdulla, 2007; El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002). The regime, from its side, retained its power through multiple crippling laws that are used to tame the opposition (Najjar, 2008; Stacher, 2004). At the beginning, the regime showed tolerance in dealing with the opposition. Joining the side of the opposition at home, the media –from time to time – expressed harsh criticism of the regime and questioned its legitimacy. The 2000s witnessed a change in the regional and international arena, which found its echo in the Egyptian society. Events such as the

second Palestinian *Intifada*, September 11th, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 galvanized antagonism at home in deviation of the policies of the regime (Albrecht, 2007). As a response, the regime of Mubarak introduced a set of reforms to mitigate the opposition at home and to meet the international pressure exerted by the United States on the heel of its war on terrorism (Hamzawy, 2005). The democratic measures adopted by the regime fed the appetite of the "legal" opposition, such as the political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood who responded to the co-optation incentives of the regime and participated in the political elections. However, the regional events coupled with the stringent economic hardship at home gave momentum to the emergence of grassroots opposition outside the matrix of the regime which mounted its criticism to the authority and called for the head of the state to step down (El-Mahdi, 2009).

In particular, the Middle East conflict inspired the media and public opinion to respond differently to these changing events. As a main player in the Arab World, Egypt restored a sour attitude toward Israel in the media. Despite the peace treaty signed with Israel in 1979 under the patronage of the United States, the history of wars between the two countries hindered the full "normalization" of ties (Stein, 1997). In many cases, the Egyptian public opinion reacted to certain events in the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict by demonstration and anti-war rallies. The regime exploited these negative sentiments to drive public attention away from the economic hardship at home (Rubin, 2006, p.151). The sensitivity of the authority to the changing political environment in the region allowed for more critical voices to be published in the media. It was the implication of the Palestinian *Intifada* that led to the mobilization of the opposition in Egypt. The opposition translated their criticism into social actions and demonstrations in support of the Palestinian calls of justice (El-Mahdi, 2009, p.93).

1.2 Reflection on the 2006 Lebanon War in Egypt

The 2006 Lebanon war presents a salient example through which the opposition movements in Egyptian society played a tangible role galvanized by the hostile attitude toward Israel. The media found itself amid competing political players who tried to market their own interpretation of the events. The media was not homogenous in framing the war. The state-owned press abided by the foreign policy of the government and framed the war in accordance with the guidelines of the regime. The opposition and privately-owned press allowed for more diversity in the framing of the Lebanon war. One can trace a correspondence between the deeply rooted ideological, political, and historical norms in the society and the frames used in reporting the war. In essence, the 2006 war in Lebanon was marked by mobilization of different scales and arenas. The Arab world was divided between full support of the Hezbollah position and criticism of its "adventure" (Aly, 2006). In Egypt, society witnessed intra-state differences between the government, which held Hezbollah accountable for the escalation of war, and the opposition

blocs rallied by the public protests that hailed the resistance of Hezbollah. Ideologically, Hezbollah as a faction in the 2006 Lebanon war constituted a new alternative ideological model that combined Islamism and Pan-Arabism (Hamzawy, 2006; Valbjørn & Bank, 2007). The ramification of the 2006 Lebanon war on the Arab societies in general, and the Egyptian society in particular, was significant. From one angle, the war showed the fragility of the Arab regime and the contradiction between the public opinion and their governments. In different parts of the Arab world and in Egypt, the public opinion was mobilized by what it perceived as the "historical victory" of Hezbollah (Aly, 2006, p.4). From another angle, the war gave rise to the Islamic non-state movements like the Muslim Brotherhood, who transcended the legitimacy of the state and called for *jihad* (Holy war) in support of Hezbollah. Accordingly, the Egyptian regime formulated its stance partially on religious bases within the paradigm of the conflict between *Sunni* Islam represented by the stance of the "moderate" states of Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and *Shiite* Islam represented by Hezbollah and its supporters in Iran and Syria (Hamzawy, 2006). These contradictory viewpoints of the war were accompanied by a continuous flow of information and interpretation of events to serve the framework of the competing political players. In sum, the base of this study is the Lebanon war of 2006 because it:

1.) Reflects the intra-state division with regard to the premise of conflict.
2.) Highlights the powerful role of the Egyptian public opinion and the opposition blocs who expressed bold criticism to the authoritarian regime.
3.) Demonstrates the alternative roles played by Islamic factions who used the Pan-Arab ideological resistance toward Israel and the United States to rally in the street in support of its values.
4.) Paved the road for major political transformation in Egypt as a result of the mounting spirit of resistance.
5.) Helped to reduce the ability of the Egyptian, as well as the Arab regimes, to be the sole interpreters of events as it came amid the growing impact of Arab satellite channels and internet bloggers.
6.) Allowed for the potential involvement of international parties other than the United States in the Middle East policy due to the transparency of the war.

1.3 Aim of the Study

The study aims to test the role of the media in regional conflicts. It is a comparative study of the Egyptian newspapers representing different ideological tendencies in order to understand the political orientation of the regime and different sectors of the society with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and main regional players. The study applies the framing analysis within the constructionist approach to understand the social, political, cultural, and historical factors in light

of the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the 2006 Lebanon war in specific. The analysis is based on the deductive approach for investigating the six main frames: *victim/feuding neighbors, strategic interest, reconciliation, responsibility, protest,* and the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. Comprehensively, the study explores the tendencies of various newspapers toward coverage within Galtung's war journalism frame and peace journalism frame. Framing was affected by political, social, ideological, and psychological factors (Edelman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 1994; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Framing of the 2006 war in Lebanon received attention in several studies that explored the coverage of the issue in newspapers of foreign countries as well as the Egyptian press. The literature review of the 2006 Lebanon war suggests that the framing of the war is affected by several interrelated intrinsic and extrinsic factors (El-Bendary, 2010; Hackett & Schroeder, 2009; Kamal, 2008; O'Regan 2010; Parry, 2010; Shinar 2009). Since frames provide evidence of the flow of power in the society and the competing interests of the political players (Entman, 1993, p.55; Maher, 2001, p.88), it is expected that there will be competing frames assigned to the war. The core argument in this study is that the ideological leanings of the newspapers affected the framing of Lebanon war issue.

1.4 Structure of the Study

This study is divided into eight consecutive chapters. Chapter One is the introductory approach to the study. It identifies the research problem (1.1) and sheds some light on the political and media systems in Egypt and how they influenced each other within the realm of the authoritarian regime in the country. More specifically, this chapter draws attention to the core of the analysis by introducing the perspective on the Lebanon war in the Egyptian media (1.2). This section specifies the reasons behind choosing that particular war in the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. In this view, Chapter One addresses the aim of the study (1.3) and provides a glimpse of the framing technique applied in it based on the effect of the ideological leaning of the newspapers under investigation.

Chapter Two is the literature review. It focuses on the role of media in political conflicts and the factors affecting the coverage of war in the media. The assumption that media reflect the "reality" of the war is addressed in detail in this section (2.1) and the following (2.1.1). The theoretical background of the constructionist approach is elaborated in section 2.2. The effect of the social constructionist of reality approach on the process of framing is articulated in section 2.3. In this section, the roles of the political and social norms and their impact on framing are presented. The potential of the media in wartime and the orientation of the frames toward war journalism and peace journalism are cited in section 2.4 with further elaboration on the characteristics of the competing frames. The relationship between the media and the political

antagonists in wartime and how each side exploits the other to manifest their frames of interpretation is illustrated in section 2.5. The synopsis of this chapter is presented in section 2.6, which highlights the pattern of framing the Middle East conflict and the main frames used in the media (2.6.1) and the orientation of these frames toward Galtung's war journalism and peace journalism frames (2.6.2). The study briefly overviews the location of the frames found in the media in section 2.7. Moreover, the factors affecting the process of framing in wartimes in light of the constructionist approach are elaborated in section 2.8. A final summary and discussion are formulated in the last section of Chapter Two (2.9).

Chapter Three concentrates on the media and political environment in Egypt. It opens with an overview of the history of the Egyptian press (3.1), from the establishment of the press system until the regime of Mubarak. The press system is addressed with further articulation regarding press freedom in section 3.2 and how the authoritarian regime in Egypt developed a mechanism for controlling the political and media environment. The interaction between the regime and the different political and media players in Egypt is highlighted in section 3.3. The chapter concludes with a summary (3.4).

Chapter Four articulates more on the political circumstances surrounding the 2006 Lebanon war from an Egyptian perspective. It starts with the historical and political dynamics of the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict in section 4.1. In particular, the nature of the 2006 war in Lebanon is presented in section 4.2, followed by an overview of the Egyptian stance toward the war in section 4.3, from three dimensions: the official stance of the regime in section 4.3.1, the stance of the opposition movements in section 4.3.2, and finally, Egyptian public opinion in section 4.3.3. The war in Lebanon is further addressed ideologically within the "Arab-Islamic Nationalism" perspective in section 4.4 and how this ideological perspective affected the framing of the war in the media. The chapter ends in section 4.5 with a summary of the political environment in light of the 2006 Lebanon war.

Chapter Five addresses the methodological approach and the research design. It opens up with the ultimate aim of the study, which is the investigation of the main frames of the 2006 Lebanon war and the orientation of the coverage toward the war journalism frame and peace journalism frame in section 5.1. The research questions and hypotheses are presented in section 5.2. The definition of "framing" is identified in section 5.3 and the conceptualization of the frames is addressed in section 5.4. The methodology of the research is elaborated in section 5.5 based on a quantitative content analysis of three Egyptian newspapers representing three ideological tendencies: state press, liberal press and leftist press. The data collection, the unit of analysis and the variables used are addressed in this section. The problem of the missing values is presented in section 5.6 and the reliability test is undertaken in section 5.7. Finally, the frames are operationally investigated in section 5.8.

Chapter Six illustrates the results of the study based on the conceptualization and operationalization of the frames presented in Chapter Five. The frames of the Lebanon war of 2006 are explored in the news (6.1, 6.2, and 6.3) as well as in the editorials in sections (6.4, 6.5, and 6.6) and finally in the visuals (6.7, 6.8, and 6.9).

Chapter Seven presents a manifestation of frames used for the 2006 Lebanon war in the three newspapers understudy. It measures the hypotheses and addresses the main frames (7.1) with further clarification of the development of the frames during the five weeks of the war (7.2). Broadly, the coverage of the Lebanon war is analyzed in terms of the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames in section 7.3. In section 7.4, an overview of the hypotheses testing is presented followed by the interpretation of the results in light of the social constructionist approach in section 7.5. The chapter ends with the summary of the main results in section 7.6.

Chapter Eight is the concluding chapter and overviews the theoretical background of the study in section 8.1, and tackles the hypotheses in section 8.2. The methodology is summarized in section 8.3 and the general findings are presented in 8.4. The limitations of the study are assembled in section 8.5 followed by recommendations for further studies in section 8.6.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Media and War "Reality"

Mass media is not an objective messenger of reality, but rather an active participant in the formation of stereotypical images about war antagonists. Most of the wars experienced in contemporary history are beyond the direct experience of mankind. Lippmann (1922) articulated that through mass media, man learns "to see with his mind vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember"(p.181). People develop their view of the war as a result of the mass media which plays an influential role in setting the agenda for those who cannot access the war in reality. Media in conflicts not only draws the attention of the public to the issue but also plays a role in resolving the issue and de-escalates it (Kempf, 2007b).

As a channel of international information about wars, some scholars view media as fundamental in framing conflicts thus altering the perception of the public about the nature of the conflict and its outcome (Gilboa, 2002; Ross & Tehranian, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Politicians and governments rely on mass media to convey their perspective of the conflict to their own people and to the international community. Mass media provides a route for antagonists in different nations to enhance their political status and to acquire legitimacy for their conflict cases. Naveh (2002) contended that media is part of the environment through which it works. As a component of the environment, there are six variables that should be taken into account in order to understand the role of media: the political regime of the state, the communication policy adopted by the government, the political economy of mass media, the diversity of communication channels existing in the country, the function of media channels, and finally the criteria of news values that push the "gatekeepers" to select some items and omit others (p.5). The decisions made by the political actors, as well as the public opinion, are affected by the media.

2.1.1 Media as Reflection of "Reality" during Wartime

The media has transformed the management and resolution of conflict. Policy makers and antagonists rely on media to propagate their perception of the reality of the conflict. The potential of the media in war times questions the notion of media objectivity. The selectivity of some aspects of war reality emphasizes the media bias toward one side over the other (Entman, 2004; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Griffin (2010) summarized the importance of media in war times as follows: first, media influences public opinion by drawing its attention to matters of war and conflict; second, media acts as "high-stakes artifacts" of war reporting by contesting the

notions of balance and objectivity in its reliance on official sources, press releases, and theater of actions; third, media filters the war reporting through the context of cultural norms that invoke notions of ethnic identity and national sentiments; fourth, the nature of war reporting highlights the government/press relation and the role of political consensus in drawing the media agenda (pp.7-8). The reliance on official sources and military press releases and briefings renders the media willingly to avert its objectivity as being "the fourth estate" and voluntarily joins the military service (Taylor, 1992, p.268). Despite the pluralism of media outlets in the 1991 Gulf War, the media was extensively dependent on coalition military briefings as news sources. This created a monopoly on war reporting. Taylor explained, "It was monopoly in the guise of pluralism" (p.268). In every political conflict, there is a struggle of media frames which reflects a "portion" of reality (Wolfsfeld, 1993, p.xxi). Antagonists develop their own frames based on the reality of "what's going on," their notion of the nature of the conflict, the history of dispute, the role of third parties, and the means of solution. Therefore, frames developed by antagonists are least likely to change during the course of conflict. Nevertheless, the media frames of political conflicts are more "fluid" than the antagonists' frames due to the professional demands that journalists should search for new "angles" to cover the conflict. Media frames are more likely to change according to the change in the political context (p.xxiv). This explains the level of attention given by the media to a certain war, which may not contribute to the reality of violence associated with the war. In essence, the role of the media as mediator of the real world attained considerable attention from media scholars who relentlessly identified key tasks of media in the political arena (Cohen, 1963; Gilboa, 2002; Mc Quail, 2005:2013; Ross & Tehranian, 2009; Watson, 2003:2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). In the literature review, several roles are ascribed to the media. First, the media provides information about the conflict. Second, the media participates in the society through reinforcing the status quo or changing it. In many cases, the media plays a major role in reinforcing the status quo by "prevent[ing] erosion of legitimacy, "draining motivations and anger that are necessary to produce political change (Denton & Woodward, 1985, p.155). Third, the media acts as a "watchdog" by providing feedback for the public about problems at home. Fourth, media acts as a participant in the conflict by inciting bigotry, or mediating for peace building and political consensus (Ross & Tehranian, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2004). Michael Ignatieff, London-based commentator with the BBC and CBS television channels, analyzed the role of media in the Kosovo crisis by saying, "when war becomes a spectator sport, the media becomes the decisive theatre of operation…it also transforms journalists from observers into protagonists, and makes the media much more than mediators" (Laity, 2007, p.276). Fifth, the media plays the role of "agenda setting" by drawing the attention of the public to conflicts and war. Finally, the media acts as a "corporate entity" by benefiting from the conflict reporting in increasing their sales (Putnam, 2002, p.119). Gandy (1982) viewed

the information provided by the media within a political economic perspective rather than social-psychological base (p.29).

But what the media provides as the "reality" that people know outside their experience is not objective but rather subjective reality dependent on multiple variables related to the journalists and the society through which media works. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) assumed in their five level hierarchy of influence model that media messages are affected by a variety of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. The first level is the *individual communicator*, their professional background and personal attitude, values and personal experience, which affect the news content (p.53). The second level is the effect of *media routines* or that set of constraints that structure the journalist's output independently from his personal values and beliefs (p.85). The third level is the *organizational influence,* which seeks to understand the variation in media content based on the organizational ownership. The roles that people fill in the media organization help determine their views. Through a pattern of recruitment, the views on media content are dictated (p.125). The fourth level is the *extra-media* level including sources of information, advertisers, and revenues of the media institution, the political power of the governments and other interests groups, and technology (p.147). The final level of influence is the *ideology* of the society, which structures the story and helps the public to interpret events based on their frame of reference (p.183). Hall (1973) first addressed the powerful effect of ideology by arguing that news selection is a subjective process dependant on the tendency of the journalist and his frame of reference, ideological bases, and newsworthiness of the action. He regarded ideology to be at the heart of news reporting. Accordingly, there are two levels of news values: the first is the formal, belonging to "the world and discourse of the newspaper, to newsmen as a professional group, to the institutional apparatuses of news-making"; the second level is the ideological news values which pose a particular angle of news reporting to fit the ideological bases of the society (p.179).

This is to say, whatever the impression the audience gains about a given conflict via the media is not necessarily an accurate representation of what is actually happening but rather subjective reality based on their ideological reference. The foreign correspondent Martin Woolacott of the elite British newspaper, *The Guardian,* said: "Objectivity is critical, but pretending that both sides or different sides in a war are equal or equally wrong is foolish. There is usually a side which is preferable and sometimes which is enormously preferable" (Watson, 1998, p.163).

2.2 Media as Social Construction of Reality

There are many perspectives that seek to identify the role of media in covering world events. Lippmann (1922) determined that the "real world" is a "pseudo environment" which is fabricated and assembled by the mass media (p.15). Shaw and McCombs (1977) pointed out

that "[o]ur knowledge of political affairs is based on a tiny sample of a real political world. The real world shrinks as the news media decide what to cover and which aspects to transmit in their reports" (p.7). Some scholars view the media within the perspective of the agenda setting theory in the sense that what's emphasized in the media becomes the priority of the public (Cohen, 1963; Shaw& McCombs, 1977). Lang and Lang (1983), however, determined that media is a "central focus" between different players in the political system who determine what should be on the media agenda and what should be kept beyond the scope of the media (p.4). News organizations, based on the Lang and Lang assumption, are more than transmitters of messages about "reality". They are rather creators and producers of news. In other words, news organizations produce a "refracted image" of that reality as they deliberately choose from that information in the environment that serves the interests of the political players or what the official sources believe the public needs to know (p.8). In essence, it is this relationship between the media, the public, and the political players in society that determines the salience of a particular issue over the other. The agenda of the media changes according to the change in the "reality" of the environment (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p. 266). Nevertheless, the professional norms and structural values affect how journalists construct the news story. The news values of immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism affect the selection of the news items (Wolfsfeld, 2004, pp.15-16). In addition, the embedded cultural norms tend to have an influence on how the events are framed in the media (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.39). A theory that adds to the explanation of how the media covers the events is the social construction of reality theory (Gamson, 1992; Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992; Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997: 2004). Gamson et al. (1992) explained that the social construction should be seen as a "transparent description of reality, not as interpretations, and are apparently devoid of political content" (p.382). The way the individual interprets events in the media is a cultural process. The set of religious beliefs, political attitudes, and personal experiences is used by the person and amplified by the media in order to give meaning to a given issue (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p.60). In political conflict, the "issue," according to Cobb and Elder (1983), is "a conflict between two or more identifiable groups over procedural or substantive matters relating to the distribution of positions or resources" (p.82). Lang and Lang identified the "issue" as "perceptions of key problems facing the country and about which the government should do something" (Lang & Lang, 1983, p.34). Hertog and McLeod (2001) regarded the "issue "as residing within the frames so that frames provide the base for the "issue" to emerge. In the absence of a common frame, there would be no evidence to suggest which issue would prevail (p.145). The salience of an issue on the media's agenda, or the degree of importance the media gives an issue, is aimed to tell the viewers, readers and listeners "what issue to think about." Dearing and Rogers suggested that the relative weight of an issue on the media's agenda

determines how the public agenda is formed which in turn influences which issues policymakers should consider (Dearing & Rogers, 1996, p.8). Thus, the media's agenda precedes public agenda (Reese, 1991). Although the nature of the events determines the media's agenda, other important factors transcend this to determine the weight of particular events in the media. In other words, the media does not respond to the objective reality of the events, but is rather subjected to the filtration of the bureaucratic organization and the powerful sources (Reese, 1991, pp. 314-315). The media's agenda is determined by the exchanging relationship between the media and the elite exerting power in the society. Reese argued that the media represents the "interest" of the powerful elite in the society and in turn operates in accordance with these interests (p. 318). Mass media plays a dual role as a contest between "sponsor" of meaning and site of meaning in the sense that the media is a site in which various "carriers" compete to propagate their interests. This does not mean that the media system is "neutral" but rather the degree of openness to an issue differs in accordance to the cultural impact (Gamson, 2006, pp.107-109). For an issue to reach the media's agenda, it must be supported by some key decision-makers in the society. Some groups in the society are privileged by high social and political status thus having their demands placed on the media's agenda (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Wolfsfeld, 1997). This explains the reason why the media's agenda is often influenced by the policy agenda. Cobb and Elder (1983) identified two basic types of political agendas: a *systematic agenda,* which "consists of all issues that are commonly perceived by members of the political community as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority;" and the *formal agenda,* which is "that set of items explicitly up for the active and serious consideration of authoritative decision-makers" (pp.85-86). Berkowitz (1992) suggested that the news agenda is usually "built" rather than "set" in the way that the news materials are "built" through a dynamic process between journalists, news sources and policy makers within the context of role framework. The role theory, which Berkowitz explained, considered the relationship between policy makers and journalists within a macro level approach where journalists do not have the potential power in defining their roles, but rather "fit into role slots" predetermined by higher level social forces. In the same vein, the impact of the policymakers to shape the news agenda is often affected by other internal and external factors that reduce their control. Role perspectives for both journalists and policy makers are subject to these internal and external factors on several levels: the individual level, organizational level, professional level, and societal level (Berkowitz, 1992, pp.92-93). The media, according to this assumption, operates in accordance with the political power in the society which in turn determines the agenda of the media. The media engages in a power relation with many entities in the society, like governmental sources, the elite, pressure groups, and advertisers, which affect the content of the media. The news is affected by market force and

shaped by economic consideration (Hamilton, 2004). The sum of these interrelated entities is referred to by Reese as *source* (Reese, 1991, p.323). In conflicts, the powerful antagonists or "sources" use the media to achieve their interest and market their norms. Wolfsfeld also viewed the interrelation between media and political players in what he described as "competitive symbiosis" as each side relies on the other to maximize his benefits (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.13). The dynamism of the relationship between antagonists and news media determines which events become news. But, the media could act independently and be ahead of the government by focusing on some areas of the conflict while ignoring others, pushing the government to act under the label the "something must be done brigade" (Laity, 2007, p. 287). The media plays an influential role in elevating an issue to the *systematic agenda* and increases its chance to be placed in the *formal agenda* of the government (Cobb & Elder, 1983, p.91). Nevertheless, there are issues which are suffocated before they are even voiced or kept covert or even killed before they gain access to the relevant decision making arena. The ability for an issue to be set on the policy agenda and media agenda is dependent on the consistence of this issue with the set of norms and deeply embedded beliefs and myths of the society, as well as the organizational procedures that set the values of the news. Issues that contradict with the set of norms in the society and the organizational rules are regarded as "illegitimate" and receive scant attention or even excluded from the policy and media agendas (Kent, 2006, p.185). In international conflicts, media sometimes participates in the decision making and acts as a "catalyst" for change. In analyzing the role of the U.S. media in the Bosnian War, Robinson (2002) hypothesized that the media coverage of the fall of Srebrenica in the Bosnian War played a role in pushing the U.S. to intervene militarily in Bosnia in 1995. The U.S. media not only focused on the "victimization" frame and the plight of the refugees from Bosnia, but was also deeply critical of the U.S. policy toward Bosnia. By emphasizing the "failure" of the West and the humanitarian side of the Bosnian refugees, the news media in the U.S. was of a critical "do something" nature (pp. 180-182). However, as many researchers argue the way the media frames an issue affects the public behavior toward that issue (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Entman, 2004; Gilboa, 2002; Kuyers 2002; Ross & Tehranian, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 1997). In one of the studies to detect the correlation between the U.S. public opinion toward the Kosovo crisis and the American print media's photographic coverage, Bissel (2002) found there is clear association between news media agenda and public agenda. The public attitude toward the conflict in Kosovo and its support of the U.S. Administration to send troops there corresponded with the amount of news coverage as well as themes found in coverage of the crisis (pp.311-329). In a study on the effects of news "framing" on U.S. public opinion about the crisis in Kosovo, Berinsky and Kinder (2006) pointed out that people's understanding of politics depends on *how* the information is presented to them. Their experiment demonstrated that changes on *how* the story is "framed" to the public

altered the attitude of the public toward the Kosovo crisis and moved it toward one side of the controversial issue. They argued that "frames not only enhance understanding; they influence opinions" (p.654). In another study, Fahmy, Wanta, Johnson, and Zhang (2011) explored the interrelationship between the president, the press, and the public on the five rationales provided by U.S. President Bush to go to war on Iraq: "war on terror," desire to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of weapon inspectors, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and that Saddam Hussein was an evil dictator. The study found that the degree to which the president was devoted to his five attributes influenced media coverage. The media thus has a limited effect on the presidential agenda. While the president was able to influence the media to some extent, both the media and the public influenced the agenda of the president to the level that President Bush changed his strategy and the amount of attention he devoted to particular war rationales. In sum, the people's understanding of a given issue depends on the way the media frames that issue.

2.3 Framing as a Social Construction of Reality

Different approaches have been introduced for understanding the framing of an issue. The framing approach has replaced agenda setting theory in media research (McCombs 2003; McCombs & Ghanem 2001; Kuypers 2002; Shaw & McCombs 1977; Weaver 2007). It extends beyond agenda setting and its implications to include areas of sociology and social movements (Benford & Snow 2000; Gamson 2006; Gamson et al., 1992). Scheufele (2000) argued that the difference between second-level agenda setting and framing is the difference between "accessibility" versus "applicability". Meaning, agenda setting relies on the memory of the audience to remember some pieces of information made accessible to them via the media. Framing, on the other hand, assumes that media coverage has an effect on the audience not through the issue but rather the attributes of that issue or *how* the issue was covered by the media (Scheufele 2000; Kim, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2002). In the same vein, Maher (2001) stated that agenda-setting and framing do not overlap (p.92). Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) also regarded framing as going beyond agenda setting, as it deals not only with *what* people talk or think about by examining, but *how* they talk and think of an issue (p.93). Van Gorp (2007) argued that the assumption that framing is an extension of the agenda setting theory is in contradiction with the sociological origin of framing within a broader perspective of the social constructionist approach. Framing is a constructionist process that differs from agenda-setting in two ways. First, framing determines the active construction of reality, whereas agenda-setting and priming are "causal" as a result of the emphasis on the topic in the media. Second, agenda-setting is concerned with the "shell of the topic," whereas framing extends beyond the shell of the topic to cover the issue in a multiple ways (p.70). Therefore, framing involves the examination of the

political language as used in the various levels of political communication. Framing analysis tends to analyze the news discourse that deals with how public discourse considered an issue and how it is constructed and negotiated (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.70). In essence, there are two ways of using the word "framing": individual frame and media frame. Scheufele (1999; 2000) viewed media frames within the macroscopic level while the individual frame within the microscopic level. Both levels intervene and affect one another. Individual frames are defined as "mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individual's processing of information" (Sheufele, 1999, p.107). Media frame, as defined by Gamson and Modigliani is "a central organizing idea or story line that provided meaning to an unfolding strip of events" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p.3). As a concept, framing is "indispensable and elusive" (Gamson et al, 1992, p.384). The process of framing itself is an active process that resides within the premise of the social construction of reality (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.614). Within the social construction of reality approach, the framing process is not only affected by media-makers who used the frames but rather the frames influence the schema of journalists in their coverage of an issue (Van Gorp, 2007, p.67). Framing can be studied as a dependent variable affected by competing structural influences including ideology and social norms (Edelman, 1993; Fahmy, 2007; Hertog & McLeod, 2001; Reese, 1991; Tuchman, 1978). Edelman (1993) regarded media frames to be a dependent variable driven by ideology and prejudice rather than by analysis aiming to solve the problem (p.232). Hertog and McLeod (2001) distinguished between the concept of ideology and the concept of frames. They viewed ideology to be more broadly constructed than frames so that frames are often "fit" within the ideology (p.144). Previous literature proved the effect of political ideology on covering foreign countries. Chang and Lee (1993) concluded that ideology underlies the editors' coverage of the New World Information Order debate (NWIO) raised in the UNESCO conference in Belgrade in 1980. Editors of "conservative" inclination are more inclined to support the official United States perspective. In contrast, editors of "liberal" orientation, better trained professionally, who worked for newspapers with ample spaces devoted to international news prove to be more responsive to the NWIO debate ideas (p.314). Framing can be studied as an independent variable (Entman 1993; Pan & Kosicki 1993). Pan and Kosicki suggested that each news story has a theme that "connects different semantic elements of a story into coherent whole." They called this theme "frame". The frame is "structurally located lexical choice[s] of codes conventionally constructed based on the shared norms and rules (p.59). For them, the media frame is an independent variable that shapes the public frame (p.58).

Entman (1993) defined framing as the following:

[T]o select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation and moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation of the item described.(p.52)

By selecting and highlighting some issues and events and making connections among them, the frames promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution" (Entman, 2004, p.5). Hertog and McLeod (2001) contended that frames structure the cognitive understanding of social phenomena in a number of ways. First, frames determine which content to be "in" the frames and thus apt to be discussed by members of the society. By categorizing the phenomena to be "in" the frame would literally render other phenomena to be "out" of the frame and thus excluded from discussion. Second, frames structure the individual understanding of the phenomena by defining the roles played by groups, organization, and institutions. Therefore, a particular group could be seen as a mediating actor to resolve the social problem while in another problem the same actor could be a "source" of the problem (p.143). Third, frames draw the manner through which beliefs, values, and actions are interrelated. Fourth, frames influence the representation of a topic and determine the use of language. Finally, frames outline the goals associated with the issue, making some goals more privileged than others (p.143). Hertog and McLeod stated that the identification of the frame requires the exposure to a wide spectrum of other frames for the same topic (p.149). The media frame is identified by what it includes and what it omits (Entman, 1993, p. 54). In his work regarding the pre-Iraq war of 1991, Entman observed that the only media frames were either "war now" or "sanctions now and war later." The "negotiation" frames between Iraq and Kuwait were not allowed to be contested in the media (p.55). How the people understand the world depends on the way they frame events and interpret the cues around them. However, the cues around could be confusing if the person does not give them meaning by focusing on some aspects while ignoring others and placing them within certain categories. Edelman (1993) explained this by saying "[t]he characters, causes, and consequences of any phenomenon becomes radically different as changes are made in what is prominently displayed, what is repressed, and especially in how observations are classified" (p.232). Notwithstanding, frames are regarded as a reciprocal process. DeVreese (2005) viewed "framing" in communication as an integrated process between frame building and frame setting. Frame building refers to the factors that influence the structure of frames and is a result of interaction between journalists, elites, and social movements. Frame setting refers to the interaction between media frames and individual prior knowledge and predisposition. The consequences of the framing process are conceived on the individualist as well as societal level. On the individualist level, framing could alter attitude. On the societal level, framing could affect

political socialization and decision-making (p.52). In essence, framing is seen within the aggregate constructionist approach as being affected by political and social contexts (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, Gamson et al., 1992; O'Regan 2007; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Therefore, frames are never neutral (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, p.641). The resonance of a particular frame in the news media varies over time and place due to the variation of the political and cultural base of the news media. Two sets of factors affect the resonance of a particular frame: the credibility of the frame and its salience. The credibility of the frame is a threefold factor involving frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of the frame articulators (Benford & Snow, 2000, p.619). Wolfsfeld (1997) contended that "deep frames" which attain their specificity over a period of time are rarely examined and difficult to change. Frames in this context act as "time capsules" that "[offer] a brief glimpse of the political symbols, myths, and stories that are popular at a particular time and place" (p.32). Entman (2004) spoke of the depth of media frames employed by the American media in the incident of a Soviet Air Force jet fighter shooting down a Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight, killing 269 people in September 1983. For Entman, the media frame is an independent variable that shapes the attitude of the public and the elite. He observed that the U.S. media framed the story within the "Cold War" paradigm. The way the U.S. media framed the KAL incident shaped the attitude of the elites, journalists, and U.S. citizens in a way supporting the U.S. administration's basic line of interpretation (p.48). The media professionals package the information received and construct it into frames familiar within the ideological and cultural premises of the society. Journalists attempt to find the "narrative fit between incoming information and existing media frames" (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.34). Related to the concept of "framing" is the use of "symbols" noted by Cobb and Elder (1983) in building the agenda of the media and the public. They argued that key roles of the "symbols" are to gain attention of possible allies and to create an enemy. Cobb and Elder hypothesized that the political symbol is the "Black power" that "strikes deeper and deeper roots in the unconscious and diffuses its emotional quality to types of behavior or situations apparently far removed from the original meaning of the symbol" (pp.56-57). All "symbols" or frames have "temporal limitation" in the sense that symbols of great appeal to the public could lose their lure over time. An example is given by Cobb and Elder with the use of symbol "Indian," which once posed a threat in the U.S. public but lost its appeal now. In political communication, when the symbol is supported by a historical precedence, the greater the chance that the conflict would be expanded (Cobb & Elder, 1983, p.133). The nature of the framing process renders it a focus of contestation between different social actors (Gamson et al., 1992, p.385). Wolfsfeld (1997) remarked that there is competition between Palestinians and Israeli antagonists in promoting the frame of covering the *intifada*. While the Israeli media framed the *intifada* within an aggregate frame of "terrorism and violence" threatening the Israeli society, the

Palestinians – having control on the political environment – promoted the "injustice and defiance" frame which found great echo in the Western media (p.167). In essence, the popularity of a given frame depends on its cultural and political resonance in the society (Gamson, 1992, p.135). Snow (2004) contended that the framing process is not static and is deeply embedded in the broader culture and political context (p.385). Snow viewed the framing process within the vantage point of the social movements' collective identities in the way that the framing process plays a role in defining and maintaining the identities of social movements in the society (p.391). Social movements in a given society are ideologically driven and intend to frame events in such ways as to mobilize potential adherents, gather bystanders, and demobilize antagonists (p.384). Gamson et al. (1992) argued that the media operates in a way that leads to "apathy, cynicism, and quiescence" rather than active participation of the people. Nevertheless, the media allows for multiple voices and open texts that are subject to several interpretations of reality. Social movements and challengers use the media discourse to offer their competing frames of reality construction and to gain support from the readers whose daily lives lead them to construct meaning beyond the imagery proposed by the media (p.391). Journalists play a substantial role in assigning meaning to relevant events. In the realm of political communication, the information and images provided by journalists resonate with the political belief system in the society and this is reflected in the way frames are constructed (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.155). Entman (2004) declared that the central goal of political "maneuvering" of the news frame is to generate support or opposition to political actors or policy, and these dominant frames produce "one-sided" opinion polls (pp.47-48). In wartime, journalists have every motivation to support the dominant frames that resonate with the cultural and political ideology of the society. Counter frames receive low salience and remain below the threshold of political significance (p.74). Noelle-Neumann (1993) referred to this phenomenon as the "spiral of silence" in which the individual in the society has a largely subconscious fear of isolation. This fear of isolation causes people to check on the opinion and behavior approved by the society in order to gain strength. She elaborated by saying:

> If people believe that their opinion is part of a consensus, they have the confidence to speak out in both private and public discussion…when people feel that they are in the minority, they become cautious and silent, thus reinforcing the impression of weakness (p.202).

Stemming from this assumption, in his content analysis of Japanese newspapers during the Russian-Japanese war period (1904-1905), Ito (2003) declared that the newspapers were divided between pro-war and anti-war tendency. As the war escalated and the general public and the government were supportive of the war, the "pro-war" newspapers expanded circulation, while the "anti-war" newspapers declined to the extent that "anti-war" newspapers were compelled to

change their editorial policy to match the dominate frames and the climate of opinion supportive of the war (p.9).

2.4 War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames

The powerful effect of media in wartime encouraged scholars to study the media's psychological role as inciter of war or mediator of peace through its framing of reality. Galtung, the pioneer scholar of peace journalism, contended that the media is not the cause of war or peace, but it mediates causes. Through shaping the image that people have on an issue, the media affects the action of the people based on the assumption that people react according to the image in their head rather than on the actual reality (Galtung, 1985, p.11). The war offers the media the melodramatic images necessary to make the war more preferable to cover in news media than other activities. Denton and Woodward (1985) note:

> Political reporting rarely ignores the elements of theater. Roles, scenes, acts, and audiences are endemic to descriptions of political events…The themes used to outline many stories are constant: the triumph of the individual over adversity, justice winning over evil, redemption of the individual through reform rewarding of valor or heroism.(p.155)

By the same token, Wolfsfeld hypothesized that "due to the fundamental contradiction between the nature of a peace process and news values, the media often plays a destructive role in attempts at making peace" (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.15). Nevertheless, Howard (2003) points to the power of the media in reducing conflict rather than agitating it. He sets major functions the media could do to reach what he terms "good journalism, "which aims to seek solutions to the conflicts: (a) channel communication between conflicting parties, (b) educate, (c) build confidence, (d) correct misperceptions, (e) make both parties human, (f) identify interests, (g) allow rivalries to address their disputes in the media, rendering media sources as "emotional outlets" instead of addressing their disputes violently, (h) frame the conflict, (i) save face and build consensus, (j) build solutions, (k) encourage the balance of power between conflicting parties (pp.8-9). Bratic and Schirch (2007) view the influential role of the media in either escalating the conflict or supporting its prevention and peace building. In order for the media to support peace building and prevent conflict, they view the roles of the media as information provider and interpreter, watchdog, gatekeeper, policy maker, diplomat, peace promoter, and bridge builder (pp. 9-10). David Loyn, a leading BBC foreign correspondent, contended that the role of the reporter is not to make peace but rather to shed light on the 'dark places' where peace-makers can frame the situation in a different way (Loyn, 2007). Hanitzsch (2007) identified two dimensions in conceptualizing peace journalism: the first, "interventionist reporting," through which the journalist has a moral obligation to participate in prevalence of peace; the second, the

"good journalism" dismissing the conflict antagonism as either good or evil. Nevertheless, peace journalism is often difficult if not "impossible" to apply in conflicts in the neighborhood where the journalist belongs to a group involved in the war. Kempf (2007a) had another point of view: he regarded the essence of peace journalism as not that the reporters are active participants in the "cat's cradle, "but rather "how" they fulfill that role (p.4). In fact, the elements of war journalism which focus on the immediacy and drama of the events rather than the aggregate structure of the conflict motivated many journalists to favor it instead of promoting the complex intermingling elements of peace journalism. The factors of drama as described by Galtung deal with the world as a sort of "sport arena" or "court tribunal" with major questions being: Who won? Who lost? Was he guilty? What was the verdict? (Galtung, 1985, p. 6). These factors contribute to war journalism as they open the door for reaction and counter-reaction thus increasing bigotry.

Constructing "reality" does not simply mean reporting events. It entails assignment of meaning and interpreting events according to particular cognitive frames. Following the wars of the last twentieth century– the Iraq war of 1991, Balkan wars – the media is expected to play a more complex role in foreign policy. Not only does it report on the environment of war, but is closely attached to shaping that environment and influencing the reaction to events. In political conflict, media is said to play four major roles: "observer" of conflict; "commentator," verbally and textually in accordance to actors moves; "actor," playing a more active role in the conflict; and finally, as "catalyst" of change (Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig, 2002, p.155). The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was an example of how the media intervened in the foreign policy and pushed the government to react (Bissell, 2002; Robinson, 2002). Kempf (2003) hypothesized that the media plays an important mediating role but one should not exaggerate its influence within the stimulus-response model. It interacts along with other elements in the society to construct the meaning of the political conflict. The active role of media in conflicts becomes the major concern of scholars to introduce theories regarding the potentials of media. One of the most important proposals is the concept of war journalism and peace journalism, which was initially developed by Galtung. His famous typology differentiation of war journalism and peace journalism (as cited in Shinar & Kempf, 2007) states that war journalism is violence and propaganda relying on elite sources to extol the zero sum victory of one side. On the other hand, peace journalism defines war as a problem in itself promoting non-violent discourse as a means of conflict resolution. Galtung said: "[T]he task of peace journalism is to make conflict transparent; the task of war journalism is war secrets" (Galtung, 2000, p.163). Peleg (2007) regarded peace journalism framing of war to be a "third party" ameliorating dialogue between conflicting parties and enhancing communication between belligerents (p.27). Wars are often "opaque" in a sense that they have to be mediated by the media to be on the public agenda. Lynch (2007) asserted the need to practice peace journalism. Peace journalism bases its

prescription on the active role of journalists in participating in the peace process by reporting on it. As a practice, peace journalism is faces several obstacles: cuts in commercial revenues rendering it hard to report a wide agenda on limited media outlets; the downfall of the documentaries, which are venues of exposing complex issues; and lastly, the mushrooming effect of satellite channels which encourage quantity at the expense of quality (Loyn, 2007). Reporters live in a social context within which they share norms, values and even language with their audience. Therefore, they tend to simplify foreign news by reporting some aspects while ignoring others. This renders reporters more apt to cover conflicts within the war journalism frame rather than the complexity of the peace journalism frame. By relying on the war journalism frame to simplify events, journalists help to escalate conflicts (Kempf, 2003). There is no absolute objective reality to conflict, but rather three different realities. There is the reality of one's party, the subjective reality of the opponent, and that from an external perspective, which shows how the other two realities interact with one another (Kempf, 2007a, p.5). Kempf argued that the controversy about war journalism versus peace journalism is subject to interrelated factors. These factors are aggressive interaction, the construction of social reality, and the question about the role of journalism and the media in this process. The war discourse tends to answer the question "Who is the aggressor?" and "How can he be made to stop?" In the peace discourse, the key questions are "What are the objects of the conflict?" and "How can they be transformed in such a way that permits a satisfactory solution for all parties?" (Kempf, 2003, p.6). Usually, the news story is supposed to answer six basic questions: Who? What? When? Where? Why? How? But many journalists reporting wars are preoccupied with answering "What?" and not "Why?" McGoldrick (2007) emphasized that without exploration of the causes of the conflict, violence remains the only solution that "makes sense." He added that "wars remain opaque, in the sense that we are given no means to see through the violence to problems that lie beneath" (p.21). Most of the research on war journalism and peace journalism frames focus on the potential of the written text rather than the visual representation. Literature review showed the tendency to portray the conflicts within the war journalism rather than the peace journalism frame (Hackett & Shroeder, 2009; Khan & Shakir, 2011; Lee & Maslog, 2005; Shinar, 2009). The visual photo is said to play a tangible role in promoting either war journalism or peace journalism frame. Through presenting certain photos while omitting others, the media draws the attention of the public and orients their perception into certain ways. Ottosen (2007) contended that what matters is not the content of the photo itself but rather the context of its presentation associated with the symbolic values that it carries. Previous studies on visuals prove that in reporting wars, journalists are inclined to use photos that qualify ideas war journalism (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012; Neumann & Fahmy, 2012).

In essence, the orientation toward the war journalism or peace journalism frame resides in the culture of the society itself. The society that does not value the necessity of peaceful settlements of conflicts is blameworthy (Hanitzsche, 2004, p.491; Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.44). In this sense, peace journalism could be difficult if not impossible if journalists report about conflicts in their home countries as it is difficult to remain impartial and detached (Hanitzsche, 2007, p.6). Nevertheless, journalists contribute to the peace journalism frame through various means: defining the political atmosphere through which peace prevails, influencing the debate of peace, influencing the antagonists' behavior, and raising or lowering the "legitimacy" of antagonists participating in the peace process (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.11).

2.5 Relation between Media and Political Antagonists in Wartime

Gadi Wolfsfeld described the relation between political antagonists and news media in his political contest model as being "competitive symbiosis," where each side tends to exploit the other side with as minimal costs as possible. Political antagonists rely on the press to get their message to large public audience, reset the political agenda, and invoke legitimacy to their case. The press, in turn, relies on the antagonists for information and events to be turned into news (Davis, 2007, p.108; Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.13). This mutual exchange of benefit between antagonists and the media determines the structure of news available to the audience during wartime. Wolfsfeld hypothesized that the power of a given antagonist over a given news media is based on the inherent news value of the antagonists and the need for the news media. There are four major factors, according to Wolfsfeld, that determine the news value of antagonists in international conflicts: first, political and social status of the antagonists; second, the ability to carry out exceptional behavior; third, the organizational level of antagonists; finally, the control over the political environment (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 16). That is, the higher the social and political status of the antagonist actor, the greater the ability for controlling the news content and set the agenda for media. For this reason, the governmental sources, with their high social and political status and their relative ability to control the political environment, are more likely to be in the frontline of the media content. Denton and Woodword contended that "[if] access itself is not power, it is at least a requisite condition to political control. And access frequently went to governmental sources who had the most to gain by maintaining a steady stream of positive publicity about their work" (Denton & Woodword, 1985, p.155). Herman and Chomsky (1994) regarded the news sourcing to be an essential ingredient of the propaganda-model. They elaborated by saying that the quest for a continuous flow of information forces the media to rely on "credible" governmental and corporate sources in order to maintain the image of "objectivity" and shield themselves from criticism of bias and threat of libel suits (p.19). One key communication aspect of interest groups and social movements is *how* to gain access to the

media. There are two ways through which the social movements attain media attention. First, the social movements and interest groups position themselves vis-à-vis the government in such a way as to propagate their frames of interpretation. They could locate themselves close to the government as "insiders" and have formal representation within the regime in such a way as to bring them closer to the institutional power. Despite the accessibility of "insiders" to decision making, they run the risk of co-optation with the regime (Davis, 2007, pp.133-134). Second, the social movements and interest groups prefer to remain as "outsiders" vis-à-vis the government and risk political exclusion. In this case, interest groups and political actors who lack the social and political power often rely on exceptional behavior in order to set the media agenda. For example, despite the ongoing tension between the Palestinians and the Israelis, Palestinians came to the media agenda only after the 1967 war when some of the Palestinian factions' resorted to exceptional behavior of hijacking planes to gain world attention. Only then did *Palestinian* in the U.S. media become synonymous with terrorist guerillas (Zaharna, 1995, p.43). In a study to detect the pressure of social movement groups in the process of framing, Noakes and Wilkins (2002) conducted a comparative content analysis on the Palestinian social movements between the period 1984 to 1998 in *The New York Times* and *Associated Press*. The analysis of 300 articles using random sampling revealed a changing frame in the coverage of the Palestinian issue over time. Prior to the *intifada*, the Palestinians were framed negatively as terrorists and as "cause of the problem." During the *intifada* of 1987, the media outlets gave attention to the event of the intifada*,* framing it positively as an injustice claim of the Palestinians which echoed the Western understanding of the social movements frame. In the pre-Oslo agreement, the positive frame for covering the Palestinian was clear in the coverage. Noakes and Wilkins criticized the claim that dominant ideologies and social norms restrict the media access to social movements. For them, the issue is not whether the insurgent group gains access but rather *in what condition* they do so. They concluded that social movements like the Palestinians were able to get access to the media and affected the framing of their cause based on their reflexivity, resources and international sponsorship of external parties (Noakes & Wilkins, 2002, p.666). Notwithstanding, the power of the actors is not the only factor that determines their ability to access the media. The domain over the political environment is the key situational variable, according to Wolfsfeld, that determines the ability of the news media during wartime to act independently (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.24). During the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein imposed strict censorship on the war areas in Baghdad. Many foreign journalists were forced to leave Iraq. Only CNN was allowed to resume its transmission from Baghdad with censored voice and tapes. Journalists who were authorized to report from Baghdad were required to submit their reports to the chief censor appointed by the Iraqi Information Ministry. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein imposed control over the political environment by restricting the work of the

foreign correspondents under pretext that the media was helping coalition forces to target areas in Iraq (Taylor, 1992, pp.98-99). The Iraqi regime during the 1991 Gulf War was "reluctant" to disclose causality figures of Iraqis in order not to demoralize the morality of its own public (p.173). Nevertheless, the censorship was lifted after the bombing of the Amiriya shelter on February 13, 1991. Western correspondents were allowed to go to the scene and report the aftermath of the allied attack on civilians particularly women and children (p.169). In addition, there was another censorship in the American newsrooms. Many reports remained "off-the-record," such as interviews with service men and women and troops in the field, photography of allied forces in "agony or severe shock" (p.35). Griffin and Lee (1995) in their content analysis of the 1991 Gulf War photo reporting in *Time, Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* found that the photographic portrayal of the war promoted American military superiority in a sense that the majority of photos focused on U.S. troops and technology whereas the Iraqi troops were almost absent in the photos. In addition, the human cost of the war as well as the political activities related to the war was slightly presented. The choice of Iraq war photography in these magazines reinforced the notion of the clean war waged by the United States to free Kuwait. Griffin (1999) stated that in the 1991 war in Iraq, "the victory was more commercial than moral" (p. 151). Later on, in the 2003 Iraq War, photos showing coffins of dead U.S. soldiers returning to their bases were banned by the Pentagon and thus were not published in any U.S. media outlets. The photo, in this case could bring sympathy or act as a threat or what is known to be "Vietnam syndrome" (Ottosen, 2007, p.116).

By the same token, in the 2006 Lebanon war, the Hezbollah group controlled and exploited the media environment to its advantage. The group denied access to journalists without authorization to Hezbollah-controlled areas and maintained absolute control over where journalists should go thus framing the story in accordance with Hezbollah's terms. Through its direct link between the military branch of the group and the information branch, Hezbollah used its television channel *Al-Manar* to cover the tactical actions of the group. For instance, within minutes of the Israeli navel destroyer *Hanit* hit by missiles, *Al-Manar* provided "live" coverage of the event to viewers and other local and international television channels (Caldwell, Murphy, & Mennig, 2009, p.5). The use of information continued even after the ceasefire on August 15, 2006. Hezbollah continued to use self-justifying information to attribute the responsibility frame and its victory frame. For instance, over the top of a destroyed building in the southern Lebanon, Hezbollah placed a large billboard that said "Made in the USA" in reference to the perpetrator role of the United States in supporting Israel in this war. In essence, the way Hezbollah extensively used the information to propagate its framing of events proved that information is a strategic choice of the military in war times (p.6). Modern communication technology has increased the ability of the media to bring home news of war even if the journalist is not present

on the war scene. The media has the potential to make all wars that they could get access to a matter of public concern. This, in turn, has made it all the more essential for the conflicting parties to control the political environment. In his analysis of the media coverage of both the 1991 Gulf War and the first *intifada* in 1987, Wolfsfeld contended that the role of the press during the *intifada* was as an "independent advocate," whereas its role in the1991 Iraq war was that of a "faithful servant to the United States and her allies" (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.127). The Palestinians provided full access to foreign correspondents despite the futile efforts of the Israeli army to control the flow of information from the occupied territories by closing the Palestinian Press Service (PPS) office providing information and alerting the correspondents to the time and place of each new protest. Wolfsfeld points out that the "ability of the Palestinians in the territories to carry out the uprising with all of its human costs turned this potential into a reality" (p.131). In contrast, in the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. and the allies had a superior hand in the battlefield geographically and logistically which rendered the press "dependent" on the military bureaucracy to get news about the war. Whether the media is an "observer" or "participant" in the conflict, the audience relies strongly on it to get information from the battlefield which is beyond the scope of their direct experience.

2.6 Framing the Middle East Conflict

Wolfsfeld viewed the construction of meaning within the two paradigms of *structural* level and *cultural* level. The *structural* level entitles the relationship between political antagonists and media through which the antagonists have the ability to control the conflict environment and propagate their issue to the media and the public. The *cultural* level involves the construction of media frames to align with the cultural and ideological dimension of the society (Wolfsfeld, 1997). The Middle East conflict is a focal point for both symmetrical and asymmetrical wars. In asymmetrical wars, the media frames of political conflicts, as well as image-making and stereotypical language, usually contain a political viewpoint of the issue of legitimacy (p.160). Antagonists in political conflicts use the media to market their own packages of ideas and causes to the public and the media. Applying the constructionist approach of framing (Gamson, 1992; Gamson et al, 1992; Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997), the Middle East conflict is always viewed within the premise of competing frames to gain the legitimacy of either side. The frames that employ more culturally resonant terms and use images and words highly salient in the culture have the potential power to stimulate support or opposition to the sides of the warring parties (Entamn, 2004, p.6). Wolfsfeld (1997) maintained that the "challenger can compete and even win the cultural war when they have the ability to carry out actions that are considered not only worthy but legitimate" (p.168). Most studies of Middle Eastern conflict in the media center on agenda-setting related approaches like framing, image-

making, stereotypes (Cohen & Wolfsfeld, 1993; Entman, 2004; Kamalipour, 1995; Ross & Tehranian, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 1997). The role of media in political conflict does not work in a vacuum. The threshold of constructing meaning in media discourse is via the use of language. Denton and Woodward (1985) view language as serving the "agent of social integration and as the means of cultural socialization." They add that the public's reality has three dimensions: "the outside world," the inner private world, and a shared symbolic world of beliefs, experiences, and meanings (p.25). Language, based on their assumption, is "a very active and creative process which does not reflect an objective reality but creates a reality by organizing meaningful perception abstracted from a complex world" (p.30). Labeling the problem is a framing process. Therefore, the way the war is framed and categorized affects the public belief about that war. In this sense, if the war is framed as being "noble" then the victims of the war would have been justified. In contradiction, if the war is unjustified as being aggression then the claim about national victory is repressed (Edelman, 1993, p.231). In the Middle East conflict, language is used to reconcile between the parties concerned or to increase bigotry. Diana Buttu, legal advisor to the Palestinian Liberation Organization said: "[t]his is a battle over language sometimes more than over anything else" (Gaouette, 2003). In the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the semantic battle served to propagate the antagonists' framing of the conflict. Roeh and Nir (1993) in their content analysis of the headlines in the Israeli press examined the linguistic variables through which ideological stance was established. They found that the use of the term *intifada* coined by the Palestinians and extensively used in the Arab literature to suit the David-Goliath narration of the Palestinians was rather slow on the Israeli press and was replaced by the term *hitpar'uyot* or *mehumot,* which means "riot" or "disturbances" in order to deprive the legitimacy of the action taken by the Palestinians against Israelis (p.186).

2.6.1 Main Frames of the Middle East Conflict

The Middle East conflict is a scene of frame contestation in the media. Media worldwide frame the conflict based on interrelated extrinsic and intrinsic factors. In his content analysis of the Israeli and the Palestinian media, Wolfsfeld (1997) identified two major competing frames used by the conflicting parties: *law and order* frame, and *injustice and defiance* frame. The Israeli government maintained a *law and order* frame in dealing with the Intifada. The *law and order* frame resonated in the Israeli political cultural; it is framed within the aggregate historical context of Arab-Israeli wars over the "existence" of the state of Israel and the desire of the Arabs to destroy Israel (p.145). The Palestinians, on the other side, maintained the frame of *injustice and defiance* by focusing on issue of "victimization" and the brutality of the Israeli occupation force (p.147). In another study of the United States media coverage of the Middle East conflict during the period 1948 to 1988, Gamson (1992) identified four main frames: *Feuding Neighbors,*

which portrayed the issue within "fanaticism and the nurturing of long-standing grievances"; *Strategic Interests*, which focused on the issue within a geopolitical terms and viewed the Middle East as "a theater of major power competition"; *Arab Intransigence,* which recognized the roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict due to the unwillingness of the Arabs to accept the existence of the state of Israel; and finally, *Israel Expansionism, which* presented Israel as a tool of Western imperialism. The dominance of any of the competing frames depends on the political context. However, the *Feuding Neighbors* frame was the mainstream frame during the period of the study. Others frames appeared in the media according to the political events and the international context. In O'Regan's (2007) qualitative content analysis of Irish quality newspapers, she found that the four "opinion leaders" in the Irish press understudy were sites of frame contestation rather than a propaganda repertoire of either frame. Relying on the signature of matrix, the study categorized the frames into partisan frames (law and order/terrorism frame, Jewish injustice/national homeland frame, Palestinian injustice/defiance frame) and non-partisan frames (reconciliation/dual rights, nihilistic violence/warring tribes frame, and regional stability/international security frame). Based on the constructionist approach, the reason the Irish press did not portray a mainstream frame was due to its commitment to the political interest of Ireland, in the sense that the country does not play a "hard" role in the Middle East conflict nor does it have any historical or contemporary political ties with fighting rivalries (O'Regan, 2007, p.17). In another study on the 2006 Lebanon war in the Irish press, O'Regan (2010) identified four different frames in 138 editorial articles: the *Israeli security/war on terror* frame, the *Israeli aggression/Lebanese resistance* frame, the *Lebanese democracy/regional stability* frame, and the *another round of futile violence in the Middle East* frame. Results showed that there was no singular framing trend in the Irish press and that there was no direct correspondence between the Irish political discourse and the frames. With regard to the Lebanon war in 2006, the Irish press extended beyond the domain of the political discourse so that the media message to the Irish political system was a "diluted one" with ideological implications. None of the newspapers advanced the international or Irish interventionist frame of Irish troops among the UNIFIL II mission in Lebanon as outlined in the *another round of futile violence in the Middle East* frame (O'Regan, 2010, p.177). In another study of two wars in the Middle East, the 2003 Iraq War and the 2006 Lebanon war, Kara and Atabey (2013) found that two newspapers in North Cyprus framed the wars in the Middle East within a local angle to help the readers identify with the two wars. The news articles and editorial content in the *Afrika* and *Kubris* newspapers were analyzed from the period, March 20 to May 1, 2003, for the Iraq War, and July 14 to August 18, 2006, for the Lebanon war. The researchers identified eight frames: *military*, *human interest, violence of war, reaction to war, diplomatic meetings, causes of war, consequences of war*, and *human aid* (Kara & Atabey, 2013, p.178). Results showed that there was inclination to frame the wars

within the *military* frame and the *violence of war* frame with emphasis on the death toll and the destruction of war. The Iraq War was reported as an imperialist game in the Middle East (p.181). The 2006 Lebanon war was reported from the humanitarian viewpoint and the effect of the war on Cyprus. Both newspapers expressed a negative tone toward the United States and Israel. The Turkish Cypriot newspapers under exploration emphasized that those wars would lead to the establishment of new colonies in the region, and in this sense, the newspapers framed the war according to the historical and cultural perception of the Cypriot people who, throughout their history, were subjected to colonialism and imperialism (p.185). In another study, Gavriely-Nur and Balas (2010) found that the framing process for Israeli wounded soldiers in the 2006 Lebanon war in the Israeli television was subjected to legal, cultural, and political consideration in the Israeli society. The coverage of the wounded soldiers was framed within the *hero* frame, while the wounded Israeli civilians were framed within the *victim* frame.

Nevertheless, the contextualization of the Middle East conflict is not static in the media. It witnessed changes in the image portrayal of the antagonists due to the change of the conflict phase itself. This change in portrayal altered the perception of the people toward the rivaling parties. Daniel (1995) studied how attributes given by the U.S. media on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict altered the American perception of the Palestinians. He contended that the dominant frame of covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was limited to "terrorism" since it combined with the "post-Holocaust victim characterization of the Jews and equates the Palestinians' intention to those of the Nazis" (p.66). This frame has changed with the outbreak of the *intifada* showing other sides of the Palestinian character not previously portrayed in the Western media. The drama of the Israeli David-Goliath scenario was gone and replaced with the frame of suppression against superior military force (p.69). With the *intifada* challenging the old frame of Israeli hero/Palestinian villain, the American public opinion became eager to accept the Palestinian claims and increased the support of U.S. involvement in the process of bringing resolution to the conflict (p.70). Moreover, covering the Middle East conflict varied significantly due to the variation of viewpoint between the West and the Arab world with regard to the roots of the conflict. In the Western media, the totality of attributes or the images associated with the Middle East have their roots in the media's image of Islam. Mowlana (1995) believes that the image distortion of the Middle East is due to two main reasons: the nature of the polity was not understood by those reporting it. Second, the Western media coverage of the Middle East was dominated by secularism and Cold War and post-Cold War ideological agendas (p.4). Haque (1995) pointed to two main reasons associated with the distorted image of the Middle East, including Arabs and Muslims: religion and values. He determined that the Westerners, particularly the Americans, are "ethnocentric" in judging the Middle Easterners in a sense that they understand and judge the Middle East culture including the conflicts in the Middle East

based on the values and ideologies of the West (Haque, 1995, p.20). Media representation of the Middle East wars reflects the policies of political institutions and reinforces the ideologies that form the basis for public opinion and understanding. Ideology reflects the basic component of social identity and defines the interests of the groups in the form of an attitude associated with the issue of conflict (Mandelzis, 2007, p.101). In their coverage preference of the Middle East, media professionals resort to the images of action associated with heroism and conflict, focusing on the emotional rather than the rationales of the events (Shinar, 2002, p.287). Shinar identified two phases in the coverage of the Western and Middle Eastern media of the Middle East conflict. In the first phase, between the mid-nineties and September 2000, before the eruption of the second Palestinian *intifada,* coverage was inspired by the "reconciliatory" model and a positive tone of admiration for the Arab and Israeli leaders who signed peace processes. The second phase following the 2000 Second Palestinian *intifada,* the media was characterized by abandoning that reconciliation model. However, the explanation given by the media for this transformation was "the failure to reconcile" rather than the deep roots of the conflict (Shinar, 2002, p.291). Liebes (1997), in comparing the U.S. and Israeli media coverage of the Palestinian *Intifada* and the 1991 Gulf War, found six framing mechanisms which strengthened the use of the war journalism frame. These mechanisms were *excising,* which portrays the conflict without showing the other side, *sanitizing,* which tends to avoid showing the blood of the Palestinian and Iraqis. Obscuring the human causalities of the "other" side in the Middle East conflict is a common technique in the media. Liebes noted that the pattern of *sanitizing* the blood of the Palestinians and Iraqi side is equivalent to the effect of "Vietnam syndrome" (p.72). The third mechanism is *equalizing,* which serves the media quest for balance between the conflicting parties. In other words, the media applies the frame of "Gulliver" instead of the "David-Goliath" frame that presents the war as happening between oppressed victim and powerful oppressor (p.73). The fourth mechanism was the *personalization* of "our" victims and depersonalization of "their" victims (pp.74-75). Finally, the mechanism of *contextualization,* which is inclined to minimize the context for "our" side while providing it for "their" side.

In essence, framing the Middle East conflict was subject to several factors that affected the way of media coverage for different wars in the region. Ross (2003) determined that cataclysmic events, national politics, media autonomy, political culture, societal engagement in the conflict, organizational factors, and professional norms set the media frames. In her analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the editorial section of *The New York Times* for a period of thirteen months following September 11, 2001, Ross found that the American newspaper served the role of the "faithful Servant" in adopting the United State's supportive policies to Israel. The analysis was based on seven competing frames, the *U.S. strategic interest* frame, three justice frames (*Israeli need for justice, Palestinian need for justice, dual justice)*, three adversary frames

(Israeli aggression, Palestinian aggression, feuding Arab neighbors). The study confirmed the absence of the *Palestinian need for justice* frame.

2.6.2 War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames in the Middle East Conflict

War journalism is widely used in reporting different wars in the Middle East. The literature review of the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war suggested that the war journalism frame was more frequent than peace journalism frame. Hackett and Schroeder (2009), in their cross cultural comparative analysis of Israeli, Canadian, American, and Qatari print media regarding the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war and the 2003 Afghanistan war found that regardless of the degree of involvement in the war and the nationality of the publication, there was a tendency to frame the conflict within the war journalism frame with few salient characteristics of the peace journalism frame. Among the few elements of peace journalism were framing the conflict as involving multiple parties rather than only Israel and Hezbollah. Hackett and Schroeder attributed the dominance of the war journalism frame in covering the two wars in the press of the four countries to the structure of the news organizations and the ideological tendency of the society (Hackett & Schroeder, 2009, pp. 31-57). Shinar (2009) reached a similar conclusion in her comparative analysis of Canadian and Israeli press coverage of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war. She found similarities in the framing pattern preference to the war journalism frame despite the differences in social proximity to the war. Ross (2009) reached a different conclusion than her previous counterparts. In her qualitative content analysis of the U.S. newspaper *The Seatle Times*, she found that peace journalism was practiced in the coverage of the Lebanon war in 2006 in terms of humanizing the victims of both side, exposing the devastation of both Israel and Lebanon and providing a more complex portrayal of the conflict as involving different parties (p.74). Peleg (2007) analyzed three different conflicts: the Arab-Israeli conflict, Northern Ireland conflict, and Basque conflict in the local media of each country, as well as on CNN, according to the triangle of conflict developed by Galtung known as the ABC triangle of "Attitude, Behavior, and Contradiction."He found that the three conflicts were reported within the psychology of war journalism frame. In the visuals, Fahmy and Neumann (2012) conducted a quantitative content analysis of Gaza War photos (2008-2009) in the three leading Western wires (*Associated Press, Reuters, and AFP/Getty Images*). Results indicated that the Gaza war was represented in the news wires within the war journalism frame (reactive and victory oriented) more than the peace journalism frame. However, differences emerged between the three newswires with each serving a different purpose and market. The *Associated Press* was more distant from the conflict thus included more elements of the peace journalism frame unlike the two other newswires which inclined more to be "war correspondence" (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012, p.19).

2.7. Location of Frames

Frames are found in the text as well as the visuals. In the text, frames are based on the macrostructure of events (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006, p.654). Pan and Kosicki described the news media discourse in general, and framing devices in particular, as composed of four categories: syntactical structure, script structure, thematic structure, and rhetorical structure (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.59). Syntactical structure refers to the arrangements of words and phrases in the text. Van Djik (1988) determined that macrostructure of news reports as well as the schema that organized them do not appear in a continuous manner. In the top level of the macrostructure news report comes the headline (highest macrostructure), followed by the lead (top macrostructure), and the lowest level of macrostructure are the details of the content. This macrostructure of texts is driven from an individual system of knowledge and belief about the issue, thus considered to be "intersubjective" (p.15). Script structure refers to the established and sequential forms of activities in the news story, which are known as the five "Ws" (p.60). Thematic structure is a "multi layer hierarchy" with the theme as the centre of the news discourse and related sub themes interconnected. Finally, rhetoric structure is that stylistic choice taken by journalists to formulate the news discourse (p.61). Entman (1993) suggested that frames have at least four locations: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. The communicator is the one who decides what to say and include in the news story guided by the societal frame of reference. The text contains certain key elements that determine the presence of the frames, such as catch phrases, stereotypical images, sources of information, and sentences that provide facts and judgments. The receiver has a cognitive frame which might not identify with the communicator intended frame. Finally, the culture is the key component through which the common discourse of people's thinking in the society is fused (Entman, 1993, pp.52-53). Gamson and Modigliani (1989) identified "framing devices" that form the "media package" of the issue. They showed that frames are located in the metaphors, exemplars, catch-phrases, depictions, and visual images. Tankard (2001) specified a list of locations in order to detect the frames: headlines, sub headlines, photos, photo captions, leads, source selections, quotation selections, pull quotes, logos, graphical and statistical illustrations, concluded statements (Tankard, 2001, p.101). The frames are also found in the visual photos. Photos are "the sensory reality of war" as said by the famous U.S. journalist Chris Hudges (Roth, Huffman, Huling, Stolle, & Thomas, 2007, p.268). Visuals can reinforce or erode public support for war (Griffin, 2010, p.8). They affect our understanding of war. Visual photography is defined as a "means of making real or more real matters that the privileged and the merely safe might prefer to ignore" (Sontag, 2003, p.7).

In his comparative analysis of visuals representing three wars, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001 Afghanistan war, and the 2003 Iraq invasion, in U.S. magazines, Griffin (2004) explained the potentials of the visuals by saying:

> As conventionalized motifs, news photographs more often reinforce preconceived notions and stereotypes than reveal new information or provide new perspectives. Counter to continuing popular perceptions of photographic media, photographs do not simply reflect events occurring before the camera but are inextricably implicated in the constructive process of discourse formation and maintenance. (p.399)

Photography is embedded in the process of framing. Sontag (2003) said "to photograph is to frame, and to frame is to exclude" (p.46). The photo resonates with the deeply embedded frame of reference related to past experience. The familiarity of a given photo is related to a historical experience, thus invoking emotional sentiment even more effectively than verbal text (p.85). Photos are ideologically saturated in a sense that they signify the cultural attitude in the society (Brothers, 1997, p.184). Visual images have three main characteristics that distinguish them from words: their analogical quality, their indexicality, and their lack of explicit propositional syntax. The analogical quality of a photo refers to the nature of the visual images which make them more closely linked to "reality" than words, which depend largely on social convention to obtain their meanings. The indexicality of images means that due to the "true-to-life" quality of photography, the likelihood of questioning the content of photo is reduced. Finally, the lack of an explicit propositional syntax in photography differentiates it from text in a sense that words demand casual proposition in order to attain their meaning (*who, what, where, how, and why)*, whereas photos lack this conventional causality as the meaning is implied in the visual structure of the photo itself (Messaris & Abraham, 2001, pp.215-219). Ottosen (2007) argued that "visual impressions of war coverage were more present in our memories than written texts." Such pictorial images combined with the experience and knowledge of the audience lead to the conclusion and judgment on an issue (Ottosen, 2007, p.113). It is not the content of the photo that affects the perception of the reader, but rather the context of its presentation associated with the symbolic values that it holds. Research on the effect of war photography on the public proved that people remember the story more when it is accompanied by "negative" visual images of victimization (Coleman, 2010, p.243). In war reporting, the visuals of children are sites in which legitimacy and justification of war are ascribed. What is selected for presentation in the media is dependent on the sensibilities of the audience through which the image is presented as well as the contexts of events (Wells, 2007, p.58)

2.8 Factors Affecting Framing of Conflicts

Literature review suggested that the media's framing of conflict was affected by an avalanche of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. These factors included the national interest, the degree of involvement in the conflict, the proximity to the area of conflict, the ideological tendency, the support of the war, the level of press freedom in the country, and the organizational structure of the media system (Fahmy, 2007; Hackett & Schroeder, 2009; Kamal, 2008; O'Regan, 2007; Shinar, 2009; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Yang, 2003).

First: National Interest. News content on conflict is not an objective reflection of reality. It is a subjective process dependent on political, social, and cultural factors (O'Regan, 2007; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Yang (2003) compared the U.S. newspapers, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* and the Chinese newspapers, *People's Daily* online and *China Daily,* on framing the NATO airstrike on Kosovo in 1999. The content analysis of 200 news stories revealed that the U.S. and China used different media frames to cover the airstrike. The Chinese newspapers relied on the frame of protest and condemnation against the strike while ignoring the frame of refugees and ethnic cleansing. By emphasizing a particular aspect while ignoring the other aspect, the Chinese newspapers questioned the legitimacy of such a NATO strike on the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The Chinese newspapers echoed the Serbian point of view by emphasizing an anti-strike frame and relying on Russian and Serbian sources. The U.S. newspapers, however, focused on air war updates and the issue of refugees and humanitarian aid. The emphasis on such frames provided legitimacy to the air strikes for the sake of rescuing the Albanian victims. The U.S. newspapers justified the strike by focusing on the air war plans and military tactics and quoting American and NATO sources to explain the events. Significantly, the Chinese newspapers reflected the Chinese government's point of view in the conflict, while the U.S. newspapers mirrored the American stance in the conflict. Yang concluded that national interest played a pivotal role in framing the international conflicts due to its important role in determining governmental policies and actions. Schwalbe (2013), in her study of the visuals of the 2003 Iraq War in U.S. magazines, found that the photos displayed were from an "American-centered" perspective, promoting the nationalist and ideological values of the American audience (p.252). Schwalbe inferred that the dominant frame of covering the Iraq War was the *conflict* frame in the three magazines, which focused on the superiority of the U.S. army while ignoring the troops and the weapons of the Iraqi side. The secondary frame in the study was the *politician* frame focusing mainly on the U.S. and Western leaders more than the Iraq leaders. The third frame was the *human interest* frame. The three U.S. magazines ignored antiwar protests, damage and destruction to infrastructure, and human casualties. Likewise, images of females and children during wartime were slightly displayed, and if displayed, they were mainly victims, so as to conceal the "cruel face" of the war (p.253). In

another study, Young and Gwangho (2002) compared the coverage of the territorial conflict over Tokdo Island in Japanese and South Korean newspapers from January to June 1996. The quantitative analysis of 844 news stories from South Korean newspapers and 365 stories from Japanese newspapers, found that the *propaganda* frame was applied in both nations dependent on the national interest and the bias was in line with the prevailing political stance to the other nation. In terms of the frequency of coverage, the South Korean newspapers ran more stories on the disputed Island than Japanese newspapers. In terms of the approach of coverage, the study showed a significant difference between the two nations. While the Japanese newspapers presented the Tokdo issue as an international issue to be settled through negotiations, the South Korean newspapers declined the importance of negotiations with Japan. Newspapers in both countries adopted a negative stance toward the other country based on the prevalence of the national political line in the home country. Nevertheless, the study found a shift in the editorial position of the state-owned newspaper of *Seoul Shinmun* in South Korea to be less negative toward Japan as a response to the decision to host the 2002 World Cup.

Second: Degree of Involvement in the Conflict. Previous studies inferred that the coverage of conflict and wars varied significantly between the countries with direct military involvement in the conflict and countries with partial or no military involvement in the conflict. Hackett and Schroeder (2009) studied both the Afghanistan war and the 2006 Lebanon war in newspapers and television of Israel, Canada, U.S., and Qatar. The analysis of 522 articles published between July 1 to September 1, 2006 and September 15 to September 29, 2006 found that the frequency and frames of coverage differed between the media outlets based on the country involvement in the conflicts. The Canadian press covered the Afghanistan war in a more "belligerent" way than the 2006 Lebanon war, where no Canadian troops were deployed in the latter. In contrast, both the U.S. and Israeli newspapers dealt with the Afghanistan war as being "the forgotten war." Despite the deployment of the American troops in Afghanistan, Hackett and Schroeder rendered the reasons for this limited coverage in the American newspapers to several reasons: first, the meager news values of the Afghanistan war in comparison to Iraq war; second, the costlier American presence in Iraq; third, the dramatic events of the Lebanon war in 2006; and finally, the strong historical and political ties between the United States and Israel made Israel a "home team" in American media coverage albeit there were no U.S. troops in Lebanon. As for Qatar media outlets, the attention to both conflicts was fairly divided (p.42). In the same vein, Fahmy (2007), in her content analysis of visual photography in 43 newspapers in 30 countries on the fall of Saddam Hussein statue from 10 to 15 April 2003, found that the frames of covering the event differed based on the degree of military involvement in the Iraq War. The frame of coverage of those countries which deployed troops in Iraq, or were among the coalition

forces, devoted more coverage to the event and presented the issue within the *victory/liberation* frame rather than the *occupation* frame.

Third: Support for the War. Fahmy (2007) found that the war support was positively correlated to the amount of coverage and negatively correlated to the tone of coverage. Thus, the newspapers affiliated to countries that supported the war in Iraq ran more visual photography of the toppling of Saddam Hussein statue than countries which rejected the war but were more critical in their coverage (p.160). In another study, Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) compared the frames of the 2003 Iraq war in two elite newspapers, *Dagens Nyheter* in Sweden, and *The New York Times* in the United States, from the war period March 20 to May 1, 2003. Through the quantitative content analysis of 408 news articles, the study found differences in frames used based on the difference in the political and media system in both countries as well as the degree of support for the war. In foreign policy, Sweden and the United States took different positions with regard to the war. Sweden was critical, while the United States was supportive of the war. *The New York Times* focused more on *military* frame and war strategies to achieve victory. On the other hand, *Dagens Nyheter* focused on the anti-war *protests* frame as well as the *responsibility* frame more frequently than the American newspaper. In essence, the closer the society felt itself bound in historical, political, or cultural terms to any of the conflicting parties, the more it would interpret the conflict according to the same mental model accepted by the party it favored (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005, p.137). El-Bendary (2010) studied the frames and tone of coverage of the 2006 Lebanon war in the Egyptian newspaper, *al-Ahram,* and two Saudi newspapers, *al-Hayat* and *Asharq Al-Awsat*. The analysis of 209 articles revealed a significant difference between the three newspapers' view toward Hezbollah. The two Saudi newspapers showed an unfavorable position toward Hezbollah in consistence with the political stance of the Saudi regime which adopted a critical position toward Hezbollah. The newspapers portrayed Hezbollah as an "Iranian-supported" group that aimed to expand the military and political influence of the Shiite state in the region. Moreover, they viewed the kidnapping of the two Israeli soldiers as a move that instigated the war and endangered Lebanese security. On the contrary, the Egyptian newspaper, *al-Ahram,* showed a favorable tone toward Hezbollah justifying its resistance against Israel. The Egyptian newspaper drew historical and cultural similarities between Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Pan-Arab President Gamal Abdel-Nasser (El-Bendary, 2010, pp.83-84).

Fourth: Degree of Press Freedom. The level of press freedom has an effect on the diversity and the framing of content in conflicting issues. Young and Gwangho (2002), in their comparative analysis of Japanese and South Korean press, determined that the Japanese press presented diversity in viewpoints more than the South Korean press. They explained this result by virtue of the fact that the Japanese press operated in a more open atmosphere of press freedom

and pluralistic political life (p.112). Fahmy (2007) also found that the degree of press freedom was negatively correlated to the tone of visual coverage of the fall of Saddam Hussein statue in 2003, in the sense that countries with high press freedom showed a more critical tone of coverage than countries with low press freedom. Wolfsfeld (1997) contended that the degree of control on the media environment affected the framing of the issue. In his analysis of the 1991 Gulf war media coverage, Wolfsfeld declared that the tight control which the United States Administration exercised over journalists covering the war promoted media frames in favor of those who controlled the political environment (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.198).

Fifth: Ideological tendency. Ideology influences the political and public life as it provides the background through which people understand the world. Heywood (2007) defined ideology as "a more or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organized political action" (p.11). Ideology is linked to political power in a sense that it strengthens the political power of the authority in its quest for legitimacy. The power of ideology is based on its potential to fuse the conscious and unconscious beliefs of the public in such a way as to empower the authority within the binaries of "us" versus "them" and "true" versus "false" (Pranger, 1988, p.19). The Middle East region is characterized by a variety of ideological perspectives that determine its domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, the ideological variance in the Middle East provides an approach for other nations to draw their international and domestic policies for what is deemed essential for their interests (p.28). Literature review showed that countries with similar political and economic ideologies tend to frame the conflict in similar terms. Shinar (2009), in her comparative content analysis of the 2006 Lebanon war in the Israeli newspaper, *Yediot Aharonot*, and the Canadian newspaper, *The Toronto Sun*, concluded that the similar ideological tendencies of both nations affected their inclination to cover the war within the war journalism frame in regard to emphasizing the use of visual effects of war, immediate events rather than the wider aspects of war, showing one or two parties, and the tagging of a good and bad bias (p.21). The Israeli newspaper, however, was more inclined toward the war journalism frame than the Canadian newspaper due to the influence of the geographic proximity to the war (p.23). The ideological tendency is not only confined to the policy of the government, but tends to include the intra-state ideological tendencies of the newspapers and the opposition movements. Roeh and Nir (1993) conducted a comparative quantitative content analysis of the reporting of the Palestinian *intifada* in four Israeli Hebrew newspapers representing the quality press (*Ha'aretz* and *Davar*) and "popular" press (*Yediot Aharonot* and *Ma'ariv*) during the first fifteen months of the *intifada*. The analysis of 563 news items on the 1987 *intifada* found that in times of crisis, the newspapers maintained a social consensus regardless of the ideological tendencies. The Israeli newspapers tended to "routinize" the news of the *intifada*. The *intifada* received more salience in the quality press than the popular press. Results also showed no difference

between the newspapers in terms of the role ascribed to actors as newspapers articulated the term "us-against-them" in covering the *intifada*. In a different study exploring the tendencies of the British newspapers toward Galtung's war journalism frame and peace journalism frame, Lynch (2006) found that the political leaning of the newspaper has an intrinsic effect on the preference toward Galtung's competing frames. In his study of the UK press on the Iran nuclear crisis over a period of five months starting August 2005, he reached the conclusion that the left-of-center newspaper was more propagandistic in its coverage, with more of a war journalism reporting frame than the liberal-wing press, which was more inclined toward peace journalism frame.

Sixth: Organizational and Social Constraints. Wolfsfeld (1997) hypothesized that antagonists with a high level of organization and resources, known as "production assets," are more likely to have their frames propagated. He distinguished between two levels of resources: hard resources and soft resources. Hard resources refer to the concrete assets, the number of people in the organization, the amount of funds in the organization and the number of "paid professionals" working for the organization. The soft resources are the degree of group solidarity and the knowledge and experience they share on the news media (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.20). Dearing and Rogers (1996) showed that the real world indicators are not sufficient enough to guarantee making the media agenda. There are other organizational and financial factors involved in boosting an issue in the media agenda; this includes the impact of advertisers, public relations staff, and technical sources of information, such as scientists and media experts (p.31). Scheufele (2000) determined five factors that influence how journalists framed a news story such as social norms, organizational pressure, leverage exerted from social groups, journalist routines, and ideological tendencies of the journalists and news organization (p.307). With regard to the organizational and editorial constraints, Kamal (2008) found that there were significant differences between the privately owned Egyptian newspaper, *Masry,* and the state-owned newspaper, *Ahram,* in framing the Lebanon war in 2006 in editorials and opinion articles. The analysis of 272 articles revealed that *Ahram* framed the war within the *responsibility* frame, pointing to the responsibility of both Israel and Hezbollah for the escalation of the war; *Masry* pointed to the responsibility of the Arab regimes. In addition, results showed that *Ahram* focused on the Egyptian effort to bring the war to an end. In contrast, *Masry* criticized the Egyptian and Arab diplomatic efforts regarding them as being "unsuccessful" and giving an excuse to Israel to escalate its assault (p.194). Kamal explained that these discrepancies in the framing of the war were due to the editorial differences between *Ahram,* which abides by the state policies in its coverage, and the privately owned *Masry,* which is not subject to direct governmental constraints. In another content analysis study of the depiction of children in the 2003 Iraq war in British newspapers' visuals, Wells (2007) contended that the depiction of photos about the war was not subject to the proximity or distance to the war but rather to the editors' calculation of

readers' interests, sensibilities, and the role of media in shaping public opinion at home. Wells found two dominant frames of Iraqi children in the construction of narratives about the war: the *liberation* frame, which presents a favorable image of the Iraqi children in welcoming the allies to overthrow the regime; and the *innocent suffering* frame, which fits into a "universalizing discourse" that children should be protected from the conflict orchestered by the adults (pp.60-66). Parry (2010) in her content analysis of the visuals of the 2006 Lebanon war in both *The Guardian* and *The Times* shared the same conclusion that the editorial decision affected the selection of photos resulting in differences in framing the war. Her analysis of 211 visuals in these two "quality" newspapers found that *The Times* was more "balanced" in its framing of war than *The Guardian,* which "skewed" bias toward the Lebanese perspective. This was seen in the less graphic portrayals of the victims from the Lebanese side, which reflected the editorial decision from the *The Times* editorial staff to downplay the Israeli military assault on Lebanese civilians. Evans (2010) analyzed 80 articles in *The New York Times* on two events: the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank where the violence was between Israeli forces and Palestinians militias in 2002; and the Nahr-al-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon where the violence was between the Lebanese army and Palestinian militias in 2007. He found that *The New York Times* editorial decision for framing the Jenin events was within the framing of "proximity," with empathy to the civilian suffering, contrary to their framing of Nahr-al-Bared which fit the "distance" framing, leaving the reader feeling "detached" from the conflict (p.223). He explained that senior *New York Times* correspondents were dispatched to cover the Jenin camp, whereas coverage of Nahr-al-Bared relied mainly on local journalists.

2.9 Summary and Conclusion

Framing the conflict is a cultural process that is affected by different extrinsic and intrinsic factors. The process of framing is not a "one-way street" where the political elite manipulates the public's perception of an issue, but rather a multifaceted process in which influences apply in every direction. The notion of framing entitles the selection and salience of a portion of reality and presents it in a way that evokes evaluation of an issue (Entman, 1993). Politicians and governments rely on mass media to provide their frames to the public. Likewise, social movements resort to the media to contest the frames of the elite. The potential of a given frame lays in its resonance with the deeply embedded cultural and ideological perception of the society (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p. 32). The Middle East conflict is a site of frame contestation in the world media. The media – whether it was the Arab or the international media – engaged in the conflict by taking sides and reflecting the political ideologies in the society in which they operate. The rivalries competed over media frames depending on the ability of the antagonists to control the political environment in the Middle East wars (Taylor, 1992; Wolfsfeld, 1997).

Through different mechanisms of framing the disputes in the region, antagonists justify their actions and demonize their rivalries (Liebes, 1997, pp.70-79). Literature review proved that there is no mainstream frame in reporting the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Israelis, from their side, used the media to propagate the frame of *law and order* in their exercise of power with the Palestinian uprisings. The Arabs and the Palestinians framed the conflict as *defiance and injustice*, and *Israeli expansionism* on the Arab lands (Gamson, 1992; Liebes, 1997; Wolfsfeld, 1993: 1997). The Middle East conflict became an arena for extensive use of symbols and war escalating frames from both conflicting parties to "legitimize" their issue of dispute. Even after the peace treaties and the establishment of political and economic relations between Israel and some of the Arab states, the media tended to echo the "accepted primordial sentiments" in which co-existence is remote and violence is often legitimized (Shinar, 2003, p.3). The question is not whether or not the media should exercise its power and act as broker of peace, but rather to what extent could the media challenge the predetermined prejudice and perceptions and act as a catalyst for reconciliation? The nature of war usually feeds the appetite of media with news values such as immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism, thus playing a destructive role in the peace process (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.15). In order for the news media to play a constructive role as broker of peace, it should define the political atmosphere, have an impact on the debate over the issue of peace, influence the political actors and their strategies, and raise or lower the legitimacy of the antagonists (p.221). The role of the media in peace processes was assumed to be powerful. Hanitzsch (2007) pointed out, however, that journalists could contribute to the peaceful settlement of conflict, but their influence remains limited and dependent on the atmosphere of reconciliation in the society (p.491).

CHAPTER THREE

THE PRESS AND THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN EGYPT

Known for its long history of media, Egypt is considered to have the most developed media sector in the Arab world. One could not track the history of the Egyptian press separately from the country's history, dating back to the nineteenth century when the Egyptians came to know the art of printing.

3.1 History of the Press in Egypt
3.1.1The Press before 1952

The history of the press in Egypt dates back to the French invasion in 1798. The French expeditionary missionaries brought with them printing machines. Due to this three-year period of occupation, the Egyptians encountered modern European science and technology (Stagh, 1986, p.71). The French missionaries introduced two newspapers, *Courier de L'Egypte* in August 1798, and *La Decade' Egyptienne* in October 1798. The aim of these two newspapers was to inform the French delegates and soldiers about the news of the expeditionary mission. Despite being the first Arab country to come to know the press, the Egyptians were far from benefiting from it because the early newspapers were in French, which the Egyptians didn't speak, and mainly covered news of interest for the French expatriates in Egypt (Sediq, 2006, p.14). After the French Missionaries ended their occupation of Egypt in 1801, the press disappeared because the French took back their printing machines and thus the two newspapers that Egypt knew in this time stopped publication. A few years later, Muhammed Ali, the autocratic ruler of Egypt, realized the importance of taking advantage of this new knowledge. He sent Egyptian students to learn in Europe and to study the art of printing there. By 1819, the government established the first printing press, the *Bulaq* press. This was followed by the construction of other small printing houses affiliated with the ministers and schools (p.15). The first indigenous Egyptian bilingual paper in the Turkish and Arabic languages appeared in 1827, with a daily edition of less than one hundred copies. The following year of 1828 saw the publication of *al-Waqa'a al-Misriyya*, which covered news of premium interest to the Egyptian people (Stagh, 1986, p.73). Although the press was a complete state venture at first, which offered Egypt a certain advantage in publishing, it was dependent on the situations of the political regime at this time. Therefore, the press witnessed times of deterioration due to a lack of understanding of its importance. When Khedive Ismail took the reins of power in 1863, he presented a favorable climate for intellectual development in Egypt during which the press flourished. For him, the press was a venue to propagate his political agenda to the populace (Cook, 2012, p.14). During his time, many

official, as well as private, newspapers were introduced that covered different issues including politics, economics, culture, and literature. Egypt became an asylum for Lebanese and Syrian journalists and intellectuals like the Taqla brothers who founded the *Al-Ahram* newspaper in 1876, and the Syrian, Salim al -Naqqash, who founded the weekly *Jaridat Misr* in 1877, and many others. In addition, an Egyptian Jew called Jacob Sanuoa, active in both journalism and theatre, started his satirical newspaper, *Abu Naddara Zarkaa* (*The One with the Blue Glasses*) in 1877 (Sediq, 2006, p.27). Sanoua sharply criticized the Khediva, who lost patience and closed his newspaper, forcing Sanoua to immigrate to France where he continued publishing his newspaper. The openness of the Egyptian ruler, Khedive Ismail, to the press did not shield him from criticism for what *Al-Ahram* regarded then as "subordination to the West" (Cook, 2012, p. 15). In the late nineteenth century, Egypt witnessed a cycle of political tension between several competing political players, mainly the ruler and the British mandate. Egypt was a semi-autonomous province in the Ottoman Empire. The British sought to increase their strategic influence in Egypt through purchasing shares in the Suez Canal in 1875. The British presence was aimed at weakening the Ottoman influence in Egypt (p.13). The press increasingly became a venue of expressing dismay for the regime. It was through the press that the ideas of the time were propagated. A diversified, vigorous press was thus born that has had a great impact on intellectual political life in Egypt. There were many newspapers calling for the departure of the British occupation from Egypt. On their part, the British encouraged some journalists to issue newspapers loyal to the British like the newspaper of *Mokatam* in 1889 (Sediq, 2006, p.31). With the eruption of the First World War, the British imposed martial law and seized publication of many newspapers. After the war, there were mounting calls from Egyptian intellectuals for independence, which were headed by Saad Zaghloul and his colleagues who formed a group known as *el-Wafd* (the Delegation). The resistance to the British existence in Egypt was deemed successful when the United Kingdom announced on February 22, 1922, the "Declaration of the British government to Egypt," in which Egypt was granted its independency (Cook, 2012, p.23).The group of *el-Wafd* was hailed by the Egyptians. The *el-Wafd* took power, restoring an overwhelming majority in the parliament and thus was assigned by the king to formulate the government (p.24). During this time, the number of newspapers representing different political trends in the Egyptian society increased sharply. To name a few, the Marxist movement issued newspapers such as *Al-Hisab* (*The Judgment*) in 1925, *Shubra* in 1937, but they did not last except for a few issues and disappeared due to lack of finance. Other movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood, issued newspapers of their own but were subject to different restrictions and, sometimes, suppression from the government. Minority groups living in Egypt during this time were active in expressing their viewpoint in the press. The Jewish community in Egypt issued many newspapers, like *Israel,* the *Israeli Union*, and *El-Shams* (*The Sun*) (Ibrahim, 1999,

p.174). With the outbreak of the Second World War, the British directed more attention to international affairs in Egypt because Egypt was seen as strategically vital to the British operation battlefield with the Axis. The British mandate exerted pressure on the Egyptian government to announce the martial laws in September 1939 and to halt the ties with the Germans. Beneath the surface, the Egyptian politicians and the King were inclined toward the Germans in their war with the Allies. German and Italian propaganda was translated into Arabic and was heard on Egyptian radio (Botman, 1988, p.23). During the period of the Second World War, the press saw its golden age in terms of freedom and professionalism. The press mounted its attack against the government and the king (Dabbouss, 1994, p.62). According to Rugh (1987), the main reason that guaranteed the continuation of the critical diverse press was that the government was faced with major political levers beyond its direct control (p.59). One of the most significant opposition newspapers appeared in 1942 called *Al-Ithnin* (*Monday*). Known for its sarcastic way in criticizing the government and the British mandate, the newspaper was echoing the national sentiment of the Egyptian public opinion calling for the liberation of Egypt from the British occupation (Aziz, 1956, p.69). On the same line, *Akhbar el-Youm,* issued in 1944, directly discussed the relation between Egypt and Britain and called bluntly to deter the British occupation. In 1947, the paper opened the first correspondent bureaus in New York and Washington (p.88). Later on in 1948 during the war between the Jewish militias and the Arab forces in Palestine, *Akhbar el-Youm* dispatched correspondents in the battlefield and was the only newspaper to show photos of the war on the ground (p.145). In terms of quantity, the choice for the reader during that time was tremendous. By September 1951, the readers in Egypt could choose between 21 daily newspapers, 121 weeklies, and 172 bi-weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies and more irregulars (Stagh, 1986, p.75).

3.1.2 The Press after 1952
3.1.2.1 The Press during Nasser

On July 1952, a group of mid-level army officers known as the Free Officers undertook a coup d'état overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a republican system. The new regime under the command of the Free Officers sought to reform political life in Egypt. In reaching this objective, the Free Officers formed the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) comprised of nine to twelve officers to run the country. The RCC set a number of goals, known as principles of the revolution, to alter the political system. These principles included the eradication of aspects of imperialism in Egypt, extinction of feudalism, abolition of capitalist control, and establishment of strong army forces. Moreover, the new regime adopted a series of economic measures, including agricultural reforms and confiscation of private property, which altered the social structure in Egypt. The levers of power in Egypt after the coup d'état of 1952 rested in the

hands of the military institution, which indulged itself in every aspect of the Egyptian political life. The newly-born regime dissolved the parties, confiscated their properties, and their leaders were put on house arrest (Stagh, 1986, p.77). The military officers established a publishing house of their own, *Dar al-Tahrir* (*the House of Freedom*) and issued a bi-monthly magazine called *Majallat al-Tahrir* (*Newspaper of Freedom*). The magazine was anti-imperialist, leftist in its tone and supportive of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Many RCC officer members used to write for the magazine, like Anwar el-Sadat and Gamal Abdel-Nasser, and both became president of Egypt (Rugh, 1987, p.61). The publishing house of *Dar al-Tahrir* issued al-*Gumhuriyya* (*The Republican*) newspaper to become the mouth piece of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

When Abdel-Nasser – who was already President of the RCC – became President of Egypt, he tightened the control of the press. The RCC took direct control through censorship of the press and used all its "legal" powers against newspapers that didn't show "obedience" to the ruling regime (p.62). In 1954, *al-Misri*, the biggest daily in the Arab world, with a circulation of 120,000 copies, criticized the head of the state. The government responded not only by seizing publication of the newspaper, but also putting the owners of the paper on trial before a revolutionary panel for "aiming to destroy the government" (p.62). Many writers and journalists were arrested if they went too far in their criticism of the regime. To ensure full support of the policies of the regime, the government appointed key figures at the head of the major newspapers. For example, *Al-Ahram* (*The Pyramids*) was headed by Nasser's personal spokesman, Muhammed Hassanein Heikal (Stagh, 1986, p.79). The regime became aware that adhering to the principles of the revolution and guaranteeing the loyalty of the press could not be achieved as long as the press was in the hands of the "capitalists" (Rugh, 1987, p.66). In 1963, the government passed a law nationalizing the press in Egypt. After that, the press was not only supposed to avoid issues and subjects considered hostile to the regime, but was also expected to actively promote the objectives and principles of the revolution. The newspapers then became increasingly loaded with propagandistic material on Arab socialism, nationalism, and Pan-Arabism. Also, the regime of Nasser started to crackdown on the members of the Islamic trends (Kavli, 2001). Thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members were put in jail. The regime went even further by executing some keynote members of the group. Ironically, instead of weakening the Muslim Brotherhood organization, the repression posed by the Egyptian regime strengthened their presence (Zollner, 2009, p.56). A new thought in the Islamic resistance was developed by one of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb, who was arrested, tortured in the prison, and then executed in 1966. Qutb's thoughts remained an inspiration to many young people affiliated to violent Islamic movements.

It was Israel's defeat of the Egyptian Army in 1967 known in Arabic as *al-Naksa* (set back) that put the Egyptian political regime to the test. The military defeat began the process of "demilitarization of the Egyptian politics" (Cook, 2007, p.63).However, the Israeli presence on the Egyptian soil was the cause that kept the legacy of the military institution high preparing for the "decisive" battle with Israel. Socially, the defeat of the Egyptian forces overthrew its shadows on the political life in Egypt allowing more space for criticism and freedom of expression (Stagh, 1986, p.81).

3.1.2.2 The Press during Sadat

When Nasser's successor Sadat came to office, he undertook the process of "demilitarizing" political life in Egypt. He introduced a series of measures in an attempt to reduce the influence of a number of senior military officers. Moreover, he encouraged foreign and Arab investments in Egypt. The constitution was ratified in 1971, affirming the sovereignty of the people and granting "freedom of the individual." The new constitution acknowledged the importance of religion in society. Article 2 of the constitution reads, "Islam is the religion of the state; the principles of the Islamic *Shari'a* are the source of legislation, and Arabic is the official language" (Cook, 2007, p.68). Trying to distinguish himself from Nasser, whose era was marked by a crackdown on members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic organizations, President Sadat presented himself as the "pious" president who adhered to the "democratic" nature of the new regime. At the beginning, he showed some tolerance toward the Brotherhood members. The military victory of Egypt in the war of 1973 over Israel helped to restore an image of Sadat as a leader rather than a president. Benefitting from the wide Egyptian and Arab support that endorsed his regime, Sadat carried out multiple reforms at home. In 1976, some articles of the constitution were amended again allowing the reemergence of the multi-party system. Sadat introduced major economic and political liberalization policies. His "open door" policy, or what is known in Arabic as *Infitah,* endorsed the role of the private sector and encouraged foreign investment. This led to a rise in the prices of the basic commodities and thus resulted in wide public discontent. The economic change endorsed by President Sadat aimed to reinstate the private sector and to encourage foreign investment in Egypt. Nevertheless, the social conditions of the mass Egyptian population deteriorated significantly. The main beneficiaries from these economic reforms were the commission agents and senior bureaucrats, as well as senior military figures (Marfleet, 2009, p.21). The press echoed this change in the political system. Sadat showed relative openness to the press putting an end to the long-detention of political opponents and opposing writers and journalists (Stagh, 1986, p.81). Sadat endorsed freedom of the press but he called on the press to be "responsible." He was quoted once as saying that "if freedom of expression is sacred, Egypt is more sacred and I am not prepared to relinquish any of her [Egypt]

right" (Rugh, 1987, p.47). He adopted several laws that crippled the freedom of the press. His attitude toward the press turned even harsher when he decided to approach the West after a long term of positive relations with the Soviet Union during the Nasser era. Sadat viewed the existence of "leftist[s]" and journalists loyal to Nasser to be of major threat to his personal image and the image of Egypt as a "pro-Western democracy." He transferred some journalists to minor administrative jobs, while others chose to stop writing voluntarily and were replaced by journalists loyal to the policies of Sadat (Rugh, 2004, p.153). Though censorship was abolished in theory in 1974, these journalists and writers censored themselves. To tighten the control of the press, the Supreme Press Council was introduced in March 1975. The real administrative control of the press was concentrated on the Supreme Press Council, which was headed by the director of the legislative council himself (*Shura* Council) (p.153). The next phase related to the press was Law 40 on political parties, enacted in 1977, which allowed different political parties to be revived. Shortly after, each political party issued its newspaper. On November 1977, the Liberal Party issued *Al-Ahrar* newspaper and then in spring 1978, the leftist Progressive Party issued *Al-Ahali,* which was more vigorous in criticizing the stance of the government toward the United States and the peace process with Isreal (Rugh, 1987, p.46). In 1980, Sadat issued Law 148 regarding the authority of the press and the responsibilities of the journalists. Stagh (1986) contended that this press law continued the "nationalization of the press" issued by Nasser, as it transferred the ownership of the press to the state (p.87). The law also regulated the newspapers' ownership. It prohibited individuals to issue newspapers of their own, a right given only to corporations and political parties. However, not all political parties, according to the press law of 1980, had the right to issue newspapers. The law prescribed that a party must have at least two representatives in the parliament to get the authorization of publishing a newspaper. The law also demanded a deposit of 250,000 Egyptian pounds in a bank before granting the license of publication (Stagh, 1986, p.87). With the last two years of his presidency, coupled with the peace process signed between Egypt and Israel, the press became more aggressive in its criticism of the major policies of the regime. Sadat lost patience and decided to silence criticism. He ordered the suspension of many opposition newspapers and put many writers, journalists, university professors, and members of the Muslim Brotherhood organization into jail (p.49). In October 1981, Sadat was assassinated, and Mubarak, who was Sadat's vice president, became the president of Egypt.

3.1.2.3 The Press during Mubarak

The press under Mubarak can be divided into three phases: the period of the 1980s; the period of the 1990s, which witnessed severe clashes between the state and radical Islamic groups; and finally, the period of the early 21st century. In the 1980s, Mubarak showed tolerance

to freedom of expression. He lifted many restrictions imposed by Sadat and set many journalists and opposition figures free. Moreover, Mubarak allowed the re-emergence of opposition parties such as the *Al-Wafd* Party which became the most influential opposition party in the 1980s (Rugh, 2004, p.157). In order to consolidate his authority, Mubarak resorted to co-optation with the opposition parties and movements, particularly the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood – the biggest opposition bloc in Egypt – to be represented in the parliament (Abaza, 2008; Albrecht, 2007, p.62; Dunne, 2006, p.4; Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, 2007, p.15; Kavli, 2001). In the 1990s, the regime started political deliberalization, which led to the marginalization of many political players in participating in the political structure (Kienle, 1989). The 1990s witnessed storming events in the Middle East that boosted the role of Egypt in the region, but at the same time led to growing criticism at home. The 1991Gulf War, in which Egypt participated, provided a political chance for Egypt to re-activate its role in the region and to re-emerge as an influential state in the Middle East. On its part, the United States benefitted from the relationship with Egypt, maintaining the levers of power in the region and expanding regional peace with Israel (Cook, 2012, p.230). Egypt successfully played a substantial role in bringing the Palestinians and Israelis to the negotiating table to sign the Oslo peace accords in 1993 (p.163). In the same vein, Egypt played a role in containing the Iranian influence in the region (Sharp, 2009, p.11). At home, there was mounting criticism of the role of Egypt in the Gulf War in 1991. The regime used different means to quell the opposition (Kodmani, 2005). At one point, the financial constraint was a means for bringing the opposition parties into compliance with the policies of the regime. For instance, when the Nasserite opposition party expressed salient criticism of the Mubarak regime ahead of the 1991 Gulf War and stood against the referendum nomination in May 1999, the government threatened the party financially. The government called on the party's paper, *Araby,* to pay its debts of three million Egyptian pounds to the state-owned publishing house, *Al-Ahram*. Furthermore, the regime exerted pressure on the advertisers, pushing them to pull their advertisements from the *Araby* newspaper. As a result, the newspaper turned from daily in the 1990s, into weekly, and the editor in chief sought a private investor to buy the newspaper (Stacher, 2004, p.226). As for the opposition groups of fundamentalist Islamic ideology, the regime resorted to coercive means to quell their influence. The nineties saw fierce confrontations between the regime and the radical Islamic groups. Tough penalties were imposed on individuals for belonging to radical groups threatening the "social peace." Life imprisonment and death penalties were enforced by law under the jurisdiction of the Supreme State Security Courts, in which verdicts could not be appealed (Kienle, 1989, p.222). Freedom of the press was at stake. The state issued the Press Law of 1995, which stipulated fines and imprisonment of journalists who criticized the president or official members of the state, as well as foreign heads of the state, under the banner of spreading "false news." (Shauman & Ibrahim,

1999, p.236). The law provoked severe public outcry from many human rights organizations and journalists who rallied against the law in a protest in the headquarters of the Egyptian Press Syndicate (p.337). Despite the restrictions on the freedom of the expression, the opposition press, as well as the private press, continued to attack public figures and governmental officials. Many journalists were jailed, but criticism continued adamantly in Egypt. By 1999, there were 14 partisan newspapers, 7 private newspapers, as well as 240 licensed newspapers that were published in Egypt but took their license from abroad, particularly in London and Cyprus (p.330).

In the early 21st century, with the international and internal pressure for political reform, the regime of Mubarak allowed for more openness in the political atmosphere and gave ample space to freedom of expression in the press. Economically, in spite of the virtual economic reforms introduced by the Egyptian regime in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the majority of Egyptians did not sense the economic flourish. In 1991, the poorest 10 percent of the population had access to only 3.9 percent of the national income. Ten years later in 2001, the poorest 10 percent of the population had access to 3.7 percent, while the richest 20 percent received 29.5 percent of the national income (Marfleet, 2009, p.17). The gap between the rich and poor widened sharply and the level of discontent among Egyptians deepened. The government program of economic reform entailed discontinuing subsidies on some basic goods. In 1980, there were 20 different food goods under the governmental subsidy, with a total of approximately 15 percent of total governmental expenditure. By the end of the 1990s, only 4 food items remained subsidized (Richter, 2007, p.187). This raised the level of discontent in Egyptian society between the haves and the have-nots. The situation deteriorated in the early 2000s. Egypt's external debts were at approximately $29 billion by the end of June 2005 (Central Bank of Egypt, 2005, p.45). The poverty rate in Egypt was 19.6 percent in 2005, with 42.76 percent of the population living on less than $2.5 per day (Khorshid, Kamaly, El-Laithy, & Abou El-Enein, 2011, p.24). Politically, major events in the world cast a shadow on the Egyptian political environment. The outbreak of the second Palestinian *intifada* in 2000, the war on "terror" in 2001, and the Iraq War in 2003 marked the start of a new domain in the Egyptian street. The early 2000s society witnessed the transformation of collective actions from economic needs to the realm of political reforms. The spirit of protest surrounding the political environment in Egypt could be explained by the social movements' theory conceptualized by Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004):

> [C]ollectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are a part. (p.11)

The mobilizations in response to the *intifada* produced what is known in the social movements theory as "spillover" effect, in which subsequent movements led to the emergence of other movements (Whittier, 2004, p.533). The ire in the Egyptian streets as a result of the second Palestinian *intifada* brought other political actors and actions in the scenes of protests. In 2000, a group of twenty NGOs and political activists from a wide political spectrum, including leftists, Islamists, and liberals, formed the Popular Committee to Support the Intifada (PCSI). Following that model, in 2003, dozens of protests in the streets of Cairo were organized in salient denunciation to the 2003 Iraq War (El-Mahdi, 2009, pp.94-95). In 2004, another grassroots movement was formed called *Kifaya* (enough), which was comprised of activists from different ideological tendencies, and challenged the regime's political structure, calling for wide political and constitutional reforms (Hamzawy, 2005). The movement of *Kifaya* broke the taboos of Egyptian politics by directly criticizing the head of the state, President Mubarak. The base of its ideas was rooted in the conviction of its members that challenging the political system should come from outside the matrix of the political organization (El-Mahdi, 2009, p.92). In a bid to absorb the waves of anger in the Egyptian street, in late 2004, the regime legalized two political parties: the Free Social Constitutional Party (FSCP), and the *Hizb-el-Ghad (Tomorrow Party)*, which then emerged as the most powerful opposition party in mid 2005. In another sudden political step, Mubarak announced the amendment of Article 76 in the constitution that was concerned with the presidential election. The amended article paved the road for a multiple candidate presidential election for the first time in the Egyptian history (Albrecht, 2007, p.65). In addition, another wave of protest emerged from within the judicial system when a group of judges from the Court of Cessation demanded the independence of the judicial courts from the regime. The judges threatened to boycott the supervision of the presidential election (p.66). Furthermore, the ruling National Democratic Party launched an initiative under the banner of "New Thinking and Priorities," which lay the ground for the emergence of young businessmen and finance figures under the leadership of the President's son, Gamal Mubarak. Gamal surrounded himself with political entrepreneurs who strongly believed in the free market economy, and due to wrong governmental calculations, Egypt had grappled with a wave of high prices and less working opportunities, and overall more burdens on the working and lower classes (Cook, 2012, p.177; El-Naggar, 2009, p.36). In sum, the reforms introduced by the regime in the early 2000s, which were dominated by a neoliberal economic approach, led to the marginalization of a large sector of the Egyptian society (Hamzawy, 2005). Amid this turbulent political atmosphere at home and in the region, the regime of Mubarak eased the tight control of the press and allowed for relative freedom of expression. Rugh (2004) referred to the press system of Egypt in the 21st century as the "transitional system" through which journalists from different political persuasions, even those in support of the regime, used free speech from time to

time in a way that demonstrated the steady ongoing changes in the political atmosphere (Rugh, 2004, p.121). The pluralism adopted by the regime helped to retain a positive image of the state in its quest for legitimacy amid the growing opposition at home. Shukor (2005) articulated the regime's ostensible pluralism by saying:

> The adoption of political pluralism gave the regime a positive image and a much-needed democratic veneer in the eyes of its new allies, under the leadership of the USA, who were presenting the capitalist system to the countries of the world as the one best able to fulfill their aspiration of economic progress and democracy. (Shukor, 2005, p.33)

The regime allowed criticism to be aired freely on the state-owned television, leaving the press alone, who were provided with an ample amount of freedom to express critical discourses. The advent of pan-Arab satellite TV channels such as *Al-Jazeera* and *Al-Arabiya* and the increase in the numbers of privately owned local TV channels provided the Egyptians with high-budget programming and more open talk-shows on social and political issues. This subsequently produced changes in the Egyptian media landscape. There was growing awareness among the Egyptians that whatever the government wanted to hide or turn a blind eye on, other Pan-Arab satellite channels, independent newspapers, and internet bloggers were eager to disclose. Nearly every household in Egypt had access to television with a penetration rate of 95 percent, in comparison to print media, with readership ranging from 15 to 20 percent among literate adults (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008, p.92). Due to the low literacy rate among adults, 55.6 percent during the period 1995 and 2004, the TV became a major source of information for many Egyptians (UNESCO, 2012, p.13). The regime maintained a monopoly over television and radio in Egypt via the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTV) established in 1971 to be the "sole authority" of all radio and television channels in the country (Rugh, 2004, p.205). In the 1990s, there were mounting calls from businessmen to allow for the emergence of private television channels. However, the government declined the requests under pretext that television in Egypt was not yet ready to compete in the international market. In 2003, the government allowed for the formation of private television channels broadcasted from Egypt but retained authority over the terrestrial dissemination of such channels (Rugh, 2004, p.206). Although there were many private television channels besides the Egyptian digital channels, they lacked diversity of views. For example, the picture presented in the Egyptian television channels for the Arab-Israeli conflict was confined to the Israeli political leaders and the military actions done by Israel. Moreover, the television channels never criticized the policies of the regime or disclosed issues related to human rights in Egypt (p.242). As for the internet, Egypt had the highest rate of internet usage in the Arab world. While the number of internet users in 1999 was 220,000, it grew dramatically to reach 5.2 million users in the year 2006 (Abdulla, 2007, p.45). In retrospect, the internet was introduced in Egypt in 1993 through the Egyptian Universities

Network with relative high prices, making it inaccessible to potential users. In the years between 1995 and 2000, the government encouraged investment in the internet highway projects. In January 2000, the Egyptian government embarked on one of the most ambitious initiatives in the Arab world by allowing free internet connectivity. As a result, the internet usage increased sharply with proliferation in the internet cafés in different provinces and areas throughout the country (p.48). In 2004, the Egyptian Parliament voted to pass the Law Regulating Electronic Signatures, known as the E-Signature Law, aiming to provide electronic infrastructure of e-business and e-commerce in Egypt (p.51). On the political front, *El-Ghad* opposition party established its online radio station on its website in 2005. In the same vein, some grassroots movements, such as *Kifaya,* used the internet to propagate their principles and organize their activities (p.152). Notwithstanding, the freedom of press remained at a low level. The government used the Press Law and Penal Code to interrogate journalists and sentence them to prison on libel convictions. As for the internet, the government did not exercise direct censorship over the content of the internet. In 2005, it lifted the censorship imposed over websites associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, the authoritarian regime resorted to coercive means against bloggers to force compliance. Security force harassments against internet bloggers were continuously reported (Freedom House, 2006). In sum, the political reforms introduced by the regime in 2005 signified a dilemma for the regime in the presidential election as well as the parliamentary elections. It became obvious that the country began to spiral into protests. In response, the regime postponed local elections in 2006 and extended the Emergency Law for another two years. It practiced a systematic crackdown on popular demonstrations including detention of outlawed Muslim Brotherhood members (Dunne, Hamzawy, & Brown, 2007, p.4).

3.2 Press Freedom in Egypt

Though Egypt had a long history of party pluralism and press diversity, it lacked continuity. Pluralism was re-adopted in contemporary Egyptian history particularly during the era of President Sadat with the formation of the multi-party system. Nevertheless, the way the authoritarian regime in Egypt dealt with this political pluralism rendered it crippled and incomplete. Shukor (2005) referred to this phenomenon as "controlled pluralism," where the state remained in control of the political environment (p.33). Even the view of the press toward the Middle East conflict was related to the degree of press freedom in Egypt. In the Middle East conflict, the issue of democratization and pursuit of peace with Israel remained at stake. The press system mirrored the changing nature of the political system. However, the authoritarian regime of Egypt retained its control over the political and media environment through different components.

3.2.1 Regime Control of Media and the Political System

3.2.1.1 Military Control

One of the strongest components of the regime was the status of the military which directly and indirectly maintained the levers of power in the society (Droz-Vincent, 2007; Marfleet, 2009). Ever since the establishment of the republican system in Egypt in 1952 following the coup d'état, the state developed a symbiotic relationship between the regime and the media system. The regime of Nasser inferred that the economic and political reformation would never be possible if the press was in the hands of "capitals." As a result, the regime passed a law in 1960 that put the press under the control of the Arab Socialist Union (Rugh, 2004, p.151). The situation did not differ when Sadat –Nasser's successor – came to power. Although he called for freedom of expression and the formation of political parties, he put military officers ahead of the parties (Cook, 2007). During the administration of Mubarak, the military and security forces remained in control of the political system through various executive positions. For instance, the majority of the 26 governor positions in Egypt are held by military and police officers to insure the integration of the political system within the military structure of the society (Cook, 2007, p.26). During elections, the appointed officials in the governorates developed a wide network of connections in their areas in order to mobilize the people to vote for their candidates, who were usually members of the ruling National Democratic Party (Marfleet, 2009, p.25). Likewise, the university presidents were appointed by the president of the state. In turn, they nominated the head of faculties and deans to assure their conventional loyalty to the regime policies (Aknur & Karakir, 2007, p. 317).

3.2.1.2 Press Legislation

Despite the assertion of the regime that the press was free, censorship and crippling legislation hindered the freedom of the press. The authoritarian regime used legislation to confirm their dominance in political life. When the regime under President Sadat introduced the multi-party system in 1976, its implementation was constrained with the party law of 1977, which set the parameters for the creation of political parties in Egypt. The 1977 law of political parties set other requirements for the political party to be recognized according to the following aspects. First, the program and policies of the political party should be different from other parties. Second, the law prohibited the establishment of parties based on the classification of ethnic, religious, factional, and geographic foundation. Third, the leaders and members of the party should not be affiliated to any organization or political power that called for the abrogation of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. Fourth, the party may not be a reincarnation of a previous party banned by the government (Human Rights Watch, Monopolizing Power, 2007). Perhaps, the most restrictive measure of the 1977 law was the creation of the Political Party Committee

(PPC). The PPC had the authority to license and register news parties, freeze existing parties, and demand the closure of their newspapers or halt the activities of political parties. The PPC was affiliated to the *Shura* Council (Legislative Council). It was composed of three appointed ministers who hired the other three members who were mostly senior judges (Stacher, 2004, p. 220). Between the year 1977 and 2004, the PPC rejected 63 parties' applications and only approved two (Human Rights Watch, Monopolizing Power, 2007). Under the power of the PPC, the Labor opposition party, which aligned itself with the Islamic trend, had been suspended under claims of disputes between its leaders. The PPC decided that the party remained banned unless it spelled its anti-regime figures and abolished its "Islamic rhetoric" (Stacher, 2004, p.229). It also closed down its newspaper *El-Shaab* (*The People*) when it waged a campaign libeling the Egyptian Ministry of Culture for allowing the publication of a novel *Dinner of Seaweeds* by the Syrian writer Haydar Haydar, which sparked violent protests in *Al-Azhar* University among students. The protestors regarded the novel to be in violation of all divine religions. Another case in point was the PPC decision to freeze the right-wing Liberal opposition party *Al-Ahrar* (The Liberals) as a result of internal disputes among its leaders but did not ban its newspaper as it did with the Labor Party (p.228).

The press freedom remained low in Egypt. On a different measurement scale of press freedom, Egypt is considered "not free."According to a Freedom House report in 2006, Egypt scored 61 on a scale of 100, where 0 was the best and 100 was the worst (Freedom House, 2006). Journalists in Egypt are constrained by a number of laws that render the press freedom weak in Egypt, including the Emergency Law, Press Law, Penal code, and Publication Law. In 1995, the Egyptian Parliament passed a law imposing heavy sentences for up to five years for "false rumors," "mendacious information," and "defamation."Within one year after the enactment of the law, 99 journalists from different ideological perspectives and affiliations had been charged by courts (Kienle, 1998, p.223). Under pressure from the journalists and the press syndicate, the law was amended in 1996. The amendment of the law shortened the imprisonment period for journalists to only one year. Moreover, the amendments guaranteed the free access to information and imposed penalty on any administrative body that refused to cooperate with the journalists' request for information. Nevertheless, these amendments remained ink on paper and were not adopted by the government (Najjar, 2008, p.226; Rugh, 2004, p.160).

Between 1996 and 1999, the Egyptian Public Prosecutor referred 175 journalists to court and banned the publication of several articles under the pretext of protecting "national security" (Rugh, 2004, p.126). Violation of the freedom of press was systematically practiced by the regime. On April 2005, the government sentenced three journalists to one year in prison and imposed fines of around $1.740 each for "defaming a public employee" with libel about the Minister of Housing (Freedom House, 2006). There were more than 500 newspapers and

publications in Egypt that the government directly controlled. The government owned shares in the "national press," –a term used to describe the state-owned press- whose chief editors were appointed by the president. Opposition parties, granted their license by the Political Parties Committee (PPC), were basically affiliated to the regime legislative council and predominantly administered by members of the ruling parties. To summarize, the same law that grants freedom of expression and regulates the press contains articles within it that hinder press freedom. For example, the law of 1996 prohibits administrative bans or seizure of publications or harming journalists. However, the same law contains several provisions allowing for imprisonment of journalists for various offenses, including defamation, insult, and false information (Stacher, 2004). Criticism of the president of the state or president of other states is regarded by law as a crime. The Penal Code set the detention penalty for such a "crime" as between six months and five years in prison and a fine of between 5,000 to 20,000 Egyptian pounds (U.S. $870-$3,480) to "Whoever vilifies... the king or president of a foreign country" (Human Rights Watch, 2006). To mention a few cases: the 2005 annual report issued by the organization, Reporters without Borders, mentioned the case of former editor in chief of the opposition Nasserite weekly newspaper, *Araby,* journalist Abdel Halim Qandil. He was kidnapped in 2004, and the kidnappers wearing plainclothes roughed him up in the street in Cairo and threatened to kill him if he continued his antagonist campaign against who they called "top people." *Araby* newspaper was waging a campaign against President Mubarak at that time (Reporters without Borders, 2005). The early 21st century marked a new era of openness in the political atmosphere and was coupled with regional development and mounting international calls by the United States administration on Egypt to undergo political reforms (Hamzawy, 2005). The momentum of political dynamism came out when rumors about the possibility of the President's son Gamal Mubarak inheriting the rule of Egypt. This had provoked many sectors of the Egyptian public: internet bloggers, journalists, intellectuals, civil society groups, and grassroots movements, like *Kifaya* Movement (Enough) to talk bluntly about the ruling family and to criticize prominent figures in the regime (El-Mahdi, 2009, p.88). The regime responded by undertaking major steps toward democracy. The opposition press took advantage of these reforms and oriented their criticism toward the president of the state and his family.

3.2.1.3 Ownership of the Press

Rugh (2004) divided the Egyptian press into three main categories according to its ownership: the governmental press or "national press," the private press, and the partisan press (p.121). The governmental press is owned and supervised by the legislative council. The Egyptian regime exerts influence on the government-owned newspapers through control over personnel. Thus, the president of the state, who is at the same time the head of the Ruling

National Democratic Party, appoints the chief editors of the governmental newspapers in order to insure their loyalty to the policies of the regime. That is why the state-owned press seldom criticizes the policies sensitive to the government (El-Nawawy, 2002, p.133). However, the Egyptian governmental press is not "dull completely predictable and [a] slavish mouthpiece of the regime" (Rugh, 1987, p.43). It usually carries criticism of the executive sectors and the ministers in domestic issues but never of the head of the state (Rugh, 2004, p.157). Another sort of press ownership in Egypt is private ownership. Despite the relative independence from the direct control of the state, the regime maintains control through licenses. The private press is owned by individuals and a group of share holders, who, in order to publish a newspaper, should obtain approval from the prime minister. The third type of ownership is the partisan press affiliated and run by the opposition political parties (Rugh, 2004, p.122). The re-emergence of the party system in the late 1970s maintained pluralism in political life; however, the regime, through various means, exerts pressure on political parties to assure compliance. The regime exercises direct control over the political parties through the Political Parties Committee (PPC) predominantly run by members of the ruling National Democratic Party, which gave the license for political parties (Shukor, 2005, p.45). The president appoints six out of the seven members of the PPC: the minister of justice, the minister of the interior, the minister of state of parliamentary affairs, and three former judges. The PPC is chaired by the head of the Legislative Council (*Shura* Council) (Human Rights Watch, 2007, Monopolizing Power). The political parties in Egypt rely mainly on their newspapers to propagate their programs and connect with the public. Despite the censorship practiced by the regime, the political parties' press criticize the government on key issues like corruption in the government, issues related to human rights, and torture in the prisons, as well as foreign policies, especially the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (Ibrahim, 1999, p.326). Until 2003, there were 16 legal political parties; each has its own newspaper (Rugh, 2004, p.122). In 2004, the country legalized another two parties: *El-Ghad* Party *(Tomorrow Party)* and the Free Socialist Constitutional Party. The latter does not have any significant impact on the Egyptian political map, but *El-Ghad* Party maintained strong presence in Egyptian politics when the chairman of the party ran for the presidential elections in 2005 (Albrecht, 2007, p.64). Table (1) shows the most influential political parties in the Egyptian political landscape until 2004 (Abdul-Rahman, 2006; Rugh, 2004; Shukor, 2005). There are other small political parties but their political presence remains weak. Among the small parties are the Young Egypt Party formed in 1990, the Green Party in 1990, the Democratic Unionist Party in 1990, the Social Justice Party in 1993, the Social Integration Party in 1995, the National Accord Party in 2000, Egypt 2000 Party in 2001, and finally, the New Generation Party in 2002 (Shukor, 2005, p.50).

Table 1: Main Political Parties and their Newspapers (until 2004)

Political Party	Year	Newspaper	Ideology
Al-Wafd	1978	*Al-Wafd*	Liberal
Tagammu	1976	*Al-Ahali*	Leftist Socialist
The Liberals	1976	*Al-Ahrar*	Liberal
The Nasserite Party	1992	*Al-Araby*	Leftist Pan-Arab
Ruling National Party	1978	*Mayo*	Capitalist
Labor, "frozen"	1978	*El-Sha'ab*	Islamist
El-Ghad	2004	*El-Ghad*	Liberal

*Data compiled by Shukor (2005) regarding the main political parties, their year of formation, and their ideologies.

In essence, Ottaway and Hamzawy (2007) declared that the Egyptian political map forms a triangle of three dimensions: the regime, robust Islamic opposition, and secular parties, which strive to maintain their position in political life. These secular parties have different ideological tendencies from liberal to leftist. Their impact remains weak in politics. On one hand, they feel "victimized" by the authoritarian regime that thwarts their capabilities; and on the other, they lag behind the competition with the Islamic movements who take advantage of Islamic endowment and mosques to propagate their ideas (p.1). Collombier (2013) categorized the opposition political parties into three categories. The first category includes the parties that grant licenses by the regime but remain weak in structure with no influence in political life (p.4). The second category includes opposition parties that emerged in the late 2004, such as *El-Ghad* party *(Tomorrow Party)* pioneered by Ayman Nour the second runner up in the 2005 presidential election, and the Free Socialist Constitutional Party. The third category includes those opposition parties that have existed in the political arena for a long time, such as *El-Wafd* and *Tagammu,* progressive parties that engaged in the process of co-optation with the regime to insure their survival in the political landscape (Lust-Okar, 2007, p.41). The first and third categories remain loyal to the regime and contribute positively to its quest for legitimacy (Collombier, 2013, p.4). Ottaway and Hamzawy (2007) divided the political parties into two ideological categories according to their ideology: the liberals and the leftists. They said that most of the political parties are insignificant due to their incapacity to transform their historical heritage into present-day political effectiveness. Though both ideological parameters play tangible roles in the political life, they fail to build on these roots. For example, the leftist parties, like the Arab Nasserite and *Tagammu* Party, fail to take advantage of the deteriorating living conditions among their supporters from the industrial sectors and peasants, leaving the door open for the Muslim Brotherhood organization, which acts among these sectors by offering major services benefiting

a large degraded segment of the Egyptian population. The *Al-Wafd* Party with its liberal perspective does not find an echo on the Egyptian streets, which saw no distinction between the economic policies of the ruling National Democratic Party and the liberal *Al-Wafd* party (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2007).There are no precise figures about circulation of partisan press. But the liberal *Al-Wafd* newspaper remains one of the highest circulated among opposition press with an estimated circulation of 60,000 copies in 2003 (Rugh, 2004, p.123). In addition, the leftist Pan-Arab Nasserite Party newspaper *Al-Araby* was also widely circulated in 2005 based on the influence of its editor in chief who was the spokesman of *Kifaya* movement and waged a campaign in the newspaper against the re-election of President Mubarak in 2005 (Abdul-Rahman, 2006, p.144).

As for the private-owned newspapers, they appeared in the late 1990s and 2000s, representing a new phenomenon in the Egyptian press system. Sometimes, they are referred to as "independent press" due to their independent ownership from both the state and the political parties. The independent press appeared in the late 1990s with the advent of *El-Dustor* newspaper (*The Constitution*) in 1995 followed by the newspaper *El-Osboa* (*The Week*) in 1996. The law maintains stringent conditions on the ownership of the newspaper. For instance, foreigners are denied the right to invest in print media and to own a newspaper. In addition, ownership should take the form of "co-operatives" with no individual ownership of more than 10% of the overall capital (IPDC, 2013, p.37). The 21st century saw the proliferation of the privately-owned newspapers coupled with the political and economic reformation introduced by the government. Benefiting from the margin of freedom, the privately owned press stepped over the ideologies of the partisan press and began to discuss issues used to be regarded as "taboos," such as the issue of succession for the president's son. They represent a wide spectrum of ideological tendencies ranging from right to left. There are more than 500 publications in Egypt representing a wide scope of ideological orientation in Egypt. Table (2) displays the circulation of major daily newspapers and their year of publication (Rugh, 2004, p.123).

Table 2: Circulation of Dailies in Egypt (1985-2003)

Dailies	In 2003	In 1985	First publication
Al-Akhbar	700,000	650,000	1952
Al-Ahram	700,000	550,000	1875
Al-Gumhuriya	400,000	400,000	1953
Al-Masa	350,000	50,000	1956
El-Wafd	60,000	Not yet	1988
Ahram el-Masa	50,000	Not yet	1990
Egyptian Gazette	20,000	10,000	1880
Le journal	10,000	10,000	1936
Progress	10,000	8,000	1893
Al-Alam al youm	15,000	Not yet	1991
Al-Ahrar	5,000	Not known	1977

Data of some Egyptian dailies and their daily circulations in years (1985-2003) compiled by Rugh (2004).

3.3 Interaction between Political and Media Players

Despite the long history of diversity in the media system, the levers of power remain in the domain of the authoritarian regime in Egypt. In the early 21st century, the political environment in Egypt changed dramatically. The influence of the Islamic trend increased significantly and the level of antagonism against the regime increased as a result of its foreign policy and internal policy that led to stringent economic conditions. At the international level, there were mounting calls from the United States for the Egyptian regime to undergo political reforms following the events of September 11, 2001 (Dunne, 2006). The integration of these factors led to cycles of demonstration and cooperation across different ideological divides in Egypt. The mid 2000s saw the emergence of sporadic civil society protests joined by leftists, Islamists, and liberals for the sake of high profile demands that antagonized the head of the regime (Albrecht, 2007, p.66). The impact of the opposition movements was growing in the Egyptian street. Different political parties engaged with the waves of protest incited by the opposition and grassroots movements in an attempt to restore their weak impact on the political life (Abdul-Rahman, 2006, p.157; Beinin, 2009; El-Mahdi, 2009). Amid this growing level of discontent, the media took advantage and began to tackle senior figures in the regime including the head of the state (Abdul-Rahman, 2006, p.161). The regime, in an attempt to absorb the waves of discontent, mobilized the people in issues related to foreign policies. During the Lebanon war in 2006, Mubarak's regime, after being criticized by the opposition movements due to its unfavorable stance toward Hezbollah, fended off his critics by sending the President's son

Gamal to Lebanon in solidarity with the Lebanese people (Cook, 2012, p.242). In general, the Arab-Israeli conflict was instrumentalized by the regime to deviate the attention of the angry public opinion from the economic hardship at home. In the same vein, it was used by the opposition movements and public opinion as a pretext to mount their criticism of the regime (Albrecht, 2007).

3.3.1 Political Players in Egypt

There are various political players who play tangible roles in mobilizing the public opinion in key issues. Taking advantage of the growing dismay from the stringent economic conditions and the criticism of the "facilitating role" of Egypt in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Egyptian media, with its different outlets, became more vigorous in criticizing the regime. The main political players who affected the political arena and led to increasing the level of discontent at home were the Pan-Arab satellite channels, as well as grassroots movements and opposition blocks.

Pan-Arab Satellite Channels. What made the demonstrations in the Egyptian street during the early 2000s significant was the proliferation of the Pan-Arab satellite channels and the increase in communication. In particular, *Al-Jazeera* satellite channel broadcasts from the tiny Arab peninsula of Qatar paved the road to what became known as the "information war" (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002, p.26). The channel started its transmission in 1996. Through its programs, *Al-Jazeera* reflects different views and appeals to many from different ideological tendencies. *Al-Jazeera* plays a substantial role in "liberalizing Arab media discourse," limiting the control of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world in general, and the Egyptian media, in particular (El-Oifi, 2005, p.66). The impact of *Al-Jazeera* extends beyond the Arab world. It helps strengthening the support of the Palestinian cause and the Arab issues in the West. The Arab public opinion perceived *Al-Jazeera* not only as a channel that criticizes the corrupt policies of the authoritarian regimes, but also as a channel that sympathizes with the causes of their dissent (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002, p.26). In January 2000, President Mubarak paid an unofficial visit to *Al-Jazeera*'s headquarters in Qatar and was reported as saying to his Minister of Information: "all this trouble from a matchbox like this!" (p.23). Lynch (2008) contended that in the "pre-*Al-jazeera* era," the regimes in the Arab world were in control of the flow of information; even the elite who accessed the Western media via satellite dishes had no significant impact on the political life. Nonetheless, the situation changed in the "*Al-Jazeera* era," offering opportunities for more social actions to the extent that it triggered fears in the Arab regimes (Lynch, 2008, p.27). Following the path of *Al-Jazeera*, other Pan-Arab channels emerged, like the Saudi channel of *Al-Arabiya*. In essence, the political and ideological

atmosphere surrounding the Arab region led to the emergence of such Pan-Arab satellite channels. After the 1991 Gulf War and the discontent in the Arab street, the authoritarian regimes conducted a number of elections attempting to restore their eroding legitimacy that was contested by Islamic parties (El-Oifi, 2005, p.74). In this framework, the term "public opinion" acquired particular attention from politicians in the Arab world. Moreover, the strong legitimacy of what is known as "nation-state" confirmed by many authoritarian regimes, particularly in Egypt, put the regimes in a defensive position against their opponents who advocated larger ideological claims. Within this atmosphere of contestation between the regimes and the opposition groups, satellite channels like *Al-Jazeera* emerged (p.75). In their programs, *Al-Jazeera* appealed to the three main ideologies in the Arab world –the Islamic, the leftist, and the liberal ideology – thus gaining momentum among people in the Middle East region. With regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the role of *Al-Jazeera* was to translate the disenchantment in the Arab world into political actions. It increased the Arab sympathy for the Palestinian question and augmented the bigotry toward Israel (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002, p.55). In particular, the Egyptian regime of Mubarak suffered from a problem of ideological rationale that it rallied the people behind. On one hand, the Pan-Arabism ideology adopted by President Nasser had long being "jettisoned"; on the other, the ideology of Islam "as a solution" was presented by the opposition movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to contest the regime. Amid this ideological paradox, the Egyptians began to question the eagerness of the regime to carry out political and economic reforms. Their criticism was translated into a cycle of protests in adamant contestation to the regime (Bradly, 2008, p.213). The Pan-Arab channels covered the waves of discontent in the Egyptian street and inspired more opposition groups to join the spiral of dismay.

Grassroots Movements and Opposition Blocs. In the early 2000s, the regime was faced by adamant opposition movements outside the matrix of the regime. This opposition was different from the "homogeneous" opposition in the 1980s and 1990s, which was "loyal" to the regime within the clientalist structure of co-optation (Albrecht, 2007, p.72). Perhaps the most significant movement in the mid 2000s was the *Kifaya* movement, which united other movements under its banner. The origin of the movement can be traced back to 2000 with the eruption of the second Palestinian *intifada*. Thousands of demonstrators took to the street of downtown Cairo, denouncing the Israeli use of force against the Palestinians. The uprising brought collective actions in the street. A grassroots movement under the name of the Popular Committee to Support the Intifada (PCSI) was established. The PCSI was joined by many activists from various ideological and political spectrums (El-Mahdi, 2009, p.94). This collaboration between different political factions extends beyond the narrow boundaries of the

political parties and the ideological group of the Muslim Brotherhood. Abdul-Rahman (2006) explained that this form of collaboration between the leftists and the Islamists should not be seen as "coalition" between rival parties but rather as "political camps" expressing their anger in the international policies (p.26). The PCSI movement focused on three main issues: oppose normalization of ties with Israel, support the *intifada* through supply of food and medical services, and boycott Israel and American products (Peterson, 2003). The 2003 Iraq War gave another impetus to such collaborations between leftists, Islamists, Nasserites, Communists, even unaffiliated sympathizers with the issue of Iraq and the Palestinian question. It ignited even more anger among Egyptians denouncing the U.S aggression. Scenes of angry protestors marching in the streets of downtown Cairo became common. Demonstrators openly criticized the Egyptian regime calling bluntly on the Egyptian President Mubarak to step down. These NGOs included Women for Democracy, Youth for Change, Journalists for Change, Artists for Change, and Workers for Change. In December 2004, those groups, as well as human rights activists, held their first silent protest under the slogan of *Kifaya,* meaning "enough" (El-Mahdi, 2009, p.89). The movement highlights two important aspects for this analysis: first, the fact that the protests of the movement were unauthorized and beyond the collective actions of the known opposition blocs, yet were unconventionally not dispersed by security services; second, the movement slogan of *Kifaya* raised the political demand of different sectors to put an end to the policies of Mubarak and his attempt to allow his son to inherit the power (Albrecht, 2007, p.66). The taboo around the presidency was broken. A year after its formation, *Kifaya* claimed to have 1.800 signatures on its founding statement. The statement set the demands of political and democratic reforms. The statement issued by *Kifaya* pointed to the dual "dangers" that beset the "nation." These two "dangers" were the "odious assault on Arab native soil, [Palestine and Iraq]," and "repressive despotism" of the regime (El-Mahdi, 2009, p.89). The tolerance of the authoritarian regime in dealing with the movement's protestation incited some political parties to connect with the movement in order to restore their deteriorated influence at the popular level (Abdul-Rahman, 2006, p.156). After the presidential election of 2005, the collective actions of *Kifaya* began to fade. Nonetheless, the important development brought by the grassroots movement of *Kifaya* was the political mobilization in the Egyptian political scene and the collective actions under the banner of a "united front" away from the tight ideological tendencies of the political parties and the weakness of their structures (Abaza, 2008; El-Mahdi, 2009, p.98).

Another important opposition bloc in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood, which restored a long history of contestation and co-optation of the regime ever since its establishment in 1928 under the leadership of Hassan al-Banna (Abaza, 2008; Cook, 2007:2012; El-Awaisi, 1998; Kavli, 2001; Munson, 2001; Zollner, 2009). The Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to raise their antagonism against the regime refusing the peace process

signed between Egypt and Israel (Al-Anani, 2007; Cook, 2007, p.85). The regime regarded the Muslim Brotherhood as an outlawed organization. Being outlawed in the Egyptian political life was a double edged weapon. The government could crack down on them under the pretext that they belonged to an "outlawed" organization; however, being illegal gave them relative flexibility in asserting their presence in the society. Their illegal status and independence from the regime gave them more freedom than other parties enjoyed, in the sense that the regime could not dissolve them or freeze them (Abaza, 2008). The authoritarian system in Egypt found it useful to have the position of the Muslim Brotherhood "institutionalized" and carefully observed by the security services. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood was granted some space in the political system under Mubarak and their members were able to be presented in the parliament as independent candidates who did not belong to any groups or parties but remained clandestinely affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood organization (Albrecht, 2007, p.62). In many cases, the regime quells their antagonism through coercive means (El-Dawla, 2009). The impact of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian society was great, with many charitable activities serving poor sectors in Egypt (Abaza, 2008).

3.4 Summary and Discussion

The regime in Egypt developed flexible mechanisms for containing the opposition and maintaining its *status quo*. Despite the claims of the government that it supported political diversity and media pluralism, the levers of power remain in the domain of the regime. Even the recipes for democratic configuration were meant to accentuate the autocratic nature of the regime. Through the course of the recent history in Egypt since the coup d'état of 1952, which abolished the monarchy, the successive regimes used a combination of coercion and co-optation to quash the opposition and exclude opponents from participating in political life. Marfleet (2009) described the regime as resorting to "low-intensity democracy" to control the domestic policies (p.15). In Egypt, the opposition is divided into "legal" and "illegal." The "legal" opposition is the opposition of the political parties that are licensed by the government and remain within the realm of the general policies of the regime. Criticism to corruption and poor social services was allowed without alluding to senior governmental officials. Upon crossing the agreed-upon rules, the regimes took off its democratic façade and intervened to force the opposition to comply by its rules (Lust-Okar, 2007, p.41). The effect of the political parties on political life remained low. Several factors contributed to this weakness: fragmentation within the internal structure of the political parties, coercive laws, economic pressure from the regime and co-optation (Kodmani, 2005; Shukor, 2005; Stacher, 2004). With regard to the "illegal" opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime used dual measures combining coercion and co-optation to contain their antagonism. Within the co-optation mechanism for strengthening

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ideological opposition groups to create a threat to other "moderate" groups, the Egyptian regime provided ample space for the Muslim Brotherhood organization to participate in the political life and run in the parliament elections (Lust-Okar, 2007, p.48). In the early 21st century, politics witnessed the emergence of another form of opposition movement beyond the scope of the "legal" opposition of the political parties and the "illegal" opposition of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood organization. Interrelated international and regional factors served in the emergence of such opposition grassroots movements in Egyptian life. The discontent from the economic policies of the regime and the orientation toward the market economy led to diminishing the role of the state and to increasing the burden on the Egyptian middle and lower class (El-Naggar, 2009, p.36). This led to a cycle of workers' struggle and protests calling for economic reforms and an increase in wages (Beinin, 2009). Regionally, the second Palestinian *intifada* and the 2003 Iraq War brought the Middle East conflict to the forefront of public concern and contributed to raising the level of dissatisfaction among Egyptians who criticized the regime's foreign policies. Both the regime and the opposition bloc used the Middle East conflict for political means. The regime took advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to divert the public attention away from economic and domestic problems. The opposition camp used the Arab-Israeli conflict and the American war on Iraq in 2003 as an umbrella to mount their criticism of the political and economic policies of the regime (Albrecht, 2007). The impact of such grassroots movements like *Kifaya* (Enough), which directly antagonized the head of the state, was immense in Egyptian political life. As a response to the growing "spirit of resistance," the regime responded by more openness in political and media freedom (Abaza, 2008; Albrecht, 2007; El-Mahdi, 2009). The media system in Egypt was a reflection of the political life. The regime kept the media under its domain through different means of media ownership and crippling laws that threatened the freedom of the press (Rugh, 2004). Parallel to the atmosphere of openness in the early 21st century, the regime allowed the proliferation of many newspapers and TV channels and granted free access to the internet (Abdulla, 2007; El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002; Rugh, 2004). The change in the media landscape paved the road for more freedom of expression at home. It became clear that the diversity in the information sources was directly proportionate to the level of antagonism at home (El-Nawawy & Iskander 2002; El-Oifi, 2005). The opposition and privately-owned press rode alongside the opposition movements and began to tackle issues considered as "taboo" for decades like libel against the head of the state and senior governmental officials. The press became a route for political activists to disparage the regime (Abdul-Rahman, 2006). Amid the growing defiance at home, the regime resorted to coercive means for tightening its control over the press to force its compliance. Many journalists, internet bloggers, and political activists were imprisoned. Press freedom in Egypt was at stake (Reporters without Borders, 2005). Despite this mechanism of control over the media system, the momentum of the

internal and regional events changed political life advantageously for the opposition, from outside the realm of the regime.

CHAPTER FOUR

EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE 2006 LEBANON WAR

4.1 Historical and Political Dynamics of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Though more than quarter of a century has passed since the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was enacted, the relationship between the two countries has never been smooth. Stein (1997) called it a "no war environment." The Israeli Defense Ministry Director, General David Ivri, declared in 1992 that, "[t]he peace with Egypt is not peace; it is actually a ceasefire that has continued for 15 years" (Stein, 1997). Today, this fragile relationship is seen not only as a reflection of past chapters of war and bigotry but also as a barometer to test the level of antagonism at home between the regime and its commitment to peace and the opposition movements and their rejection of the Egyptian facilitator role in the region. Hudson (1995) speculated that the modest democratization process in Egypt during the Mubarak regime did not mean the participation in a peace process defined by Washington. The relative pluralism in the press provided a solid ground for the opposition movements to resist what they viewed as the "facilitating role" of Egypt in the peace process (p.213).

In retrospect, the confrontation between the Arab world and Israel could be tracked before the creation of the state of Israel, particularly to 1917 with the Balfour declaration, when the British government informed the Zionist movement that it supported the creation of a "national home for the Jewish people" (El-Nawawy, 2002, p.2). The years following the Second World War and the UN declaration of a partition resolution in 1947 saw the beginning of confrontation between the Arabs and the Israeli forces in Palestine, which ended in total defeat of the Arab forces in the 1948 war (Cook, 2012; Herzog, 1982; Munson, 2001; Stein, 2012). In Egypt, the defeat of 1948 exacerbated the many internal problems between the King, the British mandate, and the *El-Wafd* Party, which formed the government. It was this defeat that accelerated the political change in Egypt crowned by the coup d'état of 1952 by a clandestine group in the Egyptian Army that overthrew the king and declared the republican system under leadership of Gamal Abdel-Nasser (Cook, 2012, p.37). Military tension continued between the

Israeli forces and the Egyptian and Palestinian infiltrators in the Gaza Strip under the Egyptian administration (Oren, 1992, p.25). During the era of Nasser, the relationship between Egypt and the United States deteriorated significantly. The United States rejected a request from Egypt to finance the Aswan Dam project, which forced Egypt to nationalize the Suez Canal. This was the breaking point that triggered the 1956 tripartite war by British-France-Israel intensive air raids destroying many Egyptian aircraft in the area of the Suez Canal (Herzog, 1982, p.140). In 1967, Israel waged a massive war against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Most of the Egyptian aircrafts were destroyed. Afterwards, Israel destroyed the air force of Jordan, Syria, and then Iraq. The Egyptian media "exaggerated" the capacity of the Egyptian army and underestimated that of the Israeli forces (Al-Tarabishi, 1994, p.347). The regime continued to fabricate propaganda stories about the superiority of the Arab forces over Israel until the third day of the war when King Hussein of Jordan admitted the defeat of the Arab forces. The defeat triggered massive anti-American and anti-British demonstration in the Middle East in what the public opinion perceived as responsible for the defeat due to their support to Israel (Herzog, 1982, p.160). Nasser, not relinquishing the responsibility of the defeat, announced in a television speech that he would step down from office. A massive pro-Nasser demonstration was organized in Egypt calling him to withdraw his resignation (Stein, 2012, p.91). The impact of the 1967 defeat was huge at the military and the political level. It weakened the credibility of Arab nationalism, strengthened the position of Israel over vast areas in the Arab land, including the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of Jordan River, areas of the Palestinian territories, and the Golan Heights in Syria. Most importantly, the defeat led to the weakening of the regime's grip on the political environment opening the door for criticism at home (Stagh, 1986, p.81). When Sadat came to power after Nasser, he reiterated the need to regain the Egyptian lands occupied by Israel.

The mood in the Arab world and in Egypt was euphoric glory. The state-owned newspapers in Egypt glorified the Egyptian performance during the war drawing a comparison between the bitterness of the 1967 defeat and the glory of 1973 war (Al-Tarabishi, 1994, p.361). Nevertheless, the relation between Egypt and the Arab states witnessed a major shift after Sadat signed the peace accord with Israel in 1979, triggering waves of dissent at home not only at the public level but also at the diplomatic level. Three foreign Ministers resigned and other diplomats who were critical to this "one-sided" move from Sadat (Kamel, 2002, p.505; Lesch, 1995, p.232). Following the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt's membership of the Arab League was suspended, and the League's headquarters was changed from Cairo to Tunis. Egypt's League membership was restored ten years later in the wake of the1991 Gulf war (Lesch, 1995, p.233). The peace treaty triggered demonstrations at home and was encountered by adamant popular criticism from different ideological divides. Sadat lost patience with opposition and sentenced opponents to prison. Intellectuals were forbidden to express any criticism to the peace treaty. For

the Islamic radical groups, the discontent from the peace treaty was translated into political actions. Inspired by the Iranian revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Shah, the radical groups perceived the Iranian revolution as an example of "anti-imperialism" and "anti-Zionism[ism]" that turned into actions (Stein, 2012, p.162). The confrontation between Sadat and different opposition divides reached its peak in 1981 with the assassination of Sadat by members of radical Islamic organization. Despite the peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel, the relationship between the two countries remained within the diplomatic level without extending to the normalization of ties on the popular level (Dowek, 2001; Stein, 1997). On the media level, the coverage of Israel was totally negative (Armbrust, 2007; Talhami, 2007). The cycle of violence continued between the Arabs and Israel in the late seventies and the eighties on the Lebanese front (Hirst, 2010; Roskin & Coyle, 2008). Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 while Egypt remained on the sidelines. Amid the heat of the fight in Lebanon, a clandestine *Shiite* group was formed in 1982, called Hezbollah, or Party of God, aiming to deter Israel away from Lebanon. The group Hezbollah engaged in an attrition war with Israel in South of Lebanon (Hirst, 2010, p.271). In the early 21st century following the Israeli withdrawal from the south of Lebanon in May 2000, Hezbollah became one of the most important political players in the region (Cordesman, 2006; Sobelman, 2010, p.62).

4.2. Perspectives on the Lebanon war in 2006

The 2006 Lebanon war is known in Israeli discourse as the "Second Lebanon War," in Hezbollah discourse as "Operation True Promise," and in the Arab discourse as the "Sixth War" (Hirst, 2010; Spyer, 2009). The war started on July 12 when Hezbollah crossed the Israeli borders and attacked two armed *Humvees* manned by Israeli reservists. Three Israeli soldiers were killed, two injured, and two abducted and taken to Lebanon. The aim of the abduction, according to Hezbollah, was to trade their release with Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners in Israel. Immediately after the hostage-taking, the Israeli cabinet decided to respond to the abduction and waged large scale air raids followed by ground incursion into southern Lebanon (Spyer, 2009, p.146). The American administration was supportive of Israel in the war. The American position on the Lebanon war in 2006 is of twofold: the war on terror and the urge of democratization in the Middle East. As a result, the U.S. administration was slow on calling for ceasefire in order to give Israel the time to weaken the capabilities of Hezbollah. The United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed her optimism by saying that the war was "birth pangs of a new Middle East" (Pressman, 2006, p.3). Some Arab countries like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were "unprecedented" in their support for the war, aligning themselves closely with Israel to contain the growing influence of Iran and Hezbollah in the region (Hirst, 2010, p.339). Fierce confrontation between Israeli ground forces and Hezbollah fighters using

anti-tank weapons took place with tactical maneuvering ability of Hezbollah fighters that limited Israeli advance in several Lebanese areas. The cycle of violence between Israel and Hezbollah continued until it reached the "turning point" for the realm of the war with the Israeli attack on a Qana refugee shelter on midnight of July 30 killing mostly women and children. For the Americans, the Qana incident was a source of "embarrassment and exasperation." The incident became the forefront of TV coverage all over the world. It cast shadows on the American relations with its Arab allies (p.366). King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who took a negative stance toward Hezbollah at the outset of the war, denounced the massacre and dispatched his foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, to tell Condoleezza Rice, "if that was the new Middle East…we would rather go back to the old" (p.367). On the popular level, the Qana incident triggered waves of anger all over the world. Demonstrations were organized in many Arab and Islamic countries, as well as European countries, calling for an end to the war. Parallel to that, diplomatic efforts were underway between interlocutors from the Arab and Western worlds. The ceasefire came into effect on August 14, 2006 with the implementation of the United National Resolution 1701 (Spyer, 2009, p.148). The war was concluded with massive humanitarian loss and grave infrastructure destruction on the Lebanese side, with less on the Israeli side. According to the report from the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon issued by the United Nation Human Rights Council on November 23, 2006, the causalities form the Lebanese side mounted to 1.191 killed, 4.409 injured, and 900.000 displaced. In addition, the Inquiry Commission counted the destruction of 109 bridges and 137 roads in Lebanon (United Nation General Assembly, 2006). The report issued by Human Rights Watch estimated the casualties on the Lebanese side to be 1.109 killed, 4.339 injured, and an estimated one million displaced. On the Israeli side, the estimated deaths were 43 Israeli civilians, and 12 soldiers (Human Rights Watch, Why They Died, 2007). The Lebanon war in 2006 created a new situation in the Middle East. Despite the "divine" victory of Hezbollah, the political arena in Lebanon witnessed a strong fracture and the question of Hezbollah arms gained further momentum (Sobelman, 2010, p.65). In the Arab and Muslim worlds, Hezbollah was hailed by Arab commentators in the media, who described him as a "model of dignity, steadfastness and defiance that could revive a frustrated Arab spirit burdened with the accumulation of pain and defeat" (Hirst, 2010, p.376). The 2006 Lebanon war was the forefront Arab issue on the public and media agendas. It was instrumentalized by political players for different means. For the authoritarian governments in the Arab world, the Arab-Israeli conflict was used to divert attention from hard economic conditions at home and other internal problems (Rubin, 2006, p.151; Tessler & Grobschmidt, 1995, p.144).

4.3. The Egyptian Political Stance on the Lebanon War 2006

The implications of the Lebanon war in Egypt could be understood within the realm of three dimensions: first, the governmental stance; second, the opposition parties and grassroots movement stance; and finally the public opinion stance.

4.3.1 The Egyptian Official Stance

On the heel of the Lebanon war in 2006, the Egyptian official stance as explained by President Mubarak was critical of Israel for the disproportional use of force, but put the blame on Hezbollah for dragging the region into a cycle of violence. Mubarak issued a joint statement with King Abdullah of Jordan warning against the "uncalculated adventures" that did not serve the interests of the Arab causes (*Al-Ahram*, 2006). In a written interview with *TIME* published on July 27, 2006, Mubarak blamed Hezbollah for acting as a "state within a state" outside the framework of the Lebanese government. He criticized the response of Israel, calling it "disproportional" and that it "went too far," thus causing waves of anger in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Mubarak summoned the Egyptian official stance, calling on the immediate ceasefire as an "utmost priority" (Macleod, 2006). In essence, the Egyptian official stance was skeptical of the ability of the radical groups Hamas and Hezbollah to conduct peaceful negotiations with Israel. This stance was similar to both the Jordanian and the Saudi stance. In his analysis of the stance taken by these three Arab states during the Lebanon war, Hersh (2006) said "the long-term Administration goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab coalition – including countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt – that would join the United States and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran." He added that "those nations would moderate their public criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating the crisis that led to war." In retrospect, Egypt expressed concern over the linkage between Hezbollah and Iran. From the Egyptian official point of view, the *Shiite* regime in Iran attempted to disperse its influence in the region through Hezbollah. In a TV interview with *Al-Arabiya* Satellite channel on April 8, 2006, Mubarak alluded to the menace of the *Shiite* influence of Iran by saying:"Definitely Iran has influence on Shi'ites. Shi'ites are 65 percent of the Iraqis . . . Most of the Shi'ites are loyal to Iran, and not to the countries they are living in" (Blanford, 2006). The concept of the *Shia* crescent was first coined by King Abdullah II of Jordan in December 2004 in an interview with *The Washington Post* when he warned of a *Shia* crescent running from Hezbollah in Lebanon, through the Assad regime in Syria, and the *Shiite* dominated government in Post Saddam Iraq, to Tehran (Bröning, 2008, p.61). In the same vein, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia denounced the actions of Hezbollah that triggered the war in the region. One of Saudi Arabia's leading Wahhabi sheiks, Abdullah bin Jabreen issued a strongly worded religious edict declaring it unlawful to

support, join or pray for the "Shiite" Hezbollah (Lake, 2006). In the wake of the 2006 Lebanon war, Saudi Arabia issued an official statement that read:

> The Kingdom stood firmly with the resistance in Lebanon until Israel's occupation of Lebanon ended. ... A difference should be drawn between legitimate resistance and rash adventures carried out by elements inside the state and those behind them without consultation or coordination with Arab countries. ... The Kingdom views that it is time that these elements alone bear the full responsibility of these irresponsible acts and should alone shoulder the burden of ending the crisis they have created. (Stalinsky, 2006)

This Islamic stance taken by some Islamic scholars in Saudi Arabia was explained by Bröning (2008) by saying that the Saudi regime played the card of the *Shiite* influence over the *Sunni*, accusing the *Shiite* Muslims of being "unbelievers." The reason behind adopting this sectarian stance was to eliminate the influence of the Islamic revolution of Iran over the Arab region (p.75). The position adopted by President Mubarak placed him in a defensive stance. Demonstrations stormed Cairo condemning the stance taken by the government. The demonstration sent a message to the regime that the public was less concerned about the alleged Iran-Hezbollah menace than about the antagonism toward Israel. Amid this inflammatory public opinion, Mubarak dispatched his son Gamal ahead of a delegation composed of parliament members, members of political parties, and politicians to Beirut in an expression of solidarity with the Lebanese public (Cook, 2012, p.242). This uncertainty on the part of the Egyptian government and the lack of a clear-cut stance toward the Israeli-Hezbollah fighting paved the ground for the Egyptian political parties and the opposition blocs to mount their criticism of the regime.

4.3.2 The Stance of the Opposition Movements

The opposition movements are divided into "legal" opposition, including the opposition political parties that were granted their license from the Egyptian regime (Collombier, 2013; Ottaway & Hamzawy 2007), and the "illegal" opposition, including the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood organization and the grass roots movements (Albrecht, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2007).

4.3.2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood group rejected the Saudi *fatwa* (Islamic verdict) viewing the 2006 war in Lebanon as another round in the confrontation between the *umma* (Muslim community) and "the American-supported Zionist plot" to control the Middle East. From the outset of the military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel, the Brotherhood called on Muslims to support what it viewed as the legitimate resistance of Hezbollah to "the onslaught of

the Zionist gangs."The group also condemned what they regarded as the "failure" of the Arab regimes to protect Lebanon (Hamzawy & Bishara, 2006, p.5). It even took a strong position against such efforts by theologians and pro-government intellectuals in the three "Moderate Sunni" countries of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, who sought to disparage the legitimacy and popularity of Hezbollah as "Shiite defectors-enemies of the Sunnis." Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood called for *jihad* (holy war) and announced its ability to mobilize 10,000 volunteers to defend what they viewed as the honor of the *umma* (p.6). In addition, the highest legal authority of the Muslim Brotherhood worldwide, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, declared that the *Shiite* Muslims were part of the Muslim Nation. Al-Qaradhawi expressed solidarity with Hezbollah in its fight with Israel regarding its resistance as being "legal *jihad*" (*"Mubarak: Egypt will not go to war for Lebanon"*, 2006).

4.3.2.2 Political Parties and Grassroots Movements

Despite the major differences in ideologies between the Egyptian political parties, the Lebanon war seemed to unite them in one mainstream attitude that could be summarized as total support for Hezbollah and harsh criticism of the Arab countries for their weakness in bringing the war to an end. *El-Wafd* Party, for example, one of the oldest opposition liberal parties in Egypt called – in one of its popular conferences–to "freeze" the peace treaty with Israel and suspend diplomatic ties (El-Hawary, 2006, p.1). The Nasserite Party went even further to call in one of its conferences for *jihad.* The party issued a statement on August 6, 2006 describing the war as an "American Zionist aggression" on Lebanon that was deterred by the brave Lebanese resistance headed by Hezbollah Chairman Hassan Nassrallal who uncovered the fragility of the Arab regimes and the weakness of the Zionist entity which could not survive without the support of the United States (*Al-Araby*, 2006, p.A1). The opposition and private newspapers disparaged the Arab and Egyptian governmental stance on the war. For example, the privately owned weekly newspaper of *Dustor* linked the Arab kings and presidents to the medieval princes who cooperated with the Crusaders and let them "eat away" the "Muslim Lands" (Hirst, 2010, p.360). In the same vein, *El-Ghad* (Tomorrow) Party organized an anti-war rally in downtown Cairo, raising posters of Hassan Nasralleh and the Party's Chairman, Ayman Nour. The Party's supporters praised the stances of both Nasralleh and Nour for their antagonism toward Israel and the United States (Cook, 2012, p.242). Throughout the war, the political parties tried to restore their weak impact in political life and maintain linkage with the outraged people demonstrating in the streets. A similar effort was done by the *Kifaya* movement, which received wide Egyptian support ever since its inception in 2004. The movement launched a campaign to collect one million signatures on a petition calling for the abolishment of the peace treaty with Israel (Hendawi, 2006).

4.3.3 Egyptian Public Opinion

The 2006 Lebanon war brought the Arab Israeli conflict to the forefront of the attention of the Egyptian public opinion. The Middle East conflict had been used by both the government and opposition for domestic aims. On one hand, the government took advantage of the Middle East conflict to divert attention from domestic grievances at home (Tessler & Grobschmidt, 1995, p.144). On the other hand, the opposition movements used the conflict to project their anger from the policies of the regime (El-Mahdi, 2009). Many Egyptians identified themselves with Hezbollah. There was a conviction in Egypt that the Islamic movement of Hezbollah restored the dignity of the Arabs (Slackman, 2006). As the war concluded, the political mood in Egypt was impressed by what it regarded as the victory of Hezbollah. In one of the public opinion surveys conducted by Ibn Khaldun Center in August 2006 to measure the popularity of the political figures among Egyptians, Hezbollah Chairman, Hassan Nasrallah, ranked first with 82%, followed by the Iranian President, Ahmadi Najjad, with 73%, then prominent Hamas figure Khaled Mesha'al, with 60%. None of the heads of Arab states were mentioned by the interviewees. The director of Ibn Khaldun Center Ibrahim (2006) explained that the results showed the orientation of the Egyptians toward Islamic figures and their disrespect to the ruling regimes viewing them to be "autocratic, corrupt and inept." Moreover, during the fasting month of Ramadan in 2006, retailers gave the nickname of "Nasrallah" and "Nasrallah rockets" to the best quality of dates selling them at $2 a pound, while the cheapest dates were given the nickname of "Bush" and "Olmert," selling them at just 11 cents a pound. The nicknames given to the dates in Egypt during the month of Ramadan were an indicator of the political mood of the Egyptian public opinion (Abou El-Magd, 2006).

4.4 "Arab-Islamic Nationalism" Perspective on the 2006 Lebanon War

The Middle East provided a good example through which the religious and cultural identities were contested. Political Islam and transcendental identities such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism laid the foundation to evaluate the role of ideologies and identities adopted by non-state movements in defining the foreign policy of the Middle East (Bassedas, 2009, p.16). Hezbollah's identity has multiple dimensions, combining both religious ideology and nationalism. The prominence of Hezbollah's religious rhetoric has diminished for the sake of wide national goals that allowed it to transcend the sectarian division in Lebanon and the Arab world. Without imposing its religious ideology, Hezbollah gained wide popularity in the Arab world with its different religious orientation and was perceived as "defender of the Lebanese state against the Israeli occupation," thus transcending religious differences between *Sunni* and *Shia* Islam (Bassedas, 2009, p.34; Hirst, 2010, p.359). This was mostly significant in the

demonstrations in the Arab world that supported Hezbollah during the 2006 war in Lebanon. In Sudan, for example, demonstrators called upon the Arab States to join Hezbollah "Pan-Islamic *Jihad.*" Similarly, in Yemen, demonstrators made a comparison between Hezbollah and the *Sunni* Palestinian group of Hamas and chanted "no to the shameful official Arab stance toward the Palestinians and Lebanese" (Hirst, 2010, p.359). Hezbollah *raison d'être* relied on its resistance to the Israeli occupation in Lebanon (Wärn, 2010, p.129).

Hamzawy (2006) contended that the 2006 Lebanon war has changed the political arena in the Arab world at two levels: first, a temporary change that lasted only during the 34 days of the war, and second, a structural change that contested the reality of the authoritarian regimes. The temporary affect of the Lebanon war was represented in the return of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the forefront of public concern. In this context, the resistance of Hezbollah, which combined Islamism and Pan-Arabism, became the source of political division between those who advocated the resistance of Hezbollah and those who called for peace with Israel to the extent that the political environment was polarized, rendering it difficult to achieve political consensus within the state. Beyond the temporary effect, Hamzawy (2006) added that the 2006 war in Lebanon revealed the political deficiency in the legitimacy of the Arab regimes. Declining popular acceptance of the policies of the regimes for alleviating their hardships and protecting human rights, paved the road for the rise of Islamic non-state opposition movements like the Muslim Brotherhood. Such movements overstepped the legitimacy of the political regime and drew their legitimacy from the transcendental notion of the *umma* (global Islamic community). For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt called for *jihad* in a challenge to the commitment of the Egyptian state to peace with Israel. Valbjørn and Bank (2007) declared that the Lebanon war of 2006 presented a new ideological frame that they referred to as "transnational Islamo-Arabic order." The notion of such an ideology lied in the similarities between the Pan-Arabism advocated by the "secular socialist leaning president," Gamal Abdel-Nasser, and Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who was hailed as the "only true Arab leader today" (p.10). Fundamentally, the failure of the "moderate Arab Sunni States" to rally around the pan-Arab flag advocated by Hezbollah led to "cold" confrontation between such regimes and non-states actors, like Hezbollah and Hamas, who succeeded to threaten the legitimacy of such regimes through their Islamic nationalist garb (p.10). Slackman (2006) observed that Hezbollah's perceived "victory" had given rise to another unifying ideology that he termed "Arab-Islamic nationalism." He elaborated by saying: "Political Islam was widely seen as the antidote to the failures of Arab nationalism, communism, socialism and, most recently, what is seen as the false promise of American-style democracy." Nevertheless, the Lebanon war of 2006 revealed the supremacy of religious over political culture. The banner of the "American-Zionist attack" on the "Islamic *umma*" was not only the domain of the Islamic non-state organization but was also used

by Pan-Arab leftist opposition movements (Hamzawy, 2006). Even the "moderate" states colored the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah with religious flavor to discredit the *Shiite* Hezbollah. The problem in this intersection between religion and politics, as explained by Hamzawy (2006), was that it reduced the complexities of politics to an "unending" confrontation between "good" and "evil," thus accentuating polarization and threatening the possibilities of peace. In essence, the debate in the Arab world over the 2006 Lebanon war centered on the binary of "victory" and "defeat." Aly (2006) contended that this binary reflected a "failure" on the Arab part to look at the regional and domestic development in the course of the war. This debate, which dominated Arab politics, was the focal point of the media in the Arab world. As a result, the media was part of the polarization of politics in the Arab countries, which led to the inter-state division between the Arab states as well as intra-state division between the Arab regimes and their public opinion. In the wake of the war, opinion in the Arab world varied from support of Hezbollah to condemnation of its behavior, which triggered the violence in the region (Aly, 2006, p.3). The source of this division was of two folds: first, lay partially on Hezbollah itself and its quest for legitimacy; and second, on the current state of Arab media (p.4). As for the nature of Hezbollah itself as a militant Islamic organization, the Arab regimes were reluctant to show support to Islamic insurgent movements that could threaten the stability in their regimes. For the first time, some Arab states and Israel found common ground in denouncing Hezbollah. The Arab public opinion, on the other side, found it hard to side with the Israeli point of view and was supportive of Hezbollah. The second source of division was embedded in the media itself. Aly (2006) hypothesized that the state-owned media rarely attributed the victorious role to Hezbollah, while the opposition media affiliated to the political parties or the privately owned media, on the contrary, glorified the "historical victory" of Hezbollah. The binary of "defeat" and "victory" reflected the competing political and cultural trends in the Arab World; one dwelled in the notion of Pan-Arabism and Islamic insurgency, and the other, adhered to liberal democracy, which supported the peaceful coexistence with Israel (p.4).

4.5 Summary and Discussion

The 2006 Lebanon war was a link in the chain in the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. Unlike the previous wars between the Arab world and Israel, the Lebanon war of 2006 took place in a changing regional and international political and cultural context. The international framework was significantly affected as a result of the United States war on "terror" and the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism in the early 21st century. The nature of antagonists in the Lebanon war accentuated this cultural and political view of the war. In particular, Hezbollah combined the Islamic identity and nationalist identity (Bassedas, 2009). The Islamic identity of Hezbollah was a source of division in the Arab region between those Arab states that supported Hezbollah and

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those known as "moderate Sunni States," which held Hezbollah accountable for the instability in the region (Aly, 2006; Hamzawy, 2006). The "moderate Sunni" Arab states viewed Hezbollah Islamic insurgency as a threat to their regimes (Aly, 2006). On the regional level, the Lebanon war in 2006 came amid structural and political transformation in the Arab world that contested the legitimacy of the Arab regimes. In Egypt, the growing discontent from the social and economic situation at home coupled with the regional violence of the second Palestinian *intifada* and the 2003 Iraq War helped in the emergence of heterogeneous opposition movements that questioned the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime (Albrecht, 2007, p.72). At the outset of the war, the Egyptian regime adhered to its commitment to peace with Israel, proposing ceasefire as the ultimate solution that would lead to stability in the region. The public opinion and the opposition camp, galvanized by the long-lasting negative attitude toward Israel, used the Arab-Israeli conflict as a pretext to mount their criticism of the Egyptian regime (El-Mahdi, 2009). In particular, the Lebanon war of 2006 was trapped between the religious discourse of "good" versus "evil," and the media discourse of "victory" versus "defeat" (Aly, 2006; Hamzawy, 2006). As for the religious discourse, the Muslim Brotherhood – the biggest opposition bloc in Egypt – viewed the Lebanon war as a "Zionist" war against the *umma* (Islamic Community). The Nasserite leftist party used the religious discourse, calling for *jihad* (holy war) in support of Hezbollah. The regime in Egypt and "moderate Sunni" states rode alongside the opposition and instrumentalized the religious discourse to support their negative political stance toward Hezbollah. They crystallized the conflict within a religious context as confrontation between *Sunni* and *Shiite* Islam (Bröning, 2008; Hamzawy, 2006). The use of religion in the political context reduced the war to a confrontation between "good" and "evil," thus thwarting the possibility of peace reconciliation (Hamzawy, 2006). On the media level, the 2006 Lebanon war was simplified within the binary of "victory" and "defeat" in the Arab press in general, and Egyptian press in particular. This led to the polarization of the political environment. The public opinion in Egypt hailed what they perceived as the victorious role of Hezbollah (Hirst, 2010, p.359). Moreover, it mounted its criticism of the regime, accusing it of weakness in the face of Israeli aggression. Amid this pressure from public opinion, the authoritarian regime shunned criticism by dispatching a delegation of high-level politicians and public figures headed by the president's son, Gamal Mubarak, to Lebanon in solidarity with the Lebanese people (Cook, 2012, p.242). Despite these endeavors from the regime to mollify the public opinion by presenting itself as moderator of peace, the political environment in Egypt remained polarized to the extent that it thwarted constructive dialogue between the regime and the opposition movements.

CHAPTER FIVE
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 Aim of the Study

This study is based on the framing analysis within the constructionist approach as frames are affected by social, cultural, historical and political factors (Gamson, 1992; Gamson et al., 1992; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; O'Regan, 2007:2010; Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). It seeks to detect and compare the media frames of the 2006 Lebanon war in three Egyptian newspapers representing the state press, the liberal privately-owned press, and the leftist partisan press. The study involves the contextual analysis of Egyptian-Israeli relations as well as the political and media environment characterizing Egypt. The essence behind studying the framing of an issue is to reach an understanding of the flow of power in the society (Maher, 2001, p.88). Based on Edelman's (1993) conceptualization of frames as a dependent variable affected by the ideology, it is assumed in the study that the ideological tendencies of the newspapers play a tangible role in the framing of the issue. Figure (1) alludes to the structure of analysis. As articulated in detail in Chapters Three and Four, the Egyptian authority exerts different pressures on the press to force it to comply with its set of norms. In many cases, the Arab-Israeli conflict was used by the regime to deviate attention from the problems at home that questioned the credibility of the government. On the other hand, the Egyptian public opinion and opposition blocs exploited the conflict to mount their criticism of the regime. Despite the fact that Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the Egyptian media restored a sour tone toward Israel in its coverage of the Arab-Israeli prolonged conflict (Dowek, 2001; El-Bendary, 2010; El-Nawawy, 2002; Kamal, 2008; Stein, 1997; Talhami, 2007). Conceptually, the study attempts to identify the main frames of the Lebanon war in 2006 as presented in the Egyptian press and to explore the role of media in covering conflicts in accordance with Galtung's peace journalism and war journalism typology (Galtung, 2000; Kempf, 2007a).

5.2 Questions and Hypotheses of the Study

The war of 2006 that took place on the soil of Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel revealed genuine intra-state differences between the official governmental stance and the opposition camp in Egypt. The position of the government as expressed by President Mubarak condemned the "disproportional" use of force by Israel, albeit it held Hezbollah responsible for dragging the region to war (Macleod, 2006). The Egyptian state formed an alliance with both Saudi Arabia and Jordan and condemned the "adventure" of Hezbollah, accusing it of dragging

the region into violence (Hersh, 2006). The opposition with its wide ideological spectrum used the Lebanon war of 2006 and the agitated anti-Israeli sentiment in the Egyptian society due to the long historical wars between Egypt and Israel (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973) to escalate its criticism toward the regime. It pointed to the procrastination of the Arab regimes in stepping in to attempt to stop the war and the accomplice of the international community against Lebanon. The opposition bloc denounced the claims of the regime and engaged in collective actions such as demonstration and popular conferences in solidarity with Lebanon (Cook, 2012; Hamzawy & Bishara, 2006; Hendawi, 2006; Hirst, 2010). The two main questions of the study were formed to explore the different trends in the Egyptian media as a mirror of the political situation in Egypt during the period of the war.

Questions of the Study.

Q1: Does the use of frames for the 2006 Lebanon war vary significantly between newspapers? Based on many studies identifying the frames in the Middle East conflict in international newspapers, it was clear that there are no dominant media frames with regard to the Arab-Israeli struggle (Gamson, 1992; Hackett & Schroeder, 2009; Kara & Atabey, 2013; O'Regan, 2010; Ross, 2003; Shinar, 2009). Within the same nation, there are different frames on the same topic dependent on political context (Gamson, 1992), media autonomy, societal engagement in the conflict (Fahmy, 2007), organizational and professional norms (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; Kamal, 2008), and the degree of internal opposition in the society. Wolfsfeld pointed out that whenever there is an elite consensus about a specific political issue, the media tends to reveal the dominant frame with minimal questions about its validity. But, when the level of opposition grows, alternative frames emerge in the media (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.28). The 2006 Lebanon war raised several issues with regard to the degree of opposition in the Egyptian society and the viewpoint of the different political players toward regional states indirectly involved in the conflict as well as the stance of the regime and the opposition toward Hezbollah (Blanford, 2006; Bröning, 2008; Hirst, 2010; Pressman, 2006; Sobelman, 2010). Based on that, the study expects to find competing frames of the war in accordance with the political and social context.

Q2: How do the newspapers differ in emphasizing peace and war journalism frames? The second question is seen within the contextual frame of the mediatory role of Egypt in the Middle East conflict. The political discourse of the Egyptian state was in support of the peaceful solution to end the Lebanon war (Macleod, 2006). On the contrary, the opposition movements and political parties took a favorable stance toward Hezbollah accusing the regimes of the "Moderate Sunni" states of failure to protect Lebanon (Hamzawy & Bishara, 2006; Hirst, 2010). The state press assumed to reflect the viewpoint of the regime, which inclined toward solving the tension between Israel and any Arab state through negotiations. Nonetheless, the suspicious

sentiment toward Israel that characterized the popular level drove the press to focus more on elements of war journalism in order to match the political context of the angry public. Therefore, it is expected that there will be diversity between the Egyptian newspapers in using the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames.

Hypotheses of Study. H1: There is significant difference between the newspapers in framing of the 2006 war in Lebanon.

This hypothesis is seen within the constructionist approach in the sense that the media is a site of frame contestation due to the difference between the political players with regard to the war. Related to this hypothesis are several others.

H2: The state-owned press *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the Egyptian regime in displaying the "reconciliation" frame more likely than *Masry* and *Araby*.

H3: The leftist Pan Arab press *Araby* is likely to display the "heroic Hezbollah" frame more than *Ahram* and *Masry*.

Literature review showed that the position of the leftist Pan-Arab press *Araby* was in support of Hezbollah during the war. It extolled its performance to deter the Israeli offences (Refer to Chapter Four, section 4.3.2.2).

With regard to the Galtung competing peace and war journalism frames, the main hypothesis is:

H4: The newspapers differ significantly in terms of their inclination toward war journalism and peace journalism frames.

Related to this hypothesis are several others:

H5: The state-owned *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the regime and displays more elements of the peace journalism frame than the war journalism frame.

H6: The liberal newspaper *Masry* is more likely to use elements of the peace journalism frame than the war journalism frame.

H7: The leftist Pan-Arab newspaper *Araby* is more likely to use elements of the war journalism frame than the peace journalism frame.

Hypotheses 6 and 7 were assumed based on literature review that inferred that the political leanings of the newspapers played an intrinsic role in their preferences toward Galtung's competing frame. The leftist newspapers were inclined to be more propagandistic in their coverage than the liberal press, which was proned toward peace journalism (Lynch, 2006).

5.3 Framing Definition of the Study

There is no standard definition of framing. Among the many definitions of framing mentioned earlier was that of Gamson and Modigliani (1989) "as a central organizing idea or story line that provided meaning to an unfolding strip of events." Gamson and Modigliani's modified model of framing suggested that *frame* is the internal structure or core of "media packages."The task of these "packages" is to construct meaning over time and incorporate news events into their interpretive frames (pp.3-4). These "packages" are guided by "symbolic devices" that suggest how to think of an issue. These devices are metaphors, exemplars (i.e. historical examples from which lessons are drawn, catch phrases, depiction, and visuals). Gamson and Modigliani suggested in their model that these framing packages and symbolic devices, as well as reasoning devices (i.e. roots or casual analysis, consequences or type of effect, and appeals to principle or set of moral claims of an issue), form what they call "signature matrix" (p.3). Another definition of framing was presented by Entman (1993) as "*to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described*" (p.52). The frame, according to Entman's definition, is intended to perform several functions: First, frame defines the problem and identifies what the casual agents are doing and with what costs. Second, it diagnoses the causes and identifies the forces responsible for the problem. Third, frame evaluates moral judgment of the problem in an attempt to determine its effects. Finally, it recommends remedies and solution for the problem (p.52). To frame an issue involves *selection* and *salience* of that issue. There are different ways to make an issue salient through placement, repetition, or association with culturally familiar symbols (p.53). For the purpose of this study, the definition of framing imposed by Entman is applied in order to determine the issue of war, identify the antagonists and effects of the war, diagnose the problem and suggest remedies for it. Frames, according to Entman, are not homogeneous in the different levels of analysis even if the problem definition, casual analysis, and moral judgment are homogenous. The remedies may differ based on the political context and the discourse of power (Entman, 1993, p.55).

5.4 Conceptual Frames of the 2006 Lebanon War in the Egyptian Press

The study aimed to investigate the main media frames of covering the 2006 war in Lebanon and to explore the orientation of the Egyptian press toward the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames.

5.4.1 First: Main Frames

The Middle East conflict lured many studies to use different techniques to explore the framing of the conflict (Gamson, 1992; Gavriely-Nur & Balas, 2010; Kara & Atabey, 2013; O'Regan, 2010; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Wolfsfeld (1997) used the "signature matrix" developed by Gamson and Modigliani in his analysis of the Palestinian *intifada* in the American and Israeli newspapers of *The New York Times, Yediot Ahronot,* and *Ha'aretz* from December 10, 1987, to December 31, 1987, as well as coding the official governmental statements of the Israelis and the Palestinians. He identified two main frames: the *law and order* frame, and the *injustice and defiance* frame. The *law and order* frame was the dominant frame in the Israeli press which viewed the intifada as a threat to the Israeli citizens (p.146). The *law and order* frame was a "defensive" frame that denied any accusation of Israeli brutality against Palestinians. On the other side, the *injustice and defiance* frame was used extensively in the Palestinian official leaflets focusing on the evil of the Israeli occupation and calling upon the need to stand for the Palestinian rights (147). In his analysis of a wide range of American media on a long period of time from 1948- the date of declaration of the state of Israel- until the *intifada* of 1987, Gamson (1992) identified four frames used in the American media discourse in covering the Arab-Israeli conflict. They are the following: the *strategic interests,* which viewed the Middle East as a hotbed for competing interests of major powers in the region; the *feuding neighbors,* which viewed the conflict as a vicious circle of bigotry and the real victims were the bystanders not the combatants (p.54); the *Arab intransigence* frame, which pointed to the unwillingness of the Arab state to recognize the existence of Israel; and finally, the *Israeli expansionism* frame, which pointed to the responsibility of Israel, which attempted to expand its size at the expense of the Arab state. Gamson proved that the mainstream frame in the coverage of the Middle East was the *feuding Neighbor* frame (Gamson, 1992). Kara and Atabey (2013) reached similar results. They inferred that in framing the 2003 Iraq War and the 2006 Lebanon war, the dominant frames were the *military* frame and *violence of war* frame (p.178). O'Regan (2010) identified four frames of the Lebanon war of 2006 in the Irish Press: the *Israeli security/'War on Terror'* frame that justified the Israeli aggression to deter Hezbollah "terrorism"; the *Israeli aggression/Lebanese resistance* frame that criticized the "illegal" violence of Israel, presenting the violence of Hezbollah as a "reactive" response to Israeli aggression; the *Lebanese democracy/regional stability* frame that avoided attribution of responsibility and presented peace as a solution for the stability in the region; and finally, the *another round of futile violence in the Middle East* frame that portrayed the 2006 Lebanon war as another round of a vicious circle of violence, which took the lives of both Lebanese and the Israeli civilians (p. 171). She concluded that there was no dominant frame in the framing of the Lebanon war as the Irish press was site of frame contestation (p.177).

This study relied on the *deductive* approach in identifying frames of the 2006 war in Lebanon in the materials under study. The *deductive* approach is based on previous studies to identify and operationalize the frames (DeVreese, 2005, p. 53). Based on literature review, the study identified six main frames as follows: victims/feuding neighbors frame (1), strategic interest frame (2), reconciliation frame (3), heroic Hezbollah frame (4), protest frame (5), and responsibility frame (6) (Gamson, 1992; Gavriely-Nur & Balas, 2010; Kara & Atabey, 2013; O'Regan, 2010; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Furthermore, the study focused on Galtung's competing frames of war journalism and peace journalism.

1. *Victims/Feuding Neighbors* **Frame.** Gamson (1992) viewed the frame as *feuding neighbors* where the bystanders were the victims; while Wolfsfeld (1997) in his analysis of the Palestinian *intifada* regarded it as *injustice and defiance* frame of the Palestinians. O'Regan (2010) recognized it in her analysis of the 2006 Lebanon war as *another round of futile violence in the Middle East*. This current study combined the *injustice and defiance* frame of Wolfsfeld and the *feuding neighbors* of Gamson and *another round of futile violence in the Middle East* of O'Regan into one frame called *Victims/feuding neighbors*. The main features of this frame are:

- Innocent Lebanese bystanders were victimized as a result of Israeli aggression.
- Innocent Lebanese bystanders were victimized as a result of the fight between Hezbollah and Israel.
- Innocent Lebanese bystanders were victimized without implication about who was to blame.
- Innocent civilians of other nationalities were targets of violence in Lebanon (with or without attribution of responsibility to rivaling parties).
- The Lebanon war had an effect on economic and ecological stability in the region.
- Throughout its history, Lebanon paid the price for instability in the region.
- The 2006 Lebanon war is a chain in the prolonged history of violence between the Arabs and Israel.
- Lebanon lacked full authority over its land as a result of Israeli occupation and Hezbollah control over the southern part.

2. *Strategic Interest* **Frame.** This frame is borrowed from Gamson (1992). The frame regards the 2006 war in Lebanon as a global chess game between regional powers. The regional powers are interfering in this war by taking sides and supporting one of the rivalries. While Gamson viewed this frame within the Cold War paradigm and the growing influence of the Soviet Union, this study modified it to fit the rivalry between Iran and the United States. The main features of this frame are:

- The United States had special interests in the Middle East and sought the re-birth of a new Middle East.

- The United States supported Israel in this War.
- Iran and its regional allies had interest in the Middle East.
- Iran and the U.S. sought to deploy their influence in the region.
- The Lebanon war of 2006 was a proxy war between Hezbollah and its allies (Iran and Syria) and Israel and its ally (the United States).

3. *Reconciliation* **Frame.** Borrowed from literature review, the *reconciliation* frame is similar to the frame of *Lebanon democracy/regional stability* frame in O'Regan's (2010) study. The main feature of this frame is that the peaceful solution is the ultimate aim for restoring the regional stability in the Middle East.

- The diplomatic efforts exerted by Egypt as a main broker of peace in the region were essential to reaching a ceasefire.
- The international community and the efforts of the United States administration were welcomed for reaching peace.
- The UN Resolution 1701 paved the road for peace in the Middle East.

4. *Heroic Hezbollah* **Frame.** This frame is borrowed from the study of Gavriely-Nur and Balas (2010) with further modification to cope with the historical and political context in Egypt. In their study, Gavriely-Nur and Balas identified the features of the *hero* frame and *victim* frames by comparing the coverage of Israeli television on the injured Israeli soldiers and injured Israeli civilians. They found that the *victim* frame applied to civilians while the *hero* frame applied to Israeli soldiers. The *victim* frame is "euphemized and esthetic" (p.410). It tends to expose bleeding organs, personal suffering, and mess and confusion surrounding the atmosphere. On the contrary, the *hero* frame annihilates some characteristics of the event like the injuries of the Israeli soldiers and their wounds and suffering. The *hero* frame shows the Israeli wounded soldier sitting or sleeping comfortably. His wounds are often covered by a blanket or not shown. The soldier is portrayed as being calm with no sense of pain or crying (p.414). This study uses the same technique to indentify the *hero* frame of Hezbollah by comparing between the military performance of both Israeli and Hezbollah soldiers. This frame focuses on the binary of Hezbollah and Israel without including Lebanon as an actor. The main features of this frame are:

- Israel lost the war with Hezbollah.
- Hezbollah won the war over Israel.
- Hezbollah was the torchbearer of resistance.
- The Israeli Army was suffering from defeat.
- The Israeli soldiers were tired and exhausted
- Hezbollah had successful military tactics in the battlefield.

5. *Protest* **Frame.** This frame is similar to the *Reaction to War* frame identified by Kara and Atabey (2013) in their framing analysis of the 2006 war in Lebanon and the 2003 Iraq War in

Cypriot newspapers. This frame tackles the demonstration as reaction to the war. The main features of this frame are:

- Anti-war protests in Egypt and worldwide calling for the stop of violence in Lebanon.
- The anti-war protests in Egypt and worldwide condemned the excessive use of force by Israel.
- Pro-war demonstrations in support for Hezbollah were present in some countries.

6. *Responsibility* **Frame.** This frame is similar to Semetko and Valkenburg's (2000) frame of *responsibility*. It pointed to the responsibility of instigating the war. It is easy to confuse this frame with the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame in pointing to the responsibility of either Hezbollah or Israel. Nevertheless, this frame points to the responsibility of the actors NOT involved in the conflict. For example, this frame points to the responsibility of the Egyptian regime, the weakness of the Arab stance, and/or the reluctances of the international community to stop the war. This frame excludes the responsibility of the main allies of the rivaling parties like Iran and U.S. In other words, this frame is only directed to the responsibility of the Arabs, and/or Egypt, and/or the UN to stop the violence.

- Arab weakness provided a cover for the Israeli aggression.
- The Egyptian regime adopted a weak stance in the conflict.
- The United Nations was not successful in resolving the conflict.
- Some Arab countries were accomplice to war.
- The weakness of the Arab and/or Egyptian regime led to the escalation of the conflict.

5.4.2 Second: War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames

From an aggregate perspective, there are two approaches in reporting news of conflicts and wars: the peace journalism frame and the war journalism frame (Galtung, 1985:2000; Hanitzsch, 2004; Kempf, 2007a). Based on that, the frames of covering the 2006 Lebanon war could fit into either one of the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames depending on the elements of covering the war. Conceptualizing the war journalism and peace journalism frames was best introduced by Lee and Maslog (2005) in their quantitative analysis of ten English-speaking Asian newspapers in covering regional Asian conflicts. They compiled the elements of war journalism and peace journalism frames in thirteen conceptual indicators providing a methodology that enables researchers to identify these elements. Table (3) explores the elements of war and peace journalism as suggested by Lee and Maslog.

Table (3): Lee and Maslog Typology of War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames

War Journalism	Peace Journalism
Reactive	Proactive
Visible effects of war	Invisible effects of war
Elite-oriented	People-oriented
Differences-oriented	Agreement-oriented
Focuses on the here and now	Causes and consequences of war
Dichotomizes the good and bad	Avoids labeling of good and bad
Two-party orientation	Multi-party orientation
Partisan	Non-partisan
Zero sum orientation	Win-win orientation
Stops reporting and leaves after war	Stays on to report aftermath of war
War Journalism Language	**Peace Journalism Language**
Uses victimizing language	Avoids victimizing language
Uses demonizing language	Avoids demonizing language
Uses emotive language	Avoids emotive language

Borrowing from this typology, this study focused on six major elements to compare the three newspapers under study in terms of their tendency toward favoring either frame (Lee & Maslog, 2005; McGoldrick, 2007; Shinar, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2004). The six elements were: here and now/wider aspect of war (1), visual effects of war/non visual effects of war (2), elite oriented/people oriented (3), war oriented/agreement oriented (4), zero sum/win-win orientation (5), partisan/non-partisan (6).

5.4.2.1 Features of War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames

The current study borrowed six features from the operational analysis of war journalism and peace journalism frames provided by Lee and Maslog (2005). These operational elements were:

1. *Here and now* refers to the immediate events of the war as happened between antagonists in the battlefield. It seeks to answer the questions of "what, when, where, who, and how." The *Wider aspect of war* element refers to the aggregate contextual events surrounding the events of the war. It focuses on events of demonstration and negotiations occurred on the margins of the war.

2. *Visual effects of war* element depicts the direct vivid effects of the war as the casualties, wounded, death, or physical damage to infrastructure. On the other hand, the element of

non-visual effects deals with aspects of trauma and environmental and ecological damage. The *non-visual effects of war* found its roots from the notion of Galtung who viewed the task of a peace journalist as focusing on the suffering –particularly of women and children (Galtung, 2000, p.163)

3. ***Elite-oriented*** refers to the use of elite sources for information. The element of ***people oriented*** refers to the use of non-elite sources of news such as parliament members, religious clerics, students, media persons, civilians, doctors or humanitarian workers.

4. ***War oriented*** focuses on aspects that enhance bigotry and revenge between antagonists. It suggests violence and counter-action as remedies of war. ***Agreement oriented*** seeks reconciliation and peaceful solution as a remedy of war. Kempf (2011) emphasized that war discourse tended to answer the questions: "Who is guilty? How can they be stopped?" On the other hand, peace discourse sought to answer the questions: "What is the problem? How can it be solved?"

5. The ***zero-sum*** element focuses on the superiority of one side over the other side in the battlefield. On the other hand, ***win-win*** element presents the war as a vicious circle of violence with no victory for any side.

6. The **partisan** element is biased to one side of the conflict, whereas **non-partisan** is not taking sides and putting the blame on both sides. It could also point to the culpability of a third party which exploits the rivalries for its own interests.

5.5 Methodology

5.5.1 Data Collection

This thesis investigates the frames of the 2006 Lebanon war provided by three Egyptian newspapers representing three ideological tendencies: state-owned press, *Al-Ahram*, liberal privately-owned press, *Al-Masry al-youm*, and leftist partisan press, *Al-Araby,* during the war. The period of the study is the 34 days of the war using the purposive sample starting from 13 July, 2006, one day after the war erupted, until 15 August, one day after the cease-fire truce between Hezbollah and Israel. As for the weekly edition of the leftist Pan-Arab newspaper *Al-Araby*, five editions are coded during the period of the war in 2006: 16 July, 23 July, 30 July, 6 August, and 13 August. The newspapers are chosen based on the prominence and the influence of the newspaper in the Egyptian society. *Al-Ahram* is a state -owned newspaper with a circulation of 700,000 in the year 2003 (Rugh, 2004, p.123). The privately-owned liberal *Al-Masry al-youm* claimed to be the fourth most read newspaper in Egypt behind the three state-owned newspapers, *Al-Ahram, Al-Akhbar,* and *Al-Gumhuriya,* with a circulation of over 50,000 in the year 2006 (Arab Press Network, 2006). In addition, *Al-Masry Al-youm* became one of the most influential privately owned newspapers in the mid 2000s. It was the first privately owned

newspaper to conduct an exclusive interview with the president of the state ahead of the presidential elections in 2005, which was typically the domain of the state-owned press (Levinson, 2005, p.224). As for the leftist Pan-Arab newspaper *Al-Araby*, it is affiliated with the leftist Arab Democratic Nasserite Party representing the ideology of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser. The Nasserite Pan-Arab ideology remains an inspiring ideology for many grassroots movements not only in Egypt but also in the whole Arab world (Nafaa, 1987). The study categorizes the newspapers according to their ideology as well as ownership. The main division is according to the ideological tendency (state, liberal, Pan-Arab leftist). Subdivision is according to the ownership (governmental, private, and partisan). There are other parties and political movements well established in the Egyptian political arena, such as the strong opposition bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood, but the outlawed group does not have a newspaper of its own during the time of this war. The data is collected by the hard copies of the newspapers *Al-Araby* and *Al-Masry*. Only the *Al-Ahram* newspaper is analyzed from its online edition due to the difficulty of obtaining the hard copies. The second level of sampling is the census, which compiles all the written news, editorials and photos representing the 2006 war in Lebanon. Translated materials from other foreign newspapers, charts, maps, and graphic illustrations are excluded from the analysis. In order to compile the texts and the photos representing the war, each page from the hard copies was read. The same applied to the online edition of *Al-Ahram* where each article in the website of the newspaper was read to determine the texts and photos relevant to 2006 Lebanon war. A total of 1.728 materials were analysed, including 756 in *Al-Ahram*, 822 in *Al-Masry*, and 150 in the weekly *Al-Araby.* In order to bridge the gap between the numbers of the dailies and the weekly newspapers, the study weights the weekly *Al-Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies. To facilitate the interpretation of results, the newspapers are called by their names only (*Ahram, Masry, and Araby*).

The frames in the study are explored on two different levels. The first level identifies the frames of Lebanon war in 2006 based on the deductive approach. In the second level, the frames are studied according to their orientation toward Galtung's competing war journalism and peace journalism framing approach. The study is based on the quantitative content analysis of the news texts, editorials and opinion articles, and photos representing the war in the three newspapers. The analysis relies on newspapers and not other media outlets due to the easiness of retrieving the materials under study. Content analysis as a method is applied as it allowed for hypothesis testing. One of the earliest and classic definitions of content analysis was introduced by Berelson (1971) defining it as "a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (p.18). Neuendorf (2002) presented another definition by saying that "content analysis is a summarizing, quantitative analysis of message that relies on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity-inter subjectivity,

a priori design, reliability, validity, generalizability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) and is not limited to the types of variables that may be measured or the context in which the messages are created or presented" (p.10). Krippendorf (2013) defined content analysis as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (p. 24). The content analysis in the study is a two-level hierarchal technique. On the first level, the study focuses on the textual material and visual representation as a whole. The texts and photos representing the 2006 Lebanon War are coded in terms of name of newspaper, date, ownership, and ideological tendency of the newspaper. The main argument of the study is that the framing of the 2006 war is affected by the ideological orientation of the newspaper. Figure (1) shows the structural analysis of the study.

Figure (1) Structural Analysis of the Study

Independent variables
-ideological and organizational structure

→

Dependent variables
-frames
peace/war journalism

→

Lebanon war of 2006 in Egyptian press

On the second level, the study analyzes the theme in the news. The "theme" is referred to by Holsti (1969) as "assertion" and by Lasswell, Lerner, and Pool (1952) as "statement" and by Berelson (1971) as "theme." Identification of "theme" was introduced by Rapoport (1969) by saying a "theme is identified by stating who does what, how, to whom, according to whom" (p.33). The "theme" from Rapoport's point of view is a statement that forms a complete idea about the action, the actors, the form of action, and the source of statement. A "theme" according to Pan and Kosicki (1993) is defined as "an idea that connects different semantic elements of a story (e.g., description of an action or actor, quotes of sources, and background information into coherent whole". They regard each "theme" as formulating a particular frame (p.59). Despite the comprehensiveness of the "theme" as a unit of analysis, it has some drawbacks. Among the drawbacks of the "theme" as a unit of analysis is that it is difficult to set its boundaries, which affects its reliability (Berelson, 1971; Holsti, 1969). The study relies on Pan and Kosicki's identification of "theme" considering each "theme" to present a frame (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.59).

5.5.2 Unit of Analysis

As shown in figure (2), the study based its content analysis on a hierarchy way of coding the whole text on the first level and the "theme" of the text on the second level (Baeva, 2014). On the first level of analysis, two units of analysis are used, the whole text (news and editorials) and the photo as a whole unit. In the second level, the "theme" as a complete idea is regarded as a unit of analysis in the news texts (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.59). The components of the "theme" in news texts are: action, actors, consequences of action, legitimization of action, and quoted sources of information. Van Dijk (1988) argued that the macrostructure of the news (topics) and the schema that organize them do not appear in the news on sequential manner. In the top of the macrostructure is the headline, followed by the leading paragraph, and then the lower macro proposition of the report which consist of the content, and the summary. The beginning of the news text "always" contained the most important information (p.15). Based on the assumption of Van Dijk's, the study analyzes the first three themes in the news text due to their importance. Each theme represents a particular frame. The theme in the news text is coded according to action (1), consequence of action (2), actors (3), role of actors (4), legitimization of action (5), and source of information (6). If the text has more than three themes, the rest are excluded from analysis. For the purpose of the study, the main components of the news texts are "action," "consequence," "actors," and "roles." In many cases, the "legitimization of action" and the "sources of information" quoted are not written in the text. Thus, the study does not consider them main components. The editorial as a journalistic genre is important to be analyzed since it "is THE formulation place for newspaper ideologies" (Van Dijk, 1989, p.252). The editorial as a complete unit of analysis is coded according to the position of the writer (1), appeal to principle (2), end result of war (3), and finally, historical events mentioned – if any – in the text (4). In order to achieve accuracy, the position of the writer mentioned implicitly or explicitly is used to identify the frame. Only the first two positions and remedies suggested in the editorial text are coded due to their salience. If the writer mentioned more than two positions and suggested more than two solutions, then the others are excluded from coding. In this study, the main components of the editorials are "position of the writer," and the "remedy suggested." In many cases, the editorial texts defy including the "end result of the war" and the "historical events." Regarding the photo, it is considered as a whole unit based on previous studies (Fahmy, 2007; Parry, 2010; Schwalbe, 2013). The photo representing the 2006 Lebanon war is analyzed according to focus region (1), role (2), and depiction in the photo (3). For those photos depicting humans, categories that explored the age, physical harm and emotional harm are included (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012). Figure (2) represents the hierarchy analysis of the study.

Figure (2) Hierarchy of Analysis

5.5.3 Variables of Analysis

The study investigates the frames in news texts, editorials, and photos. All the materials under study were subject to the same variables identifying the name of newspaper, date, ownership, and ideological tendency of the news outlet.

Name of newspaper: Only three newspapers were coded *Ahram, Masry*, and *Araby*

Date of issue: 34 days were coded; starting from July 13, one day after the war erupted, until August 15, 2006, one day after the cease-fire was implemented.

Week of issue: The study divided the weeks into five consecutive ones: week 1 (13 July-19 July), week 2 (20 July-26 July), week 3 (27 July- 2 August), week 4 (3 August-9 August), and week 5 (10 August-15 August).

Ownership: The item divides the newspaper into governmental press, privately owned, and partisan press affiliated to the political party.

Ideology: This item measures the political tendency of the newspaper in which the material is coded and includes state press, liberal press, and leftist Pan-Arab press.

Genre: This includes news, opinion of the newspaper that is usually not signed by a writer, and editorial/column/op-ed, which are signed and embedded in the opinion page in the newspaper.

Text size: This item is divided into three categories depending on the number of paragraphs: from 3 to 5 paragraphs, from 5 to 8 paragraphs, and more than 8 paragraphs. If the article has less than 3 paragraphs, it is excluded from analysis.

After identifying the nature of the material, the materials were then coded according to specific categories

5.5.3.1 Categories of News Texts

News texts were analyzed based on the following categories:

Form of Action: The action in cognitive studies is a "dialectical relations" among people acting within a cognitive "context" or environment that determines the nature of their behaviors (lave, 1988, p.150). In the study, the action is divided into weaponry actions (bombardment, air raids, panzer, kidnapped, patrolling of tanks, blockade), demonstration, negotiations, humanitarian supply, and "others," which does not fit into any of the previously mentioned action.

Consequence of Action: This category refers to the aftermath of the action. It is categorized into killings/wounding/kidnapping, destruction of roads and buildings, humanitarian trauma (deportation of refugees), economic and ecological consequences, negotiation, demonstration, and "others."

Nationalities of actors: This category concerns the nationalities of the actors mentioned in the news text. The actors are either directly or indirectly involved in war. This category encompasses Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, Hezbollah, the U.S., European countries, pro-Hezbollah countries (Iran and Syria), anti-Hezbollah countries (Saudi Arabia and Jordan), international organizations (United Nations, Arab League, Red Cross), and others. It's worth mentioning that the study distinguished between "Lebanon" and "Hezbollah" as actors despite the fact that Hezbollah is a political faction within the state of Lebanon. This is due to the distinction drawn by the Egyptian officials on the actors directly involved in the conflict (See Chapter Four, section 4.3.1). Moreover, the regional actors who are not directly involved in the war are divided based on their political stance to Hezbollah, to include "pro-Hezbollah nations," like Syria and Iran, and "anti-Hezbollah nations," like Saudi Arabia and Jordan (See Chapter Four, section 4.3).

Roles of Actors: This item identifies the role mentioned for the actor in the text. Roles are categorized as either "perpetrator," the one who did the action, "victim," the one who the action fell upon, "negotiator," the one who discussed the ceasefire and mediated between antagonists to end the violence, "demonstrator," the one who protested against the war or in support of any of the rivalries, "rescuer/humanitarian worker," the one who helped among rescuing teams to save victims, and "other," whose role was not any of the described roles.

Legitimatization of Action: This category identifies the moral casual justification for the action. It is divided into "self defense," "destroy Hezbollah arsenal," "occupation/aggression," "free POW," "deploy influence in the region,""restore peace/supply humanitarian aids," "demonstration/condemnation," "retaliation/ re-action, "and "other."

Source of Information by Nationality: This category applies to the quotation said by the sources of news in the text. It is classified based on the nationality of the sources of information, which is the same as the categories of the nationality of the actors.

Source of Information by Occupation: This refers to the status of the sources of news. It is classified into three items: "elite governmental," such as the president, ministers, head of UN organization; "elite military," such as the military leader of a militant group, minister of defense and commander of an army; and "non-elite," such as civilian, cleric, parliament member, media person, humanitarian worker, student, and anyone who does not hold governmental position.

5.5.3.2 Categories of Editorials and Opinion Texts

Categories of editorials are designed to diagnose the issue from the viewpoint of the writer of the editorial and to investigate the remedy suggested. They are divided into:

Depiction of Position: This item refers to the position of the writer as explicitly or implicitly said in the text. It is divided into 10 items as follows: "Hezbollah adventure dragged the region to war";"Hezbollah fight proxy-war for Iran"; "Confrontation of wills in the region between the U.S. and Iran"; "Israeli aggression to expand its land from ocean to gulf"; "Lebanon as a land and people is paying the price of this war"; "Diplomatic efforts in Egypt and worldwide to reach ceasefire"; "U.S. hegemony in the region and re-birth of new Middle East"; "Hezbollah is the torchbearer of resistance"; "Arab/Egyptian silence and weakness led to further Israeli aggression"; and "other."

Remedy (appeal) suggested: Sometimes, the text contains a remedy or solution for the conflict suggested by the writer. If the remedy is suggested, it is divided into the following: "disarmament of Hezbollah diplomatically"; "military solution to deter Israel"; "restore peace and reconciliation"; "freeze the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel"; "Lebanese government of Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora should extend its influence over all Lebanon"; and "other."

End Result of the War: This variable is divided into "Hezbollah won," "Israel won," "no one won," "Lebanon lost, "and "Israel lost."

Historical Background: In some cases, the editorials and opinion texts contain historical background information to support the main idea of the editorial text. This variable is categorized into "Arab-Israeli history of wars 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973," "Invasion of Lebanon 1982," "Iraq War 1991 and/or 2003," "War on terror 11 September 2001," "Israeli

withdrawal from Lebanon 2000," "Qana in south Lebanon 1996," "peace accords between Arab nations and Israel," and "others."

5.5.3.3 Categories of Visuals

The visuals are analyzed based on the caption and the content of the photo.

Regional focus: This category refers to the location where the photo was captured. The caption is analyzed to identify the regional focus. This category is coded the same as the category of the nationalities of actors in the news.

Role: Based on previous studies (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012), the roles are categorized as "insurgent,", "victim," "negotiator," "demonstrator," and finally, "other," if it does not adjust into any of the mentioned roles. Any photo showing military officers, or patrolling tanks, or jet fighters is considered as "insurgent."The "victim" item includes all the photos that capture human or infrastructure damage. The "victim" item applies to the human casualties, refugee suffering, and infrastructure damage. It also encompasses the symbolic representation of the dead as well. For instance, a person captured holding a portrait photo of a dead person is considered "victim." By the same token, a grave marker, or empty helm, shoe or coffins are symbols of death thus coded as "victim" (Roth et al., 2007, p.259). The "negotiator" in the photo is determined if the caption and the photo specified the mediatory role of the antagonists. In some cases, the antagonist is coded in one photo as "perpetrator" and in another photo as "negotiator" depending on his role as mentioned in the caption and identified in the visual. Finally, the "demonstrator" is that role given to an antagonist who protested against the war or in support of any of the rivaling parties.

Main Depiction: This category is borrowed from Schwalbe's (2013) study on visual framing of the 2003 Iraq War. The depiction of the photo reveals the contextual atmosphere and provides further information about the content of the photo. The depiction is categorized into the following items:

1. "Weaponry activities," including soldiers in a mission, patrolling tanks, military officials, and any photos of missiles and military barricades.
2. "Protesting and demonstrating," showing civilians demonstrating in the streets and popular conferences.
3. "Holding talks and meetings of peace conferences," which refer to photos showing officials in round table or press conferences discussing the aspects of peace as stated in the captions.
4. "Refugees engaging in activities" are those photos that depict refugees receiving humanitarian aid, or walking amid wreckage or sitting in asylum settlements.
5. "Casualties receiving medical treatment" are those photos that show injured civilians suffering from pain and aberration or in hospitals receiving medical treatment.

6. "Dead bodies, coffins, or funerals" are those photos that depict the scenes of death or implicitly referred to it by showing single shoe or toy amid the debris in reference to a dead human or child (Roth et al., 2007, p.259).

7. "Personal photo" is that photo that shows one person without including the contextual environment surrounding him or her. The role of the person in the "personal photo" is mentioned in the caption.

8. Finally the "other" category included all the photos that did not match into any of the depictions described. For instance, a scene of the Egyptian bourse building accompanied by a caption indicating the loss of the Egyptian stock market as a result of war was coded as "other." The visuals that depict human beings are further analyzed in terms of the age, physical and emotional harm (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012).

Age: Photos that showed human beings are analyzed according to the age of the actors. Age in the photos is divided into several categories: "children/adolescent," "only adults," "mixture of children and adults," and "other." The essence behind studying the age in the visuals stemmed from the assumption that images of children are sites in which narratives about justification and legitimization of the war are contested (Wells, 2007, p.55). Visuals of children in wartime avert sentiments and break the code of neutrality due to their custodianship and dependence on "caregivers." They transcend the boundaries of state matters to universal issues in a call that something must be done to alleviate the suffering of these children in wartime (Cartwright, 2004, p.38).

Physical Harm: This variable is borrowed from previous studies done on framing analysis (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012). This category divides the human photos into "most severe," "severe," and "not severe." The "most severe" photos include those of dead bodies, coffins, or grave markers in reference to death, as well as photos of funerals or relatives holding the photos of their beloved dead. The "severe" human photos depict human causalities and injured victims of war. Finally, photos are coded as "not severe" if no physical damage has occurred (e.g. people negotiating or demonstrating, or refugees engaging in activities).

Emotional Harm: In particular, emotions are only detected in the close-up photos or medium-shot photos. Human photos of long-shots are coded as "not mentioned" due to the difficulty of inducing the facial emotions. The emotional harm category is divided into "positive," "negative," and "neutral."The photo is coded as emotionally "positive" if it portrays happiness, laughter, hope, confidence, or relaxation. Emotionally "negative" photos show anger, sadness, frustration, desperation, pain, or fear. Finally, the "neutral" emotions photos apply to the photos showing humans without any clear emotions.

5.6 The Missing Values

During the process of coding, the problem of the "missing values" emerged. The study differentiates between the code "not mentioned" and "not fitting."The "not mentioned" item is coded when the item of analysis exists but its description is not specifically identified. For example, if the news theme mentions the "action" but defies mentioning the "consequence of the action," then the "consequence" is coded as "not mentioned." Likewise, if the news text identifies the "nationality of the actor" but defies describing his "role," then the "role" is coded as "not mentioned."The "not mentioned" item applies to the main component of the text. For the purpose of this study, the main components of the news theme as a whole unit are "action, consequence, actors, and roles." The "legitimization of action" and the "sources of information" quoted are not considered main components of the theme. That is why, in the code book they are preceded by the yes/no question. That is, if the news text does not include "legitimization of action, "then its categories are coded as missing values or "not fitting." Only the first three themes in the news texts are coded. If the text has only one theme, then the other two themes with their components are considered missing values or "not fitting." Similarly, the study regards "depiction of position" as the main component of the editorial texts. Only the first two positions are coded. If only one "position of the writer" is mentioned, then the second "position" is coded as missing value "not fitting." For those categories that are not main components of the editorial texts like "remedy suggested", "end results of war," and "historical background," they are only coded if the questions preceded them were answered by "yes," indicating their existence. In terms of the "remedy suggested", only the first two remedies are coded. If only one remedy is mentioned then the second remedy is coded as missing value. As for the "historical backgrounds," the study analyzed only the first three mentioned historical events. In this case, if only one historical event is mentioned, then the other two are coded as missing values or "not fitting." With regard to the visuals, the study considered the main components of the image to include "focus region," "actor," "role," and "depiction." If the photo shows a human being, then the coding categories are extended to include "age,""physical harm," and "emotional harm." If the photo was a long-shot rendering it difficult to detect the other components of the human photos, like the age, physical and emotional harm, then these elements are coded as "not mentioned." Nevertheless, if the photo shows building destruction and does not contain human beings, then all the components of the human being photo (age, physical harm, and emotional harm) are coded as missing values or "not fitting."

5.7 Reliability Test

Reliability is defined as the extent to which the measuring procedures reach the same results each time they are conducted (Neuendorf, 2002, p.141). The reliability test helps achieve two purposes: to provide validation for the coding schema and to use many coders and "calibrate" their results against one another (p.142). There are two techniques of the reliability test: inter-coder, where the amount of agreement is calculated against two or more coders (p.141), and intra-coder, where the schema of analysis is re-coded again by the same coder at a second point in time (p.163). In order to reach reliability, the study used the intra-coder reliability test through which the coder re-coded a sample of cases after a period of one year. This study relied on the reliability test of the Holsti formula $2M/ (n_1 + n_2)$, where M=agreement items, $n_{1=}$ items coded for the first time, and n_2=items coded for the second time. The level of agreements ranged between 0 (no agreement) to 1 (total agreement) (Holsti, 1969). There is no agreement between scholars on the reliability of coefficient values. However, Neuendorf (2002) determined that a coefficient of 0.90 or greater would be acceptable at all levels, and 0.80 or greater would be acceptable in most situations, and below that is considered unacceptable (p.143). In addition, there is no agreement on the subsample size that the reliability test should rely upon. However, the reliability sample should never be below 50 and rarely above 300 (p.159). In this study, a subsample size of 61 cases were re-coded in the three newspapers in which 26 cases were in *Ahram*, 24 cases were in *Masry* and 11 cases were in *Araby*. The choice of the subsample is based on the simple random sampling. In the news text, there were 18 cases re-coded in the three newspapers under study in which 54 "themes" were re-coded. The coefficient agreement of the "theme" components (form of action, consequence of action, actors, roles of actors, legitimization of actions, source of quotation, and occupation of source) ranged from 0.87 to 1. In the editorials, the whole text was the unit of analysis. A total of 13 editorials in the three newspapers were re-coded. The agreement level ranged from 0.69 to 0.97. Finally, there were 30 visuals re-coded. The coefficient agreement in the visuals ranged from 0.83 to 1. As for the headlines as a unit of analysis to determine the dominant frames, the study used the inter-coder reliability. One coder was trained to identify the frames according to the conceptual definition of frames in the study. A total of 64 headlines in the news text were analyzed and the results compared. The coefficient agreement on headlines between the original results of the study and the coder results rendered an agreement of 0.93, which is acceptable. Table (4) presents the results of the reliability tests in the news texts, editorials, and visuals. Based on these results, the study considered the reliability test agreement to be accepted.

Table (4): Reliability Test of a subsample (n=61) in the three newspapers

Variable	Reliability Score
News **n=18**	
"Theme" n=54	
Form of action	1
Consequence of action	0.9
Actor	0.87
Role	0.9
Legitimization of action	0.87
Source of quotation	0.938
Occupation of source	0.938
Editorials **n=13**	
Position	0.769
Remedy suggested	0.80
End result of war	0.69
Historical event	0.97
Visuals **n=30**	
Focus region	0.833
Role	1
Depiction	0.966
Age	0.833
Physical harm	0.966
Emotional harm	0.8

5.8 Operational Identification of Frames

Based on the conceptual definition of frames presented earlier, the study operationally identified the frames in the news, editorials, and visuals representing the 2006 war in Lebanon in three Egyptian newspapers representing three ideological tendencies: state-owned, liberal, and leftist Nasserite Pan-Arab press.

5.8.1 Location of Frames in the Study

Tankard (2001) identified a list of possible locations of frames: headlines, sub headlines, photos, photo captions, leads, source selections, quotation selections, pull quotes, logos, graphical and statistical illustrations, and concluded statements (p.101). For the purpose of this study, the frames were identified from the headlines, photos, and texts. In addition, the frames were identified from the themes in the main body of the text. Each theme represents a frame (Pan

& Kosicki, 1993, p.59). Likewise, each headline in the news text represents a frame. For example, in the liberal newspaper *Masry* on July 20, 2006, the main headline was "From Washington to Tel-Aviv: 7 Days to Destroy Hezbollah."The headline pointed to the role of United States in helping Israel in this war. According to the conceptualization of the frames presented earlier in the chapter, the headline fostered the *strategic interest* frame as it mentioned the U.S. assistance to Israel. Another headline in the leftist Pan Arab newspaper, *Araby,* on August 13, 2006, on the front page, said "The Resistance has won: Israel Dignity on the Brink." This headline pointed explicitly to the heroic performance of Hezbollah who won this war over Israel. Thus, the headline fostered the frame of *heroic Hezbollah.*

For the editorial texts, the frames are detected from the "position of the writer." The writer usually expressed his main position in the lead paragraph. For the purpose of the study, each "position of the writer" represents a frame. In particular, the identification of the frame from the "position of the writer" was based on the roles of frames as presented by Entman in a sense that frame defines the problem, diagnoses its cause, morally judges its effects in an attempt to suggest remedies (Entman, 1993). In the editorial, the writer identifies the problem, diagnoses its cause and develops moral assessment of it. As for the visuals, the frame is detected from the focus region, the role of actors in the photo, and the depiction of the photo. Previous studies suggested that the photo could hold more than one frame (Parry, 2010). However, the current study analyzed one frame for each photo. The caption is also content analyzed to determine the frame.

5.8.2 Operational identification of the Main Frames

Based on literature review, the study identified dominant, secondary, and idiosyncratic but newsworthy frames. The "dominant" frame is the frame that appears most frequent. The "secondary" frame is that frame that scores the second highest frequency rate of appearance in the text. The "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" frame might appear in one story or few stories but tends to be observed (Dong & Chitty, 2012, p. 283). Operationally, the "dominant" frame in the current study represented the frame that appeared most frequently and scored the highest percentage rate of appearance. The "secondary" frame is operationally defined as the frame that scored the second highest frequency percentage rate in the coverage. Finally, the "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" scored the third frequency rate of display.

1. *Victims/feuding neighbors* **Frame.** This frame depicts the sufferings of the bystanders with reference to the fierce fighting between the two feuding neighbors Hezbollah and Israel. In the news texts, the "action" mentioned in the theme is "weaponry" or "humanitarian supply." The consequence of action refers to the victimization side of Lebanon and other nationals with or without identification of the rivaling neighbors of Hezbollah and Israel. For example, if the

theme revolves around the deportation of European expatriates from Lebanon as a result of the severity of fight, then it fosters the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame. This frame might be confused with the *Heroic Hezbollah* frame. The difference between this frame and *Heroic Hezbollah* is that this frame is coded if the role of Lebanon or other nationals was mentioned as one of "victims." On the contrary, the *Heroic Hezbollah* frame only mentioned the rivalry between Hezbollah and Israel presenting Hezbollah in most of the cases as the "perpetrator" and Israel as the "victim" without including any other nationals.

In the editorials, the position of the writer promotes this frame if it mentions the responsibility of Hezbollah in escalating the conflict, "Hezbollah adventure dragged the region to war," or the assault of Israel on the Arab lands "Israeli aggression to expand its land from ocean to gulf, "or the victimization side of Lebanon, "Lebanon as a land and people is paying the price of this war." In the visuals, the frame of *victim/feuding neighbors* is inferred if the focus region referred to the victimization side of Lebanon or other nationals. It can also be inferred if the photo depicts the insurgent role of either Hezbollah or Israel and depicts them performing weaponry activities. The caption is used to determine the frame.

2. *Strategic Interest* Frame. The *strategic interest* frame presents the Middle East conflict as a theater of regional interests. It points to the role of regional powers in exploiting the Lebanon war in order to expand their influence. In particular, this frame refers to the role of the allies of both Hezbollah and Israel. It presents the war as a proxy war through which the United States and Iran were pursuing their interests. In this frame not only the fighting sides are presented as "perpetrators" but also their allies, like Iran, Syria, and the United States. This frame could be confused with the previous *victim/feuding neighbors* frame. The difference is that the *strategic interest* frame points to the role of the feuding allies in agitating the war. For instance, if the theme points to the victim role of Lebanon, and presents Israel as the perpetrator with reference to the support the United States gives Israel in this war, then the theme is qualified to promote the *strategic interest* frame. In the editorials, the writer presents "the confrontation of wills in the region between U.S. and Iran" or points to the "U.S. hegemony and the re-birth of the new Middle East," or presents Hezbollah as fighting a "proxy war for Iran." In the visuals, this frame is indicated from the caption of the photo. For example, if the photo is a personal photo of the United States president or the president of Iran and the caption refers to their interests in the region, then the photo is coded as promoting the *strategic interest* frame.

3. *Reconciliation* Frame. This frame deals with the diplomatic efforts and the involvement of different actors to mediate the dispute and bring the war to an end. In the news text, the action mentioned is the "negotiation" and the legitimization, if mentioned, is to "restore peace." The efforts to intermediate the peace talks could involve any actor whose role is "mediator"; in the editorials, the position of the writer specifically mentions the "diplomatic

efforts of Egypt or/and worldwide to reach ceasefire." With regard to the visuals, the "reconciliation" frame is promoted if the image depicts scenes of any actors "holding peace talks/meeting/conferences" and the caption of the photo indicates the mediatory role of the actors. For example, a visual showing Egyptian president Mubarak holding peace talks with King Abdullah II of Jordan is qualified to advance the *reconciliation* frame.

4. *Heroic Hezbollah* Frame. This frame particularly extols the military superiority of Hezbollah over Israel. Based on previous study of Gavriely-Nur and Balas (2010), the *heroic Hezbollah* frame is fostered by showing the loss and pain on the Israeli side while eliminating it for the Hezbollah side. In the news theme, the "weaponry" is mentioned as an action pointing to the victimization consequences of war on Israel. The theme might allude to the "perpetrator" role of Hezbollah showing its military tactics in the war front. This frame refrains from referring to the victimization side of Lebanon or other nationals. This frame might be confused with the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame. The difference is that the *heroic Hezbollah* frame focuses on the military tactics between fighters without including the bystanders. For example, if the theme mentioned the role of Hezbollah as "perpetrator" and the role of Israel as "victim" and included the role of Lebanon as "victim," then the theme is qualified as promoting the "victim/feuding neighbors." In the editorial, the *heroic Hezbollah* frame is promoted if the "position of the writer" refers to "Hezbollah as a torchbearer of resistance." In some cases, the editorial text refers to the superiority of Hezbollah in the battlefield by alluding to its victory or to the defeat of Israel in the category of "end results of war." With regard to the visuals, the photo is qualified to be *heroic Hezbollah* frame if the focus region indicates either Hezbollah or Israel showing the victimization side of Israel with reference to its physical or emotional harm. It also refers to the perpetrator role of Hezbollah with indication to its glory. The caption is analyzed to indicate the qualification of the photo for the specific frame. For instance, a photo showing a group of Israeli soldiers with negative emotional harm and the caption referring to their defeat is qualified to advance the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. Likewise, a photo showing a Hezbollah fighter smiling and raising his figures with the V symbol signifying victory is qualified to advocate this frame.

5. *Protest* Frame. This frame shows the demonstration as a reaction to the war. The demonstrators might express solidarity to any of the warring parties or denounce the atrocities of the war in an anti-war protest. In the news theme, the main action is the "demonstration" performed by any actors. In the editorials, this frame is detected if the writer mentioned in the "other" category of writer's positions the collective action of the people either in solidarity with any of the fighting parties or in condemnation to the war. Therefore, the item of "other" in the position of the writers is further analyzed verbally to detect the display of the *protest* frame. In the visuals, the frame is qualified from the depiction of the photo showing groups of

"demonstrators" protesting or holding flags in condemnation to the war or in support of any of the rivaling sides.

6. *Responsibility* **Frame.** The *responsibility* frame refers to the responsibility of the international community and the Arab states for the escalation of the conflict. In the news themes, the perpetrator role is ascribed to Egypt, anti-Hezbollah states, European countries, or international actors. This frame might be confused with the *strategic interest* frame. The difference lies in fostering the accomplice role of the mentioned countries without alluding to the role of the ally countries like U.S or pro-Hezbollah countries (Iran and Syria). In the editorials, the *responsibility* frame is qualified if the writer's position pointed to the "Arab/Egyptian/world silence and weakness that led to further Israeli aggression." In the visuals, the *responsibility* frame is inferred from the caption in the photo. For example, the photo that depicts a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the Arab League headquarters and the caption refers to their weak stance for bringing the war to an end is then coded as *responsibility* frame. The same photo could be coded as promoting the *reconciliation* frame if the caption refers to their efforts to bring the war to an end.

5.8.3 Operational Identification of War Journalism and Peace Journalism frames

War or violence journalism, as introduced by Galtung, is propaganda-oriented, justifying the actions of "our" side versus "their" side. It focuses on the visible effects of the war (death, casualties, and material damage) seeking an answer to the violence in the battlefield. War journalism views the conflict as a zero-sum game between two rivalries and tends to reflect the viewpoint of the elite. On the other side, the peace journalism frame promotes the value of peace seeking reconciliation and peaceful settlement to conflicts. It gives voices to all parties exposing the culpability of all sides involved in the conflict. It focuses on the invisible effects of violence (trauma, damage to structure and culture). Peace journalism is people-oriented, giving voices to the "voiceless" exposing the sufferings of women, aged, and children. It views the conflict as involving many parties with conflicting intentions (Hanitzsch, 2004; Shinar, 2009). Operationalizing the two competing frames of war and peace journalism was a rich ground for quantitative and qualitative media researches. For the textual articles, one of the useful measurements of this frame was introduced by lee and Maslog (2005) and was further adopted in many studies (Hackett & Schroeder, 2009; Shinar, 2009). For the visuals, the study borrowed the operational analysis of peace journalism and war journalism frame from Neumann and Fahmy's (2012) study of the Sri Lanka civil war in Western newswires. Neumann and Fahmy operationally declared that orientation of the visuals toward the competing frames based on the role of the focus region. They contended that the roles of "demonstrator" and "negotiator" contribute to the peace journalism frame, whereas "belligerent" and "victim" contribute to the

war journalism frame (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012, p.187). Nevertheless, this current study identifies the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames from the depiction of the photo and not the role. The reason, per se, is that the depiction of the photo identifies the role of the focus region within the context of the environment. For instance, the "victim" role of Lebanon is applied to the refugees as well as to the injured civilians, albeit the context is different. The issues of refugees foster the peace journalism frame, whereas the wounded civilians foster the war journalism frame. The war journalism frame is applied if the depiction refers to "dead bodies/coffins/reference to death," "receiving medical care/treating wounds," "weaponry and military actions," and "aftermath of destruction."On the other hand, the peace journalism frame is advanced if the depiction points to the "protesting/demonstrating/raising flags," "holding talks/meeting/conferences, "or "refugees eating/mourning/walking."

Table (5) presents the elements of the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames as found in the materials under study.

Table (5): Elements of War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames

	Variables	War Journalism	Peace Journalism
News	**Action**	**1.** *Here and now* Battlefield	**1.** *Wider aspect* Demonstration, negotiation, humanitarian
	Consequence	**2.** *Visual effects* Killing/wounded, destruction	**2.** *Non-visual effects* Negotiation, demonstration, refugees, economic/ecological damage
	Quoted Source	**3.** *Elite oriented* Elite (military, governmental)	**3.** *People oriented* Non-elite
Editorial	**Position**	**4.** *Partisan* -Hezbollah dragged the region to war. -Israel aggression to expand its land. -Hezbollah torchbearer of resistance.	**4.** *Non-partisan* -Hezbollah fights proxy war for Iran. -Confrontation of wills in the region. -Lebanon is paying the price. -Diplomatic efforts in the Egypt and world. -U.S. hegemony in the region. -Arab/Egypt/world silence.
	Remedy (Appeal)	**5.** *War oriented* Military solution to deter Israel, freeze treaty.	**5.** *Agreement oriented* Disarmament of Hezbollah diplomatically, restore peace; Siniora gov. should extend influence in South Lebanon.
	End-Result	**6. Zero-sum** Israel won, Israel lost, Hezbollah won.	**6. No win/no lose** Lebanon lost, no one won.
Visuals	**Depiction**	**7.** *Here and now* Weaponry, receiving medical treatment, dead bodies, destruction.	**7.** *Wider aspect* Negotiating, demonstration, refugees performing activities.

CHAPTER SIX

STUDY RESULTS

This study relies on framing analysis to investigate the framing of the 2006 Lebanon war in the Egyptian Press. Unlike the traditional approaches of content analysis of news, the framing analysis does not regard the news text as objective construction of meaning but rather intersects with the memory reservoir of the individual to form its meaning. Therefore, the validity of framing analysis does not reside in the texts but rather in the readers' cognitive memory (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.58). Based on the constructionist approach in the study, the media frames of the Lebanon war are outcomes of interaction between extrinsic factors, such as political, historical and social, and intrinsic factors, such as newspaper ideological tendencies and editorial values. In order to explore the frames, the news, editorials, and visuals representing the Lebanon war in three Egyptian newspapers are quantitatively content analyzed. This rendered a body of n=1728 materials during the 34 days of the war, from July 13 to August 15, 2006, in the three newspapers as shown in Table (6).

Table (6): Coded News, Editorials and Visuals (n=1728)

	Ahram n=756	*Masry* n=822	*Araby* n=150	Total n=1728
News	247	226	19	492
Editorials	315	158	63	536
Visuals	194	438	68	700

As indicated from the table, the 2006 war in Lebanon was at the forefront of media attention in Egypt. The state-owned daily newspaper of *Ahram* covered the war in a total of 756 materials, including 247 news texts, 315 editorials, and 194 visuals. The liberal privately-owned daily of *Masry* covered the war in a total of 822 materials, including 226 news texts, 158 editorials, and 438 visuals. The leftist weekly newspaper of *Araby,* affiliated to the Nasserite opposition party, covered the Lebanon war in its five weekly editions in a total of 150 materials, including 19 news texts, 63 editorials, and 68 visuals. As noticed from Table (6), the value of the weekly *Araby* is underrepresented in the analysis. To bridge the gap between the dailies and the weekly, the leftist *Araby* is weighted at 7 times more than the dailies in order to conduct statistical tests.

6.1 News Texts

In the study, the news texts are analyzed according to a hierarchal schema. At the first level, the whole news text is read to identify the "themes" presented in the article. Only the first three themes are analyzed. The theme is defined as "an idea that connects different semantic elements of a story (e.g., description of an action or an actor, quotes of sources, and background information) into a coherent whole" (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.59). In some cases, the news text contains only two themes. In this case, the third theme is coded as missing values since it does not exist. In the second level of analysis, the whole text is read and analyzed.

Table (7) shows the semantic elements of news themes in the three newspapers coded in the study, as well as the percentage of coded elements of the text themes.

Table (7): Semantic Elements of News Themes (n=1476)

	Total elements	Coded elements	Percentage of coded elements
News Articles	492	492	100
Themes	1476	937	63
• **Actions**	1476	937	63
• **Consequence**	1476	937	63
• **Actors**	4428	2603	59
• **Legitimization**	1476	736	50
• **Quotes**	1476	990	67

- The difference between the total number of themes and their semantic elements in comparison to the coded ones was due to the "missing values." The "missing values" were applied if the semantic element did not exist in the article.
- The missing values of the total "themes" (n=539)

In each of the newspapers under study, the semantic elements forming the theme are analyzed. Table (8) presents the semantic elements of the three themes in each newspaper as well as the coded articles. The coded semantic elements formed the themes through which the frames are detected.

Table (8): Semantic Elements of Themes in Newspapers (n=492)

	N	Coded	Percentage of coded elements
News Articles	492	492	100
Ahram	**247**	-	
Themes			
• Actions	741	426	57
• Consequence	741	426	57
• Actors	2223	1162	52
• Legitimization	741	330	45
• Quotes	741	442	60
Masry	**226**		
Themes			
• Actions	**678**	465	69
• Consequence	**678**	465	69
• Actors	**2034**	1314	65
• Legitimization	**678**	366	54
• Quotes	**678**	510	75
Araby	**19**		
Themes			
• Actions	**57**	46	81
• Consequence	**57**	46	81
• Actors	**171**	127	74
• Legitimization	**57**	40	70
• Quotes	**57**	38	67

- The missing values of the total "themes" (n=539)

As shown in Table (8), the total number of news articles under investigation is 492, including 247 news articles in *Ahram*, 226 in *Masry,* and 19 news articles in the weekly *Araby*. In the news articles, the "theme" is regarded as the unit of analysis. In the study, the first three themes in the news articles are analyzed due to their salience. Entman (1993) articulated that "[t]exts can make bits of information more salient by placement or repetition or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols" (p.53). According to this definition of salience, the study assumed that the placement of the first three themes rendered them more salient than the other themes. Each theme composed of major elements forming one action, one consequence of action, and three

actors and their roles. There might be more than three actors in the theme. For the purpose of the study, only the first three actors in the theme are analyzed due to their salience and the rest are not coded. There are other minor semantic elements in the theme like legitimization of action or sources of information that might be found in the text. However, the study did not consider them major elements due to their occasional existence. The source of information might not be found in the content of the theme but rather at the end of the news article. Therefore, the whole text is read and the quoted sources are coded. Only the first three sources of information are coded according to their nationalities and their occupation, whether they are elite sources or non-elite sources.

Semantic Elements of the Theme. The theme as a unit of analysis composed of major elements such as actions, consequences of action, actors, and minor elements such as legitimization of action, and quoted sources of news. For the purpose of the study, the major elements are defined as the elements that exist in the majority of the theme, whereas the minor elements are the elements that appear occasionally in some themes. Each of these elements was content analyzed in each newspaper within the scope of the study and the results were coded.

1. Form of action. From a total of 1476 actions in the newspapers, only 937 actions representing 63% of the total were coded after excluding the missing values (n=539) if the action did not exist in the text. Table (9) presents the results of the actions in the three newspapers under study after excluding the missing values.

Table (9): Form of Action in Newspapers (n=1476).

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=741	*Masry* n=678	*Araby* n=57	Total N=1476
Not mentioned	3	4	15	7
Battlefield	44	45	46	45
Demonstration	8	12	20	13
Negotiation	37	33	17	30
Humanitarian	7	5	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2= 102.518, df=10, p<0.001
- The chi-square test was calculated after weighing the weekly at 7 times more than the dailies.
- The percentage was calculated after combining the three actions coded in each case into groups of related cases.
- Missing values of actions (n=539)
- Missing values in *Ahram* (n=315), *Masry* (n=213), and *Araby* (n=11)

In general, the action in the "battlefield" was the most frequently mentioned action in the three newspapers representing 45% of the total actions. The state-owned *Ahram* covered the action in the battlefield in 44% of its news text; the liberal *Masry* covered it in 45% of its news; while the leftist *Araby* covered it in 46% of its news cases. The second most frequently mentioned form of action in the total news texts was the "negotiation," representing 30% of the total actions. This could be explained by virtue of the fact that the simplicity and the drama of the battlefield actions provides the material for news coverage more than negotiations behind closed doors (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.16). However, the differences in covering the form of action between the three newspapers under study are statistically significant, X^2=102.518, p<0.001. "Negotiation "was the second most frequently mentioned form of action in the state *Ahram* and the liberal *Masry*, with 37% and 33% respectively in their coverage, whereas the leftist *Araby* covered it in only 17% of its news. It is also clear that the state-owned *Ahram* tends to dilute the significance of the "demonstration," representing it in only 8% of its coverage. The liberal *Masry* covered the "demonstration" more frequent than *Ahram,* with it representing 12% of its news. The leftist *Araby* devoted more coverage to "demonstration" than the two dailies, with it being 20% of its coverage. "Demonstration "was the second most frequent action mentioned in the leftist *Araby* news texts after the news from the "battlefield". The action of "humanitarian aids" was the least mentioned form in the three newspapers.

2. Consequence of Action

Results show that there are significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of the consequences of actions mentioned in the news texts, $X^2 = 148.663$, p<0.001.

Table (10): Consequences of Action in Newspapers (n=1476).

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=741	*Masry* n=678	*Araby* n=57	**Total** N=1476
Not mentioned	7	13	31	12
Visual effect				
Killing/wound	27	25	22	26
Destruction	7	5	4	6
Non-visual Effect				
Refugees	11	8	-	7
Economic/ecologic	2	2	2	2
Negotiations	37	33	17	33
Demonstration	8	13	20	12
Other	1	1	4	2
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2= 148.663, df=14, p<0.001
- The chi-square test was calculated after weighing the weekly at 7 times more than the dailies.
- The percentage was calculated after combining the three consequences in each case into groups of related cases.
- Missing values (n=539).
- Missing values in *Ahram* (n=315), *Masry* (n=213), and *Araby* (n=11)

As shown from Table (10), the newspapers reported the consequences of war differently. From the total of the "consequences of action" analyzed, study proved that the "negotiation" was the most frequently mentioned with 33% of the cases, followed by the visual effect of war represented by the "killing/wounded" in 26% of the cases. Both state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* allocated more attention to the "negotiation" in 37% and 33% respectively. The leftist *Araby* reported on the "negotiation" in only 17%. The frequency of mentioning the visual effects of war on humans (killing/wounded) was given considerable attention among the three newspapers: 27% in *Ahram,* 25% in *Masry,* and 22% in *Araby*. However, the leftist partisan newspaper of *Araby* paid more attention to the consequences of "demonstration" as reaction to the war with 20%, more than both *Masry,* in 13%, and *Ahram,* representing only 8%. This result shows that the partisan press tends to reflect the pulse of the street by showing the "demonstration" more frequent than the state-owned press and liberal press. The table also shows that the consequences of infrastructure "destruction" and the effect of war on the economic and ecologic environment did not receive much attention in the written news text of the three newspapers.

3. Legitimization of Action

In the study, the category of legitimization of the action refers to the reason given in the article for the mentioned action. In many cases, the article does not contain justification for the action. In this case, the legitimization of action is regarded as missing value. Table (11) presents the results of the existed legitimization of action in the three newspapers under study.

Table (11): Legitimization of Actions in Newspapers (n=1476)
(By percentage)

	Ahram n=741	*Masry* n=678	*Araby* n=57	**Total** N=1476
Self-defense	4	6	8	5
Destroy Hezbollah	10	17	20	14
Occupation	3	3	15	4
Restore peace	56	45	7	48
Condemnation	15	18	25	16
Retaliation	7	6	5	7
Other	5	5	20	6
Total	100	100	100	100

- The percentage was calculated after combining the three variables of legitimization 1, legitimization 2, and legitimization 3 in each case into groups of related cases.
- Total number of missing values (n=740), in *Ahram* (n=411), *Masry* (n=312), and *Araby* (n=17).

Analysis showed that the three newspapers tended not to include the reasons for the actions in the news. Only 50% of the news articles mention legitimate reasons for the actions. This explains the high amount of missing values (n=740) in the news. Results showed that the "restoration of peace" was the legitimate solution for the war in both state-owned press, *Ahram,* and liberal press, *Masry* with 56% and 45% respectively. The "restoration of peace" signifies the wider aspect of war and the intention to reach a ceasefire. The second most frequently mentioned reason for the action in both *Ahram* and *Masry* was the "condemnation "of the severity of the war with 15% and 18%. The essence of these two legitimizations of actions mentioned in the state and liberal press was that they focused on the reaction of the international community and its intentions to reach a ceasefire. However, the legitimization to "destroy Hezbollah" arsenal was given attention in the news coverage representing 10% in *Ahram* and 17% in *Masry*. The case in the leftist *Araby* was quite different. The *Araby* newspaper focused mainly on the international community's "condemnation" of the gruesome of war, representing 25% of its news coverage. In the same vein, the leftist newspaper focused on the intention of Israel to "destroy Hezbollah" in 20%, followed by its aims of "occupation" of more Arab lands in 15%. This latter purpose of "occupation" was hardly mentioned in the liberal and state-owned press.

Results concluded that the state-owned press *Ahram* and the liberal press *Masry* tend to de-escalate the conflict by promoting the "restoration of peace" and "condemnation "of the war as justification for the pre-determined actions in the news. Nonetheless, the leftist newspaper *Araby,* despite condemning the war, attempted to magnify the intentions of Israel to "destroy Hezbollah" and "occupation" of more Arab lands. The rest of the legitimizations of actions were mentioned with a low frequency rate.

4. Actors and Roles in the Egyptian newspapers. In each theme, different actors are mentioned performing different roles in the war. Table (12) presents the roles of actors as mentioned in the news texts in the three newspapers under study.

Table (12): Roles of Actors in Newspapers (n=4428)

(By percentage)

	Perpetrator	Victim	Demonstrator	Mediator	Rescuer	Other	Total
Egypt	2	10	27	46	11	4	100
Lebanon	-	84	1	14	1	-	100
Israel	76	18	1	5	-	-	100
Hezbollah	84	13	-	2	1	-	100
U.S.	18	-	4	74	4	-	100
Europe	-	1	15	72	12	-	100
Pro-Hez	32	2	7	49	8	2	100
Anti-Hez	6	-	13	72	7	2	100
Int. Org.	1	8	1	57	33	-	100
Others	17	17	22	39	4	1	100

- The percentage was calculated after combining the actors and roles in the themes into groups of related cases.
- Total number of actors in the three newspapers (n=4428)
- Total number of missing values (n=1825)
- Total number of coded actors (n=2603)
- Total number of news cases in the three newspapers under study (n=492)
- Total number of actors in *Ahram* (n=2223), in *Masry* (n=2034), and in the weekly*Araby* (n=171).
- Total number of missing values in *Ahram* (n=1061), missing values in *Masry* (n=720), missing values in *Araby* (n=44)

As noticed from Table (12), the actors directly involved in the war (Israel, Hezbollah, and Lebanon) were mentioned mostly within the binary of the perpetrator-victim role. In the three newspapers under study, "Hezbollah" was mentioned in the news texts as "perpetrator" in 84% and as "victim" in 13% of all the news cases. By the same token, "Israel" was mentioned as a "perpetrator" in 76% and as "victim" in 18% of the cases in the newspapers. Lebanon was mostly mentioned as passive "victim" in 84% of the cases and as "mediator," playing an active

role in the peace talks in 14% of newspapers coverage, more than Israel (5%) and Hezbollah (2%). Thus, the Egyptian newspapers under study recognized the role of Lebanon as participant seeking peace to end the war in its land more than Hezbollah and Israel, who engaged into fierce fighting rendering Lebanon a helpless victim paying the price of this war.

With regard to the roles of countries not directly involved in the war, the table shows the United States and Europe were mostly mentioned as "mediators" of peace in 74% and 72% respectively. But, the alliance between the United States and Israel was clearly fostered in the news. The United States was mentioned in 18% of the news cases in the three newspapers as "perpetrator" in the war, while this role was completely absent for the rest of the European countries. Besides the recognized "mediator" role of the European countries, they were also mentioned as "demonstrators" in 15% of the cases and as "rescuer" in 12% of the cases, providing humanitarian aid for the victims of war. With regard to the countries that adopted specific stance toward warring parties like anti-Hezbollah countries (Saudi Arabia and Jordan) or pro-Hezbollah countries (Syria and Iran), the news texts in the three newspapers alluded to the necessity of including them as "mediators" of peace in majority of cases. However, the role of anti-Hezbollah countries (Saudi Arabia and Jordan) was mentioned as "mediators" of peace in 72% of the cases, more frequently than pro-Hezbollah countries, in 49% of the cases. The news texts in the three newspapers under study refer to the strategic bounds between Hezbollah and its allies (Iran and Syria) and their accomplice "perpetrator" role in 32% of the cases in comparison to only 6% of the cases to anti-Hezbollah countries (Saudi Arabia and Jordan). The international organizations (U.N., Red Cross, Arab League etc.) and the "other" countries were mentioned differently as mediators, rescuers, or demonstrators, and less as perpetrators and victims. It is worth mentioning that results should be handled with care as the news texts of the weekly *Araby* newspaper are underrepresented in comparison to the other two dailies.

5. *Source of Information.* The use of sources in news reporting is an important mechanism in framing. Previous studies proved that regardless of whether the government imposes restriction on the flow of information and denies access to war zones, the media relies on elite official sources for information (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Not all news articles contain quoted sources of information. Therefore, the study regarded the sources of information as minor semantic elements. Table (13) presents the quoted news sources in each newspapers based on their national affiliation.

Table (13): Quoted Sources of Information by Nationality (n=1476).
(By Percentage)

	Ahram n=741	*Masry* n=678	*Araby* n=57	**Total** n=1476
Egypt	13	33	64	25
Lebanon	16	9	5	12
Israel	20	20	13	19
Hezbollah	4	3	5	4
U.S.	10	11	8	10
Europe	16	9	-	12
Pro-Hez.	4	3	-	4
Anti-Hez.	1	1	-	1
Int. Org	10	5	-	7
Other	6	6	5	6
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=172.095, df=18, p<0.001.
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Total number of missing values (n=486).
- Total number of missing values in *Ahram* (n=299), in *Masry* (n=168), and in *Araby* (n=19)

As shown in the table, there are statistical differences between the three newspapers in terms of the quoted sources of news, X^2=172.095 and p<0.001. The above analysis concluded that the state-owned newspaper of *Ahram* was a site of contestation between different news sources. The rates of source representation achieved by the Israeli sources were proportionally higher than the rates of representation achieved by any other actor. *Ahram* used Israeli sources in 20% of its news coverage followed by sources from Lebanon and the European countries representing 16% each. Egyptian sources were represented in 13% of the news in the state-owned newspaper higher than the access given to sources from the United States and the international organizations (10% each). In the liberal *Masry*, the rates of representation given to Egyptian sources were higher than the rates of access given to the Israeli sources (33% and 20% respectively). As for the leftist *Araby,* analysis concluded that the Egyptian sources were given the highest access to news in 64% of its coverage and followed by Israeli sources in 13% of the news. Results showed that Hezbollah and the countries that took a pro- or anti-stance toward it were minimally quoted as sources of information in the news texts.

Status of Quoted Sources of Information

In the news articles, the credibility of the source of information is dependent on its political and social status. Sources of high political status are more likely to have access to news media and to propagate their frames of interpretation (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.18). Table (14) shows the positional status of the sources of information.

Table (14): Quoted Sources of Information by Status (n=1476)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=741	*Masry* n=678	*Araby* n=57	Total n=1476
Not mentioned	2	1	-	1
Elite (gov.)	55	50	8	51
Elite (Military)	12	10	5	11
Non-Elite	31	39	87	37
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=226.196, df=4 and p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly Araby at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Total number of missing values (n=486)
- Total number of missing values in *Ahram* (n=299), in *Masry* (n=168), and in *Araby* (n=19)
- The percentage was calculated after combining the three statuses of sources into groups of related cases.

Results show that there are significant differences between the newspapers in terms of their reliance on information sources, X^2=226.196 as p<0.001. Both state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* used mainly elite governmental sources of information more frequently than non-elite. More than half of the sources quoted in state-owned *Ahram* were elite governmental sources (55%), like the presidents of state and foreign ministers. The liberal *Masry* used governmental elite sources in half of its news (50%). The non-elite sources in the two newspapers were given considerable attention in more than a quarter of the coverage in the two newspapers. However, the liberal *Masry* was more likely to use non-elite sources (39%) than state-owned *Ahram* (31%). As noticed from the table, the leftist Pan-Arab newspaper *Araby* proved to be the voice of the voiceless as it relied in an overwhelming majority of its cases on non-elite sources of information (87%). The leftist newspaper defies the claims of the elite sources by giving them scant attention in its news coverage. In general, the military elite sources of information were minimally represented in the three newspapers.

6.2 Identification of Frames in the News

The frames were coded in the headlines of the news texts as well in the themes. Each theme represents a frame. News texts were coded for up to three frames.

Frames in News Headlines. Headlines in the news have important textual and cognitive functions. The main textual function of the headline is to summarize the important information presented in the text. Cognitively, the reader captures the headline, which is often written in bold on the top of the news story across several columns and is used to construct the meaning or the main topic of the news article. The headline activates the embedded memory needed by the reader to understand the news article (Van Dijk, 1991, p.50). Headlines have ideological implications. Van Dijk (1991) summarized the potential of headlines by saying:

> "*Since they express the most important information about a news event, they may bias the understanding process: they summarize what, according to the journalist is the most important aspect, and such a summary necessarily implies an opinion or a specific perspective on the events. Thus, journalists may 'upgrade' a less important topic by expressing it in the headline, thereby 'downgrading' the importance of the main topic. In other words, headlines are a subjective definition of the situation, which influences the interpretation made by the readers.*"(p.51)

Due to the importance of the headline in constructing the meaning of the text, the study coded the display of 492 headlines representing 492 frames. Table (15) illustrates the results of the frames coded in the main news headlines in the three newspapers under study.

Table (15): Main Frames of News Headlines (n=492)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=247	*Masry* n=226	*Araby* n=19	*Total* n=492
Victim/feuding neighbors	41	39	16	39
Strategic Interest	6	13	16	9
Heroic Hezbollah	5	7	32	7
Reconciliation	34	16	5	25
Responsibility	3	10	10	6
Protest	10	10	21	11
Other	1	5	-	3
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=158.695, df=12, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was conducted after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Missing values (n=0)

The cross tabulation of the rates of display of different frames in the headlines reveals patterns of divergence and similarities. In general, the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame received the highest percentage of display in 39% of the total coverage, followed by the *reconciliation* frame in 25% of all the headlines in the three newspapers. However, results proved the existence of significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of the frames in the headlines, X^2=158.695 and p<0.001. The *victim/feuding neighbors* was the highest displayed frame in *Ahram* and *Masry,* representing 41% and 39%, respectively, while given dilute attention in the leftist *Araby,* representing only 16%. The second most frequently displayed frame in the state-owned *Ahram* and *Masry* was the *reconciliation* frame. Nonetheless, analysis showed that *Masry* was a site of frame contestation. The liberal newspaper pointed to the *strategic interest* frame in 13% of its headlines, followed by the *responsibility* and *protest* frame, representing 10% each. A very low percentage of display ranging from 5% to 7% in both *Ahram* and *Masry* was given to the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. In contrast, the leftist *Araby* displayed this frame with the highest proportion considering it the dominant frame of coverage at 32%. The leftist newspaper presented the *protest* frame as a secondary frame in 20% of its headlines. Scant attention was given to the *reconciliation* frame in the leftist Pan Arab newspaper of *Araby* with it only amounting to 5% of its news headlines. The leftist newspaper displayed the frames in the news headlines with remarkable variance.

Frames in News Texts. News frames were coded in up to three frames in the news texts according to the number of coded themes in the news. A total of 1476 frames were recognized in the news articles in the three newspapers under study. Table (16) presents the results of re-grouping the coded frames in combined forms.

Table (16): Main Frames in News Texts (n=1476)

(By Percentage)

	Ahram n=741	*Masry* n=678	*Araby* n=57	Total n=1476
Victim/feuding neighbors	47	39	22	42
Strategic Interest	4	11	11	7
Heroic Hezbollah	4	4	29	5
Reconciliation	34	26	15	29
Responsibility	2	5	13	4
Protest	8	12	20	11
Other	1	3	-	2
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2= 219.107, df=12, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* newspaper at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Statistical test was calculated after re-grouping the three frames in text into a group of related cases.
- Total of missing values (n=539); In *Ahram* (n=315), *Masry* (n=213) and *Araby* (n=11).

Generally speaking, it is gathered from the analysis of the frames in the news texts that the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame was the dominant frame of covering the 2006 war in Lebanon in the news. The highest percentage of displaying this frame was presented in the state-owned *Ahram* in 47% of its news, followed by the liberal newspaper *Masry* in 39%, and less in the leftist *Araby*, with 22% of its news coverage. The secondary frame being displayed in the news text was the *reconciliation* frame. The state owned *Ahram* presented this frame with a high percentage of 34%, more than the liberal *Masry,* which displayed it in 26% of its coverage. This trend in framing the news texts is in consistence with the above findings of the frames in the news headlines (Table 15). The rest of the frames received a low percentage of display in the two newspapers. On the contrary, the leftist *Araby* newspaper was a site of frame contestation. The *heroic Hezbollah* frame was the most frequent displayed frame in the Pan-Arab newspaper *Araby* with a percentage of 29% of the news, followed by the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame with 22%, and the *protest* frame with 20%. The rest of the frames were displayed in the leftist newspaper with slightly lower percentage.

6.3 War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames in the News

The competing war journalism and peace journalism frames were identified in each theme in the news text. Within each theme, specific semantic elements were taken as determinants to decide the orientation of the theme towards either frame. In the new texts, the determinant factors are the "action," "consequence of action," and "source of information."

Table (17) summarizes the results of the semantic elements in news texts. Results concluded the statistical difference between the three newspapers under study in terms of the elements of war journalism and peace journalism frames. In terms of the *here and now* versus *wider aspects of war* as obtained from the "form of action" category, statistical differences between the three newspapers were obtained, X^2=102.518, df=10, p<0.001. The *visual effects* versus *non-visual effects* as indicated from the category of "consequences of war" showed significant difference between the three newspapers, X^2= 148.663, df=14, p<0.001.The *elite* versus *non-elite* element as inferred from the "source of information" category rendered significant differences, X^2= 226.196, df=4 and p<0.001. The inclination toward Galtung's competing war journalism and peace journalism frames were also measured by the peace index scale ranging from 0 to 1. In this peace index scale, the items were categorized according to their frames so that the items fostering the war journalism frame scored 0, and the items fostering peace journalism scored 1. Then the composite mean was calculated for the orientations of the newspapers toward either frame. After calculating the mean index, the state owned *Ahram* scored 0.546, while the liberal press *Masry* scored 0.533 and leftist *Araby* scored 0.682. Together with the raw percentage analysis, it indicated that both *Ahram* and *Masry* balanced their news coverage with a slight orientation toward peace journalism frame. On the other hand, the leftist *Araby* was more oriented toward the peace journalism frame. Both state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* covered the news applying the peace journalism frame in terms of using *wider aspects of war* and *non-visual effects*, but applied the war journalism frame in use of *elite sources of information*. On the other hand, the leftist *Araby* applied the war journalism frame only in its focus into the *here and now* events of the battlefield, but promoted the peace journalism by shading lights into the *non-visual effects* of war, and by reporting on the "demonstrations" and "negotiations." Moreover, it relied heavily on the *non-elite* sources of information in its news coverage. Thus, results show that there was balance between the competing frames in both state press *Ahram* and *Masry* and more orientation toward peace journalism frame in leftist *Araby*. Table (17) summarizes the results of the determinant factors in the semantic elements in news texts in order to detect the orientation of the newspapers toward either war journalism frame or peace journalism frame.

Table (17): Elements of War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames in News Texts (n=492)

(By percentage)

	Elements of War journalism and Peace journalism frames	*Ahram* n=247	*Masry* n=226	*Araby* n=19
Action	*Here and now*			
	Battlefield	44	45	46
	War Journalism	**44**	**45**	**46**
	Wider aspect			
	Negotiation	37	33	17
	Demonstration	8	12	20
	Humanitarian aid	7	5	2
	Peace Journalism	**52**	**50**	**39**
Consequence	*Visual effects*			
	Killing/casualties	27	25	22
	Destruction	7	5	4
	War Journalism	**34**	**30**	**26**
	Non-visual effects			
	Refugees	11	8	-
	Economic/ecologic	2	2	2
	Negotiation	37	33	17
	Demonstration	8	13	20
	Peace Journalism	**58**	**56**	**39**
Source	*Elite oriented*			
	Elite gov.	55	50	8
	Elite Military	12	10	5
	War Journalism	**67**	**60**	**13**
	Non-elite oriented			
	Non-elite	31	39	87
	Peace Journalism	**31**	**39**	**87**

- Action: X^2= 102.518, df=10, p<0.001
- Consequences: X^2= 148.663, df=14, p<0.001
- Sources of information: X^2= 226.196, df=4 and p<0.001
- Chi-square tests were conducted after weighting the weekly Araby newspaper at 7 times more than the dailies.
- The results shown excluded the "not mentioned" and "others" items.
- Total number of missing values in **Action (n=539),** *Ahram* (n=315), *Masry* (n=213), and *Araby* (n=11)
- Total number of missing values in **Consequences (n=539),** *Ahram* (n=315), *Masry* (n=213), and *Araby* (n=11)
- Total number of missing values in **Sources (n=486),** *Ahram* (n=299), *Masry* (n=168), and *Araby* (n=19).

6.4 Editorials and Opinion Texts

The editorial texts are analyzed according to different variables as follows: position of the writer, remedy suggested, end result of war, and historical background information.

1. Position of Writer. The study analyzed the first two positions due to their salience. The text might present only one position, in this case only the first position was coded and the second position was reported as a missing value. A total of 536 editorials were content analyzed in the three newspapers: 315 in *Ahram*, 158 in the liberal *Masry,* and 63 editorials in the leftist weekly *Araby*. Table (18) illustrates the position of the writers in the three newspapers.

Table (18): Positions of Editorials (n=536)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=315	*Masry* n=158	*Araby* n=63	**Total** N=536
Hez. dragged region to war	6	3	-	4
Hez. proxy war	3	4	-	3
Confrontation of wills	3	5	1	4
Israeli aggression	25	15	20	21
Lebanon pays price	15	10	4	12
Restore peace	12	1	-	7
U.S. Hegemony	10	9	10	10
Hez. torchbearer resistance	10	21	30	16
Arab/Egypt silence	10	28	33	18
Other	6	6	3	6
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=412.156, df=18, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was conducted after weighting the *Araby* weekly newspaper at 7 times more than the other two dailies.
- Total number of missing values (n=177); in *Ahram* (n=124), *Masry* (n=42) and *Araby* (n=11).

The study showed a significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of the positions expressed in editorials, X^2= 412.156, p<0.001. The state-owned *Ahram* was more partisan in referring to the "Israeli aggression" in 25% of its editorial coverage. However, it tends to be non-partisan in showing the helpless victimization side of Lebanon that "pays the price" of the war in 15%, followed by the assertion to "restore peace" in 12% of its position. The state-owned newspaper *Ahram,* managed, in its editorial positions, to widen the scope of war by presenting both the variables of "U.S. hegemony" in the region, and the "Arab/Egypt silence" that gave the green light to Israel to continue its aggression, with 10% each in its coverage. Nevertheless, *Ahram* extolled "Hezbollah torchbearer of resistance" in 10% of its editorial

position, more than its criticism that Hezbollah "dragged the region to war" in 6%. The case with the liberal *Masry* was different. The newspaper of *Masry* set the "Arab/Egypt silence" as responsible for the escalation of the war, representing 28% of its coverage, followed by the recognition of the role of "Hezbollah as torchbearer of resistance" in 21% of the editorial position. The newspaper referred less to the "Israeli aggression" and the victimization of "Lebanon that pays the price of the war," representing 15% and 10%, respectively. The leftist press of *Araby* pointed to the "Arab/Egypt silence" that led to the escalation of war in 33% of its coverage, presenting "Hezbollah as torchbearer of resistance" in 30% of the coverage, and as an alternative that restored the pride of Lebanon in the face of the "Israeli aggression" was mentioned in less in 20% of the editorial positions. The analysis concluded that the editorials of both the liberal newspaper *Masry* and the leftist newspaper *Araby* defied the claims of the Egyptian regime that Hezbollah set the region into ablaze. They rather held the Arab and Egyptian regime accountable for the escalation of the conflict due to their weakness.

2. Suggested Remedy to the war. In many cases, the editorials suggest remedy to the conflict. If the editorials do not suggest any remedies for the war, the category is coded as missing value. If a remedy is suggested in the editorial, it will be recorded according to several items. In each editorial, up to two remedies were coded. Table (19) presents the results of the remedies implied in the editorials.

Table (19): Suggested Remedy (n=536).

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=315	*Masry* n=158	*Araby* n=63	Total n=536
Disarmament Hez. diplomatic	4	2	-	2
Military vs. Israel	10	42	73	48
Military vs. Hez.	1	-	-	-
Restore Peace	48	16	2	19
Freeze treaty	5	7	12	9
Siniora gov. extend Influence	9	10	-	4
Other	23	23	13	18
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=344.777, df=12, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* 7 times more than dailies
- Total number of Appeals (appeal 1, Appeal 2) are 1072, in *Ahram* (n=630), in *Masry* (n=316), and in *Araby* (n=126).
- Total number of missing values (n=678); in *Ahram* (n=405), *Masry* (n=208), and *Araby* (n=74).

Results show that there are significant differences between the three newspapers under investigation in terms of the suggested remedy for the war, X^2=344.777 and p<0.001. The state-owned newspaper *Ahram* fostered the peaceful solution to "restore peace" in majority of cases in 48% of the combined remedies. Other solutions were given scant attention. On the contrary, the liberal *Masry* and leftist *Araby* advocated the "military solution versus Israel" in 42% and 73% respectively.

3. End Result of War. In many cases, the editorials did not predict the outcome of the war. This explains the big rate of missing values in this variable (n=338). However, for those cases that predicted the outcome of the war, the study revealed significant different, X^2= 147.326 and p<0.001. Table (20) shows the results.

Table (20): End Results of War (n=536).

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=315	*Masry* n=158	*Araby* n=63	**Total** n=536
Hez.won	30	58	96	67
Israel won	6	9	-	4
Non-won	17	15	-	8
Lebanon lost	25	10	-	10
Israel lost	22	8	4	11
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=147.326, df=8, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Total number of missing values (n=338), *Ahram* (n=201), *Masry* (n=98), and *Araby* (n=39).

Data analysis showed that the three newspapers were inclined to present the war as a zero-sum game with winners and losers. The three newspapers predicted the victory of Hezbollah with different percentage of representation. The state owned newspaper *Ahram* referred that "Hezbollah won" in 30% more than its mentioning that "Lebanon lost" in 25% of the cases. The prediction that "Israel lost" was presented in 22% of the editorials in *Ahram*. This was contrary to the liberal *Masry* and leftist *Araby* which glorified the victorious role of Hezbollah "Hezbollah won" in majority of cases (58% and 96% respectively).

4. Historical Background

The editorials in the three newspapers often do not include historical background events to explain the news. The essence of historical background was to associate the reader with historical experience deeply embedded in the cognitive memory thus enforcing certain frames of interpreting the events (Wolfsfeld, 1997, p.32). Table (21) shows the historical events in the editorials.

Events of History

Results show that there was diversity in the historical events presented in the editorials with more emphasis on the "Arab-Israeli wars". However, the diversity in the historical events signifies the different angles of covering the war.

Table (21): Nature of Historical Events (n=536)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=315	*Masry* n=158	*Araby* n=63	Total n=536
Arab-Israeli wars	24	25	24	24
Invasion Lebanon 1982	10	12	13	11
Iraq wars (1991-2003)	18	18	11	17
Terror war	5	5	4	5
Israel withdrawal 2000	8	10	9	9
Qana 1996	6	2	3	4
Peace accords	6	5	4	5
Other	23	23	32	25
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=23.462, df=16, p=0.102
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Percentages were obtained after re-grouping the three historical events into a variable case.
- Total number of historical events after re-grouping (n=1608)
- Total number of missing values (n=1204), in *Ahram* (n=755), in *Masry* (n=328), and *Araby* (n=121)

Statistically, there was no significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of the historical events mentioned, X^2=23.462, and p=0.102. Results concluded that the historical events of the "Arab-Israeli wars" dominated the editorials in the three newspapers representing 24% of the events in *Ahram* and *Araby,* and 25% in *Masry*. The history of the Arab-Israeli wars signifies both defeat and victory for the Arabs as presented in Chapter Four. The second frequently represented historical events were the "Iraqi wars (1991-2003)" representing 18% of the coverage in both *Ahram* and *Masry,* and less in *Araby,* with 11% of the coverage. The essence behind presenting the Iraqi war was to widen the scope of the war and to retrieve in the reader's collective memory the U.S. hegemony in the region that ended in the occupation of Iraq. The "invasion of Lebanon in 1982" and the atrocities of the Israeli forces in the Palestinian refugee camp of Sabra and Shatila in Beirut were presented in 13% of the editorials in leftist *Araby*, 12% in liberal *Masry,* and 10% in state-owned newspaper *Ahram*. Analysis also renders a considerable percentage of "other" historical events in the three newspapers, 23% in *Ahram* and *Masry,* and 32% in *Araby*. The following are examples of the "other" historical events mentioned in each newspaper. In *Ahram*, for example, the historical events mentioned include: the collapse

of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of the one pole, the Cold War between the U.S. and Russia, the Israeli bombardment of Iraq nuclear reactor in 1981, President Truman's project in 1949 to give economic and military assistance to countries in the Middle East, the Baghdad coalition in 1957, the Vietnam War, the Second World War, the Crusaders war in the sixteenth century, the Kosovo war in 1999, the Ta'aif Accord to end the civil war in Lebanon 1989, Egyptian resistance against French occupation in 1800, and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Harriri in 2003.

In *Masry,* the historical events include the blaze of Aqusa Mosque in Palestine in 1969, the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik El-Harriri, the Egyptian revolution of 1919 to protest the British mandate in Egypt, the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah's son Hadi in an Israeli ambush in 1997, the Crusaders war on the Middle East, Palestinian *intifada* in 1989 and 2000, French resistance against the Nazis in the Second World War, and the Andalusian history and Arab continuous loss since then. With regard to *Araby*, the historical events mentioned within the "other" category include the Egyptian coup d'état in 1952 (in an attempt to draw similarities between the former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah), the nationalization of Suez Canal in 1956, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, the Vietnam War and the role of Vietnamese resistance against U.S. invasion, and the history of the Zionist movements in the pre-World War One period.

6.5 Main Frames in Editorials

Editorials and opinion articles are sites of frame display. They suggest that a wide spectrum of positions manifests frames. For the purpose of the study, the frames were detected from the position of the editorial writers. Table (22) presents the frames of Lebanon war in 2006 as manifested in the editorial positions. The first two frames originated from the positions were coded due to their prominence.

Table (22): Mainframes in Editorials (n=536)
(In percentage)

	Ahram n=315	*Masry* n=158	*Araby* n=63	Total n=536
Victim/feuding	46	27	23	37
Strategic Interest	16	17	12	16
Heroic Hezbollah	10	21	30	16
Reconciliation	12	1	-	7
Responsibility	10	28	32	18
Protest	-	-	-	-
Other	6	6	3	6
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=321.956, df=10, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was conducted after re-grouping (frame 1) obtained from position 1 with (frame 2) obtained from position 2
- *Araby* was weighted at 7 times more than dailies
- Total number of missing values (n=177), in *Ahram* (n=124), *Masry* (n=42) and *Araby* (n=11).

The study showed that there are statistical differences between the three newspapers in terms of the main frames present in the editorials, X^2=321.956, and p<0.001. Results showed that there was no monolithic frame in the editorials as they were rather a site of frame contestation. Broadly speaking, the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame was the dominant frame in the editorials representing 37% of the total coverage in the three newspapers. The state-owned *Ahram* displayed it in 46%, *Masry* in 27%, and *Araby* in 23% of its editorials. Frames like the *responsibility* frame, *strategic interest* frame, and *heroic Hezbollah* frame were displayed in the editorials with quite similar results. However, differences emerged between the three newspapers in terms of the frame display. In the state-owned *Ahram* newspaper, the *strategic interest* frame was displayed more frequently, representing 16% of its editorials, followed by the *reconciliation* frame in 12%. The state press of *Ahram* timidly alludes to the responsibility of the Arab and international community in escalating the war. The *responsilbity* frame was displayed in only 10% of its editorials. Likewise, *Ahram* diluted the significance of Hezbollah, displaying the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in only 10% of its editorials. The position of the editorials in the liberal newspaper of *Masry* covered the war within a trilogy of three dimensions: the weak stance of the Arab and international community led to further Israeli aggression and was replaced by the heroic resistance of Hezbollah. The *responsibility* frame that attributed the responsibility of the Egyptian and Arab regime in the war was displayed in 28% of the editorials in *Masry,* followed by the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame that focused on the

attrition war between Israel and Hezbollah on the Lebanese soil in 27%. The resistance of Hezbollah received particular attention in the editorials of the liberal press, displaying the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in 21%. The editorial coverage of the leftist press *Araby* was quite similar. It pointed to the responsibility of the Egyptian and Arab regimes in the war, presenting Hezbollah as the torchbearer of resistance. The *responsibility* frame was displayed in 32% of the editorials, followed by the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in 30%. It is inferred from analyzing the "other" category in the position of the writers in the editorials that none of the editorials alluded to the collective action of the people in condemnation of the war or in solidarity with any of the fighting parties. Thus this is why the "protest" frame was not represented in the editorials texts.

6.6 War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames in Editorials

The competing frames of Galtung were investigated in the editorial texts from different dimensions. The positions in the editorials reveal the *partisan* versus *non-partisan* element. The remedies suggested show the *war orientated* versus *agreement oriented* element. Last but not least, the end result of war reflects the orientation toward portraying the war within the *zero-sum game*. Table (23) represents the results of three elements of war journalism and peace journalism frames as suggested by Lee and Maslog operational typology (Lee & Maslog, 2005).

Table (23): Elements of War Journalism and Peace Journalism in Editorials (n=536)
(By percentage)

	Elements of War Journalism and Peace Journalism	*Ahram* n=315	*Masry* n=158	*Araby* n=63
Position	*Partisan*			
	Hezbollah dragged to war	6	3	-
	Israel aggression	25	15	20
	Hezbollah resistance	10	21	30
	War Journalism	**41**	**39**	**50**
	Non-Partisan			
	Hezbollah proxy war	3	4	-
	Confrontation of wills	3	5	1
	Lebanon pays price.	15	10	4
	Diplomatic Efforts	12	1	-
	U.S. hegemony	10	9	10
	Arab/Egypt/world silence	10	28	33
	Peace Journalism	**53**	**57**	**48**
Remedy	*War oriented*			
	Military vs. Israel.	10	42	73
	Military vs. Hezbollah	1	-	-
	Freeze peace Treaty	5	7	12
	War Journalism	**16**	**49**	**85**
	Agreement oriented			
	Disarm Hez. Diplomatic	4	2	-
	Restore Peace	48	16	2
	Siniora Gov. influence	9	10	-
	Peace Journalism	**61**	**28**	**2**
End Results	*Zero-sum game*			
	Hez. won	30	58	96
	Israel won	6	9	-
	Israel lost	22	8	4
	War Journalism	**58**	**75**	**100**
	No-win no lose			
	No one-won	17	15	-
	Lebanon lost	25	10	-
	Peace Journalism	**15**	**10**	**-**

- Position: X^2=412.156, df=18, p<0.001
- Remedy: X^2=344.777, df=12, p<0.001
- End Results: X^2=147.326, df=8, p<0.001
- Chi-square tests were calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Data excluded the "other" and "not mentioned" items from calculations.
- Total number of missing values in **Position** (n=177); in *Ahram* (n=124), *Masry* (n=42) and *Araby* (n=11).
- Total number of missing values in **Remedy suggested** (n=678); in *Ahram* (n=405), *Masry* (n=208), and *Araby* (n=74).
- Total number of missing values in **End Result** (n=338), *Ahram* (n=201), *Masry* (n=98), and *Araby* (n=39).

As shown from the table, the newspapers under study used the elements of war journalism and peace journalism frames differently. The state-owned *Ahram* fostered the peace journalism frame in using the *non-partisan* and *agreement orientated* elements more frequently than the *partisan* and *war-oriented* elements of war journalism frame. The *non-partisan* elements of peace journalism as inferred from the position were displayed in 53% of its editorials, in comparison to 41% of the *partisan* war journalism frame elements. Likewise, the state-owned newspaper advocated the *agreement-oriented* elements in high percentage of 61% in its editorials. Nevertheless, *Ahram* tended to foster the war journalism frame in reporting the war within the *zero-sum* dimension in 58% of the mentioned results. The liberal *Masry* fostered the peace journalism frame in its emphasis on the *non-partisan* elements in majority of 57% of its coverage, albeit it promoted war journalism in its preference to the *war orientated* remedy of war and its *zero-sum* prediction of the war outcome. The *war-oriented* solution was put forward in 49% of the suggested remedies, in comparison to only 28% for the *agreement-oriented* solution. The *zero-sum* outcome of war was frequently mentioned in the liberal newspaper *Masry* in a vast majority of 75% of the war results. As for the leftist newspaper *Araby*, it was qualified as promoting the war journalism frame in the explored elements. It is noticed that the rate of displaying the *partisan* elements in the leftist newspaper was slightly more than the rate of displaying the *non-partisan* elements, (50% and 48% respectively). The tendency toward the war journalism frame and peace journalism frame is computed using the composite mean index scale ranging from 0 to 1 for these elements. The state-owned *Ahram* earned 0.592, *Masry* earned 0.552, and *Araby* earned 0.327. Generally speaking, results suggested that in their editorials, both *Ahram* and *Masry* balanced between the war journalism frame and peace journalism frame with a slight tendency toward the peace journalism frame, whereas leftist *Araby* fostered the war journalism frame.

6.7 Visuals

Due to the potentials of visuals, they play a more effective role in framing than verbal texts (Messaris & Abraham, 2001). The study analyzed all the visuals relevant to the Lebanon war of 2006 in the three newspapers. A total of 700 photos were investigated according to previous studies and the data obtained (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012; Neumann & Fahmy, 2012; Schwalbe, 2013). The photos were analyzed according to the regional focus, role, and depiction. The photos that depicted human beings were further analyzed according to age, physical harm, and emotional harm (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012). The unit of analysis is the single photo.

1. Regional Focus. This category identified the location where the photo was taken. It could also refer to the actor depicted in the photo. For the purpose of this study, there is a

specific variable for "Hezbollah" despite the fact that the latter is a political faction in Lebanon. This is due to the political stance of the Egyptian regime as expressed by the President Mubarak during the course of the war that distinguished between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah (See Chapter 4, section 4.3.1).

Table (24): Regional Focus in Visuals (n=700)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	**Total** n=700
Not mentioned	1	2	3	2
Egypt	10	22	22	18
Lebanon	54	41	28	43
Israel	12	11	31	13
Hezbollah	2	3	15	4
U.S.	5	5	-	4
Europe	13	11	2	11
Other	4	6	-	5
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2= 236.895, df=14, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Missing values (n=0)

Results show that "Lebanon" was most frequently covered by the state-owned press *Ahram* (54%) and the liberal press *Masry* (41%), and less in leftist *Araby* (28%). The attention given to "Israel" in *Araby* was great in comparison to the other two newspapers. The most frequent region to be depicted in the leftist press was "Israel" in 31% of its photos, and only 12% in the state-owned *Ahram,* and 11% in the liberal *Masry*. It is also deduced from the table that "Egypt" was substantially covered in the liberal and leftist press, each with 22% of the photos, and only 10% in the state press. Visuals that focused on "Hezbollah" were very low represented in *Ahram* (2%) and *Masry* (3%). In contrast, the leftist newspaper *Araby* depicted "Hezbollah" in a considerable high percentage of 15%. It is interesting to find that "European countries" were more represented than the United States (U.S.) in the photos. Visuals depicting the "U.S." were only 5% in both *Ahram* and *Masry* and none in the leftist *Araby*. The "European countries" were captured in the photos in 13% in *Ahram*, 11% in *Masry,* and only 2% in *Araby*. The statistical chi-square test proved significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of the focus region, X^2= 236.895 and p<0.001.

2. Role of Regional Focus. This category refers to the role of the depicted region in the photos.

Table (25) Role of Regional Focus (n=700)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	Total n=700
Not mentioned	-	1	2	1
Insurgent	8	13	22	16
Victim	58	46	52	50
Negotiator	21	15	2	10
Demonstrator	12	21	24	21
Other	1	4	-	2
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2= 122.628, df=8, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after excluding the category "not mentioned" and after weighting the weekly at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Missing values (n=0)

Broadly speaking, there was a tendency in the three newspapers to depict the victimization side in the majority of photos. In *Ahram* the "victim" role was displayed in 58% of the photos, in *Masry* in 46%, and in the leftist *Araby* in 52%. However, differences between the depicted roles emerged between the newspapers with regard to the rest of the roles. The statistical test showed significant differences, X^2= 122.628, p<0.001. The "insurgent" role was considerably depicted in the leftist press *Araby*, in 22% of its photos, and less in the liberal *Masry*, and state press *Ahram*. The "negotiator" role was given high attention in the state-owned newspaper *Ahram*, representing 21% of its visuals, and less in liberal *Masry*, representing 15%, and a very low representation in the leftist *Araby* (2%). The "demonstrator" role was depicted in the liberal *Masry* and the leftist *Araby* in 21% and 24% respectively, more than in the state press *Ahram*, where it was represented in only 12%. It is inferred from the results that there is no homogenous trend in depicting the roles in the visuals. Despite the fact that the "victim" role dominated the coverage in the three newspapers, there was discrepancy between the newspapers in the rest of the roles. While *Ahram* tended to widen the aspect of war by focusing on the role of "negotiator," the liberal *Masry* and the leftist *Araby* depicted the "demonstrator" role as reaction to the war worldwide instead.

4. Main Depiction in Visuals. Specifying the depiction in the photo is important for emphasizing the frames in the study. As shown in Table (26), the study revealed significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of the main depiction portrayed, X^2= 210.741, p<0.001.

Table (26): Main Depiction (n=700)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	Total n=700
Weaponry	5	8	4	7
Visual effects				
Injuries	10	8	19	10
Destruction	23	11	15	14
Dead	4	6	9	6
Non visual				
Refugees	22	19	3	18
Demonstration	11	19	16	16
Negotiation	15	5	-	7
Personal Photo	9	22	28	20
Other	1	2	6	2
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=210.741,df=16, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was conducted after weighting the weekly Araby at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Missing values (n=0).

Analysis revealed that the depiction of the victimization side varied between the newspapers. In portraying the victims, the state-owned *Ahram* captured the "destruction" of building and infrastructure in 23%, and the "refugee" issues in 22% of its newspaper photos. The *visual effect* with people (injuries and dead) was given little coverage, ranging from 4% to 10%. The liberal press *Masry* covered the victimization trauma of the "refugees" in 19%, more than its coverage of the "destruction" of buildings and roads in 11%, and humans (injuries, 8%; dead 6%). These results were reversed in the leftist *Araby* newspaper, which depicted the "injuries" of humans in 19% and the "destruction" of buildings in 15% of its photos. The issue of "refugees" was hardly captured in the leftist press with only 3%. The three newspapers gave quite similar coverage to the depiction of "demonstration" as a reaction to the war worldwide: 11% in *Ahram*, 19% in *Masry*, and 16% in *Araby*. Nevertheless, the visuals of the "negotiations" and peace talks varied between the newspapers. The state newspaper *Ahram* depicted the most frequent photos of

"negotiations" in 15% of its coverage, in comparison to a low percentage of 5% in the liberal *Masry,* and none in the leftist newspaper *Araby.* Table (26) also shows that the liberal and leftist press presented the highest amount of "personal photos" devoid of contextual atmosphere. The status of the person depicted in the photo was further analyzed in terms of being elite or non elite as shown in Table (27).

Status of "Personal Photo": The personal photo, which captured a static photo of the person without putting him in his contextual atmosphere, amounts to 138 photos, representing 20% of the total number of photos. Table (27) shows the status of the person presented in the photo.

Table (27): Status of Personal Photo (n=700)
(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	**Total** n=700
Elite	89	68	68	70
Non-elite	11	32	32	30
Total	100	100	100	100

- Total number of personal photos (n=138)

The majority of the personal photos in the three newspapers were of elite persons, thus showing heads of state, ministers, or governmental officials. *Ahram* represents the vast amount of elite photos in 89% of its personal photos portrayed. As for the liberal and leftist newspapers, though showing elite photos in the majority of cases (68% each), they tended to include the non-elite in 32% of their photos.

5. Age, Physical, and Emotional harm. Visuals bear witness to reality as constructed in the media. Photos of the human cost of war stir sentiments more than photos of destruction because they present a testimony to the brutality of the fight and the responsibility of the antagonists rather than a painless war. The imagery of war tends to achieve two goals: to rally the public consciousness for the justification of the war and to satisfy the "commercial audience" (Aday, 2005, p.143). The study examined the human photos in terms of the age, physical, and emotional harm. The examination of human photos borrowed the technique of analysis from Neumann and Fahmy (2012). From a total of 700 photographs analyzed in the study, there were 612 photos – representing 87% of the total photos – showing humans.

Age

The categories of age are divided according to the assumed age of antagonists: children/adolescents (0-15), adults (apparently men and women above adolescent age), and a mixture of both if the photo contains groups of children and adults. It is worth mentioning that

the age of antagonists was not clearly indicated but roughly assumed from the features and the size of the person.

Table (28): Age of Antagonists (n=700)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	**Total** n=700
Not mentioned	4	3	9	6
Children/adolescent	5	11	-	5
Adults only	74	72	86	78
Mixture of children and adults	17	14	5	11
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=79.369, df=6, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Total number of missing values that are not photos of human beings (n=88); in *Ahram* (n=32), *Masry* (n=43) and *Araby* (n=13)
- The category "not mentioned" are long shots photos of human being which rendered them hard to detect their age.

The study indicated that the three newspapers under study with regard to the age of antagonists shown in the photos were significantly different, X^2=79.369, p<0.001. In general, results showed that depicting "adults only" in the war photos was a trend in the three newspapers representing 74% of the human photos in *Ahram*, 72% in *Masry*, and 86% of the human photos in *Araby*. It is also clear that the three newspapers rarely depicted photos of "children/adolescent" alone. Photos of children alone symbolize abandonment. Children who are distracted from their society and guardians signify how wars shatter the family apart (Wells, 2007, p.63). Only the liberal *Masry* newspaper depicted the "children/adolescent" alone with a percentage of 11%, more than *Ahram,* which only depicted them in 5%, and none in the leftist *Araby*. The children are usually presented within the companion of their caregivers. Visuals depicting a "mixture of children and adults" represented 17% in *Ahram*, 14% in *Masry,* and a low percentage of 5% in *Araby*. Visuals of children and adults served different purpose according to the context of the photo. On one hand, they showed the effect of the war on family unity. A mixture of children and adults as victims of war in the photos gave an impression effect of war as tearing families apart and leading to their massive exodus (Brothers, 1997, p.150). Also, the construction of the image of children is inscribed with innocence, and vulnerability demands the protection of adults by demanding the governments to act and alleviate the suffering of the children (Wells, 2007, p.59).

Physical Harm. The degree of physical harm in a photo reflects the effect of the war on human beings.

Table (29): Physical Harm of Humans (n=700)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	**Total** n=700
Most severe	9	7	11	9
Severe	8	8	22	14
Not severe	83	85	67	77
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=43.882, df= 4, p<0.001.
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Total number of missing values that are not photos of human beings (n=88); in *Ahram* (n=32), in *Masry* (n=43) and *Araby* (n=13).

The differences in depicting the physical harm between the three newspapers were statistically significant, X^2=43.883, p<0.001. The three newspapers generally portrayed the humans with "not severe" physical harm. Both *Ahram* and *Masry* captured humans of "not severe" harm in 83% and 85% respectively. The "severe" and "most severe" physical harm of humans were captured with a low percentage in *Ahram* and *Masry*. The leftist *Araby*, despite representing the photos of humans with "not severe" physical harm in majority of its cases (67%), tended to include the "severe" and "most severe" harm with a relatively considerable percentage. Analysis shows that the leftist newspaper *Araby* presented more sensational photos of "severe" harm (injured humans) in 22%, and "most severe" photos of dead bodies or symbols of death in 11% of its human photos. The threshold of the images of dead civilians is that it evokes hatred of the "foe" (Sontag, 2003, p.10).

Emotional Harm. The emotional facial expression determines the psychological mood of the person shown in the photo. The person portrayed as smiling, laughing, or shown relaxing implies a positive mood. On the contrary, the person captured as crying, sad, or desperate implies a negative mood. The categories of emotional harm were simply coded as either negative (sad, angry, crying, or depressed), positive (happy, smiling, relax), and neutral (no clear emotional expression), and "not mentioned." The last element "not mentioned" included the long-shot photos of human beings where it was hard to determine their emotional expression by a reader eye. Table (30) represents the results of emotional harm of human photos.

Table (30): Emotional Harm of Humans (n=700)

(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	**Total** n=700
Not mentioned	16	9	5	8
Positive	7	7	11	9
Negative	73	72	78	75
Neutral	4	12	6	8
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2=32.605, df= 6, p<0.001.
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly Araby at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Total number of missing values that are not photos of human beings (n=88); in *Ahram* (n=32), in *Masry* (n=43) and *Araby* (n=13).

As indicated from the table, the photos of humans that depict them in a "negative" mood represent 75% of the total number of human photos. However, the leftist *Araby* included more photos of humans in a "positive" mood (11%), in comparison to *Ahram* and *Masry* (7% each). It also showed that the state-owned *Ahram* presented photos of humans with long-shots more than the other two newspapers, thus depriving them of the intense emotional feeling depicted in their facial expressions. The percentage of photos with long-shots in *Ahram* was 16%, in *Masry* 9% and least presented in *Araby*, in only 5%. By this technique, *Ahram* refrained from identifying with the persons in the photos and presented them as collective masses without showing their emotions.

6.8 Main Frames in Visuals

The frame of the photo was explored from the caption associated by the photo. Table (31) presents the results of analysis.

Table (31): Main Frames in Visuals (n=700)
(By percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	Total n=700
Victim/feuding	53	51	28	41
Strategic Interest	7	9	6	7
Heroic Hezbollah	8	7	38	21
Reconciliation	22	9	-	8
Responsibility	1	2	15	7
Protest	9	20	13	15
Other	-	2	-	1
Total	100	100	100	100

- Chi-square X^2= 342.905, df=12, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies
- Missing values (n=0).

The study showed significant difference between the three newspapers, X^2=342.905, p<0.001. The *victim/feuding neighbors* frame dominated the visuals in both *Ahram* and *Masry,* representing 53% and 51% respectively, and less in the *Araby* newspaper, representing 28%. The leftist *Araby* newspaper displayed the *heroic Hezbollah* frame with the highest percentage rate in 38% of its visuals. This contrasts *Ahram* and *Masry,* which diluted the significance of that frame, displaying it in only 8% and 7% subsequently. In addition, the state-owned newspaper *Ahram* regarded the frame of *reconciliation* in visuals as proportionally important, displaying it as a secondary frame with a percentage of 22%. Visuals of peace talks and negotiations received scant attention in the liberal newspaper *Masry* and no attention at all in the leftist *Araby.* Results also show that the state-owned newspaper tended to marginalize the *protest* frame, displaying it in only 9% of its visuals. On the other hand, the *protest* frame was displayed with a high percentage in visuals of the liberal *Masry* and the leftist *Araby,* in 20% and 13% respectively. The results are consistent with the regime's political stance in Egypt. The regime viewed the Lebanon war as a vicious circle of violence that harvests the lives of innocent civilians calling for ceasefire. Therefore, the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame followed by the *reconciliation* frame were dominantly displayed in the visuals of *Ahram.* This was in contrast to the position adopted by the Nasserite Party, which denounced the claims of the regime and promoted the resistance of

Hezbollah as justifying a reaction to the atrocities of the Israeli aggression. Thus, the *heroic Hezbollah* frame was highly represented in the visuals of the leftist newspaper *Araby,* the mouthpiece of the Nasserite Party.

6.9 War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames in Visuals

The competing war journalism and peace journalism frames were determined from the depiction of the visuals. Table (32) presents the results of analyzing the elements of the competing frames based on the depiction of the visuals.

Table (32): Elements of War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames in Visuals (n=700) (In percentage)

	Ahram n=194	*Masry* n=438	*Araby* n=68	Total n=700
Visual effects				
Weaponry	5	8	10	7
Injuries	10	8	19	10
Destruction	23	11	15	14
Dead	4	6	9	6
War Journalism	**42**	**33**	**53**	**37**
Non-visual effects				
Refugees	22	19	3	18
Demonstration	11	19	16	16
Negotiation	14	5	-	7
Peace Journalism	**47**	**43**	**19**	**41**

- The "other" and "not mentioned" elements in "depiction" category are excluded from analysis.
- Chi-square X^2=210.741 df=16, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Missing values (n=0)

Results conclude that there are significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of the used elements of war journalism and peace journalism frames. Applying the peace mean index scale, *Ahram* earned 0.529, *Masry* earned 0.564, and *Araby* earned 0.289. Results show that both *Ahram* and *Masry* balanced their coverage between war journalism and peace journalism frames with a slight inclination toward the peace journalism frame. In their visuals, they both gave significant attention to the suffering of "refugees" representing them in 22% and 19%. The state-owned *Ahram* devoted more attention to the depiction of "negotiation" in 14% of their visuals, followed by "demonstration" in 11%; the liberal *Masry* depicted "demonstration" in 19% and the least attention to the visuals of "negotiation" in only 5% of its

coverage. Thus, the peace journalism frame in *Ahram* was seen with the plight of the "refugees" and peace "negotiation" visuals. The liberal press *Masry* viewed the peace journalism frame from the "refugees" suffering and "demonstration" as reaction to the war. With regard to the elements of war journalism that were less represented in both newspapers, results illustrated that the visuals of building "destruction" dominated the category of war journalism frame more than sensational visuals of human "death" and "injuries." As for the leftist *Araby* newspaper, analysis showed a clear tendency in the visuals for promoting the war journalism frame by depicting images of the visual effects of war on humans and infrastructure, as well as visuals of military preparations (weaponry).

CHAPTER SEVEN

TESTING HYPOTHESES AND MEASURING FRAMES

This study, as previously elaborated, is concerned with exploring the framing of the 2006 Lebanon war in the Egyptian press, as well as the orientation of the newspapers toward war journalism and peace journalism frames. The frames in the news, editorials and visuals in three Egyptian newspapers, representing the state press, liberal press and leftist press, are investigated. This chapter discusses the findings of the framing patterns in the three newspapers under study during the period of analysis. The hypotheses are tested and the questions are answered. Finally, the results are interpreted through the social constructionist approach.

7.1 Main Frames of the 2006 Lebanon War

Literature review acknowledged that there are no mainstream frames in covering the Middle East conflict. The pattern of framing is dependent on an avalanche of intrinsic and extrinsic factors in the countries producing the media framing. The similarities and differences between the three newspapers under study were statistically calculated and the results were obtained. For the purpose of the study, the frames were differentiated according to the frequency of their display in the materials under examination. The "dominant" frame is the frame that scored the highest frequency rate of display. The "secondary" frame is the frame that occurred less frequently than the dominant frame but still remained as the second most frequently displayed frame. "Idiosyncratic but newsworthy" is the frame that occurred in articles and visuals with less frequency yet still tended to be observed (Dong & Chitty, 2012, p. 283). In the current study the "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" frame is the third frequently displayed frame.

> H1: There is significant difference between the newspapers in terms of framing the 2006 war in Lebanon.

The statistical chi-square test was calculated in each of the news texts and headlines, editorials, and visuals.

Frames in News Headlines. In the headlines, Table (15) in Chapter Six showed that there is a significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of the frames used in headlines. The assumption was asserted statistically, X^2=158.695, df=12, p<0.001.

Figure (3) illustrates the frames in the headlines of the three newspapers under study.

Figure (3): Frames in News Headlines (n=492)
(By percentage)

- Chi-square X^2=158.695, df=12, p<0.001
- Missing values (n=0)

The news headlines in the state-owned *Ahram* newspaper focused dominantly on the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame in 41% of the newspaper headlines. The secondary frame in the headlines of *Ahram* was the *reconciliation* frame in 34% of the headlines. The "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" frame was the *protest* frame in 10% of the newspaper coverage. The rest of the frames were displayed with a minimal percentage. The liberal newspaper *Masry* showed similar results to the state-owned *Ahram* in terms of the dominant frame. The second displayed frame in the state-owned newspaper was the *reconciliation* frame in 34% of the headlines. The headlines in the liberal *Masry* showed nearly similar results to *Ahram*, yet tended to show more variation of frames. The dominant frame displayed in *Masry* news headlines was the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame in 39%, followed by the *reconciliation* frame in 16% of its news headlines. Nevertheless, considerable attention was given to the rest of the frames displayed. The *strategic interest* frame was displayed. The *responsibility* and *protest* frames were equally displayed in 10% each, and the *heroic Hezbollah* frame was displayed in only 7% of the news headlines of *Masry*. The leftist *Araby* displayed the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in the majority of cases, representing 32% of the news headlines, followed by the secondary frame of *protest* in 21%. The *victim/feuding neighbors* frame and *strategic interties* frame were regarded as "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" frames representing 16% each.

Frames in News Texts. As mentioned before in Chapter Six, the frames are measured in accordance to the themes of the news texts. The first three themes are coded and frames are

detected. A total of 1476 themes, rendering a total of 1476 frames, were recognized in the three newspapers. It was inferred statistically from Table (16) in Chapter Six that there is significant difference between the newspapers under study in terms of the frames used in news texts, X^2=219.107, p<0.001.

Figure (4) illustrated the frames in news texts in the newspapers under study n=1476.

Figure (4): Frames in News Texts (n=1476)

(By percentage)

- Chi-square X^2= 219.107, df=12, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* newspaper at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Statistical test was calculated after re-grouping the three frames in text into a group of related cases.
- Total of missing values (n=539); in *Ahram* (n=315), *Masry* (n=213) and *Araby* (n=11).

The dominant frame in both state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* news texts was *victim/feuding neighbors*, in 47% and 39% respectively. The secondary frame in the two newspapers was *reconciliation*, representing 34% in *Ahram,* and 26% in *Masry*. The "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" frame in both *Ahram* and *Masry* was the *protest* frame, displayed in 8% and 12% of the news texts. Nonetheless, the liberal *Masry* globalized the conflict by displaying the *strategic interest* frame in 11% of the news texts, nearly similar to the newsworthy frame of the *protest.* With regard to the leftist *Araby* newspaper, the dominate frame was *heroic Hezbollah* in 29% of the news texts, followed by the secondary frame of *victim/feuding neighbors* in 22%. The "idiosyncratic but newsworthy" frame in the leftist newspaper was the *protest* frame, displayed in 20% of its news coverage.

Analysis of the frames in news headlines and texts suggested that the state-owned newspaper *Ahram* covered the 2006 Lebanon war within the framework of *victim/feuding neighbors*, presenting the *reconciliation* frame as a way of resolving the conflict. The liberal press *Masry* showed more diversity in its coverage of the war by focusing on the role of the superpower in keeping the war ablaze with the *strategic interest* frame and the reaction of the public opinion to the severity of the war in the *protest* frame. Moreover, it was inferred that the leftist *Araby* was on the forefront for extolling the *heroic Hezbollah* frame.

Frames in Editorials. The editorials reflect the ideological leanings of the newspapers (Van Dijk, 1989, p.252). Results from Table (22) showed that there is significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of the frames in the editorials, X^2=321.956, p<0.001. Figure (5) shows the frames in editorials in the three newspapers understudy.

Figure (5): Frames in Editorials (n=536)

(By percentage)

- Chi-square X^2=321.956, df=10, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was conducted after re-grouping (frame 1) obtained from position 1 with (frame 2) obtained from position 2
- The leftist *Araby* newspaper was weighted at 7 times more than dailies.
- Total number of missing values (n=177); in *Ahram* (n=124), *Masry* (n=42) and *Araby* (n=11).

In the state-owned newspaper *Ahram*, the editorials dominantly displayed the *victim/feuding neighbors*, with 46% of its coverage. The liberal and leftist press displayed a diversity of frames in the editorials. The liberal *Masry* gave particular attention in its editorials to the *responsibility* frame and the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame, displaying them in 28% and 27% respectively. Moreover, it promoted the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in 21% of its coverage, rendering it the newsworthy frame in the editorials of the liberal newspaper. The leftist *Araby*

newspaper advanced the *responsibility* frame in 32% of its editorials, followed by the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in 30%. The *victim/feuding neighbors* frame was covered less in the leftist newspaper, representing 23% of its editorials.

Analysis inferred that the state-owned *Ahram* viewed the Lebanon war in 2006 within the perspective of the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame with less attention given to the rest of the frames. The liberal and leftist press viewed the Lebanon war from an aggregate point of view, advancing the *responsibility* frame that points to the procrastination of the Arab and Egyptian regime in seeking to stop the escalation of the war. Both newspapers provided particular attention to the victimization side of the war presenting Hezbollah as the torchbearer of resistance with different percentages. None of the newspapers displayed the *protest* frame in the editorials.

Frames in Visuals. Table (31) in Chapter Six showed that the visual framing of the 2006 Lebanon war differed significantly between the newspapers, X^2= 342.905, p<0.001. Figure (6) illustrates the frames in visuals.

Figure (6): Frames in Visuals (n=700)

(By percentage)

- Chi-square X^2= 342.905, df=12, p<0.001
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighting the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.
- Missing values (n=0).

Results showed that the dynamic events of the Lebanon war displayed in the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame dominantly prevailed in the visuals of both the state-owned *Ahram* and the liberal *Masry* newspapers in more than half of their coverage. The rest of the frames were displayed less. However, differences could be observed between *Ahram* and *Masry* in terms of

the secondary frame. The state-owned *Ahram* depicted the secondary *reconciliation* frame more frequently than the liberal *Masry,* which regarded the *protest* frame as the secondary frame. With regard to the leftist newspaper *Araby*, results showed that the visuals depicted *heroic Hezbollah* as the dominant frame of representation followed by the secondary frame of *victim/feuding neighbors*. It is clearly observed that the visuals of *negotiations* were completely ignored in the leftist press.

With regard to the first hypothesis H1, results obtained from headlines, news texts, editorials, and visuals showed significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of the frames of the 2006 Lebanon war. Table (33) represents the statistical differences between the newspapers in terms of the frames of analysis as explored in headlines, news texts, editorials, and visuals.

Table (33): Statistical differences of Frames displayed in Newspapers

	Ahram	*Masry*	*Araby*	Total	Table	Chi-square X^2
Headlines	n=247	n=226	n=19	N=495	Table (15)	X^2=158.695,df=12,p<0.001
News texts	n=741	n=678	n=57	N=1476	Table (16)	X^2=219.107,df=12,p<0.001
Editorials	n=315	n=158	n=63	N=536	Table (22)	X^2=321.956,df=10,p<0.001
Visuals	n=194	n=438	n=68	N=700	Table (31)	X^2= 342.905,df=12, p<0.001

- Total number of frames in headlines (n=495), missing values (n=0)
- Total number of frames in news texts (n=1476), number of missing values (n=539)
- Total number of frames in editorials (n=536), number of missing values (n=177)
- Total number of frames in visuals (n=700), number of missing values (n=0)
- Chi-square test was calculated after weighing the weekly *Araby* at 7 times more than the dailies.

Based on calculating the chi-square statistical tests for the news headlines, news texts, editorials and visuals, there are statistical differences between the three newspapers understudy in terms of the frames for the 2006 war in Lebanon. Therefore, hypothesis **H1 was supported.**

H2: The state-owned press *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the Egyptian regime in displaying the *reconciliation* frame more than *Masry* and *Araby.*
H3: The leftist Pan-Arab press *Araby* is more likely to display the *heroic Hezbollah* frame than *Ahram* and *Masry.*

With regard to hypothesis H2, results showed that the *reconciliation* frame was given more attention in the state-owned press than the liberal and leftist press. In the news headlines and texts (Tables 15 and 16) the *reconciliation* frame was displayed in the state-owned *Ahram* in 34% of its coverage. In comparison, the liberal *Masry* displayed the *reconciliation* frame in 16%

of its headlines and 26% of its news texts. The leftist *Araby* displayed that frame the least among the three newspapers. In the headlines, the *reconciliation* frame was displayed in only 5% and in the news texts in 15% of its coverage. In the editorials (Table 22), the *reconciliation* frame did not receive the same attention as in the news. However, analysis revealed that the state-owned press *Ahram* covered it in 12% of its editorials in comparison to only 1% in the liberal press *Masry,* and no coverage in the leftist press *Araby*. In the visuals (Table 31), the *reconciliation* frame earned the highest percentage of display in *Ahram,* representing 22% of its visuals, in comparison to only 9% in the liberal *Masry*, and no representation in the leftist Araby. Thus, in comparison with the liberal and leftist press, the state press displayed the *reconciliation* frame with the highest frequency rate. The state newspaper of *Ahram* echoed the stance of the Egyptian government in fostering the peaceful solution as the means for bringing the war to an end (See Chapter Four). The statistical tests presented for the news, editorials, and visuals as shown in Table (33) proved the difference between the three newspapers. Therefore, hypothesis **H2 was supported**.

In regards to hypothesis H3, which is related to displaying the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in the leftist *Araby,* results showed that this frame was given considerably more attention in the leftist press than the state press and liberal press. In the news headlines (Table 15) the *heroic Hezbollah* frame was represented in 32%; more than the state-owned press (5%) and liberal press (7%). In the news texts (Table 16) the latter frame was represented in 29% in the leftist press, in comparison to only 4% in each *Ahram* and *Masry*. In the editorials (Table 22), the *heroic Hezbollah* frame was on the forefront of the leftist *Araby* coverage. It was displayed in 30% of *Araby* editorials, in comparison to 10% in the state press *Ahram,* and 21% in the liberal press *Masry*. Analysis showed the liberal press *Masry* devoted strong attention to the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in its editorials, albeit the level remained less than the leftist press *Araby*. As for the visuals (Table 31), analysis proved that the leftist *Araby* displayed the *heroic Hezbollah* frame with the highest percentage in comparison to the other newspapers. The frame was displayed in the leftist *Araby* in 38% of its visuals, in comparison to only 8% in state-owned *Ahram,* and 7% in liberal *Masry*. Data obtained from the raw percentage rate in addition to the statistical significant test presented in Table (33) proved that there are significant differences between the newspapers, determining that the *heroic Hezbollah* frame was more represented in the leftist *Araby* than *Ahram* and *Masry*. Therefore, hypothesis **H3 was supported**. Results were consistent with the stance of the Nasserite Party that adopted a favorable stance toward Hezbollah extolling its military performance in the war (see Chapter Four).

7.2 Timeline Analysis of Main Frames in News Headlines

During the course of the 2006 Lebanon war, different frames competed with each other to attain the reader's attention. The events of the war helped certain frames to dominate at one time and fade at another time, depending on the course of the conflict. The following timeline presented the competing frames used in the Egyptian press over the period of five weeks from 13 July 2006 to August 15, 2006. The timeline in Figure (7) presented the main frames of the Lebanon war in news headlines. The reason for choosing the headlines to detect the development of the frames during the five-week war period is because the headlines captured the attention of the reader first due to its importance and ideological implication (Van Dijk, 1991, p.51).

Figure (7): Main Frames in News Headlines Over Time (n=492)

(By percentage)

- Missing values (n=0)
- The percentage was calculated for the news headlines in the three newspapers.

As indicated in the analysis of frames in news headlines, Figure (7) showed the prominence of certain frames depending on the historical events. In general, the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame consistently remained the dominant frame over the five week period of the war. Even at a low point in week 4, it was mentioned in more than 20% of the headlines in the three newspapers combined. With less emphasis, the *reconciliation* frame continued to prevail during the war, reaching its peak in week 5, which witnessed extensive diplomatic efforts to bring the war to an end. The rest of the frames had their moments of prominence in accordance with the

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contextual political events. However, they competed with each other rather than with the main *victim/feuding neighbors* frame and *reconciliation* frame. The *responsibility* frame was largely muted in the newspapers until week 3, when the Israeli air strike killed 54 Lebanese civilians, most of whom were children in the southern village of Qana on July 30, 2006. Mounting criticism flared in the Egyptian press, pointing to the responsibility of the Arab states and the procrastination of the international community in stopping the violence. The *protest* frame was allowed to compete with the dominant frames in week 4. It was observed from the figure that the dominant frame of *victim/feuding neighbors* was reduced in favor of the *protest* and *reconciliation* frames in week 4. The *strategic interest* frame was significantly observed in the first two weeks of the war. This was coupled with statement of the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on July 21, 2006 introducing the "birth pangs of a new Middle East" and the Egyptian president's accusation that Iran and Syria were involved in the conflict. As the war advanced, the *strategic interest* frame faded. The *heroic Hezbollah* frame received minor attention in the first three weeks of the war. As the war continued with no signs of Israel winning the ground and achieving its goals, the *heroic Hezbollah* frame attained momentum and competed with the rest of the frames reaching its peak after week 4.

7.3 War Journalism and Peace Journalism Frames

The current study explored the tendency of the Egyptian newspapers under examination toward Galtung's competing peace journalism and war journalism frames. The essence behind studying the competing frames was to shed light on the contextual factors that affect the role of media in war times.

H4: The newspapers differ significantly in terms of their inclination toward the war journalism and the peace journalism frames.

The tendency of the newspapers toward the war journalism frame and the peace journalism frame is measured in the news (Table 17), in the editorials (Table 23) and in the visuals (Table 32). The statistical chi-square test was measured for each of these categories. Furthermore, the general tendency was measured by the composite mean peace index scale ranging from 0, for war journalism frame, to 1, for peace journalism frame. Results obtained from Tables (17, 23 and 32) showed significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of each of the items of war journalism and peace journalism frames, thus proving the differences between the newspapers' tendencies toward the competing frames.

Comparative Findings. The frequencies computed from a total of 492 news cases, 536 editorials, and 700 visuals showed the differences between the newspapers in terms of their tendencies toward Galtung's competing frames.

Here and now **versus** *wider aspect of war*. This element is explored from the category of "action" in news texts. Results of news texts obtained from Table (17) showed a significant difference, X^2=102.518, p<0.001. The state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* focused more on the *wider aspects of war* such as the news of "negotiations,""demonstration," and "humanitarian aid" activities more than the actual events of the "battlefield" from the war zones. The news of "negotiations" and peace talks was covered at a high percentage. The leftist newspaper *Araby* covered the actual *here and now* events of the "battlefield" more than the wider aspects of war.

Visual effects **versus** *non-visual effects of war*. This element is indicated from the category of the "consequence" of action in news texts and the category of "depiction" in the visuals. Analysis of news texts as shown in Table (17) indicated the significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of the "consequence of action" as X^2=148.663, p<0.001. In the visuals, Table (32) indicated significant difference between the three newspapers understudy, X^2=210.741, p<0.001. Both state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* devoted more attention to the *non-visual effects* of war and the consequences of "negotiations" and "demonstrations."With regard to the elements of the *visual effects of war,* analysis showed that the three newspapers focused on the "killing/casualties" more frequently than the consequences of the war on the "destruction" of buildings and roads. As for the *non-visual effects of war,* results showed that the trauma of "refugees" was covered in 11%, more frequently than *Masry,* which covered it in only 8%, and the leftist *Araby,* which had no coverage. Moreover, results showed that the consequence of "negotiations" was given considerable attention in *Ahram* and *Masry,* and less in *Araby*, which covered the "demonstrations" more progressively than the state and liberal press. In sum, it is observed that the coverage of the three newspapers fostered the elements of peace journalism frame in the category of "consequences" of war more than elements of the war journalism frame.

Elite **versus** *non-elite oriented.* This item is detected from the "source of information" in the news texts. Results from Table (17) showed significant differences between the newspapers, X^2=226.196, p<0.001. Both state-owned *Ahram* and liberal *Masry* adhered to the *elite* sources of information, contrary to the leftist *Araby,* which relied heavily on *non-elite* sources of information.

Partisan versus non-partisan. This element is detected in the editorial "position of the writer" as shown in Table (23). Analysis showed the significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of the "positions," X^2=412.156, p<0.001. The state-owned *Ahram* and the

liberal *Masry* adhered more frequently to the *non-partisan* position of the editorial writers, contrary to the leftist *Araby,* which promoted the *partisan* position in favor of Hezbollah.

   War oriented* versus *Agreement oriented. This element is detected from the "remedy suggested" in the editorials. Results (Table 23) confirmed the significant differences between the three newspapers, X^2=412,156, p<0.001. The state-owned *Ahram* newspaper boosted the *agreement oriented* element, whereas both liberal *Masry* and leftist *Araby* favored the *war oriented* remedy to the war.

   Zero-sum game* versus *no win-no loss. This element is explored in the mentioned "end results of war" as shown in Table (23). Results showed the significant differences between the newspapers in their view of the winning parties, X^2=147.326, p<0.001. In general, the three newspapers under study favor the *zero-sum* game in their editorials. The state-owned newspaper *Ahram* referred to the winning side of Hezbollah slightly more than mentioning the losing side of Israel. The liberal *Masry* and leftist *Araby* pointed to the winning side of Hezbollah in the majority of their coverage.

   Based on the statistical chi-square test in these categories as pointed out in Tables (17, 23, and 32), it is concluded that there are significant differences between the three newspapers in terms of their tendencies toward peace journalism frames and war journalism frames. Therefore, hypothesis **H4 is supported**.

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H5: The state-owned *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the regime and displays more elements of the peace journalism frame than the war journalism frame.
H6: The liberal newspaper *Masry* is more likely to use elements of peace journalism frame than war journalism frames.
H7: The leftist Pan Arab newspaper *Araby* is more likely to use elements of the war journalism frame than the peace journalism frame.

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   Hypotheses H5, H6, and H7 were measured by the composite mean index. In the news texts, the state-owned *Ahram* earned a score of 0.546, while the liberal *Masry* earned a score of 0.533 and the leftist *Araby* earned a score of 0.682. This indicated the balance of both state press and right-wing between the war journalism frame and the peace journalism frame in their news coverage with a slight inclination toward peace journalism frame. The leftist Araby newspaper showed a clear tendency toward the peace journalism frame in its news coverage.

   In the editorials, results of the composite mean index showed that the state-owned *Ahram* earned 0.592 while liberal *Masry* obtained 0.552. The editorials in the leftist *Araby* earned 0.327. Therefore, in both their editorials, *Ahram* and *Masry* balanced between the war journalism frame and the peace journalism frames with a slight inclination toward the peace journalism frame,

albeit the leftist *Araby* was prone to promoting the war journalism frame. In the visuals, the state press *Ahram* earned 0.529, while the liberal *Masry* earned 0.564 on a mean index scale indicating a balance between the two competing frames with slight inclination toward the peace journalism frame. However, the leftist *Araby* earned 0.289 promoting the war journalism frame. The composite mean index together with the raw percentage data of Tables (17, 23, and 32) showed that both state-owned press *Ahram* and liberal press *Masry* showed balanced coverage with slightly tendency toward the peace journalism frame. Thus, hypotheses **H5 and H6 were supported**.

With regard to hypothesis H7, results of the composite mean index and raw percentage data from Tables (17, 23, and 32) showed that the leftist *Araby* promoted the peace journalism frame in the news texts while adhered to the war journalism frame in the editorials and the visuals. In sum, the leftist *Araby* is said to promote the war journalism frame in its editorials (n=63) and visuals (n=68), whereas inclined toward the peace journalism frame in the news text (n=19). Taken into consideration the lower intensity of hard news in the weekly leftist newspaper *Araby,* in comparison to the number of editorials and visuals, it is therefore inferred that the elements of war journalism frame in news, editorials, and visuals exceeded the elements of peace journalism frames. Therefore, hypothesis **H7 is supported**.

7.4 Empirical Testing of Hypotheses

The questions and hypotheses of the study were assumed based on the political perspectives in Egypt during the 2006 Lebanon war as described in detail in Chapters Three and Four.

Table (34): Review of Hypotheses

Nr.	Hypotheses	Hypotheses tests
H1	There is significant difference between the newspapers in terms of framing the 2006 war in Lebanon.	Supported
H2	The state owned press *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the Egyptian regime in displaying the *reconciliation* frame more than *Masry* and *Araby*.	Supported
H3	The leftist Pan Arab press *Araby* is more likely to display the *heroic Hezbollah* frame than *Ahram* and *Masry*.	Supported
H4	The newspapers differ significantly in terms of their inclination toward the war journalism and the peace journalism frames.	Supported
H5	The state-owned *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the regime and displays more elements of the peace journalism frame than war journalism frame.	Supported
H6	The liberal newspaper *Masry* is more likely to use elements of the peace journalism than the war journalism frame.	Supported
H7	The leftist Pan Arab newspaper *Araby* is more likely to use elements of the war journalism than the peace journalism frame.	Supported

Analysis showed that the newspapers understudy covered the Lebanon war of 2006 with diversity. The ideological leanings of the newspapers had an effect on the framing patterns of war. However, one should not confine the effects only to the ideological orientations, as there are multiple contextual intrinsic and extrinsic factors that affect the framing of Lebanon war. The testing of hypotheses in the study showed that the state-owned newspaper of *Ahram* abided by

the political stance of the Egyptian regime in blaming both Hezbollah and Israel for escalating the war calling on all parties concerned to ceasefire (Section 4.3.1. in Chapter Four). Therefore, the *reconciliation* frame, which resonated with the position of the Egyptian regime, was advanced in *Ahram* more than the liberal press and the leftist press. On the other hand, the leftist press *Araby* affiliated to the Nasserite Egyptian party promoted the *heroic Hezbollah* frame more than the other two newspapers under study. The framing pattern of the leftist newspaper echoed the stance of the Nasserite Party on the heels of the war. The party extolled the resistance and *heroic Hezbollah* frame (Section 4.3.2.2. in Chapter Four). In terms of the tendency toward the war journalism and peace journalism frames, the study confirmed the significant difference between the three newspapers in terms of their preference to the competing frames. The state-owned *Ahram* showed a slight tendency toward the peace journalism frame in most of the cases, which echoed the regime's stance toward solving the war through diplomatic means. Nevertheless, *Ahram* used some elements qualified as part of the war journalism frame, such as the reliance on *elite sources* of information in their news and reducing the war into a *zero-sum game*. The liberal press *Masry* promoted the peace journalism frame in most of the cases, slightly more than the war journalism frame. Results were consistent with previous studies (Lynch, 2006) which proved the tendency of the liberal press toward peace journalism frame. However, the liberal *Masry* used the war journalism elements of *elite sources* of information and its *war orientation* solution, along with its simplification of the war into *zero-sum game*. The leftist press *Araby* qualified in the majority of the cases as falling into the war journalism frame in terms of covering the *here and now* actual events of the battlefield, reducing the war to *zero-sum game*, the *war oriented* solution to the war, and in its emphasis into the *visual effects* of war on human beings. It used the elements of peace journalism frame in many cases in the news texts by relying on the *non-elite source* of information. The orientation of the leftist press toward the war journalism frame was echoed in the partisan position adopted by the Nasserite Party in favor of Hezbollah.

7.5 Interpretation of Results in light of Social Constructionist Approach

The overall political and media environment in Egypt provided the contextual framework of analysis concerning the pattern of framing the 2006 Lebanon war in the Egyptian press. The Arab-Israeli conflict possessed a historical and political significance in the Egyptian press. The pattern of framing is affected by extrinsic political and historical factors, as well as intrinsic factors.

1. The Contextual Political and Historical Influence of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The intensity in covering the Lebanon war in the three newspapers understudy confirmed the significance of its historical and political influence. In the 34 days of analysis from July 13 to

August 15, 2006, the number of materials analyzed was 1728, with 756 in state newspaper *Ahram*, 822 materials in the liberal *Masry,* and 150 materials in the leftist *Araby* (Table 6 in Chapter Six). The total number of news articles concerned with the Lebanon war in the three newspapers was 492 cases. The total number of editorials that tackled the Lebanon war was 536 cases, and the total number of visuals that depicted the war was 700 cases. The intensity of coverage signifies the great attention devoted by the media to the Arab-Israeli wars. In terms of the pattern of framing, analysis showed that the coverage of the Lebanon war in 2006 was affected by two factors: the historical factor, and the prolonged history of wars between Egypt and Israel. That explains the reason why the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame was the dominant frame of coverage for the first three weeks of the war before other frames competed with it. The second factor is related to the foreign policy role of Egypt as a broker of peace in the region. Ever since the Camp David peace accord signed between Egypt and Israel in 1979, Egypt emerged as a mediator of peace between Israel and other Arab countries. This commitment to peace with Israel kept Egypt on the sidelines in other Arab-Israeli wars (Lesch, 1995). The domain of the diplomatic foreign policies of Egypt overshadowed the pattern of framing. Therefore, the *reconciliation* frame emerged to be the second most frequently covered frame following the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame.

      2. The Impact of the Media Environment on the Pattern of Framing. As mentioned in detail in Chapter Three, the authoritarian regime of Egypt maintained tight control on the media environment. In some cases, it loosened the control on the press allowing for more criticism, but preserved its right to suspend the freedom of the press by a number of crippling laws. The Middle East conflict was the route of the opposition camp for mounting their criticism of the Egyptian regime (Albrecht, 2007). Results showed that in the coverage of Lebanon war of 2006, the state-owned press remained closely tied to the official standpoint of the regime. It promoted the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame followed by the *reconciliation* frame in the majority of the cases. The state newspaper *Ahram* paid scant attention to the *protest* frame and the *responsibility* frame. The Egyptian regime of Mubarak, which suffered from a problem of ideological rational that the people rallied behind (Bradly, 2008, p.213), refrained from pointing to the responsibility of the Arab states and the international community and their weakness in bringing the war to an end. The state-press *Ahram* echoed this issue by diluting attention given to the protest and the unrest in the streets worldwide in reaction to the war. It also insignificantly covers the *responsibility* frame, pointing to the weakness of the Arabs and the international community in reaching a ceasefire agreement. However, the relative independence of the liberal press of *Masry* and its private ownership increased its potential to uphold diverse frames of the 2006 Lebanon war. Although it promoted the *victim/feuding neighbors* and *reconciliation* frame in its news coverage, it showed diversity of framing in the editorials and visuals by promoting

other frames that were kept muted in the state-owned press, such as the *responsibility, protest,* and *"heroic Hezbollah"* frames.

The regime allowed for more criticism on the opposition press in issues related to the Middle East conflict in order to deviate attention from the economic failure at home (Albrecht, 2007). This explains the pattern of framing used in the leftist newspaper *Araby* affiliated with the opposition Nasserite Party. Analysis showed that the *Araby* newspaper promoted the *heroic Hezbollah* frame in the majority of its coverage in defiance of the stance of the Egyptian regime, which held Hezbollah accountable for the war ablaze.

3. The Impact of Ideological Tendencies. Results showed that the ideological leanings of the newspapers had an effect on the pattern of framing the Lebanon war. *Araby* promoted the *heroic Hezbollah* frame and the war journalism frame in most of the cases, thus creating a conflict-centered view on the war in accordance with the political and ideological stance of the Nasserite Party during the war. The *Masry* newspaper advocated the peace journalism frame, which aligned with the ideological leanings of the liberal press as proved in previous studies (Lynch, 2006). With regard to the state-owned newspaper *Ahram*, the political leanings of the authoritarian regime created a pressure on the editorial policy to align with the perspective of the government in promoting the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame and the *reconciliation* frame, as well as to incline toward the peace journalism frame.

In sum, analysis proved the effect of the ideological tendency on the pattern of framing, but one should analyze it within the historical and political constructionist factors that drive the political standpoint of the government and the opposition movements, which extended beyond the boundaries of the authoritarian regime.

7.6 Summary and Discussion

The study is based on the analysis of the news, editorials, and visuals of the 2006 Lebanon war to explore the framing patterns, as well as the role of the press in war times. Two framing analysis approaches were applied. The first approach identified the main frames of covering the Lebanon war. Six main frames were assumed in this study; *victim/feuding neighbors, reconciliation, strategic interest, protest, responsibility, and heroic Hezbollah.* The second aggregate level explored the inclination of the newspapers toward the war journalism and peace journalism frames. The study adopted a two-level system of unit analysis, with the first being the whole text and photo as a unit of analysis, and the second being the "theme" in the news text. The study relied on the social constructionist approach in the sense that the framing patterns are affected by historical, political and ideological factors. It is possible to trace a correspondence between the media framing, on one hand, and the political position of the regimes and the opposition blocs with their wide ideological spectrum on the other. The state-

owned press abided by the stance of the regime in promoting the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame and *reconciliation* frame, which correspond with the viewpoint of the regime in seeing the war as a vicious circle of violence that took the lives of civilians. The regime viewed the diplomatic solution as a means to bringing the war to an end. The liberal press framed the Lebanon war of 2006 with more diversity, which resonants with its relative independence from the state in terms of ownership. It advanced frames that were kept muted in the state press. The leftist press aligned with the political leanings of the Nasserite Party in viewing Israel as a historical "enemy" that could be deterred thanks to Hezbollah. It also defied the stance of the regime by adopting the partisan *heroic Hezbollah* frame in most of the cases. The leftist press questioned the credibility of the official sources, relying mostly on non-elite sources of information thus proving to be the newspaper of the voiceless.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The study discusses the framing of the 2006 Lebanon war in the Egyptian press. Significantly, the purpose of this study is to shed light on the overall political and media environment that prominently supplies contextual analysis of the Egyptian press and its framing patterns of the war. The study of framing presents evidence that the levers of power in society affect the decision of journalists to "frame" the story using specific attributes (Maher, 2001, p.8). In Egypt, the levers of power in society –the regime, the opposition movements, and the political parties– constitute different spheres of influence that affect the process of media framing. The research based its framing analysis on the constructionist approach, which determines that the media pattern of framing is influenced by a host of political, historical, and ideological factors (Edelman, 1993; Entman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky 1994; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Van Gorp, 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). Accordingly, the press does not present reality as it is, but rather selects some aspects of reality and presents them within a specific frame. The mediation nature of media in distant wars is referred to by Cottle (2006) as "mediatized conflict."The term conveys a more powerful role of media, as "capable of enacting and performing conflicts as well as reporting and representing them" (p.9). In Egypt, the 2006 war in Lebanon war represented a distant war that was not experienced firsthand by the audience, but rather through the press and television channels. The war was viewed as a link in the chain of the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict in which Egypt once took part in different wars (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973). Galvanized by the hostile attitude toward Israel as a result of the long history of wars between the two sides, the Lebanon war of 2006 provides a salient example in which the media reflected the social and political environment in Egypt. The media framed the war within predetermined frames that resonated deeply with society. Nevertheless, the diversity of the political players in Egypt in turn led to the diversity of media frames. The media found itself amid competing political players who tried to market their own interpretation of the events, stemming from their own political viewpoints of the war.

8.1 Theoretical Background of the Study

In conjunction with the theoretical background of the social constructionist approach, this study viewed the print media as affected by other factors in the society that influence the content of the media (Van Gorp, 2007). Through an analysis of frames in print media, the study sought to understand the power and boundaries of political, historical, and ideological factors on the issue

of the Lebanon war in 2006. Entman (1993) said that while framing tends to highlight some aspects of "reality" and obscures others, it plays a significant role in the exertion of political power. He elaborated by saying:

> [F]raming in this light plays a major role in the exertion of political power, and the frame in a news text is really an imprint of power-it registers the identity of actors or interests that competed to dominate the text. (p.55)

Framing is affected by political, social, ideological and psychological factors in the society (Edelman, 1993; Herman & Chomsky, 1994; Shoemaker & Reese, 1991; Wolfsfeld, 1997). The current study borrowed the definition of Entman in viewing the function of frames:

> [T]o select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation and moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation of the item described.(Entman, 1993, p.52)

The central questions are *how* the Lebanon war of 2006 was framed in the Egyptian press, and whether the frames were affected by the ideological and political leanings of the political players in society. The salience of an issue in the media is subject to the interrelation between antagonists and media players (Wolfsfeld, 1997). Policymakers and news sources with inherent high value would affect the content of the media and their frame of interpretation is more salient than other antagonists with less prominent news values (Berkowitz, 1992; Reese, 1991; Wolfsfeld, 1997). The study regards the frames as dependent variables that are affected by the ideological tendencies of the newspapers under investigation. The study relies on the *deductive* approach for identifying frames of the 2006 war in Lebanon in three Egyptian newspapers representing the state-owned press, the liberal press, and the leftist press (DeVreese, 2005, p.53). Based on the literature review, the study explored six main frames of the 2006 Lebanon war: *victim/feuding neighbors, strategic interest, responsibility*, *reconciliation*, *protest*, and *heroic Hezbollah*. The *victim/feuding neighbors* viewed the war as a vicious circle of violence between Hezbollah and Israel that took the lives of innocent civilians in Lebanon. The *strategic interest* frame formulated the Lebanon war within a geo-political perspective and viewed the Middle East as a "theater" of competition between major powers (Gamson, 1992, p.54). This frame particularly focused on the allegiances in the region between the United States and Israel, on one hand, and Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, on the other. The *responsibility* frame pointed to the procrastination of the international community and the weakness of the Arab and Egyptian position that lead to the escalation of the war. The *reconciliation* frame devoted particular attention to the diplomatic efforts exerted worldwide to bring the war to an end. The *protest* frame focused on the demonstrations in reaction to the war. Finally, the *heroic Hezbollah* frame presented Hezbollah as the torchbearer of resistance that succeeded through tactical superiority

to achieve victory over Israel. From an aggregate perspective, the study explored the frames within the premise of Galtung's competing war journalism frame and peace journalism frame in order to reach an understanding of the role of media in war times. Egypt was the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel after long-standing confrontations between the two nations. The media – as mirror of the political environment in the society – is expected to propagate a wide range of frames that resonate with the political and social values in the society. Galtung, the pioneer scholar of peace journalism, argued that media is not the cause of war or peace, but it mediates causes through shaping the image that people have of an issue. Galtung differentiated between the war journalism and peace journalism frames (as cited in Shinar & Kempf, 2007) arguing that the war journalism frame is violence-oriented, propaganda-oriented, elite-oriented and victory-oriented, whereas the peace journalism frame is solution-oriented, non-elite oriented, and transcends the boundaries of the immediate events by disclosing the untruth of all sides. Literature review of the 2006 war in Lebanon emphasized the use of the war journalism frame more than the peace journalism frame (Hackett & Shroeder, 2009; Ross, 2009; Shinar, 2009). The Egyptian authoritarian regime allowed for some criticism in the media but maintained its dominance through sets of rules and laws that hindered the freedom of the press (Shukor, 2005). The Arab-Israeli conflict was exploited by the regime and the opposition blocs for different means. The regime used it to divert the public's attention from domestic problems that eroded the credibility of the government, whereas the opposition blocs used the Arab-Israeli conflict to question the credibility of the regime on issues of foreign policy (Albrecht, 2007). Despite the fact that Egypt is the first Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, the Egyptian media restored a sour tone toward Israel in its coverage of the Arab-Israeli prolonged conflict (El-Nawawy, 2002; Stein, 1997; Talhami, 2007).

The study relied on a number of different yet related approaches to explore the frames of Lebanon war 2006. Firstly, an analysis on the context surrounding the political and media environment in Egypt was undertaken, as well as the historical background surrounding the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. Secondly, a quantitative content analysis using the framing technique on three Egyptian newspapers representing different ideological trends was applied. The purposive sample was applied to select three newspapers based on the circulation of the newspaper and the influence of the political party on the partisan press. The newspapers were *Ahram,* representing the state-owned press, the privately owned *Masry,* representing the liberal press, and *Araby* representing the leftist press. The frames are said to be embedded in several locations in the media texts (Tankard, 2001, p.101). For the purpose of this study, frames were explored in news themes and headlines, editorial texts and visuals from July 13 to August 15, 2006.

8.2 Hypotheses on the 2006 Lebanon War

The Arab-Israeli conflict has shaped the history of political life in Egypt. The Palestinian issue, in particular, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, in general, was regarded as stimulus for many grassroots movements that used the issue to address their criticism of the Egyptian governments. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, viewed the Palestinian issue as a ramification of the Western Zionist hegemony over the *umma* (Islamic community). They took advantage of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 to call for *jihad* (holy war) and to raise funds for the deported Palestinian families (El-Awaisi, 1998; Munson, 2002). The Arab-Israeli conflict and the defeat of the 1948 war presented for the Arabs a cornerstone in the creation of a new system in Egypt, with the 1952 coup d'état led by a group of military officers that abolished the monarchy system and established the republican system. The new republican regime exerted tight control over the political environment, banning all political parties and centralizing the power in the hands of President Gamal Abel-Nasser (Cook, 2007). Again, it was the defeat of the Arab troops in the 1967 war that led to further alterations in political and social life and allowed for more criticism of the Nasserite regime. When President Sadat came to power after Nasser's sudden death in 1970, the victory of the Egyptian army over Israel in 1973 helped consolidate his regime. Nevertheless, the peace initiative with Israel in 1979, coupled with economic policies, led to the discontent of many Egyptians. The regime responded to this criticism by further coercive means to silence the opposition. These measures, instead of bringing stability to the country, led to the assassination of Sadat by radical Islamic groups (Stein, 2012). The sour mood toward Israel did not change after the Camp David peace treaty with Israel. In many cases, the violent incidents between the Arabs and Israel in the occupied Arab territories were used by the Egyptian regime and the opposition movements for different reasons. With regard to the regime, the Arab-Israeli violence was used to distract attention from stringent economic and social problems at home. For the opposition blocs, the Arab-Israeli conflict was used as a pretext to mount their criticism against the regime (Albrecht, 2007; Rubin, 2006).

The Lebanon war of 2006 presented a salient example through which the deep cultural and political beliefs about the Arab-Israeli conflict affected the way the press and the spectrum of political levers in the society interpreted the events. The 2006 war in Lebanon presented a new mode of ideologies that combined the Islamist as well as the Pan-Arab belief. The Islamist ideology is grounded in the religious emblem of the Hezbollah faction headed by a *Shiite* cleric Hassan Nasrallel. The Pan-Arab belief is based on the political ideology of Hezbollah, which restored the fight with Israel within the context of the Zionist and American hegemony over the Arab world (Bassedas, 2009; Valbjørn & Bank 2007). In reference to the social and political background in Egypt during the 2006 Lebanon war, the study explored the frames of the war and the inclination to favor either the war journalism or peace journalism frame. The following are

the different hypotheses that were assumed. **H1:** There is significant difference between the newspapers in framing the 2006 Lebanon war. This hypothesis is seen within the constructionist approach in the sense that the media is a site of frame contestation due to the difference between the political players with regard to the 2006 war in Lebanon. **H2**: The state-owned press *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the Egyptian regime in displaying the *reconciliation* frame more than *Masry* and *Araby*. **H3**: The leftist Pan-Arab press *Araby* is more likely to display the *heroic Hezbollah* frame than *Ahram* and *Masry*. With regard to the Galtung competing peace journalism and war journalism frames, the main hypothesis assumed that **H4**: The newspapers differ significantly in terms of their inclination toward the war journalism and peace journalism frames. Related to this hypothesis are several hypotheses. **H5**: The state-owned *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the regime and displays more elements of the peace journalism frame than the war journalism frame. **H6**: The liberal newspaper *Masry* is more likely to use elements of the peace journalism frame than war journalism frame. This hypothesis is assumed based on previous studies that proved the inclination of the liberal press more toward the peace journalism frame than the war journalism frame (Lynch, 2006). Finally, **H7**: The leftist Pan-Arab newspaper *Araby* is more likely to use elements of the war journalism frame than peace journalism frame.

8.3 Methodology of the Study

The study sought to explore the frames of Lebanon war 2006 in the Egyptian print media. The period of the study was limited only to the wartime, starting the analysis from July 13, one day after the war erupted, to August 15, 2006, one day after the implementation of a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel. In choosing the newspapers, the study relied on the purposive sample to analyze three newspapers based on the circulation of the newspaper, the influence of the political party for the partisan press and the ideological tendency represented by the newspapers. Then, the study used the census to explore all the content of the newspapers relevant to the 2006 war in Lebanon. The newspapers in the study were the state-owned daily newspaper *Ahram*, the liberal privately-owned daily newspaper *Masry,* and the weekly Pan-Arab leftist newspaper *Araby,* the mouthpiece of the Pan-Arab Nasserite Party. Hard copies of the liberal newspaper *Masry* and the weekly leftist *Araby* were used for the analysis. As for the daily state-owned *Ahram*, the study relied on analyzing the online version of it due to the unavailability of the hard copies and the high cost of the microfilm. The materials subject to analysis included the news, the editorials, and the visuals representing the 2006 Lebanon war. The news texts included all the hard news in the newspapers that exceeded the length of three paragraphs, thus excluding the short, hard news. The editorials included Op-eds, editorials, opinions of the newspaper, and column articles. The visuals included all the photos depicting the Lebanon war of 2006. The

caption of the photography was used to determine the frame of the photo. Translated articles, graphics, and interviews were beyond the scope of analysis. A total of 1728 materials were analyzed, including 756 materials in *Ahram*, 822 in *Masry,* and 150 materials in the weekly *Araby*. To bridge the gap between the weekly newspaper *Araby* and the two dailies of *Ahram* and *Masry*, the study weighted the weekly at 7 times more than the dailies in the statistical results. Literature review suggested the hierarchal, two levels of analysis, on the basis of two levels of units of analysis (Baeva, 2014). On the first level, the article was analyzed as a complete unit of analysis. On the second level, the "theme" in the news texts was analyzed. The definition of the "theme" was borrowed from Pan and Kosicki as "an idea that connects different semantic elements of a story e.g., description of an action or an actor, quotes of sources, and background information into a coherent whole" (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p.59). Due to their prominence, only the first three themes were analyzed in each news text. The components of the theme were divided into main components, such as "action, consequences of action, actors and roles," and minor components, such as "legitimization of action and quoted sources of information." The editorials and opinion articles were analyzed as a whole unit of analysis according to variables measuring the position of the writer, the remedy suggested by the writer, the end-result of the war, and the historical background events mentioned in the text. The frames of the war in the editorials were determined from the position explicitly or implicitly mentioned. The visual representing the 2006 Lebanon war was measured as a unit by itself. Visuals were analyzed according to regional focus, the roles of actors, and the depiction of the photo. For those visuals that depicted human beings, they were further analyzed in terms of the age of actors, and physical and emotional harm affecting the actors (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012). In order to explore the frames of the 2006 war, the study adopted the deductive approach in identifying six main frames based on literature review. As for the competing frames of war journalism and peace journalism developed by Galtung, the study borrowed the operational analysis of Lee and Maslog (2005) in recognizing only six elements: 1) visual versus non-visual consequence of war; 2) war-oriented versus agreement-oriented; 3) here and now events versus wider aspect of war; 4) zero-sum game versus no-win no-lose end; 5) elite-oriented versus non-elite oriented, and finally, 6) partisan versus non-partisan oriented. The tendency of the newspapers was measured using a composite peace journalism mean index.

8.4 General Findings of the Study

The study assumed that the ideological tendencies of the newspapers affect the framing of the war. Parallel to the ideological tendency is the ownership of the newspaper that plays a substantial role in shaping the content of the news. Ownership power presents a blunt means for the government and corporate elites to control the media (Davis, 2007, p.56). In the current

study, the newspapers were divided mainly according to their ideologies and ownership. As for the ideology, the study categorized three trends: state press, liberal press, and leftist Pan-Arab press. In terms of ownership, the newspapers were categorized into three types: governmental, private press, and partisan press. In general, the study showed that the Egyptian press is not homogeneous in framing the 2006 war in Lebanon and is divided along lines of political and ideological tendencies. It was also found that the press in Egypt was ethnocentric in framing the war as it frames the war based on certain political, cultural and ideological bases that resonated in Egyptian society (Liebes, 1997, Wolfsfeld, 1997:2004).

The study determined that the most frequently displayed frame in covering the Lebanon war was the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame as it contained the newsworthy evaluative criteria of immediacy, drama, simplicity, and ethnocentrism (Wolfsfeld, 2004). However, one can trace a correspondence between the political leanings of the newspaper and the media frames. The state-owned newspaper *Ahram* portrayed the war within the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame. As a secondary frame, the newspaper used the *reconciliation* frame to shed light on the diplomatic efforts and the necessity to reach a peaceful solution to stop the violence. The frames used in *Ahram* resonated with the political position of the Egyptian regime. On the heels of the war, the government in Egypt pointed to the liability of Hezbollah in waging the war. However, it criticized the disproportional use of force by Israel. Fundamentally, the newspaper of *Ahram* focused on the drama of the actions in the "battlefield," presenting Lebanon as the worthy victim that was trapped in violent confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah. The action of "negotiation" was presented in the news with considerable attention following the events from the battlefield in an attempt to advocate the diplomatic solution of ceasefire. *Ahram* refrained from criticizing the Arab regimes or referring to their responsibility in the war escalation presented in the *responsibility* frame. Moreover, it diluted the significance of the protests all over the world and the anti-war protests flared in the streets in different countries so as to minimize the effect on public opinion. Thus the reason the *protest* frame was displayed trivially in the state-owned press. In reference to the skeptical position of the Egyptian regime toward Hezbollah, the newspaper of *Ahram* displayed the *heroic Hezbollah* frame as its minimum. In the visuals of *Ahram*, the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame was most obvious in covering the effects of war on streets and buildings rather than on humans. It was clear from the visuals that the *Ahram* newspaper declined to rely on the sensational photos of wounded humans or scenes of death. The state-owned newspaper roughly captured scenes showing the human costs in order not to intensify hate and increase bigotry (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.23). The liberal newspaper *Masry* had similar results to *Ahram* in terms of the dominant and the secondary frames. However, it showed more diversity in displaying other frames that remained muted in the state press. Literally speaking, the relative independency in terms of ownership from the state provides it with the

flexibility to display wider aspects of frames thus extending beyond the boundaries of the regime domain. It included the *protest* frame, the *strategic interest* frame, and the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. In the editorials of the liberal newspaper, the *responsibility* and *victim/feuding neighbors* frames were dominantly displayed in the editorials, followed by the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. In the visuals, the liberal newspaper reflected the immediacy of the war events. It tended to show the aftermath of destruction in the streets and buildings, as well as the sufferings of the refugees. However, the *Masry* newspaper mirrored the unrest in the streets and the public reaction to the war by capturing the action of demonstration in the photos. The liberal *Masry* newspaper attempted to depict the growing criticism of the war more frequently than state newspaper *Ahram,* which diluted the significance of the street unrest.

The leftist Nasserite press *Araby* abided by the political stance of the Nasserite Party in viewing the war as a "Zionist aggression" on Lebanon that was faced by the "brave Lebanese resistance headed by Hezbollah chairman Hassan Nasrallah" (*Al-Araby,* 2006, p.A1). According to this political stance adopted by the Nasserite Party, the leftist partisan press dominantly framed the Lebanon war of 2006 within the pattern of the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. As a secondary frame, the *victim/feuding neighbors* was displayed in the news texts pointing to the atrocities of the war experienced by the bystanders. The *protest* frame was regarded in the course of the news as a newsworthy frame. The Pan-Arab leftist newspaper of *Araby* attempted to mount its criticism of the Egyptian regime through this frame by focusing on the unrest on the street.

With regard to the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames, the study showed that the state-owned press and liberal press balanced between the competing frames with a slight tendency toward the peace journalism frame. Both newspapers widened the aspects of war and focused more on the non-visual effects of war rather than the visual effects. Nonetheless, they relied on elite sources of news to tell their narration of the war. In their editorials, the state and liberal press showed the non-partisan position to the war promoted to foster the peace journalism frame. Nevertheless, the difference between the two newspapers lied in their preference to the remedies suggested for bringing the war to an end. While the state-owned *Ahram* fostered the diplomatic solution to reach ceasefire, the liberal press advocated the military solution to stop the atrocities of Israel. The proposed military solution toward Israel in the liberal press could be explained by virtue of the fact that the process of exciting the reader urged journalists to echo the most extreme voices and viewpoints (Wolfsfeld, 2004, p.19). The leftist newspaper was inclined to foster the war journalism frame in editorials and visuals by preferring the military solution against Israel and depicting the visual effects of the war on human beings by showing more injuries and death. Notwithstanding, the leftist newspaper promoted the peace journalism frame only in the news texts by reporting on the "demonstration"

and "negotiations" more than the immediacy of the events on the "battlefield" and by relying heavily on the non-elite sources of information. *Araby* proved to be the voice of the voiceless people by giving them more space to tell their interpretation of the events instead of the governmental official sources.

Because data was collected at a specific period of time during the 34 days of the Lebanon war, findings reflected variations based on the ideological differences between the newspapers rather than the nature of events. During the period of analysis, the media frames changed from *victim/feuding neighbors* frame to embracing wider prospects of war. The frames seemed to change for two main reasons. First, the nature of the fighting had changed. Israel was not able to weaken the capabilities of Hezbollah and achieved its designated goals. Nor was the United States Administration able to exert pressure for the "birth pangs of a new Middle East" (Pressman, 2006). Hezbollah showed stubborn resistance, vowing to continue the war "without any red lines" (Hirst, 2010, p.347). As the cycle of violence increased, the extravagant human costs provoked massive protests all over the world. It wasn't until the end of the third week, following the massacre of Qana refugee camp in Lebanon where mostly the victims were women and children that the demonstrations erupted worldwide. The incident of Qana was the turning point that helped shift the position of the United States, as well as the Arab countries, which adopted a negative stance toward Hezbollah (pp.366-367). Amid the growing protest against the atrocities of the war, remarkable focus was centered on the weakness of the Arab states to protect Lebanon. By week 3 (refer to Figure 7), frames of *responsibility, protest,* and *heroic Hezbollah* were clearly evident in the news. Although these frames did not compete with the dominant frame of *victim/feuding neighbors*, and the remedial secondary frame of *reconciliation*, they revealed the other scenarios of war away from the immediacy of the news from the battlefield and ongoing diplomatic talks behind closed doors. The second reason for the changing frames over the course of time was due to the change in the Egyptian regime's political stance. The inflammatory criticism at home and the growing demonstrations that encompassed wide sectors of the Egyptian society exerted pressure on the regime to shift its stance. In order to pacify criticism at home, President Mubarak dispatched his son on the head of a semi-official delegation to Lebanon in solidarity with its tragedy (Cook, 2012, p. 242). This lack of consensus engendered different frames of interpretation in the media.

In sum, analysis showed the newspapers were not homogenous in framing the war but rather were sites of frame contestation based on the ideological leanings of the newspapers. It is possible to trace association between the stance of the different political players and the media frames. The state-owned press abided by the policy of the Egyptian regime in retaining its role as a broker of peace in the Middle East region. The liberal press showed few similarities with the state press but included wider aspect of frames thus extending beyond the domain of the regime.

The leftist press reflected the stance of the Nasserite Party and its political ideology. From an aggregate point of view, the intensity of Lebanon war coverage in the Egyptian newspapers showed the degree of importance given by the media and the public opinion to the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict. Covering the war was overshadowed by the historical memory of the war and peace between Egypt and Israel. This explains the dominance of the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame and the *reconciliation* frame. However, the prevailing climate of public support for the plight of the Lebanese civilians exerted pressure on the Egyptian regime to retool its stance and included more frames as the war proceeded. It is suggested that the framing of Lebanon war of 2006 in the Egyptian press is a result of interrelated political, historical, and ideological factors that affected the editorial policy of each newspaper.

8.5 Limitations of the Study

Several limitations originated during the content analysis of the three newspapers.

1. The leftist weekly *Araby* newspaper was underrepresented in terms of the number of materials analyzed thus results originated from its analysis could not be generalized.

2. The study lacked the data on public polls in order to determine the effect of public opinion on the content of the media and how the interrelation between the policymakers and public opinion affected media frames.

3. Only three newspapers were content analyzed representing three political trends: the state, the leftist Pan Arab, and the liberals. The Islamic trend was not represented in the study due to the absence of any print newspaper representing the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood or other religious movements.

4. A purposive sample was adopted to explore the content of three newspapers thus results should be handled with caution when generalized.

5. The study focused only on a limited period of time during the 34 days of the war; therefore, the changes of media frames over a longer period of time were not represented.

6. Due to the unavailability of the hard copies of the widely circulated daily newspaper *Ahram*, the study relied on the online version of the newspaper. As a result, the study was unable to take the format of the visuals into analysis due to the difference in photo dimension between the online version and the hard copy of the newspaper.

7. The study explored a deductive, predetermined six frames of the 2006 Lebanon war in the newspapers. Other frames could be found in the analysis, yet remained outside the scope of investigation.

8. The rhetoric and narrative structure of the content was not addressed in the study, putting the emphasis on the context of the text and the themes and not the words.

8.6 Recommendation for Further Research

The results suggest the need to conduct further research on the interplay between the public opinion in Egypt and the media and how each side affected the other. The lack of public opinion data rendered the studies on framing effects limited in scope. In addition, the study shows the need for more emphasis on the analysis of visual photography in the Egyptian press due to its impact on a society with a high illiteracy rate. Finally, the study suggests more cross cultural comparative analysis between newspapers in different Middle East countries.

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Code Book

V1-Name of Newspaper

      1-*Al-Ahram*

      2-*El-Masry El-Youm*

      3-*El-Araby El-Nassery*

V2-Date of Issue

4- 13 JUL	5- 14 JUL	6- 15 JUL	7- 16 JUL	8- 17 JUL	9- 18 JUL
10- 19 JUL	11- 20 JUL	12- 21 JUL	13- 22 JUL	14- 23 JUL	15- 24 JUL
16- 25 JUL	17- 26 JUL	18- 27 JUL	19- 28 JUL	20- 29 JUL	21- 30 JUL
22- 31 JUL	23- 1 AUG	24- 2 AUG	25- 3 AUG	26- 4 AUG	27- 5 AUG
28- 6 AUG	29- 7 AUG	30- 8 AUG	31- 9 AUG	32- 10 AUG	33-11 AUG
34- 12 AUG	35- 13 AUG	36- 14 AUG	37- 15 AUG		

V2A- Week of Issues

0.1- Week 1 (13 Jul-19 Jul)

0.2- Week 2 (20 Jul-26 Jul)

0.3- Week 3 (27 Jul- 2 Aug)

0.4- Week 4 (3 Aug-9 Aug)

0.5- Week 5 (10 Aug- 15 Aug)

V3-Ownership of Newspaper

      38- Governmental

      39- Private

      40- Partisan

V4-Ideology of Newspaper

      41-State   42-Liberal   43-Leftist Pan-Arab

V5-Article/photo

      44-Textual material (Go to B variables)

      45-Photo (Go to C variables)

V6- Numbers of photos accompanying an article

      46-No photo

      47-1

      48-2

      49-3

      50-4 Or more

V7- Sequence Number of Text----------------

V8- Sequence Number of Photo---------------

V9- Genre

      51-News (hard news)

      52-Opinion of newspaper (Go to B40)

      53-Editorial/Column/Op-Ed (Go to B40)

V10- Text Size (For textual materials only)

      54-From 3 to 5 paragraphs

      55-From 5 to 8 paragraphs

      56-More than 8 paragraphs

News Textual Articles

B1-News Headline_____

B2-Frames in Headline

1010-Victim/feuding neighbors

1011-Strategic Interest

1012-Heroic Hezbollah

1013-Reconciliation

1014-Responsibility

1015-Protest

1016-Other

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

News Theme

Theme One

B3-Form of Action 1

  57-Panzer/air raids/bombardment/blockade/kidnapped (Weaponry)

  58-Demonstration

  59-negotiation

  60-Humanitarian supply

61-Other

999- Not fitting

0- Not mentioned

B4-Consequnces of action 1

63-Killing/wounded/casualties/kidnapped

64-Destruction of buildings and streets

65- Deportation/refugees

66-Economic and ecological consequences

67-Negotiation

68-Demonstration

69-Other

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

B5- Actor 1 by Nation

71- Egypt

72- Lebanon

73- Israel

74- Hezbollah

75- U.S.

76- Europe

77- Pro-Hezbollah countries (Iran and Syria)

78- Anti-Hezbollah countries (Saudi Arabia and Jordan)

79- International (UN-Red Cross)

80- Other

999- Not fitting

0- Not mentioned

B6-Role of Actor 1

102-Perpetrator

103-Victim

104-Demonstrator

105-Mediator

106- Rescuer/ Humanitarian aid worker

107-Other

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

B7-Actor 2 by Nation (same as B5)

B8-Role of Actor 2 (same as B6)

B9-Actor 3 by Nation (same as B5)

B10-Role of Actor 3 (same as B6)

B11-Action 1 Legitimized?

-1-Yes (if yes, go to B12)

-2-No (if no, code B12 as 999, not fitting)

B12-Legitimization of Action 1

  108-Self-defense

  109-Destroy Hezbollah arsenal

  110-Occupation/aggression

  111-Free POW

  112-Deploy influence in the region

  113- Restore peace/supply humanitarian aid

  114-Demonstration/condemnation

  115- Retaliation/re-action

  116-Other

 999-Not fitting

 0-Not mentioned

F1-Frame of Theme One (same as B2)

Theme Two

B13-Form of Action 2 (same as B3)

B14-Consequences of Action 2 (same as B4)

B15-Actor 1 in Action 2 by Nation (B5)

B16-Role of Actor 1 in Action 2 (B6)

B17-Actor 2 by Nation (same as B5)

B18-Role of Actor 2 (same as B6)

B19-Actor 3 by Nation (same as B5)

B20-Role of Actor 3 (same as B6)

B21-Action 2 Legitimized?

-1-Yes (if yes, go to B22)

-2-No (if no, code B22 as 999 not, fitting)

B22-Legitimization of Action 2 (same as B12)

F2-Frame of theme Two (same as B2)

Theme Three:

B23-Form of Action 3 (same as B3)

B24- Consequences of Action 3 (same as B4)

B25- Actor 1 in Action 3 by Nation (B5)

B26- Role of Actor 1 in a Action 3 (B6)

B27- Actor 2 by Nation in Action 3 (B5)

B28- Role of Actor 2 in Action 3 (B6)

B29- Actor 3 by Nation in Action 3 (same as B5)

B30- Role of Actor 3 in Action 3 (same as B6)

B31- Action 3 Legitimized?

-1- Yes (if yes, go to B32)

-2- No (if no, code B32 as 999, not fitting)

B32- Legitimization of Action 3 (same as B12)

F3- Frame of Theme Three (same as B2)

B33- If the article has quotation or source of information

-1-Yes (if yes, go to B34 to B39)

-2-No (if no, code B34 to B39 as 999, not fitting)

B34- Source of Quotation 1 by Nation (same as B5)

B35- Source of Quotation 1 by Occupation

    119- Elite (governmental official).

    120- Elite (military official or spokesperson)

    121- Non Elite

    999- Not fitting

    0-Not mentioned

B36- Source of Quotation 2 by Nation (same as B5)

B37- Source of Quotation 2 by Occupation (same as B35)

B38- Source of Quotation 3 by Nation (same as B5)

B39- Source of Quotation 3 by Occupation (same as B35)

Editorials and Opinion Text

B40- Depiction of Position 1 (For editorials and opinion articles only)

    131- Hezbollah adventure dragged the region to war

    132- Hezbollah fights proxy-war for Iran

    133- Confrontation of wills in the region between U.S. and Iran

    134- Israeli aggression to expand its land from Ocean to Gulf

135- Lebanon as a land and people is paying the price of this war

136- Diplomatic efforts in Egypt and worldwide to reach ceasefire.

137- U.S. hegemony in the region and re-birth of new Middle East

138- Hezbollah is the torchbearer of resistance.

139- Arab/Egypt/world silence and weakness led to further Israeli aggression.

140- Other_____

999-Not fitting

F1-Frame One in Editorial (same as B2)

B41-Depiction of Position 2 (Same as B40)

F2-Frame Two in Editorial (same as B2)

B42a-Does editorial suggest remedy?

-1-Yes (if yes, go to B42)   -2- No (if no, code B42 as 999, not fitting)

B42- Suggested Remedy 1

141-Disarmament of Hezbollah diplomatically

142-Military solution to deter Israel

143-Military solution to deter Hezbollah

144-Restore peace and reconciliation

145-Freeze the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel

146-Lebanese government of Siniora should extend its influence over all Lebanon

147-Other

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

B43-Suggested Remedy 2 (same as B42)

If only one remedy is suggested, then B43 is coded as 999, not fitting

B44a-Is the end of war mentioned?

-1-Yes (if yes, go to B44)   -2-No (if no, code B44 as 999, not fitting)

B44-End-Results of the War

148-Hezbollah won

149-Israel won

150-No one won

151-Lebanon lost

152-Israel lost

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

B45a-Historical Background

-1-Yes (if yes, go to B45)   -2-No (if no, code B45 as 999, not fitting)

B45-Event 1 of Historical Backgrounds

    153-Arab-Israeli history of wars (1948, 1953, 1967-1973)

    154-Invasion of Lebanon (1982)

    155-Iraq War (1991, 2003)

    156-War on "terror" (11 September 2001)

    157-Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon (2000)

    158-Qana in south Lebanon (1996)

    159-Peace accords between Arab nations and Israel

    160-Others

    999-Not fitting

    0-Not mentioned

B46-Events 2 of Historical Backgrounds (same as B45).

B47-Events 3 of Historical Backgrounds (same as B45)

Photo

C1-Regional Focus: (same as B5)

Photo Caption _____

C2-Frame of Photo :(same as B2)

C3-Role of Actors

       170-Insurgent

       171-Victim

       172-Negotiator

       173-Demonstrator

       174-Other

C4-Depiction of the Photo

       175- Preparing to attack/traveling in convoy/photos of weaponry/soldiers

       176- Protesting/demonstrating/raising flags

       177-Holding talks/meeting/conference

       178- Refugees eating/mourning/lamenting/walking or doing other activities.

       179-Receiving humanitarian aid/treating wounds/rescuing injured

       180-Aftermath of destruction on buildings and streets

       181-Dead bodies/coffins/reference to death

182-Other

183-Personal Photo (go to C5).

C5-Status of Personal Photo

119-Elite   120-Non elite   999-Not fitting

C6-Age of Actors (for those photos of humans)

184-Children/adolescents

185-Adults

186-Mixture of children and adults

187-Other

999-Not fitting

0- Not mentioned

C7-Physical Harm (for humans)

188-Most severe

189-Severe

190-Not severe

191-Other

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

C8-Emotional Harm (for humans with close up or medium shots to detect facial expression)

192-Positive

193-Negative

194-Neutral

999-Not fitting

0-Not mentioned

APPENDIX B

Coding Procedures and Protocol

Variable 1, Name of the newspaper: Coded according to the name written on the newspaper's front page or the website of the online version of *Ahram* newspaper.

Variable 2, Date of issue: Coded nominally.

Variable 2A, Week of issue: This is divided into 5 weeks. Each week is presented in an interval of time.

Variable 3, Ownership of newspaper: This is coded based on literature review. This category is divided into governmental press for *Ahram* newspaper, the private-owned press for *Masry* newspaper, and the partisan press for the *Araby* newspaper affiliated to the Nasserite Party.

Variable 4, Ideology of newspaper: This is coded based on the general reading of literature. This category is divided into state press for *Ahram*, liberal press for *Masry,* and leftist Pan Arab press for *Araby*.

Variable 5, Article/photo: If the material under study is an article, then start with B variable (for news and editorials). If the material is a photo, then go straight to the C variables for the visuals.

Variable 6, Number of photos accompanying an article: This variable is to determine whether the article is associated with a photo and how many photos accompanied each article.

Variable 7, **Sequence of the text:** Each text, whether news or editorial, is given a sequence number of 5 digits starting from 10001 in order to ease the retrieval of text.

Variable 8, **Sequence of the photo**: Each photo is given a sequence number of 5 digits starting from 20001 in order to ease the retrieval of photo.

Variable 9, Genre: This variable is divided into hard news, opinion of the newspaper and editorials/op-ed/columns. The hard news is located on the front page and the inside pages. If the news item starts on the front page and continues into the inside pages, then is coded as one news item. The item of the "opinion of the newspaper" is only for *Ahram* newspaper and is located in page 15 in the upper left hand side with a title "opinion of Al-Ahram" and it not signed by any writer. Finally, the editorials/op-ed/columns are all the opinion articles written by named writers. This entails going through the whole newspaper to collect the editorials.

Variable 10, Text size: This category counts the paragraphs in the text. If the text has less than 3 paragraphs, then it is excluded from analysis.

Variables B: These are the variables used to code the news articles and the editorials.

Variable B1, News headline written out: If the news text has more than one headline, then only the main headline is coded and written verbally.

Variable B2, Frame of headline: Only the main headline in the text is coded based on its manifested frame (refer to Appendix C for coding the frames).

Variable B3, Form of action 1: In the news text, the first three themes are coded. Each theme is coded according to the main components of the action 1, consequence of action1, 3 actors, and 3 roles of actors. The action is divided into:

> 57- Panzer/air raids/Bombardment/blockade/kidnap (weaponry), which includes all the actions that signify war and violence and are mentioned explicitly in the theme.
>
> 58- Demonstration, which includes rallies, anti-war or pro-war demonstration.
>
> 59- Negotiation, which includes the meetings between presidents and prime ministers or press conferences.
>
> 60- Humanitarian supply, which includes the endeavors by people or nations to supply food and aids.
>
> 61- Other, is used when the mentioned action did not meet the specified items.
>
> 999- Not fitting, is coded for missing values only.
>
> 0- Not mentioned, is coded if the action was not mentioned in the text but the components of the actions such as consequences and actors and roles are mentioned.

Variable B4, Consequence of action 1: This item is related to the results of the action mentioned in the text and is divided into:

> 63- Killing/wounded/casualties/kidnapped
>
> 64- Destruction of buildings, roads, streets, villages, and infrastructure.
>
> 65- Deportation of refugees which includes the transfer of refugees from place to place, or supplying aids to refugees
>
> 66- Economic and ecological consequence is related to the effect of war on the market economy, loss in the burse, unemployment, and pollution of the eco system.
>
> 67- Negotiation is coded when the text mentioned the meetings between heads of states to discuss ceasefire and peace talks.
>
> 68- Demonstration is coded for the rallies, the act of revolt and protest in the streets whether in support or in condemnation to the war.
>
> 69- Other is coded if the consequences of action 1 mentioned did not meet any of the categories.
>
> 999- Not fitting is coded for the missing values only.
>
> 0- Not mentioned is coded if the consequence is not mentioned in the news text but the other main components are mentioned such as the actions, actors and roles.

Variable B5, Actor 1 by Nation. In the news texts, each theme is coded for up to three actors only. If the theme has more than three actors, then the fourth actor is not coded. Likewise, if the theme has only two actors mentioned, then the third actor is coded as 999, not fitting, and is regarded as a missing value. The actors are divided based on their nationalities as follows:

71- Egypt, if the article mentions the president of Egypt or any figure representing Egypt.

72- Lebanon, if the article mentions the president or any figure representing Lebanon.

73- Israel, if the article mentions the prime minister or any figures representing Israel.

74- Hezbollah, if the article specifies the affiliation of the actor to Hezbollah faction in particular and not to Lebanon. For example, if the article mentions the chairman of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah then it is coded as "Hezbollah".

75- U.S., if the article mentions the President of the state or Secretary of state or any figure from the United States of America.

76- Europe, this includes any figure representing any European country.

77- Pro-Hezbollah countries, this includes president, ministers or any figures from countries that took a stance in support to Hezbollah in specific Syria and Iran.

78- Anti-Hezbollah countries, this includes kings, princess, ministers, or any figure from countries that took critical stance toward Hezbollah in particular Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

79- International organization, this includes all international organization such as United Nations, Arab League, Red Cross, Human right Watch, Reporters Without borders, doctors Without borders, UNICEF,etc.

80- Other is coded if the actor did not meet any of the previously mentioned actors.

999- Not fitting is used only for the missing values

0- Not mentioned is coded if the main component of the theme was mentioned such as the "action,""consequence of action" but the actors were not mentioned.

Variable B6: Role of Actor 1. This variable determines the role mentioned for the coded actor and is divided into the following:

102- Perpetrator: is the one who did the action. For example, if Hezbollah fired Katyusha missiles on an Israeli village, then Hezbollah is coded as "perpetrator" because he did the action.

103-Victim: is the one who has the action fallen on. In reference to the previous example, the actor "Israel" in this case is the "victim" which was fired by missiles of Hezbollah.

104-Demonstrator: is the one or group of people who rally anti-war protest or pro-war protest, or burn flags.

105- Mediator: is the one who intermediate or hold peace talks to ceasefire depending on his role mentioned in the theme.

106- Rescuer/humanitarian aid worker: is the role mentioned for those who rescue people or supply food or engage in volunteer activities to help others. This includes social workers, Red Cross workers.

107- Other is coded if the role mentioned did not fit into any of the specified roles mentioned above.

999- Not fitting is coded for missing values only

0- Not mentioned is coded if the role for the actor is not mentioned. For example, if the theme mentioned the "action", "consequence of action" and the "actor" by nations but decline to mention the "role", then the variable is coded as 0 "not mentioned."

Variable B11, Is the Action 1 Legitimized? This is a binary yes or no question. If the variable is coded as "yes," then the coder should go to B12 variable to determine the nature of the reason for the action. If the variable is coded as "no," then variable B12 is coded as 999, not fitting, and is regarded as a missing variable

Variable B12, Legitimization of Action 1: This variable is coded only if B11 variable is coded as "yes."This category is divided into the following:

108- Self Defense is coded if the reason explicitly mentioned for doing the action was to self defends the land or the property or life.

109- Destroy Hezbollah Arsenal is coded if the reason for the action was meant to destroy or curtail the military capability of Hezbollah by a violent way or an act of war.

110- Occupation is coded if the action explicitly mentioned that the reason was to occupy more lands or to affiliate more lands to the aggressor.

111- Free POW (Prisoner of War) is coded if the reason mentioned for the action was to free the POW or to bring the POW issue into the negotiating table.

112- Deploy influence in the region is coded if the reason was to deploy ideological or political influence in terms of proxy wars in the region. For example, if the reason mentioned was to deploy the Iranian ideological influence in the region. Likewise, if the article mentions the U.S. intention to create a new Middle East; in this case the legitimization of the action is "deploy influence in the region."

113- Restore peace is coded if the reason was to negotiate the implementation of peace and ceasefire.

114- Demonstration/condemnation is coded if the demonstration and rallies specified their demands of action. For example, if the article mentioned the action of "demonstration" calling for the ceasefire or condemning the severity of war. In this case, the legitimization of the action is "demonstration/condemnation."

115- Retaliation/re-action is coded if the reason explicitly mentioned revenge or retaliation.

116- Other is coded if the reason mentioned does not meet any of the specified legitimizations.

999- Not fitting is coded for the missing values if the B11 is coded as "No." Therefore, the legitimization of the action is coded as a missing value.

0- Not mentioned is coded if the legitimization of the action exists but is not mentioned.

Variable F1, Frame of Theme One: After reading the whole theme and coding its components, the frame is coded as B2 (Refer to Appendix C for main frames).

Theme Two

If the news text has only one theme, then variables from B13 till B32 are coded as 999, not fitting, or missing values.

Variable B13: (Code the same as B3).

Variable B14: (Code the same as B4).

Variable B15: (Code the same as B5)

Variable B16: (Code the same as B6)

Variable B17: (Code the same as B5)

Variable B18: (Code the same as B6)

Variable B19: (Code the same as B5)

Variable B20: (Code the same as B6)

Variable B21: (Code the same as B11)

Variable B22: (Code the same as B12)

Variable F2: (Code the same as B2)

Theme three

In some cases, the news texts contain only two themes. Therefore, the components of the third theme (variables B23 until B32) are coded as missing values 999, "not fitting."

Variable B23: (Code the same as B3)

Variable B24: (Code the same as B4)

Variable B25: (Code the same as B5)

Variable B26: (Code the same as B6)

Variable B27: (Code the same as B5)

Variable B28: (Code the same as B6)

Variable B29: (Code the same as B5)

Variable B30: (Code the same as B6)

Variable B31: (Code the same as B11)

Variable B32: (Code the same as B12).

Variable B33,Does the article have a quotation?

A quotation is a source of information quoted between parentheses or paraphrased. The variable is a binary yes or no question. If the variable is coded as "Yes," then the coder should go to B34 and B35 variables to determine the nationality and the status of the quoted source. If the variable is coded as "No," then variable B34 and B35 are coded as 999, not fitting, and are regarded as missing variables. Only the first three mentioned quoted sources are coded.

Variable B34, Quoted sources by nation: The source of information is coded based on its nation. This variable is coded the same as B5.

Variable B35, **Source of quotation by status:** This variable measures the status of the quoted source of information and is divided into the following:

> 119- Elite (government), which refers to presidents, kings, princes, ministers (excluding minister of defense), vice-presidents, official envoys, governorates, and governmental official actors.

> 120- Elite (military), which refers to the ministers of defense, leaders of militias like Hassan Nasrallel, soldiers, military commanders.

> 121- Non-elite, which refers to civilians, parliament members, journalists, academics, experts, commentators, peace activists, witness, victims, and social workers.

> 999- Not fitting is coded for missing values if B33 is answered with "no" indicating no quotation in the text.

> 0- Not mentioned is coded when the source of information is quoted but its status is not mentioned.

If the text has only two quoted sources of information, then code variables B36 and B37, whereas variables B38 and B39 are coded as 999, not fitting, as they are considered missing values.

Variable B36: (Same as B34)

Variable B37: (Same as B35)

Variable B38: (Same as B34)

Variable B39: (Same as B35)

Editorials

Variable B40, Depiction of position 1: The position of the writer and his viewpoint is explicitly stated or implicitly implied in the editorials. Only the first two positions are coded. The variable of the position is coded according to the following items:

> 131- Hezbollah adventure dragged the region to war. It is coded if the writer holds Hezbollah accountable for instigating the war.

132- Hezbollah fights proxy-war for Iran. It is coded if the writer refers to the support Hezbollah receives from Iran or mentions the correspondence between the Hezbollah faction and Iran.

133- Confrontation of wills in the region between the U.S. and Iran. This item is coded if the writer refers to the competing interests of the United States and its allies from one side and Iran and its allies from the other side.

134- Israeli aggression to expand its land from the ocean to the gulf. This item holds Israel accountable for the war. It mentions the expansionist intention of Israel to occupy more Arab lands.

135- Lebanon as a land and people is paying the price of this war. This item is coded if the writer mentions implicitly or explicitly the victimization side of Lebanon.

136- Diplomatic efforts in Egypt and worldwide to reach ceasefire. This item is coded when the writer refers to the endeavors of the international community to bring the war to an end.

137- U.S. hegemony in the region and the re-birth of the new Middle East. It is coded if the writer refers to the war conducted by the United States to deploy its domain in the region. It is also coded if the writer refers to the statement of the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about the re-birth of the new Middle East.

138- Hezbollah is the torchbearer of resistance. This item is coded if the writer extols the role played by Hezbollah to deter the Israeli aggression away from Lebanon.

139- Arab/Egypt and world weakness led to further Israeli aggression. It is coded if the writer puts the blame on the international community and their procrastination in bringing the war to an end. It is also coded if the writer blames the Arab leaders for their weak stance in the war that gave the green light to Israeli to continue assault.

140- Other is coded if the position mentioned by the writer did not meet any of the pre-mentioned items. If the writer mentioned the collective action of the people and the demonstration in the streets worldwide in solidarity with any of the fighting parties or in condemnation to the war, it is coded as "other" and written out in the coding sheet.

999- Not fitting is coded only for the missing values if the position did not exist.

Variable F1, Frame 1 in position 1: The frame is coded in each position of the writer. Only two frames are coded for the two positions. Each position applies one frame only. The frames are coded the same as B2 variable

Variable B41, Depiction of position 2: In the editorials, the coder measures only the first two positions explicitly mentioned or implicitly implied by the writer. If the editorial article has only one position, then B41 is coded as 999, not fitting, as it is regarded as a missing value. This variable is coded the same as B40.

Variable F2, **Frame 2 in position 2:** This item is coded only if B41 is mentioned. If B41 is coded as a missing value, then F2 is also coded as missing value. The item is coded the same as B2.

Variable B42a, **Does the editorial suggest a remedy?** This is a "yes" or "no" item. If the writer did not suggest a remedy or solution, then this item is coded as "no" and B42 variable is coded as 999, not fitting, and is regarded as a missing value. But, if the answer is "yes," then code variable B42 according to the items mentioned.

Variable B42, **Suggested remedy:** This item measures the solution suggested by the writer and is explicitly mentioned in the editorial text. The item is divided according to the following divisions:

141- Disarmament of Hezbollah diplomatically is coded if the writer explicitly mentions the arsenal of Hezbollah, suggesting bringing the issue to the negotiating table to eradicate its weapons.

142- Military solution to deter Israel is coded if the writer mentions that the solution to the Lebanon war is to meet the violence of Israel by resistance and counter violence.

143- Military solution to deter Hezbollah is coded when the writer suggests targeting Hezbollah positions in south of Lebanon in order to curtail its military abilities.

144- Restore peace and reconciliation is coded when the writer determines that the solution is to ceasefire and to negotiate and solve the conflict by diplomatic means

145- Freeze the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is coded if the writer refers to the peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel calling for its suspension.

146- Lebanese government of Siniora should extend its influence over all Lebanon is coded if the writer calls for more sovereignty to the Lebanese government of Fouad Saniora.

147- Other is coded if the writer mentions a solution that does not meet any of the pre-determined remedies suggested

999- Not fitting is coded if the answer to variable B42a is "no," determining that the writer did not suggest a remedy.

0- Not mentioned

Variable B43, Suggested remedy 2 (same as B42): This variable is coded if the writer suggests a second remedy. But if the editorial contains only one remedy suggested, then B43 is coded as 999, not fitting, as it is regarded as a missing value.

Variable B44a, Is the end of war mentioned? In some cases, the writer predicts the end result of the war in the editorial. This variable is a binary yes or no answer. If the answer is "yes" then go to variable B44. If the answer is "no," then code B44 as 999, not fitting, as it is a missing value.

Variable B44, End-Results of the war: This variable is coded according to the following items:

148- Hezbollah won is coded if the writer mentions the triumph of Hezbollah and its superiority in the war

149- Israel won is coded when the writer predicts the victory of Israel due to its military potentials.

150- No one won is coded when the writer explicitly refers to the war as a vicious circle without winners but rather specifically mention that all parties concerned lost the battle.

151- Lebanon lost is coded when the writer mentions the loss and agony of Lebanon in this war

152- Israel lost is coded if the writer mentions the military defeat of Israel.

999- Not fitting is coded if the answer to variable B44a is "no."

0- Not mentioned

Variable B45a, Does the editorial provide historical background? This is a yes or no answer. If the editorial does not provide historical background, then code variables B45, B46 and B47 as not fitting 999 since they are missing values. If the answer is yes, then go to B45. Only the first three mentioned historical events are coded. If the editorial mentions only one historical event, then only B45 is coded according to the items mentioned; whereas B46 and B47 are coded as 999, not fitting. Likewise, if only two historical events are mentioned, then only B45 and B46 are coded and B47 is regarded as a missing value.

Variable B45,Event 1 of historical background

153- Arab-Israeli history of wars (1948, 1953, 1967-1973)

154- Invasion of Lebanon 1982 is coded if the writer refers to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon or to the event of Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp in 1982.

155- Iraq war (1991, 2003) is coded if the writer alludes to the 1991 Gulf War or to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

156- War on "terror" (11 September 2001) is coded if the writer mentions the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001.

157- Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon 2000

158- Qana in south Lebanon (1996) is coded if the writer refers to the event of the first Qana refugee camp in South Lebanon in 1996,where Israel's raid on the refugee camp of Qana in south of Lebanon killed mostly women and children.

159- Peace accords between Arab nations and Israel is coded if the writer mentions the different peace treaties signed between Israel and some Arab countries, e.g. Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

160- Others is coded if the mentioned event does not meet any of the pre-determined events.

999- Not fitting is coded if the answer to variable B45a is "no."

0- Not mentioned

Variable B46, Events 2 of historical backgrounds (same as B45)

Variable B47,Events 3 of historical backgrounds (same as B45)

Photos

Variable C1, Regional focus: This variable identifies the location in which the event in the photo took place. It is coded the same as B5. The caption is used to clarify the location of the event. For example, if the photo shows a destructed building and the caption mentions the destruction of the Hezbollah television channel, then the regional focus is coded as "Hezbollah." Also, if the photo depicts the scene of the handshake between Egyptian President and the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Sharm El-Sheikh, then the regional focus is coded "Egypt" because the event took place in Egypt.

Photo caption: The caption of the photo is written out. If the photo does not have a caption, like many photos in the leftist newspaper of *Araby*, then the headline of the article associated with the photo is taken into consideration to clarify the content of the photo.

Variable C2, Frame of the Photo: It is coded the same as B2 based on the caption of the photo or the headline of the article associated with the photo.

Variable C3, Role of actors: This variable identifies the role of the focal region. It is divided into five items as follows:

170- Insurgent is identified as a person or group of people who are shown engaging in war actions or identified as leaders of militant groups. For example, a photo showing a group of Israeli soldiers marching in a parade or riding tanks is coded as "insurgent."

171- Victim is the person or scene of events or group of people suffering from harm or deportation or destruction. This category applies to individuals and buildings. For example, a photo depicting a scene of destruction in Lebanon as mentioned in the caption is coded as "victim."

172- Negotiator is the person or group of people holding peace talks or taking part in a peace conference.

173- Demonstrator is the person or group of people protesting against the war or in support of any of the rivalries. This also includes photos depicting people holding or burning flags.

174- Other is coded if the role of the regional focus does not match any of the mentioned items.

Variable C4, Depiction of the photo: This category describes the context of the photo. It is divided into the following items:

175- Preparing to attack/traveling in convoy/photos of weaponry/ Soldiers. Example of this item is a photo depicting tanks or group of soldiers preparing to attack or their tanks. It is also applied to photos showing missiles being fired.

176- Protesting/demonstrating/raising flags. Example of this item is a photo depicting a demonstration anywhere worldwide in support of the war or against the war.

177- Holding talks/meeting/conference. Examples are photos depicting meetings of foreign ministers to discuss a ceasefire.

178- Refugees eating/mourning/lamenting/walking or doing other activities. This category is coded when the photo depicts an individual refugee or groups of refugees walking in debris or eating in a refugee camp or doing any other activities. An example for this category is a photo depicting groups of children learning in schools affiliated to UNRWA refugee camp.

179- Receiving humanitarian aid/treating wounds/rescuing injured. For example, if the photo depicts an injured person receiving medical care from doctors or being rescued by firemen. This category applies to photos showing human causalities or scenes of abrasion.

180- Aftermath of destruction on buildings and streets. This category applies to scenes of destroyed buildings or streets or city in ablaze.

181- Dead bodies/coffins/reference to death. This category applies to photos depicting funerals, coffins, or symbols of death. For example, if the photo depicts a mother holding a photo of her child and crying and the caption mentions the death of the child, then the photo is coded as "dead bodies/coffins/reference to death." In addition, if the photo shows a toy or an empty shoe amid the debris then it signifies death.

182- Other is coded if the depiction of the photo does not meet any of the pre-determined items aforementioned.

183- Personal Photo (go to C5).This applies to the photos that show a photo of king or president or civilian outside of his/her contextual environment. For example, if the photo depicts a photo of king Abdullah of Jordan without showing him in a meeting or a conference, then it is coded as "personal photo." The personal photo is coded further in terms of the status of the person.

Variable C5, Status of personal photo: The status of the personal photo is divided into simple dichotomy of "elite" and "non-elite"

119- Elite. An example of an elite photo is one of kings, presidents, ministers, governmental officials, Secretary General of the United Nation/Arab League, etc.

120- Non-Elite. An example of a non-elite photo is one of civilians, doctors, teachers, media spokespeople, parliament members, religious figures, etc.

999- Not fitting. This is used for all the photos that are not coded in C4 as "personal photos." It is also applied to all the photos that do not show human beings.

Variable C6, Age of Actors (for those photos of humans): This category is applied for all the photos that depict human beings as individuals or groups.

184- Children/adolescents. Photos that depict a group of children in a refugee camp or a child receiving medical care are coded as "children."

185- Adults. This item applies to photos of meetings between presidents or foreign ministers. It is also applied for soldiers and insurgents.

186- Mixture of children and adults. An example of this category is a photo showing a demonstration combining children and adults protesting against the war. Also, it is applied to a family of parents and children in a refugee camp.

187- Other

999- Not fitting is used for coding the photos that do not show human beings. Example of this category includes photos depicting scenes of infrastructure destruction or a city ablaze.

0- Not mentioned. This item is used for photos of long shots that make it difficult to determine the age of the actors in the photo. Examples are long-shot photos of demonstrations or photos that capture people from their back while sitting, rendering it difficult to identify the age of the human beings.

Variable C7, Physical Harm (for humans): The photos that depict human beings are coded in terms of their physical harm as follows:

188- Most severe, which applies to photos showing dead bodies, coffins, or signs of death.

189- Severe, which applies to photos showing injured human beings or people with an abrasion or amputated limbs.

190- Not severe, which applies to photos showing people demonstrating or holding talks as well as personal photos.

191- Other

999- Not fitting, which applies to all the photos that do not show human beings. For example, photos that depict destroyed buildings are coded as "not fitting" as they are missing values.

0- Not mentioned

Variable C8, Emotional Harm (for humans with close-up or medium-shots to detect facial expression):

192- Positive, if the photo of close-up or medium-shot depicts an individual or group of people laughing, smiling, relaxing, celebrating.

193- Negative, if the photo of close-up or medium-shot depicts an individual or group of people crying, lamenting, angry, nervous, or tired.

194- Neutral, this applies to "personal photos" that show the person without indicating any emotional feelings of happiness or sadness. Examples of "neutral" emotional feelings are the biometric personal photos of individuals.

999- Not fitting is applied for all the photos that do not show human beings. An example is a photo of destructed buildings with no human beings included in the scene.

0- Not mentioned is applied for photos of human beings at long-shot, which makes it difficult to detect the emotional feelings. For example, a long-shot photo of a demonstration is coded as "not mentioned" as it is difficult to identify the facial expressions.

APPENDIX C
Conceptualization of Main Frames

1010) Victim/Feuding Neighbors
- Innocent Lebanese bystanders were victimized as a result of Israeli aggression.
- Innocent Lebanese bystanders were victimized as a result of the fight between Hezbollah and Israel.
- Innocent Lebanese bystanders were victimized without implication about who was to blame.
- Innocent civilians of other nationalities were targets of violence in Lebanon (with or without attribution of responsibility to rivaling parties).
- The Lebanon war had ramification on economic and ecological stability in the region.
- The abyss of violence characterized the history of Lebanon, which paid the price for instability in the region.
- The abyss of violence characterized the history of the Middle East as a result of war between Israel and the Arabs.
- Lebanon lacked full authority over its land as a result of Israeli occupation and Hezbollah control over the southern part.
- Deportation of Lebanese refugees to neighboring countries.
- Deportation of expatriates to their home countries/ arrival of expatriates to the airports of their countries.
- Lebanon was a city ablaze (description of destruction in the city)
- Israel was a city ablaze (same as above)
- Violence and counter-violence between Israel and Hezbollah.

1011) Strategic Interest Frame
- The United States had special interest in the Middle East and sought the re-birth of a new Middle East.
- The United States supported Israel in this war.
- Iran and its regional allies had interest in the Middle East.
- Iran and the U.S. sought to deploy their influence in the region.
- The Lebanon war of 2006 was a proxy war between Hezbollah and its allies (Iran and Syria) and Israel and its ally (the United States).

1012) Heroic Hezbollah
- Israel lost the war with Hezbollah.
- Hezbollah won the war over Israel.
- Hezbollah was the torchbearer of resistance.

- The Israeli army was suffering from defeat.
- The Israeli soldiers were tired and exhausted.
- Hezbollah had successful military tactics in the battlefield.
- Israel was forced to retreat as a result of the fierce fighting.
- Hezbollah celebrated the glory of war.

1013) Reconciliation Frame

- The diplomatic efforts exerted by Egypt as a main broker of peace in the region was essential to reach ceasefire.
- The United States administration efforts to ceasefire
- The UN resolution 1701 paved the road for peace in the Middle East.
- The French and Russian peace proposal
- Differences between Egypt and the U.S. on the date of ceasefire
- Diplomatic efforts exerted by the G8 and the international organizations appealing for an immediate ceasefire.

1014) Responsibility Frame

- Arab weakness provided a cover for Israeli aggression.
- The Egyptian regime adopted a weak stance in the conflict.
- The United Nations was not successful in resolving the conflict.
- Some Arab countries were accomplice to war.
- The weakness of the Arab and/or Egyptian regime led to the escalation of the conflict.

1015) Protest Frame

- Anti-war protest in Egypt and worldwide called for the end of violence in Lebanon.
- The anti-war protest in Egypt and worldwide condemned the excessive use of force by Israel.
- Pro-war demonstration in support of Hezbollah was present in some countries.

1016) Other Frame

If the frame as indicated in the news headline, news text, editorial, and photo captions did not allude to any of the pre-determined frames.

Timeline of Events of the 2006 Lebanon War
(July 13-August 15)

Timeline of the 2006 Lebanon War

July 12 :Hez. captured and killed
Israeli soldiers.
 Israel attacked Lebanon
airport.

17 Jul: Israeli
ground forces
advanced in
Lebanon;
Hez. rockets hit
Haifa.

July 21: Rice
described the war as
"birth pangs of a new
Middle East."

25 Jul: Israeli
airstrike killed 4
UN observers in
Lebanon.

26 Jul: Battle of
Bint Jbail ,9 Israeli
soldiers killed.

28 Jul: EU
evacuated its
citizens from
Lebanon.

30 Jul: Israel
airstrike on Qana
killing 28 civilians.

2 Aug: Israel airstrikes &
ground forces advanced.
Ayta-ash Shab battle
killing 12 Israelis.

5 Aug: Israel
airstrike on Tyre.

1 Aug: Five UN
security council
members discuss
ceasefire.

10 Aug:
Hezbollah struck
Haifa.

14 Aug:
Deployment
of UNIFIL

11Aug: Ceasefire 1701.
13Aug: Israeli cabinet
approved resolution.

Figure (8): Timeline of Events of the 2006 Lebanon War

Chronology of the 2006 Lebanon War

July 12: In a cross border raid, Lebanese Hezbollah militia captured two Israeli soldiers and killed eight. In a statement by Hezbollah, it named this operation "truthful promise," aiming to exchange the Israeli captured soldiers with Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert described the capture as an "act of war." In a response, Israeli war planes bombed the south of Lebanon and called up reserve troops ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week one", 2006, July 19).

July 13: Israel war planes bombed the Beirut Airport and South Lebanon headquarters of Hezbollah, imposing an air and sea blockade on Lebanon. Hezbollah, in response, fired rocket missiles on Haifa northern Israel.

July 14: Israel air forces bombed Beirut-Damascus road.

Egyptian-Jordanian summit between former President Mubarak and King Abdullah II condemning the Israeli military operation on South Lebanon and warning without naming Hezbollah of "the region being dragged into 'adventurism' that does not serve Arab interests" (Stalinsky, 2006, July 19).

July 15: Israel expanded its airstrike on South Lebanon reaching Tripoli. Hezbollah katyusha missiles fired on Tiberias.

Arab foreign ministers hold talks in an emergency meeting of the Arab League. Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa said the Middle East peace process was "dead." ("Arab League head", 2006, July 15).

July 16: Hezbollah rockets hit Haifa, killing 9 Israelis and injuring 25. Israel air raid killed at least 23 people in southern Lebanon. Syria Ministry of Information warned Israel against any attack on Syria. G8 nations meeting in St. Petersburg issued a communiqué blaming Hezbollah for violence ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 17: Israel expanded its airstrike on Tripoli and Baalbak. EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels called upon Israel not to respond with "disproportional action" ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 18: Evacuation of European nationals from Lebanon. UN warned of "humanitarian disaster" in Lebanon as Lebanese refugees fled their homes ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week one", 2006, July 19).

July 19: Israel dropped explosives on South Lebanon and raided Tyre and Baalbak. Hezbollah rockets fired on northern Israeli city of Haifa ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week two", 2006, July 31). France circulated proposals for immediate ceasefire. Washington dismissed the proposal ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 20: Israel ground forces encroached into Lebanon. Fierce fighting between Israel and Hezbollah troops inside Lebanon. United Nation Secretary General Kofi Anan accused Israel of "collective punishment" and said Hezbollah is holding the "entire nation [Lebanon] hostage." No resolution agreed on by the United Nations concerning the 2006 war in Lebanon ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 21: Israel called on reserve troops and severe ground fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. United States rejected the ceasefire proposal. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice dismissed the ceasefire plan in a press conference and described the war as "the birth pangs of a new Middle East." ("Bush slams Syria", 2006, July 22).

July 22: Israeli army continued ground incursion into South Lebanon and fierce fighting between Hezbollah militias and Israeli ground forces. Hezbollah fired rockets into Haifa.

July 23: UN Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland called the Israeli strike on Lebanon "violation of humanitarian law" ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 24: Fierce fighting between Hezbollah militias and Israel in South Lebanon. Hezbollah claimed responsibility of shooting an Israeli helicopter in northern Israel ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week two", 2006, July 31). Israel demanded a ceasefire plan to put the Lebanese-Syrian border under international control ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 25: Israel air strike killed four UN observers in South Lebanon, with strong international criticism of Israel ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week two", 2006, July 31).

July 26: Battle of Bint Jbail. Fierce fighting between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli ground forces resulted in the killing of 9 Israeli soldiers and injuring of 22. Biggest loss for Israeli forces since the beginning of the war ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week three", 2006, August 1).

July 27: Israeli cabinet decided to expand airstrike on Lebanon and call up more reserve troops. Hezbollah continued firing rockets on northern Israel.

July 28: Diplomatic talks between Tony Blair and Bush in Washington. UN called upon a truce to allow humanitarian aid in Lebanon ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 29: Israel pulled its troops from town of Bint Jbail after heavy losses ("Diplomatic timeline", 2006, August 2).

July 30: Israeli air raid in southern village of Qana in Lebanon killed 54 civilians, of which 34 were children ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week three", 2006, August 1).

July 31: Wide Arab and international criticism of Israel. Olmert dismissed call for ceasefire. Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel in response to Qana event ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week three", 2006, August 1). Egypt condemned the "massacre" and called for an "immediate and unconditional cease-fire" ("Qana triggers Arab diplomacy", 2006, July 31).

August 1: European Union foreign ministers in Brussels called for "immediate cease-fire." Israeli forces pushed toward Litani River in South Lebanon ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week three", 2006, August 1).

August 2: Israeli commandos launched raids in Lebanon and kidnapped five people said to be members of Hezbollah. Diplomatic efforts in the UN to reach a cease-fire ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week four", 2006, August 9).

August 3: Hezbollah Chairman Hassan Nasrallah warned Israel, in a TV speech, of an attack on Tel Aviv if Israel attacked Beirut. Fighting continued between Hezbollah fighters and Israel ground forces in South Lebanon (Cody, 2006, August 4). Diplomatic efforts discussed UN resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire.

August 4: Israeli airplanes struck Christian areas north of Beirut. Israeli war planes destroyed vegetable warehouses in South Lebanon resulted in the killing of 33 Syrian workers. Hezbollah launched rocket missiles into Israel.

August 5: Israeli commandos launched raid in the city of Tyre. Fighting continued between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces, resulting in the killing of 9 Israeli soldiers. The U.S. and France agreed on a ceasefire proposal.

August 6: Hezbollah launched its heaviest attack on northern Israel, killing 12 Israeli soldiers.

August 7: Israeli continued airstrikes on south Lebanon. Fighting continued between Hezbollah and Israeli ground forces in South Lebanon. Emergency meeting of the Arab foreign ministers concluded in Beirut. UN Secretary General issued a report accusing both Hezbollah and Israel of targeting civilians ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week four", 2006, August 9).

August 8: Egyptian delegation headed by President's son Gamal Mubarak arrived in Beirut in solidarity with Lebanon. Anti-war demonstration in Egypt and the rest of the war continued (Essam El-Din, 2006, August 10-16).

Diplomatic efforts continued in the Arab League and the United Nations debating a draft resolution for cease-fire. Firing continued between Hezbollah and Israel in South Lebanon.

August 9: Israeli cabinet approved a plan to expand ground incursion in South Lebanon toward Litani River. Severe fighting raised the Israeli casualties to 12 Israeli soldiers.

August 10: Heavy clashes in the towns of Marjayoun and Khiam in South Lebanon. Israeli air forces dropped leaflets on south Beirut warning residents to leave immediately. Hezbollah continued launching rockets into northern Israel. Diplomatic efforts continued.

August 11: UN Security Council unanimously approved the resolution 1701 calling for a "full cessation of hostilities" and a deployment of international forces in South Lebanon.

August 12: Israel continued its ground attack on southern Lebanon. Fierce clashes between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces resulted in the death of 24 Israeli soldiers in the largest loss of Israeli troops.

August 13: Israeli troops continued airstrike.

August 14: Ceasefire went into effect at 8:00 a.m. In a violation of the truce, Israel continued its strike on south Lebanon. Deployment of UNIFIL started. Lebanese troops deployed in the south under the control of the U.N. peacekeeping force. Return of Lebanese refugees.

August 15: Sporadic violence overnight and during the day erupted between Hezbollah and Israeli forces. United Nation expressed its hope to deploy 3,500 troops on the ground in southern Lebanon mostly from France. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad hailed the "victory" of Hezbollah ("Day-by-day: Lebanon crisis- week five", 2006, August 17).

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APPENDIX E

Brief Summary of Results

The current study aims to investigate the framing of the 2006 Lebanon war in the Egyptian press within the social constructionist approach. It seeks to understand the political, historical, and ideological factors that affect the pattern of framing. Analysis proved that the overall political and media environment supplies a contextual analysis for the framing of the war. The study relies on a number of different research approaches. First, an analysis was undertaken on the context surrounding of the political, historical, and media environment in Egypt and its implications on the 2006 war in Lebanon. Second, a quantitative content analysis of three Egyptian newspapers, representing three ideological trends in Egypt, was conducted to explore the main frames of coverage, as well as the orientation of the frames toward the war journalism and peace journalism frames.

The authoritarian regime of Egypt maintained tight control on the political and media environment. It resorted to different mechanisms combining coercion and co-optation to contain the opposition at home. Despite the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the attitude of the press toward Israel remained negative. The Arab-Israeli conflict was the pretext for both the regime and the opposition movements. The regime used the conflict to distract attention from the domestic political and economic grievances (Rubin, 2006; Tessler & Grobschmidt, 1995). The opposition movements exploited the conflict differently to project their anger from the policies of the regime (El-Mahdi, 2009). The 2006 Lebanon war revealed the intra-state discrepancy between the regime and the growing opposition in Egypt. The stance of the regime was skeptical toward Hezbollah, accusing it of igniting the war and dragging the region into further violence. The opposition movements criticized the regime position and were supportive to Hezbollah.

The study assumed that the ideology of the newspapers affected the framing patterns of the war. Frames are regarded as a dependent variable affected by ideology (Edelman, 1993). It based its structure on the content analysis of three Egyptian newspapers, representing three ideological tendencies: the state press, the liberal press, and the leftist Pan-Arab press. The analysis included all the relevant materials concerning the 2006 war in Lebanon in news texts, editorials, and visuals. Based on the definition of framing adopted by Entman, the thesis relied on the deductive approach in identifying the frames of the 2006 Lebanon war in the newspapers

under study. Six main frames were investigated in the analysis: *victim/feuding neighbors, strategic interest, responsibility*, *reconciliation*, *protest*, and *heroic Hezbollah*.   Two main questions were addressed:

Q1: Does the use of frames of Lebanon War 2006 vary significantly between newspapers?

Q2: How do the newspapers differ in emphasizing peace journalism and war journalism frames?

A set of hypotheses were assumed in the study. The hypotheses are **H1:** there is significant difference between the newspapers in the framing of the 2006 Lebanon war. This hypothesis is seen within the constructionist approach in the sense that the media is a site of frame contestation due to the difference between the political players with regard to the 2006 war in Lebanon. **H2**: The state-owned press *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the Egyptian regime in displaying the *reconciliation* frame more than *Masry* and *Araby*. **H3**: The leftist Pan-Arab press *Araby* is likely to display the *heroic Hezbollah* frame more than *Ahram* and *Masry*. With regard to the Galtung competing peace journalism and war journalism frames, the main hypothesis assumed that **H4**: The newspapers differ significantly in terms of their inclination toward war journalism and peace journalism frames. Related to this hypothesis are several hypotheses. **H5**: The state-owned *Ahram* adheres to the political position of the regime and displays more elements of the peace journalism than the war journalism frame. **H6**: The liberal newspaper *Masry* is more likely to use elements of the peace journalism than the war journalism frame. This hypothesis is assumed based on previous studies that proved the inclination of the liberal press more toward the peace journalism than the war journalism frame (Lynch, 2006) Finally, **H7**: The leftist Pan-Arab newspaper *Araby* is more likely to use elements of the war journalism than peace journalism frame.

Key Findings

The newspapers framed the 2006 Lebanon war differently. It is possible to draw a correspondence between the ideological and political leanings of the newspaper and the frames used to cover the war. Findings can be summarized as follows:

First, the 2006 war in Lebanon possessed a historical and political prominence in the Egyptian media and social landscape. The Egyptian media remained interested in the war ever since its onset. This explains the intensity of coverage in the three newspapers during the 34 days

of the war from July 13 to August 15, 2006. A total of 1,728 materials in the three newspapers were subject to analysis, including 492 news articles, 536 editorial texts, and 700 photos.

Second, findings showed that the Egyptian press did not homogenously frame the Lebanon war 2006 but was a site of frame contestation divided between lines of ideological and political tendencies.

The state press *Ahram* remained closely tied to the official Egyptian stance in viewing the war as a vicious circle of violence that took the lives of innocent bystanders. The regime supported the diplomatic solution to reaching a ceasefire. The dominant frames for covering the war were the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame, followed by the *reconciliation* frame. Frames like the *strategic interest*, *protest*, *responsibility*, and *heroic Hezbollah* were downplayed.

In terms of the competing war journalism and peace journalism frames, the state-owned *Ahram* showed balanced coverage with a slight tendency toward the peace journalism frame. The state press widened the scope of the war by focusing on the events of "negotiation" that involved many actors not directly involved in the conflict. However, *Ahram* relied heavily on the elite governmental sources of information to interpret the events and convey their perspective.

The liberal press *Masry* showed more diversity in covering the Lebanon war. Despite the fact that the *victim/feuding neighbors* frame was the dominant frame in the liberal press, the other frames, which remained muted in the state press, were given significant attention, such as the *strategic interest*, *responsibility*, and *protest* frames. The market economy and the relative independency from the domain of the state in terms of ownership gave ground for more diversity in the coverage in order to increase readership.

Masry press thus showed balance in using the war journalism and peace journalism frames with a slight preference toward the peace journalism frame. Likewise, the liberal press presented wider aspects of the war involving different parties though did rely on elite sources for news interpretation. However, the liberal press advanced the military solution against Israel thus joining the side of the mobilized public opinion that hailed what they perceived as the "victory" of Hezbollah (Slackman, 2006).

The leftist press *Araby* abided by the ideological leanings of the Nasserite Party in condemning the weakness of the Arab and international community, and presenting Hezbollah as the torchbearer of resistance capable to deter Israeli atrocities in Lebanon. The war was framed mainly within the domain of the *heroic Hezbollah* frame. The *responsibility* frame, which

pointed to the accountability of the Arab and international community to stop the violence, was given remarkable attention. Also, the *protest* frame was presented in the leftist newspaper, showing the unrest and demonstration in the streets, contrary to the regime, which reported the demonstrations as trivial. It is significant to observe that the frames promoted by the leftist *Araby* press were in defiance to the viewpoint of the regime's official stance. Analysis proved that the leftist press exploited the Lebanon war of 2006 to mount its criticism against the government.

Results showed that *Araby* promoted the war journalism frame in the majority of cases except in its preference to use non-elite sources of news information instead of the elite governmental sources. The leftist newspaper discredited the government interpretation of events.

Finally, results showed that as the war continued, the newspapers embraced more frames that were muted at the beginning. The military and political development exerted pressure on the government and the media to respond to the events from the ground. The *victim/feuding neighbors* frame remained the dominant frame during the war, albeit more frames competed in the third and fourth week, reflecting the political environment. The frames seemed to have changed for two main reasons. First, the nature of the fighting had changed. Israel was not able to weaken the capabilities of Hezbollah and achieve its designated goals, nor was the United States administration able to exert pressure regarding the "birth pangs of new Middle East" (Pressman, 2006). Hezbollah showed stubborn resistance, vowing to continue the war "without any red lines" (Hirst, 2010, p.347). Frames of *responsibility, protest,* and *heroic Hezbollah* were clearly evident in the news headlines.

Kurzzusammenfassung der Ergebnisse

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht mithilfe eines sozialkonstruktivistischen Ansatzes das *Framing* innerhalb der ägyptischen Presselandschaft während des Libanonkriegs 2006. Hierbei der Versuch unternommen die politischen, geschichtlichen und ideologischen Faktoren, die das *Kriegsframing* beeinflussen, darzustellen. Die Analyse wies auf, dass die politische wie auch die mediale Landschaft eine kontextuelle Analyse des *Kriegframings* zuließen. Zunächst wurden hierfür die Rahmenbedingungen innerhalb der politischen, geschichtlichen und medialen Landschaft bezüglich des Libanonkriegs 2006 analysiert. Zweites diente eine quantitative Analyse dreier ägyptischer Zeitungen, die die drei verschiedenen ägyptischen Trends der Zeitungslandschaft repräsentieren, dazu, dass die grundlegenden *Frames* der Darstellung erforscht wurden, sowie die Orientierung derer bezüglich kriegs- und friedensjournalistischer *Frames* untersucht wurde.

In der gegenwärtigen Geschichte Ägyptens greift das autoritäre Regime zur Ausgrenzung der Opposition auf verschiedene Mechanismen, die sowohl Zwang und Kooptation verbinden, zurück. Trotz des Friedens zwischen Ägypten und Israel bleibt das Meinungsbild gegenüber Israel negativ. Der Nahostkonflikt wurde vom autoritären Regime als eine Ausrede benutzt, die die Aufmerksamkeit von den innenpolitischen und ökonomischen Missständen lenken sollte (Rubin 2006; Tessler/Grobschmidt 1995). Auf dieselbe Art benutzten oppositionelle Bewegungen den Konflikt um ihren Unmut über die Politik des Regimes kundzutun (El-Mahdi, 2009). Das Wesentliche hinter dem Libanonkrieg von 2006 war, dass eine innerstaatliche Diskrepanz zwischen dem Regime und der wachsenden Opposition in Ägypten ans Tageslicht kam. Die Haltung des Regimes war skeptisch gegenüber der Hisbollah, die sie für den Kriegsausbruch verantwortlich machten. Die oppositionellen Bewegungen kritisierten die Position des Regimes und wiesen eine der Hisbollah zugeneigten Haltung auf.

Die vorliegende Arbeit nimmt an, dass die Ideologie der Nachrichtenagenturen die Muster des *Framings* des Krieges beeinflussen. Diese *Frames* werden als abhängige Variable, die durch eine Ideologie beeinträchtigt wurde (Edelmann, 1993), behandelt. Die Struktur der Arbeit basiert auf der inhaltlichen Analyse von drei ägyptischen Zeitungen, die die drei ideologischen Tendenzen innerhalb der Gesellschaft wiederspiegeln; Einen von der Regierung vorgegebenen, einen liberalen und einen den Pan-Arabismus vertretenen linken Trend in der Gesellschaft. Die

Analyse beinhaltet alle Themen des Libanonkriegs, die den Nachrichten, den Leitartikeln und den Visualisierungen entnommen wurden. Basierend auf Entmans Definition des *Framing*, obliegt dieser Arbeit ein deduktiver Ansatz bei ihrer Identifikation der *Frames* des Libanonkriegs aus 2006 in den untersuchten Zeitungen. Sechs *Frames* wurden in der Analyse mit einbezogen: Opfer/ zerstrittene Nachbarn, strategische Interessen, die *Frames* der Verantwortung, der Aussöhnung, des Protests*,* und der heroischen Hisbollah. Dabei stellten sich zwei Hauptfragen:

1) Variieret in den Zeitungen die Nutzung von *Frames* des Libanonkriegs 2006 in signifikanter Weise

 2) Wie setzten sich die Zeitungen mit ihren unterschiedlichen Tendenzen zugunsten eines kriegs- oder friedensjournalistischen *Frames* ein?

Eine Reihe von Hypothesen wurde für diese Arbeit aufgestellt:

H1: Es bestehen signifikante Unterschiede zwischen den zu untersuchenden Zeitungen im Bezug auf die *Frames* des Libanonkriegs 2006. Diese Hypothese obliegt einem konstruktivistischen Ansatz im dem Sinne, dass die Medien ihre *Frames* aufgrund der unterschiedlichen politischen Haltungen im Wettbewerb gegenüber anderen *Frames* zum Libanonkrieg 2006 platzieren.

H2: Die staatlich kontrollierte *Ahram* richtet sich nach der politischen Ausrichtung des ägyptischen Regimes, wobei ein „versöhnendes" *Frame* öfter verwenden wird als in *Masry* und *Araby*.

H3: Die linke panarabische Zeitung *Araby* greift in ihrer Darstellung häufiger auf das Frame der „heroischen Hisbollah" zurück als die *Ahram* und die *Masry*.

Im Bezug auf Galtungs Meinung zum Wettbewerb zwischen Friedens- und Kriegsjournalismus sind die Haupthypothesen:

H4: Es bestehen signifikante Unterschieder zwischen den Zeitungen im Bezug auf Tendenzen bezüglich kriegs- und friedensjournalistischer *Frames*. Im Bezug hierzu stehen weitere Unterthesen:

H5: Die staatlich kontrollierte *Ahram* würde den politischen Diskurs gemäß des Regimes unter der Begünstigung des friedensjournalistischen *Frames* wiedergeben.

H6: Die Zeitung des liberalen Flügels *Masry* würde friedensjournalistische Elemente in ihrer Berichterstattung kriegsjournalistischen *Frames* bevorzugen. Diese Hypothese gründet sich aufgrund von vorhergegangenen Studien, die eine Neigung der liberalen Zeitungen in Richtung des Friedensjournalismus aufwiesen (Lynch, 2006).

H7: Die dem linken Spektrum zugehörige panarabische Zeitung *Araby* bevorzugt Elemente des Kriegsjournalismus gegenüber denen des Friedensjournalismus.

Hauptforschungsergebnisse

Die verschiedenen Zeitungen stellten den Libanonkrieg 2006 unterschiedlich dar. Hierbei ist es möglich eine Übereinstimmung zwischen den ideologischen und politischen Sichtweisen der Zeitungsagenturen und der benutzen *Frames* zur Kriegsberichterstattung nachzuweisen. Die Ergebnisse lassen sich zusammenfassen:

Zunächst (1) muss man festhalten, dass der Libanonkrieg 2006 einen wichtigen Stellenwert in der ägyptischen Medienlandschaft und unter der Bevölkerung hatte. Seit dem Beginn des Krieges bestand ein großes Interesse von Seiten der ägyptischen Presse. Auch während des 34 tägigen Verlaufs des Krieges, beginnend mit dem 13.07.2006, blieb der Krieg im Augenmerk der drei untersuchten Zeitungen. Dabei entstand innerhalb dieser Zeitungen eine Sammlung von 1.728 Materialien. Darunter befinden sich 492 Zeitungsartikel, 536 Leitartikel und 700 Photos.

Zweitens (2): Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die ägyptischen Zeitungen den Libanonkrieg 2006 nicht homogen darstellten, sondern dass die von ihnen benutzten *Frames* im Wettbewerb zueinander standen, was sich mit den verschiedenen ideologischen und politischen Sichtweisen erklären lässt.

Die staatliche Zeitung *Ahram* verfolgte den offiziellen Kurs des Regimes. Dieser lautete, dass der Krieg einen endlosen Kreis an Gewalt, in dem Unschuldige ihr Leben verloren, bedeutete. Auch strebte das Regime nach einer diplomatischen Lösung, die einen Waffenstillstand erwirken sollte. Die *Ahram* portraitierte den Krieg primär innerhalb eines „Opfer / Zerstrittene Nachbarn" *Frame*. Als ein weiteres *Frame* benutzt die Zeitung das „Versöhnungs" *Frame*", wohingegen *Frames* wie „strategisches Interesse", „Protest", „Verantwortung" und das *Frame* der „heroischen Hisbollah" umgangen wurden. Im Bezug auf die Elemente des Kriegs- und

Friedensjournalismus hielt die Ahram eine Balance mit leichter Tendenz in Richtung eines friedensjournalistischen *Frames*. Die staatliche Press erweiterte zudem die Debatte, in dem sie den Fokus auf „Verhandlungen" richtete. So wurden auch externe Akteure, die nicht im direkten Zusammenhang mit dem Krieg standen, einbezogen. Nichtsdestotrotz bezieht sich die *Ahram* hauptsächlich auf elitäre Quellen innerhalb der Regierung, deren Perspektive von ihr übertragen wird.

Die liberale Zeitung *Masry* zeigte in ihrer Berichterstattung eine größere Diversität. Neben der Tatsache, dass die „Opfer / Zerstrittene Nachbarn" und „Versöhnung" *Frames* dominierten, tendierte die Zeitung auch dazu weitere *Frames* aufzugreifen, die von den staatlich kontrollierten Zeitungen außer Acht gelassen wurden. Dazu gehörten die *Frames* „strategisches Interesse", „Verantwortung" und „Protest". Wirtschaftlicher Wettbewerb und die Unabhängigkeit vom Staat boten die Möglichkeit für eine differenziertere Berichterstattung, auch um eine größere Leserschaft zu erreichen. Im Bezug auf die *Frames* des Kriegs- und Friedensjournalismus tendierte die liberale *Masry* in ihren Nachrichten und Leitartikeln in Richtung friedensjournalistische *Frames.* Auch präsentierte sie dabei unübliche Themen, indem sie über verschiedene Akteure berichtete, von denen sie über elitäre Quellen erfuhren. Stark wurde sich auch für eine militärische Lösung eingesetzt, eine in der Öffentlichkeit herrschende Meinung, die daher stammte, dass ein „Sieg" der Hisbollah wahrgenommen wurde (Slackman, 2006).

Die politisch-linke Zeitung *Araby* orientierte sich an den ideologischen Lehren der nasseristischen Partei, indem sie die Schwäche der arabischen und internationalen Gemeinschaft kritisierte und zugleich die Hisbollah als den Fackelträger des Wiederstands gegen die israelischen Grausamkeiten im Libanon stilisierte. Der Krieg wurde deswegen größtenteils mit einem „heroische Hisbollah" *Frame* dargestellt. Auch dem „Verantwortung" Frame kam eine gewisse Bedeutung zu, da dieses auf die Verantwortung der arabischen und internationalen Gemeinschaft den Krieg zu beenden zielte. Genauso war das „Protest" *Frame* präsent, das die Unruhen und Demonstrationen in den Straßen einfing, eine Darstellung die vom Regime als unbedeutend abgetan wurde. Festzuhalten ist, dass die bevorzugten *Frames* der linken Araby im direkten Kontrast zu den Sichtweisen des offiziellen Kurses der Regierung standen. Die Analyse zeigte, dass die linke Presselandschaft den Libanonkrieg 2006 dazu benutze ihre Kritik an der Regierung zu äußern.

Die *Araby* bevorzugte in den meisten Fällen ein kriegsjournalistisches Frame. Anstelle auf Informationen der Regierung zurückzugreifen, wurde zumeist nicht-elitäre Quellen zur Informationsbeschaffung benutzt. Folglich diskreditierte die linksgerichtete Zeitung die Interpretationen der Regierung über die Ereignisse.

Letztlich (3) lässt sich feststellen, dass mit dem Andauern des Krieges, die Zeitungen ihr Repertoire an *Frames* erweiterten. Militärische und politische Entwicklungen übten zunehmend Druck auf die Haltung der Regierung und der Medien aus. Das „Opfer / zerstrittene Nachbarn" *Frame* blieb zwar dominant, ab der dritten und vierten Woche stand es jedoch zunehmend im Wettbewerb mit neu auftauchenden *Frames,* die die politische Entwicklung besser einzufangen vermochten. Hinter dem Wechsel unterhalb den *Frames* stehen zwei wesentliche Gründe. Zunächst hatte sich die Art des Kampfes verändert. Weder gelang es Israel die Hisbollah wesentlich zu schwächen und die gesetzten Ziele vollends zu bewältigen, noch war die amerikanische Führung in die Lage Druck auf die „Geburtswehen eines neuen Nahen Ostens" (Pressman, 2006) auszuüben. Hisbollah erwies sich als ein zäher Widerstand, der sich schwor den Krieg „ohne eine rote Linie" (Hirst, 2010, S. 347) vorzusetzten. Die *Frames* der „Verantwortung", des „Protests" und der „heroischen Hisbollah" waren in den Nachrichten klar zu vermerken.