IS INTERNATIONALLY-LED STATEBUILDING FUTILE? EVIDENCE FROM KOSOVO'S MUNICIPALITIES

A Dissertation
Presented to the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the Freie
Universität Berlin in fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

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February 2016
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Date of defence: 27th June 2016

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

DECLARATION

I, David Jackson, declare this dissertation to be my own work. The dissertation has not been submitted for a degree at another university.

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ABSTRACT

Is internationally-led statebuilding futile? If so, why? Answers to these questions
have been found in examining the type of governance that has emerged in the
municipalities of Kosovo, a country subject to an unprecedented level of
statebuilding by external actors. Based on fifteen months of field work, including
a survey of over one thousand citizens and over one hundred in-depth interviews,
this dissertation presents empirical evidence that privileges the views of citizens
and local political actors experiencing statebuilding. This research has taken a
novel approach, for it assesses the effectiveness of statebuilding through the study
of the informal institutions that statebuilders inevitably confront—in this case, an
informal, clientelist model that competes with the formal-democratic
'statebuilding' model in Kosovo's municipalities. In prioritising the persistence of
this informal model as the central line of inquiry, new light is shed on the crucial
questions of why is the implementation of statebuilding so difficult, why do
citizens often not embrace the models of the statebuilders, and what are the local
structural constraints that impede statebuilding? The dissertation ends by
explaining a rare case in which one outlier municipality has cast off the
dominance of clientelism—a case of successful transformation that can contribute
to our understanding of how and when statebuilding can be effective.

Ist internationale Staatsbildung aussichtslos? Wenn ja, weshalb? Antworten auf
diese Fragen findet der Autor mit seiner Untersuchung von Governance-Formen
in den Kommunen von Kososvo, und damit einem Land, das in bisher
beispiellosem Maß Staatsbildung durch externe Akteure unterliegt. Basierend auf
15 Monaten Feldforschung - im Rahmen dieser wurden mehr als 1000
Bürger/innen befragt und über 100 Tiefeninterviews geführt – präsentiert die
Dissertation eine empirische Basis und stellt Sichtweisen von Bürger/innen und
lokalen politischen Akteur/innen und ihre Erfahrungen mit Staatsbildung in den
Vordergrund. Für die Untersuchung wurde ein neuartiger Ansatz gewählt, der sich
der Effektivität von Staatsbildung über eine Analyse voninformalen Institutionen
annähert. Mit diesen sind statebuilders unweigerlich konfrontiert – im Fall von
Kosovos Kommunen mit einem informalen ‚klientelistischen Modell' (clientelist
model), welches in Konkurrenz tritt mit dem formal-demokratischen
‚Staatsbildung-Modell' (Staatsbildung model). Indem die zentrale Fragestellung
dem Fortbestand eines solchen informalen Modells Beachtung schenkt, können
die wesentlichen Aspekte von Staatsbildung in neuem Licht erscheinen, u.a.
warum Staatsbildung schwierig ist, Bürger/innen das Modell ablehnen oder lokale
strukturelle Beschränkungen Staatsbildung erschweren. Die Dissertation endet mit
der Beschreibung des seltenen Falles, wo eineKommune die Dominanz des
Klientilismus abstreift – der Fall einer erfolgreichen Transformation, die zu
unserem Verständnis beitragen kann, wie und wann Staatsbildung effektiv ist.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAK	Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës)
EU	European Union
EC	European Commission
EULEX	EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICO	International Civilian Office
ICR	International Civilian Representative
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JIAS	Joint Interim Administrative Structure
KFOR	NATO Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës)
LVV	Self-determination party Kosovo (Vetëvendosje)
MLGA	Ministry for Local Government Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës)
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (the Kosovo institutions)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

*Note on names of places and people. As Kosovo is a contested state, the names of places in Kosovo are also contested. Though some place names are the same in Albanian and Serbian, like the town of Prizren, wherever possible I use the English usage for names of places. In this dissertation, 'Kosovan Albanian' or 'Albanian' refers to Albanians from Kosovo and not Albanian-speaking people in Albania or Macedonia. Likewise, 'Kosovan Serbs' or 'Serb' refers to Serbs living in Kosovo.

Introduction

'ALL PASSENGERS MUST QUEUE IN SINGLE-FILE AND WAIT THEIR TURN'

This rule confronted me on a large sign as I entered the small passport control area of Pristina's rickety (and now replaced) airport on a typically breezy evening in Kosovo's capital in April 2013. Next to the Republic of Kosovo symbol in the bottom corner of the sign were the unmistakable golden stars of the European Commission (EC) revealing the likely author of the rule—it was the EC which, after all, has been instrumental in defining Kosovo's border control and customs system over the last fifteen years. As I and the fifty or so other passengers from the Zagreb-to-Pristina evening flight ambled past the sign, we started to assemble into an orderly, single-file queue to wait for our passports to be checked.

Everyone knew the script, or that is how it at first seemed. Then something happened that encapsulated what I had been researching in Kosovo for those past fifteen months. In front of me was a young mother who, along with a couple of small pieces of luggage, carried a small child in her arms, while her slightly older child of perhaps five years stood next to her. As we waited, some young Kosovan men, fellow passengers, started to say something directly to the young mother. Speaking first in Albanian, the young men soon realised by her appearance that the young mother was most likely northern European rather than Kosovan. They then articulated in English: 'please, you can go to the front of the queue.' Unsure of whether she could upset the existing order of the queue, I could see the young mother looking around at her fellow passengers for some kind of confirmation. She noticed that the other Kosovans in the queue were gesturing with their hands for her to go to the front of the long line. As the gestures became more widespread

and encouraging, the young mother picked up her bags and led her two children past a handful of bemused non-Kosovans to the front of the queue.

For those interested in internationally-led statebuilding, a process in which external actors, working with local actors, support the creation or renovation of institutions—including rules that regulate queuing in airports—something interesting had just happened: the formal rule issued by the Kosovo government but most likely designed by an international organisation, in this case the EC, had been *trumped by an alternative rule*. This alternative rule was enforced through social mechanisms, a mixture of articulation and then more physical communication. It was the young Kosovan men who articulated the rule to the young mother, and it was the other Kosovans in the queue whose hand-gestures and waving ensured its enforcement.

Interestingly, this did not seem to be an exceptional circumstance in which a special human concern permits a formal rule to be suspended. In fact, there was nothing exceptional about the situation of the young mother as neither she nor her children were visibly distressed by having to queue—there were no observable signs of struggle, no shouting and no crying. Permitting young mothers to skip queues seemed therefore to be normal, and the lack of discontent from the Kosovans as the young mother moved to the front of the queue implied that this alternative rule was widely held as legitimate. The way this shadow 'queue rule' was articulated, communicated and enforced by the Kosovans in the queue also suggested it was deeply embedded in society. I had therefore witnessed the operation of an *informal institution,* a regular pattern of behaviour that is informal in the sense of being unwritten and unofficial. Whether this informal institution undermines the formal rule on the sign is an open question. Allowing people to

move to the front of the queue could undermine orderliness and stability; yet, the informal institution could in the end provide for more stability, as it prevents unnecessary distress in the queue.

Regardless of the effects of the different rules, such confrontations and mismatches illustrate the fascinating currents and tensions inherent in statebuilding between the formal and informal. They raise the questions of what kind of institutions hold sway under statebuilding, why do informal institutions persist and why do they trump the governance models brought in by international statebuilders? They also raise the question of whether statebuilding can be done at all—and if it can be done, how?

Answers to these questions have been found in examining the type of governance that has emerged in the municipalities of Kosovo, a country subject to an unprecedented level of statebuilding by external actors. Based on fifteen months of field work, including a survey of over one thousand citizens and over one hundred in-depth interviews, this dissertation presents a wealth of empirical evidence that privileges the views of citizens and local political actors experiencing statebuilding. This research has taken a novel approach, for it assesses the effectiveness of statebuilding through the study of the informal institutions that statebuilders inevitably confront—in this case, an informal, clientelist model that competes with the formal-democratic 'statebuilding' model in Kosovo's municipalities. In prioritising the persistence of this informal model as the central line of inquiry, light is shed on the crucial questions of why is the implementation of statebuilding so difficult, why do citizens often not embrace the models of the statebuilders, and what are the local structural constraints that impede statebuilding?

This is a political science dissertation that speaks directly to the statebuilding literature.[1] It does so inspired by insights from the political ethnography and anthropology literatures. This dissertation itself was inspired by a general frustration at the lack of systematic empirical data within the statebuilding literature. In particular, it has sought to empirically evaluate an important strand of thought that views internationally-led statebuilding as *futile* in the sense that statebuilding does not do what it is supposed to do—that the formal institutions created by international statebuilders seldom end up defining political behaviour in target societies. Beyond this, the research is dedicated to understanding why statebuilding may be futile and why it may be effective. The research question: is internationally-led statebuilding futile? If so, why? The dissertation aims to make contributions to the conceptual, empirical and policy dimensions of statebuilding.

Dissertation overview

The first chapter explains from where this policy of internationally-led statebuilding has emerged. After that, the chapter reviews the state of scholarship to put the dissertation on a clear intellectual footing and presents a coherent rationale for the research question. The chapter then elaborates on the conceptual apparatus upon which the research is based and presents a novel conceptualisation of futility—that is, the 'statebuilding model' has less actual influence on political behaviour than its informal alternative.

The second chapter moves beyond this conceptual framework to offer concrete steps about a research design which most effectively sheds light on the

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[1] In this sense this dissertation does not engage with the parallel norm diffusion literature which is about the diffusion of norms (e.g human rights norms) rather than the creation and renovation of institutions. For a seminal article within the norm diffusion literature, see Acharya 2004.

research question. It explains why Kosovo has been chosen as the case study, before moving on to the unit of analysis, which is the governance model that frames how resources are distributed from state to society at the municipal level. The chapter then operationalises the abstract concepts to give precise analytical meaning to the two alternative governance models—a statebuilding (programmatic) model and informal (clientelist) model—that underpin the research. These statebuilding and clientelist model are competing in the sense of providing two alternative pathways of action. The question to be answered is which constrains or channels behaviour more, the formal statebuilding or the informal clientelist model of governance?

The third chapter develops the measurement tool that aims to measure the extent to which the clientelist model structures the way resources are distributed from the state to citizens at the municipal level. The chapter will show that the development of this original 'Clientelism Index' is important because there are no sufficient instruments in the literature. Statistical tests demonstrate the validity and reliability of the instrument and the chapter elaborates on how process reliability, that is a survey that minimises bias, has been ensured.

Over one thousand residents of Kosovo across eleven different municipalities answered the survey, and the fourth chapter outlines the overall results. This chapter shows that statebuilding in Kosovo has been mostly futile in the sense of the statebuilding model is unimportant when it comes to the distribution of resources compared to the clientelist model. It is plausible then to theorise that this futility at the municipal level raises serious concern about the possibility of building formal institutions in more complex and controversial areas in Kosovo. But, this should not overshadow that the test revealed an outlier case.

The results from Hani i Elezit municipality demonstrate that international statebuilding can be effective. In this municipality, the type of governance can be roughly equated with what is experienced in many advanced democracies, revealing that it is premature to suggest that statebuilding is pre-ordained to fail: just as statebuilding was successful in Hani i Elezit, it could be plausibly effective in other municipalities, sectors and countries.

The fifth chapter aims to bring this clientelist model 'out of the shadows' and present an empirically based and conceptually structured account of this alternative governance model. In doing so, it shifts away from a focus on the constituent institutions (i.e rules) to a perspective on the actors, organisations and social ecology that populate and drive the clientelist model. The analysis, through a political scientist's sensitivity towards institutions with an ethnographer's sensitivity towards gaining an insider perspective, will present a number of vivid insights about how the clientelist model operates in Kosovo.

The sixth chapter aims to plug an important empirical gap by modelling the 'demand side' of statebuilding and clientelism. Using vignette research, as well as interviews with key informants, the chapter identifies at the level of individual agency how people's beliefs and choices available to them shape responses to international statebuilding. It shows that there are three distinct logics present in the demand side of clientelism within Kosovo's municipalities: the logics of fear of 'losing out', functionality, and social norms.

The seventh chapter switches to the supply side of the puzzle. The chapter traces the impact of three logics of supply through which statebuilding has been channelled. It traces the impact to the level at which they play out on the ground. Using a comparative research design, the chapter challenges the assumption

behind the logics of statebuilding. In doing so, it identifies a crucial aspect of the statebuilding puzzle: the impact of statebuilding strategies is dependent on the degree to which they converge with the orientation of the political leaders of the municipalities on the ground.

The final chapter interrogates this crucial variable of local leadership. It aims identify certain features of the political environment which may act as constraints on the kind of public leadership that is necessary for statebuilding. The final section ends by explaining a rare case in which one outlier municipality cast off the dominance of clientelism—a case of successful transformation that can contribute to our understanding of how and when statebuilding can be effective.

Chapter I: Internationally-led statebuilding

As the jubilation from the fall of the Berlin wall subsided, a new anxiety arose in Western politics. No longer tied to the calculable behaviour of states and the possibility of nuclear apocalypse or great military confrontation, global threats seemed to spring from multiple sources and were 'extra-polity' in nature: more complex, unpredictable and less containable than what had characterised the Cold War standoff (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010). Suddenly, not the behaviour of states but the fragility of states had become the prime source of global risks.

A new international policy – bound up in development strategies, Europeanisation processes, debt-relief agreements, and bi-lateral aid – emerged to address this fragility: internationally-led statebuilding, defined in this dissertation as a set of actions undertaken by national and international actors to establish or reconstruct effective and autonomous state institutions where these have been seriously eroded or are missing (Caplan 2005, p. 3).[2]

This dissertation is about internationally-led statebuilding and this chapter aims to put the rest of the dissertation on a clear foundation. It begins by explaining from where this policy of internationally-led statebuilding has emerged and what it is. After that, Section II presents a coherent rationale for the research question: is internationally led-statebuilding futile? If so, why? Taking up these questions presents an immediate challenge: how to understand concepts such as

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[2] This formulation is a modification of Caplan's definition and is generally agreed upon in the literature. For example see, Fukuyama (2004, p. ix) 'the creation or strengthening of institution'; or Call and Cousens (2008, p. 4): 'actions undertaken by international and national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society.'

futility and to link them to an empirical reality. Section III takes up this challenge by presenting the conceptual apparatus that will underpin the research.

Section I: The rise of statebuilding

I:I:I Fragility is rooted in the absence of institutions

Three different areas of concern propelled fragile states to the priority of international development policy (Cammack 2006). Ferocious violence and its dire humanitarian consequences in Somalia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere, prompted actors concerned with human security to demand greater action against state collapse. Poor development outcomes and new calamities, such as HIV/Aids, were attributed to state ineffectiveness leading to international agencies to call for the strengthening of states through 'good governance'. Links were also made between this under-development and global insecurity—a growing concern that became a rousing clarion call after the September 11th attacks in the United States.[3]

The diagnosis for why different parts of the world have become sources of global harm has been remarkably similar: states are fragile because of the absence or erosion of the *formal institutions of governance*. This conclusion is mostly explained by a number of influential analysts drawing inspiration from the same Weberian understanding of the state. Famously defining the state as 'a human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory,' for Weber the capacity of state institutions to get a grip on society was at the essence of a state's being (Lemay-Hébert 2009).

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[3] Though it is now commonly used, the label *fragile* has no precise meaning within the policy or academic discourse. Unhelpfully, fragile has become a vague epitaph used by governments and international agencies to describe states that are either lacking in capacity, sources of the most severe development challenges or just plainly difficult partners. For critique of term see, Cammack 2006.

From this, neo-Weberian thinkers have identified the institutional capacity to provide public goods as the key quality by which states can be judged (Rotberg 2003). Fukuyama, for instance, sums up state strength as 'the ability to enact statutes and to frame and execute policies; to administer public business with relative efficiency; to control graft, corruption and bribery; to maintain high levels of transparency and accountability; and most importantly, to enforce laws' (Fukuyama 2004, p. 22).

As a corollary, state fragility has been diagnosed as a situation in which states lack the institutional capacity to implement and enforce policies. This conception of weak institutions as the underlying cause of state fragility has become highly influential within policy-making circles.[4] Conclusions from the European Council in 2007 explained that: 'weak or failing structures...is due to the state's incapacity or unwillingness to deal with its basic functions, meet its obligations and responsibilities regarding the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, security and safety of its population, poverty reduction, service delivery' (European Council 2007, p. 1). International organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have monitored great swathes of the world map for fragility—the detection rate has been high: almost 1.5 billion people live in the forty to sixty states affected by fragility, violence or conflict (World Bank 2011, p. 50).[5]

I:I:II International statebuilding as a treatment for fragile states

Lemay-Hébert notes that 'the mental conception interveners have of the concept of state collapse will impact on the actual intervention and the means deemed necessary by the international community to address statebuilding challenges'

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[4] Even earlier in 1995, Boutros-Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary-General defined state collapse as the 'collapse of state institutions' (Lemay-Hébert 2009).

[5] For example see, Fund for Peace's 'Failed State Index' http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/

(Lemay-Hébert, p. 11). If state fragility has been diagnosed as a volcanic source of under-development and global risk due to weaknesses in the formal state institutions, the treatment prescribed has been internationally-led statebuilding.[6]

Now considered an 'imperative' (Wesley 2008, p. 369), internationally-led statebuilding has become a policy marked by its vast scope and complexity. Increasingly, external actors have been assuming to varying degrees a hands-on role in the institutional development of target states, from the post-conflict societies of the Balkans to the developing nations of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Domestic institutions have been increasingly shaped and re-casted by international and regional organisations, individual donors, or transnational NGOs. These actors rarely operate alone but instead, depend upon a complex chain of delegation and co-option so that these principal actors are assisted by numerous partners (Mac Ginty 2011). As Chandler and Sisk note 'statebuilding historically was for most part quite endogenous' but now 'in engaging to build states through military deployments, civilian capacity building, and development aid flows, international actors have changed the nature of contemporary statebuilding' (2013, p. xxii).

To facilitate this profound shift in the involvement of international actors, world politics has witnessed a novel form of global governance architecture pivoting around a reformulation of the concept of sovereignty. Stephen Krasner, for one, has argued that sovereignty not only comprises political and legal components but also 'domestic sovereignty' defined as, 'the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to

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[6] Institutions can be defined as "regularised patterns of interaction that are known, practised and regularly accepted (if not necessarily normatively approved) by given social agents who, by virtue of those characteristics, expect to continue interacting under the rules and norms formally or informally embodied in those patterns" (O'Donnell 1996, p. 5) In short, they are 'rules of the game' (North et al. 2009, p. 11). State institutions are those that pertain to the state.

exercise effective control within the borders of their own polity' (Krasner 1999, p. 4). This reworking of the concept has facilitated external intervention into societies as intervention no longer violate a state's sovereignty but, through statebuilding, could be considered to contribute to domestic sovereignty in the sense of state capacity.[7]

Moreover, international institutions have been afforded a new role to engage in long-term partnerships with fragile states. Even as early as 1992, the United Nation's Agenda for Peace had clearly established the UN's role in statebuilding: 'There is a new requirement for technical assistance which the United Nations has an obligation to develop and provide when requested: support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the strengthening of new democratic institutions' (Mac Ginty 2011, p. 37). The importance of international statebuilding has found expression in new organisational forms, such as the British Government's 'Stabilisation Unit'. The rise of a cadre officials and development experts who jump from one statebuilding location to the next has prompted some observers to imply the rise of an international statebuilding industry (Wesley 2008).

I:I:III The model of international statebuilding

More than two decades of contemporary internationally-led statebuilding practice has revealed the policy's complexity, one which encapsulates a myriad of actions and actors. The specific form of intervention and actors involved can vary depending on the overall objective—whether external actors prioritise promoting local peace and human security, or improving economic development and

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[7] The UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI), for example, has suggested that closing 'the gap between *de jure* sovereignty and *de facto* sovereignty is the key obstacle to ensuring global security and prosperity' and that external actors can legitimately intervene to help 'the goal of enhancing the sovereignty of states – that is, enhancing the capacity of these states to perform the functions that define them as states' (Overseas Development Institute 2005, p. 4).

governance, or ensuring global security (Cammack 2006; Woodward 2009). Statebuilding that aims at promoting local peace may focus on practices such as post-conflict institution building or demobilisation, and privilege actors such as peacekeepers, humanitarian workers and refugee agencies. If global security is the overall aim, as it is in Afghanistan and Iraq, then actors such as the UN Security Council, diplomats, defence actors, arms specialists are more likely to focus on institutions such as border management, the police or army. Improving institutional capacity and governance, *the aspect of statebuilding that is the focus of this research*, may involve a range of actors, such as donor agencies, NGOs, economic analysts or development experts, with a focus on different institutions, from central bureaucracies to municipal elections.

Despite a difference in which actions and actors come to the fore, internationally-led statebuilding has been generally underscored by a consistent framework of action.[8] One in-depth survey of developed countries' position papers on fragile states revealed 'a remarkable similarity among their conceptions of the state and priorities for addressing state failure' (Wesley 2008, p. 373). This framework is comprised of three basic pillars.

Unsurprisingly, the first pillar is the belief in the absolute primacy of formal state institutions to structure political order, an emphasis on effective institutions which explains why the statebuilding model is often referred to as the 'neo-Weberian' or 'institutional model' (Lemay-Hébert 2009, p. 23). The second element of the model prescribes that these institutions will be of a liberal democratic character. Consequently, the central ingredients of a liberal-democratic order – notably the rule of law, democracy and accountability, human

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[8] In the literature, this model is also referred to as the 'Western', 'OECD', 'liberal democratic' or 'rational-legal' model.

rights and a free market economy – structure the strategic aims of intervention (Wesley 2008).

The third pillar of the model is that governance arrangements in the domestic settings of international statebuilders often inspire reforms in target states. While internationally-led statebuilding often involves the input of local partners and so is not generally about the *direct transfer* of institutions (i.e 'copying and pasting'), it remains rather common that the domestic arrangements of statebuilders serve as the core reference point for reform. For example, the development of Kosovo's local government system has drawn upon the domestic experience of the Norwegian donors assisting in the reform.

Section II: Research question and approach

I:II:I Research question

This research is interested in those instances when international actors, along with local partners, attempt to create or renovate institutions of governance so that they 'have a grip' on the society in which they operate. Studies have shown that establishing functioning institutions has proven to be extremely difficult, especially in areas of acute instability. Renewed violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, continued instability in the Balkans, new epidemics in Africa and entrenched volatility in Asia, has shown that statebuilding according to the standard model has been mostly inadequate to solve the challenges posed by fragility.

This stark reality has seen the international statebuilding literature come to a point where many scholars are questioning whether there is any point to it all. Indeed an important strand of thinking, possibly the dominant strand of thinking, has declared internationally-led statebuilding to be *futile* in the sense that statebuilding does not do what it is supposed to do—that the formal institutions

implanted by international statebuilders seldom end up structuring political order in target societies.

Reflecting this 'futility thesis', Belloni points out that, though under statebuilding progress may be projected through various reports and evaluations, governance structures generally emerge that are 'only superficially democratic, effective and accountable and are perceived illegitimate, constraining and unsuccessful by those experiencing them' (Belloni 2012, p. 1). According to these scholars, the dominant outcome is that state institutions 'tend to adopt a 'western' form under the influence of internationalised norms, but keep functioning according to other social logics' (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, p. 115). In Tajikistan, for example, John Heathershaw has shown that community-based organisations 'successfully built' by the international community worked in reality according to informal patterns of power wielded by traditional authorities (Heathershaw 2008). And so, 'what evolves often has the appearance of democracy because local elites are able to easily hoodwink gullible international observers by applying the nomenclature and physical facades of the new. But behind such facades persist the very ways such reformation is designed to eliminate' (Roberts, p. 95). Indeed, 'trying to replace or outlaw informal practices... is a Sisyphean, and ultimately pointless and wasteful task' (Roberts, p. 102).

The major problem with the futility thesis is that it has not been furnished with systematic evidence. Indeed, reading such scholars one could be convinced that internationally-led statebuilding is entirely bankrupt. Such sweeping, perhaps speculative, conclusions conceal variations in the extent to which statebuilders' institutions have defined political behaviour, variations that can manifest across

sectors, geographical regions or levels of government, whether this be police reform in Sierra Leone (Albrecht 2010), customs management in Kosovo (Skendaj 2011), or democratic governance in the municipality of Brčko in Bosnia (Bieber 2005). In these instances, formal institutions structure what kind of governance occurs, which suggests that just as it was myopically assumed that external actors could engineer political orders, it is equally presumptuous that *all* statebuilding is ineffective, everywhere.

Moreover, there is no *a priori* reason why statebuilding should be entirely futile. Clearly the transfer of exact institutional copies, for example bringing Swedish models of local government decision making to South Sudan, may not be possible, nor desirable, because differences in world views and norms are intrinsic to the human experience and each society, therefore, has its own way of interpreting human behaviour and shaping rules. The idea, however, that societies are too different as to be inherently unreceptive to institutions from other societies flies in the face of much of history: societies have always learned from each other and transnational factors have consistently played a role in the domestic developments. Indeed, the movement of institutional forms across political boundaries is relatively uncontroversial as it has been going on since the beginning of political history, within ancient empires and between princely states. Imitation may even be more natural than we think. Fukuyama has shown that similar solutions have been arrived at by societies with no contact with one another. Early agrarian societies from China and the Middle East to Europe and India all developed centralised monarchies and increasingly bureaucratised forms of government without ever encountering one another (Fukuyama 2011). Despite

natural differences, individual polities have never been islands set apart; a broad imitation of institutional forms has marked global political history.

Statebuilding is not going away from international politics any time soon. The futility thesis has emerged as an antithesis to those whom assumed the effectiveness of statebuilding. However, the main argument of this antithesis that statebuilding is preordained to fail is unconvincing. Indeed, the futility thesis is proclaimed without reference to systematic evidence or any clear understanding of what futile precisely means and how it can be discerned. There is surely a more plausible and accurate path to be forged that overcomes these two polar opposite conceptions of statebuilding's effectiveness. Indeed for those interested in eradicating sources of global risk, some form of statebuilding may be the best policy we have—it just needs to be thought about differently and, perhaps radically, altered in practice.

Cases of success demonstrate that we need better empirical evidence to demonstrate whether statebuilding is futile or not. This dissertation will move the debate by providing systematic evidence to empirically test the claims advanced by the literature. The first element of the research question is then: *is internationally-led statebuilding futile?* We need to know not just whether international statebuilding *is* futile but *why* it is and *why it is not*. What mechanisms and theories can account for cases of futility or non-futility? The real-world significance of such a puzzle is hopefully self-evident, an importance heightened by the simple fact that we do not have good empirical or theoretical answers to the question.

I:II:II Research approach

Two different research paradigms dominate approaches to statebuilding. The first, the so-called 'orthodox' school (Heathershaw 2013, p. 275), is rooted in a positivist tradition and mostly found in the United States; the second is represented by a more critical group of scholars (Mac Ginty 2011; Chandler 2010; Heathershaw 2008). This section will show that while I am inspired by many elements of the critical school, especially its emphasis on new ways to conceptualise statebuilding, strict adherence to either school brings about its own limitations. A balanced approach is necessary: while this research emphasises the critical school's call for clearer and more imaginative ways to understand statebuilding, it also holds that problem-solving is an important goal of academic inquiry.

As a starting to point this research tries to avoid two basic limitations of the 'orthodox' statebuilding school. The first is that this school's research takes place within a framework of understanding that is highly circumscribed. Statebuilding is generally conceived of as a contained and highly rational exercise in which statebuilders *do* things and there is an outcome. Explanations for success and failure of statebuilding can be located in the *doing* of the statebuilders. Consequently we have, for example, the "RAND management" school of statebuilding (Stewart, Knaus 2011, p. xvii) concluding that the greater the expenditure and effort of the international community the more effective it will be (Dobbins 2005, 2007); or the "liberal imperialist school" suggesting that it is the supply of authority that matters (Cooper 2003).

The point is that this approach is self-referential: there is a tendency to confuse what statebuilders *do* with what actually *occurs*. This viewpoint encourages the cognitive bias that statebuilding is self-contained and takes place

within a vacuum, a realm independent of the society in which statebuilders intervene. Such a view is no longer tenable as researchers have convincingly pointed out how statebuilding is always shaped by and is affected by the society in which it takes place (Lemay-Hébert 2009; Mac Ginty 2011).[9] All technical fixes are somehow political as they intervene into a domestic values system (Woodward 2009), galvanise social logics (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010) and distribute power between different groups in society (Berdal, Zaum 2013a). This research aims to expand the analytical scope by bringing society firmly back into the analysis. New conceptual apparatus are necessary to understand what goes on in statebuilding, apparatus that will be developed during the dissertation.[10]

The second limitation to be avoided is the idea that the orthodox school has neglected to challenge the intellectual foundations of the statebuilding model. So, while scholars have, admittedly, turned their attention to the errors of statebuilding practice, especially the organisational weakness of international missions (Caplan 2005), there is still a working assumption that the basic framework is sound. Tellingly, the most recent scholarship in the orthodox school is not about challenging the framework *per se* but revolves around discussions on the dilemmas or trade-offs of statebuilding, such as whether democracy should be introduced before administrative structures (Paris, Sisk 2009). Policy has also

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[9] This research adheres loosely to the basic positivist assumption that beyond human consciousness there is an objective reality and that the aim of positivist research is to get a most accurate picture of this reality (Sandberg 2005). However, in line with many post-positivists, I am rather sceptical of many elements of positivism—or at least, believe that many of the assumptions cannot be taken for granted. Instead of positivism's strict objectivist epistemology, which assumes that researchers can discover objective truth, I would rather side with the post-positivist view that reality is only imperfectly apprehendable and as researchers we can make probable conclusions about facts and laws (Lincoln, Guba 1994).

[10] Some critical scholars working in an interpretivist tradition have argued that there is, in effect, no such thing as external agency. Subject (statebuilders) and objects (society, politics) are not distinct but are intertwined, each affecting to the extent that there can be no cause and effect relationship (Heathershaw 2013). I do not quite adhere to the idea that there is no bifurcation between subject and object in these places. Rather I take from these perspectives that researchers should pay particular attention about the nature of external agency in statebuilding and especially how statebuilders themselves are embedded and shaped by the society in which they intervene.

generally remained unchanged over the last two decades. Hout's recent review of the EU's engagement with fragile states, for example, concludes that EU action plans are still focused on the ostensibly technocratic task of reconstructing state capacity according to a standard model; in doing so, 'the failure to address the fundamental problems underlying state fragility raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the EU's policy on fragile states' (Hout, p. 372).[11]

Meanwhile, critical scholars have hammered the model and proclaimed its redundancy. Some have suggested that statebuilding represents a form of Western narcissism (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010), a self-referential activity devoid of legitimacy (Ignatieff 2003) or that the model merely fosters incongruous 'phantom states' within the international system (Chandler 2010). Others have drawn attention to the fallacy that the violent historical process of statebuilding in the West can be distilled into a truncated, sanitised and concise technical plan of action for fragile states (Wesley 2008).

During this research, I do not take the view that statebuilding is self-evidently desirable; in fact, it is clear that the statebuilding model needs to be thought about differently. But this research also views the critical school's denigration of the statebuilding model as excessive; instead the continued intellectual relevance of the statebuilding model is an *empirical* question and the degree to which it should be altered, challenged or cast aside should be firmly rooted in the evidence available. Hence, as will be discussed in the next section, the research starts by evaluating statebuilding on its own terms: does statebuilding

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[11] Changes to international statebuilding practice have not come forth despite requests, articulated through an official g7+ fora, from some of those countries subject to statebuilding for international donors to modify engagement. These requests, have thus far 'stimulated relatively limited change in international engagement at that country level' (OECD / OCDE 2011, p. 1). There is seemingly a high degree of recalcitrance to change amongst practitioners. As two seasoned onlookers have noted: 'with its elaborate theory, intricate rituals, astonishing sacrifices and expenditure... can often resemble the religion of Aztecs' (Stewart, Knaus 2010, p. xxvi).

do what it is says it will do? Taking up this question presents an immediate and core methodological challenge: how to build a conceptual apparatus that links this theoretical puzzle to an empirical reality, a challenge that the next section takes forward.

Section III: Conceptualising the research question

This dissertation engages with this theoretical statement about the lack of effectiveness of statebuilding and the starting point is one of scepticism towards the futility thesis. The reason for the scepticism is both empirical and conceptual because the futility thesis is proclaimed without reference to systematic evidence. One of the main reasons for this is that there is very little clear understanding of how to conceptualise and measure effectiveness/ futility in these kinds of settings. At stake, then, is not only the empirical question of whether and why or not statebuilding is futile or effective, but also the way in which we conceptualise this question.

At the moment, it is important to judge statebuilding on its own terms. This section will offer a constructive path to more accurately thinking about effectiveness in settings of statebuilding. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that the trust test of futility is located at the point of *internalisation*. Second, I contend that statebuilding is not just about building formal institutions; it is actually mostly about eliminating pre-existing, informal frameworks of governance rooted in society; *effectiveness* is therefore the degree to which the formal institutions shape political behaviour relative to their informal alternatives.

I:III:I Conceptualising statebuilding

Internationally-led statebuilding has been defined as a set of actions undertaken by national and international actors to establish or reconstruct effective and

autonomous state institutions where these have been seriously eroded or are missing (Caplan 2005). Institutions are the 'rules of the game'—that is, the patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationship of individuals (North et al. 2009, p. 15). A set of institutions combine to form a 'governance model' that frames the behaviour of actors in a given field of politics, whether it be a specific policy field or the relations between different levels and branches of government.

Descriptively we know what statebuilding is—but analytically these statebuilding has not really been placed in a framework from which we can more effectively interrogate the phenomena. Statebuilding is often inadvertently considered as a kind of static transaction, a one-shot moment of 'establishing, reforming, and strengthening', but it should rather be thought of as a *process* comprised of three different stages. First, there is the *adoption* aspect when a governance model is formally inscribed into the law of the society subject to statebuilding; second, the *implementation* aspect when, if they are necessary, resources and personnel are dedicated towards building up the material foundations of the model (e.g physical infrastructure, new organisational forms, training); and finally, the *internalisation* aspect, whereby the governance model is 'taken up' by society—that is it matters for political behaviour, it has a grip on the functioning logic of society.

Consider a particular model for democratic elections brought in by statebuilders. Novel electoral rules, in relation to transparency or candidature for instance, are placed on a statute book, the implementation of which may require the creation of a new organisation, such an electoral monitoring commission, training for government officials, or resources for physical infrastructure, like

computers or ballot boxes. While the adoption and implementation of a model may represent highly visible aspects of statebuilding, internalisation is the crucial stage at which point the model is (or at least should be) embedded in society—in this case, the degree to which elections actually function according to the rules of the model.

Mapping these different dimensions of statebuilding does not imply an orderly procession from one stage to the next as elements of implementation may precede formal adoption, for example. Nonetheless, the point of mapping statebuilding is that it clarifies the different dimensions of the process. Most importantly it clarifies that there is an important point of *disjuncture*: the first two stages are what statebuilders *do* (the supply of statebuilding rules, resources and organisational forms); yet, internalisation is dependent on how society reacts to the efforts of international statebuilders.

No statebuilding effort aims merely to change the rules and provide some resources to support the execution of the rules. The explicit aim is internalisation: for these institutions to be taken up by society and therefore have sustainable effect on political behaviour.[12] The reasons for this are quite clear: sustainable institutions are the most robust insurance against relapse into state failure and also a kind of guarantee that investments made by international statebuilders are not all in vain. If internalisation is the *raison d'etre of statebuilding,* then it is here that the true test of effectiveness or futility must be located.

I:III:II Internalisation as the dependent variable

Common approaches to assessing the effectiveness of institutional transfer seldom consider whether the institutions -under-development are internalised. If political

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[12] Thus, Fukuyama thus defines statebuilding as 'the creation of new economic or political institutions that will be self-sustaining after the withdrawal of the international community' (Fukuyama 2004, p. 229).

development implies the crossing of some sort of threshold in which societies gain some political qualities that they had previously lacked, many political scientists see this threshold at the *adoption* level—that is when, for example a new rule has been adopted on the statute book or when the internal rules of bureaucracy change. This level analysis is about the *form*: political development occurs when the outward form of formal institutions change. Global indicators from the Bertlesmann Stiftung or Nations in Transit, for example, invariably track political progress by focusing on the form of a wide range of governance institutions. Powerful actors, such as the European Commission also understand political development in terms of development in outward form as evidence in their annual 'progress reports.' Of course, focusing on this level is somewhat understandable as it is the most unproblematic level from which data can easily be produced allowing for cross-national comparisons.

Yet, many wise scholars remind us form should not be confused how governance models actually *function* (Pritchett et al. 2010). Assessing political development through scrutinising the formal changes presents problems. First, there is the possibility of 'isomorphic mimicry': the adoption of the forms of other functional states and organisations which camouflages a persistent lack of function (Pritchett et al. 2010, p. 1). From this perspective, formal changes are merely a facade and have very little impact on how politics actually functions because the governance models are simply not applied, enforced nor influence actor's behaviour. Students of Europeanisation, for example, have shown that while the EU has induced impressive reforms on paper in central and eastern Europe 'developments on the ground are modest to nil' (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, p. 22). Such 'isomorphic mimicry' has shown also to be present in across many

developing states which 'tend to adopt a 'western' form under the influence of internationalised norms, but keep functioning according to other social logics' (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, p. 115).

The point is that changes in *form* do not necessarily mean changes in how politics *functions*—by implication, restricting analysis to this level is likely to be misleading and possibly spurious. Likewise, practitioner reports may focus on the implementation level but invariably these assess the kind of inputs or outputs involved. In this vein, reports on local government reform may assess effectiveness by looking at the number of municipal staff trained or new computers installed, and then evaluate progress in terms of how many building permits have been issued or how satisfied people are with services (e.g see (MLGA 2011). Such an approach reveals then operational efficiency but it is silent on the issue of internalisation and reveals very little about whether the formal rules of statebuilding actually shape municipal governance. As a first step then, any test of futility or effectiveness must be located at the level of internalisation: do the formal rules matter for actual political behaviour?

I:III:III How to conceptualise internalisation?

Measuring internalisation is very difficult as it requires an analytical apparatus that is able to drill deep. This is where political science theory, specifically the literature on informal institutions, can guide us.

Internalisation means that the formal institutions 'have a grip' on the society in which they have been installed and so our understanding of internalisation must be rooted in an analysis of social dynamics. Excluding society from any analysis implicitly privileges external agency. Indeed, recent scholarship has argued that statebuilding is not done to passive recipients but confronted by

informal structures that operate according to different logics (Mac Ginty 2010,

p. 10). This new conventional wisdom amongst statebuilding scholars that society

should be at the forefront of any analysis chimes with my own view that

understanding internalisation requires extending the analytical scope to include

society, but how can we conceptualise society so that it can be effectively

analysed? [13]

The concept of informal institutions helps us bring society into the

analysis. Analytically, the key point is that there is no clean slate or empty

canvass upon which statebuilding occurs; rather it hits pre-existing structures that

can be broadly understood as *informal institutions*. The core distinction between

formal and informal revolves around the fact that informal institutions 'are

created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels'

(Helmke, Levitsky 2004, p. 725). The notion that informal forms of governance

are a natural and inevitable part of any system has become increasingly influential

in mainstream political science. Helmke and Levitsky have reminded us that

'careful attention to informal institutions is critical to understanding the incentives

that enable and constrain political behaviour. Political actors respond to a mix of

formal and informal incentives, and in some instances, informal incentives trump

the formal ones' (Helmke, Levitsky 2004, p.726). [14]

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[13] Often society is referred to as 'context' in policy circles. Zaum, for example, highlights how the 2011 World Bank Development Report has recognised the importance of local context (Zaum 2012), and likewise, a 2011 OECD/DAC policy brief calls for an in-depth analysis of context to understand how it is shaping the incentives and interests of local actors, and the opportunities for statebuilding (OECD 2011)

[14] Informal institutions are not the same as informal organisations or behavioural regularities. Helmke and Levitsky also make the point that not all non-formal behaviour can be considered an informal institution because institution implies a rule that can be enforced. Formal institutional weakness does not necessarily imply the presence of informal institutions. It may be that no stable or binding rules—formal or informal—exist (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) Perceived abuse of executive power then is not an informal institution but best understood as non-institutional behaviour taking place in the context of weak institutions; something like clientelism though can be understood as an institution because it is enforced and thus exhibits a law-like presence (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

Informal institutions matter because they represent an alternative and separate source of political behaviour and therefore may continue to persist irrespective of efforts to implement formal state structures. Formal institutions are created and guaranteed by state agencies and their disapproval is sanctioned by that state; informal institutions may be equally recognisable publicly, but they are not laid down in writing, and are enforced through social mechanisms. Whilst the nature of formal institutions can be shaped and changed by actors with rule-making authority, this is not the case with informal institutions, as these do not possess a centre which directs and co-ordinates their actions; rather they are based upon a societal form of auto-licensing (that is, self-enactment and subsequent self-assertion) (Lauth 2000, p. 24).

Informal institutions are not always in tension with the aims of the formal institutions—they can both compete with or support formal institutions—but they inevitably confront and represent alternatives to the governance models of internationally-led statebuilding. *Every formal governance model therefore is—or has at least the potential to be—shadowed by an informal alternative*. Patronage is the informal alternative to merit-based systems, clan-based authority to democratic authority, and traditional rules to an alternative to the legal system.

Internalisation is therefore a relative concept: the extent to which a formal model of governance has a grip on the functioning logic of society is *relative* to the extent which the alternative informal institution shapes and constrains behaviour. One could go even further: the fundamental flaw of the literature is the idea that statebuilding is about building formal institutions; it is actually mostly about eliminating pre-existing, informal frameworks of governance that defy

formalisation and are rooted in society. *Full internalisation* would mean the absence of countervailing informal institutions. The analytical implication is clear: any test of internalisation must include an assessment of the extent to which the informal alternative to a particular model is present and influencing political behaviour.

Chapter conclusion

This chapter has aimed to put the dissertation on a clear intellectual footing by building on insights from the huge wealth of knowledge literature to present a coherent rationale for the research question and to explain the core building blocks upon which this research is based. It ended with a discussion of a conceptual apparatus that links the theoretical question with the empirical reality. Indeed, the main contribution of this chapter is conceptual: it has presented a rather novel way of understanding effectiveness from the perspective of the statebuilding model. It has argued that the effectiveness or futility of internationally-led statebuilding is only meaningful when it is located at the level of internalisation. From this, it has argued that statebuilding is not just about building formal institutions; it is actually mostly about eliminating pre-existing, informal frameworks of governance rooted in society. Internalisation is the therefore the degree to which the formal institutions shape political behaviour relative to their informal alternatives.

This offers a new yardstick for understanding statebuilding, an approach that represents a departure from many mainstream methods that follow a deficit-based approaches and 'turn a blind eye' to informal institutions. This deficit-based approach is about constructing a yardstick for the optimal form of governance and assessing how far countries fall short from that ideal. Freedom House's 'Nations

in Transit' report uses this approach (Freedom House 2013). While these reports cover a wide-range of areas, from media to corruption, and allow for cross-national comparisons, they are analytically incomplete as they do not reveal anything about the countervailing informal institutions, and consequently, we only get a partial view of the governance picture. The next chapter moves beyond the theoretical framework to offer concrete steps for a research design which most effectively sheds light on the research question.

Chapter II: Research Design

Futility in the context of statebuilding means that the formal model of governance intended to be implemented by statebuilders has less actual influence on political behaviour than its informal alternative. This section moves beyond this theoretical framework to offer concrete steps about a research design which most effectively sheds light on the question: is internationally led-statebuilding futile? If so, why?

The research design is detailed in a way in which the analytical level drops each time: from the case study, cases then unit of analysis, to concepts and concrete phenomena. The chapter starts with an explanation of why Kosovo has been chosen as the case study, and in turn why Kosovo's municipalities represent the cases. From the case study, we move to the unit of analysis, the specific phenomenon under study. This research focuses on one dimension of the 'governance map' that is central to the plans of international statebuilders: the governance model that frames how resources are distributed from state to society at the municipal level. Section II describes and explains why this unit of analysis has been chosen. Section III operationalises the abstract concepts to give precise analytical meaning to the two alternative governance models—a statebuilding model and clientelist model—that underpin the research.

Section I: Background on Kosovo as a case study

Kosovo is one of Europe's smallest places. Nestled in south-eastern Europe, its 10,908 sq.km are made up of plains and valleys, which are surrounded by dramatic mountain ranges bestriding its borders. Kosovo is bordered in the southwest by Albanian, in the south by Macedonia, in the east and north by

Serbia, and in the northwest by Montenegro. A 2015 estimate states that the total

population is 1,870,981 with around 92 percent of that number identifying as

Albanian. Around 5-6 percent of the population consists of the Serb minority that

are mostly concentrated north of the Ibar river adjacent to the Kosovo-Serbian

border, but some also reside in small areas in southern Kosovo (see map). The

remainder of the population is comprised of the Roma, Bosniaks, Turks, and

Gorani minorities.

Figure 1: Map of Kosovo
Source: International Crisis Group 2008

II:I:I An overview of Kosovo's recent history

This section will provide a very basic overview of Kosovo's recent history

focusing mostly on the antagonisms between the Serb and Albanian community

from the end of the 19th century onwards. This draws on the many pieces of work that give a much more comprehensive view of Kosovo's history.[15]

KOSOVO UP UNTIL 1999

Finding itself on the frontier land between large empires, Kosovo has historically been ruled over by different powers, notably by Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Celts, Slavs and latterly, the Ottoman Turks—the latter's domination began in 1389 and lasted over 500 years (Reineck 1993). But, since the waning of Ottoman power in Kosovo from 1877 onwards, both Albanians and Serbs have made increasingly vehement claims to the land. For Serbs, the land of Kosovo is the cradle of Serbian civilisation, the centre of their short-lived medieval kingdom, and the site of a unique covenant between their Serbs' ancestors and God, forged in the Serbian defeat at the hands of the Turks in 1389 in a field close to modern-day Pristina (Malcolm 1998). Many medieval monasteries and monuments central to the Serbian identity are located in Kosovo.

For Albanians, the claim to Kosovo is made on the basis of simply being there first, long before the Slav invasions of the Balkan Peninsula in the sixth century. Albanians also claim to be far more numerous in Kosovo than the Serbs or any other nationality in recent times (King, Mason 2006). These contradicting claims have served as source of underlying hostility between the two groups, fuelling both a sense of victimhood but also nationalism and often violence.

The first Albanian nationalist body, the League of Prizren, emerged in 1897 and demanded autonomy within the Ottoman Empire. But while Albania became a state in 1912, Albanians in Kosovo were left out of the new territory and later became part of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the

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[15] For an overview of Kosovo's and Yugoslavia's history see, for example, Malcolm 1998; Vickers 1998; Judah 2008; Ramet 2002

precursor to Yugoslavia). This was in part a result of Serbia's successful lobbying of the Great Powers that it needed the land of Kosovo to recover from the enormous trauma it had suffered during the war (King, Mason 2006). In 1921, Albanians in Kosovo submitted a 72-page petition to the League of Nations begging to be part of the new Albanian state (King, Mason 2006).

In the lead up to World War II, mutual mistrust characterised the relationship between Kosovan Albanians and the early Yugoslav state, during which much of the Albanian population were reluctant to participate in elections, while others openly rebelled—and many fell victim to state violence. After the war, the Yugoslav Communists (LCY) distrusted the Albanians because of 'the low numbers who had joined the Party, their reluctance to be re-incorporated into Yugoslavia and, in view of the break between Tito and his former protégé, Albanian president Enver Hoxha, their potential as 'fifth columnists'' (Clark 2000, p. 12). Albanians in Kosovo distrusted the state because it had generally been a source of repression rather than relief—Alexander Rankovic, the Yugoslav Minister of Interior was particularly despised.

Tito's first visit to Kosovo for sixteen years in the spring of 1967, however, seemed to usher in a new era, and during the period 1968-81, Kosovan Albanians began to thrive within formal state structures. For the first time, the majority of members of the LCY in Kosovo were Albanians, the provisional Kosovan government gained more autonomy and Albanian became an official language and a language for instruction in secondary schools (Malcolm 1998). In 1974, a new constitution gave the province of Kosovo (along with Vojvodina) equal rights and responsibilities equal to those of a republic including a veto within the presidency—except, crucially, the right to secession. For Kosovan

Albanian elites, this was an 'era of political emancipation', with a new echelon of state and party officials emerging but also policeman, university lecturers and teachers (Clark 2000, p. 39).

But this 'golden period' proved to be short-lived. Despite receiving much greater economic development aid than other poor parts of Yugoslavia, Kosovo's unemployment rate was always the highest in the country (King, Mason 2006). Protests in 1981, instigated by Kosovan Albanian students frustrated by the slow pace of economic development and poor conditions at the University of Pristina, spread across the country triggering a backlash from the Serbian police as martial law was imposed and 1,700 Albanians were arrested. At the same time, Kosovan Serbs increasingly objected to what they saw as discrimination in employment, petty harassment and outright attacks by Albanians (King, Mason 2006).

The protests marked a watershed as co-existence 'gave way to a new round of accusations and counter-accusations between the two groups' (Malcolm 1998, p. 337). On April 24th, 1987 an LCY apparatchik, Slobodan Milosevic was due to address a meeting in the House of Culture in Kosovo Polje when Serb protestors began hurling stones at the predominantly Albanian police. When the police responded by beating the Serb protestors, Milosevic stormed into the middle of the melee and shouted to the crowd: 'No one shall dare beat you!' This statement, repeatedly shown on Serbian television, opened the floodgates for a more virulent form of Serbian nationalism that would once again push the Kosovo Albanian community away from state structures (Clark 2000).

By the end of the 1980s, Kosovo's autonomy had been virtually extinguished as political decision-making switched to the Serbian assembly in Belgrade, wherein measures were decreed which aimed essentially at

strengthening the position of Serbs at the expense of Albanians. In March 1990, the 'Programme for the Realization of Peace and Prosperity in Kosovo' established a series new policies and laws which essentially turned the bureaucratic screw on the Kosovo Albanian population (Malcolm 1998).[16] Police harassment, a common feature of the 1980s, turned nastier, with police allowed to intern Albanians for a three day period.

This favouritism was a precursor to direct discrimination as soon enough a new labour law made possible the expulsion of more than 80,000 Albanians from their jobs (Malcolm 1998, p. 347). By the early 90s, the government had sacked the overwhelming majority of those Albanians who had any form of state employment (Malcolm 1998, p. 349). Albanian teachers were allowed to continue to take classes in the school buildings, but strict physical segregation was introduced—and they taught without pay. Kosovan Albanian boycotts of elections organised by Belgrade occurred from 1990 onwards. State driven 'Serbianisation' continued: the Serbian language was imposed, while most Albanian-language publications and cultural institutions were shattered.[17]

During the 1990s in Kosovo, Albanians and Serbs therefore inhabited parallel worlds (King, Mason 2006). The disintegration of the Kosovan-Albanian relationship with the Yugoslav state created a vacuum and a new political regime emerged for Kosovan Albanians, led by Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) party. This political regime amounted to a parallel state: it had a formal constitutional structure to which its people owed allegiance and paid taxes, and a clear political goal to deny systematically the legitimacy of

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[16] Measures included concentrating investment in Serb-majority areas, building new houses for Serbs who returned to Kosovo and creating new municipalities for Serbs.
[17] Notably, the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Albanian-language newspaper *Rilindja* were shut down.

Serbian rule while creating 'at least the outlines of a Kosovo Republic' (Malcolm 1998, p. 348). In addition, there was a crucial problem-solving dimension to this parallel state, with structures set up to manage daily challenges and to distribute resources (Clark 2000). Health and education systems were built from nothing. Empty houses, warehouses, garages, basements and mosques served as makeshift high schools. Most of the funds for education were raised inside Kosovo by system of voluntary and improvised form of taxation. Informal social networks were also crucial for the parallel health system operated by the Mother Theresa Association.

But after the Dayton Peace Conference in 1995, which did little address the concerns of Kosovan Albanians, support for the LDK's peaceful resistance began to recede. By 1997, the momentum began to swing towards more violent methods of resistance, especially after the emergence of the Kosovan Liberation Army (KLA), a paramilitary force dedicated to securing independence through violent means. Attacks by the KLA on Serb targets throughout Kosovo had by 1998 drawn a heavy response by the Yugoslav army, which shelled many villages and towns. The cycle of violence led to civilians being driven from their homes. By august 1998, UNHCR estimates that there were 260,000 displaced people in Kosovo and another 200,000 outside it (King, Mason 2006).

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE AND STATEBUILDING

Increasing violence and displacement provoked an international response. In October 1998, after NATO had voted to authorise airstrikes against Serbia if security forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo within 96 hours, Milosevic pulled back his security forces and also allowed a 2000-strong OSCE Kosovo

Verification Mission to enter the country. Still, skirmishes continued, and concerned about further KLA gains into the country, the Yugoslav army had by 1999 re-deployed into Kosovo in even larger numbers (Judah 2008). Subsequent diplomatic talks with the Serbian government brokered by the Contact Group (an ad hoc group comprised of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US) broke down, despite the threat of NATO airstrikes. The NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, began in March 1999 and lasted for seventy-eight days. By the end of the campaign and the withdrawal of Serbian security forces in June 1999, up to 800,000 Kosovan Albanians had been driven out of the province.

Meanwhile, the Serb population faced violent reprisals from returning Albanians and many fled Kosovo. The international community, fearing that the vacuum would cause chaos in the region, sought to establish some systems of governance as Serbia's administration of Kosovo was replaced by an UN-led administration. UN resolution 1244, while recognising Serbia's continued sovereignty over Kosovo, established the United Nation's Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to take over core administrative functions as well as to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government. The UN Security Council vested in UNMIK unprecedented authority over the territory and people of Kosovo, including overall legislative, executive and judiciary powers. Along with its partners—the EU, OSCE, NATO and the people of Kosovo—the UN commenced on a mission to create a functional, democratic society. Statebuilding by the international community had begun.

II:I:II Why Kosovo as a case study?
Since 1999 and up until the present day, a constellation of foreign powers in partnership with local actors have sought to engineer a governance framework that

encapsulates all the different facets of political life, from the rule of law to human rights to tax administration. Though Kosovo seems to have gone off the radar of Western newspapers and some foreign ministries, statebuilding efforts have steadfastly continued, even after Kosovo declared independence in 2008. External agency has been channelled through many different activities, from direct political oversight to the provision of public goods, which conform to the whole range of logics of influence: coercion, for example, via the executive authority of UNMIK, the International Civilian Office and EULEX; conditionality, notably through the Stabilisation and Association Process which attaches conditions to a membership perspective; and by socialisation through political dialogue and mentoring projects.

For scholars interested in the potential of external actors to instil institutions of governance in other societies, Kosovo represents a very attractive country to study because quite simply, the focus on statebuilding activities has been more intense than in comparable settings in the past two decades and perhaps even since the days of colonial 'protectorates.' Compared to both regional and post-conflict interventions, the focus of international intervention in Kosovo is much more heavily weighted towards governance. For example, in the past four years the amount of aid allocated towards governance as a proportion of all aid inflows into Kosovo has been between 60-80 percent; in the other countries of the region it has not reached above 20 percent and in other post-conflict situations it is around 40 percent. Yet, it is the scale of resources that has been startling: in 2009, for instance, the international community dedicated $345 per person on international statebuilding efforts in Kosovo, an amount that towers over the aid spent on statebuilding activities in those other, more high-profile efforts in

Afghanistan ($62 per capita) and Iraq ($41 per capita), and dwarfs that allocated

to other countries in the SEE region (after Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina receives

the second highest at $44).[18] The two graphs below demonstrate the comparative

intensity of statebuilding efforts in Kosovo over the last four years.

**Figure 2: Statebuilding aid per capita comparison with other post-conflict
countries**
*Source: authors own calculations based on OECD data set.

**Figure 3: Statebuilding aid per capita comparison with other SEE region
countries**

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[18] Author calculations OECD database http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/#; unfortunately data for Kosovo
only exists for 2009 onwards; statebuilding aid refers to those activities related to the building up
of governance structures (e.g via public administration development, democratisation, capacity
building etc).

As one of the main statebuilding projects of the international community, the empirical phenomena of interest—the emergence of governance structures under conditions of internationally-led statebuilding— can be viewed in *high definition.* Indeed, Kosovo showcases the whole spectrum of external activity, which may only be partly present in other cases, enabling a comprehensive analysis of all possible facets of the relations between external and local actors. As Kosovo represents the most vivid case possible, it remains of utmost importance for researchers interested in theoretical innovation, and the breadth and depth of external agency provides a wealth of data to support the fine-grained research method at the heart of the study.

It is not only the richest case from a research point of view: from a policy perspective, Kosovo represents *the crucial case.* In addition to the unprecedented scale of resources, many theories would suggest that it is the 'most likely' case for external actors to be able to induce sustainable formal institutions because many of the background conditions that have been cited as possibly hindering state-building missions are not as pronounced (Paris, Sisk 2009; Collier 2004; Caplan 2005). For example, the economic development of Kosovo exceeds that of other target societies (e.g. Timor-Leste and Afghanistan), the underlying political norms of the country are not sharply divergent from that of the external actors, and the level of conflict in the country is very low, with co-operation now emerging between the two hitherto warring groups.[19] Hence, if policies and interventions

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[19] Paris amongst others, argues that state building efforts are about the transfer of values and norms, but there seems to be problems when the underlying political traditions of the society in question is not in close proximity to those of the external actor (Paris, Sisk 2009). Other academics have noted that in poorer post settings it may be harder because poverty could intensify the "greed and grievance" dynamic (Collier 2004). The degree of conflict intensity has also been cited as a

are shown to be fruitless in Kosovo where existing theory suggests they are least likely to fail, then we can make quite reasonable generalisations that they may not work elsewhere.

Section II: Unit of analysis

As described in chapter one, statebuilding involves a myriad of actions and actors, and can vary on the overall objective—external actors may prioritise promoting local peace and human security, or improving economic development and governance, or ensuring global security (Cammack 2006; Woodward 2009). This research in interested in efforts to build-up governance. Such statebuilding occurs across many different dimensions: parliaments are reformed, tax systems reshaped, judicial systems overhauled, civil society groups strengthened, and so on. This section cuts through the complexity of statebuilding to identify the precise unit of analysis: the governance model that frames how resources are distributed from state to society at the municipal level.

II:II:I Governance model: resource distribution at the municipal level

In Kosovo, statebuilding by external actors has essentially covered all the aspects of the 'governance map'. Underlying all these different dimensions are formal institutions—that is some formal rules of the game that constrains individual behaviour (North 1991, p. 4). A set of institutions form a governance model. A governance model for higher education comprises rules relating to access, equity, syllabus, teachers etc. Hence, the term 'governance model' is used here because it helps analyse a set of institution together. The term governance model refers to what statebuilders aim to install in target societies—it does not refer to the set of institutions that frame how statebuilders themselves behave in these settings.

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possible cause of performance because the more intense the conflict, the more likely that either side has more opportunities to resist international efforts (Caplan 2005)

The research focuses on one dimension of governance in Kosovo that is central to the plans of international statebuilders: the governance model that frames how resources are distributed from state to society at the municipal level. This unit of analysis has two core aspects: a venue (the municipal level) and an action (the distribution of resources).

POST-1999 MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE IN KOSOVO

The municipal level has been chosen as the focus of the research because it is the primary empirical venue in which goods are distributed from state to society in Kosovo due to the fact that Kosovo is a decentralised state. At the point of international intervention in Kosovo, municipal governance was in a state of disarray.[20] Municipal governance, however, was re-established by the UNMIK administration, which assumed responsibility for Kosovo in the wake of war and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (King, Mason 2006). Reforming municipal government was an important assignment for the UNMIK administration, which sought to effect an early change on the ground with emphasis on transitioning away from the Yugoslav system of self-management, which tended to favour elites, towards a more liberal democratic system (Cocozzelli 2010, p. 141). A flurry of UNMIK regulations gave shape to the municipal governance system;[21] while local political structures, despite being active and influential, were subsumed under the authority of an UNMIK Municipal Administrator, then co-opted into 'Joint Interim Administrative Structures.' The first municipal elections were held in 2000.

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[20] Kosovo's municipalities are akin to counties or parishes in the sense of incorporating many small settlements or villages that are centralised around one larger town (Cocozzelli 2010).
[21] Regulation 2000/1, for instance, created both Municipal Administrative Boards and Municipal Councils, both of which were headed by UNMIK Municipal Administrators.

In October 2002, Michael Steiner, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and head of (UNMIK) announced a plan to further implement the spirit of the European Charter on Local Self-Government, a multinational legal instrument that defines the principles of local autonomy and aims to protects citizens' rights to participate effectively in the making of decisions which affect their everyday environment. The main objective was to provide a mechanism to allow communities, especially non-majority communities at municipal level, sufficient political control over the key public services (OSCE 2010). In April 2004, the UN Security Council issued a statement calling for 'more effective local government through the devolution of central non-reserved responsibilities to local authorities and communities in Kosovo.' The internationally-devised 'Ahtisaari proposal' of 2007, essentially a peace plan upon which Kosovo's post-independence constitution was subsequently based, intensified the development of municipal governance by instituting a far-reaching de-centralisation of administrative competence to the municipal level, including over primary and secondary education, health care, economic development, and urban or rural planning.

Core facets of people's lives have been—and continue to be— administered by, dealt with and delivered by municipalities: the central state shifts resources to municipalities but it is at the municipal level where 'who gets what and how' is decided. At the same time, society's relationship with the central state is rather distant, compounded by the lack of direct representation of citizens in the national parliament where members are elected by a nation-wide list system rather than representing a particular constituency. There are also very few political

organisations, such as trade unions or professional associations, that mediate between the individual and the central state.

MUNICIPAL GOODS

A multitude of goods is distributed by states. Licensing permits or subsidies may be distributed to businesses, or grants and tax-breaks to civil society organisations and religious groups. This research is interested in those goods that are distributed to people in their role as *ordinary citizens,* particularly those goods that are distributed directly from state institutions and are not mediated by a third party, such as in the case of education (mediated via teachers) or healthcare (doctors). The range of 'municipal goods'—from roads, small grants, sporting facilities, university scholarships, basic infrastructure, building permits, employment—is basically the same across all municipalities in Kosovo.

II:II:II: Rationale for unit of analysis

This research is interested in real-world distribution models at play at the municipal level and extent to which these may deviate from the state-building model. Later in the chapter it will be explained how deviance from statebuilding model is most effectively captured through comparison with the clientelist model, but for now the discussion turns to why this specific unit of analysis has been chosen.

Kosovan municipalities may not be the source of events that make international newspapers, but for the average citizen the way municipal resources are distributed matters: the unit is intrinsically important to the trajectories of lives and therefore demands scrutiny. In addition, outlined here will be further

empirical and methodological reasons why this unit of analysis is an important one.

There is simple empirical rationale for this unit of analysis: as statebuilding scholars have invariably studied the grand institutions of the central state (parliaments, judiciary, and armed forces), what happens at the municipal level has been often overlooked.[22] Indeed, though Kosovo has been somewhat of a favourite case for all sorts of scholars, from those interested in the political status of such territories (Ignatieff 2003; Zaum 2007) or the organizational dynamics and actions of the 'UN Transitional Administration' (Caplan 2005), there has been very little work on the type of governance structures that have actually emerged in decentralised Kosovo.

Such a subnational focus seems necessary as statebuilding is likely to be more uneven and complex than what is assumed by studies focusing on the national level. As Snyder points out, 'processes such as democratization and economic reform often have varied effects across territorially defined subunits of a political system' and so comparing subnational units, 'better equips us to handle the spatially uneven nature' of these processes (Snyder 2001, p. 93). Just as political processes are different in Kunduz than Kandahar or Erbil than Baghdad, it is common sense to assume similar variations in state-building have occurred in Kosovo. Moreover, the style of this research is 'bottom up' and studying municipalities allows access to compressed and bounded data, which is vital to a deep understanding of how the day-to-day operates, and the subtleties and intricacies that are involved in municipal politics, something that would not be easily assessed with broad brush evidence from the national level.

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[22] Exceptions include Pickering 2010; Holohan 2005; Cocozzelli 2010

In addition, what occurs in this unit of analysis can be clearly traced to a crucial aspect of the overall analysis: international agency. Local dynamics matter certainly, but the shadow of internationally-led statebuilding has loomed large in the municipalities of Kosovo, and though the precise effects of this agency will be discussed later in the dissertation, the important point at this stage is that it is evidently significant. Indeed, though it is quite difficult to work out the precise proportion of resources allocated towards the municipal level, a review of the OECD micro-data suggests a substantial flow of aid.[23] In 2009, the largest projects within the public sector policy and administrative management category were directed at the municipal level, for example.

Compelling methodological reasons also explain this choice of unit, specifically that the two endogenous explanations for futility—'premature load bearing' and insufficient institutionalisation—are not relevant.

Pritchett et. al have noted that development assistance is often 'not grounded in the feasible' which results in 'premature load bearing'—that is, an attempt to be as ambitious as possible in terms what these institutions under development can do. Burdening institutions with difficult tasks before they have the capability of executing these responsibilities leads to them being 'over-stressed.' According to this view, attempting to load, for example social security institutions with the kind of complex responsibilities they have in developed states—making Kosovo act as if it is Denmark—is never likely to succeed, and can lead back to 'square one' (Pritchett et al. 2010, p. 37). Analysing then an institution subject to this 'premature load bearing' would build 'inherent failure' into a research design and merely sets up a 'straw man.' As we shall see,

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[23] OECD statistics on resources allocated towards decentralisation are misleading in this respect: first, not all statebuilding at the municipal level is accounted for by this subcategory (e.g much of the aid included in the public sector management category is directed towards the municipal level).

embedding the 'statebuilders model' of resource distribution at the local level is untainted by 'premature load bearing' as it involves basic responsibilities, such as following straightforward procedures and administering a modest amount of goods to a small population group. In terms of research design, this realistic possibility of statebuilding in this area is an important quality.

Another source of inherent failure is insufficient 'institutionalisation.' Building a public, open and formalised decision-making process in relation to the distribution of basic resources requires sufficient 'institutionalisation', meaning clear guidance from the relevant authorities. For this pre-condition to be met, there must be rules in place that do not distort but clearly direct a particular framework of governance, and in Kosovo this condition is fulfilled because the set of laws that frame municipal governance in Kosovo explicitly demand the statebuilding model. The Law on Local Self-Government has accorded significant weight to accountability procedures, as well as participatory structures in decision making, such as petitions, citizen committees or representation by assembly members.[24] Indeed, it is clearly stated that 'the Municipal Assembly shall adopt municipal regulation promoting the transparency of the legislative, executive and administrative bodies of the municipalities, enhancing the public participation in the decision making at the local level, and facilitating the public access to official documents of the municipalities.'[25] Clientelist-style practices are explicitly ruled out by the law: for example, 'elections for a Municipal Assembly shall not constitute a cause for reconsidering appointments of civil servants.[26]

Furthermore, the basic provisions of the Law on Local Elections guarantee the practice of people voting freely, with their conscience and secretly, which is

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[24] Law Nr. 03/L-040 on Local Self Government
[25] Law Nr. 03/L-040 on Local Self Government 68,4
[26] Law Nr. 03/L-040 on Local Self Government 65, 3

an important aspect of the statebuilding model.[27] At the overarching level, equitable access and rules that are applied neutrally are firmly embedded in Kosovo's constitutional 'preamble', which proclaims Kosovo to be a 'state of free citizens that will guarantee the rights of every citizen, civil freedoms and equality of all citizens before the law.'

This section has identified the unit of analysis. Now it is time to get into the analytical specifics. What is this statebuilding model of resource distribution and what is the informal alternative? The next section will give conceptual clarity to the two models of governance that underpin the research.

Section III: Conceptualising the models of distribution

Governance models represent a set of institutions that combine in a given are: in this research, the distribution of resources at the municipal level. Distinguishing between different models of resource distribution is not a straight-forward task. For analysts it is important to find a heuristic that can effectively cut through this ambiguity, and this section will demonstrate that in the context of Kosovo's municipalities there are two possible alternatives. The first is the model intended to be implemented by statebuilders structured by liberal democratic institutions, called the 'programmatic model.' The second is the alternative model called the 'clientelist model'—named clientelist because the model is based upon a series of informal rules grounded in clientelist relationships. This section will describe the different facets of these models and show how juxtaposing these two models can help us get to the bottom of the question of effectiveness in statebuilding contexts.

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[27] Law No. 03/L-072 on Local Elections in the Republic of Kosovo 3

II:III:I Two models of resource distribution

As a starting point, Stoke's framework (presented below) helps us to think about the various kinds of allocation models and frames three main models of resource distribution: (I) programmatic; (II) non-programmatic–partisan bias; (III) non-programmatic – clientelism.

Figure 4: Distribution models (adapted from Stokes et. al 2014)

The framework starts from an explicit normative and empirical reference point: in those countries that are or aspire to be roughly described as democracies, resources are invariably distributed according to a *programmatic model*, a model anchored by two basic qualities. First, the criteria of distribution are publicly visible. Often these rules are made visible through public debate. Sometimes internal government decisions are made in seemingly opaque settings, but if these decisions are then made explicit through formal government communication and are therefore available for public debate in the media or parliament, then they would fulfil this criteria. Second, these public, formal criteria of distribution must

'bite' in practice to actually shape the distribution of resources. Because of these two qualities, this model could also be named the 'formal democratic model.'

If either of these two qualities is violated, we have *non-programmatic* forms of distribution. This is when there are no explicit public criteria of distribution—we just do not know why goods were distributed in that way—and/or there are public criteria but in practice these are subverted and 'hidden rules' come into play to determine the distribution.

The second cut makes a distinction between different models of non-programmatic goods and pivots around conditionality. If the distribution of a good is contingent upon a citizen 'returning the favour' either with a vote or other forms of political support then it is called clientelism; if there is no conditionality—if a citizen can enjoy the good without directly exchanging something in return—then this refers to a model called partisan bias that can be further disaggregated depending on whether the distribution targets individuals (non-conditional individual benefits) or collectivities (pork-barrel politics).

Fifteen years of internationally-led state-building have involved a steadfast and focused effort to install the programmatic model of resource distribution at the municipal level, an aim made clear by tracing the nature and type of the interventions made by the international community and local actors. For example, an EU funded project (€0.8m per annum) has aimed to 'establish a more efficient, effective and accountable local government with emphasis on better management, consistent service delivery and improved relations with citizens.'[28] Other development agencies have supported the programmatic model through a variety of interventions aiming to increase citizen participation and raise awareness on

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[28] OECD microdata: project code 06k0s01/05/01/001 2009

democratic issues, including the 'Effective Municipalities Initiative' Program supported by USAID and the 'Support to Decentralisation in Kosovo' project implemented by UNDP.

Deviance from this programmatic model is most effectively captured through comparison with the clientelist model because the dynamics of clientelism are just much more relevant to the distribution of municipal goods. Scholars have noted that even if partisan bias may be prior to clientelism (i.e. when resources are distributed from the centre to the local), it is ultimately the clientelist model that determines to whom these resources are distributed (Scott 1969; Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Also it is at the municipal level where mutual monitoring between politicians and people, a central element of contingent exchange, is much more likely to occur.

TWO MODELS: STATEBUILDING AND CLIENTELIST

Implied in Stoke's schema are certain institutions. When we combine these institutions we create a governance model that frame political behaviour in a given area (in this case, resource distribution). This research is concerned therefore with two distinct models of resource distribution, **clientelist** and **programmatic, which for the sake of clarity will be from now on referred to as the 'statebuilding model'**, with each model distinguished by a different set of institutions. The table below summarises these different 'rules of the game'.

Table 1: Two models of resource distribution

Dimension of policy cycle	Statebuilding model (Programmatic model)	Clientelist model
Distribution is decided by...	Democratic participation in public settings	Connection-based participation in informal settings
Distribution is administered according to...	Formal rules	Formal rules are set aside
Distribution contingent upon...	Nothing	'Returning the favour' to patron
Receipt of resources based upon...	Neutral application of the formal rules	Connection-based favouritism

ADVANTAGES OF CONCEPTUALISATION

In addition to analytical precision, there are two further advantages of this conceptualisation. First, it provides a framework for understanding a substantive governance model: a set of institutions that combine to frame political behaviour in a given area (in this case, resource distribution). Scholars often do not do justice to the widespread impact of clientelist relations. In fact, many just focus on clientleism as a style of electoral politics, or a kind of isolated incident. Kitschelt and Wilkinson, for instance, conceive of clientelism as a type of party-voter linkage that plays out at elections as voter mobilisation strategies, but such a conception runs into the problem that it sees clientelism as a 'snapshot' that occurs during elections only (2007).

Most scholars, however, are in agreement that the influence of clientelism is diffuse (Hilgers 2011). I would argue too that clientelist relations are not just activated during an election period but bear influence throughout the political cycle. An important contribution of the schema presented here is that it invites scholars to assess clientelism more appropriately as a governance model that structures municipal politics in a *multi-faceted way across time.* Each dimension of the model represents a core aspect of the policy cycle, from the input side of

how decisions are made and administered, through to how political agents interact with citizens and to the outcome of who gets what. In doing so, this conception allows us to see further in the sense that it encapsulates more accurately all the different ways that clientelist relations can influence politics.

The second core value is the schema has been built up *inductively* from an extensive review of scholarly studies on distributive politics, meaning that it presents a *common* framework within which a diverse range of scholars can finally speak to each other. Clientelism scholars, for example, have consistently lamented the 'lumping together' under the 'clientelism' label all those informal political exchanges—vote-buying, pork barrelling, corruption, nepotism, machine politics, corruption etc—that deviate from formally established rules or involve a misuse of public resources (Hilgers 2011). In purposefully presenting a common analytical frame from which all clientelism scholars can draw, this schema overcomes the analytical imprecision tainting much of the literature and provides a much needed boon for theory development.

II:III:II Vignettes of the governance models

Field work has revealed how these two contrasting models—statebuilding and clientelist—play out in Kosovo. Consider the distribution of university scholarships in Kosovo. Every municipality receives a number of scholarships from the central government in Pristina and it is up to the individual municipalities to distribute the scholarships. In one municipality, the process by which these university scholarships were distributed coincided with the statebuilding model. The criteria for distribution had been discussed in a public municipal meeting; these criteria were then placed outside the municipality on the formal notice board and placed in the central hall of the school. Unsuccessful

students, who had appealed the decision, were, in the interests of public transparency, also shown a full spreadsheet by municipal officials with all the data with which the allocation had been made.[29]

In another municipality, the clientelist model was traced.[30] Apparently, no discussions about the scholarships had taken place in the municipal assembly and there was very little information on the municipal website and teaches weren't aware either. Students who did enquire were told that all the scholarships had been handed out to those who 'had done the best at school' or had 'contributed most to society.' The vague rules were mooted by the municipality had been ultimately set aside. One unsuccessful student told me that her neighbour, who had apparently received low grades, had received a scholarship. The unsuccessful student had apparently much better marks than her neighbour, and so asked the neighbour why she had received the scholarship. The neighbour had replied that her family had been always neglected by politicians, but before the last election her father had demanded that one particular candidate support the family, and in return that candidate would receive the votes of the entire extended family. Fortunately for the neighbour, her candidate became Mayor of the municipality and a few weeks after the election, her father told her that the municipality had awarded her a scholarship.

Chapter conclusion

In this chapter, I have given precise analytical meaning to two alternative models of governance, in a way which advances the statebuilding literature. Often, informal realms of governance fall under the rubric of 'hybridity' (Boege 2008;

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[29] Author interviews: Hani I Elezit municipality with Mayor, Director of Education, chemistry teacher, former mayor and student.
[30] Author interviews: Mitrovica municipality with students, civil society groups and teachers.

Mac Ginty 2010). The language of hybridity has advanced statebuilding scholarship because it demands a shift of focus away from formal institutions and towards a more complex reality that incorporates the informal realm. Yet, the crucial point is that hybridity as a tool for academic inquiry is *inherently limited* and it seems highly reasonable to agree with many scholars who have pointed out that the concept suffers from being too broad, that it lacks the analytical sharpness to fulfil the aim of explaining the realm beyond the formal state (Zaum 2012). In fact, it should only be taken seriously as a kind of scaffold concept that enables the construction of new lines of enquiry and concepts but becomes essentially irrelevant as these new concepts gain a foundation.

Hybridity needs to be deconstructed into precise analytical concepts that cover all sorts of informal institutions and actors. If statebuilding scholarship is to advance, it must build bridges to other research areas and disciplines that can provide the relevant wisdom. If we are to understand how formal state institutions interact with informal structures we must grasp insights on tribal structures, warlords, clientelism, corruption, patronage, resistance and religious norms, that have been built up over many years in the ethnographic, anthropological, sociological and political science literatures. By deliberately crossing boundaries to include insights from the clientelism literature, this dissertation then integrates more refined analytical tools into statebuilding scholarship and in doing so, more nuanced theoretical insights can emerge.

The research will also improve the statebuilding literature by providing systematic evidence of statebuilding's effectiveness. We have seen in the vignettes in this chapter how in one municipality, the statebuilding model seems to be in the foreground in relation to the distribution of university scholarships; in

the other, the process was opaque, informal and crucially the allocation was contingent on a mutual exchange—the neighbour's family gave support to a political candidate, who then reciprocated with the scholarship. Illustrative as these vignettes about the two models are, this research has aimed to provide more methodical and wide-ranging evidence that is often scarce in the debate. It seeks therefore to measure the *extent to which the clientelist model generally structures the way resources are distributed from the state to citizens at the municipal level.* The next chapter discusses how the clientelist model has been measured.

Chapter III: Measuring clientelism in Kosovo's municipalities

Clientelism is a part of all societies. 'But we have that here in Germany' is often the response when I explain the subject of my research. Of course, in Germany the clientelist model may be present but it is not the dominant framework as political behaviour is more likely to be constrained and channelled via the formal rules. Similarly, the workings of the federal government of the United States is often talked about as being beset by clientelist practices but empirical work has shown that US Senators spend very little time looking after individual interests compared to their Pakistani counterparts, for example (Keefer 2007). The reason for this is the influence of the formal rules and norms that proscribe these kinds of clientelist practices are far more internalised; in other words, they have greater weight when it comes to influencing the behaviour of US Senators.

As futility in the context of statebuilding means that the formal model installed by statebuilders has less influence on political behaviour than its informal alternative, the question I am interested at this stage is which channels behaviour more, the formal (statebuilding) or informal (clientelist)? The statebuilding and clientelist models presented in the last chapter are competing in the sense of providing two alternative pathways of action. Such a dichotomy allows us to investigate *relative influence.*

This question of relative influence is essential but often overlooked. This research aims to measure the extent to which the clientelist model structures the way resources are distributed at the municipal level in relation to the formal

model, but as one scholar recently noted, 'the search for a valid measure of clientelism is particularly daunting' (Hicken 2011, p. 304). This chapter will demonstrate how an original instrument that measures the relative influence of the clientelist model has been developed. The development of this instrument is not an academic indulgence. Rather, it is necessary because, as section I will demonstrate, there are no sufficient instruments in the literature. Section II describes step-by-step how the measure has been developed, while Section III shows how statistical tests have demonstrated the validity and reliability of the instrument. Sections IV and V elaborate on how process reliability has been ensured in a way which contributes to the generation of quality and systematic data on the extent of clientelism in Kosovo's municipalities.

Section I: A review of existing measures

The most sophisticated attempts at measurement currently deploy proxies, expert interviews or perception-based indicators; yet even the most advanced of these still suffer from problems relating to validity and reliability. The use of proxy (i.e substitute) variables in many studies has floundered precisely because the proxies have not been valid substitutes for the phenomena.[31] Though a vanguard of scholars have more recently developed creative forms of measurement (Szwarcberg 2013; Weitz-Shapiro 2012) [32], even these are still tainted with problems of validity because the proxies do not sufficiently grasp clientelism.

This problem is illustrated by Henry Hale's interesting study that undertakes a systematic, subnational comparison of 'clientelism' in Russia (2007).

[31] Attempts to use the size of the public sector as a proxy for clientelism typifies these inaccuracies, as the size of the public sector may be a result of clientelist politics but it may also be the result of a contradictory phenomenon, such as 'state rationalisation.'
[32] In Szwarcberg 2013 the proxy is extent to which politicians monitor attendance of participants at political rallies based on original surveys. In Weitz-Shapiro 2012 the proxy is extent to which mayors intervene to create or alter lists for beneficiaries within a National Food Security Program based on original surveys.

Hale makes the assumption that political parties in Russia behave like party machines and in doing so are 'extreme manifestations' of clientelist linkages between voters and politicians (p. 227). Hale then uses the success of various political parties in elections as a proxy measure for clientelism and deploys regression analysis on electoral data to understand at the regional level the institutional and socio-economic factors that explain why some areas become 'preserves of clientelism', i.e. why some party machines score persistent victories. Aside from the rather questionable assumption that all successful political parties in Russia behave in the same, machine-like way, the imprecision tainting the measurement here is that though party machines in Russia may contain clientelist relationships, it can be assumed that they engage in non-clientelist practices—corruption, violence, the sale of office, vote rigging, and police and judiciary 'capture'—that may also explain party success but are explained by different socio-economic and institutional factors than those that explain clientelism. To be fair, the author acknowledges that he may not be measuring 'pure clientelist exchanges' but he doesn't explicitly state what he is in fact explaining: the success of more broadly defined party machines and *not* variations in the level of clientelism.

Expert interviewing has also been a method used to get at a more direct measure of clientelism. While this type of interviewing may be used to shed light on some aspects of the phenomenon (e.g the kind of practices that political parties pursue), there is an intrinsic problem of reliability with this kind of research strategy. Not only could there be a shortage in expertise (i.e people who have closely studied the phenomena for a long period) but information provided may suffer from the prospect of bias or the possibility that the expert's view may

diverge from the real experience of citizens (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007).

Moreover, expert interviews cannot provide a definitive or clear insight on

clientelism's extent and are also poor at providing comparative data because we

just do not know what the anchor point for each expert is, a problem that also

makes data collection at the subnational level extremely difficult.

If expert interviews seem to be fraught with difficulties, some researchers

are turning to perception-based surveys to gauge clientelism. Invariably, these

indicators are components of a broader measure of corruption or favouritism in

the public sector. For example, the question 3 of the Global Corruption Barometer

Index from Transparency International (TI) asks: 'In your dealings with the public

sector, how important are personal contacts to get things done?' (Transparency

International 2013). Few indicators of this kind seem to overcome the validity or

reliability problem inherent in proxies or expert surveys. In terms of validity,

questions like this fail to adequately grasp the real depth of the phenomena and

only skim clientelism's surface. In the TI question above, it is questionable what

we can actually learn from such an indicator: the 'public sector' is too vague a

term (would this mean dealings with teachers or judges?) to capture a

phenomenon that has any analytical meaning. Moreover, often these indicators are

unreliably phrased. For example, in the TI question 'dealings' may already imply

some sort of personal relationship. Overall this question has thrown up odd results

for 2013: in France 75% of people believe personal contacts to be important or

very important whereas in Kosovo it is just 71%. Nearly all other evidence would

suggest that it is hardly likely that France is more clientelist than Kosovo—

perhaps then these results are a product of these problems with validity and

reliability.

Section II: 'Operationalising' the clientelist model

So, despite recent attempts at more sophisticated measurement, the literature offers few compelling measurement tools. In this section, I show how I have constructed an original instrument to measure clientelism that is directly useful for this research and the broader research agenda. The instrument itself is not perfect and there is scope for further refinement. But the ambition is for the measure to be more reliable and valid than existing measures: more valid because of the more appropriate conceptualisation and operationalisation, and more reliable because of the way the measure has been carefully constructed and undertaken.

III:II:I Formulating propositions

To start with it is important to be clear what is being measured: *the extent to which the clientelist model structures the way resources are distributed from the state to citizens at the municipal level.* The instrument is based upon Stoke's schema (see II:III:I) that conceives of the clientelist model as representing different facets of the policy cycle, from how decisions are made and administered, through to how political agents interact with citizens and to the outcome of who gets what. As the clientelist model is manifested in different dimensions, each of these must be assessed. In order to specify the empirical implications of the clientelist model in each dimension, the first step of the operationalisation is to ask: if the clientelist model were present, what would we expect to see?

From this question an index of five items has been developed that was used as a basis for a survey conducted in eleven different municipalities. The first item items relate to clientelism's presence when decisions are being made. In the

statebuilding mode, decision making is done in formal and public venues, while in the clientelist model these formal institutions do not matter. Clientelism is present in this dimension if participation is not determined by institutional structures but if 'having your voice heard' depends on private clientelist relationships, operationalised as 'strong connections' (Item I). The second item asks about the relevance of the formal rules in administration. Clientelism as an unwritten, informal rule is more likely to be present in situations when the formal rules are perceived to be less relevant for decision-making (Item II).

The next dimension of the process relates to contingency: clientelism rests on reciprocal exchanges, for which the main mechanism is the vote. The clientelist model is observable if there is a clear perception that people vote because they have been personally promised something in return (Item III). The clientelist model is also present if the access to resources is not determined by rights and rule-based entitlements but by 'strong connections.' The resource dimension poses the dilemma that different categories of goods may affect the degree of clientelism. To cover for this, the resource dimension was disaggregated into two types of resources: strictly private goods (a. operationalised as employment) (Item IV) and semi-private or 'small club goods', enjoyed by more than one individual but no more than a few households (b. roads) (Item V).[33]

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[33] Other private goods may include university scholarships, building permits, access to healthcare, awards etc. Employment was chosen to represent these goods as this good is often the most visible and, as the largest employer, most people will know someone who has applied for a job in the municipality. Other 'small club goods' could include sewage repairs, street lighting, pavements or a new street signs. 'Repair to roads' was chosen because again this is the most visible and basic of these kinds of goods, increasing the likelihood of respondents knowing how these goods are accessed. Small club goods, as opposed to larger club goods such as a new school, can be considered to be purely part of clientelist networks because there is the possibility with these goods that each member of a group agree with each other to enter into a clientelist exchange with a patron—hence the direct relation of clientelism is maintained. Neighbourhoods in Kosovo tend to be rather small, consisting of 3-10 houses. Given this small size, each household on a street could each agree with each other that they will exchange their vote for a personal promise, such as a new road. Even though the exchange may be executed by a broker, the exchange itself is clientelist because it would normally involve a personal offer by a patron to all the residents of the street. A

From these observable implications, certain propositions can be formulated. These propositions were read out to respondents, who were asked to configure their response according to a 5-point ordinal *Lickert response format* ranging from: strongly agree/ agree/ neither agree or disagree /disagree/ strongly disagree.

Table 2: Propositions of the Clientelism Index

Clientelist model	**Clientelism Index: Propositions**
Rules of distribution are decided by particularistic participation in informal settings	**Item I:** It is generally people who have strong connections with the political leaders of the municipality who have their voice heard when decisions are made.
Rules of distribution are administered by informal rules (formal rules are set aside)	**Item II:** In general, the political leaders of the municipality rarely follow the proper rules and procedures.
Rules of distribution contingent upon 'returning the favour'	**Item III:** In general, people of the municipality vote for candidates during elections because they have been made a personal promise of something
Receipt of resources based upon connection-based particularism	**Item IV:** It is generally people with strong connections with the political leaders of the municipality who have a chance of being employed.
	Item V: It is generally people with strong connections with the political leaders of the municipality who have a chance of having better roads in their neighbourhood.

III:II:I Crafting propositions

Two qualities guided the crafting of the propositions to ensure that they have sufficient specificity to clearly mark out clientelist practice. First, the Items were worded to make sure they reflected likely situations. For example, if the 'participation Item I' was worded 'influence on decision making' then a bias

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good that affects many hundreds would not grasp purely clientelist exchanges. For example, a new high school could be enjoyed by many people beyond those who agreed to exchange their vote for it and therefore could not follow a clientelist model but would rather be part of what Stokes et.al call partisan bias.

would be introduced as the likelihood of ordinary having a personal influence on decision making is very low making them more likely to respond in the negative; instead, '*voice heard*' implies not having a tangible influence but merely the possibility that voice can be exercised. Likewise, '*having a chance* of being employed/ have roads repaired' implies not being employed but rather a low threshold situation of even being in the running for access to resources. If the situations were 'low threshold', then the clientelist aspects were phrased in a way which implied a 'high threshold' for identifying the practice. Thus, '*strong* connections' was used rather than 'connections' or 'people who know each other' in order to grasp the diffuseness of the relationship. Similarly, for voting the phrasing was 'made a personal promise of something' to convey the sense of a direct form of exchange.

Section III: Validating the instrument

Is this approach valid and reliable? Statistical tests would suggest so. The argument I have made is that the clientelism is an underlying factor that structures the constitutive aspects of how resources are distributed from state to society. The measurement tool has sought to grasp this complex reality by transforming the different aspects into a coherent measurement tool. Going beyond the conventional framings and measurements of clientelism, this represents an innovation that helps us understand clientelism more accurately and fully. So far this chapter has gone into detail about how this measure flows from a robust definition that has been logically operationalised, but for this innovation to be ultimately proved valid and reliable, it should be subject to statistical testing. This section will show through various tests that this 'Clientelism Index' does indeed measure a common construct; that each item display substantial loadings on the

common factor; and that the measure exhibits good construct validity and internal

consistency.

II:III:I Content validity

 A 'principal component factor' test assesses whether the set of items used

represent one underlying factor (all share common variance) and that each item

contributes (loads) to the overall score.[34]

Table 3: Results I: Eigenvalue

Factor	Eigenvalue	% of variance
Factor 1	2.19	44
Factor 2	0.88	17
Factor 3	0.73	14
Factor 4	0.68	13
Factor 5	0.51	10

This table assesses the strength of the underlying dimension 'clientelism'

represented by the 'factor 1' row. The 'clientelism' factor 1 has an eigenvalue of

2.19 which accounts for over 44% of the combined variance of all the items, a

dominant factor within the data. In comparison, the other factors have an

eigenvalue of less than one which means these are actually insignificant in

relation to the underlying structure of the data (because these factors account for

less than one item). This test demonstrates *all the items measure a common*

construct.

Table 4: Results II: Factor loadings (pattern matrix)

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[34] Principal Component Factor (PCF) test (obs 973) has been used because this is generally
regarded as the most appropriate when you have a set of items that you believe measure one
concept (i.e this is not exploratory analysis). The extent to which a measure is valid depends upon
the extent to which it measures what it is meant to measure and not something else—increasing
validity, decreases bias.

Variable	Factor 1
Participation	0.74
Informal	0.51
Voting	0.62
Employment	0.75
Roads	0.65

The loadings score in the factor1 column assess the extent to which individual items cluster around a single factor. If an item has a loading over 0.4 then it is considered a good indicator of that factor (2010, p. 344). All these items load above 0.6, which suggests that they are all strong indicators for clientelism. The range of these loadings is between 0.51-0.75 which suggests there is no need for different weightings. Overall, all the items in the scale *display substantial loading* on a single factor, meaning it is justifiable to compute these items into a single-scale score.

III:III:II Construct validity

Another test for validity is the extent to which the instrument correlates with other measures that are believed to be related to the construct. An important check of this validity was built into the survey through the inclusion of an additional item.

Item IV: In general, people are treated equally by the political leaders of the municipality.

Item IV represents the null hypothesis of clientelism as it reflects the norm of *universalism*: all citizens are treated equally by the state regardless of the group to which one belongs.[35] Clientelism reflects the obverse of this norm, the norm of *particularism:* the stronger the relationship the client has to the patron, the better

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[35] Though the Index contained five questions + 2 validating questions, the total survey contained 12 questions—the additional questions will be used for the interpretation of results.

treatment received (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, p. 88). Logically, there should be an inverse relationship between the mean clientelist score and the score for Item IV. Acock suggests where correlations are used to test validity this way, a value of 0.30 is considered moderate support, and a correlation of 0.50 is considered strong support for validity (2010, p. 344). As a disagreement with this item implied clientelism, the scores were reversed for this variable so that a disagreement was coded as a negative score to be in line with the other clientelist scores. The correlation co-efficient between the clientelist mean score and this item is 0.42 (p<0.001)—the more people affirmed clientelism, the more they rejected the null hypothesis—which gives good support to the construct validity of the instrument.

To further demonstrate content validity on the scale level, the clientelist score should correlate poorly with variables that are theoretically unrelated to the construct. It was therefore hypothesised that if clientelism is present in a municipality, then demographic variables (age, gender and ethnicity) should not affect the perceptions of clientelism. If this were the case, then there would be inbuilt perception bias in the instrument, but there is virtually no correlation between these variables and clientelism and none of the correlations are statistically significant.

Table 5: Correlation with demographic variables

Demographic variable	Co-efficient with clientelism
Age	0.03
Gender	0.03
Ethnicity	-0.08

III:III:III Internal consistency

A measure is reliable if it produces consistent results and it reduces the sources of measurement error. The tool was examined for reliability via the Cronbach's alpha (α) estimate.[36]

Table 6: Cronbach Alpha test

Item	*Alpha (α)*
Participating	0.58
Informal	0.67
Voting	0.63
Employment	0.58
Roads	0.63
Test scale (overall score)	*0.67*

Two conclusions can be made from this test. The first is that the overall reliability for the scale is 0.67 meaning that 67% of a variance in the scale represents the true score of the variable (and 33% is random error). As this score is a function of the number of items, the mean co-variance of the items, and the mean variance of the items, if the number of items increases so does the alpha; hence, the overall score should be interpreted in light of the number of items. A scale that has been designed to contain four items is unlikely to have a high alpha, which doesn't mean the items are any less internally consistent. As this scale has only four items, a score of 0.67 therefore gives an indication of *good reliability*.[37] Second, the alpha scores for the individual items are all below the overall score (0.67). This means that dropping one of the items would decrease the reliability of the

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[36] The Cronbach alpha cuts up the results creating random samples and then assesses the internal consistency of the samples. The Cronbach Alpha is a co-efficient that calculates how the items vary with other items.

[37] According to George and Mallery's (2003) rules of thumb an alpha of between 0.6-0.7 is 'acceptable' but this would be for a standard scale which normally contain 10 items or more. Increasing the number of items may increase the overall alpha but doesn't actually increase the internal consistency of the items. The research here took the view that the conceptual significance of the items was central to the measure's construction.

measure; in other words, in the interests of reliability, all the items are useful and should be included in the measure.

Section IV: Sampling

During February and April 2013, one thousand and eighty citizens (n=1080) took part in the survey, which took place across eleven municipalities. The population of municipalities was all those that had been subject to internationally-led statebuilding. This means that three 'northern' municipalities (marked red in the map below) in Kosovo—Leposavic, Zvecan and Zubin Potok—were excluded from the analysis because internationally-led statebuilding has not occurred to a meaningful extent in these Serbian dominated areas north of the Ibar river. The population of respondents was all those people eligible to engage with the state, that is all adults over eighteen.[38] Except in one ethnically mixed municipality where the sample was 'proportionally stratified', random sampling was used, that is every person in the population had an equal chance of participating.

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[38] There is no hard and fast rule about sampling. The aim is to eliminate all the possible sources error, which can only be done via a mixture of common sense and theory. The first possible source of error lies in the construction of the sample, and specifically the failure to incorporate a logically crucial category, a category or strata of a population that could theoretically distort the results. Clearly, ethnicity is one such category: it is reasonable to assume that different ethnic groups have different patterns of life and therefore may have different experiences of clientelism. With such crucial categories, the sample should be calibrated so that this category is purposively included as a proportion of the population. Hence for the ethnically mixed municipalities, the relative size of the Serb and Albanian community within the population was worked out and then included as an explicit part of that sample for that municipality. Actively seeking out this category within the sample then provides a safety check that the sample will converge as closely as possible with the population. Such safety checks are not necessary for all categories. For example, there is no *a priori* reason why age should affect a person's experience of clientelism, and therefore no reason to actively stratify the sample according to age. Clearly, characteristics such as age may be important and so the sampling was accompanied by the collection of biographical information that will be used to interpret the results. The core point is that for some crucial categories, the sample should be purposively stratified. For all the other categories that differentiate populations that are not *a priori* a crucial category (gender, age, favourite colour etc) stratified sampling is not necessary. Yet what is necessary is to make a safety check in another way: by conducting the survey in a proper way to eliminate coverage bias. In theory, in a randomised survey conducted perfectly, the sample should mirror the population. Hence, the process by which the survey is conducted is crucial.

The survey took place across eleven municipalities.[39] This number was chosen to ensure coverage of municipalities in different regions, and comprised of different ethnic groups and population sizes. Within in each municipality, sampling took place across the different neighbourhoods that were identified beforehand.[40] All respondents were interviewed personally in their homes and chosen according to a random-route technique.[41] To minimise the margin of error, the number of respondents in each municipality ranged between eighty-five and one hundred and thirty. For each municipality, a survey team of four-six people was created and undertook the survey under my direct supervision. Each member of the team also received prior training. Depending on the size of the municipality, each municipality survey would take between 10-18 hours to complete. One important aspect of sampling reliability is stability: is the measure stable over time and across respondents. An important consideration for this measure is whether any external events or circumstances, such as an election, major political reform or other significant dislocations, may have occurred that

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[39] That is a third of the total number of municipalities in Kosovo.

[40] Likewise, when selecting the survey routes within each municipality a pre-check of the different neighbourhoods were made with a local person and the routes allocated accordingly. Such a door-to-door technique clearly ensures greater coverage and randomisation than rival techniques, such as street interviewing on a main street or a town square. One source of bias though to address with this type of door-to-door interviewing is coverage bias, that is, it is possible that during the interview period some people may not be at home but rather at work (during the week), or at the market (on a Saturday) or elsewhere. The working day in Kosovo ends at 4pm and so possible bias was addressed by holding all interviews on a weekday during the times of 11am-7pm, which ensured coverage was extended to workers. If this bias were present, the sample would contain far more women than men (as in Kosovo it is generally the women who stay at home) but this was not the case. Moreover, another bias relates to the behaviour of the researcher, who may avoid certain neighbourhoods or be unwilling to speak to certain types of people. To overcome this, all interviewers were trained beforehand and were monitored at various points during the interview day to ensure quality control.

[41] Random-route technique means respondents are chosen according to a random formula. This means that interviewers are required to select every third house/address on the left-hand side of the street, beginning with the second one from the starting point onwards. In a block of flats of up to four floors, the selected household was every fifth apartment, counting them from the first to the left after reaching the highest inhabited floor and proceeding downstairs. In a block of flats of five floors and over, the selected apartment was every tenth apartment, counted in the same manner. If there was more than one person in the apartment, the selection of a respondent in the household was carried out by the 'next birthday' principle, by which the member of the household whose birthday was closest to the day of the interview was selected.

could impact upon the reception of the survey. No such event occurred between the starting and end point of the survey.

Figure 5: Municipalities surveyed

Table 7: Municipalities Surveyed

	Municipality	Maj. Ethnicity	Population	No of Obs.
1.DC	Deçan/Dečane	Albanian	40,019	100
2.FZ	Ferizaj/Uroševac	Albanian	108,610	85
3.GJ	Gjilan/Gnjilane	Albanian	90,178	86
4.GR	Graçanica/Gračanica	Serb.	10,675	90
5.HE	Hani i Elezit/Đeneral Janković	Albanian	9,403	96
6.KM	Kamenicë/Kamenica	Albanian	36,085	101
7.MT	South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica	Albanian	71,909	95
8.PJ	Pejë/Peć	Albanian	96,450	87
9.PR	Prishtinë/Priština	Albanian	198,897	120
10.PZ	Prizren	Albanian	177,781	122
11.SK	Skënderaj/Srbica	Albanian	50,858	98

Section V: Ensuring process reliability and validity

The last part focused on how the measure was validated via statistical tests—this section focuses on how the survey was undertaken. An essential task for social

scientists when undertaking a survey is to reduce the number of errors that may introduce a distorting bias between the 'true score' and 'the observed score' of the phenomenon subject to measurement. The concept of 'total survey error' (TSE) sensitises researchers to all the different ways error may accumulate via a survey measurement and provides a wise guide for this research (Gideon 2012; Groves, Lyberg 2010). Non-sampling errors, ranging from badly worded questions to the poor behaviour of the interviewer, are also sources of error. Ways in which these potential problems were anticipated and overcome are discussed here.

LANGUAGE

All respondents were surveyed in their first language (i.e Albanian or Serbian). Field work prior to the survey allowed for an understanding of the terms used to discuss the topic so that the propositions were intuitively understandable and conveyed with clear and simple language. For example, 'strong connections' was translated into the words referred to in public discourse (e.g 'lidhje të forta' in Albanian). A pre-test of the survey helped refine the statements and also gave rise to the importance of establishing consistent definitions of the terms.[42] The statements referred to the non-specific 'political leaders of the municipality' rather than 'Mayor' in order to avoid the problem of specific grievances with individual politicians biasing answers.

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[42] In the pre-test, some of the respondents would ask the interviewer: 'promised what kinds of things?' To ensure clarity and consistency, all of the interviewers were trained to respond with a list of goods that qualitative research had shown is often involved in clientelist exchanges: a job, a phone card, a road, a building permit, a scholarship. Interviewers were instructed to define the abstract nouns of 'political leaders' as: mainly elected politicians but anyone else who may be politically significant, such as heads of parties not in power, and sometimes Directors of departments; and for example 'treated equally': it doesn't matter where you are from, who you know, what background you have, which family you are from: everyone has the same treatment from the municipality. Strong connections: a personal relationship in which a person may be able to have relatively quick access to a political leader. For example, they may be able to phone up the political leaders or phone someone close to political leaders if required.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Sources of potential harm for participants were identified beforehand. The themes of the survey could be considered somewhat sensitive, especially if some of the items referred to possibly less than desirable behaviour. Surveyors were trained to stress the voluntary nature of the survey and trained to gain informed consent from every single respondent. The items were deliberately phrased to ask of other people's behaviour to be non-intrusive. Pre-tests of the survey specifically focused on whether the survey generated any emotional or psychological harm through requesting feedback from respondents about how they felt during and after the survey. These 'well-being' tests were repeated throughout then survey proper.

SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS

Social desirability bias refers to when people do not give honest answers in order to present themselves in a socially desirable light. As it has been established that this bias can be neutralised through indirect questioning,[43] the statements were phrased impersonally (i.e asking about other people's behaviour and not their own) to address this possible source of bias. There seems no reason why respondents would want to paint the behaviour of others in a good or bad light. Moreover, meta-analysis of surveys has suggested that respondents are inclined to answer more honestly when the benefits of the survey are emphasised (Gideon 2012). Hence, all interviewers were trained to clearly set out the purpose and

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[43] Fisher 1993 in (Gideon 2012)

social relevance of the survey, and the anonymous nature of the response was also stressed prior to the survey.[44]

RESPONDENT KNOWLEDGE

Field interviews prior to the survey inquired into the extent to which respondents are privy to information on politics, voting behaviour and who gets what in the municipality. They revealed that through a variety of mechanisms—family relations, friendship circles, local newspapers, cafe talk, the mosque or church etc.—most people could talk at length and give examples on different aspects of municipal life. Most communities are tight-knit and the phrase 'in this town everyone knows about everyone else's business' was commonly heard during field work. Generally, the importance of the municipality for people's lives and wellbeing should not be underestimated: often the largest building in the town, it serves as a central focus for community development and an important source of vital resources. Q2 of my survey confirms the view that it is likely that participants are well-informed: 68% of people agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that 'in general, citizens take an interest in what happens in the municipality' with only 20% disagreeing. A 2012 UNDP survey revealed that when asked to name the current Mayor of their municipality, 83% of survey respondents across Kosovo provided the correct name. The same survey revealed that only 20% think that they are not informed at all about the work of their municipality (UNDP 2012).

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[44] Interviewers were also trained to always behave in a polite, co-operative and sympathetic manner during interviews. Aside from being intrinsically important, this was done in anticipation of another potential pitfall that may result from the sensitivity of clientelism: respondents' unwillingness to answer. In establishing an atmosphere of courtesy and trust during the face-to-face interviewing, the co-operation and motivation to answer of the respondents were increased.

As quality data requires respondents to feel comfortable and mentally alert, respondents were asked on two 'dummy' propositions that related to the 'degree of optimism' and 'interest in municipal life' prior to the main Index items being read out.[45] The first purpose of the 'dummy' questions was to avoid asking difficult questions straight-off so that the respondents didn't feel uncomfortable. As these dummy questions were phrased according to possible positive aspects of municipal life, the second purpose was to present a positive tone so that when switching to possibly more negative statements about clientelism, respondents would have to consider a mental shift that could enhance their level of alertness.[46]

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated how an original instrument that measures the relative extent of the clientelist model in Kosovo's municipalities has been developed. The development of this is necessary because there are few sufficient instruments in the literature. Though future refinements will improve the measure, the index makes important contributions to the research agenda. First, the instrument carves out clientelism's multi-faceted influence and then transforms these different aspects into a coherent measurement tool. The instrument therefore improves on other indicators by clearly marking out the phenomena at hand and helps us understand clientelism more fully.

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[45] Dummy Q1. *In your opinion, people of X are optimistic about the future. Q2. In your opinion, people of X take an interest in what happens in the municipality*

[46] Most experts agree it is important to mix-up the tone of the questions. Negatively worded questions were then added to the scale to act as 'cognitive speed bumps that require respondents to engage in a more controlled, as opposed to more automatic, cognitive processing' Gideon 2012.

Deliberately unproblematic to administrate, the measure can also contribute to the broader research agenda by being deployed in other settings.[47] Indeed, the instrument has been subsequently used by other scholars assessing clientelism in the business sector as part of a Swiss-funded regional project in Albania and Kosovo (see Uberti 2015).

The significance of the instrument is that it generates quality and systematic data. Clientelism matters but we just do not know to what extent. In examining the relative weight of clientelism in relation to the formal democratic rules, it is assesses the real-world impact of clientelism. In this sense the measure could be very significant for theory building as it provides the kind of data ripe for comparison across cases, something that is essential if we are to understand why the phenomena persists.

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[47] If it is applicable across time and space, one quality of the measure that may vary is the reliability. As mentioned, municipal politics in Kosovo, like in many other countries, matters: it is invariably central to people's lives, an important element of social discourse and often a major provider of resources. Consequently, while respondents in Kosovo may be in an excellent position to provide reliable answers, it is questionable whether in a large German town, for example, where the municipality is not the main provider of resources and only widely relevant for administrative purposes, people actually are in a good position to judge the way in which goods are distributed. For example, would the residents of Spandau know much about municipal politics? Perhaps they would, but the deployment of the instrument should then depend on the good judgement of the researcher. Some fine tuning of how the items are phrased should take place. For example, the items referring to access to resources should be those that are most relevant and people are most likely to be informed about.

Chapter IV: Is internationally-led statebuilding futile? The results

The empirical test presented in this chapter evaluates a tacit consensus emerging in the literature that statebuilding is futile. Futility is understood here as the degree to which the formal institutions shape political behaviour relative to their informal alternatives. The specific testing ground has been the municipal level in Kosovo and in particular the models of governance that frame the distribution of resources. This chapter will show the results of the empirical test. Section I explicitly states what is being tested and develops an interpretive framework from which to understand the survey scores. Section II presents the results, while Section III compares these results with equivalent assessments made by the international community and highlights that clientelism is just not on the radar of international statebuilders. The conclusion draws out some implications of the results.

Section I: The interpretive framework

One thousand and eighty citizens in Kosovo across eleven municipalities were asked to respond to certain proposition that expressed the clientelist model of resource distribution. These scores reveal the relative influence of the clientelist model but the research is more interested in understanding what these scores demonstrate for the bigger theoretical puzzle—the futility or effectiveness of internationally-led statebuilding. This section deals with the important issue of how we use the scores to test the *effect* of internationally-led statebuilding.

IV:I:I Scoring the variable

Each set of responses were configured to a 5-point Lickert response format ranged in which the scores ranged: strongly agree (scored -2) – agree (-1) – neither disagree or agree (0) – disagree (1) – strongly disagree (2).[48] From these scores, the arithmetic mean for each item has been taken then aggregated to a score for *each municipality* meaning each municipality can be placed on a scale that ranges from -2 to 2. The scores can be interpreted as shedding light on the extent to which municipalities in Kosovo distribute goods according to the clientelist model (informal, hidden rules, particularist) or the statebuilding model (formal, public rules, universalist).[49] An overall score of -1 (i.e. an agreement with the clientelist item), for instance, suggests on average the clientelist model was affirmed in all aspects, meaning in any given situation clientelist model of distribution is most likely one—it predominates. An overall score of -2 would suggest the clientelist framework is the only framework of distribution.

There are two ways to read the scores. The first is rather simple: the measure robustly demonstrates the levels of clientelism at the municipal level. Yet, the research is more interested in understanding what these scores demonstrate for the bigger theoretical puzzle—the futility or effectiveness of internationally-led statebuilding. The futility thesis states that even if the statebuilding model is formally put on the statute book, it does not ultimately

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[48] The reason for having a 5 point Lickert response format rather than a dichotomous yes or no is based on increasing accuracy. The measure captures not one-off moments but generalised behaviour that occurs more than once. For example, in responding to Item III (*voting because of personally promised something*), respondents may mentally picture five cases in which the voting motivations of people are mapped. Having two categories captures more nuanced possibilities: 'agree' could mean that three out of the five cases conform to the statement; strongly agree would mean all cases.

[49] The overall scores will be treated as interval data meaning there is a meaningful difference between the different values of the scale. Carifio and Perla (2007) point out that while a single Lickert Item should be treated as ordinal data, a Lickert Scale, an aggregate of items, can be treated as interval data (as long as it passes some statistical tests, such as the Cronbach Alpha test.

structure the day-to-day distribution of municipal goods but instead is displaced

by the informal alternative: the clientelist model. The important issue is how we

use the scores to test the *effect* of internationally-led statebuilding. Effect is

worked out here in two steps: the first constructs a hypothetical score for point A

(i.e. the point of intervention) and the second step uses related data to assess what

could be a realistic expectation for an effect.

CONSIDERING THE 'NON-TREATMENT' SCORE

First we have to consider the counterfactual score, a situation in which there has

been no internationally-led statebuilding. There has been no longitudinal study of

the clientelist model's relevance, nor can we go back in time to posit a beginning

score at a hypothetical point A, to see how international statebuilding has affected

it over a decade later at point B. At this point we are interested in point A: in a

scenario without statebuilding what is the likely baseline score in a society like

Kosovo?

Many facets of the political science literature give credence to the

assumption the clientelist model may be the *most likely model* in a society like

Kosovo. The reason has nothing to do with cultural attributes because clientelism

exists in all cultures. Rather theoretical groundwork by Mushtaq Khan and North

et. al, amongst others, have emphasised that, given a particular stage of societal

development, personalised relations are likely to be the rules of the game as they a

rational response to a given set of political and economic conditions (North et al.

2009; Khan 1998). Guillermo O'Donnell also has reminded us that particularism,

the selective access to goods based on personal relationships, 'is a permanent

feature of human society; only recently, and only in some places and institutional

sites, has it been tempered by universalistic norms and rules' (O'Donnell 1996b, p. 40).

These theoretical perspectives have been backed up empirical studies that build up a picture of the clientelist model being the likely default one in post-communist states, like Kosovo. Favouritism, informality and clientelist networks seem to be a feature of former communist states, including those in Yugoslavia, partly because they were strong features of the old system: communist states were rife with informal solutions and few structures of formal public accountability existed (Grzymala-Busse 2010, 2006). Insightful studies across the region tend to emphasise less the importance of democratic structures and more the continued influence of patron-client networks in politics (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010). Related data bears out that clientelism and particularism are residual features of former Yugoslav societies. A 2008 poll of Bosnia Herzegovina, for example – a country often reported as beset by clientelist-like politics—found that only 21 percent of people believe that the government is 'fair' (Gallup 2008).

This review of the relevant literature helps us build a hypothetical counterfactual: if there was no attempt to install the statebuilding model, then, given the insights from theory, the past and present day, the best bet is that the clientelist model would be the most likely model. The point here has been to construct on relatively solid footing a hypothetical baseline from which we can judge effectiveness. If, Kosovo's hypothetical baseline is clientelist (i.e. a score of -1), next subsection asks discussion a realistic expectation for statebuilding's effectiveness.

What score would reveal the effectiveness of internationally-led statebuilding? Theoretically, only a positive score (i.e. above zero) would suggest effectiveness as this would imply a full negation of the clientelist model. Yet, the scoring should be grounded in a more *realistic* view of what could be considered a likely score in other countries. Related data suggests that there is a high probability that populations in only a few countries would probably rank their municipalities above zero and so reject the relevance of the clientelist model. For example, question three of the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer Index asks: 'In your dealings with the public sector, how important are personal contacts to get things done?' (Transparency International 2013). The results are suggestive of clientelism's ubiquity in EU countries: for those twenty-two countries in the EU surveyed in the Barometer, the average percentage of respondents that believe personal contacts to be important or very important stands at 63 percent. The implication of this is that on my scale a score of between 0 and -0.5 may be the *norm in EU countries* (maybe we can talk of 'getting to Slovakia' rather than Denmark) because on average clientelist practices seem to be affirmed by in this opinion poll.[50] Accordingly, after more than a decade of internationally-led statebuilding, reaching the EU norm of below than -0.5 (i.e toward zero) seems like a reasonable threshold of efficacy. Below -0.5 would imply that the clientelist model is somewhat negated and the formal institutions matter just enough to have some kind of grip on society. As the table below summarises, the futility thesis is

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[50] In France 75 percent of people believe personal contacts to be important or very important whereas in Kosovo it is just 71 percent; Germany (67 percent) scores higher than Albania (66percent). Section III:I:I discussed how this was not the most unreliable measure. Still, it is the best EU-wide data we have.

increasingly disproved the closer the score moves to 0. The next section discusses
the results.

Table 8: Interpretive framework

Score	Futility thesis
-1	Confirmed
-0.5	Somewhat confirmed
0	Unconfirmed

Section II: Municipality scores

Fifteen years of concerted efforts to install the statebuilding model of resource
distribution at the municipal level have been made by the international
community. The basic framework of government has itself been structured
according to the model, and numerous projects and interventions have supported
the internalisation of these institutions. Have these institutions taken root in
Kosovo? This section demonstrates that internationally-led statebuilding in
Kosovo's municipalities has been *mostly ineffective* in establishing the
statebuilding model of resource distribution; yet there is one outlier in particular
that the 'futility thesis' does not account for.

IV:II:I Discussion of results

The median score for the municipalities is -1.01 which suggests a widespread and
consistent affirmation of all the different elements of the clientelist model. The
table below reveals the breakdown for each municipality.

Table 9: Clientelism test results

Municipality	Clientelist model score	
Prizren	-1.17	
Graçanica/Gračanica	-1.15	
Deçan/Dečane	-1.07	Upper quartile
Kamenicë/Kamenica	-1.03	
Prishtinë/Priština	-1.03	
Ferizaj/Uroševac	-1.01	Median
Pejë/Peć	-1	
Gjilan/Gnjilane	-0.96	
South Mitrovicë/Mitrovica	-0.92	Lower quartile
Skënderaj/Srbica	-0.64	Minor lower outlier
Hani i Elezit/Đeneral Janković	-0.25	Major lower outlier
Mean score	**-0.94**	

Notes: *The range is 0.92; the inter-quartile range is 0.15.*[51]

The general results are disappointing for those advocates of statebuilding in its current form: the municipalities are clustered around -1 (interquartile range is low at 0.15) and nine out of eleven municipalities fall between a range of -0.92 to -1.17, meaning that the clientelist model is predominant in a high majority of the cases assessed—the futility thesis is mostly confirmed.

Clearly, the notion of futility has to be qualified because not everything that international statebuilders have done has been ineffective. Across Kosovo's municipalities new municipal offices have been built that has made municipal governance easier; new laws have been adopted that have set out a clear form of

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[51] The range is 0.92; the interquartile range (i.e. midspread) is 0.15: meaning 50percent of items fall within this range; no upper outlier ; one minor lower outliers (1.5 times the midspread below the lower quartile); one major outlier (3 times midspread) Major outlier: lies on outer fence of the data points. Minor outlier: lies on the inner fence

governance; people are participating in municipal assemblies for the first time; and local elections have generally become better managed.

Nevertheless, as I argued in Chapter I, the true test of effectiveness should be located at the level of internalisation. Unprecedented levels of external resources, expertise and political capital has had very little effect in Kosovo in terms of internalisation: the governance model implemented by international statebuilders has generally not directed the actual functioning of governance. Instead, in ten of the eleven municipalities sampled here citizens on the whole perceive that resources are distributed according to the clientelist model, meaning the rules are decided by connection-based participation in informal settings and administered without reference to the formal rules and procedures; actual distribution is also ultimately contingent upon an exchange with patrons, with the general outcome of the better connection you have, the better treatment you receive.

The chart below shows that there is no discernible relationship between the size of municipality and the clientelist score. The clientelist model is most relevant for the distribution of resources in Prizren (PZ, population 177,781), Kosovo's second largest municipality that lies in the south of the county and has scored highest at -1.17. Closely behind is Gracanica (GR, 10,675), a small municipality five kilometres outside of the capital and the solitary Serb-only municipality surveyed. Pristina (PR, 198,897), the capital and largest municipality, scored just above the median with -1.03.

Figure 6: Clientelist score and population size of municipality

The results in ten of out the eleven municipalities confirm the futility thesis. Yet, a very important finding is that there is a major outlier*:* the evidence points to one municipality, Hani i Elezit (-0.25) functioning much more according to the statebuilding model compared to the other municipalities, a finding that the 'futile thesis' would not account for. Internationally-led statebuilding can be said to be *effective* in Hani i Elezit as the result would comfortably fit into what would according the framework set out here be roughly regarded as the EU norm.

IV:II:II Checking for time

It is a matter of common sense that after the formal adoption of a governance model, there may be a delay or lag before the model is fully internalised—it may take time for effects of implementation to be felt. It is extremely difficult to conjure expectations about time. Early theories and rhetoric around statebuilding seemed to suggest a compressed timeframe (e.g. see (Dobbins 2007), while other analysts have pointed out Western statebuilding took centuries, and so it seems

far-fetched that statebuilding can be fully completed in the short-term (Wesley 2008). Societies though are not trapped by their past (Fukuyama 2011). Statebuilding in Kosovo has been going on for fifteen years, which is the short to medium term. It is certainly possible that this is enough time for the institutions to be internalised: Uruguay, Botswana and Estonia testify that quick gains in governance can occur (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Moreover, scholars of local government have consistently emphasised how quick changes can take place at the municipal level, especially when compared to statebuilding at the national level (Grindle 2007).

Still, it is a sensible riposte to the results presented above is that internationally-led statebuilding takes time and so the futility revealed by the survey is misleading: there has been an effect of internationally-led statebuilding but the effect has not had the time to be fully felt. To check for possible confounding effects of time, additional items in my survey assessed changes over the past five years (i.e. since independence). Each respondent was asked the extent to which people are *treated equally by the political leaders of the municipality* (Item 10). This is a *proxy* for universalism, the antithesis of clientelism. A follow up question was then asked whether they thought that situation had become more equal, unequal, or stayed the same over the last five years. The point here is not to precisely measure changes over time as this could not have been done.[52] The aim is to get a handle on trajectories: hence this is a *robustness check*—that is, a plausibly confounding factor, time, has been assessed.

Evidence of increasingly equal treatment (i.e. a trajectory that coincides with the statebuilding model) over the past five years would give credence to the

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[52] First, there are issues of measuring changes over time from a single point in time; second, the item does not represent a conceptual model but a proxy for the models I am interested in

idea that statebuilding takes time to 'bed in' and would undermine the results presented in the previous section: internationally-led statebuilding is not futile it just takes time. However, the results below suggest that for the more clientelist municipalities, there is no trajectory towards more equal treatment (used here as a proxy for a statebuilding model) but more likely stagnation or deterioration; while a majority of people in the less clientelist municipalities suggest a different trajectory, that treatment has become more equal over the last five years. Perceptions of no changes over time then serve to strengthen the robustness data presented in this chapter and reinforce the general picture: internationally-led statebuilding has been futile in most of the municipalities sampled.

Figure 7: Perceptions of equal treatment by municipal leaders across time

This section has presented the results of the survey and demonstrated that even accounting for time, the clientelist model is the dominant framework of action in many municipalities. Few studies have considered statebuilding and institutional development from the angle presented here. The next section seeks to triangulate

this original data, with the equivalent evaluations made by the international community.

Section III: Comparing results with other evaluations of progress

In general, my research contradicts those reports by the international community that project progress in Kosovo's institutional development. Consider the assessment of municipal governance made by an internal 2012 European Commission feasibility study for a prospective Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. The report states, 'over the past three years, Kosovo has made significant progress on decentralisation' (EC 2012, p. 6). My findings would suggest a different general picture: the institutions of de-centralisation continue to be subverted by a clientelist model.

Clearly not all assessments of Kosovo by international statebuilders project this kind of clear-cut progress; in fact, many list a number of challenges and call for improvement in governance qualities, such as transparency and accountability. The point though is that there seems to be an analytical 'blind spot': many of the assessments of Kosovo's institutional progress focus just on the formal institutions that are under-development and in doing, so the clientelist model that I have shown can exist as a dominant framework of action is simply not acknowledged.

Consider the local government section of the 2014 European Commission Progress report for Kosovo. Much of the discussion on local government describes progress in terms of the building up of formal structures and achieving a balance with central government. One indication of progress is that 'the Ministry for Local Government Administration (MLGA) has improved its guidance for

municipalities by cross-checking the compliance of municipal acts with the overall legal framework' (European Commission 2014, p. 9). Clientelism is not mentioned anywhere in the report because it is only the formal institutions that feature in their framework of understanding.

Consider also a USAID funded management system that the same 2012 European Commission report states will enable the Ministry of Local Government Administration 'to ensure a more efficient monitoring of the local government structures' (MLGA 2011, p. 2). The system monitors local government structures by solely measuring different outputs: how many bus shelters constructed; the total length of new pavements; the number of disabled persons employed in the municipality etc. In monitoring outputs only, the systems fails to 'monitor structures' and misses what this research has shown to be in reality the most likely governance structure: clientelism.

In general then, my research does not seek to add another problem to the list of challenges facing Kosovo, but calls into question the framework of understanding deployed by statebuilders. In demonstrating how clientelism is such a stark feature of the political landscape, it has proved the theoretical argument that shaped the research: that statebuilding is not just about building formal institutions, it is mostly about eliminating informal frameworks of governance rooted in society. For the sake of accuracy, it is these important features of political life that should be integrated into any assessments of political development.

Chapter conclusion

Kosovo has been subject to an intensive statebuilding effort that has aimed not merely to change the rules and provide some resources to support the execution of

the rules but aimed at internalisation: for these institutions to be taken up by society and therefore to consistently matter for political behaviour. If internalisation is the raison d'être of statebuilding in Kosovo, then it is here that the true test of effectiveness or futility must be located. This chapter has shown that statebuilding in Kosovo has been mostly futile: the statebuilding model intended for by the statebuilders seems to be unimportant when it comes to the distribution of resources.

This test has taken place under conditions that are relatively supportive for international agency. Not only has the amount of resources expended been higher than in any other equivalent setting, the governance area under scrutiny is devoid of any *a priori* confounding factors, such as undue complexity or insufficient institutionalisation. It is plausible then to theorise that futility at the municipal level raises serious concern about the possibility of building formal institutions in more complex and controversial areas in Kosovo.

Because many of the unfavourable conditions, such as conflict, very low economic development and clashing norms, that possibly hinder state-building missions are not as pronounced, Kosovo is a 'most likely' case for external actors to be able to induce sustainable formal institutions. If policies and interventions are shown to be fruitless in Kosovo, then we can make quite reasonable generalisations that they are unlikely to work effectively in other countries.

This should not, however, overshadow the most important conclusion of the research that in fact the picture is not unequivocal. The results from Hani i Elezit demonstrate that international statebuilding can work, revealing that it is premature to suggest that statebuilding is pre-ordained to fail. Just as statebuilding

was successful in Hani i Elezit, it could be plausibly effective in other municipalities, sectors and countries.

Hence, the main conclusion from the results is that there is no conclusive answer: the futility thesis does not account for all the outcomes of statebuilding. Ultimately, these results invite us to answer two important questions: if statebuilding is mostly futile, why is it so? But if it can be effective, why it is so? After the next chapter elaborates on how the clientelist model operates in Kosovo's municipalities, it is to these two lines of inquiry that the rest of the dissertation turns.

Chapter V: Understanding the clientelist model: Actors, organisations and social ecology

The clientelist model is the *decisive framework* within which resources are distributed in Kosovo's municipalities. Yet, this informal system, with which the statebuilding model competes, has been rarely subjected to close scrutiny. This chapter aims to bring this clientelist model out of the shadows. In doing so, it shifts away from a focus on the constituent institutions (i.e rules) to an analysis of how the key actors behave, how they are organised and in what kind of social ecology they are embedded, insights that are necessary to get to grips with the dynamic question of why the clientelist model persists (Helmke, Levitsky 2004).

In addition to deepening our understanding of this particular clientelist model, I also aim to contribute more broadly to the clientelism literature. As a starting point, my research has adopted the analytical framework provided by classic studies of clientelism but through careful empirical research I have tried to both assess whether these frameworks are still valid and to see in which ways they need refining. James C. Scott points out, while the pattern of clientelism in a given nation at a particular point in time is in one sense unique, there are meaningful parallels across time and space (Scott 1972, p. 3), and in this respect, the research allies itself with those scholars who argue that different case studies can converse with each other to debate and enrich our understanding of the core attributes of clientelism (Hilgers 2012).

This chapter embraces the complexity of patron-client organisation. No research has been done on the patron-client organisation in Kosovo. To produce

the original data required, during a fifteen month period between July 2012 to November 2013 interviews were made with mayors, local officials, key informants and civil society groups in all the sampled municipalities; diplomats and international organisation staff, as well as local analysts, journalists and researchers, were also consulted; and relevant secondary material, local histories and media reports were gleaned for insights.

The first section will discuss the key actors of the clientelist model and the key organisational structures within which clientelism operates. The second section argues that these structures are channelled through political parties, which in Kosovo's municipalities take a very different form from those in western European states—for the most part they should be best understood as informal networks that are created to distribute public resources and act as reference points for different patron-client networks. The third section demonstrates that political parties and the patron-client networks which they contain have become part of broader social logics in Kosovo; in particular, they have become intertwined with pre-existing social networks that exist at the kin, village and neighbourhood level. In contrast then to some political scientists who view ties between patrons and clients as purely political and expedient, this chapter affirms the view of those who propose that clientelist structures are firmly embedded in a broader social ecology in which they operate.

Section I: Patrons, Brokers and Clients

In its most abstract form clientelism involves patrons, who in order to access or maintain power, seeks the vote, favours or loyalty from a client, who receives treatment or resources that are not readily available to everyone in the same, or similar, positions (Hilgers 2011, p. 568). The first section drills down from this

definition to discuss the key actors of the clientelist model—the patron and the client—and explores how they operate, their interests and motivations behind both and other actors with whom they are connected. It also describes the basic organisation of a patron- client network and the most important 'nuts and bolts' of the organisation: brokers.

V:I:I Patron and Clients

In ancient Rome, 'patronus' spoke on behalf of individuals in public; in the contemporary world, resources matter much more than oratory skills for an aspiring patron because most scholars agree now that clientelism is based upon an interest maximising exchange of resources (public or private) (Hilgers 2011). The only pre-requisite for both clients and patrons is that you must have something to exchange.

Patrons are those actors with access to public resources. The question, therefore, of 'whom' the patrons are depends, in part, on how a given political system structures the command over public resources. In a decentralised state like Kosovo, the chief patrons at the municipal level are most likely—but not exclusively—to be the mayors, who are directly elected and have significant executive powers. In Kosovo few mayors have independent wealth or expend private resources on maintaining their client network, and so nearly all depend on what is apportioned to municipalities by the central government. Nearly 80% of the municipality budget comes from the central level, and much of this is fixed by law to be spent in a particular way on core areas such as education and health. Mayors, therefore, do not have a free reign over all the resources administered at the municipal level.

Despite this institutional constraint, my field work has shown that the scope of resources that each mayor in Kosovo presides over is still significant, especially compared to any other economic or political actor at the local level. And it is wide-ranging, from road repairs, small infrastructure developments and street lighting to non-routine administrative documents, such as building permits, and one-off material goods, including phone cards and even sacks of flour. Field work revealed that patrons will place few resources off limits—flowers and beauty treatment have been offered as sweeteners to potential clients (Gashi 21.11.12). The patron-client relationship may remain stable, but the nature of the goods can evolve over time. In Kamenica municipality, scarce water and electricity used to be the currency of exchange, but now most of the town is adequately supplied as these two goods seem to have left the clientelist armoury (Writer Kamenica 11.02.13).

The most valuable resource in the patron's armoury is discretion over public employment. Directors of schools, teachers, municipality administrators, builders on public works, health workers, security guards and refuse collectors can all be chosen directly or indirectly by the mayor. The demand for any sort of municipal employment is extremely high. Economic insecurity in Kosovo is rife, with the unemployment rate having stood steadily at 40 percent and more than a third of the countries' citizens live below the poverty line of €1.55 per day (Swiss Embassy Pristina 2013). Alternative employment opportunities in the private sector are scarce; in fact, there are very few productive sectors within the economy, which explains why for many people and families, the prospect of employment by the municipality offers the only hope for regular income and a glimmer of light in the economic gloom. The Mayor of Hani i Elezit revealed to

me that in 90 percent of his daily meetings with citizens a request is made for employment, whether for themselves or a family member. 'People see the municipality as a job agency', the Mayor said (Mayor Suma 21.03.13). A political candidate in the same municipality also described how when he is approached to provide 'compensation' for a potential client, the request almost always takes the form of a job (PDK candidate Hani I Elezit 22.10.13).

The centrality of employment in patron-client relations in Kosovo is not just explained by the demands of potential clients, but jobs also have some natural qualities that make it such an appealing resource for patrons. Economists Robinson and Verdier argue that the charm of employment is that it is a more 'credible, selective, and reversible method of redistribution, (Robinson, Verdier 2013, p. 262); more credible because jobs normally involve observable contracts and more selective because they can be easily apportioned to individuals, unlike road repairs for a street. Reversibility though may be the most attractive quality as it creates strong incentives for clients to remain loyal to the patron. Patrons cannot undo road repairs or ask for a university scholarship to be paid back but they can withdraw employment if necessary, an implicit threat that keeps clients in line and stops defection to another patron. Employees also know that may be sacked if a rival patron beats their own patron and so a second bind is created whereby 'the continued utility of a voter to the particular success of a particular politicians' (Robinson, Verdier 2013, p. 262).

These assumptions of how patrons may utilise employment are confirmed by my field work in Kosovo. The threat of taking away employment is sometimes explicit. A keen observer of the political scene in Mitrovica revealed to me that besides the formal contract, an employee at the municipality has to accept

informal conditions: 'One condition is that parties expect votes. If you are from a certain village then the party expects the votes from that village. If you do not bring them enough votes, you are either demoted or are out.' He added that in Mitrovica, 'It is very scary how normal this is becoming' (NGO director Mitrovica 18.03.13).

Across Kosovo, workers are also aware that the length of employment is most likely tied to the continued success of the patron. In Mitrovica, it is also 'common sense' that if your work is connected to the municipality, you should become a member of the ruling party (NGO director Mitrovica 18.03.18). Turnovers of staff after elections are extremely common and create the perception at least that one's job is tied to the continued success of the patron. After the 2009 election in Kamencia, the incoming Mayor tried to kick out forty three people from their jobs (Journalist Kamenica 08.02.13); in Peja, it was reported to me that over twenty five people were fired after the same election (LDK secretary Peja 24.04.13). An employee never knows if your job has been targeted as part of the spoils of a rival patron, and therefore, there is a rationale for those employed to continually support the incumbent patron in charge, even if you disagree with his or her broader politics.

Field work also seemed to confirm Robinson and Verdier's general hypothesis that patrons' offers are most likely to take the form of employment. Indeed, such is the attractiveness of employment, mayors often improvise to create short-term positions that can ignore normal civil service hiring practices, and serve to increase the number of employment places on offer. In Kamenica municipality in 2011, it has been found that ten employees were hired without any formal call for applications (Gemi 13.11.12).

Within the formal system, people are citizens with, in theory at least, attendant rights and responsibilities. Under the informal system, they assume the role of clients with different rights and responsibilities: they have a responsibility to offer support and a right to claim privileged access to goods and resources. Clients' currency is political support. This can be expressed in different ways, with voting the most likely form. More valuable currency, however, is for the client not only to offer the vote but also join the political party as a sign of a greater commitment to the patron. Important to note is that, as one Mayor explained to me, party membership is understood rather informally; attending a party meeting in the local village can be a signal of affiliation (Mayor Selmanaj 17.07.13).

There are seemingly few barriers to entry into a clientelist relationship. During interviews, there was no sense that patrons paid attention to what are possibly traditional obstacles in Kosovo to entry into work or social relationships, such as age or gender. Observing politicians on the election trail, it was noticeable how they canvassed voters indiscriminately. In one restaurant in Kamenica, a candidate for the 2013 mayoral contest, deep in campaigning mode, moved from table to table, canvassing people of all ages and gender. While movement *up* the network does certainly depend on certain pre-requisites (see section I:III), the only condition for becoming a client is the ability to vote.

V:I:II Patrons and entrepreneurship

There is much discussion in the literature about how the character of clientelism is shaped by the formal institutions within which it operates (Hilgers 2012; Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007). From this perspective, the resources available to patrons are configured according to the institutional formula linking

municipalities with the centre and this would imply that there is a 'standard menu' on offer across Kosovo. While there is to a certain extent a set range of resources, the scope and nature of offers of patrons can vary considerably, despite patrons operating in the same institutional setting. In-depth investigations revealed that differences in the scope and nature of the resources on offer are shaped by one important characteristic: the entrepreneurial ability of patrons.

The common lament of international organisations that municipal actors lack 'management experience' in Kosovo is contradicted by the entrepreneurial skill exhibited by patrons, who do not just rely on resources from the centre but seek out new sources of spoils. The Mayor of Decan, for example, explained to me that he felt it was incumbent upon him to seek out resources through as many different avenues as possible, connections, friends, comrades, rivals (Mayor Selmanaj 17.07.13).

Field interviews have suggested that a patron's entrepreneurial endeavours normally involve two routes: the private sector and international donors. Public-private partnerships occur across Kosovo—just not in the form envisaged by the disciples of 'new public management.' A common model of engagement is that a private company receives privileged treatment in relation to a building permit or tender, and in exchange a patron is guaranteed discretion over a number of places of employment, which are deployed to shore up or extend his or her own clientelist network. There is good evidence to suggest, for example, that a Swiss-based supermarket chain had been given favourable treatment to build a huge supermarket that now dominates the old bazaar in Kamenica, and in exchange the incumbent Mayor could put 'his people' into positions of employment within the store (Gemi 13.11.12; Journalist Kamenica 08.02.13). Field work suggests that

patrons in Prizren have also engaged in partnerships with the private sector, this time a shopping mall constructor, to increase the number of jobs they have discretion over (NGO director Prizren 13.03.13).

It is not just the private sector that is vulnerable to the clientelist logic but donor investment programmes can also provide patrons with additional resources. Public infrastructure projects funded by donors, such as a municipal square, a new bridge or municipal building, create short-term work opportunities that are often subsumed under clientelist relations as it is often the local patron who can decide who gets employed. Workers building a small public bridge and seating area in Kamenica municipality as part of the European Commission investment programme 'Beautiful Kosova' had been apparently pressured to join a particular party before they could take up their positions (IO employee Kamenica 19.02.13). In Mitrovica, the choice of participants within a UNDP-funded internship programme for young people fell under the clientelist logic (NGO director Mitrovica 18.03.18). In the literature, it has long been recognised that national elites accommodate international actors in order to secure the general grants and funding that can make patronage networks possible (Shefner), but what is demonstrated here is how specific project interventions by international actors occurring on the lowest levels of government can also be also incorporated in a very direct way into the clientelist system.

To sum up, there is variation in the 'resource regimes' in which clients from different municipalities are faced with diverse kinds of deals and offers. The mutability of this aspect of clientelism at the local level depends in part on the ability of patrons to seek out new resources. The important point raised here is that certain characteristics of clientelism (in this case, the type and scope of

resources) are not just shaped by the formal rules but are also self-made, locally-negotiated and ever-changing, a finding that sensitises researchers to possibly question the idea that over-arching formal institutions frame actors' behaviour within clientelist relationship.

Section II: Patron-built organisations

At the heart of clientelism are personal relationships between patrons and their clients, but most empirical studies demonstrate that to be successful, patrons cannot rely solely on these face-to-face interactions because managing clients in this way would be overwhelming—the informational requirements needed are just too great for one person. Consider the scale of information patrons must acquire at the municipal level in Kosovo to keep their networks 'in business.' They need to know whom may be susceptible to offers and which voters need what, e.g are the large family in village X interested in a job or would road repairs be more alluring. Patrons must also find a way of discerning how much support a particular client can bring, how much influence a client may have in a particular neighbourhood or village, how credible the client is, and whether rival patrons have also offered them a deal and on what terms (Stokes 2014). Finally, patrons must also find ways of ensuring that clients uphold their side of the bargain as 'politicians run the risk of misdirecting resources to voters who will defect; in other words, take the money and run' (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007, p. 14).

Without this information, it is very difficult for a patron to maintain his or her network of clients, but these aspects of political behaviour are intricate, opaque and subject to constant change and can only be collected informally via personal communication. To manage the prodigious informational demands of the clientelist system, *patrons build organisations.* This sub-section describes the

basic organisation of a patron-client network and the most important 'nuts and bolts' of the organisation: brokers.

V:II:I Brokers

Central to a patron's organisation are 'brokers': people who lack access to distributable resources but have organizational and leadership skills and use their abilities to act as middlemen between clients and higher levels of power (Scott 1969). Brokers mediate the relationship between patron and client and are an essential and recurring feature of the clientelist model in Kosovo. While in other parts of the world, brokers can be often identified by a particular name (e.g cabos electorais in Brazil or porteurs de voix in Senegal) (Stokes 2014, p. 19), in Kosovo there is no specific or colloquial label for brokers, but most people, could identify who they may be in the municipality. Brokers must not only key into community gossip, they are themselves part of it, making it easier for people to identify them. One key informant in Kamenica suggested that brokers are easy to locate for the average citizen: 'Speak to anyone here [in the municipality], they know who to approach' (NGO director Kamenica 20.02.12).

Although brokers have always been part of the clientelism literature, studies often do not distinguish between different kinds of brokers; if they do, the distinction generally references a hierarchy presaged by different levels of power (i.e brokers at the municipal, regional then national level). Field work uncovered that there are in fact a hierarchy of brokers *within* the municipal level, a finding that should sensitise researchers to the complexity of clientelist organisation, even at the lowest level of government. The distinction stressed here is between 'first order brokers' and 'second order brokers' (Muno 2010, p. 5). What kind of broker you are depends on how close you are to the patron, and in turn, this will

determine your role: first order brokers are the core management team and their role is to keep an overview of what is going on, monitor the overall distribution of resources and manage subordinates in the chain of command—all of which is done in close collaboration with the main patron; while second order brokers, who mostly lack direct access to the patron and often work under the guidance of first order brokers, tend to collect information about particular villages or neighbourhoods and are a important channel of communication between patrons and clients.

'First order brokers' will invariably hold positions in the municipality as director of a particular department or will be influential in the local party. The Deputy Mayor of Skenderaj is a good example of an insider broker. While I interviewed him in a small cafe on the main street in Skenderaj, many people approached him to say hello, exchange information and ask for favours. He also exhibited intricate knowledge of what was going on across the municipality. Engaging with a man at a neighbouring table, he was able to point out to me the problems in that man's village: 'this guy, I know his village has a problem with the road and we will fix it for them' (Deputy Mayor Fadolli 24.03.13). During the interview, it was clear his deference to the patron, Mayor Lushtaku, as he waxed lyrical about all the important things he had done for the municipality.

In Kosovo, directors of schools are also particularly important 'first order' patrons because they have a crucial monitoring role in relation to elections, which take place in schools under the management of the schools' directors. Directors play important logistical roles on election days, and during what is a sometimes a rather chaotic process, they can access the voting registers and essentially monitor who votes for whom (D4D 2013). This specialist function of subverting the secret

ballot is an important way that patrons can hold clients to account (Gemi 13.11.12).

In the large municipalities, the monitoring and informational demands of a clientelist network cannot be satisfied via the first-order brokers alone. Second-order brokers, who lack direct access to the patron and often work under the guidance of first order brokers, also mediate between patrons and clients. They can be village leaders, party militants, low-level administrative workers in the municipality, and are essential for information gathering in particular villages and neighbourhoods. When I asked the Mayor of Decan how he knew who had voted for him, he explained to me that: 'I have many friends, the way I organise the party, I can understand the situation in every community'(Mayor Selmanaj 17.07.13).

Often second-order brokers will become what is termed in the local parlance, a 'party militant.' During election time, they may hand out campaign material but are more likely to camp out in a certain cafe or tea shop to convince customers to support the party, and on election night, they pour onto the streets, waving flags, beeping horns and shooting fireworks into the sky, even if the result is not altogether satisfactory.[53] Party militants are those who make their support for a patron public and conspicuous, and thus most credible because by declaring such public support, party activists are essentially pledging 'all or nothing support' for the patron as militants effectively cut themselves off from any resources if the opposition should win, but increase their chances of a reward if the incumbent is re-elected (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007, p. 15).

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[53] Author observations: Peja, Hani I Elesit, Pristina.

The figure below then presents a stylised municipal patron-client network in Kosovo and uses a classic organisational chart that has long been used to depict patron-client structures (Scott 1972, p. 59).

Figure 8: Patron-client structure

As described earlier, patrons sit at the top of the pyramid by virtue of their discretion over public resources. The ties of the chain are all vertical, all linking up to the patron in a hierarchical sense—there are no lateral ties between brokers, for instance, who, as discussed all report to the undisputed authority in the structure: the patron. Even in Kamenica, a municipality in which no particular party has a stronghold, interviewees underlined the elevated status of the mayor. Summing up the views of many interviewees, one informant suggested 'unofficially the Mayor controls everything' (IO employee Kamenica 19.02.13). As the ties are vertical, they also span status differences: a second-order broker is dependent on a first-order broker who is dependent on the patron. Status within these networks at the municipal level merely means proximity to the patron rather than status accorded by an official position (though an official position can

increase proximity to a patron). This does not mean that the status differences are always acute as there is some degree of mutual dependence. For example, mayors cannot easily cast aside brokers for fear of the broker taking some clients with him.

To sum up this section, internationally-led statebuilding has sought to establish a statebuilding model of governance at the municipal level sustained and shaped by mayor and citizens, but in reality, these political actors work in a different guise: mayors act as patrons and citizens as clients and both actors co-operate through informal means. Patrons also deploy brokers to manage the complex informational demands required to sustain and extend a patron-client network. Yet these patron-broker-client ties are not free-standing or detached. Indeed, patron-broker-client ties operate within in a broader organisational setting: the political party. At this point then it is important to introduce this important additional dimension and the next section will explore how political parties are connected to patron-client organisation.

Section III: Political parties as organisational casing for patron-client networks

Party politics is a conspicuous feature of day-to-day life in most of Kosovo's municipalities. Walk through the main street of Kamenica municipality, for example, and one cannot help but notice how the different party branches occupy the most visible buildings, each with large and bright facades displaying the logos and symbols of the party. This section presents research into the nature of political parties in Kosovo at the municipal level that reveals they have a very different 'organisational DNA' from those political parties found in countries of the international statebuilders, such as Germany or the United States. Political parties

are mostly (but perhaps not entirely) *non-political* in the sense of being disinterested or impassive towards political ideology, beliefs or policy. Instead, the objective for parties is mostly about furnishing the patron-client network with public resources whenever it is possible to do so. Consequently, rather than open and democratic organisations that seek to implement a collective plan, political parties at the municipal level for the most part should be understood as informal networks that provide an organisational setting for the different actors in the patron-client structure: patrons normally lead the local political party; brokers are often members of it; and clients express support for it.

V:III:I Municipal parties as non-political

According to most definitions of modern political parties, they should aim primarily to provide for collective action on the part of like-minded people and aggregate disparate social interests around a common platform (Diamond, Gunther 2001). Common platforms and collective action are normally underpinned by and geared towards an ideology: a core set of beliefs and principles that distinguish one party from the other and invariably motivates members of parties and binds them together.

In general, the evidence suggests that political parties at the municipal level in Kosovo (aside perhaps from the 'self-determination party', Vetevendojse) do not meet this core definition of a political party because they are not underpinned by any kind of ideology whether this is based in on class interests, political philosophy or policy concerns. For the past fifteen years, the three main parties have struggled to articulate where they stand on the ideological spectrum

and seldom campaign on broad programmatic appeals.[54] A 2012 policy report

from a respected local think tank in Kosovo summed up the situation:

> 'There is nothing new to be said if we repeat that political parties in Kosovo do not have their own political ideology, no real programs, and not even a clear membership...The best indicator of the lack of ideology and affiliation and identification of members with the ideology of a party is frequent transfer of members of one political party to another' (KIPRED 2012, p. 5).

Interviews with party activists and leaders at the municipal level have confirmed

political ideology offers little guidance for how the main parties behave. When I

asked a senior PDK politician and opposition candidate in Hani i Elezit

municipality what his party were campaigning on, he pulled out a technical report

from a think tank in Pristina on some of the issues in the local area and started to

read it out. This report, which had nothing do with his own or his party's internal

thought process, merely listed the infrastructure challenges facing the

municipality rather than policies or solutions (PDK candidate Hani I Elezit

22.10.13). Party manifestos when they do exist tend to be a long-list of generic

promises about jobs and roads, which are generally unrealisable (Gemi 28.06.15).

Discussions with party activists and voters on what the party stood for

often revolved around the rather vacuous 'doing better' than the other parties. One

keen observer of the political scene in Mitrovica municipality described

'pragmatism' as the only ideology in local politics (NGO director Mitrovica

18.03.18). When party identities do exist but they are, in the cases of AAK and

PDK especially, built upon the supposed mercurial abilities of their leaders, or in

the case of LDK their past role in the Albanian resistance, rather than ideology.

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[54] Since the war in 1999, three main parties have dominated the Kosovan political landscape: the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) established in 1999; the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) created in 1989; and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) was founded in 2000. The other notable party is The Self-Determination Movement (VV) established in 2005 as a civic initiative.

V:III:II The organisational basis of political parties

If parties are not bounded by ideology, what does tie the members of political parties together? The evidence suggests that political parties in Kosovo are tied together by what James C. Scott labelled 'the political cement of self-interest' (Scott 1969, p. 1151) and for the best description of contemporary political parties in Kosovo, we should look to political parties in 19th century urban America, from where political sociologists have drawn the idea of a political machine: 'a non-ideological organisation interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders and distributing income to those who run it and work for it' (Scott 1969, p. 1143). Patron-built networks have always existed but in different political guises—as 'cliques' in European princely courts or 'factions' in Stuart England. What distinguishes a political machine from these earlier, more elite-enclosed incarnations of patron organisation is that the machine is a response to mass democracy and therefore, is itself or has the potential to be, a mass network.[55] The crucial feature of machines is that material interests and not ideology are central to the organisation as 'a party machine relies on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for' (Scott 1969, p. 1143).

Field work across Kosovo's municipalities confirms that political parties may be considered to be non-political in the sense that they rarely express ideology but rather rely on material inducements. Keen observers of the political scene in Prizren municipality, for instance, suggested to me that the leaders of the former incumbent party, 'do not even like each other, it is common interests that

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[55] According to Fukuyama, the modern political machine was invented in the United States in the middle of the nineteenth century, where they were most sophisticated at the municipal level (Fukuyama 2014, p. 146).

keep them together. There is no ideology, just interests' (NGO director Prizren 13.03.13).

Tellingly, the word politics has come to mean 'the management of particular interests' in local discourse. In Skenderaj municipality a local construction worker explained how he was surprised that his friend had recently decided to run as a political candidate in the next election: 'I told him, you are wealthy, why do you need to get involved in politics.' He then turned round and smiled: 'maybe he wants to get even wealthier' (SK1). In Peja municipality a similar sense that politics was a way of furthering private interests was conveyed by a man who, when asked by me if he is involved in the local party, explained: 'no I am lucky. I have two jobs [one as a prison warden, the other on a farm] which means I can stay out of politics'(P7). Most other analyses in Kosovo affirm that material and particularistic interests underpin political organisation. One report for example suggests 'financial and material benefit seems to be the greatest cohesive force within the political party...this keeps members inside the party and motivated' (KIPRED 2012, p. 15).

The importance of this political cement is evidenced by the fact rules favouring open and democratic debate are generally cast aside in favour of informal and flexible organisation that serve better the distribution of resources. Consequently, the formal rules from their basic organisational documents matter very little and one indication of this is the informality of decision making, which one report suggests 'are frequent and powerful' and often put 'into shade party organs and the requirements derived from the basic documents of the party' (KIPRED 2012, p. 16).

To conclude, despite their logos, slogans, party badges, official structure and headquarters, political parties in Kosovo's municipalities take a very different form from those in western European states. Rather than public associations shaped by internal democratic rules and underpinned by a certain ideology, for the most part they should be best understood at the municipal level as informal networks that are created to distribute public resources and act as reference points for different patron-client networks. Often this is where political scientists cease their analysis but this would be to fall into the trap of treating these structures as enclosed political forms. Yet, as the next section demonstrates, another layer of analysis is necessary precisely because patron-client networks are not independent of the social setting in which they operate.

Section IV: Patron-client networks and social embeddedness

This section presents further findings of the empirical investigation into political networks at the municipal level to demonstrate that clientelist structures are not self-contained, political organisations that create relationships anew; rather they tap into *pre-existing* social networks. Political parties and the patron-client networks which they contain have become part of broader social logics in Kosovo; in particular, they have become intertwined with pre-existing social networks that exist at the kin, village and neighbourhood level. In contrast then to political scientists that view the ties between patrons and clients as purely political and expedient (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007), the findings presented here affirms the view of those scholars who propose that clientelist structures are firmly embedded in a broader social ecology in which they operate (Auyero 2001). This section interrogates this broader social ecology that exists in Kosovo's municipalities. It

argues that *kin-communities*, that is kinship structures + immediate neighbourhood or village ties, are the central foundations of social life and important conduits for patron-client networks.

V:IV:I The primary associations of social life: Kin and the 'rreth'

Our understanding of social life in Kosovo's municipalities owes a lot to two anthropologists researching in Kosovo in the 1970s and 1980s (Backer 2003; Reineck 1993). These works by Bert Backer and Janet Reineck have demonstrated how for Kosovan Albanians associational life is not configured by class, religion, ideology or profession but, first and foremost, by the extended family; this kinship structure, however, extends to a slightly larger association, the immediate village or neighbourhood.

The extended family is the centrepiece of social organisation. Contemporary Kosovo has the largest households in Europe, a feature of the Kosovo Albanian community that has endured for centuries (ESI 2006). In 1948, for instance, the average Kosovo household had 6.4 members and in 2003 at 6.4 members. To place this in context, the average household size in the European Economic Area declined to 2.5 in 1995 (with Ireland standing out with Western Europe's largest families at 4.0 members) (ESI 2006).

In rural areas, households are often huge with up to forty members living under one roof, while adjoining houses may also contain relatives and sometimes these are contained in a walled family compound (ESI 2006). Janet Reineck has described how the nuclear family (*familija e ngusht)* extends into more extensive kinship structures that encompass the extended family (*shtëpia e madhe*), then to the father's brothers (*axhallarët*), the cousins (*kusherinjtë*), the village (*farefis)* and finally to the broadest expression of kin relations, the clan (*fis)* (Reineck

1993, p. 41). Kinship structures are not just extensive but have been traditionally intimate and tightly-knit to the extent that anthropologists have referred to the family as a 'corporate entity':

> 'The family is corporate group par excellence: property is held in common, the group acts as one body in the face of disputes with outsiders, there is a leader who represents the group to other groups...the structure has, in a sense, a life of its own independent of the members' (Reineck 1993, p. 55).

Though kin structures are central to the social fabric, ties and participation occur beyond the family to the immediate village (in more rural municipalities) or the neighbourhood (in more urban municipalities). Villages and neighbourhoods tend to be tightly knit, partly because members of the extended family often live in the same village or neighbourhood, but also because they provide a setting for inter-family co-operation. These relations beyond the extended family are very intimate and, rather tellingly, members of the immediate community are referred to with kin-like labels. In an interview with a village elder in Koperinice village for example, he referred to non-family members as 'our niece and nephews' (Village elder Kopernice 20.02.13). Indeed, the importance of these obligations and participation to the immediate community is tied up in a traditional concept of the 'rreth'. Literally translated as a 'circle', it is taken to mean the social circle or moral community, with each 'rreth' underpinned by its own norms and expectations of appropriate behaviour (Reineck 1993, p. 189).

Important anthropological work then has demonstrated that the central foundation in Kosovo's social organisation is the kin-community (extended family + immediate village or neighbourhood). Life in Kosovo has possibly changed somewhat from when these two anthropologists were researching and we should be wary of generalising to the present day from such specific studies. In

urban settings, especially the capital Pristina, it is plausible that the pre-eminence

of the family and the 'rreth' have attenuated in recent years and not all

neighbourhoods and extended families may be so tight-knit across the country.

Yet, my own investigation, based on in-depth interviews with key informants and

semi-structured interviews with sixty citizens across four municipalities, has

mostly confirmed the main proposition of the anthropological work conducted

more than two decades ago: immediate ties to kin-community remain the bedrock

of social organisation—that is, they still remain the primary sources of trust and

mutual obligations.[56]

V:IV:II Kin communities and trust

Data on trust and social capital is rather thin on the ground in Kosovo. To get a

broad idea of trust patterns in municipalities, I asked citizens (n=60) about whom

they trust: almost everyone, a few people, or only my family. The continued

importance of the kin-community would predict that citizens display

particularistic trust, meaning people trust members of their family and perhaps a

few other but display very little 'inter-personal' trust, that is they do not trust

wider society (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, p. 7). The results suggest that kin-

community in Kosovo are still the major source of trust with 51 percent of

respondents reporting that they only trust their family.

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[56] The influence of kinship structures on politics is often brought to light by the concept of clans—informal identity organizations with a kinship basis (Collins 2004). Analysts have described elsewhere about how clans have shaped political life in Kosovo; notoriously, the Musaj and the Haradinaj clans from the Dukagjini region (Kaltcheva 2008). The 'clan approach' is important because it sensitises political scientists to the enduring influence of family relations on political structures (Schatz 2005, p. 3). But given the importance of the 'rreth', one shouldn't *equate* patron-client networks with clans. *Strands* of patron-client networks are clan-like in the sense that they rest upon a kinship structure, but as organisations, patron-client network, as the survey has shown, have additional foundations, the immediate community.

Answers to questions: who do you trust in society? n=60

Figure 9: Types of trust in Kosovo's municipalities

The results of the research here have been supported by a larger Kosovo Youth Survey sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (IDRA 2012). One thousand young people in Kosovo were asked to evaluate their trust in several groups, according to a 0-100 scale where 0 means 'Do not trust at all' and 100 means 'Trust a lot.' The results demonstrate that family and relatives are the by far the most trusted social institutions for Kosovo's youth, having received 98 and 80 points on the trust scale, compared with 67 for friends and 53 for work colleagues, for example (IDRA 2012).

V:IV:III Kin-communities and connection to politics

The reason why kin-communities are so valuable for the patron-client structure is that they help overcome the trust problem. Patron-client networks are complex structures that operate in an entirely informal environment and rest on personal, face to face communication. Without the availability of formal contracts or formal rules to monitor brokers or clients, the principal-agent problem in this informal network is particularly pertinent: how can patrons ensure that both clients and

brokers uphold their side of the bargain. As Stoke suggests, brokers are 'agents ...whose actions cannot be exhausted or perfectly monitored; there is the possibility that brokers may defect, mislead or serve their own interests' (Stokes 2014, p. 19). Moreover, patrons must also find ways of ensuring that clients return support as 'politicians run the risk of misdirecting resources to voters who will defect; in other words, take the money and run' (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007, p. 14). Within the informal structure, finding ways to develop trust becomes extremely important, something that patrons seem to be well aware of. In a revealing exchange, the Mayor of Kamenica told me that he had been approached by an influential member of an opposition party (PDK) about joining his party (LDK). When I asked how he had dealt with the approach, it became clear that considerations of trust were central: 'the chance is open for him to work with us, but we cannot yet fully trust him. In the future maybe, but he would have to prove himself' (Mayor Shaip Surdulli 18.07.13).

As I have explained, kin-communities are extensive social groupings underpinned by trust – perfect channels, therefore, through which to build patron-client networks. There is an additional gain of efficiency in channelling patron-client networks through these pre-existing social configurations. Kitchelt and Wilkinson, for instance, argue that patrons prefer deals with groups of clients because 'monitoring groups of voters—or having them monitor themselves then rewarding or punishing the group—is much more efficient than monitoring and then punishing individuals' (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007, p. 17).

Patron-client networks connect to these broader social structures through the informal ties of the broker system (see section I). Brokers connecting kin-communities to patron-client networks are likely to be family members or village

residents, and clientelist connections may be held over a long period or emerge more spontaneously in meetings with village elders (Gemi 28.06.15). Despite the recent transformation of Kosovo's political landscape, it is rather interesting to compare the brokers of today with the League of Communists representatives whom used to connect families and villages to the broader Yugoslav political system. Bert Backer, for example, has explained how the village of Isniq was integrated into political structures in the 1970s via 'party people' (*partia)*, whom had less natural authority than the traditional village elders and instead would generate relationships based upon the kind of public resources they could deliver to the village (Backer 2003, p. 92).

V:VI:III A deeper view—new actors

In seeing patron-client networks as being embedded in broader social networks that revolve around kin and immediate community, a deeper understanding of how the clientelism model functions in Kosovo can be gained. For instance, the broader literature often stresses the private, individualised nature of clientelist relationships (Hilgers 2011), an emphasis that overlooks the fact that in Kosovo it is common for kin-communities to 'club' together to enter into a collective bargain with a patron over small club goods, such as road repairs or small infrastructure investment. These small club goods can still be classed as being part of clientelist exchanges because it would normally involve a personal, face-to-face offer by a patron to *all* the residents of the kin-community, who then would all agree with each other to exchange their vote for the small club good. Moreover, this tendency is often the result of the nature of the resources that a patron presides over, most of which, such as road repairs, new waste management, a small football pitch or playground, cannot be divided up into individual parcels.

These groups of what I label *clientelist collectives* oriented around a kin-community are an important aspect of the clientelism that is often overlooked in the classical political models that focus on individualistic exchanges. The importance of 'clientelist collectives' is evidenced in voting patterns which suggest that kin-communities tend to vote in the same way. Perhaps this is not always the case across Kosovo, but a mapping analysis of voting behaviour in the 2013 municipal election in Kamenica revealed a strong correlation between neighbourhood and party choice, for example (Gemi 28.06.15). My own interviews with politicians revealed that it is rather common for them to be able to identify parts of the municipality with certain political parties and a rather striking feature of many neighbourhoods is that they are often peppered with graffitied symbols of their favourite parties. A keen observer of the local political scene in Mitrovica affirmed the importance of clientelist collectives when she described how municipal planning is often oriented towards groups: 'When your guy is in power, you have priority as a neighbourhood. When your guy isn't there, then 'good luck', you will not be part of the municipality plan....The ties to the party are often channeled via the neighbourhoods' (NGO worker Mitrovica 18.03.13).

The broader social perspective also challenges classical political models in another sense, as it reveals an important additional layer of actors that I have called '*clients by association*' (CBAs): people who do not directly benefit from a clientelist exchange of a private good but are part of the network because they have some sort of kin-community association with a client and therefore feel obligated to vote according to the clientelist logic. The classic model often assumes that it only those directly receiving a good that are part of the relationship because it would be 'irrational' to support a patron without receiving something

back in return. This assumption overlooks socio-cultural logics (Olivier de Sardan, J.P 1999) of kin-communities that obligate people to support a family member or a neighbour, to give a common example from Kosovo, whose job at the municipality depends on bringing in votes. Clients by association are recruited during a kind of 'shadow election campaign' in which clients knock on the doors of family members or even neighbours to ask for votes so that they may be able to obtain or maintain their a job for the next four years (Gemi 13.11.12).

The number of CBAs increases in contexts where kin-community obligations are strong. One analyst calculated that only 10 percent of active voters in his municipality can make a free choice during elections; while some of the remaining 90 percent are clients, a larger proportion will be CBAs (Gemi 13.11.12). Though CBAs are secondary actors, they are of primary significance through their tacit endorsement of the clientelist system. The CBAs have no direct relationship with a patron, nor will they gain anything directly from supporting the clientelist exchange, but by voting according to a clientelist logic, they endorse the system, while foregoing the anti-clientelist alternative, i.e voting for a party that bases appeals on programmatic concerns.

EMPIRICAL TEST

Research has shown that patron-client networks are channelled through political parties, which in turn connect to broader social networks, especially the kin-community. The conclusion is based on intensive field-work as well as evidence from secondary sources: but does it stand up to a more extensive quantitative check? To check if this view is broadly supported by perceptions of citizens, I included a question in the main survey (n=1056) that asked respondents what do

you think is the 'best way to establish strong connections with the political leaders'? A choice was designed around the main social institutions in Kosovo: religion, educational, business, kinship, political party and moral standing, all of which were chosen because prior field work suggested that these were the mostly likely possibilities for political ties at the municipal level in Kosovo.

According to the perception of citizens, by some distance the best way to establish connections with political leaders is to join the political party (38%) or to be a member of their family (33%). Education, moral standing and religious affiliation were barely relevant in most municipalities. Business links (13%) may matter but not to any great degree.

Figure 10: Answers: 'best way to establish strong connections with the political leaders'

As the histogram below demonstrates, there is some diversity when the results are broken down by municipality. In Gracanica, the only Serb municipality surveyed, business connections (29%) are more important than family membership for connections (24%), though the political party still came out on top (42%). In Hani

I Elezit, positive qualities (high levels of education and being a good person) were much higher (32%) on average than the rest of the municipalities (13%). In three municipalities (Skenderaj, Prizren and Pristina) kinship structures were perceived as better ways of establishing connections than political parties. Notwithstanding some diversity, the results are rather clear from the survey, the two main blocks on the histogram are for kinship structures and the political party, a result that holds even after stratifying responses according to gender and education attainment. This quantitative check then provides robust supporting evidence for the main qualitative arguments.

Figure 11: Answers: 'best way to establish strong connections with the political leaders'

Chapter conclusion

This chapter has aimed to bring give an empirically based account of the different actors and elements of the clientelist governance model. It has described how patrons, clients and brokers behave and how they are organised in Kosovo's municipalities. Perhaps, the most important finding of the chapter is that clientelist structures are not self-contained organisations that create relationships anew; rather patron-client networks tie into capacious social networks that pre-

exist clientelist organisation. Qualitative research, confirmed by survey data, has shown patron-client networks have become part of broader social logics in Kosovo and intertwined with social relations that exist at the kin, village and neighbourhood level. In this sense, my findings side with those scholars who emphasise the social embeddedness of clientelism (Persson et al. 2013; Olivier de Sardan, J.P 1999; Auyero 2001), and which challenges those who tend see patron-client organisation as predominantly political in nature (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007).[57]

This perspective has extended the analytical space to reveal a deeper layer of actors, notably client-collective and clients-by association, which the literature has generally missed out on. The implication of these findings is that patron-client networks are probably more deep-seated and pervasive than is often portrayed, as social networks embroil relatives and neighbours into clientelist exchanges, whom often do not have anything thing to directly gain from the exchange. It is precisely because of this intertwinement with social networks that explain why some scholars depict patron-client organisation as 'tentacle-like' (Stokes 2014, p. 19).

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[57] Javier Auyuero's now classic study of Peronist networks in a shanty-town in Buenos Aires has revealed how clientelist networks are often not the result of opportunistic political constructions but rather express *already existing* informal networks and cultural practices that are 'key elements in the everyday lives' of the poor people (Auyero 2001, p. 13).

Figure 12: Depiction of a socially-embedded patron-client network

In sum these findings suggest that we can reassess how patron-client organisations are depicted. This highly stylised diagram depicts a patron-client network that is more complex than conventional depictions. The shaded box represents the political party, which provides an informal organisational setting within which patrons and brokers operate and act as reference points for different patron-client networks. The red lines and connectors portray the social networks, the ties of trust and mutual obligations, within which patron-client networks are rooted.

Finally we have the actors themselves. As described earlier, patrons sit at the top of the pyramid by virtue of their discretion over public resources. Beneath the patrons is a chain comprised of first then second order brokers that links to clients, clientelist collectives and clients by association. Though the network is

depicted as hierarchy this does not mean that the status differences are always acute as there is some degree of mutual dependence. Large clientelist collectives, for example, sometimes have a stronger bargaining position than patrons. The status differences are also not always sharply delineated; indeed, the lower rungs of the network can be fluid and dynamic as clients, for instance, are often recruited into second order broker roles. Clients are often pressured into bringing in votes at election times, an obligation which turns clients then into brokers as they must mediate between their village or neighbourhood and the municipality, thus becoming part of the structure (NGO director Mitrovica 18.03.18).

This depiction is of a rather complex structure but it is important to note that the nature of the structure will vary across municipalities in Kosovo. In larger municipalities in which more clients must be maintained and sought, a more sophisticated, broker-driven structure may be built by patrons. But even in small municipalities, the patron may be a particularly effective and can build a structure with many layers. In other municipalities, patron-client structures may be rather simple with patrons relying on an inner team of brokers and nothing more.

Even so, one important characteristic endures across all municipalities: patron-client organisations are rooted in social networks. Such a view reaffirms that clientelism *is not a series of unrelated, individual acts but a social phenomena*. This perspective forces us to reassess what kind of institution clientelism is. Many perspectives would view clientelism as bad for governance. But as part of social networks, clientelism may not be considered corrupt, especially as it ties into mutual obligations that are deeply embedded, so seeking a job for a family member from a patron may not be seen as countering social norms but rather fulfilling them. Ultimately, this is an important empirical

question. The next chapter goes into more detail to focus on the question: why do people engage with the clientelist model rather than the statebuilding model?

Chapter VI: The demand-side of statebuilding

'*If you build it, they will come***...'** This oft-quoted line from the 1989 film 'Field of Dreams' refers to the voice that Iowa farmer Ray Kinsella hears in his head, an utterance that encourages Kinsella, despite the incredulity of his friends and family, to destroy his corn crop in order to build a baseball field in the middle of his field. Though international statebuilding has little to do with building baseball fields in rural Iowa, the underlying assumption is often the same: build up liberal-democratic states and the local people will come, they will engage, participate and support the new institutions.

It is not hard to see why there has been such confidence in this assumption that the supply of formal rules of the game will always meet demand in these settings. Statebuilders are often welcomed—or at least invited—to these settings, and cordial day-to-day interactions between international project managers and local politicians reinforce the assumption that everyone is unified by the statebuilding vision. When resistance does occur, it is framed as marginal acts of deviance by 'spoilers', dissidents in a general swell of demand for statebuilding.

The self-evident desirability of the statebuilding vision has been propped up by decades of western thought that have exalted the liberal-democratic state to the point where it is sometimes considered as ultimate form of societal organisation (Fukuyama 2006). As legal anthropologist Leopold Posposil noticed almost forty years ago (Pospisil 1971, p. 115): [58]

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[58] Quote in Migdal 1988, p. 30

> 'in our Western civilization we are accustomed to regard the rule of law of the state as the primary, almost omnipotent standard to which the individual looks for the protection and with which he tries to conform his behaviour. Only within the framework of this basic conformity, we tend to think, may there exist additional controls of the family, clique, association, and so on.'

The state has such a taken-for-granted quality in western thought that it has somewhat blinded statebuilders to the fact that it is a rather partial phenomenon, a form of organisation that may be less cherished in many parts of the world which have operated under different forms of organisation (Boege 2008; Kraushaar, Maren and Lambach, Daniel 2009; Roberts). The point is that statebuilding confronts an environment in which the state may not be considered as an unrivalled form of organisation; moreover, there exists alternative forms of organisation which may exert a greater hold over the population.

This has long been recognised. Joel S. Migdal, surveying world politics thirty years ago, insightfully argued that 'the central political and social drama of recent history has been the battle pitting the state and organizations allied with it against other social organizations dotting society's landscape' (Migdal 1988, p. 28). What Migdal noticed was a constant struggle for ascendancy between the state and other forms of organisation, a competition which was not marginal but essential. Non-compliance with the formal state 'is not simply personal deviance or criminality or corruption; rather, it is an indication of a more fundamental conflict over which organizations in society, the state or others, should make these rules'(Migdal 1988, p. 31).

International statebuilding engages in these 'fundamental conflicts.' As I had argued earlier, every formal model has an informal alternative, and statebuilding mostly attempts to eliminate these informal alternatives. The empirical research in this dissertation has shown that one informal model, the

clientelist model, has in many cases won the competition with the formal statebuilding model of the international statebuilders.

A MARKET FOR POLITICAL ORGANISATION

Build it and they will come—or they may not, people may be drawn to other forms of social organisation. Perpetual competition between different organisational forms, each vying for predominance, characterises settings in which statebuilding occurs, and to grasp this I use the analogy of a *market for political organisation* to emphasise the different political products on offer. The use of this metaphor does not imply that the dynamics can be explained by the utility-maximising behaviour of actors—as will be explained rational choice models are insufficient to explain dynamics—but the point is to emphasise that there is market place for political organisation.

The market analogy also emphasises other important elements of the competition. First, to explain why different organisational forms persist, it is necessary to look at both why political leaders *supply* the market with different political products, whether international statebuilders supplying formal, liberal models or local leaders supplying clientelism, and to explain why citizens *demand* –implicitly at least—a certain form of political organisation that may differ from that of the statebuilders. Second, the market metaphor emphasises that it is the micro-foundations, those constant daily interactions, which explain the predominance of a certain model. Consider a citizen who uses personalised connections with a politician to access a certain good (a common practice within Kosovo's municipalities as this chapter will show). In this instance, the viability

of the clientelist model is reaffirmed while the formal alternative (i.e going through formal procedures) atrophies precisely because it has been overlooked.

Finally, the market analogy more helpfully frames the reality of uncertain political contexts characteristic of post-conflict situations like Kosovo but also many other development settings. Transition is often used to describe such situations—we are reminded about 'Nations in Transition'—but such a framing is unhelpful because it implies that a clear trajectory has been set and all that is required is for nations to pushed along that transitional path. This notion obscures a reality of uncertainty in which various models of governance compete for predominance.

Competition, supply and demand, and micro-foundations constitute the frame in which to explain why clientelism persists and why therefore statebuilding is futile. This question will be answered in the course of rest of the dissertation. While the next chapter investigates the supply-side of clientelism, this chapter focuses on the demand side of the clientelist model.

Clientelism cannot be sustained by a small cabal but requires a core mass of clients. Put another way, the clientelist model persists because there is a sizeable group of people that through engaging in clientelist practice implicitly demand its continued existence. People still 'opt in' to clientelism despite international statebuilders having tried to smother the demand for clientelism through installing the statebuilding model of resource distribution at the municipal level. But the literature is very short of empirical evidence to pertaining to why people choose clientelism. In places subject to internationally-led statebuilding, we know almost nothing. This chapter aims to address this empirical gap by investigating why people engage in clientelism.

Section I will outline the theory and research method used to answer this question. Section II and III will present the empirical results. The chapter shows how people's beliefs, and goals, and choices available to them, shape responses to international statebuilding. In doing so, it has gone beyond purely cultural or rational-choice explanations to open up a hitherto understudied dimension of why people engage in clientelism. It has shown that in the demand side of clientelism, three distinct logics are present within Kosovo's municipalities: the logic of fear of 'losing out', a functional logic, and the logic of social norms.

Section I: Theoretical model and research approach

VI:I:I Theoretical model: the subjective rationality approach

Research into the question of why clientelism is both supplied and demanded should underpinned by a coherent theoretical approach for social behaviour. Two paradigms have dominated the study of institutions, of which the first is a 'culturalist' view that perceives institutions to be inextricable from a particular cultural context—clientelism then is 'just part of the culture.' Such a view is untenable because analytically it provides no room for agency (Rothstein 2005); it is as though clientelism persists because it is rooted in some mysterious, elusive force called culture rather than human agency.

Not only does the culturalist view make it very difficult to build up actual explanations for outcomes, a cursory review of history demonstrates that it really has very little explanatory significance, especially because it essentialises culture to the extent that it is difficult to imagine how social change could happen. Fukuyama has helpfully stressed that the country which invented modern clientlism was the United States and if it the cultural explanation were true then the country's politics would not have departed from one dominated by clientelist

party machines (Fukuyama 2014). The results from my empirical data also defy culturalist explanations as they show that Hani i Elezit municipality has a very different political style than others even though this municipality has, broadly speaking, the same culture in common with the others.

The second interpretation eschews cultural aspects and instead explains institutional outcomes according to the interactions of rational 'utility-maximising' actors. Rationalist perspectives have been criticised in recent years for caricaturing human behaviour, especially the idea that people only behave according to pure self-interest (Rothstein 2005). Empirically, rationalist explanations also seem insufficient to explain institutional outcomes. From the rationalist perspective it would be possible to predict clientelism according to certain objective, socio-economic criteria. Consider, the most-developed theoretical model for why clientelism persists based on a rational perspective and developed by Kitschelt and Wilkinson, which contains four socio-economic mechanisms (2007):

(1) Economic insecurity: as income increases, clientelist exchanges decrease because the opportunity costs of choosing clientelism increase compared to choosing the statebuilding model.

(2) Low education: people with less education have less capacity to understand and trace the lengthy causal process linking policy change to personal benefits, which may make them ignore or understate the benefits of the statebuilding model.

(3) Scaled-down social networks: the more locally-defined and circumscribed the social networks, the lesser appeal of collective goods serving wide constituencies (e.g based on professions or class) and the greater appeal of clientelism.

(4) Ethnic cleavages: ethnic divisions will increase clientelism as it emphasises the salience of targeted goods and increases the value of clientelist offers

This model is insufficient to explain the variation in clientelism as measured in my survey. First, variables three and four are controlled within this subnational research design as the municipalities surveyed were on the whole mono-ethnic, and social networks in Kosovo tend to be scaled down and circumscribed to the local level, with virtually no organisations representing broader interests. The second reason is that a cursory analysis of the remaining two mechanisms of the model also suggests that a purely rational-choice perspective is insufficient in explaining why people choose clientelism in Kosovo's municipalities. The following scatter plots correlate municipal level economic and education data gleaned from a UNDP survey (2012) with my own clientelism score to demonstrate a weak relationship between the variables.

r= -0.13593; P(T<=t) two-tail 2.84;

Figure 13: Economic insecurity: unable to afford to treat illnesses

r=-0.21662; P(T<=t) two-tail 1.45

Figure 14: Economic well being: unemployment

r=0.269904; P(T<=t) two-tail 3.69

Figure 15: Education Level

The explanatory power of the rationalist socio-economic model is not confirmed by the data. One can see a scattered distribution on each of the three plots, a pattern confirmed by the low co-efficient scores (-0.13, 0.21, 0.27), and the T-test scores for the data suggest we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two variables. The weak relationship between the variable is confirmed when one sees that municipalities with varying socio-economic characteristics have similar levels of clientelism. For example, levels of secondary education and above are thirty-five percent higher in Gracanica

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compared to Prizren but both have similar levels of clientelism. In Decan, fifty percent of the municipality are more insecure compared to Gracanica but again there are similar levels of clientelism. Moreover these variables seem to not really matter a great deal in explaining the outlier case of Hani I Elezit. The model would predict lower levels of economic insecurity and higher levels of education in this municipality. In each case, the data confounds the explanation—Hani I Elezit has one of the lowest levels of education, for example.

The point was not to test the Kitschelt and Wilkinson model but to show that it may be *insufficient:* it cannot fully explain in the cases here why some economically insecure people do not choose clientelism or why those more educated still engage in it. Clearly, economic insecurity and poor education do have a role to play. Indeed, during interviews economic circumstances was highlighted as an important factor that may affect the choice, and it is quite likely that these socio-economic factors provide an important background condition for clientelism or make it perhaps overall more likely.[59] Yet, the model's limitations show that objective or outside predictors of clientelism are insufficient and imply that there is also a significant realm of explanation *independent* of rationalist explanations which explain why people engage in clientelism.

This research aims to identify this realm. In doing so, it heeds to the approach of those scholars who argue that a unified conceptual map is necessary that links rationalist and cultural explanations (Rothstein 2005). Writing of political behaviour in rural societies, Migdal wisely stated, 'attempting to distinguish whether peasants act according to a moral economy or are rational

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[59] A middle-aged lady in Kamenica municipality, for example, explained that 'the difficult economic situation forces people to take such [clientelist] actions. The economic crisis is everywhere' (K1). Elsewhere other scholars have pointed out that poverty makes people more vulnerable to clientelist offers because of the short-term material relief it may offer (Szwarcberg 2013).

actors driven by material needs is a futile exercise; it loses sight of the integration of the material and the moral' (Migdal 1988, p. 27). A subjective rationality approach emphasises how interests can be defined as both material and normative; people do reason their actions but they do so in a way which is shaped by mental maps of their normative and material environment. Reasoned behaviour can only be understood by understanding the subjective rationality of actors; in other words, clientelist choices depend on 'where people sit and what they perceive'— in addition to or despite certain structural conditions, such as socioeconomic circumstances (Rothstein 2005; Ledeneva 2008).

The main implication for a subjective rationality approach is that we should not prescribe what motivations individual people use, but leave this for empirical investigation (Rothstein 2005, p. 42). Moreover, research should be geared towards finding an *insider perspective*. Structures, such as socioeconomic circumstances, of course matter but as Little argues, they do not 'plausibly cause outcomes' just make certain outcomes more likely than others. Instead:

> 'it is imperative to have further knowledge about the processes at work at the local level—the level of individual agency and choice—if we hope to say why one outcome occurred rather than another... we need to know what their beliefs and goals are and what choices are available to them through which they can pursue their goals' (Little 1991, p. 105).[60]

This research then aims to understand those beliefs, goals and choices from an insider viewpoint and the next section will explain the research method used to gain this perspective.

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[60] Quoted in (Migdal 1988, p. 38)

VI: I:II Research method: Vignettes

Generating insights into why people engage in clientelism is not easy and a mixed-method approach has been used. The main method has been to deploy 'vignettes' as an instrument to tap into motivations about clientelism. As part of in-depth interviews, sixty citizens across four different municipalities were asked to respond to three different vignettes about real-life situations in Kosovo. This section explains how I deployed the vignette research method; yet it should also be highlighted that these interviews with residents were complemented by additional interviews with key informants that sought to supplement and triangulate the information gained from the vignette research.

Vignettes are 'short stories about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances, to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond' (Finch 1987, p. 105). This research instrument is particularly appropriate because it provides an engaging and subtle instrument with which to tap into highly complex behavioural frameworks. Researchers should be sensitive to the fact that beliefs and behaviours are not necessarily held constant across all circumstances— choices about clientelism may depend on a particular situation or the position of the participant. While fixed survey style questions struggle to address this complexity, the core advantage of the vignette approach is that it addresses the situational elements of behavioural choices because vignettes allows for different situations to be built into the research design, thus bringing choices nearer to the kind of situations which people face in (Finch 1987). In this way, vignette research is more likely to produce better quality data.[61]

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[61] Many previous studies have used vignettes to explore moral codes. For example, see Renold 2002.

Vignettes are also useful to engage people about sensitive topics. As commentating on a vignette story is less personal that talking about direct experience, it is often viewed by participants as being less threatening, and allays the possible intrusiveness of face-to-face interviews, creating a comfortable distance between the researcher and participant (Renold 2002).

Design of vignettes:

The previous sections have shown the rules and patron-client organisation that underpin the clientelist model. Yet, because in real-life people experience the clientelist model through a distinct set of clientelist-based practices or actions, it is these that form the core of the three vignettes. My research demonstrates these kinds of clientelist-based practices are diverse but the main three likely to be experienced are favours or string pulling (i.e prioritising the fixing of a problem for a friend or family member); vote-swapping (i.e swapping a vote for a good promised by a candidate); and collusion (an informal arrangement between patron and client designed to achieve an improper purpose). Hence, the three vignettes revolved around vote-swapping, string-pulling and collusion – the core practices that keep the clientelist model 'in business.'

During September and November 2013, sixty citizens across four different municipalities –Peja, Kamenica, Hani I Elezit and Skenderaj—were asked to respond to three different vignettes about real-life situations in Kosovo.[62] Two choices were given, one reflecting clientelist practice and one reflecting the

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[62] The interviews were anonymous and so citations for the interview take the initial of municipality (P, K, H, SK) and the position in which they were interviewed. All respondents were interviewed personally in their homes and in their first language (i.e Albanian or Serbian). The sample was 'proportionally stratified' according to age and gender. The population of respondents was all those people eligible to engage with the state, that is all adults over eighteen. The survey took place across four municipalities. This number was chosen to ensure coverage of municipalities in different regions and of different sizes. Within in each municipality, sampling took place across the different neighbourhoods that were identified beforehand.

practices of the statebuilding model.[63] Respondents were also given the opportunity to offer a different response.[64] After each choice was made I sought to inquire deeper into why these were made. Further questions could include: Why do you make this choice? Would you have made that choice if you knew Besa was poor? Do you think family connections matter? All sixty interviews were collated, coded and analysed for dominant themes, patterns and motivations that could shed light on explanations for why clientelism is engaged in.

1. Vote-swapping:
During election time a political candidate approaches and suggests that if Besa and her family all vote for the candidate, then the candidate will be able to give one of Besa's family members a job in the municipality. What do you think Besa should do?
❖ Ignore the offer and ask the candidate what he/she is going to do improve the lives of the people of the municipality
❖ Take up the offer and tell the candidate that she/he has her vote

2. String-pulling
Besa's neighbourhood has issues with water. Often the water is not always available and the situation is getting worse. Besa wants to solve this problem. What do you think Besa should do?
❖ Write a letter to the municipality or make an official petition to the municipality
❖ Phone the Mayor or speak to someone who has a connection to the Mayor

3. Collusion
Besa's daughter wants to go to university and needs a municipal scholarship. The rules state that whoever has the best marks should get the scholarship, but the marks of Besa's daughter are not so strong. What should Besa do?
❖ Apply to the municipality for a scholarship
❖ Try to make connections with the political leaders of the municipality

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[63]To ensure that the vignettes related to the actual lives of the respondents, when the respondent was female, the vignette would be based on Besa (a common female name in Kosovo), while for male respondents the vignette would be based on Artan (a common male name in Kosovo). Hence, questions came in the form of: What should Besa or Artan do next?
[64] Studies about clientelism are prone to social desirability bias—that is, when people do not give honest answers in order to present themselves in a socially desirable light. Asking people to respond from the vignettes characters' perspective rather than on the basis of their own lives can reduce the effects of social desirability bias (Hughes, Huby 2004). An introduction to the vignettes clearly explained the purpose of the research and it was also important to stress before the vignettes that there are no right or wrong answers to the vignette. The themes of the survey could be considered somewhat sensitive, especially if some of the items referred to possibly less than desirable behaviour. Pre-tests of the vignettes specifically focused on whether the survey generated any emotional or psychological harm through requesting feedback from respondents about how they felt during and after the vignettes.

Section II: Overview of vignette research

This section gives an overview of the results of the vignette research. Table 10 shows that the clientelism options were generally rejected for a number of different reasons, but then table 11 breaks down the data to reveal something rather interesting: while, most respondents rejected the clientelist option in each vignette, when the results are compiled from the perspective of the respondent, a finding emerges that suggests that the majority would still utilise clientelism in certain situations when necessary. This section first explains the reasons for clientelism's rejection in table 10, then goes on to elaborate the ambiguity as revealed in table 11.

Table 10: Overview of responses to vignette scenarios

Clientelist practice	Vote swapping	String-pulling	Collusion
Advised by respondent	43% (26)	27% (16)	18% (11)

Source: author interviews conducted between September November 2013 (n=60)

The first table demonstrates that overall the clientelist options were mostly rejected as a path for the characters to take—yet, it was not always an overwhelming rejection. A considerable 43 percent of respondents said that they would be willing to swap their vote and that of their family for some kind of employment during an election, while 57 percent said that the protagonist in this vote-swapping vignette should ignore the offer and ask the candidate what he/she is going to do improve the lives of the people of the municipality. The clientelist option in this vignette was chosen more readily than in the other vignettes, perhaps because the demand for any sort of municipal employment is extremely high, especially as economic insecurity in Kosovo is so widespread (see chapter V:I).

Phoning the mayor directly or a friend with a connection to the mayor was mostly rejected as a strategy to fix the technical yet important problem of water, with most people (73 percent) choosing official mechanisms such as public meetings and petitioning to solve the problem. Collusion, that is seeking something via connections that is unmerited, was mostly rejected as a practice to gain a university scholarship, with 82 percent suggesting a formal application should be made.

The research revealed that different norms are at play in the rejection of clientelism. Clientelism was rejected because it contravened the norm of the public good: pursuing clientelism would be detrimental to society. In rejecting to swap his vote for employment, a sixty-five year old retired auto-mechanic from Kamenica neatly summed up this perspective 'if everybody did it, it would be bad for everybody' (K3). A retired man from Hani I Elezit rejected vote swapping on the grounds that personal interest should not triumph over the public good: 'I do not care about having good conditions when no one else does. This is all about personal interests that will damage other parts of society' (H34). A young lady from Peja municipality talked about the socio-economic consequences, explaining that she would reject swapping her vote even if she was desperately poor because it would make 'poverty deeper' (P49). On a political theme, a young student from Skenderaj said Artan should reject the offer of employment because 'the road to the EU isn't paved that way' (SK17). Other respondents pointed to the perverse incentives created by clientelism. A young lady from Skenderaj municipality, for example, urged Besa not to collude with politicians in order to get an unmerited scholarship because it is important to motivate people: 'it doesn't matter if it only happens once, it will motivate the daughter next time. You must stimulate

everyone to move forward and develop themselves, then the entire state develops (SK23).

Beyond the norm of the public good, respondents explain the rejection of clientelism in terms of it contravening the notion of fairness in society. Asked why the character in the scenario should reject collusion, a thirty-five year old male from Kamenica replied simply: 'she doesn't deserve it' (K8). Another male respondent from Kamenica of a similar age suggested that: 'If Artan creates connections, others will lose out. It is not fair, especially as poor people with children will lose out' (K11). A woman from Kamenica municipality echoed this point: 'You would be taking the place of someone who is qualified and that is not right' (K7).

Some respondents, albeit less commonly, immediately identified corruption within the vignettes. In reference to the vote swapping scenario, a retired university professor in Peja municipality suggested: 'this is corruption and personal gain...I would not accept because the candidate is trying to corrupt me' (P46). A younger student from Skenderaj put it in more sophisticated political terms: 'it is corruption because the candidates are placing pre-conditions on voting for them' (SK21). Another student from Peja suggested that 'it is vote theft' (P56), while an older resident from the same municipality suggested 'I would want them to put them in jail for making offers such as these' (P55).

Clientelist practice was rejected for different reasons, most commonly that it contravenes norms relating to the public good or notions of fairness. It was less common for clientelism to be identified as corruption, although this did happen. Yet these findings are complicated—and possibly undermined—by the finding presented in table 2, which breaks down the data to reveal something rather

interesting. While, most respondents rejected the clientelist option in each vignette, when the results are compiled from the perspective of the respondent, an interesting ambiguity emerges: overall, *65 percent of respondents* suggested the protagonist should choose the clientelist option in *at least one of the cases*, while only 35 percent would be reject the clientelist option in all the three cases.

Table 11: Overview of individual responses to vignette scenarios

	Situations in which clientelism advised				
Response:	**Reject all**	**At least one**	**One**	**Two**	**Three**
Total	35%	65%	38%	23%	2%
Age18-30	35%	65%	39%	22%	2%
31-49	25%	75%	38%	38%	0%
50 over	54%	46%	38%	8%	0%
Female	38%	62%	33%	25%	4%
Male	33%	67%	42%	22%	0%

Source: author interviews conducted between September November 2013 (n=60)

The majority of people demonstrated some degree of ambivalence: in most cases they would reject clientlism, but not in all, and the rejection of clientelism in one scenario does not imply the rejection of it in another. Perhaps in most cases then the respondents would advise the protagonist to reject the clientelist option, but these figures suggest that a majority would still keep it in the repertoire of political behaviour; in other words, the *majority would still utilise clientelism when in certain situations when necessary.* It is this interesting finding that needs to be thoroughly investigated and the rest of the chapter is dedicated to explaining this ambiguity. The next three section will presented the results of vignette research, as well as interviews with key informants, which investigated why people engage in clientelism. Three logics have been discerned: (1) people fear losing out; (2) a functional logic; and (3) logic of social norms.

Section III: The logic of the fear of losing out

The first dominant strand of explanations can be summed up as even if people object to clientelism, they engage in it because they fear losing out if they do not. This choice is set against a dominant belief that clientelism is systemic, a belief rooted in the perceptions that the formal agents and methods of the municipality cannot be trusted and that everyone else engages in clientelism.

Even though the governance model of the international statebuilders has been clearly defined and backed up by significant resources, interviews revealed that there is very little trust in the institutions to function in a way which will meet the daily challenges that people face. Respondents did not describe these shortcomings in terms of an absence of capacity or technical ability; instead, weakness was described in terms of a lack of trust in those political agents in charge of the institutions. This is not based on a philosophical evaluation of the international statebuilding model but is rooted in experience: people's repeated interactions with the municipality has crystallised a dominant perception that the distribution of resources seems to be based on connections rather than on any public or formal criteria, and in turn, this creates deep scepticism about political agents' willingness to act as guardians of the public good.

During my research people explained how due to the primacy of connection-based decision making, the municipality has come to be seen as an unpredictable source of help. A head of a household in Skenderaj explained how when the municipality were installing new sewage infrastructure in his village, the families at the two ends of the street were connected but he couldn't get connections for his house because 'our house is sort of in the middle, and we

didn't know anyone in the municipality so we got left out' (SK23). A gardener

from the Peja region described his experience of the municipality.

> In the present politicians only think about themselves... [later on in discussions]... The politicians from the municipality say that they are helping us. However the mosque sends food and flour. I have sent a request for a year now just for the materials to build my house, nothing has happened. The municipality even stopped my social welfare assistance. (P55)

The case of the gardener becomes more extreme:

> Every Tuesday I go the municipality but the Mayor only sees people he has connections with. Security guards block my way and tell me I cannot go further into the municipality. I am even shouted at by these people. (P55)

These initial experiences of the state matter for shaping patterns of political

behaviour. Connection-based rule is inherently unpredictable; in turn, the

experience of unpredictability has created a deep mistrust of politicians, and by

extension the state. This distrust of politicians was expressed vigorously during

interviews. Sometimes, politicians were castigated as 'selfish', in politics 'just to

get to rich' or even as 'liars.' But, the dominant negative characteristic of

politicians cited was rather than being utterly corrupt, it was believed politicians

worked for their own interests and not for the public good, or that looking after

the people is a secondary aim for politicians. A young student from Peja town

summed up this view: 'presently the public interest comes second' (P49). A

teacher in a school of small village in Peja municipality, who has much

experience of the how the municipality operates, declared 'I only trust poor

people. Those touched by government cannot be trusted.'(P57).

Despite all the democratic discourse that has accompanied the

development of the Kosovan state, formal institutions are beleaguered by a

credibility gap as many respondents revealed that they simply do not trust politicians to be stewards of the public good. State weakness in reality means that from the perception of citizens it is arbitrary, unpredictable and untrustworthy. However, in many respects, this is only an important background condition and doesn't explain directly why people enter into clientelist relations. Indeed, the argument found in the literature that weak institutions cause clientelism is somewhat a tautology: the evidence here reveals that institutions are weak precisely because they are clientelist. Hence, there is an additional aspect to the puzzle, and the important question is to answer why do people enter into clientelist relations rather than trying to overturn the system through accountability mechanisms or through social organising?

Interviews revealed that people reject the alternative offered by the statebuilders and enter into clientelist relations because they believe not just politicians but everyone else is engaged in clientelist relations, and so there are no potential allies to fight against clientelism. One man in Kamenica municipality said in response that vote selling and clientelist offers of employment 'happen everywhere in Kosovo—it's ordinary' (K4). In Skenderaj municipality, a local sculptor said that in an ideal world he would reject the offer but in 'reality, of course this is different. Most people would take up the offer of the job from the politician. In fact, 99 percent of people would take this offer' (SK18). Reinforcing the expectation that everyone else engages in clientelism is a pattern of discourse which seemed to lament how people have in recent years become more inwardly concerned, or as a housewife from Kamenica put it, 'less sensitive towards others' (K1) and more likely to pursue their own interests. Interviewees described the behaviour of fellow residents in terms of a new culture, a culture that has emerged

after the 1999 war and is qualitatively different from what preceded it. A dentist

technician from Peja suggested:

> Everything has changed. There isn't any love between each other
> anymore. I helped people during the war, no one cares anymore. In the
> past [90's] I didn't suffer for anything. Even people were more loving
> toward one another. Today it's all about everyone for themselves
> (P52).

Because people believe that everyone else engages in clientelism and rarely act in

a manner befitting the public good, clientelism is thought to be systemic, a view

expressed by many residents. A thirty-four year old university educated male said

that 'yes, the situation isn't fair. It's corruption but the *whole system* isn't fair'

(SK26). In Peja municipality, a retired university professor said that he would like

to use the formal routes to apply for the scholarship but 'in reality everyone

attempts to do this by trying to make connections' (P46). A thirty-five year old

man from Peja explained that he knows phoning the Mayor directly in order to

receive help with his water problem is 'not a good thing' but he also knows:

> 'you really can't do much otherwise. I know that if I knew the mayor
> I would be more successful. I know how many people who don't even
> wait in line in the municipality because they know the mayor. Without
> connections there is nothing.' (P55)

Unsure that the politicians and the broader population will look out for you and

knowing that the system is based on clientelist practice, people feel trapped in the

system, and this explains why moral objections are, when necessary, relegated to

a secondary consideration. Indeed, some respondents explained how they didn't

approve of clientelism but felt it was necessary. For example, a young male

student from Kamenica municipality suggested in response to the scholarship

scenario that the clientelist option 'is reality in Kosovo and Kamenica. If you have

connections then you get the scholarship. I know it's wrong but this is the way it

is' (K10). Likewise, a businessman in Skenderaj suggested the first choice of

going through the formal route will 'never work': 'It would be nice to apply and not be a 'soldier of politics' but things do not work like this' (SK19).

Another important element reinforcing clientelism is that given that the systemic nature of clientelism, people sense that they gain little from abstaining from or resisting clientelism and the costs of doing so may be too great to bear. A young housewife from Peja municipality explained not engaging in clientelism can make the difference of her young son attending pre-school:

> Sometimes maybe you don't want to go into connections, but you do. For example to get my son into a pre-school I had to do it by connections. There is nobody investing properly in the municipality and so everything is being done by nepotism. Everyone [politicians] is working for themselves, there is no sense of community (P48).

From here own experience she also went on to admit that connection is crucial even for vital medical aid: 'If you do not know anyone, even in a hospital, you can't do much. My child fell from the second floor once, and the emergency services didn't react for four days. You can't achieve or solve anything without connections (P48).

The most dominant explanation for why people keep clientelism in their repertoire was because citizens revealed simply do not trust the other actors, namely other citizens and politicians, to refrain from clientelism and therefore feel trapped in the system; hence, even if people object to clientelism, they engage in clientelism because they fear losing out if they do not. The reasoning can be summed up as: given everyone else does it, I may lose out if I don't do it—why therefore shouldn't I? (Persson et al. 2013, p. 457).

Section IV: The functional logic

During the vignettes another important theme emerged: clientelism was often advised because it reflected an informal and personalised style of politics that is more supportive for basic strategies of survival and 'getting on' in life. These strategies, which Migdal has referred to as 'blueprints for action' (1988, p. 27), are essential in a relatively poor and uncertain country like Kosovo for navigating challenging circumstances, whether poverty, unemployment or post-conflict dislocation, but also important for providing opportunities and even upward mobility. 'Blueprints for action' are about securing concrete material needs and address challenges such as how does my son find work, how do we afford materials to build a new floor on our house or how can I get a new engine for my van.

These strategies are 'homemade' and improvised, relying on personal connections or trading favours, and forged through day-to-day experiences, local social knowledge, common sense or what James C. Scott has described as 'mẽtis'(Scott 1998, p. 6). Strategies and techniques for 'getting ahead' underpin daily social behaviour and they predispose people to acting and thinking in a certain way. Illustrating the pervasive nature of these techniques is an insight relayed to me by a UK-educated Kosovan advisor to an international development agency, who described these blueprints as being part of a general 'lifestyle' across Kosovo. He told me that when he pays his bills at the outlet for the electricity company, he unconsciously starts chatting to the man behind the counter:

> I will ask him, which village is your family from, or which
> neighbourhood do you live in. I will be seeking out a connection
> between us. Maybe I will chat with him for ten minutes. Maybe we do
> have a connection somehow and he can make my life a little easier
> with the bills, then I help him with something in the future. Yes it

> sounds crazy to do this just to pay some bills. But it is our way of surviving, of getting things done. This is how we [Kosovan Albanians] are...always seeking out new ways to get ahead a little. It's not as calculating as it seems, everyone does it. It's a kind of lifestyle (Development professional 03.05.15).

Problem-solving blueprints are essential reference points for social and political behaviour in Kosovo. Viewing political dynamics through the lens of the daily techniques of survival and getting ahead helps clarify an important dynamic within statebuilding: the degree to which the international statebuilders are able to penetrate society is based on the degree to which their statebuilding model is able 'to deliver key components for individuals' strategies of survival' (Migdal 1988, p. 27). With its formal rules and procedures, the statebuilding model is presumed to be the most rational and therefore effective way of organising the municipality and providing services, but this section demonstrates that for those experiencing the model, the benefits of this rational-legal rule are not always self-evident. Put the other way, the clientelist model persists because it is seen as a more supportive ecology for these 'blueprints for action' than the statebuilding model.

Clientelist politics has long been recognised by scholars as having a problem-solving side (Scott 1969, p. 1155). Most recently, Javier Auyero's study of Peronist networks in Argentina described how clientelist networks were from the perspective of clients 'problem-solving' and actually essential for the survival of the residents in the shanty-town of Buenos-Aires he studied (Auyero 2001). But we know very little about *why* clientelism is perceived to be an appropriate ecology for these blueprints of action, apart from the obvious fact that people receive resources from it. This section goes beyond the simple equation that

clientelism is functional to identify two reasons why people see the clientelist model, especially with its emphasis on personalised connections and informality, as more conducive for their blueprints for action. First, because clientelism feeds into a pre-existing infrastructure of problem-solving fashioned during the 1990s; second because that these informal social networks continue to be held by citizens to be more efficient and flexible in addressing citizens' daily challenges.

PRE-EXISTING PROBLEM SOLVING MECHANISMS

Statebuilding in Kosovo has not taken place in a vacuum but in a society organised in part via strategies of survival and getting ahead that may exist independently of any formal structures. The origins of these blueprints for action reach back into the distant past. Nevertheless, in the modern period there was a clear phase in which these non-state blueprints took on their contemporary form, a period that is almost entirely overlooked on more recent studies of Kosovo but which is essential to understand present-day dynamics. This period is the 1990s and was characterised by the disintegration of Kosovo Albanians' relationship with the Yugoslav state, and the subsequent creation of a 'parallel state' led by Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) party. This subsection doesn't try to give an account of this period but rather briefly explains where Kosovan society was *coming from* when international statebuilders entered, in particular a parallel state supporting informal 'blueprints for action.'

The parallel state of the Kosovan Albanians (whom amounted to 85% of the population of Kosovo at this time) had two goals during the 1990s. In part, it had a clear political goal to deny systematically the legitimacy of Serbian rule while creating 'at least the outlines of a Kosovo 'Republic' (Malcolm 1998,

p. 348). While there was a roughly formal structure to the regime mostly inherited from the Yugoslav regime, it had a formal constitutional structure, mostly to which its people owed allegiance and paid taxes.

Yet, in addition to this political aspect, there was a practical dimension to the parallel state. Set against a backdrop of economic hardship and mass unemployment, it was also concerned, at the municipal level, with managing daily challenges, such as the provision of education and health treatment. The 'parallel state' was also in reality an informal problem-solving milieu that was central to the day-to-day existence of Kosovan Albanians.

Consider the provision of education within this parallel state. Banished from state educational facilities, Kosovan Albanians relied on social networks to set up makeshift schools in private buildings, such as empty houses, warehouses, garages, basements and mosques served as makeshift high schools. A parallel university of Pristina similarly operated out houses and backyards wherein students literally studied under candlelight and used the backs of other students for improvised desks (Clark 2000). Remarkably, nearly all secondary schools (60 out of 66) functioned in makeshift class rooms, meaning around 330,000 pupils were educated in these informal settings (Clark 2000, p. 98)

Informal social networks were also crucial for the parallel health system operated by the Mother Theresa Association (MTA). In establishing clinics, the MTA relied entirely on the support of local businesspeople for the premises and the equipment. The system more generally relied on solidarity as social networks were galvanised to find volunteer nurses and doctors. While never entirely adequate, by 1998 there were 91 clinics and 7000 volunteers and all treatment was free (Clark 2000, p. 108).

Social solidarity and informality characterised the core functions of the parallel state. This was also true of tax collection. While small businesses would pay tax when they could and while the diaspora also contributed, most of the funds for education were raised inside Kosovo by system of voluntary and improvised form of taxation. There was no formal rate of taxation; rather each municipality had a multi-party Council of Finance whose volunteer tax collectors assessed how much each family should contribute, agreed this with the family and then collected it (Clark 2000, p. 103).

Summing up, when the international statebuilders entered the scene, the broader political setting was structured according to an informal and connection-based system in which Kosovan Albanians forged strategies for survival and getting ahead. Yet the resilience of this clientelist framework is also explained by the perception amongst residents that informal methods *continue to be* more effective than the statebuilding model.

CLIENTELIST MODEL CONTINUES TO BE HELD AS EFFICIENT AND FLEXIBLE

Such a perception works through two mechanisms: first, these informal networks seem to be more efficient in terms of information generation and sharing, but also more flexible to meet the specific challenges of post-war Kosovo. Interviews revealed an important quality of informal networks: connections are utilised because the chain that links information about the problem to the problem-solver is shorter and more fluid as it is integrated in general channels of sociability. The alternative is to go through the formal procedures of the statebuilding model: wait in line at the municipality, fill out a form and wait for the bureaucratic processes

to finish. Consider this example of an NGO worker who needed to renew the identity card of the NGO director.

> Actually it was quite serious as the municipality threatened a huge fine. But, there were mitigating circumstances. I took the informal route because with the official because it's easier just to speak to them and to explain why the director hadn't renewed his identity card. In the end, we got sorted. This wouldn't have happened through filling in all these forms. Because the official gave me his time, in return my friend helped him out with a little problem he had. (NGO worker Pristina 24.06.15)

The broader ecology of informality and connections offers an infrastructure of information generation and sharing that is perceived to be more efficient than that offered by statebuilding model. A resident of Pristina explained to me how this works:

> Generally, you would ring someone you know who works in the municipality, a cousin perhaps. Even if the connection doesn't work in the department that deals with the particular problem, he or she knows will have a connection in the relevant department, a family member or friend perhaps. They meet over lunch or coffee, then you get a call back in the afternoon with an update of what is going on (Citizen Pristina 05.05.13)

Interviews also revealed that there is a perception that the alternative statebuilding model is rather slow and these cumbersome procedures are inappropriate for the type of problems that citizens expect municipalities to address. Discussions often emphasised the drawbacks of the rules and procedures of the formal model, with respondents associating them with inertia and onerous. Connections help us 'avoid bureaucracy' as a twenty-six year old woman from Kamenica suggested (K5), or can 'the problem solved more quickly' (K2), (K13). A builder from Skenderaj municipality explained that with the formal route 'you can make requests once, twice, three times and then maybe it reaches the higher level' but if you use personal connections, 'your problem will be solved quickly' (SK16).

Clientelism then can be particularly appropriate for the urgent natures of the challenges that people face in complex, post-conflict settings like Kosovo.

Another advantage of the clientelist model is that it provides for flexible governance as informality widens the scope of discretion. Mayor Selmenaj of Decan municipality, a popular politician, rather openly explained to me how with regards to employment decisions, discretion beyond the formal rules is part of the process.

Author: How do you choose who gets jobs in the municipality?

Mayor Selmenaj: 'Well there are rules but I also take other things into account. For example, I give jobs to poor families or those who have lost people in the war.'

From the outside perspective, this discretion may represent the absence of the rule of law; from the inside, it is merely a way of tailoring solutions to problems, such as family poverty, a flexibility that may not have been possible under the rational-legal system as economic poverty or past-history in war would contravene equal treatment, for example.

To sum up this section, people engage with the clientelist model because it is perceived to provide a more effective problem-solving framework than the formal state institutions. This evidence the supports the view of theorists who emphasise that a certain institutions, regardless of whether it has been derived formally or informality, will become 'sticky' if people identify with it as an accepted and known behavioural practice that continues to show effectiveness (relative to an alternative) (Lauth 2000, p. 23).

In this research, I have gone beyond the simple equation that clientelism is functional to identify the factors that sustain this perception. The first is that an informal framework of problem-solving established during the 1990s has given

sustenance to the clientelist model, a finding that more generally suggests it is important to understand and identify the informal rules operating in a society undergoing statebuilding. The swiftness of information production and generation, as well as the flexibility intrinsic to the informal mode of clientelism are the other mechanisms that explain clientelism's functionality. These mechanisms enhance functionality because they work through well-established informal social networks. In this respect, the evidence supports those scholars who emphasise the relationship between social problem-solving networks and clientelist networks (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2011).[65]

Section V: The logic of social norms: kin communities and mutual obligations

A separate strand of discourse emerged during interviews that emphasised how the clientelist option should be taken up, or is at least acceptable, if it seemed to benefit the kin-community. The previous chapter described in detail how clientelist networks are often channelled through kin-communities as they are a rich source of trust. But, along with trust, kin-communities along embody a sense of mutual obligations, and, while many traditional customs in Kosovo have been displaced, the *sense of obligation* to the kin-community still lives on, which, for at least some, acts as a strong norm that can persuade people to enter into clientelist practice.

During interviews, there was a sense amongst residents that it is perfectly fine to request special favours from kin-community members. For example, a painter from Skenderaj municipality said Artan should accept the offer of a job

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[65] Szwarcberg (2011), for example, has brought attention to how informal networks of problem solving (that are often concerned with non-political resources such as babysitting, money lending and counselling) overlap with clientelist networks.

from a political candidate so that 'another family member can get something out of this' (SK27). A thirty-four year old university educated male said in response to the vote-swapping scenario that 'if someone from his family gets a job at the municipality then they could get services done for us' (SK26). Likewise, a young man from a village in Peja municipality explained that utilising kin-community connections can be a valuable way of 'getting help', especially if the formal processes do not work:

> 'Our village elder is from [the political party] PDK and most of the village supports PDK. The PDK has helped us out in the past, for example, the village has the best school in the region. We have gained a lot from having this special connection...so I would advise everyone else to make connections' (P47).

Citizens often answered in discussions that it was natural to find a kin-community member in the municipality to help with a problem. In response to fixing the water problem, a man from Kamenica municipality suggested 'connections are much more effective. If I know the brother or sister then I would call' (K8). For the municipal worker, prioritising the kin-community cannot always be served through the formal channels, and so often they would have to push aside formal rules and procedures to help with the issue. Illustrating this, a Kosovan director of Swiss-funded civil society programme explained to me that he recently needed a document from the municipality for a visa application but he was concerned that municipality may be too slow:

> 'So I asked my father if he knew anyone at the municipality. I couldn't believe it, he found a 'long lost cousin,' someone who I have never met, but is, you know part of the network, and it worked. I'm not sure how he did it but I received the visa very quickly' (NGO director Pristina 23.06.15).

This example also illustrates how long-lost cousins, even those you have never met, can be commandeered to support the network as long as they are part of the bloodline or have ties to the village. An interesting case study revealing the importance of this norm relates to the experience of the Vetvendojse (LVV) party who now govern in Pristina municipality after victory in the 2014 elections. The party itself had stood on a platform of good governance and had issued explicitly anti-clientelist messages during the campaign. Yet, having been in power for over a year, it seems that the norm of family obligations can distort even the most zealous commitments to good governance. A political analyst, who has strong links with the leading members of the party, explained:

> 'The family obligations are still very strong, even here in Pristina. Ask some of the Vetvendojse guys. Though they are all against clientelism, they still feel the pressure to serve the family. These guys are from urbane families in Pristina. But now they are in power, they get phone calls asking for jobs for cousins. And some of them have had to give in to these requests' (Gemi 28.06.15).

A NORM ROOTED IN SELF-IDENTITY

Interviews, therefore, revealed that supporting kin-community members through clientelist practices are seemingly well tolerated, and the weight of the evidence collected suggests that there are not isolated or unrelated instances but reflect a norm that carries significant weight and is well understood across society. Social norms and 'blueprints for action' are intimately tied and often overlap but they work according to separate logics of action. As discussed in the previous section, blueprints for action operate according to a functional logic, with the chief consideration being how one can get something done. These blueprints are often then also channelled via this norm. Indeed, the origin of this kin-community norm probably has its roots in some kind of functional logic: you were more likely to

survive if you have people to cooperate with, family members being the most trusted. But this norm now exists independently of its functional origins because it has been invested with emotional significance. For a politician or municipal worker not adhering to this norm risks not just material but emotional consequences, such as social discomfort or disappointing one's immediate family. Indeed, to push the analysis a bit deeper, I now explore the key mechanism that explains why obligations to the kin-community persist—that key mechanism is self-identity.

A Kosovan advisor to an embassy of an EU member state summed up the general view:

> "Solidarity still exists in Kosovo but it is about the family first; we just cannot give beyond family until family is taken care of first. Few people have the luxury of being able to give beyond the family. I have my own family to take care of here in Pristina. But also I am paying all the bills for my aunt and sister and I pay for nephew's education too. This is a natural obligation, rooted in Albanian tradition."

The use of the word 'tradition' by the advisor to explain something of contemporary importance chimes with those anthropologists who have emphasised how Albanians personal and collective identity are primarily forged in terms of symbols derived from the past (Reineck 1993, p. 104).[66] Reineck explains that faced with a history of marginalisation, Kosovan Albanians have seized upon 'tradition as the guide to personhood...customs are considered valid and indisputable simply by virtue of being of the past' (Reineck 1993, p. 104).

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[66] The view that the extended family and immediate community are the central pillars of social life because they are bounded by mutual obligations is corroborated by some contemporary anthropological work from 2011 in the village of Isniq where 'kinship ties seems to be still very strong and faithfully preserved' and 'regardless of geographic distances, relationships between relatives appear to be very well preserved, even if some of them have gone to Pristina, Mitrovica, Istog or elsewhere more than 40 years ago' (Latifi 2012, p. 19.)

This equally applies to the importance of kinship obligations. A young writer

from Kamenica municipality explained how:

> 'Individuals and families are the most important unit and there is little
> sense of community. Blood relations are most important. This is
> because we have been trying to survive and through that process, we
> know that the family is the only one who can protect you in the end'
> (Writer Kamenica 11.02.13).

Tradition as a force that shapes contemporary self-understanding can extend well

into the urban elite of Pristina. A young US-educated advisor for an international

NGO when asked why family is so important (he tells me he visits his family

village each weekend), he again draws on a historical narrative:

> 'Never in our history could we Albanians rely on anyone else. We had
> to build these big homes, they looked like fortresses. In Albanian
> language we have no word for home, in the broader sense, only house
> because for centuries, outside the family house there was nothing, no
> security or friendship. Our history is about not trusting outsiders'
> (Project Officer NDI 03.07.15).

The levity of the norm is even tied up in the linguistic structure of local dialect

through the traditional concept of the 'rreth'. Literally translated as a 'circle', rreth

is taken to mean the social circle or moral community of which people feel part

(Reineck 1993, p. 189). Each 'rreth' is said to be underpinned by its own norms

and expectations of appropriate behaviour, norms which as we have seen certainly

extend to condoning clientelist-style behaviour; indeed, linguistically, rreth and

'connection' are used interchangeably in common parlance.

In summing up this section, for at least some residents the sense of

obligation to the kin-community acts as a strong norm that can persuade people to

enter into clientelist practice. Perhaps this is finding is not surprising: many

scholars have emphasised the importance of kin-community obligations in

shaping the rhythm of politics (Banfield 1955).[67] Fukuyama, drawing on evolutionary biology, argues that kin-community norms are in fact default modes of sociability: 'the desire to pass resources on to kin is one of the most enduring constants in human politics' as 'all human beings gravitate towards the favouring of kin and friends (reciprocal altruism) with whom they have exchanged favours unless strongly incentivised to do otherwise' (Fukuyama 2014, p. 43). This evidence also reveals how the lens of socio-cultural logics offers an important conceptual framework from which to understand political behaviour. The socio-cultural logic lens emphasises the importance of the 'larger fabric of everyday social practices' and modes of sociability in shaping choices regarding clientelism (Olivier de Sardan, J.P 1999; Olivier de Sardan, J.P, Blundo 2006; Ledeneva 2008).

Yet, it is important to note that the discussions during interviews also put caution on overstating the relevance of this norm. Indeed, in discussions many politicians were condemned for 'putting their family first.' A young student from Skenderaj suggested: 'Nothing should be handed to you. [In swapping your vote] you would be being unfair to many other people just to get something for your family' (SK28). Moreover, the norm is not necessarily underpinned by a broader moral philosophy which would give it a strong social force. This is in contrast to Guanxi practices in China, clientelist-style gift-exchanges that Yang has shown to be morally informed in that they would find origin in the traditional Confucian search for social harmony and virtue of connectedness (Ledeneva 2008).

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[67] In his 1955 study of the Montengranesi of the Lucania region in southern Italy, Edward Banfield established the concept of 'amoral familism' to explain political and social behaviour. Familism for Banfield was 'amoral', in the sense that it was essentially about maximising the material short-run advantage of the nuclear family, at the expense of more public spirited behaviour (Banfield 1955, p. 85).

Chapter conclusion

This chapter has challenged the 'build it and they will come' assumption behind statebuilding. It has presented the results of vignette research, as well as interviews with key informants, which investigated from an insider perspective why people engage in clientelism and eschew the model of the international statebuilding. It has identified at the level of individual agency how people's beliefs, goals are and choices available to them shape responses to international statebuilding. In doing so, part of the 'futility puzzle' is solved: internationally-led statebuilding is futile because it fails to smother the demand for clientelism. But the important question is: what are the logics behind this demand? It has shown that in the demand side of clientelism, three distinct logics are present within Kosovo's municipalities: the logics of fear of 'losing out', functionality, and social norms. Clearly these are all related as, for example, the fear of 'losing out' may combine with the perception that clientelism is functional in explaining why people would choose clientelism over the statebuilding model of the international statebuilders.

Nevertheless, as I have shown, these explanations work according to distinct logics; in doing so, it has gone beyond purely cultural or rational-choice explanations to open up a hitherto understudied dimension of explanations for why people engage in clientelism, something that could provide a conceptual map for other researchers pursuing similar research in other cases.

One important theoretical implication of the emphasis on this demand side relates to how we frame actors behaviour in statebuilding. The principal-agent framework that has dominated explanations for why clientelism persists but the

evidence here suggests this theory is insufficient (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007).[68]

Applied to clientelism, principal-agent theory is based on the assumption that citizens (the prinicipals) object to clientelist behaviour but lack the information or accountability mechanisms to prevent politicians (the agents) from pursuing it. Clientelism then is a result of citizens not being able to monitor effectively the actions of politicians, and so the core assumption of this theoretical perspective is that citizens in general object to clientelist practice and therefore would like to stop the agents engaging in it. Clearly as section II demonstrates, some citizens do object to clientelism and see it as a form of malpractice or in violation of certain basic principles of fairness and meritocracy. Yet, the weight of the evidence suggests that even if people would rather not in engage in clientelism, they still keep it is a possible course of action in day-to-day life, a finding that severely undermines principal-agent theory's assumption that citizens seek to stop clientelist-style behaviour. As I have shown, they keep it in the repertoire because they fear losing out, it is functional and it chimes with social norms.

Hence, in the real world there is no principal-agent dichotomy: principal and agents' interests do not clash but converge on the same action—clientelism practice. This is not to say principal-agent theory is entirely misleading but rather the weight of the empirical evidence suggests it is insufficient to explain why clientelist behaviour persists. Instead, the most apt theoretical framework is to see it as a classic collective-action problem (Olson 1971). Mancur Olson famously identified collective-action problems as occurring when a group of people work together to achieve some common goal but the co-operation breaks down because group members find that it is in their interest not to contribute to the realisation of

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[68] see (Marquette, Peiffer 2015) for a good outline of the debate.

the common goal. In this case, the statebuilding model was identified by many respondents as the preferred form of political practice. Yet, residents refrain from contributing to strengthening this model through engaging with the formal rules and procedures because they feel that they may lose out in doing so—the family member may not get the job, their road may not be paved or the sewage system fixed on their street. This empirical research supports those scholars who are increasingly arguing that the analysis of political practices, including clientelism, should be rooted in a collective-action framework (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006; Persson et al. 2013; Fukuyama 2014).

Chapter VII: The supply-side of statebuilding

The last chapter identified the demand logics that contribute to why the clientelist model has sidelined the statebuilding model in Kosovo's municipalities. This chapter focuses on the supply side because the futility of statebuilding is not only explained by citizens engaging in clientelism: explaining the agency, or lack of agency, of the statebuilders—international actors and local partners—is equally important.

Despite international statebuilders expending huge amounts of resources on executing strategies designed to embed the statebuilding model, the results of the large survey (chapter III) demonstrate that these attempts have not resulted in this model being the framework through which goods are distributed. In the absence of effective agency, the clientelist model has predominated. Curiously, however, in Hani i Elezit municipality the clientelist model has been displaced implying that the agency of statebuilding has been effective—an outcome that presents a rare opportunity to control for crucial background conditions in order to methodically interrogate how international agency accounts for this variation.

Building from this opportunity, the research in this chapter represents a departure from the conventional statebuilding literature because it focuses on the level of implementation, the stage at which policy is meant to be realised on the ground. This should be central to the statebuilding story, but as three eminent scholars recently summed up, 'implementation remains conspicuously under-appreciated, under-theorized and under-researched' (Pritchett et al. 2010, p. 1).

Because the literature has not delved deeper into how interventions work on the ground, we have little evidence, nor convincing explanations, for why statebuilding may not work. Based almost entirely on original evidence garnered from tracing how implementation plays out in reality, an important ambition for this chapter is to contribute to filling this gap.

The chapter will demonstrate that the myriad interventions undertaken to embed the statebuilding model in Kosovo's municipalities can be encapsulated by three different logics: a social accountability logic, a democratic competition logic and a capacity-building logic. The term 'logics' has been used to emphasise how statebuilders strategies of action (each of which are defined by a particular goal) are also underpinned by certain *theoretical assumptions* about how these strategies will play out in reality. Hence, it is not just the strategies that should be taken into account; the theories aligned to these strategies must also be under scrutiny. Explaining the variation in outcomes means examining each of these logics individually. They have been done so in the context of a comparative research design of two municipalities similar in nearly all respects apart from the outcome: one is clientelist (Kamenica) and one is where the international statebuilding has been implemented (Hani i Elezit).

Two different lines of explanation are possible for this variation. The first is that the inputs entailed in these logics have been insufficient in Kamenica relative to Hani i Elezit. But, as we shall see, there is little evidence that statebuilding has been 'done more' in Hani i Elezit than in Kamenica. Then we turn to the second line of explanation *that statebuilding agency has played out differently in Hani i Elezit than in Kamenica*. This cannot be put down to differences in the cases as the background conditions are very similar. Instead, to

answer this puzzle, we have to turn to the assumptions upon which these logics are based. As in Kamenica these logics have not worked as the theories predict, the research aim of the chapter is to understand and explain this *mismatch* between theory underpinning the different logics and how these logics operate in reality.

Section I describes the research design and cases. Section II elaborates more on the different logics and demonstrates why the level of agency has been similar in both municipalities. Section II, IV and V breakdown the respective logics into causal mechanisms, which are then closely examined. The conclusion of the chapter is that each of these logics, despite dominating the policy and academic discourse, are plagued by a cognitive 'blind spot': the causal chain linking cause and effect is mediated by the agendas and orientation of political leaders of the municipalities. Hence, the conclusion is not that one strategy and theory may be superior to the others but that each of them misses a crucial conditional variable: the impact of these modes of supply is dependent on the degree to which they converge with the orientation of the political leaders of the municipalities.

Section I: Variables, research design and method

VII:I:I Cases

The research employs a comparative research design of two municipalities similar in most respects apart from the outcome. A crucial advantage of comparing cases within Kosovo is that, as each case is framed by the same institutional structure and has a broadly common historical and cultural trajectory, potentially confounding 'background conditions' are controlled for (Snyder 2001). Case selection has followed John Stuart Mill's 'method of difference' logic with

different values on the outcome variable: in one municipality, after fifteen years of statebuilding, the outcome is that the clientelist model distributes resources, in the other the statebuilding. Clearly, one case has to be Hani i Elezit (-0.25), the outlier case in which internationally-led statebuilding seemed to be effective compared to the other 'futile' cases. While it would be ideal to then select the most clientelist case (i.e the case with the most extreme clientelist value), a more crucial consideration for the comparative case is that is should share similar general characteristics to mitigate against the causal influence of 'third variables' (van Evera 1997). From the most clientelist municipalities, Prizren (highest clientelist score) cannot be considered because it is far larger, more urban and multi-ethnic than the rather small Hani I Elezit. Gracanica (2nd highest) is ethnically Serbian and therefore too fails on the similar general characteristcs, as does Decan (3rd highest) which is a larger municipality. Kamenica is then the best case given that it shares the similar basic characteristics (notably the next smallest after Hani i Elezit, non-urban and almost entirely Albanian) but still has a high value on the outcome variable; indeed, Kamenica's score of -1.03 is still above the median (-1.01) and mean (-0.92) and hence is one of the most clientelist municipalities sampled. Given that the subnational design and control for background conditions mean Kamenica can be considered to be broadly representative of the other cases of futility, but, as an additional check, findings in this municipality were also triangulated to see if they were at work in other municipalities.

Table 12: Background characteristics

Key characteristics	Hani i Elezit	Kamenica
Population	10, 000	36,000
Size	83 km^2	423 km^2
Population ethnic Albanian (%)	99	90
Estimated unemployment (%)	23	30
Primary education only (%)	50	44
Economic well-being: cannot afford expenses to treat illnesses (%)	31	37

* Sources: RKS Census; (OSCE 2015a, 2015b); (UNDP 2012)

Kamenica is marked on the map below in red, while Hani i Elezit is marked in

blue.

Figure 16: Location of municipalities

KAMENICA:

Kamenica is a relatively small municipality nestled in the hills in the east of Kosovo close to Serbia and about a ninety minute drive from the capital Pristina. More scenic than other municipalities, the air is pleasant in Kamenica and in the spring months, the river circumventing the town flows strongly. Developed during the 1960s, the city centre is reminiscent of many other municipalities in Kosovo: there is one main street with a few housing blocks, cafes and businesses dotted along the side. A newly-built supermarket, seemingly far too large for a town of this size, backs up the main street at one end; at the other, there is the old pottery factory, now an all-purpose restaurant. Ninety-percent Albanian, Kamenica had a sizeable Serb minority, but after the war this has whittled down to less than 10 percent of the population. While, the small Serb neighbourhood just off the main street boasts a couple of cafes serving Serbian beer rather than the Kosovan alternative, inter-ethnic relations in Kamenica have been notably less fraught than in the rest of Kosovo. The undulating hills in the immediate vicinity of the centre host new neighbourhoods that have emerged due to migration from surrounding villages as well as investments from the diaspora. A large hotel, an important social gathering place, stands on a hill overlooking the town, while further afield, seventy-four villages are disbursed throughout the municipality. Though not one of the poorest municipalities, Kamenica suffers from a scarcity of jobs and new investment, especially as most of the socially-owned enterprises no longer function, while others are in the process of privatization.

HANI I ELEZIT

One of the smallest municipalities, Hani i Elezit is directly on Kosovo's southern border with Macedonia. Few people stop to visit as they zoom past on their way to the border crossing but if they did, they would find a small main street full of cafes and traditional 'cajtores' (tea houses) which ends with the municipality building and a small train station, the last stop in Kosovo on the Pristina-Skopje route. A sleepy municipality, the road leading out of the main part of the municipality connects to small, rather isolated villages. A huge brick factory, with 770 employees, casts a shadow over the centre of the town, a large brutalist construction that seems to be always in sight wherever you are in Hani i Elezit. The economy of Hani i Elezit is mainly supported by this company and two others in the cement industry that were socially owned until 1989 and have been subsequently privatised. Private shops and other commercial businesses operating in the municipality are mostly family-operated, with approximately 200 employees. A considerable part of population, however, works in the agriculture sector or remains unemployed (ECOI 2009). Hani i Elezit municipality had been part of Kacanik municipality but in 2005 became a new pilot municipality,[69] where after competences were gradually handed over from the so-called mother municipality to the Hani i Elezit, which became a fully-fledged municipality in 2008 (OSCE 2010).

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[69] Pilot municipal units were intended to act as a test case for the creation of new municipalities in non-majority community areas.

Empirical research into Kosovo's municipalities is scarce, and so this comparative method has relied on the production of a large amount of original data. Over the course of fifteen months, repeated visits and stays meant I became extremely well-acquainted with the social and political terrains of both municipalities. Past and present Mayors, local officials, key informants and civil society groups were interviewed; long, semi-structured interviews were conducted with fifteen randomly-selected citizens in each municipality; the relevant electoral histories and dynamics were scrutinised; survey data was collected; relevant documents about local conditions were examined; and political analysts, international diplomats and NGO workers were all consulted.

Section II: Explaining outcomes: what are the potential factors?

In the survey results presented in chapter III, Kamenica scored -0.103, which suggests in this municipality the clientelist model as the main framework through which goods are distributed was affirmed in all aspects by respondents. Hani i Elezit (-0.25) was a major outlier, positioned three times beyond the midspread of the data, suggesting that in this municipality the statebuilding model (formal, public rules, universalistic) matters. From the perspective of the supply-side, what could account for the variation? This chapter examines possible explanations offered by the literature. It first demonstrates that endogenous reasons for the futility of statebuilding can be discounted in this case. Instead, we must turn to international agency, which in this section is conceptualised and shown to be encapsulated by three logics. The section demonstrates that the most conventional explanation—these logics have been insufficiently executed in Kamenica relative

to Hani i Elezit—is unconvincing. The section ends by setting up the main thrust of the research: exploring why the strategies have not played out in Kamenica as the theory predicts and why have these logics been effective modes of supply in Hani i Elezit.

VII:II:I Alternative explanations:

Some scholars would suggest that the reason for the futility of statebuilding lies in the inherent difficulty of the task in hand—statebuilding is unrealistic and bound not to work. Pritchett et. al have noted that development assistance is often 'not grounded in the feasible' which results in 'premature load bearing'—that is, burdening institutions with difficult tasks before they have the capability of executing these responsibilities, which leads to them being 'over-stressed' (Pritchett et al. 2010, p. 37). As I argued in Chapter II, however, implementing the statebuilding model of resource distribution at the local level is untainted by 'premature load bearing' as, given that it involves basic responsibilities, such as following straightforward procedures and administering a modest amount of goods to a small population group, it is reasonable to assume it is a realistic goal. Moreover, scholars of local government have consistently emphasised how quick changes can take place at the municipal level, especially when compared to statebuilding at the national level (Grindle 2007).

Futility is also not a question of insufficient 'institutionalisation'—a lack of clear guidance from the relevant supervising authorities—because the set of laws that frame municipal governance in Kosovo explicitly demand the implementation of the statebuilding model. The Law on Local Self-Government has accorded significant weight to accountability procedures, as well as transparent and participatory structures in decision making, such as petitions,

citizen committees or representation by assembly members.[70] Clientelist-style practices are explicitly ruled out by the Law on Local Self-Government—for example, 'elections for a Municipal Assembly shall not constitute a cause for reconsidering appointments of civil servants.[71] Given that in this case study, futility cannot be explained by a lack of realistic goals or insufficient clarity about goals, endogenous reasons for statebuilding's futility can be discounted; instead, the answer should lie with how international agency plays out in reality.

VII:II:II The three logics of international agency:

Many actors and interventions have been undertaken to embed the statebuilding model, with various international organisations, CSOs and the Ministry of Local Government Administration executing projects, programmes and reforms. To understand this complex picture and to refine our understanding of agency, it is important to discern the different logics of these interventions, each of which is underpinned by a particular goal and theoretical assumptions about how they will play out in reality. A review of all the different kinds of interventions suggests that international agency in Kosovo's municipalities can be encapsulated by three different logics: a social accountability logic, a democratic competition logic and a capacity-building logic.[72]

1. Social accountability: Social accountability interventions have been very important for statebuilding and development plans across the globe (World Bank 2012); not least in Kosovo where these kinds of investments have been comprehensive. Drawing on research into social capital and associational life (Tocqueville 2003), social accountability strategies are based on the idea that

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[70] Law Nr. 03/L-040 on Local Self Government, 2008
[71] Law Nr. 03/L-040 on Local Self Government 65, 3
[72] Orientation towards these different explanations is based on (Grindle 2007)

engaged citizens and a thriving civil society will exert a strong pressure on political leaders to implement the statebuilding model (Peruzzotti, Smulovitz 2006; Mungiu-Pippidi 2013; Fukuyama 2014). Accordingly, societal accountability strategies focus on promoting civil society organisations (CSOs) and citizen engagement, both of which, according to the theory, should play an active role in monitoring the municipal administration so it treats people equally, makes decisions openly and administrates according to the letter of the law (World Bank 2012).

2. Democratic competition: An important element of statebuilding has been to make efforts to facilitate the democratic process. This is certainly true at the municipal level where investments have been made to strengthen key electoral institutions and mentor political parties. The theory underlying these efforts is that a competitive and vibrant democracy leads to better governance (Stockemer 2009). Hence, the political competition hypothesis states that where there are many political parties competing in elections, incumbent political leaders face more insecurity and are therefore more likely to supply the statebuilding model because they will be more motivated to provide as many public goods and be as responsive to people's needs as possible. In politically competitive municipalities, political leaders will face more accountability and therefore will also be more constrained in exploiting the state for their own political goals (Grzymala-Busse 2006). In a less competitive environment, political leaders will be more likely to use clientelist methods for mobilising support (Hale 2007).

3. Capacity-building logic: Capacity building has been central to statebuilding approaches (Wesley 2008), and more widely has been a 'generalised tonic prescribed for municipalities in poor health' (Grindle 2007, p. 106). Capacity building is part of what has been described as the 'management school of statebuilding' (Stewart, Knaus) and is very much in line with New Public Management ideas of administrative reform (Dunleavy, Hood 1994). The theory states that an increase in such things as training, infrastructure development, computerisation and technology will boost municipal capacity so that political leaders can more effectively implement the statebuilding model (Dobbins 2005).

VII:II:III Testing the assumptions behind the theories

The assumption behind the theories of social accountability, democratic competition and capacity building is that they are effective conduits for the supply of statebuilding—there is a clear-cut relationship between cause and effect. From this we can infer that the explanation for this variation in outcome is that the endeavours entailed in one or all of these logics has been *insufficient* in Kamenica relative to Hani i Elezit. Insufficiency relates to the extent of the resources, personal, expertise, training, programmes and projects dedicated to a particular logic. Clearly, given that the statebuilding process has been long and complex involving a myriad of actors and interventions, it is difficult to get an exact assessment of the extent to these logics have taken place. Still, by reviewing donor documents, speaking to key informants, as well as municipal staff, we can assess whether these logics of international agency have been insufficient in Kamenica relative to Hani i Elezit.

From a macro perspective, it is reasonable to assume that resources for statebuilding have been similar for each municipality because both, since 2006

onwards especially, have been beneficiaries of the major 'macro' interventions at the municipal level undertaken by the largest donor organisations. So, the European Commission's two-year project titled 'Support to Local Government' has worked in both municipalities in improving the functionality and transparency of the municipal departments and the financial management of the municipalities. The 'Effective Municipalities Initiative' Program supported by USAID has also directed significant inputs into both municipalities, as have the DEMOS and LOGOS projects supported by the Swiss Development Agency. The OSCE's 'Local Governance Programme' has provided training and capacity building in both municipalities. As these major municipal statebuilding projects have tended to distribute aid according to the population size of the municipalities, it is a fair assumption that per capita aid to both municipalities has been roughly similar.

Even with a focus on the particular logics themselves, it is difficult to find evidence that agency has been insufficient in Kamenica in relation to Hani i Elezit. Experts, who have kept a close eye on social accountability in Kamenica, suggested that over the past fifteen years many NGOs have been established in the municipality to provide this kind of accountability, and there have been many projects to develop social accountability in specific areas, such as reporting on municipal assemblies (KDI project manager 24.05.15). In fact in Kamenica dozens of CSOs have been established; to name but a few, there has been the Women's Network, Fortessa, the Youth Centre, Radio Kamenica and various others. Projects undertaken by international donors aimed at increasing citizen participation and raising awareness on democratic issues, such as the Swiss funded LOGOS project and the USAID's 'Participatory Budgeting Programme', have also taken place in Kamenica (NGO director Peja 28.10.13).

In relation to building up democratic competition, the OSCE have undertaken electoral monitoring in all municipalities and international foundations, such as the National Democratic Institute and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, have undertaken training and mentoring for both municipalities, with the aim of ensuring democratic integrity and proper electoral competition, (Project Officer NDI 03.07.15). Indeed, the figures below depict the distribution of votes in the last three election results to demonstrate both municipalities have been similarly competitive since decentralisation began in earnest.


Figure 17: Distribution of votes Kamenica municipality

Figure 18: Distribution of votes Hani i Elezit municipality

The municipal election results show that no one political party has been able to obtain more than forty percent of the votes in either municipality; there has been sizeable multi-party representation in all the elections; and there have been fluid changes in the distribution of the vote shares. If anything, Kamenica has been more democratically competitive with a greater elasticity of voting and changes in the dominant party compared to Hani i Elezit.

Interviews with municipal officials and politicians in Kamenica revealed that an emphasis on capacity building, too, has been a core part of the municipality's relationship with international donors (Mayor Shaip Surdulli 18.07.13). As in Hani i Elezit, Kamenica has been an important beneficiary of the European Commission's infrastructure project and has received aid to build a whole new municipality building (IO employee Kamenica 19.02.13). The USAID DEMI project has also provided technical and financial assistance for the execution of municipal responsibilities. The Kosovo Local Government Institute's 'Local Governance Academy' has consistently worked in both municipalities since 2008.

To sum up, there is scarce evidence that suggests the extent of the resources, personal, expertise, training, programmes and projects dedicated to a particular statebuilding logic has been different in Kamenica compared to Hani i Elezit. From this we can infer that the outcome in variation has little to do with the *extent of statebuilding agency*. Instead, it leads to an important conclusion: international statebuilding has played out differently in Hani i Elezit than in Kamenica, something that cannot be attributed to differences in the cases as the background conditions have been very similar. As in Kamenica these logics have not have not worked as the theories predict, the research aim of the rest of the

chapter is to understand and explain this *mismatch* between theory and how these logics operate in reality.

To answer this puzzle therefore, we have to turn to the theoretical foundations upon which these strategies are based. Within each of the theories of change underpinning these logics, certain causal mechanisms have been specified that connect these logics to the embedding of the statebuilding model. Social accountability works through civil society organisations and citizen engagement exerting an accountability pressure on political leaders to implement the statebuilding model; democratic competition works through motivating political leaders to be generally responsive to people's needs and to orient themselves to public good provision; capacity-building works through developing capabilities—human, technological, infrastructural—that facilitate the implementation of new processes. The table below summarises the causal mechanisms involved through which the logics should take effect at the municipal level.

Table 13: Statebuilding logics

Logic	Core mechanisms underpinning theory of change
Social accountability	CSOs, citizen engagement, public assemblies
Democratic competition	Public orientation, responsiveness
Capacity building	Technology, human capital, infrastructure

Understanding why international agency has played out differently in Kamenica compared to Hani i Elezit requires analysing how these causal mechanisms have operated in reality so that 'the cause-effect link that connects the independent variable and outcome is unwrapped and divided into smaller steps' (van Evera 1997, p. 54); hence, the analysis is based on the process-tracing method (Checkel

2006). Relying on the wealth of original data collected, the analysis involved scrutinising each causal mechanism and assessing whether they have work as predicted. At each analytical stage, the evidence was examined for patterns, triangulated with secondary data, as well as assessed in light of countervailing explanations, and to ensure reliability, the findings of the research were also triangulated through research into other municipalities. The next three sections will show the results of the analysis and the conclusion of the chapter will discuss the findings.

Section III: Social accountability

To understand why social accountability inputs have not prompted the supply of the statebuilding model, we need to examine the mechanisms – civil society organisations, citizen engagement and municipal assemblies – through which the theory purports to work.

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

Examining CSO behaviour in Kamenica has revealed certain limitations, which suggest CSO promotion is not a straightforward conduit for the statebuilding model. The first limitation relates to the freedom of CSOs to act as the theory assumes. One CSO representative put the logic quite clearly: 'if you are a CSO and need support, you have to support the political leaders somehow to get financing' (NGO representative Kamenica 20.02.13). While some CSOs receive international funding in Kamenica, the research found that most are actually dependent on municipal funding for their continued existence (Journalist Kamenica 08.02.13). CSO representatives across Kamenica complained that this dependency has made them wary of challenging political leaders. Not only has

this dependence blunted the effectiveness of CSOs, it has cultivated an unfavourable environment for CSOs who genuinely want to hold the municipality to account. According to one source, because the Fortessa CSO had opposed the mayor, it cannot receive funds from the municipality and is likely to close down (Journalist Kamenica 08.02.13).

Moreover, CSOs should not be assumed to act in the interests of the public at large and as simple mechanisms for statebuilding.[73] Informants confirmed that CSOs have been merely vehicles for self-aggrandisement and, ultimately, a form of income rather than organisations genuinely seeking to change the pattern of politics, especially as CSO creation has been a way of distributing income to favoured clients. CSO representatives complained that the most well-funded CSO in Kamenica municipality has apparently very 'friendly' relations with the Mayor (NGO representative Kamenica 20.02.13).

CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

To be effective, civil society mobilisation is also dependent on a public willingness to mobilise against political leaders, yet many CSO representatives feel it has been difficult to obtain general support for their initiatives because citizens are fearful of clashing with established political authority, especially the mayors. One director of a major civil society building programme described how this was a major challenge right across Kosovo: 'No one has really wanted to 'rock the boat' because you may end up offending neighbours or cousins...or politicians' (NGO director Pristina 23.06.15). A CSO representative in Kamenica said citizens have felt powerless because one day they or a member of the family

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[73] Grindle also stresses this point during her studies of CSOs in Mexico (Grindle 2007)

may need a job from the municipality, which means that there is a degree of self-censorship and citizens' discontent has been often muted. One CSO director described the contrast between independently organised debates, where citizens have expressed anger and contempt for the municipality, and those where the political leaders have been present, wherein there has been a general subservience and deference (NGO director Kamenica 20.02.12).[74]

A related limitation is that there is a sense of deep inequality in power between political leaders and citizens. A local radio journalist described how, 'people have had no faith that they can change things. They feel like they experience a kind of dictatorship. Whenever someone starts to speak out, they have been challenged by a bigger network of people (Journalist Kamenica 08.02.13). This 'dictatorship' has been especially pertinent for opposition activists, one of whom, a history teacher in the municipality, told me how he has been 'sent away' to a village (to which it costs 60 euros a month more to travel) as a punishment for campaigning against the Mayor. He told me, 'the political leaders are basically forcing him to leave his job to make space for 'one of their people' (LVV representative Kamenica 11.02.13). Such a power imbalance in Kamenica has been reflected in data collected by the author (presented below) wherein nearly half of all respondents strongly agreed that the political leaders have much more power.

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[74] This lack of spirit to challenge political leaders is certainly evident in other municipalities. In March 2013, for example, an anti-government protest of around 60 people in Peja was met with laughter from some of the hundreds of coffee drinkers passively observing from the surrounding cafes, not because they thought it was a hapless cause but because they found the protestors' belief that they could change politics faintly amusing.

Table 14: Power imbalance compared

Responses to statement: *Political leaders generally have much more power than citizens in the municipality*	Kamenica (n=101)	Hani i Elezit (n=96)
Citizens whom strongly agreed (%)	45	2
Citizens whom agreed (%)	34	53
Total (%)	79	55

*Author survey (Jackson 2013)

Contrast such a feeling of powerlessness with the results in Hani i Elezit, wherein only 2 percent of respondents strongly agreed. While a majority there still believed that some power imbalance exists, this is perhaps due to the natural distinctions between citizens and political office holders. Indeed, what the research found in Hani i Elezit is a *deliberate effort* by the Mayor to close the gap between citizens and politicians in the municipality. The Mayor told me that close consultation with citizens has been an essential part of his *modus operandi*. 'For every investment project, the citizens are involved 100%. In other municipalities, mayors are only interested in cutting the red tape. I am always personally involved. If there are any problems during the development I am engaged and I am constantly consulting with citizens.' Citizen engagement has not been political window-dressing but, according to the Mayor, has been an essential ingredient for successful governance: 'There is no way we can implement project without 100% support of the citizens' (Mayor Suma, Rufki (III)).

Opposition politicians are even willing to concede that the Mayor has done a lot to close the power imbalance. The local LVV party secretary said that the main strength of the Mayor is that 'he has been very close to the citizens. He has become close because he identifies problems together with the citizens and implements those solutions together (LVV secretary Hani I Elezit 21.10.13). This view is also echoed by citizens. A forty-eight year old chemistry teacher in the

municipality suggested '[In other municipalities] there is a big [power distance] differences between the leaders and citizens. However, I saw [Mayor] Suma this one time while he was [cleaning] the snow at midnight – nobody else does that. The Mayor shows he cares with his actions' (H3).

MUNICIPAL AND PUBLIC ASSEMBLIES

Social accountability also works through structures, notably municipal and public assemblies, and though these have been enshrined in the Law on Local Self Government, another shortcoming of the social accountability logic in Kamenica is that they have not been given 'life' by political leaders.[75] Instead amongst CSOs in Kamenica and the public in general there is a widespread (but not total) lack of faith in the formal institutions, especially the municipal assembly and public meetings, to provide sufficient means of holding the municipality to account.[76] Many felt that these formal fora are just not credible. A thirty-three year old architect in Kamenica described to me his experiences:

> 'I do not go to public meetings so often because...well, last time, the municipal government manipulated the meeting. I had a proposal for a business park to be built in the municipality, but they decided for a residential building to be constructed in that area...it will only be Mayor's close circle that could get benefit from this building. And anyway, the Mayor gets his people to go to these meetings so he can dominate' (K9).

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[75] The law states that any person or organization with a particular interest in the municipality may attend public meetings, and representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can attend consultative committees and may submit proposals, conduct research and provide opinions on municipal assembly initiatives.

[76] Some citizens, for example, suggested that the municipal public meetings can work well. For example, a firefighter in Kamenica said: 'Often I take part in these meetings. The directorate talk about projects. We propose projects, for example lighting in the neighbourhood or an ambulance. I think these hearings are effective' (K9).

A Kosovan employee of an international organisation, whose job is to keep a close eye on developments Kamenica's municipal assembly, concluded that the current Mayor 'has neutralised the municipal assembly', but that it has been generally a common tactic for all mayors to undermine accountability mechanisms of the public institutions. He gave an example:

> 'If the Mayor has opponents, the Mayor will get 'revenge' on them because he controls the education and health sectors. So if the wife of the opponent works in education, next year she will be re-allocated into another village. Then once the opponent falls back into line in the assembly, the wife is placed back into her original position. Everyone knows what is going on but people do not want to clash with the mayors' (IO employee Kamenica 19.02.13).

While in Kamenica the municipal assembly has been described as 'just a theatre with scenes' (NGO director Kamenica 20.02.12), the Mayor of Hani i Elezit has deliberately endeavoured to make public meetings an effective forum where concrete problems can be solved. For public meetings, he and colleagues have gone from door to door to make personal invitations to citizens and stimulate attendance through the offer of a free lunch and coffee (Mayor Suma, Rufki (II) 24.10.13). The view of citizens is that he has also made major steps to increase the credibility and effectiveness of public meetings. One resident, having witnessed a public meeting held in a village, said he was 'really surprised by the meeting' as 'there were a lot of constructive discussions'. He added, 'I know for a fact that the requests from citizens have been acted upon and implemented. We are not used to that in Kosovo' (H3).

Conclusion:
Social accountability is expected to work through civil society organisations and citizen engagement exerting an accountability pressure on political leaders but tracing the causal mechanisms of the logic one can see that these mechanisms

cannot be assumed to be a straightforward boon for statebuilding. The quantity of CSOs and public engagement should not be confused with the quality. The research shows that the effectiveness depends on the right organisational, institutional and social environment, which cannot itself be shaped by citizens or CSOs but is ultimately reliant on the political leaders of the municipality. The impact of social accountability interventions in Kamenica, in stark contrast to Hani i Elezit, have been blunted because political leaders have exploited the organisational dependence of CSOs on the municipality, have not tried to address feelings of powerlessness, nor provided effective institutional settings for accountability. The effect of social accountability interventions is ineluctably dependent on the degree to which political leaders at the municipal level are willing to provide a favourable environment for citizen participation and civil society.

Section IV: Democratic competition

To understand why in the slightly more competitive Kamenica political competition has not prompted the supply of the statebuilding model, the mechanisms – greater orientation to the public interest and greater responsiveness –through which the theory purports to work need to be examined.

GREATER PUBLIC ORIENTATION

As political competition increases the importance of seeking as many votes as possible, the implication is that one would expect to see leaders increasingly oriented towards a more public-interest style of politics. Yet, tracing how political leaders have behaved in Kamenica over the last decade suggests that political competition has not created a broader public orientation amongst political leaders;

instead, the general perception amongst citizens and local observers is a widespread shunning of public-oriented electioneering. Research by local analysts has shown that in Kamenica political candidates have almost never offered a coherent public programme in the past decade (Gemi 28.06.15). Interviews with citizens also confirmed that they found it very difficult to say what the different parties stood for and individualistic electoral offers seem to have been the norm in the municipality. One young lady explained that her peer group in Kamenica 'receive [clientelist] job offers all the time, nothing is ever specific but before the elections every second person offers you a job' (K15).

RESPONSIVENESS

As political competition increases the marginal utility of votes, it is meant to make leaders more responsive to citizen's needs. In Kamenica, however, political competition has stoked a logic that contradicts the expectation of the theory. Because under conditions of political competition voters have many alternative candidates to choose from, for political candidates the risk that their supporter may defect to other candidates has increased. Consequently, there has been a kind of *perverse effect of democratic competition*. To avoid the electoral costs of voters defecting in the next election to other political leaders, the pressure has been on incumbent politicians to deliver to supporters first and foremost—keeping 'sweet' those who put them in power. As an illustration, a key informant told me that an inhabitant of Kamenica had told the Mayor that if he does not employ his daughter at the hospital then 200 family members will go to the other party. Now the daughter is employed in the hospital (NGO representative Kamenica 20.02.13).

Instead of greater responsiveness, competition has engendered a pattern of punishing voters who do not vote and rewarding those who do. There is no more striking symbol of these particularist tendencies than the large modern water well that lies unused and rusting at the edge of Kopernice, a village of around four hundred residents situated about seven kilometres from the centre of Kamenica municipality. I found out that this well, that would have provided water for the whole village, remains disconnected to the villagers' homes. As a consequence, the residents of the village still have to depend on their own unreliable wells that are normally self-built or improvised. According to the 'village elder', the municipality has refused to connect the new well to the villagers' homes. Why did this happen?

> 'The new well was built by the previous Mayor of Kamenica municipality, whom the village overwhelmingly voted for. We voted for this Mayor again because he comes from our village but he lost, and a new man was in charge. This new Mayor knew we voted for his opponent so he decided he would do nothing for us' (Village elder Kopernice 20.02.13).

Meanwhile, the accused, incumbent Mayor told me that the reason why there are no connectors is because the previous Mayor had promised the village that the municipality would pay for the connectors as a reward for the village voting for him (Mayor Shaip Surdulli 18.07.13). The incumbent Mayor claims he was not taking revenge as the municipality had not paid for these connecting pipes in any other village and so the previous Mayor should not have promised them. Whoever's story is correct is beside the point: the case of this vital piece of infrastructure going to waste can be blamed precisely the dominance of a tit-for-tat system of electoral rewards and punishments over a more public-oriented mode of politics. As a

corollary of particularism, if you have not backed the 'right horse' then your access to government is circumscribed. The village elder in Kopernice explained how the municipality simply did not listen to him precisely because the village voted en masse for an alternative candidate. 'Government absenteeism' in out-of-favour villages and neighbourhoods has therefore been a feature of political life in Kamenica.

Contrast these developments with the village of Huneli in Hani I Elezit. In this village, the road that led from the houses to the local school at the top of a hill was severely inadequate, meaning children had faced a daily scramble up this road, essentially a rocky path, to reach the school (Village Iman 21.03.13). Like in Kopernice, in this village the residents mainly voted for the opposition candidate and not the incumbent Mayor. Yet, in contrast, rather than shunning this 'opposition' village, one of the first priorities of the Hani i Elezit Mayor was to visit the village and discuss the problem. Soon after, the Mayor took the issue of the damaged road to the municipal assembly, after which the go-ahead was given to build a new road (Mayor Suma 21.03.13). I asked the Mayor why he prioritised these voters who had opposed him: 'We shouldn't be divided by politics here', was the Mayor's explanation.

The two different cases demonstrate that a competitive electoral system does in fact provide an important conduit for information about citizens' needs and preferences. The water-well and inadequate roads became 'electoral issues' and therefore of amplified concern to the political leaders. Still, whether and how this information is acted upon depends on the orientation of the political leaders. In Kamenica, the situation with the

well became part of the particularistic logic; whereas the more public-

oriented Mayor in Hani i Elezit responded by reaching out to the voters, in

doing so treating them as citizens and engaging them via the formal system.

The data presented below of relevant indicators taken from a separate

UNDP survey in 2012 confirms more broadly the different levels of

responsiveness.

Table 15: Responsiveness indicators

Responsiveness and public orientation indicators	Kamenica	Hani i Elezit	Kosovo average
Citizen considerations taken into account a lot or to some extent by municipal officials (%)	52	80	55
Respondents very or somewhat informed on the work of the municipality (%)	42	84	49

* Data source (UNDP 2012)

Compared to Hani i Elezit (and the rest of Kosovo) citizens in Kamenica do not

feel their views are taken into account, nor have good information of what is

going in the municipality, both of which can be traced in part (but not exclusively)

to the logics of political competition that have operated very differently from how

the theory has predicted in Kamenica.

Conclusion

Democratic competition is expected to work through motivating political

leaders to be generally responsive to people's needs and to orient

themselves to public good provision, but in Kamenica it has worked this

way. Indeed, the research shows that that the effect of democratic

competition depends on its interaction with contextual conditions (Grindle

2007). While other scholars point to the interaction effect with socio-economic conditions (Weitz-Shapiro 2012; Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007), the research here emphasises how the effects of democracy-enhancing measures to encourage political competition depend on the underlying orientation of political leaders. When, as in Kamenica, political actors' actions are determined by the narrow calculus of electoral rewards, political competition inspires particularistic politics, which works against the implementation of the statebuilding model.[77] These findings have been triangulated with my own investigations into other municipalities that have confirmed the same logics at work.[78] When, political leaders, as in Hani i Elezit, are more concerned with representing the public interest then it is quite likely that political competition can engender a more responsive municipality that seeks to provide more public goods, including the statebuilding model.

Section V: Capacity building

Clearly capacity-building inputs have been important. Improvements in the delivery of services have also been made through trainings and technology, and so people now receive business permits, birth certificates and passports in a slightly timelier manner in Kamenica (UNDP 2012). Yet, though routine tasks and organisational matters may have become more efficient, such aspects of municipal

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[77] The research is then consistent with those scholars whom have argued democratic elections are not necessarily a causal factor in better governance (Khan 2005; Collier 2010).

[78] This has also been the case in other highly competitive municipalities. In Peja it has been speculated that the former Mayor of Peja, for example, had managed to assume control over a quarter of the municipality's investment budget through the creation of an investment fund, which channelled money only into those neighbourhoods and organisations that had supported him politically—or were willing to do so in the future (LDK secretary Peja 24.04.13)

responsibilities shouldn't be confused with the implementation of a model of governance.

Tracing how capacity building operates, my research has identified an important variable that the theory misses: capacity building inputs are mediated through the agendas of political leaders. Consider attempts to develop participatory budgeting mechanisms in Kamenica undertaken by USAID in 2011. After diagnosing that the municipality lacked the capacity to develop an engaging mechanism for citizens to discuss the budget, USAID invested in communication tools and training for staff as well as organisational resources (USAID 2012). A report by USAID lauded the programme a success based upon the increases in the number of people who had attended these sessions, as well as the size of the budget allocated to this participatory mechanism (USAID 2012). Insiders working on the project, however, revealed to me that while participation did increase, this was because the public hearings were subject to 'client packing.' One expert explained: 'At first, we thought it was a success then after the meeting we realised that everyone there was placed there by the political party. The Mayor used his party contacts to fill the room just so they could tick the boxes and then everyone was happy' (NGO director Pristina 23.06.15). Mediated through the orientation of the mayor, the effect of this capacity building was nullified because the communication tools and training were used to mobilise the Mayor's supporters rather than ensuring that the new capacity is deployed to create a genuinely open and public meeting.

The same negation of capacity-building efforts, especially with regards to human capital and technological development, has occurred because of the type of organisational culture cultivated in Kamenica by political leaders. Having worked

closely with successive mayors in Kamenica, a leading expert and director of a

municipal reform programme in Kosovo, said that information sharing has been

very poor, there has been a deferential and controlling culture, and motivation

amongst some staff has been extremely low (Ginka 16.11.12). Due to this poor

sense of public mission, new technology inputs, such as computers, have not been

used to their fullest potential and have not been helpful in terms of improving how

the municipality operates. Many staff members in Kamenica have also undergone

trainings via seminars undertaken by international organisations or specialist

CSOs. Yet because for most staff there is no incentive to work efficiently and to

targets because rewards and promotion are not configured according to clear and

objective standards, attending training is considered to be more of a 'break' from

work rather than a chance to develop personal capacity (Ginka 16.11.12).

In general then, capacity-building inputs have not been channelled

effectively in Kamenica. As the table below demonstrates, trust in the competence

of Kamenica municipality is desperately low and satisfaction levels are poor.

TABLE 16: MUNICIPAL CAPACITY INDICATORS

Municipal capacity indicators	Kamenica	Hani i Elezit	Kosovo average
Citizen trust in competence of municipality to solve local problems (%)	22	83	65
General satisfaction with the work of the municipality (%)	54	93	69

* Data source (UNDP 2012)

In contrast, in Hani i Elezit capacity building has had an important impact because

it has converged with the political agenda of the leaders, especially the Mayor, in

which the desire to improve the efficiency of how the municipality operates has

been strong. As the Director of public and emergency services described: 'the

work culture is very strong a good ethic, it is very open and we all want to do a good job for the municipality' (Municipal director 27.05.15). Aligned with this kind of political agenda, new technology and training have enabled not just a more efficient provision of core services but also enabled core elements of the statebuilding model, such as databases, improved administrative practices, better interactions with citizens, to be implemented (Municipal official Hani I Elezit).

Conclusion

Capacity-building is expected to work through developing certain capabilities—human, technological, infrastructural—that facilitate the implementation of new processes, yet the research has shown that capacity building initiatives are often misconceived as leading inevitably to statebuilding. Tracing how they operate on the ground, these initiatives can easily face negation: an insidious disruption of projects, trainings, technology and infrastructure. The important point is that capacity building is not an independent factor but depends on the underlying orientation of political leaders. When a particularist agenda predominates over that of the public interest, as has been the case in Kamenica, then the effect of capacity building is negated; whereas in Hani i Elezit capacity building initiatives have had a stronger effect, precisely because they have dovetailed with the political leader's general orientation to the public good.[79]

Chapter Conclusion: the missing variable of local political agency

The empirical significance of this chapter is that it has traced the impact of three logics of statebuilding to the level at which they play out on the ground. The

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[79] This finding is consistent with the work of Grindle, whose detailed studies of municipalities in Mexico revealed that 'the political dynamics behind capacity-building initiatives were crucial to understanding their impact ...such activities are embedded in political preferences and electoral rhythms' (Grindle 2007, p. 108).

assumption behind the logics of social accountability, democratic competition and capacity building is that they are effective conduits for the supply of statebuilding—there is a clear-cut relationship between cause and effect. Yet, in tracing the causal mechanisms through which these logics operate, the core finding of this research is that each of these logics, despite dominating the policy and academic discourse, are limited by a cognitive 'blind spot': the causal chain linking cause and effect is mediated by the agendas and orientation of political leaders of the municipalities. Hence, the conclusion is not that one strategy and theory may be superior to the others but that each of them misses a crucial *conditional variable*: the impact of these logics is dependent on the degree to which they converge with the orientation of the political leaders of the municipalities on the ground.

In Kamenica these logics of international agency have diverged with local political agency. Social accountability mechanisms have been blunted because political leaders have neglected to provide an adequate organisational and institutional environment; political competition has resulted in neglect because leaders have been oriented by electoral calculus; and capacity-building measures have been negated precisely because they have been channelled not for the public good but for narrow political interests. In Kamenica, as elsewhere in Kosovo's municipalities, the emphasis has been on *particularistic leadership*—that is, prioritising the interests of those who vote or may vote for you and putting the consolidation of power at the top of the agenda. This particularistic form of local agency has thus explained the *futile effect* of international statebuilding logics.

Contrast this with Hani i Elezit, where *public leadership* has defined the exercise of political agency: the public interest has guided decision making above

the particularist concerns of serving client networks and hoarding institutional power. In this municipality, the modes of implementation have been effective precisely because they have been given strong impetus by political agency – or what I term leadership – oriented towards the public good.

Theoretically, the research has shown that debates about sequencing (Paris, Sisk 2009) – what should come first, build up the capacity of the state, democratise or build up bottom-up accountability – are somewhat irrelevant because social accountability, democratic competition and capacity building measures have no *independent effect*; instead, they have impact *only if* these measures, as in Hani i Elezit, are given forward motion and thrust by political agency on the ground.

Indeed, one important implication of the research is that it has shown how important agency and leadership are for the theoretical assumptions underlying statebuilding strategies. In doing so, it fundamentally challenges those scholars who assume that international actors can just *do* statebuilding (Dobbins 2007). Local municipal politicians are not merely 'partners' but 'gatekeepers': while they may outwardly appear as supine benefactors of international aid they are in fact decisive, subtly shaping and determining the outcome of various logics of action.

While the statebuilding literature has regularly treated local agency as a monolith, as though it is a unitary force rather than a diverse and contradictory phenomenon (Barnett, Zuercher 2008; Mac Ginty 2011; Bieber 2005), this chapter has nuanced the picture of local agency by isolating one particular type of agency: local political leadership. The chapter also showed how this one type of local agency actually conflicts with other types: local leaders have undermined local

civil society actors as well as ignored instructions from the relevant domestic ministries.

Leadership is understood here in a very neutral way as the exercise of political agency; in other words, it is the 'mobilisation and organisation of people and resources in pursuit of particular ends' (Leftwich 2009, p. 14).[80] Leadership is distinguished as a form of local agency by the position that leaders occupy and the subsequent opportunities they have to mobilise information, people and resources. Compared to other forms of local agency – civil society actors, bureaucrats, and NGOs – local leaders in Kosovo's municipalities have access to privileged information and public resources and discretion over allocation decisions, which set them apart (Grindle 2007, p. 170).

The fate of international agency in developing formal institutions is determined by local leadership. At first glance, this may seem like an unsurprising conclusion: yet, what is very surprising is that leadership has been utterly overlooked both in the conception of policy and the broader academic discourse. Policy programming in general has yet to understand the role of political leaders as critical agents in the process of statebuilding. Consider the core planning document of a Swiss Development Agency project that aims to install the statebuilding model in Kosovo's municipalities (DEMOS 2014). The specific goal of the project is that municipality works 'like a modern state,' an aim achieved through various courses of actions, such as training, infrastructure development and technical expertise, all of which are encapsulated within a project document. In one of the matrixes of the project document, there is a demand for

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[80] Leadership should not be equated with power; it is an aspect of power but leadership is more limited in the sense that leaders must fulfil the wishes of their followers whereas power holders can ignore these. 'Leadership, unlike naked power-wielding, is thus inseparable from followers' needs and goals.'(Burns 1978, p. 19)

'assumptions' to be spelled out and for many of the activities, the assumption is that the Mayors and Municipal Assemblies are 'willing and capable' to engage in a constructive dialogue with citizenry or improve services. Hence, the assumption that partners and actors will work in the same direction is made explicit in the document. The irony is that as a blueprint for a new kind of social and political order, there is no mention of how interventions may interact with society and politics, and especially political agents on the ground. Instead, the agency of political leaders is assumed away and totally discounted from the underlying model of change in this strategy.

Other scholars too have argued that leadership has been routinely ignored in the design of statebuilding policies. As one expert has summed up: 'while the international development community has increasingly understood what constitutes effective states, strong institutions and good governance, there is a significant gap in its recognition and understanding of the centrality of politics and leadership in all this'(Leftwich 2009, p. 6). When leadership is considered in policy circles, it is often treated merely as a skill that can be nurtured through trainings, and even though donor regularly demand the need for more 'political will' or 'stronger leadership', there is no understanding of what these actually means nor the complexities of what leadership involves.

This neglect is reflected too in the academic discourse, wherein in leadership is rarely considered as a variable in its own right. Instead, as Bass has argued, many political science scholars see leadership as merely a quality ascribed to leaders by followers but has no independent effect in the real world (Bass 1985). Consequently, though the broader academic literature on leadership is now vast covering many disciplines from management and organisational studies (and

to a lesser extent) to psychology and sociology, but there is almost no work on leadership in development studies and very little work has been done on analysing leadership as a political concept (Lyne de Ver, Heather 2008).[81]

Besides lingering suspicions that leadership may not be a 'sophisticated' branch of political science (Peele 2005), there are two main reasons for the systematic neglect of the analysis of leadership in the political science and development literatures. The first reason is because of its awkward relationship with power. If leadership is granted a deterministic role in political outcomes, it brings with it disagreeable connotations of authoritarianism, which are difficult to reconcile with the more favoured themes of democracy, justice, representation and equality (Peele 2005). This has lead to a greater focus on the factors that constrain the power of leaders, especially the democratic institutions of the state, at the expense of engaging with the concept (Lyne de Ver, Heather 2008, p. 31). The second reason is because predominance of the explanatory power of institutions in political science in recent years has tended to obscure the role of political agency (Peele 2005). In the same way, governance concepts such as 'capacity building' and 'institutional reform' tend to evacuate the power inherent in the leadership role (Lyne de Ver, Heather 2008, p. 29).

Hopefully the research findings here have persuaded the reader of the need to conceptualise political agency and leadership more clearly. Local leadership must be brought back in as a key variable within statebuilding and the agency of political leaders requires investigation in its own right. But here we come to the

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[81]The clear neglect is a rather recent phenomenon. Though political theorists, from Plato to Machiavelli to Weber had famously theorised about leadership 'modern political theory certainly fails to explore the leadership issue in depth' (Peele 2005, p. 189). Where political science has touched on leadership, it has been generally oriented towards stable, Western political contexts in which it is assumed that the rules of the game are clear but this existing literature is unhelpful for unstable contexts; as a corollary, there is virtually no understanding of leadership in development state (Lyne de Ver, Heather 2008).

crux of the problem: as it has been largely ignored by both the academic and policy communities, there have been few attempts to understand how political agency works and where it comes from in settings undergoing institutional development. The next chapter, by explaining differences in local leadership, contributes to filling this gap.

Chapter VIII: From particularistic to public to transformational leadership

The last chapter identified the core of the explanation for the varied outcomes of statebuilding strategies: local political leadership. So central is this to the statebuilding story, it requires investigation in its own right. As a first step, leadership is understood as the 'mobilisation and organisation of people and resources in pursuit of particular ends' (Leftwich 2009, p. 14). This neutral definition means we can avoid distinctions revolving around 'strong or weak' or 'effective and ineffective'; instead, if leadership is about action towards certain ends, it is worthwhile to think more broadly in terms of differences in *orientations* of leadership. Orientations relate to the broad agenda and motivations of the political leaders.

From the perspective of the supply side of statebuilding, two types of leadership—underpinned by different orientations—have been witnessed, which I have termed *particularistic* and *public* leadership. In Kamenica, as elsewhere in Kosovo's municipalities, the emphasis has been on particularistic leadership; in Hani i Elezit, public leadership has defined the exercise of political agency. Particularistic leadership occurs when leaders prioritise the needs and demands of their own clients and social networks, while public leadership is about above advancing what could be broadly understood as the public interest above narrow political considerations.

Yet, chapter VI demonstrated that the clientelist model has a demand-side too. In Hani i Elezit there has been an increase in support for the statebuilding model which implies a threshold has been crossed in which there has been a drop in demand for clientelism, a change that is critical for the sustainability of statebuilding because the supply of new institutions can be easily swamped by a dominant particularistic culture (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). This implies that public leadership is not enough: leadership that aims to *transform* underlying behaviours and values so that a majority of actors 'buy in' to the new institutions is a critical factor in determining whether the statebuilding model could be 'institutionalised' (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). Transformational leadership is in the same vein as public leadership but it aims to *go beyond* orientation towards the public interest to transform the behaviour and values of that public.[82]

These *types* of leadership—particularistic, public and transformational— explain the varied impact of internationally-led statebuilding and need to be more rigorously interrogated. This chapter aims to explain these differences local leadership.[83] It is divided into two sections. The first looks at leadership within the supply-side and identifies certain features of the political environment which may act as constraints on public leadership or encourage particularistic leadership. Section II explains how a local leader in Hani i Elezit has reduced the demand for clientelism, and in doing so, has exercised transformational leadership.

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[82] The concept of transformational leadership is inspired by Burns' definition that it 'elevates both leaders and followers to a new plane of action in which values and behaviour fundamentally change (Burns 1978, p. 20).

[83] This research then is consistent with an emerging research area that has re-emphasised the importance of the politics of implementation and the role of leadership within this, on the activities of agents in public positions of authorities who make strategic choices about how to advance (or not) new organisational and institutional agendas (Grindle 2012, 2007).

Section I: From particularistic to public leadership

What explains the predominance of particularistic leadership in Kosovo's municipalities? Why is public leadership so rare?[84] Eminent studies of leadership have often followed the 'trait' approach, emphasising the unique personality and crucial abilities of the leader (Lyne de Ver, Heather 2008). Biographies, such as Robert Dallek's (2004) on John F. Kennedy or more recently Anthony Seldon's (2007) 'Blair's Britain' are classics in this regard.[85] Personality traits and abilities certainly matter but, if we aim to analytically model leadership, such an approach is insufficient because an emphasis on individual qualities tends to be narrative driven and reticent on the features of the political order that may also explain the types of leadership that emerge. Moreover, much of this work takes place in Western settings wherein the institutional settings are stable and predictable – an environment which is hardly relatable to many non-Western settings (Lyne de Ver, Heather 2008).

A different approach is necessary. This section aims to explain why different types of leadership have existed in Kosovo's municipalities. The aim is not to create a theory about how political leaders behave in all situations, for such a theory may be impossible, but rather to, more modestly, go beyond trait explanations to identify certain features of the political environment which may act as constraints on public leadership or encourage particularist leadership.

Examining local leadership demands a focus on the most important political leaders of the municipality, the mayors, whom since 2007, when decentralisation and statebuilding began in earnest, have been central to the

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[84] Public and particularistic have been used here as adjectives but exclusive and inclusive could also be used.
[85] Other studies have focused on the psychological and social sources of leadership. See for example (Burns 1978)

statebuilding story. The research has been largely inductive, based on a comprehensive examination of the political environment in Kosovo's municipalities, but also borrows insights from the emerging literature. The hypothesis is that certain political constraints on leadership have existed in Kamenica (and other municipalities) but not in Hani i Elezit and so a comparative method has been deployed, based on a close examination of the behaviour of the dominant political figures in both municipalities. In Hani i Elezit this has meant focusing on Rufki Suma, twice-elected mayor of Hani i Elezit, and in Kamenica, the incumbent Mayor Shaip Surdulli, as well as the former PDK Mayor.[86] In depth interviews were conducted with each politician. In addition, I interviewed political opposition candidates and political analysts and key informants were also consulted. Two constraints on public leadership have been identified: credibility and the nature of political organisation.

VIII:I:I Structural constraint I: Credibility

Political scientists examine the essential elements of political order, especially qualities such as legitimacy and authority. Yet, there is another distinct ingredient, which receives less attention in the literature, but my research revealed as very important for politics in Kosovo's municipalities: credibility. During interviews with citizens in Kamenica a recurring theme emerged: there is a 'credibility gap' for both politicians and the municipality itself. One resident, for instance, explained that 'I don't even want a politician to help just me...I don't expect that' (K8), while a local lawyer and keen observer of the political scene in the municipality concluded that 'it is naive to believe that politicians will deliver on what they promise to do' (K6). A thirty-three year old architect in Kamenica

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[86] Shaip Surdulli lost office in the 2013 municipal election after the research had been conducted

municipality summed up this rather widespread view: 'In the past, honest people had the power. Now, people are less kind and politicians lie, and they don't get the job done – whatever they promised you' (K9).

This perception was evidenced elsewhere in Kosovo.[87] Indeed, national quantitative data illustrates how little credibility politicians tend to have as political parties have been rated the least-trusted organisations in Kosovan society. In 2008, over a thousand residents were presented with a list of ten organisations like the church, the government, civil society and political parties and were asked by Gallup how much they trusted each organisation. At the bottom of the pile were political parties with only 8 percent of respondents having a lot of trust in political parties compared to, for instance, 63 percent for NATO rand 43 percent for EU institutions (Gallup 2008).

Credibility is the belief that an individual or state institution is believable or trustworthy (Gourevitch et al. 2012). This is a quality independent from democratic legitimacy and legal authority: a political leader can be elected and hold legitimate office but that does not mean that people see him or her as credible: that people will believe the leader will deliver on promises and trust the public statements made. Credibility 'entails a judgement of a receiver' and is therefore a relational concept: it is not something that leaders possess but it is up to citizens to attribute credibility to political leaders. Credibility is also not a stable attribute but can rise and fall, and so for political leaders and institutions it is a quality that cannot be acquired in one moment but needs to be constantly nurtured (van Zuydam 2014).

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[87] Section III of chapter VI detailed the general mistrust in politicians in Kosovo's municipalities. During an interview, a young student in Peja, for example, suddenly stopped talking and said: 'I must add that all those promises [of politicians] are in fact lies' (P47).

Not all politicians in Kosovo lack credibility. Some leaders, such as Hashim Thaci leader of the PDK or Ramush Haridinaj leader of the AAK, have emerged with almost divine reputations amongst their supporters for their role in the war, for example. Nevertheless, those with the high levels of credibility are in a very small minority and are often found in the upper echelons of the leadership of political parties and not really at the municipal level, wherein the shortages in credibility are more pronounced.

Why are Kosovo's municipalities a 'credibility scarce' environment? This is somewhat puzzling for it is not as though individuals in general lack credibility. Consider, the Mayor of Kamenica, Shaip Surdulli. As a former leader of the Kosovan Albanian non-violent resistance movement as well as a university professor, he has been highly respected in the community. Curiously, this respect has not carried over into the political sphere, which would imply that there are some feature of politics in Kosovo that acts as a constraint on political credibility.

I identify two features. First, the political credibility gap is a result of Kosovo being a 'young democracy'. Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) have advanced an important insight that as credibility is mostly developed through an evaluation of past actions (i.e reputation of past performance), an intrinsic structural constraint of young democracies is that politicians have no 'track record' upon which to demonstrate credibility. The absence of credibility therefore is not because politicians lack the abilities of the politicians in the 'mature' democracies, but because there has not been a sufficient period within which political candidates can demonstrate that they will always fulfil their electoral promises, a record that takes both time and also information to develop. Time because politicians must be able to have the time-period to translate political promises into tangible outcomes

(i.e to show that they can deliver) and information because voters must know that politicians have in fact fulfilled these promises (Keefer, Vlaicu 2007).

But Keefer and Vlaicu miss another important element: the lack of an individual track record must combine with a sense that the institutions too are not necessarily credible, or do not have integrity independent of that of the leaders. In countries with credible institutions, leaders with no track record can swiftly acquire credibility given that voters know that the institutions that they preside over have some degree of integrity. But Kosovo's municipalities do not have the reputation of the Swedish Civil Service, for example, so gaining credibility through the 'reflected glow' of well-functioning institutions has not been possible.

In credibility scarce environments such as Kosovo, political leaders will always seek to enhance their own credibility as the more credibility a politician nurtures, the more effectively he or she can convince voters of their electoral platform. Given that political leaders want to win as many votes possible to survive in the job, the key criterion about credibility seeking is efficiency: which method will deliver the most credibility in the quickest time. Seeking credibility is not about what political promise *but whether they deliver.* Moreover, politicians do not have to seek general credibility, just enough to convince a sufficient number of voters to keep voting for them. For politicians in democratic settings, there are generally two different strategies to decide upon: to make your appeal on the provision of public goods or through the provision of personalised and targeted promises to individuals (Keefer, Vlaicu 2007).

The argument I make is that in Kosovo, *the most efficient way of generating credibility* has been to shun appeals based on public goods and make personalised and individualised promises to the electorate. The reason for this has

to do with the generally low capacity to deliver public goods. One strategy for a political leader in Kamenica to build up credibility could be appeal to the electorate based on his or her ability to provide public goods, such as democratic governance or a new major public infrastructure project. The candidate may assess the capacity of the municipal administration and foresee, however, that seeking credibility through the provision of public goods is much more risky compared to a more targeted approach. Providing, for instance, a public waste management system may take time to deliver and to be translated into tangible gains for the electorate—or the municipality may just lack capacity to deliver this public good. Moreover, for any electoral gain to be realised, voters need to know about the development of this system but it is quite costly to constantly provide information about public good initiatives through, for instance, leaflets, adverts or media appearances.

In contrast, personalised and targeted appeals—employment, small infrastructure, minor resources—are more efficient in generating credibility because offering a job to someone, for instance, can be delivered immediately after the election and the fulfilment of this promise can be more easily observed by the beneficiary taking up the role. In fulfilling the electoral offer, credibility is then generated and the politician could be quite confident that he has secured votes for future elections too.

This tendency to make personalised and targeted promise leads to a sustained particularist orientation which favours the development of the clientelist model over the programmatic model. In implementing the programmatic model, the mayor is meant to ensure that decisions are made openly and procedures are followed, but these would act as constraints on the mayor fulfilling his or her side

of the bargain. Consider a politician who has tried to build credibility through promising jobs to various families: openness about the allocation of these jobs may cause a backlash by aggrieved citizens and distributing jobs in this way may also violate the formal laws and processes. Instead, prioritising the client network is helped if a leader consolidates his or her ability to act with discretion and behind closed doors rather than through distributing authority to other actors, such as civil society or the municipal assembly, or through ensuring that the administration works transparently.

In short, the inevitable shortfalls of credibility in young democracies combined with the low capacity to deliver public goods leads to politicians to seek credibility through personalised and target electoral offers, which in turn leads to exercise of political agency in particularistic manner. In turn, this leads to the neglect of the implementation of the programmatic model and the building up of the clientelist model.

Clearly, it is very difficult to observe the internal rationale behind politicians' decisions but the evidence seems to support much of the steps in the argument presented here. First, interviews with politicians revealed that they are aware that they have little credibility. The mayor of Kamenica explained how '[Kosovan] Albanians had a lot of hope after the war but now they are disappointed by the politicians' (Mayor Shaip Surdulli 18.07.13). The local LDK secretary in Peja municipality explained how 'not a high score is given to honest or intelligent politics...people do not believe in the honesty [of politicians]' (LDK secretary Peja 24.04.13). In an interview with a candidate for mayor for Pristina in the 2013 municipal elections, he told me:

> When I go to the different neighbourhoods [of Pristina], it is very
> difficult to convince people because they are sceptical...they are not so

believing of the candidates. One thing I learnt from this campaign is that all the other candidates just lie. None of them can be trusted (Political candidate 04.13.13.).

Second, the orientation towards particularistic offers has been clear in Kamenica (see also (Chapter VII:IV). There has been no sense, for example, that elections campaigns have been increasingly conducted in a more public-oriented fashion whereby politicians seek the greater share of votes through offers of public programmes. Local analysts have shown that political candidates in Kamenica have seldom fought elections on public-oriented offers (Gemi 28.06.15); instead, personalised electoral offers have been the norm in the municipality and have dominated the style of campaigning (Journalist Kamenica 08.02.13).

CREDIBILITY IN HANI I ELEZIT

Most importantly, if credibility has been an important factor in explaining the types of leaderships that emerge then in Hani i Elezit there would be evidence that the credibility of Rufki Suma has been high. Credibility is difficult to measure with any precision but interviews with citizens and opposition politicians affirmed that the Mayor has enjoyed a great deal of credibility. Indeed, Suma had credibility in abundance prior to entering politics. He never had political ambitions but such was his standing across Hani i Elezit that a group of citizens pleaded to him to run in the municipality's first direct election for mayor in 2009. He reluctantly agreed but only on the condition that he wouldn't campaign, and so, remarkably, through his reputation alone, Suma managed to defeat the political machines of the three largest parties.

This endowment of credibility, as the Mayor explained to me, 'is not about one or two years but thirty years of hard work'(Mayor Suma, Rufki (II) 24.10.13).

This work began when he was a leader within the youth division of the LDK, at that point a Kosovan-Albanian resistance movement. In the late 1990s, his local reputation grew when he became Commander of the local unit of the Kosovan Liberation Army. Yet, it was really in the post-war period that Suma proved himself as dedicated to serving the community. Having remained in Hani i Elezit throughout the NATO bombing, it was he who led a core team in rebuilding the damaged municipality. Schools, homes and roads were repaired under his direction and readied for returnees. Suma set up a system of taxation to generate resources to clean the town and organised informal directorates relating to various aspects of life. Against UNMIK's wishes, he even reopened the cement factory so that people could return to work, which prompted threats of arrest from UNMIK officials (Mayor Suma 21.03.13).

To a certain extent this shows that there are opportunities for leaders to overcome the credibility constraint and develop credibility outside of formal contexts but this is often difficult to do across a whole in municipalities. Suma admits that the relatively small size of Hani i Elezit helped in the nurturing of his credibility: it is easier to cultivate a reputation amongst 10,000 people than 100,000 people. Yet, his sustained efforts have almost been unique in Kosovo. When in 2015 pictures emerged of the Mayor in the middle of a freezing January night driving a snow plough through the blocked streets so that by the morning stranded residents resume their normal lives, citizens were simply not surprised for this was considered just another deed in a series of good deeds stretching back three decades (Municipal director 27.05.15).

To conclude this part, unlike nearly all other local political leaders, Rufki Suma's high credibility has enabled him to exercise public leadership. Credibility

is a key ingredient because it makes public leadership *compatible with political survival.* Public leadership without credibility is likely to end up in defeat as the electorate remain unconvinced that the broad processes under implementation will ever come to fruition. Yet, if the electorate generally see the leader as trustworthy then it makes it easier to get buy in for public plans from the electorate; more likely that the electorate will be more patient with the reform processes; and more attuned to the future benefits from building up the statebuilding model.

VIII:I:II Structural constraint II: the nature of political organisations

The nature of political organisation is where the second constraint on public leadership is found. Mayors find themselves part of political parties. Chapter IV (section II) detailed how political parties in Kosovo's municipalities take a very different form from those in western European states. Rather than public associations shaped by internal democratic rules and underpinned by a certain ideology, for the most part they should be best understood as informal networks that are created to distribute public resources and provide an organisational setting for the different actors in the patron-client structure. Yet, the most relevant aspect for constraints on public leadership is not the lack of ideology but the way political parties are organised which structures the incentives shaping the behaviour of political leaders at the municipal level.

The core distinguishing feature of the organisation of political parties in Kosovo is that they have been extremely *hierarchical* in nature: nearly all the decision making and command over resources have been concentrated in the hands of the leaders, or in the leaders' close inner circle. Those at the top can be understood as 'super patrons': undisputed leaders who sit at the apex of the organisation, charting its course and ultimately managing the internal flow of

resources. This core quality of political parties has long been recognised by analysts in Kosovo. A report written in 2006 suggested that 'elected representatives perceive few compelling reasons to be thankful to voters for getting elected. They certainly feel as they owe more towards respective party heads' (KIPRED 2006, p. 20).[88] In my own interview with the mayor of Decan municipality in 2013 he admitted that the obligation he has for his party is just as important as the one he has to citizens (Mayor Selmanaj 17.07.13). One development expert with two decades of experience in Kosovo summed up the organisational structure of parties in Kosovo: 'You are either the big man at the top or you take orders, there is no middle management. It takes strong personalities to break the mould and those who do try to do so are normally sidelined' (International Development Professional 27.03.13).

Reinforcing the acute hierarchy has been the absence of internal mechanisms that could allow party members, especially municipal leaders, to challenge the orders of the leader at the top. Rules favouring open and democratic debate have been generally cast aside in favour of informal and flexible organisation that serves the writ of the party leader. In the words of Philip Keefer, this means there has been an absence of 'organisational arrangements that provide for collective action' such as subjecting party leaders to oversight by members (Keefer 2015, p. 229).

Hierarchy has bred dependency. Without support from the super patron, politicians at the municipal level would find it difficult to survive politically

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[88] Attending a rally for the AAK party in 2013, it was striking to see that what linked everyone in the room was their adoration for Ramush Haradinaj, the leader of the AAK and a former general in the KLA. The whole rally consisted of a slide show of pictures of the leader, whom then spoke in rousing fashion for thirty minutes about the future without ever announcing a policy or making an ideological statement.

because they have been dependent on super patrons on two resources that party leaders have control over and municipal politicians lack: money for electoral campaigns and credibility. Resources for election campaigns have been vital for a politician's survival. The Mayor Hani I Elezit, a veteran of politics in Kosovo, explained how virtually no candidates running at the municipal level in Kosovo have access to their own resources but must rely on financing from the party leadership (Mayor Suma, Rufki (II) 24.10.13). Leaders of political parties are also important for according authority and credibility to the candidates at the local level when fighting election campaigns. The importance of this 'reflected glow' of the party leader is indicated in the importance municipal candidates accord to party leaders visiting their municipalities to rally support for them (KIPRED 2006).

The main constraint hierarchy has exerted on public leadership and the implementation of the statebuilding model is that local leaders must, first and foremost, ensure that the super patron's interests and patronage requests are well managed at the local level. To illustrate, a local employee of an international organisation and something of an insider in Kamenica municipality described a situation in 2012, wherein the Mayor received a request from the party centre to employ someone as a security guard in one of the schools. The Director of Education actually refused at first but then he received a phone call from a minister in Pristina, who demanded the person to be hired. As the insider explained 'it's about power in the end and he had to give in' (IO employee Kamenica 19.02.13).

The pressure on mayors to fulfil requests sent from 'the centre' has not been incidental but constant, meaning politicians, who ordinarily may want to

implement the statebuilding model, have been sidetracked by the compelling logic

of serving the patronage interests of the super patron. Analysts elsewhere have

also established that due to this hierarchical structure of the political parties in

Kosovo leaders of parties sometimes places pressure on local leaders to conduct

policies that may not necessarily be in their best interests, but which are

demanded by their party centre (KIPRED 2006). This has certainly been the case

in Kamenica, where one political analyst explained that successive leaders have

neglected to really take on the important challenges that confront the municipality,

such as improving living conditions and making sure that the administration runs

according to the rule of law, precisely because they have been under 'intense

pressure from higher levels' to direct most of their efforts to consolidate power for

the party (Gemi 13.11.12). Consequently, while the municipality, according to an

evaluation undertaken by the IMF, needs only sixty workers there are currently

over two hundred employed, due to 'all the jobs the Mayor has created because of

requests from all the party leadership' (Gemi 13.11.12).[89]

Party organisation has therefore mattered for the type of leadership that

has emerged in Kosovo's municipalities. Exercising public leadership has been

difficult because of the pressure to fulfil requests from the centre. It has made

more sense from the point of view of political survival to refrain from

strengthening the municipal assembly, to abstain from increasing the integrity of

the administration and to avoid making all decisions public because these

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[89] This logic is observed elsewhere. For example, careful observers of the political scene in Prizren municipality explained how even the younger generation of politicians are trapped by the logic of the hierarchy. 'There is quite a well-known and young politician. People thought he would change things and bring new ideas and modernise the municipality. But actually [since he became chairmen of the municipality] nothing has changed. In fact, this politician has even changed his behaviour. He just acts like the rest of all the politicians these days (NGO director Prizren 13.03.13.)

activities would make it more difficult to serve the patronage requests and interests of the super patron.

If party organisation has constrained public leadership, we would expect to see in Hani i Elezit some other form of party organisation. Significantly, Mayor Rufki Suma has never been a part of a political party—he has been the only mayor in Kosovo independent of a party structure. The Mayor himself admitted to me that this has given him significant freedom in pursuing policies oriented towards the public good. In a revealing exchange, the former PDK mayor of Hani I Elezit admitted that the incumbent mayor Rufki Suma has a distinct advantage when it comes to statebuilding because he is an independent MP. The former Mayor spoke in very positive terms about personal qualities of the incumbent Mayor but also identified how important it was that the Mayor was not part of a political party (Ex-Mayor Hani I Eleizit 21.10.13).

> Former mayor: 'Yes he has an advantage! If you come to power because of the party, you have to listen to the party. Because he is independent he does not have to follow a line that someone else has set.
>
> Author: What kind obligations did the party put on you?
>
> Former mayor: Nothing directly, but indirectly you have to give something back to them, for example employment to people. You are dependent on them for your political base so it is important to give something back.
>
> Author: Is this common in Kosovo?
>
> Former mayor: It is not just here. Under the party flag there are always obligations.

Though political parties receive very little attention in debates about statebuilding and institutional development, the research here demonstrates that they are central to the type of political agency that is exercised. The research supports Philip

Keefer's work, which in recent years has persuasively argued that the organisation of political parties is not a self-contained matter but has important knock-on effects for the characteristics of governing institutions and the exercise of political agency. Keefer argues that the provision of certain government models is heavily influenced by the nature and organisation of political parties because political parties are crucial in structuring political incentives and choices (Keefer 2015). The more 'organised' the political party, that is the more party organisation provides arrangements that limit the ability of individual party members and leaders to undertake personally advantageous activities, the higher the incentive to provide more public oriented provision of goods, which in turn, amongst other things, leads to a better quality of bureaucracy. Keefer has based his argument on proxy data, which the author admits may be not entirely valid (Keefer 2015, p. 232). Yet, here careful interviews with politicians, party members and analysts have revealed that the theory broadly holds when tested against more fine-grained scrutiny.

Nevertheless, the research here also points to something that Keefer's theory is missing: it is not just about the presence organisational arrangements but also how the existing distribution of power in a party matters, especially as it relates to electoral resources and credibility, for explaining the absence of collective action in parties. Even if politicians at the municipal level in Kosovo were to draw up arrangements which could in theory allow them to act collectively, they would be almost impossible to implement because of the power imbalance. Still, in supporting the theory laid out by Keefer, this research suggests that an important constraint to public leadership and therefore statebuilding is located in the organisation of political parties.

To conclude this section, particularistic leadership is a more a result of features of the political environment than poor character or lack of political will. These two constraints identified here are not just germane to the particular setting here. The absence of credibility resonates with many young democracies and most political parties in statebuilding settings tend to be hierarchically organised. Clearly, in other settings other, additional constraints could also be identified. Nevertheless, it is important to examine and model these constraints rather than to attribute the frustration of statebuilding to a 'lack of political will.'

Section II: Transformational leadership in Hani i Elezit

Before Rufki Suma took charge in 2009, Hani I Elezit had been dominated by clientelism, with two different parties, the LDK and PDK, generally carving the resources and municipal jobs for party supporters (Mayor Suma 21.03.13). Yet, as has been demonstrated by the survey data presented in chapter III, in just under five years the clientelist model has been sidelined — 'the difference has been like the difference between 'night and day' explained one municipal staff member (Municipal official Hani I Elezit).

So far, the explanation for this outcome has focused on the supply-side: how local agency, in this case, leadership, has shaped the implementation of the statebuilding model. Yet, chapter VI demonstrated that the clientelist model has a demand-side too. What has been unique about Hani i Elezit is not that the statebuilding model has been effectively supplied but that there has been also a drop in demand for the clientelist model and 'buy in' from citizens for the statebuilding model.

It could be argued that demand has not diminished but has been merely masked as people change tactics in response to the municipality no longer offering opportunities for clientelist action. But if the demand for clientelism was still at the same level, then you would have expected clientelist actors to reassert themselves at the next election, profiting from a pent-up demand. Instead, the evidence points to a genuine shift in the kind of politics demand by citizens, especially because clientelist actors in the municipality *have not been able to reassert themselves*; in fact, support for the main clientelist parties has decreased significantly since 2009: the PDK's share of the vote has fallen around 10 percent, while the LDK has dropped around 20 percent. It is also no coincidence also that LVV, one of the few anti-clientelist parties in Kosovo, has enjoyed far greater support in Hani i Elezit in the last five years than in other municipalities.

As a corollary of this drop in demand for clientelism, there has been demand support for the statebuilding model, substantiated by the fact that the anti-clientelist Mayor Rufki Suma was re-elected in 2013 with, at 55 percent, an increase in the share of the vote from the December 2009 elections. Only three other candidates in the whole of Kosovo won with a wider margin in the first round, a result all the more remarkable given that Suma abstained from campaigning during the elections.

These results, however, suggest there has not been a revolutionary-like dramatic shift, but we can think of framing this change as one in which a 'tipping point' has been crossed (Helmke, Levitsky 2004, p. 732), whereby a majority of actors, as shown by their continued support to Suma, have become convinced that the statebuilding model represents a better alternative to the clientelist model. The significance of this change should not be underestimated because it represents, in

a microcosm, a change that societies all over the world are struggling with: a genuine shift in the values and behaviour of a significant portion of the population in Hani i Elezit.

Furthermore, it is a shift that is critical for the sustainability of statebuilding. The effective supply of statebuilding is necessary but not sufficient because, as Mungiu-Pippidi has warned, statebuilding can easily roll-back because new institutions can be overwhelmed by a dominant particularistic culture (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). Understanding how the underlying logics in society shift provides insights into sustainability of statebuilding because if the majority of actors 'buy in' to the new institutions then we can assume that institutions will be less vulnerable to collapse and more likely to be 'institutionalised' (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015). This implies that public leadership is not enough; leadership that aims to *transform* the behaviour of enough people to cross a certain threshold is also crucial. This section explains how this transformational leadership has been exercised in Hani i Elezit.

VIII:II:I Identifying a mechanism of change

This 'buy in' to the clientelist model implies a reduction in sources of the demand for clientelism that were detailed in chapter VI. What needs to be explained therefore is a change from a situation where there was little trust in others to refrain from clientelism to one where people expect others not to engage in clientelist practices; from a sense that clientelism offers an effective problem-solving framework to one where the formal procedures are perceived to be the most effective route to solve problems; from a situation where favouritism towards the kin-community obligations would override formal institutions to one where they were less tolerated.

To explain these changes, it is important to identify the broad mechanism of change – and related policies and actions that make the mechanism effective. In the literature, one mechanism tends to dominate explanations: social mobilisation, that is when social actors, generally outside of the formal political institutions, act in concert through various means, such as newspapers or civil society organisations, to 'overcome the resistance of existing stakeholders in the old system, and then condition people to accept a new set of behaviours as routine and expected' (Fukuyama 2014, p. 478).

Certainly, explanations of historical case change have emphasised this 'bottom-up' mechanism. Fukuyama in his examination of how clientelism faded from US politics between1880-1914 emphasises how social mobilisation was realised through certain actors and actions. New arguments against corruption espoused by intellectuals such as Woodrow Wilson were channelled through civil society organisations, many of which were part of a broader social reform movement. Professional classes, especially those found on the east coast, became more vocal and adamant about change. Newspaper editors and businessmen, especially City merchants, were also important in persuading people to buy into a new kind of politics (Fukuyama 2014, p. 159). Likewise, Pippidi, in her examination of how 'ethical universalism' became entrenched in France in response to the backlash against the state during the Dreyfus affair, demonstrates the importance of social action through various means, such as newspapers, civil society and participation (Mungiu-Pippidi 2015, p. 161).

Social mobilisation is well established as a crucial mechanism but it may not be applicable to all cases; indeed, it seems an unlikely mechanism in Hani i Elezit. First, there has been no civil society organisations at all in the municipality

oriented towards anti-clientelism, and local newspapers, which could have advocated for change, have not existed. More generally, education levels, a strong predictor of likely social mobilisation (Weitz-Shapiro 2012), are lower in the municipality than the rest of Kosovo, and desperately low from a European perspective, as less than half the population have education beyond primary school level. In other words, it is difficult to argue how the shift has been spurred on by an active, politically-engaged population.

If it is not social mobilisation, we turn, again, to the more 'top-down' agency of political leaders, in particular the Mayor. But how has the Mayor conditioned this change? Charismatic authority, in Weberian terms, may have played a role but only a marginal one. Residents are generally respectful of Suma but there is no evidence, in Weber's words, that they are 'devoted to his exceptional sanctity' and therefore 'the normative patterns of order ordained by him' (Waters, Waters 2015, p. 129).

VIII:II:II Political signalling and mental models

Instead, it is important to identify an alternative mechanism of political agency. Here, Rothstein's work is particularly useful, which emphasises a crucial mechanism of change: signalling by political leaders that shapes the development of 'mental models' of society (Rothstein 2005). Rothstein argues that how people behave is shaped by a mental model of how other actors in society are likely to behave. Mental models are maps that are 'short hand' for the kind of underlying social norms operating in a society: they structure our 'subjective rationality.' So, for example, if a citizens' mental model of society is dominated by a sense that the rules of game are corrupt, this structures how they are likely to behave.

Rothstein emphasises how mental models are not rooted in tradition or culture but are the result of deliberate action by political actors (Rothstein 2005, p. 161).

Rothstein suggests that these models are forged through 'collective memories', which are images of past events shared by a limited group of individuals (Rothstein 2005, p. 160).[90] Changes to collective memories and mental maps have been important in explaining where 'buy in' for more universalist institutions has come from. Sweden became free from corruption in the end of the nineteenth century precisely because there was a fundamental change in the image of who Swedes are.

Changes to mental models are forged through the signalling of political actors: communicating that institutions work in a different way. This mechanism recognises that changes in behaviour do not come about through a technical process of capacity building nor reorganisation. Nor can change come about through just rebranding or superficial changes in appearance. Rather, signalling must be seen as containing valid and credible messages that can induce a deeper change in people's images of how institutions work. Reducing demand for clientelism therefore 'requires *strong signals* that the government agency in question has changed' (Rothstein 2005, p. 166).

Rothstein argues that impressions of public institutions are key conduits for signals because people make strong inferences about how the world works from their interaction with public officials; in other words, public officials send strong signals about what kind of game is being played in society. The basic logic can be described as: if public officials, whom should be constrained by law and act in service of the public, are corrupt, they cannot be trusted. Because these

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[90] This concept is borrowed from the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs

public officials are exactly the sort of people who should be trustworthy but are not, then it is easy to infer that most other people cannot be trusted either. If most other people cannot be trusted either, then one can infer that they too are likely to engage in corrupt acts. For most people then the basic map to navigate social life can be summed up as: since other people are corrupt, I might as well engage in corruption; if I myself am untrustworthy, then everyone else must be also untrustworthy too (Rothstein 2005, p. 121).

Public institutions are important 'signallers'. Section VI:III:I has highlighted how the nature of institutions in Kosovo's municipalities have encouraged clientelism as people's repeated interactions with the municipality has crystallised a dominant perception that the distribution of resources seems to be based on connections rather than on any public or formal criteria. These initial experiences of the state have created mental models that matter for shaping patterns of political behaviour.

In contrast, in Hani i Elezit political signalling has worked the other way: a new set of expectations of how the municipality operates has been forged through the leadership of the Mayor and the kind of signals he and his staff have communicated to citizens. Given the emphasis in the literature on 'bottom-up' social mobilisation, we know very little about how local political agency can signal in a way which inspires a genuine change in behaviour. Based on an examination of the Mayor's policies, the next part provides some insights into how this has been done: how leadership has been exercised in a way that has gone beyond public leadership to something like transformative leadership. These interventions outlined in the next part may seem ordinary but taken together they represent a sustained attempt to deconstruct the public image of particularistic

institutions which have driven the demand logics of clientelism. Each 'demand logic' is addressed in turn.

VIII:II:III Political signalling and transformative leadership in Hani i Elezit

I: OVERCOMING THE 'FEAR OF LOSING OUT'

The first explanation for why people engage in clientelism is that people believe clientelism is systemic; hence, as everyone engages in it, people fear they will lose out if they do not. How has political signalling changed the mental model of formal institutions and ended the sense that clientelism is systemic. In a series of interviews with the Mayor he cited a number of actions which have deconstructed established perceptions of how public officials operate and nurtured the sense that they operate indiscriminately and with integrity.[91]

On entering the municipality on his first day, the walls of were covered with flags, posters, and pictures of the two dominant parties, all of which had conveyed a sense that when residents entered the municipality building they weren't entering the public domain but a highly politicised realm carved up by political parties. The first task for all his staff was to remove all these symbols from their offices. As the Suma explained 'we needed to show that the

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[91] Rothstein's mechanism relies on rethinking the source of trust in society. Famously, Robert Putnam demonstrated how social trust is generated through membership of clubs, groups and organisations, with the more expansive this associational life, the better the governing institutions in a society. Scholars challenging this theory have argued that it fails to recognise that there are many associations, such as football hooligans, which erode rather than generate trust. Rothstein also argues that Putnam's theory is also only demonstrated on the aggregate level but there has been no empirical demonstration that at the individual level membership of associations generate social trust (Rothstein 2005). Instead, Rothstein argues the cause and effect relationship flows in the other direction: the nature of political institutions, especially administrative institutions are crucial in explaining levels of trust or mistrust in a society (Rothstein 2005, 2011). Clearly, the debate about 'what causes what' is difficult to resolve—Rothstein himself acknowledges that the 'causal traffic' may go in different directions. Rothstein, using an impressive array of evidence, persuasively makes the case that institutional conditions may be just as important as civic associations as a source of trust.

municipality is dedicated to citizens and not to political parties' (Mayor Suma 21.03.13).

Another strong signal which has shifted expectations about how public officials behave has been to dismantle the 'privilege culture.' Citizens in other municipalities cited the culture of privileges, especially expenses, as an indicator of the lack of public service.[92] Mayor Suma has struck a blow to the privilege culture in Hani i Elezit by taking resources for expenses from municipal officials and assembly members and transferring it to public good: the money has gone to funding mobile phones for teachers so that they can communicate better with each other, as well as parents of students. In none of the other municipalities I studied was this kind of policy enacted.

Actions aiming to instil a sense of integrity and universalism have gone beyond the municipality. One political intervention aimed to stamp out elements of favouritism and cheating afflicting the broader community. Having found out that some pupils at the local high school had been routinely stealing the grade book from teachers and manipulating grades in their favour, the Mayor ended years of established practice by bringing in an electronic system whereby grades are entered into a secure computer database, which the Mayor can even monitor from his own office. What is noteworthy here is that such a signal relied on the kind of intricate local knowledge that no statebuilding plan could grasp.

The Mayor has conveyed a sense that his very nature predisposes him to act in an open and indiscriminate way. One neat illustration of this instinctive openness has been the mobile phone he carries everywhere with him and which rings every few minutes. During one interview, it became clear that whenever it

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[92] Section V:III: I: revealed how politicians were castigated as 'selfish', in politics 'just to get to rich.'

rang, the Mayor had no idea who was calling. I asked his assistant why he never

stored names on his phone: 'He never records who is calling, he just answers and

whoever it is, he will speak with them. He tries to be open and available for

citizens the whole day.' Who tends to call him: 'Oh everyone in the municipality

has his number' (Municipal official Hani I Elezit). Such openness can be

contrasted with mayors in other municipalities to whom access is mediated

through the particularistic concerns.[93]

II: Signalling the effectiveness of the formal framework

Demand for the clientelist model in Kosovo is also driven by the perception that

the clientelist model provides a more effective problem-solving framework than

the formal state institutions. The question for Hani i Elezit is then how has

confidence and trust in the procedures of the formal institutions been developed so

that it is seen as a more effective problem-solving framework? In other words, so

it becomes sensible to opt-out of clientelist practices.

Crucial to these shifts in perceptions has been the cultivation of a 'public

service' culture in the municipality, which stands in stark contrast to the

clientelist-induced dysfunction and inertia of the other municipalities. Suma has

mostly done this without recourse to the 'set menu' of organisational change

advocated by the international community. Instead, the Mayor has tried to shape

the organisational culture in the spirit of the TMK, the Kosovan Defence Force

(successor to the KLA): 'it is about getting the job done for the community' he

tells me (Mayor Suma 6/26/2015). Every municipal staff worker who arrives to

work after 8am has been sent home without pay because an electronic check in

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[93] Section V:III:I: revealed the case of the gardener whose way to the municipality was blocked by
security guards.

and out system helps Suma monitor late arrivals, of which nowadays there are generally none. Monitoring has been an important aspect of his management style. Cameras installed throughout the municipality have not only allowed the Mayor to castigate those who he deems have spent too long on a coffee break but also to assess whether public work programmes have been running efficiently. For the standards of international statebuilders, this is an uncomfortable level of surveillance; for the mayor, it has been merely a way of checking on the fidelity of public officials.

Additional policies that have nurtured trust in the municipality have centred on entrenching universal entitlements. The Mayor has eschewed the particularism of other municipalities and emphasised universalism. Hani I Elezit is the only municipality in Kosovo in which the mother of every new born child receives 100 euros and the only municipality in which the funeral expenses of citizens are covered by the municipality. For a country with the scant resources of Kosovo, this has been a radical set of 'cradle to grave' policies. So, while the international community focus on transparency and process, the Mayor, rather uniquely, has pushed forward in convincing citizens that the formal state institutions care for *all* citizens. It is worth reminding ourselves what the data suggests about the efficacy of these interventions.

Table 17: Trust and satisfaction in Hani i Elezit

Municipal capacity indicators	Kamenica	Hani i Elezit	Kosovo average
Citizen trust in competence of municipality to solve local problems (%)	22	83	65
General satisfaction with the work of the municipality (%)	54	93	69

III: Overcoming particularist kin-community norms

A separate strand of discourse emerged that emphasised how clientelist practice is acceptable if it benefits the kin-community. What kind of signalling addressed this source of clientelism? This shift can be in part explained by the new sense of public integrity inspired by the Mayor that has wrought a new kind of trust: a diminishing of a particularised trust in only family and friends to a more generalised trust in the broader community, including public institutions to serve the common good (Rothstein 2005). Interviews with residents revealed a sense that there has been a re-orientation. An older gentleman, a lifelong resident explained, 'we know this Mayor doesn't work because of family interests or nepotism...he has made things much 'softer' in terms of connections. Now I can't blame the Mayor for not finding my son a job' (H34).

This is not to say that kin-community obligations have been eliminated but rather they have been ushered out of the political context. This process has also been helped, perhaps, through the clarification and development of the community's 'collective memory.' Suma has set himself apart from other leaders by emphasising the broader attachment to a national community over the particularistic attachment to a kin-community. Interestingly, the cultivation of this sense of community has been based upon Albanian patriotism. No other municipality in Kosovo has been replete with such patriotic symbolism: the Albanian flag, not the Kosovan flag, is located in the entrance of the building; Albanian patriotic symbols adorn the Mayor's desk; and having removed any references to political parties from the municipal building, he has replaced them with pictures of historic 'patriots.' The common struggle during the 90s has been re-emphasised: Suma has built a large war monument to the Kosovan Liberation Army in the centre of town and the municipal building even contains a room

dedicated to 'fallen heroes.' Maintaining the sense of 'us against them', he was the first political leader in Kosovo to instigate legal proceedings against the Serbian state.

Owing to a lack of evidence, it is difficult to judge whether and how this focus on Albanian patriotism has actually changed social norms. But, in line with Rothstein's emphasis on collective memory, it is possible to hypothesise that is has changed mental models by emphasising the sense of a broader attachment to the broader community and de-emphasising attachment to the narrow kin-community. Nevertheless, what is interesting about this hypothesis is the role of Albanian patriotism because it is something that the international community have tried to steadfastly eliminate from public institutions.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the key variable within international statebuilding – local leadership – and has aimed to explain why different types of leadership have emerged. In this sense it has gone to *the core* of the explanation for the varied outcomes of statebuilding at the municipal level in Kosovo.

First, it has identified why political leaders frustrate international agency via particularistic leadership. Political and policy discourses often ascribe labels to differences in leadership. Leaders are accused of being simply weak or corrupted; the 'lack of political will' is another stock phrase used to explain the absence of a certain outcome. These labels illuminate very little about actual political behaviour. The lack of political will, for example, is merely an expression of disappointment when one course of action is shunned rather than an actual concept that can be interrogated. A more sophisticated and insightful understanding of political behaviour is required and the aim of this section has

been to *explain why* these two different models of leadership have emerged rather than to *label* behaviour as normatively bad or counter-productive. In demonstrating how credibility and party organisation affect motivations, the 'black box' of political will has been opened up and the local constraints on statebuilding identified.

Secondly, it has explained a unique case where transformational leadership has occurred; in other words, where political agency has gone beyond orientation towards the public interest to transform the behaviour and values of that public, and in doing so, reducing the demand for clientelism. Political signalling has been identified as the crucial mechanism for transformational leadership. From the case of Hani i Elezit, we can gain a number of insights about the types of actions and policies that are necessary to create new mental models of how people think about politics. Two qualities seem particularly important. First, signalling must be consistent and sustained in order to deconstruct images of how public institutions operate. Second, they should be comprehensive, intervening in many aspects of social life beyond the municipality.

Yet, most interesting about the activities underpinning transformational leadership is that they are not in the repertoire of international statebuilding. This raises the importance of 'local statebuilding'– and of local ingenuity in the process of institution building. For one, these activities have rested on local knowledge about which it is almost impossible for statebuilders to know. Consider the intervention into the school grading system: this relied on intricate knowledge about student behaviour, which only those with an intimate relationship with the community could grasp. Moreover, some of techniques used by the Mayor depart from the statebuilding script. The cameras installed across

the municipality would certainly sit uncomfortably with many of the standards and expectations of international statebuilders, as would the emphasis on Albanian patriotism. In others words, transformational leadership, that key ingredient of 'local statebuilding', could emerge from sources that strike a discordant note with some of the standards of the international statebuilders. In any case, the implication is that crucial aspects of statebuilding take place *outside* of the formal processes through which statebuilding is normally channelled and relies on local forms of innovation and problem-solving.

Conclusion

Internationally-led statebuilding is not going away from international politics any time soon. It is still high on the agendas of powerful states and central to the various strategies that aim to address sources of global risk. This conclusion summarises what the research presented in the preceding chapters can bring to bear on the empirical, methodological and practice dimensions of statebuilding. It is divided into three parts. Sections I and II discuss the answers to the two core questions posed by the dissertation and the final section aims to give some recommendations about what international statebuilders should do in light of this research.

Section I: Is internationally-led statebuilding futile?

This dissertation was inspired by a general frustration at the lack of detailed data that could shed light on this question and aimed to construct an empirical test to assess the impact of statebuilding in Kosovo's municipalities. Not all aspects of statebuilding at the municipal level have been futile: new laws have been adopted, people are participating in municipal assemblies for the first time, and local elections have generally become better managed. Yet, the futility test has been at the level of internalisation. Steadfast efforts to ensure the rules of the statebuilding model define political behaviour have met with little success: the statebuilding model in Kosovo's municipalities has been mostly unimportant when it comes to the distribution of municipal resources compared to the alternative clientelist model.

This test has taken place under conditions that are relatively supportive for international agency. Not only has the amount of resources expended been higher than in any other equivalent setting, the governance area under scrutiny is devoid of confounding factors, such as undue complexity or insufficient institutionalisation. Moreover, many theories would suggest that it is the 'most likely' case for external actors because many of the background conditions that have been cited as possibly hindering statebuilding missions—conflict, very low economic development and clashing norms—have not been as pronounced (Paris, Sisk 2009; Collier 2004; Caplan 2005). Because the test has taken place in a 'most likely' case, it raises doubts, not only about the possibility of building formal institutions in more complex and controversial areas in Kosovo, but in more challenging settings too.

Yet, the more important conclusion of the research is that the picture is not clear-cut. The results from Hani i Elezit demonstrate that international statebuilding can be effective. In this municipality, the statebuilding model mostly defines behaviour, revealing that it is premature to suggest that statebuilding is pre-ordained to fail. Just as statebuilding was successful in Hani i Elezit, it could be plausibly effective in other municipalities, sectors and countries. Hence, the main conclusion from the results is that there is no conclusive answer: the 'futility thesis' does not account for all the outcomes of statebuilding.

From a theory-building perspective, the results should encourage further research rather than providing definitive answers, and the most important implication we can draw from the results relates to how we should conduct that research: subnational investigations remain vital, whether this is disaggregating the national according to policy sector, region or level of governance (Snyder

2001). Too often, national aggregate data overlooks within nation variation to the detriment of theorising and these results suggest that advocates of 'scaling down' in research are vindicated as futility and effectiveness can occur within the same national case of statebuilding.

In answering this question, new conceptual tools have been provided with which to understand statebuilding. The first contribution in this regard is to offer a novel way of understanding effectiveness and futility. In doing so, it has challenged the ontological importance of formal institutions within statebuilding by emphasising institutions beyond formal frameworks of governance. Indeed, in demonstrating how clientelism is such a dominant feature of the political landscape, the survey results have strongly supported the assumption that has shaped the research: statebuilding is mostly about eliminating informal frameworks of governance rooted in society. The survey results therefore have an important analytical implication for future research in international statebuilding: informal institutions matter and any test of futility or effectiveness must include an assessment of the extent to which the informal alternative to a particular model is present and influencing political behaviour. This offers a novel gauge for understanding statebuilding. It also suggests that mainstream approaches, pursed by the European Commission, the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Nation in Transit reports amongst others, are analytically incomplete. As these follow a 'deficit-based approach'—constructing a yardstick for the optimal form of governance and assessing how far countries fall short from that ideal—they do not reveal anything about the countervailing informal institutions, and consequently, we are only able to partially examine political developments (BTI 2012; Freedom House 2013; European Commission 2014).

An approach that privileges the informal institutions of governance is not necessarily new. Still, the statebuilding literature has mostly lacked the analytical tools to effectively grasp this realm. Invariably, informal realms of governance have fallen under the rubric of 'hybridity' (Boege 2008; Mac Ginty 2010). Yet, the hybridity concept suffers from being too broad and lacks the analytical sharpness to fulfil the aim of explaining the realm beyond the formal state (Zaum 2012). Hybridity needs to be deconstructed into precise analytical concepts that cover all sorts of informal institutions and actors. If statebuilding scholarship is to advance, it must build bridges to other research areas and disciplines that can provide the relevant analytical tools. In crossing 'boundaries' to include insights from the clientelism literature, this dissertation integrates more refined analytical tools into statebuilding scholarship—and consequently—enables for a more nuanced understanding of statebuilding settings to emerge.

Beyond a general approach that has traversed literatures, this dissertation has made a specific contribution to the clientelist literature through developing an original instrument that assesses the extent of clientelism. Though future refinements will improve the measure, the 'Clientelism Index' etches clientelism's multi-faceted influence and improves on other indicators by clearly marking out the phenomena at hand. The measure can also contribute to the broader research agenda by being deployed in other settings. Indeed, scholars assessing clientelism in the business sector as part of a Swiss-funded regional project in Albania and Kosovo (see Uberti 2015) have used this Index. In this sense the measure could be significant for theory building as it provides the kind of data ripe for comparison across cases, something that is essential if we are to understand why the phenomena persists.

Section II: Why is internationally-led statebuilding futile – or what explains the effectiveness of statebuilding?

This research has been a comprehensive assessment of statebuilding. It has sought explanations for the varied effectiveness of statebuilding beyond the conventional parameters of investigation. It has gone beyond explanations rooted in the kind of strategies that are used (Paris, Sisk 2009); how much resources are deployed (Dobbins 2007; Zuercher 2006); what kind of mandate statebuilders may have (Caplan 2005); or how they are organised (Holohan 2005). It has done this by pursuing a line of inquiry that seeks to understand the deeper effects of statebuilding (Berdal, Zaum 2013b; Cheng, Zaum 2013; Mac Ginty 2011). The research has assessed statebuilding from different angles: it has traced the impact of supply-side strategies as they play out on the ground; focused on the demand-side in attempt to understand how citizens may or may not engage with the statebuilding model; and used a comparative research design to isolate the most important factors shaping the effectiveness of statebuilding. Three variables have been identified to explain the impact of statebuilding. The results can be summed up by the following statement: beyond what statebuilders do and how they do it, the effectiveness of statebuilding is dependent on:

(1) The extent to which, on the supply-side, strategies converge with the orientation of the political leaders of the municipalities on the ground.

(2) The extent to which, on the demand-side, statebuilding models chime with social norms; support citizens' 'blueprints of action' for getting ahead; and maintain levels of trust between citizens.

(3) The extent to which statebuilding is supported by 'local statebuilding',
especially independent attempts by local leadership to change the values and
behaviours of citizens.

(1) Local leadership matters for the supply of statebuilding

Debates about sequencing (Paris, Sisk 2009) – what should come first, build up
the capacity of the state, democratise or build up bottom-up accountability – are
somewhat irrelevant because these statebuilding strategies have been shown to
have no independent effect; instead, they have impact only if these measures, as in
Hani i Elezit, are given impetus by local leadership on the ground. When
international strategies diverge with local political agency, these statebuilding
strategies are likely to be futile.

This statement is made about statebuilding at the municipal level but
leadership can also be decisive for statebuilding at other levels and within other
sectors. The degree to which local leadership is important depends on the extent to
which international statebuilders rely on these actors for implementation and the
extent to which the behaviour of these actors can be monitored. At the municipal
level, both of these conditions are clearly fulfilled but in many other statebuilding
settings, this 'scope condition' would also be met.

The research has gone beyond asserting local leadership matters to explore
why different types of leadership have emerged. In Kamenica, as elsewhere in
Kosovo's municipalities, the emphasis has been on particularistic leadership—that
is, prioritising the interests of those who vote or may vote for you and putting the
consolidation of power at the top of the agenda. Contrast this with Hani i Elezit,
where public leadership has defined the exercise of political agency: the public
interest has guided decision making above the particularist concerns of serving

client networks and hoarding institutional power. The research went further to explain these differences in leadership. It identified how the lack of credibility amongst political actors and the hierarchical nature of political parties constrain public leadership.

The 'local turn' has been a prominent feature of the statebuilding literature in recent years, helpfully turning attention to how local actors react to and influence statebuilding. While this local turn is certainly to be lauded, Heathershaw points out how many influential accounts treat local agency as though it is a unitary force rather than differentiated and complex (Heathershaw 2013).[94] Mac Ginty, for instance, frames statebuilding as an interaction between international-liberal and local-indigenous (Mac Ginty 2011). The statebuilding literature has been less disposed to exploring the different facets of local agency, to understand their relevance and how they may contradict each other. The research here demonstrates, not only that political leadership is a critical form of local agency, it can also shape the impact of other forms of local agency, such as civil society. In general, the role of local leadership in the implementation of statebuilding requires further research. One avenue would be to build on the research here to start developing a conceptually precise typology of leadership that would map the different kinds of statebuilding-leadership interaction. Moreover, building from the explanations here, further research into what constrains public leadership in statebuilding settings is necessary.

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[94] The issue is not with the international-local dichotomy itself. Unless one takes an interpretevist perspective, it is difficult to avoid making some kind of distinction between international and local agency, and this research has also assumed that international agency can be something that is analytically self-contained. Other scholars have pursued an interesting line of inquiry in which the 'subject-object' distinction between international and local agency to more 'inter-subjectively' analyse how the statebuilders are themselves affected during the process and how different kinds of governance may emerge (Heathershaw 2013). Schneckener, for example, argues that external actors do not achieve a state 'based on a particular approach or strategic orientation' but in fact generate 'different forms of governance' (2010, p. 233).

<u>(2) Statebuilding depends on success in the political market</u>

Statebuilding is a social enterprise. I have shown how people may be drawn to other forms of social organisation, like clientelism. To grasp this I have used the analogy of a *market for political organisation* to emphasise how statebuilding confronts an environment in which the state may not be considered as an unrivalled form of organisation but instead various models of governance compete for predominance. In such a market, another form of local agency becomes highly relevant, citizens, whose level of demand for statebuilding is a critical factor for effectiveness.

Two perspectives have dominated the statebuilding literature about how citizens may react under statebuilding. One is the 'build it and they will come' perspective, that citizens will automatically engage with the statebuilding model (Cooper 2003; Dobbins 2007). The other perspective is that citizens may resist statebuilding (Kappler, Richmond 2011). This dissertation has ignored both assumptions and argued that actually support or rejection of statebuilding is an empirical question. Indeed, rather than the unhelpful dichotomy of for or against, the research suggests that it is more insightful to talk about *sources of demand for statebuilding.*

The research has shown that one important source relates to the degree of trust in society. If not, then citizens become unsure whether the political leaders and the broader population work towards the public interest, and in turn, tend to fall back on clientelist methods. Statebuilding models must be able to maintain levels of social trust (Rothstein 2005).

Local demand is also explained by the logic of problem-solving. People engage in clientelism because it offers a supportive ecology for their strategies of survival and getting ahead. The swiftness of information production and

generation, as well as the flexibility intrinsic to the informal mode of clientelism, are the mechanisms that explain clientelism's functionality. These mechanisms enhance functionality because they work through well-established informal social networks. This raises a critical point that the literature is not always inclined to acknowledge: 'bringing in' the state and therefore sidelining informal institutions could eliminate local knowledge and structures that are crucial for meeting the daily needs of citizens. While some scholars have raised this point in relation to anti-corruption efforts (Cheng, Zaum 2013; Khan 1998), it is also relevant for related statebuilding activities and further research on how statebuilding may challenge frameworks of problem-solving would be vital.

Social norms are also an important source of demand. The research shows that just because international statebuilders are afforded a large degree of support by the local population, this does not mean that the two groups always speak from the same page. In fact, the importance of the social norm of supporting the kin-community shows that international statebuilding does not take place in a vacuum but in social settings wherein basic norms can contradict the core elements of the statebuilding model.

(3) Internationally-led statebuilding depends on 'local statebuilding'

The research has shown how local leadership not only matters for how it converges with international statebuilding strategies. Local leadership is also crucial in reducing the demand for statebuilding's competitors, such as clientelism. Changing behaviour and norms is crucial to ensure that institutions are not overwhelmed by a countervailing particularistic culture and so are sustainable. In Hani i Elezit, the Mayor through political signalling has shifted the underlying behaviour and values of the public. This signalling has been based on

activities and policies that are not in the repertoire of international statebuilding: they rest on local knowledge about which it is almost impossible for statebuilders to know; moreover, some of techniques used may diverge from the standards and expectations of international statebuilders. The implication of this is that crucial aspects of statebuilding take place outside of the formal processes through which statebuilding is normally channelled and relies on local forms of innovation and problem-solving—a local ingenuity that is invariably overlooked. The extent to which local leaders pursue statebuilding beyond the formal frameworks of international-local interaction is therefore another important variable for the effectiveness of statebuilding. Further research into forms of 'local ingenuity' that support the broader statebuilding process could be fruitful.

Section III: Implications for statebuilding practice

The section addresses the implications for practice of my finding. The first part recommends a change in the way statebuilding is approached from a heuristic perspective. The second part makes policy recommendations how more public leadership could be encouraged.

I: Integrating findings into statebuilding heuristics

The findings present a challenge to the assumptions that underpin statebuilding activities. Statebuilding is not realised through one strategy but is animated by various 'micro' interventions, for example projects that deliver trainings, technical expertise, infrastructure developments. Each of these have individual 'road maps' embodied in project documents or strategic plans that are often crafted according to templates, which commonly demand information about timeframes, inputs, costs, risks and so forth. This 'programming templates' are highly standardised

and vary little across international actors – as such, they amount to a common heuristic with which different actors approach statebuilding. Within this common heuristic certain assumptions about change in statebuilding settings are implied.

Consider again the core planning document of a Swiss Development Agency project that aims to install the programmatic model in Kosovo's municipalities. With a budget of over €10 million, this is the largest statebuilding project in Kosovo's municipalities and runs from the period 2014-17. The specific goal of the project is that 'municipal administrations, mayors and assemblies work like a modern state,' an aim achieved through various courses of actions, such as training, infrastructure development and technical expertise, all of which are encapsulated within a project document (DEMOS 2014). A theory of change is implied in the project document via an input-output-outcome framework that captures many of the statebuilding activities. The theory of change is that certain inputs (in this case training and financial support) will lead to an output (democratic checks) that will lead to the desired outcome. For example, one desired outcome of the project is that 'supported municipalities foster democratic processes and apply sound public policy and finance management processes', a goal that will be achieved through the 'output' of stronger democratic checks and balances between Mayor, Municipal Assembly and citizenry. This output will be 'delivered' through the inputs of 'support to village council elections, to the municipal information office, to the Policy and Finance Committee of the Municipal Assembly, and through training municipal assembly members and strengthening the women caucus of municipal assemblies' (DEMOS 2014, p. 6).

My research demonstrates that the heuristic underpinning the document are based on an inadequate theory of change.[95] The main weakness is that the input-output-outcome framework implies a theory of change that conflates what statebuilders *do* with what *occurs.* In doing so, it ignores many aspects of how implementation will play out. There is no space within the heuristic to comprehend how inputs and outputs may be shaped by local leadership; how processes may interact with social norms or blueprints for survival; or how local sources may complement implementation. It is surprising is that the beginning of the project document describes in detail the many challenges that Kosovo faces, including core social and political aspects such as clientelism, a lack of accountability and low political will to change things, but these are not included in theory of change. It is not true to say statebuilders are not aware of context—they are, the first page of the document outlined the context—but they 'unsee' it when it comes to thinking through what kind of change their activities may bring about.

This research has gone beyond the framework of the international statebuilders to see how these strategies play out in reality. In doing so, it has revealed three dimensions that should be integrated any new theory of change. Statebuilding heuristics should systematically integrate answers to the following:

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[95] During May 2015, I had the chance to work with this project. Observing staff meetings of the project, it was clear that this document is not there just to satisfy administrative demands but really provide the key reference point for action and also sets boundaries for the kind of discussions used. The point here is not to churlishly criticise the approach of this project because in the real world things must get done and processes need to be managed efficiently. In general, the project document was well-written, detailed and clearly thought through. The aim is to point out how heuristics should be expanded.

1. Understanding local leadership

Local municipal politicians should not be seen as merely 'partners' but 'gatekeepers' with the potential to be decisive for the outcome of statebuilding strategies. Hence, the position of local leaders should be understood.

- Do leaders have a track-record of representing the public interest?

- What is the nature of political organisation?

- Are leaders held to be broadly credible?

- What kind of political constraints may local leaders be under?

- How could statebuilding affect the political economy of local leaders?

- How could leaders capture elements of statebuilding processes?

- How electorally secure are local leaders?

2. Understanding the market for governance

The statebuilding model must compete with other forms of governance for ascendancy, within the market for political organisation. 'Market analysis' should be undertaken before any intervention.

- What is the alternative to the statebuilding sysem?

- Why may people engage in these alternatives?

- Do social norms support the statebuilding activities?

- Do everyday problem-solving techniques support the statebuilding activities?

- How will levels of social trust affect statebuilding?

- How can political signalling be used to stimulate demand for statebuilding?

3. Understanding local sources of support

International statebuilders should be more sensitive to the potential of local knowledge. In many respects, the standard statebuilding heuristic represent what James C. Scott calls a 'formulaic simplification' of reality (1998). Scott warns that statebuilding diminishes essential features of a real, functioning social order, especially those informal processes and local knowledge that structure that social and political life (Scott 1998, p. 6). A perspective is needed that is able to seek out these sources of 'local ingenuity.'

- Which sources of local knowledge are vital?

- Which social actors have high social standing?

- Which established informal practices can support statebuilding?

- What kind of skills do staff members need to grasp this local knowledge?[96]

- Who are the most important political entrepreneurs?

II: Policies to generate public leadership

The research has shown how particularistic leadership is a major constraint on statebuilding and more focus should be directed towards constraining this kind of political agency. One approach could be to seek ways to establish a credible a 'shadow of hierarchy' over local actors so that they commit to the international statebuilding model (Heritier, Lehmkuhl 2008, p. 2). Yet, development experts have stressed to me how difficult is to bind political leaders at the municipal level to implementation agreements, especially as there are few ways to monitor or

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[96] One mechanism to grasp informal process is to employ people with practical experience who are more attuned to the potential of these mechanisms. Interestingly, USAID's municipal projects tend to employ people who have experience of working in municipalities in eastern Europe. The Director of the programme was in fact the Mayor of a municipality in Bulgaria.

sanction local partners if they deviate from expected behaviour. Indeed, it is clear that monitoring at the municipal level involves high transaction costs. For instance, the director of a funding mechanism based in Pristina for municipal civil society organisations illustrated to me that basic facts of geography and lack of manpower explain why it is so difficult to monitor how projects have worked on the ground (NGO director Pristina 23.06.15).[97]

Moreover the sheer number of international agencies and the pressure for them to 'do development' has also created a moral-hazard problem, whereby local partners have easily dismissed the threat of sanctions by merely turning to other international partners. In Kacanik municipality, for example, a municipal official was indicted on corruption charges, which prompted a statebuilding project led by a Swiss team to withdraw funding from the municipality in 2013. In response, the municipality, rather than addressing the issue of corruption, merely turned to other sources of international aid, which were readily on offer (Development professional 03.05.15). Further research on how international actors can better cast a credible shadow of hierarchy to reign in particularistic behaviour is necessary (Börzel, Risse 2010).

In the meantime, this research has identified how the lack of credibility amongst political actors and the hierarchical nature of political parties constrain public leadership. Interventions focusing on these two features of the political order therefore could be an effective way of encouraging public leadership. As

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[97] To give an illustration, the NGO director told me: 'We helped establish village councils so that the municipality and villages had better communication but these always take place after 7pm, after working hours, so it has been difficult to know what actually happened at these meetings. We cannot take the two hour trip [from Pristina] to see how they function because we are busy with other things and have families' (NGO director Pristina 23.06.15)

these features are present elsewhere, the policies recommended here could be relevant for other statebuilding settings.

POLICY I: A NEW MODEL FOR POLITICAL PARTY REFORM

The core distinguishing feature of the organisation of political parties in Kosovo is that they have been extremely hierarchical. The main constraint hierarchy has exerted on public leadership and the implementation of the statebuilding model is that local leaders must, first and foremost, ensure that the super patron's interests and patronage requests are well managed at the local level. Local leaders, who ordinarily may want to implement the statebuilding model, have been sidetracked by the compelling logic of serving the patronage interests of the super patron. Party organisation has therefore mattered for the type of leadership that has emerged in Kosovo's municipalities and is intimately connected with the type of governance structures that emerge.

Reforms to political organisation are vital so that they become less hierarchical and give more scope for individual actors at the local level. To do this, a new approach is required. While some activities have been directed towards political party reforms in Kosovo—the National Democratic Institute, for example, has made attempts to democratise political parties—these seem to have had little effect partly because these reform efforts have treated political parties as though they are comparable to those found in advanced democracies. In other words, it has focused trying to model parties in Kosovo on the image of their western European counterparts, rather than on getting a grip with how they function in reality (Carothers 2008).

Changing the formal internal rules is unlikely to work because the rules do not constrain behaviour anyway. Instead, interventions should start from the perspective that political parties are informal networks that provide an organisational setting for the different actors in the patron-client structure. In turn, this structure ties into capacious social networks that pre-exist clientelist organisation. In other words, political parties in Kosovo have a very different organisational basis from those political parties found in countries of the international statebuilders and reforms should be modelled accordingly.

Many analyses of political parties in Kosovo also still fall into the trap of treating them like modern organisations, often highlighting their shortcomings in relation to the core characteristics of political parties in the OECD world. Hence, one report has analysed the formal rules governing party financing (Group for Legal and Political Studies 2013) and another has interrogated the democratic quality of internal party rules (KAS 2013). A new model of political party reform is required and it would be wise therefore if reforms sought to moderate party hierarchies through changing the behaviour and norms of political actors. Mentoring and educational projects could be important in this regard.

POLICY II: ENHANCING THE CREDIBILITY OF POLITICAL ACTORS

My own research has show that clientelism is embedded in the strategies of political parties because (1) political candidates have little capacity to develop or implement broad-based policies and therefore campaign on clientelist platforms; and (2) political candidates have little credibility: citizens do not trust politicians to deliver on programmatic policies and therefore choose clientelist relationships. The question is how to raise the credibility of local political actors? One

intervention, developed by a team of economists working in Benin, is to link political candidates with 'epistemic authority' during elections campaign (i.e a group of policy experts) to raise the credibility of programmatic political offers.

Specifically, it would work in Kosovo's municipalities by linking municipal political candidates with a 'Council of Public Ideas' before and during election campaigns. 'Councillors' will be assigned to each candidate six months before municipality elections and will develop a plan in conjunction with the candidate. The plan must be feasible, evidence-based, specific, fully costed and clear about a timeline. An example of plan could be: if elected, I will create 80 new jobs in the municipality through an irrigation and agricultural project through a partnership with UNDP etc. This link-up then provides capacity for political candidates to move away from clientelist style-campaigning.

The plans will be presented to the public by the 'Councillors' themselves in a town hall meeting or in a series of neighbourhood meetings at the beginning of the election campaign and will be widely communicated in the local media. This link up provides a mechanism for credibility because it provides expert-backing for public oriented plans. While politicians' platforms are often met with incredulity, 'Councillors' are widely seen as credible, often by virtue of their western education. Linking this credibility with the authority of local candidates then provides an impetus for politicians to provide public goods and citizens to trust the viability of the platforms. Whether such a plan could be put in place is another matter but evidence from an economist who studied the intervention suggests that it can raise the credibility of political actors (Vicente, Wantchekon 2009)

Annex A: Survey instrument (English version)

Contact number: _____ Neighbourhood: _____

Age: _____ Female/ Male   Urban/Rural   High
School/ University

1. *In your opinion, people of X are optimistic about the future (dummy question)*
2. *In your opinion, people of X take an interest in what happens in the municipality (dummy question)*
3. It is generally people who have strong connections with the political leaders in the municipality who have their voice heard when decisions are made.
4. In general, the political leaders in X municipality rarely follow the proper rules and procedures.
5. In general, people of X vote for candidates during elections because they have been personally promised something.
6. It is generally people who have strong connections with the political leaders in the municipality who have a chance of being employed.
7. It is generally people who have strong connections with the political leaders in the municipality who have a chance of having better roads in their neighbourhood.
8. In your opinion, the political leaders in X municipality have generally much more power than citizens.
9. a: In general, people are treated equally by the political leaders of the municipality.

   b) If strongly agree/ agree: are people treated more equally by the political leaders now compared to five years ago?
   Yes /no/ stayed the same.

   c) If strongly disagree/ disagree: are people treated more unequally now than five years ago?
   Yes /no/ stayed the same.

10. The best way to establish a good/ strong/ any connection(s) with the political leaders of the municipality is to:
– *be a member of their family*
– *join a political party*
– *have a business*
– *have a university degree*
– *show that you are a good person*
– *be a religious leader*

Annex B: Vignette survey instrument (English version)

Date: Time: Survey ID
Contact
Profession   F/ M   U/ R   Education

We are interested in improving the lives of ordinary people in Kosovo and so we want to understand about their lives and how they would act in certain situations. These vignettes are about X, an ordinary X living in Kosovo.

Vignettes

1. During election time a political candidate approaches and suggests that if Besa and her family all vote for the candidate, then the candidate will be able to give one of Besa's family members a job in the municipality.

   What should Besa do:
   1. *Ignore the offer and ask the candidate what he/she is going to do improve the lives of the people of the municipality*
   2. *Take up the offer and tell the candidate that she/he has her vote*

   Please tell me: why did you make that choice?

2. Besa's neighbourhood has issues with water. Often the water not always available and the situation is getting worse. Besa wants to solve this problem. What should Besa do?
   1. *Bring up the issue in a public meeting/ write a letter to the municipality/ make an official petition*
   2. *Phone the Mayor or speak to someone who has a connection to the Mayor*

   Please tell me: why did you make that choice?

3. Besa's daughter wants to go to university and needs a municipal scholarship. The rules state that whoever has the best marks should get the scholarship, but Besa's daughter's are not so strong. What should Besa do:
   1. *Apply to the municipality for a scholarship*
   2. *Try to make political connections with the political leaders of the municipality*

   Please tell me: why did you make that choice?

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