https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/26377 Thu, 30 Apr 2026 21:30:20 GMT 2026-04-30T21:30:20Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/28667 A literature overview on scheduling electric vehicles in public transport and location planning of the charging infrastructure Olsen, Nils The Vehicle Scheduling Problem (VSP) is a well-studied combinatorial optimization problem arising for bus companies in public transport. The objective is to cover a given set of timetabled trips by a set of buses at minimum costs. The Electric Vehicle Scheduling Problem (E-VSP) complicates traditional bus scheduling by considering electric buses with limited driving ranges. To compensate these limitations, detours to charging stations become necessary for charging the vehicle batteries during operations. To save costs, the charging stations must be located within the road network in such a way that required deadhead trips are as short as possible or even redundant. For solving the traditional VSP, a variety of solution approaches exist capable of solving even real-world instances with large networks and timetables to optimality. In contrast, the problem complexity increases significantly when considering limited ranges and chargings of the batteries. For this reason, there mainly exist solution approaches for the E-VSP which are based von heuristic procedures as exact methods do not provide solutions within a reasonable time. In this paper, we present a literature review of solution approaches for scheduling electric vehicles in public transport and location planning of charging stations. Since existing work differ in addition to the solution methodology also in the mapping of electric vehicles' technical aspects, we pay particular attention to these characteristics. To conclude, we provide a perspective for potential further research. Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/28667 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/27492 Antiquity and capitalism Dombi, Akos; Grigoriadis, Theocharis; Zhu, Junbing This paper explores the impact of antiquity on capitalism through the finance-growth nexus. We define antiquity as the length of established statehood (i.e., state history) and agricultural years. We argue that extractive institutions and deeply entrenched interest groups may prevail in societies with ancient roots. The paper offers an in-depth analysis of one particular channel through which extractive institutions may impair economic growth: the finance-growth channel. We propose that in countries with ancient statehood, the financial sector might be captured by powerful economic and political elites leading to a distorted finance-growth relationship. We build a model in which the equilibrium relationship between companies and banks depends on the entrenchment of the economic elites and the length of established statehood. To validate our argument empirically, we run panel-threshold regressions on a global sample between 1970 and 2014. The regression results are supportive and show that financial development – measured by the outstanding amount of credit – is negative for growth in states with ancient institutional origins, while it is positive in relatively younger ones. Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/27492 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/28670 Cojump Anchoring Winkelmann, Lars; Wenying, Yao This paper develops a two-step inference procedure to test for a local one-for-one relation of contemporaneous jumps in high-frequency financial data corrupted by market microstructure noise. The first step develops a new bivariate Lee-Mykland jump test for pre-averaged, intra-day returns. If a jump is detected in at least one of the two assets, then the second step tests for equal jump sizes. We apply the test procedure to pairs of nominal and inflationindexed government bond yields at monetary policy announcements in the U.S., U.K., and Euro Area. The analysis provides new high-frequency evidence about the anchoring of inflation expectations and central banks’ ability to push a measure of inflation expectations towards their inflation target. Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/28670 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/26580 Collusion and Delegation under Information Control Asseyer, Andreas This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the supervisor and agent may collude. I show that the principal optimally delegates the interaction with the agent to the supervisor if either the supervisor's budget is large or the value of production is small. The principal prefers direct communication with the supervisor and agent if the supervisor's budget is sufficiently small and the value of production is high. Wed, 01 Jan 2020 00:00:00 GMT https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/26580 2020-01-01T00:00:00Z